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Team 5 NOTES
Steve Emerson, Executive Director, The Investigative Project
4/25/03, TE, SG, JKR
Topic: General views on Mamicist terrorists and anti-terrorist immigration practices

Public information on immigration issues and 9/11 terrorists

Joe Mowbry, National Review
Center for Immigration Reform (right of center) reports/articles

Potential interviewees:
Fake ssn's - Gordon Kromberg, AUSA, Northern VA, 703-299-3721
Fake credentials, passports - Rick Congretino, [former?] AUSA, Detroit
Terrorist entry - Bill West, former-[former?] INS inspector Miami
Terrorist entry - Jim Goldman, [former?] INS inspector Miami
Terrorist entry, Tom Hampson, INS Border Patrol, Miami
9/11 Terrorist associates, document fraud - Jim Savage, USSS
Terrorist entry, Canada - Scott Newark, Chief of Staff to Bob Runciman, chief of
security, Ontario
DOJ Michael Chertoff - Halloween massacre re: locating terrorists [?]

Topics mentioned:
1. fake ssn's 10 million a year. Among Moslems [?], 500k. A problem Not a
priority for SSAdministration.
2. Islamic militants in the U.S. Many currently here have connections with known
terrorists - a couple of hundred -- and are likely dangerous and should be acted
upon: a serious problem. Video shown to AG Ashcroft - shows two sides of U.S.
mosque mullahs - moderate face/language to the general public and U.S. political
leaders, violence in rhetoric in the mosques and at Islamic events attended.
Emerson's view: wholesale, serious deception.
3. Domestic law enforcement investigative response. Much improved. Improved
penetration. Improved surveillance.
4. Border —Islamic militants entering the U.S. Still happening: Canada, Florida.
5. Border —Canadian visa loophole. If have Canadian visa from Saudi Arabia, can
get visa for US at the border
6. Border/internal —Foreign source intelligence. Not enough critical mass to rely
upon it, but clearly useful. Needs more attention to fully exploit it for visas and
border controls. [?]
7. Islamicist terrorist recruitment. A. Increased domestic recruitment
foreseeable. B. Problem: virtual camps, e.g. website hosted in CharlottesviHe NC.
B. Continuing international recruitment from foreign training camps: Chechnya,
Kashmir, Phillipines, Indonesia
8. Domestic law enforcement capability and response. Problem in length of time
- at least 6 months - and the legal standard required, for deporting foreign
Islamicist terrorists. Examples:
Al Ashkar, Howard U professor;
Ackmed Usef;
Adam Hassan
[Wagdi Hamen, Hamas?]

9. Alien Terrorist Removal Court. Not being used, [why not discussed]
10. FBI information sharing. Improved in the immediate aftermath but cooperative
spirit dissipated after 6 months. Sharing and cooperation vary by field office and
hq does not control this. Washington Field Office poor in this respect.
11. Foreign student entry and tracking. Entry significantly tightened, but how
much more enforcement is not clear.
12. Prosecutorial and investigative resources, impact on deterrence. Full blown
resources at the border deprive prosecutors of experienced investigators, which
reduces number of prosecutions (criminal, immigration) and results in increases in
the number of active domestic terrorists, due to lack of deterrence.
13. Threat from Al Qa'ida. Significant progress against command and control. Bin
Laden quarantined. Likely to take on soft targets outside the U.S.
14. Threat from other Islamicist terrorists. Threat is there from
individual/personal jihadists, like the man who attacked the El Al counter at LAX.
15. Enforcement proposal. Need for integrative intelligence/investigative teams,
centrally and regionally, perhaps 10 per team.
16. Politics, civil liberties. Attacks on enforcement actions and NSEERS on civil
liberties grounds (e.g. Sen. Feinstein) are misguided and dangerous when it comes
to terrorists, and should be resisted.
17. Needed steps. Better intelligence coordination and sharing. Amendments to the
Patriot Act and FISA authority. INS - which would be BICE - needs more
experts and analysts. Deportation process needs to be made less onerous
generally - time and costs, which reduce usage of deportation authority.

Requests by Team 5 to Steve Emerson and Matt Epstein:

A. Any immigration related information on the 19 9/11 terrorists

B. Immigration related information about current terrorists in the U.S. (named
C. (to Matt) List of areas where the IP thinks there are problems that need to be
addressed - [to expand or confirm list in 17 above].
Mt Tlie Investigative Project
5505 Connecticut Avenue, NW Phone:(202
No}41 Fax:(202
Washington,DC 20015-2601 E-mail:SAE7




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