Section I
I, Douglas-Mac: of the Duff Family, hereinafter referred to as “Claimant” or “I” do on this Sixth Day of July, in the Year of our Lord Two Thousand Nine, declare, proclaim, admonish, and fully state the following: “You” and “Your” are, hereinafter referred to as the Legal Fictional Entity listed at the bottom of Point 6, to include said Legal Fictional Entity, and all associated Legal Fictions connected to said Legal Fictional Entity by way of Interlocking Directorates, with Claimants’ Injury, to wit: Point 01. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE due to the exigent nature of an act of war and violence and “mixed domestic war” (reference Offer Number 100843 by minion of said Legal Fictional Entity listed at the bottom of Point 6) against Claimant, an Heir Elect Sovereign, NON-U.S. CITIZEN, American of the Aniyvwiya Nation of Category Four, nontreaty Indians, domiciled upon the Soil of Father Creator, in their Native Region commonly referred to as Arkansas Republic; and, Point 02. "The entire taxing and monetary systems are, hereby, placed under the U.C.C." The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, also see: Public Law 89-719, Legis. Hist., pg 3722, C.R.S. 51-106. (U.C.C. means Uniform Commercial Code); And, Point 03. The U.S. pays $260,000 per year to UNIDROIT for the use of the copyrighted UCC. The International Registry is the private law of UNIDROIT; And, Point 04. The Vatican Bank had owned Continental Bank, Chicago, whose sole stockholder was Walter Commings, Jr, the Chief Judge of 7th Circuit Court of Appeals; And, Point 05. All courts in the United States are "for profit" corporations and listed in Dunn and Bradstreet under the heading, "Also Trades As:" And, Point 06. Chicago Board of Trade is owned largely by a Judge. The nightly “EFT deposit” for the corporate, “for profit,” “Also Trades As” entity listed below as BOONE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT is (to the best of Claimants' knowledge) ledgered into the Federal Reserve Bank at Chicago under the “BIC” (Borrower In Custody) trade platform for high yield overnight investments of a Private Corporate For Profit Enterprise, BOONE COUNTY, STATE OF

ARKANSAS; following copied directly from Dun & Bradstreet website: “JUDICIARY COURTS OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS, Also Trades as BOONE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 100 N MAIN ST STE 200, HARRISON, AR.” [If not, you’re not following IOTA and IOLTA law.] Point 07. Claimant, herein, NOTICES the above legal fictional entity that: I DO NOT volunteer to contract with you. I DO NOT desire, solicit, want, need, or wish to have any “forced benefit” of the Fictional Legal Entity named above. Point 08. All impressed, expressed, implied, or otherwise assumed Powers Of Attorney are herein REVOKED, rescinded, and renounced. You have NO JURISDICTION over Claimant, the Living Man upon the Soil. You are herein and hereby FIRED from any assumed, or implied, “Powers” you may have thought you had under false circumstances and false pretenses originating in FRAUD. According to: (Barr v. Day, 124 Wn.2d 318, 979. F.2d 912 (1994)). “Attorney when fired is fired without question.” A separate "EXHIBIT R.P.O.A." is attached for clarity. Point 09. All other Documents, NOTICES, and Exhibits attached herein are part of this Declaration; and, all Points and Authorities attached shall have full force and effect. Point 10. "The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." [Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)] Point 11. It is true, Claimant has no rights to the Constitution of the United States as Claimant was not a party to it (although, his lineal ancestors were); however, all officers, agents, and others in authority IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR have taken an Oath to uphold Claimants’ Rights to the Constitution of the United States; Claimant, therefore, ACCEPTS ALL OATHS as a binding contract between Claimant and said Fictional Legal Entities (knowing full well that a fiction cannot make a decision or sign a document) acknowledging that Claimant has full Right of Discovery to the Christian Appellation (under Common Law) of each, and every, offending and injuring Party involved, directly, or indirectly, by way of Interlocking Directorates within said corporate structures, injuring Claimant; and, Claimant, herein, declares Offending Parties Oath to uphold Claimants’ Constitutional Rights to be “The Constitution Of The United States Of America” circa 1789, and NOT the Constitution of the United States, circa February 21, 1871 (the charter for the new Fictional Federal Government); and, Point 12. Presidential documents, FEDERAL REGISTRY 48 #38 Title 3, Executive Order 12407, signed on February 22, 1983, by Ronald Reagan revoked all powers from municipalities, policing, and maintenance, referenced at; COMMUNITY COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. BOULDER, COLORADO, "Ours is a [Page 455 U.S. 40, 41] "dual system of government,"

Parker, supra, at 351, which has no place for sovereign cities”; and, Point 13. 19 C.J.S. Sections 884 of Chapter XVIII, Foreign Corporations Section 884. Status “A corporation exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of law, and where that law ceases to operate, the corporation can have no existence. A state cannot impose one of its artificial creatures on another sovereignty nor confer on its corporators powers which they can lawfully exercise beyond its jurisdiction. Rather, it must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty.” [Legal Entities: stay the hell in your box.] The United States of America, 1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20501 – 0001 (DUNS number 161 906078) Point 14. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th edition, under the word Honor defines the term "Office of Honor" which says "As used in constitutional and statutory provisions, this term denotes a public office of considerable dignity and importance, to which important public trusts or interests are confided, but which is not compensated by any salary or fees, being thus contrasted with an "office of profit." End quote. (I won’t get into the “Slush Fund” in this document.) Point 15. You are hereby placed on NOTICE pursuant of Title 18 USC sec. 4 of the commission of crimes cognizable by a court of the United States under Title 18 sec. 513, to wit: “513(a) Whoever makes, utters or possesses a counterfeited security of a State, of a political subdivision thereof, or of an organization, or whoever makes, utters or possesses a forged security of a State or political subdivision thereof or of an organization, with intent to deceive another person, organization, or government shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” See also sections 2311, 2314, and 2320 for additional fines and sanctions. Among the securities defined at Title 18 USC sec. 2311 is included “evidence of indebtedness”, which, in a broad sense, may mean anything that is due and owing, including a duty, obligation, or right of action. Point 16. Black's 1st "UTTER. To put or send into circulation; to publish or put forth. To utter and publish an instrument is to declare or assert, directly or indirectly, by words or actions, that it is good; uttering it is a declaration that it is good, with an intention or offer to pass it. Whart. Crim. Law, Section 703" (possibly 708). Is not “Offer Number 100843” mentioned in Point 01 above an “Utterance” and a demand for money with an implied, express, assumed, or otherwise stated content that said demand was made under “Authority” and for the express act of Piracy and Claim to Prize and Booty? Any "arrest" exercised without an affidavit of liability, under Oath, signed by a competent witness, swearing to the fact of contractual liability, by a Real Injured Party, is deemed an “Utterance”of a "forged and/or counterfeited security." [And, shall be recompensed for accordingly.] Also, "DEFALCATION" means the act or an instance of embezzling. Point 17. Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states; "... a presumption imposes on the

party against whom it is directed the burden of proof [see Section 556(d)] of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption." This document is formal NOTICE OF REBUTTAL to all pertinent Legal Fictional Entities. Point 18. There is a circus of conflicting deceitful codes that act as the operating procedures of the FEDERAL CORPORATION: the United States is a Corporation [See 28 U.S.C. § 30020 (15)]. The States are sub-corporations of the Federal United States, the aforementioned Corporation. [See 1934, State Compact Act; Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. § 101]. Point 19. ALL of the corporations, legal fictional entities, their sub-corporations and minions are bankrupt and are in receivership status and can function ONLY within parameters of a bankrupt corporation dealing with other legal fictional entities, as per attached EXHIBIT "Bankrupt", which by reference is made part of this document; and, Point 20. Information: In law, Information means; "A formal accusation of a crime made by a public officer rather than by Grand Jury Indictment"; and, Claimant charges that "wrongful information", which is the entering, editing, registering, recording, or charging of any living man/woman with a crime, when there is NO INJURED PARTY, is a Tort (damage, injury, or wrongful act done willfully, negligently, or in circumstances involving strict liability, but not involving breach of contract, for which a civil suit can be brought), and establishes liability upon the "Actor" bringing forward the Accusation. Claimant, in all cases, at all times, reserves the right to administer "Waiver of Tort", if Claimant, at his discretion determines justice would be better served by a charge of Wrongful Information than with remedy of Tort. Point 21. It must be reiterated, "ALL GOVERNMENTS ARE CORPORATIONS," not unlike Exxon and Enron, as per: PROPRIETORS OF CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE v. PROPRIETORS OF, 36 U.S. 420 (1837) "Corporations are also of all grades, and made for varied objects; all governments are corporations…” verifiable at The term "License" is not unlike the term "lascentiousness" in the Holy Writ. [See EXHIBIT "License"] Points 22 through 34 exemplify the reasons and authorities for Claimant's action: Point 22. As per the Supreme Court in Murdock v. Pennsylvania 319 US 105, "A state may not, through a license tax, impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution." Claimants’ Right of Travel is antecedent – PERIOD. Point 23. "All subjects over which the sovereign power of the state extends are objects of taxation, but those over which it does not extend are exempt from taxation. This proposition may almost be pronounced as self-evident. The sovereignty of the state extends to everything which exists by its authority or its permission.” McCullough v Maryland, 17 U.S. [4 Wheat]

316 (1819). Point 24. Claimant has NO nexus with the “state” in form of license granted, as per; "It is impossible to prove jurisdiction exists absent a substantial nexus with the state, such as voluntary subscription to license. All jurisdictional facts supporting claim that supposed jurisdiction exists must appear on the record of the court." Pipe Line v Marathon. 102 S. Ct. 3858 quoting Crowell v Benson 883 US 22. Point 25. Claimant has no record or evidence that Claimant is a "Licensee", as per; "Where a person is not at the time a licensee, neither the agency, nor any official has any jurisdiction of said person to consider or make any order. One ground as to want of jurisdiction was, accused was not a licensee and it was not claimed that he was." 0'Nei1 v Dept Prof. & Vocations 7 CA 2d 398; Eiseman v Daugherty 6 CA 783 Point 26. "An action by Department of Motor Vehicles, whether directly or through a court sitting administratively as the hearing officer, must be clearly defined in the statute before it has subject matter jurisdiction, without such jurisdiction of the licensee, all acts of the agency, by its employees, agents, hearing officers, are null and void." Doolan v. Carr, 125 US 618; City v Pearson, 181 Cal. 640. Point 27. “Failure to reveal the material facts of a license or any agreement is immediate grounds for estoppel.” Lo Bue v. Porazzo, 48 Cal.App.2d 82, 119, p.2d 346, 348. Point 28. "The tax is placed upon those obtaining compensation for the use of the public highways." –In re Bush, 6 Cal.2d 43 [Crim. No. 3945. In Bank. April 1, 1936.] Point 29. As per the Supreme Court in Schware v. Board of Examiners. 353 U.S. 238, 239, “they [attorneys] cannot represent any private citizen nor any business as the State cannot license the practice of law.” Point 30. "Ignorance of the law does not excuse misconduct in anyone, least of all in a sworn officer of the law." In re McCowan (1917), 177 C. 93, 170 P. 1100; And, "No officer can acquire jurisdiction by deciding he has it. The officer, whether judicial or ministerial, decides at his own peril." Middleton v. Low (1866), 30 C. 596, citing Prosser v. Secor (1849), 5 Barb.(N.Y) 607, 608. Point 31. USC, as per; 18 USC 31, (6) Motor vehicle.— The term “motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo. Point 32. USC, as per; 18 USC 31, (10) Used for commercial purposes.--- The term "used for commercial purposes" means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge, or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.

Point 33. "An action by Department of Motor Vehicles, whether directly or through a court sitting administratively as the hearing officer, must be clearly defined in the statute before it has subject matter jurisdiction, without such jurisdiction of the licensee, all acts of the agency, by its employees, agents, hearing officers, are null and void." Doolan v. Carr, 125 US 618; City v Pearson, 181 Cal. 640. Point 34. "Agency, or party sitting for the agency, has no authority to enforce as to any l icensee unless he [licensee] is acting for compensation. Such an act is highly penal in nature, and should not be construed to include anything which is not embraced within its terms. [Where] [T]here is no charge within a complaint that the accused was employed for compensation to do the act complained of, or that the act constituted part of a contract." Schomig v. Kaiser, 189 Cal 596. And, The Fourth Amendment forbids stopping a vehicle even for limited purposes of questioning its occupants unless the police officer has a founded suspicion of criminal conduct. U.S. V. Ramirez & Sandoval, 872 F2d. 1392. And, "founded suspicion" of the driver or occupant is determined from the inception, as per; "Founded suspicion [OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT] must exist at the time the officer initiates the stop". U.S. v. Thomas, 863 F2d. 622, 625. And, "Founded suspicion exists when the officer is aware of specific articulable facts that, together with rational inferences drawn from them, reasonable warrant a suspicion that the person to be detain has committed or is about to commit a crime". U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 416, U.S. v. Robert L., 874 F2d. 701, 703. And, "any restraint of a person for the purpose of checking identification and asking questions or detaining him or her briefly while obtaining is such a detention; it comported with the Fourth Amendment only when based on articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a criminal offense." U.S. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 [83 L.Ed.2d. 604]. And, "In a unanimous decision the U.S. Supreme Court" held: "demand for identification is an intrusion on the interests prohibited by the Fourth Amendment and requires reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts relating to the person or his or her conduct [CRIME], in order to be lawful." When police officers, with or without arresting an individual, detain the individual for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they perform a seizure of person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. ...that the defendant's conviction requiring identification upon a lawful stop [RELATED TO CRIME] was improper, the police officer's stopping the defendant and requiring him to identify himself violated defendant's Fist, Fourth and Fifth Amendments was in violation of...United States Constitution when the police officer has no reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was engaged or been engaged in criminal conduct". Brown v. Texas, (1979) 443 U.S. 46 [61 L.Ed.2d. 357]. And, "A person driving an automobile cannot be stopped to see if he or she is licensed to drive". Delaware v. Prouse, (1979) 440 U.S. 648, [ 59 L.Ed2d. 660]; And, "Judicial Council sponsored legislation that reclassifies minor traffic violations as noncriminal infractions". Validated at /documents/ar2001-1.pdf "Further, infractions are not crimes and the rule forbidding successive prosecutions of a defendant is not applicable when an infraction is one of the offenses involved". People v. Battle (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 [123 Cal.Rptr. 636]. fn. 1 [1b]; And, "The term "liberty " as used in state and federal constitutions consists partially of the right to be free from arbitrary restraint; for example, the right of a citizen to drive on public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality is a fundamental constitutional right". People v. Horton, (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d. 930, [92 Ca.Rptr. 666]; And, "The innocent individual who is harmed by an abuse of governmental authority is

assured that he will be compensated for his injury." Owens v. City of Independence, 100 S.Ct 1398 (1980); And, ...If one individual does not possess such a right over the conduct of another [Good and Lawful Christian Man], no number of individuals [in a deliberative body] can possess such a right. All combinations, therefore, to effect such an object, are injurious, not only to the individuals particularly oppressed, but to the public at large." People v. Fisher, 14 Wend.(N.Y.) 9, 28 Am.Dec. 501 Point 35. "The high Courts, through their citations of authority, have frequently declared, that “...where any state proceeds against a private individual in a judicial forum it is well settled that the state, county, municipality, etc., waives any immunity to counters, cross claims and complaints, by direct or collateral means regarding the matters involved.” Luckenback v. The Thekla, 295 F 1020, 226 Us 328; Lyders v. Lund, 32 F2d 308; Point 36. “[courts] merely act as an extension as an agent for the involved agency -- but only in a “ministerial” and not a “discretionary capacity...” Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583; Keller v. P.E., 261 US 428; F.R.C. v. G.E., 281, U.S. 464. Point 37. "Ministerial officers are incompetent to receive grants of judicial power from the legislature, their acts in attempting to exercise such powers are necessarily nullities." Burns v. Sup. Ct., SF, 140 Cal. 1. Point 38. “Where lawful services are blended with such as are forbidden, the whole being a unit and indivisible, the bad destroys the good.” Trist v. child, 21 Wall. 452 (1874). (Actus Reus: A wrongful deed, which renders the actor criminally liable when combined with mens rea, a guilty mind.) Point 39. "The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding civil or criminal formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” Lefkowitz v. Turley, 94 S. Ct. 316, 414 U.S. 70 (19 73). [Involuntarily? On the “Offer Number 100843” in red letters it states “SUMMONS”] Point 40. Quoted, as per; A Lawyer's View of the Justice System, Joseph H. Delaney, July/August, 1999, issue of Analog Science, Vol. CXVIX No. 7 & 8 -- "... the proportion of judges who are dishonest, who are on the take, who harbor prejudices against parties or counsel, is far greater than the lay public realizes. ... Corruption is rampant in courts at every level throughout the country. It is equally rampant among prosecutors and law enforcement people. ... The primary corrupting influence is the drug business. ... the dope interests own contemporary justice. ... There is no greater shock than to find that even with both law and the facts in your favor your constitutional rights are worthless because you can't get the crooked regime to enforce them." And, Point 41. This “action” was made directly, or indirectly, through coercion, threat, duress, or other “presentments” under and in response to “vi et armis”: “by force and arms.” "Vi et armis" invalidates every act/action brought against a Living Man.

Point 42. Where an individual is detained, without a warrant and without having committed a crime (traffic infractions are not crimes), the detention is a false arrest and false imprisonment. With “Equality under the Law” being paramount I call attention to: Damages awarded; TRESEVANT v. CITY OF TAMPA, 241F2D.336 (11TH CIR.1984) Motorist illegally held for 23 minutes in a traffic charge was awarded $25,000 in damages. The above case sets the foundation for $75,000 dollars per hour, or $1,800,000 dollars per day. Claimant was detained AND TORTURED for more than five hours as will be covered in Section III.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful