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Ramon Christopher R.

Nollora Election Laws – Regular Class Tuesday 5:30pm – 6:30pm Election Law Assigned Cases

LLB – II

Bondoc vs. Pineda G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991 Facts: Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4 th District of Pampanga. Bondoc is a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipno. While Pineda is a member of the Nacionalista Party. Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently declared as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET). One member of the Electoral Tribunal, Juanito Camasura Jr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc. This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. Camasura was then removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Herrera. Issue: Whether or not the HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion. Ruling: The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. In time, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As the SC pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since “a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. And the tribunal was not supposed to comply with the proposal of the LDP. But since the HRET did then there is an abuse of discretion. The SC can take cognizance of the case. Macalintal vs COMELEC G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003 Facts:

A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal, a memer of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. He claimed that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed this petition as a taxpayer and as lawyer. R.A. No. 9189, entitled, “An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,” appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention: That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution; That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the VicePresident, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Article IX-A, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Issues: 1. Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. 2. Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. 3. Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Held: 1. No, Sec 5(d) is valid. The Court has relied on the discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in connection with Section 2, Article V of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: “Sec. 2. The Congress shall

provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.” It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further weakening petitioner’s claim on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. 2. Yes, Section 18.5 is unconstitutional. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vicepresidency, granting merit to petitioner’s contention that said Section appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of President and VicePresident. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.” 3. Yes, Section 25 creating the JCOC is unconstitutional. The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions. The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body “except those specifically granted by the Constitution,” that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law.

Domino vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999 Facts: Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the May 1998 elections. However, private respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that the petitioner is neither a resident nor a registered voter of the Province of Sarangani where he seeks election.

Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voter’s Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City. The votes cast for Domino were counted and he got the highest number of votes. So, he filed a motion for reconsideration but denied by the COMELEC en banc. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is a resident of Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May 1998 election.

Held: No, the term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to reside in a fixed place and personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilucos Sur but acquired his domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. The petitioner contended that he already established his new domicile in Sarangani by leasing a house and lot located therein. However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in Sarangani, however, it does not produce the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of his original domicile.

The term “residence”, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed but also personal presence in tha place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani. A person’s domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.

Japzon vs. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Manuel Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty ran for Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the local elections of 14 May 2007. Japzon instituted before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. He averred that Ty is a US citizen and had been residing in the United States of America for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar

Issue: Whether or not Ty complied with the one (1) year residency requirement under the Local Government Code. where he. that is. no matter where he may be found at any given time." but rather to "domicile" or legal residence. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). he never actually resided in Barangay 6 for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of Local Government Code. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship. he must establish residence in the USA. However. Ty won the elections. he alleges that prior to the election. He had also complied with the 1-year residencey rule as shown by the following: a. A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. the Court already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship. Ty admits that he had indeed lost his Philippine citizenship when he was naturalized as a US citizen. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. Reacquisition of citizenship does not automatically establish his domicile at Barangay 6. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed. otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation.) Community Tax Certificate from Barangay 6 (March 2006) b. The COMELEC First Division ruled in favor of Ty. eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). for one year before 14 May 2007 and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. 9225.(“Barangay 6”).) Registered voter at Barangay 6 (July 2006) Pending this case. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a . Held: Yes. In Coquilla.) Passport indicating that his residence is in Barangay 6 (Oct 2005) c. he had successfully reacquired his Filipino citizenship as shown by his act of executing an Oath of Allegiance to RP and a duly notazaried Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home.

R. by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as Barangay 6.. Also. Issues: 1. said place becoming his new domicile of choice. 3785 2. Ang Bagong Bayani. No. Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur. immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005. Thereafter. and transferred to the USA. Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice in Barangay 6 became apparent when. Bayan Muna filed a petition challenging the said resolution.OFW Labor Party GO! GO Phil. No. Ang Bagong Bayani. 147589. June 26. 147613. G. Eastern Samar. Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna. he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was Barangay 6. Philippines. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice. ????? Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. as his domicile of choice. 3785. Moreover. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections . He could still retain his domicile in the USA. Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct.naturalized American citizen. the COMELEC approved the accreditation of 154 parties and organizations but denied those of several others in its assailed Omnibus Resolution No. 2001 Facts: On the registration period. and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in Barangay 6. then he must have necessarily abandoned Barangay 6 as his domicile of origin. Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007.R.Youth also filed a petition for cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some herein respondents. Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a petition to delete from the Certified List of Political Parties/ Sectoral Parties/ Organizations/ Coalitions and that said certified list be accordingly amended.OFW Labor Party filed a petition assailing the COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur. 3785. et al G.

peasant. Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national. From its assailed Omnibus Resolution. political parties may participate in the party-list elections. indigenous cultural communities. Section 5."Furthermore. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. women. it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. namely. Whether or not party-list system is exclusive to marginalized sectors. and professionals. Basic rudiments of due process require that the organizations or parties should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with. No. urban poor. because the party-list election is national in scope. handicapped.R. x x x. 2010 Facts: . elderly. “labor. fisherfolk. Rather. the state policy focused mainly on proportional representation by means of Filipino-style party-list system.” 3. and sectoral parties or organizations. For its part. overseas workers. veterans.3." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof. Article IX (C) of the Constitution. youth. “Proportional representation” here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district. February 16. 188920. and their meaning is ascertained by reference to. the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Held: 1. 2. Atienza vs COMELEC G. regional. it refers to the representation of the “marginalized and underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law. COMELEC failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution in connection with the due process clause. Yes. No. Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national. under Sections 7 and 8. political parties may be registered under the party-list system.” While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive.

Moreover. Atienza. the COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. NECO and NAPOLCO. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over intra-party dispute. the former president of the Liberal Party (LP) announced that his party withdrew support for the administration of former Pres. However. Also. were not properly convened. et al. the COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political party. there is a three-year term. “include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. Subsequently. . Thus. As for the validity of petitioners Atienza. Atienza hosted a party conference which resulted to the election of new officers. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The Court ruled in Kalaw v.Arroyo. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Atienza alleged that the amendment to the LP Constituion providing the three-term had not been properly ratified.Drilon. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the said election claiming that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies. However. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2.” Moreover. alleged that Drilon made the announcement without consulting first the party. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP questioning the validity of the quorum. his term has not yet ended. Atienza contested that the election of new officers could be likened to people power removing Drilon as president by direct action. Article IX-C of the Constitution. The COMELEC held that the election of Atienza and others was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the LP Constitution. LP Chairman.’s petition. Drilon was only sitting in a hold-over capacity since his term has been ended already. the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilon’s term expired which resulted to the election of Roxas as the new LP president. Held: The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. Drilon claimed that under the LP Constitution. the COMELEC ruled that since the said Constitution was not ratified. Meaning. Atienza et al. with Atienza as LP president.’s expulsion as LP members. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve. Gloria Macapagal. Moreover. The COMELEC issued resolution denying petitioners Atienza et al.

A. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC resolution instead it filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC resolution. Moreover. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R. 2009 Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution before the NBC. April 21. acting as NBC. and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. Abono. applying the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats. Issues: 1. b. On the same day.the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute. as an incident of its power to register political parties.)The parties. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated? 2. 7941. Bayan Muna. in a proper case brought before it. organizations. 179271.A. can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? Held: 1. organizations. the following procedure shall be observed: a. No.R. NBC denied the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic. The COMELEC did not err when it upheld Roxas’ election but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza’s expulsion.) The parties. No. BANAT vs. to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of R. and A Teacher asked the COMELEC. the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC. COMELEC G. . and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. No. 7941. BANAT filed its petition because the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have announced in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall iomplement the Veterans Ruling.

c. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation on May 20. The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list elections. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R. However. by vote of 8-7.)Those garnering sufficient number of votes.)Each party.A.R. When the petitioners sought registration and certification as Overseas Absentee Voters. the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. the COMELEC filed a comment. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus. 2006 Facts: The petitioners who already acquired Philippine Citizenship under RA 9225 prayed that they be allowed to vote as part of their right. the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections. to every two-percenter. 2. A week before the May 10. In computing the additional seats. directly or indirectly. or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Lewis vs. the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. 162759. However. 2004 elections. Issue: Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 may vote as absentee voter under RA 9189 Held: . organization. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary. No. d. Thus. at one seat each. COMELEC G. the 2004 elections ended already. August 4. according to the ranking in paragraph 1. shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. so the petition becomes moot and academic. No. may do so. 2004 stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage. they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the US that a COMELEC letter stated that the petitioners have yet no right to vote due to their lack of one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated.

Tecson vs. 1939. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP). Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to Disqualify FPJ and to Deny Due Course or to Cancel his Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen. 2004. 2004 Facts: On December 31. in essence to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipino who save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions. Fernando Poe Jr. In his Certificate of Candidacy. as an exception to the residency proscription in the preceding Section. On the other hand. are qualified to vote. With the passage of RA No. grant under its Section 5 (1) the same right of suffrage as granted an absentee voter under RA No. the aforequoted Section 1 of Article V of the 1987 Constitution prescribes requirements as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and RA 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of RA 9225. the irresistible conclusion is that dual citizens may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme. On the contrary. 9225 requiring dual citizens to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote.Yes. It cannot be overemphasized that RA No. implying that a non-resident may. His real name was stated to be “Fernando. 9225 . 9189 aims. after the effectivity of RA 9189 become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath. be allowed to vote. Section 2 of Article V of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote. Jr. the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of their countries. subject. RA No. 9189. natural-born citizens of the Philippines who. FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen. 9225. however. According to Fornier. FPJ’s parents were foreigners – his mother Bessie Kelley Poe was an American . 2003.” or “Ronald Allan” Poe. There is no provision in RA No. In a nutshell. Victorino X. On January 9. to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225. born in Manila on August 20. in implicit acknowledgement that duals are most likely non-residents. COMELEC March 3.

Even if Allan F. a Spanish subject. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos. FPJ’s earliest established ascendant was his grandfather Lorenzo Poe. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before marrying Bessie Kelley according to an “uncertified” copy of a supposed certification of the marriage in July 5. 1915. 1940 where Allan was 25. Pangasinan. Poe and Paulita Gomez Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Allan F. unmarried and American.and his father Allan F.) Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ b. Poe On their part. Poe . Poe was a Spanish national being a son of Lorenzo Poe. Even if no such prior marriage existed. The birth certificate of Allan showed that his father was an Español father and to a mestiza Español mother. Allan F. In the January 19. Poe married Bessey Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ. No birth certificate for Lorenzo but his death certificate issued upon his death in September 11. Fornier presented the following pieces of evidence: a. Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan was born on May 17. unmarried and Filipino. 1954 at age 84 identified him as a Filipino residing in San Carlos. he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate. Poe was a Filipino citizen.) Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita Gomez-Poe attesting that she had filed a bigamy case against Allan F. Poe because of his relationship with Kelley (in Spanish) English translation of (b) Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe Certification from the director of the Records Management and Archives Office stating that a Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the Philippines before 1907 Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives stating that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. 1936. 2004 hearing before the COMELEC. The marriage certificate of their marriage reflected the date of their marriage to be on September 16. Pangasinan Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there was no available information about the marriage of Allan F. FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among others: Certification that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. and Bessie was 22.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would not include cases directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. 2. In seeking the disqualification of FPJ before the COMELEC. Poe) challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and assert that only the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case. Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Poe Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Poe Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Poe and Bessie Kelley Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos. Issues: 1. COMELEC and Velez v. Fornier relied on the following: “A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 is false…” (Omnibus Election Code. Sec. 2004 – COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition for lack of merit and Fornier filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26.Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Poe. Whether or not FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino? Held: 1. Whether or not the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed. The two other petitions (Tecson and Desidero v. The COMELEC’s decision on disqualified cases involving a presidential candidate could be elevated to and could be taken cognizance by the Supreme Court. praying for Temporary Restraining Order. Pangasinan stating that the records of the birth of the said office from 1900 to May 1946 were destroyed during World War II On January 23. The motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on February 6. 78) . 2004 – Fornier filed a petition before the Supreme Court. On February 10. 2004. a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. 2004.

Election contests are either election protests or a quo warranto which would have the objective of dislodging the winner from office.” (Rule 14) The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election.” A “contest” refers to a post-election scenario.” Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court which includes the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of instrumentality of the government.“…the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of enduring free. 52. Constitution). 7. 8. Aside from that. “any decision. according to Art. The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal state: “Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests…relating to qualifications of the President or VicePresident of the Philippines. Sec. returns and qualifications of the President and the Vice President and not candidates for President or Vice-President. Sec. 9. In Tecson petition and Velez petition: The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art. same) Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65). returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. 7 of the Constitution. (Art.” (Rule 13) “Only the registered candidate for President or Vice-President who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President…by filing a verified petition…within 30 days after the proclamation of the winner. same) “any interested party” authorized to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate (Art. orderly and honest elections…” (Sec.” (Rule 12) “An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election contest or a petition for quo-warranto against the President or Vice-President. order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof. . Sec 4(7) of the Constitution in assailing the COMELEC’s jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the Fornier petition because the “Supreme Court sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election. 69. 1.

4 October 1971 41 SCRA 292 Facts: On 8 February 1961. Allan F. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Poe). she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. Poe. during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light. after the expiration of her authorized stay. in turn. she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. in the absence of any other evidence. that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration.000. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. would have himself been a Filipino citizen and. she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. if acquired. could have well been his place of residence before death. would thereby extend to his son. It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction.2. Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. father of respondent FPJ. On 25 January 1962. for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. The 1935 Constitution. in the affirmative. such that Lorenzo Poe would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.00 to undertake. After repeated extensions. which. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Poe could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old. Allan F. when the Philippines was under Spanish rule. depended on whether or not the father of respondent. Asher Y. Pangasinan. On the date of her arrival. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. and that San Carlos. Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a nonimmigrant. Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870. among others. . Commissioner of Immigration GR L-21289. Poe. his place of residence upon his death in 1954.

who dies during the proceedings. Mallare then petitioned that the case be opened for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidences which would alter the decision previously promulgated by the Court. 1969. . Apparently. it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Thus. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata. 1974 59 SCRA 45 Facts: Florencio Mallare was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5. 1962. native born or naturalized. the Court resolved to set aside its previous decision and granted the new trial prayed for. provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. to be the natural son of Ana Mallare. Consequently. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. The evidence consisted of an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church purporting to show Esteban Mallare. Likewise. in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof. is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings. Mallare was declared excluded from the practice of law and his admission to the bar was revoked. and testimonies of certain persons who had known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings. September 12. was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim. both his parents were Chinese. Section 15is a parallel provision to Section 16. a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962. hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. A complaint was filed by the then Acting Immigration Commissioner. if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino. the purpose of which is to determine whether Mallare should be stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the Philippines.Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473. Mallare moved for reconsideration of the decision but was denied by the Court. an alien woman marrying a Filipino. In its resolution dated July 31. becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. a Filipina. IN RE: MALLARE Adm. Case No. Lau Yuen Yeung. 533. the petitioner's father. an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen.

maintained that he is a Filipino citizen. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. The petitioner's evidence shows that his father was born out of wedlock and that his grandmother is a Filipina who resided in Macalelon.Issue: Whether or not Esteban Mallare. 1990 185 SCRA 1990 Facts: On November 19. Petitioner's father is therefore a Filipino. 1958. 0855103 issued . being a citizen of the United States of America. a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña. 1987. Sr. and a definite declaration that Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification and right to continue the practice of law.R. On January 22. Quezon. Held: The Court found sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting aside of its previous decision. who had personal knowledge of the person. issued at Manila on March 27 and 28. Emilio D. Aznar vs. birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen. Esteban. 1988 local elections. 133911. petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. affirmed by the testimonies of the natives of Macalelon. thus making petitioner Florencio Mallare also a Filipino citizen. On January 27. that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. petitioner Jose B.. (Annex "B-1"). Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he come of age. private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18. No. is a Filipino. COMELEC and Osmeña G. 83820 May 25. and even assuming that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien. constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship. Osmeña. 1988. 1988. the petitioners father. alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. and therefore should be included back in the Roll of Attorneys.4) During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent. respectively.

1988. and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 19 65. Thus. both as a voter and as a candidate. No. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express". Hence. truth to tell.on March 25. From the evidence. the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. of both nationalities or citizenships. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country. and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present. that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months. Indeed. it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either “express” or “implied. the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C. it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American. there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship. (2) by express renunciation of citizenship. Held: Supreme Court dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELEC’s decision. In the instant case.A. In the case of Osmeña.5) Thereafter. on June 11. Issue: Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship. private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States.” . the petition for Certiorari. possessed as he is. COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. 1987. 63.

respondent Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. he was born in San Clemente. claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representative since he is not a natural-born citizen. and the naturalized citizen. 2927). can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. 1990. Tarlac on April 27. 63. Issue: Whether or not respondent Cruz. 1960. and by Republic Act No.) by naturalization. 1985. a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by.” Then on June 5. generally under Commonwealth Act No. “natural-born citizens are those citizens of the Philippine from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. he was naturalized as US citizen. 2630. however. As defined in the same Constitution. 473. in connection with his service in the US Marine corps. “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He ran against petitioner Bengzon III then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam before the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET). As a consequence. naturalized citizens are those who have become a Filipino citizens through naturalization. among others. On March 17. of Filipino parents. otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law.” On the other hand.) by birth. 2001 Facts: Respondent Cruz a natural born citizen of the Philippines. a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen. and (2. HRET dismissed the petition. an applicant has to prove that he possess all the qualifications and none of . To be naturalized.Bengzon vs. 1994. he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Section 1 (4) of commonwealth Act No. respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA No. Cruz GR No. took an oath of allegiance to the United States of America. On November 5. May 7. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen. 142840. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country. is a naturalborn thereof. Held: There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1. 530.

(1. he lost Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. (2.) desertion of the armed forces. Commonwealth Act No. may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to.) by repatriation. he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R. on the hand. (4.) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien. 63. Repatriation Results in Recovery of Original Nationality Moreover. and (3. On the other hand.) by direct act of Congress.) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II. 63.A. (1. As distinguish from the lengthy process of naturalization. Modes of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.) by naturalization. naturalization as a mode of reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. (2. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. (2. 2630.) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession. repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.) not left the Philippines. naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1. However. 473.) political and economic necessity. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship. (3. the applicant has.the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. (3. Under this law.) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. and (5. On the other hand. as amended. repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executor only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period. In respondent Cruz’s case. he will be restored his former status as a natural-born Filipino. or (4. 473.) service in the armed forces of the United States at any other time. if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Filipino citizenship. a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualification and none of the deisqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of CA No. No. Repatriation. .) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules.

elected Philippine citizenship. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of separate category for persons who. he is perforce . or return to. of Filipino mothers who. a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover. Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision. Under the 1973 constitution definition. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1.) those born before January 17. his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Those “naturalized citizens” were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. and (2. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision. however.) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows: Section 4. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perform his Philippine citizenship. After defining who are natural-born citizens. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.e.Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem. upon reaching the age of majority. Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1. necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Petitioner’s contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. subsequently reacquire it. Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.) those who are natural-born and (2. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship. i. 1973. only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. Section 2 of Article IV adds sentence: “Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3).) he does not have to perform any act to obtain his Philippine citizenship.) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth.. respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen. now considered those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority as a natural-born.) those who were naturalized and (2. The present Constitution. after losing Philippine citizenship. there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1. “Consequently. the term ‘”natural-born citizen” was first defined in Article III. did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship.

the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18. 1988. Issue: . Sorsogon Chapter. No.a natural born Filipino. the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. 1988. the Local Government Code. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. 1988. election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen. In their Comment. was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad. who was also suing in his personal capacity. he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. COMELEC G. June 28. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution. As such he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. 1988. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino. represented by its President. As an alien. his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage.R. filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo. Estuye. In his answer dated May 22. Frivaldo vs. the League of Municipalities. 120295. 1983. and assumed office in due time. he said. having been naturalized in the United States on January 20." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. 1996 Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22. and the Omnibus Election Code. His naturalization. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor. Speaking for the public respondent. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. On October 27.

Even so. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco. as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country.A. this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V. abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.Whether or not petitioner Juan G. California. among other qualifications. as provincial governor of Sorsogon. Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI. that the candidate was qualified. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.S. Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Obviously. for all its difficulties and limitations. especially if they mistakenly believed. of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws. The evidence shows. This country of ours. Once . this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18. he must owe his total loyalty to this country only. of the Constitution. U. however. But once it is surrendered and renounced. omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. as in this case. a citizen of the Philippines. 1987. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. Northern District of California. that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court. is like a jealous and possessive mother. the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. Section 9. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines. it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. 1988. which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. Section 1. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country.

Jr. Jose Ong. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. Co vs. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. On May 11. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose Ong. Northern Samar for voting purposes. Jr. denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22. however. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. and 2) Jose Ong. 1989. 92191-92.rejected. 1989. July 30. the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong. The HRET in its decision dated November 6. This was. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners. 1989. The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong. Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent. Jr. the renewal of his loyalty and love. it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. Hence. HRET and Jose Ong. Jr. 1987. found for the private respondent.R. No. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang. by an express and unequivocal act. Jr. Petition Dismissed. The returning renegade must show. Jr. G. Accordingly. 1991 Facts: The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). these petitions for certiorari. Petitioner JUAN G. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12. .

correspondingly. On May 15. the private respondent. Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. The two fell in love and. Parenthetically. finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang. the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's . however. his elder brother. 1954. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28. 1957. Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino. The father of the private respondent. He was baptized into Christianity. a branch was set-up in Binondo. Pursuant to said order. Jose Ong Chuan. On April 28. was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration. In 1971. 1955. unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang. As the years passed. As a result. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. thereafter.Held: Yes. Jose Ong graduated from college. The business prospered. After completing his elementary education. During this time. the respondent looked for work here. Petitions are dismissed. arrived in the Philippines from China. he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. the CFI of Samar. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila. In the meantime. got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. The records show that in the year 1895. in search for better education. Agripina Lao. Later. The couple bore eight children. Emil. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned. one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948. Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather). and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Expansion became inevitable. he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. after trial. Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old. 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance. Manila. filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15. Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance. went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education. As a resident of Laoang. Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.

Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. he was not. under earlier laws. of Filipino mothers. In 1969. Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2. Those born before January 17. respondent's full brother. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. conferred the status of a naturalborn. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17. Section 2. and 4. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. 1973. The private . elected citizenship before that date. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject. He was already a citizen. The Court interprets Section 1. In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old. 1987 but also to those who. having been born of Filipino mothers. The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read: Section 1. 1973. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. the following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. 3.citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong. If one so elected. if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. as a natural born Filipino. 2. Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.

Subsequently. eventually. Rodolfo Tabasa. Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on 3 August 1995 and was admitted as abalikbayan for one year. to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest. paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Thereafter. He has established his life here in the Philippines. that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in §13. SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of his citizenship after his death. became a naturalized citizen of the United States. Issue: Whether or not Tabasa a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171. August 29. in 1968. Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order on 29 May 1996. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Petitioner was. Rodolfo Tabasa. ordered deported to his country of origin. In 1968. Malay. 125793. Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. among others. Tabasa alleged. he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father. By derivative naturalization. his father. 2006 Facts: Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. No. Tabasa vs Court of Appeals G. therefore.respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. Aklan by agent Wilson Soluren of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on 23 May 1996 (pursuant to BID Mission Order No. Held: . petitioner was arrested and detained in Baybay. LIV-96-72). when petitioner was seven years old.R.

: Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship. as enumerated in the law: Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government. subsequently. or association for the predominance of their ideas. the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. or Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. “An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine Citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship. viz. Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence. the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents. 8171. and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. Manzano and COMELEC G.” was enacted on 23 October 1995. Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. On their own. however. on account of political or economic necessity. if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171. Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171? He does not. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons. may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. Republic Act No.R. 1999 207 SCRA 630 . personal assault. May 26. 63. This means that. No. 135083. This includes a situation where a former Filipino. That the applicant is not one of those disqualified. Mercado vs. To claim the benefit of RA 8171.He does not. including their minor children. as amended: Provided. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

he no longer had US citizenship. he registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzano’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a dual citizen. Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. Such a person.Facts: Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11. Considering the citizenshipclause (Art. 1998 elections. However. he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. In its resolution. He was born in the United States (San Francisco. as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states. this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship. In his answer. which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. 14. 40). dual citizens are disqualified from running for any position. Held: To begin with. IV) of our . Issues: Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen. CA) on Sept. is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part. Manzano got the highest number votes while Mercado bagged the second place. For instance. Moreover. the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the age of majority. Hence. Under Philippine law. Under the Local Government Code (sec. Manzano’s proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen. Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office. The COMELEC en banc reversed the division’s ruling. The former arises when. 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli). it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a Filipino citizen. a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an American passport. dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US. this petition for certiorari. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen.

That is of no moment. loyalty to two or more states. Unlike those with dual allegiance. on the other hand. the candidate forswear Allegiance to the Other Country. While dual citizenship is involuntary. By Electing Philippine Citizenship.Constitution. whether by . Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country. unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. By electing Philippine citizenship. it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli. such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status. states. who must. it would suffice if. from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may. therefore. by some positive act. without performing any act. but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a person who is a national of the United States. be also a citizen of another state. upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that.” Consequently. persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens. dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. LGC prohibits “Dual Allegiance” not “Dual Citizenship” The phrase “dual citizenship” in the LGC must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance. Dual allegiance. Petitioner’s Election of Philippine Citizenship they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his American citizenship. for candidates with dual citizenship. refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes.

shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post. the Bureu of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation. In Yu v. and on the same day. Defensor-Santiago. 1989. The Los Angeles PCG issued an Order of approval of Jacot’s request. 2006.” He filed a request for the administrator of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles. private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines. and taken part in past elections in this country. 179848. No. Dal and COMELEC G. 9225 or the “Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen. as far as the laws of this country are concerned.birth or naturalization. that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country. leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. Should he betray that trust. Nevertheless. practiced his profession as an artist. effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. To recapitulate. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. private respondent has. Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines who became a naturalized citizen of the US on December 13. but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.” But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. November 27. we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that.R. after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen. 2008 Facts: Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. . in electing Philippine citizenship. California. September 27. Jacot vs. On the other hand. when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood. renounces his foreign nationality. private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. 06-12019 recognizing Jacot as a citizen of the Philippines. he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who. received his education. Yulo.

Held: No. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against Jacot. 2007. COMELEC (Aug. as required under Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections. J. Labo. Jacot garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. Jacot filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman. vs. Jacot filed a Motion for reconsideration but COMELEC en banc dismissed his Motion. 1989) Ponente: Cruz. for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. In Jacot’s answer he countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship. The COMELEC explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA No. On May 2. he sought remedy from the Supreme Court via the present Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Jr. On June 12. 2007 National and Local Elections were held.Six months after. while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any elective public office. It additionally ruled that the filling of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign citizenship. the May 14. Hence. In the meantime. considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship. respondent Roger T. Issue: Whether or not Nestor Jacot effectively renounced his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor. the COMELEC issued a Resolution disqualifying Jacot from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman. 2007. 1. Camiguin. 9225 and who seek elective public posts. Camiguin. arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship. .

can Lardizabal. and in the interest of the speedy administration of justice. Jr. the Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto was not filed on time. Although no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen. and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). 1. In 1980. Luis Lardizabal. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. the marriage was declared void for being bigamous. and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be annulled. He later applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. using an Australian passport. According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul). Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18.FACTS:     Ramon Labo. Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12. 1984. the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. Contrary to Labo's claim. as the runner-up in the elections. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship? 2. However. filed a petition for quo warranto. However. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor. a Filipino citizen? 3. Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee -. hence the COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his citizenship. The second-placer. Yes. 1988. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines? 4.thus. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition. Jr. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980. the SC decided to rule on the merits of the case. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. ISSUES: *The original issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over Lardizabal's petition. alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of alienage. Is Ramon Labo. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a preproclamation proceeding. replace him? HELD/RATIO: 1. he still complied with the . The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance. given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen holding public office in the Philippines). which does not require the payment of such a fee.

): Although no decision has been rendered by the COMELEC and elevated to the SC for review. 3. his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. that Labo should be disqualified on the basis of his citizenship because he has already achieved a lot while serving as Mayor during the pendency of the case. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country. and (3) repatriation. his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. 4. *Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. it is undeniable that a foreigner cannot be allowed to hold public office in the Philippines. (2) naturalization. and is even alleged to have been politically motivated. Despite getting the second highest number of votes. Instead. (2) express renunciation of citizenship. .The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest. and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country.The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. It is regrettable. when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Also. however. Furthermore. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. the Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues. He was not even a qualified voter when he was elected.Contrary to Labo's claim. . 2. J.. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless. He has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress. .prescribed 10-day period. the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo. such as the one being decided in this case. .

COMELEC and Abdusakur Tan G. "Permanently. Held: In Miguel’s “Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 1990 191 SCRA 229 Facts: Mateo Caasi is seeking the disqualification of Merito Miguel as candidate for municipal mayor of Bolinao. a resident of the United States. the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have “waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently. April 14." Miguel's answer was. COMELEC G. 1999 Facts: . Department of State) which he filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984. it identifies Miguel as a Resident Alien. Miguel's answer to Question No. 230. 88831 November 8.” Also. Issue: Whether or not a green card is a proof that the holder is a US resident. and the congressional elections on 18 May 1987. Pangasinan on the ground that he (Miguel) is a green card holder. including the plebiscite on 2 February 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution." On the green card itself. Miguel admits possessing a green card but contends that he only uses it for convenience to freely enter US for his medical treatment and to visit his children. No. Miguel’s immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. so state).Caasi vs. No. Miguel only resided in Bolinao for 3 months after returning to the country which is in violation of the 1 year residency requirement.R. hence.R. He also alleges that he voted in all previous elections. 133676. Loong vs. To be “qualified to run for elective office” in the Philippines.

Tolentino. some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino. Jr. Issues: 1. Tolentino. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation. Atty. Tolentino. Atty. 1998.) The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. The next day. Jr. Jose Tolentino.. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions. as a consequence of which. Before midnight of May 12. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu. 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Some recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri). Jr. . 1998. On May 12. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the militarypolice officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Tudanan. 1998. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC. COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong sequence code. On May 15. There was lack of agreement. Siasi. These municipalities were Talipao. 6 On the same day. Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. the experts told him that the problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. COMELEC started the manual count on May 18. Jr. After the consultations. Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor. Jr. Tapul and Jolo. May 13. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count. 1998. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count.An Automated elections system was used for the May 11. Atty. the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. the automated machines failed to read them correctly. urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. 1998. Atty. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata. The error was in the printing of the local ballots.’s recommendation and the manner of its implementation. 98-1750 approving. he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine.

Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable.A.A. These are enough considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. whether or not it is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu. there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. plebiscite. 98-1796 and 98-1798. Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R. (The main issue in the case at bar) 2. Are its factual bases reasonable? 2. The issue is not only legal but one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire nation. 2. We hold. 1.a. referendum and recall. Held: The petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed. the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner. The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. peaceful. No. 98-1750. honest. however. initiative. Our status quo order of June 23. Undoubtedly. 8436. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count.2. Is there a legal basis for the manual count? 2.b. No. The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary. 98-1748. capricious or whimsical. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it ordered a manual count? 3.c. the private respondents and the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1). Article IX(C) of the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election . orderly. and credible elections. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office. whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. that the vacuum . a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate In enacting R. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous count. 1998 is lifted.

. such election results in a failure to elect. not held. There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. 8436. COMELEC had to act desively in view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting of votes. or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting. To hold a special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R. These officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. 6. Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is completely offline. 3. a province with a history of violent elections. Private respondent’s election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes. . viz: Sec. their assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. They later submitted written position papers. The Tolentino memorandum clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. Failure of election. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election. fraud.A. call for the holding or continuation of the election. or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof. It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post election tension in Sulu. – If. terrorism. or other analogous causes.in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. R. They were orally heard. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. on account of force majeure. the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. If manual counting is illegal. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election. The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to end. Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to Manila.A. the Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing. and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election. The records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties.

Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative. 2002 Facts: Codilla. the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality. he was found guilty and ordered disqualified. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of Locsin’s proclamation. for the purpose of inducing. However. influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. 10. Dec.R. 150605. At the time of the elections on May 14. Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally elected Representative. he garnered the highest number of votes. xxx Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him.Codilla vs. alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract. and Locsin. 2001. no. his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob. Issues: 1. In fact. The validity of the respondent’s proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Leyte. Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. After hearing of his disqualification case. the timely filing of the motion for . the disqualification case was still pending so Codilla’s name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code. then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City. A petition fordisqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. Codilla’s votes being considered stray. De Venecia G. were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. 2. Held: First.

Cua. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve.” This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC. the winner. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. To stress again. thus. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET.reconsideration suspends its execution. be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. Her proclamation was a patent nullity.. the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. and if she won. to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding. at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin. the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter. In the case at bar. could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves. Hence. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case. It cannot. In Puzon vs. xxx (a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc. whether issued by a division or en banc. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent. even the HRET ruled that the “doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office. neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. as a loser. it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives. xxx A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. to assume office. to tell petitioner Codilla. There is no issue that she was qualified to run. (b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin. Second. Sr. .

The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. trust. In sum. and that the petitioner has a well-defined. The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. In the case at bar. section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless unproclaimed candidate. clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. or station. No. officer or person. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed. without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. 154512. the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. Three (3) Term Rule Socrates vs. it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty. board. 447 votes in the May 14. on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin.R. Under Rule 65. such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. 2002 391 SCRA 457 . The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion. in a prescribed manner. COMELEC G. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. and there is no other plain.350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53. any person may file a verified petition for mandamus “when any tribunal. 2001 elections. corporation. November 12. in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority.” For a petition for mandamus to prosper. or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71. and not purely discretionary on the part of the board.

Hagedorn’s qualification to run for mayor. Hagedorn’s recall term from September 24. 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30. The court ruled that the rationale behind the three term rule was to prevent consecutiveness in holding office. Hagedorn’s continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30. Issue: Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for the 2003 recall election. In the case of Edward Hagedorn. 2001. we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24. the incumbent mayor. 2002 to June 30. On August 23 of the same year. and 4. Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in recall election. 3. COMELEC and Asilo . A petition for his disqualification was filed by Socrates on the ground that he cannot run for the said post for his 4th consecutive term. Held: YES. 2002 during which time he was a private citizen. In summary. faced a recall proceeding and was asked to step down from office. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30. 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because: 1. 2.Facts: Edward Hagedorn has already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. 2001 to September 24. Aldovino vs. Socrates. 2002. He did not run in the immediately following regular elections. One July 2. there was a break after the end of his third term and before the recall election. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders. 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term.

Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. The petitioners Simon B. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office. and whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160 Held: The Supreme Court answered in a negative. Significantly. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001. No. and Ferdinand N. Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. Jr. 2007. In the 2007 election. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8. The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo’s favour in its Resolution of November 28. As worded. 2001-2004. and 2004-2007 terms. 7160 (RA 7160. Faller. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms. Wilfredo F. This Court. Issue: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule. Danilo B. or the Local Government Code)? The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term. The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three .. thus. respectively. Article X.G. such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension order. Petition is meritorious. however.R. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply. Aldovino. his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8. the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. 2009 Facts: Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8. December 23. 184836. hence. as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered. the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced.

the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.R. COMELEC G. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time.. to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment.e. using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption. i. for an effective interruption to occur. preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption… Lonzanida v. not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. 1. and 2. 147927 376 SCRA 90 Facts: . No.. Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8. Commission on Elections presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. (EXCEPTION) "Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post. The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus..years – during which an official has title to office and can serve. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. however short. That he has fully served three consecutive terms…… The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections. Adormeo vs.

Tagarao was recalled and in the May 12. 1992. . 2001. This did not amount to a third full term. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18. Petitioner Benjamin U. On March 27. Held: No.Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in 1992. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. Talaga was candidate for Mayor in the May 14. who was also a candidate for mayor. 1998 259 SCRA 157 Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Jr. he was a private citizen. upon the death of the incumbent. Cesar Borja. 2001 elections. 1998 elections. Borja vs. and a petition for cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed on the ground that he has served as Mayor for three consecutive terms. 2000 recall elections. that unexpired term. Issue: Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms. Unlike government officials. Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. Jr. Carpo. will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed” this comment of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. 1998. private respondent Carpo filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11. re-elected in 1995. On September 2. he became mayor. 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. no matter how short. 1988 for a term ending June 30. In the case at bar. Bernas applies only to members of the House of Representatives. Borja.“ If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another. COMELEC September 3. Neither can Talaga’s victory in the said recall election can be deemed as a “voluntary renunciation” under the Constitution. but lost to Tagarao in 1998 elections. he was again re-elected as Mayor.. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995. It was only by virtue of the recall that he served Tagarao’s unexpired term. Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30. 1989. there is no recall election for members of Congress. sought Carpo’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30. For nearly 2 years. by operation of law.

before assuming the position of Mayor. Issue: Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as having served the term for the purpose of the three-term limit under the Constitution. the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. this petition.” Carpo won the election case against Borja. he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the three term limit. The Court held that when Carpo occupied the post of the Mayor upon the incumbent’s death and served for remainder of the term. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. 1998. By this time Ong had already served his full term. However in 1998 when Ong was proclaimed the winner. No. For his defense petitioner cites Lozanida v COMELEC. Held: No. It is because of this event that Alegre sought for the disqualification of Ong. Ong vs. 16395. The term he served must be one for which he was elected. an election protest was filed against him by Alegre. Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. Hence.COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Carpo saying that “In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code. COMELEC ruled in favor of Alegre. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Francis Ong‘s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente. According to him Ong is banned to run for the 2004 elections as Mayor since he has already reached his three term limit.R. Furthermore. and 2001 elections. . then incumbent mayor were both running for the position of Mayor in the May 2004 elections in San Vicente Camarinas Norte. he served first as a Vice Mayor and the duties and responsibilities of the two positions are wholly different from each other. Alegre G. Ong was proclaimed mayor for the 1995. Hence this petition. However the decision annulling the proclamation of Ong as winner only came out in 2001. 2006 Facts: John Stanley Alegre and Francis Ong. January 23.

154829. 2000 ratified Republic Act No. the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city. in Lonzanida. The assailed COMELEC resolutions are affirmed. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply. was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos.Held: Petition dismissed. A plebiscite conducted on September 8. Davao del Sur Province into a Component City to be known as the City of Digos or the Charter of the City of Digos. there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis‘ service respecting the 1998-2001 term. An Act Converting the Municipality of Digos.R. No. In this case. there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service. But more importantly. Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term. the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. On the other hand. December 10. . During petitioners third term. In fine. Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. and (2) That he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. and 1998. Petitioner cannot rely on the case of Lozanida v COMELEC. For one. as a consequence thereof. the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified. the difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For another. 8798 entitled. 2003 Facts: Petitioner Arsenio A. two conditions or requisites must concur. here. Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992. followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. Latasa. to wit: (1) That the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post. to be known as the City of Digos. under Section 53. and. This event also marked the end of petitioner’s tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente. Francis was never unseated during the term in question. 1995. the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of ―failure of election. COMELEC G. However. Unlike Lonzanida. Latasa vs.

and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor. the dispositive portion of which reads. 2001. Respondent Sunga alleged therein that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since petitioner had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. Despite this. Sunga. having garnered the most number of votes. private respondent Sunga filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the City Board of Canvassers From Canvassing or Tabulating Respondents Votes. petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14. petitioner Latasa was still proclaimed winner on May 17.Article IX of the Charter. It was only on August 27. petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections. 2001. On March 5. however. 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of citymayor. filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course. 2001. Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated May 4. Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. he took his oath as the city mayor. On March 1. 2001 elections. private respondent Sunga filed. Issue: . 2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. on May 27. 2001. 2001. he argued that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14. a Supplemental Motion which essentially sought the annulment of petitioner’s proclamation and the suspension of its effects. petitioner Latasa filed his answer. Consequently. arguing that he did not make any false representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. 2001.which remained unacted upon until the day of the elections. Hence. On April 27. respondent COMELECs First Division issued a Resolution. 2001. premises considered. 2001. On February 28. petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office as the newly elected mayor of Digos City. Moreover. 2001. On May 16. and From Proclaiming Him as the Duly Elected Mayor if He Wins the Elections. Both parties submitted their position papers on March 19. the respondents certificate of candidacy should be cancelled for being a violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. private respondent Romeo M. 2001. as follows: Wherefore. On July 1. May 14. 2001.

Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule. Article X. petitioner states that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct personalities. Section 8. is not barred from running again in for same local government post. it attained a different juridical personality. COMELEC. This Court also notes that the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. The term of office of elective local officials. It is evident that in the cases of Borja. the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. Therefore. True. Held: As a rule.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post. however. shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. in that it limits the range of choice of the people. He does not deny the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor. Sec 7 (Creation and Conversion) of the Local Government Code and Sections 2 and 53 of the Charter of the City of Digos). Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. In the present case. he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city. This does not mean. the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. Lonzanida vs COMELEC. the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. therefore. in a representative democracy. COMELEC. he cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post as seen in the aforementioned provisions (Section 450 (Requisites for Creation). except barangay officials. the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. Consequently. and Adormeo vs. unless two conditions concur: 1. Socrates vs COMELEC. which shall be determined by law. An elective local official. However. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. and 2. when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor. As stated earlier.Whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision. there exists a rest period or a break in the service of the local . These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. the Court noted that the delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. v. Jr.

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. with the intention of running for the position of Governor. Mitra vs. In Lonzanida. among other territories. Puerto PrincesaCity was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan. On March 20. 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as Representative). Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. . Sta. COMELEC G.Brgy. On March 26. Municipality of Aborlan. in Adormeo and Socrates. 191938 Facts: When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled.elective official. Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. No. the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City.R. Indeed. Puerto Princesa City. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos. and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010. 2009. Similarly. if not abhorred by it. Province of Palawan. Isaub. 03720 of Brgy. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of PuertoPrincesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City. petitioner therein was a private citizen a few months before the next mayoral elections. Monica. to Sitio Maligaya. petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution. This district then included. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. the private respondents therein lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively.

R. respondents Antonio V.Soon thereafter. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. Likewise." Rivera III vs. he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in 1998-2001(2nd term) because his election was declared void by the RTC due to an election protest. declared it final and executory on May 14. Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995-1998 (1st term) and 2004-2007 (3rd term). Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground the he already served three consecutive terms in the office he seeks to run. 2004. 167591 May 9. The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10. Issue: . Hence. No. Gonzales and Orlando R. 2007 Facts: A petition for cancelation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat. The respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC. Held: Yes. Issue: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution. the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC. this petition. 2010 elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3. Jr. COMELEC G. Comelec ruled that Morales already served his third term and after a Motion for Reconsideration was filed. Balbon.

Here. 2001. However. No. Daan-Bantayan.R. HRET and Salimbangon G. Morales was elected for the term July 1. Martinez a nuisance candidate only on June 12. and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. 2007. Edilito C. He assumed the position. it is the petitioner. it is a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. January 11. Held: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply. Hence. who should take his position. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer. Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. two conditions or requisites must concur. the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor. he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely". On March 29. Martinez. a resident of Barangay Tambongon. the candidate having the second highest number of votes cannot assume the position. On April 3. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. He served as mayor until June 30.Whether or not Morales had already served his three (3) consecutive terms and if so. the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito C. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. 2010 Facts: In the May 14. 2007 or almost one (1) month after the elections. With regard to the person who will replace Morales. 2001. 189034. Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections. 2007. 2007 elections. Cebu. filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. Martinez a nuisance candidate. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post. petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. Nuisance Martinez III vs. 1998 to June 30. .

2009. Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be considered as stray votes or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate? Held: The court finds the petition meritorious. and the Resolution dated July 30. Hence. What is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after the elections. 2009 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof. MARTINEZ” written on the line for Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors did not count for Martinez on the ground that there was another congressional candidate (Edilito C. affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon and declared him to be the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu. 211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Code. Martinez filed an election protest before the HRET based on the 300 ballots more or less with only “MARTINEZ” or “C. The HRET dismissed the election protest. the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance with Sec.173) votes. Since the name of Edilito C. 2. Issue: 1. Martinez was still included in the official list of candidates on election day (May 14. having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. In its decision dated May 28. Martinez moved for reconsideration of the Decision. Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that he garnered sixty-seven thousand two hundred seventy-seven (67.401) ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. 2007. but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30. . MARTINEZ" only written on the line for Representative were properly denied on the ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter. 2007). 2009.277) votes as against Martinez who garnered sixty-seven thousand one hundred seventy-three (67. Martinez) who had the same surname. or a difference of one hundred four (104) votes.On July 9. this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to nullify the decision of HRET dismissing the election protest declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu. the HRET held that five thousand four hundred one (5. 1.

Otherwise. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. involve the adjudication not only of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates. Otherwise. final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day.948 votes. be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray. Accordingly. Ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may. Thus.108 total votes of private respondent.The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed. be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray. potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed. Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private respondent with a winning margin of 4. nuisance candidates. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes.056 votes as against 67. the 5. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. nuisance candidates. in certain situations as in the case at bar. Election Law Ballots. in appropriate cases. in appropriate cases.401 votes for “MARTINEZ” or “C. but also of paramount public interest considering the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. . even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. MARTINEZ” should be credited to petitioner giving him a total of 72. We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may. therefore. Thus. Election protest. 2. in certain situations as in the case at bar. Election contests.

2736. his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate. on the ground that it . manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error. Reapportionment of Legislative District Montejo vs. or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who. The judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial interference. the sheer logistical challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign. pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. after considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could not have been intended for “Edilito C. Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final outcome of revision showing 5. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar. has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed. judicial review. based on the attendant circumstances. Electoral tribunal. representative of the first district of Leyte. Vice-President and Senator. March 16. Martinez” who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment. COMELEC 242 SCRA 415. The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due process of law. In elections for national positions such as President. “MARTINEZ” written on the line for Representative.401 ballots with only “MARTINEZ” or “C. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. 1995 Facts: Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo. the law contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for either of them. unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte. votes which should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes.

whose population has so . The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein. Kawayan. Culaba. respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested parties and on December 29. it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte. The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. Cabucgayan. the power was given to the Congress. Caibiran. Cabucgayan. 1994. Caibiran. Biliran. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city.067 as per the 1990 census. Issue: Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not. Kawayan. Held: Section 1 of Resolution no. it promulgated the assailed resolution where. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein made. Naval. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. San Isidro. Biliran. 2736 is annulled and set aside. Tabango and Villaba. the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. among others. Section 3. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the 1987 constitution. Any province that may hereafter be created. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146. Said ordinance states that: Section 2. it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent elections. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria. Culaba. respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran. located in the 3rd district of Leyte. On 1992.) As a consequence of the conversion. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite. Biliran. Maripipi. voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria. was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. Calubian.violates the principle of equality of representation. Also. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants. Leyte.

section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities. Examples include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district.) .increases. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments. is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.