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Compiled by The Military Studies Group Anglesea Barracks Hobart, Tasmania, 2006

Sivis pacem, para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war)(1)

The advantages of successful war are doubtful: the disadvantages of unsuccessful war are certain. Real security lies in the preventing of war and today that hope can come only through adequate protection.(2)

FOOTNOTES: (1) Attributed to Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Roman historian, 4th century AD. (2) General of the Army, Omar N. Bradley quoted in the Australian Army Journal, 1951, p 16.

CONTENTS Dedication Acknowledgements Introduction PART 1 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 PART 2 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 10 PART 3 Chapter 11 Chapter 12 Chapter 13 Chapter 14 Chapter 15 PART 4 Chapter 16 Chapter 17 Chapter 18 Chapter 19 Chapter 20 PART 5 Chapter 21 PART 6 Chapter 22 Chapter 23 Chapter 24 Chapter 25 FUNDAMENTALS Introduction Leadership, Morale and Man in Battle Logistics Military Intelligence THEORY Introduction Philosophers of War Strategy and Statesmen in Relation to War Principles of War Military Strategy The Operational Level of War and Operational Art Tactics Doctrine EXECUTION Introduction Commanders, Planning, Command and Control, and Training Combined Arms Warfare Sea Power Aerospace Power Joint Warfare MILITARY HISTORY Introduction Warfare from Antiquity to 1815 Warfare from 1815 to the Present Low Intensity Conflict Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page iii iv v 1 3 9 13 17 19 23 27 35 41 47 55 61 63 91 97 109 117 119 121 129 149 155 168 171 173 175 177 181 199 207

Official Histories of the Land Forces of the British Empire and Page Commonwealth at War Military Misfortunes THE FUTURE Introduction Warfare in the 21st Century MISCELLANEOUS Introduction Military Geography Miscellaneous Sources of Military Information Periodicals Odds and Sods Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page


This guide is dedicated to General Sir Harry Chauvel who led Queensland Mounted Infantry in the Boer War, Australian Light Horse in The Great War and soldiered on during the lotus years that followed and Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Honner and the Australians who fought in New Guinea (in particular, the 39th Infantry Battalion) and elsewhere against the infamous Imperial Japanese Army.


The compilation of this guide would not have been possible without the availability of information from the Internet, and other sources such as the British Army Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasionals. All sources have been identified in the guide, but particular thanks are due also to Steve R Waddell, editor of the 2004 edition of the United States Military Academy Officers Professional Reading Guide, the United States Marine Corps A Book of Books, and the authors/editors of other reading lists included at Annex B to the introduction to this guide. The various electronic archives made available by the United States Defence Services, the Royal Air Force, the New Zealand Defence Force and the Australian Defence Force were also helpful. So too, were dedicated web sites such as Chris Bassfords Clausewitz Home Page and the Western Front Association. In the case of future warfare, the bibliography compiled by Jane E Gibish of the United States Army War College Library was a vital aid and so too, in the case of official histories, the works of Robin Higham. Other crucial information has been obtained from free or purchased works by authors, editors and compilers and again all such sources have been identified in the following chapters. The work of formatting the guide was done by Lieutenant Colonel Peter McGuinness, MBE, RFD, ED, Royal Australian Infantry, (Rtd). Without his assistance the guide would still be a hand written draft. Many thanks, Peter. Thanks also to all members of the Military Studies Group but in particular, the contributions of Wing Commander Robert Grey, Royal Australian Air Force, (Rtd) , Mr Anthony J Lee, Lieutenant Colonel David F Solomon, Royal Australian Corps of Transport, (Rtd) Commander George Sydney, CSM, Royal Australian Navy, Mr Charles Tate, JP, Squadron Leader TRC Turnbull, JP, Royal Air Force, (Rtd) and Lieutenant Colonel DM Wyatt, RFD, Royal Australian Corps of Transport, (Rtd). It should be noted that this guide has not been produced for sale or for profit. Where possible it is available at nil cost or simply the cost of production that is; printing, photocopying and postage. It may be reproduced by any individual for personal or student use, or by any Military Service for its members provided that the normal acknowledgement to the sources quoted in the guide are made. Finally, the greatest care has been taken in acknowledging quotes, references, etc used, but if any error or omission has been made it is regretted, and naturally the fault must be mine. Suggested amendments, additions or improvements are welcome. Lieutenant Colonel Chad Sutton, Royal Australian Armoured Corps (Rtd) Hobart, Tasmania, 2006

FOOTNOTES: (1) Compilers contact details: Postal: Chad Sutton, 43 Opal Drive, BLACKMANS BAY, Tasmania, Australia, 7052. Email:



of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Peruse again and again the campaigns Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederick. Model yourself upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of acquiring the secret of the art of war . . . Napoleon(1) . . . from military maxim of Napoleon LXXVIII. Today the reader would need to consider many more Great Captains and a much wider range of subjects. This guide has been prepared to give the general reader interested in war and the history of war an easy reference to selected, available books and articles from periodicals, etc. Primarily, however, it has been written for the serious student of war the soldier who seeks to become a great captain or at least a more competent commander; and who also seeks to acquire the secret of the art of war. The primary focus of this guide is upon land forces. But why study war(2) via the written medium when todays soldier is exposed to much more realistic and testing training than in the past? In answer consider the following: Without knowledge of military history men are really unconscious of the existence of the most wonderful of moral forces . . ., and it is not a thing of which anyone can afford to be ignorant.(3) The soundest preparation for an understanding of the delicate relationship of statesman and soldier and of their mutual problems in the conduct of military affairs in peace and war can be made by studying history particularly American history of the periods preceding, during, and following national emergencies.(4) A sense of what is practicable in war is difficult to acquire in peace. Exercises with and without troops help, but they lack the reality of war. Fear, confusion and uncertainty are absent. The unpredictable hazards of active operations cannot be simulated, but it is possible to imbibe some of the atmosphere from the stories of past campaigns and to asses the scale of achievement of our forbears under the conditions prevailing on the battlefield of the day.(5) Most people try to profit from experience; I profit from other peoples experience! It is not widely realized just how crucial Bismarcks dictum [above] is to the military profession. Their duty is, perhaps, the most exciting and perilous that falls on any citizen and yet, unlike other professional men, they cannot practice manoeuvres or sham fights fall ludicrously short of real warfare . . . this is only one great problem. Another lies in the tendency of human nature to resist change and become immersed in day-to-day administration.(6)
FOOTNOTES: (1) The Military Maxims of Napoleon Translated from the French by Lieutenant General Sir George C DAguilar with a new introduction and commentary by David G Chandler, Greenhill Books, London, 1987, ISBN 0947898 646. (2) Because: No study is possible on the battlefield, one simply does what one knows. Therefore, in order to do even a little one has already to know a great deal, and know it well. Attributed to the French Marshal Foch, and quoted in How to Study Military History, Directorate of Military Training, AHQ, Australian Army in the Australian Army Journal, c1948-1950, p47. (3) Attributed to Sir John Fortescue eminent British military historian in History and the Military Profession by Brigadier General PM Robinett, US Army (Retd) published in the Australian Military Journal, 1954, p38 with the permission of Military Review (4) Ibid p47 (5) The Value of Military History by Brigadier WGF Jackson, British Army, from the Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, London c1962 and published in the Australian Army Journal in December 1963 and/or December 1973 p18. Professor Sir Michael Howard supports this view. He comments that: The advantage enjoyed by sailors in this respect is a very marked one; for nobody commanding a vessel at sea whether battleship or dinghy is ever wholly at peace from The Use and Abuse of Military History Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, London, February 1962, Vol CVII, No 625, p7 (6) Some Attractions and Pitfalls of Military History by Professor Brian Bond, Military Review, February 1965, p95


Military history, accompanied by sound criticism, is indeed the true school of war.(7) The study of military history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice.(8) [History is] the most effective means of teaching war during peace.(9) Only the study of history is capable of giving those who have no experience of their own a clear picture of what I have just called the function of the whole machine. (10) It should be noted also that while any combat experience at any rank helps, the time spent in combat represents usually only a fraction of the total time spent in a military career. Therefore a military student must not allow personal experience on the battlefield to limit his personal view, but should add to it the experience of others.(11) Having accepted that the study of war is of interest to the general reader, and that it can add to the knowledge and competence of the professional soldier, other questions naturally arise. Two prime questions are how to study (what method to use) and what to study from amongst the many books and numerous periodicals devoted to war. Annex A to this introduction attempts to answer both of the how and what questions by providing some of the advice offered over the years by military officers and academics and taken from various periodicals. Other sources recommended are the following: The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence by Roger Nye.(12) While it may be a little dated in terms of some of the books Nye recommends the introduction to each chapter is of particular value. A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History by JE Jessup and RH Coakley.(13) Although also a little dated in terms of some of the books recommended, the use of this guide prepared by United States military officers and academics for the use of United States officers is strongly recommended. It can be downloaded free from the Internet. A more recent study of General George Patton by Roger Nye which provides an example of the professional development of a successful military leader through his personal study of military history and theory.(14) Other aids which will assist the student in his efforts to study war include a military atlas one or more military encyclopaedias. (16)


Annex B to this introduction contains the details of the various reading lists issued by overseas
FOOTNOTES: (7) Attributed to Baron Jomini in Whispers of Warriors: the Importance of History to the Military Profession by US Congressman Ike Skelton in Naval War College Review. (8) Attributed to AT Mahon, ibid. (9) Attributed H von Moltke (the Elder) ibid. (10) Attributed to C von Clausewitz, ibid. (11) History and the Military Profession et al above p45. (12) The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence by Roger H Nye, Avery Publishing Group, New Jersey, ISBN 089529 280 7. (13) A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History by JE Jessup and RH Coakley, Centre of Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC, 1988. Available from CMH on Internet as CMH Pub 70-3. (14) The Patton Mind: the Professional Development of an Extraordinary Leader by Roger H Nye, Avery Publishing Group, New Jersey, ISBN 0895294281. (15) West Point Military Atlas series is recommended see Chapter 23 of this guide. (16) Two that are recommended are: A. Brasseys Encyclopaedia of Land Forces Warfare edited by FD Margiotta, Brasseys London, 2000 c1996, ISBN 157488 250 3. Good definitions and articles. B. The Encyclopaedia of Military History from 3,500 BC to the present by RE and TN Dupuy, MacDonald, C1970, ISBN 356 029980. Most comprehensive.


military colleges and defence forces, and used in the selection of many of the books listed throughout this guide as recommended reading. Readers are invited to customize this guide to include additional subjects of personal interest and the results of future reading. The guide should remain a living document a personal reference aid. The format of the guide allows for individual amendment. Annexes: A. How to Study and What to Study B. Key to the Various Reading Lists Referred to in this Guide




Many periodicals over the years have published articles explaining HOW and WHAT to study to better understand war. Extracts from some of those articles follow. A number of additional articles are also included the last of which is more recent than most. It offers some very interesting ideas about the use of the study of war in officer education in the 21st century. EXTRACTS A very sound piece of advice (and one perhaps the most frequently quoted) is that offered by Professor Sir Michael Howard and taken from a lecture he gave at the Royal United Services Institute, London on 18th October, 1961.(1) To keep its meaning clear a much larger portion of the lecture is quoted than is normally given. Three general rules of study must therefore be borne in mind by the officer who studies military history as a guide in his profession and who wishes to avoid its pitfalls. First, he must study in width. He must observe the way in which warfare developed over a long historical period. Only by seeing what does change can one deduce what does not; and as much can be learnt from the great discontinuities of military history as from apparent similarities of the techniques employed by the great captains through the ages. Observe how in 1806 a Prussian army soaked in the traditions of the greatest captain of the 18th century, Frederick the Great, was none the less destroyed; and how the same thing happened in 1870 to a French army brought up in the Napoleonic mould. Consider whether in the conditions of warfare of 1914-18 the careful studies of Napoleons or Moltkes methods were not hopelessly irrelevant; and whether indeed the lessons which Mahan drew from his studies of 18th century naval warfare did not lead our own Admiralty to cling to doctrine of the capital fleet for so long that, in the age of the submarine and the aircraft carrier, this country was twice brought within measurable distance of defeat. Knowledge of the principles of war must be tempered by a sense of change, and applied with a flexibility of mind which only wide reading can give. Next he must study in depth. He should take a single campaign and explore it thoroughly, not simply from official histories but from memoirs, letters, diaries, even imaginative literature, until the tidy outlines dissolve and he catches a glimpse of the confusion and horror of the real experience. He must get behind the order subsequently imposed by the historian, and recreate by detailed study the omnipresence of chaos, revealing the part played not only by skill and planning and courage, but by sheer good luck. Only thus can he begin to discover, if he is lucky enough not to have experienced it at first hand, what war is really likewhat really happened. And lastly, he must study in context. Campaigns and battles are not like games of chess or football matches, conducted in total detachment from their environment according to strictly defined rules. Wars are not tactical exercises writ large. They are, as Marxist military analysts quite rightly insist, conflicts of societies, and they can be fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting them. The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield,
FOOTNOTE: (1) The Use and Abuse of Military History by Professor Sir Michael Howard, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, London, CVII (February 1962) No.625


in political, social, and economic factors which explain why armies are constituted as they are, and why their leaders conduct them in the way they do. To explain the collapse of Prussia in 1806 and of France in 1870, we must look deep into their political and social as well as into their military history. Nor can we understand fully the outcome of the First World War without examining the social and political reasons why the Central Powers had so much less staying power than the Western Allies; so that Germany collapsed within a few months of her most sweeping triumphs. Without some such knowledge of the broader background to military operations one is likely to reach totally erroneous conclusions about their nature, and the reasons for their failure and success. Today, when the military element in the great power-struggles of the world is inhibited by mutual fears of the destructive power of the weapons available to both sides, such political and economic factors have an importance such as they have never possessed before; but even in the most apparently formal and limited conflicts of the past they have never been entirely absent. Pursued in this manner, in width, in depth, and in context, the study of military history should not only enable the civilian to understand the nature of war and its part in shaping society, but also directly improve the officers competence in his profession. But it must never be forgotten that the true use of history, military or civil, is, as Jacob Burckhardt once said, not to make men clever for next time; it is to make them wise for ever. The approach stated above can not be too highly recommended. General George S Patton wrote: To be a successful soldier you must know history, read it objectively dates and even minute details of tactics are useless . . . You must [also] read biography and especially autobiography. If you will do it you will find war is simple. (2) General Patton makes the conduct of successful war sound simpler than it is and the reading of biography by admirers and autobiography needs to be done with care. However, there is much truth in the statement. Brigadier General Robinett also recommended caution: Histories written during the lives of the actors or too near their era are generally tinged with prejudice coloured by self-interested flattery, and influenced by the selective treatment of source material. Histories written too long after the time of the participants are frequently fictional or sentimental.(2) Brigadier General Robinett also included in his article the following advice:(2) One of the most important lessons a military student can learn from history is the necessity of quickly recognizing the changes in tactics and techniques which are indicated during the course of a war, and especially during the meeting engagement . . . Knowledge gained through a study of the initial phases of past operations will pay untold dividends to those who may be involved later in similar situations. A student should not allow personal experience on the battlefield to limit his point of view, but should add it to the experience of others. Conclusions and principles based on a single personal experience or an inadequate preparation in military history are very dangerous.
FOOTNOTE: (2) History and the Military Profession by Brigadier General PM Robinett, United States Army (Retd) and contained in Australian Army Journal, September, 1954 and previously published in Military Review.


The most convincing lessons can be learned from defeats. However, it is infinitely better to learn from the defeats of others, It is, therefore, advantageous to study and analyse the records of the vanquished. The soundest preparation for an understanding of the delicate relationship of statesman and soldier and their mutual problems in the conduct of military affairs in peace and war can be made by studying history . . . preceding, during and following national emergencies. In a similar vein in more recent history the study of past coalitions formed for wars would also be instructive. The next extracts are taken from an essay by Brigadier WGF Jackson, British Army. The essay was awarded first place in the Trench Gascoigne Prize Essay Competition, 1962. It was first published in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institute London, and then republished with permission in the Australian Army Journal of December 1963 and/or December 1973.(3) Future commanders should plan their reading to acquire a wider and more varied store of knowledge than previous generations . . . greater emphasis must be placed on the inter-relationship between politics, diplomacy, economics and military power. The study of the use of force in all its aspects should be linked with reading general and military histories of our potential enemies. But, in these days of haste and bustle, few officers have the time to extend their reading. If scope is to be widened, depth must be reduced. Detailed study should not start before the middle of the 19th century. The American Civil War and the Austro- and Franco-Prussian Wars of 1866 and 1870 are important starting points because precision weapons and national mobilisation made their first impact upon war during this period. The study of earlier campaigns should be restricted to background reading to gain an insight into the part they played in the volution of war and in the formation of the national characteristics. We should resist the temptation of over-studying the feats of our national heroes such as Marlborough, Nelson and Wellington, and turn our attention instead to more recent Central European, Russian and Chinese campaigns. A study of the Second World War and of the Korean campaign probably provides future commanders with the soundest basis for developing their sense of what is practicable, . . . [note the date of the essay, 1962]. The greatest change of emphasis comes in using the study of history for mental training. He [the future commander] must apply his knowledge of future scientific and technological trends to his assessment of the past. The scale of the battlefield, the relative importance of the various principles of war and the mechanics of waging war, must all be revalued . If he is a soldier, he must study sea and air warfare. If he is a sailor or an airman, he must include the land battle in his reading. The following paragraphs are taken from an article by Major General EKG Sixsmith(4). It is in this study of the mind of the commanders that military history is so superior to abstract war studies. Schlieffen brought out the proper place of facts in this study when he said at the Kriegsakadamie: Before everyone who wishes to become a commander-in-chief there lies a volume called the history of war. The study is not always very amusing, but in
FOOTNOTES: (3) The Value of Military History by Brigadier WGF Jackson, British Army, from the Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, London, republished in Australian Army Journal, December 1963 and December 1973. (4) Military History or War Studies by Major General EKG Sixsmith in Army Quarterly, July 1971.


it one will find facts, often soul-stirring facts of how every thing happened, how it was bound to happen and how it will happen again. Much has happened since Schlieffens day to complicate war but still the matching of one mans mind against another is a dominant factor . Wavell, in a lecture to candidates for the Staff College, said: I do advise you to study the human side of war . . . If you can understand how a young unknown man [Napoleon] inspired a half-starved, ragged, rather Bolshie crowd; how he filled their bellies; how he out-marched, out-witted, outbluffed and defeated men who had studied war all their lives and waged it according to the text books of their time, you will have learnt something worth knowing. Captain Cyril Falls, soldier, author, historian and Chichele Professor of the History of War, Oxford offered this advice:(5) So the military student strives first of all to discover what the fighting men of old wars were like. Then, in general history we look for the origins of institutions, ideas and customs. So in military history we seek the origins of theories of strategy and tactics, administration and discipline. Next we search in general history for the characteristics of nations. Again, it is necessary as well as interesting for the military student to examine those national military policies which reproduce themselves over and over again. The next extract by Major HED Harris(6) whilst recommending biographies for serious historical study cautions that: One pro and one con should be read so that a judgement can be made. In the case of Douglas Haig one pro and one con would be a most difficult choice, but in the case of most commanders this is a quite feasible approach. Harris also recommended that: Books by war correspondents and journalists can be of great value if trouble is taken to ascertain the writers background. The profit motive should be borne in mind here! Some further cautions in regard to authors are offered by Brigadier CN Barclay:(7) When writing military history meticulous factual accuracy is very important. A careless author, whose book is full of elementary mistakes, cannot expect to be taken seriously when he comes to criticize, and pronounce judgment, on some military venture. Criticism of military operations is valueless unless the circumstances at the time are taken into consideration. In particular the information about the enemy, and the topography, in the commanders possession on the day or what he could reasonably be expected to have found out are of paramount importance. A writer who assumes that the general knew as much as he, the writer, has gleaned from close study, over perhaps a period of years, merely makes a fool of himself. The following comment by Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard made at the lecture given by Professor Sir Michael Howard and referred to at the beginning of these extracts should also be
FOOTNOTES: (5) The Place of Military History by Cyril Falls in Australian Army Journal, November, 1952 reproduced with permission from the Illustrated London News. (6) The Value of Military History to the Soldier by Major HED Harris in the Army Quarterly, October, 1962 (7) Military History: the Cult of Denigration by Brigadier CN Barclay in the Army Quarterly, April, 1962.


considered: The real lesson of history, [particularly British Empire and Commonwealth history] and particularly of the last two wars, has been the refusal of our governments to provide beforehand the money needed to do the job. The following extract again draws attention to the study of the enemy: (8) In the teaching of military history in the United States, including that done in the Armys schools and colleges, more attention should be paid to the other side what the enemy is like, what he did or can do and his leadership capabilities. Again, (drawing partly from Professor Sir Michael Howard), Peter Harvey and Hew Strachan make the following points first quoting Howard:(9) After all allowances have been made for historical differences, wars still resemble each other more than they resemble any other human activity. The influences of topography, supply and morale are constants. Technological, economic and political developments prevent the strategic precepts of one generation being of direct value to its successors, but their study must at least heighten the soldiers understanding of war. The next article (10) also recommends the American Civil War for the students recruit training for the following reasons: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. . . . one of the best documented wars . . . in English. The records are very complete and are relatively accurate. The accurate geography of each theatre is available. The political situation was relatively simple; full details of it are available and its full effect on operations can be studied. The war was on a huge scale and was fought over great distances, giving wide variation in terrain and communications. The background, mentality and heritage of the participants were similar to our own. Tactics were not subordinate to modern weapons, it being therefore easier to gauge the effect of theoretic alternative plans, whilst methods and manoeuvres were sufficiently modern to be intelligible today.

To these reasons could be added that it had brown water naval aspects and the majority of battlefields today are largely available to visit. Lieutenant Colonel MP OHare (the author) also recommended as a method of study a continuous series of military appreciations of the situation mental with short notes. The author saw a necessity for the student having read an account of a battle to be clear before proceeding on four points: a. b. c. d. What each of the opposing commanders did and why. What [the reader] would have done in the place of each, and why. What developments should each side have made for the next campaign in the war, or should the victor have made for his next war. What effect has this on the command and control of our army today.

FOOTNOTES: (8) Military History: the Armys Pivotal Study by WW Hassler, Jnr in Military Review, October, 1976. (9) Arms in Acadame: War Studies at Universities by P Harvey and H Strachan in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institute of London. Vol 124 No 2, June 1979 p42. (10) The Study of War: Part 1 Military History by Lieutenant Colonel MP OHare in Australian Army Journal.


The next series of extracts are taken(11) from an article by Dr Jay Luvaas. The entire article is worthy of study and is strongly recommended. Perhaps the most frequent error in the abuse of history is to take historical examples out of context. Once removed from its historical context, which is always unique, a battle or a campaign ceases to offer meaningful lessons from history. It is also a distortion to compress the past into distinctive patterns, Quoting Clausewitz: There are occasions where nothing will be proven by a dozen examples . . . If anyone lists a dozen defeats in which the losing side attacked with divided columns, I can list a dozen victories in which that very tactic was employed. Luvaas also cautions that : Perhaps the greatest disservice to history and its lessons comes from the frequent association with a given set of military principles or doctrine, The following articles [from which extracts have not been taken for inclusion in this Annex] are also recommended: ADDITIONAL ARTICLES Some Attractions and Pitfalls of Military History by Brian Bond in Military Review February, 1965. History and the Professional Soldier by Major HR Winton, US Army and Captain HH Lau, US Army in Military Review, April 1974. Strongly recommended. How to Study Military History by the Directorate of Military Training, AHQ, Australian Army in Australian Army Journal. Caution needed as it stresses the use of principles of war. The Lessons of Yesterday! The Relevance of Military History to the Teaching of Tactics in Todays Army by Major HGR Boscawen in the British Army Review, No 90, December 1988. Judgement in Military History by Professor B Bond in Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, London, Volume 134, No 1, Spring 1989. The Bertrand Stewart Prize Essay for 1989 The Value of the Study of Past Conflicts by Captain P Miller, the British Army Review, Vol 94. No date. Military History and the Modern Soldier by DB Hawke in the Military Review, January 1983. The Role of Military History in the Education of Future Officers by M Evans, Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre prepared for the 1997 Chief of Army Exercise Preparing Future Leaders: Officer Education and Training for the 21st Century. Web:

FOOTNOTES: (11) Military History: Is It Still Practicable? by Dr Jay Luvaas in Parameters Summer, 1995.




AA. Historical Bibliography No. 8: Military Classics by Dr. Robert H. Berlin, 1983, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KANSA, USA. Available from the Internet and has good comment on each book listed. BB. Books for the Military Professional by Gary J. Borge, Combat Studies Institute, Combined Arms Research Library, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KANSAS, USA. An extensive list of books grouped by subject. Available from the Internet. CC. Joint and Multinational Operations by Major General F. J. Blaisdell, USAF. Each book listed is supported by a brief comment. DD. Chief of Staff of the Armys Professional Reading List. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KANSA, USA. Good comment on each book. Regularly updated and available from the Internet. EE. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Professional Military Reading List. A list of books. Available from the Internet. FF. Commandants Reading List, USMC. A Book of Books MCRP6-11A PCN144000001400 1997. A list of books by rank and subject with amendments and detailed comments. USMC home page.

GG. US Army War College Library Suggested Military Reading List, December 2002 to 2004 (as at July 2005). A list of books with comments. Web:

HH. Navy Professional Reading List from Chief of Naval Operations US Navy. A list of books available from the Internet. II. Web: JJ. Air Force Readings and just about everything else. See Air War College: Gateway to the Internet, US Air Force. The 2004 United States Military Academy Officers Professional Reading Guide editor Steve R. Waddell, Associate Professor. A very comprehensive list of books with comments. Available from:\history\home.html


KK. Royal Australian Navy General Reading List. This may not be available to the general public. Numerous books with comments.