Columbia Roosevelt Review

Spring 2009

The Roosevelt Institution
at

Columbia University

A project of the Roosevelt Institution at Columbia University
Copyright 2009 All rights reserved

Columbia Policy Review

Justin Floyd - Editor-In-Chief Sonali Pillay - Assistant Editor The Editorial Board Nick Turner - Administrative Director Dario Abramskiehn - Research Director Katherine O’Gorman - Secretary Nancy Huemer - Membership Director Andrew Colvin - Treasurer Sarah Scheinman - Equal Justice Director Clare Kelley, Raul Mendoza - Education Co-Directors Isaac Lara - Foreign Policy Director Barak Wouk - Energy and Environment Director Aaron Welt - Labor Director Adrian Haimovich - President Emeritus Eric Rosenberg - Executive Board Member Maddy Joseph - Education Center Member

Columbia Roosevelt Review
A project of

The Roosevelt Institution
at

Columbia University Spring 2009

Preface
We welcome you to the Columbia University Roosevelt Institution Journal. This is the first annual progressive policy journal produced by students at Columbia University and Barnard College. In the following pages, we present innovative and pragmatic solutions to problems facing the United States at the local, state, national, and international levels. The Roosevelt Institution is the first non-partisan, non-profit, student-run think tank in the United States, with chapters at over 75 different university campuses across the country and abroad. Here at Columbia, we strive to affect our community by advocating for progressive ideas and policies. As our membership continues to grow and mature, our voice grows louder at Columbia and around the nation. Our chapter emphasizes two components of participation. The first part is a weekly body meeting, where our membership has spirited discussions and debates on progressive issues. Often, these meetings include distinguish guest lecturers from Columbia’s faculty and elsewhere discussing their areas of expertise. The second part is through our policy centers. Individual members join with other members in groups that discuss and formulate policy in six fields: Economic Development and Labor, Equal Justice, Energy and the Environment, Healthcare, Education, and Foreign Policy. These centers meet outside of body meetings to devise and provide the strategic means for implementing policies. This Journal is the product of a diverse and committed group of undergraduate writers at Columbia and Barnard. The Journal’s pieces are organized by Center. They cover topics ranging from incentivizing energy conservation on Columbia’s campus to improving America’s role in promoting and securing nuclear stability. Our members, executive board, and editorial board put forth an extraordinary effort to produce a high-caliber Journal with informed and creative policy solutions. But, as all our members acknowledge, writing progressive policy is only the first step toward enacting change. In creating this Journal, we hope our ideas inspire policy leaders of today and tomorrow with the content of our ideas and demonstrate the promise of our generation.

Table of Contents
7 8 8 Economic Development and Labor Saving the MTA Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein Measuring Poverty: The Moment to Change Nicolas Rio Freedom of Speech on the Job Aaron Welt Equal Justice Protecting America’s Immigrant Workforce Emily Tamkin Redistricting and Representation: Reforms for a Broken System Billy Organek Tax-Exemption and Political Involvement: Institutional Regulation Eliot Oh Representing the People: A Standard for Filling Senate Vacancies Nancy Heumer and Sarah Scheinman Hope for Minor Parties: Electoral Fusion Katherine O’Gorman Energy and the Environment Waste Disposal and Energy Generation through Plasma Gasification by Parinitha Sastry, Angela Wong, Barak Wouk A New Approach to the Electricity Bill in Higher Education: Submetering College Dorm Rooms to Incentivize Sustainable Consumption by Dario Abramskiehn and Brenden Cline Education Green Jobs through Vocational Education Maddy Joseph and Clare Kelley Secular Education Against the Proliferation of Unregulated Madrassas Kyu-In Lee and Raul Mendoza Foreign Policy Towards a Stronger Nuclear Policy Sam Klug Culture without Bias, Diplomacy without Propaganda Justin Floyd and Philip Verma After Guantánamo Eric Schorr Swat Valley and Beyond: Re-examining American Efforts in Pakistan Christine Choi From Poppies to Red Gold: An Alternative Approach to Eradication Sonali Pillay The Clout of Creativity: Shaping American Policy on Foreign Arts Justin Floyd and Isaac Lara

11 12 16 17 19

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32 33 36 38 44 48

Economic Development and Labor
Democracy is a system that spreads into every aspect of life, including the political, cultural, economic and social realms. Crucial to any successful self-governing system are the economic rights and opportunities that ensure fairness to workers and consumers in their everyday lives. The current world financial crisis reveals the dearth of American democratic norms and the weakness of liberal principles within our social structure. The following are policy proposals that would ensure greater fairness and equity in the U.S. economy as well as bolster American democracy.

Michael-Spitzer-Rubenstein By mid-July, New Yorkers will be subject to a world of hurt every time they leave home. If their bus or subway line still exists (35 bus routes and 2 subway lines will be cut) a ride will cost $2.50, assuming the ride is in New York City, under the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s recent rate hikes. In Long Island, the new bus fare will be $3.50. It will cost $5.26 to cross the East River Bridge using E-ZPass, and $6.50 using cash, up from $4.15 and $5, respectively, as the New York Times reported. Commuters taking the train will suffer the most, paying as much as $350 a month. Those living in Manhattan or New Jersey and driving to work will barely be touched by these new tolls and fares. Instead, the brunt of the burden falls on poor, working class, and even middle class workers who need to get to Manhattan to earn a living. Moreover, there is no suggestion that a dramatically increased commuter tax will reduce either transit pollution or gridlock. It’s a horrible situation, and from the cries of city and state elected officials, one would think there is no alternative. But there is. New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg recognized that there were other options in January 2008, when he proposed a congestion pricing system by which cars entering Manhattan’s Central Business District (Manhattan south of 60th St) between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. would be charged $8. This would have decreased traffic by six percent in this District and generated significant extra revenue that could strengthen NYC’s aging transit system. It was a novel idea for New York, though it drew heavily on similar plans in Europe, especially London, Milan, and Stockholm, that had been very effective at reducing traffic. However, with opposition from many in Brooklyn, Queens, and Long Island, all of whom would pay dramatically more under Mayor Bloomberg’s plan than drivers from New Jersey and Manhattan,1 the plan did not win approval. After Bloomberg’s proposal failed to gain support, the Nurture New York’s Nature Foundation studied congestion in the city and discovered that each additional car that enters the Central Business District adds $30 worth of delay and gridlock and an additional $10 worth of pollution. As a whole, it totals more than $13 billion of costs to the metropolitan area and 52,000 jobs lost annually, according to the Partnership for New York City’s report Growth or Gridlock? The Economic Case for Traffic Relief and Transit Improvement for a Greater New York. If all drivers were expected to pay for the externalities they caused, tolls to go into Manhattan would be $40 instead of $5, dramatically surpassing even the $8 tolls Mayor Bloomberg proposed. However, because straphangers taking the bus or subway downtown subtract from both traffic and pollution, they should pay nothing. Even reducing bus and subway charges to $20 or less, depending on the time of day, would fundamentally reshape New York City’s transit system, take cars off the streets, and make New York’s air much healthier to breathe. Of course, it would also be so controversial and revolutionary that it would not likely pass. As a result, the Nurture New York’s Nature Foundation put out a much less radical plan, the Kheel-Komanoff Plan, which was named after its authors, noted transit experts Ted Kheel and Charles Komanoff.

Saving the MTA

Under the Kheel-Komanoff Plan, a sliding scale of tolls is imposed on cars driving into Manhattan’s Central Business District, from $2 at night and for most of the weekend to a maximum of $10 during morning rush hour (from 6:00-9:00 a.m.), when the most cars are going into the city, according to traffic statistics included in the Balanced Transportation Analyzer provided by Nurture New York. The average congestion price would be $6, low enough that Westchester and Long Island residents could afford to come into the City for an occasional cultural outing. Nevertheless, such policies would offset many of the negative externalities of traffic, as car speeds would increase by as much as 28 percent, saving drivers more than $1.1 billion in time as people began using mass transit or curtailing unnecessary trips. This would also create almost $1.4 billion of new revenue for NYC.2 This revenue would cover the current operating deficit of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, allowing the system to run itself and build up long-term capacity, without depending on a state or federal bailout to continue service without increasing fares. These proposals should then be combined with Senate Majority Leader Malcolm Smith’s plan to create an income tax of one quarter on every $100 (0.25 percent) on New Yorkers. This would create a very low, fair tax to balance out the benefits everyone would gain from NYC having less traffic and less auto pollution. Non-drivers, too, would see benefits as shipping costs decline since trucks face less traffic bringing goods from one place to another. Police would respond to incidents more quickly if they do not have to slog through traffic to reach the scene of the crime. Buses could get through traffic more quickly if there were fewer cars on the street, just as other cars would. There would be less potential for accidents between motorists and pedestrians. The only people who would not see a direct benefit would be subway riders during their commutes, and even then, they would reap other benefits once they step aboveground. As such, it is only fair that New York taxpayers help support those improvements with an almost negligible tax that would generate $1.16 billion. Between the two revenue streams, roughly $1.3 billion would be available to the MTA to make mass transit a more viable alternative to driving. For one, the MTA would have no need to cut services, so that transit fares would still pay for the same trip they do now. Alternatively, they could also be used to gradually reduce fares, making it more affordable to take the subway or bus. That would in turn stimulate the economy as consumers could travel to more stores to buy goods and open up more potential jobs for commuters. In addition, by staggering the fare reduction, the MTA could also pay off its debt, gradually freeing it from the $1.5 billion burden of servicing already-issued bonds and opening up more opportunities to reduce fares. Within a year of this plan being implemented, however, the base fare for the subway and bus could be halved from its current $2 a trip to just $1, making it inestimably more affordable for the millions of New Yorkers who take the MTA. Another, similarly priced alternative, which the Kheel-Kormanoff Plan actually endorses, would make buses entirely free and put subway fares on a sliding scale so that only at rush hour would fares be $2. Either way, the savings for commuters and travelers would be immense. If this plan proves anything, it is that there are options. The MTA fare hikes are not the only alternative open to New York in order to save the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. In-

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stead, by combining a miniscule income tax with congestion pricing, the MTA’s operating deficit would be alleviated and the MTA would make significant progress on paying down its multi-billion dollar debt burden. With the excess money, NYC could then plot a new future that would make mass transit more affordable and accessible for New Yorkers. It would spur economic growth, as car-free New Yorkers would have access to a wider market in which to work and shop in. Car drivers would spend less time stuck in traffic and more time being productive at work or enjoying time with family. Everyone would benefit, which is a far better situation than the current fare hikes that leave no one better off. Political will is all that is required for New York’s leaders in Albany and at City Hall to stand up for sensible transportation policy that does not merely delay an inevitable reckoning.

This might seem obvious. Why, then, has the measure for poverty not already been changed? The new measure will increase the total number of the poor and as such has lead to the failure to implement this policy. No politician wants to have negative poverty data undermining his mandate. Today is the best moment to change this. No one would blame Obama for an increase in poverty at such an early stage in his presidency. On the contrary, the Obama Administration would be praised if it were table to reduce the poverty rate calculated under this new system. During an economic crisis that will make poverty a more divisive issue, the United States can no longer afford to ignore those who really are the poor. To fight poverty boldly and swiftly, relevant tools and honest data are needed.

Measuring Poverty: The Moment to Change
Nicolas Rio

Freedom of Speech on the Job
Aaron Welt

The middle-class was the main focus of the 2008 Presidential campaign. This is understandable; the middle-class represents the majority of the U.S. population. However, the focus on this demographic has contributed to disregard for another group, growing in number as a result of the economic crisis. I am, of course, talking about the poor. In designing successful policy, one first needs to know whom it is targeting and how many people are being targeted. This is also true in regards to poverty. The U.S. measurement for poverty becomes increasingly archaic. Improving its accuracy is now more necessary than ever. Poverty measure needs to switch from absolute to relative. Currently, poverty is measured in relation to a fixed level of income, dependent on family size: $14,000 a year for a couple and $3,600 per child. These figures were derived in the 1960s by tripling basic food costs. Since then, it has been adjusted in accordance with changing rates of inflation. Today, however, the proportion of food in one’s average total budget is no longer one-third, but one-seventh. This can mainly be attributed to relative cost increases in health care and transportation. The threshold of absolute poverty is therefore more than two times lower than what it should be. This is already becoming a huge problem. However, there is still a bigger one: this method does not correlate with the definition of poverty in a developed country. In countries like the United States, levels of poverty do not focus on having enough to avoid starvation. Rather, poverty is about social exclusion: having enough economic resources to remain integrated in American society. The appropriate measure is not a fixed amount of money, but should depend on the income of the rest of the population. Having enough to buy basic food is not a satisfactory measure in countries where more is needed to be socially integrated, such as a car, a home, and clothes. That is the reason why most developed countries and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) define poverty as personal income below 50 percent of the average. There is no reason why it should not be the same for developed countries, including the United States. This method is easy to measure and includes no risk of becoming outdated. Since it is based on average income, inflation does not play a factor.

The stagnant and declining standard of living of American workers is the result of the absence of individual sovereignty in the workplace. This loss of sovereignty is the result of contemporary labor laws that strip workers of the basic rights taken for granted in the political sphere. The most egregious denial of rights is the refusal of the right of free speech during union elections in the American work force. American workers ought to have the right to speak freely at their worksites and express their values and beliefs no matter the biases and agendas of management. Ultimately, allowing workers free speech rights transforms employees from commodities to citizens and thus enhances the control they have over their material and emotional livelihoods. According to political scientist Gordon Lafer, “Under federal labor law, management is permitted not only unlimited reign to voice anti-union arguments to employees, but also nearly unlimited reign to stifle employees’ own political speech.” Every year, 10,000 employees are punished in some form during union elections for pro-union speech at their worksite. Official labor law bars pro-union discussion at a worksites, except during break time and in a break room. This prohibition includes distributing pro-union literature, one of the most effective means of persuading fellow workers of the benefits of unionization. Additionally, union organizers are not allowed to even enter a worksite. While workers can claim only token rights, employers gain what is essentially a monopoly of media in union elections. They can compel workers to have one-on-one meetings with the management to emphasize the drawbacks of a union unto their subordinates. These meetings serve as both an intimidation tactic to their employees and as a de facto elimination of the secret ballot in union elections as employers can gauge which way an employee will vote based on their one-on-one meetings. Management can and generally does organize mass anti-union speeches (so-called “captive audience speeches”) turning a worksite into hostile ground for pro-union sentiments. Evidence suggests that in the 1990s, 92 percent of union campaigns witnessed such captive audience propagandizing. The statutes of labor law in America essentially eliminate fair enforcement of worker freedom of speech and conscience during union drives. Simple policy alterations would eliminate this dearth of liberal rights in the workplace. First, prohibitions to freedom of discussion and campaigning must be eliminated, without creating an

openly hostile working environment. Labor law should have protections for freedom of discussion amongst workers outside of the break room and distribution and display of pro-union literature and propaganda. Additionally, labor law should create formal designation of where campaign literature can be displayed and when pro- or anti- union speech can be made. This could be enforced by a representative of the National Labor Relations Board during a union election. Violations of the agreed places and times of speech would be reported to this representative, with a subsequent investigation and fines for any infringement proven to have taken place. The goal of these reforms should be equality and freedom of speech between employees and employers of a workplace. In line with principles of fairness and liberty, labor law should mandate that a debate between representatives of a union and its opposition take place on a worksite 24 to 48 hours prior to a union election. This would give both sides of a campaign equal time and access to refute claims of the opposing side as well as to present their own arguments, free of contextual bias or intimidation. A federally mandated debate on a worksite would also reverse the inherent control an employer may have over the sentiments within the worksite as compared to the very limited control a union outsider may have. Overall, the goal should be to replicate the ideals and principles Americans hold sacred in political elections within union elections. Political elections necessitate free and open dialogue, which is currently egregiously absent from elections of the workplace. It could be argued that having extensive campaigning within a worksite could politically polarize a workplace, pitting workers against each other or against management and thus inhibit the productivity and even livability of a worksite. But a free society should burden adults with such circumstances, that we may and will disagree with one another over crucial issues such as workplace democracy. Workers are in fact citizens, and if they cannot be trusted to adequately deal with campaigning in their work area then this argument must hold for democratic political society as well. But the great lesson of American history is that greater, not less, democratization produces beneficial outcomes because it grants the individual autonomy over their life. If we are to be a free people, democracy cannot be confined to the political or social realm. Our economic lives are indeed a fundamental aspect of existence and to deny democracy in this sphere is essentially a negation of freedom in the entire working life of an individual Free speech is thus the first step toward the direction of making workers actual citizens. However, a true revitalization of the working class in the United States, and working life in general, will see this as only the first step, but a crucial one nonetheless.

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Equal Justice
The Equal Justice Center consists of diverse undergraduate policy makers, united in the common quest for progressive reforms that rectify electoral and social wrongs. Whether protecting the rights of those who crossed our borders to find work, or to defend the democracy of our political institutions, the submissions that follow provide solutions to the central injustices that animate modern American life.

Protecting America’s Immigrant Workforce
Emily Tamkin

In the 1900s and 1910s, the Immigration Bureau viewed the United States’ southern border as “regulated by labor market demands in [the southwestern] border states.”1 Although the 1920s – and virtually every decade thereafter – saw border control as a less trivial and vastly more formal issue, the intricate link between border regulation and labor is, to this day, undeniable. However, the faults of one do not permit the corruption of the other; the fact that border control is a work in progress is not an invitation to disregard fair labor standards. In 1935, Congress established the National Labor Relations Board. The NLRB was set up to ensure that the National Labor Relations Act was effectively enforced. The Act exists to guarantee employees the right to organize and bargain collectively. In 1984, the United States Supreme Court upheld the integrity of the aforementioned act through its decision in Sure-Tan, Inc.2 The case centered on the plight of employees who had left the country to avoid deportation as the result of their employers informing the INS of their status after they had tried to participate in union elections.3 The court held that undocumented aliens did indeed fall into the National Labor Relations Act’s definition of an “employee,” and that these employees must be given four years time to legitimately re-enter the country so as to be reinstated with a minimum of six months back pay.4 The decision solidified the legitimacy of the NLRA and demanded progress on the labor front in American government. Fourteen years later, a kosher butcher attempted to change all of that. A company by the name of Agriprocessors (the largest national kosher meat producer), owned by the Rubashkin family, seems to want to exist in 1934. In May 2008, an Agriprocessors warehouse in Postville, Iowa was raided; 400 illegal workers were found, though employers claimed they did not know that any held such a dubious status. Before that, however, agriprocessors and its illegal immigrant employees were embattled in three years of legal struggles. The illegally employed workers wanted to unionize as a result of mistreatment. Three courts have ruled that Agriprocessors must recognize the unionization, pointing to the 1984 ruling. Agriprocessors, however, has decided to forgo judicial precedent in favor of an appeal to the Supreme Court.5 Generally speaking, the right of employees to form unions cannot be denied. It is also popularly considered unacceptable to pay one’s employees $6.50 an hour without benefits.6 One might think it wrong, then, that there is a standard rejection for anyone who approaches an employee about unionization,7 particularly since the National Labor Relations Act, which allows workers to, in fact, say yes if they so choose, has been in existence for over seventy years. Workers cannot be fired for supporting unions, nor can workers votes be blocked, and typically it is considered inappropriate to bully workers into supporting a puppet union. Employers cannot ignore employee’s vote because he or she just happened to discover that the worker is undocumented. Agriprocessors maintains, as it did in the Iowa incident, that it had no idea its workers were illegal. Its lawyer, Richard Howard, has argued that illegal immigrants’ votes should not count because “they’re not documented workers and not allowed to work.”8 Nathan Lewin, the company’s lead lawyer in its appeal,

has argued that the 1984 decision is no longer applicable because there are more illegal immigrants today and because of the existence of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which made hiring illegal immigrants a criminal act.9 Mr. Howard’s and Mr. Lewin’s arguments are troubling on multiple counts. The only reason that the undocumented workers were working was because Agriprocessors hired them. Additionally, as the Sure-Tan decision eloquently established, allowing illegal immigrants to unionize “helps to assure that the wages and employment conditions of lawful residents are not adversely affected by the competition of illegal alien employees,” thereby reducing the number of jobs open to illegal immigrants. This in turn adversely affects the allure of unlawfully entering the country. Hence, the reality of the benefits of illegal immigrants unionizing directly contradicts Mr. Howard’s claim that there are too many undocumented workers for the principles of the 1984 decision to apply. Finally, it is absolutely true that IRCA made hiring undocumented workers illegal, and it is true that, with the implementation of complex I-9 forms, employers must be cognizant of the immigration status of their workers and not employ those who are not appropriately documented. Thus, if an employer improperly fills out her or his I-9 forms while either not knowing or choosing to ignore the status of his workers, she or he must accept the fact that the chosen workers that are criminally hired are entitled to the same benefits as every other worker. Unions exist for the protection of workers. The group of workers that need this protection the most has changed over time. At one point, it was young women, and at another, poor, legal immigrants benefited most. The new frontier of progressive labor policy is that which behooves the group that, in today’s America, most easily finds itself under employment’s wheel: illegal immigrants. Their protection is domestically prudent (as has been said, it makes them as expensive as documented workers) and, far more importantly, ethically sound. Twenty years is a long time to regress, seventy longer still. If Agriprocessors did not want undocumented workers in its union’s ranks, it should not have hired them. If, however, an employer breaks the law by hiring an illegal alien, the onus should be on that employer. Immigrants – legal and otherwise – must unionize, which means that employers need to allow them to do so without incursion of deportation, which even nativist Judge Learned Hand recognized as “exile, a dreadful punishment, abandoned by the common consent of all civilized peoples” in 1929.10 Eighty years later, regardless of the imperfections of border control or the process of naturalization, the veracity of that statement must not be undermined. It is sadly evident that the laws that led to the Sure-Tan decision are now insufficient to ensure the fair treatment of all workers. Legislation should and must be passed such that the union elections process need not require proof of citizenship. A neutral body familiar with workers, possibly the particular state’s labor bureau or a legal mediation firm, should be responsible for counting the workers’ votes, thus moving away from the possibility of INS interference. Cases such as the one described above are not a matter of immigration, citizenship, or deportation. There is a larger issue of basic labor rights to uphold, regardless of how or in what way a worker crossed a border.

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Redistricting & Representation: Reforms for a Broken System
Billy Organek

The House of Representatives consists of 435 members elected every two years by constituents of each Representative’s district, in order to represent the will of the people; therefore, each representative should be the voice of a small number of constituents, and the Founding Fathers felt that re-election should not be taken as a “matter of course.”1 Yet, out of the 435 seats in the House, fewer than 40 are considered to be competitive today.2 Why is this? When the lines that divide districts are drawn not out of any concern for local interests, fairness, or natural boundaries, but instead are drawn for partisan political gain, the representation of the individual suffers, and elections become less competitive. Redistricting for political advantage regardless of local concerns, in order to ensure a politician’s or party’s re-election, known as gerrymandering, is alleged to cause decreased voter turnout, increased election costs, and increases in partisanship; this essay will seek to evaluate those claims by using data from three districts, and suggest policies which can address gerrymandering. After analyzing the data, we will see that the largest problem associated with gerrymandering is not any quantifiable variable, but the immense effect that small changes in the shapes of districts have on the outcome of an election, and thus on the quality of representation; and, since this power is vested in the hands of the very legislators who stand for election in these politicized districts, the only way to prevent Representatives from using this power to their own advantage is to remove this power from them while simultaneously making districts more representative by making them smaller. History Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution requires that a census be taken every ten years, and that the reapportionment of Representatives follow this census to ensure representative accuracy. However, the Constitution is silent on the shape and size of individual districts. Therefore, Congress is free to create its own districts at will, so long as they conform to the proper ratio of representation. This has come to be known as the “one person, one vote” doctrine – every district within a state must have the same population, to ensure that every resident in a state has the same voice as every other. Due to Public Law 62-5 (1913) which froze the number of Representatives to 435, the size of districts has increased without a corresponding increase in representation; now, a district encompasses 650,000 people because the U.S. population has tripled, as compared to approximately 30,000 when the Constitution was written. Moreover, the population of the United States has tripled since the passage of Public Law 62-5, with no corresponding increase in the number of Representatives.3 The United States has become the world’s second-least representative democracy simply because of this rule, without even considering the effect of gerrymandering on representation.4 Effects of Gerrymandering Gerrymandering is considered to be the cause of many electoral ills, such as creating uncompetitive districts which discourage voter turnout; increasing the cost of elections due to the increased cost of presenting a viable challenger in an un-

competitive district; and finally, electing politicians with narrow, ideological agendas, further polarizing our national politics. It is these assumed effects of gerrymandering which will be analyzed in this paper. Yet, gerrymandering does have its legitimate defenders. It has been used successfully to increase the representation of minorities in many areas by uniting distinct population centers into a single district, thus politically empowering them. Furthermore, gerrymandering is sometimes used to respect the wishes of local communities, such as Arizona’s 2nd district, which was drawn to consider the wishes of Native American communities.5 While the merits of policies which favor one group can be argued, it seems that gerrymandering cannot easily be called unequivocally good or bad, but is instead more complicated. The following diagram can serve as an illustration of how gerrymandering works:6

In the above picture, the Grey Party (G) outnumbers the Black Party (B) by 36:28, with B located mainly in the center, and G located mainly along the outskirts. In this diagram, one can see that districts can be redrawn to give either party a significant advantage. The two most egregious cases of gerrymandering are the bottom two, in which G wins all four districts or B wins three districts, from left to right. As the proportion of G to B does favor G, it would make sense that, in a given area, there is more representation for G than for B; however, as this is only a slight advantage, it makes no sense for G to win all four seats. More obviously, however, is the outcome where B, the minority, wins 3 of 4 districts. This is obviously gerrymandered, as one can tell from the odd shapes of the districts, a telltale sign of gerrymandering. But, the most important part of the above diagram is that all four situations follow the “one person, one vote” doctrine – every district in the state has 16 residents. It is therefore evident that gerrymandering can have a significant impact on the outcome of an election, regardless of the actual voting behavior of constituents in a given area. Since there is no correct way to draw a district’s boundaries, there is no agreed-on quantitative assessment to determine how gerrymandered a district is, but there are mathematical approximations.7 Using one approximation method, which compares the compactness of a district to the compactness of the state in which it lies, two of the most gerrymandered districts which satisfied the following two criteria were selected for analysis in this paper: first, the district must not have recently been redrawn; and second, once the first district that satisfied the first criterion was selected, the next district selected must be from the opposite

party, to show that gerrymandering is used by Democrats and Republicans equally. Using this methodology, the first two districts eligible were the Illinois 4th, represented by Democrat Luis Gutierrez, and the Pennsylvania 18th, represented by Republican Tim Murphy. Finally, as a control, the Colorado 7th was selected: due to a 2002 court case in Denver, a judge redrew the district to evenly divide it between Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, making it the only district in the country “purposefully drawn to be balanced between the parties and provide a genuine test of the ideals and abilities of the opposing candidates.”8 Using these districts, voter turnout records, FEC records, and Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI) scores will be compared to try to show that gerrymandering does, in fact, decrease voter turnout, increase the cost of elections, and increase the partisanship of districts, as is often alleged. Data – Voter Turnout In the Colorado 7th, of 614,465 residents, and a population over the age of 18 of 460,849,9 the total registered population was 366,078, or 79.44 percent of the voting-age population.10 Yet, on Election Day, only 182,108 voters actually voted, a total turnout of just under 50 percent of registered voters.11 Even though this district is referred to as Colorado’s most competitive,12 the turnout in this district was below the Colorado average of slightly less than 55 percent.13 This seems like an anomaly, as one would expect the most competitive district in the state to easily outperform the state average, but this is not the case. Understanding how voter turnout is affected by gerrymandering will become easier when compared to two districts which have been gerrymandered. In the Illinois 4th district, data for the total registered population is not readily available, so numbers must be extrapolated based on the over-18 population of the district and the overall registration rate in the state, taking into account the higher-thanaverage Hispanic, young, uneducated and poor population of the 4th when compared to national averages.14 By comparing the demographics of the state to those of this district, and accounting for how these specific indicators affect voting behavior, one can make an extrapolation based on the likelihood that a specific demographic group votes. According to the Census data of 2006, Hispanics are 70 percent as likely to register as non-Hispanic whites, and a high school dropout is half as likely to register as a high school graduate; moreover, since there is a strong correlation between income and registration, it is safe to assume that the registration rate in the 4th is significantly lower than the Illinois average.15 However, it would be impossible to calculate exactly how much lower; therefore, I will use three possible values: 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30 percent lower than the average, or 69.94 percent, 62.17 percent, and 54.40 percent respectively. Thus, using the over-18 population of 438,255 (68.1 percent of 643,547), the assumed registered populations used are 306,516; 272,463; and 238,411, respectively. The total turnout in the election was 79,810, which gives possible turnouts of 26.04 percent, 29.29 percent, or 33.48 percent of registered voters, far below the Illinois average of 49 percent, and in line with what gerrymandering would predict. That is, using conservative estimates as to how depressed voter registration would be in the Illinois 4th due to demographics, one can see that turnout is significantly lower in this gerrymandered district than the national or state averages. However, is this the result of gerrymandering or of demographics? To try

to determine this, we can look at the same data for the Pennsylvania 18th.16 The data of the total registered population for the Pennsylvania 18th is also unavailable, so a method similar to the one used in Illinois can also be used. With a population of 646,374, an over-18 population of 504,172 (78 percent), and an overwhelmingly white demographic breakdown, race and age are not factors in registration.17 Education rates and median income also are similar to the state average, and as a result will not disproportionately affect registration rates in the 18th district more than the state’s average voter.18 Therefore, it is safe to assume that the registration rate in the 18th district is similar to that of the state-wide registration rate of 87.02 percent.19 Thus, with an over-18 population of 504,172, and a registration rate of 87.02 percent, we can assume that there are 438,730 registered voters in the 18th district; and, with a total turnout of 248,637, we can assume that 56.67 percent of registered voters voted on Election Day, a value well above the state average.20 This data seems to go against the original hypothesis, that gerrymandering depresses voter turnout. Nationwide, 48 percent of the electorate voted; yet, in both the Illinois 4th and the Colorado 7th, turnout was significantly lower than their respective states’ averages, and in the case of the Colorado 7th district, was roughly equivalent to the national average.21 Yet, in the Pennsylvania 18th district, turnout was well above both the state average and the national average. This data makes it difficult to say that gerrymandering is responsible for depressed turnout, as it seems that there could be other factors that affect turnout, such as education, income, race, or other demographic characteristics, that have a significantly larger impact on voter turnout than gerrymandering. However, regardless of whether or not gerrymandering reduces voter turnout, politicians ensure their re-election in gerrymandered districts through the arbitrary redrawing of districts, and it is for this reason that gerrymandering must be reformed. Data – Campaign Finances22 The 2006 election in the Colorado 7th was dominated by the Democratic and Republican candidates, who together raised $5,814,303. Only looking at the two main contenders, their total receipts were equivalent to $15.88 per registered voter, or $9.46 per person. But, this was the costliest election in the state, costing more than 2.5 times as much as the average of the other elections. The least expensive elections in the state were the elections for the 1st, 2nd, and 5th, which cost $1.03, $2.49, and $2.78 per person, respectively, while the second-most expensive election was the 4th, which still cost over $1 less person. Of note is that in the least expensive elections, the 1st was unopposed, and in the 2nd and 5th the winner outraised his opponent by a significant margin (almost 100 times in the 2nd, and the 5th by two times as much), showing that it is potentially the ‘competitiveness’ of an election, rather than the degree to which a district is gerrymandered, which affects its cost. Instead, it seems that, for the Colorado 7th, gerrymandering and the cost of an election are inversely, rather than directly, related – the more expensive an election is, the less gerrymandered a district is, and vice-versa. The election in Illinois’ 4th paints a similar picture. The incumbent vastly outspent his opponent, but the 4th was still the state’s least expensive election, costing only $0.26 per person in the district for the campaigns of the two main candidates, and

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only $0.54, $0.60, or $0.69 per registered voter, depending on which estimate is used. By comparison, the next-least expensive election (the Illinois 3rd) cost almost three times as much as the election in the 4th. Yet, the most expensive elections were also the most competitive, and two of those were even considered upsets, further giving credence to the negative correlation between cost and gerrymandering. The average cost of $2,275,607.89 for an election in Illinois was almost 14 times the cost of the 4th, $164,233, while the most expensive elections in the state were the 8th, 6th, 14th, and 10th districts, at a cost of $14.50, $12.25, $8.22, and $7.78 per person in the district, respectively; of these districts, the 8th and 6th are not gerrymandered, while the 10th is only somewhat gerrymandered. Meanwhile, the 4th and the 7th are among the most gerrymandered, and the 7th was also less expensive, costing only $1.16 per person.23 Again, it seems that gerrymandering and the cost of an election are inversely related, as the most expensive elections were not in gerrymandered districts, while the least expensive elections were in gerrymandered districts. The costs of Pennsylvania’s elections reflect this negative correlation, though the results are not quite as decisive in Illinois. The total cost of the election of the 18th was $1,704,568, or $3.89 per registered voter, or $2.64 per person. There are 11 elections out of 19 which were less expensive than the 18th, and even the average Pennsylvania election cost less than the 18th $1,668,639.69 compared to the 18th’s $1,704,568. From this data, it would seem that gerrymandering and the cost of an election are unrelated. Yet, there were some elections that cost much more than the 18th, including the 6th, 7th, and 8th, which cost $11.56, $9.34, and $8.41 per person, respectively, and Of these districts, the 6th and 8th are both gerrymandered while the 7th was not gerrymandered, which would seem to provide evidence disproving the supposed inverse relation between gerrymandering and election cost. However, the 6th and 8th were re-gerrymandered by the opposite party to make them more competitive than they had been previously, which explains their increased cost – in fact, the gerrymandering of the 8th was so effective that it certainly cost the Republican the election.24, 25 This reinforces the notion that gerrymandering is not nearly as important a factor in the cost of an election as the competitiveness of a race, which in turn can be affected by gerrymandering, but is not completely determined by it. The conclusion to be drawn here is that, far from increasing the cost of an election, gerrymandering for partisan advantage almost certainly decreases the cost of an election by making it less competitive. There are outliers in the data, alluding to other possible factors than competitiveness which influence the cost of an election – for instance, urban districts will cost more than an equivalent rural district due to the increased cost of advertising and campaigning, to select one possible additional factor. Therefore, gerrymandering cannot be seen as strongly impacting the cost of an election, which is instead affected by the competitiveness of a district, thus disproving the claim that gerrymandering makes elections more expensive. In fact, in some cases, gerrymandering makes elections so uncompetitive that they cost far less than the average election, by guaranteeing that one politician or party will win in an election. Data – Partisanship To measure partisanship, in order to see whether districts gerrymandered to include narrow political constituencies po-

larizes national politics, the Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI) is used, assigning a value to a district which indicates its party leaning: a district which is heavily Democratic may have a PVI D+20 or higher (indicating that Democratic candidates, in recent elections, have an average result 20 percentage points higher than the Republican candidates), while a close district may have a PVI with a small magnitude, such as D+1 or R+2.26 Therefore, a more heavily gerrymandered district should theoretically have a higher PVI; however, the data will show otherwise. The Colorado 7th has a PVI D+2, indicating an increase in the Hispanic population of the district since the 2002 court-ordered redistricting. This is the lowest PVI in the state, whose districts vary between values as low as R+6 and D+8 and values as high as R+16 and D+18. This is what we would expect for the control district, if the above hypothesis were true. The Illinois 4th has a PVI D+31, while the rest of the state varies between as low as R+1 and D+4 and as high as D+35 and R+8. This makes sense, but we should also look at the districts which share borders with the 4th: the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th. Except for the 6th, all of these districts are heavily Democratic with a PVI of at least D+10. The 6th has a PVI R+3, and is considered to be a Republican-favored district. Yet, the 6th was drawn to contain specific portions of Cook and Dupage counties which tend to vote Republican, while being drawn not to contain the other portions of Cook County which are heavily Democratic, helping the Republican 6th remain in Republican control.27 No amount of gerrymandering could reduce a PVI of D+35 enough to make it competitive for Republicans; however, for the 6th, including some of the Democratic parts of Cook County from the 4th would likely make the district change parties. The districts within Chicago, including the 4th, would elect a Democrat regardless; however, it is possible that the 4th and 6th were drawn so as to include the Republican-leaning populations in the 6th, rather than the 4th, guaranteeing the Republicans a seat.28 Pennsylvania’s 18th’s PVI of R+2 indicates that it is not a very partisan district. The rest of the state varies between as low as R+2 and D+2 and as high as D+39 and R+15. Being one of the least partisan districts in the state, we must look at the districts which border the 18th. The 18th shares borders with the 4th, 12th, and 14th, all of which have portions that, if switched, could very easily influence the outcome of an election in another district. The 4th has a PVI R+3, but is now considered a Democratic-leaning seat and is currently in Democratic control.29 If portions of the 18th and 4th switched, it could easily make either of these districts change their leanings. It is also worthwhile to note that the 18th contains much of Allegheny County, the county which contains Pittsburgh, but the 18th does not contain the city itself. On the other hand, the wealthy Republican suburbs of Pittsburgh are not in the 18th either, but are in the 4th instead. If either of these arbitrary boundaries were switched or altered, then the 18th could be made more hospitable to Democrats, or the 4th more hospitable to Republicans. The 12th has a PVI of D+5, and is also a famously gerrymandered district, skipping “across nine counties, eight of which are shared with other districts;” if it took small parts from its neighbors, the 9th and 18th, it could arbitrarily made to be much more conservative, as opposed to its currently arbitrary status as a Democratic-leaning district.30 Finally, the 14th includes all of Pittsburgh and very little else, and therefore has a PVI D+22. Yet, the 14th takes suburbs from three sides of Pittsburgh, but not the Democratically-leaning suburbs

on the other side. If these were included in the 18th, then it is likely that the 18th would be less Republican. There can be no reasonable geographic rationale for these divisions, and the only explanation available is a political one. The most important thing to note about the PVI and its relation to gerrymandering is not the absolute value of the PVI, which is often impacted by the political leanings of the location of the district; instead, one should evaluate the PVI of the specified district as compared to its neighbors, to see if there are small changes which can be made to switch the leaning of one or the other district. Chicagoans will elect a Democrat no matter how gerrymandered the districts within Chicago become, and any district within Chicago will have a PVI that is highly pro-Democratic; therefore, these are redistricted not to change the party in control, but instead for some other political reason. However, in Pennsylvania and in districts outside of Chicago, it seems that small changes which are as arbitrary as the current boundaries of the districts in question could completely change the outcome of an election. Contrary to the original hypotheses of this paper, gerrymandering does not seem to decrease voter turnout, increase the financial cost of an election, or increase the absolute partisanship of a district. Yet, there is still ample reason to address gerrymandering: it is an obvious abuse of power, one which makes arbitrary divisions in communities for political advantage, decreasing the representativeness of an elected official while allowing an elected official to stay in office for far longer than the Framers ever intended. As can be seen from every example of gerrymandering cited above, small and arbitrary changes in the borders of districts can have huge impacts on the outcome of an election. When districts are drawn with political calculations in mind, it can be very easy to make minor changes which seem as arbitrary as the original borders of a district, but can drastically alter the outcome of an election; this is not the sign of a competitive district, but instead of a district crafted for political, rather than representative, reasons. How can gerrymandering be addressed, so as to increase the representativeness of elected officials, while still allowing for districts that help represent historically underrepresented segments of the population? Policy Recommendations As gerrymandering is a complex problem, it requires many solutions, none of which will be perfect. The goal of any policy should be to create districts that represent the interests of the constituents in a given area without capriciously dividing communities for political advantage, while simultaneously seeking to create districts that are competitive because they represent the interests of various portions of the community equally. Clearly, there will be many parts of the country in which this latter goal will be difficult – urban areas will almost always tend towards Democrats, while more rural areas will support Republicans, and in these areas respect for local boundaries and interests is more important than simple ‘competitiveness’. However, there are many parts of the country which, if districted properly, could be competitive for both parties, forcing candidates to present coherent ideas rather than partisan rhetoric. The only body that would be in any position to be able to say, on a state-wide level, whether or not a district properly represents the local interests contained within it, would be the state itself. Therefore, each state should create independent commissions that will be responsible for redistricting every ten years. Currently, five

states have independent commissions which can both take local interests into account and create districts which are as free from political influence as possible, and when these commissions are nonpartisan, such as in the case of Iowa, they are very successful; a similar idea should be used nationwide, and these commissions should follow specific institutional guidelines to remain politically insulated. In order to ensure the political insulation of the commissions, half of the members should be appointed in a staggered process similar to the one used for the Federal Reserve, which will ensure that no Governor has the opportunity to appoint more than one member of the board in a term, and the other half should be elected by the general public in the election prior to the census. This will guarantee that half of the members, while potentially politically motivated by virtue of being appointed, will have technocratic knowledge of the state and the districting process, while the other half of the members will directly represent the will of the people. No person should be allowed to serve more than one term on the commission, eliminating issues of vested interests. The commission should have an even number of people, as a tie resulting in no change to a district would be preferable to a politically-motivated split vote which comes as a result of the appointed members (who will likely be of the same party as the appointing Governor) colluding against the elected members. Clearly, there should also be strict restrictions on who is eligible to be on the commission, to ensure their impartiality: they should not have been elected to state-wide or federal office before, and they can receive no kind of political gifts. Contrary to current case law, redistricting should only be allowed according to the results of the decennial census, and it should redraw districts with the representation of local interests and competitiveness as its two primary concerns. Such a plan will guarantee, as much as possible, that redistricting remains as fair as possible. One of the most troubling aspects of gerrymandering is the tendency of those responsible to divide areas in seemingly nonsensical ways from a geographic perspective. Obviously, these divisions have huge political consequences: small changes in districts based around specific demographic groups can, and often does, alter the outcome of elections, as happened in the Pennsylvania 8th.31 In addition to giving politicians a distinct political advantage, such arbitrary drawing of district lines completely ignores the realities of the local political landscape – for instance, many districts include parts of many counties while only containing one or two full counties, or two districts will spread in opposite directions for miles but will fight for control of individual streets where they share borders, such as the Pennsylvania 12th and the Illinois 4th and 7th, respectively. Therefore, these independent districting commissions will be mandated to make districts which are, insofar as possible, coterminous with counties and cities. The single most important rule that these commissions must follow is the “one person, one vote” doctrine – that is, all districts within a state must contain the same population. However, this directly conflicts with the new mandate: for instance, New York City has approximately eight million residents, compared to the state’s nineteen million, thereby making it impossible to include the whole city in one district; similarly, many counties have fewer people in them than the requisite number of people for the “one person, one vote” doctrine, yet there may be no combination of counties which adds up to the exact number required. To deal with the requirement that cities and counties will

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sometimes have to be split, they should be split in the least political way possible: the shortest splitline algorithm.32 When a city or a county must be split, if it is split according to this method, then there will be only one possible districting plan that will emerge, and it will not take into account anything about the demographic qualities or party affiliations of the population to be contained within the district. So, for New York City, the algorithm will be used to create the same number of districts that currently exist within New York City, with the same population in each, but without political bias; and, for a state with many sparsely-populated counties, one county will be selected at random to be split, while avoiding splitting any cities within the county, so that the two districts to be created share the same number of people. The advantages gained from such an additional mandate should be manifest: by following existing political boundaries agreed on at the local level by the parties directly concerned, rather than by a far-removed and politically-motivated legislator, people can be sure that their districts follow the interests of their city and county, the two political units to which they have the closest affiliation and share the most direct interests with. Finally, in the event that county or city boundaries are to be changed for local reasons, the independent commissions must review the proposed changes and suggest new possibilities for redistricting the affected areas, if necessary. With such a solution, people can be sure that their local interests are being accounted for, and that political concerns have been removed, as much as is possible, from the process. Concomitant with any gerrymandering reform must be some kind of campaign finance reform. As the above data shows, the price paid for making districts more competitive is quite literal: competitive districts tended to cost at least three times as much as the state average, and if elections become significantly more costly, then politicians will become further dependent on wealthy interest groups, taking away from any gains made by redistricting reform. There are many suggested alternatives for campaign finance reform, and analyzing the effectiveness of such alternatives is far beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is critical, if one wishes to decouple money and politics, that any increase in competitiveness of districts is combined with a serious attempt to change campaign financing laws. Finally, the issue of representation generally could be addressed by increasing the number of Representatives in the House of Representatives. Federalist 58 argues that there is no arithmetical formula for arriving at the proper number of Representatives, and that those who wish to add more Representatives to increase representation “will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic”, because those new representatives will be of lower quality and therefore susceptible to a few powerful leaders.33 Yet, if the Framers intended each Representative to represent 30,000 people, there surely must be something wrong if each Representative currently speaks for close to 700,000 people. However, if we were to follow the original prescription of the Constitution, a House of Representatives with over 10,000 members could not possibly function. While Federalist 58’s worries of making government more oligarchic are warranted, I believe that a middle ground can be found between fixing the size of the legislature, which is what is currently the case, and ensures that each individual’s voice becomes di-

luted as the population increases; and increasing the size of the legislature too quickly, which would certainly make the vast majority of the legislature impotent in the face of the few powerful committee members. A compromise by which the House is augmented until each member represents 500,000 people, which would be equivalent to just over 600 members of the House, with provisions for a staggered increase of that ratio once the population surpasses certain benchmarks, would strike a powerful compromise between representativeness and oligarchic tendencies. What is crucial is that the number of Representatives should never be fixed; rather, a ratio should be fixed for a given population level, and that ratio should change over time. This will guarantee that people have a fair say in their government, and that their elected officials truly will speak for them. The data presented in this paper makes the case that gerrymandering, contrary to common allegations, does not depress voter turnout, increase the cost of elections, or increase the partisanship of a given district – in fact, it has been shown that, in certain cases, the opposite is the case; while in others, gerrymandering seems to have no effect. Yet, gerrymandering still decreases the representativeness of a district because it gives politicians the power to redraw their districts arbitrarily to their own advantage, thus ensuring their re-election at the expense of the people. Such abuses of power cannot be allowed in our political system, and therefore gerrymandering must be reformed, so that the accountability of our government can be restored.

Tax-Exemption & Political Involvement: Institutional Regulation
Eliot Oh

On November 8, 2008, California’s Proposition 8, which defined marriage exclusively for opposite-sex couples, was passed with 52 percent of the vote.1 The Mormon Church vehemently advocated for this proposition. Some have accused it of abusing its tax-exempt status to substantially affect the outcome of the election. Currently, even though the Internal Revenue Service prohibits tax-exempt religious institutions from performing partisan actions, the IRS has had much difficulty in enforcing regulations. The problem is that there is no clear definition of what it means to “not devote a substantial part of their activities to attempting to influence legislation.”2 Therefore, a solution involving a combination of a financial and time limit is required. Currently, there are no clear standards to judge whether a religious institution is politically active or not. Under current IRS regulation 501 c), religious institutions are classified as non-profit organizations and are granted tax-exempt status.3 In exchange, these non-profit organizations are not to “substantially” devote their resources to endorse a political candidate or lobby for specific agendas. Yet, there has been little court or legislative precedents to clarify the standards for “substantial.” Even though a 1974 court case has determined “substantially engaged in lobbying activities” as comprising between 16.6 percent and 20.5 percent of the institution’s annual expenditures, the court provided no reasoning for how it derived this figure and the definition still remains blurry.4 In addition, the IRS is prohibited from judging a religious institution’s primary motive.5 This ruling undermines

the necessary means to enforce regulations. As a result, the IRS, even in the most extreme case, in which a New York church paid for a two-page ad urging voters to vote against Bill Clinton in 1992, the IRS was only able to revoke the church’s tax-exempt status three years later. In 2000, the court affirmed the validity of the revocation and the IRS, after eight years, was able to revoke a religious institution of its tax-exempt status.6 Currently, even though the Mormons have contributed as much as nearly $20 million and over 80 percent of the early door-to-door volunteers for Yes on Prop. 8, the IRS has been able to take no action. Twenty million dollars is over half of the amount raised for Yes on Prop. 8 ($39.9 million) and next to half of what No on Prop. 8 ($43.3 million) raised.7 According to these figures, the Mormon Church has provided substantial resources to affect the outcome of the election, yet the IRS, due to the aforementioned problems, has been reluctant to take action. As the solution, I propose a stringent regulation on the amount of money and time devoted for political agendas. As religious institutions vary in size, the limits imposed should be set in percentages. Even though the court ruling of 16.6 to 20.5 percent has little legal backing, it is commonsensical. If a religious institution devotes 20 percent of their financial and human resources, it means that they are devoting every one out of five resources to the cause. Considering that the United States spends nearly 8 percent of its GDP on defense spending, the 20 percent benchmark is quite a substantial part of its activity.8 Using one out of every five resources the church has, it has more than ample resources to express their First Amendment rights. As the IRS already has means to enforce regulations, providing a clear definition will enable it to more effectively administer religious institutions. In conclusion, setting a limit on financial and resource religious institutions can use to express their political opinions will reduce church abuses and protect the church’s freedom of speech. It will provide a clear standard and enable the IRS to effectively regulate churches and impose strict discipline to churches. This legislation will provide an equal footing for both the church’s and the liberals to voice their political aspirations. Even though there is no specific timeline under which this policy should be enacted, it should be preferably enacted within the next four years. Religious institutions have been a prominent part of the American way of life and it is time to ensure that they can continue its proud tradition.

Representing the People: A Standard for Filling Senate Vacancies
Sarah Scheinman and Nancy Huemer

The 2008 Presidential election was a benchmark in contemporary American society, giving many progressively-inclined voters a renewed faith in the American system of government. However, one of the greatest controversies of the 2008 election was how to fill the United State Senate vacancies in Illinois, Delaware, New York, and Colorado. The most infamous among these involved President Obama’s vacant senate seat, an appointment that was turned into a series of illegal negotiations by then-Governor, Rod Blagojevich. Blagojevich was attempting to secure payment for a seat in the United States Senate, a position to which he later

appointed Senator Roland Burris. This leads to a serious public lack of confidence in Burris, not only by his constituents, but even among his fellow Democratic Senators. The appointment of Ted Kaufman in Delaware was also not well received by the people of Delaware, and there was much complaint generated regarding the way Governor David Paterson of New York chose Senator Kirsten Gillibrand to fill the vacancy left by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Ultimately, this most recent election season has prompted many voters across the country to question the process of political appointments, especially to positions of such high authority as the United States Senate. The Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was created to revise the process by which United States Senators are chosen.1 The power was originally designated to the state legislature, but has evolved over time, reconstituted under the jurisdiction of the citizens of individual states. When crafting the Constitution, the New Jersey Plan maintained one vote for each state in Congress, a measure of fairness from the Articles of Confederation, and it remained in the structure of our government in the form of the United States Senate. The revision under the Seventeenth Amendment expanded the process for electing members of the House of Representatives to the United States Senate.2 The process with regards to special elections in the United States Senate should mirror the process provided for the House of Representatives because the revisions of the 17th Amendment were made in the interest of democracy, and democracy does not merely apply in the general election. The same rules must apply for all elections, at all times. Also, many states were maintaining permanent vacancies as a result of political disputes within the state that were a result of increased partisanship. The Seventeenth Amendment sought to remedy this situation. There is a provision within the Seventeenth Amendment that grants the power to appoint an interim/ full term Senator to the governor of the individual states, if there is a vacancy.3 The decision to include this provision is a break from the original democratic intent of the amendment. In a representative democracy, the legislative body is chosen by the people, in order to promote their best interests. Under the original United States Constitution, the people and their Senator were separated by the State legislature, but the 17th Amendment made the process more direct, allowing the people to directly choose their Senator based on an electoral majority, a far more democratic process. When governors are given the authority to appoint one of two representatives in the United States Senate, an institution that does wield greater authority than the U.S. House of Representatives with regards to appointments, foreign policy, and budgetary processes, it is much more undemocratic than to provide the same standards for electing Senators in special elections as given by the House. By giving the executives of our states the unilateral authority to install members of the federal government, we are circumventing the democratic process and denying citizens their voice in choosing their representatives. The United States House of Representatives has often been portrayed as the more democratic institution of our bicameral legislature, but the United States Senate should be the same in this manner. When vacancies occur in the United States House of Representatives, there are rules set in place to democratically handle the situation. Article I, Section 2, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution mandates, “When vacancies happen in the

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Representation for any State, the Executive thereof shall issue Writs of Elections to fill such Vacancies.”4 This process usually begins and concludes within 60-90 days (find a citation) of the vacancy, therefore quickly filling the seat. If we have made the process the same across states with regards to electing these representatives in our legislature, it seems only fitting to allow for the same rules and regulations with regards to filling vacancies in the Senate as well. Furthermore, one of the least democratic parts of this process is the disparity between individual states. Originally, under the Articles of Confederation, each state was given one vote in Congress. Since the Senate was designed as the body of Congress that was supposed to maintain a level of fairness across all states, no matter their size, it is preposterous that different states could and would have different procedures for filling these vacancies. While states currently have varied procedures for dealing with vacancies, many call special elections. In these states, when a Senator dies or resigns and a vacancy occurs before the biennial general election, which precedes the end of the six-year term, a special election occurs. When a politician wins a special election, he or she serves the rest of the term. However, several states have differing policies, like Texas and Louisiana, which hold all-parties special elections separately from general elections, in which any qualified candidate may run. This is a shift from other states that often hold off on democratically electing the United States Senator and instead to choose to wait until the next general election. Additionally, many states have party based nomination procedures, which Texas and Louisiana do not require in special elections.5 Most states have maintained policies in which the governor of the state can appoint an individual as an interim Senator, until a special election is certified. The problem with this process is that often times the Governor will appoint someone that may have had interest in running for the United States Senate and this will certainly give them an unfair advantage, not based on the rules of politics, but rather a relatively arcane practice that provides the governors of individual states with undue influence over federal, rather than state policy. Creating this great discrepancy with regards to the special election system, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Wisconsin do not allow their governors to appoint interim Senators, but instead, require special elections, and Oklahoma allows interim appointments under limited circumstances, but otherwise requires special election.6 In these states, this often creates a problem, as they are not represented by two Senators until the entire special election process has been completed. Ultimately, there must be special elections that reflect the democratic system these representatives seek to stand for. While it is clear that this is a problem deserving a remedy, there are certain flaws in creating a purely democratic system of electing representatives when vacancies exist. Unlike the House of Representatives with its 435 members, there are only 100 members of the United States Senate with each of their presences crucial for many votes. Many votes are extremely close, and neither side wants to create a standard where there will be vacancies when they have a chance to swing votes their way. Unlike the House of Representatives, vacancies in the Senate do leave a greater and potentially more problematic vacuum when votes are being cast. Since each state is only represented by two

senators, having an opening in one of those seats is losing fifty percent of your representation and voice in the Senate. However, this vacuum in the Senate is not as great as the one that is left if we do not allow voters the right to voice their opinions about who should be running their government and representing them in the Senate. Also, it is true that some states do call for special elections and they do maintain relatively more democratic procedures in filling vacancies. However, when discussing the rules and regulations of the federal government, it is important that state executives do not have the authority to decide how the federal government is run. There must be a standard process that is available in all states with regards to confronting senate vacancies in a democratic and streamlined fashion, the same standard for all states and all senate vacancies. What we offer is a new plan. We believe that although it may be difficult to allow vacancies to exist in the Senate, we must allow democracy to triumph if we intend for our government to be a true representative democracy. In order to do so, we must make a constitutional amendment that standardizes the process for filling senate vacancies. To begin, after a vacancy occurs in the United State Senate, a Writ of Elections must be issued, and an election must commence between forty-five to sixty days of the declared vacancy. On the forty-fifth day of the vacancy, a ballot will be sent to all the state’s citizens that are currently eligible to vote. The voters will have fifteen days to return the ballot, and the votes will be tallied between the sixtieth and seventieth days since the Senate position became vacant. On the seventieth day a winner will be announced. States will maintain their individual procedures regarding runoff elections, in the case of a non-majority winner. While we would not require states to implement a vote by mail system, investing in these kinds of systems would be the right step to securing more fair, representative elections for their citizens. We chose to have ballots (pre-stamped) administered by mail because it is impractical to think that voter turnout for a special election would be truly representative of the constituency. While turnout is never 100 percent, with mail-in ballots, a higher rate could be expected. A candidate in a United States Senate or House of Representatives campaign can only get on the ballot officially if they have filled out their FEC Forms 1 and 2 for the office they are seeking.7 We believe this is the most fair and democratic process for dealing with Senate vacancies and special elections to fill those vacancies. Ultimately, the electoral system will never be perfect, but we can always seek to make it fairer. By adopting a procedure that calls for special elections in the case of vacancies in the United States Senate, we put the choice back in the hands of the people, a key tenet on which our country was founded.

Hope for Minor Parties: Electoral Fusion
Katherine O’Gorman

The United States, throughout its history, has been dominated by an extensive two-party system that limits the ability of minor parties to gain a voice in American political discourse. There has been little opportunity for minor parties to impact elections; minor parties have, in fact, only altered the presidential election in three instances since 1950.1 The domination of the two-party system is a direct effect of the institutional structure of American elections, most critically the single-member district elections that are most prominent in American politics.2 In a single-member district election system, candidates are required to gain a plurality of the votes on Election Day, motivating the major parties to target fifty-one percent of the popular vote. In order to gain electoral success, then, political parties must create broadbased coalitions that reflect a wide number of issues and political stances. Many issues are forced out of these coalitions for political reasons, leaving these issues out of mainstream political debate. While neglected from the two major parties, minor parties often support these marginalized issues. Minor parties play this crucial role by raising issues and political stances that are largely ignored by the major parties.3 Minor parties ask the American electorate to consider new policy ideas and political ideologies that may provide solutions that will become prominent in time.4 Similarly, minor parties can impact the political discourse of the major parties by forcing them to respond to criticism or positions outlined by the minor parties. Furthermore, minor parties can provide a crucial outlet to the expression of political discontent.5 Minor parties offer different ideologies for Americans upset with the tone and issues represented by the major parties, and thus a vote for these parties can often reflect not only support for the issues that the minor party represents, but also discontent with the major parties.6 Despite their crucial role in American politics, minor parties are largely pushed to the fringes of American political discourse, often considered illegitimate political contenders. Discounted for their lack of success, the issues and constituencies of minor parties are ignored because they lack a platform from which to advocate for these stances. Voting for a third party is most often viewed as a “wasted vote” as it will fail to impact the election in and substantial way. At worst, however, votes for minor parties are “spoiler votes” which take away votes from the political candidate most closely aligned with the minor party and inadvertently aid the candidate with the most opposing views.7 Furthermore, the extensive history of the two-party system results in the socialization of the American electorate along the two-party system. Instead of considering all the available political parties and ideologies, questions of political affiliation tend to simply consider whether an individual is a Democrat or Republican.8 As a result, minor parties are not only barred from electoral success due to institutional barriers, but also from gaining support in the population because of political socialization. Current election law limits the ability of minor parties to impact American elections. However, the utility and importance of third parties and the issues they support demonstrate a clear

need to provide policy solutions that allow these minor parties to insert their voices into American political discourse. The strongest democracy is that which allows the free flow of ideas, which considers all possible policy solutions, and actively seeks to provide organizations that represent all of the views of its electorate. Without aiding third parties, American democracy is missing the opportunity to add new views. Electoral Fusion, the practice of allowing multiple parties to endorse a single candidate for the same office, presents one policy solution to provide a platform for minor political parties to assert more influence in the American political system. Currently, two forms of electoral fusion are practiced in the United States across seven states: South Carolina, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Mississippi, Vermont, and most notably New York.9 In the first form, multiple parties are listed next to a candidate’s name, indicating their endorsement of the candidate. For example, Candidate X may be listed as the nominee for the Democratic, Liberal, and Working Families Parties on a single ballot line. While this form of fusion presents a step towards more minor party participation in American elections, it is not as effective as fusion’s alternate form. This alternate form is distinguished from the first in that it allows a candidate to be listed multiple times on a single ballot under different parties. In this form, Candidate X is listed once as Candidate X – Democratic Party, a second time as Candidate X – Liberal Party, and a third time as Candidate X – Working Families Party. A voter then chooses not only which candidate to support, but which political party’s ballot line to cast their vote on as well. All votes for Candidate X, regardless of ballot line, are tallied together, representing the total number of votes cast for this candidate.10 However, because the votes are originally cast on separate ballot lines, this form of electoral fusion is able to distinguish how many votes were cast on each ballot line. Due to this ability, this second form of fusion is more beneficial than the former because minor parties are then able to directly determine the number of votes they added to a major party ticket. As it is more effective, this paper will focus on the form of electoral fusion that allows a candidate to be listed on multiple lines on a single ballot. The state with the most prominent use of fusion is New York.11 Three prominent minor parties, the Working Families Party, the Conservative Party, and the Independent Party, consistently either utilized fusion to cross-endorse a major party candidate or offer their own political candidate. No other state in the United States demonstrates such prominence of minor parties, and many scholars argue that the prominence of major parties in New York is due to the extensive history of fusion in New York. Because New York represents the most prominent example of fusion elections this paper will examine congressional elections in New York to determine the possible effects of electoral fusion. Primarily, minor parties can increase their influence through electoral fusion, by both raising their electoral and monetary support and increasing their influence on the major parties.12 In fact, minor parties actively pursue the adoption of electoral fusion because they believe it will increase their support. Through both of these mechanisms, minor parties raise their relevance in American dialogue and gain the tools to create lasting political parties that can consistently affect electoral politics. First, electoral fusion allows minor parties to increase their base of electoral support by reducing the costs of voting for a minor party.13

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In an electoral system without fusion, minor party supporters are asked to vote either for a candidate that has a legitimate chance to win the election, or a candidate that represents the party to which they subscribe. Many minor party supporters choose to vote for the major party candidate that most closely supports their views, so that the politicians that both has a likely chance of electoral success and is closest to their views will win. As a result, the potential electoral success for minor parties is reduced because of the perceived irrationality of voting for a minor party. Minor party supporters, through fusion, are able to both cast a vote for a political party that best represents their beliefs, and a candidate the enjoys a likelihood of electoral success. As a result, the minority party voters are able to express their support for minor parties without the costs of losing their vote and therefore minor party electoral success increases. 14 In fact, when comparing the electoral success of minor parties in New York State to the national average, fusion’s effects are clear. The table below demonstrates the percentages of the vote that each of New York’s large minor parties gained throughout the last five elections in comparison to the national level of minor party support. Nationally, all minor parties combined totalled approximately three percent of the congressional vote in 2008 and 2.49 percent of the vote in 2006. Minor parties in New York, on the other hand, were able to garner a much higher percentage of electoral success. The Working Families party and the Conservative parties attained a higher percentage of the vote individually than all minor parties across the United States. Clearly, fusion has aided minor parties in New York to establish a more significant base of support. Percentage of the Total Congressional Votes Cast for New York Minor Parties15 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Independence 1.5 1.42 2.8 2.54 2.46 Conservative 5.4 2.74 4.4 2.58 2.61 Working Families 0.88 1.74 1.92 2.92 National Percentage16 4.17 3.58 2.75 2.49 Increasing the number of votes for minor parties has a magnified effect because it aids the ability of minor parties to secure public finance for future elections. Currently, public money is awarded to political parties after they have established a requisite percentage of the vote in an election. Minor parties bear the initial costs, but their expenses are paid after they establish the number of votes required.17 As fusion increases the number of votes for minor parties by reducing the costs of voting for these parties, they also increase the ability of minor parties to qualify for public money. Thus, minor parties are able to gain important resources that can aid in sustaining their effect on the political dialogue. Electoral fusion further establishes the influence of minor parties because it provides a mechanism through which minor parties can greatly impact the major parties. Fusion provides evidence for minor parties to rely upon when attempting to alter the agenda of the major political parties. In the form of fusion that lists candidates on multiple ballot lines, minor parties are armed with evidence of how many votes their supporters added to the major party ticket. In close elections, these votes may provide the difference in the election. As a result, minor parties can put pressure on the major parties to include their issues and

views in their major party agenda.18 Minor parties can threaten to endorse the other candidate, or withhold their endorsement and run their own candidate.19 In fusion states, major party candidates do, in fact, become concerned with the endorsement of minor parties, and will actively seek to gain the support of minor parties because they want to gain the votes of that party’s supporters.20 For example, the Working Families Party makes influence on the major political parties a primary piece of why they advocate for fusion: “it [fusion] lets third parties like the WFP demonstrate support for the issues we’re fighting for. When vote on the WFP’s ballot line help a candidate we’ve endorse win, we can hold that politician accountable to working people. Big business has plenty of money and power. Fusion helps us even the score.”21 Clearly, minor parties are able to insert themselves into the electoral equation through their endorsement of the major parties. After the election, they can continue to push for representation by the major party due to their involvement in the electoral coalition that elected the official. They can lobby for patronage jobs, which would insert minor party officials into the government structure, thereby increasing minor party supporters in office. As a result of fusion, therefore, the political views that are traditionally marginalized are brought into the political debate through minor parties’ influence on the major political parties.22 In addition to aiding the rise of minor political parties, electoral fusion has a positive influence on the nature of American democracy by creating a system that allows voters to send a message with their vote and increasing participation. Fusion voting allows more information to be conveyed to public officials through the nomination and electoral process. For minor political parties, an endorsement, or lack of endorsement, can demonstrate how the minor party views the current status of American political discourse. If there is a major party that reflects their views closely enough, minor parties will endorse a major party, indicating that they believe their views are reflected enough in the existing major parties. However, if a minor party withholds their endorsement of a major party, then the minor party either believes that they have a more exciting candidate, or they believe that neither of the major parties represents their constituencies enough. Furthermore, fusion allows individual voters to indicate what issues induced them to vote for a particular candidate. Minor parties often reflect a more specific group of issues that are central to their party’s creation. As a result, fusion, by allowing voters to choose which candidate and party that they support, gives voters the ability to not only vote for a candidate but indicate which issues were the central issues in their electoral decision. Voting for Candidate X on the Green Party line gives public officials different information than voting for Candidate X on the Democratic Party line. Thus, fusion allows voters to not only say that they support a candidate, but they can also give insight as to why they support that candidate. 23 While fusion allows voters to send a message to public officials, fusion plays a dual role in also offering more information to voters on Election Day. Through endorsements of minor parties that often reflect a smaller range of issues than do major parties, voters making a decision on Election Day can glean additional information about the candidates by understanding the endorsements of the minor political parties.24 This is particularly illuminating in smaller elections that do not enjoy the same level of publicity that major elections have. These indicators allow for

voters to make more informed decisions, thus representing another benefit of electoral fusion. Furthermore, fusion has more positive effects on American democracy by increasing voter turnout in elections. By increasing the perceived representation of minor party views, fusion encourages minor party voters to come to the polls. More minor party voters are pleased with their electoral choices because they are able to express support for a candidate that is electorally viable, while not neglecting the minor party that they support. In consider this point, the voter turnout in six congressional districts in New York. In New York congressional districts four, twenty-one and twenty-six, fusion is heavily practiced with three minor political parties impacting the elections. Each of the Conservative, Independence, and Working Families Parties endorsed one of the major party candidates in these three districts in the 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 elections in all but one election where the Working Families party decided to not endorse any candidate. Alternatively, districts six, seven, and ten demonstrate low amounts of fusion. District 10 shows the least amount of fusion, as the Working Families Party decided to cross-endorse only in the 2006 election. Otherwise, the Conservative party chose to run their own candidate in 2000-2006 and the Working Families Party chose to run their own candidate in 2002. The Independence Party did not participate in Congressional elections in district ten at all. Districts six and seven both show some occasions in which minor parties ran their own candidates and other times where they chose not to participate at all. There are some cases of fusion in these districts, but none as prevalent as in districts four, twenty-one, and twenty-six. Voter Turnout in Six New York Districts25 2000 2002 2004 2006 District 4 65% 43% 67% 40% District 6 55% 34% 54% 31% District 7 55% 32% 54% 31% District 10 48% 32% 51% 27% District 21 66% 53% 69% 52% District 26 65% 49% 69% 50% Comparison of the turnout across these districts demonstrates that fusion does in fact increase voter turnout in these districts. Districts with a high level of fusion (highlighted in gray) demonstrate turnout ten percent higher than the districts with low levels of fusion (in white). This effect is more pronounced when considering the difference between district ten, the district with the lowest frequency of fusion, in comparison to districts six and seven, which have low but more fusion in their elections. District ten demonstrates turnout rates of 2-4 percent lower than those of districts that have any fusion at all. Clearly, fusion impacts voter turnout by sending more voters to the polls. However, the increase in voter turnout is not directly the result of increasing voter turnout amongst minor party voters because the percentage of minor party voters does not widely vary across the districts. Thus, more voters turned out regardless of political affiliation indicating that fusion may have had a greater impact across political parties. More districts need to be incorporated into this study in order to ascertain with any certainty the impact of fusion on voter turnout. Yet these preliminary results demonstrate the potential of fusion’s effects. Despite these advantages of fusion voting, many scholars and

politicians oppose fusion voting. Many argue that electoral fusion will increase voter confusion, resulting in a large increase in the number of over-votes because voters will cast their vote on each line that a candidate appears on..26 To remedy this potential effect, all that is needed is to build into fusion policy a requirement that multiple votes for the same candidate represent a single vote for that candidate. Furthermore, opponents to fusion highly object to excessive factionalism, which would occur with more minor parties gaining power. The United States has shown marked rejection of excessive factionalism, or even factionalism at all, since the Revolutionary War period.27 Opponents of fusion use this argument to claim that fusion would produce negative effects on the efficiency of elections and on the legitimacy of elections. First, if minor parties were successful in achieving political office, whether by patronage jobs due to fusion or by direct election, the minor party officials in government would create inefficiency because they would strain existing governmental coalitions. Each vote would become more complicated and it would result in a stalling of the legislature. Second, opponents argue that if minor parties were to become more numerous through the device of fusion, plurality victories would increase, thereby delegitimizing the election. While these arguments consider legitimate concerns, these objections appear more directed to the rise of minor parties themselves rather than against the practice of fusion. The effects of minor parties on the United States are largely unknown because there have ever been more than two major political parties in the United States. Currently, however, third parties’ benefits appear to drastically outweigh the consequences. Regardless of these concerns, however, fusion provides a mechanism through which American democracy can be strengthened. It increases the number of voices in American political discourse, increases voter turnout, and allows voters a tool to send a message with their vote. While fusion, even in the states in which it is practiced, has not lead to a significant number of minor party office holders, its wide adoption may have more extensive results. By increasing the level of support for minor parties across the United States, minor parties may be able to gain enough political support to begin to run for office in greater numbers. Furthermore, because of the institutionalization of the two-party system, additional reforms are needed to promote the rise of minor parties in American political discourse. The main point, however, is that fusion represents a step in the right direct – a step towards making the American political system more representative of all political views of the electorate.

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Energy and the Environment
As the Columbia Roosevelt Institution’s Energy and Environment Center, we are proud to tackle 21st century issues with technological and sustainable proposals. In order to solve our global energy and environmental crisis, communities must focus on implementing local solutions. The Energy and Environment Center’s contributions focus on exploring a clean, high-tech, energy-creating garbage disposal system for New York City, and designing an energy saving dormitory information system at Columbia University.

Waste Disposal and Energy Generation Through Plasma Gasification
Parinitha Sastry, Angela Wong, Barak Wouk

In 1987, a garbage barge from Long Island was at sea for seven weeks in search of a landfill. While the “barge to nowhere” provoked more laughs than outrage, its inability to find a home for its trash draws attention to problems with New York’s waste disposal programs. New York’s twenty-seven landfills require a large amount of monetary funding, with no financial gains or returns in the long run. These landfills quickly reach full capacity since garbage requires thousands of years to decompose. Consequently, even more taxpayer money is needed to transport surplus waste to facilities as far as Virginia. Instead of landfills, which require lots of money and land while emitting significant amounts of greenhouse gases, New York City should employ a new technology that would allow cities to permanently dispose of their waste while generating a profit. Plasma gasification technology converts trash to electricity, and it is poised to become a prominent disposal method for cities with significant amounts of solid waste. New York City currently generates 12,000 tons of garbage every day, resulting in an above-average cost of disposal. With its already high rates of garbage generation and population growth, New York City must face its high costs of disposal. This makes New York City an obvious candidate to implement plasma gasification technology, as landfills are quickly filling up and becoming scarcer. By embracing plasma gasification, New York City will reap economic profit, counteract environmental damage, and also set an example for other global metropolises to feasibly enact sustainable policies. While New York’s twenty-seven landfills accepted more than eight million tons of solid waste in 2007, the city also must rely heavily on out-of-state landfills, shipping garbage to Pennsylvania and Ohio by railway and trucks.1 Although landfill disposal methods are an improvement from ocean-dumping and incineration New York residents, and the environment pay an enormous price. The disaster of Fresh Kills Landfill in Staten Island exemplifies the costs of these methods. A landfill that could be seen from outer space, Fresh Kills was ordered to close by Mayor Rudy Giuliani in 2001 because it caused significant air pollution and groundwater contamination.2 Numerous studies have shown that landfills contribute to global warming by emitting greenhouse gases like methane, carbon dioxide, and other bioaerosols.3 Moreover, landfills have also leaked leachate and other harmful chemicals into groundwater, contaminating drinking water and damaging the environment. Liners and other methods are designed to minimize air and water emissions from landfills.4 However, according to the EPA, landfills inevitably produce emissions.5 Because gasification can decompose all non-radioactive material, it does not require a complex separating process, distinguishing it from processes like recycling. Incineration, a process whereby garbage is simply burned, is very inefficient as it produces and releases high amounts of carbon dioxide, poses a risk of starting fires, and emits toxins and odors into the air. Plasma gasification produces no odors, releases negligible amounts of carbon dioxide, does not start fires, and even generates significant amounts of surplus energy. According to Foster A. Agblevor, a bioprocess engineering

specialist at Virginia Tech, municipal solid waste is an ideal feedstock for gasification.6 As a process, plasma gasification converts waste into energy by vaporizing material into a gas, which can then be used to produce electricity. Specifically, the garbage is pelletized and placed into a high-heat and high-pressure chamber called a gasifier. Inside the gasifier there is a lightening-like electrical arc created by two electrodes. Gas is passed through the electrical arc, creating an intense energy field. As a result, temperatures within the electrical arc reach as high as 30,000 degrees Fahrenheit (17,000 degrees Celsius), over three times as hot as the surface of the sun. The heat radiating from these arcs decomposes waste into two main products. The first is an inorganic glass-like substance that can be reused for roadbed, high-strength asphalt, and heavy construction. The second is a gas, termed syngas, which can be converted into fuels such as hydrogen, natural gas, and ethanol. Additionally, syngas can be fed into a cooling system to generate steam that is then used to drive a turbine and produce electricity. After the first use of the gasifier, the machine no longer needs an external energy source; it produces enough electricity to power itself while creating surplus electricity to export for other uses.7 In addition to being more environmentally sustainable, gasification is also more cost-effective than landfills. Approximately $400 million of taxpayer money is sacrificed each year to ship and store New York City’s trash.8 Of this $400 million, a fraction is directly paid to Virginia and Pennsylvania’s landfills for merely storing the city’s trash. Because New York City is in the unusual position of having to ship and store its garbage to other states, New York City pays as high as $90 per ton of garbage, compared to the national average of $35 per ton.9 While landfills pose an environmental risk and drain New York City’s limited monetary funds, gasification generates a profit in the long run. A plasma converter that processes up to 2,000 tons of waste a day costs approximately $250 million to build. With three plasma converters, New York City can feasibly process half of its daily waste of 12,000 tons. The cost of transportation and maintenance is negligible in comparison to the amount of money that the city currently pays to support its landfills, as the city will no longer have to pay to ship and store trash out-ofstate. After the decrease in transportation and storage costs, the plasma converter has the potential to reduce New York City’s cost of disposal from $90 per ton to $36 per ton.10 Additionally, about one-third of the electricity generated by the syngas of each gasifier can be sold to utility companies. In total, the profits generated by selling the surplus electricity are greater than the cost of the gasification disposal system; the city would make $15 per ton of garbage disposed! In other words, the city would be gaining money by gasifying its garbage. Although the fixed cost of installing three plasma gasifiers is $750 million, this is affordable with the help of a federal loan. By investing in gasification, New York City could repay its entire loan within a decade. If New York City applied for a $750 million federal loan, the city would be able to redirect funds that are currently used to sustain the cost of waste management to pay back its loan at a steady rate. The city’s debt would be set at a rate similar to the amount that would have been spent on the transportation and storage of trash before the gasifiers were built. Since the payment system is correlated to the amount New York City would have already spent without the gasifiers, this will allow repayment of the city’s loan at a three percent interest rate

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without any significant added strain to their yearly budget. This way NYC turns a $90 per ton garbage cost into a $15 per ton garbage profit within 5-7 years. By implementing a gasification system, NYC’s garbage disposal will be greener, less costly, and energy creating. Considering the immense environmental and financial cost of New York’s current garbage disposal system, it makes sense to invest in a new, effective, and sustainable system such as plasma gasification. Despite the large initial investment, the money saved through plasma gasification helps make it economically viable. Although plasma gasification is still an emerging technology, successful implementations in Japan demonstrate its feasibility.11 Plasma gasification will allow New York City to reduce its carbon and toxic gas emissions, diminish the need to unsustainably store trash and generate enough surplus electricity to enable this disposal to become profitable.

Submetering College Dorm Rooms To Incentivize Sustainable Consumption
Dario Abramskiehn and Brenden Cline

Columbia University, like a significant majority of other institutions of higher education, incorporates the costs of students’ electricity consumption into their annual housing fee, effectively causing a disconnect between students’ usage and charges. The additional costs from residents who waste electricity and savings from those who conserve are not passed along to them directly, but are distributed into the average cost of housing for the entire on-campus undergraduate community. Thus, simple, but mildly inconvenient tactics for reducing energy usage—unplugging one’s refrigerator over breaks, turning off lights, and disconnecting appliances that consume standby electricity—go unheeded by all but the most environmentallycommitted students. The end result of all of this is that most Columbians choose not to make even the smallest effort to curb their energy usage because the University’s policies disconnect them from the financial and environmental costs of their consumption. In the context of sharply rising real electricity prices over the coming decade, the threat presented by anthropogenic climate change today, and Columbia University’s oft-cited commitment to environmental sustainability in the future, it is abundantly clear that this conventional method of charging students for their electricity usage must be revised. Solution & Benefits The economically and environmentally pragmatic solution is to have students pay an electricity bill for their individual consumption—the same way that electric utilities charge residential consumers for their electricity usage rather than the average per capita consumption of their municipality. All Columbia University residential buildings, particularly undergraduate dormitories, should be retrofitted with an energy information system (EIS) comprising electricity submetering of every dorm room and a graphical feedback system for individuals’ usage data. Even without a pricing mechanism, the introduction of a high resolution energy information system, which provides participants with real-time feedback on their room’s individual electric-

ity use,1 has been proven to reduce energy consumption. For example, as documented by Petersen et al., the availability of high resolution feedback for residents of Oberlin College’s dormitories, combined with peer education and the moderate incentive of a small party, was sufficient to cut electricity use by 55 percent during a competition.2 Significantly, these savings were 77 percent greater than those of the low resolution group, which, like Columbia students during the “Do It In the Dark” Energy Challenge,3 only received weekly data transcribed from buildings’ aggregate electricity meters. This trend demonstrates that the immediacy of feedback is a key component of understanding and subsequently changing one’s patterns of consumption. It has also been demonstrated that economic incentives can be successfully used to reward students’ energy conservation at the college level.4 Rather than merely reward students collectively for aggregate savings, however, modern technologies of individual room metering should be harnessed to provide the same price incentives renters and home owners receive to reduce consumption: an electricity bill. Implementation Physical installation of the EIS requires purchasing multipoint submeters with Ethernet capability, retrofitting all existing undergraduate dormitories over several years to meter each resident’s room, concurrently installing LCD monitors in dormitories’ lobbies, and incorporating submetering into the design of future dormitories. The first physical consideration must be the number of submeters to purchase. According to Enetics, Inc., Columbia’s current supplier of electricity meters, submetering technology will be available within the next two years that can track as many as 42 circuit points with an expected price of $1400 per unit. These meters, like those the university currently uses, can be used with automatic meter reading (AMR) software to report the data as frequently as every 15 seconds to a central digital database. Excluding Watt, the East Campus high-rise, and the Brownstone residences, the average of the remaining 16 undergraduate dorms has approximately 20 people per floor and about 9 floors.5 For our undergraduate housing, the East Campus highrise would require one small-scale (< 12 circuit) submeter in each suite, each of the 16 Brownstones needs a single meter, Watt warrants no additional metering, and the remaining 16 buildings call for one meter per floor on average. Thus, an estimated 150-175 of these upcoming large multipoint submeters and 110 small-scale submeters will be sufficient for monitoring all undergraduates’ residential electricity use. These meters will be installed at circuit breakers or other access points to the electrical distribution system, and their transponders will be set up through a connection to the local IP network. Estimating the price of smaller-scale multipoint meter to be $1000 yields a total cost for the meters within the next five years of approximately $350,000. When a dorm is retrofitted with the submetering technology, it will be highly beneficial to display the building’s instantaneous electricity usage on the ground floor entrance of each building. It would contribute greatly to residents’ awareness of the system if the data were publicly displayed in a readily interpretable way, by tracking the dormitory’s aggregate electricity usage, displaying the average resident’s demand, comparing per capita usage amongst dorms, and displaying resources equivalent to the level of energy consumption (i.e. pounds of coal, pounds of CO2 emissions, dollars, etc.). New LCD dedicated monitors for the 18 resi-

dence halls and 16 brownstones at $500 each will cost less than $20,000. Secondly, since the capital expenditure and installation time will be an issue, these energy monitors should first be introduced in freshman dormitories, which are more prone to change their energy usage behavior.6 This trend, along with the inability to retrofit all buildings at once and the need to develop proper implementation protocol before the project is scaled up completely, entails that the system’s efficacy and cost-effectiveness could be maximized by phasing in installation over a number of years and ideally accomplishing one stage of retrofitting per year. At a minimum, Columbia must commit to incorporating submetering into the design of all future undergraduate housing to be constructed and all significant renovation projects. This proposal for an EIS could be extended to graduate students’ housing, but the smaller scale and varying nature of graduate students’ buildings (including apartments that already charge utilities) forces this to be looked at on a case-by-case basis.
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 Stage 7 Carman and John Jay (~50 meters) Furnald, Hartley, and Wallach (~30 meters) 47 Claremont, McBain, Ruggles, and 600 West 113th (~30 meters) Schapiro and Wien (~30 meters) Brownstones, Hogan, and Woodbridge (~30 meters) East Campus townhouses, high-rise floors 6-10 (~20 meters and ~40 small meters) East Campus high-rise floors 12-20 (~70 small meters)

Next, technological implementation will involve acquiring software to render the energy usage in an accessible, engaging way and formulating a computer program for attributing the costs of electricity usage and assessing the charges to students’ accounts. The former program could be realized with little difficulty, as the introduction of Lucid Design Group’s Building Dashboard7 software on campus is currently in the works and Google will soon be releasing free software for this purpose called Google PowerMeter.8 The task of making the raw metered data studentfriendly may be outsourced in this way or managed in-house by software engineers, as Enetics’ metering software is already capable of some level of graphical representation. Secondly, a new program needs to be developed to ascribe electricity use to students and charge them for the variable cost of their usage. While a perfectly equitable system for attributing shared electricity use to individuals is not possible, one must be attempted for the sake of spurring conservation and levying usage fees appropriately. Thus, the program should take data from individual room meters and add to it prorated shared usage (such as bathrooms, lounges, kitchens, and hallways with light switches) proportionate to the number of residents who share the space. To illustrate, this would entail that the typical resident of Carman Hall is charged for 1/2 of his double’s electricity use plus 1/4 of a 4-person suite’s bathroom and hallway usage. Besides appropriately coupling energy use with the students responsible, this software should charge the most accurate fee possible. In some buildings, the university is charged a different rate for peak and off-peak hours; where possible, this fee should be passed along to students in real-time to reduce costs and even out the peak demand load. In the next two decades, there is a chance that New York City will have a “smart” grid in some fashion and charge a varying rate dependant on instantaneous demand; with a submetering system in place using even today’s

technology, this price signal can further affect student decisions and reduce utility costs. In order to best serve residents in any case, the software should post charges digitally on an hourly basis, allowing students to check at any time throughout the month to find out how much they will owe and accordingly alter their behavior. Finally, the software must be able to report these charges to Student Financial Services for posting on each student’s monthly E-Bill. The billing system is most effective when it is frequent enough for students to be reminded of the fees, but infrequent enough that the costs are given time to accumulate and be substantial. Thus, a monthly billing interval is far preferable to the regular semester cycle not only because it mirrors the reality of a residential monthly utility bill, but because this frequency will divorce the charge’s relationship to tuition, next to which it is a paltry sum. Additionally, by that time the average student (with today’s consumption habits) will have a bill of $25, but their individual choices can reasonably reduce this by around $10. Lastly, personnel demands may necessitate the contracting or hiring of additional staff to install the meters, develop needed software, meet the new data management needs, and handle the new item of student billing. The physical installation could easily be contracted or performed by Columbia staff during summer break. According to estimates based on a similar installation conducted by Columbia Professor John E. Taylor for a research project, installation costs may be as high as $1000 per unit. This may be lower when performed on the much larger scale proposed, but at an estimated $750 per large multipoint meter and $500 per small meter, the total cost of installation may be up to $200,000. The software could be developed rather quickly by a team of computer programmers at a likely project cost of less than $10,000. Finally, this amplified energy infrastructure may necessitate the hiring of a Facilities electricity infrastructure manager dedicated to running the database as well as an additional Student Services Representative to help manage the fee payments, including ensuring the automatic application of students’ financial aid to the charges and their timely posting to students’ accounts. These additional salaries can be liberally estimated to cost $120,000 per year. The total cost of purchasing and installing the meters and LCD monitors, developing graphical feedback and pricing/billing software, and hiring additional staff will have a cost in the neighborhood of $600,000 fixed expenditures plus additional salaries of $120,000 per year. The electricity usage of Columbia’s undergraduate dorms is on the order of 1,000,000 kWh/month and electricity prices in New York City are approximately $.18/ kWh,9 amounting to an estimated $180,000 in monthly charges. While submetering has been demonstrated to prompt residential electricity conservation of 18-26 percent and the mere presence of an EIS has prompted short-term savings of up to 55 percent and sustained savings of 5 percent,10 a conservative estimate from this pricing plan could put the estimated reduction at 12.5 percent, or roughly $22,500/month and $270,000/year in savings. Next Steps At today’s prices and market conditions, this plan is not feasible. However, over the next few years as meter prices fall, electricity demand rises, and economic conditions improve to allow needed investment in infrastructure, this proposal will be a relevant and prudent course of action.

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Numerous variables will dictate the exact repayment period of these savings, but these assumptions estimate that the system will pay for itself within approximately 4 years of being fully online. Although the university operates on a largely short-term investment cycle and may be hesitant to embrace these upfront costs, the EIS is not only a smart investment for its savings of $150,000 per year, but because the system will enable Columbia to optimize investments in dorms’ energy efficiency, provide insight on electricity losses and waste, and demonstrate Columbia’s commitment to sustainability and energy conservation in a meaningful, precedent-setting way. This system is not only environmentally and financially sound; it also should not be particularly difficult to sell to students. Although this introduces a rate charge where a fixed fee existed before, the reduction of students’ housing fees because of this alternate electricity charge will likely benefit the 60-70 percent of residents who use less than the per capita average. Further, it is a more fair allocation of costs because, on average, the highest consuming 10 percent of residents use 20-25 percent of a building’s total electricity.11 Conclusion We acknowledge that a comprehensive EIS will take a very substantial amount of time for Columbia to put into place, and may require a greater level of detail than this initial inquiry provides. We hope that this paper can provide the impetus for some such investigation, as we believe that an electricity pricing scheme in higher education residences that more closely reflects that which conventional energy costumers experience, can empower the most substantive and most important changes in patterns of consumption among college students, and better prepare them to be conscious consumers in the future. Columbia, as an institution that prides itself on its leadership within the realm of academia, must also take this as an opportunity to set a positive example of fiscally prudent, but conscientious and relevant environmental practices from which other colleges and universities may take heed. As efforts to combat anthropogenic climate change become more entrenched in American society and an effective carbon pricing scheme takes root, electricity prices are likely to increase substantially in the near future, while the cost of metering technology will continue to decrease. Thus, it is crucial that Columbia begin its investigation of EIS implementation as soon as possible, in order to take full advantage of the changing economic conditions that will facilitate its efforts at conservation.

Education
Unlike many policy issues the benefits of educational reform may not be immediately apparent but are indisputable. Education fosters progressivism through promoting equal opportunity and the flow of information. In a progressive society, education is at the core and promotes active citizenship. We as a center work to further these tenets by exploring, developing, and hopefully implementing educational reform on the local as well global level. Roosevelt and New York’s After School Education. This semester the Education Center has been working with the Partnership for After School Education. PASE is a New York City area non-profit organization which works over 1,600 partner programs to develop and promote after school education. The Education Center has worked with PASE to develop a policy statement on their initiative to promote healthy eating in after school programs. Childhood obesity has become epidemic in poor and minority communities in New York City. PASE and Roosevelt hope to create a program that teaches children and parents about the importance of healthy lifestyle choices. Through tools such as a cookbook and possible partnership between food providers and after school programs, the initiative hopes to educate and motivate communities. Center members have visited PASE partner programs and presented policy to the Children’s Health Advisory Council, of which the center is a member. Visiting afterschool programs allowed center members to see education policy in action, and the concrete effects that after school programming has on children. The relationship between PASE and Roosevelt has allowed Roosevelt members to create lasting ties to the New York City community. Mindful of the need to preserve programs despite budget cuts, the education center hopes to propose alternative solutions that both streamline existing programs and create efficient new ones.

Green Jobs through Vocational Education
Maddy Joseph and Clare Kelley

In recent decades, education reform movements in the United States have shifted money and infrastructure steadily towards test-based approaches to improvement, neglecting funding and support for vocational education programs. Yet there is strong evidence that vocational education, like apprenticeship programs, can increase social inclusion and aid responses to shifting economic conditions.1 Apprenticeship and vocational programs are more abundant in various forms outside the United States. In many European countries, vocational education remains an important element of social policy, and the ability to learn a trade is considered a right. This model, however, has flaws including a lack of flexibility and choice. The United States should improve upon the European model and build a vocational training program that takes advantage of opportunities in the growing green jobs sector. Two basic models for apprenticeship programs exist in Europe: the U.K. and German models. In the United Kingdom, vocational education exists as government-regulated apprenticeships, where professional organizations and governmentsupported job centers help to connect potential trainees and mentors. In 2001, the British Association of Construction Heads recommended that apprenticeship programs be expanded, explaining that apprenticeships are desirable because they provide on the job training, employer involvement in education, and an opportunity for trainees to earn while they learn.2 The apprenticeship system in the United Kingdom offers a useful model for vocational education outside of school. However, while it provides support and resources for people already interested in apprenticeships, the program does not offer inschool programming that can target a wider audience and allow for students to experiment with different trades. German schools, in contrast, offer an in-school approach to vocational education. German children are tracked into different types secondary schools based on teacher recommendations. One level of secondary education is focused primarily on vocational education for trades. This system provides strong institutional support for young people who aspire to enter the trades and starts training at an early age. However, the rigidity of the system does not allow for the exploration of different options. Young people often have shifting interests and abilities, and vocational education programs are perhaps most effective and desirable when they do not force people into trades in which they are uninterested. Though the United States has recognized the economic and social importance of vocational education programs, it has lagged behind other industrialized nations, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, in their successful implementation.3 Apprenticeship programs in the United States developed without much regulation until the 1937 Fitzgerald Act created a national regulatory framework that promoted standards and models of apprenticeship.4 This trajectory of development ensured that, despite the Fitzgerald Act’s creation of the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training and despite state offices dedicated to apprenticeship, programs in the United States lack the “supporting infrastructure of the European models.”5

Concerns about the absence of a coherent system connecting high schools and workplaces and about the economic effects of this on the skilled workforce prompted the passage of the School-to-Work Opportunities Act in 1994. The Act has reduced drop-out rates and increased college enrollment where implemented.6 However, despite the successes of this program and the recognized need for vocational education, legislation and reforms like No Child Left Behind have shifted the focus and funding away from vocational programs to test-based reform.7 The current global economic climate provides an opportunity to re-shift this focus. As the United States seeks to address rising unemployment, two policy elements are essential. First are training and re-training programs that equip workers for skilled jobs and provide more adequate employment opportunities to the underemployed and those at risk of losing their jobs. Second are programs that look to growing and previously untapped industries as avenues for job creation. The establishment of an apprenticeship program that trains young people to go into the green jobs sector would introduce both of these program types. The most recent stimulus bill8 includes funding for a green jobs training initiative that is funded through the Department of Labor that both creates new green industries and re-trains workers to enter those industries. However, the program lacks a clear path to achieving these goals. Though there is a framework for vocational programs, policy points are vague and lack specific procedures of implementation.9 An effective approach to a green apprenticeship program under the Department of Labor (DOL) initiative would be a twoyear certificate program, called Eco Corps, operated through community colleges. The first year of the program centers on a classroom-based curriculum focusing on environmental issues and various opportunities in the green jobs sector. Students will spend the second year completing an apprenticeship in the chosen field. Offering the program as a community college degree would lessen the stigma attached to traditional vocation education programs run through many high schools. To ensure that no potential participants are excluded from the Eco Corps program because of financial considerations, comprehensive financial aid would be provided and apprentices would be compensated on a staggering scale beginning at 50 percent and increasing to full pay. The aim of the certificate’s first year would be to educate participants in two areas. The first is the importance of environmental stewardship and the strong connection between the health of the economy and the health of the environment. This would make clear the value of green sector jobs to the economy, the environment, and to society as a whole. Second, participants would be educated about a variety of career opportunities in the green sector. This avoids the negative consequences of the narrowness of the British and German systems, and as a result, participants can make informed decisions about their future employment. In the second year, participants will be paired with mentors from their specific, chosen green industries. Apprenticeships provide hands-on experience and allow workers to enter the industry with skills already in place. Companies that agree to take on apprentices should receive a government subsidy to both incentivize and cover the cost of the program. Following appren-

tice’s completion of the program, it is hoped that these mentor companies will hire these experienced apprentices. America currently lacks a strong and structured framework for apprenticeship; this proposal’s implementation will create a foundation for future growth in this area of vocational education. That the program can potentially fuel both economic growth and the American green revolution is a broader benefit in which the skilled workforce can take pride.

Secular Education Against The Proliferation of Unregulated Madrassas
Kyu-In Lee and Raul Mendoza

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States began improving its diplomatic presence in the Muslim world after decades of neglect. Among the better known American interventions, the U.S. Department of State and other executive agencies have targeted their efforts towards stamping out extremist religious education in Muslim madrassas. Events of the past decade have aroused much antipathy against the United States. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in Pakistan, where the Taliban has gained a foothold in the largely tribal areas of the Northwest. Enrollment in madrassas has grown rapidly in this region. It would be a mistake to equate the rise of enrollment in these institutions with a similar rise in animosity against the United States. Madrassas serve a vital purpose; providing an education to those who simply lie beyond the reach of government. The problem is not the role of religious education, but the lack of governmental oversight that allows organizations with known terrorist links to operate madrassas. Any proposed solution must address several areas: firstly, the Pakistani government must put forward a program of direct school financing as an inducement for madrassas to implement a broad curriculum; and secondly, the Pakistani Ministry of Religious Affairs must develop a council of Quranic scholars to evaluate the legitimacy of religious curricula. While the first course of action requires a distinctly Pakistani response, the latter could be achieved with the help of the United Nations and Red Crescent nations. The precipitous increase in the number of madrassas has strained the ability of the government to effectively monitor the education progress of the Pakistani youth. During their early proliferation from 1947-1956, the number of madrassas increased from 137 to 244.1 This number increased dramatically during the tenure of General Mohammed Zia Ul-Haq as Pakistani head-ofstate from 1977-88 on account of his generous patronage of religious schools.2 Because many in Ul-Haq’s loyal military corps came out of these schools, religious education during his time also served a political purpose. With the onset of the Soviet invasion in 1979, Muslims from across the region and beyond came to the madrassas for instruction and ultimately mobilization into guerrilla units. Unlike madrassas elsewhere in the Muslim world, Pakistani madrassas focused on the doctrine of jihad as a tool of ideological mobilization for the purpose of combating the Soviets. Much of this ideological instruction remains present today. Recently there has been an exponential increase in the number of madrassas in Pakistan. In 2005, the number has broken the 13,000 benchmark. Several thousand of these madrassas cur-

rently remain unregistered as only 11,000 madrassas were registered according to statistics released by the Pakistani government in 2005.3 Unregistered madrassas are highly problematic because students may not be offered an education that meets the standards either offered by the public education system or mandated by religious institutions.4 In addition, unregistered madrassas do not receive aid offered by the Pakistani government’s Madrassa Reform Programme (MRP), which offers federal financial support to help standardize the privatized madrassas.5 By creating a more tightly enforced, efficient licensing system for madrassas, the Pakistani government will be able to more effectively implement the MRP to standardize education and introduce secular subjects such as the sciences, math, and computer courses in madrassas. The education offered by the madrassas is usually limited to religious studies; students are taught how to read and recite the Qu’ran. As a result, the students who graduate from the madrassas are usually employed as imams (priests) or khatibs (lecturers) at mosques or they are employed by their madrassa.6 Currently, the curricula of most “reforming” madrassas address the sciences, math, technology, and English. These courses, however, disappear by the eighth grade, since clerics argue that, beyond a certain point, these subjects lose their focus on God.7 Some graduates establish their own madrassas. The current expansion of madrassa graduates also entails a surplus of qualified candidates for advanced Quranic study as well as the positions mentioned above. If the madrassas were to offer more secular and modern courses such as math, sciences, computer related courses, and foreign languages, then variety of potential occupations for madrassa graduates would increase. This would mean that Pakistan’s job market would likewise expand, in turn creating larger and more diverse job markets in the future. For example, children who would normally be limited to being employed as an imam because of their exclusively religious education would be able to alternatively become engineers if they are offered the basic science courses. Graduates of the madrassas with a more diverse education will be able to make better individual career decisions and join larger job markets. Yet similar proposals have met failure across Pakistan. Due to the entrenchment of military officers trained in the madrassas during the past two decades, the Pakistani military has approached its task of enforcing the MRP with ambivalence. Once cleric describes his experience with the Pakistani government, “The negotiations (with the government) failed, but this was a success for us.”8 Also wary of the influence of the Pakistani government in tribal affairs, prominent clerics have blocked the efforts of the government to enforce this policy.9 Opponents of Madrassa regulation claim that their educational approach does not advocate violence or antipathy towards the West. Yet the cleric of the Darul Uloom Haqqania madrassa, where prominent Taliban leaders were educated, claims that Osama bin Laden is “a brave and courageous man.”10 According to the leadership of this madrassa, 1,000 of its pupils left to fight the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq.11 This madrassa is still active today. Some critics of Musharraf’s policy, like the International Crisis Group which is a self-described “independent, non-partisan, source of analysis” for conflict mediation based in Brussels, claim that Musharraf did not go far enough to force clerics to submit to state regulation.12 President Musharraf appointed Muhammad Ijaz Ul-Haq as the Head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.13 Fre-

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quently invoking the legacy of his father, General Zia Ul Haq, Ijaz Ul Haq sought to forge a compromise.14 Recognizing the large degree of autonomy that tribal leaders possess, Ul Haq positioned himself as friendly intermediary between religious leaders and the central government. His relationship with clerics has so far failed to be fruitful. The issue of madrassas in Pakistan raises larger questions beyond education about the autonomy of religious leaders in Northeastern Pakistan. President Musharraf relied on the support of this constituency due to its strong military ties. His challenge to them was largely responsible for his recent ouster. After the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the attacks in New Delhi by Pakistani militants, the need for the regulation of madrassas is greater than ever. The government has shown, however, that it cannot accomplish this alone. The proposal of offering state-funds to madrassas also exposes a number of concerns regarding the application of educational funds. Firstly for estimated number of unregistered madrassas, it is possible that state financing would directly fund terrorism. This is a crucible that the government cannot afford to undertake. Rather, the government must offer state funds to religious schools in exchange for more oversight over the curriculum. Any proposed measure would have to encompass secular subjects as well as the religious curriculum. The government must assemble a panel of national or international Quranic scholars to ensure that the religious component of madrassa education encompasses Islam broadly and not focus exclusively on jihad. The role of jihad in the unregulated Pakistani madrassas is excessive. The struggle defined in the Qu’ran as jihad takes many definitions, predominantly dealing with one’s personal struggles in overcoming the vices that threaten to obstruct the path towards holiness that the Prophet describes. The more familiar definition of jihad revolves around a holy war when the faith falls under attack. In the entire Qu’ran, only fifteen pages deal with either definition.15 The outright prevalence of militant jihad in the Quranic education in unregulated madrassas seems to be doing a disservice to the rest of the religion. In the Haqqania madrassa, for instance, one cleric denied that students left to go wage jihad on the Americans in Afghanistan, yet a member of this cleric’s community claimed that the cleric in question—as well as the other religious leaders who operate Haqqania madrassa—told followers, “Go there is a jihad.”16 The clerics that run these institutions have indicated their unwillingness to deal with the government. The level of commitment the government can expect from the military is similarly limited. In addition to the problem of regional loyalties, another pressing problem is how clerics use their own religion. Beyond the registration of madrassas, the government of Pakistan must also recognize the lessons of the failure of the MRP in terms of exerting itself over the autonomous tribal chieftains of the North. These leaders have challenged the apparent religious neutrality of their own religions to urge their followers on to jihad. The prevalence of jihad in the curriculum of unregistered madrassas makes this religious extremism appear legitimate. With the assistance of the United Nations, Pakistan should establish a national tribunal of preeminent Muslim scholars to determine which schools do not meet the standards for national registration on account of their extremist views. This panel should represent a wide diversity of scholars and clerics from around the world. Working in conjunction with the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education, this distinguished panel will

decide the legitimacy of curricula thus eliminating the problem of conflicting religious opinions on jihad. The Pakistani government should be ready to furnish educational materials and additional teachers should madrassa clerics request it, but should not impose them by force. By enacting such measures, Pakistan can finally achieve what former President Musharraf described as “Enlightened moderation” instead of being a hotbed of ideological war.17 Despite the failure of previous reforms and in spite of regional opposition, reform of the madrassas is still possible. The satiation of the job market with over-qualified, madrassa-educated students limits the potential of Pakistan’s human capital. The struggle over religious education in Pakistan also represents a proxy test of wills between the Karachi government and the chieftains of the outlying areas. Although President Musharraf attempted to forcefully change the system of madrassa registration during his time in office, his efforts failed on account of the implicit limitation of their ideological influence. In order to combat the ideological ambiguities of jihad, credible experts invited at the behest of the Pakistani government must denounce what they perceive to be as extremism. Since madrassas satisfy the demand for education in some areas, the government should not impose itself in a forceful way, but offer incentives for an ideologically balanced curriculum with more support and teachers. Recent events have shown religious extremism manifested into violent actions have originated from Pakistan exclusively. Further reform of the Pakistani school system will ensure peace and progress for generations to come.

Foreign Policy
“If civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships - the ability of all peoples, of all kinds, to live together, in the same world at peace.” Franklin D. Roosevelt The year 2009 promises to be a crucial year in American Foreign Policy. The United States must assert itself as a world power that seeks not to impose its own values, but rather to deal evenhandedly with all nations. Its role must be to protect morality and humaneness, rather than hidden agendas. Its policies must be lucid in dealing with ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as future policies with both allies and nations that harbor anti-U.S. sentiment. It is crucial that the United States regain its status as a trusted mediator beacon of morality in order for its presence in international politics to be legitimized once again. The Obama Administration has inherited foreign relations crises in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result of the exposed torturing at Abu Gharaib Prison as well as the deprivation of Guantanamo Bay’s enemy combatants to basic legal rights, President Obama closed the Guantanamo Prison on his first day of office. While this is a step forward for progressive American policy, it is unclear what will come of the prison itself as well as the prisoners it housed (i.e. how they will be tried and if they will be extradited). U.S. Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke has been sent on a tour of the region and returned reporting that the situation is grimmer than previously reported; he stated that in Afghanistan the $800 million spent per year on counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan is “wasteful and ineffective,” and that violence is spreading from the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan eastward to the city of Lahore. Rather than the Cold War’s “us versus them” approach, the United States must be willing to engage all nations in bilateral or multilateral talks. These talks must certainly include the looming issue of nuclear proliferation and expand its policy to include unrecognized nuclear-weapon states. In dealing with those nations, a true appreciation and understanding of those cultures is necessary, whether it be by understanding typical local governing systems or by ensuring the preservation of its historical landmarks and art. True understanding is the only means to mastering F.D.R.’s “science of human relationships,” and ultimately will allow us to regain our status as a morally conscious world power.

Toward a Stronger Nuclear Policy
Sam Klug

The United States has not adjusted its nuclear policy to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world. Looking forward, any potential nuclear threat to the United States will most likely come from either a rogue state attempting to increase its regional power or from a non-state actor that has acquired nuclear weapons in the aftermath of state failure. Given the current international climate, maintaining over 3,000 nuclear weapons is unnecessary and dangerous. American policymakers must cast our country’s nuclear policy not in terms of national strength, but in terms of global non-proliferation. This reconsideration would require two new priorities: bringing unrecognized nuclear-weapon states into international treaty agreements and significantly reducing the size of our own arsenal. To address these new priorities, the United States must commit itself to strengthening current treaties that govern the world’s nuclear weapons.1 The United States is committed to three nuclear-weapons treaties: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991 (START I), the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 2002, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. START I calls for verification of all U.S. and Russian nuclear sites, allowing each to know where the other’s nuclear weapons are located, thus reducing the potential for another Cuban Missile Crisis. The Moscow Treaty requires the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear stockpiles to between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons by the end of 2012, when the treaty expires. Finally, the NPT, the only multilateral nuclear treaty signed by the United States, established the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors the nuclear activities of each signatory state, and expresses the twin goals of global disarmament and non-proliferation. The United States should attempt to turn both of its bilateral treaties with Russia into multilateral treaties that include all other recognized nuclear-weapon states – the U.K., France, and China – as soon as possible. Former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn argue that the United States must “extend key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991” as a first step toward greater nuclear security.2 START I expires on December 5, 2009. The Obama Administration should seek to extend the treaty beyond this date and expand its membership to include the U.K., France, and China. The United States should take similar steps to strengthen the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. According to the Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, the treaty’s requirement for maximum stockpile size by the end of 2012, a range of 1,700 to 2,200 weapons, “is a level that will provide a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with national security requirements and Alliance obligations.”3 This statement epitomizes the Cold War mindset under which American policymakers continue to operate. Because the most credible nuclear threats to the United States will most likely come from rogue states or terrorist groups, the time for a large stockpile of nuclear weapons to play the role of strategic deterrent has come to an end.

Therefore, the United States should reaffirm its commitment to arms reduction on a larger and more multilateral scale. Working with Russia to extend the Moscow Treaty beyond 2012, the United States should set a short-term target of reducing arsenals to 1,000 weapons by 2016. The belief that 1,700 nuclear weapons (as opposed to 1,000 or 500) would serve as a deterrent to an attack by a terrorist organization is not plausible. Regarding potential threats from rogue states, continued attempts to enrich uranium in North Korea and Iran prove that the current U.S. arsenal does not successfully deter proliferation in countries that believe acquiring nuclear weapons is necessary to ensuring national security or prestige. Eventually, the United States must also seek to include the unrecognized nuclear-weapon states – India, Pakistan, and Israel – in START I and the Moscow Treaty. This task will be difficult, especially considering the provision in Article XI of START I that gives “each Party…the right to conduct inspections and continuous monitoring activities” of the other parties.4 While the U.K., France, and China are likely to see the success the treaty has had in reducing alert levels on nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia as a reason to sign, Pakistan, India, and Israel are unlikely to allow inspections of their nuclear arsenals. However, agreement on this point is the only way to reduce the chances of both a nuclear crisis in South Asia and further proliferation in the Middle East. By verifying and monitoring locations of nuclear weapons in Pakistan, the international community could provide greater assurance that these weapons do not fall into the hands of the terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province. In addition, increased confidence in Israel’s accounting for and monitoring of its nuclear weapons would reduce the temptation for countries across the Middle East – all of whom currently act under the assumption that Israel possesses nuclear weapons – to seek their own nuclear arsenals as a means to self-defense. Presumed unwillingness on the part of these states to sign START I should not deter the United States and Russia from extending an invitation to them; it should also not deter the United States and Russia from pressuring them to accept an invitation. If these states agreed to reduce the secrecy of their nuclear programs, but not to adhere to the provisions of Article XI, the United States should urge them to sign a limited agreement. START I has helped the United States and Russia make significant progress in regards to nuclear safety by reducing alert levels on both countries’ nuclear weapons; any extension of this treaty’s principles to other nuclear-weapons states is worth pursuing. A long-term agreement with Russia that sets a goal of reducing stockpiles to no more than 500 weapons should constitute the final goal of the new U.S. nuclear policy. In the recent article, “The Logic of Zero,” Ivo Laalder and Jan Lodal identify even 1,000 weapons as excessive, given the current threats to the United States; at the height of the Cold War, “it was widely agreed that 400-500 weapons on target would assuredly destroy the Soviet Union’s vast economic and military potential.”5 Acknowledgment of this fact, in addition to recognition that no threat currently facing the United States possesses the industrial or military capacity of the former Soviet Union, would lead to increased support for a policy of further reduction beyond the 1,000-weapon threshold. As no country other than the United States and Russia has more than 350 nuclear weapons, the United States should seek

to include all other nuclear-weapon states – recognized and unrecognized – in a provision of the treaty that, outside of the NPT, calls for countries not to expand their arsenals under any circumstances.6 Such a provision would force China, the only recognized nuclear-weapon state still building new weapons, as well as India, Pakistan, and Israel, to adhere to a policy of not enlarging their nuclear stockpiles regardless of their status inside or outside the NPT. Security benefits of further disarmament to the United States lie in the strength such a policy would give to the NPT. The NPT expresses two fundamental goals: disarmament and non-proliferation. So long as the recognized nuclear-weapon states make cursory attempts at the former goal, the world will continue to see the treaty as weak, and thus will shirk on its commitment to the latter goal. Article VI of the NPT calls upon the five recognized nuclear-weapon states “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”7 While such language only requires “negotiations” toward disarmament, it does put forth “general and complete disarmament” as a goal. Regardless of the desirability of complete disarmament from an American point of view, a strong non-proliferation treaty is undoubtedly in U.S. national interest. The treaty will never be seen as strong if one of its sponsors fails to pursue one of the treaty’s goals. Negotiated reductions in nuclear weapons on the part of all five recognized nuclear-weapon states, especially the United States and Russia (who own over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons), would demonstrate a renewed commitment to following the NPT’s requirements, exposing failure by states such as Iran to adhere to the other core principle of the NPT: non-proliferation. Article II demands “each non-nuclear-weapon state…not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,” while Article III calls upon the same states “to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency…with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”8 Iran represents the best current example of a country taking advantage of the weakness of the NPT to continue proliferation at only a moderate cost in terms of sanctions and international criticism. Because the IAEA is not satisfied with Iran’s cooperation regarding Article III – the agency recently reported that “Iran needs to provide the [IAEA] with substantive information to support its statements and provide access to relevant documentation and individuals…to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran” – Iran’s adherence to Article II cannot be verified.9 By renewing their commitment to Article VI of the NPT, the five nuclear-weapon states would demonstrate the importance of full compliance with the treaty and expose states such as Iran that are not in full compliance. Because of the clarity of the contrast between those who adhere to the NPT in its entirety and those who do not, any action taken against a rogue state after some form of disarmament by the five recognized nuclear-weapon states would benefit from broader international support, and thus could have more wide-reaching effects than the narrow sanctions on individuals currently levied against Iran.

In a 1960 presidential debate, John F. Kennedy expressed the fear that “ten, fifteen, or twenty nations will have a nuclear capacity…by the end of the Presidential office in 1964.”10 Thanks largely to the treaties enacted since that time, fewer than ten nations possess such a capacity even in 2009. Despite its detractors, who cite the examples of India, Pakistan, and North Korea as nations who left the treaty with impunity, the NPT remains the strongest document protecting the world from further nuclear proliferation. By extending the verification provisions of START I, and by further reducing weapons stockpiles through expansion of the Moscow Treaty, the United States would demonstrate its belief in the continued importance of adhering to the NPT. To ensure that the world never sees ten, fifteen, or twenty nations with nuclear capacities, the United States must make every effort to live up to its obligations under the NPT and lead the movement toward further disarmament.

Culture without Bias, Diplomacy without Propaganda
Justin Floyd and Philip Verma

Cultural diplomacy is an integral component of any progressive foreign policy. Current U.S. policy, however, does not recognize the power of freely-exchanged culture in securing diplomatic links between nations. Because of its world political position and rhetorical commitment to progressive ideals, the United States must craft a new cultural diplomacy regime for the twenty-first century. Cultural diplomacy, also known as public diplomacy, is the use of various arts and media to advance a nation’s foreign policy. To understand the current problems with American cultural diplomacy, it is necessary to look at the historical residues of the Cold War. The Cold War, through efforts by the CIA, United States Information Agency (USIA), and other organizations, as well as state-run media outlets such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, saw the creation of a massive web for cultural diplomacy. These individual components served as instruments with which the government created a propagandistic message that could be disseminated to foreign countries, especially hotspots where Soviet influence was most potent or feared. Many of these institutions and programs have since ceased operations. Yet, no cultural diplomacy institutions have been created to replace them, particularly in the 1990s post-Soviet world. And although the collapse of the U.S.S.R. should have warranted a re-examination of diplomatic policy and its underlying motivations, lingering Cold War structures remained and continue to form the basis of twenty-first century cultural diplomacy. The Cold War foreign policy mentality, characterized by an ‘us versus them’ rhetoric and decision-making apparatus, currently resonates with U.S. governmental efforts to combat socalled Islamic ‘extremism.’ In both instances, U.S. foreign policy leaders used alarmist rhetoric to scare the citizenry and garner support for offensive and defensive measures. For example, the United States portrayed the Soviets as increasingly threatening because of their nuclear capabilities and potential to detonate nuclear weapons. Now, terrorist cells are seen in the same fear-

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ful light because of their quests to acquire ‘loose nukes’ could potentially be successful. In both cases, the specter of a nuclear attack served to increase hostility and American hysteria, thus swaying American foreign policy towards the antagonistic. Condoleezza Rice’s now famous dictum, ‘We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud,’1 indicates that the same rhetoric of diplomacy and defense lingers from the Soviet era. Cultural diplomacy should be given high priority in U.S. foreign policy, but it must not have the characteristics of anti-Soviet policy. During the Cold War, cultural diplomacy was the cornerstone of a foreign policy that trafficked information, ideas, and artists around the world. However, it was very much tainted by the simultaneous and somewhat conjunctive propaganda war of the time. With an eye to both the successes and failures of these past policies and adjusting to world affairs today, the U.S. must craft a cultural diplomatic policy fundamentally based on open cultural exchange, not pre-packaged propaganda. Because of the antagonistic history of U.S. cultural diplomacy, arts packaged directly under U.S.-government auspices today is immediately open to criticism of biases and message tampering. Many of these criticisms hit upon central problems of U.S. cultural diplomacy, prime among them the hypocrisy of America’s foreign image. The United States crafted an international posture that presented itself as a monolithic state built upon shared cultural, economic, and political values. Such a model served as a tool to forge unity against an outside antagonist, first Soviet Communism and more recently Muslim ‘extremism’ This unity of purpose—defeating an enemy and protecting the ‘American’ way of life—treated all forms of opposition could be portrayed as part of the larger effort to undermine American society For the past 60 years, then, American cultural diplomacy rested upon foundations of antagonism. Uniting both Cold War era and more recent cultural propaganda efforts is the common misrepresentation of the ‘American Dream’ as universally accessible. The view that Americans have unlimited, unrestricted potential for greatness is constrained by the realities of continued racism, misogyny, and overarching socio-economic disadvantages. The 1950s saw the legacies of segregation and racial bigotry systematically purged in favor of a falsified self-representation of an inclusive, egalitarian American society. These falsifications allowed the American government to portray its country as an unimpeded teleological entity, which then cultivated amongst the American people a sense of superiority and predestination for greatness. This model of manipulation has been altered as the twentieth century progressed, but its root antagonistic spirits remain. In 2004, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued that, ‘The values of freedom and democracy—as much, if not more, than economic power and military might—won the Cold War. And those same values will lead us to victory in the war on terror.’2 Historically, the verdict is still out on this issue. But Rice’s statements are defensible and shed at least partial light on what happened during the Cold War period. However, what is missing from Rice’s argument is recognition that concepts of freedom and democracy were and remain mutable. Furthermore, there is the continued—and false—assumption that American-made art inherently carries with it so-called American values like ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy,’ the values that constitute the core of American exceptionalism. The freedom with which the United States supposedly won the Cold War was not one of unfiltered free exchange, whether it

is commercial, intellectual, nor artistic. The last of these realms— the artistic—was the site of actions that supported freedom and democracy in name while employing intentionally unfree means to win the ideological battle. The U.S. government saw the Soviets as ‘conducting an intensive propaganda campaign directed primarily against the US and...employing coordinated psychological, political and economic measures designed to undermine non-Communist elements in all countries.’ The U.S. government responded with efforts to reconfigure and polish American culture for worldwide distribution, creating a press mechanism that could defeat the Communists. Alleged Soviet propaganda efforts spurred both censorship and active propaganda on the part of the U.S. government; but, these were excused, as they were in defense of liberal ideals. The U.S. government’s propaganda tactics of cultural diplomacy pervaded not only art intended for foreign distribution but also art produced predominantly for Americans. For example, after George Orwell’s death in 1950, the CIA successfully used agents to purchase film rights over Animal Farm. Thus, when the first silver screen adaptation of Orwell’s classic emerged in 1955, several plot developments and characters were altered to inculcate an anti-Communist message. At the end of the movie, only the ‘communist’ animals are shown in a negative light, whereas the original book depicted communist animals and capitalist humans in totalitarian collusion. This episode illustrates that the United States’ campaign of propaganda against the Soviets contained much more than just cheerleading for freedom abroad. The “us-versus-them” mentality pervasive in the U.S. government’s posture was foisted upon the American public, and involved the articulation of a simple pro-America, anti-Soviet message. Even on the screen, the complex realities of world politics could never come to light. Thus, pro-American propaganda not only demonized the Soviets; it actually cultivated cultural ignorance among the American people. These policies deprived both the artist and the spectator of their ability to freely engage with the creative process. By rigging the arts towards pro-Americanism, the U.S. government confessed that liberal American art no longer existed. In fighting Communism, propaganda and artistic manipulation were seen as better armaments than free cultural exchange. The American government used its national cultures, specifically jazz, during the Cold War as a response to Soviet criticisms. The perpetual attack was that, although the United States preached the ideals of freedom and equality, it was in fact a remarkably elitist and racist society, perhaps an inevitable result of capitalism. The United States was further criticized as culturally inferior to the U.S.S.R. whose investments in cultural programs sustained the internationally-renowned Bolshoi Ballet among other groups. Jazz seemed to the American government the perfect reply to Soviet criticisms. Jazz began in the early twentieth century as black music, but it quickly became popular among interracial audiences and musicians. Bands often became sites of racial integration and interaction, symbols of racial harmony that the government was only too happy to exploit. However, two major changes had to occur in jazz’s presentation for it to become a political tool of diplomacy and propaganda. First, instead of being presented as solely black music, jazz needed to be framed as inherently American in nature and universal in appeal. Second, it had to be presented as art, not just entertainment. Both of these changes are evinced by shifts in the period’s discourse about jazz. Popular middle-class magazines including The New

Yorker and Esquire began to devote more attention to jazz as a legitimate and respectable music.3 Jazz was meanwhile touted by writers and politicians alike as America’s art form, with its supposed messages of egalitarianism, coexistence, and freedom. Once this process of Americanization began, the United States started exporting jazz around the world as a form of cultural diplomacy. This exportation took two main forms. The first was radio; Voice of America’s Music USA program began broadcasting jazz around the world in 1955 to international acclaim.4 The second type was Department of State-funded tours, which sent musicians across the world as cultural ambassadors. The famed trumpeter Dizzy Gillespie became the first of these ambassadors when he toured eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia in 1956. However, the government’s presentation of jazz abroad belied certain realities of the music’s past and present. Embracing jazz with a “color-blind universalism” obscured the seminal role black musicians played in jazz’s creation, development, and spread.5 It also obscured the contemporary racial tension in the music industry. White musicians consistently received better contracts because they were viewed as less threatening and therefore more profitable. For example, television companies at the time did not show integrated bands lest they risk losing their Southern audience.6 Voice of America did not broadcast in the United States for similar reasons. Thus, the masking of jazz disabled the comprehension of America’s social ills and made manifest material disadvantages for black musicians. Music aside, the United States was still very much a racially divided society, both in law and in practice. In 1956, when Gillespie began his global tour, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka was only two years old and it would be a number of years before enforcement of the decision took effect. The schools of Little Rock had yet to be integrated, and the Rosa Parks-inspired boycott of Montgomery buses began only two months earlier. Gillespie would conclude that diplomatic trip, as well as other trips abroad, before the boycott ended successfully. Jazz was deliberately presented internationally as the embodiment of the American Dream but that dream had not yet been fulfilled, revealing a disconnect between the reality of segregation and the mirage of racial harmony that would haunt the tours for decades. By propagandizing jazz, the American government formulated a central paradox of American racial relations: integration and unity abroad, segregation and bigotry at home. The second major problem with the jazz ambassadors program was that it very often had political undertones. The State Department almost always sent ambassadors to non-aligned or Communist-leaning nations in the hopes that cultural diplomacy would either engender a political alliance or dispel the Soviet ‘myths’ about American culture. Dizzy Gillespie traveled to the Middle East, Louis Armstrong to Africa, Dave Brubeck to Europe and Asia, and Benny Goodman to Southeast Asia and later to the U.S.S.R. Sending cultural diplomats to strategically important areas is a worthwhile venture in itself, but the Cold War missions were too often accompanied by covert C.I.A. operations. Two notable examples include the invasion of Lebanon in 1958 and the assassination of Congolese president Patrice Lumumba in 1961. These actions occurred after Gillespie’s and Armstrong’s visits, respectively, and they demonstrate the shallowness of the United States’ commitment to transparent cultural diplomacy. Cultural exchange should never be politicized. Political views

will inevitably be manifest in cultural representation but the external injection of politics into cultural interchange is something that must be avoided. This is not to say that American efforts at cultural diplomacy were fruitless or completely bungled. Many important intercultural contacts and relationships were created during this period but they occurred at personal, informal levels that bypassed the scrutiny of the Department of State, especially during the program’s first fifteen years. Benny Goodman’s band strayed from the official agenda during its tour of the U.S.S.R. in 1962. His musicians frequented Moscow’s recently reinstated jazz clubs and played with local musicians.7 This episode reveals the conflicting interests of the American government and the musicians it sent as ambassadors. Musicians were interested in fostering intercultural exchange and spreading their music around the globe. They wanted to play for the masses, especially youths, as well as jam with local musicians. On the other hand, the U.S. government was primarily interested in working with local elites as a means of cultivating political alliances against Communism. It was not until Richard Nixon’s presidency that the man in the street became the intended audience of jazz embassies, perhaps because Nixon recognized the power of popular resistance. However, Nixon’s actions should not be taken as a model for current cultural diplomacy. Although his efforts to bring American music to the people of different countries might seem laudable, his motivations were not. Political and military concerns underlay every one of his actions and the United States continued to support coups around the world under his tenure. A September 2005 report by the Department of State Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy recommended Nixonian ambassadorial policies. The recommendation had the stated purpose of mobilizing non-governmental individuals to foment change abroad.8 This startling continuity in discourse indicates the problem with government-led cultural diplomacy. Such discourse says that ‘diplomacy’ will always take precedent over the ‘culture,’ preventing true artistic exchange. The U.S. government should therefore leave cultural exchange to those who understand it best, the Benny Goodmans and Dizzy Gillespies of the world. The most notable achievements of U.S. cultural diplomacy during the Cold War were ones in which the government played almost no role. They occurred in the interstices and voids of government policy, the spaces where musical ambassadors could deemphasize the politics of otherness and reassert the primacy of artistic achievement and exchange. The accidental successes of the Cold War program indicate the importance of interpersonal relationships in fostering cultural understanding. In order to gain the unintended benefits from interpersonal meetings, the United States should establish an artistic exchange program within the State Department. This program should receive a line-item in the federal budget so as to ensure its funding will not be subject to competition with other State Department agencies. In this program, a council of musicians, music executives, critics, and scholars would jointly select small groups of musicians to represent the United States abroad. The council would also invite and sponsor other countries to send artists to the United States. A number of provisions must be made to prevent the politicization of the program. First, the council should not target specific, politically-salient regions for cultural bombardment. Instead, funding for the artist exchange program should be allocated regionally, with funding assigned

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per region based on the State Department’s overall budget allocations for each region. Second, the council should choose American artists solely on their artistic merits, not for any political reasons. Finally, the United States should grant foreign governments the right to choose their representatives and not censor any group. As a point of comparison, the U.S. government prevented the Soviet Chorus and Ensemble from performing in the United States during the late 1950s, effectively heightening diplomatic tensions and forestalling cultural exchange for years to come.9 Foreign governments will see that cultural exchange creates opportunities for increased economic and political interaction and will then, hopefully, be motivated to form their own cultural diplomacy programs. The establishment of this program by the United States should build myriad avenues of intercultural relations. The United States should not end all efforts at publicly funding and exporting the arts. Funding for the arts both domestically and abroad should be increased. Instead of a public diplomacy regime that tends towards the propagandistic, the U.S. government should fund institutions and individuals without regard to their political utility. This can be accomplished within the federal arts regime. Funding should take place under the National Endowment for the Art’s auspices, as the NEA is an independent agency not engaged in security or military efforts. In order to further shield cultural diplomacy from political machinations, the NEA should reinstate its policy whereby individual artists may receive NEA sub-grants, a policy which was eliminated along with much of the entire NEA’s budget during the 1995 budget cycle. Funding individuals requires investment without much control over the final product.10 At the same time that American artists should be sponsored to go abroad, there must be increased awareness of foreign artists in the United States. The free exchange of art is a circuitous process, in which creators and their products travel back and forth across cultural boundaries. One of the main flaws of programs like Radio Free Europe and Voice of America was the lack of reciprocity between foreign consumers and American producers. In order to increase the volume of foreign voices in America, radio outlets that are either publicly-owned or the results of public-private partnerships must devote at least five percent of their weekly programming to international artists. Furthermore, to prevent foreign entertainment from being placed in graveyard timeslots, compliance with this regulation will be measured based on ratings figures instead of merely one-to-one hour ratios. Such requirements will show a commitment to the importation of international arts, and American cultural ignorance will be reduced. U.S. foreign policy should be augmented so that the residue of past political antagonisms does not stain current cultural diplomacy efforts. If there is any message the United States should impart, it should be a subtle one in which the process of cultural exchange is more important than the culture itself. In other words, the government should not try to treat cultural diplomacy as a way to sell American culture or showcase the so-called American Dream. The United States promoting free cultural exchange would provide a stronger message about our intentions—perhaps even our culture—than an ideologically-tainted artistic mission ever could.

After Guantánamo
Eric J. Schorr

The events of September 11, 2001 proved to be some of the most trying and difficult the United States has seen since World War II and the assault on Pearl Harbor. The political, military, and even social responses to that day’s events have helped shape the policies and direction of the U.S. government for the last seven years. President Bush initiated two military conflicts, one in Afghanistan and the other in Iraq, partially in an effort to pursue his administration’s goals in the newly outlined War on Terror. One factor of any war is the inevitability of capturing prisoners or enemy combatants. However, unlike previous national conflicts, the global War on Terror has resulted in persons whose prisoner status is not clearly defined. The United States, although engaged in military conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, is in fact not officially at war with those countries. Therefore, traditional rules of war regarding captured enemies do not apply creating a void in defining how armies should deal with captured enemies. This absence in policy necessitates a new and innovative plan that will combine U.S. military detention, international prosecution, and third party rehabilitation; all vital elements for addressing this issue. For the purposes of the forthcoming argument, when stating “captured enemy combatants,” “jihadists,” “captured terrorists,” etc., the defined terms refer to individuals who are arrested or captured under suspicion of terrorist acts against the United States, its citizens, and its allies. This definition includes only individuals who are not charged with capital crimes, that is to say, crimes or acts of terrorism that would warrant a punishment of execution. By limiting the scope of this definition, it is possible to address the main policy issues facing the United States concerning captured terrorists. As dictated in the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the formal definition used for captured, non-state aggressors is understood to apply to anyone “engaged in hostilities … against the United States … who is not a lawful enemy combatant.”1 According to this definition, these individuals are not covered by international law, and no official precedent exists for properly dealing with them. Critique: Obama’s Orders Immediately following his inauguration, President Barack Obama issued a series of executive orders concerning the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. President Obama’s orders describe new policies to deal with the prisoners currently at Guantánamo, as well as to facilitate the prison’s closure. In Section 2 of the executive order Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, the Obama outlines specific conditions for detainees currently held at the base. Obama declares that “individuals currently detained at Guantánamo have the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus” as well as the chance for prosecution only following a formal review process.2 The order also states that, If any individuals covered by this order remain in detention at Guantánamo at the time of closure of those detention facilities, they shall be returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third country, or transferred to another United States detention facility in a manner consistent with law and

the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. This broad description leads to the open-ended question, “What law?” Is the President referring to domestic U.S. law, U.S. military law, international law, or perhaps even the laws of the prisoner’s home country? It seems it would not be the last possibility, for that would compromise U.S. jurisdiction over these individuals. But the question of what law President Obama means remains a prevalent one, and its answer is necessary to properly understand his policy agenda. In Section 4 of his executive order, President Obama calls for an official review of all Guantánamo detentions. The first part orders a review to identify “whether it is possible to transfer or release the individuals.”3 Should some individuals not be able to be transferred, the review is to move onto the possibility of prosecution. The order declares that “the cases of individuals detained at Guantánamo not approved for release or transfer shall be evaluated to determine whether the Federal Government should seek to prosecute the detained individuals for any offenses they may have committed.”4 Finally, the last section of the order approaches the situation of individuals who do not apply for either transfer or prosecution. The order states that “the Review shall select lawful means, consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice.”5 The order leaves the president wide latitude of discretion in terms of how to implement his policy. The problem with such leeway is that an official policy does not exist, leaving both a political and an operational gap in addressing the issues in handling captured terrorists. Although the President’s executive orders attempt to sort out the many issues associated with captured enemy combatants currently held at Guantánamo Bay, they fail to describe or even institute formal policy that will solve the difficulties in releasing, prosecuting, or even rehabilitating captured terrorists. Furthermore, in ordering the closure of Guantánamo Bay “no later than 1 year from the date” of his order, President Obama limits the time-frame necessary to formulate policy for accurately managing the detainees held at the base.6 Critique: The Army Field Manual The Army Field Manual, the basis for all U.S. military actions and functions both domestic and abroad, details a number of sections associated with Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW’s). In Field Manual 19-4, only two of the portions of the document remotely apply to the pretext of captured enemy combatants. Nowhere among any of the sections are guidelines given to deal with the issues that arise when faced with EPW’s. Nowhere in the policy are the terms for such prisoners clearly defined, nor are instructions provided to handle such individuals. Without carefully defined terminology and procedural measures, army personnel are left at a considerable disadvantage in implementing appropriate actions. The federal government needs proper policy to ensure that the military observes regulations and upholds the interests of the United States. Method of Reform: Rehabilitation One option for handling captured jihadists, explored by a number of countries but overlooked by the United States, is the process of rehabilitation. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, efforts to deal with the increasing number of homegrown extremists have led to a new series of initiatives at special institutions, aimed at “deprogramming” jihadists.7 Saudi Arabia is, unfortunately, the top country in the world in producing jihad-

ists and Islamic extremists, as illustrated by the Saudi majority of September 11th hijackers.8 Reporting on the program in a New York Times article, Katherine Zoepf writes, “the Saudi government tends to explain its rehabilitation program in purely Islamic terms, as an effort to correct theological misunderstandings.”9 By addressing the core elements that breed jihadist mentality, the Saudi program combats the problem at its root. Above all, the Saudi program may reap its biggest reward in providing an example for others to follow. Other Islamic nations may look to Saudi Arabia for guidance in managing their concerns and growing problems with jihadist militancy, making success in the Kingdom all the more necessary. The United States, on the other hand, does not have a formal rehabilitation program. According to Cmdr. Jeffrey Gordon, a Pentagon spokesman for Guantánamo, the main purpose of U.S. detention facilities such as Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib are to “keep dangerous enemy combatants off the battlefield.”10 There currently exists no formal policy dealing with the prospect, let alone functioning program, for the rehabilitation and reintegration of captured enemy combatants. However, individual cases do exist where efforts are being made to treat captured terrorists, such as a small initiative in Iraq under Maj. Gen. Douglas Stone. Using a process of separation, alienating the “truly hardened extremists from those who had potential to abandon violence,” Maj. Gen. Stone formed a program to deradicalize individuals who have the potential to give up their extremist ways.11 Still, the small number of private efforts aimed at rehabilitation is not enough to fill the vacant space in need of formal policy. Method of Reform: Release & Transfer A second option in handling captured combatants is releasing or transferring them to foreign countries. Under this technique, the United States moves a captured terrorist from his detention facility to either to his native country or to a third country, often Saudi Arabia.12 The initial issues with such policy stem from a lack of cooperation or willingness on the part of the individual’s native country. The most critical issue with release or transfer is the propensity of captured jihadists to return to the business of terrorism and fundamentalism. Most recently, on January 27, 2009, Fox News reported it obtained a video of a former Guantánamo inmate, Abdallah Ali al-Ajmi, before he committed a suicide bombing attack in Mosul, Iraq that killed twelve people. Al-Ajmi had been previously released and transferred to his home country of Kuwait in 2005. When local governments neglect the essential factors involved with containing these dangerous individuals following release and transfer, they abandon their responsibility to both the United States and the international community, and any positive efforts made by the United States are ultimately compromised and the policy is a failure. Policy Proposal: Triangle Policy In order to fill the void of no official policy position, U.S. legislators may benefit from a new, more conditional policy suggestion that incorporates many of the aspects previously discussed. By considering all of the angles that are necessary for properly dealing with captured terrorists, the United States will set a precedent that can be followed by its allies and other countries around the world. Triangle Policy is a system by which three main actors, not necessarily three distinct countries, work together to accomplish a set of goals. This policy structure would be the foundation for

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conditions in managing the dilemma of handling captured terrorists. The first piece of the triangle centers on the capture and detention of the individual under the supervision and jurisdiction of the United States military. Adhering to the regulations of the Army Field Manual, though introducing new sections with clearly defined terms and additional conditions not previously included, the military would have complete control over where and how the individual is detained. To address concerns over issues such as exploitation and abuse of power, a congressional committee should be formed to facilitate proper civilian oversight and thereby assuage political concerns for what President Obama calls the “the U.S. commitment to human rights, civil liberties and the rule of law.”13 The focus of the policy puts the United States in direct control over all detention facilities and procedures. By doing so, individuals captured over the course of military operations will stay under the direct supervision and jurisdiction of the United States military. The second aspect of the policy requires the inclusion of a judicial body able to properly prosecute and convict these individuals in accordance with the conditions of war, specifically the untraditional War on Terror. Under these circumstances, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the most feasible venue in which to address the issues of war crimes and crimes against humanity most often associated with acts of terror. By including the ICC in the process of dealing with captured terrorists, the United States can properly defend its own detention policy while adhering to the international rule of law. Captured individuals are not American citizens and therefore warrant a neutral, objective judicial body to perform appropriate, impartial, and just prosecutions. The last function of the Triangle system integrates a third actor to administrate the process of rehabilitation. Under the conditions associated with fundamentalist Islam, or what is considered “the jihadist mentality”, convicted terrorists should be sent to rehabilitation facilities in Saudi Arabia that are capable of accurately handling the provisions of religious ideology. The Saudi program seems the most suitable for such conditions. The Saudi Arabian government defines its rehabilitation services in strictly religious terms, and attempts to combat the mentality of fundamentalist jihad in order “to correct theological misunderstandings.”14 By including the Saudis in the process of dealing with captured jihadists, specifically in the administration of psychological and medical treatment, the United States lends further legitimacy to its overall support for the rehabilitation program. The jihadists are under the supervision of a Muslim government, and their treatment is defined “in purely Islamic terms.”15 Conclusion The War on Terror has undoubtedly led to a rise in the number of groups and individuals aiming to cause harm and destruction directly to the United States and its allies. It is clear that, currently, no real policy exists in the United States to properly handle and manage captured enemy combatants. In order to fill this procedural gap, the federal government should adopt a system of practical measures, such as those of Triangle Policy, which creates mechanisms for adequately dealing with captured jihadists. Detention, prosecution, and finally, rehabilitation, are the cornerstones of a solid policy foundation that will guarantee the United States can satisfy its domestic and global interests.

Swat Valley and Beyond: Re-examining American Efforts in Pakistan
Christine Choi

In 1969 the shari’a based legal system in Pakistan’s Swat Valley was exchanged for a federally backed judiciary. By the 1990s, the system had grown so corrupt and inefficient that many in the region agitated for a return to the “simple, if sometimes brutal” shari’a law codes.1 At the time, such a movement never amounted to a formal agreement. But in the past two years, the Talibanbacked uprising in Swat Valley has left 1500 civilians dead and 200,000 more displaced.2 The combination of administrative and civic upheaval resulted in an agreement between the local government and insurgents this past February, a cease-fire in exchange for shari’a-based courts.3 This is certainly not the restoration of order Swat Valley residents had in mind back in the 1990s. While violence against prominent civilians and military officers has remained steady it is also unclear how long the 120,000 female students in the area will stay in school, and residents have continued to flee the area. Furthermore, the cleric responsible, Sufi Muhammad, and his son-in-law, Mullah Fazlullah, have tightened deadlines and refused to compromise with the government on the judges appointed to the shari’a courts.4 The unraveling of the cease-fire seemed to justify the condemnation of observers who decried the deal as a concession that would embolden radicals in an already volatile area.5 However, other members of the international community, alongside the Pakistani government and military, argued that it was a tactical move meant to restore stability and separate more moderate militants from truly dangerous radicals.6 Either way it is viewed, the cease-fire is a messy situation that leaves little room for maneuvering. Reneging on the deal could mean an insurgent backlash that will result in the further destabilization of Swat Valley. Allowing it to remain intact, however, would potentially allow for the consolidation of Taliban-based forces in the region. But this is not the only factor. The situation in Swat Valley is a microcosm of larger troubles plaguing both the country and American and European-backed efforts across the region. Focusing on Pakistan It has become widely recognized that “winning the war” in Afghanistan, now entering its eighth year, hinges on the cooperation and stability of Pakistan,7 particularly since the country has been identified as the seat of various radical networks that have been responsible for attacks as nearby as Karachi and as far away as London.8 The two countries share a 1500 mile border, and numerous extremists who were routed by the 2001 U.S. invasion fled to the Pakistani side, so much so that Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, has now become an Afghani Taliban stronghold.9 Furthermore, the border region is poorly overseen by both governments as it is considered a “soft” border. As such, the region has become notorious for the ease with which drugs (such as Afghanistan’s crop of opium), militants, and arms slip across in either direction.10 The issues extend deeper into Pakistan, into provinces as central as Punjab and cities as financially developed as Karachi. The

country’s volatile political and economic situation has provided fertile breeding grounds for local and international militant and radical groups that have created multi-layered, variously-linked networks with a plethora of agendas that, in turn, have contributed to further destabilization.11 It doesn’t help that Pakistan’s government and military have a long legacy of supporting militant groups to promote geopolitical agendas. Furthermore, numerous military dictatorships have often trampled on the country’s shaky democratic foundations, destroying public confidence in the government. This has fostered civil unrest and hampered efforts by other governmental elements to track down and prosecute radicals who are undercutting infrastructural and economic development, All of these factors have helped facilitate the growth of militant and radical groups in Pakistan.12 Additionally, any internal government reforms that do occur will have little worth in the long term if the country does not develop its economy and infrastructure. Unemployment and a poor education system, particularly against the backdrop of a youthful Pakistani population disillusioned by the government’s internal strife, create an ideal pool of potential recruits for many militant groups.13 American Policy American efforts must work in tandem with those of the Pakistani government, but the United States cannot and should not attempt to stabilize the region with broad strokes of policy. Instead, a pragmatic approach that identifies and addresses sources of weakness is necessary. As such, there are three specific areas that any American policy must target: overdependence on military intelligence, the legal status of the border regions, and national economic and infrastructural development on the provincial and local scale. By no means will resolving these issues result in the elimination of militant and radical groups, but neither can any efforts to stabilize Afghanistan occur without them. From the September 11th attacks onward, the United States’ material support to Pakistan manifested itself in monetary aid for the country’s military operations,14 which, while presumably directed towards the country’s fight against militants, were also unaccounted for by U.S. officials.15 President Obama’s recent shift in strategy seeks to change such a pattern by developing benchmarks for Pakistan’s counterterrorist efforts and shifting the focus from blind monetary support for the Pakistani military to specifically delineated training of the country’s forces.16 While such criteria have not yet been determined, the Obama administration’s change in policy is a step in the right direction. However, alterations in military and combat strategy alone will not suffice: American officials must also apply pressure in the realms of Pakistan’s political and civic life. This means insisting on the independence of the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, and respecting the electoral mandate.17 Both need to occur in order to restore popular confidence in the government, which is currently viewed as ineffectual. Furthermore, the United States must pressure Pakistan to revisit the political and legal status of the tribal provinces, one of which, the Federally Administered Tribal Area, continues to be governed under an antiquated code that has not been revised since 1901.18 The civic limbo in which these provinces exist has been identified as a source of hostility towards Islamabad and must be eliminated.19 There is also much the United States specifically can, and must do, in terms of expertise and financial support. In order

to reduce Pakistan’s dependence on the military and its intelligence, the United States must help to develop a plan alongside the Pakistani government to expand non-military intelligence agencies by redirecting current monetary aid for the military and American expertise into such endeavors. Furthermore, the United States must help to oversee the economic and infrastructural development of the country, another source of popular discontent. The Obama administration has set aside $750 million for the development of Pakistan’s tribal belt in addition to billions in aid for Pakistani citizens. Once again, this is a step in the right direction, but a cohesive plan towards Pakistan’s infrastructural and economic development, particularly on a local level, and working directly with provincial and community-based leaders and organizations, must emerge. Having sketched an overview of the situation, this paper attempts to further explore the varying factors that determine Pakistan’s current situation and recommendations towards U.S. policy in the country. Pakistan’s Shaky Democracy In the sixty-two years since its inception, the Republic of Pakistan has seen thirty-three years of rule under military presidents. Most recently, former president General Pervez Musharraf seized power in 1999 in a bloodless coup and only ceded control of the government last year upon the prospect of impeachment. This is indicative of the nature of Pakistan’s political system, one in which, out of historical and cultural necessity, the military plays a key role in state affairs.20 Intelligence also largely lies in military hands. Of the country’s three national intelligence agencies, the military’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) remains the most powerful and, unlike its oft-cited U.S. counterpart, the Central Intelligence Agency,21 answers to neither the executive nor legislative branch.22 Founded in 1948 to facilitate the coordination of information between Pakistan’s three military branches, the ISI’s role was further developed in the 1950s under President Ayub Khan, who, as a Commander-in-Chief of the army, seized power in a military coup. In order to help sustain martial law during his term, he shifted the accountability of the ISI to the president rather than the Commander-in-Chief.23 But throughout the 1980s (which will be discussed shortly) and since then, its role has expanded so greatly that it is now often referred to as a “state within a state,” held accountable neither by the President, the Prime Minister or the Army’s director.24 While the ISI possesses the power to operate independently of the army, its ties to the military remain intact: many in its 10,000 member staff are members of the military; it draws its directors from the army’s pool of lieutenant generals; its main function continues to be the coordination of intelligence amongst the country’s military divisions.25 Such lack of supervision means that the ISI has been able to pursue its own agenda, regardless of official government policy. it has acted both independently and in conjunction with the central government, and, as such, its role within Pakistan’s government is hazy. What is clear, however, is that due to its power, it is able to pursue an agenda that may or may not coincide with Islamabad’s.26 As such, the ISI may best be described as the military’s powerful and independent intelligence branch that, while at times working with the central government, is not held accountable in any other governmental capacity and is thus able to pursue its own agenda. Thanks to the close ties between the government, military and ISI (particu-

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larly as officials from one organization have fulfilled roles in another), the ISI’s goals have converged with those of the executive branch. However, due to the recent official shift in government policy away from the support of militant groups, the ISI has been described as fulfilling ulterior governmental agendas that have not been a part of Islamabad-sanctioned policy but rather the result of Pakistan’s military-oriented history.27 As such, the ISI greatly overshadows its civilian counterparts, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) and the provincially-based Criminal Investigation Departments (CID). The three organizations are, in contrast to the ISI, staffed by civilians and remain accountable in both an official and practical capacity to the legislature and president, tasked with carrying out official Islamabad-sanctioned policy. Technically, the CID and FIA are tasked with criminal investigations, while the NIB, the civilian-based counterpart to the ISI, is responsible for gathering intelligence.28 However, all three are understaffed, underfunded and underdeveloped, thus limiting, for all practical purposes, any capacity to execute such tasks. They have been described as lacking “the resources and the authority to meet their potential,”29 and, consequently, suffering from deep-seated corruption. Furthermore, these civilian-based agencies not only rely on the ISI for data but, given such dependence, are unable to pursue an agenda independent of the ISI.30 What does such an agenda entail? As mentioned, the ISI’s relationship with both the executive branch and its agenda has remained unclear.31 However, the long legacy of close ties between the presidency, military and ISI ensures that, for much of its history, the ISI’s goals have aligned with or served the goals of the central government. In this manner, one of the ISI’s chief functions has been to develop relations with and facilitate the use of proxies in Pakistan’s geopolitical struggles by contacting and supporting various militant groups, including many that are considered unsavory by the United States, as a means of asserting the Pakistani government’s agenda in regional conflicts. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the United States urged Pakistan to facilitate insurrection along the Afghan border that would destabilize the Soviet regime and lead to its departure.32 Complying, the Pakistani government oversaw the growth of the ISI in this capacity, using the organization as a channel through which to provide Afghani mujahedeen that waged war against the Russians money and arms from the CIA.33 Following the departure of Soviet forces and the subsequent power vacuum, southeastern Afghanistan was subsumed in 1990s by civil wars amongst various tribal leaders. As a means of stabilizing the region, the ISI began to foster relations with the Pashtun-based Taliban, providing intelligence and arms.34 Despite a change in policy following September 11, 2001, in which the Pakistani government withdrew official support for Kabul’s Taliban regime and extremist organizations within Pakistan,35 the links continue to this day; the Afghani Taliban hold on Quetta is widely recognized as having been facilitated by the ISI.36 Furthermore, according to the March 2009 New York Times article “Afghan Strikes by Taliban Get Pakistan Help, U.S. Aides Say,” Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt described the claims of American officials, who stated that “the Taliban’s widening military campaign in southern Afghanistan is made possible in part by direct support from operatives in Pakistani’s military intelligence agency, despite Pakistani government promises to sever

ties to militant groups fighting in Afghanistan.”37 While it is unclear to what extent such an agenda has been facilitated by the upper echelons of the agency, U.S. officials have asserted that even midlevel officials have provided both material and tactical support to the Taliban in preparation for the proposed increase of American troops in Afghanistan.38 Due to the agency’s long history with the Taliban, it is no wonder that the United States is government doubts the extent to which the ISI will be cutting off ties with Taliban and other militant groups despite recent Pakistani pledges.39 The diverse network of militants and radicals that exist in Pakistan are linked in any number of ways and motivated by a range of agendas. Groups such as the Taliban have roots in Pashtun law codes, while many, many others fall under the ideology of puritanical Deobandi Sunni ideology. Still others, such as alQaeda, have a more international scope. Alignments between the groups shift, and many often draw recruits from a variety of pools across the country. Whatever the relationship between the organizations, it is clear that the country’s government, particularly via the military’s intelligence branch, has a long history of facilitating their development as a means of furthering political agendas. Only following the September 11, 2001, attacks did Pakistan begin to undergo an official change in policy toward such groups, but whether such ties will be cut off in reality remains to be seen. Another recent change that has yet to be tested in the long term is Pakistan’s stabilization as a democracy. Much of Musharraf’s presidency was characterized by the rise of new militant groups and deals between Islamabad and such organizations to rig elections and gain majority coalitions over various localities.40 While Musharraf’s resignation signaled the end of military power and such wheeling and dealing, the transition to current president Zardari merely shifted concern to the independence of the Supreme Court. Zardari recently ensured in a Supreme Court ruling that his political rival, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, would be kept from assuming his elected seat at the governorship of a province. Civil unrest and numerous protests followed until the chief Supreme Court justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, viewed as independent of Zardari’s interests, was reinstated. This led to hopes that both electoral mandate and commitment to democracy would be respected.41 However, again, only time will tell if such commitment will be or can be sustained. It is no wonder that there is such little faith in Pakistan’s democracy. Zardari may not be a military general, but the dispute over the Supreme Court and the intense contentiousness with Sharif is another characteristic of the Pakistani political system in which institutions meant to serve as checks on the executive branch are severely politicized and squabbling and unrest between political factions distract from issues such as counterterrorism. Stabilizing the Government, Reworking Intelligence Hence there are three major factors that have superseded any semblance of Pakistani democracy. Firstly, military power and intelligence, rather than electoral mandate, has too often played the key role in determining the source of governmental power. Secondly, the government’s deal making with various militant groups has further damaged any electoral mandate and facilitated the rise of such groups. Thirdly, competition amongst

political parties and the resulting politicization of the judiciary have also impeded any institutions intended to serve as a check against executive power. There is little the United States can do beyond pressuring Zardari to continue to respect the independence of the Pakistani Supreme Court allow Sharif to assume his governorship, and ensure the continuation of fair elections. Two more policy possibilities are to either condition American assistance on the basis of perceived political stabilization or ally the United States with Sharif on the understanding that Zardari faces such little popular support that aligning the United States with the current president will produce little in the way of tangible results. However, pursuing both strategies on an official level would most probably deepen the perception of American meddling in a populace that has become wary of such foreign influence. Instead, what the United States can and must do in terms of the administration is to help in the development of civilian-based intelligence agencies that are accountable to the central government, providing both funds and training for intelligence and counterterrorist organizations. Doing so would result in the circumventing of longstanding Pakistani relations between government, military intelligence, and militant groups, relations which have strengthened over the years, even after the government’s post-9/11 change in policy. Arnaud de Borchgrave, the Director of Transnational Threats at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes: In the 1980s, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, some 1,300 Pakistanis attended U.S. warstaff colleges. … And over the past eight years, it was a paltry 98. Senior Pakistani officials are reluctant to accept U.S. counterterrorism training or to participate in combined operations. But they have accepted 25 military trainers to advise selected members of the Frontier Corps, raised from tribes in FATA, who will then train others fighting Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists.42 But the seeds for the successful development of the three civilian based intelligence agencies arguably do exist. The International Crisis Group notes that “the Bhutto and Sharif governments’ attempts at curtailing Islamist radicalism in 1995 and 19971998, respectively, were more thorough than Musharraf’s exactly because they relied on civilian law enforcement and the courts rather than the military.”43 While the situation has drastically changed since the 1990s, Pakistan must begin by curtailing not only the power of the ISI and military but also lifting technical limitations on the civilian intelligence and police forces, forces staffed by civilians without current ties to the military and operating under the aegis of Islamabad. As the FIA, NIB and CID do not have the funds, manpower or training to obtain their own information, they often depend on the ISI to supply them with the basic intelligence, such as mobile phone records, that they rely on to track down and prosecute militants and extremists. Furthermore, these agencies lack the equipment, including forensics labs, to effectively gather evidence for cases.44 Additionally, witnesses who are often crucial to the prosecution of militants are not protected and thus remain in fear of testifying. The creation of a witness protection program is thus absolutely necessary.45 As such, U.S. support must help such civilian-based agencies in developing their own means of obtaining and storing records of intelligence and

provide the equipment necessary for their operations. By doing so, the United States would help the FIA and NIB develop into intelligence and criminal investigation entities strong enough to pursue agendas and cases independent of those of the ISI. Furthermore, the underdevelopment of such civilian agencies means that personnel lack the proper training through which they are able to effectively serve in intelligence and counterinsurgency capacities. As de Borchgrave noted, there remains resistance to U.S. sponsored counterterrorism education, America must provide some measure of development in this manner through expertise and the funding of such training. If current trends against American-facilitated training prove to be an impediment, the United States must develop a program alongside the local government to train a select group of Pakistani recruits, particularly younger officers, who will then be able to aid in the development of such programs within Pakistan’s intelligence and counterinsurgent agencies. Only by facilitating the material and tactical development of these agencies will Pakistan’s civilian intelligence community be able to play a more prominent role in mitigating both the strength of militant groups and producing a longer legacy of governmental and military ties to such organizations. The Tribal Belt: The Durand Line Beyond the strife occurring in Islamabad, the country’s more remote regions play a crucial role. Swat Valley is located in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province that, along with the Federally Administered Tribal Area and the province of Baluchistan, comprises a large swath of territory bordering Afghanistan. The provinces, particularly FATA and NWFP, are dominated by tribes of ethnic Pashtuns, of whom some 40 million live on either side of the 1500 mile-long Durand Line, with 25 million in Pakistan. As such, these regions play a crucial role for militant groups, and it is widely known FATA and NWFP host training grounds and bases for organizations such as the Taliban.46 The key difference between the two areas is in jurisdiction; whereas NWFP falls under the rule of Pakistan’s federal government, FATA is semi-autonomous and governed by a set of laws known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR).47 The FCR were established by British mandate in 1848, back when Pakistan was India’s northwest frontier, and were continually revised until 1901. They are frequently criticized as antiquated and in violation of several human rights tenets and, as such, many of Pakistan’s judiciary have condemned the Regulations’ provisions, including those regarding trial procedure and arrest and detention, as dated and out of step. Last year, the Pakistani parliament expressed a desire to repeal the FCR, one supported by popular sentiment in the FATA, but official action has yet to arise from it.48 Endowing FATA with a separate legal status that is not only isolating but roundly criticized has stirred national discontent with Islamabad’s policies. FATA’s political status has also been criticized as isolating: while FATA was granted universal national enfranchisement in 1997 and is represented in the National Assembly, it does not have any regional representation in the NWFP legislature as it does not come under the jurisdiction of the province. Despite the fact that residents of FATA are affiliated with various parties, political parties are officially barred from operating in the region as the Pakistan Political Parties Act does not extend there. As such, Nawaz argues, “This has given a free field of operation to the religious groups, affiliated with various political parties” and

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“the lack of political participation has also created a sense of deprivation of rights and alienation from Pakistan proper.”49 FATA also suffers from a dearth in physical governmental presence. Part of this stems from Afghan policy. Pakistan’s western neighbor has thus far not recognized the Durand Line as an official border and, as a result, does not maintain legitimate border patrols or posts that regulate movement between the two countries. Nawaz notes that “currently some 1,000 border posts on Pakistan’s side attempt to monitor movements across this difficult and porous border” while “only 84 coalition and Afghan National Army border posts exist on the Afghan side. The tribes that straddle the border do not recognize the border as anything more than a bureaucratic hindrance…”50 Furthermore, though Pakistan maintains a greater number of forces at the Durand Line, it still generally considers the border provinces, particularly FATA, as a buffer state against Pakistan rather than another national entity. Combined with the lack of official boundary recognition by Afghanistan and many of the tribes in the area, militants, arms and the Afghan-grown opium crop have little trouble slipping across in either direction, supporting and funding militant groups on both sides of the Durand Line. More important than the recognition of the border, however, is the issue of severe underdevelopment in the region. In Waziristan, a significantly remote and rural region of FATA, maliks, or tribal leaders, have identified three areas of urgent need: irrigation via canals and tube wells and control of waterways so as to prevent flash floods, conserve rain water, and to grow cash crops such as olives; an education system, particularly for young females; and organized health-care.51 This is not an issue unique to Waziristan; FATA is generally acknowledged to lack basic infrastructure, including roads and other administrative capacities. As such, the Pashtun-dominated border region suffers from a variety of issues that, in some aspects, may be chalked up to neglect on Islamabad’s part. FATA is isolated by lack of fully-realized political enfranchisement and recognition. The Durand Line is a “soft” border that allows for easy movement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Many of the border provinces are severely underdeveloped. Combined with Taliban roots in the Pashtun tribes, the area is full of weaknesses ripe for militant exploitation. Since a great number of Pashtun tribes do not feel their rights are fully represented locally and nationally, many feel that the Taliban and other militant groups are the best proponents of their rights. Furthermore, lack of development provides infrastructural weaknesses that militant groups are able to fill in order to legitimize themselves to local populations. Political and Civic Overhaul Given these weaknesses, the national government must work to further develop FATA, both politically and in terms of infrastructure. As such, the United States must once again exert pressure on Islamabad to go through with the repealing of the FCR and the application of national civic presence in the region. Additionally, the Pakistani government must be urged to allow political parties to be officially recognized in the region and to incorporate FATA into the NWFP so as to allow for greater regional political recognition. In Afghanistan, where the United States exercises a great deal more influence, Karzai’s government must also be urged to recognize the Durand Line as a boundary and to work with Pakistan to create greater jurisdiction over the area. This means increasing the presence of Afghani troops and outposts along the border and following stricter regulations

with the passage of humans and goods from one country to the other. In conjunction with the tightening of borders, the United States must offer assistance in the way of equipment and training to counterinsurgency forces both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which will increase the counterinsurgency presence along official border outposts. In addition, the United States must reach out to members of tribes to recruit them to work in or alongside such counterinsurgency forces. Otherwise, the salary offers of militant groups provide an appealing alternative to the lack of employment that characterizes much of the tribal regions. Furthermore, one of the most important ways that the United States can help Pakistan in the tribal belt is via economic and infrastructural development. Without economic and infrastructural development, there will remain opportunities for militant groups to legitimize themselves to local populations. The United States must not allow this to happen. Instead, it should provide both the aid and expertise to local governments and organizations to further develop. In places such as Waziristan, but also throughout the underdeveloped border provinces, this would mean aiding in technological development and the construction of administrative structures like roadways, schools, hospitals and governmental buildings. Economic and Infrastructural Development As debilitating as Pakistan’s military dominance and the frontier situation may be, any efforts towards the rectification of either situation will fall quickly without short-term and long-term economic and infrastructural development. More specifically, this must be manifested in two concrete developments: the establishing of schools and the creation of jobs. Overwhelmingly Youthful Amongst Pakistan’s 176 million citizens, the median age is striking: 20.8 years, or 20.6 for the average male. Furthermore, dearth of employment remains a chronic problem. The average per capita GDP is $2,600, and where the unemployment rate is at 7.8 percent, there’s also a substantial percentage that suffers from underemployment.52 It is clear that the country’s population of jobless, uneducated, and disenchanted young males provides the ideal pool from which militant and radical groups are able to draw their members. Sunni Deobandi organizations such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (formerly the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) have been noted for aggressively recruiting amongst Punjabi youth. Another group, Jamaat-i-Islami, has a student wing that “enlists students from universities and high schools; these young men often join the party’s jihad wing, Hizbul Mujahidin, or new terrorist cells.”53 In Swat, the Pakistani Taliban has tapped “into a large and increasingly alienated youth pool,” enlarging the Deobandi madrassa and converting some schools into seminaries.54 Halting recruitment amongst militant groups is a crucial step towards U.S. efforts in Pakistan. Infrastructural and Economic Weaknesses Pakistan’s lack of infrastructural and economic development has proven to be a weakness that militant groups have exploited to their advantage. The aforementioned Jamaat-ud-Dawa, centered in southern Punjab, “recast itself as a social welfare organization, setting up medical camps and providing ambulance services in major districts… Its welfare networks and ambulance services are expanding… The group has also established 150 ‘model schools’ in various districts of…Punjab, imparting, it claims, ‘truly Islamic’ education, and provided relief to victims of natural disasters in Baluchistan and NWFP.”55 As the International Crisis

Group has noted, “Pakistani Taliban groups have targeted the limited administrative infrastructure in tribal areas, destroying educational institutions…establishing parallel Shari’a courts, and killing and intimidating tribal leaders…” International Assistance Recently, the Obama administration announced plans to “dramatically increase civilian aid to Pakistan as part of its new strategy on Afghanistan and the surrounding region,” partly in order to gain leverage over the Pakistani military and stymie the influence of militant groups.56 Such plans are a step in the right direction. However, the United States must help local regions develop comprehensive plans for economic and infrastructural growth. Like the situation in Waziristan, this will extend beyond throwing money at the problem. Instead, any aid must be given in the context of a strategically developed plan. International officials must work with local leaders to target areas most in need of development, whether in terms of agriculture or hospitals. One of the clearest areas of development is in the establishment of schools, which must be opened so as to help prevent the further recruitment of youths by radically-oriented madrassas. Furthermore, aid should also extend to individuals displaced by militant activity in these regions, including the residents who have fled from violence in Swat Valley. By establishing funds for such groups, the United States may help prevent the susceptibility of refugees to aid offered by radical organizations. Conclusion Given the interplay of numerous organizations and elements in Pakistan, it is no wonder the situation there is daunting in scope and intensity. The country’s government has a long history helping to cultivate the very groups the United States is currently combating. The Pashtun tribal elements and the messy Afghanistan-Pakistan border situation provide fertile grounds on which radical groups can develop. Pakistan’s lack of infrastructural and economic development makes portions of the country susceptible to militant and radical overtures. As such, U.S. policy towards Pakistan must take the following course: All U.S. pressure in regards to Islamabad must work towards restoring the confidence of the Pakistani constituency in the presidency and the country’s democratic process. The United States must pressure Zardari to respect the independence of the judiciary. Reinstating chief justice Chaudry was the right move on the President’s part but such a move should occur independent of political motivations. Additionally, the United States must also pressure Zardari to respect the electoral mandate. With respect to intelligence, all U.S. aid with Pakistani intelligence agencies must be oriented towards establishing a strong civilian-based intelligence community that is independent of the ISI’s agenda and power. Obviously the military remains crucial to any U.S. efforts to combat militants but given the ISI’s and military’s long history and relationship with such groups, which may prevent their full integration into official Islamabad policy, the United States must help Pakistan develop alternate intelligence and counterinsurgency organizations. As such, the United States must support the development of civilian-staffed intelligence agencies that are held accountable by the presidency and legislature and are not affiliated with the military. Assistance must include providing the FIA, NIB and CID with the most recent counterterrorist and counterinsurgency training, equipment (include modern forensics labs), the struc-

ture for a witness protection program and recruiting program, support for the development intelligence gathering and filing and access to information that is currently stored by the ISI. Meanwhile, in the tribal regions, the United States must pressure Pakistan to incorporate FATA into the NWFP and grant it provincial enfranchisement. Furthermore, American officials must also pressure Pakistan to repeal the antiquated CFR and replace it with a modern-day civic code that integrates both national laws and FATA-oriented laws that recognize the unique structure of the tribal system. The residents of FATA must feel that Islamabad and the provincial government of the NWFP represent their interests. The United States also needs to pressure Afghanistan to recognize the Durand Line and establish stricter patrols and regulation along the border. This will mean setting up border patrols to ensure that individuals and goods do not move illegally from one country to the other and to monitor and record any such movement. Washington. must aid with the development of infrastructure, education, agriculture and jobs in the tribal regions, but must work on a local level with community leaders and organizations, not larger provincial structures, to devise specific plans of development and aid that will and must be followed through. Washington cannot afford to blindly pump monetary aid into such plans but must help oversee such development. The United States and Pakistan must also work to recruit tribal members to work in counterinsurgency operations by offering better salaries and stability in communities. Otherwise, such individuals may be and are often recruited to work in such militant organizations. The United States must also provide the monetary aid and expertise to train counterinsurgency forces. Finally, in terms of economic and infrastructural development, as in FATA and elsewhere, the United States must provide aid, particularly with the creation of and access to schools and jobs so that youths are not driven to the particular madrassas that are central to militant recruitment. The situation in Pakistan will continue for decades, and will remain crucial for efforts both in Afghanistan and the international realm. As such, the United States must prepare itself for long term investment. Investment, however, must not come in the form of military prowess but in the strategic application of economic assistance and expertise. The focus must be on the development of civilian and democratic organizations and infrastructure, in order to prevent any weaknesses. A legacy of resistance to foreign influence will make any American efforts in the region infinitely more complex. However, by seeking alternatives to the previous policy of unaccounted monetary aid to the Pakistani government, the United States and its regional allies will begin to see progress both for its own efforts and for local populations.

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From Poppies to Red Gold: An Alternative Approach to Eradication
Sonali Pillay

In the nation of Afghanistan, the illicit trade of opium is rampant. Afghanistan produces 93 percent of the world’s opiates.1 Not only does this trade exacerbate a global drug crisis, but it also provides Taliban and insurgent groups between $100 million and $400 million per year.2 Tackling the ongoing and growing opium trade in Afghanistan must be a priority to American policymakers. The current U.S. strategy is to train and aid Afghan forces to conduct a mass forcible eradication campaign, which has proved to be ineffective. Instead, in order to tackle the vast production of poppies, one must tackle the forces that compel farmers to plant them – namely that poppies are a high-value, low-risk crop with marketing and trading outlets already established. A substitutable crop, which provides an equal or better livelihood for farmers, such as saffron, must be introduced. This paper proposes that U.S. assistance and aid be used to fund development initiatives that give farmers the resources to substitute saffron for poppies without forcing them to incur any costs that make substitution unfeasible. Providing small farmers with alternative sustainable livelihoods may be the key to the elimination of the drug trade, which will in stabilize Afghanistan and restrict the breeding ground for extremists and terrorists. “Opium is a source of literally billions of dollars to extremist and criminal groups... Cutting down the opium supply is central to establishing a secure and stable democracy, as well as winning the global war on terrorism.”3 - Former Assistant Secretary of State Robert Charles Afghanistan is responsible for 93 percent of the world’s opiates and 90 percent of the world’s opium.4 The illicit trade has flourished into an integral part of the Afghan economy. 70 percent of poppy cultivation occurs in five provinces bordering Pakistan and 50 percent of the entire nation’s production comes from one province, Helmand.5 An increasingly lawless Afghanistan, riddled with corruption at all levels of government and police, has led the way to an explosion of poppy cultivation. The illicit trade and production of opium and heroin has become an increasingly embedded part of the Afghan economy, benefiting members of every level of government and funding insurgent and Taliban activity. Indeed, the nexus between the insurgency and the opium trade has been clearly established; the Taliban extracts a percentage of revenue in return for protection and the securing of trade and distribution routes.6 The scope of this trade is enormous. In 2007 the UN calculated that Afghan farmers made $1 billion from poppy harvests, while the total export value of these poppies was $4 billion (53 percent of Afghan GDP). In the last year (between 2007 and 2008), production has hit a record high of 8,200 tons of raw opium, much of which was refined into heroin by traffickers before it left the country.7 Past and Current Tactics Beginning in 2000, the Taliban simply used a policy of summary execution as punitive action against poppy farmers during their ban of poppy cultivation as an “un-Muslim” endeavor. Since

the overthrow of the Taliban-led government, the United States and Britain have taken an active role in training Afghans to carry out poppy eradication themselves. One tactic for poppy eradication was to use military enforcement, drawing on Taskforce 333 (Afghan commandos), trained by Britain’s Special Boat Service8, which shut down more than 125 heroin refineries. In 2005 the Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) was created with the help of United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the U.S. State Department. The troops consist of Police drawn from Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior.9 The AEF’s first major effort in Uruzgan consisted of its 250 man force as well as nearly 40 contractors supplied by DynCorp, a Virginian private military company with many U.S. contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan.10 On occasion these eradicators have been put in the line of fire or even ambushed by Taliban forces.11 Suicide bombers have even targeted police assigned to ensure eradication.12 Eradication is not working; in fact, last month Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, stated that the $800 million the United States spends per year on counternarcotics is “wasteful and ineffective.”13 Clearly, the root causes of the drug trade have not been properly addressed, such as the necessity for low-income farmers to have a high-profit, low risk, substitutable crop with a proper marketing strategy and assurance of markets for their goods. In June of 2005, the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) was established through the United Nations Development Programme to aid the Afghan Government by providing additional resources to implement the policies of the National Drug Control Strategy of the Afghan government. The CNTF has, among other things, been promoting a system of subsidies as a means of creating incentives for provinces that eradicated all their poppies, making them “poppyfree provinces.” The United States has been responsible for 75 percent of the funds pledged for so called “performance incentives” for poppy-free provinces. Many farmers who endeavored to eradicate poppy cultivation did so because they were eager to receive a portion of those subsidies. According to a UNODC report, 98 percent of farmers said they would be ready to stop poppy cultivation “should access to alternative livelihoods be provided.”14 In 2007, this system seemed promising; 13 out of a total of 34 provinces became poppy free. It is important to note that this has, in most instances, been achieved with the active support of provincial governors, most of whom have strong militia followings and are capable of providing protection to farmers if they in fact choose to move away from poppy cultivation, thus depriving Taliban and insurgents of profit from the trade. Unfortunately, in many instances, provinces that claimed poppyfree status substituted poppies with cannabis, another illicit crop that propagates drug trade. In fact, one survey found an increase in cannabis cultivation, with 18 percent of villages planning to grow it in 2008, compared with 13 percent last year, when some 172,970 acres of cannabis crops were cultivated.15 Not only have development agencies ignored the potential for proliferation of other drugs through unregulated eradication, but they have not followed through on their promises to provide those subsidies to the farmers and provinces that rightly deserve it. This inconsistent behavior will certainly lead to lowered confidence in the integrity of the Afghan government and the agencies involved, decreasing the effectiveness of poppy substitution efforts in the future to be effective in the region. Lowered confidence will lead to a resurgence of poppy growth if the farmers and provinc-

es are not properly rewarded for moving away from cultivating an incredibly high profit crop, something they would certainly not be interested in doing without proper incentives. Continued Expansion of the Trade National production of opium rose from 6,500 tons to 8,200 tons between 2005 and 2006.16 The number of hectares of land used to produce poppies increased from 165,000 in 2006, to 193,000 in 2007. The export value of these poppies increased from $2.7 billion in 2005 to $3.1 billion in 2006. Under President Hamad Karzai’s rule, the number of provinces growing poppies has increased from 24 to 32 provinces out of 34 in the nation. Between 2007 and 2008 there was a 19 percent drop in cultivation, though “bumper yields” (high productivity due to unusually high rainfall) may mean that total yields only dropped 6 percent.17 This drop in cultivation can largely be attributed to pre-planting campaigns as well as low opium prices and high wheat prices that made licit goods a more viable option. While this sounds like a promising statistic, in 2008 poppy cultivation was estimated to have only dropped by 3.5 percent by October.18 On the whole, poppy eradication has been popular in provinces that were never the central cultivating grounds in Afghanistan. In fact in between 2007 and 2008, poppy cultivation increased by 1 percent in Helmand,19 the largest site of cultivation in Afghanistan. In 2007 alone, although some provinces became poppy free, poppy production increased in eight other provinces.20 Poppies and Insurgents: A Cozy Nexus Insurgency forces and the Taliban currently profit greatly from the trade of opium. Both the UN and NATO believe insurgents get roughly 60 percent of their annual income from drugs, between $100 and $400 million, while the Taliban is estimated to gain $100 million alone from the drug trade.21 According to the UNODC, farmers cultivating poppies only receive 24 percent of the total income from narcotics, while the remaining 76 percent goes to traffickers and heroin refiners. It is estimated that insurgency or Taliban forces tax farmers 10 percent of the farm gate value of their crops (the net value of the crop after it leaves the farm, after marketing costs have been subtracted).22 The head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has said that the Taliban made about £50 million from opium in 2007 by extorting money from smugglers and charging for guarding convoys as well as labs where opium is processed into heroin. In a nation so dependent upon drug trade, which constitutes more than half of its GDP, members of all levels of government are involved in the trade. It is estimated that 80 percent of personnel at the Ministry of Interior benefit from the drug trade and Afghan officials even believe that 100,000 members of the Afghan government benefit directly from drug trade (whether it be from transportation fees, bribes or profits).23 Even highway police are believed to be involved in facilitating and taxing smuggling, and at times smuggling the drugs themselves in government law enforcement vehicles.24 Current Interior Minister Hanif Atmar admits that drug lords were tolerated because they paid government officials in order to carry out their illicit business. It is estimated that Policemen make £80 a month, while a drug mule can earn £100 a day by carrying drugs.25 In addition, the network of drug traders itself has evolved, becoming a more organized entity. Former Finance Minister, Ashraf Ghani claims that while the drug trade before comprised of 400,000 individuals, it is now a hierarchy, similar to that of Colombia, led by 35 individuals.26

The Attraction to Poppy Poppies are resistant to natural diseases and require less irrigation than most crops, and are therefore exceedingly well suited to Afghanistan’s arid conditions. Poppies can be used for a variety of purposes; residue provides fuel for winter, the seeds have medicinal value, oil is used for cooking and oil cake for winter fodder, and finally, opium resin can be made from poppies. The trade of opium once again provides a series of conveniences such as its high value, long shelf life and its ability to be easily transported. Profits from poppies are estimated at around $5,200 per hectare,27 and buyers are guaranteed. All the appropriate channels for packaging are established as well as means for financing (though the interest rates are either usurious or subject to massive penalties imposed by local traders or warlords). Substitution vs. Eradication Forcible crop eradication is not a viable option to end the cultivation of poppies in Afghanistan. Eradication would entail the destruction of the livelihoods of many Afghan farmers who simply cultivate out of necessity. In fact, many farmers cultivate poppies in order to pay off a loan-in-kind from the previous year. It is common for moneylenders to charge usurious rates or conduct other forms of intimidation such as simply kidnapping family members of defaulters (usually daughters).28 At this point in time, farmers are reliant upon loans at staggeringly high interest rates and have taken loans in advance for the next season’s harvest, meaning that if they choose to abandon poppy cultivation, they will still have to pay for the loan they took out on the next season’s harvest, without any of the profits they should have made during that period. This makes it nearly impossible for them to move away from poppy cultivation for fear that they will default on the loans they have taken. The welfare of these farmers must be the primary concern of the international community if it intends to end the drug trade in Afghanistan, which benefits insurgency and Taliban forces. The most viable solution that keeps the best interest of these farmers as a focal point is to induce crop substitution. In order for crop substitution to occur, a high-profit crop must be introduced to the region. This crop’s profitability must be comparable to that of poppies ($5,200 per hectare in 2007, an increase from $4,600 per hectare in 2006)29 and at least as high as the profits accrued through cannabis (which yields twice as much crop per hectare as poppies and can even equal profits per hectare of poppy), in order to make cannabis a less inviting prospect for substitution. In order to find a crop of this nature, one must examine crops in the region that match this description and would be suitable to Afghanistan’s climate. Upon finding this substitutable crop, the international community should pledge to provide the farmers with the resources (i.e. machines and even seeds or corm at a fair or subsidized price). In order to fund what is not provided, farmers should have access to credit at fair market or lower rates. Agricultural organizations must be invited to share their expertise with the farmers through detailed training programs on how to grow these new crops, refine them and ship them to buyers. Indeed, it is not enough to ensure that the farmers create a product of high profitability if there are no markets to which they have access to sell their goods. In order for Afghans to have access to these international markets, their national regulators must adopt quality standards uniform to the International Organization for

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Standardization (ISO), allowing Afghan crops to be deemed up to international quality assurance regulations. This will ensure the product’s profitability, making it viable in the international market. With international quality assurances from the ISO, or an Afghan regulator up to ISO standards, must come willing buyers who are ensured a high-quality good at a competitive rate. This means that buyer channels must be established for these farmers before they begin crop-substitution; they will only cultivate knowing that there are prospective buyers for their product. Red Gold: Saffron The ideal substitutable crop is saffron. As a result of being one of the most expensive spices in the world, saffron has been nicknamed “red gold.” Saffron is a high-profit, low-risk crop, which is suitable to climatic conditions especially in Western Afghanistan, along the border with Iran. Iran has a long history of growing the best saffron in the world. The regions of Afghanistan on the border with Iran have almost identical climatic conditions and could easily use the same techniques as Iranian growers. In fact, trials of saffron growing in the Herat province, bordering Iran, have beaten the international record for most productive yield, on average $5,000 per hectare annually and even up to $8,000,30 making Saffron a higher-value crop than cannabis and close to par with poppies. Saffron, like poppies are relatively resistant to disease (except fungus growth, which can simply be controlled by proper irrigation draining), it requires less irrigation than many crops (a maximum of two irrigations required annually, and none required between May and September), has a higher value, longer shelf life, and is more easily transported than crops such as wheat as it is less perishable. As a crocus flower, saffron is perennial, and poppy seeds cannot be planted on the same land. This makes it a direct competitor to poppies, ensuring that once a farmer has made a proper shift to saffron cultivation, he will not be able to cultivate poppies simultaneously.31 Saffron is a versatile crop whose stigma can be used for spice or coloring in food preparation, materials in pharmaceutical, cosmetic and perfume industries, dyes for textiles and has even been found to have anti-cancer effects. In addition, the leaves can be used for animal feed, which could be useful to farm owners who also breed animals. While Saffron is a labor-intensive crop, family labor is often sufficient for small farmers or sharecroppers to cultivate without having to resort to outside labor and incur additional costs. This makes it appropriate to the condition of small farmers, who currently have no choice but to grow poppies because it is a similarly manageably labor-intensive crop that accrues high profits. In addition, Saffron corms (bulbs) usually double in 4-5 years and should be lifted at that time because their useful life is over. This ability to double in so short a period makes landowners more willing to allow tenant farmers and share croppers to cultivate saffron for an extended period,32 allowing larger scale farms to operate effectively as well. Implementation There must be an initial investment to provide farmers with saffron corms. Saffron corm must be planted after maturing 2-4 years.33 These corms may be provided from a saffron corm bank or multiplication field. The head of agricultural administration in western Afghanistan, Bashir Ahmad Ahmadi, implemented a pilot for growing saffron in his province. Upon seeing that his 40-hectare plot yielded 320 kilograms of saffron, he received hundreds of applications from farmers asking for saffron corms.

Access to these matured corms is essential and must be provided by the international community because increasing interest in corm has lead to artificially inflated prices. Currently the amount of corms necessary per hectare stands at $5,000,34 which is exorbitant for most farmers. The process of collecting saffron is highly labor intensive and requires thorough knowledge of the crop. Farmers must be educated on the differences between ridge planting and flat bed planting. While flat bed planting has proven to be slightly more lucrative, it requires immaculate irrigation draining to prevent fungus growth, which could wipe out the entire harvest. Since applying fungicide to corms is not recommended because high mercury contents may impede the quality of the harvest, ridge planting irrigation, while slightly less lucrative, may be a safer method of planting to reduce the chances of fungal growth. Saffron does not require any artificial fertilizer and requires few nutrients, but between 20-30 tons of well-decomposed animal manure must be spread per hectare of land before plowing and planting.35 This cost must at the least be subsidized, or rather provided for the first planting season. Picking saffron flowers is possibly the most labor intensive and time constrained aspect of its cultivation. It takes around 450,000 stigmas and between 150,000-170,000 flowers to make a kilogram of saffron spice. Saffron requires little irrigation because it grows primarily during the rainy season (for more information on irrigation, see ICARDA’s Saffron Manual for Afghanistan). Instigated by the first irrigation at the end of September, flowering lasts for only three weeks in October. Flowers only live for 48 hours but should be picked early in the morning as soon as they open, even before there is full sun. If the flowers are picked after they have begun to wilt, this can make the post-harvest process difficult or even impossible and will surely severely lower the quality. After collection, the flowers must be transported to a farmhouse or location where they can be kept clean and out of the sun for no more than seven days. In order to keep the quality of the stigma after picking, drying must be done immediately. An exact level of moisture must be maintained after drying; too much moisture makes the saffron subject to fungus, while if it is too dry, it may break and turn into powder, reducing the weight and thus the value of the crop. This process, like all parts of saffron cultivation, can be done by hand. Simple air-drying takes a week and cannot guarantee the proper moisture content of the saffron. Handheld electric dryers can be used instead. These dryers take minutes rather than days and make it much easier to control the moisture level. These dryers have been introduced in Herat with great success. The most accurate drying method is to use kiln dryers, though they are far too expensive to provide to all farmers willing to cultivate saffron. Both the electric dryers and kilns require steady electrical supply, which presents a problem in Afghanistan where electrical outages are common. As a result, farmers would require generators and access to fuel to ensure timely drying as to save the harvest from possible spoil. Once dried properly, the stigmas can be stored for up to two years. Packaging is also incredibly important to raise the value of the saffron produced. Without proper packaging equipment, local farmers and exporters cannot expect maximum value for their final product. Without this proper packaging, they do not have the benefit and advantage of price speculation. In Iran, farmers typically receive just a few hundred dollars for each kilogram

of high-quality unpackaged saffron, which once repackaged in Spain or Italy is valued at $2,000 per kilogram in the West. Saffron prices in Herat rose from $300 per kilogram in 2005 to $450 per kilogram in 2006, while the current potential price is equal to Iranian saffron, which can stand at a maximum value of $2,000 when packaged properly.36 Each hectare of land should produce ten kilograms of saffron, meaning the potential for up to $2,000 per hectare of properly packaged saffron. Industrial packaging machines are incredibly expensive but necessary for the crop to be sold in western markets without losing a portion of profits to middlemen. Access to the Global Market As a new entrant in the global saffron market, the quality of Afghan saffron must either be better than other international competitors, or be on par with the best in the world but sold at a slightly discounted rate so as to attract the attention of buyers. In keeping with the current quality control norms in the international marketplace, Afghan saffron needs to be graded according to ISO 3632 standards. The main ISO determinant of quality is based on crocin (color) in a properly dried sample. The gradations of quality are measured in four categories (I-IV), of which Category I is superior. The range of scores varies from below 80 in Category IV, to above 250 in Category I. Sargol, which is known to be the best saffron produced by Iran, is given a rating between 235 and 250.37 In order to produce saffron of this quality, only separated stigmas should be packaged, rather than stigmas connected to the style; connection to the style makes the drying process less reliable and can result in both shortening of shelf life and reduction in quality. While some interest has arisen from investors interested in organic saffron who are willing to pay a higher price for “fairtrade” saffron,38 the restrictions on Afghan farmers in order to comply with the Fair Trade Organizations Internal’s (FLO’s) standards would be unfeasible in the short term. The FLO guidelines for organic production include: 1. Prohibition of the use of fertilizer or unapproved pesticides for up to three years before the harvest. 2. Prohibition of the application of manure within 90 days of harvest. 3. Use of only organically produced corm. 4. Crop rotation that would require saffron to be replanted where saffron has not grown for at least one year. While pesticides are not a necessity, chemical fertilizers may be indispensable for farmers cultivating saffron for the first time who need to ensure the growth of their crop. A three-year window would result in three years of no income on that land and a resulting inability to pay outstanding loans. Furthermore, organic corms are likely to be sold at an increased price from regular corms. Finally, crop rotation poses an insurmountable problem for small farmers who most likely do not have spare land that can sit idle for one year. Organization: The Role of Cooperatives Moral dilemmas must be expressly addressed when talking about the ways in which United States’ Aid should be channeled into Afghanistan. The CNTF has been riddled with accusations of corruption and aforementioned data seems to prove that a large component of the Afghan government is complicit in the drug trade. In addition, the US’s policy of collaborating with warlords has come under scrutiny.

To circumvent the aforementioned problems, a more direct and palatable means of providing aid to farmers may be through the creation of cooperatives of communities of farmers. If properly managed, cooperatives should also serve to cut out middle-men and maximize farm-gate value. Unlike the cooperatives established by the Soviets, toward which Afghans harbor incredible disdain,39 these cooperatives would be a capitalist endeavor intended simply to provide farmers with the resources they would otherwise be unable to afford if forced to function alone. The services these cooperatives must provide to farmers are: i) Inputs at favorable prices ii) Machinery to do ISO quality testing iii) Stockpiling facilities iv) Packaging supplies for distribution v) Marketing know-how and access to markets The cooperatives should be an outlet to distribute necessary inputs and allow farmers to purchase these inputs at favorable prices. Because of the large volume of the cooperatives, serving a community, the cooperative would be able to purchase these inputs at a discounted value (i.e. through their bulk purchase). Inputs would include corms, chemical fertilizer, packaging materials, handheld electric dryers, backup generators, etc. Initially these inputs would need to be provided to the cooperatives by U.S. aid. These cooperatives would then distribute these inputs to the farmers by need. In order to make Saffron competitive on the global market, the cooperative should seek to ensure that all saffron produced by its farmers is ranked with an ISO rating between 235 and 250, which is on par with Sargol. The cooperative should house the simple testing materials to verify quality in compliance with ISO 3632. The cooperatives should provide stock-piling facilities so that farmers are protected from price drops as a result of surplus supply or diminished demand in any given year. Once properly dried, farmers can stockpile saffron for up to two years, giving them the flexibility to wait out one or two harvests before selling their crops. The cooperative should provide packaging supplies to farmers. Packaging facilities have a high initial cost, which must be provided in full by U.S. aid, but one that is necessary to ensure the success of saffron in Afghanistan. The ability to package on site cuts out a series of middle-men who typically profit exponentially more than the saffron farmers themselves. Packaging materials, while simple, are often a cost that individual farmers cannot take on. The ability to package on site would increase the farm-gate value significantly. Finally, the cooperatives should provide marketing know-how and provide access to markets. This can include transportation providing simple access to markets outside rural areas. This is the final necessity in order to reach international markets once quality has been established as well as proper packaging standards. Because of the crucial role that cooperatives would play, it is essential that they be established as independent, not-for-profit entities, managed at the community level in a fully transparent manner. In the traditional community structure, village elders form a council called a “shura” and are the repository of significant communal authority. In consultation with the farmers, the

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shuras should nominate outstanding members of the community (a typical qualification for leadership in rural Afghanistan)40 to serve on the board of the cooperative. Board members, in turn, should nominate the staff of the cooperative based on skills and experience. Cooperative staff and board members will need to be trained by a donor agency in management skills as well as protocol for farming saffron to ensure they are fully informed of the technical expertise they must have to produce saffron of international trade quality. The Role of U.S. Assistance U.S. assistance should be used to: i) Provide essential equipment for drying, packaging and marketing; ii) Subsidize inputs required for the first season of planting (in order to break the cycle of dependence on moneylenders); and iii) Provide training to the staff and board members of the cooperatives in management skills as well as the essential elements of the production chain involved in the saffron industry. U.S. funding should also be used to capitalize a micro-finance scheme managed by the cooperative, along the lines of the Grameen Bank’s group lending practices, but adapted to Islamic banking principles. For instance, instead of charging an interest rate on a loan, which is a notion quite foreign to many Afghans, 41 the cooperative could receive a small percentage of each farmer’s output. Upon receiving the assigned quantity of saffron from each farmer, the cooperative could then sell the saffron itself for cash to continue lending to farmers or could barter for the essential inputs its farmers require, as bartering is a widespread practice in rural Afghanistan.42 The managers of the credit facility would need to be fully trained in the management of credit by donor agencies. For the United States, the value of providing aid to crop substitution of saffron for poppies in Afghanistan is threefold: it will increase national security in both Afghanistan and the United States by destroying a major source of Taliban income and a major source of terrorism, it will complement our anti-narcotics trafficking endeavors by eliminating up to 93 percent of the world’s opiates that are produced in Afghanistan and finally, this can only serve the U.S. economy in the long run as the United States is a major importer of Saffron. It is important to note that while the U.S. imports most of its saffron from Spain, that the saffron is actually produced in Iran, a nation with which we have a trade embargo. The United States would be pursuing a more coherent foreign policy strategy by substituting imports from Iran guised as Spanish imports with Afghan saffron. The transition to Afghan saffron would not be an economic loss. In fact as previously explained, Afghan saffron has the potential to be as good quality as the best Iranian saffron, Sargol. In addition, as a new industry for Afghanistan, prices would most likely be somewhat discounted from current prices on the international market, so that it can enter competitively. Not only would this serve to end this indirect trade with Iran, but it would also promote economic ties with Afghanistan, a nation that needs U.S. assistance not only to maintain security, but also to regenerate its economy.

The Clout of Creativity: Shaping American Policy on Foreign Art
Justin Floyd and Isaac Lara

Some modern policymakers do not appreciate the power of the arts in crafting individuals, the nation, and the world. As evidenced during the ‘Gingrich Revolution’ of the 1990s, slashing the funds of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) became a cause célèbre for many conservatives in Congress. These particular politicians tried to forge tenuous links between the NEA and public programs to create public outrage. False equivalencies were drawn, even from defenders of the NEA, as sober writers cut through the ‘hysteria’ on both sides of the debate.1 Yet, the furor in 1995 was concentrated on one side: conservatives wishing to destroy the American system of public arts funding (conveniently forgetting that, per capita, American arts funding is lower than most other industrialized nations by a magnitude). Despite their initial efforts to subvert the arts, these policymakers did not realize the power for the arts to secure American national interests through it inherently progressive messages. By serving as a testament to history, art provides a glimpse of truth for current and future generations to admire and learn from; with the destruction of these testaments, windows into a particular society and people as well as connections to their past are irrevocably shattered. Through the promotion and preservation of the arts, the United States can foster increased social equality, pacifism, and historical awareness both at home and abroad. This essay will explore the progressive and practical benefits of preserving art during today’s era of American internationalism. Art objects are vital in defining the progressive state and cultivating progressive values amongst people across cultural and national boundaries. Art should be protected because its destruction only serves to weaken forces of equality, justice, and common human experience. However, current American foreign policy does not actively incorporate art objects into its foreign policy calculus. This imbalance can be redressed through several interlinked measures including art protection and preservation training for soldiers, the establishment of a State Department Office of Artistic Preservation, and the creation of an international body to oversee the reconstruction of destroyed objects and the protection of endangered objects. These steps, taken together, will improve America’s protected world image, and they will signal that leadership has arrived to address the artistichistorical policy changes that modern warfare necessitates. On a short-term scale, efforts to preserve the arts in violent regions of the world where they are currently being compromised would best serve American national interests by acting as a political deterrent against warfare and instability. Art and Warfare: A Brief History Whether it is from the Chinese Sun Tzu or the Western republican Niccolo Machiavelli, the ‘Art of War’ holds a titular place within global military and intellectual development. Progressives, on the other hand, have instead cast their gaze towards the Art of Peace. Throughout the millennia, they have developed and defended complex relationships between art, power, and military might. Examples of works that have inspired progressive movements include American Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, which helped

galvanize Washington to enter the war against the British. Picasso’s Guernica depicted the German bombing of Spanish civilians and intensified Castilian nationalism amongst republicans against Franco’s authoritarian rule. These examples demonstrate the forward-thinking essence art tends to inculcate. This traditionally progressive message of art is sharply undermined, however, when a state subordinates the value of art during periods of armed conflict. In war, items of artistic value are compromised purposefully or accidentally; either they are destroyed intentionally or incidentally via the preliminary phases of invasion by a state, or the weaker state may purposefully destroy its own cultural artifacts in an effort to undermine the efforts of opposing forces. Looting may also occur from all parties in conflict, delivering pieces to the Black Market and removing them the jurisdiction of public museums. The effects of such actions are incredibly detrimental to state politics. The United States has been involved in several armed conflicts where art has been undermined as a priority and spared preservation. Take for instance the Allies’ inaction as Nazi forces looted Polish museums during WWII, or American refusals to avoid bombing the National Museum of Iraq.2 The implications of these transgressions on the national interest of the United States, however, are serious because of the value art holds to particular nations, as well as the individual property rights of art owners. Present-day standards in American foreign policy for preserving art during military campaigns fall short in accounting for the tumultuous consequences destroying or losing art has on a nation-state’s political and social development. The wartime compromise of art, especially during the last century’s rise of destructive weapons, has disastrous consequences for the nation-state’s political stability. Oftentimes art is housed at cultural heritage sites that when bombed, breed intense (and often times violent) antagonism against opposing forces since items of cultural and historical value are destroyed. This destruction wreaks havoc on a nation-state’s self-identification, and insurgencies often develop around the destruction of a particular artifact to defend what they view as representative of their nation-state. Nations often identify particular pieces of art as symbols of national sovereignty and fight fiercely to defend them. During the Civil War, for instance, Union soldiers’ resolve was reinvigorated after the American flag reminded them of the tenets of federalism.3 Dolley Madison’s rescue of an original portrait of President George Washington before the White House was set ablaze in the War of 1812 also demonstrated a desire to preserve the American national identity.4 Had Washington’s portrait been lost, the resulting sense of detachment from the republic’s founding father would have undermined the legitimacy of American values just as it would for other states had their national symbols been compromised. When praised and beloved art is destroyed, a cultural vacuum develops whereby visceral hatred towards the destroyers becomes the normal mode of artistic creation. Israel’s bombing of cultural heritage sites in southern Lebanon during its 2006 war fueled harsh resentment among Arabs against Israeli troops. The Lebanese arts community retaliated by painting pieces, composing songs, and drawing graffiti that slandered Israeli forces. This contributed to lingering discord and fostered new feelings of resentment among the public towards occupying forces. AntiSemitic caricatures were even circulated by Arab newspapers

in an attempt to stir fervor over the Second Lebanese War and the destruction it was causing to Lebanese society; they often demonized Israel as a genocidal state bent on killing Arabs.5 Opinion leaders and weekly magazines also helped express Arab discontent with the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. One such Jordanian editorial published in Al-Rai Newspaper describes how “…the Israeli soldier butchers the family after he committed rape to the body, soul, land and to the honor, sanctioned all of the women, men, children and elders…”6 The fact that this is the most widely distributed newspaper in Jordan helps explain how the Arab population can be swayed by these kinds of antiSemitic propaganda.7 Moreover, Arab columnists such as Dr. Latifa an-Najjar proceed to rationalize their anti-Semitic attacks by recasting doubt over Israel’s legitimacy as a state. “The Zionist theory is racist, arrogant and colonial, which is based on the concept of robbery, subjugation and hostility. In order to implement its goals, it relies on the great colonial powers, and it does not belong to the region in its culture, civilization and expectations...”8 It is inflammatory commentary like his that produces a framework for current and future Arab generations to refocus antagonism against Israel. This adverse reaction from the Arab arts community is important in understanding why consolidating stability in any state is difficult after military exercises are finished. New creative and intellectual pieces that emerge depicting injustice, death, and exploitation have consequential effects on the psyche of the public, breeding more anger and violence against invading forces like Israel. The Compromise of Art Art is compromised by a nation’s own forces in two ways. The first involves the state’s purposeful destruction of its own pieces to avoid them being compromised by opposing forces. This principle of destroying a resource that could be valuable to invaders has been repeated numerous times throughout history, most notably during the Gulf War when Iraqi forces attempted to undermine UN troops by implementing a scorched earth policy and burning oil wells that could be of use to the enemy.9 Ironically, the destruction of one’s own art also serves as an effort in preserving its own national identity by preventing its enemies from asserting their control over a state’s identity. If invaders are able to control a state’s museums, art galleries, or artistic community, they can subsequently transform art to their own ideological or political standards; much like how Hitler’s forces mandated the creation of anti-Semitic art and propaganda following the fall of Warsaw in 1939. As a result, the infiltration and artificial instillation of alien, Aryan messages of hate within Polish identity helped pave the way for Anti-Semitism among Polish citizenry that persisted long after the fall of World War II, as was part of Hitler’s motives. This manipulation and corruption of Polish identity via artistic propaganda after the war included an instance in which the Polish Peasants Party actually passed a resolution thanking Hitler for the annihilation of Polish Jewry.10 Hitler’s manipulation of Polish art to serve his own ends explains why some nation-states may purposefully destroy their own artistic works to avoid any further compromise of their identity. The second way art is compromised by domestic forces is via partisan conflict between various interest groups within the country. Some of these groups, in vying for power, may restrict the consumption of art in order to maintain cultural and political

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spheres of influence. This can have severe implications on the nation’s political stability, as exemplified in 2001 by the Taliban’s destruction of the giant statues of Buddha in Bamiyan and the wave of rocket attacks launched by Buddhist militants in retaliation.11 The struggle for power in Bamiyan has enabled militants to grow increasingly violent towards one another, and consequently will undermine each other’s artistic creations to express their disapproval. Secondly, domestic forces can also threaten its own art when ruling government resorts to censorship as a political tool in removing voices of civilian dissent. The implications of such action on regional stability, however, are unclear. When this occurs, dissent does not simply fade away but is merely channeled through other legal means of expression. Most notably when Argentine dictator Juan Peron censored certain tango lyrics in 1943, he was surprised by the powerful opposition tango enthusiasts and Argentine nationalists formed to challenge the government’s actions. Not surprisingly, he relaxed the restrictions on tango music to avoid the instability that had plagued earlier regimes.12 It is evident from this example that censoring art merely channels the community’s energy into other forms of dissent that could endanger the consolidation of the standing regime. Reorienting American Foreign Policy Towards the Arts In order to inure military invasions against artistic destruction, the armed forces must be trained to recognize art’s value before wars start. This can be accomplished by establishing cultural training programs that all members of the armed forces must complete before entering the field of combat or even preparing for military missions. Soldiers will be trained in the artistic landscape of the state in which they will stationed, including specialized training for those whose positions or missions involve direct interaction with heritage sites or other artistically-valuable areas. Within the armed forces, there should be certain groups whose task is the surveying and protection of artistic heritage sites within an invaded country. These specialists will be responsible for initial assessment of damages after a mission, and they will provide full written reports of how art fared during military engagement. After each artistically sensitive mission, a written report should be produced detailing how art was impacted as well as what could have been done better to preserve culturally sensitive art objects. This would in turn improve the public image of our armed forces, as well as their efficacy in addressing problems on the ground related to art. In cases of military invasion, it is important that the invaded country experience as little trauma at the hands of U.S. military personnel as possible. This includes not only the individuals living in invaded areas, but just as importantly the artistic and historical heritage objects that define who they are. Warfare inevitably leads to the destruction of land; there is no reason why blameless individuals deserve their identity stripped away, too. The inculcation of art-preservation habits in the armed forces is only the first step towards protecting art during wartime. The United States should also establish an Office of Artistic Preservation within the State Department to ensure the emphasis of art in diplomatic engagements. By establishing such an office, the government will signal to both allies and enemies that in the battle of creativity and destruction, the United States is a force for creation. Since the inherently destructive nature of warfare can potentially compromise art at all times, the Office

will work to cure the negative portrayal of the United States as solely militaristic and uncaring. The Office will do this by utilizing the NEH and NEA, which have domestic and international components, as advisors to this office since the Endowments already have trained professionals and scholars who deal dayto-day with questions of artistic value. Finally, the Office must be under the State Department as its message must be communicated through diplomatic channels and through the representative faces of the American government abroad. Because this Office will be within a Cabinet Department, it will take its shape based upon the particular organizational emphasis of the overseeing president. For the Obama administration, creation of an Office of Artistic Preservation will help to spread the platform and ideas that then-Senator Obama articulated during his presidential campaign. His party platform contained a pledge to increase federal funding for the arts, and both he and Vice President Biden have continued to speak favorably for such increases. The White House has played host to many American singers and musicians during the early months of this administration, showing that President Obama understands the value of keeping art alive.13 Finally, in conjunction with reorienting American foreign policy toward art’s protection, the United States must also lead the world in assuring that the future destruction of art pieces does not occur and that current neglects of artistic preservation are rectified. To do so, the United States should begin assembling a multi-national coalition, secured by treaty, whose purpose is the monitoring of artistic objects and projects during and after military engagements. This coalition will serve as the center of first response whenever member states are militarily engaged abroad. Sanctioned art experts will be commissioned to survey damages to artistic heritage sites, thereby serving as a stamp of approval for their efforts. After assessments are made, appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that the void left by art’s destruction is quickly filled. A key first step should be complete funding for the reconstruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues in Afghanistan. The then-supposed defeat of the Taliban left many Afghans hopeful for the future, and the reconstruction of their decimated iconographic heritages was one expected change. Failure to secure funding for this project has only exacerbated the artistic problems of Afghanistan, and because there is little art onto which the Afghani people can rely to define themselves, the population is more open to a return to Taliban oppression, destruction, and iconoclasm. Despite the continued fragility of the military endeavor, rebuilding the Buddhist monuments will help bolster a positive American legacy in Afghanistan. Switzerland and Japan have so far formally pledged funds for the reconstruction effort, thus a U.S.-led effort to rebuild those statues will signal that art now has a place in American foreign diplomacy. Conclusion Art’s manifestation of progressive values continues to transform cultural and political events in the world today. By serving as a window into other societies, art offers us unique perceptions of a nation’s historical identity. When art is compromised from warfare, these windows into society are shattered, fostering antagonism and hatred against its offenders, and worse, domestic instability that could endanger American national interests within that country. For this reason, the United States has a vested stake in preserving the arts on its interventionist missions and in places

where it does not even have active military presence. Any failure in addressing these concerns can have severe implications on the external security of American troops overseas, as well as on the global reputation of the United States. Through three key measures – surveying cultural heritage sites, establishing an Office for Artistic Preservation within the State Department, and organizing a multilateral treaty to monitor the condition of artifacts during periods of hostilities – the United States will take a leading role in preserving the national identity of other countries, thereby improving its own among the international community. America must become proactive in the preservation of other countries’ artifacts in order to continue fostering cultural relations with other countries. Good diplomacy is build upon the foundation of a mutual understanding, which is destroyed when the arts are likewise undermined. The future fashioning of American diplomacy may rely on the extent to which the United States appreciates the progressive nature the arts may have on a nation-state and the world.

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Endnotes
Saving the MTA 1. Manhattan drivers do not have to pay bridge tolls as they are already on the island, while tolls on bridges and tunnels from New Jersey would have been included as part of the congestion charge. Commuters going across the East River, however, would have had to pay bridge tolls in addition to the congestion charge. 2. These numbers are based on the Kheel-Kormanoff Plan’s internal analysis and are included with the Balanced Transportation Analyzer. For more information on the plans discussed in this article, please see: Komanoff, Charles. “Free Buses, Cheaper Subways -- and a Solution to New York’s Traffic”, Gotham Gazette, February 6, 2009: http://www.gothamgazette. com/article//20090209/255/2821. Neuman, William. “How Will You Cope With Higher Fares?” New York Times City Room, March 23, 2009: http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/ how-will-you-cope-with-higher-fares/. Partnership for New York City. Growth or Gridlock? The Economic Case for Traffic Relief and Transit Improvement for a Greater New York, December 2006: http://www.nycp.org/publications/Growth%20or%20Gridlock.pdf. Smith, Malcolm. Senate MTA Proposal: http://www.nymtasolutions.org/ proposal/. Freedom of Speech on the Job All statistics and information on union election procedures can be found in: Lafer, Gordon. Free and Fair: How Labor Law Fails US Democratic Election Standards. American Rights at Work Report. June 2005. Accessed on April 2, 2009, at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/ FreeandFair%20FINAL.pdf Protecting America’s Immigrant Workforce 1. Ngai, Mae M. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 64 2. Prescott, Andrew P. “Illegal but protected: Federal Appeals Court holds that undocumented aliens enjoy employee status under National Labor Relations Act.” Nixon Peabody. 10 Jan. 2008. http://www.nixonpeabody.com/publications_detail3.asp?ID=2128. 3. ibid. 4. ibid. 5. Popper, Nathaniel. “In Rubashkins’ Backyard, Another Tale of Labor Strife.” Forward. 14 Aug. 2008. http://www.forward.com/articles/13997/. 6. ibid. 7. ibid. 8. Greenhouse, Steven. “Meatpacker in Brooklyn Challenges a Union Vote.” New York Times. 31 Aug. 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/01/ nyregion/01union.html?_r=1. 9. ibid. 10. Ngai, Impossible Subjects. 56 Redistricting and Representations: Reforms for a Broken System 1. Federalist No. 53, accessed at http://federali.st/53. 2. Noncompetitive Elections for Congress. Ed. Lee Hamilton. The Center on Congress at Indiana University. <http://www.centeroncongress.org/radio_commentaries/noncompetitive_elections_for_congress.php>. 3. Hastings Letter. FairVote Program for Representative Government. 21 May 2001. < http://www.fairvote.org/?page=866>. 4. Ibid. 5. CQ Politics: Arizona 2nd, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=district-AZ-02 6. “Gerrymandering”. Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Accessed at: http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerrymandering 7. Please see The Gerrymandering Index. Cicero Geospatial Districting Analysis, Avencia Inc. October 2006. <http://www.avencia.com/LinkClick.aspx ?fileticket=EnCCb7KObuU=&tabid=205&mid=848> for more information on the mathematics behind this model. 8. Hulse, Carl. “Leveled Colorado District Creates an Election Lab”. New York Times 5 August 2006. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/05/ washington/05house.html?_r=1&scp=10&sq=colorado%207th%202006&st=cse> 9. CQ Politics: Colorado 7th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=district-CO-07#

10. Colorado Secretary of State. Colorado 2006 Election Data, accessed at: http://www.elections.colorado.gov/ DDefault.aspx?tid=860&vmid=777, and then by selecting “Voter Recaps by Congress and District”. 11. CNN Election Day 2006 Data, accessed at: http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/states/CO/H/07/ 12. CQ Politics: Colorado 7th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=district-CO-07# 13. United States Census Bureau. Voting and Registration in the Election of 2006. Accessed at: http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p20-557.pdf, p. 10. 14. Ibid., p. 4; CQ Politics: Illinois 4th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics. com/wmspage.cfm?docID=district-IL-04#; United States Census Bureau. Median Income of Households by State: 1984-2006 Two-Year Moving Averages. Accessed at: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/h08a. html; United States Census Bureau. Illinois – Congressional District (106th Congress). Accessed at: http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&context=gct&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-mt_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_GCTP11_ ST6&-CONTEXT=gct&-tree_id=403&-geo_id=04000US17&-format=ST-6&-_ lang=en; Illinois State Board of Elections. Voter Registration Data. Accessed at: http://www.elections.il.gov/Downloads/ ElectionInformation/PDF/reg-prct. pdf. Please note that the 77.71 percent figure was arrived at by dividing the percentage of registered voters by dividing the registered population by the over-18 population found here: http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?_event=&geo_id=04000US17&_geoContext=01000US|04000US17&_ street=&_county=&_cityTown=&_state=04000US17&_zip=&_lang=en&_ sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=040&_ submenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=ACS_2007_3YR_SAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr_ name=null&reg=null%3Anull&_keyword=&_industry= 15. United States Census Bureau. Voting and Registration in the Election of 2006. Accessed at: http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p20-557.pdf, p. 16. 16. CNN Election Day 2006 Data, accessed at: http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/states/IL/H/04/ 17. CQ Politics: Pennsylvania 18th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/ wmspage.cfm?docID=district-PA-18 18. United States Census Bureau. Pennsylvania – Congressional District (106th Congress). Accessed at: http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-context=gct&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-CONTEXT=gct&mt_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_GCTP11_ST6&-tree_id=403&-redoLog=true&-_ caller=geoselect&-geo_id=04000US42&-format=ST-6&-_lang=en; United States Census Bureau. State Median Income. Accessed at: http://www.census.gov/ hhes/www/income/statemedfaminc.html, and then by selecting “Using 2-Year Average Medians”. 19. Pennsylvania Department of State. Voter Registration Statistics. Accessed at: http://www.dos.state.pa.us/elections/cwp/view.asp?a=1310&q=446974 &electionsNav 20. CNN Election Day 2006 Data, accessed at: http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/states/PA/H/18/ 21. United States Census Bureau. Voting and Registration in the Election of 2006. Accessed at: http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p20-557.pdf, p. 2. 22. The following financial data for all three elections was collated from the following source: United States Federal Election Commission. Summary Reports Search, accessible at: http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/srssea. shtml. For each district, the 2005-2006 period was selected, an individual state was selected (Colorado, Illinois, or Pennsylvania), and only the House election receipts were compared for the Democratic and Republican candidates. 23. Ibid. 24. CQ Politics: Pennsylvania 6th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/ wmspage.cfm?docID=district-PA-06 25. CQ Politics: Pennsylvania 8th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/ wmspage.cfm?docID=district-PA-08 26. The methodology of the PVI as well as the source of all of the PVIs below, can be found here: Cook Political Report, PVI for the 110th Congress, accessed at: http://www.cookpolitical.com/sites/default/files/pvichart.pdf 27. CQ Politics: Illinois 6th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=district-IL-06# 28. This alludes to a potential flaw in the Avencia model of compactness, as the district that was more likely drawn for outright political advantage was not included in its list of most gerrymandered districts. 29. CQ Politics: Pennsylvania 4th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/ wmspage.cfm?docID=district-PA-04 30. CQ Politics: Pennsylvania 12th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/ wmspage.cfm?docID=district-PA-12 31. Cf. Notes 24,25. 32. For a mathematical explanation of this algorithm, please see Rangevoting.org, accessed at: http://www.rangevoting.org/GerryExamples.html 33. Federalist No. 58, accessed at: http://federali.st/58

Tax-Exemption and Political Involvement: Institutional Regulation 1. Statement of Vote: November 4, 2008, General Election. California Secretary of State. 1 April 2009. < http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/sov_complete.pdf> 2. Tax Guides for Churches and Religious Organization. Internal Revenue Service. 1 April 2009. < http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf> 3. 501 (c) (3) exemptions apply to corporation, funds or foundations operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, education purposes. They are to devote a majority of their activities to the listed activities. They are prohibited from conducting political campaigning as well as lobbying for influence legislation. In exchange, they received taxexemption status for these activities. Churches and religious institutions do not need to request tax-exempt status as they are automatically provided with it. 501 (c) (4) exemptions apply to civic leagues and other organizations operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare or local associations of employees whose membership is limited to a designated company or persons in a particular municipality or neighborhood and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, education, or recreational purposes. Even though they receive the same tax-exempt status as 501 (c) (3) organizations, they can participate in political campaigns and can lobby for legislations. 527 exemptions apply to groups created to influence the nomination, election, appointment of candidates for public office. For further information, refer to Internal Revenue Service’s tax guides. 4. Internal Revenue Manual 7.26.3. Internal Revenue Service. 1 April 2009. < http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/ch10s06.html> 5. United States v. Christian Echoes Ministry, 404 U.S. 561 191972). Findlaw. 1 April 2009. <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase. pl?court=US&invol=561&vol=404> 6. From Branch Ministries to Selma. Duke Law School. 1 April 2009. < http:// www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?71+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+185+(spring+2008)# H2N4> 7. “Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay Marriage.” New York Times. 14 Nov. 2008. 1 April 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/15/us/ politics/15marriage.html> 8. “Trillion Dollar Defense Budget is Already Here.” The Independent Institute. 15 March, 2007. 1 April 2009. < http://www.independent.org/newsroom/ article.asp?id=1941> Representing the People: A Standard for Filling Senate Vacancies 1. Constitution of the United States. Amendment Seventeen 2. ibid. 3. ibid. 4. U.S. Constitution. Article 1, Section 2, Clause 4 5. The United States of America. The Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. By Sula P. Richardson and Thomas H. Neale. House and Senate Vacancies: How are they filled? Congressional Research Service. <www. senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Vacancies.pdf>. 6. The United States of America. The Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Filling U.S. Senate Vacancies: Perspectives and Contemporary Developments. By Thomas H. Neale. 10 Mar. 2009. Congressional Research Service. <www.opencrs.com/getfile.php?rid=80860> 7. The United States of America. Federal Election Commission. Information Division of the Office of Communications. Campaign Guide for Congressional Candidates and Committees. By Dorothy Yeager. Hope for Minor Parties: Electoral Fusion 1. Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, Controversies in Voting Behavior (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001), 379 2. Howard A. Scarrow, “Duverger’s Law, Fusion, and the Decline of American ‘Third’ Parties,” Western Political Quarterly 39, no. 4 (December 1986): 634 3. Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 4 4. Daniel Mazmanian, Third Parties in Presidential Elections, Studies in Presidential Selection (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 67 5. Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 9 6. Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 8 7. L. Sandy Maisel and Kara Z. Buckley, Parties and Elections in America, 4th ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005), 270 8. Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1984), 3 9. Adam Morse and J.J. Gass, eds., “More Choices, More Voices: A Primer on Fusion,” special issue, Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elections Series (October 2006): 1 10. Adam Morse and J.J. Gass, eds., “More Choices, More Voices: A Primer on Fusion,” special issue, Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elections Series (October 2006): 2 11. Adam Morse and J.J. Gass, eds., “More Choices, More Voices: A Primer on Fusion,” special issue, Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elections Series (October 2006): 2 12. Melissa R. Michelson and Scott J. Susin, “What’s in a Name: the Power of Fusion Politics in a Local Election,” Polity 36 (January 2004): 2-3 13. William R. Kirschner, “Fusion and the Associational Rights of Minor Political Parties,” Columbia Law Review 95, no. 3 (April 1995): 683-684 14. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), Justice Stevens 15. “Election Results,” New York State Board of Elections, http://www.elections.state.ny.us/2008ElectionResults.html (accessed October 20, 2008). 16. Richard Winger, “Minor Party and Independent Candidate Vote for U.S. House in 2008,” Ballot Access News, entry posted December 9, 2008, http:// www.ballot-access.org/2008/12/09/minor-party-and-independent-candidatevote-for-us-house-in-2008/#respond (accessed December 9, 2008). 17. Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 25-26 18. Adam Morse and J.J. Gass, eds., “More Choices, More Voices: A Primer on Fusion,” special issue, Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elections Series (October 2006): 5 19. Melissa R. Michelson and Scott J. Susin, “What’s in a Name: the Power of Fusion Politics in a Local Election,” Polity 36 (January 2004): 2-3 20. Alyssa Katz, “The Power of Fusion Politics,” The Nation, September 12, 2005, 1 21. “Working Families: About Us,” New York Working Families Party, http:// www.workingfamiliesparty.org/about/ (accessed December 7, 2008). Emphasis added. 22. Daniel Mazmanian, Third Parties in Presidential Elections, Studies in Presidential Selection (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 118 23. Ashlee Albies, “To Restore Fusion Voting” (Testimony, Senate Elections and Ethics Committee, Oregon State Senate, March 28, 2007), National Open Ballot Voting Project, http://www.openballotvoting.org/resources.php (accessed December 6, 2008). 24. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), Justice Ginsburg 25. “Election Results,” New York State Board of Elections, http://www.elections.state.ny.us/2008ElectionResults.html (accessed October 20, 2008). 26. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), Mr. Slowes’ Argument 27. Lisa Jane Disch, The Tyranny of the Two-Party System (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 35 Waste Disposal and Energy Generation through Plasma Gasification 1. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. “Municipal Solid Waste Landfills.” 2009. <http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/23682.html> 2. Cohen, Steve. “Wasted: New York City’s Giant Garbage Problem.” The New York Observer. 25 March 2009. <http://www.observer.com/2008/wastednew-york-citys-giant-garbage-problem>. 3. Energy Information Administration. “Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government: Landfill Gas.” April 2008. < http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar. renewables/page/landfillgas/landfillgas.html> 4. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. “Municipal Solid Waste Landfills.” 5. United States Environmental Protection Agency. “Landfill Gas Emission Data: Help for Municipalities.” 17 October, 2008. <http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/ news/news062006.html> 6. Agblevor, Foster. “Feedstocks for Gasification.” 4 April 2007. 25 March 2009. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. <http://www.mawaterquality.org/conferences/biofuels/Agblevor_Biofuels> 7. Behar, Michael. “The Prophet of Garbage.” PopSci. 1 Mar, 2007. http:// www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2007-03/prophet-garbage 8. Behar, “The Prophet of Garbage.” 9. Behar, “The Prophet of Garbage.” 10. Behar, “The Prophet of Garbage.” 11. Cobbs, James T. Jr. “Production of Synthesis Gas by Biomass Gasification.” University of Pittsburgh. <www.engr.pitt.edu/chemical/facstaff/Biomass_ Energy_Project.doc>

A New Approach to the Electricity Bill in Higher Education: Submetering College Dorm Rooms to Incentivize Sustainable Consumption 1. B. Swords et al., “An enterprise energy-information system,” Applied Energy, Vol 85, Issue 1, Jan 2008: 61-69. 2. John E. Petersen et al., “Dormitory residents reduce electricity consumption when exposed to real-time visual feedback and incentives,” International Journal of Sustainability in Higher Education 2007, Vol. 8, No. 1: 16, 33. 3. http://www.environment.columbia.edu/greenlivingchallenge/ 4. Gregor P. Henze, “Building energy-management as a continuous quality control process.” Journal of Architect Enginereering, 2001: Vol. 7, No. 4: 97–106. <http://scitation.aip.org/getpdf/servlet/GetPDFServlet?filetype=pdf&id=JAEIED 000007000004000097000001&idtype=cvips&prog=normal>. 5. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/housing/docs/residence-halls/index.html 6. Person et al., 27. 7. http://www.luciddesigngroup.com/contest.php 8. http://www.google.org/powermeter/index.html 9. “Electricity Prices – Why do New Yorkers Pay More? (Summary)” Feb 23, 2008. <http://www.nyri.info/docs/White-Paper-Electricity_Price_Differences_%20 (summary)_%202-23-08.pdf> 10. Herbert E. Hirschfeld, P.E. “Integration of Energy Management, Electrical Submetering and Time Sensitive Pricing in a Large Residential Community Utilizing Wireless Communications” <http://www.submeteronline.com/pdf/ ACEEE_SummerStudyPaper.pdf>: p.2 11. Herbert E. Hirschfeld, P.E., et al., “New York State Energy Research and Development Authority Residential Electrical Submetering Manual,” 2001. <http://www.submeteronline.com/pdf/subman2001.pdf> The Single Payer Solution 1. “Can George Bush Fix American Health Care?” The Economist, June 26, 2006. 2006. http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_ id=5436968 2. Kaiser Family Foundation. “Health Care Spending in the United States and OECD Countries.” January 3, 2007. http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/ chcm010307oth.cfm 3. “Can George Bush Fix American Health Care?” The Economist. 4. The 2008 World Fact Book. Central Intelligence Agency, 2008. https:// www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html 5. Nationmaster.com. http://www.nationmaster.com/red/country/cu-cuba/ hea-health&all=1 6. K. Davis, C. Schoen, S. C. Schoenbaum, M. M. Doty, A. L. Holmgren, J. L. Kriss, and K. K. Shea. Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: An International Update on the Comparative Performance of American Health Care. The Commonwealth Fund, May 2007 http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/publications_show. htm?doc_id=482678 7. Huebner, Jeff. “Equality for All? Will Med Students in the 21st Century Be the Difference? From the COC to Your Practice.” American Medical Student Association, 2001. http://www.amsa.org/uhc/cocuhc.ppt 8. Ruth, Erin. “Health Care Financing and Reimbursement.” American Medical Student Association, 2005. http://www.amsa.org/uhc/2005_healthcare_financing.pdf 9. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. “National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the United States, March 2005.” http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebsm0003.pdf 10. Institute of Medicine, “Hidden Costs, Values Lost: Uninsurance in America.” The National Academies Press, June 17, 2003. 11. Heubner, “Equality for All?” 12. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “The Number of Uninsured Americans Is at an All-Time High.” August 29, 2006. http://www.cbpp.org/8-2906health.htm 13. ibid. 14. ibid. 15. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Second Inaugural Address. 16. Children’s Defense Fund. “Improving Children’s Health: Understanding Children’s Health Disparities and Promising Approaches to Address Them.” http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data/Childrens-Health-Disparities-Report-2006.pdf 17. State Health Access Data Assistance Center and the Urban Institute. “Going Without: America’s Uninsured Children.” Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. http://www.rwjf.org/files/newsroom/ckfresearchreportfinal.pdf 18. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. “National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the United States, March 2005.” http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebsm0003.pdf 19. State Health Access Data Assistance Center and the Urban Institute. “Going Without: America’s Uninsured Children.” 20. Green, Jeff. “U.S. Has Second Worst Newborn Death Rate in Modern

World, Report Says.” CNN.com, May 10, 2006. http://www.cnn.com/2006/ HEALTH/parenting/05/08/mothers.index/index.html 21. Insititute of Medicine of the National Academies. Insuring America’s Health: Principles and Recommendations. January 14, 2004. http://www.iom. edu/?id=17846 22. Physicians for a National Health Program. “Study Shows National Insurance Could Save $286 Billion on Health Care.” Public Citizen, January 14, 2004. http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=1623 23. ibid. 24. ibid. 25. McCormick, Lauren A. and Russel T. Burge. “Diffusion of Medicare’s RBRVS and Related Physician Payment Policies – Resource-Based Relative Value Scale – Medicare Payment Systems: Moving Toward the Future.” Health Care Financing Review, 1994. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0795/ is_n2_v16/ai_16863013 26. Himmelstein, David and Steffie Woolhandler. “Why the US Needs a Single Payer Health System.” Physicians for a National Health Program. http:// www.pnhp.org/facts/why_the_us_needs_a_single_payer_health_system.php 27. Galvin, Robert S. “Physician payment in Canada, Germany, and the United States.” Physician Executive (May-June 1993). http://findarticles.com/p/ articles/mi_m0843/is_n3_v19/ai_14235773/pg_5?tag=artBody;col1 28. ibid. 29. Himmelstein, David and Steffie Woolhandler. “I Am Not Health Reform.” The New York Times, December 15, 2007, Opinion. http://www.nytimes. com/2007/12/15/opinion/15woolhandler.html Green Jobs through Vocational Education 1. “Toward a history of vocational education and training (VET) in Europe in a comparative perspective” Proceedings of the first international conference, October 2002, Florence. Volume II: “The development of VET in the context of the construction of the EC/EU and the role of Cedefop”. Cedefop Panorama Series; 101. Luxembourg: Office Publications of the European Communities, 2004. 2. “Modern Apprenticeships, The Way to Work: A synopsis and commentary”. British Association of Construction Heads. A BACH Occasional Paper: 2001. http://www.bach.uk.com/downloads/2003/modern_apprenticeships_2002. pdf 3. Study of School-To-Work Initiatives October 1996 4. Daniel Jacoby, “The Transformation of Industrial Apprenticeship in the United States.” (The Journal of Economic History, Dec., 1991), 906. 5. Peter Cappelli, Daniel Shapiro, and Nicole Shumanis, “Employer Participation in School-to-Work Programs.” (The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sep., 1998), 112 6. Katherine L. Hughes, Thomas R. Bailey and Melinda J. Mechur, “Schoolto-Work: Making a Difference in Education. (Institute on Education and the Economy, Teachers College, Columbia University, 2001). 7. School-to-work and educational reform symposium. (Economics of Education Review, 2006). 8. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 9. “Green Jobs: A Workforce System Framework for Action.” United States Department of Labor. http://www.doleta.gov/ Secular Education Against the Proliferation of Unregulated Madrassas 1. Khan, Shehar Bano. “Pakistan: There’s More to Madrassas Than Terror” Women’s Feature Service. New Delhi: Aug 8, 2005 2. Lancaster, John. “Lessons in Jihad for Pakistani Youth; Religious Schools Resist Law to Curb Extremism.” The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Jul 14, 2002. pg. A.19 3. Khan. “Pakistan: There’s More to Madrassas Than Terror.” 4. Ahmed interviews one cleric who claimed that his students could merely memorize and recite the Qu’ran. They did not even understand the words they were reciting, according to the cleric. 5. Looney, Robert. “Reforming Pakistans educational system: The challenge of the Madrassas” The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies. Washington: Fall 2003. Vol. 28, Iss. 3; pg. 267 6. Khan. “Pakistan: There’s More to Madrassas Than Terror” Women’s Feature Service. New Delhi: Aug 8, 2005 7. Lancaster. “Lessons in Jihad for Pakistani Youth” 8. ibid 9. ibid. 10. Ahmed, Noreen S. “Schooled in jihad; Clerics block education reform in Pakistan; Musharraf seen as U.S. lackey Series: SPECIAL REPORT: Struggle for the soul of Islam.” Chicago Tribune. Chicago, Ill.: Nov 28, 2004. 11. ibid. 12. Lancaster. “Lessons in Jihad for Pakistani Youth”

13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Ahmed. “Schooled in jihad.” ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

held or have ever been held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba 13. Prieto, Daniel B. ‘Terror War now Obama’s.’ Baltimore Sun, February 15, 2009. 14. Zoepf. ‘Deprogramming Jihadists’ 15. Ibid. Swat Valley and Beyond: Re-examining American Efforts in Pakistan 1. Fareed Zakaria, “Learning to Live with Radical Islam,” Newsweek, 9 March 2009. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Talat Masood, “The Sultan of Swat,” Foreign Policy, 20 March 2009. 5. Christopher Hitchens, “Swat? Not!: Handing the Swat Valley to the Taliban was shameful and wrong,” Slate, 9 March 2009.; Masood. 6. Jane Perlez, “Truce in Pakistan May Mean Leeway for Taliban,” The New York Times, 5 March 2009. 7. Shuja Nawaz and Arnaud de Borchgrave, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place: Forward,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (2009): VI. 8. “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” International Crisis Group (2009): 7. 9. Ibid, 5-8. 10. Nawaz, 7-10. 11. International Crisis Group, 6-15. 12. Ibid, 2. 13. Ibid, 8, 10, 13. 14. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Obama’s War,” The Washington Post 15 February 2009: B2. 15. Peter Baker and Thom Shanker, “Obama Sets New Afghan Strategy,” The New York Times 26 March 2009. 16. Ibid. 17. Jane Perlez, “Rise of Pakistani Raises Questions: U.S. Weighs Sharif Role as Possible Partner,” The New York Times 25 March 2009: A1 18. Jayshree Bajoria, “The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border,” Council on Foreign Relations, 20 March 2009. 19. Nawaz, 8. 20. Iftikhar H. Malik, The History of Pakistan (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2008), 129-10; Robert Kaplan, “The Lawless Frontier,” Atlantic Monthly, September 2000.. 21. “Inter-Services Intelligence,” The New York Times, 25 March 2009. 22. “Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence,” Globalsecurity.org, 31 March 2009. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid; “Inter-Services Intelligence.” 25. Globalsecurity.org 26. Ibid; “Inter-Services Intelligence.” 27. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Afghan Strikes by Taliban Get Pakistan Help, U.S. Aides Say,” 28. International Crisis Group, 19. 29. International Crisis Group, i. 30. Ibid, 19. 31. Ibid, 19. 32. “Inter-Services Intelligence,” The New York Times 25 March 2009. 33. Kaplan. 34. Kaplan. 35. International Crisis Group, 4. 36. “Inter-Services Intelligence.” 37. Mazzetti and Schmitt. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. International Crisis Group, 4-5. 41. Perlez, “Rise of Pakistani Raises Questions.” 42. Nawaz and de Borchgrave, VII. 43. International Crisis Group, 18. 44. International Crisis Group, 18-21. 45. International Crisis Group, 20. 46. Nawaz, 1-14. 47. Jayshree Bajoria, “The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border,” Council on Foreign Relations 20 March 2009. 48. Nawaz, 1-8. 49. Nawaz, 56. 50. Nawaz, 12, 51. Nawaz, 31. 52. “Pakistan: People”; “Pakistan: Economy,” CIA—The World Factbook, 19 March 2009. 53. International Crisis Group, 10.

Towards a Stronger Nuclear Policy 1. While ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.S. would strengthen non-proliferation efforts as well, this paper will focus on the treaties the U.S. has already ratified. 2. Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. “Toward a Nuclear-Free World.” The Wall Street Journal Online. 15 Jan 2008 <http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html>. 3. “Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Quantities and Deployment” in “U.S. Nuclear Stockpile.” Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters. <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nuclearstockpile.html>. 4. U.S. Department of State, “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.” 31 July 1991. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. <http://www.dod.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start1/text.htm#top>. Article XI. 5. Laalder, Ivo, and Jan Lodal. “The Logic of Zero.” Foreign Affairs. November/December 2008 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64608/ivo-daalderand-jan-lodal/the-logic-of-zero>. 6. Figures on the size of other country’s nuclear stockpiles are from: “Just How Low Can You Go?” The Economist Online. 27 Mar 2008 <http://www. economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10926586>. 7. U.S. Department of State, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” 1 July 1968. U.S. Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/www/ global/arms/treaties/npt1.html>. Article VI 8. “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Article II; Article III 9. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” International Atomic Energy Agency. 15 Sep 2008 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2008/ iran_iaea_gov-2008-59_081119.htm 10. “Third Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debate.” 13 Oct 1960. The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showdebate. php?debateid=3>. Culture without Bias, Diplomacy without Propaganda 1. Condoleezza Rice, Interview on Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, CNN. September 7, 2003. Accessed online at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0309/07/le.00.html 2. Speech at the United States Institute of Peace, September 19, 2004. Webcast of speech available at http://www.usip.org/events/2004/0819_webrice. html 3. Anderson, Iain. This is Our Music: Free Jazz, the Sixties, and American Culture. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007, p 11. 4. Music USA’s listening audience was 30 million in its first year and up to 100 million a decade later (Von Eschen, p 14). 5. Anderson, p 75. 6. Anderson, p 13. 7. Von Eschen, Penny. Satchmo Blows Up the World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004, p 110. 8. p 2 9. Von Eschen, 95. 10. NEA Budget Cuts Aimed at Controversial Art Projects.’ Philadelphia Enquirer. 27 October 1994. Page E01. After Guantánamo 1. United States. Cong. Military Commissions Act of 2006. 109 Cong., 2nd sess. Cong. Doc. Washington, D.C, 2006. 2. Exec. Order No. 13492, 3 C.F.R. 1-4 (2009). Sec. 2 (c) and (f) 3. Ibid. Sec. 4 (2) 4. Exec. Order No. 13492, 3 C.F.R. 1-4 (2009). Sec. 4 (3) 5. Ibid. Sec. 4 (4) 6. Exec. Order No. 13492, 3 C.F.R. 1-2 (2009). Sec. 3 7. Zoepf, Katherine. ‘Deprogramming Jihadists.’ The New York Times. November 9, 2008. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Rehabiliation never tried at Gitmo – By Rowan Scarborough, February 19, 2009, The Washington Times 11. Ibid. 12. To the knowledge of this author, no female prisoners are currently being

54. Ibid, 13. 55. Ibid, 8. 56. Julian E. Barnes and Paul Richter, “U.S. plans to boost civilian aid to Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times 24 March 2009. From Poppies to Red Gold: An Alternative Approach to Eradication 1. Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” 2. Brigadier General John Nicholson. News Hour with Jim Lehrer. Aired 3/18/09. 3. (Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Robert Charles. Congressional Hearing, 1 April 2004) 4. Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” 5. Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” 6. Emery, James. Middle East Times “The Taliban Opium Connection.” Published April 1, 2008. Viewed February 1, 2009. http://74.125.95.132/ search?q=cache:8Vthwzoxi4wJ:www.metimes.com/International/2008/05/14/ the_taliban_opium_connection/2650/+taliban+profit+opium+trade+distribution&cd =7&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari 7. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?” 8. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?” 9. Anderson, Jon Lee. The New Yorker: “The Taliban’s Opium War.” Published July 9, 2007. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_ fact_anderson 10. Anderson, Jon Lee. The New Yorker: “The Taliban’s Opium War.” Published July 9, 2007. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_ fact_anderson 11. Anderson, Jon Lee. The New Yorker: “The Taliban’s Opium War.” Published July 9, 2007. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_ fact_anderson 12. Governor Muhammad Ghulab Mangal of Helmand. News Hours with Jim Lehrer. Aired 3/18/09 13. BBC News Online. “Envoy Damns US Afghan Drug Effort.” Published 3/21/09. Viewed 3/24/09. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7957237.stm 14. Rubin, Barnett R., Jake Sherman, Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication (9). 15. Coleman, Joseph. Associated Press. “Afghanistan: Opium Growth Thriving.” 16. Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” 17. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?” 18. ibid 19. ibid 20. Coleman, Joseph. Associated Press. “Afghanistan: Opium growth thriving” 21. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?”; Brigadier General John Nicholson. News Hour with Jim Lehrer. Aired 3/18/09; Coleman, Joseph. Associated Press. “Afghanistan: Opium Growth Thriving.” 22. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?” 23. Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” 24. Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” 25. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?” 26. Ashraf Ghani. News Hours with Jim Lehrer. Aired 3/18/09 27. T. V. Padma. “Dropping the Poppy Habit.” August 20, 2008. Viewed at: http://www.scidev.net/en/features/afghan-agriculture-dropping-the-poppyhabit.html 28. Interview. Shoaib Harris. 3/18/09. 29. IRIN. Afghanistan: Afghan opium production soars to record levels 30. ICARDA. Saffron Manual for Afghanistan. 31. Research in Alternative Livelihoods (RALF). Research in Production and Marketing of Saffron as Alternative to Opium Poppy Cultivation 32. Research in Alternative Livelihoods (RALF). Research in Production and Marketing of Saffron as Alternative to Opium Poppy Cultivation 33. ICARDA. Saffron Manual for Afghanistan. 34. ICARDA. Saffron Manual for Afghanistan.

35. ICARDA. Saffron Manual for Afghanistan. 36. Synovitz, Ron. “Afghanistan: Saffron Could Help Wean Farmers Off Opium Poppies” 37. Department of Trade of Bhutan. Saffron: Issues in International Marketing. Published March 2005. Viewed March 19, 2009. http://www.trade.gov.bt/ administration/mktbriefs/12.pdf 38. For further information see: http://www.icarda.org/RALFweb/ FinalReports/G_Marketing_Afghan_Saffron_Strategy_RALF02-02.pdf 39. Interview. Shoaib Harris. 3/18/09. 40. Interview. Shoaib Harris. Interview. Shoaib Harris. 3/18/09. 42. Interview. Shoaib Harris. 3/18/09. The Clout of Creativity: Shaping American Policy on Foreign Arts 1. Alice Goldfarb Marquis, ‘N.E.A. Hysteria, On Both Sides’, February 21, 1995 http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/21/opinion/nea-hysteria-on-both-sides.html 2. Bogdanos, Matthew (January 2005). “Pieces of the Cradle”. Marine Corps Gazette (Marine Corps Association) (January 2005): 60–66 3. The Flag in the Civil War. Smithsonian National Museum of American History. Retrieved February 23, 2009, from http://americanhistory.si.edu/starspangledbanner/the-flag-in-the-civil-war.aspx 4. Mattern, D. B., & Shulman, H. C. (Eds.). (2003). The Selected Letters of Dolley Payne Madison (p. 3). Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 5. Wagner, M. (2007, January 29). Anti-Semitic incidents on the rise. The Jerusalem Post, pp. 6, 7. 6. Al-Horani, Yosif (2006, July 6). From Gaza to Al-Mahmodia and back again. Ar-Rai. (Jordan). 7. http://www.360east.com/?p=230 8. an-Najjar, Latifa (2006, August 2). Zionism and Arabism are opposed to each other and cannot meet. Al-Bayan. (UAE). 9. Bhattacharya, S. (2003, March 20). Iraq oil field fires could be devastating. The New Scientist. Retrieved March 2, 2009, from http://www.newscientist. com/article/dn3529-iraq-oil-field-fires-could-be-devastating.html 10. Margolick, D. (2006, July 23). Postwar Pogrom. The New York Times. Retrieved March 2, 2009, from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/books/ review/23margolick.html 11. Ahir, Diwan Chand. Bamiyan Buddhas. (2001). Senseless Destruction by Taliban. New Delhi: Blumoon Books. 12. Foster, D. W., Lockhart, M. F., & Lockhart, D. B. (1998). Culture and Customs of Argentina. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 124 13. Baxter, Sarah. ‘Celebs in non-stop parade for Obamas’ Sunday Times (London), March 8, 2009.

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