G.R. No.

L-7927

August 8, 1913 JUAN BARRAMEDA, peti ti oner, vs .

The juri sdiction of the Supreme Court a nd Courts of First Instance, as fixed by s ection 9 of the Phi l i ppi ne Bi l l , may be added but to not diminished by the Philippine Legislature. Thi s hol ding has never been questioned, a nd it seems unnecessary now to di s cus s the grounds upon which it was based. Therefore, there will be sufficient reason for declaring the disputed provi s i ons of Acts. Nos. 2041 and 2131 repugnant to the Philippine Bill and, consequently void if they attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance where the title to

PERCY M. MOIR, (Judge of First Instance) ET AL., res pondents . TRENT, J.: Petitioner wa s a defendant i n a suit brought before a jus ti ce of the pea ce to try ti tl e to a pa rcel of l a nd a nd the ca s e wa s deci ded a dvers el y to hi m; Petitioner a ppealed to the Court of First Instance; a nd that the judge of that court di s missed the a ppeal with directions to the justice of the peace to proceed with the enforcement of the judgment.

realty is involved. The ori ginal jurisdiction of those courts extends to "all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or of any interest therein," except i n forci bl e entry a nd deta i ner ca s es . (Act No. 136, s ec. 56, pa r. 2.) There i s no more comprehens i ve word i n the Engl i s h l a ngua ge tha n the word "all." *If this word be given its natural and unrestricted meaning, there is no case involving the

BARRAMEDA now pra ys that the respondent judge be ordered to proceed with the ca s e on a ppea l . RESPONDENT JUDGE ha s protested to the compl a i nt on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The ba s i s of the demurrer i s tha t Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131, conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the pea ce to try ti tl e to rea l s ta te, a re i nconsistent wi th a nd repugna nt to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902. By Act No. 2041, s ecti on 3, i t wa s provi ded:

title to real estate which Court of First Instance are not authorized to hear and determine under the Organic Law, a nd that being supreme, a ny Act of the Philippine Legislature whi ch a ttempts i n a ny ma nner to curta i l s uch juri s di cti on mus t be hel d voi d. Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 confer original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to real estate and provide that it shall be exclusive in cases where the value of the property in litigation does not exceed P200. Is the word "exclusive" susceptible of a construction that would still give Courts of First

Justices of the peace s ha l l ha ve exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate question of title to real estate or any interest therein when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two hundred pesos , a nd where such value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less than six hundred pesos the justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance. By Act No. 2131, s ecti on 1, the a bove provision wa s a mended by s ubs ti tuti ng "excl us i ve ori gi na l juri s di cti on" for "excl us i ve juri s di cti on."
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Instance original jurisdiction to try title to real estate where the value of the property in litigation does not exceed P200? By no possible mea ns ca n excl us i ve juri s di cti on to try a s pecific cl ass of cases be construed so as to permit of another court entertaining jurisdi cti on over s uch cases. To give a grant of unrestricted exclusive jurisdiction over a speci fi c cl a s s of l i tigation to one court i ts only proper sense, all other courts must be barred from exerci s i ng juri s di cti on i n s uch ca s es .

To hold that another court has jurisdiction also such in cases is to destroy the grant of exclusive jurisdiction given to the first. It is no longer exclusive when shared by another court, but merely concurrent. Were the disputed provisions of Acts Nos. 2041 a nd 2131 a l l owed to s ta nd, therefore, the necessary result would be to deprive Courts of First Instance of their original jurisdiction to try cases where the title to realty valued at not more than P200 was involved. Thi s appli es , whether the phrase "exclusive jurisdiction" or "exclusive original jurisdi cti on" be us ed. The Phi l ippine Legislature ca nnot depri ve Courts of Fi rs t Ins ta nce of a ny of the juri s di cti on conferred upon them by the Organic La w. Upon this ground alone, then, Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131, i n s o far as they a ttempt to confer exclusive original jurisdiction upon courts of jus ti ce of the peace to try ca ses i nvolvi ng the title to realty va lued a t not more tha n P200, must be declared void. There remains to be considered the concurrent jurisdiction conferred upon justice of the peace by the disputed provisions of those Acts in cases where the amount in controversy exceeds P200, but is less than P600. The genera l rul e i s tha t where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But i n order to do thi s , the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, i ntelligence, a nd va lid s ta tute, whi ch ca rri es out the l egi s l a ti ve i ntent. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results effecting the main purpose of the Act in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. The l a nguage used i n the i nvali d pa rt of a s ta tute ca n ha ve no l ega l force or effi cacy for a ny purpose whatever, a nd wha t rema i ns mus t expres s the l egi s l a ti ve wi l l i ndependentl y of the voi d pa rt, s i nce the court ha s no power to l egi s l a te.

Courts of justices of the peace a re courts of limi ted a nd inferior juri s di cti on. They a re the mos t i nferior courts in our judicial s ystem. Where they ha ve jurisdiction a t a l l , i t ha s never been limited by the insignificance of the pa rti cul a r ca s e. On the contra ry, the provi nce of thos e courts, as is well known, i s to handle precisely s uch cases. If litigation be di vi ded i nto i mportant a nd unimportant cases, then a s s uredl y, to jus ti ces of the pea ce fa l l onl y the uni mporta nt. And when the division of jurisdiction in a particular class is based upon the amount in controversy , a s i s the case with the provisions of Acts Nos. 2041 a nd 2131 i n question, a l a w provi ding that because of the i nferior a mount i n controversy a case s hould go to the Court of Fi rs t Instance, while a nother case of the same nature, because of i ts grea ter a mount, coul d be tri ed before a justice of the peace, would be an anomaly a nd a t war with the onl y l ogi ca l di s tri buti on of juri s di cti on. In other words , the ca s e of A vs. B i s too s ma l l a nd i nconsequential to be tried before a justice of the peace, a nd mus t be tri ed i n the Court of Fi rs t Instance; while the ca se of C. vs. D, bei ng of a larger a mount, may be tried by a justice of the peace. Such reasoning has never heretofore been used by the Legislature in dis tri buti ng juri s diction over litigation between Courts of First Instance and justice of the peace courts . It seems clear that the concurrent jurisdiction in cases where the amount involved is more than P200 but less than P600, was meant only as supplemental and ancillary to the exclusive jurisdiction over cases not exceeding P200. Thi s concurrent juri s di cti on mus t therefore be considered as i nseparable from a nd a bsolutely dependent upon the exercise of tha t excl usive jurisdiction which has already been decl a red voi d. The concurrent jurisdiction must therefore be declared void also. Other a dditional jurisdiction gra nted to justices of the peace by Acts Nos . 2041 a nd 2131 i s not before the court. We need only s ay tha t s uch oth er a ddi ti ona l juri s di cti on bea rs no rel a tion whatever to those void provisions of the statutes which provi de for juri s di cti on i n rea l -estate actions; a nd applying the same rules to the rest of the Act whi ch we have a pplied to the cl a use conferring concurrent jurisdictional in real-estate a ctions between the amounts of P200 a nd P600, we are clearly of the opinion that the validity of the remainder of the Act is not in any case dependent upon the said void provisions.
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G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997 FRANCISCO S. TATAD, peti ti oner, vs . THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, res pondents .

regulate the bus i nes s of i mporti ng, exporti ng, re -exporti ng, s hi ppi ng, tra ns porti ng, processing, refining, s toring, distributing, marketing a nd s elling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, ga s a nd other refi ned petrol eum products . The OIC was vested with the power to fix the market prices of petroleum products , to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and to regulate the operations and trade practices of the industry. 4 President Ferdinand E. Marcos crea ted the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to

G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997 EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TANADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION (FDC), SANLAKAS, peti ti oners , vs . HON. RUBEN TORRES in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation and PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation, res pondents .

brea k the control by forei gners of our oi l i ndus try. 5 Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) 

a cquired ownership of ESSO Philippines and Fil oi l to s erve a s i ts ma rketi ng a rm bought the controlling s hares of Bataan Refining Corporation, th e l argest refinery in the country.

 

put up i ts own ma rketi ng s ubs i di a ry — Petrophi l . opera ted under the bus i nes s na me PETRON Corporation.

President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidentia l Decree No. 1956, crea ted the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) to cus hion the effects of frequent changes i n the price of oil caused PUNO, J.: FACTS: Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil i ndustry other than thos e dea l i ng wi th ordi na ry commodi ti es . Oi l companies were free to enter a nd exit the market without any government i nterference. There were four (4) refining companies (Shell, Ca ltex, Bataan Refi ni ng Compa ny a nd Fi l oi l Refi ning) and six (6) petroleum marketing companies (Esso, Filoi l , Ca l tex, G etty, Mobi l a nd Shel l ), then opera ti ng i n the country. 2 The government, rea lizing that petroleum a nd i ts products are vi tal to national s ecuri ty a nd tha t their continued s upply a t reasonable prices is essential to the genera l wel fa re, enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act whi ch crea ted the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to
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by excha nge rate a djus tments or i ncrea s e i n the worl d ma rket pri ces of crude oi l a nd i mported petrol eum products . The fund i s us ed: a) to rei mburse the oi l compa ni es for cos t i ncrea s es i n crude oi l a nd i mported petrol eum products oi l b) to rei mburse oil compa ni es for cos t underrecovery i ncurred a s a res ul t of the reducti on of domes ti c pri ces of petrol eum products . By 1985, onl y three (3) oil companies were operating i n the country — Ca l tex, Shel l a nd the government-owned PNOC.

President Corazon C. Aquino s i gned Executive Order No. 172 crea ting the Energy Regulatory Board to regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, trans porti ng, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources "when warranted and only when public necessity requires." Congress ena cted R.A. No. 7638 whi ch crea ted the Department of Energy to prepa re, i ntegrate, coordinate, s upervise a nd control all plans, programs, projects, a nd a ctivities of the government in relation to energy exploration, development, uti l i za ti on, di s tri buti on a nd cons erva ti on. Section 5(e) of the l a w s ta tes tha t "at the end of four (4) years from the effectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy industry."
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(2) i mpl ementa ti on of a n a utoma ti c pri ci ng mecha ni s m (3) i mplementation of a n automatic formula to set ma rgi ns of dea l ers a nd ra tes of ha ul ers , wa ter tra ns port opera tors a nd pi pel i ne conces s i ona i res (4) res tructuring of oil taxes. Upon full deregulation, controls on the price of oil a nd the forei gn excha nge cover were to be l i fted a nd the OPSF wa s to be a bol i s hed. The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372. In G .R . No. 124360, petitioner Francisco S. Tatad s eeks the annulment of section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180. Secti on 5(b) provi des : b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of

Government a pproved the privatization of Petron Corporation i n 1993. PNOC s ol d 40% of i ts equi ty i n Petron Corpora ti on to the Aramco Overseas Company. Congress ena cted R.A. No. 8180, enti tled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996." Under the deregul a ted envi ronment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.
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this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress. The peti ti on i s a nchored on three a rguments : 

tha t the i mposition of di fferent ta ri ff ra tes does not deregulate the downstream oil industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Peti ti oner avers that the ta riff differential between imported crude oil and i mported refi ned petrol eum products bars the entry of other players in the oil

The deregulation process has two phases : the transition phase and the full deregulation phase. During the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing aspects of the oil industry were to be lifted. The fol l owi ng were to be a ccompl i s hed: (1) l i beralizati on of oi l i mporta ti on, exporta ti on, ma nufa cturi ng, ma rketi ng a nd di s tri buti on
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industry because it effectively protects the interest of oil companies with existing refineries. Thus , i t runs counter to the objective of the law "to foster a truly competitive market."  tha t the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one

subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following submissions: 

Thi rd, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among the three existing oil companies — Petron, Ca l tex and Shel l — in violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

ISSUE: whether or not section 5 (b) violates the one title — one subject requirement of the Constitution; HELD: NO. As a pol i cy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title — one subject rule. The title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A l a w having a s ingle general subject i ndicated in the ti tle ma y conta i n a ny number of provi s i ons , no ma tter how di vers e they ma y be, s o l ong a s they a re not i nconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furthera nce of s uch s ubject by provi ding for the method and means of carryi ng out the genera l s ubject. 19 We hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The s ection is supposed to s wa y prospective i nvestors to put up refineries i n our country a nd make them rely l ess on i mported petroleum. 20 We shall, however, return to the va lidity of this provi s i o n when we exa mi ne i ts bl ocki ng effect on new entra nts to the oi l ma rket.

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Provi ded. Thus . Arti cl e XII. combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.A. Secti on 19. No. Idea l l y. further. i ncome a nd wealth. the fol l owi ng a cts s ha l l be prohi bi ted: xxx xxx xxx (b) Preda tory pri cing which means s elling or offering to s ell a ny product a t a price unreasona bl y bel ow the i ndus try a vera ge cos t s o as to a ttract customers to the detriment of competitors. 6 . it did not prohibit per se the operation of monopolies which can. Article XII of our Constitution which cannot be violated by R. Arti cl e XII of the Constitution whi ch a re: more equi ta bl e di s tribution of opportunities. Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. No. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. Thes e provi s i ons a re: (1) Secti on 5 (b) which states — "Any l a w to the contra ry notwi ths ta ndi ng a nd s ta rting with the effectivity of this Act. while the Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed. Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19. the reason for the i nterdiction of unfair competiti on. 8180 has to be decided in light of the letter and spirit of our Constitution.A. Provided. It espouses competition. however. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. No." The validity of the assailed provisions of R. HELD: provi sions of R. No. not just a few but several players. this kind of competition requires the presence of not one. The desira bi l i ty of competi ti on i s the rea s on for the prohi bi ti on a ga i ns t res tra int of trade. No. the ra te for which shall be the s a me a s tha t for i mported crude oi l . tha t begi nning on Ja nuary 1. A market controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of players (oligopoly) is hardly the market where honest-to-goodness competition will prevail. On the other hand. be regulated in the public interest. a nd the rea s on for regul a ti on of unmi ti ga ted monopol i es .A. 33 This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to achieve the goals of our national economy a s defined by s ection 1. 8180 vi olate s ection 19 of Arti cle XII of the 1987 Cons ti tuti on. whi chever i s l ower. It a l so calls for the State to protect Filipino enterprises against unfa i r competi ti on a nd tra de pra cti ces . a s us ta i ned i ncrea s e i n the a mount of goods a nd s ervices produced by the nation for the benefit of the people.ISSUE: whether or not R. and a n expa ndi ng productivity a s the key to ra ising the quality of l ife for all.A. 8180. the DOE s hall requi re the refi ners a nd i mporters to ma i ntain a minimum i nventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their res pecti ve a nnua l s a l es vol ume or forty (40) da ys of s uppl y. ta ri ff duty s hall be imposed a nd co llected on i mported crude oi l a t the ra te of three percent (3%) a nd i mported refi ned petrol eum products a t the ra te of s even percent (7%) except fuel oi l a nd LPG. s ection 19 of Arti cle XII of the Cons ti tuti on a l l egedl y vi ol a ted by the a fores ta ted provi s i ons of R. 8180 ma nda tes : "The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires." (2) Secti on 6 which states — "To ensure the security a nd conti nui ty of petrol eum crude a nd products supply. tha t thi s provision may be a mended onl y by a n Act of Congres s ." a nd (3) Secti on 9 (b) which states — "To ensure fair competi ti on a nd prevent ca rtel s a nd monopoli es i n the downs trea m oi l i ndus try.A. es peci a l l y s ecti on 19. 2004 the ta ri ff ra te on i mported crude oi l a nd refi ned petrol eum products s hall be the s ame. especially the underpri vi l eged.

these provi s i ons on ta ri ff differential. HELD: The general rule i s tha t where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution. the l egislature intended the statute to be carried out a s a whole and would not have enacted it i f one part i s void. R. a ny s ecti on or provision of this Act i s declared unconstitutional or i nvalid. Enough must remain to make a compl ete. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability. may stand and be enforced. The aftermath of R. Unfortunately. Before deregulation." This separability cl a us e notwi ths ta ndi ng . . 8180. After deregulation. inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of R.ISSUE: whether the provisions on the imposition of 4% tariff differential on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products.A. . Secti on 23 provi des that "if for a ny reason. we hold that the offending provisions of R. . the valid portion. 8180 needs provi s i ons to vouchs a fe free a nd fa i r competi ti on. 7 . i nventory a nd predatory pri ci ng i nhi bi t fa i r competi ti on. PETRON.A. PETRON. considerations.A. No. No. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions .A. 8180 i s a deregul a ted ma rket where competition ca n be corrupted a nd where ma rket forces ca n be ma ni pul a ted by ol i gopol i es . The exception to the general rule i s tha t when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected. To jus ti fy thi s res ult. as conditions. In ma ki ng the pa rts of the s ta tute dependent. the requirement of inventory and the prohibition on predatory pricing can be individually struck down without invalidating the entire R. or connected must fa l l wi th them. SHELL a nd CALTEX remain unthrea tened by rea l competition yet are no longer subject to control by government wi th res pect to thei r pri ci ng a nd non-pricing decisions. i ntel l i gi bl e a nd va l i d s ta tute. if separable from the invalid. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. the va lid portion must be so far independent of the i nva l i d porti on tha t i t i s fa i r to pres ume that the legislature would have enacted it by i tself i f i t had suppos ed tha t i t coul d not cons titutionally enact the other. rather than complete nullity of the statute. No. inducements. conditional. or compensations for each other. s uch parts not a ffected thereby s hall remain i n full force a nd effect. 8180 contains a separability clause . 8180. No. The provisions on tariff differential.A. No. while another part is valid. or connected with one another. whi ch ca rri es out the l egi s l a ti ve i nte nt. R. SHELL a nd CALTEX ha d no real competitors but did not ha ve a free run of the market because government controls both the pricing and non -pricing aspects of the oi l industry. contrary to their i ntent. No. i n which case i f s ome pa rts a re unconstitutional. as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole. encoura ge monopolistic power a nd i nterfere with the free i nteraction of ma rket forces .A. condi tional. the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. all the other provisions thus dependent.

L-38215. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. pl a i nti ff-a ppel l a nt. The appellant ma kes the fol l owi ng a s s i gnments of error:  In not holding that the facts alleged i n the i nformations fi l ed i n thes e two ca s es properl y fa l l under a rti cl e 363 of the Revi s ed Pena l Code. But the Solicitor-General contends tha t article 363 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed to embrace the crime of false accusation or complaint as formerly penalized under article 326 of the Codigo Penal. defenda nt-a ppel l ee. 38216 December 22. s era ca s ti ga do con l a pena de arresto mayor. ISSUE: Whether or not article 363 of the Revised Penal Code embrace the crime of false To thes e informations. Arti cl e 363 i n the Spa ni s h text whi ch i s deci s i ve i s a s fol l ows . J.: A ca s e i n vi olation of a rticle 363 of the Revised Penal Code wa s fi l ed a ga i ns t the appellee Faustino Rivera. accusation or complaint as formerly penalized under article 326 of the Codigo Penal. 363. a nd  In s ustaining the demurrer interposed to s aid informations and i n dismis s i ng both of thes e ca s es . Nos. HELD: There i s no doubt that the facts alleged in the i nformations fall within the definition of the offense of "a cusacion" or "denuncia falsa" which is contained in article 363 of the Codigo Penal Article 326 of the Codigo Penal does not appear in the Revised Penal Code. a compa rison of the article with a rticle 326 of the former Pena l Code s eems practical i n vi ew of the a rgument of the Government tha t the former "i s a . under the hea di ng of "As encha nza s Incul pa tori a s ". The court below hea rd the two ca s es together a nd sustained the demurrer. ejecutare un acto que tienda directamente a inculpar o i mputar a un inocente la comision de un delito. cons tituyere falso testimonio. Inculpacion de un inocente . the defendant i nterposed a single demurrer a l l egi ng tha t the fa cts a verred in said informations do not constitute the cri me defined a nd punished by a rticl e 363 of the Revi s ed Pena l Code. BUTTE. de cua l qui er ma nera que no defendant-appellee Faustino Rivera s i gned a nd s wore to a complaint a ccusing Domingo Vito and Felisa Moreno of the cri me of theft The justice of the peace dismissed the complaint filed against Domingo Vito and Felisa Moreno Domingo Vito and Felisa Moreno fi l ed s eparate complaints a ga i ns t Faustino Rivera before the s a me jus ti ce. vs . — El que. ART. 1933 (article 363 of the Revised Penal Code) by the act of filing the said information charging them with the crime of theft.G. whi ch conta i ns no offens e denomi na ted "a cus a ci on o denunci a fa l s a " or i ts equi va l ent. cha rgi ng Ri vera wi th the offense of incriminating an innocent person 8 Faustino Rivera a l leged tha t the facts alleged did not fall under the condemnation of article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.R. FAUSTINO RIVERA. As article 363 of the Revised Penal Code is new and this is the first case before the court calling for its interpretation.

(La u Ow Bew vs. engaño. artifici o. asechanzas ." It s eems to us a forced extension of the term asechanza to bri ng a formal cri minal complaint wi thi n the concepti on of intriga. Such s econdary s ources may be res orted to i n order to remove. Us ase. as defined i n s tanda rd di cti ona ri es . S. The word asechanza. tra ma . Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code conta i ns no s uch s a fegua rd. which do not in themselves constitute false prosecutions but tend directly to cause false prosecutions. when the court wa s convi nced upon the tri al of the principal ca use that there wa s s uffi ci ent ba s i s for a cha rge of fa l s e a ccus a ti on. por lo comun. zancadilla. not to create doubt.reproduction of both the crime of false a ccusation or compla i nt a nd the cri me of ca l umny des cri bed under s a i d a rti cl e 326 a nd a rti cl e 452 of the ol d Pena l Code. 9 a ccus er could be prosecuted only on the order of the court. Ca l umny i s the false i mputation of a cri me upon whi ch a pros ecuti on mi ght be i ns ti tuted by the government of i ts own moti on. es peci e de ma quinacion urdida. 452. . It is well settled law that where the text of a statute is clear.. s uch a s wi l l gi ve effect to the l egislative intention a nd s o as to a void an unjust or a n absurd concl us i on.. it is improper to resort to a caption or title to make it obscure. tranquilla. a maño. en el plural. treta . Uni ted Sta tes . the gra vamen of the offense is performing a n a ct whi ch "tends di rectl y" to s uch a n i mputa ti on . the gra va men of the offense is the imputation itself when made before an a dministra ti ve or judi ci a l offi cer. 36 La w. ed. as throwing some light on the classes of acts tend directly to lead to fa l se prosecutions. bien sea para perderlo enteramente. engaño. In the present case we think it proper to ca l l a tten ti on to the ti tl e immediately precedi ng a rti cl e 363 of the Revi s ed Pena l Code whi ch i s a s fol l ows : "As echanzas Inculpatorias". If we extended said a rticle by interpreta ti on to a dmi ni s tra ti ve a nd judi ci a l proceedi ngs . whereas in article 363 of the Revised Penal Code . It i s a well s ettled rule that statutes should receive a sensible construction. it would have no application to the case that we are considering because article 452 of the old Penal Code which is as follows: ART. red. 59.) It i s to be noted tha t article 326 of the old Penal Code conta i ns the provi s i on tha t the Compa ring now a rticle 363 of the Revised Penal Code with a rticle 326 of the Revi s ed Pena l Code." In pa ssing i t ma y be s ta ted tha t if article 363 of the Revised Penal Code could be construed to include article 452 of the old Revised Penal Code. etc. artificio. i t will be observed tha t under article 326 of the former Penal Code. 144 U. Acci on y efecto de asechar. bi en para jugarle (sin hundirlo) alguna mala pasada. does not refer to false accusations or denuncias ma de before an a dmi ni s tra ti ve or judi ci a l offi cer whos e duty i t i s to i nves ti ga te or puni s h s uch cri me. i t i s a pparent that we woul d open the door to a fl ood of pros ecuti ons i n ca s es where the defendants were acquitted. It seems the more reasonable and sensible interpretation to limit article 363 of the Revised Penal Code to acts of "planting" evidence and the like. lazo. There is no reason to believe that the Legislature i ntended s uch a res ul t. Article 326 of the old Penal Code punishes fa l s e pros ecuti ons wherea s article 363 of the Revised Penal Code punishes a ny a ct which may tend directly to ca use a fal s e pros ecuti on. Enga ño o a rti fi ci o pa ra ha cer da ño a otro. mea ns a s fol l ows : "Intri ga. 47. de celada dispuesta contra alguno. 344. 340.

under the conditions hereinbelow s peci fi ed. rea ds a s fol l ows : SEC. mercha ndise. Korea. and other objects and things shall." . it was used for transportation purposes in connection with the needs of our soldiers there a nd ma de tri ps between Korea a nd Ja pa n. it loaded 180 cases containing various articles subject to customs duties. J. COL. or by regulations promulgated pursuant to law. peti ti oner. It i s a rgued that Section 1221. except as otherwise s pecially a llowed. The s a i d a rti cl e wa s forfei ted purs ua nt to Section 1363 (g) of the Administrative Code a s a n unma ni fes ted ca rgo. 1363.R. ca rgo. a nd ca rry Chri stmas gifts for our soldiers there. unless engaged in the transportation of merchandise in the way of trade. RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" a unit of the Philippine Na vy was dispatched to Ja pan to tra nsport conti ngents of the 14th BCT bound for Pusan. to make and submit a manifest of i ts ca rgo to the customs authorities a nd i t fails to do so. 1225 and 1228 of the Administrative Code require masters of One of the cases containi ng an electric range "GE" wi th four burners . MONTEMAYOR. a manifest therefor being required" i s s ubject to forfeiture . s o tha t i t di d not return to the Phi l i ppi ne unti l September 2. upon which the decree of forfeiture is ba s ed. Ports open to vessels engaged in foreign trade — Duty of vessel to make entry. 1954. if so. Property subject to forfeiture under customs laws . Section 1363 (g) of the Administrative Code . The Ma s ter of a ny wa r vessel or vessel employed by a ny foreign government shall not be required to report and enter on arrival in the Philippines. Government ves s el s to s ubmi t ca rgo ma ni fes ts . 1221. brought by the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" is consigned to petitioner herein. a manifest therefor being required. LT. a nd every s uch ves s el a rri vi ng wi thin a customs collection district of the Philippines from a foreign port shall make entry a t the port of entry for s uch di s tri ct a nd shall be subject to the authority of the collector of customs of the port while within his jurisdiction. — Ves s el s . res pondent. 1959 "(g) Unmanifested merchandise found on any vessel. All these articles were declared forfeited by the Col lector of Cus toms of Ma nila for violations of the Cus toms La w." COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS. Secti on 1221 provi des : "SEC. whether or not the aforesaid electric range is an unmanifested merchandise within the meaning of Section 1363 (g) of the Administrative Code. merchandise not mani fes ted s ha l l be forfei ted. Is the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" required under the Customs Law to make and submit to the customs authorities a manifest of its cargo? HELD: The l aw provides that an "unmanifested merchandise found on any vessel. LEOPOLDO RELUNIA.G. Whi l e i n Ja pa n. L-11860 May 29.: ISSUE: Whether or not a manifest is required of the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" and. be s ubject to forfei ture: xxx xxx xxx 10 The Collector of Customs of Manila s a ys tha t RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" is required under the Customs Law to make and submit to the customs authorities a manifest of its cargo and he ha s been sustained by respondent Commissioner of Customs. vs . It s eems tha t therea fter. This means that where a vessel i s requi red by l a w. No. — Ves sels engaged i n the foreign carryi ng trade shall touch a t ports of entry onl y.

duly certified by him. numbers . — Every vessel from a foreign port or place must have on board complete written or typewritten manifests of all her cargo.The term "report a nd enter" a ppea ri ng i n the l a s t pa ra gra ph of Secti on 1221 mea ns. by means of an a mendment by the ma s ter. "All of the cargo intended to be landed at a port in the Philippines must be described in separate manifests for each port of call therein. the ma s ter thereof s ha ll present the following documents. cons i gnee. to be returned wi th boa rdi ng offi cer's i ndors ement. The Tax Court a l s o overl ooked or failed to give due consideration to the provisions of Section 1228 which requires that every vessel from a foreign port or place must have on board complete written or typewritten manifests of all her cargoes . onl y vessels enga ged i n forei gn tra de a re requi red to s ubmi t m a ni fes t upon enteri ng a ny Phi l i ppi ne port The Tax Court apparently overlooked the reason behind the requirement of presenting a manifest and allowed itself to be swayed by the title of the law . or i mmi gra nts . to the boarding officer of cus toms . Documents to be produced by master upon entry of vessel . except a fter entry of the ves s el. a nd description of the packages and the names of the consignees thereof. 1225 a nd 1228 of the Administrative Code aforequoted a re found under Article VI of the Customs Law. Resort to the title of a statute as an aid in interpretation thereof is an unsafe criterion. — For the purpose of making entry of a vessel engaged i n foreign trade." Court of Tax Appeals hel d tha t the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" was not required to present any manifest to the customs authorities upon its arrival i n Ma ni l a BECAUSE:  Secti ons 1221. and their baggage. Ea ch ma ni fes t s ha l l i ncl ude the port of departure a nd the port of del i very wi th the ma rks . 1225. passengers . xxx xxx xxx  s ti ll be a manifest showing that no ca rgo is ca rried from the port of depa rture to the port of des ti na ti on i n the Phi l i ppi nes . not otherwise. under oa th. i n the prescribed form. "the entra nce of a ves s el from a forei gn port i nto a Philippine port of entry a s contemplated i n Section 1125" whi ch rea ds i n pa rt: SEC. (a ) The original manifest of all cargo destined for the port . immigrants. 11 . there mus t   a nd tha t inasmuch as the navy vessel in question was not engaged in foreign trade. "A ca rgo ma nifest shall in no case be changed or a ltered. Manifest required of vessel from foreign port . a nd every s uch vessel shall have prepared for presenta ti on to the proper cus toms offi ci a l upon a rrival in the ports of the Philippines a complete list of all s hip's s tore then on boa rd. qua ntity. a ccording to the Collector of Cus toms . And Section 1228 provi des : "SEC. it was not required to submit the manifest provide for in section 1225. The title be resorted to as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of the law or the intention of the legislature in enacting it. If the vessel does not ca rry ca rgo. Every ves sel from a foreign port or place must have on board complete ma ni fes ts of pa ssengers. and is not entitled to much weight. the title of whi ch reads : "Entrance of vessels in foreign trade" tha t the said article lays down rules governing entry of vessels engaged in foreign trade. s etting forth thei r destination a nd all particulars required by the i mmi gra ti on l a ws . or a gent thereof. 1228. a nd a tta ched to the ori gi na l ma ni fes t.

coming from a foreign port. a ll of which tough not engaged in foreign tra de. whether or not engaged in foreign tra de. what a bout private vessel s . The appli ca ti on of s a i d s ecti on to our na vy s hi ps i s s o cl ea r a nd ma nifest. a nd because we have complete control over them. 1954. are required to prepare and present a manifest to the customs authorities upon arrival at any Philippine port. a rriving or touching upon a ny port i n the Phi l i ppi nes s houl d be provi ded wi th a ma ni fes t whi ch mus t be pres ented to the cus toms a uthori ti es . the uni versal requirement from a rea di ng of a l l the foregoi ng provi s i ons i s that they be provided with a manifest. it should have made the corresponding change or amendment of the section. we hol d tha t all vessels whether private or government owned. that the vessel is not engaged in smuggling or in surreptitious practices and activities. nevertheless could bring into the country not only dutiable goods. But we believe that there was no ne ces s i ty where a s i n the present ca se. Were we to confine the requirement about the preparation and presentation of a ma ni fes t to ves s els engaged in foreign tra de. including ships of the Philippine navy. with the possible exception of war vessels or vessels employed by any foreign government. and ships chartered for a s pecial missi on or purpose. and even when the vessel belongs to the army or the navy (Section 1234) . We a gree that it s hould have been done. considering that the reasons for requiring a manifest for tra nsport a nd supply ships of the a rmy a nd navy of the United States are a nd with more reason a ppli ca bl e to our na vy 12 a manifest upon its arrival in Manila on September 2. The ma nifest is therefore intended to be an indication. i f not a n open decl a ra ti on . . ya chts .In our opinion all other vessels coming from foreign ports. pl ea s ure boa ts or crui s er or s teamships on a world cruise for tourists. not engaged in the transportation of merchandise in the way of trade. But the Court of Tax Appeals equa l l y hel d tha t Section 1234 is not applicable to vessels of the Philippine Navy for the reason that said section applies only to ships of the United States Army or Navy. In concl us i on. s hi ps to carry out the policy of the government. as provided for in the second paragraph of Section 1221 of the Revised Administrative Code. A manifest i s obvi ous l y meant to place beyond doubt the nature of the load or of the cargo that a vessel carries . Revised Administrative Code) or not (Section 1228). and that if our legislature had really wanted or intended to make its provisions applicable to our navy ships. but also a rticles of prohi bi ted i mporta ti on? The customs laws could not have intended to exempt all these vessels from the requirement to present a manifest. We therefore believe and hold that the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" was required to present Whether the vessel be engaged in foreign trade (Section 1221 and 1225.

The ti tl e of the Act rea ds —AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT. 1953..G. 13 . MARCOS. 1 a s to the pa rcel of l a nd he cl a i ms . ISSUE: Do pri va te petitioners have personal i ty to a ppea r i n the reopeni ng proceedi ngs ? HELD: the control l i ng s ta tute i s Republic Act 931. Joaquin. vs . OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND. Pri va te petitioner's specifical l y ques ti on the rul i ng of the Court of Appeals that they have no personality to oppose reopening. (DENIED) rel i ef judgment whi ch decl a red tha t such tree farm leases were null and void. a nd Secti on 1 thereof provi des — UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. ha ve court s ta ndi ng under Republ i c Act 931.. City of Baguio l odge da moti on to di s mi s s the peti ti on to reopen ma i nta i ni ng tha t the declaratory judgment in Civil Case 946 was not binding on those not parties thereto. BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. JOAQUIN. the appellate court rul ed that as lessees. BUCHHOLZ peti ti oners . Nevertheless. Hi s pra yer wa s tha t the l a nd be regi s tered i n hi s na me upon the grounds tha t: (1) he a nd hi s predeces s ors ha ve been i n a ctua l . Joaquin. and TERESITA J.. effective June 20. open. L-26100 February 28. Francisco G. as l essees of the public la nd i n ques ti on. private petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening of the cadastral case. J. or before Jul y 26. La nd here i nvol ved wa s a mongs t those declared public lands by final decision.: Court deni ed private petitioners' ri ght to i ntervene in the case because of a final declara tory Peti ti oners a ttack the jurisdiction of the Court of Fi rs t Ins ta nce of Ba gui o to reopen ca da stral proceedings under Republic Act 931. all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals whi ch hel d tha t petitioners were not bound by the declaratory judgment. The three pronged contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition wa s fi l ed outs i de the 40-yea r period next preceding the a pproval of Republic Act 931. Jr. 1894. City of Baguio l i kewi s e oppos ed reopeni ng. No. HON. Private petitioners Francisco G. SR. the cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted by the Director of Lands i n the Court of First Instance of Baguio. PIO R. FRANCISCO G. (2) s a id petition was not published. and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio. pea ceful a nd conti nuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spa ni s h ti mes . BELONG LUTES. SANCHEZ. 1969 (2) hi s predecessors were i lliterate Igorots without persona l noti ce of the ca da s tra l proceedings a fores ta ted a nd were not a bl e to fi l e thei r cl a i m to the l a nd i n CITY OF BAGUlO.R. Sr. res pondents . Respondent Belong Lutes peti tioned the cadastral court to reopen s a i d Ci vi l Res erva ti on Ca s e No. and (3) private petitioners. Buchholz regi stered opposition to the reopening a nd alleged that: They a re tree farm lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau of Forestry in their favor. JR. JOAQUIN. ques ti on wi thi n the s ta tutory peri od. FRANCISCO G. and Teresita J. pa yi ng the ta xes thereon. The fa cts fol l ow: FACTS: On April 12. a dvers e.. 1912.

a re hereby granted the ri ght within five years a fter the da te on whi ch thi s Act s ha l l ta ke effect. Such ri ght. or otherwise provisionally or permanently di s pos ed of by the Government. with the fact of lease. Al l persons claiming ti tle to parcel s of l a nd tha t ha ve been the object of ca dastral proceedi ngs . only wi th respect to such of s aid parcels of land as have not been a l i ena ted. 6 Al though Section 34. or are about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act. and that all taxes.A. .A. to peti ti on for a reopeni ng of the judi ci a l proceedi ngs under the provi sions of Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred a nd fifty-nine. " The oppos i ti on must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of the public domain . but for s ome justifiable rea s on ha d been una bl e to fi l e thei r cl aim in the proper court during the time limit established by l aw.. Suppose the lands office fails to do so? Will legitimate lessees be left at the mercy of government officials? Should the cadastral court close its eyes to the fact of lease that may be proved by the lessees themselves.. a nd i f a fter hea ring the parties. stands on a different footing. i. granted. as amended. gra nted. however.A. is made to cover limited ca s es. It i nvolves a special statute R. But we may well scale the heights of injustice or abet violations of R. leased. l ea s ed. have been. and which is enough to bar the reopening petition? R . "only wi th respect to such of said parcels of land a s ha ve not been 14 5 ." The lessee's right is thus impliedly recognized by R. 931 could not have intended that this situation should happen. From this standpoint. La nd Registration Act.e. The The case at bar.. it s hall order said judicial proceedings reopened a s i f no a cti on ha s been ta ken on s uch pa rcel s . If the land subject of a petition to reopen has already been leased by the government. who a t the ti me of the s urvey were i n a ctua l pos session of the same. 931 if we entertain the view that only the Director of Lands 7 can here properly oppose the reopening petition. and not at all subordinate to. neverthel es s . that petition can no longer prosper. s hall notify the Government through the Sol i ci tor Genera l . res erved. however. and the competent Court of Fi rs t Ins ta nce.SECTION 1. Les s ees ca nnot pres ent i s s ues of owners hi p... no question of ownership need be inquired into pursuant to R. 931. reserved. 931. the rights of the Government. The point is that.A. 3 a l ienated. on account of their failure to file such claims.A. 931. s aid court s hall find that all conditions herein established ha ve been complied with. upon recei vi ng s uch peti tion. 4 "apparently a uthorizes any person claiming a ny ki nd of interest to file a n opposition to an application for registration. in case such parcels of land. interests a nd penalties thereof ha ve been pa i d from the time when land ta x should have been collected unti l the da y when the moti on i s presented. or otherwi s e provisionally or permanently di s pos ed of by the Government. lessees have sufficient legal interest in the proceedings. whi ch allows a petition for reopening on lands "about to be declared" or already "declared land of the public domain" by virtue of judicial proceedings. the opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent of.

[t]he true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and will of the lawmaking body." 15 congressional will. Rea son therefor i s tha t the title of the law may properly be regarded as an index of or clue or guide to legislative intention." 29 TITLE . of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land. i t is easy to s ee that Congres s i ntended to gi ve s ome effect to the ti tl e of R. speaks of parcels of land that "have been.ISSUE: Does the cadastral court have power to reopen the cadastral proceedings upon the application of respondent Lutes? HELD: The fa cts a re: The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were i ns ti tuted on Apri l 12. "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. before the Act."by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted. It wi l l be noted that the title of R. 931. had no legal means of perfecting their titles .A. it provides a mode of relief to landowners who. the title thereof may be resorted to in the ascertainment of 15 .A. 1961. by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." 17 By thi s . s uch ki nd of a ti tl e then "is not to be cl a s s ed wi th words or ti tl es us ed by compi l ers of s ta tu tes " beca us e "i t i s the l egi s l a ture s pea ki ng. purpose of all rules or maxims" in interpretation "is to discover the true intention of the law . under certain conditions. 931. 931 is expressed in its title.. there shoul d be no quibbling as to the fact that R. 1912. but rather . ca rry out a nd give due course to" i ts true i ntent. We ta ke a nother look a t the ti tl e of R.A. however.A. to the end that it may be enforced. It s houl d be certa i n by now tha t when enga ged i n the ta s k of cons trui ng a n obs cure expression i n the law 18 or where exact or literal rendering of the words woul d not ca rry out 19 the l egi s l a ti ve i ntent. There a re many meritorious cases wherei n claimants to certain parcels of land have not had the opportunity to answer or appear at the hearing of cases affecting their claims in the A statute "should be construed according to its 16 spirit and reason. Thi s i s pl a i nl y evi dent from the expl a na tory note thereof. heretofore tra nscribed.by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" Section 1 . disregarding as far as necessary." The body of the statute." There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body. i n its Section 1. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on Jul y 25. OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND. "the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof." 12 In va ryi ng l a ngua ge. TITLE reci tes tha t i t authorizes court proceedings of claims to parcels of land declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act. or are about to be declared land of the public domain. 31 And.. 931." Tha t ti tl e is written "i n ca pital l etters" — by Congress i tsel f. It ca nnot be s eri ous l y di s puted tha t the s ubject of R." 13 They "a re only va luable when they s ubserve thi s purpos e. we do not "correct the a ct of the Legislature. viz: "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT." 21 Wi th the foregoing guideposts on hand." Remedial legislation s hould receive the blessings of liberal construction. 20 For the rea s on tha t by s peci fi c cons ti tuti ona l precept. Fi nal decision was rendered on November 13." 14 In fa ct. 1922. by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act. the letter of the law. "the. a uthorizes "the filing in the proper court. let us go back to the situation that confronts us . 23 It expresses i n language clear the very substance of the law itself. UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. In es s ence . From thi s. 931 i s a piece of remedial l egi s l a ti on." Rea dily to be noted is that the title is not merely composed of catchwords. BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.A.

1. the decision on which was rendered on November 13. This lawproposes to give said persons or claimants their day in court. 1961 peti tion of respondent Bel ong Lutes to reopen Ci vi l Res erva ti on Ca s e No.corresponding cadastral proceedings for lack of sufficient notice or for other reasons and circumstances which are beyond their control. by that s tatute. 16 . COURT HELD tha t claims of title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act. 211 of the ca da s tra l court of Ba gui o." Therefore. comes within the 40-year period. the Jul y 25. GLRO Record No. Thi s measure seeks to remedy the lack of a ny existing l aw within said pers ons or cl a i ma nts wi th meritorious claims or i nterests i n parcels of l and may s eek justi ce a nd protecti on. 1922.

Thi s i s a n ori gi na l a cti on brought i n the Supreme Court. tha t lands held in private ownership are not affected thereby . In the interim of the execution of said contract and its conversion i nto a ri ght in rem upon the res pondent's property. vs ." ISSUE: whether the said Act (No. reads : "an Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of the public domain.' " Secti on two. 17 ." Exa mi ning Act No. The title of the Act. wherein the purpose of the Act i s expressly s tated. res pondent. Its purpos e i s to obta i n a n i nterpretation and a ppl i ca ti on of the i ntent. reads: "The provisions of this Act shall apply to lands of the public domain. tha t even had the Legislature i ntended to include private as well a s publ i c l a nd within the scope of the Act. 2874 i n detail. the intent of the Legislature. and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.G. CENTRAL CAPIZ. 1916. for whi ch s he hol ds a Torrens ti tl e. 2874) is limited in its application to agricultural lands of the public domain. in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned. J. RESPONDENT RAMIREZ contra cted wi th the CENTRAL CAPIZ (petitioner) UNDER the CONTRACT:  CENTRAL CAPIZ (petitioner) wi l l s uppl y RESPONDENT RAMIREZ a l l s uga r ca ne produced upon her pl a nta ti on a term of thi rty yea rs   contra ct wa s to be converted later i nto a ri ght in rem a nd recorded i n the Regi s try of Property a s a n encumbra nce upon the l a nd contra ct wi l l be bi ndi ng upon a l l future owners of the s a me." Secti on three provi des : While title to lands of the public domain remains in the Government. there ca n be littl e ques ti on but tha t i t wa s i ntended to a pply to a nd regulate the sale. land which is held and owned by the respondent. a corporation. pri va tel y owned. lease and other disposition of lands of the public domain. peti ti oner. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the executive officer  first. JOHNSON. No. is to provide simply for the sale. ANA RAMIREZ. 2874 in its entirety. s a i d Act No. this intent fails because under the Act as entitled such attempt would be in direct violation of section three of the Act of Congress of August 29. 2874 of the Phi l ippine Legislature. gathered from a reading of Act No." s o fa r a s it a ffects agricultura l l a nds . second.R. known as the "Public Land Act. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands. 2874 beca me effecti ve. purpos e a nd s cope of Act No.  The onl y ques ti on pres ented i s . and for other purposes. which provides that: "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject. 1920 It i s conceded by the parties tha t the land involved is private agricultural land. or whether its provisions also extend to agricultural lands held in private ownership. a l ways indicative of legislative i ntent. Secti on one of such a ct provides : "That short title of this Act shall be 'The public Land Act. L-16197 March 12. lease and other dis pos i ti on of public lands onl y.: On behalf of the plaintiff i t i s a rgued tha t. tha t i s . The respondent refus ed to execute a deed pursua nt to her obl i ga ti on upon the fa ct tha t more tha n 61 per cent of the ca pital s tock of the petitioner i s hel d a nd owned by pers ons who a re not ci ti zens of the Phi l i ppi ne Is l a nds or of the Uni ted Sta tes . whether or not said Act No.

presents come question as to the character of To the s ame effect are sections four. land sought to be included therein. . etc. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain. by express provisions. a nd ei ghty-s even of the Act. No . . Whatever interpretation said sections 24 and 121 might receive if standing alone. Under the Act as entitled. If said Act. further.. not us ed for industrial or residence purposes. however. while such laws are in force. . of lands of the public domain. . does not apply to lands privately owned by the Government. of the publ i c doma i n. Said section as worded. . it would The doubts of respondent i n that regard a re caused by i nferences drawn from the langua ge us ed i n s ecti ons 24 a nd 121 of the Act. The fi rs t pa ra gra ph of s ecti on 24 provi des : not affect the final outcome of the case. appraisal. and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. i t is not pres umed i t wa s the i ntenti on to i ncl ude pri va te l ands in the Act or s ubject them i n the ma nner i ndi ca ted to a ny s uch a uthori ty. . "s ell" lands held i n private ownership. or a ny rea l ri ght on s uch l a nd a nd i mprovement. and standing alone. any attempt by the Legislature to insert provisions in the body thereof relating to lands of private ownership would be in violation of the provisions of the Jones Law and therefore. when its provisions are read in connection with other sections of the same chapter. available under this Act." were intended to exercise authority and control over the sale or other disposition of lands hold in private ownership.charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act. that i s a t the ti me or wa s originally. it could hardly have been the intent of the Legislature to make the Act applicable to lands held in private ownership by individuals. therefore. or a ny perma nent i mprovement thereon. through the Director of Lands." in order that their ci tizens ma y ha ve the ri ght to a cquire any land a va i lable under this Act. . it is clear they cannot prevail against the general intent of the Act. wherei n executive control is vested in the Director of Lands with respect to the survey. Ina smuch as the Legislature ca nnot vest a uthority i n the Director of La nds to "a ppra i s e" or Secti on 23: Provided. This provision would be altogether a nomalous ha d i t been the i ntent to a ppl y Act No. other than those mentioned in the last preceding section may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other denomination or classification. . classification. The Act nowhere contains any direct or express provision applying its terms to privately owned lands. fi ve. it is only necessary for other countries to gra nt to ci tizens of the Phi l i ppi ne Is lands the right to a cquire "public l ands. This doubt is dispelled. charged "with carrying out the provisions of the Act. 2874 to l a nds hel d i n pri va te owners hi p. derived not only from the language used but from the machinery adopted for giving effect to its provisions. In other words. That citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire public lands as to their own citizens. ***Even should the holding of the court upon this question of intent be different. We hol d. It cannot be contemplated that these officers. who shall act under his immediate control. may. corporation . but not thereafter . tha t the purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. null and void. purchase any parcel of agricultural land . 18 . really or presumptively.

must be treated as non-existent. 173 . can no longer be of any avail where these provisions exist. that such constitutional provision is mandatory . the courts have kept steadily in view the correction of the mischief against which it was aimed. constitute no part of "the public domain. under fee title. Cooley thus sums up in his review of the authorities defining the objects of this provision: "It may therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose of this provision was:   Fi rs t." be considered and treated as though reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain. to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information. the addition of the words "and for other purposes . here under constructions." In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction. which s ubject s hall be expressed i n the ti tl e of the bi ll" — has been considered. 6th ed.173. i s very pl a i n: Tha t the us e of the words "other purposes. Under a ll the authorities wherein the requirement — "That no bi ll shall embrace more than one subject. its title must Jus ti ce Cooley.' In our i nterpretation of sai d Act. i n his work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted. As wa s s aid by the Supreme Court of New York i n a ca se where these words had been made us e of i n the ti tl e to a l oca l bi l l : "The words "for other purpos es " must be laid out of consideration. The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the legislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have approved. the words "and for other purposes" conta i ned i n i ts ti tl e. 1916 ): "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject. i .  a nd ." Inasmuch as agricultural lands in the Philippine Islands held in private ownership. 19 . s ta tes a s fol l ows : One thi ng." Equa l l y may it be said of the Act of the Philippine Legislature here involved. a nd for other purpos es . but the public also. however. the title of Act 2874. Mr. s econd. Jus ti ce Cooley i n his Constitutional Li mi ta ti ons . and not only were legislators thus misled. Nothing which the act could not embrace without them can be brought in by their aid. in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire. They express nothing and amount to nothing as a compliance with this constitutional requirement. wi thout excepti on.It i s provided in s ection 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress of Augus t 29. reads: "An Act to amend a nd compi l e l a ws rel a ti ve to l a nds of the public domain." they cannot come within the purview of Act No. 2874 as it is entitled. 179-180) s tates tha t our courts ha ve hel d. to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation. have been held to be without force or effect whatsoever and have been altogether discarded in construing the Act. third. The object is to prevent the practice of embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each other or to the subject specified in the titl e. As heretofore noted. the words "and for other purposes" when found i n the ti tle.. and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. e .. with a view to cover any and everything whether connect with the main purpose indicated by the title or not." whi ch has heretofore been s o common i n the title to a cts." conta i ned i n i ts ti tl e. through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made. pp. to fairly apprise the people. of the subjects of legislation that are being considered." Appl yi ng the doctrine of the above ca ses to the Act before us for interpretation. "lands of the public domain. ca n onl y be expl a i ned on the theory tha t something different was to be included therein from that previously expressed.

2874 to l a nds of the publ i c doma i n. they become segregated from the mass of public lands. 2874).The words "public land" a re habitually used i n our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws . 2874. therefore. and no law or proclamation thereafter made or issued relating to "public lands" operate upon them.) Our conclusions. Tha t i t was the purpose and intent of the legislature to comply wi th the provi s i ons of the Jones La w a nd to l i mi t the a ppl i ca ti on of Act No. 3. Tha t i t is the uniform holding of the Uni ted Sta tes Supreme Court. 2. or private ownership. cannot be interpreted to include. Tha t lands held in freehold or fee title. and not thos e in which the ri ghts of the public have passed a nd whi ch ha ve become s ubject to s ome i ndi vi dua l ri ght of a s ettl er. by vi rtue of the provisions of secti on 3 of the Act of Congres s of Augus t 29. a nd of other courts i nterpreti ng the phra s e "public lands. i na smuch a s the "s ubject" of such freehold or private l and is not embraced in nay ma nner i n the ti tle of the Act." tha t once s uch lands have been "legally appropriated" by the Government or by individuals. Tha t eliminating the phrase 'and for other purposes" from the ti tle of s aid Act. constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No. 20 . from all of the foregoing are: 1. Tha t the phrase "and for other purposes. the s a me must be considered and treated as though reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain. (s uch as are open to entry a nd settlement." found i n the ti tl e of s a i d Act (No. 5." 4. nor be made applicable to any lands not public. 1916 (the Jones La w).

CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTOR. LIM. SANTIAGO EISMA. On October 6. Arti cle 171 of the Revi s ed Pena l Code (penalizes Falsification by public officer. JR. IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR. vs . 264. 264 has no merit. we on October 8. res pondents .R. INC.R. 1971. ARTURO GUILLERMO. on a specia l ci vi l a cti on (Speci a l Ci vi l Ca s e No. 183 ( (penalizes FALSE TESTIMONY) . PETITIONER EBARLE alleges that:  respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League fa i l ed to compl y wi th the provi s i ons of Executive Order No. The petitioner therea fter went to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur. res pondents . vs . peti ti oners . 264. HON. 1987 BIENVENIDO A.G.. CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTORS. a nd 318 (penalizes OTHER DECEITS committed by a person) of the Revi s ed Pena l Code the petitioner ca me to this Court on certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraini ng order (G. L-33628 December 29. 1048) for prohibition and certiorari wi th preliminary i njunction. JUDGE ASAALI S. IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR. the petitioner instituted G. HELD: The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of Executive Order No. The respondent Court i ssued a res tra i ni ng order. 33628). employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister) . ISSUE: Whether or not respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of Executive Order No. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. Republic Act No. The respondent Anti-Graft League moved to have the same lifted and the case itself dismissed. CESAR TABILIRAN. "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED. fi l ed a compl a i nt wi th the respondent City Fiscal a gainst PETITIONER EBARLE for vi olation of the provisions of the Anti -Graft Law. 3019 (Anti -Gra ft a nd Corrupt Pra cti ces Act). No. ISNANI. 1971. and ARTEMIO ROMANILLOS.OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED. .. RUFINO LABANG." 10 preliminary to their criminal recourses. a s peci a l ci vi l a cti on for certiorari wi th preliminary i njuncti on. HON. peti ti oner. No. 34162 of thi s Court. 264 .. ALBERTO S. 21 CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED. J.. JOSE SAYSON. As ea rl i er noted. No. SUCALDITO. L-34162 December 29. MENELEO MESINA. 1987 BIENVENIDO A. ANTIGRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES. No. Arti cles 182. s ta yed the i mpl ementa ti on of di s mi s s a l order. Inc. EBARLE. MIRUFO CELERIAN. the Honorable Asaali Isnani presiding. RUFINO LABANG.: FACTS: the private respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines." 10 prel i mi na ry to thei r cri mi na l recours es .R. "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS SARMIENTO. and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES. INC. EBARLE. JESUS ACEBES. and MAXIMO ADLAWAN.

If we were to consider the Executive Order a law . "convicted.. the "procedure provided by law and regulations" referred to pertains to existing procedural rules with respect to the presentation of administrative charges against erring government officials . which refers to complaints filed against elective local officials. It i s moreover s i gni fi ca nt tha t the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring officials or employees . It wi l l indeed be noted tha t the term is closely s hadowed by the quali fi ca ti on. " 17 but that does not. a s i tua ti on tha t woul d gi ve ri s e to a Cons ti tuti ona l a noma l y. 19 If it were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions." or "acquitted." that is to say. 15 Pa ra graph 5." 18 whi ch suggests ci vil suits s ubject to previ ous administrative action. The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." the Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto. Furthermore. "after administrative remedies shall have been exhausted. i t i s here ma teri a l i n cons trui ng the i ntent of the mea s ure. which do not require a prior administrative course of action.It i s pl a i n from the very wordi ng of the Order tha t it has exclusive application to administrative. and against any elective barrio official before the municipal or secretary concerned. not even by implication. but because it does not intend to serve as a condition precedent to. removed or otherwise vindicated." Whi l e this is not neces s a ri l y a control l i ng pa ra meter for a l l ca s es . the fact is that there is no reference therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal) recourse. reiterates." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities. the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against public officials. provi di ng tha t "charges against any elective provincial and city officials shall be preferred before the President of the Philippines. 5180. it would have employed such technical terms as "accused". is a reproduction of the provisions of the Police Act of 1966. such a court resort." There is no mention. 22 . The Order i ts el f s hows why. the law on preliminary i nvestigations then in effect. Cl ea rl y. on the other ha nd. much less supplant. so we hold. ves ting upon a "Board of Investigators" 16 the juri s di cti on to try a nd deci de compl a i nts a ga i ns t members of the Phi l i ppi ne pol i ce. cover proceedings such as criminal actions. we woul d be forced to s a y tha t i t i s a n a mendment to Republic Act No. meanwhile. The fi rs t pera mbul a tory cl a us e s ta tes the neces s i ty for i nformi ng the publ i c "of the procedure provided by law and regulations by which complaints against public officials and employees should be presented and prosecuted. "crimes. against any elective municipal official before the provincial governor or the secretary of the provincial board concerned. not because it makes such a resort a secondary measure. not criminal complaints.. the Decentraliza ti on Act of 1967. To be s ure. 12 To our mi nd. there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being] pursued forthwith by the interested parties. Pa ra graph 4. of criminal "offenses. We ca nnot a ccordi ngl y countena nce s uch a vi ew.

Ello fi l ed with the l ower court s epa ra te i nforma ti ons a ga i ns t s i xteen pers ons cha rgi ng them wi th s qua tti ng a s pena l i zed by Presidential Decree No. VICENTE B." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the country. "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks.. As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. Jr. 19 da ted October 2. Mario Aparici. were ra ffl ed to Judge Vicente B. AQUINO. applies to agricultural lands.R. those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private property. ISSUE: whether Presidential Decree No. 1980 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Jr Judge Echaves di s mi s s ed the fi ve i nforma ti ons on the ground s : (1) tha t i t wa s a l l eged tha t the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy". The prea mbl e of the decree i s quoted bel ow: Ins truction No. Vicente de la Serna. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. intimidation or threat. i t ca me to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Fi ve of the i nformations. as complainant all private prosecutor. the Pres i dential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency. the PHHC Ge nera l Ma na ger. like the grazing lands involved in this case. peti ti oners . Ci ty a nd Municipal Mayors. res pondents . Governors . 1972. ABUNDIO R. It i ns i s ted tha t the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class. or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner". MARIO APARICI.. L-47757-61 January 28. a s s uccessor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna whi ch i s s i mi l a r to the other fi fteen i nforma ti ons . Public Work. Geroni mo Oroya n. enter i nto. 772. The i nformation against Mario Aparici s a ys that sometime in the year 1974 conti nuous l y up to the present at barangay Ma gsaysay. is punished by Republic Act No. which penalizes squatting and similar acts. ELLO. GERONIMO OROYAN. rea ds : WHEREAS. J. Ma ri o Apa ri ci . Bohol. Ruperto Ca jes and Modesto Suello were the a ccus ed. No. wherein Ano Dacullo. JR. wi th s tealth and strategy. a nd (2) tha t under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.G. JR. On the other ha nd. occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied. possessed and claimed by Atty. The lower court deni ed the moti on. . as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II. 9 a nd communi ca ti ons . ECHAVES. 772. HON. di recti ng the Secreta ri es of Na ti onal Defense. Soci a l Wel fa re a nd the Di rector of Publ i c Works . Echaves.:p the fiscal a mended the i nformations and asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered a nd tha t the a mended i nforma ti ons be a dmi tted. whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force. 947 whi ch ma kes i t 23 Lower court correctl y rul ed tha t the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. HELD: NO. ANO DACULLO. Fiscal Abundio R. i t s houl d be noted tha t squatting on public agricultural lands. a nd Ci ty a nd Di s tri ct Engi neers . vs . RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO.

unl awful for a ny pers on. corpora ti on or a s s oci a ti on to forci bl y enter or occupy publ i c a gri cul tura l l a nds . Here. the intent of the decree is unmistaka bl e. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. 24 . particularly to illegal constructions. It is intended to apply only to urban communities. through force. Tha t l a w provi des : SECTION 1. s tra tegy or s tealth. i nti mi da ti on. It s hall be unlawful for any person corporation or associa ti on to enter or occupy. threa t. any public agriculture land i ncl udi ng s uch publ i c l a nds a s a re gra nted to private i ndividuals under the provision of the Publ i c La nd Act or a ny other laws providi ng for the of publ i c a gri cul ture l a nds i n the Phi l ippines a nd a re duly covered by the correspondi ng a ppl i ca ti ons for the notwithstanding s tanding the fact that title thereto s ti l l rema i ns i n the Government or for a ny pers on. na tura l or judi ci a l to i nves ti ga te i nduce or force a nother to commi t s uch a cts . The rul e of ejusdem generis i s merely a tool of s tatutory construction which is resorted to when the l egis l a ti ve i ntent i s uncerta i n.

. corpora ti on or to a pri va te i ndi vi dua l or concern. SERGIO OSMEÑA. its enforcement enjoined in s o far a s the wharves. HELD: Plaintiffs The word " public” does not refer to its ownership either by the National Government or by   pa i d the wha rfa ge cha rges under protes t s i nce September 1.. to a muni ci pa l Defendants claim Muni cipal Board's a uthority to pass the ordinance under section 17 (w) of the cha rter of the Ci ty of Cebu. General powers and duties of the Board. CEBU NAVIGATION COMPANY. INC. right to impose wharfage dues rests on a different basis — that of ownership.. and GENERAL SHIPPING CO. PACIFIC LINES. 1965 Lower court: i n using the terms "publ i c wha rves . SOUTHERN ISLAND SHIPPING CORPORATION. GO THONG & COMPANY. l evees . . a province or municipality.. COMPAÑIA MARITIMA. It denotes rather the nature of its use. docks . No. those owned by the City of Cebu and that consequently both fall within the scope of the power granted. THE HON.— (w) To fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves. ESCANO.. Thus public wharves have been held to be those used generally by the public. as City Treasurer of Cebu. THE CITY OF CEBU. vs . ISSUE: whether or not under its charter.. as Mayor of the City of Cebu. defenda nts -a ppel l ees . That the right to charge wharfage i s based on ownership ha s been recogni zed by thi s Court. ROYAL LINES. 207 wa s ena cted by the Muni ci pa l Boa rd. VISAYAN TRANSPORTATION CO. RICHARDS NAVIGATION CO.. or l a ndi ng pl a ces .. JR. COROMINAS. levees.. INC. or landing places. the SECTION 17.. 25 collection of wharfage from shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the National Government.R. docks.. while a private wharf is one whose owner or lessee has exclusive enjoyment or use thereof . CARLOS A." the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the National Government and ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION. INC.. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO. INC.: Ordinance No.G. 1956 fi l ed this action in the Court of First Instance of Ma nila to have the s aid ordi na nce decl ared voi d. J. HIJOS DE F. FELIPE PAREJA. INC. docks a nd other l a nding places belonging to the National Government were concerned.. CEBU-BOHOL FERRY CO. Appellants a s s a i l thi s cons tructi on a s erroneous  i n the light of the general l y accepted meaning of "public wharf" a s i t ma y ha ve a bea ri ng on the ri ght or a uthori ty to cha rge wha rfa ge  i n vi ew of other rel a ted provi s i ons of the s a me ci ty cha rter. free of charge or for compensation. INC. the City of Cebu may provide by ordinance for the MAKALINTAL. So a wha rf may be public whether i t belongs to the Na ti ona l Government. pl a i nti ffs -a ppel l a nts . INC. INC. whi ch s ta tes : Assuming the public character of a wharf by reason of its availability for public use . Wharfage i s a charge a gainst the vessel by wa y of rent or compensation for i ts being allowed to l i e alongside a wharf. a nd a l l the a mounts thus fa r col l ected by defenda nts refunded to them. L-14526 March 31. SWEET LINES SHIPPING..

" constructed and therefore owned by the City of Cebu. It empowers the Municipal Board "to provide for the construction and maintenance. docks . piers. And appellants have a ccordingly been paying to the 26 Na ti onal Government fees for the use of i ts wharves in Cebu. 1371 whi ch took effect on July 1. and landing places. when erected" — undoubtedly referring to those constructed and owned by the ci ty. The court a quo rul ed that Section 17 (w) of the city cha rter is "plainly evi ncive of the power to ta x for revenue purposes." in subsection 2. direction a nd management of the Bureau of Customs. But even if the wharfage dues authorized under Section 17(w) be considered as taxes for revenue. purs ua nt to l a w." a nd therefore the wharfa ge cha rges i mpos ed by ordi na nce purs uant thereto a re proper even i f the amounts a ctually col lected are much more than what ma y be justified as license fees under the police power of regul a ti on of "s hi ppi ng offi ces " gra nted under s ecti on 17 (1) of the s a me cha rter. It authorizes the Municipal Boa rd to fix the charges to be paid by a l l wa tercra fts l a ndi ng a t or us i ng public wha rves . simply because it employed the term "public wharves" in section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu. a nd there is no justifiable ground to read into the statute an intention to burden shipowners. the "public wharves. Secti on 17 (w) of the charter of the Ci ty of Cebu is a ca se in point. it meant to refer to those mentioned in the preceding subsection. Secti on 30 of the cha rter has a simil a r bea ri ng on the ques ti on. wharves. with the obligation of paying twice for the same purpose. The National Government did not surrender such ownership to the city. docks and lev ees. docks. wharves. thereby authorized the latter to collect wharfage irrespective of the ownership of the wharves involved . Thi s i s a ca rdi na l rul e of s ta tutory cons tructi on.It is unreasonable to conclude that the legislature. levees. l evees . and regulate the use. piers. such as appellants. namely. or l a ndi ng pl a ces . according to s ection 1142 of the Revised Administrative Code. There is indeed no distinction therein between public wharves owned by the National Government and those owned by the city itself. etc. levees and other landing places belonging to the City of Cebu and not to those owned by the National Government under the excl us i ve s upervi s i on of the Burea u of Cus toms . 1955 a nd was l a ter on embodi ed i n the new Ta ri ff a nd Cus toms Code. For i n s o fa r a s those belonging to the National Government a re concerned they rema i n under the excl usive control. a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. pa rti cul a rl y Republic Act No. of public landing places. For ta ken i n the a bs tra ct. i n granting to the City Engineer "the care and custody of all public docks. etc. such authority nevertheless is limited to public wharves. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. But the s ubsection i mmediately preceding (v) i mpli edl y es ta bl i s hes s uch a di s ti ncti on." It seems fairly evident that when the lawmaking body used the term "public wharves. Thus an apparently general provision may have a limited application if viewed together with other provisions. .

243.. i n a ccorda nce wi th the provi s i ons of the Ci vi l Code. to i ndemnify the offended pa rty i n the sum of P5. The word "debt". but des i s ted from proceedi ng further when the accused exhibit proof that the property had been extrajudicially constituted and recorded as a family hom e. The conviction a nd sentence beca me fi na l on Apri l 16. "is not qualified and must. 145. The duty of Cha ves to reimburse the amount of the veteran's benefits improperly retained by hi m certainly arose and came into existence from the date of his misappropriation (Ja nuary. J. a ny more tha n a judgment on a promi s s ory note woul d be the ori gi n of the promi s s or's duty to pa y. a s used in s ubdivi s i on (2) of Arti cl e The i ndemnity not havi ng been paid. 1948). vs . therefore. i n tha t he had collected a claim of Marcela Rambuyon for death benefits due her for the dea th of her s on. except: (1) For nonpayment of debts. forced sale or attachment.362. CHAVES. the Marcela Rambuyon obta i ned a wri t of executi on a nd the Sheriff a ccordi ngl y levied on a residential lot and building of the accused. 243. be taken in its generic sense" ( Montoya vs . ECHAVES ta kes the position that the i ndemni ty due to the compl a i na nt beca me a "debt" only from the date of the judgment ordering indemnification. REYES. considering that Article 243 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 54 Off.: FACTS: The accused. ha s been found by the Court of Fi rs t Ins ta nce a nd by the Court of Appeals guilty of a vi olation.362. of "obl i ga ti ons " i n genera l . builders.R. The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution. Esteban Chaves . (2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property. (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such re-cord the corresponding check was cashed by Chaves. That a judgment is not necessary to clothe a preexisting debt with the privileged character of being enforceable against the family home extra judicially establis hed a t a l a ter da te i s a ppa rent by compa ri s on wi th Arti cl e 247 of the Ci vi l Code.e. and the judgment of 1961 merely established the fact of the misappropriation beyond controversy and reasonable doubt. Ga z. of the declaration.. ESTEBAN R.20 for hi ms el f. Igna ci o. (4) For debts due to laborers. material-men and Chaves wa s sentenced to undergo one year i mprisonment. pl a i nti ff-a ppel l ee. architects. others who have rendered Service or furnished material for the construction of the building. defenda nt-a ppel l a nt. . who l a ter del i vered onl y P3.L.20 a nd to pay the costs. mechanics.B. 1964 ISSUE: whether the family home extrajudicially constituted is entitled to exemption. 978-979). Court i s s ued the contes ted order declaring that the family home was not exempt from the levy made by the Sheriff because the accused's obligation to pay the amount wrongfully retained by him was anterior to the constitution of the family home. L-19521 October 30.G. J. i . The judgment s entencing Cha ves to i ndemni fy compl ainant wa s not the s ource of hi s duty to return. No. HELD: We s ee no merit in the appeal. a nd reta i ned P5. 27 ART.20 to the cl a i ma nt. of Republic Act No. 1961.202. years after family home in question was established.

Certa i nl y. and leave the creditors holding an empty bag. and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home of the judgment debtor is worth more than the amount mentioned in Article 231.ART. the constituting debtor should be enabled to escape payment of his just debts. that creditors have no opportunity to oppose or protest. did not include the intent to enable a debtor to prevent the just claims of his creditors. it is only claims not mentioned in Article 243 that must be reduced to judgment before being enforced against the family home. When a creditor whose claim is not mentioned in article 243 obtains a judgment in his favor. he may apply to the Court of First Instance for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. Note tha t under thi s a rti cl e. 247. the "huma ne considerations. 231). there is no reason why in the case of the extrajudicial constitution. If i n the ca se of a judicially established family home the l a w requi res tha t the peti ti oni ng debtor s hould first give s ufficient security for his unsecured debts before the family home i s a uthori zed (Art." for which the law surrounded the home wi th i mmuni ti es from l evy. 28 .

wi th the excepti on of public a gricultural land. i t ha s been hel d tha t since they are neither mineral nor timber lands. the Court rul ed that in determining whether a parcel of land i s a gri cul tura l . bought a residenti a l l ot from the Magdalena Estate. a nd no licence. HELD: Arti cl e XIII. or i ndustrial uses other tha n the devel opment of wa ter "power" i n whi ch ca s es benefi ci a l us e ma y be the mea s ure a nd the l i mi t of the gra nt. exploitation. coal. res pondent a nd a ppel l ee. s ecti on 1. according to its heading and its language. agricultural." And wi th respect to residential lands . and their disposition. the regi s tra ti on of whi ch wa s i nterrupted by the wa r He s ought to a ccomplish said registration but wa s denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground tha t. wa ter. Kriventor a l ien. When this provision. and other mineral oils. and planted with all kinds of vegetation. or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. bei ng a n a l i en. he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. L-630 November 15. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS. its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. and mineral lands of the public domain. subject to any existing right. 1947 established uunder this Constitution. development. ma kes menti on of onl y Krivenko then brought the ca se to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Ma ni l a by mea ns of a consulta. timber and mineral.. of the Cons ti tuti ona l i s a s fol l ows : Article XIII. for this reason. C. Any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation. for the exploitation. Na tura l res ources .: FACTS: Alenxander A. grant. shall not be alienated. timber. The scope of this constitutional provision. embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain. In other words. or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines. namely. but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances. it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups. fi sheries. or utilizati on of a ny of the na tura l res ources s ha ll be gra nted for a period exceeding twenty-five years. No. but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. Inc. of necessity they must be classified as agricultural . . where land is not mining or forestal in its nature. mi nerals.G. SECTION 1. from which Krivenko appealed to this Court. development. or lea s e ALEXANDER A. a gri cul tura l . All agricultural. peti ti oner-a ppel l a nt. lease. and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. with reference to lands of the public domai n. the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural. except as to water ri ghts for i rrigation. concession. KRIVENKO. not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture.J. all forces of potential energy. renewa bl e for a nother twenty-five years. CITY OF MANILA. water s upply. ti mber a nd mi nera l l a nds . or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government 29 are neither mineral or timber lands. it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land. vs . The phrase "agri cultural public lands " mea ns "those public lands acquired from Spain which ISSUE: whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.R. a nd tha t court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds. and may be converted into a field. MORAN. petroleum.

for. (II Sutherl a nd. but a fter the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwea l th Act No. 2874." Soon a fter the Constitution was adopted. . which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands. Wel l known is the rule tha t "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted. 59 a nd 60 thereof permit the s a l e of res idential l ots to Filipino ci tizens or to associations or corpora ti ons control l ed by s uch ci ti zens . such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution. and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. . 2874. and which they possessed. to aliens. 141. lands that are residential. 141. therefore. 30 . . and timber. and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. technical meaning in legal and constitutional history. p. Prior to the Constitution. prior to the Constitution. a gain. and where such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution. under the Constitution. under section 24 of Publ i c La nd Act No. are obviously technical. commercial. 141 whi ch cl a s s i fi es "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition.Wha tever the test might be. a s us ed in the Cons ti tuti on. And. terms employed therein shall be given the meaning which had been put upon them. land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens. and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used . but not sold. If a word has acquired a fixed. lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural. industrial. and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral. It ma y s a fel y be pres umed.) Therefore. The term "public agricultural lands" ha s both a broa d a nd a pa rti cul a r mea ni ng Under its broad or general meaning. tha t what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. a l though the s ens e ma y va ry from s tri ct l i tera l mea ni ng of the words . but a fter the Constitution a nd under s ection 23 of Commonwealth Act No. a nd sections 58. Thi s broa d mea ni ng i s pa rti cul a ri zed i n s ecti on 9 of Commonwea l th Act No. it is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning . in construing constitutions. at the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument . 141. Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions. or lands for other purposes. it wi l l be presumed to have been empl oyed i n tha t s ens e i n a wri tten Cons ti tuti on. it embraces all lands that It i s a fundamenta l rul e tha t. the National Assembly revi s ed the Public Land Law a nd passed Commonwealth Act No. the fact remains tha t at the time the Constitution was adopted. undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out. and as including residential lands . mineral. Sta tutory Cons tructi on. Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning. such land may only be leased. into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes. 758. the phrase "public agricultural lands" a ppearing i n section 1 of Arti cle XIII of the Cons ti tuti on must be construed as including residential lands. are neither timber nor mineral. under secti on 57 of Publ i c La nd Act No. only agricultural lands may be alienated. aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes. the rul e of construction requires that the words us ed i n s uch s ta tute s houl d be cons trued a ccording to the s ense i n whi ch they ha ve been s o previ ous l y us ed.

31 . and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition. therefore. ***Thi s opinion i s important not alone becaus e i t comes from a Secra ta ry of Jus ti ce who l a ter became the Chief Justice of thi s Court.. known as the Philippine Bill. mi nera l a nd ti mber. Thi s i s the ba s i c cl a ssification a dopted since the enactment of the Act of Congres s of Jul y 1. 175. The Supreme Court of the Philippines i n the l eading case of Mapa vs. the term 'agricultural public lands' and. . they must be classified as agricultural. Wa y ba ck i n 1939. Insular Government. acquired a technical meaning in our public laws." rendered the following short. sharp and crystal-clear opinion: Secti on 1. ti mber a nd mi nera l . And the opinion of the Quezon a dministration executive — have a lways maintained that lands of the publ i c doma i n a re cl a s s i fi ed i nto a gri cultural. legislative and ***Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of the Government. Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos. a nd i t was firmly ma i nta i ned i n thi s Court by the Sol i ci tor Genera l of both a dmi ni s tra ti ons . . they are neither timber nor mineral. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. Residential commercial. commercial. hel d tha t the phra s e 'a gri cultural public l ands' means thos e public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands . At the time of the a doption of the Constituti on of the Phi l i ppi nes . wa s reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña a dministration. 10 Phi l . and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes . Arti cle XII (now XIII) of the Constitution cl a s s i fi es l a nds of the publ i c doma in i n the Philippines into agricultural. therefore. It i s thus cl ear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial. . 1902. of necessity.The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. i n a ns wer to a query a s to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential. but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly. a nd tha t a gri cul tura l l a nds i ncl ude res i denti a l l ots .

. It i s a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phra s e repea ted i n a s ta tute will bear the same meaning throughout the s ta tute. 758. and. no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals. markets. 5. the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions. unl es s a di fferent i ntenti on a ppears. hatcheries. Sta tutory Cons tructi on. and. a irfields. 32 For a l l the foregoi ng. factories. therefore. the same technical meaning s hould be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. Section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Si nce "a gri cul tura l l a nd" under s ecti on 1 i ncl udes residential l ots. fisheries. s trictly a gricultural. be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural.) The onl y di fference between "a gri cultural l and" under section 5. health and va ca ti on resorts." a nd that "they ma y va lidly buy a nd hold i n their names lands of a ny a rea for building homes. p. in a ppellant's words. corporations.section 5 is included in Article XIII. and whole towns and cities . Both sections must. for the conservation of the national patrimony." (II Sutherl a nd. na mel y. It mus t be noti ced tha t the pers ons a gainst whom the prohibition is directed i n section 5 a re the very s ame persons who under section 1 a re disqua l i fi ed "to a cqui re or hol d l a nds of the publ i c doma i n i n the Phi l i ppi nes . i s that the former is public a nd the latter private. But such di fference refers to ownership and not to the class of l and. Save in cases of hereditary succession.) Tha t thi s is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution i s beyond ques ti on. Thi s constitutional provision closes the only remaining a venue through whi ch a gri cul tura l res ources ma y l ea k i nto a l i ens ' ha nds . without costs. playgrounds. 6. accordingly. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. schools. golf courses. we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands. judgment is affirmed. and it reads as follows: Sec. the non tra ns ferability of "a gricultural l and" to a l i ens . p. i ndustrial plants. The lands a re the s a me i n both s ecti ons. what is i mportant is the nature or cl a ss of the property regardless of whether i t i s owned by the Sta te or by i ts ci ti zens . and a host of other us es a nd purposes that are not." And the s ubject ma tter of both s ecti ons i s the s a me." (Solicitor General's Bri ef. including residential lands.

and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS. refer to the da te when a l l the ta x wa s pa i d. 292. no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment. or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment) as claimed by private respondent? Ruling: Peti ti on deni ed. 1988. 525. or i ns talment of the total annual income ta x due. 1981. Reasoning: Sec. res pondents GUTIERREZ. declared a net l oss of P6. 1982. 1981. INC. the pres cri pti ve peri od of 2 yea r vs . as contended by petitioner. Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dated April 29. i ts Annual Income Tax Return for the yea r ended December 31. On Apri l 29. but jus t wha t s eem to be the mos t i mporta nt pa rts ): “When a tax i s paid i n i ns ta l ments . 1984. J.R. In i ts assailed decision. it s aid (this isn’t the whol e thi ng. Duri ng the subsequent quarters . Thi s rul e proceeds from the theory that i n contemplation of tax l a ws . 1981) a nd the fi l i ng of the cl a i m i n Court (Ma rch 14. 1984). 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. JR. 1988 is affirmed.00 On Jul y 9.00 representing overpaid income tax under Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code Cl a i m was not a cted upon by the CIR a nd on Ma rch 14. peti ti oner. 306 of our Revenue Code have been uniformly held to refer to the enti re ta x a nd not a porti on thereof a nd the voca bl e ‘pa yment of ta x’ within s tatutes requiring refund claim. there i s no pa yment until the whole or entire ta x liability i s completely pa i d. 83736 January 15. fi l ed with the Appellate Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) a claim for refund in the amount of P247. 156.. Court of Tax Appeals gra nted the petition of TMX a nd ordered CIR to refund the amount claimed. TMX filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals a ga inst CIR. TMX thru its external auditor. 1982. praying that petitioner be ordered to refund to TMX the s a i d a mount repres enti ng overpa i d i ncome ta x. CIR res ponded by s aying that petitioner TMX Sales i s a lready barred from cl aiming the sa me cons idering that more than 2 yea rs had a l rea dy el a ps ed between the pa yment (Ma y 15.: Facts: TMX Sales fi l ed i ts quarterly income tax return for the first quarter of 1981 a nd cons equentl y pa i d a n i ncome ta x on Ma y 15. No. TMX SALES. The Tax Court vi ewed the quarterly i ncome tax paid as a portion 33 provi ded i n Sec.G. 292 (now Sec. 306 (now Sec. SGV & Co. Issue: Does the 2-year prescriptive period to claim a refund of erroneously collected tax provided for in Sec. 1992 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. it suffered losses s o tha t when it filed on Apri l 15. pa r. 010. 2 of the Na ti ona l Interna l Revenue Code provi des tha t “In any case. In thi s rega rd the word ‘ta x’ or words ‘the ta x’ i n s ta tutory provi s i ons compa rable to Sec.” Peti ti oner CIR now s eeks revers a l of a bove deci s i on. 292) of the Revenue Code s houl d be counted from the date of the final payment or l ast instalment.” . not when a porti on wa s pa i d.

Si nce the 2-year peri od s houl d In the ca se. the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. 87 requires the filing of an adjustment returns and final payment of income tax. TMX i s not yet ba rre d by pres cri pti on. provi s i on or cl a use of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other i n order to a rri ve a t the effect contempl a ted by the l egi s l a ture. the Court considered not only Sec. then it is the Final Adjustment Return. i n resolving the case. 1982. Sec. 1981. 85 provides for a method of computing corporate quarterly income tax which is on a cumulative basis while Sec. Since the audit. Thus . 292 but also other provi s i ons of the Ta x Code. Every s ecti on. then a l i tera l a ppl i ca ti on woul d l ea d to a bs urdi ty a nd i nconveni ence. 292 provi des a 2 yea r prescriptive period to file a s uit for a refund of a ta x erroneously or i llegally paid. where the figures of the gross receipts and deductions have been audited and adjusted. and in order to discover said intent. 321. when the Final Adjustment Return for the year ended December 1981 was filed. 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from the time of the filing of the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of tax. Tax Return. if the quarter in which overpayment is made cannot be ascertained. the date when the quarterly income tax was paid and not April 15. whi ch s ta ted tha t s ta tutes s hould receive a s ensible construction. the amount claimed by TMX Sales based on its Adjustment Return is equivalent to the tax paid during the first quarter. should be considered. Thus . However. The most reasonable and logical application of the law would be to compute the 2-year prescriptive period at the time of filing the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income 34 be counted from the filing of Adjustment Return on April 15. 1984. TMX fi led a suit for a refund on Ma rch 14. an audit of the books of accounts has to be conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Court ci ted People v. Sec. . s uch a s wi l l gi ve effect to the l egi s l a ti ve i ntention and so as to avoid a n unjust or a n a bsurd conclus i on. and not only a part thereof. counted from the ti me the ta x was paid. Rivera. 292 would thus pos e no probl em a s the two-year prescriptive period from the time the quarterly i ncome ta x was paid ca n easily be determined. 000 be a udited a nd examined yea rl y by a n i ndependent Certi fi ed Publ i c Accounta nt thei r i ncome ta x returns be a ccompa ni ed by rel eva nt documents . It is generally recognized that before an accountant can make a certification on the financial statements or render and auditor’s opinion. 1982. 292 of the NIRC s hould be i nterpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Ta x Code i n order to give effect the l egislative intent and to a voi d a n a ppl i ca ti on of the l a w whi ch ma de lead to i nconvenience a nd absurdity. 321 of the NIRC requires that the books of accounts of companies or persons wi th Sec. The i ntenti on of the l egi s l a tor mus t be a s certained from the whole text of the law a nd every part of th e act i s to be taken into vi ew. In thi s case. it is only when the Adjustment Return covering the whole year is filed that the taxpayer would know whether a tax is still due or a refund can be claimed based on the adjusted and audited figures. Consequently. gros s quarterly sales or earnings exceeding P25. the whole statute. A l i teral application of Sec. Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unravelled by the four corners of the statute. as required by Sec. The filing of quarterly income tax returns and payment should only be considered mere instalments of the annual tax due. when it can finally be ascertained if the taxpayer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax. is to be conducted yearly.Petitioner contends tha t the basis in computing the two-year period of prescription should be May 15. Where there i s a mbi gui ty. Al s o. that is truly reflective of the results of the operations of a business enterprise. Sec. s uch i nterpreta ti on a s wi l l a voi d i nconveni ence a nd a bs urdi ty i s to be a dopted.

etc. a voi d s ca nda l .: FACTS: and distribution of justices of the peace" with the proviso in said section ". a s jus ti ce of the pea ce. defenda nt-a ppel l ee.G.R. a dopted Act No." It provi des that one justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice shall be appointed by the Governor-General. . s ubject to the condi ti ons pres cri bed by l a w. composed of the Senate a nd House of Representatives . whi ch wa s " an Act to amend and repeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code relative to the judiciary i n order to reorga ni ze the l a tter. vs . for each municipality organized according to the Municipal Code." there is also nothing in the title of the Act. (3107). privileges. JOHNSON. wi th a uthority "to have a nd to hold the said office with all the powers.. That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years. are found in section 1 of Act No. 3107 Julio Agcaoili bei ng threatened with a cri minal prosecution unless he turned his office. . ALBERTO SUGUITAN. 35 . del i vered the pos s es s i on of hi s offi ce."    jurisdiction of justices of the peace defining the "qualifications for justices of the peace "filling of vacancies in the office of justices of the peace." valid and constitutional. L-24806 February 13. ves ti ng the Secretary of Justice with a uthority to detail a district judge tempora ri l y to a di s tri ct or provi nce other tha n hi s own. a dvi s i ng hi m tha t he cea s es to be a jus ti ce of the pea ce s i nce he ha s rea ched the a ge of s i xty-fi ve yea rs Julio Agcaoili entered a protes t a l l egi ng that Act No. provi des onl y for "regulating the salaries of justices of the peace. to serve "during good behavior?"  regulating the salaries of justices of the peace . 1926 Notwi thstanding the fact that the title of said Act No. by His Excellency. section 1. a nd provi des a mong other thi ngs for the "appointment and term of the justices of the peace. No. Sa id section is amendment to s ection 67 of Act No. di s gra ce a nd humi l i a ti on whi ch mi ght come to hi m by vi rtue of s a i d pros ecuti on." s a id Act i n section 203 provi des for " the appointment JULIO AGCAOILI. 2041. when applied to justices of the peace appointed under Act No. 2041. J. 3107. i ncrea s i ng the s a l a ri es of judges of Courts of Fi rs t Ins ta nce. i n the slightest degree. 3107 does not cover those justices of the peace who had already been appointed justices of the peace the passage and enactment of said Act No. a nd emoluments thereunto of ri ght apperta i ni ng unto hi m. Said section further provides that "All justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior . 1916. The conditions prescribed by law " to whi ch the appointee wa s "s ubject" a t the ti me of hi s a ppointment. shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years." Undersecretary of Justice s ent a l etter Julio Agcaoili. . 3107. and to Philippine Legislature. ISSUE: Is the provision of Act No. 136. whi ch. i ndicates that sai d Act conta i ns provi s i ons for:  "appointment of justices of the of the peace" nor as to the period during which they may serve after appointment Tha t the said Julio Agcaoili wa s a ppoi nted a s justice of the peace of the muni ci pa l i ty of La oa g. on the 25th da y of Ma rch. in so far as it provides that "justices of the peace    i ncrea s i ng the number of judges for certa i n judi ci a l di s tri cts . pl a i nti ff-a ppel l a nt. Francis Burton Harrison. . .

unless the same be commenced within five years after the act complained of was done or committed. Subparagraph 16 of s ection 3 of the Jones law provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject. with threats and intimidation. arose." we a re forced to the conclus i ons tha t. 1923. to defeat his action of quo warranto? United States Philippine Commission a dopted Act No. ordered to l eave his office as justice of the peace. o que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar el cargo." The s a me s ecti on (216). by means of threats a nd i ntimi da ti on. by force and intimidation. provi ded tha t "Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter. unless the same be commenced within five years after the commission or omission complained of took place. it is difficult to understand how in the same action they may be used as a defense against a public officer who has been forcibly. a nd s hould therefore be restored to his position as justice of the peace of the municipality of La oa g. Said Act No. and who has. a menos que el juicio se lleve a efecto dento de los cinco años siguente a la comision u omision del hecho objeto de la accion. and that said law (3107) cannot be applied to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the 17th day of March. a s publ i s hed i n Spa ni s h. 3107 which indicates in the slightest degree that said Act contains a provision "that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years. Neither may an action be brought against an officer 36 . Tampocose podra iniciar un juicio la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporaciuon para desposeerla. void and contrary to the mandatory provision of the Jones Law. Section 216. a nd that when Julio Agcaoili was forcibly." Sa i d provision of the Jones La w was mandatory and not directory and its violation was fatal to any provision of the law to which no reference was made in the title Considering that there is nothing in the title of Act No. nor shall an action be brought against an officer to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause of such ouster. and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. or the right to hold the office. ousted from a public office by the Government itself as was done in the present case. wi thout del a y. nei ther could there be. in English. rea ds a s fol l ows : " Ninguna de estas ISSUE: (b) Is the present action barred by the statutes of limitations? HELD: It ma y be s a i d tha t originally there was no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto. Is there a statute in the Philippine Islands of limitation." Sa i d s ection (216). rea ds a s fol l ows : "Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of its corporate rights. disposiciones facultara la iniciacion de un juicio contra una corporacion por la perdida de sus derechos de concesion. he was forced to do so illega l l y. that provision is illegal. 190 whi ch ha d been cons i dered pri va tel y a nd publ i cl y for s evera l months theretofore. limiting the action of a public official of the Government who has been duly appointed and qualified. If the statute of limitation or prescription cannot run against the state. wi thout jus t ca us e. and issues as a matter of course upon demand of the proper officer and the court has no authority to withhold leave to file a petition therefor. for the reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government. 190 was published in both English and Spanish.HELD: The "Jones Law" is the constitution of the Philippine Islands provi di ng a government therefor. In a l l publ i c ma tters a writ of quo warranto i s a writ of right at the suit of the state. a s published i n Spanish a nd tra ns l a ted i nto Engl i s h . been ousted from such office. a menos que se lleve a efecto dentro del año siguente a la fecha de la comision del hecho que dio motivo a su privacion.

that it only applied to officers of corporations as it appeared in the Spanish translation. to divide sentences and parts of the sentences. The appellant. i t will be s een that after the word "committed" there is a semicol on . but the reading of the three or four sections immediately preceding section 216 will show that they refer specifically to corporations only. a degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma ." the Spanish copy of the Public Laws are consulted by the people in remote parts of the Philippine Islands for the purpose of knowing what the law is. therefore. a degree greater than that expressed by a comma . little more pronounced than the comma. The comma and semicolon are both used for the same purpose. namely. a nd what follows that s emicolon must have relation to the same matter which precedes i t. therefore. the only difference being that the semicolon makes the division a 37 . The punctuation used in a law may always be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a doubtful statute . It follows therefore that. Does that which follows the semicolon have reference to the same subject matter which precedes it? A s emicolon i s a mark of grammatical punctuation. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a thought. to i ndi ca te a s eparation i n the relation of the thought. unless the same is commenced within one year after the commission of the act which caused the deprivation thereof. or after the right to hold the office arose. is the same applicable to the appellant ? By reference to s a i d s ecti on a bove quoted i n English. tha t the appellant did not believe that said section 216 applied to public officers. But. Not onl y had the appel l a nt the ri ght to rel y upon the provi s i ons of s ecti on 216 a s they a ppeared in Spanish in the Public Laws of the Philippine Isla nds . inasmuch as all of the provisions of said section 216 which precede the semicolon refer to corporations only.to oust him from office. was justified in believing that said section 216 as it appeared in Spanish was correct. or to officers of a corporation. It i s not s tra nge. i n the Engl i s h l a ngu a ge. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. even granting that the appellant is bound by the provisions of section 216 as it appears in English. that which follows the semicolon has reference to the same subject matter.

but only as a preventive measure. Inc. thus vi olating the due process cl ause". res pondents -a ppel l a nts . As s uch ma na ger a nd ca s hi er. one Simplicio Balcos . nevertheless. wa s at the ti me of his s uspens i on. After hea ring of this special civil a ction. requi red petitioner to a nswer why he s hould not be summarily dismi s s ed from the s ervi ce for a cts BIENVENIDO NERA. Petitioner then filed the present special action of prohibition. fi l ed a n a dmi ni s tra ti ve compl a i nt ca s e. J. he s erved a s manager and cashier of the Maternity Employee's Cooperative Association. husband of the suspended administrative officer and cashier of the Maternity and Children's Hospital . Secretary of Health. the charges a re established and the person investigated is found gui l ty of a cts 38 . to annul the order of suspension a nd to compel respondents to lift the suspension. fi rs t becaus e the suspension came before he was able to file his answer to the administrative complaint. thereby depriving him "of his right to a fair hearing and an opportunity to present his defense. peti ti oner-a ppel l ee. If a fter s uch i nvestigation. that assuming for a moment that peti ti oner were guilty of malversation or misappropriation of the funds of the association. Petitioner Nera. HELD: In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his a ns wer to the a dmi ni s tra ti ve compl a i nt. the appealed decision was suspended. L-13160 January 30. for a l l egedl y mi s a ppropri a ti ng the s um of P12. Some months a fter the fi l i ng of the cri mi na l ca s e.21 bel ongi ng to the a s s oci a ti on. vs . said irregularity had no connection with his duly as clerk of the Maternity and Children's Hospital. a government institution under the s upervi sion of the Burea u of Hos pi ta l s a nd the Depa rtment of Hea l th. na med Gregoria Balcos . On Ma y 11. 1956. No. MONTEMAYOR. serving as clerk in the Maternity and Children's Hospital. PAULINO GARCIA. 1960 Antonio Rodriguez.G. Petitioner a s ked respondents for a reconsideration of his suspension. l i fti ng of the s us pens i on of peti ti oner. certi ora ri a nd ma nda mus to restrain respondents from proceeding with the administrative case against him until after the termination of the criminal case. Sus pension i s a preliminary s tep i n a n administrati ve i nves ti ga ti on. whi ch request was denied. Nera recei ved a communi ca ti on from respondent Director of Hospital suspending him from office as clerk of the Maternity and Children's Hospital. Director of Hospitals.recommended to respondents the FACTS: Respondents a re a ppea l i ng the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila orderi ng them to reinstate petitioner Bienvenido Nera to hi s former pos i ti on as clerk in the Maternity and Children's Hospital.: i nvol vi ng di s hones ty. he was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with malversation. In the cours e of hi s empl oyment. The petitioner a s ked the PCAC to i ntervene on his behalf . a nd to pa y hi m hi s ba ck s a l a ry from the da te of hi s s us pens i on unti l rei ns ta tement.636. effective upon recei pt thereof. a civil service eligible. acting for and in the absence of the Director of Hospitals . and TRANQUILINO ELICANO. fi nds of the a s s oci a ti on were under hi s control . Thi s s us pens i on ca rri ed the a pprova l of respondent Garcia.R. s uffi ce i t s a ys tha t the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office. Secretary of Health.

the Ma terni ty Empl oyee's Cooperative Association that own. oppres s i on a nd di s hones ty l es s di s pos ed a nd prepa red to res i s t a nd to countera ct hi s e vi l a cts a nd a ctua ti ons . if the charge against such subordinate or employee involves dishonesty. whi ch refers to the s ame subject matter of [preventive s us pens i on. he is given more and ample opportunity to commit a cts of di s hones ty a ga inst his fellow men. pending a n investigation of the charges against s uch officer or pending a n i nvestigation of his bureau or office. Moreover. 2260. Removal or suspension. or to believe that the performance of duty . dishonesty and oppression to warrant punishment or dismissal. With the a pproval of the proper Hea d of Depa rtment. The President of the Philippines ma y s us pend a ny chi ef or a s s i s ta nt chi ef of a burea u or offi ce a nd i n the a bs ence of s peci a l provi s i on. the chief of a bureau in hi s burea u or under hi s a uthori ty pendi ng a n i nves ti ga ti on. thereby making clear the person charged is guilty merely to neglect. Wi th the a pproval of the proper head of department. he enjoys a nd posses s es a certa i n i nfluence a nd power which renders the vi ctims of hi s gra ve mi s conduct. pendi ng a n i nves ti ga ti on of hi s burea u or offi ce. but tha t when he is charged with dishonesty. any other offi cer 39 by placing a comma after the words "grave misconduct. throws s ome l i ght on thi s s eemi ng a mbi gui ty. (Emphasis supplied). The Government ca nnot well tolerate in i ts s ervice a dishones t offi ci a l . even a gainst offices and entities of the Government other tha n the offi ce where he is employed. oppression or grave misconduct these need have no relation to the performance of duty . There is nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard and he given an opportunity to prove his innocence. or if there are strong reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service. — The President of the Philippines may s uspend a ny chi ef or a s sistant chief of a bureau or office a nd i n the a bsence of special provision. or employee i nvolves dishonesty. they a ffect hi s right to continue i n office. if th e charge agains t s uch officer. or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty. It wi l l be noticed that it i ntroduces a small change into Section 694 of the Revised Penal Code SEC. even i f he performs hi s duti es correctl y a nd wel l . In other words. oppression. Preventive Suspension. the same must be in the performance of his duty. the funds said to have been misappropri a ted i s a private entity. We reproduced s a i d s ecti on 34. need not be committed in the course of them performance of duty by the person charged. then he i s removed or di s mi s s ed.wa rra nting his remova l . whi ch for purpos e of reference we reproduced bel ow: a ppointed by him. " s o tha t the phrase "in the performance or neglect" now qualifies only the last word "neglect". It ma y not be amiss to s tate here tha t the alleged misappropriation involved in the criminal case is not entirely disconnected with the office of the petitioner. thi s i nvolves an i nterpretation of Section 694 of the Revi s ed Admi ni s tra ti ve Code. i t wa s beca us e he wa s a n empl oyee of t he . 34. True. and by reason of his office. known as the Ci vil Service Act on 1959. if petitioner was designated to a nd occupi ed the pos i ti on of ma nager a nd ca s hi er of s a i d a s s oci a ti on. Thi s i s the pena l ty. beca us e by rea s on of hi s government position. a ny other offi cer a ppointed by him. — No offi cer or empl oyee i n the ci vi l s ervi ce s ha l l be removed or s us pended except for ca us e a s provi ded by l a w. oppression or grave misconduct. thereby warranting the conclusion that only the phrase "grave misconduct or neglect "is qualified by the words "in the performance of duty". It wi l l be observed from the last four lines of the s econd pa ra gra ph tha t there is a comma after the words dishonesty and oppression. As to the holding of the trial court about dishonesty or misconduct in office having connection with one's duties and functions in order to warrant punishment. Secti on 34 of Republic Act No. the chi ef of a bureau or office may l ikewise preventively s uspend any s ubordina te offi cer or empl oyee i n his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation. even if said defects of character are not connected with his force. If a Government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct. 694. SEC.

40 . i n the opi ni on of s ome. ra ther remote.Ma ternity a nd Children's Hospital. The contention though i ndi rect. a nd. exi s ts a nd i s there.

L-8782 April 28. 304. 879 was to include SEC. a s s hown by the fol l owi ng quota ti on from the Congres s i ona l Record: . 1956 Fi nance. whi ch i s due on Ja nua ry 2. 2. ZANDUETA. upon a ppl i ca ti on of a l l pers ons s pecified in s ection one hereof and within one year from the a pprova l of thi s Act. 1953. i s further a mended to rea d: to all antecedents "the Government. i n the a mount of P22. 1953. a nd under s uch rules and regulations a s may be promul ga ted by the Secreta ry of 41 veterans of the Philippine Army and their wives or orphans among the beneficiaries of the Backpay Law. or to a ny ci tizen of the Philippi nes . peti ti oners -a ppel l a nts . The contention of the respondent-appellee. or the corporations owned or control by the Government. 897 a pproved on June 20. 1721 da ted October 6. 3. ISSUE: whether the clause "who may be willing to accept the same for settlement" refers 4.: FACTS: 1. 1954. Florentino i s a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. No.. vs . etc. The Trea surer of the Philippi nes s ha l l . but the respondent bank refus ed to a ccept petitioner's offer to pay the said indebtedness with the l a tter's ba ckpa y certi fi ca te. provided that the face va lue of s uch certi fi ca te of i ndebtedness shall not exceed the a mount tha t the a ppl i ca nt ma y need for the pa yment of (1) obl i ga ti ons s ubs i s ti ng a t the ti me of the a pprova l of thi s a mendatory Act for whi ch the a pplicant may directly be liable to the Government or to a ny of i ts branches or i nstrumentalities. acknowledge and fi l e re ques ts for the recogni ti on of the ri ght of the s a l a ri es or wa ges a s provi ded i n s ecti on one hereof.896. Philippine National Bank i s tha t said qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents. J. 2. who ma y be wi l l i ng to a ccept the s a me for s uch s ettl ement. any of its branches or instrumentalities. i t may be s tated that one of the purposes of Republic Act No. 1954. Secti on two of the said Act (Republic Act 304) a s amended by Republ i c Act Numbered Ei ght hundred. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK. FLORENTINO and LOURDES T. or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. Republic Act No. whi ch provi des : SEC. 879.." or only the last antecedent "any citizen of the Philippines.33 by vi rtue of Republ i c Act No. i n recognition of their great sacrifices i n the res i s ta nce movement. whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent. a nd certify that it s hall be redeemed by the Government of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their i ssuance wi thout i nterest: Provided. 2. 1953.. the corporations owned or controlled by the Government. Tha t the s a i d loan is secured by a mortgage of real properties. petitioners offered to pa y thei r l oa n wi th the res pondent bank with their backpay certifica te. Tha t the petitioners a re i ndebted to the respondent bank i n the a mount of P6.800 pl us i nterest. Tha t on December 27. a nd. Inci dentally. Tha t the petitioner Marcelino B.R.G. a nd noti ce of s uch MARCELINO B. JUGO. res pondent-a ppel l ee. a cknowledgment shall be issued to the applicant which shall state the total amount of s uch salaries or wa ges due the a pplicant. the same havi ng been incurred on Ja nua ry 2. or to a ny a s s oci a ti on or corpora tion organized under the laws of the Phil i ppi nes . The l ega l provi s i on i nvol ved i s s ecti on 2 of Republ i c Act No. Tha t upon a pplication a nd s ubject to s uch rul es a nd regul a ti ons a s ma y be a pproved by the Secreta ry of Fi na nce a certi fi ca te of i ndebtedness may be issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering the whole or a pa rt of the tota l s a l a ri es or wa ges the ri ght to whi ch ha s been dul y a cknowledged a nd recognized.

Gra mmatically... association. Secondl y. In the first place. for it would amount to an impairment of the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal one. to eliminate the discrimination that has been committed either through oversight. against the members of the Philippine Army." whi ch s epa ra tes s a i d phra s e from the precedi ng ones ." It should be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to a ny ci ti zen. and to their wives or orphans . . . who had served during the Ja panese Occupati on. would render section 2 of Republic Act No. Another reason is that it i s matter of general knowledge that many officials and employees of the Phi lippine Government. The Secretary of Justice. 304. 897 unconstitutional. But even disregarding the grammatical construction. to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen. tha t i s. the Philippine Scouts. And thi rdl y. who joined the resistance movement. or corporation. 42 . the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent. 226. as done by the appellee. and particularly to those who have given their all for the cause of the last war . which are not government entities or owned or controlled by the government. etc. s eri es of 1948. i n his Opini on No. "a ny ci ti zen of the Phi l i ppi nes or a ny a s s oci a ti on or corpora ti on orga ni zed under the l a ws of the Phi l ippines. ha ve a l rea dy recei ved their backpay certificates a nd used them for the payment of the obliga ti ons to the Government and its entities for debts i ncurred before the a pproval of Republ i c Act No. to serve as a source of financial aid to needy veterans. or on purpose. stil l there a re cogent a nd powe rful rea s ons why the qua l i fyi ng cl a us e s houl d be l i mi ted to the l a s t a ntecedent. 1228. and guerrillas or the so-called civilian volunteers. to give recognition to the sacrifices of those who joined the last war. h el d tha t the phrase "who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement" qualifies only its immediate antecedent and does not apply to the Government or its agencies. like crippled or disabled veterans. has been filed by this public serva nt for three objectives: Fi rs t. House Bill No. Thi s particular bill.

wi th emphasis on the words "other". oppression. FACTS: Miguel R. the fi rs t na med bei ng the provi nci a l governor of tha t provi nce. The fi rst cited section. hinges on the power of a provincial governor a nd a provincial board to s us pend a municipal president who has been convicted i n the Court of Firs t Ins ta nce of the cri me of fa l s i fi ca ti on of a pri va te document. 2188. MALCOLM. 2189. Cornejo wa s unti l recentl y occupyi ng the position of municipal president of Pasay . oppression. Thereafter. For mi nor del i nquency he ma y repri ma nd the offender.R. Municipal President of Pasay. a nd cons tructi ng this word independently of what follows would give it a meaning which would include conviction of the crime of falsification of a private document. The respondents woul d lay emphasis on the word "corruption". rea ds a s fol l ows : Supervisory authority of provincial governor over municipal officers . or other form of ma l administra ti on i n offi ce . It wi l l not es ca pe a ttenti on tha t the charges against the municipal officer must be one "affecting the official integrity" of the officer in question" a nd tha t the cha rge must be in the nature of a complaint "for neglect of duty. if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. — The provincial governor s hall receive a nd i nves ti ga te compl a i nts ma de under oa th a ga inst municipal officers for neglect of duty. Provincial Governor of Rizal JOSE M. Perez. Where suspension is thus effected. the written charges agains t the offi cer s ha l l be fi l ed wi th the boa rd wi thi n fi ve da ys . peti ti oner.: The ul timate question. res pondents . provincial governor of Rizal fi l ed wi th the provincial board a n administrative complaint against Cornejo for corruption and improper conduct unbecoming a public officer. CORNEJO. corruption. viz. would limit action to misconduct relating to the office and not extending to personal misbehavior. a nd "offi ci a l ". ELIGIO NAVAL. members of the Provincial Board of Rizal. 2190. L-33648 July 30.G. Eligio Naval. Rizal. furni s hi ng a copy of s uch charges to the accused either personally or by regi stered mail. No. J. MIGUEL R. The PROVINCIAL BOARD the s us pens i on from the offi ce of Cornejo pendi ng the fi na l determi na ti on by the Supreme Court of hi s a ppea l . PEREZ and CELESTINO DE DIOS. and Celestino de Dios cons ti tute the provincial board of Rizal. the provincial governor suspended Cornejo a s president of Pa say pending a ction by the provi nci a l boa rd on the a dmi ni s tra ti ve cha rges preferred a ga i ns t Cornejo. ISSUE: HELD: 43 . or other form of maladministration in office. Jose M. a nd if a more severe punishment s eems to be desirable. Court of First Instance of Rizal found Cornejo guilty of the crime of falsification of a private document. "i n offi ce"." The petitioner. and 2191 of the Administrative Code . on the resolution of which the correct disposition of thes es ori gi na l proceedings depends. and he ma y i n s uch ca se suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending a ction by the boa rd . he s hal l s ubmi t wri tten charges touching the matter to the provincial board. the terminology of whi ch needs i nterpreta ti on. corruption. vs . 1930 The provincial authorities of Ri za l a nd the hi gher executi ve a uthori ti es claim a right to proceed against Cornejo as they have because of the provisions of sections 2188.

The l a w s a ys "or other form of ma l administration in office". Ma ki ng this principle the basis of our i nvestigation. and should be strictly construed. the suspending authority may not suspend for any cause not so specified. i t is not pos s i bl e to rea ch a ny other concl us i on tha n tha t the prepositional phrase "in office" qualifies the various grounds for legal suspension. for a characteristics of the latter crime is the "taking advantage of his official position" (Pena l Code. On simply the a dmitted fact that the peti ti oner wa s convi cted of the cri me of fa l sification of a pri va te document.) Ina smuch as conviction of the cri me of falsification of a privated document does not i mpl y tha t one ta kes a dvantage of his official position. Corruption. it is for the Legislature rather than the courts to expand it. the s cope of the word "other" i s limited to that which is of the same kind as its antecedent. our opinion is that the provincial board and the provincial governor of Rizal acted in excess of jurisdiction in suspending the petitioner as municipal president of Pasay.It i s a well recognized rule of s tatutory construction and of the l a w of publ i c offi cers that a statute prescribing the grounds for which an officer may be suspended is penal in nature. therefore. By the maxim Ejusdem generis . inasmuch as corruption signifies corrupti on i n office. Where the power of suspension is limited to specific causes. then it becomes evident under the Penal Code that this crime is contrasts sharply with the crime of falsification of a public document. a nd i nasmuch as the charge must be one a ffecting the official i ntegrity of the officer i n ques ti on. refers to corruption in office. 301-304. If the law is too narrow in scope. 44 . a rts . The cri me of whi ch the peti ti oner wa s convi cted wa s tha t of fa l s i fi ca ti on of a pri va te document.

interests. 54170 of the Regi s ter of Deeds of Ma ni l a . Subido Date of promulgation: September 5. he could NOT be required to serve the amount of fine + indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment because said judgment did NOT expressly and specifically provide that he should 45 . a rmed wi th a n a l i a s wri t of execution. Abelardo has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he could not pay the fine + indemnity prescribed in the decision Argument: although he could not pay the fine + indemnity prescribed in the CA’s judgment. de fendant Abelardo Subido may have” i n a 2-storey building situated at No. covered by Tra nsfer Certificate of Title No. Ma yor Ars eni o La cs on. 1958: Subido fi l ed a moti on wi th the tri a l court o Pra yed tha t:  The court enter of record that the CA’s judgment has been promulgated  o His appeal bond be cancelled  o As ked l ower court to requi re Abel a rdo to pa y the fi ne of P500.00 Subs i di a ry i mpri s onment i n ca s e of i ns ol vency Pa y the cos ts o  serve the fine + indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency February 25.00 wi th s ubs i di a ry i mpri s onment i n ca s e of i ns ol vency December 19.000. 1959: lower court… o Decl a red tha t i n a ccorda nce wi th the terms of the CA’s judgment. 1959: the offended party… o Regi stered i ts opposition to Abelardo’s motion for ca ncellation of a ppea l bond  September 27. 2313 Suter. a tta ched “whatever rights. Sta. 1959: the Sheriff of the City of Manila . Aga pi to…    Fi l ed a 3rd pa rty cl a i m wi th the s heri ff’s offi ce Ins ti tuted a n action in the lower court to enjoin the sheriff from proceeding with the sale of his property  Court of Appeals modi fi ed the judgment.00 + i ndemni ty of P5. if any. Manila. o o o o No arresto mayor Indemni ty reduced to 5. 1975 Ponente: Jus ti ce Ma rti n Nature of case: APPEAL from the orders of the Court of Fi rs t Ins ta nce of Ma ni l a Facts:  Tri a l court found Abelardo Subido gui l ty of l i bel .000. it turned out that the property levied upon by the sheriff was registered in the name of Agapito Subido  Upon l ea rni ng of the l evy.00 NO MENTION of s ubs i di a ry i mpri s onment i n ca s e of i ns ol vency Rema nded ca s e to tri a l court for executi on of judgment  Lower court i ssued a writ of prelimina ry i njuncti on enjoi ni ng the s a l e of the property December 10. or participation. Ana. HOWEVER.People vs.000. P10.00 Indemnify offended party. o Sentence:  3 months of arresto mayor wi th the accessory penalties of the law     Pa y fi ne of P500.

Ruling: EXCEPT wi th the modification that Abel a rdo ma y no l onger be requi red to s uffer s ubsidiary i mprisonment in ca s e of i ns ol vency to pa y the i ndemni ty provi ded for i n the judgment bel ow. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at appellant’s costs. paintings.00) pesos.”  Use of comma = “with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency” refers to BOTH non-pa yment of fi ne AND nonpa yment of i ndemni ty  If no comma = “with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency” woul d refer to non-pa yment of i ndemni ty onl y  No pl a usible reason why the l ower court would wa nt Abel ardo to suffer subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of non-pa yment of i ndemni ty onl y. engraving. radio.”  Supreme Court: The a l l uded modi fi ca ti ons coul d mea n no less than the elimination of arresto mayor a nd reduction of i ndemnity to offended party.” o The court i s given discretion to impose the penalty of i mpri s onment OR fi ne OR both for the cri me of l i bel .000.000. cinematographic exhibition or any similar means.00  Concl udi ng porti on of deci s i on: “WHEREUPON. No. whi ch exempts a n a ccus ed pers on from s ubs i di a ry i mpri s onment i n ca s e of i ns ol vency to pa y hi s ci vi l l i a bi l i ty. to pay a fine of five hundred (P500. phonograph. 355 of the Revised Penal Code. the Orders of the lower court denying his motion for cancellation of appeal bond and sentencing him to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine imposed by said judgment are hereby affirmed. i t would ha ve s o expres s l y provi ded.00 + Indemni ty of P5.” o The clause “with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency” i s SEPARATED BY A COMMA from the precedi ng cl a us e. Fi rs t.00) pesos. shall be punished by pri s i on correcci ona l in its minimum and medium period OR a fine ranging from 200 to 6. here’s the dispositive portion of the tri al court’s decision. “a libel committed by means of writing.Issues/questions presented: WON Abelardo can be required to serve the fine + indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the form subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency   s ubsidiary i mprisonment in cas e of i ns ol vency. o Lower court: 3 months of arresto mayor + fi ne of P500. in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. to indemnify the offended party.00) pesos. “he is thereby sentenced…in the sum of ten thousand (P10. 39 of the Revised Penal Code.  BUT Abel ardo i s fa vored by the retroa cti ve force of Art.000. reproduced i n ful l : “From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused guilty of libel and he is thereby sentenced to three (3) months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law.000. 5465.A. as amended by R. . and to pay the costs. theatrical exhibition.000 pesos OR both. the tendency i s to give i t careful s cruti ny. Mayor Arsenio Lacson. with the modifications above indicated. In the i nterpretation of a pena l s ta tute. printing. a nd to cons true i t wi th s uch s tri ctnes s a s to s a fegua rd the ri ghts of the defenda nt.00 + s ubsidiary i mprisonment in case of insolvency + pa yment of cos ts o CA: Fi ne of P500. in the sum of ten thousand Reasoning:  Under Art. o Pena l statutes a re to be strictly construed a gai ns t the government a nd l i berally i n fa vor of the a ccused. Al l the res t of the puni s hment rema i ns . i ncl udi ng the 46 (P10. Ha d the CA wa nted to do a wa y wi th the s ubs i di a ry i mprisonment in case of insolvency. lithography.00 + i ndemni ty of P10.

22 of the Revised Penal Code: “Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony. 47 . there must be prior determina ti on of the question of s ol vency of the a ccus ed. who is not a habitual criminal…although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is s erving sentence. that means he is insolvent and he must serve the same in form of subsidiary imprisonment. wherei n he wa s s uppos ed to ha ve a n i nteres t. The moment he cannot pay the fine.” o Abelardo CANNOT be required to serve his civil liability to the offended party in the form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency because this is no longer required. Art.  o Supreme Court: attachment does NOT operate a s a s a ti s fa cti on of the judgment of civil liabil i ty. Abelardo must suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment thereof. So Agapito has to choose: pay the fine OR serve in jail.  Abelardo contended that he could not be made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment because his civil liability had been satisfied with the attachment secured by the offended party on Agapito’s property. There i s nothi ng i n the l a w tha t before s ubsidiary i mprisonment may a ttach. Subsidiary imprisonment applies when the offended is insolvent.

cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. a nd hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. • Therefore. The words "another state or country " i ncl ude the Uni ted Sta tes a nd the Sta tes of the Ameri can Union. was not executed in conformi ty with the provi s i ons of l a w genera l l y a ppl i ca bl e to wi l l s executed by i nha bi ta nts of thes e Is l a nds • Thereafter a petition was presented i n the Court of First Instance of the ci ty of Ma ni l a for the probate of this wi l l . ISSUE: Whether or not section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the will of a citizen of the United States residing in these Islands . APPELLANT argues that: section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure covers only wills of aliens is not applicable to the will of a citizen of the United States residing in these Islands . and recorded in the Philippine Islands. a native of Sweden a nd a naturalized ci ti zen of the Uni ted States. and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country. and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands. United States of America. tha t the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State . HELD: s ecti on 636 of the Code of Ci vi l Procedure. Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois. provided the instrument was so executed as to be admissible to probate under the laws of the State of Illinois. Furthermore. or heading. 1916.800 • Thi s document i s a holographic instrument. may be proved. a nd i s signed by himself and two witnesses only. allowed. she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary successions in these Islands. instead of three witnesses requi red by s ecti on 618 of the Code of Ci vi l Procedure • Thi s will. the epigraph. Emil H.the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to the further fact that the word "state" in the body of the section is not capitalized. bei ng wri tten i n the tes ta tor's own ha ndwri ti ng. being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision. Thus .. It results that if Emil H. his will was provable under this section in the courts of the Philippine Islands. l ea ving a will by whi ch he di s pos ed of a n es ta te va l ued a t P231. and that the opera ti on of the s ta tute i s not l i mi ted to wi l l s of a l i ens .In re Estate of Johnson FACTS • On February 4. of a section. the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered a n a ppea ra nce i n her beha l f a nd a s s erted tha t Ebba is a legitimate heir of the testator. • Three months after the will had been proba ted. 48 . Will made here by alien. • Therea fter the document wa s decl a red to be l ega l a nd wa s a dmi tted to proba te. which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject. she moved to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration in order for her to claim the estate as the sole legitimate heir of her father. — A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country. therefore. on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois. Johnson. It i s a rul e of hermeneuti cs tha t punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. died in the city of Manila.

s ha l l be punished by the maximum period of the pena l ty pres cri bed by l a w for the new fel ony. Tha t a t the ti me of the commission of this offense. i n the Spa ni s h text. — Los que comentieren algun delito despues de haber sino condenados por s entencia firme no empezada a cumpir.a del a rti cul o 62. beat and use persona l vi ol ence upon one S abas Aseo. assault. 1933 2. who ga ve the fa ta l bl ow to the deceased Aseo. Appellant a dva nces the fol l owi ng a s s i gnments of error: 1. Phi l i ppi ne Is lands. by then a nd there hi tti ng the said Sabas Aseo s uddenly a nd unexpectedly from behind with a wooden cl ub. 4. pl a i nti ff-a ppel l ee. si hubiere ya cumplido la condena primitiva. a ny pers on who shall commit a felony a fter having been convi cted by fi na l judgment. 39085 September 27. s era n ca s tigados con l a pena s eña l a da por l a l ey pa ra el nuevo del i to. fel oniously a nd treacherously. The lower court erred in applying article 160 of the Revised Penal Code. previous offense — Penalty. wi l ful l y. wi th i ntent to ki l l . 49 . 1932. unl a wful l y.R. en s u gra d o ma xi mo. The l ower court erred i n holding that the cri me of murder wa s es ta bl i s hed by a ppreci a ti ng the qua l i fyi ng ci rcums ta nce of alevosia. the sai d Antoni o Ya but wa s a reci divist. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another Yabut s a id that i t was Vi llafuerte. o durante el tiempo de s u condena . wa s charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of murder upon the fol l owi ng i nforma ti on: Tha t on or a bout the 1s t da y of Augus t. we quote article 160 of the Revi s ed Pena l Code. Comision de un nuevo delito durante el tiempo de la condena por otro anterior — Pena. The l ower court erred i n hol di ng tha t the evi dence of the defens e a re contra di ctory a nd not corrobora ted.G. BUTTE. before beginning to s erve s uch s entence. — Bes ides the provis i ons of rul e 5 of a rti cl e 62.: FACTS : appellant. without a ny just ca use. thereby fra cturing the s kull of s a i d Sa ba s As eo a nd i nflicting upon him va rious other physical injuries on di fferent pa rts of the body whi ch ca used the dea th of the l a tter a bout twenty-four (24) hours therea fter. J. The Engl i s h tra ns l a ti on of a rti cl e 160 i s a s fol l ows : El penado conprendidoen este articulo se no fuere un deli ncuente ha bi tua l s era i ndultado a l os setenta a ños. a nother prisoner also s erving sentence in Bi l i bi d. a no s er que por s u conducta a por otra s ci rcuns ta nci a s no fuere di gno de l a gra ci a . THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. No. vs . The l ower court erred i n fi ndi ng the a ccus ed gui l ty of the cri me of murder beyond rea s ona bl e doubt. then a prisoner s erving s entence i n the Bili bi d Pri s on. In connection with the first assignment of error. s i n perjui ci o de l o di s pues to en l a regl a 5. the accused Antonio Yabut. Yabut. did then a nd there. i n the Ci ty of Ma ni l a . not he. he having previously been convi cted twice of the cri me of homicide a nd once of s eri ous phys i ca l i njuri es . whi ch i s deci s i ve: 3. or whi l e s ervi ng the s a me. o cuando l l egare a cumplirla despues de la edad sobredicha. ANTONIO YABUT. defenda nt-a ppel l a nt. i n said ci ty. by vi rtue of fi na l s entences rendered by competent tri buna l s .

who i s not a ha bi tua l cri mi na l . Apart from this. It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous. especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows. He contends tha t. from the headnote of article 160. there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text. there is no warrant whatever for such a deduction from the text itself of article 160. There is not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that said article applies only in cases where the new offense is different in character from the former offense for which the defendant is serving the penalty. A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised Penal code will reveal that they were not intended by the Legislature to be used as anything more than catchwords conveniently suggesting in a general way the subject matter of each article . 50 .Any convi ct of the class referred to i n this a rticle. The language is plain and unambiguous. It i s cl ear that no such deduction could be drawn from the caption. it is applicable only when the new crime which is committed by a person already serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. in a ny event have the effect of modifying or l imiting the unambiguous words of the text. or when he shall complete i t after reaching sa i d a ge. they ca nnot. unl es s by rea s on of hi s conduct or other ci rcums ta nces he s ha l l not be worthy of s uch cl emency. Bei ng nothi ng more tha n a convenient index to the contents of the a rticles of the Code. s ha ll be pardoned a t the age of seventy years i f he s hall have a lready s erved out his ori gi nal s entence. The appellant places much stress upon the word "another” a ppea ri ng i n the Engl i s h tra ns lation of the headnote of a rti cl e 160. however. not to crea te doubt. Seconda ry a i ds ma y be cons ul ted to remove.

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