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Rylands v Fletcher - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Rylands v Fletcher
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 ( was a decision by the House of Lords which established a new area of English tort law. Rylands employed contractors to build a reservoir, playing no active role in its construction. When the contractors discovered a series of old coal shafts improperly filled with debris, they chose to continue work rather than properly blocking them up. The result was that on 11 December 1860, shortly after being filled for the first time, Rylands's reservoir burst and flooded a neighbouring mine, run by Fletcher, causing 937 worth of damage. Fletcher brought a claim under negligence, through which the case eventually went to the Exchequer of Pleas.[1] The majority ruled in favour of Rylands; however, Bramwell B, dissenting, argued that the claimant had the right to enjoy his land free of interference from water, and that as a result the defendant was guilty of trespass and the commissioning of a nuisance. Bramwell's argument was affirmed, both by the Court of Exchequer Chamber and the House of Lords, leading to the development of the "Rule in Rylands v Fletcher"; that "the person who for his own purpose brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief, if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape".[2] This doctrine was further developed by English courts, and made an immediate impact on the law. Prior to Rylands, English courts had not based their decisions in similar cases on strict liability, and had focused on the intention behind the actions rather than the nature of the actions themselves. In contrast, Rylands imposed strict liability on those found detrimental in such a fashion without having to prove a duty of care or negligence, which brought the law into line with that relating to public reservoirs and marked a significant doctrinal shift. Academics have criticised it, however, both for the economic damage such a doctrine could cause and for its limited applicability. The tort of Rylands v Fletcher has been disclaimed in various jurisdictions, including Scotland, where it was described as "a heresy that ought to be extirpated", and Australia, where the High Court chose to destroy the doctrine in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd. Within England and Wales, however, Rylands remains valid law, although the decisions in Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc and Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council make it clear that it is no longer an independent tort, but instead a sub-tort of nuisance.

Rylands v Fletcher

Court Full case name

House of Lords John Rylands and Jehu Horrocks v Thomas Fletcher

Date decided 17 July 1868 Citation(s) [1868] UKHL 1, (1868) LR 3 HL 330

1 Facts 2 Judgment 2.1 Liverpool Assizes 2.2 Exchequer of Pleas 2.3 Court of Exchequer Chamber 2.4 House of Lords 3 Significance 3.1 Change to the law 3.2 Assessment 3.3 England and Wales 3.3.1 Developments 3.3.2 Brings, collects and keeps 3.3.3 Mischief and escape 3.3.4 Non-natural use 3.3.5 Defences 3.4 Scotland 3.5 United States 3.6 Australia 4 See also 5 Notes 6 References 7 External links

Transcript(s) Full text of House of Lords decision ( /UKHL/1868/1.html) Judge(s) sitting Cairns LC Lord Cranworth Case history Prior action(s) Court of Liverpool Assizes Exchequer of Pleas Court of Exchequer Chamber ([1866] LR 1 Ex 265) Case opinions Cairns LC Lord Cranworth Keywords Strict liability, nuisance

In 1860, John Rylands paid contractors to build a reservoir on his land, intending that it should supply the Ainsworth Mill with water. Rylands played no active role in the construction, instead contracting out to a competent engineer. While building it, the contractors discovered a series of old coal shafts and passages under the land filled loosely with soil and debris, which joined up with Thomas Fletcher's adjoining mine.[4] Rather than blocking these shafts up, the contractors left them.[5] On 11 December 1860, shortly after being filled for the first time, Rylands's reservoir burst and flooded Fletcher's mine, the Red House Colliery, causing 937 worth of damage.[6] Fletcher pumped the water out, but on 17 April 1861 his pump burst, and the mine again began to flood. At this point a mines inspector was brought in, and the sunken coal shafts were discovered.[7] Fletcher brought a claim against John Rylands, the owner, and Jehu Horrocks, the manager of Rylands's reservoir[8] on 4 November 1861.[9]

Liverpool Assizes
The tort of trespass was inapplicable, because the law at the time did not class one-off events as "trespass"; an action was instead taken under the tort of nuisance.[10] The case was first heard by Mellor J and a special jury in September 1862 at the Liverpool Assizes;[11] a court order led to an arbitrator from the Exchequer of Pleas being appointed in December 1864.[12] The arbitrator decided that the contractors were liable for negligence, since they had known about the old mine shafts. Rylands, however, had no way of knowing about the mine shafts and so was not.

Exchequer of Pleas
The case then went to the Exchequer of Pleas, where it was heard between 3 and 5 May 1865.[13] It was heard on two points. Firstly, whether the defendants were liable for the actions of the contractors and secondly, whether the defendants were liable for the damage regardless of their lack of negligence.[14] They decided for the first point that the defendants were not liable, but more split on the second point. Pollock CB, Martin B and Channell B held that the defendants were not liable, as since a negligence claim could not be brought there was no valid case. Bramwell B, dissenting, argued that the claimant had the right to enjoy his land free of interference from water, and that as a result the defendant was guilty of trespass and the commissioning of a nuisance. He stated that "the general law in matters wholly independent of contract" should be that the defendants were liable, "on the plain ground that the defendants have caused water to flow into the [claimant]'s mines, which but for the defendant's act would not have gone there".[15]

Court of Exchequer Chamber

Fletcher appealed to the Exchequer Chamber of six judges. The prior decision was overturned in favour of the appellant Fletcher. Blackburn J spoke on behalf of all the judges and said that:

We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by shewing that the escape was owing to the Plaintiffs default; or perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient. The general rule, as above stated, seems on principle just. The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbour's reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbour's privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbour's alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour who has brought something on his own property (which was not naturally there), harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows will be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour's, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there, so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequence. And upon authority this we think is established to be the law, whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches.[16]

Blackburn J gave the leading judgment.

Blackburn J's opinion relied on the liability for damages to land available through the tort of chattel trespass and the tort of nuisance, as well as the in scienter action, injury by a domesticated animal known to have a disposition to injure.[17] Rylands appealed.

House of Lords
The House of Lords dismissed the appeal and agreed with the determination for Fletcher.[18] Lord Cairns, in speaking for the House of Lords, stated their agreement of the rule stated above by Justice Blackburn, but added a further limitation on liability, which is that the land from which the escape occurs must have been modified in a way which would be considered non-natural, unusual or inappropriate. The case was then heard by the House of Lords on 6 and 7 July 1868, with a judgment delivered on 17 July. Oddly the court consisted of only two judges, Lord Cairns and Lord Cranworth; Lord Colonsay failed to attend.[19] The eventual judgment confirmed Blackburn's decision and general principle, adding a requirement that the use be "non-natural".[20] The judgment of Lord Cairns LC was as follows.[21]

My Lords, the principles on which this case must be determined appear to me to be extremely simple. The Defendants, treating them as the owners or occupiers of the close on which the reservoir was constructed, might lawfully have used that close for any purpose for which it might in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be used; and if, in what I may term the natural user of that land, there had been any accumulation of water, either on the surface or underground, and if, by the operation of the laws of nature, that accumulation of water had passed off into the close occupied by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff could not have complained that that result had taken place. If he had desired to guard himself against it, it would have lain upon him to have done so, by leaving, or by interposing, some barrier between his close and the close of the Defendants in order to have prevented that operation of the laws of nature.... On the other hand if the Defendants, not stopping at the natural use of their close, had desired to use it for any purpose which I may term a non-natural use, for the purpose of introducing into the close that which in its natural condition was not in or upon it, for the purpose of introducing water either above or below ground in quantities and in a manner not the result of any work or operation on or under the land, - and if in consequence of their doing so, or in consequence of any imperfection in the mode of their doing so, the water came to escape and to pass off into the close of the Plaintiff, then it appears to me that that which the Defendants were doing they were doing at their own peril; and, if in the course of their doing it, the evil arose to which I have referred, the evil, namely, of the escape of the water and its passing away to the close of the Plaintiff and injuring the Plaintiff, then for the consequence of that, in my opinion, the Defendants would be liable. As the case of Smith v. Kenrick is an illustration of the first principle to which I have referred, so also the second principle to which I have referred is well illustrated by another case in the same Court, the case of Baird v Williamson,[22] which was also cited in the argument at the Bar.[23]

Lord Cairns LC fully concurred with Blackburn J

Change to the law
Early English common law had, in many instances, imposed liability on those who had caused harm regardless of wrongful intent or negligence. Trespass was considered a remedy for all tortious wrongs, and sometimes used as a synonym for torts generally.[24] Over the centuries, however, judges focused more on the intent and negligence behind the actions than the nature of the actions themselves, leading to the development of negligence and nuisance and the further development of trespass.[25] At the time of Rylands, the previous case relied upon was Vaughan v Menlove,[26] decided in the Court of Common Pleas in 1837. The case had almost identical facts to Rylands, but strict liability was never even considered. The case is instead thought of as one of the best attempts of early 19th Century English judges to build up the law of negligence.[27] The outcome of Rylands meant that judges would again impose strict liability on defendants who accumulated dangerous things on their land without any need to prove negligence or wrongful intent. The decision won support for bringing the law relating to private reservoirs up to standard with the law relating to public reservoirs, which contained similar statutory provisions thanks to a pair of private Acts of Parliament passed in 1853 and 1864.[28]

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Rylands v Fletcher - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The decision in Rylands initially faced little criticism within England and Wales, although many American scholars and judges of the time felt that judgment was a poor one. Doe CJ of the New Hampshire Supreme Court wrote that it "put a clog upon natural and reasonably necessary uses of matter and tend to embarrass and obstruct much of the work which it seems to be a man's duty carefully to do". The American interpretation was based primarily on the idea that it would cause economic harm.[29] Further American criticism is based on the idea that it is poor law. Firstly, they argue, it is not trespass, since the damage is not direct, and secondly, it is not a nuisance, because there is no continuous action.[30][31] Glofcheski, writing in the Hong Kong Law Journal, notes that the doctrine has not flourished... a tort imposing strict liability should be closely interpreted and circumspectly applied".[32] It has been argued that the decision was never entirely accepted by the judiciary as a whole, and that it is difficult to justify. This is for two reasons; firstly, it is a case of very limited applicability, and it has been suggested that it be folded into a general principle of strict liability for "ultra-hazardous" activities. Secondly, subsequent case law in England and Wales, particularly in Rickards v Lothian, has undermined the "non-natural use" element by introducing a cost/benefit analysis which severely limits the decision's usefulness.[33]

England and Wales

Developments The party that can be sued in a Rylands claim is an owner or occupier of land, along with anyone who stores or collects the dangerous material, as in Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd.[34] The party suing was initially one with an interest in land, but Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd confirmed that an interest in land was not necessary to bring a claim.[35] Historically, personal injury claims have been allowed, as in Hale v Jennings.[36] More recent cases, however, such as the House of Lords decision in Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council,[37] have confirmed that Rylands is "a remedy for damage to land or interests in land. It must...follow that damages for personal injuries are not recoverable under the rule".[38] In Cambridge Water Lord Goff opined that the rule in Rylands should not further be developed, and that rather than being an independent tort it should be instead considered a sub-tort of nuisance. Statutory provisions, such as the Environmental Protection Act 1990, were a more modern and appropriate way of addressing environmental problems which would previously have been covered by Rylands. Subsequently, Transco disapproved of the Australian decision in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd to absorb Rylands into the general law of negligence,[39] deciding that Rylands should continue to exist but, as Lord Bingham said, as a "sub-species of nuisance...while insisting upon its essential nature and purpose; and...restate it so as to achieve as much certainty and clarity as is attainable".[40] It is now a sub-tort, rather than an independent tort, they have confirmed that it will be allowed to remain.[41] Donal Nolan has argued that to consider Rylands as part of private nuisance is unsound. Private nuisance requires the claimant to have an interest in land, while Rylands does not; although exceptions to this rule have occasionally been made in private nuisance, in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd,[42] the House of Lords ruled that to make exceptions would transform nuisance from a tort against land to a tort against the person, and should not be permitted.[43] John Murphy, Professor of Common Law at the University of Manchester, agrees with Nolan,[44] and makes the additional point that nuisance is focused on a loss of enjoyment to land, not physical damage as Rylands is.[45] It has also been concerned that the reasonable use test, which appears in nuisance, is not applicable to cases brought under Rylands.[46] Brings, collects and keeps The first requirement under Rylands is that the defendant "for his own purposes brings onto land and collects and keeps there". In Rylands, this was the keeping of water in a reservoir; other cases in England and Wales have illustrated what sort of material is considered. In British Celanese v AH Hunt,[47] the accumulation was of metal foil strips. "for his own purpose" is not understood to be "for his benefit", although that was what Blackburn was referring to at the time; in Smeaton v Ilford Corp,[48] Rylands was held to apply to a local authority accumulating sewage on its land, although there was no benefit to the local authority from doing this.[49] Mischief and escape The next element of Rylands is that the thing be something "likely to do mischief if it escapes". Before Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council this did not have to be a dangerous item (see below); the risk was instead in its behaviour if it escapes. In Rylands the "thing" was water. Other examples are fire, as in Jones v Festiniog Railway,[50] gas, as in Batchellor v Tunbridge Wells Gas Co,[51] fumes, as in West v Bristol Tramways Co,[52] and electricity, as in Hillier v Air Ministry.[53] The extent of the "thing"'s accumulation can also be considered, as in Mason v Levy,[54] where it was not just the type of thing kept but the sheer amount which created the danger. It is essential for a Rylands claim that there be an escape of a dangerous thing "from a place where the defendant has occupation of or control over land to a place which is outside his occupation or control". In Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd,[55] an explosion in a munitions factory killed an inspector on the property. Rylands was held not to apply, because there was no escape. The dangerous thing that escapes does not always have to be the thing which was accumulated, but there must be a causal link. In Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co (Leicestershire) Ltd,[56] explosives stored on the defendant's land led to the escape of rocks in a blast, and the defendant was found liable.[57] It should be noted that in Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council, Lord Bingham stated obiter that "I do not think the mischief or danger test should be at all easily satisfied. It must be shown that the defendant has done something which he recognised, or judged by the standards appropriate at the relevant place and time, he ought reasonably to have recognised, as giving rise to an exceptionally high risk of danger or mischief if there should be an escape, however unlikely an escape may have been thought to be."[58] Non-natural use The requirement of "non-natural use", which was created when the case went to the House of Lords, was described by Lord Moulton, in Rickards v Lothian,[59] as "some special use bringing with it increased danger to others". Because the idea of something being "non-natural" is a subjective one, the interpretation of this principle has varied over the years. In Musgrove v Pandelis, a car filled with petrol was considered "non-natural", while in Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd,[34] so was the operation of a munitions factory during war-time.[60] There is no single concrete test to define what is "non-natural", for reasons given by Lord Bingham in Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council;[37] "[non-natural use] is not a test to be inflexibly applied. A use may be extraordinary and unusual at one time or in one place but not so at another time or in another place...I also doubt whether a test of reasonable user is helpful, since a user may well by quite out of the ordinary but not unreasonable".[61] Defences There are several defences in England and Wales to a claim under Rylands v Fletcher; act of an unknown third party, contributory negligence, consent and statutory authority. An act of an unknown third party will absolve the defendant of liability, as in Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd.[36] In Northwestern Utilities Ltd v London Guarantee and Accident Co Ltd,[62] the principle was established that if a claimant knows of the unknown third party and their actions, the defendant is additionally likely to be able to deny liability. As Rylands requires strict liability, any contributory negligence voids most of the claim. Initially it was sufficient to offset the case itself; with the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, courts instead apportion damages, taking into account how much of the harm was contributed by the claimant. Nevertheless, contributory negligence is still a viable partial defence to a Rylands claim.[63] Other valid defences are where the claimant has consented, expressly or impliedly, to the accumulation of the "thing", and where there is statutory authority for the accumulation.[64]

The principles of Rylands v Fletcher were initially applied in Scots law, first in the case of Mackintosh v Mackintosh,[65] where a fire spreading from the defendant's land to the claimant's land caused property damage.[66] Scots lawyers and judges applied Rylands differently to their English counterparts, however. While the rule is interpreted in England and Wales as being distinct from negligence and the rules of duty of care and liability applied there, the principle in Scotland was that "negligence is still the ground of liability. The only difference is that in such cases the proprietor is doing something upon his property which is in its nature dangerous and not necessary (or usual?) in the ordinary management of the particular kind of property, and he is therefore bound to observe a higher degree of diligence to prevent injury to his neighbour".[67] The use of Rylands in Scots law, which was started in Mackintosh, finally came to an end in RHM Bakeries v Strathclyde Regional Council.[68] Lord Fraser, as part of his judgment, stated that the idea of strict liability that was brought into play by Rylands was not a part of Scots law, and the idea that it ever had been valid was "a heresy that ought to be extirpated".[3]

United States
Within the United States, there are many situations in which strict liability is applied to actions, and Rylands is commonly cited as the origin of that rule;[69] it was first applied in Ball v. Nye,[70] by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. The Supreme Court of Minnesota also adopted it in Cahill v. Eastman,[71] while the Supreme Courts of New York, New Hampshire and New Jersey all rejected the principle, in Losee v. Buchanan,[72] Brown v. Collins,[73] and Marshall v. Welwood respectively.[74][75] The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, reversed Welwood in 1983 in DEP v. Ventron Corp.[76] Many courts in the United States have attempted to use Rylands to justify absolute liability, which it was never intended to do; while absolute liability is where no defence is applicable, in Rylands itself Lord Cairns accepted that there were some situations where the case should not be applied.[77]

In Australia, the principles of Rylands v Fletcher were "killed off" by the High Court of Australia in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd.[78][79] The High Court's view was that the Rylands principles "should now been seen ... as absorbed by the principles of ordinary negligence, and not as an independent principle of strict liability".[80] Contrasting this, the principles have escaped destruction in Hong Kong, where the courts are yet to follow the examples set by Australia and England and Wales, and Rylands remains an independent tort.[81]

See also
English tort law US tort law Strict liability Lake Peigneur

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. ^ Simpson (1984) 212 & 243 ^ Bohlen (1911) 300 ^ a b Cameron (2004) 119 ^ Bohlen (1911) 298 ^ Elliott (2007) 288 ^ Simpson (1984) 212 ^ Simpson (1984) 241 ^ Simpson (1984) 239 ^ Simpson (1984) 242 ^ Woodside III (2003) 4 ^ Simpson (1984) 243 ^ Waite (2006) 423 ^ Simpson (1984) 244 ^ Bohlen (1911) 299 ^ Simpson (1984) 246 ^ (1866) LR 1 Ex 265 ^ (1865-66) LR 1 Ex 265, 281, relying on Cox v Burbidge (1863) 13 CB (NS), at 438; 32 LJ (CP) 89 ^ (1868) LR 3 HL 330 ^ Simpson (1984) 250 ^ Bermingham (2008) 248 ^ (1868) LR 3 HL 330, 338-339 ^ 15 CB (NS) 317 ^ (1868) LR 3 HL 330 ^ Woodside III (2003) 2 ^ Woodside III (2003) 3 ^ (1837) 132 ER 490 ^ Simpson (1984) 211 28. ^ Simpson (1984) 234 29. ^ Bohlen (1911) 304 30. ^ Since this criticism was levelled, English courts have made decisions which allow for nuisance claims for one-off events in certain circumstances. 31. ^ Bohlen (1911) 305 32. ^ Glofcheski (1994) 189 33. ^ Cane (1994) 237 34. ^ a b [1921] All ER 48 35. ^ [1956] 1 WLR 85 36. ^ a b [1938] 1 All ER 579 37. ^ a b [2003] UKHL 61 38. ^ Bermingham (2008) 252 39. ^ [1994] 179 CLR 520 40. ^ Bermingham (2008) 256 41. ^ Fordham (2004) 241 42. ^ [1997] AC 655 43. ^ Nolan (2005) 426 44. ^ Murphy (2004) 645 45. ^ Murphy (2004) 647 46. ^ Murphy (2004) 649 47. ^ [1969] 1 WLR 959 48. ^ [1954] Ch 450 49. ^ Bermingham (2008) 248 50. ^ [1868] LR 3 QB 733 51. ^ [1901)]84 LT 765 52. ^ [1908] 2 KB 14 53. ^ [1962] CLY 2084 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. ^ [1967] 2 QB 530 ^ [1947] AC 156 ^ [1918] 34 TLR 500 ^ Bermingham (2008) 249 ^ [2004] 2 A.C. 1, 11 ^ [1913] AC 263 ^ Bermingham (2008) 250 ^ Bermingham (2008) 251 ^ [1936] AC 108 ^ Bermingham (2008) 254 ^ Bermingham (2008) 255 ^ [1864] 2 M 1357 ^ Cameron (2005) 251 ^ Cameron (2005) 252 ^ 1985 SC (HL) 17 ^ Woodside III (2003) 5 ^ 99 Mass. 582 ^ 18 Minn. 324 ^ 51 NY 476 ^ 53 NH 442 ^ 38 NJL 339 ^ Woodside III (2003) 8 ^ 468 A.2d 150 ^ Woodside III (2003) 7 ^ (1994) 120 ALR 42 ^ Cane (1994) 237 ^ Cane (1994) 240 ^ Glofcheski (2004) 194

Bermingham, Vera; Carol Brennan (2008). Tort Law. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199227983. Bohlen, Francis H. (1911). "The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. Part I". University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 59 (5). ISSN 0041-9907 ( . Cameron, Gordon (2004). "Scots and English Nuisance... Much the Same Thing?". Edinburgh Law Review (Edinburgh University Press) 9 (1). ISSN 1364-9809 ( . Cameron, Gordon (2005). "Making Sense of Nuisance in Scots Law". Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly (Incorporated Law Society of Northern Ireland) 56 (2). ISSN 0029-3105 ( . Cane, Peter (1994). "The Changing Fortunes of Rylands v Fletcher". University of Western Australia Law Review 24 (1). ISSN 0042-0328 ( . Elliott, Catherine; Francis Quinn (2007). Tort Law (6th ed.). Pearson Longman. ISBN 9781405846721. Fordham, Margaret (2004). "Surviving Against the Odds - the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher Lives On". Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (National University of Singapore). ISSN 0218-2173 ( . Glofcheski, Richard (1994). "Reasonable Forseeability, Pollution and the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher". Hong Kong Law Journal (University of Hong Kong) 24 (2). ISSN 0378-0600 ( .

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RFV Heuston and RA Buckley, 'The return of Rylands v Fletcher' (1994) 110 LQR 506-509 RFV Heuston, 'Who was the Third Lord in Rylands v Fletcher ?' (1970) 86 LQR 160 Murphy, John (2004). "The merits of Rylands v Fletcher". Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press) 24 (4). ISSN 0143-6503 ( . Nolan, Donal (2005). "The distinctiveness of Rylands v Fletcher". Law Quarterly Review (Sweet & Maxwell) 121 (2). ISSN 0023-933X ( . Simpson, A.W.B (1984). "Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical Context of "Rylands v. Fletcher"". The Journal of Legal Studies (University of Chicago Press) 13 (2). ISSN 0047-2530 ( . Waite, A.J. (2006). "Deconstructing the rule in Rylands v Fletcher". Journal of Environmental Law 18 (3). ISSN 0952-8873 ( . Woodside III, Frank C.; Mark L. Silbersack, Travis L. Fliehman, Douglas J. Feichtner (2003). "Why Absolute Liability under Rylands v Fletcher is Absolutely Wrong!". Dayton Law Review (University of Dayton School of Law) 29 (1). ISSN 0162-9174 ( .

External links
Full text of judgment on Bailii ( Retrieved from "" Categories: English tort case law English nuisance cases House of Lords cases 1868 in case law

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Baron Bramwell cases

1868 in the United Kingdom

Common law

Legal doctrines and principles

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