ABRIDGED

BEFORE THE CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF

AN APPLICATION BY CANADIAN NETWORK OPERATORS CONSORTIUM INC.

(APPLICANT)

PURSUANT TO PART I OF THE CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE AND SECTIONS 24, 25, 27, 32, 47 AND 55 OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT DIRECTED TO

COGECO CABLE INC., ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS PARTNERSHIP, SHAW CABLESYSTEMS G.P. AND VIDEOTRON G.P.

(RESPONDENTS)

TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF WHOLESALE HIGH-SPEED ACCESS SERVICES THE RESPONDENTS PROVIDE TO INDEPENDENT INTERNET SERVICES PROVIDERS

27 SEPTEMBER 2013

ABRIDGED

Table of Contents Page 1.0  INTRODUCTION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF (SUMMARY OF THE APPLICATION) ..................................................................................................................1  1.1  1.2  Introduction ..............................................................................................................1  Request for relief......................................................................................................3  1.2.1  Two classes of relief are requested ..............................................................3  1.2.2  Specific orders requested .............................................................................3  1.2.3  Quality of service indicators and a rate rebate plan .....................................6  The remedies sought by CNOC are consistent with Canadian law .......................12  Structure of this Application ..................................................................................12  Confidentiality claim .............................................................................................13 

1.3  1.4  1.5  2.0 

THE TPIA LIFE-CYCLE AND RELATED SERVICE ISSUES .....................................14  2.1  2.2  2.3   Introduction ............................................................................................................14  ISP application for TPIA service ...........................................................................16  Ordering and provisioning .....................................................................................18  2.3.1  New TPIA order installation process .........................................................18  2.3.2  Installation windows ..................................................................................20  2.3.3  Tagging TPIA cable connections ...............................................................22  Troubleshooting and repair ....................................................................................22  2.4.1  TPIA repair process ...................................................................................22  2.4.2  Trouble ticket status ...................................................................................24  2.4.3  Repair windows .........................................................................................24  2.4.4  Escalation procedures ................................................................................25  Network maintenance and modifications...............................................................26  2.5.1  Network routing .........................................................................................26  2.5.2  Reducing the impact of single points of failure .........................................26  2.5.3  Network modifications...............................................................................26  2.5.4  IP address allocation ..................................................................................29  2.5.5  IPv6 implementation and rollout strategies ...............................................31  Billing ....................................................................................................................32  Disconnection ........................................................................................................33  Remedies sought by CNOC ...................................................................................34 

2.4 

2.5 

2.6  2.7  2.8  3.0 

SPECIFIC RELIEF REQUESTED TO RESOLVE CERTAIN TPIA LIFE-CYCLE SERVICE ISSUES.............................................................................................................35  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.4  Introduction ............................................................................................................35  Delays in the TPIA service sign-up process must be reduced ...............................36  Installation and repair processes require some general improvements ..................36  Installation and repair processes need some additional specific improvements where a technician dispatch is required .................................................................38 

ABRIDGED 3.5  Improvements are required in Carrier network survivability, as well as procedures relating to network maintenance, modifications and related TPIA customer notifications............................................................................................................40  Improvements are required in Carrier invoices and invoicing processes ..............43 

3.6  4.0  

QUALITY OF SERVICE INDICATORS AND RATE REBATE PLAN: FRAMEWORK AND CONSIDERATIONS ...............................................................................................45  4.1  4.2  4.3  Introduction ............................................................................................................45  Guiding Principles .................................................................................................46  Company-wide and competitor-specific indicators ...............................................48  4.3.1   Why both types of indicators are necessary ...............................................48  4.3.2  Company-wide Q of S indicators...............................................................50  4.3.3  Competitor-specific indicators relating to installations .............................52  4.3.4  Competitor-specific indicators relating to repair .......................................59  4.3.5  Competitor-specific indicators relating to disconnections .........................65  The Rate Rebate Plan .............................................................................................67  4.4.1  The proposed structure of the Rate Rebate Plan ........................................67  4.4.2  Frequency of reporting and rebates............................................................68  4.4.3  Repeat failure mechanism ..........................................................................68  4.4.4.  Other aspects of the TPIA RRP .................................................................71 

4.4 

5.0 

THE RELIEF SOUGHT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THE POLICY DIRECTION ............................................72  5.1.   5.2.  The relief sought in the Application promotes the Telecommunications Policy Objectives ..............................................................................................................72  The relief Sought in the Application is consistent with the Policy Direction ........72 

6.0.  7.0  8.0 

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................74  LIST OF PARTIES SERVED ...........................................................................................75  NOTICE .............................................................................................................................76 

ii

ABRIDGED

1.0

INTRODUCTION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF (SUMMARY OF THE APPLICATION) Introduction

1.1

1.

Canadian Network Operators Consortium Inc. (“CNOC”) is bringing this application

(“Application”) pursuant to part I of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure1 (“Rules”) and sections 25, 27, 32, 47 and 55 of the Telecommunications Act2 (“Act”). In the Application, CNOC seeks improvements to the quality of the wholesale high-speed access services (“WHSAS”) provided in the form of Third Party Internet Access (“TPIA”) services by Cogeco Cable Inc. (“Cogeco”), Rogers Communications Partnership (“Rogers”), Shaw Cablesystems G.P. (“Shaw”) and Videotron G.P. (“Videotron”) (collectively “Cable Carriers” or “Carriers”) to independent Internet service providers (“ISPs”) such as the members of CNOC. In this Application, the term “ISP” is used to refer to wholesale TPIA customers of one or more Carriers and the terms “end-user” or “end customer” refer to the customers of ISPs, unless otherwise noted.

2.

In this Application, CNOC seeks certain orders more particularly described below to

improve the robustness of the regulatory regime related to the provision of TPIA services by the Cable Carriers.

3.

This is necessary because ISPs, who are members of CNOC, are being treated in an

unduly discriminatory manner by the Carriers relative to the manner that the Carriers treat their own retail operations, contrary to section 27(2) of the Act. The vastly inferior treatment to which ISPs are being subjected, which is described in this Application, is present at all stages of the TPIA service life cycle. The result is a very poor quality of service that detrimentally and unfairly affects the reputation of ISPs that rely on TPIA services to provide high-speed Internet access and related services to their end-users.

1 2

SOR/2010-277, 30 November 2010. S.C. 1993, c. 38, as amended.

ABRIDGED 4. If this situation is allowed to persist, the very legitimacy of the TPIA platform as a means

of promoting competition in the provision of retail Internet access and other high-speed services will be irreparably diminished. Such an outcome will ultimately lead to an undue lessening of competition in the provision of the retail services that the TPIA platform is meant to support. That outcome is clearly not in the interest of consumers, or in the broader public interest.

5.

Based on these considerations, CNOC is seeking a set of remedies from the Commission

to compel the Carriers to provide a level of service that will allow the TPIA regime to fulfill the Canadian telecommunications policy objectives of the Act3 in a manner that is consistent with the Policy Direction4, to the greater benefit of Canadian consumers and society.

6.

It was not without significant consideration, that CNOC came to the conclusion that the

remedies proposed herein are required. Various CNOC members have tried to work collaboratively with Carriers for some time to address the issues underlying this Application, but those efforts have not met with sufficient success to prevent the type of undue discrimination described in the Application from continuing to occur. It is unclear to CNOC whether in any given case, the problem results from willfulness, or mere indifference on the part of the Carriers in providing TPIA services. At the end of the day, motive and intent do not matter. The important thing is that the conduct described in the Application has the anti-competitive effect of conferring an undue preference in favour of the Carriers and unjustly discriminating against ISPs that rely on TPIA services.

7. basis.

For all of these reasons, remedial action by the Commission is required on an urgent

3 4

The telecommunications policy objectives are set out in section 7 of the Act. Order Issuing a Direction to the CRTC on Implementing the Canadian Telecommunications Policy Objectives, P.C. 2006-1534, 14 December 2006, SOR/2006-355, Canada Gazette Part II, Vol. 140. No. 26, 27 December 2006 (“Policy Direction”).

2

ABRIDGED 1.2 Request for relief

1.2.1 8.

Two classes of relief are requested

In this Application, CNOC requests two classes of relief. The first class consists of a

number of specific directives aimed at the Carriers. These directives can be implemented on a one-time going forward basis to correct certain deficiencies in the manner in which TPIA service is provided.

9.

The second class of relief consists of the implementation of a regime for the ongoing

monitoring of certain service levels associated with the provision of TPIA services. More specifically, CNOC is seeking the implementation of a monitoring regime that involves the application of a number of quality of service (“Q of S”) indicators, coupled with a rate rebate plan (“RRP”) for TPIA.

1.2.2 10.

Specific orders requested

Under the first class of relief, CNOC is requesting that the Commission make an order

directing the Carriers:  To provide a potential TPIA customer the full documentation package required by the potential customer to sign up for TPIA service within three (3) weeks of a request for the documentation package, and to start the TPIA provisioning process for that party within a further three (3) weeks of receipt of all required executed documentation; 

To provide a detailed service qualification database by postal code that is updated by the Carrier at least monthly, with this activity being referred to the CRTC Interconnection Steering Committee (“CISC”) for further implementation;

To make the same tools that they use to troubleshoot their retail end-users’ connections and cable modems available to TPIA customers;

3

ABRIDGED  To provide meaningful details and status updates regarding installation orders and trouble tickets, including their causes and resolutions; 

To implement a full, business hour and non-business hour escalation process and chart with support tiers that includes reliable contact information for Carrier staff who can be reached using real time communications methods in case of network outages to assist in the timely resolution of network issues;

To require each Carrier to prohibit its employees or contractors from marketing the Carrier’s services or trying to convince end-users to switch to the Carrier’s retail services when a TPIA customer’s end-user contacts the Carrier to inquire about an outstanding TPIA repair issue;

To provide ISPs access to a Carrier’s technician dispatch staff when installation or repair technicians do not show up for a scheduled appointment or attempt to change the window for an installation or repair on the actual day that the activity is scheduled to occur;

To insert a provision in their tariffs requiring them to tag all TPIA connections whenever a TPIA end-user installation requires a premise visit by a Carrier technician;

To require each Carrier to prohibit its technicians from marketing the Carrier’s services or trying to convince end-users to switch to the Carrier’s retail services in conjunction with a TPIA installation or repair activities;

To require Carriers to implement network safeguards such as the use of a network fault detection protocol (e.g., Bidirectional Forward Detection (“BFD”) so that traffic can be routed around connection failures between a Carrier and an ISP when router equipment at either end is not aware of the failure;

To require Carriers to implement efficient protection, where practicable, to reduce the impact of single points of failures in their TPIA network designs; 4

ABRIDGED

To provide advance notification to ISPs of all changes that affect a competitor's use or potential use of Carrier bottleneck functions,5 and that such changes would include technical changes to interconnection interfaces, as well as changes to network functions (including new functions) that could be used to provide competitive services, with such notification occurring at the time a Carrier makes the decision to proceed with a change, or 6 months before the proposed change, whichever is earlier – for greater certainty, this would include, without limitation, such matters as frequency changes affecting the TPIA service, implementation of Data over Cable Service Interface Specification (“DOCSIS”) or other standard upgrades by geographic area, cable modem firmware upgrades, changes that could require the deployment of additional IP addresses to serve the ISPs’ end-users (with a corresponding analysis of that additional demand and when it will need to satisfied);6

To provide disclosure of terminal interface specifications for the Carriers' bottleneck services - for greater certainty, this would include, without limitation, all matters that could impair the continued operation of cable modems already certified for use on a Carrier’s network;7

To prohibit Carriers from restricting TPIA customers from advising their end users of any Carrier bottleneck functions (as described above), terminal-to-network interfaces, as well as reasons for TPIA service outages and remedial actions taken by a Carrier to address the outages, notwithstanding the non-disclosure provisions of TPIA Agreements.

5

6

7

In competition law and economics, bottleneck functions are those functions (including other assets, facilities and/or services) that are non-duplicable on a commercial basis within a reasonable time scale. Thus a competitor that does not possess those functions itself is dependent on access to the bottleneck functions that an incumbent has in order to provide services that compete downstream (e.g., at the retail level) with those of an incumbent. Last mile connections to end-user constitute one example of bottleneck functions. This is the same approach taken by the Commission in Re: Notification of Network Changes, Terminal-toNetwork Interface Disclosure Requirements and Procedures for the Negotiation and Filing of Service Arrangements, Telecom Letter Decision CRTC 94-11, 4 November 1994 (“Telecom Letter Decision CRTC 9411” or “TLD 94-11”) to prevent incumbent local exchange carriers from providing an undue preference to themselves with respect to network changes and terminal-to-network interface disclosure. See, supra, note 6.

5

ABRIDGED  To provide TPIA customers the latest versions of the Carriers’ roll out plans to implement the IPv6 Internet Protocol (“IP”) addressing scheme once every quarter, until such implementation has been completed; 

To provide their TPIA customers daily reports generated during peak hours (e.g., between 8 and 11 P.M. local time) that show the number of IP addresses allocated to DHCP by IP pool and the number of IP addresses actually in use by end-users by IP pool;

To provide all of the billing details set out in Attachment “A” to the Application on their TPIA invoices, to invoice at the same time every month, to provide invoices in Excel spreadsheet format, and to ensure that the details on the invoices are set out clearly by customer, using plain language, and without obscure codes or layouts; and

To commence work on the provision of TPIA invoicing information in Open Data Protocol (“OData”) format via customer portals, with this activity being referred to CISC for further implementation.

1.2.3 11.

Quality of service indicators and a rate rebate plan

The Q of S and RRP regime proposed by CNOC is based on the Q of S and RRP

framework already approved by the Commission for local voice services in Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-208 (“TD 2005-20”). CNOC is of the view that many aspects of the TD 2005-20 framework are directly transferable to the present context, including: the Guiding Principles of the voice RRP framework, the core formula of the RRP, the frequency of reporting and rebates and procedure for audits, disputes and non-compliance. CNOC’s proposal includes some additional tweaks to the TD 2005-20 regime to address specific problems relating to the delivery of TPIA.

8

Finalization of quality of service rebate plan for competitors, Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-20, 31 March 2005 (“TD 2005-20”).

6

ABRIDGED 12. The regime includes four company-wide Q of S indicators, nine competitor-specific

leading indicators and four competitor-specific trailing indicators. The trailing indicators are modeled upon similar indicators that were included in the TD 2005-20 local voice RRP. Trailing or secondary Q of S indicators are paired with main or primary (i.e., leading) competitor-specific indicator. When a Carrier fails to meet the standard of a main Q of S indicator, the trailing indicator becomes active and captures the Carrier’s ability to satisfy the main indicator within a given time frame after the original due date.

13.

In order for the proposed RRP to create an incentive for Carriers to adhere to standards

for wholesale installations that are the same as the standards they apply to their own retail operations, the measurement methods for a number of the Q of S indicators should employ the retail service standards adopted by the Carriers as the reference point for the definition of the corresponding Q of S indicators. Otherwise, the Carriers could circumvent the indicators (and the financial consequences of the RRP for non-compliance in the case of competitor-specific indicators) simply by booking wholesale activity windows that are excessively long relative to the corresponding retail activity windows. Under such a scenario, as long as the wholesale windows are not missed the indicator would be considered to have been met, even though Carriers’ wholesale customers would be significantly disadvantaged compared to their retail operations and that would defeat the purpose of the proposed Q of S indicator and RRP regime. For this reason, it is essential for retail standard intervals to be embedded in a number of the proposed competitor-specific Q of S indicators.

14.

There are also some differences in the activities to be measured in the TPIA life-cycle as

compared to the local voice regime, due to the different services and functions that incumbents provide in each case. The Q of S indicators and RRP regime proposed herein have taken account of these differences, which is why the proposal made herein is not exactly the same as what the Commission adopted in TD 2005-20 for local voice services. In fact, the proposal in this Application contains a fewer number of indicators than the number authorized in TD 2005-20. However, every attempt has been made to mirror the Commission’s determinations from that decision in the proposal made by CNOC to the greatest extent practicable.

7

ABRIDGED 15. As noted, CNOC is proposing that the Commission adopt four company-wide Q of S

indicators. Two of them relate to installations and the other two relate to repairs. The reason that CNOC is proposing two of each class of indicators is because service intervals will differ depending on whether a technician dispatch is or is not required.

16. are:    

The company-wide Q of S indicators that CNOC is asking the Commission to introduce

Indicator 1.1 - Competitor Installation Appointments Met - Dispatch Required Indicator 1.2 - Competitor Installation Appointments Met - Dispatch Not Required Indicator 1.3 – Competitor Repair Appointments Met – Dispatch Required Indicator 1.4 – Competitor Repair Appointments Met – Dispatch Not Required

17.

The competitor-specific Q of S indicators that CNOC is asking the Commission to

introduce are:  Indicator 2.1 – New Order Activation Service Interval Met – Dispatch Required  Indicator 2.2 – New Order Activation Service Interval Met – Dispatch Not Required  Indicator 2.3 – New Order Activation Confirmed Due Date Met – Dispatch Required  Indicator 2.3A – New Order Activation Late Completions – Dispatch Required  Indicator 2.4 – New Order Activation Confirmed Due Date Met – Dispatch Not Required  Indicator 2.4A – New Order Activation Late Completions – Dispatch Not Required  Indicator 2.5 – Repair Service Interval Met – Dispatch Required  Indicator 2.6 – Repair Service Interval Met – Dispatch Not Required  Indicator 2.7 – Repair Confirmed Due Date Met – Dispatch Required  Indicator 2.7A – Repair Late Completions – Dispatch Required  Indicator 2.8 – Repair Confirmed Due Date Met – Dispatch Not Required  Indicator 2.8A – Repair Late Completions – Dispatch Not Required  Indicator 2.9 – Disconnection Service Interval Met 8

ABRIDGED

18.

Based completely on the TD 2005-20 model9, CNOC recommends that the Commission

adopt the following formula as part of the RRP for TPIA:

1. The total potential rebate amount (“TPRA”) for a month is equal to 5 percent of the amounts billed to a competitor for services (existing plus incremental ordered during the month) covered by a Q of S indicator with activity in that month;

2. Each Q of S indicator with activity in that month is given equal weight and the potential rebate amount (“PRA”) for an indicator is the TPRA divided by the number of active indicators for the month; and

3. The total rebate payable to a competitor for a month is the PRA multiplied by the number of Q of S indicators for which the Carrier failed to achieve the minimum performance standard that month.

19.

With reference to the above noted considerations, CNOC recommends the following

practices (which mirror those of TD 2005-2010) in relation to the frequency of reporting and rebates for the TPIA RRP:

1. Carriers shall issue competition-related Q of S results on a quarterly basis;

2. Carriers must file those results with the Commission, providing a copy of competitorspecific results to the relevant competitor, within 30 days of the last day of the applicable quarter and make any rate rebate payments to competitors within the same 30-day time period; and

9 10

Id., at para. 74. Id., at para. 86.

9

ABRIDGED 3. Carriers are required to file with the Commission, and provide to the relevant competitor, all supporting details associated with the determination of the Q of S results and the calculation of the rate rebate amounts.

20.

In the experience of CNOC’s TPIA members, the Carriers have consistently failed to

deliver minimum service standards in many areas over prolonged periods of time. While CNOC is confident that the implementation of Q of S indicators and a RRP will provide necessary incentives to encourage Carriers to meet service standards, CNOC believes that the serious consequences of repeat service failures warrant additional measures to incent the Carriers to comply and to compensate competitors adequately when the Carriers don’t comply.

21.

In recent months, ISPs have faced dire service crises with their respective TPIA Carriers.

As previously noted, end-users naturally assume that their ISP is responsible for all of the network disruptions and service delays that they experience, even when responsibility lies squarely with the Carrier. Persistent and repeated service shortcomings at virtually every stage of Internet provisioning have seriously damaged the business reputation of many TPIA ISPs. As a consequence, the entire TPIA industry is undermined. The current state of TPIA has led to formal customer complaints and regular media coverage. In an effort to preserve customer support, some ISPs have reached out to their subscriber base and communicated their intent to resolve the situation with the Carriers and the Commission. If the remedies ordered by the Commission are not successful in reversing sub-standard service delivery by the Carriers, then ISPs will be unable to reverse the damage to their business reputation and to the viability of competitive TPIA services in general.

22.

For these reasons, CNOC proposes that a rebate for an indicator should be multiplied by

that indicator’s repeat factor. Initially, the repeat factor is set at one and is increased by one for every month in which the Carrier reports a below standard Q of S result, up to a maximum of six months. Once the Carrier delivers service at the approved standard for one month, the repeat factor is reset to one.

10

ABRIDGED 23. The basic design of CNOC’s repeat failure mechanic resembles the system proposed by

the Competitors in TD 2005-2011, but with two important adjustments that are designed to alleviate the Commission’s concern that a mechanism of this sort might become punitive in effect12. These two changes are inspired by submissions of the incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”) in the proceedings leading to TD 2005-20 that address why the proposed repeat failure mechanism of the Competitors was perceived by them to be unreasonable and punitive13.

24.

Firstly, CNOC’s repeat factor is subject to a maximum cap of six so that rate rebates do

not increase at an exponential rate ad infinitum14.

25.

Secondly, the application of the repeat factor is symmetrical in nature. In other words,

once the service standard is met for one month (as opposed to the proposed repeat failure mechanism of the Competitors in TD 2005-20, which required a service standard to be maintained for three consecutive months15), the repeat factor is reset to one.

26.

CNOC believes that this moderated proposal would not have a punitive effect and would

be an effective means of ensuring just and reasonable rates in accordance with section 27 of the Act. Again, while assessing this aspect of the proposed TPIA RRP, CNOC asks the Commission to consider the state of the TPIA industry in a time where persistent and repeated service failures have become the status quo.

27.

In this regard, CNOC wishes to highlight that the Carriers’ most flagrant deviations from

reasonable service standards occur in the back-to-school season (i.e., July through September) and around moving day in Quebec (July 1st), which are the busiest times of the year for all telecommunications service providers, and hence for consumers. The repeat factor on the RRP could be of particular assistance in dissuading the Carriers to engage in particularly unjustly

11 12 13 14 15

Id., at para. 88. Id., at para. 99. Id., at paras. 91-93. Id., at para. 92. Id., at para. 88.

11

ABRIDGED discriminatory behavior towards their ISP customers for a consecutive number of months during this very important part of the year.

28.

For all of these reasons, CNOC asks the Commission to include a repeat failure

mechanism, as described above, as part of the RRP for TPIA.

1.3

The remedies sought by CNOC are consistent with Canadian law

29.

As discussed below in this Application, the relief sought by CNOC is consistent with past

Commission rulings,16 the Canadian telecommunications policy objectives17 and the Policy Direction.18 Elimination of the anti-competitive behavior of the Carriers is in the interest of consumers and Canadian society at large.

1.4

Structure of this Application

30s.

Part 2.0 of this Application outlines the complete life cycle of a TPIA service to the end-

user, thereby providing the context for, and description of, the problems experienced by ISPs with the TPIA service provided by Carriers. It is the persistent nature of these problems that justify the granting of the regulatory relief sought in this Application.

31.

Part 3.0 proposes certain remedial orders required to address many of the problems

identified in part 2.0 on a going forward basis.

32.

Part 4.0 describes proposed Q of S indicators and RRP to address ongoing service

standard concerns also identified in part 2.0 of the Application.

16 17 18

Infra, note 21. Infra, note 19 Supra, note 4.

12

ABRIDGED 33. Part 5.0 demonstrates how the relief sought in this Application will promote the Canadian

telecommunications policy objectives19 and comply with the Policy Direction20.

34.

Part 6.0 sets out CNOC’s conclusions.

35.

Part 7.0 lists the parties served with this Application. These parties are the Respondents

to the Application.

36.

Part 8.0 provides notice of the application to the Respondents, as required by the Rules.

1.5

Confidentiality claim

37.

Certain information contained in this Application is filed in confidence with the

Commission pursuant to section 39 of the Act. The information in question is commercial information regarding the poor service levels obtained by certain CNOC members from the Carriers and adverse impacts of those poor service levels on the competitive positions of those CNOC members in the marketplace. That information is confidential and is treated consistently in a confidential manner by the members of CNOC who submitted it. Disclosure of this information could prejudice the competitive position of these members and result in material loss to them, thereby causing them specific direct harm. There is no discernible public benefit to the disclosure of the information in question. Therefore, the public interest in disclosure does not outweigh the specific direct harm to the CNOC members resulting from such disclosure. An abridged version of the Application is being filed for the public record. In the abridged version “#” indicates filed in confidence.

19 20

The telecommunications policy objectives are set out in section 7 of the Act. Supra note 4.

13

ABRIDGED 2.0 2.1 THE TPIA LIFE-CYCLE AND RELATED SERVICE ISSUES Introduction

38.

This section of the Application describes the life-cycle of TPIA services, mostly from an

end-user connection perspective, and describes the problems that can arise when a Carrier’s processes are deficient and/or a Carrier does not observe reasonable service standards.

39.

The phases of a TPIA life-cycle for an end-user connection range from the installation of

the end-user’s service through to the potential disconnection of an end-user with other possible events occurring in between. In addition, the TPIA end-user life-cycle can only begin after a Carrier actually starts providing TPIA service to an ISP.

40.

This part of the Application examines all of the phases through which an end-user

connection may pass. These phases include the ISP’s ability to start offering service on the TPIA platform, TPIA end-user access ordering and provisioning, troubleshooting and repair, and the impact on ISPs and their end-users of Carrier network maintenance and modifications and Carrier billing practices for TPIA service. The final step in the life-cycle is the actual disconnection of a TPIA end-user’s access.

41.

As described throughout this part of the Application, the ISP’s level of dependence on the

underlying Carrier providing the TPIA service throughout the life-cycle of each end-user connection is of particular significance and concern. It is this dependence that provides the justification for regulatory intervention when problems arise that Carriers are not motivated to cure on their own initiative.

42.

The reality is that ISPs and their end-users face serious delays, service disruptions and

other problems throughout the TPIA end-user access life-cycle. These types of issues can have a serious negative impact on the reputation of ISPs and competition itself – an outcome that is detrimental to consumers. In addition, the more direct service delays and disruptions to endusers’ Internet services can cause serious inconvenience and economic losses, particularly for 14

ABRIDGED those who study or work at home, some or all of the time. In addition, health and safety concerns can also arise to the extent that end-users subscribe to voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) services, which also become disrupted, thereby removing their ability to call 9-1-1 or other emergency services should the need arise.

43.

CNOC acknowledges that TPIA service issues will arise from time-to-time. CNOC

members accept the fact that the operation of complex, dynamic and vast cable networks involve unavoidable service disruptions. What is unacceptable is when Carriers either: (1) design the TPIA service and network elements so as to provide an inferior level of service compared to what the Carriers deliver to their own retail customers; or (2) do not respond to the service disruptions of their TPIA customers with the same degree of vigilance and urgency that ensures efficient resolution of issues which affect their own retail services. Even beyond the resolution of network disruptions, Carriers simply do not provide TPIA services at standards that foster competition – and they do so to their own benefit.

44.

Similarly, when a Carrier delays the availability of TPIA service to an ISP or causes

disruption to the ISP’s service (irrespective of whether this results from the willfulness or neglect), the Carrier is effectively raising a barrier to competition. A Carrier will not typically have any incentive to eliminate or reduce such a barrier that it has chosen to institute, even as it continues to favour its own retail operations. In fact, sometimes, Carriers will use the very fact that they are not as responsive to TPIA customers’ service needs as they are to the service needs of Carriers’ own retail operations to win over end-users from TPIA customers! This practice is clearly anti-competitive.21

21

The Commission has already recognized this when it mandated Carriers to provide the same service standards/ intervals to its TPIA customers that the Carrier provides to its own retail customers. For example at paragraphs 10 and 11 of Terms and rates approved for large cable carrier’s higher speed access service, Telecom Order 2000-789, 21 August, 2000, the Commission stated: “The Commission considers that it would be appropriate for the carriers to include specific wording in their tariffs that any term or restriction applied to an ISP's use of the access service must not be less favourable than the basis on which the carrier uses its facilities to offer retail Internet service. If an issue arises as whether a carrier uses its facilities to provide its own retail Internet service on a basis that is more favourable than that on which an ISP may use the carrier's access service, the onus would be on the carrier to establish that its actions are not contrary to section 27(2) of the Act.”

15

ABRIDGED

45.

When a Carrier behaves in such an adverse manner with respect to its competitors, the net

effect is that it confers an undue preference in its favour and unjustly discriminates against its TPIA customers/competitors, contrary to section 27(2) of the Act. In such circumstances regulatory action is required to remove this barrier to entry and eliminate the undue preference / unjust discrimination that results from the barrier to competition.

46.

This part of the Application describes the types of problems that Carriers can create for

their TPIA customers and how those problems can result in barriers to competition throughout the TPIA end-user access life-cycle. The specific measures proposed by CNOC to remedy this situation are set out in parts 3.0 and 4.0 of the Application.

2.2

ISP application for TPIA service

47.

Although this part of the Application focuses largely on the TPIA service life-cycle for

end-user connections, before any such connection can be established, an ISP must subscribe to a Carrier’s TPIA service, enter into the necessary agreements, pay the required initial fees, establish links to one or more aggregated points of interconnection (“POIs”), purchase capacity and provide IP addresses to the Carrier to support the ISPs’ end-users on the Carrier’s cable network and set up the necessary administrative procedures required by the Carrier.

48.

CNOC members have reported extreme delays in obtaining TPIA service after submitting

an initial request or expression of interest in the service to a Carrier22. Generally, the only official

Similarly, at paragraph 73 of Point of interconnection and service charge rates, terms and conditions for third party Internet access using cable networks, Telecom decision CRTC 2004-69, 2 November 2004, the Commission stated: “Consistent with the approach adopted in Order 2000-789, the Commission requires that cable companies provide the same service intervals for services provided to ISPs for connection of their end-customers as they provide to their own customers for similar services.”
22

These delays can stretch from 1-2 years and beyond. For example, # waited two years before obtaining TPIA service from Rogers. Similarly, # initially contacted Rogers for the purpose of launching TPIA in July 2011 and the ISP has yet to obtain service due to incessant delays and wholly inadequate service from Rogers’ account

16

ABRIDGED timelines for processing a new TPIA application are those stipulated in TPIA tariffs and standard form TPIA service agreements. However, these specified timelines typically only begin once an ISP submits a TPIA POI service application along with the prescribed TPIA tariff charges. Specific processes must then be followed that lead to the ISP’s POI interconnection becoming operational within a prescribed period of time. However, the preceding timelines for Carriers to provide TPIA applications and agreements to prospective TPIA customers are not regulated. At least one Carrier23 has imposed waiting periods which precede the delivery of a TPIA

49.

application to an ISP. In the experience of some CNOC members, these waiting periods can stretch up more than two years24. During these waiting periods, ISPs are provided few updates as to when they might expect to receive a TPIA service application and they are given absolutely no information concerning the design, technical specifications and costs that would apply to them in order to obtain service25. For ISPs that are committed to implementing a TPIA service as a foundation of their business model, such lengthy waiting times and lack of information can be fatal.

50.

For an ISP that has applied for TPIA service, it is imperative that the application process

progresses quickly and efficiently. By definition, the businesses of ISPs rely on access to the last-mile infrastructure of the Carriers in order to provide a range of competitive Internet and other high-speed services to Canadians. Until the TPIA application process is completed and the service becomes operational, the ISP is unable to market its own retail services on the Carrier’s TPIA platform, sign up end-users or conduct business generally. In light of these facts, effective and timely communication between both parties throughout the introduction, negotiation and implementation stages of the TPIA application is essential. The Carrier must also ensure that the technical steps leading up to the launch of a new TPIA service are addressed in a timely manner.

23 24 25

team. # also reports that the company has been waiting in excess of 12 months to become a Rogers TPIA customer. Namely, Rogers. See, supra, note 19. # has been subjected to a mandatory one year waiting period by Rogers prior to obtaining a TPIA application. At this early stage, # is not even sure whether it intends to implement a TPIA service but the company does not have the information required from Rogers to decide one way or the other. Rogers refuses to provide ISP-specific launch related information until the waiting period expires.

17

ABRIDGED Overall, the TPIA services of Carriers must be accessible to ISPs. The administrative and technical processes associated with a TPIA launch should not, under any circumstances, be a barrier to the business of ISPs.

51.

When a Carrier delays the whole process by not providing an ISP the initial package that

it requires in order to commence the subscription process to TPIA in a timely manner, the ISP’s entry in to the market is delayed, leading not only to loss of business for the ISP, but a general undue lessening of competition in the marketplace relative to the level of competition that would have been in place had the Carrier not delayed this initial step of the subscription process or any other step leading to the point where an ISP can start providing its owns retail services on the Carrier’s platform.

2.3

Ordering and provisioning

2.3.1 New TPIA order installation process 52. Once an ISP is ready to commence operations on a TPIA platform and an end-user signs

up to the ISP’s retail service, the ISP places an order for a TPIA access with the Carrier.

53.

Before the ISP can have an end-user order accepted by a Carrier, it is necessary for the

ISP to determine whether the potential end customer can even qualify for service, and if so, for which services, since Carriers provide different services in different areas. Some Carriers provide relatively imprecise postal code lookups to determine qualification. Other Carriers provide no such tool at all. In circumstances in which the qualification of the end-user for service is indeterminate, the only option for an ISP is to submit the order and await a response which could be a multi-day process. This leaves the end customer waiting to determine whether it can even become a customer of the ISP.

18

ABRIDGED 54. If the end-user qualifies for service, one of three provisioning processes is then triggered

depending on the circumstances.26

55.

Where the end-user’s premises do not have an existing connection to the Carrier’s

network, a technician must be dispatched by the Carrier. In this scenario, the technician must connect the co-axial cable wiring inside the subscriber’s premises to the Carrier’s network facilities.27 The technician also connects the co-axial cable in the home to the outlet to be connected to the cable modem and tests the upstream and downstream Radio Frequency (“RF”) network signals to ensure that the end-user can receive service from the ISP.28

56.

In a second scenario, where the subscriber’s premises have an existing connection to the

Carrier but the subscriber does not currently subscribe to the Carrier, a technician is also typically dispatched.29 In this case, the technician also connects the co-axial cable in the home to the outlet to be connected to the cable modem and tests the upstream and downstream RF network signals to ensure that the end-user can receive service from the ISP.30

57.

For TPIA installations (and repair) requiring a technician to be dispatched to the end-

user’s premises, the Carrier provides the ISP with a date and a precise time window for the deployment of a technician to the premises of the ISP’s end-user. The ISP then forwards this information to the end-user so that access to the end-user’s premises can be provided to the Carrier’s technician within the given time window.

58.

In the final scenario, where the ISP’s new subscriber currently subscribes to the Carrier’s

retail Internet service or that of another ISP on the Carrier’s TPIA platform, there is no need to

26

27 28 29

30

Rogers Communications Inc., “Necessity of cable installer/technician visit”, Contribution NTCO0427 to CISC Network Working Group, December 11, 2007, at para 3. Id., at para 6. Ibid. Id., at para 7. There is an exception to this practice in the case of Rogers which allows a self-installation option in these circumstances when the end-user already subscribes to another Rogers service using cable facilities. See CRTC Interconnection Steering Committee – Non-consensus report on the necessity of a cable carrier technician visit for an installation or transfer to an independent Internet service provider, Telecom Decision CRTC 200978, 18 February 2009. Ibid.

19

ABRIDGED dispatch a technician. In this situation, the Carrier initiates a transfer of service which involves certain administrative and reconfiguration activities.31

59.

Regardless of which of the above scenarios is triggered, provisioning services of one kind

or another are required from Carriers. Both the installation/connection and transfer services are contemplated in the TPIA tariffs for each of the Carriers. As a result, ISPs pay the tariffed fees required for these services.

60.

These provisioning services are vital to ISP growth, the quality of service that ISPs aspire

to deliver to their customers and the reputation that the ISPs develop in the market place.

61.

Any unnecessary delay by a Carrier in any provisioning interval associated with an

installation or transfer serves as a barrier to entry that unjustly discriminates against the ISP that ordered the service.

62.

Similarly, the lack of information provided by Carriers regarding the status of installation

orders is also troublesome as an ISP can neither investigate any anomalies in the processing of specific orders, nor keep its own end-users abreast of the progress of their orders.

2.3.2 63.

Installation windows

General delays in the provisioning and installation process can be widespread and

persistent over time. More specific delays can also be present in the amount of time that a Carrier takes to schedule a customer transfer or the dispatch of an installer, depending on the situation, or in the amount of time that an end-user has to wait for an installer to be dispatched, where a dispatch is required. A number of CNOC members who are TPIA customers have reported that they have experienced an eleven day installation interval on average during the last few months.32 In some instances, installation delays were far greater than this already unacceptable

31

32

Cogeco Cable Inc., “Necessity of cable installer/technician visit on an end-user installation or transfer to an independent ISP”, Contribution NTCO0428A to CISC to Network Working Group, 17 January 2008, at para 3. For example, Videotron has taken up to 20 days to complete installations for #. Similarly, Cogeco has taken up to 15 days to complete installations for #. Rogers has taken an average of 8-10 days for new installations and

20

ABRIDGED average. In addition, missed appointments or appointments changed on the day of installation by installers can cause further delays and disruption for end-users when they make special arrangements to be home during working hours in order to facilitate an installation visit that never occurs33.

64.

One particular CNOC member, who obtains TPIA service from four Carriers, reported

that its installation windows were altered on the very day of the scheduled installation between 40 and 300 times since June 2013, depending on the Carrier34. Moreover, this same ISP reported that the technician never even showed up to a scheduled installation between 40 and 200 times, depending on the Carrier35, over that same time period. Other CNOC members, who have had similar experiences36, also report uncooperative behavior from the technicians deployed by the Carriers37. For example, ISP end-users have reported various instances of technicians “feather knocking”38 at doors or hanging up on a call to the premises after a few rings. In these situations, the premise visit has to be rescheduled.

65.

ISPs can also be prejudiced when installation technicians use their visits to try to win

over ISP end-users to the Carrier’s competing retail services.

33

34

35

36

37

38

17.25 days for customer transfers (which do not involve an on-site technician visit) in the case of # since June of 2013. It is noteworthy that some Carriers, like Rogers, will place automated outbound calls to the customer to inform them of a technician dispatch for either an installation or repair 24-48 hours prior to the work. If the customer misses the call there is no way to re-initiate this confirmation (by callback number or other means) and the technician dispatch is cancelled. # reported that since June 2013, the occurrence of changed installation windows on the day of installation has been as follows: over 300 times for Rogers; over 40 times for Cogeco; over 40 times for Shaw; over 300 times for Videotron. # reported that since June 2013, the occurrence of Carrier technicians that did not show up for a TPIA installation has been as follows: over 200 times for Rogers, over 50 times for Cogeco, over 40 times for Shaw and over 100 times for Videotron. # reported that Shaw technicians did not show up for 18.8% of scheduled installations. # reports 333 incidents of no-show technicians for Rogers TPIA installations since June of 2013; # also reports that Rogers is unable to meet the requested installation days for 30% of orders and that Cogeco regularly changes requested installation dates since it never even acknowledges the order until the requested install date has passed. Customers of # have made frequent reports to that company detailing blatant examples of uncooperative behavior from technicians. I.e., knocking so lightly that the average person will not hear or hardly hear the knock at all.

21

ABRIDGED 2.3.3 66. Tagging TPIA cable connections

Another related problem is the lack of consistent tagging of cable connections service by

TPIA by some Carriers during installation. Carriers inspect neighbourhood cable connections from time-to-time to ensure that cable signals are not being delivered to homes occupied by persons who are not paying for such signals. Where such connections are found, the Carrier disconnects them. Tagging is necessary for cable connections on which TPIA services are provided to ensure that the Carrier does not mistake these connections as being used illegitimately, thereby leading to their disconnection and the disruption of legitimate end-users’ Internet service39.

67.

Mistaken disconnections due to a lack of tagging require separate technician dispatches

for the restoration of service and this means that an end-user can be without service for an extended period until the reason for the problem is identified, the Carrier schedules a dispatch, and the technician actually shows up to restore the connection and (hopefully) tag the line properly before leaving. The proper tagging of TPIA connections should occur without exception whenever a technician dispatch is required for a TPIA access installation.

2.4

Troubleshooting and repair

2.4.1 TPIA repair process 68. ISPs that make use of TPIA service will generally provide their own technical support to

investigate and resolve problems reported by their subscribers; however, an ISP’s ability to troubleshoot a non-working end-user TPIA access connection is very limited, because the Carriers have not provided tools that allow the ISP to monitor and reset the settings on cable modems remotely, or to monitor the presence or quality of data streams over TPIA accesses. ISPs are also charged tariffed diagnostic maintenance fees where dispatches are required, and so the lack of access of ISPs to tools that could reduce the rate of Carrier dispatches means that ISPs are subject to dispatches and related costs that could be avoided. Carriers should make the same

39

# reports that this is a recurring cause of service outages for its TPIA customers.

22

ABRIDGED tools that they use to troubleshoot their retail end-users’ connections and cable modems available to TPIA customers.

69.

When a customer is offline, the ISP’s visibility is limited to checking with the end-user

verbally whether certain lights on the modem are lit and whether the end-user does or does not have connectivity, or that connectivity is faulty in some manner. In those cases, where reverse domain name server (“DNS”) functionality is provided by a Carrier, the ISP also has the ability to determine the last time that the end-user’s modem was registered on the Carrier’s network. Following some very basic troubleshooting by the ISP, if an end-user’s problem persists, it must be referred to the Carrier. Such issues are reported to a Carrier via trouble tickets that identify the affected end-users and the nature of the problems that they are experiencing. When tickets are not resolved promptly, Carrier processes usually provide for a limited number of escalations, although not every Carrier’s escalation process has been formalized in an operational manual. Moreover, some Carrier escalation procedures merely involve submitting the escalations in the same manner as the original tickets, with no discernible improvements in priority for escalated tickets40. Ticket escalation procedures do not typically provide for the ability to communicate with actual Carrier staff.

70.

In cases where end-user disruptions are concentrated by type, timing or geographic

region and the Carrier permits, the ISP will, based on reaching certain thresholds, submit multifault master tickets to the Carrier41. When in receipt of a trouble ticket, the Carrier must take action to resolve the TPIA service disruption. Depending on the prognosis of the issue, the situation may or may not require the dispatch of a technician to the premises of the end-user or to network facilities operated by the Carrier.

71.

Regardless of whether the resolution of an issue requires on-site repairs or not, ISPs must

be able to expect, at a minimum, the same level of technical support that can be expected from the Carrier for its own retail Internet services. CNOC members have not obtained this standard of
40

41

# reports that this has been its experience with Rogers. Tickets can only be escalated once every 24 hours (up to a third level) and yet escalations do not appear to increase a ticket’s priority. In # experience with Rogers’ process associated with multi-fault master tickets, these tickets often obtain no additional priority and follow the same procedure as individual tickets.

23

ABRIDGED service for either on-site or remote repairs. The average service interval for on-site repairs has been 4-5 days since June 2013. However, these service levels degraded far below this average in a number of cases42. This means that the Carrier’s administrative processes involved in tracking and managing trouble tickets must be orderly and efficient. Similarly, ISPs must have access to the same types of troubleshooting tools that the Carriers provide to their own retail operations.

2.4.2 72.

Trouble ticket status

Moreover, the ISP should be updated on the status of the trouble ticket as matters

progress, just as the Carrier would advise its own end-users in similar circumstances. ISPs need to obtain sufficient information regarding the cause and resolution of trouble tickets43 for two reasons. In limited cases where the faults may be capable of being remedied by an ISP, this information may enable the ISP to take remedial actions to reduce similar instances in the future. The second reason is the more important – it allows the ISP to explain the reasons for troubles and steps taken toward resolution to their end-users. This is critical to the credibility of ISPs in the eyes of their end-users. ISPs should not be put in the position of not being able to provide their end-users any details regarding their outages and the actions taken to resolve them.

2.4.3 73.

Repair windows

Where technicians are required to conduct network or on-site repairs, they should be

dispatched within an acceptable service interval. As the Carriers are aware, since a subscriber’s
42

43

For example, in August 2013, Rogers’ average on-site repair interval was 12 days for # customers. Not surprisingly, average intervals for repairs where no technician dispatch is required are shorter, at approximately 3-4 days for most Carriers. However, some CNOC members have experienced very lengthy service outages even where no on-site repair was required. For instance, # suffered one chronic outage caused by Rogers that kept TPIA customers offline for 24 days. During that period, Rogers provided no explanation for the outage despite numerous requests. For example, # reported that Rogers never provides any information relating to a ticket and its resolution unless the information is requested by the ISP. Even when the information is requested, the reply from Rogers is vague or avoids the question altogether. For larger maintenance issues, Rogers never provides clear information. Some Carriers, like Cogeco are better at providing information on request, but also fail to provide information relating to larger maintenance issues. Other CNOC members had similar reports. For example, # indicated that it never receives updates or resolutions reasons on tickets from Shaw. Using # (an ILEC) for comparison, the same CNOC member noted that for each ticket it receives an exact resolution report that states the cause of the trouble, ownership of issue (wholesale customer or the ILEC), and all of the metrics around the issue. Using the ILEC’s ticket system it is also possible for the CNOC member to go back and look at past tickets and troubles of every ticket.

24

ABRIDGED confidence in its Internet provider is understandably extremely sensitive to network disruptions, the importance of prompt repair service from the Carriers cannot be overstated.

74.

ISP’s customers often have to make special arrangements to be home or ensure some

other adult is home to receive Carrier technicians on the scheduled dispatch dates. When a technician fails to show up for scheduled appointments, or attempts to change the window for repair visits on the day of the actual scheduled repair visit, the ISP’s customer is inconvenienced, and, more often than not, it is the ISP’s reputation that is at risk. In two particularly bad cases, a Carrier changed 70% of scheduled repair windows44 and

75.

one CNOC member reported that Carrier technicians did not report at all for 34.6% of all repair appointments since June 201345. Similar to what was described above with respect to the ordering and provisioning of TPIA accesses, CNOC members also report instances of Carrier technicians “feather knocking” at doors or hanging up on a call to the premises after a few rings46. In these situations, the premise visit has to be rescheduled.

76.

A Carrier’s repair technician may also use the opportunity of a repair visit to attempt to

switch the customer to the retail service of the Carrier.

2.4.4 Escalation procedures 77. Carrier network outages can cause large numbers of TPIA customers’ end-users to go

offline. Therefore, it is essential for ISPs to have proper escalation procedures and charts, both during and after business hours. The charts should include reliable contact information for Carrier staff who can be reached using real time communications methods to assist in prompt resolution of network outages47.
44 45

46

47

# reported that Rogers only respected 30% of scheduled repair dates and time windows since June 2013. # reported that Shaw technicians did not show up for 34.6% of scheduled repairs since June 2013. Similarly, # reported a no-show rate of 20% for Rogers repair technicians and of 30% for Cogeco repair technicians during that same time period. Customers of # have made frequent reports to that company detailing blatant examples of uncooperative behavior from technicians. CNOC members reports that all Carriers employ rudimentary escalation procedures that do not work well. Perhaps acknowledging this fact, some Carriers, including Rogers and Cogeco have implemented informal

25

ABRIDGED 2.5 Network maintenance and modifications

2.5.1 78.

Network routing

When a TPIA connection between a Carrier and ISP fails and the router equipment at

either end is not aware of the failure, traffic is lost and end customers experience service interruptions. The use of a standard protocol such as bidirectional Forwarding Detection (“BFD”), which is already available on Carrier routers without additional cost and implemented with ease, would prevent the unnecessary delays that result from the need to make manual routing changes around failures.48

2.5.2 79.

Reducing the impact of single points of failure

The fact that at least some Carriers have TPIA networks that are built over a single-fault

point is also a pressing concern. In these cases, the standard TPIA network design houses all TPIA connections on a single router. In other words, if this router were to fail then so would all TPIA service for the Carrier. The risk of such catastrophic consequences warrants additional safeguards. Carriers could implement efficient protection, where practicable, to reduce the impact of single points of failures in their TPIA network designs.

2.5.3 80.

Network modifications

Shifting consumer needs and demands drive the evolution of network technologies. In

this dynamic environment, both Carriers and ISPs are required to diligently maintain, adapt and modify their networks. However, in light of the adverse impacts that Carrier network modifications may have on TPIA service, it is important that Carriers and ISPs give sufficient

48

policies whereby an ISP can, in some circumstances, contact TPIA account managers directly. However, these processes are fraught with their own problems. For example, the fact that an account managers are not associated closely with Carrier help desks makes referencing specific trouble tickets through account managers very difficult. # reports that one recent outage occurred when Rogers rerouted traffic, but it is unclear whether Rogers did so manually or automatically and this Carrier is not forthcoming with details about the incident.

26

ABRIDGED notice49 and openly communicate their plans prior to and throughout scheduled and unscheduled network modifications50. These discussions must include plans to implement new technologies and network configurations. In addition to communicating network changes to ISPs, the Carriers must have adequate technical safeguards to minimize disruptions to TPIA services over the course of their network modifications.

81.

Proper coordination should involve Carriers notifying their ISP customers of network

changes that could adversely affect the service that the ISPs provide to their own customers. Ample notifications should be given by Carriers to their ISP customers for such matters as, without limitation, DOCSIS and other standards-based version upgrades (by service area), frequency changes for channels used for TPIA service, modem firmware downloads51, and other major network changes. When a carrier is not transparent about these types of changes, ISPs experience outages that they cannot mitigate and for which they cannot prepare themselves and their own end-customers. For example, recent changes made by Rogers in its network caused a very high volume of outages for a number of ISPs. In another case, a CNOC member was faced with a situation where thousands of customers were offline due to unannounced network upgrades in a regional POI52.

82.

For example, DOCSIS upgrades (such as from version 2.0 to 3.0) coupled with speed

upgrades made by a Carrier may mean that existing modems that are not compatible with the new DOCSIS version will no longer function. Advance notice by a Carrier to its TPIA customers can assist those ISPs in getting their own customers prepared for such transitions to avoid or

49

50

51

52

In order for notice to be sufficient it must be timely and informative. More specifically, notice should clearly indicate the geographic location of the equipment that is being modified and identify the affected user base. For example, “Node ABC is being maintained on the following day and the area affected or list of affected customers is as follows: XYZ”. CNOC members do sometimes obtain certain information from all Carriers. However, often this information relates to firmware updates and maintenance matters. Rogers in particular, tends not to inform its TPIA customers of work being done that will impact end-users, nor does a standardized process for such notifications even appear to exist. # has requested access to such a process and it has not been provided. ISPs need to be able to notify its end customers to leave their modems on when a Carrier will be pushing a firmware upgrade, since Carriers only push upgrades once. In addition, ISPs should be able to request firmware upgrades for specific end-users who were missed during a mass firmware upgrade. This was the situation faced by # when Cogeco performed “upgrades” during a “maintenance window” on the # POI. As a result of this incident, thousands of customers went offline. In another example, a network change made by Shaw caused three and a half day outage for all the customers of #.

27

ABRIDGED minimize service outages. In addition, prompt notification will prevent TPIA customers from being disadvantaged from a marketing perspective because they do not know the precise boundaries of areas in which DOCSIS 3.0 services are or are not supported53.

83.

Another area that can cause problems is frequency reassignments. When a Carrier

decides to reassign frequencies used to provide TPIA service, cable modems connected to the Carrier’s network may require new firmware or other reconfiguration. In addition, due to the sensitivity of cable plant to interference, changes in frequencies can also cause problems with the radio frequency (“RF”) signals used to transport Internet traffic over the cable network.

84.

Complicating matters further is the fact that cable modem unique identifiers known as

media access control (“MAC”) addresses must be registered on a Carrier’s network in order for the cable modem to function on that network. When a cable modem fails, due to incomplete firmware upgrades or other configurations or, indeed, for any other reasons, an ISP cannot simply fix the problem on its own by supplying another cable modem to the affected end-user. Coordination with the Carrier is required to ensure that the replacement modem’s MAC address is registered on the Carrier’s network. If the Carrier delays this registration process, the ISP’s end-customer will be without service in the interim.

85.

For these reasons, it is critical for a Carrier to communicate network changes to its TPIA

customers in advance and to allow those customers to notify their end-customers of such impending changes, as well. If either timely notification is not provided or a Carrier provides the information yet insists on having it treated in a confidential manner by its TPIA customers pursuant to the provisions of TPIA agreements in place between carriers and their TPIA customers, those ISPs cannot prepare their own end-users to avoid or reduce service outages.

53

# and # employ DOCSIS 3.0 throughout their network footprints while # and # have only implemented this standard in parts of their operating territories, and are gradually rolling it out further.

28

ABRIDGED 2.5.4 86. IP address allocation

Another area that needs to be managed better by Carriers relates to the deployment of IP

addresses supplied by ISPs to the Carrier for assignment to equipment that serves the ISPs’ customers. The IP addresses provided by an ISP to a Carrier are assigned to equipment used to connect the end-users of the ISP to the Internet.

87.

For example, the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (“DHCP”) is used for, among

other things, supplying IP addresses to cable modems seeking a connection to the ISP’s network. In the absence of an assignment of an IP address, a cable modem cannot be used for communication over the Internet. IP addresses are most often assigned dynamically to cable modems from a pool of addresses provided by the ISP to the Carrier for assignment to DHCPrelated equipment serving the specific area that includes the portion of the Carrier’s network to which the cable modem is connected. An IP address will be assigned to a cable modem whenever it is powered up or when the previous IP lease, which is temporary, for that cable modem expires. If the pool of addresses for a particular area has been depleted, the next cable modem in that area that requires an IP address will not be able to obtain one and the endcustomer will not be able to get online.

88.

These types of problems can lead to frustration by multiple end users and numerous

corresponding trouble tickets due to the dynamic nature of IP address allocation. This is because a cable modem that may not obtain an IP address during a specific given period of time, may suddenly be able to obtain one next time the user attempts to go online because an IP address was freed up by another cable modem in the interim. The net result is a frustrating round of “IP address whack-a-mole” as cable modems compete for an insufficient number of IP addresses in a particular area.

89.

This type of IP address depletion can occur quickly in certain situations and only the

Carrier has the data required to anticipate these situations and request more IP addresses from ISPs in a sufficiently timely manner to prevent the types of shortages and ensuing frustration just

29

ABRIDGED described54. These situations include node splits and faster than average growth by ISPs in certain areas.

90.

Due to the shared nature of cable networks, when demand for bandwidth increases

significantly in a neighbourhood served by a single node, the Carrier will split the node, thereby reducing the number of houses served by each node. Node splits will often lead to a need for the allocation of additional IP addresses to new equipment associated with each node. Unless the Carrier advises its TPIA customers of node splits in advance, TPIA customers will be caught unaware and IP shortages may result in the affected areas.

91.

When an ISP’s customer base grows disproportionately quickly in a given area, IP

shortages may also ensue, since ISPs are not aware of the specific boundaries of the areas served by the IP pools that they provide to Carriers for us in conjunction with TPIA service. Only the Carrier is able to see the trends by IP pool area in advance.55 Therefore, unless a Carrier advises its TPIA customers of impending shortages due to rapid growth in advance, TPIA customers will be caught unaware and IP shortages may result in the affected areas.

92.

There are other related problems that compound the difficulties faced by ISPs with

respect to IP address allocations. ISPs cannot be overly generous in advance allocations of IP addresses to Carrier equipment in order to try to anticipate and avoid IP address shortages because IP addresses supplied using the current IPv4 format employed by carriers and TPIA customers alike are being rapidly depleted and additional allocations from the American Registry for Internet Numbers (“ARIN”) which is responsible for such allocations throughout North
54

55

In the experience of CNOC members, the Carriers do not act proactively when it comes to TPIA IP address allocations. The average time that it takes a Carrier to complete an allocation of IP addresses to DHCP is often stated to be no more than 24 hours, although it is often longer. On its face 24 hours seems like a short delay, but in practice it is unacceptable when allocations only occur once a DHCP issue arises and the ISP issues a ticket to the Carrier, who must then investigate and determine the root cause of the issue. Only at the end of this delayladen process will the Carrier request additional IP addresses and then make allocation. Even when an allocation is complete, # and # report that their Carriers do not notify them when allocations have been completed. Consequently, the ISP is unable to determine whether the problem has been resolved and forward that information to its end-users. Even those Carriers that provide reverse Domain Name Server (“DNS”) tools, refuse to give ISPs the necessary details to be able to track this ourselves. If ISPs had the mapping of all subnets assigned to a node and cable modem terminating system (“CMTS”) interface, they could track the IPs by using the reverse DNS tools.

30

ABRIDGED America are getting more difficult to obtain. In addition, Carriers will sometimes not allow TPIA customers to make larger allocations of IP addresses in order to avoid shortages later on even where this is possible.

93.

In order to avoid these problems, Carriers should provide ISPs sufficient advance

notification of Carrier network modifications that could cause additional demand for the deployment of additional IP addresses to serve ISP end-users and daily IP address utilization reports56;

94.

Finally, due the impending exhaustion of the availability of new IPv4 IP addresses,

network operators are migrating to the use of IP addresses in the IPv6 format.

2.5.5 95.

IPv6 implementation and rollout strategies

CNOC members have received varying levels of cooperation from Carriers when it

comes to sharing information that is relevant to their IPv6 implementation and roll out strategies57. Unfortunately, most Carriers are unwilling to share their IPv6 rollout plans with their wholesale customers.

96.

As the Carriers are aware, the transition to IPv6 requires extensive preparation in terms of

hardware changes and network configuration. A number of Carriers have yet to provide any information regarding processes such as anticipated changes to the deployment of IPv6 blocks of IP addresses to Cable Modem Termination System (“CMTS”) interfaces or how they plan to implement IP addressing for modems. Carriers have also yet to provide any information on what modifications are required surrounding the interconnection to the aggregate network in order to take full advantage of IPv6.

56

57

IP address utilization reports are currently only provided automatically by Videotron. Rogers only offers reports on an ad-hoc request basis and does not provide them more than once per month. # also reports that Rogers charges them fees for these reports. Similarly, Cogeco reluctantly provides utilization reports in response to requests. Shaw does not provide utilization reports at all (whether requested or automatically). # has provided some IPv6 rollout information to its TPIA customers; CNOC members have not obtained any such information from #, # or #.

31

ABRIDGED 97. As a result of Carriers refusing or limiting the sharing of IPv6 plans, ISPs will be unable

to conduct necessary upgrades and reconfigurations proactively. Left in the dark, ISPs will undoubtedly struggle to ensure a smooth transition to the newest protocol version and end-users will ultimately suffer service disruptions as a result. In fact, without proper advance planning, migration to IPv6 will, at least in the case of one Carrier, result in a loss of the forward DNS just recently provided to ISPs by the Carrier that allows cable modem MAC addresses to be crossreferenced with IP addresses assigned to the cable modems. This is a functionality that is very important to ISPs for troubleshooting TPIA end-user access trouble reports, and which CNOC members have been clamoring to obtain for some time.

98.

In order for TPIA customers and their end customers to be ready for the Carrier

migrations and to avoid as much disruption to the end customers as possible, advance notice and coordination of migrations to IPv6 are is required between Carriers and their TPIA customers.

2.6

Billing

99.

A Carrier’s TPIA invoices must be accurate and timely. Unfortunately, there are

instances where this is not the case. For example, a CNOC member58 reported that a Carrier59 billed the member retroactively for capacity charges three times for the same time periods. Well over a year after these mistakes, the ISP has yet to obtain a correct bill or adjustment. The ISP has requested that the Carrier adjust and correlate the incorrect bills no less than six times. The dollar amount of the required adjustments is approximately $200,000.

100.

Carrier invoices must also contain sufficient information so that the TPIA customer can

verify the charges on the invoices and ensure that the TPIA customer’s own end users are being billed correctly. Attachment “A” to this Application lists all of the elements that should be present on such invoices. As the confidential version of the Attachment demonstrates none of the four major Carriers provide invoices that include all of the elements. This needs to be rectified.

58 59

Namely, #. Namely, Cogeco.

32

ABRIDGED 101. In addition, the format and layout of invoices is not clear at all and does not make it easy

for TPIA customers to import the invoice data for use in reconciling the invoices in all cases. For example, in some cases, invoices do not contain unique identifiers that match amounts invoiced to customers60. In other cases, the invoice forms do not provide a summary of the products and services that are being charged. Some invoice layouts are also not well organized and challenging to decipher61. Overall, these billing issues greatly complicate the accounting jobs of ISPs and in some cases lead to significant and unnecessary payment errors.

102.

The preferred format for invoices is Microsoft Excel and billing details should be

provided in a straightforward manner that is set out by customer, in plain language and without the use of obscure codes or layouts. It would also be very useful if invoices could ultimately be provided in an OData62

103.

format via customer portals.

2.7

Disconnection

104.

At a subscriber’s request, an ISP must arrange for disconnection of service with the

Carrier. A timely response from the ISP and the Carrier is in the interest of the end-user. Prompt disconnection and cessation of billing by the Carrier is necessary to empower consumers to make

60

61

62

This is the case for Cogeco’s invoices, as reported by #. # has a similar experience with Cogeco. This is because that Carrier uses of cable modem MAC addresses as the unique identifiers in its invoices, and when end-user modems change and this is not reflected accurately right away by Cogeco, the MAC address will no longer correspond to the end-user. # reports that Shaw bills are very inconsistent from region to region which renders them nearly impossible to audit. The OData Protocol is an application-level protocol for interacting with data via RESTful web services. The protocol supports the description of data models and the editing and querying of data according to those models. It provides facilities for (1) Metadata: a machine-readable description of the data model exposed by a particular data provider; (2) Data: sets of data entities and the relationships between them; (3) Querying: requesting that the service perform a set of filtering and other transformations to its data, then return the results; (4) Editing: creating, editing, and deleting data; (5) Operations: invoking custom logic; and (6) Vocabularies: attaching custom semantics. The OData Protocol is different from other REST-based web service approaches in that it provides a uniform way to describe both the data and the data model. This improves semantic interoperability between systems and allows an ecosystem to emerge. See http://www.odata.org/.

33

ABRIDGED it easy to choose their service providers on an ongoing basis63. This is consistent with the Commission’s ruling in Broadcasting and Telecom Regulatory Policy 2011-19164, requiring broadcasting distribution undertakings to complete customer transfers within two days of a thirdparty customer cancellation request where no coordination between service providers is necessary.65

2.8

Remedies sought by CNOC

105.

As previously noted, in this application, CNOC is requesting two different classes of

relief. The first class involves specific stand-alone orders that the Commission would make to address service deficiencies that can be resolved immediately, without the need for on-going monitoring. The second class requires the monitoring of TPIA service standards. In this case, CNOC is asking the Commission to adopt Q of S indicators and a RRP for the purpose of creating incentives for the Carriers to meet acceptable standards of service. This section fully describes and justifies the relief requested based on evidence provided by CNOC members. Part 3.0 of this Application addresses the first class of relief, while part 4.0 addresses the second class.

63

64

65

Unfortunately, the standard disconnection intervals currently imposed by Carriers do not allow customers to make these decisions in an unimpeded manner. The average disconnection interval for all Carriers is 5 days. In some cases, the intervals are much higher. For instance, # reported that Cogeco took up to several weeks in some cases to disconnect former # customers. It is also noteworthy that Rogers took up to 12 days to even respond to # disconnection requests and up to an additional 4 days to perform the disconnections throughout the month of August 2013. The customer transfer process and related competitive issues, Broadcasting and Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2011-191, 18 March 2011 (“Broadcasting and Telecom Regulatory Policy 2011-191”). BTRP 2011-191, at para. 34.

34

ABRIDGED 3.0 SPECIFIC RELIEF REQUESTED TO RESOLVE CERTAIN TPIA LIFE-CYCLE SERVICE ISSUES Introduction

3.1

106.

In part 2.0 of this Application, CNOC demonstrated how the dependency that ISPs have

on Carriers has been leading to breaches of section 27(2) of the Act due to the unduly discriminatory manner in which the Carriers often treat their wholesale TPIA customers.

107.

In this part, CNOC is asking the Commission to make specific orders that either require

or prohibit Carriers from taking certain actions in order to improve the delivery of TPIA services to ISPs. The Commission’s authority to make such orders is founded on a number of provisions in the Act, including sections 24, 25, 32(c) through 32(g). The purpose of the orders is to remove barriers to competition and to ensure that the Carriers adhere to section 27(2) of the Act, which provides:

“No Canadian carrier shall, in relation to the provision of a telecommunications service or the charging of a rate for it, unjustly discriminate or give an undue or unreasonable preference toward any person, including itself, or subject any person to an undue or unreasonable disadvantage.” 108. Act.66 The remedies proposed by CNOC are meant to advance the telecommunication policy

objectives of the Act and comply with the Policy Direction, as required by section 47 of the

109.

The following sections of this part of the Application address the specific orders

requested by CNOC.

66

This is addressed more fully in part 5.0 of this Application.

35

ABRIDGED 3.2 Delays in the TPIA service sign-up process must be reduced

110.

In section 2.2 of the Application CNOC described how a Carrier can delay the entry of

new ISPs by not providing to the ISPs the initial package that they require in order to commence the TPIA subscription process in a timely manner. CNOC also described the negative impact of such behavior on competition.

111.

In order to remedy this situation, CNOC is requesting that the Commission make an order

directing the Carriers to provide each potential TPIA customer the full documentation package required by the potential customer to sign up for TPIA service within three (3) weeks of a request for the documentation package, and to start the TPIA provisioning process for that party within a further three (3) weeks of receipt of all required executed documentation.

3.3

Installation and repair processes require some general improvements

112.

In sections 2.3 and 2.4 of the Application, CNOC described various difficulties that arise

with respect to TPIA end-user access installations and repair situations that have anti-competitive effects.

113. 

Some of these problems include:

A lack of access to a reliable service qualification tool by postal code that is refreshed on a periodic (i.e., at least monthly) basis by the Carrier;

A lack of access by TPIA customers to tools that Carriers use to troubleshoot their retail end-users’ connections and cable modems;

A lack of meaningful information provided by Carriers regarding the status of installation orders;

36

ABRIDGED  A lack of meaningful information provided by Carriers regarding the status of trouble tickets, including their causes and resolutions; 

A lack of access by TPIA customers to a full, business hour and non-business hour escalation process and chart with support tiers that includes reliable contact information for Carrier staff who can be reached using real time communications methods in case of network outages to assist in the timely resolution of network issues; and

Carrier employees or contractors marketing the Carrier’s services or trying to convince end-users to switch to the Carrier’s services when a TPIA customer’s end-user contacts the Carrier to inquire about an outstanding TPIA repair issue.

114.

CNOC is requesting that the Commission make five remedial orders directed at the

Carriers.

115.

The first order requested would be for the Carriers to provide ISPs access to a reliable

service qualification database by postal code that is refreshed on a periodic (i.e., at least monthly) basis, with this activity being referred to CISC for further implementation;

116.

The second order requested would require Carriers to make the same tools that they use

to troubleshoot their retail end-users’ connections and cable modems available to TPIA customers. This approach would ensure that the remote troubleshooting service that Carriers offer to their own retail operations are available to TPIA customers. This approach should also reduce the need for Carrier technicians to be dispatched to diagnose ISP end-user service issues.

117.

The third order requested would require Carriers to provide meaningful details regarding

the status of installation orders and trouble tickets, including their causes and resolutions.67 This is more in line with the practices of incumbent local exchange carriers and will assist ISPs to address any similar faults that they may be able to remedy on their own in the future, at least in
67

Examples of this could be such information as “provisioning status” or “repair status” that may include statuses such as “in progress”, “new”, “pending dispatch”, etc.…

37

ABRIDGED certain limited circumstances. More importantly, this requirement would enable ISPs to identify anomalies early in specific installation and repair instances and request assistance from the Carriers, as well as enabling the ISPs to provide their end-users meaningful explanations regarding installation orders and trouble tickets and explain the reasons for delays and steps taken toward resolution. This is critical to the credibility of ISPs in the eyes of their end-users.

118.

A fourth order would require each Carrier to implement a full, business hour and non-

business hour escalation process and chart with support tiers that includes reliable contact information for Carrier staff who can be reached using real time communications methods in case of network outages to assist in the timely resolution of network issues. This would enable ISPs to escalate, and Carriers to address, large outages in a more timely fashion. This type of improved communications between carriers and their TPIA customers would also facilitate ISPs’ ability to explain significant outages and the remedial measures being taken to address them to their own end-users.

119.

The fifth order requested would require each Carrier to prohibit its employees or

contractors from marketing the Carrier’s services or trying to convince end-users to switch to the Carrier’s services when a TPIA customer’s end-user contacts Rogers to inquire about an outstanding TPIA repair issue. When a TPIA customer’s end-users are out of service, the Carrier’s efforts should be focused on restoring a working TPIA access as promptly as possible and not using the outstanding service issue as an opportunity to switch the customer to the Carrier’s retail service instead.

3.4

Installation and repair processes need some additional specific improvements where a technician dispatch is required

120.

In sections 2.3 and 2.4 of the Application, CNOC also described various difficulties that

arise when the dispatch of Carrier technicians is required for TPIA end-user access installations or repair situations.

121.

Some of these problems include: 38

ABRIDGED

technicians not showing up for appointments or changing their installation windows on the day of appointments, thereby causing considerable inconvenience and expense for ISPs’ end-users;

technicians not tagging TPIA connections, thereby leading to the improper disconnections of TPIA end-user accesses; and

technicians using end-user installation or repair customer premise visits to market the Carrier’s services to the end-user and to convince the end-user to switch to the Carrier’s retail services.

122.

The effect of all these behaviours is anti-competitive.

123.

For these reasons, CNOC is requesting that the Commission make three remedial orders

directed at the Carriers.

124.

One order requested would require Carriers to provide ISPs access to a Carrier’s

technician dispatch staff when installation or repair technicians do not show up for a scheduled appointment or attempt to change the window for an installation or repair on the actual day that the activity is scheduled to occur. This will enable ISPs and carriers to plan same-day revisits by technicians and otherwise optimize their deployment.

125.

Another order requested would require Carriers to insert a provision in their tariffs

requiring them to tag all TPIA connections whenever a TPIA end-user installation requires a premise visit by a Carrier technician. Such a requirement will standardize tagging as a required practice, hopefully leading to greater consistency in tagging and the elimination or significant reduction in accidental disconnections of active TPIA end-user accesses.

39

ABRIDGED 126. The third order would require each Carrier to prohibit its technicians from marketing the

Carrier’s services or trying to convince end-users to switch to the Carrier’s services in conjunction with a TPIA installation or repair activities.

3.5

Improvements are required in Carrier network survivability, as well as procedures relating to network maintenance, modifications and related TPIA customer notifications

127.

In section 2.5 of the Application, CNOC described various difficulties that arise due to

insufficient network survivability, as well as the insufficient notice to TPIA customers by Carriers of network maintenance and modifications. 128.  Some of these problems include:

the lack of the use of a protocol that will ensure that traffic can be routed around connection failures between a Carrier and an ISP when router equipment at either end is not aware of the failure;

the fact that at least some Carriers have TPIA networks that are built over a single-fault point that render TPIA services vulnerable to the catastrophic consequences;

the lack of adequate notification of TPIA customers by Carriers of network modifications, such as, for example, DOCSIS and other standards-based version upgrades (by service area), frequency changes for channels used for TPIA service, modem firmware downloads, network changes requiring additional deployments of IP addresses by TPIA customers, terminal interface specification changes, Carrier roll-out plans for IPv6;

the lack of timely reports by Carriers that show the number of IP addresses allocated to DHCP by IP pool and the number of IP addresses actually in use by end-users by IP pool,

40

ABRIDGED so that ISPs can ensure that they provide IP addresses to Carriers in a sufficiently timely manner to avoid service disruptions to ISP end-users; and 

the presence of non-disclosure provisions in TPIA service agreements that can unduly restrict TPIA customers from advising their end users of any network maintenance or modifications, terminal-to-network interfaces, as well as reasons for TPIA service outages and remedial actions taken by a Carrier to address the outages, notwithstanding the non-disclosure provisions of TPIA Agreements.

129.

In order to address these issues, CNOC is requesting that the Commission make seven

remedial orders directed at the Carriers.

130.

The first order would require Carriers to implement network safeguards such as the use of

the BFD protocol so that traffic can be routed around connection failures between a Carrier and an ISP when router equipment at either end is not aware of the failure. Using this protocol to prevent this kind of unpredictable traffic loss is a simple and costless means of avoiding unnecessary service interruptions for end-users.

131.

Another order would require Carriers to implement efficient protection, where

practicable, to reduce the impact of single points of failures in their TPIA network designs.

132.

A third order would require Carriers to provide advance notification to ISPs of all

changes that affect a competitor's use or potential use of Carrier bottleneck functions, and that such changes would include technical changes to interconnection interfaces, as well as changes to network functions (including new functions) that could be used to provide competitive services, with such notification occurring at the time a Carrier makes the decision to proceed with a change, or 6 months before the proposed change, whichever is earlier – for greater certainty, this would include, without limitation, such matters as frequency changes affecting the TPIA service, implementation of DOCSIS or other standard upgrades by geographic area, cable modem firmware upgrades, changes that could require the deployment of additional IP addresses to serve the ISPs’ end-users (with a corresponding analysis of that additional demand and when 41

ABRIDGED it will need to be satisfied). This requirement would go a long way toward enabling ISPs to minimize the disruptions faced by their end-users and notify the end-users about any possible disruptions as a result of Carrier network modifications. This approach is entirely consistent with the network modification disclosure regime that the Commission approved for the interconnection of networks in Telecom Letter Decision CRTC 94-11 and imposed on the ILECs. There is no reason that the Cable Carriers should be exempt from these requirements.

133.

A fourth order would require carriers to provide disclosure of terminal interface

specifications for the Carriers' bottleneck services. For greater certainty, this would include, without limitation, all matters that could impair the continued operation of cable modems already certified for use on a Carrier’s network. This requirement would go a long way toward enabling ISPs to minimize the disruptions faced by their end-users and notify the end-users about any possible disruptions as a result of Carrier terminal interface specification changes. This approach is entirely consistent with the terminal interface specification disclosure regime that the Commission approved in Telecom Letter Decision CRTC 94-11 and imposed on the ILECs. There is no reason that the Cable Carriers should be exempt from these requirements.

134.

A fifth order would prohibit Carriers from restricting TPIA customers from advising their

end users of any Carrier bottleneck functions (as described above), terminal-to-network interfaces, as well as reasons for TPIA service outages and remedial actions taken by a Carrier to address the outages, notwithstanding the non-disclosure provisions of TPIA Agreements.

135.

A sixth order would require Carriers to provide to TPIA customers the latest versions of

the Carriers’ roll out plans to implement IPv6 once every quarter, until such implementation has been completed. This information would ensure that ISPs can better coordinate the roll out of IPV6 in their own networks in order to prevent end-user service issues that might otherwise arise in the absence of such coordination.

136.

The seventh order would require the Carriers to provide their TPIA customers daily

reports generated during peak hours (e.g., between 8 and 11 P.M. local time) that show the number of IP addresses allocated to DHCP by IP pool and the number of IP addresses actually in 42

ABRIDGED use by end-users by IP pool. This would ensure that ISPs can assign adequate IP addresses on the Carrier networks on a sufficiently timely basis to accommodate customer growth and avoid unnecessary service outages.

3.6

Improvements are required in Carrier invoices and invoicing processes

137.

In section 2.6 of this Application, CNOC described various difficulties that arise due to

deficiencies in Carrier invoices and billing procedures associated with their TPIA services.

138. 

Some of these problems include:

insufficient information so that the TPIA customer can verify the charges on the invoices and ensure that the TPIA customer’s own end users are being billed correctly;

format and layout of invoices are not clear and do not make it easy for TPIA customers to import the invoice data for use in reconciling the invoices in all cases; and

a lack of accuracy and timeliness in some invoicing.

139.

In order to address these issues, CNOC is requesting that the Commission make two

remedial orders directed at the Carriers.

140.

The first order would require Carriers to provide all of the billing details set out in

Attachment “A” to the Application on their TPIA invoices, to provide invoices at the same time every month in Excel spreadsheet format, and to ensure that the details on the invoices are set out clearly and organized by individual customer, using plain language, and without obscure codes or layouts. This would enable ISPs to audit their invoices, use them for reconciling their own end-user accounts, reduce billing errors and ensure that invoices are issued with regularity using user-friendly layouts, formats and data.

43

ABRIDGED 141. The second order would require Carriers to commence work on the provision of TPIA

invoicing information in OData format via customer portals, with this activity being referred to CISC for further implementation. This would vastly improve the ease and efficiency of the invoice reconciliation process for ISPs.

44

ABRIDGED 4.0 QUALITY OF SERVICE INDICATORS FRAMEWORK AND CONSIDERATIONS Introduction AND RATE REBATE PLAN:

4.1

142.

In part 2.0 of this Application, CNOC demonstrated how the dependency that ISPs have

on Carriers has been leading to breaches of section 27(2) of the Act due to the unduly discriminatory manner in which the Carriers often treat their wholesale TPIA customers.

143.

In this part, CNOC is asking the Commission to introduce a series of Q of S indicators

and a RRP in order to create some service standards in some basic areas that will improve the delivery of TPIA services to ISPs. It is important to note that this proposed regime is founded upon, and meant to mirror, the Q of S / RRP regime that has been in place since 2005 and applies to ILECs with respect to the delivery of wholesale services that competitors require to offer their own local voice services.

144.

As was the case with respect to the specific orders requested by CNOC in part 3.0 of this

Application, the Commission’s authority to impose Q of S and an RRP on the Carriers with respect to provision of certain services and performance of certain functions that form part of the larger TPIA services is firmly founded on a number of provisions in the Act, including sections 24, 25, 32(c) through 32(g). The purpose of the orders is to remove barriers to competition and to ensure that the Carriers adhere to section 27(2) of the Act, which provides:

“No Canadian carrier shall, in relation to the provision of a telecommunications service or the charging of a rate for it, unjustly discriminate or give an undue or unreasonable preference toward any person, including itself, or subject any person to an undue or unreasonable disadvantage.” 145. Act.68 The remedies proposed by CNOC are meant to advance the telecommunication policy

objectives of the Act and comply with the Policy Direction, as required by section 47 of the

68

This is addressed more fully in part 5.0 of this Application.

45

ABRIDGED

146.

Section 4.2 sets out the guiding principles underpinning the Q of S and RRP framework

requested by CNOC. Section 4.3 discusses the proposed company-wide Q of S indicators, as well as the more competitor-specific Q of S indicators that are intended to form the basis for the operation of the RRP and relates them to the specific service issues that the indicators are intended to address. Section 4.4 describes the specific company-wide and competitor-specific Q of S indicators proposed by CNOC. Section 4.5 describes the basic structure of the proposed RRP. Section 4.6 sets out CNOC’s proposal for the frequency of reporting and rebates under the RRP. Section 4.7 proposes a repeat failure mechanism. Finally, section 4.8 discusses some other aspects of the RRP.

4.2

Guiding Principles

147.

In TD 2005-20, the Commission stated that “the purpose of the Q of S regime for

competitors, including the RRP for competitors, is to ensure that all competitors receive a Q of S from the ILECs of a sufficiently high level to enable the competitors to compete on a level playing field with each other and with the ILECs”.69 Based on this starting point, the Commission went on to cite eight Guiding Principles (“Guiding Principles”) for the selection of eligible Q of S indicators and the design of the final RRP for competitors. The Guiding Principles are as follows70:

148.

1. Q of S indicators to be included in the RRP should measure performance of the provision of services to competitors;

2. Q of S indicators to be included in the RRP should be measured on a competitor-bycompetitor basis;

69 70

Supra, note 8, para 31. Id., at para 41.

46

ABRIDGED 3. Q of S indicators to be included in the RRP should be calculated only in respect of an activity that is within the ILEC's control;

4. Q of S indicators to be included in the RRP should be such that they do not duplicate activities that are already measured by other indicators in the RRP;

5. Rate rebates under the RRP should provide sufficient incentive to ensure an ILEC meets its Q of S obligations;

6. The RRP should maintain just and reasonable rates and must not operate as a penalty mechanism;

7. The RRP should be easy to understand, to administer and to audit; and

8. The RRP should be effective for all competitors that acquire services from the ILEC for which a Q of S indicator exists for that service, in all circumstances, irrespective of the type of competitor or the volume of service provided to a competitor.

149.

CNOC is of the view that these Guiding Principles are comprehensive, just and

reasonable. The Guiding Principles are inspired by the objectives of the Act and provide a strong foundation for Q of S indicators and a RRP applicable to the ILECs. For these reasons, CNOC is proposing that the Guiding Principles also serve as the foundation of CNOC’s proposed Q of S indicators and RRP associated with TPIA. Accordingly, CNOC requests that the Commission adopt the same Guiding Principles in the present context. However, wherever a Guiding Principle from TD 2005-20 refers to an ILEC, that reference should be changed to Cable Carrier for the purposes of this Application.

47

ABRIDGED 4.3 Company-wide and competitor-specific indicators 4.3.1 150. Why both types of indicators are necessary

CNOC is conscious of the Commission’s decision in TD 2005-20 not to include

company-wide Q of S indicators in the final local voice RRP71. To do so would cause redundancies with competitor-specific indicators in addition to contravening the Guiding Principle which states that the Q of S indicators to be included in the RRP should be measured on a competitor-by-competitor basis72. However, the tracking of company-wide indicators, despite their exclusion from the final RRP, serves an important purpose. Company wideindicators allow for a comparison between Q of S results for competition-related indicators and retail Q of S indicators73.

151.

As pointed out by the Commission, “This would permit the Commission to monitor an

ILEC’s performance in dealing with competitors as compared to the ILEC’s treatment of its own end-customers”74. The Commission also stated that the tracking of company-wide indicators would allow “it to monitor ILEC performance on these particular indicators and initiate remedial action if required”75.

152.

In light of the multiple problems identified by CNOC in part 2.0 of this Application with

the Carriers’ lack of observance of reasonable service standards applicable to the delivery of TPIA, CNOC urges the Commission to adopt a limited set of company-wide Q of S indicators with respect to Cable Carrier delivery of TPIA, as further described in section 4.4 below.

153.

As is the case for local voice, CNOC’s proposed company-wide indicators are meant to

demonstrate to the Commission clearly how a Carrier’s treatment of competing ISPs compares to the Carrier’s treatment of its own retail operations. If there is a performance disparity, the Commission will have grounds to take remedial action.
71 72 73 74 75

Id., at para. 127. Id., at para 41. Id., at para 130. Ibid. Ibid.

48

ABRIDGED

154.

With these factors in mind, CNOC proposes four company-wide indicators, nine

competitor-specific leading indicators and four competitor-specific trailing indicators. The trailing indicators are modeled upon similar indicators that were included in the TD 2005-20 local voice RRP. Trailing or secondary Q of S indicators are paired with main or primary (i.e., leading) competitor-specific indicator. When a Carrier fails to meet the standard of a main Q of S indicator, the trailing indicator becomes active and captures the Carrier’s ability to satisfy the main indicator within a given time frame after the original due date.

155.

In order for the proposed RRP to create an incentive for Carriers to adhere to standards

for wholesale installations that are the same as the standards they apply to their own retail operations, the measurement methods for a number of the Q of S indicators should employ the retail service standards adopted by the Carriers as the reference point for the definition of the corresponding Q of S indicators. Otherwise, the Carriers could circumvent the indicators (and the financial consequences of the RRP for non-compliance in the case of competitor-specific indicators) simply by booking wholesale activity windows that are excessively long relative to the corresponding retail activity windows. Under such a scenario, as long as the wholesale windows are not missed the indicator would be considered to have been met, even though Carriers’ wholesale customers would be significantly disadvantaged compared to their retail operations and that would defeat the purpose of the proposed Q of S indicator and RRP regime. For this reason, it is essential for retail standard intervals to be embedded in a number of the proposed competitor-specific Q of S indicators.

156.

There are also some differences in the activities to be measured in the TPIA life-cycle as

compared to the local voice regime, due to the different services and functions that incumbents provide in each case. The Q of S indicators and RRP regime proposed herein have taken account of these differences, which is why the proposal made herein is not exactly the same as what the Commission adopted in TD 2005-20 for local voice services. In fact the proposal in this Application contains a fewer number of indicators than the number authorized in TD 2005-20. However, every attempt has been made to mirror the Commission’s determinations from that decision in the proposal made by CNOC to the greatest extent practicable. 49

ABRIDGED

4.3.2 157.

Company-wide Q of S indicators

CNOC is proposing that the Commission adopt four company-wide Q of S indicators.

Two of them relate to installations and the other two relate to repairs. The reason that CNOC is proposing two of each class of indicators is because service intervals will differ depending on whether a technician dispatch is or is not required.

158.

Based on the foregoing considerations, CNOC requests the Commission to adopt the

following company-wide Q of S indicators:  Indicator 1.1 - Competitor Installation Appointments Met - Dispatch Required76 o Definition: The total number of installation appointments requiring Carrier technician dispatches booked and the number met, with percentage of those met relative to the total booked for customers who are also competitors. o Measurement Method: Completed orders are sorted to determine the actual number and percentage completed on the appointed date. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more77. o Reporting Format: Indicator 1.1 – Competitor Installation Appointments Met – Dispatch Required. o Business Rule: Installations also include inward transfers where a Carrier technician dispatch is required.  Indicator 1.2 - Competitor Installation Appointments Met - Dispatch Not Required78 o Definition: The total number of installation appointments not requiring Carrier technician dispatches booked and the number met, with percentage of those met relative to the total booked for customers who are also competitors.

76 77

78

This indicator is modeled after indicator 1.6 of TD 2005-20, Appendix B. 90% is the standard that was applied for almost all of the TD 2005-20 Q of S indicators. Based on this model, a 90% standard is recommended for all of CNOC’s proposed TPIA indicators. This indicator is modeled after indicator 1.6 of TD 2005-20, Appendix B.

50

ABRIDGED o Measurement Method: Completed orders are sorted to determine the actual number and percentage completed on the appointed date. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Reporting Format: Indicator 1.2 – Competitor Installation Appointments Met – Dispatch Not Required. o Business Rule: Installations also include inward transfers where no Carrier technician dispatch is required.  Indicator 1.3 – Competitor Repair Appointments Met – Dispatch Required79 o Definition: The total number of repair appointments requiring Carrier technician dispatches booked and the number met, with percentage of those met relative to the total booked for customers who are also competitors. o Measurement Method: Completed orders are sorted to determine the actual number and percentage completed on the appointed date. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 1.3 – Competitor Repair Appointments Met – Dispatch Required.  Indicator 1.4 – Competitor Repair Appointments Met – Dispatch Not Required80 o Definition: The total number of repair appointments not requiring Carrier technician dispatches booked and the number met, with percentage of those met relative to the total booked for customers who are also competitors. o Measurement Method: Completed orders are sorted to determine the actual number and percentage completed on the appointed date. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more.

79 80

This indicator is modeled after indicator 2.6 of TD 2005-20, Appendix B. This indicator is modeled after indicator 2.6 of TD 2005-20, Appendix B.

51

ABRIDGED o Reporting Format: Indicator 1.4 – Competitor Repair Appointments Met – Dispatch Not Required. 4.3.3 Competitor-specific indicators relating to installations

4.3.3.1 Installation service standards

159.

As noted in section 2.3 above, the average installation time over all TPIA Carriers in the

three month period starting June of this year for those CNOC members who provided statistics to CNOC was eleven days. This is clearly excessive, especially when compared to the Carriers’ retail installation targets, which are much shorter. In order to ensure that Carrier wholesale TPIA customers are not disadvantaged, the reference point for indicators 2.1 and 2.2 described below are the Carriers’ applicable corresponding service standards for their retail operations.81

160.

CNOC requests that the Commission investigate the Carriers’ service standards for their

retail operations prior to issuing a determination in this proceeding. This inquiry is required because if the Commission accepts the Q of S indicators proposed by CNOC, it will also have to rule on the applicable service standards based on information yet to be provided by the Carriers as CNOC is not privy to this information.

161.

Based on the foregoing considerations, CNOC requests the Commission to adopt the

following competitor-specific Q of S indicators related to Carrier installation activities (where installations include inward transfers as well) to ensure that the Carrier meets appropriate service standards when scheduling installations:

81

It is known that Carriers can complete installations for their own retail customers in 24 to 48 hours and that this can occur even in situations where an end-user has been waiting much longer for a TPIA installation or repair.

52

ABRIDGED  Indicator 2.1 – New Order Activation Service Interval Met – Dispatch Required82 o Definition: The percentage of time that due dates relating to orders for installations requiring Carrier technician dispatches are met within the applicable standard service interval. o Measurement Method: Completed installation orders requiring Carrier technician dispatches are compiled and the percentage of those that were completed within the applicable standard service interval is reported. Orders for which the requested due date is beyond the applicable standard service interval are excluded from this measure. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.1 – New Order Activation Service Interval Met – Dispatch Required. o Numerator: Number of orders for installations requiring Carrier technician dispatches that have met the standard interval due date for the month. o Denominator: Total number of orders for installations requiring Carrier technician dispatches for which a due date was assigned for the month.83 Orders for which the requested due date is beyond the applicable standard interval are excluded from this measure. o Business Rules:   Competitor by Competitor. Include orders that cannot be completed on an agreed expedited due date. These orders are counted as missed in the calculation of the indicator.

82 83

This indicator is modeled after indicators 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 of TD 2005-20, Appendix B. In TD 2005-20, the Commission defined the denominator of indicators 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 to include the qualification “… for which a standard interval due date was assigned for the month” (emphasis added). Thus, the purpose of those indicators was to determine which installation dates set within accepted service intervals were met. In the case of indicators 2.1 and 2.2 proposed herein, the words “standard interval” have been omitted since CNOC merely wishes to track the degree to which installation dates are set within the applicable service intervals to determine if Carriers treat wholesale customers less favourably than their retail operations. Other indicators (i.e., 2.3 and 2.4) are used to keep track of whether confirmed due dates provided (whether within or outside acceptable service intervals) are actually met.

53

ABRIDGED  Exclude from the measurement, those installation orders where confirmed due dates are missed due to causes attributable to competitors or their customers.84  Installations also include inward transfers where a Carrier technician dispatch is required.  Indicator 2.2 – New Order Activation Service Interval Met – Dispatch Not Required85 o Definition: The percentage of time that due dates relating to orders for installations not requiring Carrier technician dispatches are met within the applicable standard service interval. o Measurement Method: Completed installation orders not requiring Carrier technician dispatches are compiled and the percentage of those that were completed within the applicable standard service interval is reported. Orders for which the requested due date is beyond the applicable standard service interval are excluded from this measure. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.2 – New Order Activation Service Interval Met – Dispatch Not Required. o Numerator: Number of orders for installations not requiring Carrier technician dispatches that have met the standard interval due date for the month. o Denominator: Total number of orders for installations not requiring Carrier technician dispatches for which a due date was assigned for the month. Orders for which the requested due date is beyond the applicable standard interval are excluded from this measure. o Business Rules:  Competitor by Competitor.

84

85

The only reason for such exclusions is if a competitor does not advise its customer of an agreed dispatch window for an installation or the customer or its agent does not show up for the installation during the agreed dispatch window. This applies to indicators 2.1 and 2.2. This indicator is modeled after indicators 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 of TD 2005-20, Appendix B.

54

ABRIDGED   Include orders that cannot be completed on an agreed expedited due date. These orders are counted as missed in the calculation of the indicator. Exclude from the measurement, those installation orders where confirmed due dates are missed due to causes attributable to competitors or their customers.  Installations also include inward transfers where no Carrier technician dispatch is required. 4.3.3.2 Adherence to installation windows 162. While the Q of S indicators described in section 4.3.3.1 above address the issue of

whether installation windows adhere to applicable service intervals, those indicators do not address the persistent problem of missed or rescheduled installation windows on an on-going basis. 163. In order to promote timely installations and limit the inconvenience experienced and

costs incurred by end-users when this does not occur, CNOC asks the Commission to adopt the following additional Q of S indicators:  Indicator 2.3 – New Order Activation Confirmed Due Date Met – Dispatch Required o Definition: The percentage of occurrences that confirmed due dates relating to orders for installations requiring Carrier technician dispatches are met. o Measurement Method: Completed installation orders requiring Carrier technician dispatches are compiled and the percentage of those that were completed by the confirmed due dates is reported. Orders for which a change to a due date is requested are excluded from this measure. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.3 – New Order Activation Confirmed Due Date Met – Dispatch Required. o Numerator: Number of orders for installations requiring Carrier technician dispatches that have met the confirmed due date for the month. 55

ABRIDGED o Denominator: Total number of orders for installations requiring Carrier technician dispatches for which a confirmed due date was assigned for the month. Orders for which a change to a confirmed due date is requested are excluded from this measure. o Business Rules:    Competitor by Competitor. Include orders that cannot be completed on an agreed expedited due date. These orders are counted as missed in the calculation of the indicator. Exclude from the measurement, those installation orders where confirmed due dates are missed due to causes attributable to competitors or their customers.86  Installations also include inward transfers where a Carrier technician dispatch is required. 

Indicator 2.3A – New Order Activation Late Completions – Dispatch Required o Definition: The percentage of orders for installations requiring Carrier technician dispatches that missed the confirmed due date, which are completed within three days of the due date. o Measurement Method: Completed installation orders requiring Carrier technician dispatches that missed their confirmed due dates are compiled, and the percentage of those that were completed within three days of their respective confirmed due dates is reported. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.3A – New Order Activation Late Completions – Dispatch Required.

86

The only reason for such exclusions is if a competitor does not advise its customer of an agreed dispatch window for an installation or the customer or its agent does not show up for the installation during the agreed dispatch window. This applies to indicators 2.3, 2.3A, 2.4 and 2.4A.

56

ABRIDGED o Numerator: Total number of orders for installations requiring Carrier technician dispatches in the month that missed the confirmed due date, which were completed within three days of the confirmed due date. o Denominator: Total number of orders for installations requiring Carrier technician dispatches in the month for which a confirmed due date was missed. o Business Rules:    Competitor by Competitor. Include orders not meeting the standard in indicator 2.3. Exclude from the measurement, those installation orders where confirmed due dates are missed due to causes attributable to competitors or their customers.  Installations also include inward transfers where a Carrier technician dispatch is required. 

Indicator 2.4 – New Order Activation Confirmed Due Date Met – Dispatch Not Required o Definition: The percentage of time that confirmed due dates relating to orders for installations not requiring Carrier technician dispatches are met. o Measurement Method: Completed installation orders not requiring Carrier technician dispatches are compiled and the percentage of those that were completed by the confirmed due dates is reported. Orders for which a change to a due date is requested are excluded from this measure. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.4 – New Order Activation Confirmed Due Date Met – Dispatch Not Required. o Numerator: Number of orders for installations requiring Carrier technician dispatches that have met the confirmed due date for the month. o Denominator: Total number of orders for installations requiring Carrier technician dispatches for which a confirmed due date was assigned for the month.

57

ABRIDGED Orders for which a change to a confirmed due date is requested are excluded from this measure. o Business Rules:    Competitor by Competitor. Include orders that cannot be completed on an agreed expedited due date. These orders are counted as missed in the calculation of the indicator. Exclude from the measurement, those installation orders where confirmed due dates are missed due to causes attributable to competitors or their customers.  Installations also include inward transfers where no Carrier technician dispatch is required. 

Indicator 2.4A – New Order Activation Late Completions – Dispatch Not Required o Definition: The percentage of orders for installations not requiring Carrier technician dispatches that missed the confirmed due date, which are completed within three days of the due date. o Measurement Method: Completed installation orders not requiring Carrier technician dispatches that missed their confirmed due dates are compiled, and the percentage of those that were completed within three days of their respective confirmed due dates is reported. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.4A – New Order Activation Late Completions – Dispatch Not Required. o Numerator: Total number of orders for installations not requiring Carrier technician dispatches in the month that missed the confirmed due date, which were completed within three days of the confirmed due date. o Denominator: Total number of orders for installations not requiring Carrier technician dispatches in the month for which a confirmed due date was missed. o Business Rules:  Competitor by Competitor. 58

ABRIDGED   Include orders not meeting the standard in indicator 2.4. Exclude from the measurement, those installation orders where confirmed due dates are missed due to causes attributable to competitors or their customers.  Installations also include inward transfers where no Carrier technician dispatch is required. 4.3.4 Competitor-specific indicators relating to repair

4.3.4.1 Repair service standards

164.

As noted in section 2.4 above, the average repair time over all TPIA Carriers in the last

few months of this year for those CNOC members who provided statistics to CNOC was four to five days when on-site repairs were required and three to four days when no dispatch was necessary, but some competitors’ customers faced outages that ran into the tens of days and these were not isolated incidents. This is clearly excessive, especially when compared to the Carriers’ own retail repair targets, which are much shorter. In order to ensure that Carrier wholesale TPIA customers are not disadvantaged, the reference point for indicators 2.5 and 2.6 described below are the Carriers’ applicable corresponding service standards for their retail operations. Therefore, if the Commission accepts the Q of S indicators proposed by CNOC, it will also have to rule on the applicable service standards based on information yet to be provided by the Carriers as CNOC is not privy to this information.

165.

Based on the foregoing considerations, CNOC requests the Commission to adopt the

following competitor-specific Q of S indicators related to Carrier repair activities (where installations include inward transfers as well) to ensure that the Carrier meets appropriate service standards when scheduling repairs:  Indicator 2.5 – Repair Service Interval Met – Dispatch Required o Definition: The percentage of time that due dates relating to the clearing of trouble reports requiring Carrier technician dispatches are met within the applicable standard service interval. 59

ABRIDGED o Measurement Method: Cleared trouble reports requiring Carrier technician dispatches are compiled and the percentage of those that were completed within the applicable standard service interval is reported. Trouble reports for which the requested due date is beyond the applicable standard service interval are excluded from this measure. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.5 – Repair Service Interval Met – Dispatch Required. o Numerator: Number of trouble reports cleared requiring Carrier technician dispatches that have met the standard interval due date for the month. o Denominator: Total number of trouble reports cleared requiring Carrier technician dispatches for which a due date was assigned for the month. Trouble reports for which the requested due date is beyond the applicable standard service interval are excluded from this measure. o Business Rules:   Competitor by Competitor. Include cleared reports that cannot be cleared on an agreed expedited due date. These trouble reports are counted as missed in the calculation of the indicator.  Exclude from the measurement, those trouble reports where confirmed due dates are missed due to causes attributable to competitors or their customers.87 

Indicator 2.6 – Repair Service Interval Met – Dispatch Not Required o Definition: The percentage of time that due dates relating to the clearing of trouble reports not requiring Carrier technician dispatches are met within the applicable standard service interval.

87

The only reason for such exclusions is if a competitor does not advise its customer of an agreed dispatch window for an installation or the customer or its agent does not show up for the installation during the agreed dispatch window. This applies to indicators 2.5 and 2.6.

60

ABRIDGED o Measurement Method: Cleared trouble reports not requiring Carrier technician dispatches are compiled and the percentage of those that were completed within the applicable standard service interval is reported. Trouble reports for which the requested due date is beyond the applicable standard service interval are excluded from this measure. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.6 – Repair Service Interval Met – Dispatch Not Required. o Numerator: Number of trouble reports cleared requiring Carrier technician dispatches that have met the standard interval due date for the month. o Denominator: Total number of trouble reports cleared requiring Carrier technician dispatches for which a due date was assigned for the month. Trouble reports for which the requested due date is beyond the applicable standard service interval are excluded from this measure. o Business Rules:   Competitor by Competitor. Include cleared reports that cannot be cleared on an agreed expedited due date. These trouble reports are counted as missed in the calculation of the indicator.  Exclude from the measurement, those trouble reports where confirmed due dates are missed due to causes attributable to competitors or their customers. 4.3.4.2 Adherence to repair windows 166. While the Q of S indicators described in section 4.3.4.1 above address the issue of

whether repair windows adhere to applicable service intervals, those indicators do not address the persistent problem of missed or rescheduled repair windows on an on-going basis.

61

ABRIDGED 167. In order to promote timely repairs and limit the inconvenience experienced and costs

incurred by end-users when this does not occur, CNOC asks the Commission to adopt the following additional Q of S indicators:  Indicator 2.7 – Repair Confirmed Due Date Met – Dispatch Required o Definition: The percentage of time that confirmed due dates relating to the clearing of trouble reports requiring Carrier technician dispatches are met. o Measurement Method: Cleared trouble reports requiring Carrier technician dispatches are compiled and the percentage of those that were completed by the confirmed due dates is reported. Trouble reports for which a change to a due date is requested are excluded from this measure. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.7 – Repair Confirmed Due Date Met – Dispatch Required. o Numerator: Number of cleared trouble reports requiring Carrier technician dispatches that have met the confirmed due date for the month. o Denominator: Total number of cleared trouble reports requiring Carrier technician dispatches for which a confirmed due date was assigned for the month. Trouble reports for which a change to a confirmed due date is requested are excluded from this measure. o Business Rules:   Competitor by Competitor. Include trouble reports that cannot be completed on an agreed expedited due date. These trouble reports are counted as missed in the calculation of the indicator.

62

ABRIDGED  Exclude from the measurement, those trouble reports where confirmed due dates are missed due to causes attributable to competitors or their customers.88 

Indicator 2.7A – Repair Late Completions – Dispatch Required o Definition: The percentage of trouble reports requiring Carrier technician dispatches that missed the confirmed due date, which are completed within three days of the due date. o Measurement Method: Cleared trouble reports requiring Carrier technician dispatches that missed their confirmed due dates are compiled, and the percentage of those that were completed within three days of their respective confirmed due dates is reported. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.7A – Repair Late Completions – Dispatch Required. o Numerator: Total number of trouble tickets requiring Carrier technician dispatches in the month that missed the confirmed due date, which were cleared within three days of the confirmed due date. o Denominator: Total number of trouble tickets requiring Carrier technician dispatches in the month for which a confirmed due date was missed. o Business Rules:    Competitor by Competitor. Include trouble reports not meeting the standard in indicator 2.7. Exclude from the measurement, those trouble reports where confirmed due dates are missed due to causes attributable to competitors or their customers.

88

The only reason for such exclusions is if a competitor does not advise its customer of an agreed dispatch window for an installation or the customer or its agent does not show up for the installation during the agreed dispatch window. This applies to indicators 2.7, 2.7A, 2.8 and 2.8A.

63

ABRIDGED  Indicator 2.8 – Repair Confirmed Due Date Met – Dispatch Not Required o Definition: The percentage of time that confirmed due dates relating to the clearing of trouble reports not requiring Carrier technician dispatches are met. o Measurement Method: Cleared trouble reports not requiring Carrier technician dispatches are compiled and the percentage of those that were completed by the confirmed due dates is reported. Trouble reports for which a change to a due date is requested are excluded from this measure. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.8 – Repair Confirmed Due Date Met – Dispatch Not Required. o Numerator: Number of cleared trouble reports not requiring Carrier technician dispatches that have met the confirmed due date for the month. o Denominator: Total number of cleared trouble reports not requiring Carrier technician dispatches for which a confirmed due date was assigned for the month. Trouble reports for which a change to a confirmed due date is requested are excluded from this measure. o Business Rules:   Competitor by Competitor. Include trouble reports that cannot be completed on an agreed expedited due date. These trouble reports are counted as missed in the calculation of the indicator.  Exclude from the measurement, those trouble reports where confirmed due dates are missed due to causes attributable to competitors or their customers. 

Indicator 2.8A – Repair Late Completions – Dispatch Not Required o Definition: The percentage of trouble reports not requiring Carrier technician dispatches that missed the confirmed due date, which are completed within three days of the due date.

64

ABRIDGED o Measurement Method: Cleared trouble reports not requiring Carrier technician dispatches that missed their confirmed due dates are compiled, and the percentage of those that were completed within three days of their respective confirmed due dates is reported. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.8A – Repair Late Completions – Dispatch Not Required. o Numerator: Total number of trouble tickets not requiring Carrier technician dispatches in the month that missed the confirmed due date, which were cleared within three days of the confirmed due date. o Denominator: Total number of trouble tickets not requiring Carrier technician dispatches in the month for which a confirmed due date was missed. o Business Rules:    Competitor by Competitor. Include trouble reports not meeting the standard in indicator 2.8. Exclude from the measurement, those trouble reports where confirmed due dates are missed due to causes attributable to competitors or their customers. 4.3.5 Competitor-specific indicators relating to disconnections

4.3.5.1 Disconnection service standards

168.

As noted in section 2.7 above, Carriers can take much longer than necessary to process

disconnections.89 In order to ensure that Carrier wholesale TPIA customers are not disadvantaged, the reference point for indicator 2.9 described below is the Carriers’ applicable corresponding service standard for their retail operations. Therefore, if the Commission accepts the Q of S indicators proposed by CNOC, it will also have to rule on the applicable service

89

The five day period between a disconnection order and a disconnection reported by many ISPs is excessive and greater intervals occur as well.

65

ABRIDGED standards based on information yet to be provided by the Carriers as CNOC is not privy to this information.

169.

Based on the foregoing considerations, CNOC requests the Commission to adopt the

following competitor-specific Q of S indicator related to Carrier disconnection activities (where installations include outward transfers as well) to ensure that the Carrier meets appropriate service standards when scheduling disconnections:  Indicator 2.9 – Disconnection Service Interval Met o Definition: The percentage of time that due dates relating to orders for disconnections are met within the applicable standard service interval. o Measurement Method: Completed disconnection orders are compiled and the percentage of those that were completed within the applicable standard service interval is reported. Orders for which the requested due date is beyond the applicable standard service interval are excluded from this measure. o Geographical Basis: Company-wide, no geographic distinction. o Standard: 90% or more. o Reporting Format: Indicator 2.1 – Disconnection Service Interval Met. o Numerator: Number of orders for disconnections that have met the standard interval due date for the month. o Denominator: Total number of orders for disconnections for which a due date was assigned for the month. Orders for which the requested due date is beyond the applicable standard interval are excluded from this measure. o Business Rules:    Competitor by Competitor. Include orders that cannot be completed on an agreed expedited due date. These orders are counted as missed in the calculation of the indicator. Installations also include outward transfers.

66

ABRIDGED 4.4 The Rate Rebate Plan

4.4.1 170.

The proposed structure of the Rate Rebate Plan

In TD 2005-20, the Commission departed from the RRP formulas that were set in the

interim in Telecom Decision CRTC 2002-3490. In the Commission’s view, the interim formulas did not provide an adequate incentive for ILECs to meet minimum performance standards91. In both the Commission’s92 and CNOC’s view, the alternative formula which ultimately formed the foundation of the final voice RRP is far simpler for ILECs to administer and easier for competitors to verify. To this day, over eight years after the establishment of the final local voice RRP, the formula remains simple to operate and provides incentives for ILECs to meet their Q of S standards without becoming punitive. Based completely on the TD 2005-20 model93, CNOC recommends that the Commission

171.

adopt the following formula as part of the RRP for TPIA:

1. The total potential rebate amount (“TPRA”) for a month is equal to 5 percent of the amounts billed to a competitor for services (existing plus incremental ordered during the month) covered by a Q of S indicator with activity in that month;

2. Each Q of S indicator with activity in that month is given equal weight and the potential rebate amount (“PRA”) for an indicator is the TPRA divided by the number of active indicators for the month; and

3. The total rebate payable to a competitor for a month is the PRA multiplied by the number of Q of S indicators for which the Carrier failed to achieve the minimum performance standard that month.

90 91 92 93

Regulatory framework for second price cap period, Telecom Decision CRTC 2002-34, May 30, 2002. Supra, note 8, para. 66. Id., at para. 69. Id., at para. 74.

67

ABRIDGED 4.4.2 172. Frequency of reporting and rebates

As the Commission stated in TD 2005-20, the time span between a failure to meet a Q of

S indicator standard and the subsequent rate rebate should be as brief as reasonably possible94. At the same time, the Commission recognized the importance of ensuring that the regulatory burden on all parties is as light as reasonably possible95.

173.

With reference to the above noted considerations, CNOC recommends the following

practices (which mirror those of TD 2005-2096) in relation to the frequency of reporting and rebates for the TPIA RRP:

1. Carriers shall issue competition-related Q of S results on a quarterly basis;

2. Carriers must file those results with the Commission, providing a copy of competitorspecific results to the relevant competitor, within 30 days of the last day of the applicable quarter and make any rate rebate payments to competitors within the same 30-day time period; and

3. Carriers are required to file with the Commission, and provide to the relevant competitor, all supporting details associated with the determination of the Q of S results and the calculation of the rate rebate amounts.

4.4.3 174.

Repeat failure mechanism

In TD 2005-20, the Competitors (as defined therein) proposed a mechanism to address

repeated failures under the RRP97. The fact that ILECs failed to meet interim Q of S standards on a recurring basis prompted the Competitors to propose a system to offset any economic incentives the ILECs may have in providing substandard service delivery on a recurring basis98.
94 95 96 97 98

Id, at para. 82. Ibid. Id., at para. 86. Id., at para. 87. Id., at para 87.

68

ABRIDGED Ultimately, the Commission determined that the mechanism proposed by the Competitors might become punitive in effect and therefore chose not to incorporate it as part of the final RRP99.

175.

In the experience of CNOC’s TPIA members, the Carriers have consistently failed to

deliver minimum service standards in many areas over prolonged periods of time. While CNOC is confident that the implementation of Q of S indicators and a RRP will provide necessary incentives to encourage Carriers to meet service standards, CNOC believes that the serious consequences of repeat service failures warrant additional measures to incent the Carriers to comply and to compensate competitors adequately when the Carriers don’t comply.

176.

In recent months, ISPs have faced dire service crises with their respective TPIA Carriers.

As previously noted, end-users naturally assume that their ISP is responsible for all of the network disruptions and service delays that they experience, even when responsibility lies squarely with the Carrier. Persistent and repeated service shortcomings at virtually every stage of Internet provisioning have seriously damaged the business reputation of many TPIA ISPs. As a consequence, the entire TPIA industry is undermined. The current state of TPIA has led to formal customer complaints and regular media coverage. In an effort to preserve customer support, some ISPs have reached out to their subscriber base and communicated their intent to resolve the situation with the Carriers and the Commission. If the remedies ordered by the Commission are not successful in reversing sub-standard service delivery by the Carriers, then ISPs will be unable to reverse the damage to their business reputation and to the viability of competitive TPIA services in general.

177.

For these reasons, CNOC proposes that a rebate for an indicator should be multiplied by

that indicator’s repeat factor. Initially, the repeat factor is set at one and is increased by one for every month in which the Carrier reports a below standard Q of S result, up to a maximum of six months. Once the Carrier delivers service at the approved standard for one month, the repeat factor is reset to one.

99

Id., at para 99.

69

ABRIDGED 178. The basic design of CNOC’s repeat failure mechanic resembles the system proposed by

the Competitors in TD 2005-20100, but with two important adjustments that are designed to alleviate the Commission’s concern that a mechanism of this sort might become punitive in effect101. These two changes are inspired by submissions of the ILECs in the proceedings leading to TD 2005-20 that address why the proposed repeat failure mechanism of the Competitors was perceived by them to be unreasonable and punitive102.

179.

Firstly, CNOC’s repeat factor is subject to a maximum cap of six so that rate rebates do

not increase at an exponential rate ad infinitum103.

180.

Secondly, the application of the repeat factor is symmetrical in nature. In other words,

once the service standard is met for one month (as opposed to the proposed repeat failure mechanism of the Competitors in TD 2005-20, which required a service standard to be maintained for three consecutive months104), the repeat factor is reset to one.

181.

CNOC believes that this moderated proposal would not have a punitive effect and would

be an effective means of ensuring just and reasonable rates in accordance with section 27 of the Act. Again, while assessing this aspect of the proposed TPIA RRP, CNOC asks the Commission to consider the state of the TPIA industry in a time where persistent and repeated service failures have become the status quo.

182.

In this regard, CNOC wishes to highlight that the Carriers’ most flagrant deviations from

reasonable service standards occur in the back-to-school season (i.e., July through September) and around moving day in Quebec (July 1st), which are the busiest times of the year for all telecommunications service providers, and hence for consumers. The repeat factor on the RRP could be of particular assistance in dissuading the Carriers to engage in particularly unjustly

100 101 102 103 104

Id., at para. 88. Id., at para. 99. Id., at paras. 91-93. Id., at para. 92. Id., at para. 88.

70

ABRIDGED discriminatory behavior towards their ISP customers for a consecutive number of months during this very important part of the year.

183.

For all of these reasons, CNOC asks the Commission to include a repeat failure

mechanism, as described above, as part of the RRP for TPIA. 4.4.4. Other aspects of the TPIA RRP 184. With reference to the Guiding Principles, CNOC acknowledges that Carriers should not

be penalized for failing to meet standards due to factors that are out of their control. CNOC would support a process for Carriers to apply to the Commission for a determination that a particular failure should be excluded from the Carrier’s Q of S results. The process should follow the example set in TD 2005-20105, whereby the Carrier must apply for relief within 21 days of the adverse event (which led to the service failure) and serve a copy of its application on any affected competitors at the same time as the application is filed with the Commission. This is a just and reasonable qualification to the RRP.

185.

Concerning audits, disputes and non-compliance, CNOC recommends that the

Commission also refer to the procedures established in TD 2005-20. Carriers should conduct annual internal audits to verify that procedures and processes are in place for the Carrier to deliver and maintain facilities and services on time to competitors. Carriers should also be charged with retaining an external auditor to conduct annual audits of the competition-related Q of S results, RRP calculations and any rate rebate payments. Finally, Carriers should file a report with the Commission detailing any issues raised and findings made by the internal and external audits, within 30 days of the external auditor’s report, serving a copy on their competitors.

105

Id, at. Para. 117.

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ABRIDGED 5.0 THE RELIEF SOUGHT IS CONSISTENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY OBJECTIVES AND DIRECTION WITH THE THE POLICY

5.1. The relief sought in the Application promotes the Telecommunications Policy Objectives

186.

Without the relief requested in this Application, Carriers will continue to provide

substandard levels of TPIA related services to ISPs. This has, and will continue to lead to an undue lessening of competition in the provision of retail Internet and other telecommunications services that are delivered over cable networks. The orders sought in part 3.0 of this Application, coupled with the Q of S indicators and RRP described in part 4.0 will, consistent with section 47(a) of the Act, enhance the pursuit of a number of telecommunications policy objectives set out in section 7 of the Act.

187.

These specific objectives are: (a) to facilitate the orderly development throughout Canada

of a telecommunications system that serves to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the social and economic fabric of Canada and its regions; (b) to render reliable and affordable telecommunications services of high quality accessible to Canadians in both urban and rural areas in all regions of Canada; (c) to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness, at the national and international levels, of Canadian telecommunications; (f) to foster increased reliance on market forces for the provision of telecommunications services and to ensure that regulation, where required, is efficient and effective; and (h) to respond to the economic and social requirements of users of telecommunications services.

5.2. The relief Sought in the Application is consistent with the Policy Direction

188.

The effect of the relief requested in this Application will, pursuant to subsection 47(b) of

the Act, also be consistent with the requirements relating to the economic regulatory measures and access to networks set out in the Policy Direction.

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ABRIDGED 189. These requirements include ensuring that economic regulatory measures employed by the

Commission do not deter economically efficient entry (in this case by independent ISPs)106 and that network access regimes are: (a) technologically neutral and do not artificially favour either cable or DSL technologies over each other; and (b) competitively neutral and do not favour either the Carriers or the independent ISPs that rely on the Carriers for the provision of TPIA services over each other107.

106 107

Subsection 1(b)(ii) of the Policy Direction. Id., at Subsection 1(b)(iv).

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ABRIDGED 6.0. CONCLUSION 190. The relief requested in this Application can be expected to motivate Carriers to provide

ISPs the same quality of service for TPIA as they provide to their own retail operations, which they are already required to do by law.108 Ensuring that this is the case will promote competition in the provision of retail telecommunications services that require wholesale WHSAS as inputs. Accordingly, the granting of the Application will motivate the Carriers to adhere to prior Commission rulings, promote several telecommunications policy objectives, is consistent with the Policy Direction and is, therefore, in consumers’ interest. In sum, approval of the Application is in the public interest.

191.

For all of these reasons, CNOC urges the Commission to grant the relief and make the

orders requested in parts 3.0 and 4.0 of this Application.

108

Supra, note 21.

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ABRIDGED 7.0 192. LIST OF PARTIES SERVED The parties on which this application will be served are:

a) Cogeco Cable Inc.;

b) Quebecor Media Inc. on behalf of its wholly-owned subsidiary Videotron G.P.;

c) Rogers Communications Partnership; and

d) Shaw Cablesystems G.P.

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ABRIDGED 8.0 NOTICE

This application is made by Canadian Network Operators Consortium Inc., c/o Bill Sandiford, 107-85 Curlew Drive, Toronto, ON, M3A 2P8 [Email: regulatory@cnoc.ca].

A copy of this application may be obtained by sending a request to regulatory@cnoc.ca.

TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to section 25, and, as applicable section 26 of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure, any respondent or intervener is required to mail or deliver or transmit by electronic mail its answer to this application to the Secretary General of the Canadian Radio-television and

Telecommunications Commission (“Commission”), Central Building, 1 Promenade du Portage, Gatineau (Québec) J8X 4B1, and to serve a copy of the answer on the applicant within 30 days of the date that this application is posted on the Commission’s website or by such other date as the Commission may specify.

Service of the copy of the answer on the applicant may be effected by personal delivery, by electronic mail, or by ordinary mail. In the case of service by personal delivery, it may be effected at the address set out above.

If a respondent does not file or serve its answer within the time limit prescribed, the application may be disposed of without further notice to it.

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