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MANUEL LARA, ET AL, vs. PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, G.R. No. L-6339.

April 20, 1954


Facts: In 1950, defendant Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs, or cars, operated a taxi business under the name of WAVAL TAXI. He employed among others three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37 months. When the owner, Del Rosario, Jr., sold all of his vehicles on September 4, 1950, to La Mallorca (a transportation he failed to continue them in their employment. Because their employer did not give them one months salary in lieu of the notice required in Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, this action was instituted. Issue:
Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in excess of 8 hours a day.

Ruling: The services of the plaintiffs ended September 4, 1950, when the new Civil Code was already in force, it having becoming effective August 30, 1950 (one year after it was released for circulation). The New Civil Code on Article 2270 repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce, governing agency, one provision of which was Article 302 (particularly one speaking of salary corresponding to said month, commonly known as mesada). Hence, the plaintiffs are no longer entitled to their one month severance pay.

LORENZO M. TAADA, ET AL, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, G.R. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985
Facts: The petitioners, Lorenzo M. Taada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), were seeking a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication of laws in the Official Gazette. However, respondents through Solicitor General would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity date. They pleaded likewise that the date of publication is material in determining the date of effectivity, that is, the fifteenth day following the publication, as provided in Article 2 of the New Civil Code, but not when the law itself provides its own date of effectivity. Otherwise, there would be no room for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat, for it prejudices the right of due process since these presidential issuances are of public nature or of general applicability. Issue: Whether or not the publication of presidential issuances in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court declared that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. The enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. For the phrase unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the New Civil Code, it does not dispense the need of publication rather it refers to the date of effectivity of the law. Such publication of laws could be available in a newspaper of general circulation for it is easily available, has a wide readership, and comes out regularly. Executive Order 200, dated June 18, 1987, has modified Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides for the publication of laws either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines as a requirement for effectivity.

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996
Facts: The Philippine International Corporation (PITC) issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01. The relevant provision therein was that organizations which wanted to apply for importations from the Peoples Republic of China (PROC) had to do so under certain conditions: Imports must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of Philippine products. Private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic corporations, individually applied for the deal and executed respective undertaking to balance their imports and exports. After importation, both private respondents failed to comply in submitting corresponding export credits. Consequently, they were barred from further importation from the PROC. Eventually, private respondents filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the private respondents citing among a host of reasons that PITCs authority to create laws had already been repealed by E.O. No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987. Another considerable point was that the administrative order was null and void since the same was not published as was required by Article 2 of the Civil Code. Petitioner then came to the Supreme Court on petition for review on certiorari. While the Supreme Court was deliberating, President Fidel V. Ramos came to an agreement with PROC and forged Executive Order No. 244. The executive order essentially abrogated the administrative order.

Issues:
Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order No. 89-08-01 is valid.

Ruling:
No. The Administrative Order is not exempt from Article 2 such that regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. The administrative order issued by PITC dated on August 30, 1989 was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Hence, the law was invalid when obligations were supposed to take effect.

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA G.R. No. 158761 December 4, 2007
Facts: On June 13, 2000, Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed for directorship of Zamboanga Del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc. He was later on disqualified. The basis for the disqualification was Section 2.2.c of the Electric Cooperatives Election Code Guidelines which states that a person cannot run for directorship if his/ her spouse is an incumbent elected official higher than a barangay captain. Mr. Gonzagas wife is an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur. Mr. Gonzaga filed a case questioning the validity of the ECEC as implemented by NEA. The court ordered NEA to comment on such. Issue: Whether or not the ECEC was duly published hence can already be implemented? Ruling: No. The NEA cannot produce any proof that the ECEC was duly published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation hence it is deemed not enforceable and could not be implemented. Since the ECEC covers all electric cooperatives in the Philippines, it is one of the laws stated in Taada v. Tuvera that are required to be published before being effective.

In re estate of the deceased Ines Basa de Mercado. JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL. vs. ATILANO G. MERCADO G.R. No. L-42226
Facts: Ines Basa died and her estate was awarded to the designated administrator of such. The administrator was declared the only heir of the deceased under the will and the administration proceedings was closed. Later on, petitioners filed a motion asking for the proceedings to be reopened. They also questioned the publication of the notice of hearing. Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedures was their basis. Issue: Whether or not the notice of hearing was duly published? Ruling: Yes. The notice of hearing was published in the Ing Katipunan, a newspaper of general circulation. The Supreme Court laid down guidelines to be followed on the determination of a newspaper of general circulation. That such newspaper must be published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers and that it is published at regular intervals.

COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC. G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
Facts: Respondent filed for tax refund on March 11, 1999 for tax paid in the year 1997. This was not acted upon by the Revenue Office. Thus on April 14, 2000 petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA dismissed the said petition as such was filed beyond the two- year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund. This was based on Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The CTA considered year 2000 as a leap year thus when the petition was filed, it was late for a day already. Respondent filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals. The decision of the CTA was reversed by the CA. it reasoned that the rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year. The said decision was brought to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the claim for tax refund was filed within the prescriptive period. Ruling: Yes. Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days. However, under the Administrative Code, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. The Supreme Court held that the Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. The Supreme Court ruled that the claim for tax refund was filed within the prescriptive period as it is the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return which was on April 14, 1998.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO G.R. No. L 7234 May 21, 1955
Facts: On July 27, 1953, plaintiff filed a case of slight physical injuries against respondent. The act was allegedly committed on May 28, 1953. The trial court dismissed the case because the prescriptive period for filing charges of slight physical injuries (two months in this case) already lapsed. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but when it was denied, he subsequently filed for an appeal. Issue: Whether or not the charge was filed within the prescriptive period. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the charge for slight physical injuries was filed within the two months prescribed by law for filing such charges. The Supreme Court held that a month in computed to be equivalent to thirty (30) days. The first day would be May 28 which is the date when the act happened. This should be excluded and counting sixty days thereafter, the charge should be filed on or before July 27. Thus the case was filed on time.

D.M. CONSUNJI INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
Facts: Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician pronounced Jose dead on arrival. The family received death benefits. Upon investigation by the Eastern Police District, it was found out that the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Because of the result of the investigation, Joses widow filed a complaint for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000. The CA affirmed the decision hence DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision. Issue: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund. Ruling: Yes. The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report that there was negligence on the part of the company. Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAPT. FLORENCIO O. GASACAO G. R. No. 168445 November 11, 2005
Facts: Private complainants filed charges against respondent for large scale illegal recruitment. They testified that they applied at respondents agency for work abroad. It was proven that respondent accepted their applications and promised to fast track such if they paid their bonds. Due to their desire to earn money the soonest possible time, they then paid their respective bonds. However, they were not yet deployed even after the payment of the required fees. They tried to recover their respective money form respondent but to no avail. Complainants thus filed charges against respondent. Issue: Whether or not respondent should be convicted even if he claims that he was unaware of the prohibition against the collection of bonds or cash deposits from applicants. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that respondent is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment. It is a well-established principle that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith so he cannot claim that he is unaware of such prohibitions laid down by law. The respondent cannot use this defense because it is presumed that he is aware of such prohibitions especially as he deals with recruitment.

YAO KEE ET AL vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES ET AL G. R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
Facts: Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died on Jan. 17, 1977 in Caloocan City leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300, 000.00 more or less. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration in said petition, they alleged among others that a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillago; b) they do not acknowledge Sy-Kiats marriage to YaoKee. The petition was opposed by Yao-Kee, Sze Sook Wan, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Kiat. After the hearing, the probate court affirmed that Sy-Kiat was legally married to Yao-Kee. On appeal, the CA held that respondents are the acknowledged natural children of Sy-Kiat and that SyKiats marriage with Yao-Kee had not been proven to be valid in the both the Philippine and Chinese laws. As testified by Yao-Kee, she was married to Sy-Kiat on Jan. 19, 1931, in Fookien, China; that she is not in possession of their marriage certificate; that their marriage was an agreement of their parents who were as well the signatories of the certificate; that they were wed by a village leader; that she cannot provide the said document containing the signatures of the couples parents and that she cannot provide any legal document proving that their wedding was indeed part of Chinas custom or Chinas laws. Issue: Whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven? Ruling: No. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact. There was no valid evidence proving that their marriage was in accordance with Chinese law. Consequently the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between YaoKee and Sy-Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours. The decision of the CA was affirmed.

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000.


Facts: In 1978, plaintiff Menandro B. Laureano, then Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company through its Area Manager in Manila. Plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. On the said date, the defendant also offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted. Sometime in 1982, defendant initiated cost-cutting measures due to recession. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendants requirements. Defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance leaves. It did not however immediately terminate A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 Airbus pilots reviewed, 12 were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the 12. On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice but defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary. Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds since the plaintiff was employed in Singapore and all other aspects of his employment contract were executed in Singapore, therefore, Singapore laws should apply. Issue: Whether or not Singapore laws should be applied. Ruling: No. The Philippines laws should be applied in this case because the defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore laws has the burden of proof but defendant failed to do so. Therefore, the court decided to apply processual presumption. There was no proof of the foreign law hence our laws shall prevail.

PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION vs. V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION INC. G.R. No. 140047. July 13, 2004
Facts: This case is an offshoot of a service contract entered into by a Filipino construction firm with the Iraqi Government for the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy Medical Center Phase II in Baghdad, Iraq. The contract was executed in Iraq. Due to some setbacks and difficulties, the project was delayed. The deadline for the projects completion was not met and there were complications as with the guarantee that was extended. The petitioners then demanded the reimbursement of the guarantee that they extended in behalf of respondents. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. At the time the call was made on the guarantee, the guarantee had already lapsed, hence petitioner had no valid cause of action against respondents. The CA affirmed the said decision. Issue: What law should be applied in determining whether respondent has defaulted in the performance of its obligations under the service contract. Ruling: The intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by the proper law of the contract. This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. It must be noted that the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of the law that would govern it. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Hence the issue of whether respondent defaulted in its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However, since that foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the processual presumption, comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.
As found by both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the delay or the non-completion of the Project was caused by factors not imputable to the respondent contractor. It was rather due mainly to the persistent violations by SOB of the terms and conditions of the contract, particularly its failure to pay

75% of the accomplished work in US Dollars. Indeed, where one of the parties to a contract does not perform in a proper manner the prestation which he is bound to perform under the contract, he is not entitled to demand the performance of the other party. A party does not incur in delay if the other party fails to perform the obligation incumbent upon him.

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112193. March 13, 1996
Facts:
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint for Compulsary Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, born on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively, represented by their mother, Luz M. Fabian. The complaint prayed for an order praying that Antonia and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of Jose Aruego, Sr. who died on March 30, 1982; that the petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased; and that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them. The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children. On June 15, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego, declaring her as the illegitimate daughter of the deceased. Petitioners filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of E.O. No. 209 or the Family Code of the Philippines. Said motion was denied. Another petition to the Court of Appeals was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Family Code of the Philippines or E.O. 209 be given retroactive effect.

Ruling: No. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of the respondent, Antonia Aruego, to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. The trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209. The ruling reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ERNESTINA BERNABE vs. CAROLINA ALEJO G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002
Facts: The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twentythree(23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. On May 16, 1994, Carolina on behalf of Adrian filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestine as the sole surviving heir. Issue: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents has four years from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the provision of the Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals. Ruling: Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court. The failure of the petitioner to implead the Court of Appeal as a party is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK INC. G.R. No. 181556 December 14, 2009
Facts: The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas filed a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. The BSP alleged that Intercity Bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would cause probable loss to those concerned. This was granted and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation substituted as the liquidator. Then RA 9302 was enacted in the effect that creditors and claimants will be paid in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of a closed bank. A Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings was filed. This was partially approved by the court. The court ruled that RA 9302 cannot be given retroactive application Issue: Whether Section 12 of RA 9302 may be applied retroactively so as to benefit stockholders of Intercity Bank. Ruling: No. statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. A perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing therein authorizes its retroactive application.

MICHAEL C. GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006
Facts: On June 13, 1997, private respondent minors Karen and Kamille Oanes Wei represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a pertition for letters of administration before the Regional trial court of Makati. Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledge illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at 10, 000, 000. 00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are surviving spouse Guy, children Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael all surnamed Guy. Petitioners argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code, they further alleged that private respondents claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, extinguished by reason of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities. Issue: Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their hereditary rights? Ruling: No. Remedios Release and Waiver of claim does not bar private respondents from claiming succession rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and equivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of her children, such waiver does not bar the latters claim. Article 104 of the Civil Code requires judicial authorization of the said waiver which it lacks. Since the affiliation of the private respondents as co heirs to Sima Weis Estates, it would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when they do not have such right.

FF. CRUZ & CO. v. HR CONSTRUCTION CORP. G.R. No. 187521, March 14, 2012
Facts: The Department of Public Works and Highways contracted FFCI for the construction of the Magsaysay viaduct. On the other hand, the latter sub contracted with HRCC for the same project. The two companies stipulated that they will have a joint measurement of the constructed portion prior to progress billings and payment. The transactions went well until there was a misunderstanding with regards to the billings and payments due. The issue was brought to the CIAC. The CIAC ruled in favor of HRCC. Their decision states that FFCCI already waived its right under the subcontract agreement. There was waiver because FFCCI already paid even without the joint measurement of the two companies. Issue: Was there a valid waiver of rights on the part of FFCCI? Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that FFCCI is already barred form contesting the billings. It had effectively waived the right to rescind the contract because FFCCI had already paid HRCC without questioning the billing. Since it had not questioned such, then it is a valid proof already that FFCCI agrees with the billing. Hence, that inaction on the part of FFCCI to question such is tantamount to a waiver of right.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN MORIAL G.R. No. 129295. August 15, 2001
Facts: On the 6th day of January 1996, the above named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with intent to gain entered into the house of Paula Bandipas and Benjamin Morial. Once inside did then and there willfully and feloniously stab Paula Bandipas and Albert Bandipas with the use of a pointed weapon and stones which was used by the accused in inflicting mortal wounds which caused their instantaneous death, said accused took and stole P11, 000.00 The next day, the accused went with the police officers to the police station. There Leonardo Morial was forced to confess about the death of Paula Bandipas and Albert Bandipas. Leonardos statements were then reduced into writing. A policeman informed him that they were going to contact the lawyer to assist him during the investigation but in truth, Leonardo was not informed of his rights even before the investigation started. Issue: Whether or not the custodial investigation conducted to Leonardo Morial without a counsel is a valid waiver of constitutional right? Ruling: No. A person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception so does he enjoy such right until its termination. Even granting that accused consented to Atty. Aguilar during the investigation and to answer questions during the lawyers absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. The right cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and with the presence of a counsel. Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extra judicial confession executed by Leonard Morial, the conviction of accused is fully supported by other pieces of evidence. The accused is truly guilty and nevertheless faces conviction.

COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC. G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
Facts: Respondent filed for tax refund on March 11, 1999 for tax paid in the year 1997. This was not acted upon by the Revenue Office. Thus on April 14, 2000 petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA dismissed the said petition as such was filed beyond the two- year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund. This was based on Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The CTA based their computation of a year on Article 13 of the Civil Code hence a year is equivalent to 365 days. However, in 1987, E.O. 292 was enacted. Under Section 31 Chapter VIII book I of said law provides that a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Hence, there is a conflict between the two laws regarding the computation of a year. The issue was brought to the Supreme Court. Issue: Did Section 31 Chapter VIII Book I of E.O. 292 repeal Article 13 of the Civil Code in terms of the computation of legal periods? Ruling: Yes. As stated in Article 7 of the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Since the two laws deal with the same subject matter and there obviously is an incompatibility between the two, the Supreme Court ruled that E.O. 292 impliedly repealed Article 13 because it is the latter law.

CARIDAD MAGKALAS vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY G.R. No. 138823 September 17, 2008
Facts: Caridad Magkalas and her kin have been occupying a lot designated as TAG 77 0063, Block 1, Barangay 132 located in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Under P.D. 1315, the National Housing Authority was named as Administrator of the Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project. As administrator, it was necessary for the NHA to a lot 30 % of the total land areas as open space. It so happened that the area where the house of Magkalas was built was determined to be included as an open space. Magkalas and two others were duly informed that they should vacate the property to give way to improvements for the public. They were not to be homeless because they were given a new location to build their houses. Despite notices, Magkalas refused to vacate said property. Instead, she filed a petition and a Temporary Restraining Order against the NHA. She alleged that R.A. 7279 impliedly repealed P.D. 1472 and P.D. 1315. Magkalas contended that NHAs demolition of her dwelling infringes the social justice clause. Issue: Whether or not R.A. 7279 impliedly repealed P.D. 1472 and P.D. 1315 Ruling: No. the Supreme Court ruled that R.A. 7279 does not necessarily repeal P.D. 1315 and P.D. 1472. The former does not contain any provision which categorically and expressly repeals the provisions of repeal P.D. 1315 and P.D. 1472. Hence, the National Housing Authority has every right to evict them from said property, especially so that Magkalas was duly informed of the planned improvements.

MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 165835 June 22, 2005

Facts: Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership of the AFP. After due investigation, several complaints were filed against Garcia by the Office of the Ombudsman. These were in violation of the following: SECTION 8 (IN RE Section 11) of RA 6713(Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) Art 183, RPC Sec52(A)(1), (3) & (20) of the Civil Service Law Complaints were also filed against his wife and three sons for violation of RA 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of ill-gotten wealth. Garcia then filed a petition to stop further proceedings. He alleged that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over any separate civil action against him, even if such separate civil action is for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No. 1379. Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. Ruling: Yes. After reviewing the legislative history of the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved the question of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then Court of First Instance of the city or province where the public officer or employee resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379. Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D. No. 1486, original and exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was vested in the said court. P.D. No. 1606 was later issued expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of said court. Such civil actions removed from the jurisdiction of the Sandigabayan include those for restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of instruments and effects of the crime, civil actions under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture proceedings provided for under R.A. No. 1379. Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 abolished the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts and expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty. Since this change resulted in the proliferation of the filing of cases before the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is punishable by a penalty not higher than prision correccional or its equivalent, and such cases not being of a

serious nature, P.D. No. 1606 was again amended by P.D. No. 1860and eventually by P.D. No. 1861. Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code.

BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ - TING

G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009


Facts: On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial courts ruling. Issue: Whether or not the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases Ruling: The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.

ROBERTO FULGENCIO ET AL vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 141600, September 13, 2003
Facts: The private respondent Raycor Aircontrol Systems, Inc. was engaged in the installation of air conditioning systems in the buildings of its clients. In connection with such installation work, the herein petitioners were among those hired by the private respondent to work in various capacities, such as tinsmith, leadsman, aircon mechanic, installer, welder and painter. On different dates in 1992, the private respondent served the petitioners with uniformly worded notices of termination of employment. As a result, the petitioners joined other employees in filing three separate cases of illegal dismissal against the private respondent. The proceedings in all the cases were subsequently consolidated. On January 22, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing the complaints for lack of merit. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiters. Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in strictly adhering to technicalities, rather than in substantial compliance, in the application of the provisions of the rules of court. Ruling: It is, therefore, crystal-clear that the manner of the computation of the petitioners backwages is an issue which was already resolved by this Court in its decision in G.R. No. 114290 which had long acquired finality. Hence, the Courts decision in G.R. No. 114290, which directed the payment of the petitioners backwages from the time they were dismissed up to the time they are actually reinstated, has become the law of the case which now binds the NLRC and the private respondent. The law of the case doctrine has been defined as a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. The private respondent, therefore, on appeal to the NLRC in the course of the execution proceedings in the case, is barred from challenging anew the issue of the manner in which the petitioners backwages should be computed. Corollarily, the NLRC can no longer modify the ruling of the Court on the matter. Judgment of courts should attain finality at some point in time, as in this case, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.

FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 142947 March 19, 2002
Facts: Petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties, among them, IBC 13. When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Villanueva, Jr., IBC 13 appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Two (2) complaints for falsification of public document were filed before the Manila City Prosecutor's Office. The charges against respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz III were dismissed by the City Prosecutor's Office which, however, found probable cause against the other respondents. On April 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered its now challenged decision which reversed and set aside the two (2) Orders of the trial court dated August 27, 1998 and December 4, 1998. The appellate court directed that the name of petitioner Villanueva, Jr., appearing as the offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 be stricken out from the records. What seems to be more crucial here is the fact that the crime charged in the two information is falsification of public document committed by a private individual defined and penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Apropos, the crime of falsification of public document does not require for its essential elements damage or intent to cause damage. In the final analysis, the inclusion of the name of Francisco N. Villanueva. Jr. would then be merely a superfluity in the information, a meaningless inclusion therein. Issue: Whether or not the pronouncement of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 to the effect that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. is not an offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-13874445 is obiter dictum. Ruling: It is significant to mention that the intervention of petitioner Villanueva, Jr. in the criminal cases as an offended party is apparently predicated on the reduction by the NLRC, in IBC's appeal of the illegal dismissal case, of the monetary award to which he is entitled, despite finding the appeal as not perfected due to the posting of the spurious appeal bond. However, such alleged error should have been brought by petitioner Villanueva, Jr. to the appropriate forum, and not raised in criminal cases before the trial court as a ground for his inclusion as a "prejudiced party".

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 146486 March 4, 2005
Facts: On 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following: 1. 2. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and

3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for release. The complainants further requested that an officer-in-charge from the OMB-Manila be appointed to manage their office to prevent the Deputy Ombudsman from harassing witnesses and wielding his influence over them. To underscore the seriousness of their intentions, they threatened to go on a mass leave of absence, and in fact took their cause to the media. Issue: Whether or not the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere may not be invoked to perpetuate an erroneous obiter dictum. Ruling: A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis. The legal maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere" (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) states that where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. LORENZO B.VENERACION G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995
Facts:

On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report of the victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region. Said Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071. After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered a decision on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law." Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the judge can impose a penalty lower than that prescribed by law. Ruling: No. Under Article 9 of the Civil Code, no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. The Supreme Court ruled that Judge Veneracion should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law. The law provides that rape with homicide is punished with death then it is the proper penalty to be imposed. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing, respondent judge acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death. This should be imposed

regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. The law is clear and free from ambiguity hence the judge must apply the law as it is.

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA et al vs. PHILEX MINING CORP. G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
Facts: Several employees of Philex Mining Corp. died while they were working at its copper mines underground operations. The heirs of the victims alleged that Philex negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precaution for the protection of its men working underground. Their death was due to a cave in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. They alleged that the company was complacent when it called off immediately the rescue operations. The heirs moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act. They also petitioned before the regular courts and filed for additional damages against the company. On its part, the company argued that they cannot be sued by the heirs anymore because they have already claimed their benefits under the WCA. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the WCC. Hence, the heirs filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the heirs can claim benefits at the same time sue the company. Ruling: Yes. The trial courts order of dismissal was reversed and the case was remanded back to the trial court. The Supreme Court ruled that the heirs can still sue Philex Corporation because there was negligence on the part of the company. The claim before the WCC was different because it pertains to the accident per se that happened while the employees were on duty. The suit was due to the negligence on the part of the company.

CESARIO URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112170. April 10,1996.
Facts: On August 1 1987, Atty. Francis Palmores, counsel of the petitioner requested to the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila that he be furnished a copy of the complaint against petitioner. He then asked his client Ursua to take his letter request to the office of the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote the name Oscar Perez on the visitors logbook and upon receipt of the acknowledged by writing. Loida Kahulugan, who handed the copy of complaint, learned that the person who introduced himself as Oscar Perez was actually the petitioner, Cesario Ursua. She reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be charged. The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on May 31, 1993. The petitioner asks for review on his conviction in Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the petitioner violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Alias. Ruling: Cesario Ursua is acquitted of the crime charged. C.A No. 142, approved on November 7, 1936 entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases, was amended by R.A. No. 6085on August 4 1969. C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to penalize the act of using an alias name publicly and in business transactions in addition to his real name unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceeding. The fact that the petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez served only the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which the petitioner was a respondent. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. 6085. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statue is fairly susceptible is favored.

YAO KEE vs. AIDA SY GONZALES G.R. No. L 55960 November 24, 1988 Facts:
Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Caloocan City. He left behind real and personal properties in the Philippines. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration in said petition, they alleged among others that a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillago; b) they do not acknowledge Sy-Kiats marriage to Yao-Kee. The petition was opposed by Yao-Kee, Sze Sook Wan, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Kiat. After due trial, the court ruled that Sy-Kiat was legally married to Yao-Kee. On appeal, the CA held that respondents are the acknowledged natural children of Sy-Kiat. Sy-Kiats marriage with Yao-Kee had not been proven to be valid in the both the Philippine and Chinese laws. As testified by Yao-Kee, she was married to Sy-Kiat on Jan. 19, 1931, in Fookien, China; that she is not in possession of their marriage certificate; that their marriage was an agreement of their parents who were as well the signatories of the certificate; that they were wed by a village leader; that she cannot provide the said document containing the signatures of the couples parents and that she cannot provide any legal document proving that their wedding was celebrated in accordance with Chinese customs. Issue: Whether Sy- Kiat was validly married to Yao- Kee. Ruling: No. custom is defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. Under Article 12 of the Civil Code, a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence for it to be accepted as valid here in the Philippines. As for foreign marriage, two things must be proven the existence of the foreign law and the celebration of the alleged marriage in accordance with said foreign customs. There were no competent evidence presented by Yao Kee on her allegations hence the marriage cannot be accepted as valid here in the Philippines. Because the marriage is not valid, then petitioners cannot be considered as the legitimate family of Sy-Kiat.

ILLUH ASAALI vs. COMMISIONER OF CUSTOMS G.R. No. L 24170 December 16, 1968
Facts: Five sailing vessels were intercepted by a customs patrol team. The location was identified to be in the high seas, between North Borneo and Sulu. The vessels were headed for Tawi tawi. Upon interception, the customs found various merchandise from North Borneo. The said owners of the vessels were without the necessary permits to engage in the importation of merchandise into any part of the Philippines. They were not in possession the required import license under R.A. 426. Hence, they were caught and convicted. The owners appealed that they should not be prosecuted within our courts because they were not within Philippine jurisdiction when they were intercepted. Issue: Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the high seas is valid. Ruling: Yes. It is a settled doctrine of international law that a state has the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas. The Revised Penal Code also provides that its application is not only in the Philippines but even outside of its territory while on Philippine ship, it should be noted that the vessels were registed in the Philippines hence they are considered extensions of our territory. Our penals laws should be applied.

LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
Facts: Lorenzo and Paula were married on February 22, 1937. Lorenzo was enlisted in the US Navy and left for the United States before the outbreak of the Pacific War. He was later on naturalized as a citizen of the United States. After the war, he went home to the Philippines. He found out that Paula was pregnant and had been in an adulterous relationship with his brother. The un- couple had a notarized agreement as to their properties and the dissolution of their marriage. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce there. Paula was duly represented by her counsel and actively participated in the proceedings. They were eventually divorced. Lorenzo subsequently returned to the Philippines and married Alicia. They lived together for 25 years and had 3 children. Lorenzo then executed a will giving all his properties to Alicia and their children. He died before the proceedings terminated. Paula filed a petition. She alleged that her right as the surviving spouse was encroached. The trial court ruled in her favor. This was appealed to the CA wherein Alicia was declared co owner of the properties. Paula then raised the case to the Supreme Court. Issue: Is the divorce obtained by Lorenzo valid. Ruling: Yes. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. However, Lorenzo was already a US citizen when he obtained the divorce. Foreigners are governed by their own laws. Divorce is valid in the US. Since he is already a US citizen at that time, the divorce is valid.

MICIANO vs. BRIMO G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927


Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothersof the deceased, opposed it. Brimos opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality. Hence, they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimos estates. Ruling: Turkish law. In accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code, the laws governing the nationality of the testator will be followed. Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

AZNAR vs. GARCIA G.R. No. L 16749 January 31, 1963


Facts: Edward Christensen is a citizen of the State of California and domiciled in the Philippines. He executed in his will acknowledging his natural daughter Maria Lucy Christensen as sole heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who is declared by the Supreme Court in its decision as acknowledged natural daughter of Edward C. Counsel of Helen asserts that her claim must be increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Phil. law. Counsel of Maria insists that Art. 16 (2) provides that the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON applies in intestate and testamentary successions and since Edward C. is a citizen of CA, its law should be applied. Lower court ruled that CA law should be applied thus this petition for review. Issue: Whether Philippine laws should be applied. Ruling: Yes. Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that what should be applied is the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof. The internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad. The domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.

BELLIS vs. BELLIS G.R. No. L 23678, June 6, 1967


Facts: Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, in the United States of America. He had five legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced. He also had three legitimate children with his second wife, Violet Kennedy. Finally, he had three illegitimate children. Amos Bellis subsequently died a resident of San Antonio, Texas. Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided in trust. Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. Issue: Whether Texan Law or Philippine Law must apply. Ruling: Amos Bellis was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our laws, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates cannot be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. ESCOLIN G.R. No. L 27860, March 29, 1974
Facts: Mr. and Mrs. Hodges both provided in their respective wills that upon their deaths, their whole estates should be inherited by the surviving spouse. Said spouse could manage and alienate the said lands, with the exception of the Texas property. Upon death of the latter spouse, the residue of the estate inherited by the latter spouse from the spouse who died first would redound to the brothers and sisters. Mrs. Hodges died first. No liquidation as to her properties was made then Mr. Hodges died. Since there was no liquidation of Mrs. Hodges estate, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges wanted to determine the extent of her estate that they could inherit. Mrs. Hodges, was a citizen of Texas, USA and was a domiciliary of the Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death. Issue: Whether or not Texan laws should be applied. Ruling: No. The question of what are the laws of Texas is one of fact not of law Foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties, with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court such as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it. Under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable. One-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.

VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO G.R. No. L 68470, October 8, 1985


Facts: Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in the Philippines. They had two children and they eventually divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice obtained a second marriage, with Theodore Van Dorn. Richard filed against Alice stating that the Alices business is their conjugal property hence he still has a right over said property. Alice countered that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where Richard acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11, 1982. Issue: Whether or not the Richard is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. Ruling: No. Absolute divorce is not valid in the Philippines. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national laws. Under American law, divorce dissolves marriage, hence Alice is no longer married to Alice. Subsequently, pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. He would have no standing to sue in the case as Alices husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

BANK OF AMERICA NTC and SA vs. AMERICAN REALTY CORP.


FACTS: Bank of America (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. It is organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, USA. On the other hand, American Realty (ARC) is a domestic corporation. On numerous occasions, BANTSA and Bank of America International Limited (BAIL),organized under the laws of England, granted US Dollar loans to certain foreign corporate borrowers. These loans were later restructured. The restructured loans secured by two real estate mortgages with private respondent ARC as third-party mortgagor. When the corporate borrowers defaulted, BANTSA sued them for collection before foreign courts, without impleading ARC as party-defendant. While these civil suits are still pending before the foreign courts, BANTSA filed an extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage before the Office of the Prosecutors Office of Bulacan, Philippines. The properties were sold at public auction, prompting ARC to file this action for damages against BANTSA. The trial court ruled in favor of ARC and this was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners act of filling a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted waiver of the remedy of foreclosure. Whether or not the reward by the lower court of actual and exemplary damages in favor of private respondent ARC as third party mortgagor is proper.

Ruling: REMEDIES ARE ALTERNATIVE, NOT CUMULATIVE: A mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the1997Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate mortgages over its properties as security for the debt of the principal debtors. By doing so, private respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party mortgagor. Under the law, third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of another obligation by mortgaging his own property,to be solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to the principal contract loan remains to be

primarily bound. It is only upon default of the latter that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan. In the instant case, petitioners contention that the requisites of filing the action for collection and rendition of final judgment therein should concur, is untenable. PHILIPPINE LAW, NOT ENGLISH LAW, SHALL APPLY: In the case at bench, Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English law on the matter. In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, vs. ROMEO A. JADER, G.R. No. 132344. February 17, 2000.
Facts: Plaintiff Romeo A. Jader was enrolled in the defendants College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his last year (SY 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled from the second semester as fourth year law student and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, his grade of five (5) was submitted by Professor Ortega. In the deliberations conducted by the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law, the plaintiffs name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws. Plaintiffs name also appeared in the invitation for the 35th Investitures and Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws. The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies on April 16, 1988. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination. Plaintiff-appellee sued defendant-appellant for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latters negligence. Issue: Whether or not plaintiff-appellee can claim for moral and exemplary damages for the abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines Ruling: The Supreme Court ordered that petitioner should pay respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35, 470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid but not entitled to moral damages. The court does not believe that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain because he could not graduate and could not take the bar examinations. The court stated that it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. Respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order.

GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005


Facts: GF Equity represented by its Chief Financial Officer Steven Uytengsu hired Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) under a contract of employment. Prior to the expiration of the contract, Valenzona was terminated for failure to exhibit sufficient skill in coaching the team as being claimed by GF Equity. Valenzona then filed a case against GF Equity for unlawful termination and unpaid salary. Issue: Whether GF Equity is to be held liable for damages. Ruling: Yes, because GF Equitys act or pre-terminating Valenzonas services cannot be considered willful as it was based on a stipulation, albeit, declared void, in doing so failed to consider the abuse of rights principle enshrined in Art. 19 of the New Civil Code which provides that: Every person must in the performance of his rights and duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Since the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground,hence, contrary to Law, GF Equity negligently failed to provide legal basis for such pre-termination and thus failed to exercise in a legitimate manner its right to pre-terminate the contract, thereby abusing the right of Valenzona to thus entitle him to damages under Art. 19 in relation to Art. 20 of the Civil Code.

Go v. Cordero G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010


Facts Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA). Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. As such exclusive distributor, Cordero offered for sale to prospective buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger catamaran known as the SEACAT 25. After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship, Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of two SEACAT 25. Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totalling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel. Cordero made two trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane, Australia, and on one occasion even accompanied Go and his family and Landicho, to monitor the progress of the building of the vessel. He shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel accommodations, transportation and entertainment during these trips. He also spent for long distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho. However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner. In a handwritten letter dated June 24, 1998, Cordero informed Go that such act of dealing directly with Robinson violated his exclusive distributorship and demanded that they respect the same, without prejudice to legal action against him and Robinson should they fail to heed the same. Corderos lawyer, Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara, Jr. of ACCRA law firm, also wrote ACG Express Liner assailing the fraudulent actuations and misrepresentations committed by Go in connivance with his lawyers in breach of Corderos exclusive distributorship appointment. On August 21, 1998, Cordero

instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions (balance of unpaid commission from the sale of the first vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for the sale of the second vessel in the amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral and exemplary damages, including P800,000.00 representing expenses for airplane travel to Australia, telecommunications bills and entertainment, on account of AFFAs untimely cancellation of the exclusive distributorship agreement. Cordero also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Plaintiff and against defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. As prayed for, defendants are hereby ordered to pay Plaintiff jointly and solidarilY. On January 29, 2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding the petitioner liable for the breach. Held: In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner Cordero was not paid the balance of his commission by respondent Robinson. From the time petitioner Go and respondent Landicho directly dealt with respondent Robinson in Brisbane, and ceased communicating through petitioner Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, Cordero was no longer informed of payments remitted to AFFA in Brisbane. In other words, Cordero had clearly been cut off from the transaction until the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 which was sold through his efforts. When Cordero complained to Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson about their acts prejudicial to his rights and demanded that they respect his exclusive distributorship, Go simply let his lawyers led by Landicho and Tecson handle the matter and tried to settle it by promising to pay a certain amount and to purchase high-speed catamarans through Cordero. However, Cordero was not paid anything and worse, AFFA through its lawyer in Australia even terminated his exclusive dealership insisting that his services were engaged for only one transaction, that is, the purchase of the first SEACAT 25 in August 1997. We find that contrary to the claims of petitioner Cordero, there was indeed no sufficient evidence that respondents actually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA. But this circumstance will not absolve respondents from liability for invading Corderos rights under the exclusive distributorship. Respondents clearly acted in bad faith in bypassing Cordero as they completed the remaining payments to AFFA without advising him and furnishing him with copies of the bank transmittals as they previously did, and directly dealt with AFFA through Robinson regarding arrangements for the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 in Manila and negotiations for the purchase of the second vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement

which Cordero signed in behalf of AFFA. As a result of respondents actuations, Cordero incurred losses as he was not paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the first vessel and his exclusive distributorship revoked by AFFA. While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification. Thus the petitions was denied. The Decision dated March 16, 2004 as modified by the Resolution dated July 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 are hereby affirmed with modification in that the awards of moral and exemplary damages are hereby reduced to P300,000.00 and P200,000.00.

Villanueva v. Rosqueta G.R. No. 180764, January 29, 2010


FACTS: Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta, formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs, tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior.Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent Rosquetas position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva, then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case 01-101539. On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the Finance Secretaryfrom implementing Valeras appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTCs injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it. On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again enforce, petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner. During the Bureaus celebration of its centennial anniversary in February 2002, its special Panorama magazine edition featured all the customs deputy commissioners, except respondent Rosqueta. The souvenir program, authorized by the Bureaus Steering Committee headed by petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a space where Rosquetas picture was supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was "under litigation." Meanwhile, the commemorative billboard displayed at the Bureaus main gate included Valeras picture but not Rosquetas. On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaintfor damages before the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva in Civil Case Q-0246256, alleging that the latter maliciously excluded her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that he prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. Thus, she asked the RTC to award her P1,000,000.00 in moral damages, P500,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P300,000.00 in attorneys fees and costs of suit. But the RTC dismissedrespondentRosquetas complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva committed no

wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the Bureaus centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the RTCs decision, holding instead that petitioner Villanuevas refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages from him. Citing the abuse of right principle, the RTC said that Villanueva acted maliciously when he prevented Rosqueta from performing her duties, deprived her of salaries and leaves, and denied her official recognition as Deputy Commissioner by excluding her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Thus, the appellate court ordered Villanueva to pay P500,000.00 in moral damages, P200,000.00 in exemplary damages and P100,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation expenses. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta. HELD: No. Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20and 21of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty. The damage suit is an independent action. The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such damages may be awarded when the defendants transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiffs anguish in the cases specified in Article 2219of the Civil Code. Here, respondent Rosquetas colleagues and friends testified that she suffered severe anxiety on account of the speculation over her employment status. She had to endure being referred to asa "squatter" in her workplace. She had to face inquiries from family and friends about her exclusion from the Bureaus centennial anniversary memorabilia. She did not have to endure all these affronts and the angst and depression they produced had Villanueva abided in good faith by the courts order in her favor.

Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp. G.R. No. 184315, November 28, 2011
Facts: In his complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1114, petitioner Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleged that in the last quarter of 1994, respondents published in the Manila Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him, to wit: (1) that he was a "Marcos crony" or a "Marcos-Romualdez crony," which term according to him is commonly understood to describe an individual who received special and undeserving favors from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, thereby allowing him to engage in illegal and dishonorable business activities; (2) that he engaged in unsound and immoral business practices by taking control of Oriental Petroleum Mineral Corporation in order to divert its resources to rescue the debt-ridden Benguet Corporation; (3) that he was an unfair and uncaring employer; (4) that he induced Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation to violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans; (5) that he induced others to disobey the lawful orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission; and (6) that he was a "corporate raider," or one who seeks to profit for something he did not work for. The trial court found in favor of Yuchengco, The Manila Chronicle filed a motion to dismiss to CA but was denied since procedural rules are required to be followed. Issue : Whether the CA erred in not granting the motion to dismiss. Held: No, The Court of Appeals rightly exercised its discretion when, in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, it ruled that the citations contained in the appellants' brief were in substantial compliance with the rules. Where the citations found in the appellants' brief could sufficiently enable the appellate court to locate expeditiously the portions of the record referred to, there is substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 13 (c) and (d), Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Such determination was properly within the appellate court's discretion. Nothing in the records indicate that it was exercised capriciously, whimsically, or with a view of permitting injury upon a party litigant. For the same reasons, we hold that the respondent Court of Appeals also did not err when it did not dismiss the appeal based on the allegation that appellants' brief failed to comply with the internal rules of said court.

Custodio v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996


Facts: On August 26, 1982 a civil case was filed granting an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida Custodio, Rosalina Morato, Lito Santos, and Maria Cristina Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22. During the pendency of the case Pacifico Mabasa died and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa his survivivng spouse. Meanwhile the RTC, rendered a decision ordering defendants Snatoses and Custodios to give plaintiff permanent access- ingress and egress to the public street and to pay 8,000.00php as indemnity for the permanent use of the passage way. Not satisfied with the finding, the Custodios filed n appeal to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification. Issues: Is the grant of easement to the Heirs of Mabasa is proper so as to the award of Damages? Ruling: For the first issue, Petitioners are already barred from raising the same for they did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondent right of way, hence they presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. The issue of propriety of grant of right of way has already been laid to rest. For the second issue the court agree with the petitioners the CA erred in awarding damages because the act in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, said act must not only hurtful but wrongful. In this case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury and thus the private respondent is not entitle to damages because the petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. The damage in this case is a damnum absque injuria.

Equitable Banking Corporation v. Calderon G.R. No. 156168, December 14, 2004
Facts: Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and abroad. Calderon applied for a visa card for credits in the Equitable International Visa Card, which was granted. Said visa is used for both peso and dollar transactions with in and outside the Philippines. In April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends went to Hong Kong for business and pleasure trips. While in the department store he purchase several Gucci items, and instead of paying on cash he let the visa card be used. The saleslady upon verification by the cashier informed him and in front of his friends that said visa was blacklisted, the saleslady even stated to cut the visa into pieces since it was blacklisted. Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, Calderon paid it for cash the item he bought. Upon return to the Philippines, he filed a complaint with the RTC Makati City against the Equitable Banking Corporation. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Calderon, thus the EBC went on an appeal to CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the award of damages. Issue: Whether or not EBC is liable for moral damages. Ruling: No, for the respondent finds himself his is a case of Damnum Absque Injuria since the provision on automatic suspension without notice embodied in the same credit card agreement couch in clear and unambiguous term, not to say that the agreement itself was entered in by the respondent who by his account is a reputable businessman engaged in business activities. Moral damages are in category of an award designed to compensate the claim for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrong doer. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded, and such breach of duty be the proximate cause of the injury.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Roberto Reyes G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
Facts: Respondent herein Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name Amay Bisaya, alleged that while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by Dr. Violeta Filart, his friend of several years, invited him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for whom she replied: of course. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant. At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of Hotel Nikko. Reyes alleged that Ruby Lim, in a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, told him to leave the party because he was not invited. Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart but the latter, who was within hearing distance, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Afterwards, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman. Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees. Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a gate-crasher. Issue: Whether or not Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim are jointly and severally liable with Dr. Filart for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Held: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.

The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts ruling that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. Had respondent simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.

Manuel v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gana on July, 28, 1975. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. On or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, Eduardo contracted a second marriage with Tina Gandalera-Manuel. He assured her that he was single and was able to marry. They had lived together fruitfully for three years until Eduardo become distant and came home only twice a year. One day he packed up his things and left her. Aggrieved and curious, Tina learned from the NSO that Eduardo was previously married, she then filed a bigamy case against Eduardo. The regional Trial Court Found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Eduardo then filed a motion to the Supreme Court claiming that he had contracted the second marriage in good faith since he had not been able to see his wife for over twenty years. He alleged that under the Civil Code, no judicial decree of presumptive death is necessary for remarriage. Issue: Whether of not the act of Manuel constitutes actionable wrong. Ruling: Yes, the court declares that petitioners act is against public policy as it undermines and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of the public. Tina was innocent victim of Manuels chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone but a continuous series of acts.

Romero v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009
Facts: On April 1, 1999 at around 12:00 noon in the afternoon, the JC Liner driven by Romero and the Apego taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head collision along the Highway of Governor Jose Fuentebella at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga City while the taxi was going to the opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis Sr., Arnaldo Breis Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis, and his son Edmund Breis survived although they sustained serious injuries. Romero was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property. The MTC rendered its decision acquitting Romero however held the accused for civil liability and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total amount of 3,541,900 by way of damages. Romero appealed to the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur however the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC in toto. Refusing to give up, Romero went on appeal to the CA, The CA likewise affirmed the decision of the RTC. Issue : Whether or not the acquittal of Romero on its criminal case freed him from payment of civil liability. Held: No, since acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Courts can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages in the same case. It is not even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted.

Pe et. al. vs. Pe G.R. No. L-17396. 30 May 1962.


Facts: Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolitas house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brothers house where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolitas aparador The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed. Issue:

Whether or not the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
Ruling:

The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolitas affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.

FRANCISCO HERMOSSISIMA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et.al., G.R. No.L-14628. September 30, 1960
Facts: Since 1950, Soledad Cagigas was then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and Francisco Hermosima, who was almost 10 years younger than she was her boyfriend. They were regarded as engaged although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy between them developed. One evening in 1953, after coming from the movie house, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V Escana to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child Chris Hermosima was born on June 17,1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However on July24, 1954, Francisco married Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action was commenced on or about October 4 1954. Issue: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under the Civil Code, there can be no recovery of moral damages for a breach of promise to marry, as such the omission in the Civil Code of the proposed Chapter on breach of Promise Suits is a clear manifestation of legislative intent not to sanction as such, suits for breach of promise to marry, otherwise many innocent man may become the victims of designing and unscrupulous females. However, if there be seduction, moral damages may be recovered under Art. 2219, Par.3 of Civil Code of the Philippines. Francisco was morally guilt of seduction in this case. Soledad, the complainant, who was 10 years older, surrendered herself to him because overwhelmed by her love for him; she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of the clergy. He was, therefore, ordered to pay a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child; P4500.00 representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child as actual compensatory damages; P5000.00 as moral damages; and P500.00 as attorneys

BEATRIZ GALANG, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.L-17248.January 29, 1962


Facts: Beatriz Galang and Rodrigo Quinit were both from the same town of Sison, Pangasinan, and were engaged but Rodrigos parents were strongly opposed to their marriage. He wanted the marriage to take place after his graduation while the appellee was impatient and wanted the marriage to be held at an earlier date. On April 26, 1955, Rodrigos parents told him to leave the parental home in view of his continued relations with Beatriz. On April 27, 1955, the couple lived as husband and wife in the house of Adolfo Dagawan at Colorado Falls, Tuba, Mountain Province until May 9 when Rodrigo left and never returned. Issue: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry Held: The Court of First Instance of Baguio, rendered a decision sentencing the defendants jointly and severally to pay sums of P275.00 by way of actual damages; P5000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as attorneys fees, apart fro the costs. On appeal taken by th e defendants, the Court of Appeals absolved Maximo Quinit, and accordingly reversed said decision insofar as he is concerned, and modified it as regards Rodrigo Quinit by eliminating the awards for moral damages and attorneys fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals. Moral damages for breach of promise to marry are not collectible.

GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, G. R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993
Facts: Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipina filed on Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan in Lingayen for a complaint for damages against the petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh (an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments in Guilig, Dagupan City and is an exchnage student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges), for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of thar year; the petitioner visited to private respondents hometown in Banaga, Bugallion, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometimes in August 20, 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in his apartment. Because of the petitioners promise to marry the private respondent, the latter surrendered her virginity. A week before the filing of the complaint, the petitioners attitude towards her started to change; he matreated and threatened to kill her. He said that he does not want to marry her because he was already married to someone living in Bacolod. The private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages, reimbursements for actual expenses, and attorneys fees and costs. On the other hand, the petitioner also filed a counter claim, of course, denying and reversing the allegations against him by the private respodent. On October 16, 1989, the Regional Trial Court applied the Article 21 of the Civil Code favoring the private respondent. The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals regarding the decision of the trial court. On February 18, 1991, the CA affirmed in toto the trial courts ruling. Thus, unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed instant petition on March 26, 1991. Issue: Whether or nor damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that, in the existing rule under our Civil Law, a breach of promise to marry itself is not an actionable wrong. The Supreme Court found out the true character and motive of the petitioner, that is, he used deception and took advantage of the situation of the private respondent (a high school graduate and financially unstable) by proposing to support and marry her, just so he can satisfy

his lust. Thus, he clearly violated the Filipinos concept of morality and defied the traditional respect was not going to marry her after all, she left him. Therefore, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision the instant petition hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, G.R. No. L-20089. December 26, 1964 Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz, follwing their promise to love, decided to get married. Two days before their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage had to be postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before his marriage he sent a telegram informing her nothing changed rest assured returning soon. Despite the fact that everything was already prepared, from invitations to matrimonial bed and other accessories, and in fact bridal showers were given and gifts already received, Francisco was never heard from again. Beatriz sued for damages for breach of promise to marry.

Issue:
Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?

Ruling:
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages. This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code. When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

Natividad v. Tunac G.R. No. 143130, July 10, 2000


Facts: It appears that petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up together in Barangay Quiling, Talisay, Batangas where their respective parents, petitioners Marino and Clarita Natividad and respondent Eusebio and Elisa Tunac resided. At age nineteen (19), the two became lovers. One day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to get the bio-data which he needed in connection with his application for employment. Upon arrival at the boarding house, they found no one there. Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and, once inside, started kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the loss of her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her. Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June 1992. Ronald reassured her, again promising her marriage. True enough, on October 31, 1992, Ronald and his parents, accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's house and asked her parents for the hand of their daughter. The two families agreed to have the wedding in January 1993 as Elsa's sister had gotten married that year, and they thought it was not good to have two weddings in a family within the same year. Meanwhile, Elsa started living with Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for the baby to be born. Unfortunately, on December 19, 1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature baby which died after five (5) hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge from the hospital, the two families decided that Elsa should go back to her parents so her mother could take care of her during her postnatal period. During said period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house. It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's attitude towards the former occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald informed Elsa that he no longer wanted to get married to her. Issue: Whether Natividad is entitled for damages for breach of Promise to Marry. Held: NO. In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by Ronald, much less by his parents. From the narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two became lovers before they engaged in any sexual intercourse. Also, the moral seduction contemplated by the Code Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where the

defendant is in a position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We fail to see any of these circumstances in this case. In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans were in fact arranged between the families of the parties. That their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's miscarriage, is already beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case of a relationship gone awry.

Shinryo Company Inc., v. RRN Inc. G.R. No. 172525, October 20, 2010 Facts:
Petitinoner Shinryo Company, Inc., is a domestic corporation organized under Philippine Laws. Private respondent RRN, Inc., is likewise a domestic created under Philippine Laws. RRN, Inc., filed a claim for arbitration against Shinryo Comapany, Inc., before the CIAC for recovery of unpaid amount which consist of unpaid portions of the sub-contract, variations and unused materials in the total of 5,275,184.17 php and legal interest in the amount of 442,014.73 php, however Shinryo Company, Inc., filed a counter claim for over payment in the amount of 2,512,997.96php. It was shown that petitioner and respondent executed an Agreement and Conditions of Sub-Contract. Respondent was not able to finish the entire works with Shinryo due to financial difficulties. The CIAC rendered its decision infavor of Shinryo Company, Inc., ordering RRN, Inc. to the amount of 3,728,960.54 php plus legal interest of 6% to be reckoned from June 25, 2003 up to the filing of the case on October 11, 2004. The CA however upheld the decision of the CIAC stating that the petitioner Shinryo failed to adduce sufficient proof that the parties had an agreement regarding charges for respondents use of the manlift, by this petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Issues:
Whether or not RRN, Inc., is liable for damages for unjust enrichment. Held: No, unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully. Petitioners Shinryo Company, Inc., then reliance on unjust enrichment is likewise misplaced. Moreover to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit.

CAR COOL PHILIPPINES, INC., represented in this act by its President and General Manager VIRGILIO DELA ROSA, vs. USHIO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 138088. January 23, 2006
Facts: On December 19, 1995, Ushio Realty and Development Corporations (Ushio Realty) filed an ejectment case against Car Cool Philippines, Inc. (CAR COOL) to recover possession of a parcel of land (property) located at No. 72 (137) Quezon Avenue corner of Victory Avenue, Quezon City. USHIO Realty alleges that the former owners of the property, spouses Hector and Gloria Hizon Lopez (Spouses Lopez), leased the property to CAR COOL since 1972. In 1990, the Spouses Lopez and CAR COOL executed a written lease agreement over the property for two years. On the expiration of the agreement, the Spouses Lopez allowed CAR COOL to continue renting the property. Thus, the agreement went on by a verbal month-month agreement. Hector Lopez wrote CAR COOL to inform of his intention to sell the property and te former gave the latter the option to buy the property before offering it to other prospective buyers. CAR COOL failed to respond to the offer. Thus, the property was bought by USHIO. USHIO gave CAR COOL a specific time to which to vacate the property. But after three notice and failing, however, to comply te demands of USHIO, filed a complaint for ejectment on December 19, 1995. The Metropolitan Trial Court decided in favor of USHIO REALTY. CAR COOL filed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court, but still the latter affirm the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by way of rentals and attorneys fees in favor of USHIO. Ruling: CAR COOL asserts that to award damages to USHIO Realty would constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of CAR COOL. CAR COOL claims that it never benefited from its occupation of the property after USHIO Realtys agents enetered the property on October 1, 1995 and unlawfully destroyed CAR COOLs office, equipment and spare parts. Because of the destruction of the equipment and spare parts needed to operate its business, CAR COOL asserts that it was no longer possible to continue its business operations. The Supreme Court, however, was not convinced basing from the Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically under Sections 17 and 19.

Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 56168, December 22, 1988


Facts: The record discloses that on November, 29, 1960 the Carlos Telosa obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Lucena Inc., and a s a security thereof he mortgaged a parcel of land. Said parcel of land was registered in the name of spouses Cralos Telosa and Rufina Telosa. Several months thereafter, the Rural Bank of Lucena Inc., became a distressed bank because of anomalies that prejudices the government, its depositors and creditors. The Monetary board later on decided to liquidate the Lucena Bank, an inventory was ensued and the account of Carlos Telosa was one of the inventoried account. A demand letter was later on send to Carlos, and protested for the same amount because the obligation he knew is only 300.00php and not 5,000.00php. Mean while Carlos Telosa died on January 13, 1968. The bank claiming that payments made did not fully satisfy the whole amount Nestor R. Cruz, then the Deputy of the Central bank assigned in Lucen Bank ordered for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage and sell the collateral at public auction. A complaint was filed by the widow and children of Carlos Telosa in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against the Rural Bank of Lucena. The court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the the Heirs of Telosa. The Rural Bank fo Lucena appealed to CA, but the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto. Issue : Whether or not respondent Telosa has no factual, valid and legal basis to ask for the reformation of the real estate mortgage contract. Held: Yes, since the property in question was the only property of the private respondents. As per record examination, it showed that the amount of loan actually obtained was only 300.00php and not 5,000.00 php as claimed by the petitioner. This facts was established by the following evidence: (a) exhibit E the receipt signed by the deceased dated December 2, 1960 showing the amount of loan to be only 3,00.00php. Needless to state in this regard, this particular transaction was one of the fraudulent and anomalous transactions involving the officers of the Rural bank of Lucena, Inc. The latter took advantage of the very limited education of Carlos Telosa.

RODRIGO CONCEPCION, v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000
Facts: The spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas, the respondents, were residing in an apartment leased to them by the owner Florence Bing Concepcion at Pasig City. Nestor Nicolas was engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures. Florence Concepcion joined after contributing capital with the condition that she will receive half of the profit earned. Rodrigo Concepcion, the petitioner and brother of the deceased husband of Florence, went to Nestors apartment and accused him of committing adulterous relationship with Florence. Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame. Florence even ceased to do business with the spouses. The spouses started to quarrel as Allem became doubtful of her husbands fidelity. Nestor forced then Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. The latter ignored that triggered the spouses to file civil suit against Rodrigo for damages. He reasoned out that he did such to protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family. Issue: Whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to private respondents, spouses Nicolas Ruling: The petitioner's posture that there is no legal provision that supports such award of damages has been rejected. Article 26 of the new Civil Code stressed the sacredness of human personality, which is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Thus, the petitioner is liable to the spouses for P50, 000 as moral damages, P25, 000 for exemplary damages, P10, 000 for attorneys fees, plus costs of suit.

Philex Mining Corporation v. CIR G.R. No. 125704, August 28, 1998
Facts: The facts shows that on August 5, 1992 the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liabilities for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter of 1991, as well as the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1992 in the amount of 123,821,928.52php. Philex however protested stating that the pending claims for VAT input credit/refund for the taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of 119,977,037.02 php plus interest. Therefore these claims for tax refund should be applied against the tax liabilities. The BIR however found Philexs position as to no merits since the pending claims have not yet been established with certainty, thus it follows that no legal compensation can take place. The BIR again reiterated its demand for Philex to settle its obligation. Issues were raise to the Court of Tax Appeals and ordered Philex to pay the same with reduction and it held that taxes can not be subject to set- off because claim for taxes is not a debt or contract. Aggrived by the decision Philex appealed to the CA, nonetheless the CA affirmed the decision of CTA. Issue: Whether or not Philex Mining Corporation is liable for surcharge and interest of the tax liabilities. Held: Yes, because taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. The imposition of surcharge and interest for the non-payment of the excise taxes within the time period prescribed was unjustified. Philex posits for the theory that it had no obligation to pay the excise taxt since after all it still has a pending claims for VAT input credit/refund with the BIR is untenable. The claim has also no support in the Jurisprudence. Moreover the payment of the surcharge is mandatory and the Bureau of Internal Revenue is not vested with any authority to waive the collection thereof.

Manantan vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001 350 SCRA 387
FACTS: After going from one place to another and consuming large amounts of beer, the accused, the deceased, and two others boarded on the car of the accused where he was the driver. Driving at a high speed at the middle portion of the highway and trying to overtake tricycle. At such speed, the accused was not able to avoid the passenger jeepney and thus collided with it. The accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body away from the steering wheel but he was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the center of the road. The trial court decided in favor of the accused. However, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the lower court, in that defendant-appellee is held civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident and sentenced to indemnify plaintiff-appellants in the amount of P174, 400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that petitioners acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability. (2) Whether or not the Court a quo erred in finding that petitioners acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability. (3) Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in finding to apply the Manchester doctrine. HELD: The court of appeals in determining whether Article 29 of the Civil Code applied was not precluded by the petitioners acquittal, from looking into the question of petitioners negligence or reckless imprudence. What was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. Therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. The decision in Criminal Case No 066 supports the conclusions of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, the civil liability was not extinguished by his

discharge. It clearly shows that petitioners acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral centainty. At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions was governed by Rule III, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Heirs of Guaring v. Court of Appelas G.R. No. 108395, March 7, 1997


FACTS: This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987, along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by TedoroGuaring Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida driven by Enriquez. The Lancer was heading north at a rate of 90kph, behind it was the bus. The Cressida was on the opposite lane bound for Manila. Killed in the accident was Guaring Jr. The heirs of Guaring brought his action for damages, based on quasi-delict in the Manila RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private respondent Philippine Bus Lines Inc and its driver Angeles Cuevas for damages for the death of Guaring. HELD: No. The appellate court did not have before it the evidence in the criminal case. What it did was simply cite the findings contained in the decision of the criminal court. Worse, what the bus driver was appellate court regarded as categorical finding that the driver was not negligent and on that basis, declared in this case that the proximate cause of the accident was the act of Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him. The notion that an action for quasi-delict is separate and distinct from the criminal action was thus set aside. This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. Article 2176 states whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on a quasi-delict. It is now noteworthy that the accident in this case also involved Philippine Rabbit Bus and that as in this case the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt. The SC held that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action brought by the heirs was based on a quasi-delict.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, G.R. No. 102207. September 2, 1994
Facts: Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The counsel of Bayotas, however, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. Issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability? Ruling: Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished? Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) Quasi-delicts. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,

Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, the Supreme Court held that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed without qualification.

Cancio Jr. v. Isip G.R. No. 133978, November 12, 2012


Facts: Cancio filed three case of violation of B. P. 22 and three cases of Estafa against Emerencia Isip for allegedly issuing said checks without sufficient funds. The office of the provincial prosecutor dismissed the criminal case no. 13356 on the ground that the check was deposited with the drawee bank after 90 days from the date of the check. The two other cases for same offense however were filed with but subsequently dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1, on the ground of failure to prosecute. Meanwhile the three cases for Estafa were filed with the regional trial court of Pampanga, Branch 49. On March, 20, 1998 the trial court found in favor of Emerencia and dismissed the complaint. The court held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against the respondent on the ground of lack of interest or failure to prosecute is an adjudication on the merits which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection, and such filing of the said civil case amounted to forum shopping. Issue: Whether the dismissal of the Estafa cases against respondent bars the institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases. Ruling: No, since the basis for collection of sum of money is a breach of contract (Obligation excontractu) The mere fact of reservation does not preclude from filing another civil action for collection of money. Under the present rules, the independent civil actions maybe filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil actions based on Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.

CATALINO P. ARAFILES, vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., ROMY MORALES, MAX BUAN, JR., and MANUEL C. VILLAREAL JR., G.R No. 150256. March 25, 2004
Facts: About 2am on April 14, 1987, respondent Morales, a reporter of Peoples Journal Tonight, was at the Western Police District Headquarters where Emelita Despuig, and employee of the National Institute at Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. In the presence of Morales, Despuig executed a sworn statement narrating the events surrounding the reported offenses. She stated that the first incident was on March 14, 1987 where she was abducted and raped by the petitioner at Flamingo Hotel. The second incident was an attempted rape on the night of April 14, 1987. Morales thereupon personally interviewed Despuig. After the interview, Morales tried to contact Arafiled at the NIAS office to verify Despuigs story but failed, the office having already closed. That same day, April 14, 1987, Morales report appeared as headline on Peoples Journal Tonight reading: GOVT EXEC RAPES COED GIRL by Romy Morales. On April 13, 1988, petitioner instituted a complaint before the RTC of Quezon City. Petitioner alleged that on account of the grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item prepared by respondent Morales, edited by respondent Buan Jr., allowed for publication by respondent Villareal Jr., as president of the Philippine Journalists Inc., aspersions were cat on his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the PAGASA was injured; he became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint alleging that the news item, having been sourced out of the Police Blotter which is an official public document and bolstered by a personal interview is therefore privileged and falls within the protective constitutional freedom of the press. RTC decided in favor of the petitioner. The CA however found that petitioner was not able to prove by that respondents were motivated to cause harm or injury. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages. Ruling: Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved preponderance of evidence separately

from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioners complaint may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first 7 paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained by Despuig. The succeeding paragraphs sufficiently conveyed to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Despuig had reported at the police headquarters. In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item and the importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion. In fine, this court finds that case against respondents has not been sufficiently established by preponderance of evidence.

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL) INC vs. MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA G.R. No. 130362. September 10, 2001
Facts: IFFI is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Argos and Pineda (respondents) are the general manager and commercial director respectively of the Fragrance Division of IFFI. In 1992, the office of Managing Director was created to head the corporations operations in the Philippines. Costa was appointed as the Managing Director. Argos and Pineda as general managers have to report directly to Costa. Because of serious differences between the Managing Director and the General Manager, the latter agreed to terminate their services. They signed a Release Waiver and Quit Claim on December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a Personnel Announcement which described respondents as persona non grata and urged employees not to have further dealings with them. The respondents filed a libel case in Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila. On March 31, 1995, respondents filed a civil case for damages at Regional Trial Court of Pasig against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer. IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. On October 1995, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss for the respondents failure to reserve right to institute a separate civil case. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondents and was granted the same court. IFFI on the other hand filed a motion to reconsider the said order but was denied by the court. The case was elevated by the IFFI to the Court of Appeals reiterating the same ground for dismissal. However, the Ca dismissed the case. Issue: Whether the private respondents can sue IFFI for civil case for damages in its subsidiary capacity as employer. Ruling: It was held by the court, based on the case of Joaquin vs. Aniceto, Article 33 of the New Civil Code contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply against the employer to enforce its subsidiary liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of

the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before conviction of its employee is premature. Having established that respondents did not based their civil action on IFFIs primary liability under Article 33 but claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as employer of Costa is premature. The court granted the petition and the decisions of the RTC and Ca were reversed and set aside.

G. JESUS B. RUIZ, vs. ENCARNACION UCOL and COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. L-45404. August 7, 1987
Facts: Agustina Tagaca, laundry woman for petitioner Atty. Jesus Ruiz filed an administrative charge against respondent Encarnacion Ucol. In the answer of the respondent to the charge filed against her, she alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucols because of a case filed by Encarnacion Ucols husband against Ruiz. She also alleged to have made remarkds that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charge. The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement was made by the trial court as to the civil liability of the accused. Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded. Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribe and that the case of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel. Issue: Whether the civil case was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel. Ruling: It was held that the trial court dismissed the case filed by Atty. Ruiz against Ucol because her guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established. And in the review of the findings by the court, the disputed answer of Ucol in the administrative case contains no libel. The court found the charges against Ucol, if not malicious, at least reckless in the face of proven facts and circumstances. The court dismissed the case filed by Atty. Ruiz.

Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco corp. G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
Facts: The complaint filed by Fortune Tobacco Corporation sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of its constitutional rights arising from petitioners issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93) which the court declared invalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. Fortune Tobacco claimed that such memorandum deprived their property without due process of Law, for the Corporation itself do not have opportunity to contest such additional ad vilore. Issue: Whether Vinzons-Chato be made liable. Held: No, since A public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another maybe validly sued for damages under Art. 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not tainted with malice or bad faith. But in the present case, Vinzons-Chato can not be made liable for he issued the Memorandum circular in his personal capacity and such issuance he acted in good faith, further more in order to make him liable bad faith and malice should be properly alleged in the complaint.

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE G.R. No. 119398. July 2, 1999
Facts: Eduardo M Cojuangco, a known busenessman-sportsman, won a total of P1,020,700.00 on various horse-racing. He then sent a letter demanding to the defendants the collection of the prizes due to him. However, the demanded prizes were being withheld on advice of Commissioner Ramon Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Governance heeding to then President Corazon Aquinos Executive Order No. 2 freezing all properties of former Presidet Marcos, his immediate families, close associates and cronies, in which Cojuangco is a friend of the former President Marcos. Finally, February 7, 1991, the PCGG advised defendants that it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings. Immediately, this was communicated to Atty. Mendoza by Carrascoso, Jr. As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Mendoza, petitioners counsel, refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court. Issue: a) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office; b) Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his failure to file an appeal brief; c) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a cause of action which was not appealed from by the respondents; d) Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and the law Ruling: The appellate court committed no error in dismissing the appeal since the representation of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its basic function to act as principal law office of all government-owned or controlled corporations. With regards the alleged failure of Mr. Carrascoso to file an appeal brief, his filing is not an absolute requirement for the perfection of an appeal. What is important is that respondent Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and that his counsel before the lower court had filed an appeal brief on his behalf.

As to the third issue, respondent court could not reverse and set aside the RTC decision in its entirety and dismiss the original complaint without trampling upon the rights that the accused accrued to the petitioner from the unappealed portion of the decision. It is well-settled that only the errors assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily related thereto, may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case. The controlling article regarding the fourth issue is Article 32 of the Civil Code which states that: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: xxx xxx xxx (6) The deprivationof property without due process of law. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even of the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of ones duties. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued seaquestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law. Mr. Carrascoso is thereby ordered to pay petitioner nominal damages.

FAUSTO BARREDO, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEO ALMARIO, G.R. No. 48006. July 8, 1942
Facts: On May 3, 1936, about half past one in the morning on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision coreccional but the court granted the petition that the right to bring civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence given by the lower court in the criminal case. On the other hand, there arose two liabilities of Fausto Barredo: (1) the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from his criminal liability; and (2) Barredos primary liability as an employer under Article 1903 of the Civil Code. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take and they preferred the second. On March 7, 1939, Severino Garcia and Timoteo Almario, parents of the deceased, brought an action to the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo, as the employer of Pedro Fontanilla. This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action based on cuasi delito or culpa aquiliana against Fausto Barredo for the death of Faustino Garcia. Ruling: Yes. The plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo because of the separate individuality of cuasi delito or culpa aquiliana. The court held that this will make for the better safeguarding of private rights and is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. The court also found out that defendant-petitioner is Fontanillas employer. There is no proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. It is shown that he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of

the Automobile Law and speeding violations which appeared in the Records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed wherein the plaintiffs should be awarded for damages by defendant-petitioner P1, 000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted.

SAFEGUARD SECURITY VS. TANGCO G.R No. 165732 December 14, 2006
FACTS: The victim Evangeline Tangco was depositor of Ecology Bank. She was also a licensedfire arm holder, thus during the incident, she was entering the bank to renew her time deposit and along with her was her firearm. Suddenly, the security guard of the bank, upon knowing that the victim carries a firearm, the security guard shot the victim causing the latters instant death. The heirs of the victim filed a criminal case against security guard and an action against Safeguard Security for failure to observe diligence of a goof father implied upon the act of its agent. ISSUE: Whether Safeguard Security can be held liable for the acts of its agent. RULING: Yes. The law presumes that any injury committed either by fault or omission of an employee reflects the negligence of the employer. In quasi-delicts cases, in order to overcome this presumption, the employer must prove that there was no negligence on his part in the supervision of his employees. It was declared that in the selection of employees and agents, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. Thus, due diligence on the supervision and operation of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees. Thus, in this case, Safeguard Security committed negligence in identifying the qualifications and ability of its agents.

City of Pasig vs COMELEC September 10, 1999


FACTS: There are two petitions which question the property of the suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig. The gist of the problem is that on two Barangays namely Karangalan and Napico are claimed both. ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangay Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local governments. HELD: Yes. The COMELEC declared that the plebiscite held to ratify the creation of the Barangay Napico was null and void until after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta.

MEYNARDO BELTRAN, vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
Facts: Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973. On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them. On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. The Trial dismissed his petition. Undaunted, the petitioner filed a motion to the higher courts. Issue: a. Is there a prejudicial question involved in the case above? b. Can a party judge for himself the nullity of his own marriage? Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. In the case at bar it must be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.

Merced vs Diaz 109 Phil 155


FACTS: Abundio Merced was married to Eufricina Tan and without such marriage having been legally dissolved; he contracted a second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. Facing bigamy charges by the latter, petitioner alleged force and intimidation by relatives of Elizabeth forced him into marriage and filed for annulment. He also raised the issue of prejudicial question ISSUE: Whether or not the action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question to the prosecution for bigamy. HELD: Yes. The civil action must be decided first before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed (before the new Family Code took effect). Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case, and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.

DONATO vs. LUNA April 15, 1988


FACTS: On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado Cantor, filed information for bigamy against Leonila Donato with the Court of First Instance. The private respondent filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner. Respondent had no previous knowledge of petitioners existing marriage to Rosalinda Maluping. Donato interposed in her answer the defense that his second marriage was void and since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by respondent. Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the criminal case contending that the civil case seeking the annulment of the second marriage raise a prejudicial question which must be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the legal capacity to contract the second marriage. HELD: No. Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial question because a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question on the condition that it must be proven that the petitioners consent to the marriage was obtained through intimidation, violence and undue influence in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was done involuntarily. In the petitioners argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of force, intimidation and violence allegedly employed against him by respondent only sometime later cannot be considered relevant.

TENEBRO vs. CA
FACTS: Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy. ISSUE: Is Tenebro guilty of bigamy? HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Geluz vs Court of Appeals 2 scra 801


FACTS: On two occasions, the wife of the respondent with his knowledge had an abortion at the clinic of the petitioner. However a subsequent third abortion wherein he did not know or gave consent constituted the plaintiffs basis in filing action for award and damages. He claimed damages as a result of the death of a two month old fetus. ISSUE: Can the husband recover for damages resulting to the death or abortion of an unborn child. HELD: No. The cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child but the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked judicial personality. Furthermore, there is no basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the husband's indifference to the previous abortions clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affection.

CATALAN VS BASA G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007


FACTS: Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service b e c a u s e h e w a s unfit to render military service. T h i s w a s d u e t o t h e f a c t t h a t h e w a s suffering from Schizophrenia. O n S e p t . 2 8 , 1 9 4 9 , h e m a r r i e d C o r a z o n Cerezo. O n J u n e 1 6 , 1 9 5 1 , F e l i c i a n o a l l e g e d l y d o n a t e d t o h i s sister Mercedes Catalan o n e - h a l f o f h i s r e a l p r o p e r t y . T h e remaining half of the property remained under Felicianos Name. T h e P e o p l e s B a n k a n d T r u s t C o m p a n y (Presently known as BPI) was appointed a s t h e g u a r d i a n o f F e l i c i a n o d u e t o h i s incompetency. O n N o v e m b e r 2 2 , 1 9 7 8 , F e l i c i a n o a n d C o r a z o n d o n a t e d L o t s 1 a n d 3 o f t h e i r property to their son Eulogio Catalan. O n M a r c h 2 6 , 1 9 7 9 , M e r c e d e s s o l d t h e property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa. On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon d o n a t e d L o t 2 t o t h e i r c h i l d r e n A l e x a n , Librada and Zenaida Catalan and Feb. 14, 1983, they also donated Lot 4 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan. BPI filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and O w n e r s h i p , a s w e l l a s d a m a g e s a g a i n s t the respondents. BPO contends that Feliciano wasnt in the s o u n d m i n d u p o n g i v i n g c o n s e n t o n t h e donation given to Mercedes and therefore it should be nullified. They also contend that Mercedes had no right to sell the property to anyone. The petition of BPI was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals ISSUE: Is the donation made by Feliciano in favor of Mercedes valid? HELD: Yes. S C a f f i r m e d t h e r u l i n g o f t h e a p p e l l a t e court. What is crucial in a donation is the donors capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. The evidence presented by the petitioners was not sufficient to prove that Feli ciano w a s i n c o m p e t e n t w h e n h e m a d e t h e donation. A p e r s o n s u f f e r i n g f r o m S c h i z o p h r e n i a does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligibly dispose his property. The proof of Felicianos infirmity to give c o n s e n t w a s o n l y e s t a b l i s h e d w h e n t h e C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e d e c l a r e d h i m a n incompetent on December 22, 1953. This was years after he made the donation.

Domingo vs. Court of Appeals October 17, 2001


FACTS: Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land including the house and warehouse on oneparcel. She allegedly sold them to private respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives amounting to P850.00. The petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan, who claim to be her closest surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the properties by means of stealth, force and intimidation, and refused to vacate the same. The respondent filed a complaint for reinvindicacion against petitioners. The petitioners stated that the sale was spurious and they are the legitimate owner of the land being the nearest kin of Paulina. The respondents shown a carbon copy of the deed of sale not bearing the signature of Paulina only alleges thumb mark of the latter and the deed was tainted with alterations, defects and irregularities. The trial court found the deed fake and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. The appellate court, however, reversed the decision and declared the respondents the owner of the properties. On appeal, the petitioners asserted that there was abundant evidence at the time of the execution of the sale, the deceased was already senile. She could have not consented to the sale by merely imprinting her thumb mark on the deed. ISSUE: Whether or not the vendor has the capacity to act on the alleged sale of her property. HELD: No. The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the trial court. There is a serious doubt that the seller consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land. The time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian barely over a year when the deed was allegedly executed but before copies of the deed were entered in the registry. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly, intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed.

MENDEZONA , vs. OZAMIZ February 6, 2002


FACTS: Petitioners alleged that petitioner spouses Mario Mendezona and Teresita Mendezona own a parcel of land which they bought from Carmen Ozamiz. They initiated the suit to remove a cloud on their respective titles of ownership caused by the inscription thereon of the notice of lis pendens which came about as a result of an incident in a special proceeding for guardianship over the person and properties of Carmen Ozamiz initiated by respondents Julio Ozamiz, Jose Ozamiz, Paz Montalvan, and Ma. Terresa Zarraga,Carlos Fortich, Jose Roz, Paulita Rodriguez and Lourdes Lon. The respondents alleged that Carmen Ozamiz, then 86 years old, after an illness on July1987, had become disoriented and could no longer take care of herself nor manage her properties by reason of her failing health, weak mind and absent-mindedness. Both parties agreed that Carmen needed a guardian over her person and her properties. Thus, as guardians, respondent Roberto Montalvan and Julio Ozamiz filed their Inventories and Accounts of Carmens properties and other assets including the parcel of land bought by the petitioners. Roberto and Julio caused the inscription on the titles of petitioners a notice of lis pendens thus giving rise to the suit for quieting of titles filed by petitioners. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners; however, the appellate court reversed it. ISSUE: Whether or not Carmen Ozamiz was of sound mind thus capacitated to contract with the petitioners regarding the sale of a certain parcel of land. HELD: Yes. A person is presumed to be of sound mind at any particular time and the condition is presumed to continue to exist, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. The respondents sought to impugn only one document, namely, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989, executed by Carmen Ozamiz. However, there are nine (9) other important documents that were, signed by Carmen Ozamiz either before or after April 28, 1989 which were not assailed by the respondents. Such is contrary to their assertion of complete incapacity of Carmen Ozamiz to handle her affairs since 1987. We agree with the trial courts assessment that "it is unfair for the [respondents] to claim soundness of mind of Carmen Ozamiz when it benefits them and otherwise when it disadvantages them." Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.


FACTS: The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as tax payers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect. Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case 2. Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgement in accordance to the prayer of the complaints 3. Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution HELD: The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers (class) suit. The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit. The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially.

Despite the Constitutions non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Marcos vs. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300


FACTS: Imelda Romualdez Marcos was born in a town in the first Congressional district of Leyte. She then migrated to Manila when her parents decided to live in the said place. She was married to the then President Ferdinand Marcos, and consequently, lived in Ilocos. After several years, and upon returning to her birth place, she ran as a congresswoman in the first district of Leyte. Her opponent in that position was Cirilo Roy Montejo. The case started when Montejo asked the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos for allegedly lacking the one-year residency requirement mandated by the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Montejo claimed the former First Lady placed her residency in the first district of the province at seven months preceding the balloting, which entailed that she lacked five months of the required residency. Marcos argued that she has been a resident of the area since childhood and has not abandoned her residency. The poll body disqualified her, and as a consequence, she appealed it to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda Marcos is a resident of the First District of Leyte, and could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that Mrs. Imelda Marcos is a resident of the first District of Leyte and could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat. This is based on the ground that Mrs. Marcos is still a resident of that place and did not actually lack the requirements of those persons who could run a Congressional seat. Mrs. Marcos lived in Manila and in Ilocos for a long time and only went back to her town and lived there for only seven months prior to the election but she did not really intended to abandon her birth place. This was proved by the frequent visits that she had in that place. Mrs. Marcos is said to have her domicile of her choice and of origin in Leyte. Yes, she did left Leyte but had shown that her choice of residence was Leyte, as proved by her visits. Therefore, Mrs. Marcos could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat on the First District of Leyte.

ANCHETA vs ANCHETA March 4, 2004


FACTS: Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Pias, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio. Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial courts order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid? HELD: NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent exparte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default. The Supreme Court reiterates: The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.Petition is GRANTED.

Abadilla vs. Tabilaran October 25, 1995


FACTS: Respondent had been scandalously and openly living with Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 and begot three children all surnamed Tabiliran even while respondents marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting. Respondents contention is that his first wife left the conjugal home in 1966. And since then and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. He further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his first wife when he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1986. That he represented himself as single because that is what best fits to him since the words to choose from were widow, single and divorced. That besides both he and Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein in his former marriage to Banzuela was honestly divulged. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents marriage to Priscilla is valid. HELD: No. Article 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven years, it being known whether or not the absentee is still lives, the absent shall be deemed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. By respondents own allegation, his first wife left the conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla in 1970, only 4 years had elapsed. The respondent had no right to presume therefore that his first was already dead for all-purposes. Thus, respondents actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immortal conduct. The SC said, it makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution.

Dela Rosa vs Heirs G.R. No. 103028. October 10, 1997

FACTS: On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, Vda. De Danao filed a Petition for Letters of Administration of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado, who died on September 8, 1972, and Dr. Guillermo Rustia who died on February 28, 1974. The petition was filed by Luisa Delgado on behalf of the surviving sisters, brothers, nephews, nieces and grandnephews and grand-nieces of Josefa Delgado. With the permission of the trial court, Guillerma S. Rustia-(Alaras) was allowed to intervene in the proceedings upon her assertion of the status of an acknowledged natural child, and thus, the only surviving child and sole heir, of Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia. On April 3, 1978, Luisa Delgado filed an Amended Petition for Latters of Administration, this time alleging that the deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had been living continuously as husband and wife, but without the benefit of marriage. On March 14, 1988, herein petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa was substituted for her sister, the petitioner Luisa Vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987. On May 11, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision appointing herein petitioner Carlota Vda. De Dela Rosa as administrator of the estates of the two mentioned deceased. Private respondents appealed the decision of the court but they failed to comply with to prescribed period of filing. ISSUE: Whether or not the deceased Josefa Delgado was legally married to Dr. Guillermo Rustia. HELD: Yes. Needless to state, it s presumed in our jurisdiction that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Absence of record of marriage of Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia is not enough to overcome the validity of their marriage. Thus, all doubts must be solve in favor of the marriage.

Eugenio vs. Velez May 17, 1990


FACTS: Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palatial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. Private respondents (Vargases) alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Articles 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, inthe absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of Vitaliana Vargas. HELD: No. There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis--vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully wedded spouse; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

LEONCIA BALOGBOG AND GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, vs HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997
Facts: Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been sold to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this allegation. Witnesses then testified that they attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses. Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. She testified that after the wedding, she was handed a receipt, presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. She stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they separated. On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified that Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents before this case was filed. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents ordering petitioners to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. Issue: Was the decision of the Court of Appeals tenable? Ruling: Yes. The Court finds no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC FACTS: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." ISSUE Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a change of entries in his birth certificate HELD No. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion. Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was hi s sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN
FACTS Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appeared that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that "Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female." ISSUE Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a change of entries in his birth certificate HELD The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan's body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.

BESO VS. DAGUMAN


FACTS: The Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority by Beso. In the Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, the complainant charged judge with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar with the following facts: (a) On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainants fiance, Bernardito A. Yman, got married under the solemnization of the respondent in the respondents residence in Calbayog City, Samar; (b) That after the wedding, Yman abandoned the complainant; (c) That when Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding her Marriage Contract. The complainant found out that her marriage was not registered; (d) The complainant wrote to the respondent to inquire and the former found out that all the copies were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the respondent. The respondent averred with the following rationale: (a) Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the complainant and Yman. He also believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the complainant deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy; (b) Respondent was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married; (c) Respondents failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because Yman absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate. (d) Respondent, however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction; and HELD: The judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction. Article 7 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, Any incumbent member of the judiciary with the courts jurisdiction. In relation thereto, according to Article 8 of the Family Code, there are only three instances with which a judge may solemnize a marriage outside of his jurisdiction: (1.1) when either or both the contracting parties are at the point of death; (1.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(1.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. In this case, none of the three instances is present.

ARANES vs. OCCIANA FACTS: Aranes filed charges against judge Salvador Occiano of the municipal circuit trial court of Batalan, Camarines Sur with gross ignorance of the law. Occiano solemnized aranes marriage without the requisite marriage license the latters house which is outside the latters jurisdiction. Aranes was not able to claim her right to inherit his deceased husbands pension and property. Occiano avers that the ceremony took place in aranes house because the groom had a difficulty walking and he couldnt stand traveling. The judge was aware that there was no marriage license but due to the pleas of the couple and everything was prepared already and the visitors were there, he agreed to solemnize the marriage. He reminded them that marriage wont be valid without the license. They promised to give it within tha day but they never did. Aranes desisted but the court still decided the case. ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid . HELD: Judge can only solemnize marriage within their territorial jurisdiction. Marriage license is a requisite for marriage and without it, marriage would be void. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize the marriage. And since there was no license, Occiano did not have the authority to officiate the marriage.

REPUBLIC vs. CA FACTS:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas. The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage. She now filed a certification to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. ISSUE: WON there is a valid marriage license. HELD: At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.: Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former. In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

CARINO vs. CARINO FACTS: In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral. ISSUE: WON the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes. HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked

for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

SY vs. CA FACTS: Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died in 1977 in Caloocan City, where he was residing, leaving behind substantial real and personal properties here in the Philippines. Petition for letters of administration filed by his natural children, was opposed on the ground that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee, in Fookien, China on 1/13/31 and that the oppositors are the legitimate children. The probate court rendered judgment in favor of the oppositors; this was modified and set aside by the CA w/c held that both sets of children were acknowledged natural children. Both parties moved for partial reconsideration. ISSUE:

WON the marriage is valid HELD: For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance w/ said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and customs of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only bec. they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence." On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact." The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

JAIME O. SEVILLA, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.
Facts: Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Carmelita N. Cardenas, herein respondent, for their marriage was vitiated by machination, duress, and intimidation employed by the respondents Carmelita and her father. He was forced to sign a marriage contract with Carmelita Cardenas before a minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo D Gonzales. Moreover, he alleged that there was no marriage license presented before the solemnizing officer as certified by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila. Actually, it was certified 3 times on the following dates: March 11, September 20, 1994 and July 25, 2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was nowhere to be found. On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted these allegations of Jaime and claims that they were first civilly married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter married at a church on May 31, 1969 at Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both were alleged to be recorded in Local Civil Registrar and NSO. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of marriage of the parties based on the petitioners allegations that no marriage license was presented before a solemnizing officer and that without the said marriage license, being one of the formal requisites of marriage, the marriage is void from the beginning. This was based on the 3 certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar Manila that marriage license number 220792 was fictitious. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the trail court in favor of the marriage, because the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the said license with due effort as testified by certain Perlita Mercader because the former Local Civil registrar had already retired. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. thus, this case was elevated to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that Marriage License No. 2770792, as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties, sufficient to declare the marriage void from the beginning Held: The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The absence of logbook is not conclusive proof of nonissuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means nonexistence or falsity of entries therein. The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two offsprings, now adult themselves. Thus, the instant petition was denied.

Manzano vs. Sanchez AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001


FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels. ISSUE:

Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code. HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Ninal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122


FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void? 2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death? HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void. Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249


FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. EsmeraldaBaroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the

marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony. Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract. An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents. ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid. HELD: Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated. On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was

shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement. Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

MORIGO vs. PEOPLE GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004


FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy

case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith. ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case. HELD: Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.

MARILOU NAMA MORENO, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE, . A.M. No. MTJ-94-963. July 14, 1995
Facts: Marilou Nama Moreno filed this complainant against Judge C. Bernabe for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. On October 4, 1993, complainant alleges that she and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge Bernabe. She visited the office of the Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claims that respondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.

Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant. Judge Villarama, Jr. recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent for failure of complainant to appear on any of the scheduled hearings. He, however, also recommended that the respondent be issued a stern warning for the latter solemnized a marriage without the requisites marriage license. Issue: Whether or not the marriage is void due to the lack of marriage license Ruling: Respondent Judge displayed his ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage without a marriage license. As a judge, he is presumed to be aware of the existence of Article 3(2) of the Family Code of the Philippines, which provides of a marriage is a valid marriage license. Absence of said requisite will make the marriage void from the beginning. Family Code declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Thus, respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed against him.

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.
Facts: On September 27, 1994, Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn Borga despite the fact that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Respondent judge, likewise, performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Thus he faced an administrative for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law filed by Rodolfo Navarro, the complainant. Respondent seeks exculpation from his act by stating that he merely relied on the affidavit issued by the municipal trial court confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borga states that the formers civil status is separated. Tagadan

was civilly married to Ida Pearanda; that after 13 years of cohabitation and having borne five children, she left the conjugal dwelling and did not return for almost seven years thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead. In the marriage of Sumaylo and del Rosario, he maintained that he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in solemnizing the marriages Ruling: Yes. Should Tagadan institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes presumptive death otherwise he remains married to Pearanda. Such negligence or ignorance of the law has resulted is a bigamous, and therefore, void marriage. The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between him and Ida Pearanda. A marriage can be held outside of the judges chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29; (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote area. The written request was made by only one party. Under Article 3 of the Family Code, one of the formal requisite is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within his or her courts jurisdiction. Article 8 of the same Code refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer. Non compliance of such will not invalidate the marriage. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas otherwise there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite and may subject the solemnizing officer to administrative liability.

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 88602 April 6, 1990.
Facts: Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob was the registered owner of a parcel of land described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1433 of the Register of Deeds of Naga City. Because of the problem of paying realty taxes, internal revenue taxes and unpaid wages of farm laborers of the hacienda, Dr. Jacob asked Centenera to negotiate for a loan. For this purpose, a special power of attorney was executed and acknowledged by Dr. Jacob before notary public Lorenzo Rosales. The mortgage was annotated on the title and when the loan was twice re-structured, the proceeds of the same were not actually given by the bank to Centera since the transaction was actually nothing but a renewal of the first or original loan and the supposed proceeds were

applied as payment for the loan. The accrued interest for sixty (60) days was, however, paid by Centenera. On November 15, 1982 a definite deed of sale of the property was executed in favor of the respondent bank as the sole and highest bidder. Tomasa Vda. de Jacob who was subsequently named administratrix of the estate of Dr. Jacob and who claimed to be an heir of the latter, conducted her own investigation and therefore she filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur alleging that the special power of attorney and the documents therein indicated are forged and therefore the loan and/or real estate mortgages and promissory notes are null and void. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint for lack of a cause of action and/or her failure to prove the causes of action alleged in the complaint; and judgment was rendered against the Estate of the late Dr. Alfredo Jacob in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court and dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. Thus, the petition. Issue: Whether or not an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage may proceed even after the death of the mortgagor Held: A mortgagee has three remedies that may be alternately availed of in case the mortgagor dies under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court: a. to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; b. to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and; c. to rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same at anytime, before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency. From this rule, it is clear that the mortgagee does not lose its light to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage even after the death of the mortgagor as a third alternative under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The power to foreclose a mortgage is not an ordinary agency that contemplated exclusively the representation of the principal by the agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own protection. That power survives the death of the mortgagor. The right of the mortgagee bank to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage after the death of the mortgagor, acting through his attorney-in-fact, did not depend on the authority in the deed of mortgage executed by the latter. That right existed independently of said stipulation and is clearly recognized in Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court aforecited.

Other issues were questions of facts and can not be reviewed at the Supreme Court as only questions of law are reviewed in the latter. Thus, the case was dismissed for lack of merit.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. CRASUS L. IYOY, G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
Facts: The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. The respondent avers that Fely hot-tempered, nagger, and extravagant, she abandoned him for 13 years, and Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

On the other hand, Fely counterclaims that respondent was an American citizen, thus, she is not subject to Philippine laws. She avers she left that respondent because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Moreover, she avers that respondent misused the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses. The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initioon the gound of psychological incapacity. Petitioner Republic believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. Hence the case to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not applying Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code Held: As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. Thus, the Petition was granted and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, was reversed and set aside.

Republic vs. Orbecido GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005


FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. ISSUE:

Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code. HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND RICHARD UPTON, G.R. No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.
Facts: Alice Reyes Van-Dorn, petitioner, was a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton, respondent, was a U.S. citizen. The two got married in Hong Kong in 1972. They lived in the Philippines and begot two children. They obtained divorce in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating the business of the latter in Ermita, Manila is their conjugal property. Thus, he claimed that he has the right to manage such conjugal property. Petitioner then filed a Motion to Dismiss since it was already agreed upon in the divorce judgment that there is no community property between her and the respondent.

The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Issue: Is the effect of the foreign divorce binding in the Philippines on the matter of conjugal property? Ruling: The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided that they are valid according to their national law. Likewise, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of petitioner. Furthermore, he cannot be entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.

EDGAR SAN LUIS, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.
Facts: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146. Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. But t he trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration Held: Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code. The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

CORPUZ V. STO. TOMAS G.R. NO. 186571, 11 AUGUST 2010


FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz (Gerbert) was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He later married a Filipina, Daisylyn Sto. Tomas (Daisy). Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding because of his work. He returned after 4 months to surprise Daisy, but discovered that she was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice in Ontario, Canada granted his petition for divorce.

2 years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Gerbert went to the Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisys marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed him that the marriage between him and Daisy still subsists under Philippine law. To be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to a NSO Circular. Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisy did not file any responsive pleading and offered no opposition to the petition. In fact, Daisy alleged her desire to file a similar case but was prevented by financial constrains. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-ininterest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. The RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was NOT THE PROPER PARTY to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a NATURALIZED CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can avail of the remedy, under Art. 26, Sec. 2 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 26, Sec. 2 extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. HELD: NO. The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26, Sec. 2 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the FILIPINO SPOUSE. Art. 26, Sec. 2 was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Art. 26, Sec. 2 provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without Art. 26, Sec. 2, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond. An action based on Art. 26, Sec. 2 is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. However, no Philippine court can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.
Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. he then married the petitioner on January 12, 1992. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997. In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down. Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. The trial court held the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. Issue: a. Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven b. Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner Held: a. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. b. The Supreme Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The Supreme Court agree to the petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to

adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. Thus, the case was remanded.

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO BRILLANTES, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706. March 29, 1995.
Facts: Petitioner Lupo Atienza alleged that he was living Yolanda De Castro and that they had two children. In December 1991, he saw Judge Franciso Brillantes, Jr., the respondent, sleeping on his bed. He was informed by the houseboy that he cohabited with De Castro. He did not bother on what he saw; he simply left the house and told the houseboy to take good care of his children.

Thereafter, respondent prevented him to visit his children. The former likewise alienated the affection of his children for him. While cohabiting with De Castro, the respondent was actually married to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children. He alleged that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before the mayor of a town in Nueva Ecija on April 25, 1965, it was not valid for there was no marriage license. Even when they had their second marriage ceremony, neither party applied for marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent leaving their children to his care and custody. Respondent then claimed that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Judge Brillantes and Zenaida Ongkiko is valid Ruling: No. However, there should be judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage before a party can enter into a second marriage as provided in Article 40 of the Family Code. The fact that he is already a lawyer, he then knew marriage license is necessary or a formal requisite before one can get married. He was given an opportunity to correct the flaw when he married Ongkiko for the second time but he failed to secure motives and bad faith.

Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan, vs. Louella A. Catalan-Lee,


FACTS: Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondentMeropein Calasiao, Pangasinan.Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with EusebioBristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits ensued. On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent before appellate court and ruled in favor of her reversing the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the appellate court.Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. HELD: Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce oramensaetthoro;or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute.In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus: Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequentlycontract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlandos subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas.In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether

respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant case.

Quita vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998


Facts: Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondent herewith. They were blessed with six children.

On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen. The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estatewas ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and thePadlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals that the case was decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court. Issue: (1) Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio. (2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo. Held: No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their countrys national law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.

Tenebro v. Ca G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004


Facts: Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that

his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy. ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy. HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminalliability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Jarillo v. People G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009


Facts: On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal. On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975.

Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979. On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Issue: Can Jarillo invoke that the action has prescribed since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978? Ruling: No, the Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus: The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. Jarillos contention is untenable. The crime of bigamy prescribes in 15 years. The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. In this case, Jarillo failed to prove that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978. Her defense is therefore ineffectual.

Macarrubo v. Macarrubo A.C. No. 6148, February 27, 2004 Facts: Florence Macarrubo by herself and on behalf of her 2 children files a complaint for disbarment against Edmundo Macarrubo alleging that Edmundo deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza. Florence further averred that Edmundo entered into a 3rd marriage with Josephine Constantino; and that he abandoned Florence without providing them w/ regular support. Edmundo denied the allegations, insisting instead that complainant Florence was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage, but that

Florence dragged Edmundo against his will to a 'sham wedding'. Edmundo submitted the decision of RTC declaring his marriage to complainant void ab initio. Edmundo claimed that he left complainant and their 2 children w/ her consent Issue: Whether or not Edmundo should be disbarred.. Held: Yes. Facts show that while Edmundo has a subsisting marriage with Helen Esparza whom he had 2 children, he entered into a2nd marriage with complainant. While the marriage between complainant Florence and Edmundo has been annulled by final judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of impropriety. Even assuming arguendo that Edmunod was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress has ceased after wedding day. Edmundo having freely cohabited with her and even begot a 2nd child. The decision of RTC annulling their marriage is not res judicata on the final resolution of this case. A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor criminal but is rather an investigation by the court on the conduct of its officers.

Wiegel v. Sempio Diy G.R. No. L-53703, August 19, 1986


Facts:
This is a petition to review the orders of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action before the court for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lilia Olivia Wiegel because there was a subsisting marriage between her and Eduardo A. Maxion. Lilia admitted said marriage but claims it is null and void because she and Eduardo were forced into the marriage. In the pretrial the issue agreed upon was the status of the previous marriage assuming there was force. Lilia asked the court for an opportunity to present evidence that the first marriage was vitiated by force and that her first husband was already married to someone else. Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of

evidence because the presence of force in the first marriage has already been agreed upon. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not there is ground for nullity of marriage RULING


The court found the marriage merely voidable and that there remains to be a ground for nullity of marriage. The marriage is just voidable because assuming there is force, it only falls under the Article 80 of the Civil Code wherein force is classified. This means that the marriage is valid until annulled. With this it can be said that there was a marriage subsisting when Lilia married Karl making their marriage void. The presentation of evidence with regard to the marriage of the first husband to another is also unnecessary because a marriage needs a judicial declaration of its nullity before it can be considered as a void marriage

Republic vs. Nolasco 220 SCRA 20, March 17, 1993


FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by securing another

seamans contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.

Republic v CA 227 SCRA 447


FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and

proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse. ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity HELD: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage. The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce

procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State. The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITACAMACHO and LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO G.R. No. 111717, October 24, 1994
Facts: Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3,1942. On February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958. There were instances during Luisita

and Aurelios marriage when, because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan. In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. He lived with her from June1968 until Aurelios death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioners daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelios son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year in 1976.On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moozca. In the deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his name, Aurelio was described as single. On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No.326681 was issued in petitioners name on January 11, 1985. On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio. In answer petitioner Nenita claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the property in question using their joint funds which they had accumulated after living together for fourteen years, that the sale of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with respondent Luisitas consent; and that she was a purchaser in good faith. Issues:

Whether the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita is valid.

Ruling: In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelios marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears. It has been held that the first exception refers to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the period of seven years had lapsed. This exception cannot be invoked in this case in order to sustain the validity of Aurelios marriage to Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the time of his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had already been living together as husband and wife for five years. In fact the couple begot a child, in 1961, even before their marriage in 1962. Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of

Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place. The sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioners ownership is evidenced by a deed of absolute sale 7 executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681issued in due course in her name. Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during along period of cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years(19681988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelios son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelios child by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.

Manuel v. People G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005


FACTS: Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that

Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of single in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTCs decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed. ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code. HELD: The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court ruled against the petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines VS. Bermudez Lorino G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005
Facts: Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in June 1987. The wife was unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker with violent attitude and character and had the propensity to go out with his friends to the point of being unable to work. In 1991 she left him and returned to her parents together with her three children. She went abroad to work for her support her children. From the time she left him, she had no communication with him or his relatives.

In 2000, nine years after leaving her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. The lower court issued an order for the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. In November 7, 2001, the RTC granted the summary petition. Although the judgment was final and executors under the provisions of Act. 247 of the Family Code, the OSG for the Republic of the Philippines filed a notice of appeal. Issue: Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Art 41 of the Family Code were duly established. Held: Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family Law, sets the tenor for cases scoured by these rules, to wit: Art238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceeding. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditions manner without regards technical rules. The judge of the RTC fully complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rending judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by the petitioner.

Calisterio-Armas v. Calisterio GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000


FACTS: Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of

Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds presumptive death. Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled. ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of presumptive death. HELD: The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrietas marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.

Domingo v CA G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993


FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home

from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage. Ruling:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, v. JUDGE FRANCISCO BRILLANTES, JR.,


A.M. No. MTJ-92-706. March 29, 1995. Facts: Petitioner Lupo Atienza alleged that he was living Yolanda De Castro and that they had two children. In December 1991, he saw Judge Franciso Brillantes, Jr., the respondent, sleeping on his bed. He was informed by the houseboy that he cohabited with De Castro. He did not bother on what he saw; he simply left the house and told the houseboy to take good care of his children.

Thereafter, respondent prevented him to visit his children. The former likewise alienated the affection of his children for him. While cohabiting with De Castro, the respondent was actually married to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children. He alleged that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before the mayor of a town in Nueva Ecija on April 25, 1965, it was not valid for there was no marriage license. Even when they had their second marriage ceremony, neither party applied for marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent leaving their children to his care and custody. Respondent then claimed that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Judge Brillantes and Zenaida Ongkiko is valid Ruling: No. However, there should be judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage before a party can enter into a second marriage as provided in Article 40 of the Family Code. The fact that he is already a lawyer, he then knew marriage license is necessary or a formal requisite before one can get married. He was given an opportunity to correct the flaw when he married Ongkiko for the second time but he failed to secure motives and bad faith.

JEM

RANDALL

Ong v. Ong
Facts: Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging

that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt. While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below. Issue: Whether or not the decree of legal separation should be granted. Ruling: The Supreme Court rendered decreeing the legal separation of plaintiff and defendant, with all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for which purpose the parties are hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make a just and proper division, such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.

Banez vs Banez Facts: On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez and respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their

conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the payment to petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken from petitioners share in the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common children within 15 days from receipt of the decision. In G.R. No. 132592, petitioner manifested that she no longer questions the Court of Appeals decision on the Mazda vehicle because respondent repossessed it. As to the residential house, she claimed that being conjugal in nature, justice requires that she and her children be allowed to occupy and enjoy the house considering that during the entire proceedings before the trial court, she did not have the chance to occupy it. Further, she posted a bond of P1,500,000 for the damages which respondent may suffer. In G.R. No. 133628, petitioner Aida Baez contends that an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. According to her, the filing of a record on appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is required in this case. She concludes that respondents appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period, as provided under Section 1-b, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or not an action for legal separation one where multiple appeals are allowed. Ruling: No. Petitions are denied. The Supreme Court was of the view that there is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. The Court noted that petitioner did not refute respondents allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather than the exception. In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not refute respondents allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinely, the rule rather than the exception.

Similarly, we are not persuaded that the P100,000 advance payment to petitioners counsel was properly granted. We see no justification to pre-empt the judgment by the Court of Appeals concerning said amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial courts judgment was already on appeal.

FROILAN GAUDIONCO, vs. HON. SENEN PENARANDA, G.R No. 79284. November 27, 1987
Facts: On 29 May 1986, Teresita Gaudionco, the legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gaudionco, filed with the RTC-Misamis Oriental, presided over by respondent Judge, Hon. Senen Penaranda, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of

concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. On 13 October 1986, Teresita Gaudionco also filed with the MTC-General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage. On 14 November 1986, an application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by Teresita Gaudionco in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge then ordered the payment of support pendente lite. The petitioner believes that the civil action for legal separation is grounded on concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage. He also alleges that the judge acted in abuse of discretion in ordering him for payment of support. Issue: Whether or not the ground is sufficient in this case? Ruling: In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as we find no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify.

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992

Facts: Jose Jo admits to cohabiting with 3 women and fathering 15 children. (wow) Prima Jo is allegedly the legal wife who has a daughter named Monina. Prima filed for separation of conjugal property and support. The TC ruled in favor of Prima in the support case but failed to

render a decision on the separation of property. Jose appealed, CA affirmed support but dismissed the separation of property for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code. Issue: Did the CA err in saying that (1) the judicial separation of conjugal property sought was not allowed under Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code and (2) no such separation was decreed by the TC- Jose says since the TC decision became final sorry nalang si Prima Ruling: The Court decided (2) first so even if Jose is correct in saying that the decision of the TC failed to state the separation the Court cant let technicality prevail over substantive issues so the Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment have become final. On (1) -The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. It held that an agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that the only remedy available to her was legal separation which will result in the termination of the conjugal partnership. Prima contends that CA misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She says that the agreement was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement ended in 1942, when she returned to him and he refused to accept her. Art. 128 which superseded Art. 178 states that the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without providing for one's family although able to do so. The acts of Jose in denying entry to the conjugal home to his wife as early as 1942 and consistently refusing to give support from 1968 constitutes abandonment.

Since Jose had abandoned her and their child she is entitled to ask for the dissolution of their property regime. Jose used a dummy to keep the properties from Prima but the Court said that these properties that should now be divided between them, on the assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. The division must include such properties properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered in the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

EDUARDO ARROYO J.R. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 96602. Nov. 19, 1991
Facts: On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda Sare and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m., they dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio City then proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium owned by the Neri spouses. At around 7 pm, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris' condominium. Jabunan opened the door for Arroyo

who immediately went knocked at the master's bedroom where accused Ruby Neri and her companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Neri's request, Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused alone in the masters bedroom. About forty-five minutes later, accused Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could already come down. The event was made known to Dr. Jorge Neri, husband of Ruby Neri, who thereafter, filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the RTC-Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo. Both the RTC and the CA found the two accused guilty of adultery. Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo filed for a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA. On appeal, both accused alleges the following: that they were into an illicit affair, however, they denied that they had sexual intercourse on November 2, 1982 which Dr. Neri claims; and finally, that a pardon had been extended by Dr. Neri, and that he had later contracted marriage with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Issue: Whether or not the pardon of Dr. Neri is tenable to free the two accused of their criminal liability? Ruling: The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: "Art.344-The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both parties, if they are both alive, or in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. In the present case, the compromise agreement stating the pardon given by Dr. Neri, was executed only on February 16, 1989, after the trial court had already rendered its decision dated December 17, 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Because of this, the said pardon is not sufficient to free the two accused namely Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo of the crime adultery.

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, vs. LEONILA GINEZ,

G.R No. L-10033. December 28, 1956


Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. At about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she

had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan. As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from his sister-in-law and some from anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. On cross-examination, Benjamin admitted that his wife also informed him by letter, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her. All these communications prompted him in to seek the advice of the navy legal department. In August, 1952, Benjamin went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of Leonilas godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of a cousin ofBenjamin, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left. After that and despite such belief, Benjamin still exerted efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings". On November 18, 1952, Benjamin filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against his wife, Leonila who filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After the issues were joined and convinced that reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case for hearing on June 9, 1953. Benjamin presented his evidences, but the counsel of Leonila moved for the dismissal of the complaint due to the fact that there was condonation. Both the RTC and CA believed that there was indee d condonation. Issue: Whether or not there has been condonation? Ruling: Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". It is to be noted, however, that in defendant's answer she vehemently and vigorously denies having committed any act of infidelity against her husband, and even if we were to give full weight to the testimony of the plaintiff, who was the only one that had the chance of testifying in Court and link such evidence with the averments of the complaint, we would have to conclude that the facts appearing on the record are far from sufficient to establish the charge of adultery preferred against the defendant. Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his sister-in-law, must have been too vague and indefinite as to defendant's infidelity to deserve its production in evidence; nor the anonymous letters which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that, according to plaintiff, his wife addressed to him admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose identity was not established, do not amount to anything that can be relied upon.

The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant-wife, reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife- all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. Although he believed that her wife committed adultery, he still persuaded her wife. It is important to note that a divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties continue to live together after it was known, or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery, or sleeping together for a single night, and many others. The resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to the contrary, from the fact of the living together as husband and wife, especially as against the husband. Because of this, the Supreme Court agreed with the RTC and CAs findings that there was indeed condonation on the part of Benjamin Bugayong, therefore, the foregoing case is hereby dismissed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIO BONDOC, G.R. No. L-3047. May 161951
Facts:

In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 to March 14, 1947. The defendant-wife entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948. On February 21, 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint. The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complaints must be deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously during the years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948 is within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Issue: Whether or not consent attended the case? Ruling: Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency; it is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the same person- the offended husband; the same status- the union of the husband and wife by their marriage; and the same community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status and society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime. In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not do another or other adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last act of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and for which the second complaint was filed.

Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, the paramour already knew that his codefendant was a married woman and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted, because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts. The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed and set aside, and the trial court is directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance with law.

JOSE DE OCAMPO, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960
Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children. In March 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man, plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city, defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation; to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation. The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be decreed due to the confession of judgment by the defendant. Issue: Whether or not pardon attended the case at bar? Ruling: The mere circumstance that defendant told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement. In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it; and proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion. Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place without collusion by the parties, according to the evidence. The Supreme Court does not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between this spouse. Costs of all instances against Serafina Florenciano.

SOCORRO MATUBIS, vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES, G.R. No. L-11766. October 25, 1960

Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement,the significant portions of which are hereunder reproduced: (a) That both of us relinquish our right over the other as legal husband and wife; (b) That both without any interference by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from our separation; (c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from my husband or any benefits he may received thereafter, nor I the husband is not entitled for anything from my wife; (d) That neither of us can claim anything from the other from the time we verbally separated, that is from May 30, 1944 to the present when we made our verbal separation into writing. In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting and deporting themselves as husband and wife who were generally reputed as such in the community with Asuncion Rebulado and on September 1, 1955, said Asuncion gave birth to their child. On April 24, 1956, plaintiff Socorro Matubis filed a complaint for legal separation Alleging abandonment and concubinage on the part of defendant. The RTC and CA dismissed the case due to the presence of condonation on the part of the plaintiff. Issue: Whether or not condonation attended the case? Ruling: The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that given by the trial judge. Counsel in his brief submits that the agreement is divided in two parts. The first part having to do with the act of living separately which he claims to be legal, and the second part, that which becomes a license to commit the ground for legal separation which is admittedly illegal. We do not agree in appellants defense. Condonation and consen t on the part of plaintiff are the most vital part in the said agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil Code) specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy. Plaintiff's counsel even agrees that the complaint should be dismissed. He claims however, that the grounds for the dismissal should not be those stated in the decision of the lower court, "but on the ground that plaintiff and defendant have already been legally separated from each other, but without the marital bond having been

affected, long before the effectivity of the new Civil Code." Again, we cannot subscribe to counsel's contention, because it is contrary to the evidence. Wherefore, the decisions of both RTC and CA are hereby affirmed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RODOLFO SCHNCKENBERGER, GR No. 48183. November 10, 1941

Facts: On Mach 16, 1926, the accused, Rodolfo Schneckenberger married the complainant Elena Cartegena and after 7 years of marital life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live separately from each other. And on May 25, 1935, they executed a document in which they agreed to live separately and to choose who they want to live with. On June 15, 1935, the accused, without leaving the Philippines, secured a divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his coaccused, Julia Medel. Complainant herein instituted 2 actions for Bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for concubinage in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in the conviction of the accused. On the trial of concubinage, accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed. But upon appeal by the fiscal, accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence. Hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting accused in the offense of concubinage? Ruling: As to appellants plea for double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the offense of bigamy for which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial are two distinct offenses in law and in fact as well as the mode of their prosecution. The celebration of the second marriage, with the first still existing, characterizes bigamy; in the present case, mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife characterizes concubinage. Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused clearly shows that each party intended to forego the illicit acts of the other. As the term pardon unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, consent must have been intended, agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. In arriving at this conclusion, we do not wish to be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. Wherefore, judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted in the crime of concubinage.

PEOPLE OF THE PILIPPINES, vs. URSULA SENSANO, G.R. No. 37720. March 7, 1933 Facts: Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. they had one child. Shortly after the birth of the child, the husband left his wife to go to Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, she struggled for an existence of herself and her son until the day she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to live with him. On the return of the husband in 1924, he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to 4 months and 1 day. After completing her sentence, the accused left her paramour. Thereafter, she begged for the husbands pardon and promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her back. He refused to pardon her or to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he would have nothing to do with her anymore and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her child went back to Marcelo Ramos. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her codefendant did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband. Thereafter, he left foe Hawaii where he remained from seven years completely abandoning his wife and child. On his return to the Philippines, he presented the second charge of adultery. Issue: Whether or not the second complaint would prosper? Ruling: We have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the interference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding. We cannot accept the argument that the 7 years of consent on his part in the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the Philippines during which period it was impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is not merit in the argument that it was impossible for him to take any action against the accused during the said 7 years. Wherefore, the judgment is reversed.

AGUEDA BENEDICTO, vs. ESTEBAN DELA RAMA, G.R. No. 1056. December 8, 1903
Facts: From the affidavit of the plaintiff is the following: that plaintiff and defendant had lived together from the time of their marriage in July 1891 to August 1892. It is also admitted that the defendant suddenly, without any previous warning, took his wife to the house of her parents, left her there, and never lived with her afterwards. She also charged defendant with having committed concubinage with Gregoria Bermejo in 1982. She produced no evidence to support this allegation. On the other hand, the defendant presented his counter-affidavit where he agreed on the time of their marriage. That on his return from an inspection of one of his estates, his wifes maid gave him a letter in the own handwriting of his wife which was directed to his lover, a Spanish corporal of the civil guard named Zabal. She admitted the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees, and implored him to pardon her. That same day, he took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred, and left her there. Respondent then filed for Legal Separation which was given by the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the Legal Separating filed by the respondent would prosper? Ruling: It is said that if the plaintiff is guilty, the defendant has condoned the offense. The wife can defeat the husbands suit by proving that he has pardoned her. Our conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled to Legal Separation. As conclusion of law from the foregoing facts, we hold that neither party is entitled to judgment of Legal Separation against the other. That judgment be entered that the plaintiff take nothing by her action.

WILLIAM H. BROWN, vs. JUANITA YAMBAO, G.R. No. L-10699. October 18, 1957
Facts: On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942-1945, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl; that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share, the complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage and that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable. The court subsequently directed the City Fiscal to investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between the parties. As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's action had prescribed under Article 102 of the same Code since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in 1955. Issue: Whether or not the prescription barred the success of the case? Ruling: ART. 100 of the New Civil Code states that The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation or of consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. It is clear in this court that the case should be dismissed because of Browns illegal act of cohabiting with another woman. This court also found, and correctly held that Browns action was already barred, because he did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's

adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one 1 year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause; and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy sought, it becomes unnecessary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part. The decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint is therefore affirmed.

JOSE DE OCAMPO, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960
Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children. In March 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man, plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city, defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation; to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation. The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be decreed due to the confession of judgment by the defendant. Issue: Whether or not the petition will not prosper? Ruling: Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk. In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion. Moreover, Art. 102 of the New Civil Code stating that an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one 1 year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause; and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. This court decided that the 1-year requirement was followed. The instance when plaintiff caught his wife in

1955 with another man was deemed to be start of the 1-year requirement period. Since he filed on that same year-1955, he properly followed the above stated provision. Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between this spouse. Costs of all instances against Serafina Florenciano.

ELENA CONTRERAS, vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG, G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970
Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of Quiapo, Manila. Out of their Marriage, three children were born. Immediately before the election of 1961, defendant was employed as manager of the printing establishment owned by plaintiff's father known as the MICO Offset. In that capacity, defendant met and came to know Lily Ann Alcala, who place orders with MICO Offset for propaganda materials for Mr. Sergio Osmea, who was then a Vice-Presidential candidate. After the elections of 1961, defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent at Malacaang. He began to be away so often and to come home very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was out on a series of confidential missions. In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned to the conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report from defendant in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also received rumors that defendant was seen with a woman who was on the family way on Dasmarias St., she was so happy that defendant again return to the family home in May, 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. All this while, defendant, if and whenever he returned to the family fold, would only stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period of about a month. After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify the reports. The latter was driven by Lubos to the house in Singalong and between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock that afternoon, she saw defendant was carrying a baby in his arms. Mrs. Antioquia then went to the parish priest of Singalong where she inquired about the child of Cesar Macaraig and Lily Ann Alcala and she was given a copy of the baptismal certificate of Maria Vivien Mageline Macaraig which she gave to plaintiff sometime in October 1963. Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his family. Mr. Macaraig; however, Macaraig refused. In November 1963, plaintiff requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, and the latter obliged and arranged a meeting at her home in Buendia between plaintiff and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann said she was willing to give up defendant as she had no desire to be accused criminally but it was defendant who refused to break relationship with her. In the early part of December 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children went to talk to defendant at his place of work. Plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and

to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family. On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation. When defendant did not interpose any answer after he was served summons, the case was referred to the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of the Civil Code. After a report was received from Asst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Pearanda that he believed that there was no collusion present, plaintiff was allowed to present her evidence. Defendant has never appeared in this case. The RTC and CA dismissed the complaints because it failed to follow Article 102 of the New Civil Code providing that an action for legal separation cannot be instituted except within one year after plaintiff "became cognizant of the cause." Issue: Whether or not the rule on Prescription should be followed? Ruling: The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its status. In the instant action, the Court has to find that plaintiff became cognizant of defendant's infidelity in September, 1962. Plaintiff made successive attempts to induce the husband to amend his erring ways but failed. Her desire to bring defendant back to the connubial fold and to preserve family solidarity deterred her from taking timely legal action. The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or from December 1963. Computing the period of one year from the former date, it is clear that plaintiff's complaint filed on December 14, 1963 came a little too late. The period of "five years from after the date when such cause occurred" is not here involved.

Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month of September 1962, whatever knowledge appellant had acquired regarding the infidelity of her husband, that is, of the fact that he was then living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala, was only through the information given to her by the driver of their family car. Much as such hearsay information had pained and anguished her, she apparently thought it best, and no reasonable person may justifiably blame her for it, not to go deeper into the matter herself because in all probability even up to that time, notwithstanding her husband's obvious neglect of his entire family, appellant still cherished the hope, however forlorn, of his coming back home to them. Indeed, when her husband returned to the conjugal home the following October, she purposely refrained from bringing up the matter of his marital infidelity "in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away." True, appellant likewise heard in April 1963 rumors that her husband was seen with a woman on the family way on Dasmarias Street, but failed again to either bring up the matter with her husband or make attempts to verify the truth of said rumors, but this was due, because "she was so happy that defendant again returned to the family home in May 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away." As a matter of fact, notwithstanding all these painful information which would not have been legally sufficient to make a case for legal separation, appellant still made brave, desperate attempts to persuade her husband to come back home. In the words of the lower court, she "entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his family" and also "requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul" for the same purpose, but all that was of no avail. Her husband remained stubborn. After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December 1963 when plaintiff, accompanied by their two children went to talk to defendant where she pleaded but however was refused by the defendant. From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is hereby rendered holding that appellant is entitled to legal separation.

LUIS MA. ARANETA, vs. HON. HERMOGENES CONCECPCION, G.R No. L-9667. July 31, 1956
Facts: The main action was brought by petitioner against his wife for legal separation on the ground of adultery. Defendant filed an omnibus petition alleging that she was being molested and harassed, to secure custody of their three minor children and a monthly support of P5, 000.00. Plaintiff opposed the petition, denying the allegation and further alleging that defendant has abandoned the children; alleging that conjugal properties were only worth P80,000.00, not 1 million pesos as alleged by defendant; also alleging that defendant had abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children the love, respect and care of a true mother and without means to educate them. The RTC granted the custody of the children to defendant. Issue: Whether the cooling-off period is tenable in the case at bar? Ruling: It is conceded that the period of six months fixed in Art. 103 is evidently intended as a cooling-off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another. Take the case at bar for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim of adultery supported by circumstantial evidence the authenticity of which cannot be denied? And why assume that the children are in the custody of the wife when it is precisely alleged in the petition and affidavits that she has abandoned the conjugal home? Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to the custody and alimony pendent elite may be lawfully exercised. The rule is that all provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if necessary. Thus, the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling-off period.

ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, G.R. No. L-53880. March 17, 1994
Facts: On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage as well as for legal separation between her husband Enrico L. Pacete. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on April 30, 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a child named; that Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on August 1, 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and the name of Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita; that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were served with summons on November 15, 1979. They filed a motion for an extension of 20 days within which to file an answer. The court granted the motion. On the due date, the defendants again asked for a second extension which was again granted by the court. Again, on the agreed due date, defendants asked for another 15-day extension which was however denied by the court. Initial proceedings using the evidence only of Concepcion followed thereafter. On 17 March 1980, the court through the Hon. Glicerio Carriga promulgated the herein questioned decision namely: the valid issuance of the legal separation between Concepcion and Enrico Pacete and declaring the subsequent marriage between Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion to be void ab initio. Because of this, Enrico Pacete filed a special action of certiorari questioning the period of trial by the Hon. Carriaga. Issue: Whether or not the cooling-off period is mandatory? Ruling: Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.

It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedy, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. The 6months period is clear in this court to have been followed by the RTC judge. Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the proceedings are Nullified and Set Aside. No costs.

SAMSON T. SABALONES, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
Facts: As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years. Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children but to Thelma Cumareng whom he conducted a second marriage on October 1981 and their three children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at Greenhills, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income. Private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children. She also informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate residence. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share. After trial, the court decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife. This decision was appealed to the CA. Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to command the petitioner from interfering with the administration of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. After hearing, the CA granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife. The petitioner argues that since the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other. Issue: Whether or not the courts erred in their decision? Ruling: The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61 states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator. While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties. That designation was in effect approved by the CA when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge. The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the

things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the private respondent has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its management. Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code. Wherefore, the petition is denied.

REYNALDO ESPIRITU, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 115640. March 15, 1995
Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu who was employed by the National Steel Corporation and respondent Teresita Masauding who was a nurse, first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles to work as a nurse. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, to Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16 1986, their daughter was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child was born on January 12, 1988. The couple decided to separate sometime in 1990. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims however, the she keeps in constant touch with her children. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo had filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings to gain custody over the children. The RTC suspended Teresita's parental authority and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority. On appeal, the CA however gave custody to Teresita. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in suspending petitioners parental authority? Ruling: Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover the choice of the children and rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply followed statutory presumptions and general propositions applicable to ordinary or common situations. A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita is more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interest and welfare of her children. While the bonds between a mother and her children are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering,

pride and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration. The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a future character and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined. Decision should be based on the testimony of the daughter giving all negative characteristics about her mother. Teresita. Moreover, the court finds Teresita being as she entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the house of petitioner Reynaldo in Pennsylvania. The record shows that the daughter suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and the children. The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear front the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the First paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, vs. EUFEMIO SY UY, G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
Facts: On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married on September 30, 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok. But before the trial could be completed Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on May 31, 1969. On June 9, 1969, Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. On June 26, 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz Both the RTC and CA denied the substitution. Issue: Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? Ruling: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself. A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a

more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. Accordingly, the decision of both the RTC and the CA are hereby affirmed.

Laperal vs. Republic GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962


FACTS: The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband. HELD: In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372. Petition was dismissed.

SIOCHI V. GOZON 18 March 2010


Facts: This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land (property)registered in the name of the Spouses Gozon. Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, while the legal separation case was still pending. Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. They stipulated that Alfredo was to remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the land excluded from the legal separation case and to secure an affidavit from the wife Elvira that the property was the exclusive property of Alfredo. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993. Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally separated. As regards the property, the RTC declared it conjugal. Alfredo also executed a deed of donation over the said property in favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating the notice of lis pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million. Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of Mario. CA affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to Elvira. IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value. ISSUE: Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO. Was Alfredos share in the conjugal property already forfeited in favour of their daughter by virtue of the decree of legal separation? NO.

HELD: This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn. We disagree with the CA when it held that the share of Alfredo in the conjugal partnership was already forfeited in favour of the daughter. Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.

With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the property.

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
Facts: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of 30 years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had 6 children. On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months in Antipolo City. The children alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug. As a consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated. On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Makati. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano Ilusorio due to his advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. She alleged that respondents refused petitioners demands to see and visit her husband. The CA denied petitioners motion. Issue: Whether or not a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? Ruling: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices

revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the CA that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. Wherefore, this court affirms the decision of the CA, however, it nullifies the decision insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio.

MARIANO ARROYO, vs. DOLORES VAZQUEZ DE ARROYO, G.R No. 17014. August 11, 1921
Facts: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage in 1910 and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they lived together as husband and wife until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with the intention to live separately from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, an action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The wife answered that she had left her husbands home without his consent because of the cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Upon hearing the cause, the lower court gave judgment in favor of the wife, authorizing her to live apart from her husband. They concluded that the husband was more to blame than the wife and that his continued ill-treatment was a sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in their judgment favoring the wife? Ruling: To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in Art. 142 and 143 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, it has been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode, she can, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties and the society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife. From this consideration, it follows that provisions should be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. We are therefore hold that Mariano Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute return of the wife to the marital domicile. He is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. Therefore, reversing the judgment of the lower court, it is declared that Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and that she is admonished that it is her duty to return.

ELOISA GOITIA Y DELA CAMARA, vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA,


Facts: This is an action by the wife against the husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. Eloitia Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married on January 7, 1915 and established residence at San Marcelino where they lived together for one month because the wife returned to the home of her parents due to the following reasons: that the husband demand wife to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that whenever wife rejected husbands indecorous demands, husband would maltreat wife by words and inflict injuries on wifes lips, face and different parts of her body; and that because wife was unable to desist husbands repugnant desires and maltreatment, she was obliged to leave the conjugal home. The wife also seeks for support from his husband even if she lives separately. The husband on the other hand, seeks the relief of the courts in compelling his wife to return back to their conjugal home. Issue: Whether or not the wife is compelled to return to the marital dwelling? Ruling: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the legal existence is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of the society as well as the parties. Marriage is an institution and its maintenance is in its purity which the public is deeply interested. In the case at bar, when the continuance of the marriage becomes intolerable to one or both parties and gives no possible good to the community, relief from the court should be attainable. The Supreme Court made the observation that implied approval by the court of a wifes separate residence from her husband doe not necessarily violate the sacredness and inviolability of the marriage. Since separation de-facto is allowed in this case, it is only due to the fact that public peace and wifes purity must be preserved. Lastly, the husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take the advantage of her departure to abrogate his duty to still support his wife. In law, the wife is legally still within the conjugal domicile, even if living separately, thus he is entitled to support and maintenance by the husband.

PASTOR TANCHAVEZ, vs. VICENTA ESCANO, G.R. No. L-19671. November 29, 1965
Facts: On February 24, 1948, Vicenta Escano and Pastor Tanchavez got married and the marriage was unknown to the parents of Vicenta. The said marriage was solemnized by Lt. Lavares, an Army Catholic Chaplain. Their marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil registrar. Upon the knowledge of the parents of Vicenta, they took her to their house. Consequently, she admitted her marriage with Tanchavez. Her parents were surprised because Tanchavez never asked for the hand of Vicenta and were disgusted because of the great scandal because of the clandestine marriage would provoke. Thereafter, Vicenta continued to live with her parents, while tanchavez returned to Manila to his job. As of June 1948, the newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta filed a petition to annul her marriage; however, she did not sign the said document. Thus, the case was dismissed because of her non- appearance at the hearing. In 1950, Vicenta left for United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce. And on October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce, final and absolute was issued. In 1954, Vicenta married an American and she lived with him and begotten children. Issue: Whether or not Vicenta failed to perform her wifely duties. Ruling: It was held that the refusal to perform her wifely duties and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through he fault. Thus, the husband is entitled for indemnity.

DIOSDIDIT CUENCA, et al, vs RESTITUTO CUENCA, et al No. L-72321. December 8, 1988 Facts: Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon- Cuenca were legally married, begotten two children, Restituto and Meladora as their heirs. Maria Bangahon brought properties into her marriage. Said property was inherited by her from her parents. However, Agrapi had a second family who claimed to be the legitimate family of Agrapino. Thus, they claimed that the said properties are the conjugal property of Agrapino and Engracia, second wife. The trial court decided in favor of the second family. However, the Court of Appeals decided otherwise and thus favored the first family. Issue: Whether or not the said property of Maria is the conjugal property of Agripino and Engracia. Ruling: The Court held that, the said property an exclusive property of Maria which she inherited from her parents and brought it to the marriage. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Thus, heirs of Maria were able to prove that that said property is the exclusive property of their mother Maria. On the other hand, Engracia failed to prove otherwise.

JANE GO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 114791. May 29, 1997
Facts: Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1987. The video coverage of the wedding was provided by the petitioner spouses Nancy and Alex Go. Spouses Ong claimed the video of their wedding three times but they failed to have it. Because the newlywed couple will be having their honeymoon in US, they agreed to have the video tape upon their return. When the couple came home, they found out that the said tape had been erased by spouses Go. Furious at the lost of the tape which suppose to be the only record of their wedding. Thus, they filed a complaint. The RTC rendered its decision making spouses Go liable to the said erased tape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Issue: Whether or not Alex Go be held liable. Ruling: The Court held that, Alex Go argues that when his wife entered into the contract with Ong, she was acting alone for her sole interest. Thus, they found it with merit. Under the law, a wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. Thus, it was only Nancy Go who entered into the contract. She is solely liable to the complainant for the damage awarded.