UNIVERSITYOFLANCASTER

SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION

IN

CLIENT-STATE

WARS:

AN

ANALYSIS

OF

UNITED

STATES

AND

SOVIET

INTERVENTIONARY

BEHAVIOUR

IN

AREAS OF DISPUTED

OR UNCERTAIN

INTEREST

SYMMETRY

Mohamed

M.

El-Doufani,

B. A.

Submitted Department of

for the Politics,

degree of University

Doctor of

of Philosophy Lancaster.

(Ph. D. ), January 1988.

ABSTRACT This thesis the between examines relationship intervention by the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. in client-state in locales Sovietwars which occur where the balance of American interests is either disputed or uncertain, and in the era of stable deterrence. superpower security nuclear

first In the study, part of the a model of superpower intervention in is The wars client-state established. deal the which propositions with model consists of four intervention, between political relationship and/or the occurrence territorial and superpower security; change, interventions the and asymmetrical phenomena of nonof intervention the offers more where reciprocal rational notion of crisis of action; and the as a course mechanism United States the Soviet Union by the and which could disputes regional peacefully. resolve is an empirical The second of the work part analysis of intervention in the first the of model expounded part. double, Three case of asymmetrical, studies and unilateral in grey Interventions in wars area are superpower employed factors determine levels the the to explain which of order in by the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. intervention client-state the to examine under circumstances which and conflicts, is most is used, effective. crisis manipulation and when it 1950-1953, The the case war of studies are of the Korean Ethio-Somali 1977Arab-Israeli war of war of 1973, and the different took 1978, that is, place at conflicts which in the development States-Soviet stages relations. of United

The third the study of the consists concluding part of between the This chapter. relationship reviews intervention, security, and peaceful change superpower the background against analysis. of the empirical

CONTENTS

Chapter

1:

Introduction
An Overview of the Study .... .... 1

PART I THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS Chapter , Chapter Chapter 2: 3: 4: Crisis, Intervention, of and Peaceful .... Security Change .... .... .. 27 48 85

The Context Intervention

Intervention Superpower

and

PART II EMPIRICAL
SECTION A:

ANALYSIS
INTERVENTION: ASSYMETRICAL THE KOREAN WAR 1950 - 1953 The The The Balance Balance Crisis of of Interests Responses .... .... .... .... .... .... .. 124 158 197

Chapter Chapter Chapter

5: 6: 7:

Situation

SECTION B: 8: 9: 10:

DOUBLE INTERVENTION WAR 1973 THE ARAB-ISRAELI The Balance The Balance The Crisis of of Interests Responses .... .... .... .... .... .... .. 230 265 307

Chapter Chapter Chapter

Situation

SECTION C: Chapter Chapter Chapter 11: 12: 13:

UNILATERAL INTERVENTION WAR 1977-1978 THE ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI The Balance The Balance The Crisis of of Interests Responses .... .... .... .... .... .... .. 336 394 422

Situation

PART III Chapter 14: Conclusion .... .... .... .. 439

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER

1:

INTRODUCTION

An Overview

of

the

Study

The

ubiquity The

of

intervention of

in

international in it is the

politics history of and in any

recurrence politics an inevitable international

intervention that of

international perhaps competitive B. C., around growth the Greek death what states intervention its power, the the in lesser political struggle began to

indicates instrument system. of of Athens by the relations and

a principal,

manipulation In the the to in fifth Greek

century states

polarization affairs intervention Greek states. system between as the on alliance two the great part

among Sparta led

a substantial the affairs of life-andtransformed the patterns smaller of of such could in the the of the

major Thus, the

powers

bipolarization the rapidly linking long

which Athens

accompanied and Sparta

relationships powers of the into latter. a

coercive 1 At the

zenith of it actors

imperial in in the at the affairs will. which

Rome international of In

enjoyed

position that

dominance intervene system European city-states, ubiquitous. religious the.

system of 16th the and states, lesser 17th

most The

almost

centuries, nation-states, was

system,

encompassed and the church, period,

empires, During strife and to characteristic the Napoleonic

intervention the disorder

also of with a

this the a

combination associated intervention politics. eras in

extensive state of and

transition

system

made

dominant Likewise,

international

post-Napoleonic

Europe

1

were incessant combined generate and

typified

by

high

levels

of of of the

intervention. French Revolution France intervention a norm. era led

The

ideological with a state the of

attraction immense turmoil power in

Napoleonic in which

to

Europe

counter-intervention to this in of the the and the turmoil in

became the

virtually post-Napoleonic interventions one of which it should This the

The to a

response situation order regarding legitimate during by the

which day.

"conservative" Hence,

became great intervention take was and took

the

debates is place

conditions the modes

under which era. between

post-Napoleonic divergence Congress of of has

debate

epitomised Metternich

growing the

Castlereagh 2 in less as of

following The international in and have order domestic By the and account numerous independent Soviet at the or least four four the previous

Vienna.

occurrence system periods. and used affect political far the the or

intervention more 1945, or

the widespread various of the

postwar as sizes world in the

been Since

states corner

capabilities either to

in

almost

every to use

threatened internal or of of

military policies, states. has United these interventions in the

force or

external other

structures largest powers: Union. least indirect during example, 40 number Britain,

interventions France, them, the

been States, countries

by

great Soviet for at

Between direct military

and of The on include

other states for

interventions the directly during aimed at this either period

affairs

1946-1980.3 militarily These

Union, seven

intervened period. quelling party

occasions

interventions

discontent factions in

consolidating

sympathetic

communist

2

Eastern of 1979intervened 1946. the

Europe,

4 of

and

the

ones

in and

the the for than

Egyptian-Israeli Afghan its 10 and civil part, countries South Korea during wars 12 in in of war

"War of

Attrition" The

1968-1970, United in have North

States, not been and less

directly since during the 1958

militarily Amongst these War, War, and France were

North South the on

Korean

Vietnam civil least

Vietnamese and most 1975of which

Lebanon

during

intervened

at

occasions, Africa, and number for in of which no fewer

counter-insurgency in 1956, and in 1987. has

actions Cameroon The been

instance, Chad direct during than were 13 a in

in

Morocco

1960,

1968,1978,1985, military the period interventions under Like of an

largest by 'Britain,

consideration France, many past as to such in of and

intervened these amounted and the attempts and also Egypt Oman

times. legacy

interventions to in either 1957 of suppress in 1964. a

imperial

counter-insurgency and newly military The amongst directly war support War of during of 1958, or other

actions, measures state, in of Kenya,

Muscat

protect as the

government to Uganda been and the

independent mutinies use the

Tanganyika, has

intervention countries. on opposite Egypt Government Algeria times over in side of the the

widespread Arabia civil in Civil and the also and Ugandan

developing

Saudi Yemeni directly

intervened 1963-1968. the Federal

sides also

in

intervened during the both Morocco's Desert.

Nigerian directly war with

1967-1970. at different

intervened during Western

indirectly POLISARIO intervened directly

guerillas indirectly on the

Libya conflict, in the

Morocca-POLISARIO Idi Amin

President

3

civil 1981,1983, the before support intervened against rebels. intervene U. S. the

war

of

1978-1979, and 1986-1987. Eritreans of

and

in

the

Chad

civil

war

in

1980on

Cuba against Haile after

intervened the Ethiopian and

indirectly government directly Cuba

side the

of

the

downfall the directly regime

Selassie, the of Revolution. the

in also

of

in

support

Angolan and

government F. N. L. A. to against on

the In on and side

South Central behalf

African-backed America, of the

U. N. I. T. A. the Cubans

continue

Nicaraguan

government and, the Vietnam allegedly, El

Honduran-backed of the In in the guerillas south domestic

CONTRA rebels, against east affairs Asia, of

Salvadorian continues and Laos. to

government. intervene

Kampuchea means of

Although intraintervention significance qualitatively earlier to of the nuclear capable systemic international North system. new America, three World United times. and

clearly inter-state has during different This

a time-honoured conflicts an postwar category added added and

manipulating interactions, and places strategic it in a of due end by

other

acquired the

political which the

period, from

interventions has been since mainly the

significance which of Soviety as parts have these

systemic War II. States

changes The and as first the well

occurred was the of an

acquisition invulnerable forces The

Union

capability, of reaching

conventional of of the the globe.

military

most

second of the

development system and as the

consisted the Soviet two whole

enlargement and not just

world

Europe, in a the third

Union

became

involved led. the as to

Together, phenomenon, of

these which the

developments be This termed occurred

might world.

"involuntary" each of the

bipolarization

4

superpowers what the of for it

began regarded as

to its

define own

the security of of the

geographical sphere, states

components irrespective involved. 5 was

of of One that,

subjective the the major United

inclinations consequences States and

the

these Soviet

developments Union,

became Security and security considerations motivations Whatever (or contributed was all-encompassing. to the contributing) strengthening suspected of in the world was considered as one power of... anywhere ] to the ], [... [... other concern of immediate security it it to oppose try or make up for who therefore would 6 influence. in power by [its] or own increase Postwar much international akin to being least, in "An other, in a relations, zero-sum engaged in game, a struggle to one in other with for words, each global their the are became of the very two

superpowers or, at

dominance relative position of between vital the

a competition action all that by

maintain affects changes the balance

positions. of the

directly

international they affect

significance two. "7 The on

impact

of

the

three been

postwar

systemic To and the begin Soviet widening the whole

developments with, Union of world their has the of

intervention by interests area increased that to on of become both to

has the

manifold. States

acquisition global security vastly' conflicts, likely effect targets concerned, lays the

United and the

consequent virtually of in

include the number conflicts involved.

potentially which in the as whether dispute pointed the turn,

interventionary superpowers has had or latter or are an the are not,

is,

This, and As far

the

interveners

intervened the

intervention. superpower intervention, their As one original writer

desired open out, to the

stakes

in

a complete U. S. and

transformation.

S

the

U. S. S. R.
terms the to convert the of any power retain each hold the At a maximum they international crisis. to a superpower to raise any issue almost option... by either Any such would escalation confrontation. in the large imply other, and the of drawing risks be to alter the of stakes would effect... reciprocal Once the superpowers issue the profoundly. original imperative to follows in, there a natural are drawn are actors of the original and the goals compromise, 8 likely to be achieved. not For the of carries because these of United conflict the the danger States in of and strategically a possible possibility of their the Soviet important escalation of to Union, the regions nuclear

eruption often war by

ever-present on behalf such aura but in the of also

intervention in often not countries only the than the and

superpowers Consequently,

proteges more

conflict. not, U. S. its tend and warring to the

conflicts, crisis each

create

an

involving of these

U. S. S. R., client(s)

region

concerned.

Intervention Although crises undesirable, United their preserve "... to [i]f move States

and the

crisis

manipulation of client-state is generally opportunities on the to once be able solutions one war stimulated considered for hand, the and or out, crises are

existence the

involving it

superpowers welcome Soviet on As you the

presents and/or the client(s)

Union the

protagonist the you the status act world "9

other,

challenge pointed to use that

quo.

Kissinger should

creatively towards

structural

necessary...

' For provides through

a superpower, it the with the

the

existence to the risk

of settle of

this

type without

of

crisis

opportunity of 6

violence, of its

manipulation

war,

those

disputes severe not to

with be

the resolved to of it

other by

superpower ordinary

that diplomacy

are or such of

either are as interests. changes This and therefore patrons environment. intimate for course considerable extend can take

too simply the

amenable

diplomatic a regional it to

settlement, balance affect with more in important its need client. of,

ascertainment Furthermore, the nature of clients to of such

enables its

in is

relationship tend to be

because vulnerable situations Under possibility client, action. concessions less form or

pressure a real or

from, perceived the or may the

their

superpower high patron threat may its such may it would grant not

in

circumstances, of withholding latter

the the of

reducing

support a

or

the

anticipate client which

Consequently, to the patron,

under the

threatening of major Crisis base

conditions. rights, in also its be treaties,

Such

concessions

international associations. to their clients

realignments, 10 by providing with

changes can the

international of utility of their using ends.

them their is

with patrons valuable

opportunity towards to its and

relationship Since a client-state of upon 11 of to it it

own

superpower its over crisis ability the involving least since the hands support would refrain its of

patron to other the from own the will be patron

because confer superpower, client(s) trying cannot

its a may the avoid afford and

intrinsic competitive ignite other one, to its in have a

worth

advantage regional

superpower, the it belief defeated

or that, at its Such

at

other be plausible

superpower automatically in view

protege(s),

forthcoming.

a belief

of

7

the

superpower's its the with

basic allies

political and help associates. to its

and

strategic 12 Should it escalating

interest the may patron

in

protecting extend involved intervention competitor, support The their advantage manipulation. takes to the the been does that of

required the other

client, in it, an

become cycle of its in

superpower may by far 13 crisis them to crisis case, and, tries much it to to to lead their

which to their usefulness may through In lead exceed proteges.

'together original

with intentions

of

superpower it to

patrons their or or to the the be

and own crisis client privy that in it had

clients

manipulate

either the former situation

exaggeration the by patron alleging

a high-threat sensitive threat hope of is

information, actually

convince or more

other

greater greater

immediate, than this of the

committing to make involve as an

concessions Although escalation

willing not may Crisis usually happen

previously. an actual

technique danger,

unintended on often, the

result. other the situation

14 hand, usually announcing both win. when failed. boost in the It all involves its patron is other If the a

fabrication, or, to create more

the

patron

client, that cannot is used have

intention and the

a crisis know the

client of of last

client one that

technique forms successful, positions should it come to were to it

resort,

patron-client it of fail, both could parties the of its the client, lead

negotiation to in the

a tremendous relationship. would lose or the client if

However, credibility, it will in a refused be forced if to

either source

patron fabrication or down or

the the

aid

of

choose

between

backing

engaging

situation

8

that

could

threaten
crisis,

its

survival.
and superpower

15

Intervention,

security

For continued internal structures manipulate suited is for and/or alliance security links, exist. " he often to

some interest or of

international of the policies, states, crises, and

relations superpowers or their the in

theorists, affecting political endeavours that where are

the the

external other

domestic frequent

to more

regional a non-nuclear defined in

are

anomalies system,

international tangible, the territorial

security Jervis,

terms. that formal to Soviet the Union. but

instance, political blocs of the

questions changes are United "not is

assumption the linked and the

territorial East-West national Such do not

outside

inextricably States only are

argues, This

not

self-evident,

because

The altered for and war means that nature of technology foreign the first time in history the of control territory by alliance is not by or either conquest directly to the related national superpowers' When do not the superpowers security. worry about invading borders their have armies crossing and much than more military and economic power any possible 16 third they do not large buffer states, need zones... Thus, to this line from according of argument, aside

the

unlikely

prospect changes in

of

large

scale

defections areas, to if of

in

Europe, the the of the

alignment underdeveloped East-West the Third

extra-bloc are power.

alliance highly Indeed, the

mostly change whole of

countries, balance World this of

unlikely even

the one

came under would not

influence

superpowers, The Nor, military in the

directly remain would

threaten essentially the loss of

the

other.

balance ultimate affect

would analysis, the 9

unchanged. Western of and the

Eastern

Europe

vital

security

interests

superpowers. cut loss into of the Eastern But

The economic

loss

of strength would

Western of

Europe, the United deep

to

be

sure,

would and in the the would with a

States, anxieties to Jervis, States than

Europe even such

generate

U. S. S. R. leave deterrent powers If obsessive political blocs is the

losses, and provide the the superpowers outside past.

according the United more 17 case, with their Why, security, in many if do then

Soviet force that

Union would in wholly of in an to the

security

great

often this

possessed were

the

sometimes and/or alliance change is

concern change indeed

territorial formal such the

areas

anomaly.

inconsequential and in This of not the order tendency the only Soviet to

superpower intervene or prevent

United of the

States world quo? or both

Union affect takes

corners in the

changes form client-state

status either wars,

a most intervene mutual

blatant in

when

superpowers their and

risking a direct

relationahip, of

but escalation

also to

confrontation

the

possibility

a nuclear

war.
This to take apparent into systemic rivalry. conception to view as account paradox the arises full basically implications mentioned proponents bipolarity of of from of above, the who, superpower of the European to give of a the for failure three the

postwar superpower zero-sum are in the

developments, As of the similar 18 with postwar

territorial, like Herz, security great due the

inclined nuclear a

components to those Jervis

age

powers recognition form of,

century to and the the

earlier, postwar stakes

fails

qualitative in, the

transformation Soviet-American

global

10

strategic attributed acquisition mutually military where interests In not this

contest. to by assured forces these of the the

This

transformation developments. U. S. S. R. of

can

be

directly Thus, the for

aforementioned U. S. and the

a capability of conventional the as situation conflicting

destruction a global have of the

(M. A. D. ) and range, mutual and Union other of in which -has as created well

countries which are

a global Soviet

interdependent and the " but United

nature. States their do

situation, "cancel under occur in an

simply

each new

out,

pursue interaction.

interests These

conditions

strategic

environment

the is still is it role of force enormous even though immobilized, but in which new nonmilitary concepts--images, mutually shared expectations, climate, signals, patterns of behaviour, and reciprocity---take on new It is in the strategic significance. management of these factors has that added one superpower an 19 defeat but to to outgain the opportunity not other... It the is only by taking account rivalry with as and be of that the the role of these factors behind in the and/or in arising

Soviet-American concern change, wars wars, can

rationale territorial

superpowers' poilitical client-state from such

regional through

manifested the best

intervention of crises

manipulation understood.

The

existing Unfortunately,

literature much of the existing and and crisis literature manipulation addresses to and is of peaceful an the on United is itself of

States a

and descriptive

Soviet

intervention nature and

rarely

systematically between nuclear on the

comprehensively crisis,

relationship change of in the

intervention, age. theoretical To be 20

sure,

there

abundance

studies Numerous

dimension

intervention.

11

case

studies

have

been

made

on

the have by

subject, helped

and in states the 25

a number understanding have

of

valuable the studied, two or and norms, governing topic.

multistate 21 including

comparisons Interventions those together, for have of 24 the and

various 22

been the

U. S., Britain.

U. S. S. R. 23 Public been

superpowers justifications many works rules, postwar

excuses analyzed, 26

interventions endeavoured to and force. fall

have identify tacit 27 far

international understandings

conventions, use of of they to of armed

However, at This or that since they are the

many

these

works

short in with

of its

looking entirety.

phenomenon is to say,

superpower tend to the

intervention deal mainly

definitions, of the game"

attempt thought War

describe to II. have In

various

"rules the raison only by

developed most is cases,

between the upon given

superpowers d'etre to the the for extent U. S. and very explain nuclear continue to grey

World

superpower that the the Soviet

intervention excuses and

touched

Justifications are then, in the show few

authorities Even

analyzed, attempts context why the are of

sometimes made stable to

superficially. such deterrence, be areas concerned in As attracted been war focused stimulated 28 the with a lot on proclamations that with first

is,

to

superpowers political

territorial place.

and

change

in

intervention, of scholarly

the attention, crisis, crisis although

subject most including prevention, some work as an

of of

crisis which client-state and

has has

superpower crises,

crisis done on of

management. the

However, of the

has

been

manipulation

risk

of

war

instrument

12

compellence crisis only

and

deterrence, as a substitute

29

the for As

notion war a has result, for concerned, superpower are are the often

of been

superpower accorded a full least still

management cursory

consideration. of the crisis as powers studies stimulated such

conceptualization as far as

a surrogate are of crises

war,

at is

nuclear

lacking. in the client-state

Accordingly, war

intervention premised to principal crisis, for a is the is may not their if on the

presumption and during without

that that, such

crises

unwelcome latter's end the

superpowers objective possible, client(s). objective take crisis The in

therefore, events a the is not is

to

causing for

serious client denied of

setback as but

Victory such crises position by

superpower presumed superpower severe. welcome the change other in a to

a secondary stimulated possibility, war as

unless, the client-state that

course, war

however, stimulated of the

a superpower crisis or involving preventing status

client-state superpower the given and open even regional serious Soviet to

a way and/or

initiating international

quo United crises and

is

seldom States is left

consideration. behaviour during

Consequently, international misunderstanding

misinterpretation, " whilst during

sometimes of some missed

incomprehension, maneuvers

the such

significance crises can

superpower altogether.

be

Purpose It study value

of is has or

the

research this set. rationale background The basic that task territorial is the to purpose investigate and/or political of this the

against been the

behind

13

change superpowers United changes security. security the which regional own explain territorial one regional intervening work

in

the are

era

of

stable

deterrence, That Union is to say, be affect

as to

far show

as why

the the with vital

concerned. and do the not Soviet seem to

States that

should

concerned their

directly a link and/or exact likely

After and regional to

establishing territorial specify are to and the most

between political circumstances to such of

superpower change, under in their is regional security, a not all. to

seeks

the

superpowers crises in The why, and/or in order third light political sometimes to an equal its

intervene to

manipulate final of the change task link and

crises this study

ends.

between superpower to

superpower crisis to

allows own or

the

other

manipulate by at

advantage by not

either intervening

degree

Propositions The postulates underlying these objectives are set out

in

the

following the main

propositions thesis do not of

which, this

cumulatively, work. follow outlined the These same

constitute propositions, sequence or

however, logical order

necessarily objectives

as the

above.

Proposition deterrence, status can be quo

1: changes in

Even in

in the

the

age

of

stable and/or

nuclear political U. S. S. R. to could these be

territorial the U. S.

areas as This

outside of is vital because to

and

the

considered

security such and

concern changes could also

countries. of material

importance

them,

strongly

14

bear credibility.

on

their

general

images

of

resolve

and

Proposition do or and these unstable the of not are find agree not it

2: on certain difficult

In the

areas relative of their to

where

the

superpowers of the and in their other's to a what

either interests interest extent

balance own assess or how

interests situation,

will

become no and hard type to

engaged and of exist. fast

developing, concerning on behalf of client or both the over and game" a

rules

permissability clients are

intervention The of

likely

purpose a warring

superpower's in of such the

intervention

on

behalf could it the could other in

a rule-free following. between itself

environment Firstly, and of a set legitimizing it the crisis provide its client, could client. may a

be be

either to

resolve

dispute the regional

superpower its own of favour the

balance establish and

interest of tacit its

thereby ascertaining and rights.

"rules regional be to

interests a tighter a clientin with the the the other

Secondly, of control stimulated it to its could adjust own over

impose Thus,

degree state sense opportunity superpower,

war that

be

functional

superpower with

relationship or both.

Proposition or create superpowers because this more

3: clients an aura and kind

The of of their of

eruption the U. S. crisis

of and

war the

which

involves tends both This danger of

one to the is a

U. S. S. R. affects clients.

which

protagonist war often

carries

the

15

nuclear intervention Such the more vis-a-vis

war

due in in

to

the support

possibility of their

of

double warring

superpower clients. on by one all or

danger, parties of

turn,

generates which to can

intense be its

pressure

concerned, these the parties other(s).

exploited (their)

improve

position

Proposition asymmetrical be is, the the result

4: or

Where

superpower-intervention form, a) the this disparity situation, environments milieu, able necessary, latter and/or that client to be and, identified b) is, also the how which to

takes

an could that and,

a unilateral of either and interventionary is

crisis

political the

strategic

especially, whether on behalf the of

determine intervene

a superpower of a client other its own

sufficiently and, the if

successfully intervene depth involved of on the the how it.

confront behalf patron-client patron closely

should protege,

relationship, is it with is its

consequently, with

perceived

The case
Three intervention empirically the 1973, studies The of The first their Korean and

studies
case in the war the studies client-state thesis of advanced the of wars in United are this States selected work. and to Soviet

illustrate are October case of

These war of

1950-1953,

Arab-Israeli war to of four to the in 1977-1978. different the

Ethiopian-Somali selected these was according their value their utility

The criteria. in

were of

utility to

thesis and the their

terms

strategic was

U. S.

U. S. S. R. location

second

terms

of

16

within

the

disputed/uncertain regional closeness game with definition crisis, The three were case able and fourth studies to

interest structures. the of case the

symmetry The studies relationship security criterion third

category criterion fitted

of

superpower was the the

which

into between

conceptual

intervention, this which which of study. the they

superpower and final were

put

forward

in to to

according was the extent imperative asymmetrical, had to be

selected the

illustrate whether That

strategic in is, its they different postwar

superpower or that

intervention, unilateral form. at

double, wars the order whether of an

of in in

took

place of the what client.

qualitatively

stages relations which determine on behalf

development to show and to

Soviet-American of the

constancy extent

criteria

a superpower Hence, the Korean

Intervenes war was prior East of the

a warring example of of

chosen to war

as the was and

a client the it took

conflict October place was demise by by Korean with with

which 1973 at the

occurred Middle height on

advent selected the

detente,

because

detente, of of

Ethio-Somali during also

conflict the

chosen of detente.

basis Each

its these or of of South and

occurrence wars was

characterized intervention The intervention, directly extending the

either the

double,

unilateral, on behalf case its

asymmetrical their clients.

superpowers war the was U. S. men, help to of a

clear

asymmetrical Korean the protege indirect substantial, client U. S. S. R. through Soviet

helping and its China. regime

money,

material, North

indirect People's of

Korean Although

Republic Kim Il-sung's

support it was

was

quite

qualitatively

and

quantitatively

17

inferior what Somali the

to

the

aid

given could the the by to and

by

the

U. S. at the

to

Syngman time. a case of

Rhee The

and Ethio-

to

U. S. S. R. on with

afford other

conflict,

hand,

was massively

unilateral on of the country, Somalis. case their military other

intervention, behalf advanced transport and Finally, of double the of

U. S. S. R. supplying Ababa allied

intervening quantities

Ethiopia weapons of Cuban doing 1973

enormous and troops to was

Addis other

facilitating to help an that the

U. S. the

virtually Arab-Israeli with through

nothing war both the moves

unambiguous helping arms at and each

intervention, clients and by

superpowers supply of

respective equipment, and at the

other powers.

directed

both

regional

Format

of This

presentation study of is divided into 2,3, three and parts. 4 and deals The with first the in Sections model of tries of the to

part

consists

Chapters of The an

theoretical client-state A, B, and

dimensions wars. C, is

Soviet-American part, analysis I. The chapter consisting of third

intervention of the part which

second

empirical in the Part

intervention study draw is some The which intervention, introducing applied argues of to that superpower a made

developed up of

concluding

threads main focus

together. of the study is the peaceful of intra-state has become of presented relationship change. As which the in Chapter 2,

defines

and crisis, definition

explores and

between well can Chapter instrument crises and, as be

intervention conflicts, the principal

inter-and intervention

manipulation

regional

18

consequently, the either States relationship this change. affection A part study The or of status the and

for quo. regional the

the

instigation Although balance such of

or

prevention could between the its

of

change

in to

change power or/and and the

pertain the United of client, category and crisis. to

Soviet

Union a superpower

nature regional

the

between shall crucial prevention Chapter of by

only

deal link of 2

with between

former intervention it is

of the

change is, as the

is, therefore,

argued, devoted substitute can

a for

conceptualization war, ascertain Chapter notes United of of tacit the that States and in a means their

crisis which

a nuclear-age superpowers

peacefully

interests. 3 looks many and explicit at the of context the Union of postwar respect for, the of world 'Is intervention. the behaviour by are albeit balance operate and of " are of It the

regions the Soviet rules

constrained which

a range

game mutual, the These

a function tacit, of in thus

superpowers' of, regional with immune the to and

recognition their accordance largely political interventionary the States disposes clients. exist, regional they presence and the

relative rules

interests. principle fluctuations In are of

reciprocity the state areas, to be

in

U, S. =SQviet however, by United and of game" their do for military

relations. situations of the strategic U. S. S. R. superpowers in to these

"grey likely

characterized the

interaction This to generates intervene locales

between

uncertainty on behalf of the

Although tend

"rules

facilitate rather

"controlled than

competition" preclude

dominance

1q

intervention Chapter of disputed the

altogether. 4 turns or to the "grey areas", that is, locales and

uncertain targets of the of

superpower intervention of

interest in power which

symmetry, those regions--in spite

considers those the

components stable

balance relationship and the by

which, exists still

of the

deterrence the or takes balance this, and U. S.

between deem crisis. important

superpowers, to preserve

U. S. S. R. manipulating look and at

change a of close resolve,

It, of the

therefore, superpower between political that, dispute other only petroleum performance images sustaining superpower's of to its of for in

the

concept the nuclear areas. of It uncertainty vis-a-vis importance to ensure impact on Needless its

examines in the

relationahip age, and argues or the not future which its

superpower territorial

security change the its in

grey

a superpower, respect in to

resolution

relative areas for is of

interests great

superpower in a material supplies, in resolve a good a

grey sense, but

example, of the

also

because region

contested and image

bears

general to for say, a

credibility. in as these an ally spheres and for

is the

vital

credibility deterrent. the in of regional occurrence grey

credibility by attempting asymmetrical the political milieu. "crisis and

nuclear

The of areas conflicts, and the

Chapter

ends and of the

explain

unilateral in terms that is,

interventions situation" strategic

environments

interventionary

Sections seek empirically in war,

A,

B, and C, to illustrate

consisting the

of model with East

Chapters of

5 to intervention from the

13,

developed Korean

the

previous

chapters 1973 Middle

material war, and

the

the

October

Ethio-

20

Somali double, three -follow

conflict

of

1977-1978,

as examples

of

asymmetrical, These content, and

and unilateral Sections the
The

intervention only in their format.
is common area" the

respectively. substantive

differ

same organizational
chapter the by interests the Soviet political, in By interests the area historical Union in and at that

first

to status

all

three of the

Sections region of

seeks under

to

determine

"grey analysing

consideration primary to and strategic, superpowers both the

relative This type of in interests of the of

balance of the interest United

superpower refers States the two conflict. primary chapter between to the

there.

involvement the region

question, of eruption

and these of

economic the the time

ascertaining in scene and war in is of the for the the region an

balance under

superpower the

consideration, of the relationship

sets this outbreak This first

the balance of

analysis of

pattern area.

superpower

responses

chapter outline

followed the of progress the to it. the the

in

each of

of the of

Sections client-state the of

A to

C

by

a brief and and

conflict States discussion intervention to establish of The explain with these

a comparison the is Soviet to Union ascertain to

responses The type in this

United this

purpose of

superpower question the and

applicable the relationship

conflict

between primary

and

regional

balance

Soviet-American chapter type to of

interests. Sections chosen A to by the The and the C attempts superpowers first Soviet of to

third the

common intervention sets by the

to

reference is the

three

of

variables. States

perception

United

21

Union status balance

of

the

legitimacy This power in the

and desirability such the variables state The second of is is the of

of

the

regional regional

quo. of

concerns and area.

as the of set

client-patron of variables to of the in take

relationships according client-state war, which place.
The concluding theoretical preceding outlines grey unilateral reference. final

to

which war is

the

choice

superpower systemic

responses context milieu responses

explained factor the

the

and the

the war

third and

interventionary superpower

choice

part chapter. and

of

this This

study attempts analyses endeavours of

is to

made

up

of

the the

integrate in the

empirical and thereby theory explains in

presented to draw

the broad in and of

chapters of areas

a general which intervention

superpower

intervention double,

asymmetrical, terms of a

common

frame

22

Notes 1. History See Thucydides, Peleponnesian War, Rex trans. of the Werner (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1954), and Fleiss, Thucydides P. J. Politics Bipolarity and the of (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1966), Chapter 4. H. A. Kissinger, See A World Restored (Grosset Dunlap, and New York, 1964), for debate. a discussion of this H. K. Tillema "Law and Power in Military and J. R. van Wingen, Intervention: Major War States World II, " after International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 1982, 220-250. pp. The intra-mural Berlin interventions in East in June were 1953, in Poland Hungary in November 1956, in and and Czechoslovakia in August 1968. R. Jervis, The Logic Relations in International of Images (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1970), p. 244. J. H. Herz, International Atomic Age in Politics the (Columbia University Press, New York, 1959), p. 240. R. N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, the and multipolarity, future, " The Journal X, 1966, Resolution, Vol. of Conflict p. 316. L. T. Caldwell, "The Future Soviet-American " Relations, of Soviet-American Relations in Superpower the 1980's: Politics East-West Trade, L. T. W. Caldwell and and ed. Diebold Jr. (McGraw-Hill Company, New York, 1981), p. 26. Interview James Reston, The New York Times, Oct. 13, with 1974. C. C. Shoemaker J. Spanier, Patron-Client State and Relationships: Multilateral Crises in Nuclear Age the (Praeger, New York, 1984), 21,22,51,71. esp. pp. Ibid., 11,12,184. pp. G. H. Snyder P. Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: and Bargaining. Decision Making, System Structure in and International Crises (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977), 30-31. pp.

2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

9. 10.

11. 12.

13. 14. 15.
16. 17. 18. 19.

Shoemaker and Spanier, Ibid., pp. 75-76. Ibid., p. 77.

op. cit.,

pp.

12,72.

20.

Jervis, op. cit., p. 245. Ibid., 245-246. pp. Herz, 239-240. op. cit., esp. pp. T. M. Franck Word Politics: Verbal Strategy and E. Weisband, (Oxford Among Superpowers University the Press, New York, 1971), p. 120. L. G. M. Jaquet, Intervention in International Politics (Netherlands Institute Affairs, The Hague, of International Affairs, 1971); Journal Vol. XXII, No. 2, of International G. Modelski, The International 1968, Relations 165-302; pp. Internal War (Centre Studies, Woodrow of International of Wilson School Affairs, Princeton of Public and International (ed. ), Law and Civil University, J. N. Moore War May 1961); Hopkins World (Johns University in Modern Press, the (ed. ), International J. N. Roseman Aspects Baltimore, 1974); New University Press, Princeton, Strife (Princeton of Civil

23

21.

22.

23.

24.

(ed. ), The Limits E. P. Stern Jersey, 1964); of Intervention The California, 1977); O. R. Young, Hills, (Sage, Beverly in International Crises Third Parties Intermediaries: Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1967); University (Princeton in Third Parties idem "Intermediaries and Interventionists: Pt. "International Journal, Vol. 23, East Crisis, the Middle 52-73. 1,1971, pp. W. H. Diplomacy (Praeger, New York, 1971); Gunboat J. Cable, Violence in "Patterns Flanigan and E. Fogelman, of Political Vol. 3, " Comparative Politics, Perspective, Comparative "Power Parity Lethal D. Garnham, 1970, 1-20; pp. and Conflict Violence 1969-1973, " Journal International of 379-394; F. A. Pearson, Vol. Resolution, 20,1976, pp. Disputes, " Military Interventions Domestic "Foreign and 259International Vol. Studies 18,1974, Quarterly, pp. Military idem "Geographic Foreign 290; Proximity and Vol. Interventions, 18, " Resolution, Journal Conflict of 1974, 432-460 pp. New York, R. J. Barnet, (World, Intervention and Revolution Without War: 1968); B. M. Blechman Force and S. S. Kaplan, Armed Forces (Brookings Instrument Political as a Odell, Institution, J. S. Washington D. C., 1978); "Correlates Military U. S. Assistance Military of and Intervention, Imperialism, " Testing Theories ed. of Economic S. J. Rosen Lexington, Heath, J. R. Kurth (D. C. and Massachusetts, Military 1974); F. S. Pearson, "American Intervention Abroad, Trade Aid, " The Politics and of Investment, Wiley, New S. Raichur Craig Liske (John ed. and York, 1976); F. S. Pearson Military "Foreign and R. Bauman, Intervention Business Activity, " in United States and Changes Journal Vol. 5,1977, Sociology, of Political and Military 79-97; H. K. American Tillema, Force: Appeal PP. to Military Intervention Era of Containment (Harper in the and Row, New York, Foreign for 1973); E. Weede, "U. S. Support Governments Intervention Disorder or Domestic and Imperial 1958-1965, " Comparative Political Vol. Studies, 10,1978, 497-527. pp. B. Dismukes (eds. ), Soviet Naval Diplomacy and J. McConnell (Pergamon Press, New York, 1979); S. S. Kaplan (ed. ), Diplomacy Power: Soviet Armed Forces Political of as a Instrument (Brookings Institution, Washington EX., - 1981; Remington, R. A. The Warsaw Pact: Studies in Communist Resolution Conflict (Massachusetts Institute Technology, of Massachusetts, Cambridge, 1971). Beloff, "Reflections M. The Intellectual as Intervention", Other Essays Politics (Weidenfeld in Nicolson, and and 1970); R. Falk, "The Menace London, New Cycle of the of " Journal Diplomacy, Interventionary Research, No. of Peace 201-205; C. Holbraad, Vol. XVII, 1980, 3, Superpowers pp. Conflict (Macmillan, International London and and Legvold, R. "The Basingstoke, 1979); Super Rivals: World, " Foreign Thirld Affairs, Spring in the Conflict 1979, Aid 755-778; R. D. McKinlay to and A. Mughan, and Arms pp. Distribution World: An Analysis the Third of the and Impact 'U. S. Official (Frances Pinter, 1984); Transfers London, of in the Conflict 1980's, " Millenium: "Superpower L. B. Miller, Vol. Studies, 6, No. 1,1977, Journal pp. of International Alliances Breach: New Soviet "Into D. Zagoria, the 45-63; 733Affairs, Spring 1979, " Foreign World, in the Third pp.

24

25.

26.

27.

28.

754. Involvement Wars in Civil R. Little, Intervention: -External London, J. R. Van Wingen H. K. 1975); Robertson, (Martin and Intervention, Military " Journal Peace "British Tillema, of 291-303. No. 17,1980, Research, pp. K. Weisband, Goldmann, International Franck and op. cit., States (Scandinavian University Norms and War Between Books, Sweden, 1971); R. Higgins, The Laromedelsforlagen, International Development Law Through Political the of Organs United Nations (Oxford University Press, the of London, 1963); Moore, J. N. "The Control Foreign of Intervention in Internal Conflict, " Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 9,1969, 205-342. pp. Brownlie, I. International Law and the Use Force by of States (Clarendon T. J. London, 1963); Farer, Press, "Harnessing Rogue Discourse Elephants: A Short on Intervention Vietnam War in Civil " The Strife, and International Falk (Princeton Law, Vol. 4, R. A. ed. University Press, 1969), 1089Princeton, New Jersey, pp. 1116; J. Gowa and N. H. Wessell, Soviet Rules: Ground and American Involvement Policy (Foreign in Regional Conflicts Research Institute, P. 1982); Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Keal, Unspoken Rules (Macmillan, Dominance and Superpower London 1983); N. Matheson, The "Rules and Basingstoke, of Game" of Superpower the Third Military Intervention in the World 1975-1980 (University Washington, Press America, of 1982); A. M. Scott, "Military Intervention by Great the Powers: Rules the Game, " Czechoslovakia: the of Intervention York I. W. Impact, Zartman (New and ed. University Press, T. V. Thiele, New York, 1970), 85-104; pp. "Norms Intervention New in a Decolonized World, " York of University Journal Law and Politics, 1978, of International 141-174; I. W. Zartman, "The Norms Intervention, " PP. of Czechoslovakia: Intervention idem, op. cit., and Impact. ed. 105-119. pp. G. T. Allison, Essence Explaining Cuban the of Decision: Missile Crisis (Little, Brown Boston, 1971); and Company, C. Bell, The Conventions A Study in Diplomatic of Crisis: Management (Oxford University Press, London, Oxford, New York, 1971); L. P. Bloomfield The Control and A. C. Leiss, of Conflict: Local A Design Study Limited on Arms Control and in War Developing the Areas (Centre for International M. I. T., Studies, June 30,1967); idem, Controlling Small A Strategy Wars: for 1970's the (Allen Lane The Penguin London, 1969); R. Press, Cohen, Threat Perception in Crisis (The University International Wisconsin Press, of idem, "'Where Aircraft 1979) Carriers? ' Nonverbal are the in International Communication Politics, " Review of Vol. 7, No. 2, Studies, International April 1981; A. L. U. S. -Soviet Rivalry: Managing Problems George (ed. ), of Press, (Westview Boulder, Crisis Prevention Colorado, 1983); Foreign in Policy: Hermann, Crises A Simulation C. F. Inc., New Company, Indianapolis Analysis (Bobbs-Merrill and Insights (ed. ), Crises: from Behavioral York, 1969); idem Collier-Macmillan, London, New York; Research Press, (Free Escalation. War (McGill-Queen's Crisis, O. R. Holsti, 1972); Kosaka, M. Montreal 1972); Press, University and London, No. Papers Conflicts, " Adelphi in Regional Controls "Crisis London, Strategic Institute for Studies, 134 (International

25

29.

The American The J. L. Payne, 1977), Threat: 29-36; pp. Foreign Policy (Markham Fear War as an Instrument of of Chicago, 1970); "Crisis A. Perlmutter, Publishing Company, East Negotiations (October Kissinger; Management: s Middle Studies Vol. 19, " International Quarterly, 1974), 1973-June 316-343; Spanier, 1975, Shoemaker No. 3, September pp. and R. Smoke, Controlling Escalation (Harvard op. cit.: Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, University and 1977); Snyder P. J. Tansey, England, and Diesing, op. cit.; Game in International Diplomacy: A Crisis Diplomacy World for Academic (Society Gaming in Education and Simulation and Moxeton-in-Marsh, Glos., 1968); Training, R. Tanter, Modelling International Conflicts: The Berlin and Managing (Sage Publications, Hills, London, E. Crises Beverly 1974); Weintal An Intimate C. Bartlett, Facing Brink: the and Study Sons, Crisis Diplomacy (Charles Scribner's New of York, Confrontation 1967); P. Williams, Crisis Management: London, in the Robertson, Nuclear Age (Martin and Diplomacy Middle The 1976); idem, Crises: "Detente and Superpower East War 1984 BISA for 1973" (Paper the of prepared Conference, December 1984). For Conflict T. C. Strategy Schelling, The example, of University (Oxford Press, New York, 1963).

26

PART I:

THEORETICAL

CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER

2:

CRISIS,

INTERVENTION,

AND PEACEFUL

CHANGE

Intervention war stimulated to and

is

an

integral crisis. chapter

component It by

of seems

client-state appropriate, the concept between component,

superpower begin also and This of by which affect this by

therefore, of crisis

introducing the relationship principal

considering its will other then

intervention confrontation. conceptualization war, can a means peacefully

pave crisis States change

the as and in

way a the the

for surrogate Soviet status

a

full for Union quo.

superpower the or United prevent

An

analysis At a

of most

crisis general in the level, progress crisis of change prime is that feature the to can be defined or "a or state worse crisis as a of is in it of that

"turning-point affairs imminent. any rise the given to in "1

anything", for better of conflicts transform crisis, U. S. S. R.,

which

a decisive the

Thus, relationship

genuine

underlying the such the in and indeed, the nature as

a level

which

threatens In adversary the to

relationship. the U. S. is as that

involving transformation crisis, is from such

and

potential

from

peace

war;

intra-alliance its client, this essence it very of of useful

between rupture.

a superpower 2 that It is,

alliance'to of transformation crisis, which of peaceful is affairs.

prospect international this

constitutes the possible

and renders

it

is such

manipulation

prospect

crisis

a potentially

instrument Crisis state of

change. process is and not a true single, in the static case of

a dynamic This

especially

27

international interaction states involving war. crisis interest is not in "3 in the The takes

crisis, between severe the

which

can

be

defined of two of

as or actual high in a deep conflict,

"a

sequence sovereign war,

of

governments short of conflict" The involved. to ignite form

more

conflict,

but of

perception "severe two forms. those sufficient also initiate to favour. to party coerce resists.

a dangerously inherent first is Such

probability international conflict however, One of the

of

between itself must

a crisis. of conflict

parties in an

some the

behaviour conflict for of example, violence of

endeavour in its

resolve This the 4 "the war" by

underlying occur with when, threats

interest one and party the It high

can other

tries other is,

nevertheless, of central to as specify it of

perception the parties of this at crisis.

of

a

dangerously which it be high which in the which behaviour

probability the

involved Although must

constitutes is to to impossible qualify stimulate that of

ingredient how must fear is is from high be and

probability last sufficiently to a degree result

a crisis, feelings whatever

tension might this

implies outbreak distinguishes such as The that it

happening

war. crisis

It

precisely other

qualification of conflict "bad crisis,

forms "

"disputes, dynamic consists

"

"disagreements, of

and

relations. the between it to either conflict de-escalation

"

5

nature of a

international of it which of interaction for

fact highly

sequence makes

conflicting through promptly alternatively,

states, a number lead to of

common could the

escalate fairly or,

phases

then

a resolution undergo

underlying of

a further

process

28

which, stake. crisis, indicates notice parties threats, perceived This the fear phase, the parties series phase, are beyond allies.

ultimately, The active its of its involved and as first

ends of conflict

in these

a resolution phases In the may this

of be

the termed

issue(s) the one quo, it. and 6

at preparty gives The

phase. with to do

phase,

dissatisfaction intention then

status about

something in at mild this

engage although possibility. is followed of which

recriminations, stage war is not

warnings, a distinct phase the genesis or

first

by may

the be

opening accident,

phase

of

crisis, and the case

mutual this In the of a

suspicion, possibility of crises

deliberate of war moves

challenge. into

During

consciousness. is accidental, as a result pre-crisis crisis, factors clients

whose

opening into"

phase

either of but drawn their 8 "War scare" moves

"stumble

confrontation perhaps, during to by the lead

undertaken, neither

the to a

which into

expected

or

a confrontation such as

circumstantial of their

control

actions

or

or occur

"security as high about

dilemma" of of the

crises, fear

on of

the one or

other both

hand, parties, that crisis, to the confirm further, in

typically in the one

a result state to attack that

a fairly is

hostility it. appears In

and this like

tension, type of

other party the

makes

a move reacts

preparation mobilization,

attack, first the

other

party responds party's These

with

partial

party second so on.

with fears various

further and cause

measures, it are and not to

which mobilize

and

measures attack,

undertaken to bring though

preparation pressure

against upon

a possible the opponent.

coercive

Nevertheless,

29

defensive fear that

in the of the

nature, other is

they

only

self-confirm an 9 crises attack, in

each the

party's familiar

preparing dilemma.

dynamics

security and security

Accidental with those whose In

dilemma phase of is crisis, in another

contrast by party a

sharply deliberate an as parties10 physical by the to or an a

opening this type

triggered one its

challenge. intolerable result and, of

percieves

situation moves

developing by

environment party or or

undertaken issues

consequently, This party, could be of in more official the has readiness. nor diffuse be alone, and to media, thus

either is

a then a crisis. overt,

verbal resisted

challenge. challenged the it challenge could

challenge triggering immediate,

Resistance and unambiguous, example, a defiant that increase. of crisis of neither will

be

diffuse, response

consisting to the of

of,

for

absence outcry challenger military clear generally challenge involved of the

challenge, an or activity a quiet event a

continuance be stopped, in the of to it will exist be

the in

demanded

Even signals

unlikely resistance, as clear that a

perceived since external party be

consequence both to the

the

parties interests

observers have been to

important and least

challenged can

threatened, at

that to

it, begin

therefore, with1l. The is either and anything that

expected

resist,

third of

phase confrontation. a war

in

the

stage This

model could the

of be

crisis the of

analysis outcome challenge for rising of

accident, resistance. from

scare,

or

collision may is typified

The days to

confrontation months, and

continue by

30

tension on on both its

and

the

increasing During position

predominance this phase, and and the

of each

coercive party stands

tactics firm

sides. initial

issues

threats, to

warnings, indicate and is to in a de-

military firmness, generally be which different escalate A general the realities emptive The will avoided. case

deployments, to to undermine persuade 12 the type to. of The it phase

other other it must either and or, the

signals party's back

firmness, down if into move it war war, into may

that may ends

escalate parties

crisis interaction,

alternatively,

a negotiation will The parties power of general into that between military

phase. escalate first to of recognize and into these is in thereby war the good abort already which of a under failure time the two of the pre13

confrontation conditions.

confronting of logic second escalate

them

mobilization under possession

begun.

condition war are is so the

confrontation by to the

interests as more into war

participants peaceful reasons loss military compulsions The escalate establishes the other of for

deeply

incompatible 14 Other,

render specific include

settlement the

impossible. of

escalation by statesman 15 action phase

confrontation over the subordinates, presence

control

especially psychological

subordinates, towards confrontation to a negotiation its which, or from of the if brink

and or

of

reaction16 of a crisis either credibility its decide mutual occur, if will, one and own that 17 crisis however, party resolve weakness they clearly over and must Should enters de-

phase of

dominance in turn, both to

realizes parties avoid

capitulates, retreat either

disaster. then the

these

eventualities

31

its phase bids,

fourth is

and

final

phase, by

that

of

negotiation. tactics such

This as

characterized concessions, perhaps, the some details

accommodative and tactics,

proposals coercive of chosen, coercive was

counter-proposals the The aim exact of which type of

alongside, is to arrange

settlement. and the will about

accommodative accommodative the negotiation

tactics and

balance depend by on

between whether or often of facecase, one and or mild 18

measures brought case, the winner loser; hard of the crisis

phase In the

capitulation

compromise. includes saving the rationale

former by the some

"accommodation" of in bargaining, determination path can between on the toward have the general reference success successful resolved, into of crisis that some the sort latter with

creation for will making somewhere of need

accommodation both coercive The effects the the nature management basically one the It whose ultimate follows on latter parties moves

displays along a

settlement. wide-ranging protagonists, state to

denouement the and

subsequent third

relations and It that judged. been phase is

parties, system.

of the

international of these should one that

with the A

effects be has

crisis is is,

peacefully de-escalates in to crisis which be

confrontation sign that, of the

negotiation; is has war. been

failure extent should the has

management a crisis

successfully according chief Whilst others to

managed whether

determined of war or

primarily between diminished. relations, on the the

probability been and

protagonists some crises

increased worsen effect

embitter them. The

subsequent of a crisis

improve

exact

32

subsequent on a

relations of crisis conflict variable and is

between variables. resolution of whether or be

the In also interest the

conflicting the foremost resolves between loser is with as a which

parties of or

depends these is the

number the

whether underlying Another wall" concession third crisis precise over side sows the

mitigates the parties. to face-saving " the to protagonist leaves is war. of crisis of to is one

"driven a

the

humiliated that perhaps, can

provided

presented variable chief power terms:

"compromise. affects relates each which other

A postthe

and,

related of on the longer the

relations impact short

adversaries position of

and

a crisis over and the

one that Other the on each which

overwhelmingly the seeds which in and Finally, in crisis of the on for

predominant future affect a crisis the conflict the are

possible relations of the

variables participants alignments other. success the conduct

subsequent the the criterion should in any be way impact parties

"images"

develop

a further management crisis techniques of has of success a

according measured contributed

whether to and 19 the thus

conventions added to The according confrontation crisis, stimulated which indded, the state was the

and

crisis in crisis is

management, future has crises. been upon the of core

prospect to these phase, conducted. superpower

extent to

which criteria which

successful how of the the war by It is, of

contingent

constitutes In the the is case

client-state instrument

crises, is managed use to

principal intervention.

confrontation the threat in or

the

of affect

intervention the conflict course into

on of a

the a

part client-

superpowers war which

order

transforms

that

superpower

33

crisis.

Crisis

and

intervention is not only it that trying of be latter This one strong may power they to a principal is also instrument conceptually represent change, In in the

Intervention conduct to it of to

confrontation; the degree or risk may the

related methods of or

both affect

affecting the

change, serious

without many step

war

war20. a thus occur and when two preliminary being in or

instances, towards of

confrontation intervention, confrontation. involving Under the such into August all-out The case22 typical superpower conflict defeat superpower may as war develop was of the in these results power

an a

escalation situation parties. not yield

conflict weaker does initiating so that

more

circumstances, expected can escalate by the the The which intervention relationship war for a crisis or support counter conflict. or the within, was

confrontation power

stronger confrontation Gulf of of the

it, it grows of of 21 the A which regional serious other a

intervention. 4,1964, U. S.

Tonkin steps is

confrontation on a case the in ladder point. often crises. one in brink of a of the in

one in

Vietnam, is,

reverse client-state

nevertheless, superpower type is

stimulated of this to

scenario

threatens either or/and in out case to to the of, in 1973.

tries

intervene on the

a client the

intervention Consequently, a situation of in the

confrontation intervention, Arab-Israeli

Congo

in

1960

or

October

Conventionally,

the

term

"intervention"

has

rarely

been

used most

in of

reference the

to

an

international international

conflict. relations of a specific unit, unit, or which, that a

Indeed, studies context, is, political in most for of form an of a on

available define it

intervention namely, state, unit cases, example, international the forms the society. fashion, in rule aimed society change with the scope or at behaviour and

in into

terms a political political of

intervention a recently undergoing involves describes actor

bifurcated a process some as form

bifurcation civil strife. the whenever break at with

of

Rosenau, behaviour "the

interventionary another a sharp is directed

towards

constitutes it of In

then-existing or preserving the target restricted act to limited uphold or the law, target a break of the as power--the domestic it as an a which of excludes another from other a

whenever

changing in much as intervenor

structure "23

political a similar,

authority though intervention by of the

more "an

Schwarz and time,

considers intended or pattern of seeks by others,

principle the which imposed structure it

politics, authority or to

morality in

political to change and attitudes Gurtov

protect a behaviour

against sharp

representing and defines use of influence and Vincent a group

pre-existing "24 Likewise, and

intervenor. "the military, politics "activity group interferes state. " of

intervention national

calculated economic, of another

partisan political---to state, by "25 a state,

defines within organization affairs

undertaken states coercively In fact, any act or

a state,

an in

international the domestic explicitly' into a

Vincent of "entry

intervention states. "26

war

between

35

The acts a of civil

use entry war---is sense,

of into

the the rather

term

"intervention" affairs of

to

apply

only

to

domestic

a state---usually In alia, any The to the or is affair, target domestic structural seen Clearly, are adequate for the to a the so of

unnecessarily refers or or not be it interfering issue... be of restricted

restrictive. to, inter in "27

general action as to of

intervention 'stepping the thus course need in'

"...

affect

intervention dimension nature. embrace however, for purpose For civil proviso political should military necessarily intervention regular conflict units force, deter or " may military in such of of

a state,

a political intervention conflicts. definitions

Indeed, internone as of

increasingly, well the as intra-state

conventional and,

a wider this

application

consequently,

study. to should has in acts to the of comprise be, be first aimed international of at society. as of all, "the " well freed as well from as the of it direct be

intervention it it

conflict, that

structure Secondly, as should military of state either into

authority subsume

target both

indirect

intervention,

neither

which Direct

convention-breaking. refers units or involved or other interveners Indirect to such the as to the of the introduction intervening of such logistical short military supply transport, of as an ally

the the These

question

those in

or

proxy. as "shows actions use of

become

activities roles, of the

of to

transport potential combat. hand, 28

other

force, on the

actual

intervention, arms well and as-

other military

refers

related training

material

36

personnel funding other it

for so

this that 29 indirect it

equipment could Although military on the

to obtain less

a party weapons dramatic

to

a conflict, and than can supplies its have as its

and from direct just as

sources.

counterpart, decisive for client hitherto very small an example, with been

intervention outcome suddenly of of

effect

a conflict, supplies weapons supplied

when, warring

a superpower large quantities from

advanced or only

which to it

had in

withheld

it

quantities. however, in of when the wars a less one between obvious superpower superpower to or of of stipulations inter-state of crisis in purpose wars Firstly, this of will the military such threat a superpower war with the or as deter to the it compel warring in from it especially clients, nature. takes the often These coercive context initiating to clients. which be, and as embraces the three take of or certain a superpower encompasses occur, for

Intervention, intervention activities instance, against state a in war specific relation A

measures client-

other order action, to any

in

continuing action,

definition

intervention should wars

forementioned to the both intra-and

therefore, also

applicable appropriate of is for peaceful proposed

framework adopted for the

manipulation work. this be

a means it

change that, in

Consequently, study, defined superpower as by one

intervention or both of or or to and a other client. the a

client-state

following. proxy military Secondly, coercion client-state of it

provision personnel, logistical of

a superpower weapons,

of

assistance the by

support organized

use either aim

systematic in a a

against of affecting

a protagonist or preventing

37

change capabilities, against initiate adopting client-state narrower sense conflict, situations.

in

its or

internal in its

or domestic

external political in order

policies structure, to or action is It well to in both is as wider

action and/or it it to

or

the or or

other continue carrying war. 30

superpower a specific on with This of, includes say,

compel deter regard wider

to from the and the

action certain definition Rosenau.

than that and it

that

in

inter-as in that it

intra-state non-conflict

narrower

excludes

Crisis

manipulation The use of in

and

peaceful by of

change the United States confrontations that have 32 and the has been nature. over is stake crisis mutually is not thus the

intervention the management in 31 as are the

Soviet typically of

Union

postwar of crises

occurred

context to

a distributive, of this or they by when to the gain in type

opposed

redistributive, by bargaining that at The in their

Crises acquisition desired; controlled erupts

characterized of when the something the

division take either place of

object

contenders. collide 33

protagonists control. a grey

simultaneous attempts on war in behalf that to of area

endeavours gain their would crises, over process other

Soviet-American by intervening

dominance respective fall on into the

area in

proteges this other that being

a client-state of are crisis.

category hand, is

Redistributive by or bargaining is in the the to

characterized possessed, one to of the

something of

already by

acquired endeavours

contenders; the possessor

contender

compel

38

surrender it. issues party controls, possession 1958-1961, as examples The potential is, a the as The

all

or

part thus in to it it

of

it,

or

to

refrain the

from dissatisfied that already of of can

acquiring party the other has acquiring 1948 be and cited or

crisis

erupts the form

when of

a "challenge" transfers or or and of principal as alluded that

a demand that it process crises of

something an

halts 34

ongoing Berlin crisis

control. the this Cuban type

The

missile of crisis.

1962

ingredient for in

which these this of of

conveys types chapter, war. war which It of

upon

crisis

its change of

a mechanism to high of earlier

peaceful the is, makes perception

dangerously manipulation of may crisis the

probability this risk and doubt

basically, crisis This utility fact, of change the The risk basic respect coercive lead to other turn, whether component whether of the spheres war a an

instrument however, superpower when, of war in

deterrence cast some manipulation of to must, the mutually the risk

compellence. on as the general of

a means

peaceful

age

assured of be the by

destruction,

amounts which

catastrophe. addressed U. S. S. R. threats thus in

question is: pressure nuclear cannot raises the How

therefore, U. S. and crises and which it is in per se

this

can at all

exert may the

during

which knows This, to, firstly,

escalation possibly two risk further of nuclear crisis in areas are

each

mean

if

rational? regard is and,

in

questions war

a credible secondly,

superpower stakes of more

bargaining outside such as the to

traditional make of the the risk

superpower of nuclear

influence or a less

potent

component

bargaining

process.

The

development

of 39

nuclear

weapons

has,

undoubtedly,

been of

of crisis

momentous in of Union

significance

for relations.

the

conception To begin States are of

and with, and

role the the

international these has, as the the weapons far as gap

deployment Soviet enormously in words, between nuclear and did high the not risks a conflict it

by these

the

United countries the value of

concerned, the In in the in stakes other crisis pre-

widened and has winning era, possible exist of at war an with into that and the is the

between

possible the

cost tension 35 the

war.

exacerbated and gap cost all: or

inherent During

war-avoidance. separating of war was were

interests relatively willing to as it The go is, entry much to

conflict narrow or

either often

states even in

to war indeed, of

tolerate to avoid still nuclear the in it has nuclear Snyder any nuclear

deliberately dispute, powers. has attach not to

sacrificing the case

object

non-nuclear the equation states hence their

weapons importance conflict, strengthened crisis and issue war or

so their to

changed interests

desire constraint,

win, which 36 to

as in As

war-avoidance to it, be of thus led the to it

equivalent put would risk

disaster-avoidance. is now "difficult worth war. "37 into crisis of during each itself of the the

Diesing that a high

imagine of

considered nuclear injected a restriction

costs

The not, available contrary. is at

caution

behaviour range of On that therefore, and the

has moves the other will

however, to The least

superpowers of as amount acts that

crisis.

knowledge as cautious

superpower and, pressure risk

tolerate before

a considerable resorting to

provocation war has

seriously

nuclear

40

raised the

the United

threshold States it which and which moves

of and has they in

challenge the

or Soviet a wide in

provocation Union variety of can

below

which

compete. coercive and

Consequently, moves "nerve, war. physical grouped these as the with "

released can engage

of

contests might

resolve triggered but and can first

pre-nuclear not of different acts military of only

times verbal

have

Such

include short

threats

also be of

means into includes provision engaged

large-scale categories. indirect aid or war; to

violence,

three such of in

The military

intervention who encompasses acts, them, 38 that nuclear spheres crisis crisis war of of change and are a

client-states the second or

directly considerable as the well third

crisis of

expansion as an increased

demonstrative significance acts of not in their with, of affecting under operate could of each

signalling to

attached minor

category on will as vital are not as

includes the part

violence.

A certainty manipulation so long

superpower into

definitely interests interfered a means This is

escalate traditional would or

influence its in the that, bluff, crisis potential grey

deprive preventing

areas. the final

because, would they of

such in call make

circumstances, the each a knowledge other's of

U. S. and in a the fact

U. S. S. R. analysis, that would,

course,

mockery

bargaining. No such certainty, States which in contests of a the are of and however, the is Soviet likely Union, important and nerves. the coercion This use is to exist especially for is of them between in to

the

United

situations engage under violence

sufficiently resolve nuclear of

because limited perfectly

cover as

umbrella, crisis

means

41

conceivable imperceptibly of uncontrolled

so

that into

in 'limited

some war. is the than

cases "'39 less and

"'crisis' Although likely the

may the under

merge danger these possess either

escalation where capabilities both

circumstances second-strike one or both 40

U. S. in

U. S. S. R. where

a situation only

of it is the

them by no

possessed means

first-strike absent. the risks escalation as "the In

capabilities, the process logic military in the of first can war,

altogether of autonomous plans, and that

place, be "

controllability by such

undermined rigid

contingency as well as

insubordinate are inherent 41 is out were very in made

commanders, bargaining the process

by

risks as in

process of

such

miscalculation. limited war

Moreover, much reference by the "context

escalation " conflict, As

dependent. the Vietnam in

Smoke

has

pointed that

to United

decisions

States

that

conflict

to escalate to escalate, or not or to de-escalate... ... depended U. S. substantially upon policymakers' immediate perceptions of the situations of the moment, and ideas, only very marginally upon generalizations, theories dynamics or The of how escalation work. decisions these analyst Korean studying the made during War, be by the must to the struck extent which differences similarities by and are not explained different doctrines, theories, "rules, " or ideas about but by the escalation, concrete similarities and differences in the surrounding contexts---military, international, domestic---of the two wars. 42 and Thus, a violent to crisis probe may, developments lead to which to with a the a further totally first or the semi-violent other's due to unrelated action resolve unintended to the over intended acertain consequences action escalation may of the feel originally of obliged the to This by one issue or

superpower in a

unforeseen taken, violence, respond

unplanned superpower escalation

violence.

42

dynamic nuclear is armed

need

not

necessarily for bestow the part

be of

confined the built-in upon in limited

below

the deterrent

so-called that

threshold, to of of therefore,

designed forces

credibility

the war

conventional has been the

superpowers and clear against into of of

incorporation It, of fool-proof in the

tactical seems

theatre that, the

nuclear in view

weapons. of the of perhaps, can be a absence coercive even very The of

safeguards crisis risk

escalation war per and, se

bargaining further, credible manipulation crisis as This areas, symmetry, traditional the Europe East, following should competition allowing environment. competition States of and it transfer to the the have that as

limited war

nuclear superpower then, peaceful for of

component of this

crisis is

bargaining. ingredient

risk, for much

a central change.

a mechanism holds is, it as

Soviet-American disputed that or take

crises uncertain place in To from as the

in

grey

locales does of the for

interest the be more sure, Central Middle Gulf situation, of the

crises

areas of other Horn

superpower superpower of the

competition. competition world and the such

regions of Africa,

Persian/Arab parity intensity U. S. S. R., relatively

establishment mitigated between to This, was take the or

of

a strategic the the a not Third involved sought established, superpower to

eliminated U. S. and in did to the

thereby low-risk As the

place however,

happen. World, in avoid. and as the the

transferred Union

United very kind of

the

Soviet confrontations relationships

became each was

bilateral

A web clients

client-patron sought the,

backing

of

their

patrons,

for

43

instance, by their

during own of

client-state

wars, competition, The with

the

superpowers, became of of its the drawn

driven into

compelling

often

a cycle credibility very

escalation. and resolve for war and its in action a real each to be

identification the fate to at Thus, can make As by the be the in

patron's makes protege it in other Sovietthe to risk to 43

client its of

difficult

superpower defeated

permit the the such risk other hands

a client-state superpower American very nuclear can affect be sorts

the in

client(s). grey areas which one.

stakes as of to

crises of

warrant

escalation this in order

conflict credibly or prevent

crises,

manipulated change in

superpowers of the Third

regions

World.

Crisis

and Crisis

patron-client can changes as it be as in is so in

relationships useful the in in this the a nature settling case type often the of of mechanism of a in affecting

important relationship This the of the is client client

patron-client disputes. involves

U. S. -Soviet crisis the that

especially because to its

crisis

relationship for in

patron of

becomes

indispensable In contrast, the become 44 latter's but

successful crises relationship factor in Client and client absorb involving very military regimes major that

resolution mainly with a whole states strength often political do the range

crisis. the will patron, probably

involve client of

one

considerations. lack withstand have security often the the

generally to not or therefore, It,

economic, major institutional upheavals. involves the the

political, and depth A crisis client's superpower to

reversals,

a client, survival.

consequently,

provides

patron over

with the

a tremendous client the of the and client's utility to

opportunity demand defeat. of which crisis, will focus

to important 45

tighten

its concessions

control by this the crisis in

manipulating dimension scope as grey of

An

analysis is use of

of beyond of

however, on the

this

study, for

a vehicle areas.

changing

U. S. -Soviet

balances

power

45

Notes

1. 2.

3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

8. 9. 10.

11.

English Oxford Dictionary Shorter A Study in Diplomatic The Convention Bell, C. of Crisis: New University Press, London, (Oxford Oxford, Management 1971), York, p. 9. Nations: Conflict Among G. H. Snyder P. Diesing, and in System Structure Bargaining, Decision Making, and Princeton, International University Press, Crises (Princeton New Jersey, 1977), p. 6. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid. for blame This fact be taken to imply or guilt should not Nor does it the initiates the conflict. party who thus is a revisionist power. necessarily mean that such a party defensively It is possible to is reacting this that party been that provocative. earlier actions of others may have Conflicts See C. Lockhart, in International Bargaining (Columbia University Press, New York, 1979), p. 139. G. H. Crises: Snyder, International "Crisis Bargaining", Insights (The from Hermann Behavioural Research, ed. C. F. Free Press, 1972), New York; London, Collier-Macmillan, pp. 218-219. Snyder ', pp. 14,15. and Diesing, op. cit. Ibid., p. 16. The existence threatens a of an intolerable situation which it into issuing state and provokes could also a challenge "Nations inadvertently. come about As Lockhart out, points drift into inadvertently well conflicts as as of interest 'initiation' consciously challenging of and the one another, does imply a conflict... conscious not necessarily inadvertently manipulation. Through nations adaptation the tolerance violate boundaries And, nations. of other while conscious they manipulative actions certainly occur, hold initiation international the no monopoly on of " See Lockhart, conflicts. op. cit., p. 140. Snyder, Snyder op. cit., p. 219; and Diesing, op. cit., pp. 11,13.

12.
13.

Snyder

and Diesing,

ibid.,

14. 15. 16. 17.

Diesing, Snyder ibid. Indeed, the and among greatest is the in a crisis hazards existence of rigid military plans "necessity" for in a create action which certain Under these the circumstances, although contingencies. be in control of the conduct may technically of statesman find it difficult he to the the may resist crisis, into from built the the imperatives plans, or pressures ibid., See Snyder, to implement them. commanders military p. 241. ibid. Snyder and Diesing, Also Diesing, Snyder Snyder, see and p. 241. op. cit., ibid., p. 452. ibid. Snyder, 18ibid., Also Ibid., 219. pp. and Diesing, see Snyder p. 19.

p.

14;

Snyder,

ibid.

18.

Snyder,

ibid.;

Snyder

and Diesing, 46

ibid.,

p.

14.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

25.

26.

27. 28.

29. 30.

31.

32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40.

ibid., Snyder Bell, p. 19. and Diesing, p. 12; op. cit., Modern in the Confrontation U. Schwarz, and Intervention 1970), Dobbs Ferry, New York, Publications, World (Oceana p. 9. Ibid. Ibid., p. 10. Journal " Intervention, "The Concept Rosenau, J. N. of of Vol. XXII, No. 2,1968, Affairs, International p. 167. "Intervention: 83-96. Also Schwarz, see idem op. cit., pp. in II, " Intervention Development Historical The L. G. M. Jaquet (Netherlands Politics, International ed. 1971), Affairs, The Hague, Institute pp. of International 31-32. World: Third Against Gurtov, The United M. States the New Publishers, (Praeger Antinationalism and Intervention York, 1974), p. 2. Order International R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and 1974), New Jersey, (Princeton University Princeton, Press, p. 13. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Military N. Matheson, The "Rules of the Game" of Superpower Press Intervention (University in the World 1975-1980 Third Washington, 1982), 9,10. of America, pp. Ibid. p. 9. Y. Also in in ibid., the definitions see p. 6, and given Evron Middle "Great in Powers' Intervention the Military M. East, " Great East, Power Intervention in the Middle ed. Leitenberg 1979), New York, (Pergamon Press, and G. Sheffer p. 17. The introduced bargaining notion was first of distributive by R. F. Walton Theory A Behavioural of and R. B. McKersie, Labour Negotiations 1965). New York, (McGraw-Hill, The first bargaining concept was of redistributive introduced (Harper by F. C. Ikle, Negotiate How Nations and Row, New York, 1964), 30-35. pp. Snyder and Diesing, p. 23. op. cit., Ibid. Ibid., 450,451. pp. Ibid. Ibid., p. 450. Ibid., 451,453. Also 220, pp. see Snyder, pp. op. cit. 240,241, Force. Order. and R. E. Osgood and R. W. Tucker, and (Johns Hopkins Justice Press, Baltimore, 1967), 125-126, pp. 145. ibid., Snyder, p. 220. 19-20; K. (1970), Goldmann, Tension Schwarz pp. op. cit., Europe (Esselte Stadium, in Bipolar Stockholm, Detente and H. M. Pachter, Collision Course: 187-188; 1974), Sweden, pp. Crisis (Pall Mall Press, The Cuban Missile and Coexitence 129-130; K. Waltz, "The Politics 1963), London, of pp. Vol. Quarterly, 2, No. 3, Studies International Peace, " P. Williams, Crisis Management: September 1967, p. 202; in the Nuclear Age (Martin Diplomacy Confrontation and 1976), London, Robertson, p. 49.

41.
42.

Snyder,

43.

Escalation (Harvard Controlling War: R. Smoke, 1977), Massachusetts, Press, Cambridge, p. 5. 9,10,11,17. C. C. Shoemaker Matheson, and p. 36; op. cit.,

op. cit.,

pp.

241-242.
University Also see pp. J. Spanier,

47

44. 45.

Crises in Relationships: Multilateral State Patron-Client 1984), New York, 11,12,184; Age (Praeger, Nuclear the pp. Theories Jr., Contending J. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff A Comprehensive Survey, 2nd Relation: International ed. of 1981), J. L. Gaddis, 327; Row, New York, (Harper p. and An United Union States: Soviet the Russia, the and History Wiley New York, 1978), (John Interpretive and Sons, International C. Holbraad, Superpowers 218,278; and pp. London 1979), (Macmillan Press, Conflict and Basingstoke, p. Diffusion Control R. Lowenthal, "The 124; of Power and the in a New International Order, Papers No. Force " Adelphi of Strategic Studies, London, Institute for 134 (International 1977), p. 14. Spanier, Shoemaker, ibid., 68,71. pp. Ibid., p. 71.

ý r" .t,+ý; .

48

PAGE NUMBERING AS ORIGINAL

CHAPTER

3:

THE CONTEXT

OF INTERVENTION

The change social international Indeed, an free codes is

utility does order. not

of

crisis make This it

as

a means

of with least

affecting a as type ever, of take affairs conventions, a crisis is a

peaceful breakdown much of crisis. place that in is or which one whose of for

synonymous holds at any rarely, is, rules, to or to

crisis international environment, tacit conduct. structured is relatively entails or

as crises that explicit It by

for

other if

anomic from of

a state norms, reason explicit predict. low

stands tacit easy

that

highly

rules Such

course therefore, This

crisis,

a relatively of much it of least its

degree

of

uncertainty. and, for change. by rules of a is this great

robs

it

coercive to

potential manipulation

consequently, the purpose

makes of a crisis course is

amenable or least

instigating which highly degree is

preventing

Conversely, one nature potential change. The be more whose

constrained

unpredictable. of uncertainty as mechanisms

Crises and thus for

carry for

a high

manipulation

peaceful

rules

which

structure and partner-

international and That is

crises region-specific to say, rules the whilst

tend

to than there are that

time-specific or actor-universal. some held states by

timeless are

obviously

longstanding international in in their the new ongoing sense

basic actors,

that rules tend to

universally most both erosion affect

relations they and are hence

be to be

time-specific over time with

that

subject cannot

developments

48

relied arise, means

upon and that,

to

work

effectively in case of different shaping

in content

new and

situations coverage. war of rules

that 1

may This

area-specific in crises, the

client-state types

stimulated are likely

superpower to those the conduct types that rules tacit or of the be

three those the and clients rules States are

prevalent: determining

superpower of the and each superpowers those

interaction, towards the two sense set also, the by

behaviour vice versa,

protagonists, of the

governing The in not first the

towards closely and their the mutual

other.

these United

inter-related Soviet Union

only but

which or

govern

relationship, or by mutual which It focus are that each is of more the

explicit

understanding establish the

self-limitation shape these this likely extent chapter. to be of can region or both the fairly their two

restraint, to of fact a

rules war.

responses categories The area-specific intervention expect in of the

client-state which provide

rules that than in

the rules means

international universal wars widely regions strong, if

client-state will in

which vary in

superpower to the

other Thus, have

according which either

question.

one interests, to be

superpowers pattern predictable This is of

very

not

vital, is likely

U. S. -Soviet and not in

intervention conducive to

superpower there tacit, are rules

confrontation. likely which in to exist reflect areas the an of

because,

such

regions, if only interests. superpower war

relatively or of even

well-defined, legitimize or these uncertain

Conversely, interest invariably on the

disputed of of

symmetry, creates part

eruption aura

a client-state intense uncertainty

almost and

suspicion

49

each to

superpower the conflict. for Soviet with

regarding This intervention, Union to the in rules regional in these acts

the

probable aura as in

response

of

the

other a States other's

inevitably each of the of or over and game and there thereby

promotes United the

propensity and moves between balance a set of of the

anticipation the dispute

a view and

resolve other its own of

uncertainty the regional establish and That is which but, be very

itself interest tacit its say that

superpower favour the

ascertaining rights. are Rules no do rules exist to

legitimizing not to

interests grey areas

regulate as basic competition superpower the than regional to this in

Soviet-American chapter that

competition. to show, seek to to the

endeavours they primarily escalating try to quo use Such affect through of rules, conducive in areas

they

tend

prevent point and drastic

U. S. -Soviet where change rather of crisis can of be one in

from might status the

a rapid direct

intervention, as chapter a means shows,

stymie

intervention as this to of the

manipulation. said Soviet interest The particularly behaviour, there various things by are to be at

least

promotion or

U. S. -

competition symmetry. area-specific those should many

disputed

uncertain

nature pertaining not'be or allowed less of

of

most to to

international superpower the fact rules

rules, crisis that of put start

conceal

more are

effective

superpower application. it seems helpful rules.

types in

that

a universal

To to

perspective, at the

therefore, spectrum of

looking

Soviet-American

50

The

spectrum The

of

superpower of the

rules United is States generally their one hand, and or and the Soviet by politicoby norms, mutually or can category be be rules on the classified used that as the goes pattern all be of a Union the

behaviour international to secure interests network the need

in desire

the

system or consolidate on of to the

motivated respective and constrained rules certain climate, and

strategic complicated and shared of by

explicit

tacit

preserve a particular

modify image,

expectations, on the

behaviour,

other. within " Such

These the rules

constraints general can that then can of

conveniently "international according basis beyond of These secondly, communicated. binding positioned arrived been scale written and tacit at written upon the to

placed rules. two

principal to formulate

criteria

which more

a typology of focusing of the explicitness end of the at form

common and are, degree Thus,

tendency

problems rules. rule it are and, was placed end have are been having descending but still

description criteria the

identification firstly, of at

international of with the which

one

continuum the other that without on a

agreements, restraints of way. are

and on

mutual by

behaviour

convergence in any

self-interests In found between, non-binding, gentlemen's are rules

communicated of

explicitness, understandings; understandings, non-verbally. that restrict to decide war 2

verbal which

agreements; of conduct

signalled Rules of in

in

one

way whether fall

or

the and

other how to

the

freedom intervene this I

a superpower a client-state

upon may

anywhere

along

51

continuum. established is that which of

Perhaps between came in

the the the

most United form between

explicit States of an the declared will at the

so and

far the

to

have

been Union basic This

Soviet on the

agreement two

principles was' things, obtain Rules mainly principles flaws very where significant been limitation, environmental Soviet-American yielding conventional superpower contain endeavour of the the and limited signed each

relations in of May the 1972 two

countries. that, among from of the tend of the trying

and states

other to 3 be

refrain expense

unilateral of of this

advantage degree of value are 4 of

other. to

explicitness, and, more as often they in the

however, case not

symbolic agreement, loopholes. areas

basic with only areas yield have arms and

than

permeated cover those

Moreover, superpower is

generally

relations: highly coutnry. unlikely

U. S. -Soviet advantages

competion to either with relations, But

to they as

Hence, such issues

established

mostly economic quality. competition

regard

to space

exploration, where a fair continued chance superpower--effort influence and the of and persistent character in

in still

those

fields

carries to the either global

of

important arms to

advantages transfers, its of to the affect system,

each to

increase influence

political other, the

of other's

each

side political

ideological most recently suspicions to agree Ironically, fall global two

the have

propaganda been too high

war for of

over the

human U. S. rules issues

rights---mutual and the of which U. S. S. R. the game. tend the of the to

on

the it the

formulation is realm strategic precisely of

explicit in the fields, that

within politicosuperpowers

these contest,

especially the risk

52

being highest explicit

pulled and rules The

into where, is

an

unwanted

direct the need

confrontation for clear

is and

therefore,

greatest. of of explicit "residual the vast rules, however, which, of does it not must mean be

absence this area

that

in

freedom" majority is

emphasized, interations, contrary. limitations the Soviet

encompasses superpower 'The and tacit restraints in

Soviet-American On mutual States be rules far the selfand more

behaviour

unrestrained. and the out explicit United to

understandings that this than area the guide turn more

Union constraints

effective in legally

enshrined written One reason cannot behaviour tip the

binding and is that the rules that in

agreements, "gentlemen's" area by which in which to

non-binding agreements. the regulate superpowers their could entail therefore, an also most is inherent to a all result and interact, the

understandings, for agree tends balance risk be of the this on to of direct area more of

explicit be

which their

activities

power---and,

consequently,

enormous tends to

confrontation---and, in which they

behave reason

cautiously. inbilateral of the worldassume the

Another, principle inter-state overwhelming wide a nature particular

fundamental reciprocity

which but of within in the which, the

applies as superpowers which case they of the

relations capabilities of the arena

centrality This which in in the

Soviet-American the main each to channel superpower affect balance its of

relationship. through behaves position

principle

provides of the way

implications region

a particular other regions.

reverberate given that

Thus,

the

53

Soviet-American that uncertain principle constraint superpower careful important of in some

interests areas the the

varies superpowere balance can be

from

region fiercely

to

region, or

and are the

dispute interests, act as the

about of

of said

their to of

reciprocity the

main of A

against intervention consideration in order rules to

formulation and of this crisis

universal manipulation. is,

rules

principle the

therefore, nature

understand crisis

region-specific

superpower The

of of

management. that what is, one "the takes, duty "5 relations degree mechanism patterns reinforce is of to

principle equal or

reciprocity, measure not only of that serves

give is but

in

equivalent tenet social

a fundamental also of all

international attain as a high

arenas It

continuous which and

interaction. transforms random once 6 the

a starting systemic up, of this to

interaction system is

into set

functions, stablity. that by the right. word

systemic the notion

A manifestation one deed

principle has previously it

something and/or

superpower tends from to

asserted preventing the same

inhibit

from

other

superpower

subsequently

asserting

Thus,

to explain is embarking when a nation speaks why it on it is ordinarily a course of action, to understood as be for future proposing a principle conduct or reinforcing Other have an existing principle. states to assume that a knows right the intends speaker and level this he knows of his that meaning and that the listening On this states make this assumption. shared mutual expectation the rests element of predictability that between in the prevents relations states nuclear the from being era, particularly superpowers, chaotic 7 than they and far more dangerous usually are. Similarly, and to a move free the by one superpower to behave of tends both to encourage Once that is, this once

other a high

likewise. ubiquity,

principle

achieves

degree

54

states precepts offers

begin

to

understand to which

that they states to the

what

they

undertake to conduct act

and amount themselves

the to

according to allow by

proceed to same

other reference and the

reciprocally, development predictable. takes principles previously henceforth recourse The international serious client-state writer disputes, the who, to in the the place 8

principles, patterned

systemic and

begins By when that similar other same

behaviour same token,

becomes systemic explains with This would its

transformation conduct applied mean to that have by

a superpower are inconsistent circumstances. superpower principles. of the 9

those would expect

pervasiveness. relations dilemma wars. in over This

norm each

of

reciprocity with

in a of by regional one

presents how to

superpower to been the eruption

respond has

dilemma to

summarized in

reference that

American

strategy

noted

first, United basic States' to objectives are: ... to win each dispute country and, second, with another develop avoid war a fair way of settling and such disputes---objectives inconsistent. which are somewhat While States like the United to win would each dispute, it is not in which seeking a world any one country wins dispute. Internationally, every as well as domestically, is our government simultaneously interested in winning in each case and promoting... a 10 in which the government does regime not always win. In other words, on of in how the what to each superpower a crisis must in keep one in region are mind is in that

deciding the to rules change

manipulate of

game

international with such the way changes crises. general

politics each crisis

subject has been

accordance and that of

manipulated, influence renders the the

may This, rules

significantly of or course, norms of

outcome development

future of

55

intervention virtually interests area that to

and

crisis

manipulation Since considerably development must of accept area, However, or be no the

applicable balance from such the matter whilst without excessive. to of one rules

to

all

areas

impossible. varies another, quite the

U. S. -Soviet geographical would imply of a

each

superpower in a particular might may in may be be.

outcome how

competition that general some rules area viewed competition stake. in other relatively of favour greater lesser the 11 effect in outcome rules cases, that in as

unfavourable of in

observation serious cost Therefore, in might equally are reciprocity to

favourable it quite may

others seem it

attractive no significant if in which what one which those the intended its

a superpower interests to apply interests of

an be to at

which rather in

has

prejudicial locales

vital principle must

Consequently, means a is that in than each

superpower the of must,

concede interests

the are rules

region

latter's itself, therefore, in that and

greater game the than interests in

that be

the such region

region whose the

as

to are the

superpower those must of

interests and and pose

that the this any,

other,

one

with

recognize would

respect if

asymmetry. problems interests in is of

This areas fairly the

stipulation the balance and that

few,

where self-evident game

of where, balance

Soviet-American therefore, are The low likely problems to norms to are the

or be

rules generally likely

reflecting by the

observed arise, and far in from

superpowers. in where It areas the is of

to

however, regions clear.

interest of

superpowers interests superpowers is

balance in these

U. S. -Soviet that the

areas

56

are

most

likely in

to order

resort to the which As such apportion

to

intervention their of the regional tacit balance rather

and

crisis

manipulation and rules regional totally which thereby of

interests or explicit of than their being rules of crisis regional

facilitate the interests. rule-free, game

development reflect will regions be

seen, exhibit

tentative or the uncertainty use of

recognize

the interests, the purpose

contentiousness and of facilitate

Soviet-American coercion interests. for

ascertaining

superpower

A typology

of

superpower

competitive

games

The and of rivalry different implications different the the

geographical consequent game into make a

diversity area-specific it possible of rules crisis to

of nature

U. S. -Soviet of

interests, rules global that logics up the taking asymmetry of to have or six

superpower their

typologize "games" thus, varying Indeed, imbedded identified symmetry various regions the in

number

competitive and,

structures, for game

manipulation. that can and are be the in are and

structures competition

overall into of the

Soviet-American consideration relative world. symmetry strong interests development recognize, . regional regional if or 12 the

by or

magnitude interests with, both interests. the

superpower To in begin which vital in and not

regions of

there U. S.

high-interest have very

U. S. S. R. of facilitates and

The of this

intensity kind of rules Soviet the of

superpower the norms and which

situations general

observation

legitimize, and for also the

respective proscribe purpose

American of the

interests, crises

manipulation altering

57

configuration For example, in leaders of the

of

the

territorial equality to the

or

political of Soviet up of by World

status and

quo. American and II to of the

approximate Europe during for of rules and joint these led the their

interests Soviet zones

drawing stages

Western War and

final

occupation "

respective and procedures administration were temporary and the

forces, for of measures war vacuum of them

establishment decision-making Germany. specifically and Western once on

collective occupied intended as in Soviet Central

Although to forces the forestall

crisis to fill defeated, as the

possible power most

raced Nazis were form the

Europe took powers explicit Germany. and

eventually Western to Europe reach and

a permanent failed and in mutually Thus,

U. S. S. R. postwar arrangements of tacit

and period for

the

immediate acceptable a process these

through

understanding steps serious have Sovietinterests. region in are which it should rules the be of

mutual

self-limitation, for over 40 years upon

once-temporary preventing other's above that

succeeded American

in each to the

encroachments opposite

regional type is, of regions

Diagonally locales both stands amenable the States relatively at a set game. and of

low-interest have

symmetry, modest

superpowers to to reason the

interests. of tacit is at in be that too this or stake these

Theoretically, kind

that

situations of what Union not

development that Soviet it rules the should or

explicit for

Given the

United is arrive the In case.

situations to limits

modest, of and

difficult strictly

norms of their not

objectives reality,

means this

regional always

competition. been the

however,

has,

58

Indeed, stakes of rules in

the an of the of of this

fact area the crisis

that may game and

both actually since

superpowers work the

have against and the

relatively the development U. S. S. R. of competitive But, as

low

U. S.

may

consider games case

escalation to be

potential

category in

insignificant. the

the ' and is

Angola potential all to and the that clear. grant

1975 of

demonstrates, of low-interest

crisis symmetry

escalation not at

areas

On that independence Union

occasion, to engaged its in into

following colony, initially a major of or this

Portugal's the United low-level diplomatic' type does of not of Although and nature makes

decision States competition crisis. region necessarily crises for to

Soviet rapidly

escalated the

Nevertheless, the make the development it prone

unsuitability of rules superpower

norms

to of

manipulation

attainment may occur between American that

regional a result superpowers, in regions

dominance. of misperception the of modest this kind

intervention miscommunication of it set Soviet most about and unlikely

as the stakes either the

superpower risk of war in

would order

deliberately to achieve a

manipulating of local of

position The the rules of most of which

superiority. superpower to is are the game structure of that tacit is or by explicit asymmetry, which important Europe, for perception interests instance, by in one a Soviet than and far

type

conducive the game there are

development of pronounced

that two and

interest in more

kinds: substantially such U. S. America. has much

those

interests those those Western superpower of

clearly United encompass and the

the

States, vital South other

as

Eastern

which

interests, The greater

Europe that

59

particular norm in of that

area reciprocity, area Although way

than

it

does

should, the

in

accordance it utilize will

with

the pursue

moderate and/or the the

objectives it will of an

means

on

their

behalf. in this

recognition proscribes superpowers in the

existing

asymmetry and spheres with on the behalf risky Soviet crisis of more of

effectively by the not at

intervention each other's

manipulation interest, modest less means. position campaign and it interests ambitious Hence in over

does

inhibit from or

superpower either moderate, undermine fervent if or

stake

competing by using to the moral, nonPoland, and,

objectives the U. S.

less the

endeavours through and for its

Eastern human

Europe rights

propaganda not political

financial, as support movement In contrast areas areas---are

support Solidarity for in El to of

such in

anti-communist and the for Soviet the

organizations Union's guerilla

Nicaragua Salvador. locales or

indirectly,

of uncertain conducive behaviour. do not as the

pronounced interest to the These agree on

interest symmetry development are the East, their regions relative or own in or how in a The American the view

asymmetry, ---grey of stable in

disputed the rules least of

superpower which of their both the

either balance which the and

superpowers interests, superpowers and their find such

Middle of to become in

one other's to what

or

are it

uncertain difficult will as of

interests extent

assess engaged

interests situation, ambiguity of or this explicit

developing, contentiousness interests development in

unstable or regions of tacit

Angola. and

Soviet naturally

type

prevents the game in

rules

of

60

of

the

lack of

of their This

agreement regional state traits of Moscow's of

between interests affairs of

the

two which

countries such illustrated as rules

over

the should

balance reflect. inconsistent

can behaviour

be

by

such

Washington's advantage one hand, and thing 1973

condemnation militarily its own in

pursuit

of

unilateral on much the the the

Angola

during quest Middle

1975-1976 for East

simultaneous in the

same October

diplomatically war. 13 The in these absence types

following

of of

interest-safeguarding region of this manifests kind of of Such suspicion intentions turn, tension in the in tends and an as itself situation,

rules in

of one that

the of is,

game the the and

principal existence uncertainty compounded to gauge

features of during by the probing. a strong undertakes of, an

atmosphere crises. of

unpredictability atmosphere each of the to is

often tries through

a degree interests This,

superpower other inject

and in

cautious situation superpower anticipation doing,

into as to, or will

the each in be

element-of

hostility

measures what it may way this thinks eventuate of sort of by a their

response other is

or

a process Perhaps the

that best into

confrontation. some predictability and is and/or and in however, to of all, have thereby for the

infusing of

and

certainty the to

situation

lessening superpowers diplomatic clarification areas unlikely desired during

probability issue,

confrontation signalling credible, and intentions This, take place, First

through timely grey is the there

channels, of

clear,

interests of dispute. it does reasons.

periods occur for or, two

to effect,

if main 61

is Soviet areas other

a

reluctance Union lest side its will to they to

on define

the

part and away" in by

of delimit such

the

United their areas

States interests or to

and in

the grey the or such it

"give proceed

encourage consolidate that Secondly, for of is

endeavours allowing it to

increase endeavours is

influence not very to define a grey interest risk

assume 14

a strong if

response. not the

sometimes

difficult, or area, anticipate

impossible, full if to only for the the extent that area

a its one of a

superpower interests of uncertain into

in

particularly prior

symmetry,

escalation after

conflict has result Cuban

a crisis. to

Frequently, a certain point, as do the with its

a situation as a

deteriorated of a major

instance, Soviet-assisted implications clear,

escalation in this Angola, case strong by exhorting for

intervention

wider

for forcing can define what is and

a superpower---in consideration hardly their at be of avoided

U. S. ---become This superpowers many

a

response. the in

dilemma to

interests stake for

in one as its

advance, superpower a

situations substantially by the

increases of actions

unpredictably superpower, within a third Thus, likely hostility anticipate own. The to the

consequence or through

other

allies, area. eruption 15 of a high the actions of or in

internal

developments

a

local of

crisis suspicion, as other

in

a grey tension, one

area

is and to its

generate among the

level

superpowers of the

each with

tries of

measures

danger

collision the

through of is very

misperception, incremental great and is

miscommunication, measures inherent

accumulation a situation

such

62

most American imbues

likely

to strategic

induce

a great

deal

of By

caution the same

in

Sovietit the

calculations. with a tremendous for the

token, which establishing

local

crises can of is is

potential purpose of

superpowers the balance

manipulate their regional to be

interests. actually is primarily As will

Whether manipulated determined be seen, the by by

such the the

potential superpowers nature from the of

likely a matter type of of

that situation. the to

this

viewed proper

perspective for

rational take

actor under is to

model,

decision of anxiety

a superpower and mutual

these

circumstances

anticipation

manipulate.

Intervention The a serious each and are it of thus likely can

and eruption dilemma them has

the of for to

problems a client-state the make the

of

strategic war in and to by in

interaction a grey the to own possible of of area poses

superpowers on whether crisis not by the only

that how its the

decisions intervene advantage gains strategic crises where in, two

manipulate to make be but This disputed or

ensuing

influenced also is

presence typical

interaction. areas of

a situation, interest

uncertain

symmetry,

or

more

parties,

in

this

case

the

U. S.

and

the

U. S. S. R.,

find in a well-structured themselves situation of ... impingement where mutual each party must make a move fateful and where every possible move carries implications for In the this all of parties. influence his decision situation, each player must own by his knowing likely that the other to are players his decision in advance try to think out and may even he knows that is likely. that this Courses appreciate be made in the light then of or moves will actions of 16 one's thoughts about oneself. Superpower contingent upon decisions their made mutual under these of conditions several are aspects

assessment

63

of

each

other's

positions. intervention aspects of 17 in the The A number the most and other to or but

In

the

case

of

a war,

superpower at least

contemplating five need or different to be of

a client-state other first of of

superpower's these is its have of these that has

position "moves" to be what those and Less superpower about

assessed. action. Perhaps called action it has

choice

possibilities

considered. might choices to which be of

important begun moves,

are is,

prepared that started the

superpower its that so far, the

proposed

commit moves has,

resources. other done

important has decided

are to

"decisions" undertake

nothing

implementing. A second has refers its factors pattern, normative on to moral A account and other its how advancing observe sentiment further by for to be to approach are the that aspect considered all those to of the is factors its other superpower's position code. generally Included function goals and or aims, "18 that This influence among these

"operational that will

a given

conflict. utility of the its

superpower's is, its ordering namely, aims a variety or which of

preference and conditions are likely example, its

constraints, its

self-imposed

decision-makers such as, for

reasons

conscience. which making must a decision war determination of "is not is, to solely his the be price considered a function general be taken on concerns to to into whether the pursue itself. relative of tendency the to

consideration before in "resolve,

a superpower to intervene

a client-state " its

superpower's regional " it objctives should

regardless be noted, and is that

"Resolve, to a

particular

game

opponent's

resoluteness,

64

persevere In problem information other characteristics superpower's. deceive important suspect lines

or addition of

not

in to

whatever these out This may

game

he

is

playing. there other

"19 is also the

considerations, about refers have own the to the

finding state.

superpower's that important of States the plans it will leaders the first to be the

knowledge the and

superpower of For the for or along The fifth Soviet

about

its instance, Union

situation if the United

about to these be

a certain know what

matter, the will Soviet

Washington expect since they can

beliefs misled.

indicate

which

consideration in a local war

for

a superpower the

contemplating of all to its those draw

intervention own and the or its

involves resources, the other

assessment that will in be is, able

other

superpower's which to the

resources upon in

capacities adaptations of of strategic the

situation by one

question. superpower position about under affair condition one one the writer actor has (A) (B), or the and of

Acquisition these conditions which for is, making out, the if aspects of

information other interaction but or

superpower's is not move. even to

a complicated sufficient As if

however, a strategic in

a necessary decision

pointed knows even utility probability attributable strategic The

strategic of alternatives knowledge and even

interaction, available of if it B's had

range it

other pattern about choices

had

preference information B's to face is that the

function,

distributions to interaction, problem, nature it rather will

affecting than still says,

presence dilemma. choice

a genuine B's

crucial

- Young

of

65

action or choices

will of of of

be

contingent will, or

upon in

its turn,

estimate be 20

of

the

actions upon to its the

A which B's actions

contingent This leads

estimate problem

choices.

recursion

or

"outguessing"

regress:

[A] fact terms to the that the must come with he is trying to penetrate, the assessment namely, one [B] is likely that to make, its will contain as one of features [A] fact that the try to it. will penetrate Thus, [A] is trying [B] that is to dope out another [A] is known that to himself trying and to as someone [A] is trying to dope out dope to and someone whom [A] 21 out. Needless to produce to say, such a complicated predictions of to be either or process confident actor so by Young achieve the choices cease interaction. ways attempt these, by to however, or of the can the among a is hardly likely

accurate the

expectations long the points as the

concerning relationship of "if strategic one or

choices continues interaction.

characterized, In fact, as did of

presence out, accurate of to "22 which by-pass such the given of in stake which the be

both or

of

the

participants expectations would (ipso of of actors 23 Some

predictions other, the

confident

situation by are the a

facto)

characterized There , strategically the as problem the

presence number

strategic possible can of

inter-related of recursion. of

negotiation or the

a settlement

between

actors, strategic an such on the the outside

qualitative via, or impose "third for

transformation example, which of not in

relationship actor as to

introduction intervene at by

party"

a way

a settlement are

issues ways

original problem

particpants, of especially recursion during

feasible superpower

strategic can be

interaction, circumvented.

international

crises,

66

In involves this situation assigning alternatives other this

theory, strategic

an

actor

confronted has problem

with the by

a option

situation of

that ignoring to the

interaction its its choice

aspect as if

of

responding were values to problem. is likely of is in wars, for, the the

decision-making values faces without on should only actor's unlikely during of immense its be if choice to or

environment expected reference decision stressed, the

fixed, to the of of

specific it

impact The to use yield

purposive procedure,

actors it results on the is

acceptable interactin This,

effect problem be so

strategic negligible. case where among of the other

however,

superpower issues things, security A strategic recursion rather instance, "agreements" unilateral reciprocated however, confronted war. important con$ideration not making This is than

behaviour involved each interests. third possible interaction is to move of are the

client-state importance prestige

superpowers'

and

perceived

way can or try

by to

which

actors the

involved problem sequentially This, arms makes a

in of

circumvent choices

make or the

their

simultaneously seems to be

independently. in one tacit

for control single it is

case

where, gesture by the

initially, which other to be is not

power

followed

up

until

power. made by

Sequential the superpowers

movement, when

unlikely with is for of a the

a potentially because the in

interventionary a conflict which to costs " that choice to is, is warrant

client-state sufficiently serious of that manner

superpowers the move, superpower's

intervention, "strategic other

a superpower a in move a

influences

67

favourable uncertain A related recursion superpowers two Firstly, local threaten A the second war the

to ties further actors is

itself, of

24

may

well

outweight

those

of

the

recursion. path can through endeavour of collusion. with a client-state where this hypothetical the begin belligerents to use nuclear the a they which to strategically avoid In the the war, could problems case of there take case interof the are place. where a and

that confronted

conceivable there erupts use more is

situations the in of, presently which or even

possess

weapons. U. S. potentially and

and

conceivable might collude

instance during is region example, such in the where

where

U. S. S. R.

interventionary their expense however, and, resolve United after still amongst to where strategic It interaction relevant to the even own of very where the States they have satisfy to

client-state aspirations another few it party, instances is, it of the their the In in

war the for

could

satisfy at the are,

in

question There is

China. collusion ultimate

where cannot, strategic

possible analysis,

problems and

interaction because aspirations of "dividing the this at

among some they

the point would

Soviet own

Union original

confront

problem certain eruption

spoils" may lead

themselves.

circumstances of again regional face the

externally-encouraged the superpowers interaction. thus are issue strategically of seems most clear would

hostilities problems of

once

that

the to is of be

problems by-passed or

of

strategic where importance these the

unlikely

contention inter-related

vital actors.

high Instead,

68

problems uncertainties interaction, involved attempting In other

would and a in to words, other(s)

have

to

be that "safe"

managed go way along by can

and, with which do

given strategic one this is

the

suspicions

relatively

actor by

strategic manipulate one can or of be

interaction its the

decision-making ways by which predictable behaviour to gain the

environment. moves is as to of gain the as

relevant much Ideally, over the

made over an

more their actor

leverage this

influence enable of their the

possible. control it to of it is the

would

complete allowing the so far

behaviour predict interaction 25 of The others the

relevant behaviour

other, so that

accurately strategic concerned. behaviour is to

problem as over interaction

would main in method a situation

disappear of gaining of they context, all those maker affect given

control

strategic use in their

manipulate processes. of to

information In this about

decisionwould (whether of of in such variety to his an a

making consist intrinsic

information factors or the situation is to used to as in aspects ability

""knowledge the individual environment) to make choices his

decision which in any "26 available to be

decision-making individual way of as to

maximize

ability. tactics likely of those

There

a wide an the which

distinguishable information processes

actor decisionit has will may the pointed

manipulate making strategically out, "the

actors However,

is

inter-related. effectiveness by the to the same then, fact that of the

Young tactic other(s) of

any

given

be well first

influenced be attempting at Clearly

relevant information

manipulate time. "27

the

[actor]

management

of

the

problems

of

strategic

69

interaction emanating manipulation will more relevant strategic competent which it is enable confident it

will from of

only that the to

marginally sort of

reduce

the At the

uncertainties very by or an to of problems best, actor have the of more to

situation.

decision-making make more accurate about therefore, but art of only if it

environment predictions the reduce is than choices the

expectations and,

other(s) interaction, in the

substantially the Such actor(s) substantial to In cope in view with

manipulation inter-related.

strategically however, United are States the does

asymmetry, beween this, dilemmas war? the how of

not and the

and

is

not

likely

exist of the

Soviet likely

Union. to

superpowers and how to

whether

intervene

a client-state

The

rational The

solution simple answer

to

the is

intervention that option. theory a superpower But provides

dilemma is is two likely the different to most

choose rational answers.

the

most option?

rational Game

what

According "chicken, two as " each

to of

one the

version

of

game has not

theory, a choice to with

that

of

superpowers it can of of images choose collision

between so other and

strategies. to avoid but its the a with the at

Firstly, possibility the general other superpower the other risk

intervene the setback

superpower of should Secondly, collision harming

a grave of

regional and to intervene If both

resolve decide to

credibility intervene. and risk

superpower can choose

superpower.

superpowers

70

Figure

1

The

rationality the game

of

of non-intervention: "chicken"

United

States

NI --------------5 N k-50 Soviet Union ------------' -10 I +10 50 --------------50 ------------+10

Figure

2

The "the

rationality prisoner's

of intervention: dilemma"

United NI -------_5--

States

---------+20

N
Soviet Union -5 -20 -20

--------------

--------------

-10

I
+20---------1 -ý --10 --------------

71

decide If Each to on only

to

intervene, one intervenes, makes but but the

the it

result

will

be and

their the

collision. other loses. nor not not only

triumphs by of

superpower intervene;

a "move" outcome also---and

deciding the move

whether depends the

that by The

decision the four In intervene but for other

crucially---on

decision

taken

superpower. outcomes place, and of both thereby of -5) this game are shown may the prestige their may -50). Soviet United former the in

possible the first

Figure not collision reputation clients. intervene outcome decides decides in to

1.

superpowers avoid lost among

choose risk and regional of a

(N, N) incur unreliability the

costs (-5, both

Alternatively (I, occurs not to to I) and where intervene risk one

superpowers (-50, the the the

decide A third Union, States,

to

collision superpower, the in

while (N, I); and

other, case (-10) and N): position, States on all

intervene prestige,

which

loses latter is Union and from

position, all

reputation The one its United loses fourth (I,

while final the

enhances the

three of and (+10) and,

(+10). the thus but third enhances the

outcome Soviet prestige,

reverse

intervenes reputation intervening (-10). The of do, act the

refrains three counts

consequently,

uncertainties

of unable

strategic to in of predict advance "chicken,

interaction what the " the best this and

render other strategy would the Soviet refrain be plans

each to and nonUnion from

superpowers each it. must In for at the

hence on

choose game the if

intervention because,

both best,

United both

States superpowers

72

intervention, escalation both if it -10). rational, intervention reputation long greater the as the than other its lose one will in and

they

will

avoid annihilation) and

collision even (-5, have

(and

the

risks they will worst,

of

mutual

though -5); and

prestige the

reputation will prestige each each clearly (-5 at

at

intervenes suffer This choice as long (-50, and

other

avoided and

collision,

but (+10,

diminished of as -50) N for for is

reliability is cost than at I) is that worst), also to so

superpower of them greater best, -10 (I, the

unambiguously of of and clearly deceive as to double lost as

prestige for temptation encouraging disgrace

penalty the by

the

outcome for each

superpower

non-intervention its own theory, triumph. however,

accomplish Another "prisoner's situations "chicken, "chicken, two " "

and of "

version dilemma, much

game which closely the

that

of

the

resembles than opposite dilemma, to " does

interventionary the game As of in has either possible both and tangible had (-5, -5). may States, loses client reputation in it by

more

prescribes in the "prisoner's from (I), or game not are

strategy. each it The 2. superpower can four Firstly, (N, N), whatever have of the the Soviet the United made war

strategies

which intervene shown from but either

choose: M.

intervene outcomes superpowers doing and so of

the may

in

Figure

refrain collision gains the of the other

intervention also forego could out

avoid

intangible and one not to

intervened Secondly, choose intervenes prestige whilst the

stayed

superpowers, but the

Union,

intervene, and, even

other, the by its

(N, I) and may

consequently, be dislodged their

U. S. S. R. erstwhile and

Americans

enhance

prestige

73

and region of United Soviets

consolidate (-20, this +20).

their The with not

strategic third the

position occurs

in

the the

conflict reverse and the the the (+20, both

outcome Soviet (I, and

when

happens, States make incur The fourth decide at the to

Union N) and,

intervening as a result,

intervening

political losses and to in final

strategic or both of takes I), other dillema" know global and the should conflict, its rational the

gains these place

whilst areas when and

Americans -20). superpowers makes gains

one

outcome (I, the

intervene of

collide, (-10, -10).

neither

expense the

According theory, outcomes competition that the tempted other. superpower best, diplomatic, which could one other to each but,

"prisoners' would the U. S.

version pattern of

of

game

superpower given the

possible

politico-strategic U. S. S. R., it and the gains whilst would with for because, political, collision, war. Nonfreedom war for and of superpowers so how the long, other the be the each at

between superpower keeps

could out of or

make the

intervene neither strategy strategy This is

communicate In to this

co-ordinate the

situation, is

choose

intervention. lead gains; to and, a short, at the and results

intervention and take on risk of strategic the the

could

enormous at worst,

form other

of

limited best costs

intervention, from and both strategic other are that from under is, the incurs sides,

hand, and

promises of a limited losses political eviction as the

collision political at of worst, one

intangible and triumph the the as

diplomatic in and the the

superpower region. of strategic is So

conflict conditions

long

interaction, as to

each

superpower

uncertain

74

will

react

to

the must

client-state choose costs. they are

war, intervention,

each

in

its with both

own its

rational higher

self-interest benefits intervene simultaneously. As Soviet ordinated However, superpowers intervention of "chicken" in Union their in in the and and,

lower since

Accordingly, equally

superpowers they do so

rational,

game would

of have

"chicken, been

" much

the better

United off from of not

States if they

and had

the co-

strategies contrast "prisoner's to

and the

refrained game do because to intervene

intervention. "chicken, " the the than (-50) in the the nongame to Is hope (+10), when than

dilemma" This is not of

opt whilst

for in rather

strategy. it for greater a gain is the than rational cost the

intervene, clearly of in the the making "prisoner's other cost

double

intervention to side for is intervene not not intervene intervening

temptation the the other penalty (-20) (-10),

should dilemma"

superpower of double to it may more

intervenes intervention

clearly It seems

worse rational,

therefore, As is real Union intervene superpowers strategic remains Moreover, superpowers conflict so much world have

intervene. already appropriate where face the seem clear, the United of To political, in a local the game "prisoner's of "chicken" and the or each dilemma" to the

than the

situation to in

States whether

Soviet not of to the and This occurs.

dilemma war.

a client-state could make by

begin

with,

Immense

diplomatic, conflict.

gains

intervening or not accruing

whether the do benefits not as

double to have for

intervention either to be or both

of to

the the

necessarily happens,

restricted when

region

example,

a superpower's

75

support

for

a client to the the the

leads

to

the

latter's of allies strategy lead to

triumph that and

and,

as

a

consequence, position Depending superpower, superpower's the issue compromise or of intangibly its resolve The "prisoner's superpower double initially. such there could need As as second world, of as amongst on

enhancement client, its

superpower's sympathizers. pursued by in part couples for issue, perception that of one a a

interventionary could either happen, with other for

intervention position, could

adjustments in if and another it settles the latter

physically instance, another

contention with by the

superpower the other

over

changing general reason

superpower's

and

credibility. for version the of politics appropriateness game is all takes by room for that a theory that high, non-physical minatory maneuver Moreover, superpower the to cost at of the real of least form diplomacy, before collision annihilation. it

dilemma" interventionary intervention Where threats still to

may

not

be

intervention backed, be plenty perhaps, of

would lead not

a superpower lead concluded,

collision. to mutual

necessarily once

Kissinger

the development and appropriate rational of-a granted the foreign doctrine war between a future policy... of furthermore,... [is] even not unavoidable; superpowers it be if it to need not come, allwere [is] in fact destructive,... nuclear conflict a limited 28 possible. The strategic that where rationality interaction a superpower war, than the or of does intervention not, refrains on however, from a under conditions of imply in lesser has behaved a

necessarily intervention substantially it

client-state scale

intervenes other

superpower,

76

irrationally.

Non-intervention The superpower oversimplifies variables strategic the main other gain adversary and anlaysis area wars how

and prescription intervention matters than

asymmetrical of in in the the forming the

intervention rational client-state actor wars the political behaviour decision war. behaviour the and potential for among generally "'29 The can be and crisis otherwise asymmetrical prediction, those fall affect situation in and fundamental superpower an incentive a set the other's that of which structure the moves each and of terms the other into the model inevitably role and/or of on A in of for

that possibility

it

overlooks of

and in to of

anticipated a superpower's in a client-state

whether fuller grey

intervene superpower will of

interventionary both unilateral explain

which

perplexing interventions will variables what ability of of may be of thus

phenomena and have into called to have take

a greater the

principal These situation,

consideration. the "crisis to

a superpower client-state of variables: milieu. of a

intervene. war the These

a particular two sets

described context the

systemic establish war

interventionary structure crisis, structure, alternatives; incentive incentive which each

client-state for a set a set and of them can the of each of

stimulated

and

produce that is, and

superpower or images 30 the beliefs payoffs;

values

initial

about Given choice

structure structures of holds

alternatives. superpowers, and the

make, the

superpower

about

other's

incentive

77

choice

of

moves

are

outcomes it the

of

the

systemic that

context those of war. two

and sets

the of

interventionary variables intervention decision the appear are also The range course, are the of that rational as also in

milieu, define a particular seem model, rational account. context which of

follows

rationality client-state from as the

superpower Thus, a of might variables

would actor

irrational such once

perspective

non-intervention, these additional

perfectly taken into

systemic variables and outcome

of may

a crisis

comprises influence the

a

wide nature,

strongly In the and and

a crisis. of of, Union,

the

foremost the for,

of

these

general of and 31 client-state strategy international its the

structure influence Soviet Thus,

system, support the

international the United strategi intervention

distribution States balance. in a

U. S. -Soviet

a superpower war of will the political in not other

contemplating only have to

consider but also

the the on

probable various defining those

superpower, and strategic terms

constraints and in pursuing

interests

operational

interests. The interventionary superpower and It viable crisis milieu basically at of a client-state the available of the the war

stimulated capabilities superpowers. inter-superpower superpowers' stake, fears included superpower their of

defines the

strategies such

disposal as

includes and

variables

recent the at

superpower-client valuation military of the

relations, interests and commitments. milieu are distance such from subjective

comparative relative war, in the and

capabilities pre-crisis

their

Also interthe

interventionary as

asymmetries

geographical

78

crisis instigate status crisis

region, and quo,

which which

patron-client is trying to

group prevent the

is *change

trying in

to the pre-

domestic of their

constraints all reciprocal significant these

and

superpowers' including, of in each any of

"image"

variables,

consequently, "resolve. variables crisis consequently, crisis. Clearly in capabilities and "32 will involving

perceptions asymmetry at

other's these in will, in the a

A

place the act as

a superpower other

a disadvantage and

superpower on its

a constraint

behaviour

then, and pursue

a superpower viable

that

suffers and being will if and in strategic and disputed it in unduly be has even the

disadvantages the ability hindered reluctant substantial if the crisis disadvantage. unilateral or uncertain other will to by to

strategies, without constraints, war intervention intervention even

define domestic intervene gains

interests

and in to

international a client-state from unilateral such

make

superpower's place Hence superpower interest it at the

a further occurrence interventions

political of in

and

asymmetrical regions of

symmetry.

Putative The grey areas

"rules highly can by the of Hence ask the

of fluid be

the

game" nature said to

in of have of

grey

areas competition rise of to a tacit for these U. S. is with in

superpower given the their remark use

acceptance the regions. cannot in many purpose

superpowers apportioning Kissinger's Union the world to

intervention in what power the that

interests that "a great

Soviet of

do

as

parts

operating

competitively

79

us... in

is which,

to

keep for

itself whatever the

from

taking reasons,

advantage we do "33 This not Or, state

of do he

situations what is have affairs in that grey of This features "controlled the

required added, bestows areas superpower character that are to a

to

maintain establish character is

balance...

might of

a balance. upon significantly in other U. S. -Soviet

competition from of least called region. five

that

different types by writer kind at

competition can typical "34 be

distinguished of what In one this

has of

competition. superpowers: 1. Explicitly presence efforts and

competition,

or in to should is the accept methods the further

tacitly region, their be used firmly to of of which

agree and own

to recognize

accept that are only a rapid

each each

other's other's

interests

unavoidable if and direct drastic

resisted accomplish power of

intervention change 2. Tacitly the unilateral 3. Explicitly communication of 4. mutual in

balance rules by

the

region, which circumscribe advance their

behaviour they might

interest, or tacitly in order agree to to set up mechanisms for system

guarantee

a credible

expectations, or tacitly " agree the to maintain of a system which The of power the of would actual different between degree the to

Explicitly "tolerance result thresholds factors U. S. and such the in

thresholds, uncontrolled are as defined the

penetration escalation. by a ratio mixture of time,

relative at any

U. S. S. R.

given

80

which superpower, importance 5. Degree greater actors Soviet extent degree relations themselves. These in areas

interests and of of than on the these

under the

threat perceptions

are of the

vital each other

to about side, relations the and time, than

each the

interests over over hand the over their

to

control that one on

mutual between United At the is the the

is local the the the over actors

relations and the

States same greater superpowers regional

Union of of

other. the

control control between 35

latter by among

exerted and

characteristics of rules Union in disputed of or

of

superpower

controlled interest symmetry States

competition suggest and the

uncertain for

several Soviet

behaviour regions:

the

United

these

1.

Each

superpower

shall Influence.

endeavour

to

advance

its

politcal

and military
2. Actions. intervention permissable, expel within 3. Local diplomatic their maintain the 4. In within legitimate the crisis patrons, the their clients other on the

part aimed but

of

each at

superpower expelling

short the be

of other

direct are to

local superpower territory. of the

actors from

may

encouraged of influence

a position

own

U. S.

and

the and

U. S. S. R. military aid

receive from to over

and

economic while degree of each of its

support of control client(s). involving the the

superpowers and supervision

tries

some behaviour

situations a local client, is

domestic allied

instability with freedom the to

superpower

regime

permitted

greater

81

maneuver the other

and

flexibility superpower. also carry

to

intervene Its threats credibility. either a military is its by 36 the regime the

militarily of

than direct

intervention 5. Deterrence threats regional of be will These uncertain. Whilst inherent use of they in crisis another effective. carry rules nature seek crisis by

greater involving against objective

behaviour a superpower actor whose

actions action complete will other by defeat normally superpower

or a

regional

actor

or

Counter-threats less credibility. naturally of to superpower control

reflect interests the they the

the

contentious in grey areas. potential facilitate of ascertaining

or

escalation also

manipulation, coercion for

the

purpose

Soviet-American The game" underlines involved that however, superpowers areas. continue order in to these That to exhibit in these in existence areas the

regional of of

interests. putative or U. S. -Soviet uncertain of these of "rules interest the locales. crisis attached change the Soviet clash predominance of extra-bloc security It that the is next to in this serious The of the

disputed

symmetry risks fact

superpowers' manipulation permit the the

recognition in

crisis rules emphasizes to

exercise importance

coercion, by in the grey Union in

political the United

and/or States

territorial and to in risk

a willingness themselves

a direct of

establish areas and of

positions significance for

testifies political nuclear

to

the

territorial the age

change

superpower

stable paradoxical

deterrence.

ostensibly will now turn.

relationship

chapter

82

Notes 1. R. Cohen, International "Rules Politics, " of the Game in International Vol. Studies Quarterly, 24, No. 1, March 1980, 130-131; George, A. Managing U. S. -Soviet Rivalry: pp. Problems Prevention (Westview Crisis Press, Boulder, of Colorado, 1983), 377-378. pp. Cohen, ibid., See 132. idem, International also p. Politics: Rules the London, 1981). of the Game (Longman, See M. Willrich (eds. ), SALT: The and J. B. Rhinelander Moscow (Free Agreements Press, New York, 1974), and Beyond Appendix 3, pp. 309-312. See, for instance, George, 368-369. op. cit., pp. T. M. Franck Word Politics: Verbal Strategy and E. Weisband, Among University Press, Superpowers (Oxford New the York, 1971), p. 129. A. W. Gouldner, Reciprocity: A "The Norm of Preliminary Statement, Review, Vol. " American 25,1960, Sociological pp. 161-178. Franck and Weisband, p. 121. op. cit., Ibid., p. 131. Ibid., p. 6. R. Fisher, " International "Fractionating Conflict, Conflict Behavioral The CraiRville Science: Papers, and R. ed. Fisher (Basic Books, New York, 1964), Also D. p. 94. see Pruitt, "An Analysis Between Nations, " of Responsiveness Journal 1962, Resolution, of Conflict p. 10. George, 380-381. op. cit., pp. The from is borrowed George, ibid., typology resulting pp. 380-388. R. S. Litwak, Nixon Detente Doctrine: American and the Foreign Policy Pursuit Stability, 1969-1976 the of and (Cambridge Cambridge, University Press, 1984), 84; p. George, op. cit., p. 385. George, ibid., p. 387. Ibid., p. 388. E. Goffman, (Basil Strategic Interaction Blackwell, Oxford, 1970), 100-101. pp. These 94-96, in ibid., following are discussed pp. and the discussion. passages are based on that See A. George, in the Change International System et al., (Westview, 1980). Boulder, Colorado, Goffman, op. cit., p. 95. O. R. Interaction Young, "Strategic Bargaining, " and Bargaining: Formal Theories Young of Negotiation, ed. O. R. (University Press, Illinois Urbana, Chicago, London, of 1975), 12-13. pp. Goffman, op. cit., p. 99. Young, op. cit. See ibid., 15-19. pp. T. C. Schelling, (Harvard The Strategy University of Conflict Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960), p. 160. Young, op. cit., p. 17. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., p. 17. H. A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons Foreign Policy (New and

2. 3.

4. 5.

6.

7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

83

29.

30. 31. 32. 33.

34.

35. 36.

York, in A. B. Ulam, The Rivals: 1957). Quoted America and Russia War II (The Viking World Since Press, New York, 1971), p. 283. Compare G. H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining, " with and contrast International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research, C. F. Hermann New York, (Free Press, 1972), ed. p. 219. Ibid., 219,221-222. pp. Cf. ibid., 219-220. pp. Cf. ibid., p. 221. USIS Press Release, May 7,1975. The remark was made in a television interview broadcast Quoted in on May 5,1975. Litwak, op. cit., p. 175. Y. Evron, Military Intervention "Great Powers' in the Middle East, " Great Power in the Middle East, Intervention M. ed. Leitenberg (Pergamon Press, New York, 1979). and G. Sheffer Cf. ibid., p. 22. Cf. ibid., Also 144-145; op. cit., p. 23. see Cohen, pp. Matheson, Superpower The "Rules Military of the Game" of Intervention in the Third World 1975-1980 (University Press America, Washington, 65,99; 1982), O. R. Young, of pp. "Intermediaries Third Parties in the and Interventionists: Middle East Journal Crisis, " International Vol. 23, Pt. 1, 1971, 59-60; R. E. Osgood Force, Order. pp. and R. W. Tucker, Baltimore, (Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), and Justice 149; p. J. M. McConnell, "The 'Rules A Theory of the Game"': and the Practice Superpower Diplomacy", Naval Soviet Naval of Diplomacy, B. Dismukes (Pergamon Press, ed. and J. McConnell New York, 1979), 249,276-277. pp.

N.

84

CHAPTER

4:

INTERVENTION

AND SUPERPOWER SECURITY

The client-state through explain strategic Union. acquisition of by the course,

persistence wars a the perspective role of is

of

Soviet

and

American that is

intervention best understood which change and the with abroad been motivated in

in

a phenomenon of

superpower and the United of great

security political States

can the

territorial of

considerations The of preoccupation territory new, factors of U. S. where where interests of jeopardizing or into the the the

Soviet the is,

powers influence

and and

political has in the

nothing of

past political

a variety safeguarding the either or

ranging sources

from and

prestige of raw materials.

to

routes have

However, areas stake whatever risk

and they the they

U. S. S. R. had no

often material have

intervened interests been to posed warrant

in at to the

obvious may did mutual not

threat did their danger

that have

seem

relations intervention perhaps, is that,

through might nuclear since the

intervention escalate weapons. possession of nuclear

that

such

a conflagration is even two more

involving, intriguing of

What by the

superpowers the

a devastating of the two economic countries

arsenal and and

weapons, military third

and

immensity between these

conventional any and the fit possible territorial United to

gap states

have of Soviet national

seemingly minor

rendered

political consequence,

alignments States and the of

strategic have still to

Union security

seen excuse their

it

invoke

reasons in

Interventions of an inextricable

client-state link between

wars. territorial

Indeed,

the and/or

assumption political

85

change national not only

outside security the

the of

formal the

East-West U. S. put and the

alliance U. S. S. R. by justify Soviet

blocs has and most but doctrines of also,

and underlain

the

arguments and

forward to

American their more of the

commentators respective fundamentally, United States The strategic encompasses geopolitics space, spatial States Union securing allies on supply maintain general commitments training personnel, supply the on lines role

statesmen foreign postwar the Soviet

countries' the and of

interventions, foreign Union. and territorial superpowers concerns matters and global increasing great powers as policy

political of the to

change is one of the

in that

the both

considerations and in of exceeds regards

the

staple such

traditional control and The the to of the

communication of but as routes and

transport, conflict. extent, in the

configurations and, are the the other, of their a string war to and and operations, and the to as a lesser concerned major one hand, and with

United Soviet with their

past and

between their

themselves trading and they

principal a regular

partners reliable seek to with fulfill for

ensuring needs.

basic of

Moreover, garrisons and in in order

forward

accordance to facilities

contingencies clients for spare and the and

friends; staging of reliable

overseas military air

equipment, routes for re-

parts; facilities

relating These with relationships the

to

intelligence, have for the which the in which most the

surveillance, often formation can contribute of provided of

communications. superpowers

requirements main with Indeed, those impetus states

patron-client towards

meeting

them. have been

valuable

such

relationships

86

client its the the own

has

been

able

to

confer over

a competitive the other

advantage superpower In through return, that

to

superpower of receives weapons of direct

patron important a host and

provision client

strategic of "security

assets. transfers"

may and to of

include guarantees its this to

military assistance

equipment, in of the war event involving cause itself important the or

training, of a threat clients for to

survival. nature intervene from, region However, often either the in

The

eruption

provides to

sufficient for

a superpower deny to, assets of on behalf out visible especially from crisis. of of or

protect superpower through American risks

seize in the

other

strategic

question and carries the for

manipulation

Soviet

intervention that or seem any This of or or by

clients proportion interests so which benefits support. risk political, intervenes logically, with of the its of in the the

sometimes with at stake of

totally other is

geostrategic the superpowers. in derives

case

intervention patron international in in this is to

support minor

clients non-strategic ideological

superpower such The nuclear or on as

solidarity that, achieve the in a a

paradox war

manipulating strategic,

the

order

certain superpower client-state value as if on of In The might strict

ideological behalf upon nuclear have of

goals, a protege these war by goals

which war,

bestows cost client and, with this client is of

commensurable the the its defeat future global military of its a

proceeding influence outcome '

would

a serious the

conduct competition terms, loyal

eventually, the unlikely in a highly other to

superpower. be the case.

dominance confer

strategic

area

87

superpower the the event

patron of

with

an or

edge limited

over war

the

other

superpower the analysis, U. S.

in and the or of such the of

a crisis But, configuration

between

U. S. S. R.

in

the of

ultimate whatever degree

geographical indirect several war or

of only

direct one any is other necessary,

superpower variables crisis. ability

hegemony which could

would affect

constitute the the to outcome most

of

Of of to of

these, each escalate war.

perhaps superpower the

important the if has East

relative its to

convince

willingness the point

confrontation, As Schelling between the most but bear

general of

pointed and West

out, are in a

contemporary decided locality, willing appear "not or to that This territorial United relative fate the region, geopolitical bearing on the of States

issues by on who

contention bring

can

force by or who able

to is

bear

a particular more is force

issue, to 2 other strategic

eventually make it

bring more points change and the

to

forthcoming. to in the the Soviet and

role

of

political of index to

and the the The

considerations of the and, an

Union---that resolve of war

credibility a client in position is significant terms, resolve commitments. U. S. with and the the basic but

superpowers. by implication, in

a client-stage of its not also

relative

superpower only in it the

patron geostrategic

the and

because and In an of

could

have

a

strong of the

reputation

credibility the

superpower's by the

age

where

possession capabilities,

U. S. S. R.

"overkill" of have beyond nuclear rendered the

together rational comparisons second

"uselessness" of policy arsenals somewhat

weapons physical

as

instruments of nuclear

attainment assessment

of

strike

capabilities

meaningless,

88

of

the

credibility have between precise of the to impact

and become the of

the decisive United the

resolve in States course images to the in

aspects determining and of of the

of

a superpower's the Soviet strategic Union. war credibility nature That the is perceived global to them in where failure to of to on

character balance The each is the say,

a client-state resolve and and the

superpower's vary according

likely

region question. upon

patron-client it will of the

relationships depend the primarily clients of of the parts of the to their

how

significance competition, the superpowers, to the the of

the

Soviet-American respective alignments to

extent and relative outcome

latter's played war.

commitments by the

compare determining the of balance the

superpowers in locales the interests in a clientits the and how

Thus, is tilted, greater

U. S. -Soviet with of almost the

interests relatively

superpower the war defeat would and

prevent state of

a closely-aligned certainly in the other extent superpower's of a client effect adversely favour

protege affect of be, will client's

image other much upon, and of

resolve

credibility

superpower. credit among its will other and the

How adverse go things, the other defeat patron tarnish unless, of the This in of client is has to the the

would

superpower of the

depend defeat in the where would resolve

own

intervention in minor a region interests of

war. its not and

However, superpower necessarily credibility on behalf

relatively the latter's it was the wars

images had

course, but because

intervened by of

extensively the other

out-maneuvered expectation is something

superpower. intervention

superpower depends

client-state

which

89

mainly superpowers taking principally Soviet

on

the at

calculation stake. of In

of

the

relative words, in alia the

interests resolve

of or region of U. S. -

the riskis

other

propensity

a superpower of that of inter region. this for

a particular the balance

a function interests in

The political considerations for those have mutual own taking interest somewhat superpower argued Soviet impelled what uncertain interests because escalation residual inactivity Clearly political superpowers' it

implication and of

the

role in of crucial

of the

grey

area

territorial the Soviet Both the taking manipulate this superpowers and United

change is

strategic importance behaviour in Union in to high of may nature it of may to can their their riskhigh seem of be

understanding areas. been prone

American States

crisis and high the risks

Soviet

to to

extremely

endeavour advantage. could be

client-state propensity in in the grey

wars for regions areas

Although more its in in in is high to

understandable occurrence view those regions disputed of

symmetry, perplexing interests that, interests to take whilst

ambiguous However, the balance

areas. where each

U. S. feel

superpower in order

risk be its

activities vital the to may or very

safeguard locales superpower risk-taking danger than of any from of

considers interest may each is doubt or be

interests, ambiguity high that the

in of

symmetry sufficient

stimulate feel more that

superpower less about from then, likely its a more

acceptable mayensue

resolve cautious

either

posture. which in as the the vital poses the role of of the

a perspective change of resolve

and

territorial images

formation link

between

90

such and

change the

and

the Union

national seems Soviet of of the traced

security best suited

of

the to

United explaining in

States the

Soviet of The

persistence wars. security phenomenon crystallized and, and in the

U. S. centrality

and

intervention these U. S. to the images, and type the of after by the and In

client-state turn, to is which War States consequent these two II the a

concerns that in particular, Soviet of Union can the

U. S. S. R. structure World United the

be

international to of the

system deployment weapons

nuclear

emergence countries.

a deterrence

relationship

between

Bipolarity The significance strategic bipolar World those images War

and

superpower of the is

images images

of of

resolve resolve of the of in of pertain as of decisive

perception in balance international II.

assessment a prominent system which

Soviet-American the the the to for political security to type wake nature superpower a proper and of of of

feature emerged

An accurate in resolve of change this is, the in

representation which

aspects of

system therefore, relationship grey

essential between and of

understanding territorial and, the thus, security In system, of actors' served

areas value

superpower such intervention

of of contrast

the the

strategic U. S. to the and

the

U. S. S. R. multipolar exhibited tied crisis to a the international two sets

pre-war of

the

postwar

system which,

bipolarity

characteristics images to of elevate

respectively, to their images

principal and of also major

resolve these

behaviour position

91

strategic is the

importance. relative In and uncertainty of show of other

The

first

of of

these

characteristics and ally

permanence a multipolar on the part as

enemy the

identifications. fluidity identification that would possible state's the a not

system of friends a of in this is highly it,

comparative power enemies in the

a great or

states towards indicative Since,

meant

weakness be

particular weakness type

antagonist towards of contingent its not Under system, all a upon previous be very these weakness, from of of a

necessarily opponents. resolve in

crisis its

or

war

degree

to

which of

allies or

backed weakness

demonstrations reliable circumstances, concessions the physical in indices

strength to its than or war of to an

would

resoluteness. signifying which actually through or the the general

rather crisis

subtract transfer

capability territory

a state opponent as

strategic client with system least States ideological and their "4 an of in may

abandonment to the

be

intended-simply foe. 3 the

a prelude in

realignment contemporary

erstwhile bipolarity, the and military the element attachment rule between and, thus, permanent. tacitly,

However, overwhelming two Union, global each other sort of

predominance---at powers, coupled the with for a "hostility that a multipolar influence of is United the

field---of Soviet in their to out the make the

contest by

position, conceivable system relatively albeit and the

alignment in

principal enemy

actors and the ally existence

identifications of of mutually, influence

Moreover,

recognized of world Soviet

superpower and strengthen

spheres American this

ubiquity the

client-states perception of

throughout

serve

to

92

permanence adversary parameters therefore, to be the

because blocs set in this enemy behaviour for the tend by

relations to be

between generally

members defined competition.

of

the by

two the Since,

the system of

U. S. -Soviet the the over enemy of

today

is future,

also

likely current great over

foreseeable certain of issues future

superpower significance other issues. This the from a bipolar the show

carries resolve

expectation

prospect system, of

is

furthered the

by

another of In

characteristic superpower resolve system, actor mentioned and does lack can

of

independence support. the part of

whims of

allied on

a multipolar

weakness to an

a principal or, as

be

attributed may be part

intra-mural

dispute

above, not, of In relations of the

of

a pre-realignment indicate part the and, in crisis of

maneuvering, a the actor of to is the general

therefore, resoluteness bipolarity, to the

necessarily on however, capability actors in less this than by does the the not the

concerned. alliance resolve

contribution therefore, or the war

principal Indeed, much

relatively need an unlike option behaviour. in

peripheral. their allies that is

system, latter fact provide

superpowers them;

need that,

asymmetry

underlined realignment allies. direct resolve; very likely Rather the resolve 5

multipolarity, for the main has a

a realistic

Consequently, bearing a to than of the on

superpower assessment of as an of the

crisis

relative by its a

U. S. -Soviet superpower is

demonstration be taken being

weakness index on to the during

resoluteness. of or allies, war in

dependent actors

vagaries crisis

principal

93

the the the

present "systemic conflict

bipolar context" in four

system and the (see factors in the

is

generally

determined milieu" Within out

by of these as States of

"interventionary Chapter can be 3). singled of is

question different

categories, particular and global forces. and the 6 Soviet and,

importance resolve. especially, Although, U. S. S. R. any to that of

determination first of these

United the

The the in

perceived balance by the of U. S. have

regional the

superpower attainment capabilities "overkill" power, does acts in in

theory, strike in

second

should

rendered irrelevant seems bargaining superior appears to the be to and

differential their crisis

their

capacities practice, it a the respect believe particularly is, of of the more regional direct it

bargaining superiority

numerical asset in crises

constitute to bolster this

and

thereby Its value decision of how However, which formulation States to

power's depend on their

resolve. on how valuable

makers others, it is

perception it of in Thus, strength is. 7

adversary,

believe balance significance crisis.

Soviet-American and resolve in related greater in

forces the United seems

superpower superiority

local have missile crisis in the

conventional to its

been crisis,

strongly the 1970. crises bargaining

successes crisis, and local

in the

the

Cuban Syria-Jordan

Quemoy-Matsu Conversely, of 1948 and

of

Western 1958-1961

inferiority contributed to

Berlin

Western it did

weakness, to a Soviet The superpower relation

although, triumph. second resolve to different 8 and

in

the

final

analysis,

not

lead

third

factors their of

in strength

the of

shaping motivation and are

of in thus

determine issues

contention

94

central crisis the national might motiviation illusions, particularistic governmental that, stake for more The motivation the war, or

to

the

way The at

the

U. S.

and

the

U. S. S. R. of these as

behave is it the

during value of to

war.

more

ambiguous particularly this respect, on

interest

stake, In same an

relates interest strength

security. have the as

a "genuine"

effect

a superpower's by or the ideology,

of popular and

interest

allayed

personal

predilections, from Needless or the another, edge in

vested

interests and the internal

accretions processes. one would reason have factor

political to values say, the of

superpower interest at

strength

will.

9 of of

other

underlying conflict is In client

a superpower's the the "fact case of of an

strength possession" a client-state in the

during in patron and, regional of will the

interest the

dispute. of the

defending the status likely

interest quo to in have is

its U. S. -

possession Soviet strength to seize

by

implication, balance, is patron and In to be the

more

greater attempting

than interest

the

whose thereby

client disrupt analysis,

the the fact

local of of

superpower possession motivation even interest. The resolve will. ii more

balance. seems and, important 10. fourth is what This factor might sphere as of the the

ultimate

a crucial of

aspect superpower in

of

the

strength perhaps of

therefore, than

resolve; the valuation

disparities

the

in be of

the

determination to is the the as

of native free at of

superpower national from stake, forces, such the and

referred resolve of and

largely interest balance

considerations inertia

value quo,

status

95

can case itself This

be of

thought the in area

of United

as

an

inner and pursuit

drive the

for Soviet of

assertion. Union, it

In manifests advantage.

the

States

the of

tenacious resolve national is

competitive by such

determined as its fear

components

of

a

superpower's cultural code. One of resolve by of

psychic subjective

historical of war, and

experience, operational

proclivity,

the to

outcomes their the

of crisis

the

linkage behaviour

of

superpower which has has been

images been the in than has it by been from a

stimulated assumption risk contests taken previous principal Amongst promote place power. superpower competitions, Soviet eras, confined economic to Union the the in by taking

present

bipolar relations more by tests

system of a of shape only but system two of resolve

by

international

competition nerves that

characterized of force. competition power of of The

particular has not

this great

distinguished has of have to also

competitions the this postwar competition, images of the

been

hallmark features principal the These

bipolarity. served a pivotal of the power and the to

actors'

calculation are the

U. S. -Soviet and pre-war the United the

balance scope great States In of

longevity Unlike

conflict. the is conflict both global between and

between and

all-embracing. powers their were relatively

previous generally limited

competitions in and, scope

great by

duration military and by

especially, alliances,

capabilities, the all, fluctuating they were

by

the

need of

preserve

nature circumscribed security immediate

alliance by the

relationships. great powers' These own usually

Above

comparatively ranged from

limited their

interests.

96

neighbours European they and points mentioned, overseas was

to

the

general and in

balance the case

of of

power the

throughout colonial

the empires

continent, sometimes also

included sea and lanes so

certain leading on. whether exchanged security relatively from units, revision "12 present Union, of This

overseas to Even them, so,

acquisitions strategic as of already territory What the balanced by exceptional in of regards affairs conflict. great with each of this powers other their end. is more

their at

environs, straits, it was rarely lost, for of quo, or a usually respective sharply States past, ability immense of by as the this can its

mattered gained, great or power

a piece for was,

another. basically,

important

"maintenance status aggressive cases... to the

a certain, protection expansionist moderate units. with and rely to the in muster economic the Soviet their

stable, disturbance and in

a status state superpower unlike

contrasts The of on United the their

competition

a considerable resources to

amount towards wider of

relatively The removal

impediment gigantic by their

competition their of military invulnerable forces that

paralleled machines, nuclear to reach

expansion acquirement

manifested and parts of as these the

capabilites most

of of

conventional the two world. constraints

military Given

able the almost a world Union

disappearance simultaneously process and in not the of Just

occurred was of and the was the undergoing whole Soviet to

international with the the United of its

system involvement States outcomes security

extension Europe, one the

system,

increase In

considerably

superpowers'

interests.

97

contrast the entire in interest. party protect party intentions. by this world these one way, on are as to

to

previous compete which whatever

great in

power an area

competitions, spanning as its "security

the virtually

U. S.

and the and

U. S. S. R. globe which 13 take its

each

regards happened it which it

area" its security for

concerned is seldom might do not hostile,

Consequently, measures but of

possible deem

one to other

necessary to the

security

which

appear or that by in the

evidence Any party the the would

aggressive, or

expansionist be gained In of the if other concern strife southern in

influence be

control lost of events

might

considered effect of way

other. part

potential power position in

any

one to the

superpower, activities

especially of the

related tends in conflict

some to

superpower, about Ethiopia, Africa. The of been the the main scope conflicts

stimulate corners south of east

mutual the Asia,

superpower world, or be war it in

all in

outcome of the of

of

the

prolongation

and competition as

the

extension has thus global are pointed each seen, total of " In of or view

Soviet-American this competition in " which As as in part an "freedom" Pact

perception or episodes

a general crises has event, is

confrontation linked out, issue and

"supergame" or "subgames. considered incident to become,

specific one an writer isolated supergame of integral and countries. images of individual a

rather or thus

than

being

international tends

this

large component "communism, 14.

confrontation, an overall

nation-to-nation; contest and between the of behaviour,

between of to the their

N. A. T. O. identification crisis

Warsaw the

superpowers' this linkage

resolve crises

98

to

the

overall disposition on

Soviet-American to the In in one part this crisis extrapolate of way, on ultimately the notion

confrontation demonstrated from of the

has

generated strength

a or

general irresolution to

a superpower the their impact relative affects of the

one

situation

another.

superpowers' power of the or such of As Soviets they "15 this in notion a crisis is would

behaviour in subsequent

bargaining the outcome

crises Hence of as

supergame. "integrity" commitments places Schelling that not like

"interdependence" which to South we tell if we do not, underlies the security Korea. the

superpower those of the West it, here we say

commitments United Berlin, States and

Taiwan,

summarized to us simple, revelation react when

"[e]ssentially because, we will logic by

we have believe The

react

there...

fundamental of weakness

underlying a superpower

that

the

inevitably-stimulates tilt against of and
finds the

the it. future stand
it

long-term the

" balance other

of

resolve"

to in to first

As a result, irresolution, firm
more next resolve, damage of

superpower, willing The

anticipation challenge
superpower determination other's more through point its by the ground,

becomes, more next
to and, be in

in

the

crisis.
credibly recognition

difficult time, may to

communicate of the once so at to on some stand war

increased with further a sequence

compelled resolve Alternatively, is

to,, retreat image, if and

its

losses. superpower

disadvantaged the over-confident "16 the ramifications or the

determined may precipitate

opponent

"miscalculation. Amongst

of of

this

dynamic,

the

one

for is

the

stability

balance

superpower

deterrence

99

undoubtedly significance "capabilities" that weapons has to meant take has on

the of

most the

important. "resolve"' of with structure the the in

The

increase relation balance of to of

in

the the power

component come the that risks of of about bipolar reciprocal have nuclear deterrence, to deter

U. S. -Soviet superimposition of the

nuclear system

international of than the words of the or

superpower become more

perceptions

resolve physical of U. S. Aron, and

determining In

comparisons the the balance

stockpiles. or direct the

capacity aggression

U. S. S. R.

extreme

provocation instruments does which of each merely on the not depend but to the move resist, also on the players possess, the the to run risks, of making people art willingness Since deterrence take threat seriously. an improbable is balance between the two a relation wills, of 17 deterrence is a psycho-technological equilibrium. Although the in this equilibrium of expectation the test would deterrence of what be the equality can, will to or some otherwise extent, happen by of be when

instruments the to of The

observed, it comes

actually largely

moulded

previous

patterns

behaviour. implication for change of the arises degree stakes can crises On the of at be in one the as of role an the of index notion grey to may the in and, about it it its had could the seem question crisis if it is is, of area interdependence political and/or credibility ambiguous. whether to the any its of the a of

commitments territorial and The resolve problem

relative a little of

superpowers from resolve issue, made which hand,

superpower's more valid behaviour interest. tangible inferences in

related whether

resoluteness different be argued

from levels that

100

United reputations and at is

States for

and

the

Soviet as both of, the

Union much their game game. any one intrinsic may issue will of

regard more more

their important tactual of

general than, interest resolve" is the issues 18 about in that any the its value of of these for crisis the The assume, of

resolve independent

relatively stake; very that much

is, an

that

"balance Thus, will yield interest on

autonomous on that of

"weakness reinforce other involved. anxious

weakness"; opponent's regardless However, the crisis, extent resolve its of in "interests" will if possible it

retreating expectation of the whilst effect seems degree

statesmen on their more

indeed of

feel

resolve plausible

yielding to argue therefore, on the

somewhat

a superpower's a particular at vary the stake, across

commitment crisis and will that

and, depend the It

intensity is

interests example, involving survival leaders perceive interests, important, confidently thesis

issues. be it as

doubtful, in in a which

U. S. or

would as South it other the

committed in was ones at

Somalia of of Israel each

Zaire or

would Korea seems as

stake. to hierarchy the moderately

superpower, of the from

legitimate a

those ranging to held, becomes

having through If such the these would

vital,

the

peripheral. then the logic

perceptions balance of

are resolve a to risk of could

of

more

complex. on

Under one issue

circumstances, be expected of

superpower retreat on issues

which again at

yielded

when the

confronted same level

with or no

a similar in its

level

lower reliable

hierarchy

interests. therefrom which are be

Nevertheless, made about as its of

inferences resolve importance on

probable greater

interests to it.

perceived

101

Conversely, particular manner hierarchy, The in view on

a issue other but apparent of in about the

superpower probably issues not at

which would the

takes behave

a firm in

stand

on firm in the

a

a similarly or higher

same for

level lesser

necessarily problem in or the

interests. grey areas of if in in

19 is that,

case

of

uncertain places,

disputed

nature

superpower any, should regions, involving could Soviet uncertain the that in and a first the grey Soviet own in the to be and

interests be and, such drawn American interest of these of is made by

these their

what

presumptions, to clients

commitments about their token,

those

implication, By relative the

resolve what resoluteness

crises

clients? about

same

conclusions from or to

superpower in begin seems

crisis

behaviour To it

areas with,

of

disputed in answer to to

symmetry? questions, a superpower's to

reasonable

assume

degree area

commitment as in areas on in the to

a client U. S.

likely are of in

depend,

where that client

interests calculation region be are clearer disputed

more its

established, interests Needless

superpower's as these well are as likely interests

question. in the rather commitments more interests case

say, where

of than are

regions uncertain. likely on

superpower In the more latter

cases, and of moves in be high more on the

superpower fluctuating; the than areas expected interest ambiguous, other's on of any

to each

be

unstable assessment of its that could of are largely

dependent at stake

party's

and involved.

anticipation It

tangible

stakes interest firm in In in

follows

disputed to be as

symmetry, crisis regions crisis as in,

a superpower say, locales

asymmetry. its resolve

where would

interests depend

102

extent the stand Unless, or type crisis to have

of latter's its of

the

other involvement,

superpower's the order more to

involvement: apt would be its to

the the

greater first to

ground course, from area, the part

in both the

protect decide

reputation. de-escalate, In of either in not

superpowers crisis

disengage of grey on an

simultaneously. a demonstration is general with the more

therefore, of

weakness than of of resolve, a

a superpower on ends its

likely image

adverse if the

impact crisis

especially protege.

defeat

close

The resolve"

erosion thesis The

of

bipolarity:

implication

for

the

"balance

of

globalization and of the

of

the

scope

of

the by

Soviet-American international the most

competition politics glaring which structure, erosion, superpowers' proliferation issues affairs, importance Consequently, thesis that, political West alliance has as to

consequent character of in has the been by, over for their the

assumption are, "tight" of World

a zero-sum

perhaps, bipolar War II.

manifestations crystallized however, as evidenced hegemony of change and of the

structure This of the the of new

wake

undergoing example,

a gradual the decline

process in

respective the focus new the the in actors

alliances, appearance of to

non-aligned the

states,

East-West of in seem that

international diminish system. of application depolarized, resolve" in the 20

emergence

nation-states it might become world territorial blocs can

international "balance its

also the and

restricted becomes change occur

increasingly outside the affecting

formal either

Eastof

without

103+.

the

superpowers'
Although the indeed described the basically the

image

of

resolve.
structure some of erosion bipolar balance erosion of has the it of of the and international could be this more does thesis. has the the fact power other units significant reliant' is that time in image other such for gain each the of might takes not

bipolar witnessed as

system accurately not This reduced American the scale the military on one alter is

has

a "loose" of the nature Nor still to and the

system, resolve

relevance because

bipolarity of

world-wide area.

scope altered

Sovietthat on a in

security and the

U. S. vastly

U. S. S. R.

retain that of most way The at

military all

disproportionate system, are the is as with and/or other in some of

international actors or

that

other militarily fact other resolve the if

critical 21 as on gains

them. now impact

superpower postwar territorial make place President Soviet-assisted message nations throughout and/or not of other. through resolve. solely a transfer of but at the in era

concerned the

any its which

political of its itself, own in

expense spite Ford's of

especially efforts. 1976 that

Hence, American in to States the the Angola leaders allies impact of

example, of send African friends a

claim Cuban

acceptance "will of and

intervention not only

irresolution also the to the "22

United Thus, on the

world.

territorial is form of stability balance chance of of the

political a function from

change of one

"overarching such change system also affect of to be the little

stability" takes to that this the

whether superpower's could

Extra-bloc their

changes impact on

perceptions would seem

Indeed,

there

104

escape balance: superpower whether it of would the

from

the

association it in occurs spite of without adversely superpower. United to by States

of at the

such the efforts

change instigation of the

with of other

this one or

whether and it takes

place certainly

a Soviet-American affect the

struggle, resolve the image security Union the entire is

almost

non-benefitting of the

Because and the virtually to is to be Soviet

boundary generally globe, advantage perceived least latter's of is

perceived any at as equal image attempt the

encapsulate one superpower of and the the

make likely met or Even in

unilateral to with else the from, of, of be at the case and local one of

expense

other

a challenge vigour of by resolve that

expected

other would is, by

superpower, suffer. change which in power

spontaneous generally rather or

change, understood than other, resolve

stems terms

others

conditions superpower Soviet-American feature because, developments particularly the security to which, tactic

the the has

dominant association become affairs.

and with

resolve the

the

balance recurrent is mainly

an

increasingly 23 This to the

of in

international their in the of many United linking As past, mutual corners States, these Jervis

endeavour of the have world,

manipulate superpowers, resorted to own extent

frequently to out,

developments has pointed

their the

interests. in the

in the has Thirld World been the of struggles outcome American has been indices taken for of resolve increased American by the these statements coupling behaviour them, events, superpowers' concerning and the World in the Third to how to other the and even events 24 in other react areas of conflict. superpowers would

105

The linkage

interdependence of This centre-periphery tendency U. S. at the of is

of

superpower stability most evident

commitments

and

the

in over

the the security words,

concern impact area on of basically Union.

of of on the the

successive instability the general United associated Thus, Doctrine, "containment" essentiality on to to the permit go on Western the in stability

administrations outline the of core, and Such and/or the the or,

American in other

credibility States. with

resolve

reputations has been the Soviet as the the

instability assumed what the to became beginning favour

introducing which heralded policy, for U. S. political spread unchecked peace The of

known of Truman

Truman States' the based that

United stressed a world and other

President survival and the of

maintaining model, model to the security underlain of

economic Soviet

warned

countries of United

would and same

"undermine hence the had

foundations of the the

international States. "25

theme

Eisenhower and Truman

Administration's "massive Doctrine's stability, reactive organising "grave underlined needed strategic event of was

more retaliation. belief in

assertive " the Whilst

policies

"liberation" the centre-periphery the the basically U. S. lead "27 what give it, by in

accepting of feared would that saddle and

intertwinement and Dulles

Eisenhower nature of

containment on all

with to as was the the and

resistance budgetary, by the

fronts26 and war. policy social In

eventually

economic, Korean positive to "to the

consequences, their would also view, both

a more initiative aggression,

which and

West

allow

retaliate

instantly,

means

106

at

places

of

[its] at

own bearable

choosing, cost. of which, massive

"

thereby

producing Consequently, and to "roll in Third to

"maximum they opted for back" Eastern World. overthrow or of

protection advocated a policy the Europe, Therein governments otherwise, "international of the of

"28

doctrine expansion from its

retaliation, designed satellites in the

though acquired expression of covert promoting, claimed of

U. S. S. R. 29 it

newly

found took

concrete the form

operations

suspected what the

of

intentionally to be the Interests in support

Americans "30

communism;

vigorous and, most network at

efforts

anti-communist to establish defence external between clients of the was 1957. the East to or country included It was, of vital directly external controlled states

regimes; a world-wide pacts domestic of

importantly, of N. A. T. O. -style clients The and the that regimes and such that regimes emanating " a

of

attempts multilateral against link its

aimed

safeguarding 31 States of

and

revolution. the in the United words

presumed that of

security most evident This, existence to

Esienhower the in it U. S. the was from from term

doctrine considered Middle prepared internal "any which

in

effect, of

declared

pro-Western security, to protect by

American

intervene threats by with

inspired international close during stability bonds the

or

Communism, to the

32 U. S. S. R. era that its of the most the

nevertheless, centre-periphery in National the

Nixon

linkage forceful President of State,

received and efforts

expression and Henry to his his

views Security As Nixon view

Adviser-come-Secretary himself of the reaffirmed importance in of

Kissinger. Administration's

reference

107

Vietnam the

in

terms

of

the

impact

of of

peripheral U. S. stability,

developments

on

centre

and the

maintenance

North like Vietnam, In that the one country event the technical with most modern assisted massively is Communist by to two superpowers... able weapons it, invade and conquer you can country see how another be in the countries repeated other pattern would in Europe, the Mideast, throughout the world---in and hand, If, kind in that on the other others as well. in Vietnam fails is stopped there, and of aggression in other it be discouraged then the parts of will directly is it then, Putting what on quite world. Vietnam, for but is not just Vietnam line in peace in Europe, Mideast, in the peace and peace not peace immediately but just for the ahead of us, years What is really in the future... for time possibly a long United is the here... the line the of position on free States... the power, world as a strongest as 33 in the for force world. peace constructive Underlying stability Administration's with These the credibility were considered of of of were "34 of the the this of new the emphasis periphery and resolve as Nixon vital Doctrine. stability balances of in the of on the and overriding image of the link centre between was preoccupation United States. to sought through power the the the which, structure the failure upheld such in overof both as terms the the

continuing and

prerequisites This

implementation preservation maintenance in of turn, peace.

centre-periphery and the regional basis mainly two

global to form

"emerging to the

Conceived previous in global in with instability However, as a last to the the

reaction and Doctrine to which and regimes

extension direct the political of view

decades this

intervention long-standing change

Vietnam, perspective Third Soviet in whilst resort, local client not

problems, was the seen

World Union,

competition that

established favoured the of to a two-

U. S. S. R. 35 indirect maintain and,

ruling direct

out U. S. it

the

options

intervention advocated

commitments

clients,

108

5

tier the these the U. S. powerful

system stability tiers

of

balances of the

and periphery the

restraints and

designed centre. of

to The

preserve first of for power to or assume quo in the tier issues

involved of in state for behalf of the such the of

delegation regional or as to Israel a

responsibility of

maintenance clients

existing region

balances local who of the

"policeman" would status The

responsibility area consisted as regional on

preservation the of United

States.

second such of

a network instability like stability that the trade

"linkages" to other control

connecting aspects

superpower so this as way,

relations, to it of enhance was thought

and by

arms

negotiations, means. lured the by West, and vivendi, other quo, In the

non-military Soviet Union, with destabilization

prospect would co-opted, the words, it that soby would may the be

wide-ranging from into "new it from at of the if the this an

co-operation acts of

discouraged instead, called providing refrain arise centre was For

American-inspired order. a stake advantage of America's system resolve be of in "36 the of

modus In status

legitimate with taking outline two-tier and were to

opportunities security balances of by have the these area. and United

At restraints

credibility stability regional credibility in behalf. its So, convinced were

images

States. then

maintained had its to

means,

America's in the

proteges of willingness too, of to

absolute to to

confidence them intervene actors clients and, on

commitments and ability

ultimately, their have if

would the be

revisionist commitment from any

regional to its

to these

be

U. S. deterred

actors

misdemeanours.

109

Most penalty at the A victories

importantly, for encouraging

the

U. S. S. R. or taking

had

to

be

certain of

of

the

advantage

instabilities

periphery. series in of events and which Vietnam, war, the in the fall included the Soviet the of the the communist and allied

Cambodia in the in

interventions Cuban and doubt resumption responsibility shift the was form intervention the on Soviet the

Ethio-Somali Angola,

Soviet-assisted Shah inevitably and a led to in Iran, cast the

intervention efficacy by for the the in of

Afghanistan Doctrine of the The of latter of the period a

Nixon States of

United stability two

more

direct This

periphery. first of so-called of the of these

manifested of the

ways.

took "Rapid Carter staging

establishment during and the such the creation as Egypt, to

Deployment Administration, posts and the in

Force"

string Bahrein, Force

countries Arab instability East. consisted

Kenya, enable this

Somalia, to quickly in direct at at clientin civil wars subvert 37 by the the the rebels the in

United to

Emirates which The of second

respond the posture ousting the Middle

threatened arm of the covert

U. S. new,

interests more

both

overt allegedly them

and

action instability

aimed

governments periphery It in and also order

which replacing

promoted with of the

pro-American intervening

regimes. conflicts America's the radical

consisted to determine Hence of and the Jerry military in Libya, left the wing 110 an

outcome

of

such to

favour. regime economic administration regime in

abortive Rawlings pressure effort covert aid

attempt in

Ghana, employed

incessant Reagan Gaddafi fighting

to

destabilize to and

extended 38

Angola's

government,

interventions The potentially has meant

in relative

the

Chadian paucity

and of

Lebanese Soviet

civil

wars. or Eastern even of

clients outside

Soviet-inclined that less has recently, could the do for the of the there in order of with notion

regimes of

Europe stability

centre-periphery for In the any little safeguard area. States of was For since Soviet

constituted than quite it

a preoccupation United was to its the on States. relatively credibly security United behalf it

Union until the resolve whilst 1945 clients it and

case, that its

U. S. S. R. image has has since that power it at on

periphery globally

competed indirectly at

intervened least the

threatened only to in project own U. S. S. R., of the

mid-1950's, acquired the outside that be

1970's military

actually long it before

means its the

distance is arguable to suffers that live up

surroundings. which equal in'the has weight balance or the case aid in to where, has

Consequently, for to of the long

claimed States,

a superpower a disadvantage due claim to by its

United

resolve

with to clients. East, Union the

country to its has major to the

inability to the

unwillingness of the the in important Middle Soviet contrast, much

coming been

This an area well of as

repeatedly strategic United to

importance States its own but clients

as

latter's

commitments 39 has

carried

greater the defend the

credibility. U. S. S. R. its

Nevertheless, proclivity position its war much with to at firmer Israel,

exhibited and has to

an

increasing its by 1973 in

commitments This for Egypt

consolidate demonstrated during the the M. P. L. A.

periphery. support its

been Syria for

and

decisive

backing

111

their aided African

war

against by 40

the the its

F. N. L. A. American

and

U. N. I. T. A. and of of that

who

were by and during of

being South its its its

covertly troops,

C. I. A.

directly Ethiopia country in support Indeed, was the "a

co-optation on behalf

subsequent war with

intervention Somalia, and

its

intervention in of Afghanistan. its periphery

beleaguered concern the and of which way of over

client-regime the hope in stability that

Soviet in

evident, recognition

Kremlin's enactment rules erect those from to for

detente

would documents

usher of

international and and to fair a moral

kind

of countries, in was

code

honest a legal given its use

relations and political

between

barrier 41 It United the

the also

military.

gambles..., with lever to the

evident efforts

disenchantment detente as a

States' Soviet

prevent

Union practice general standards although that detente relaxation conflicts qualms warning

from which

coming the

to U. S. and

the for

aid long

of

its

clients to be vital

abroad, for its

a

claimed images.

credibility in it it this

resolve were clear any

Washington's proven. of a "will

double For occasions policy react of if local had few about U. S. bilateral

respect

unambiguously

had made it "will resist weaken of in tension

on a large to "

number

attempt alliances,

exploit and to

to

our is

used

as a cover trouble spots,

exacerbate 42 it " Cambodia linking of

international its 1974

during the in 43 of

"incursion" and with China the

into against development

U. S. S. R. that country Hence 'antidetente'
interlinked.

behaviour relations. policy
profoundly

Ponomarev's and

comment

that revenge

"the are

neocolonialist The problem for

"44

the

U. S. S. R.

112

was at would the of

that the be United detente

whilst periphery unlikely States. as and of and The the

it

could to to

certainly

couple relations,

American such a

behaviour strategy

bilateral have This the is

desired because which

effect the

of

restraining conception Soviet the by of achieve asymmetries By the the its east same Soviet major Asia, the

American to moderate

a

lever thereby, U. S.

with

activities stability uneven power. ends which token, Union. political retained status military The recriminations, its demise, as

theoretically, periphery nature of had exploitation the two was United countries. not possible had the thus been

safeguard underlain

irregular United the

development hoped of to the

Soviet its

States adroit

through existed however, For and an

between the whereas reverse the

for

States, setback in

despite south the

psychological impressive panoply was

of

power,

U. S. S. R. 's on its

a superpower 45 of as is of

based

almost

completely

capability. passing

detente power the and for of

amid sought best the

mutual to blame illustration relevance

Soviet-American the other of of security political in oncoming to the of the for the

each perhaps

persistence and/or nuclear the

bipolarity change The failure have

territorial ages. "Second Cold or during during of this

superpower detente been taken the and

the

War"

often turn Indeed,

attributed by Soviet of

"aggressive" policy power degree to

interventionist the 1970's. period was as

foreign Soviet

growth by an

accompanied the the U. S. S. R. stability

unprecedented the means

assertiveness and consolidate

acquired of its

preserve

periphery,

113

in since at in one fact

much 1945. the many pursued that

the

same Thus, of

way the its be

as

the

United followed area as

States by during a "mirror the postwar

has the the

been Soviet 1970's of

doing Union can, the The its own its of the

course security described throughout found

outline respects, by

image" period. to illustrate nature

the

U. S.

Washington so as objectionable it

this does the and not

similarity so much

behaviour hypocrisy Soviet-American of the

demonstrates global rivalry thesis

supergame the

continued it.

relevance

balance

of

resolve

within

114

Notes
International A War: theory of Peace Aron, R. and (Weidenfeld A. B. Fox and R. Howard trans. and Relations, 779-780. 1966), London, Nicolson, pp. Press, University (Yale Arms and Influence T. C. Schelling, 1966), London, New Haven p. 94. and Crises: International " Bargaining, "Crisis G. H. Snyder, (Free Hermann C. F. Research, Behavioral from Insights ed. 1972), New York, Press, p. 233. Aron, p. 544. cit., op. 220-221. Snyder, pp. op. cit., A Theory the Game': the 'Rules on "The J. M. McConnell, of Soviet Naval " Diplomacy, Naval Superpower Practice of Press, (Pergamon J. McConnell B. Dismukes Diplomacy, and ed. 1979), New York, p. 242. Nations: Among Conflict Diesing, P. G. H. Snyder and in Structure System Making. Decision and Bargaining, Princeton, Press, University (Princeton Crises International 1977), New Jersey, p. 462. Ibid., p. 458. McConnell, p. 245. op. cit., Ibid., 245,248-249. pp. Ibid., p. 244. Age Atomic in the Politics International H. Herz, I. 238-239. 1959), New York, pp. Press, University (Columbia 239-240. Ibid., pp. Conflict " International Conflict, "Fractionating R. Fisher, idem Papers The Craigville ed. Science: Behavioral and 91-92. 1964), New York, (Basic Books, pp. Also p. op. cit., 55,56. see Aron, Schelling, pp. op. cit., Fear the Threat: as of War American The J. L. Payne, 774; Company, Publishing (Markham Policy Foreign of an Instrument Weisband, T. M. Franck 127; and E. 1970), Chicago, p. esp. Superpowers Among the Strategy Verbal Word Politics: 1971), New York, p. 120. esp. Press, University (Oxford The Politics Also 232. see O. R. Young, Snyder, p. op cit., (Princeton Crises International During Bargaining of Force: 25,35. 1968) New Jersey, pp. Princeton, Press, University pp. Also op. cit., 681. see Schelling, Aron, p. op. cit., Order, Force. R. W. Tucker, and Osgood 55,56; R. E. and Y. 1967), Baltimore, Press, p. 148; Hopkins Justice (Johns Tel (Ma'arachot, Peace War and Nuclear Nuclear Harkabi, 9-40. Aviv, 1964), pp. " Snyder, p. 232. op. cit., Ibid. " Relations, Soviet-American Future "The L. T. Caldwell, of Superpower 1980's: in the Relations Soviet-American Diebold L. T. Caldwell Trade, and W. East-West Politics and 24-25. 1981), New York, Jr. pp. (McGraw-Hill, Ibid., p. 25. The "Rules of the Game" of Superpower N. Matheson, Quoted in 1975-1980 World Third in the Military Intervention 1982), Washington, p. 67. Press (University of America, the "Bipolarity, and Rosecrance, multipolarity, R. N. cf.

1.

2. 3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16.

17.

18. 19. 20.

21. 22.

23.

115

24.

25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31.

32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

Resolution, Vol. X, 1966, future, " The Journal of Conflict 314-327, p. 316. pp. esp. in International Relations R. The Logic Jervis, of Images Princeton, New Jersey, Press, 1970), (Princeton University p. 247. Foreign Policy Quoted American Since World in J. Spanier, War II, 8th Rinehart 1980), (Holt, 28. and Winston, ed. p. War Also Z. Brzezinski, "How the Cold Played, " was see Foreign Affairs, 1972, 184-187; R. S. October Litwak, pp. American Foreign Detente Nixon Doctrine: Policy and the and Pursuit 1969-1976 (Cambridge University the of Stability, Press, J. L. Gaddis, Cambridge, 1984), 11-14; Russia. pp. United States: An the Interpretive Soviet Union and the 180-188; 1978), History New York, A. (John Wiley, pp. Rapoport, Soviet-American Perceptions The Big Two: of Foreign 1971), New York, 9-10,84; Policy (Pegasus, pp. Since World A. B. America Ulam, The Rivals: War and Russia II (The Viking New York, 1971), Press, p. 114. Gaddis, ibid., p. 209. Ulam, op. cit., p. 211. Gaddis, op. cit., p. 209. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 187. The Central Intelligence U. S. the through endeavoured, Agency, least four covert operations at major against foreign Eisenhower Administration. during the regimes These Premier Mohamed the were of overthrow successful Mossaddeq 1953; in Iran in August President the ousting of in Guatemala in June Jacobo Arbenz's 1954; left-wing regime the to an undermine unsuccessful government of effort President in 1958; the Sukarno and abortive of Indonesia Fidel Castro's to against attempt a rebellion concoct in Cuba, during final the revolutionary planned government in but April term, actually months executed of Eisenhower's Kennedy Administration. See 1961, into three the months Geddis, op. cit., p. 219. Ibid., South This the of pacts comprised network p. 218. Formosa Treaty East 1955, Asia Treaty the of and of 1954, U. S. Baghdad the the Pact, which was with closely Americans had taken By 1958, the associated. on explicit defend to countries some 43 obligations against attack. Ibid., p. 221. Spanier, op. cit., p. 87. Weekly Presidential Documents 8, No. 19 Compilation of in Litwak, Quoted 810-811. (April 30,1972), op. cit., pp. 106-107. pp. Litwak, 95-96. ibid., pp. Matheson, 37-38. op. cit., pp. Litwak, p. 96. op. cit., Vol. Keesing's Archives, XXXI, September 1985, Contemporary p. 33829. See, February 2,1987. The Guardian, for example, Compare, for for instance the the absence of Soviet support Arats 1967 war, is at during the Kremlin the a war for which least the U. S. ' open commitment to with partly responsible, Israel, intervention its direct during on behalf of Jordan latter's Syria in 1971, the with conflagration and its other to the the substantial conservative regimes commitments of Arabian Peninsula.

116

40.

The U. S. in covert on behalf "Detente.

$32 million these with had provided at least groups intervention Cuban Soviet-assisted the before aid See D. K. Simes, took M. P. L. A. even place. the of No. 32,1978, Policy " Foreign Style, p. Russian of sary op. cit., of State 50. October the p. 50. Bulletin, Revolution, 1973, p. 528.

52.
41. 42. 43. 44. 45. Anniver 60th Brezhne v at the i n Matheson, Quoted 1977. Department Henry Kissinger, Quoted in ibid., p. 39. Litwak, p. 105. op. cit., Quoted in Mathes on, op. cit., Litwak, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

p.

117

PART II;

EMPIRICAL

ANALYSIS

SECTION

A;

INTERVENTION; ASSYMETRICAL THE KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

Until 1950, classical interest naval the Ocean, have asset been in port main the

the Korean example symmetry. of

outbreak peninsula of an

of

hostilities could area its its of have

in been

the

summer cited as

of a

uncertain to at Japan China, makers the to it as

superpower the Soviet of

Despite

proximity

Vladivostok, linking closeness by

location Sea Japan of

command the Pacific seems a valuable

passages and its

the to American

and

to

discounted the

policy

politico-strategic Indeed, the even by the United the

competition States' Soviet modest

between valuation

the

superpowers. of its own is it and belated and borne set

perhaps out about

Union's and

interests hurried line to way

in with

Korea which Soviet its

improvised a demarcation of occupation

drawing spheres hitherto

define and of by the almost northern

American and

in

Korea,

unplanned peninsula troops had which

occupation took most place of

southern one Korea. month

portion after

of Soviet

the

occupied

However, transformed States' were of

the the

eruption status of its

of of

war Korea,

on

June as far

25,1950, as in the seemed the

suddenly United Korea

assessment concerned.

secondary the period decision that might

interests preceding makers their

South

During American the possibility country

outbreak hardly lack the Soviet of

hostilities, about in

anxious interest

pronounced encourage

that

actually

Union consolidate peninsula. the Korea client regarding credibility

to

attempt, or

through increase

its its the forces by fears impact images, the

North influence outstanding and the

Korean on

client, the

to Korean

Nevertheless, North totally Korean overrun acute possible and resolve the

progress prospect forces American the thus the United rapidly U. S. that respond and of

made of a

by

advancing being

South Soviet circles States' and led to since crises

armed within on and for

generated the

substantially its become in intervention typical of As face variety success itself Korea the to and of

increased in of low the the or North the way

stakes in

war, the

a sequence

has to

superpowers

areas

uncertain Korean might, ranging

Soviet-American offensive the United from the began States, momentum to

interest collapse impelled of began regime the the Korea below peninsula event, as the Their of the a its to in

symmetry. in by the a

American of factors to the the

military commit North under the political 38th Parallel,

domestic elimination forcible of'the

political of the

pressures, communist of In North forces two a states. symbol

re-unification United managed confine Korea has Korea Nations. to save

auspices of

intervention entity

China to

and which

American into become in the

divided since South

presence increased of the

there stature United

ever of

strategic

assessment

States. of Vladivostok Fleet, the Korean which and which, its even peninsula serves as to the U. S. S. R., to as well

The especially the as Soviet to

proximity to

headquarters to its China U. S.

Pacific

closeness without

Japan,

a country

military

119

bases, greater Union was, aid

was

viewed

with and

apprehension political the United more U. S. S. R. and 11-sung by the in in to the

in

Moscow, to This

made the

it Soviet

of

strategic than however, extended of regime it was

significance States. the economic Korea Soviet

to

importance and military to penetration or behalf form of the

reflected by the

North deep in the

prior

outbreak of of the

hostilities of Kim

than

intensity on

intervention

chosen

Soviet

Union

North entity its

Korea,

even

when the serious

latter's threat

existence from rather of
of of be the the

as a political States being Korea
Union of in Chinese American North the

was under allies. of
the of the U. S. relative

the

United than

and a the
the Korea first

Nevertheless, the dispensability
inactivity occupation allies to that could the the

manifestation
Kremlin, face by the

North
Soviet whole

to
in

impending and its

explained, of of

instance, intervention.

with

reference Given

prospect presence

countertroops

on

the
in

Yalu

River,

and

the

possibility
would the that, pose

of
a grave

a

pro-Western
threat to the

regime new have

a re-united regime on the

Korea in

communist counted

China,

Soviet in the

leadership final

might analysis,

probability

the behalf

Chinese of
of on

would Kim

be impelled and

or save

persuaded the

to

intervene People's
Such to

on

11-sung
from

Democratic

Republic reliance a Soviet

Korea the

political of could Chinese only to be

obliteration. intervention been as a

a

expectation

save by

client-state apparent Korean by desire

have seen

encouraged instigated that

Moscow's the' North

not

having desire in

military to

venture, be embroiled

was with

underlain

a reluctance

a conflict

the

United

States

for

which 120

the

Soviet

Union

was

hardly

prepared Thus, the the shaped interventionary less by the by the

either whilst

politically, radically of the United respective forces. strategy primary context

strategically, differing States clients For in and

or mode the

economically. and intensity, Union have to been their determined than of was its was its its a and,

responses plight by of

Soviet to powers,

their

appear both the war

similar

throughout interest and As the far in the

was

their systemic

Korean

peninsula milieu States

interventionary as the United

crisis

situation. the overriding in its the the to

concerned, direct

consideration defence credibility fall of South of world military by other of South and

underlying Korea

intervention with is, that along lead towards and context tended of the

preoccupation fear, chain that reaction

resolve might security

images; produce area

Korea its war.

periphery a third direct

eventually, inclination reinforced systemic the duration nuclear to use whole,

The intervention

resulting was the on the a large them North Soviet of supportive the

facilitated and the to

factors milieu U. S.

within which,

interventionary favour War, the coercive without the the

Throughout enjoyed permitted the of

Korean over of Chinese This

Americans which

superiority a wide and range the

U. S. S. R. tactics

against undue in equally which allies, virtually Even in was as fear favour

Koreans retaliation. United international hostile , for backing

strategic matched

asymmetry by an

States

was political

environment Union United and its

generally witnessed, unanimous terms of

to instance, for

the

Soviet by the

Nations'

American

policies.

121

conventional area, Soviet its situation U. S. S. R. 's Soviet seriously situation. Korea States, had United strategic hostility was almost States. were, and the

military United States' to in

capability relative have been all

and

proximity

to

the

crisis the for crisis the by

inferiority more other served than aspects to

vis-a-vis compensated of the

Union superiority

seems

almost in effect,

which, regional operational hampered The on in as

neutralize

advantages. flexibility, by a highly of than on the other hand, was crisis Union the the war as tactical by United U. S. S. R. did the and the which ostensible Korea Soviet nuclear by recently Germany. to States credibly and or an it to for save which, any credit effort had its to to to a to in

unfavourable the those Soviet of

primary balance,

interests greater secondary stake the in the

terms much

of at

interests, Korean Union's restricted

However, were international this

Soviet

options of the in in alter were and to the the also a

enormously political by attempt status by aversion an quo the

environment U. S. S. R. 's by in North East Asia.

compounded

instance

implication forcibly options balance reluctance experienced Consequently, exploit allies prevent occupy rely Korea course, on its either them the the

apparent postwar restricted strong

adverse to war

strategic underlined only Hitler's unable

risk at the

the the Soviet

kind hands

of

devastation of was the

Union over their the initial 38th

local to from entire

superiority deter crossing Korean of

United

intervention Parallel Instead, in

peninsula. Chinese

prospect political Kremlin

intervention something nor

North of

from the

extinction, neither obtained

expected

122

since war.

China

had

its

own

compelling

reasons

for

entering

the

123

CHAPTER 5:
The American 1950's

THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS
the Korean the its Soviet States. to 1940's the and Sovietearly and by

significance global rivalry basically value to the

of

peninsula late

during from

derived

potential Union and,

geopolitical arguably,

geostrategic implication,

to United

the

Korea Far East,

in

the

spectrum

of

Soviet

interests

and

goals

in

the

1945-1950 with at in by reference that this time, to Soviet interests occupied could, of and a pivotal perhaps, Soviet during terms core. the the and 1 of a At former interests limited force in the the be political period goals place. best in

Viewed the Its Far East

Korea

primacy

respect the in World

described and strategic

assessing interests

importance the War II region in the comprises East Asia,

immediately circle layer nations U. S. S. R. Although this national colonialism generated concern The Japan. was for was in of

following which this of Korea circle, and only

concentric the outer colonial of the

constituted which South of an

India

were

indirect a powerful

nature. area, to from impulses Stalin's

communism due more

represented to the

attractions striving of the

of for region period, 2

Marxism-Leninism independence and than to to

liberation in during it, next The that

movements part

the which layer

Comintern was in the of the minimal.

concentric Soviet that,

circle Union in its

consisted that country

of

interest by the

illustrated

fact

despite

acquirement

of

124

Southern Kurile reward Soviet itself This States the

Sakhalin, Islands, for its

which which contribution further

was had

lost never towards

to

Japan

in

1905, to of zone

and

the in the Japan 1945.

belonged the occupation surrender ruled out defeat

Russia, Japan, in

Union on the

sought the of gave in Tokyo the

an

eve

of was,

Japanese course, the and

in by

August the status Council seemed affairs, permitting

prospect which, Allied

United on in to as the at

instead, Council

U. S. S. R. the Far

advisory Eastern

Washington. have accepted for

Henceforth, its example, Party and exclusion by

Soviet from

leadership Japanese in

evidenced Japanese systematic Of postwar in its

its to

acquiescence function from to without Moscow. the

Communist guidance much period circle in greater was of China

any 3

attempt

control

importance China, which

Soviet the Far of of were port a that

Union third

in

the layer

constituted in the

interests were given the

East. political country

Soviet and to

interests strategic the around compensate East, but

principally contiguity aspirations by the only Chinese

nature, and

U. S. S. R., the

Soviet offered fact was that not by in the of

partly facilities main part port of the

centred to in the year The Stalin's 1943, port from of under the

prospect for the

U. S. S. R. 's frozen for

Vladivostok, was also covered

Japanese-controlled respect was Conference into also on clear

Straits. from of a free evident the

Kremlin's approval, Roosevelt's intgrnational Soviet of the

interest during idea

this

Tehran making 4 in made

Dairen It May at the was

guarantee. insistence agreement

leader's secret

1945

implementation of the

Yalta

Conference

125

previous precondition 5 War. the to

February for Indeed, the at

concerning entry Yalta, of the the

Soviet U. S. S. R. allies

desires, into had they the

as Pacific recognized conceded port

a

Western in of

Soviet the

Union's

aspirations

China the

when

internationalization with part the being as of was needed for "pre-eminent safeguarded, well the to Soviet as strategic legitimize

warm-water of lease joint the of Soviet Port

at Union

Dairen, in a this naval

interests " to the the

Arthur

as

base,

Soviet-Chinese in Manchuria. and war with the thus 6

administration All pave Japan which American that the was Stalin

railways these

concessions in the

way the

participation of be a formal facilitated

against China, help of

conclusion hoped could of

agreement with friends. of was strong, Party, and and United were, which was use of the by the mitigated

persuasion the the in Soviet the

their-Chinese utility in of China a

However, granted presence ideologically running regime for Ironically, served than bases and the at by the conflict of to

long-term Union country

concessions by the and the long-

militant, by

autonomous between Kai-shek's provided interests Nationalist to Port

Communist this Party

Nationalist the support

Chiang latter Soviet a weak

Kuomintang, by in the China

States.? perhaps, more the best likely naval

regime tolerate Arthur.

Communists Dairen and

Soviet

A victorious, on of the other hand,

triumphant, could to Union full could to the be

powerful to

Communist demand the

Party, return

expected Chinese hardly

these the

facilites Soviet it

control, refuse of in

something view of the

which

importance communist

attributed 8

appearance

international

harmony.

Indeed,

126

Stalin Thus, of

seems sensing military

to the power in favour

have

recognized he

this decided the by to the it to

as to

a tip

probability. the balance and the the

inevitable, in China of to arms the

between latter over

Kuomintang ordering Chinese had delay the At to plant threat power the victory the was

Communists Army forces the the had time, strip Japanese Chinese East. Chinese the in which, until 9 in

Soviet

Manchuria most of the

turn and army, into

Communist from of

equipment and also

captured the entry

Japanese Nationalist established he the in

Kwantung armies firm his

Manchuria in in the

until province.

Communists the same

control troops of to the

ordered province order

Manchuria

systematically left any in by the

industrial whatever to Soviet

minimize might pose

postwar the of Far the of for but not met

government As it turned

out, Mao to

following did a fact of of war

Communists, ports

Tse-tung China,

demand that

return provided

Manchurian the

Sino-Soviet due 1955.10 to the

agreements outbreak

February in Korea,

14,1950, was

The in status Japan of

inherent and Korea in part at of least

limitations China within terms the as could Soviet of country far only

on

the have

pursuit served

of to

Soviet promote

goals the Its in the

strategic the warm was as II

calculations. water recognized the wrote have " late in ports by 19th 1895 a port Such

significance southern statesmen when, absolute free he and stipulated, for

Russian century of which a port, Korea) the is

back

instance, necessity open that during "must be

Nicholas Russia the on entire the

"should year.

mainland

(southeastern

127

and strip war to in Korea.

must of of

be land.

connected "11 It was ambition control with and

with had partly to of the the

our also "the achieve

existing underlain result

possessions the of

by

a

Russo-Japanese Russia's of of refusal dominance southern location Korea at

1905

which its and

moderate Korea "12

a position ports

warm-water peninsula's this in the factor Far

Coupled both of China Soviet

strategic placed East.

vis-a-vis the heart

Japan,

interests

The

political

and 1945-1950

strategic

significance

of

Korea

to

the

superpowers

Theoretically, rivalry, strategic period United peninsula to power only within communist the both China, American within interests the in China the asset bestowed States. owed in the potential to it To some the

in

terms value Soviet

of of Union

the Korea in

superpower as the a political

global and postwar to the the

immediate importance

with be of

a commensurate sure, its in this

context, to to the However, the itself peninsula had its

Korean

significance

contiguity

north, the

especially Yalu portion fold, but River. of China of the then

hydro-electric by 1949 not

complex was the state the

along

northern communist with the

secured become Party over to of its well Soviet a

victory

the

Communist of

Kuomintang. the Soviet and its military scope the

Nevertheless, Union strategic bases of region. and the location and United

proximity new People's

Korea

Republic with it as

vis-a-vis

Japan, placed as well

installations, States

Geostrateeic Strategically, domination of the Korean peninsula by

128

the equal

U. S.

or

the

U. S. S. R. to

would

have

been

of

more although

or

less its

usefulness to to the of to China the

either the two. probably

superpower, Soviet The Union division satisfied the and base and the made

contiguity importance along needs adjacent was whilst the

and

it the

of

greater country

latter Parallel superpower Sino-Soviet

of the northern

38th each the to

defensive part was

since borders power Sakhalin within

the of the

southern Japan. Kurile Sino-Soviet which

portion Thus, Islands, camp a of 13 and

nearest in presence a shield the

the

American with

conjunction of sort North of

Korea "defence

completed forward Manchuria, the the as Soviet

perimeter" the industrial of the as for either peninsula far of as North both bring the

provided centre China,

protecting political to of the east centre of Korea cover for Korean As

northern Sikhote a Western Japan. superpower in Alin

ports

mountains, served

preservation an advanced it over was the

South

entity

strategic necessary entire

Offensively, to to States would and the forces power give obtain gain a was it

however, control pre-eminent concerned, tremendous In door along industrial sea as lanes the case step the

order

position. the domination

United Korea

advantages of of Yalu heartland connecting Anshan, U. S. China, the

vis-a-vis it strategic would

China American

U. S. S. R. to the

hydro-electric striking and other to it

complex from the the such by

and of

within Manchuria, and

distance would

threaten centres Ocean bay. would

Peking and

important the Pacific

Tangshan, the

Luda to

improving threatening,

ability

control of

Bo Hai North

Equally open

American

domination

Korea

129

the

prospect front

of to

Chinese fulfil to

Nationalist Chiang topple

forces

appearing dream of

along launching regime

a

second a

Kai-shek's the Union, new the of

serious As to

campaign for the through the being

communist threat North troops of the that Korea

in be be along

Peking. posed

Soviet the

would would

China by and

conquest of American

compounded its border

spectre within of

massing naval also the port

easy North

reach Korea

of

Vladivostok. the of U. S. with

Conquest a potentially from the Soviet enhance it with the East easy Taiwan the to the angle, the

would for

provide gathering

valuable U. S. S. R. domination U. S. S. R. 's bases Sea, for and distance from with it

base

intelligence From

of

South

Korea capability the bring and

would by Sea Soviet expose of

substantially providing Japan forces Okinawa it port from since north South section upper more right would of and within and

offensive controlling would of Japan 14 the

advance China striking attacks

two

sides. to

Moreover, warm 100 water miles Thus, to Japan, over "between in the and that the

provide Pusan, the Soviet

U. S. S. R. others,

access which island held is

amongst

merely of Japan. Just of

Kyushu, the of Korea of and heinous at The the

southern-most Union the to already

Sakhalin island

Hokkaido, was the lower close Korean jaws

northern-most Kyushu, Soviet would Russian Soviet 15

domination put Japan

peninsula of the Japan. the

bear"---or, Union would point

Dulles' a dagger

metaphor, heart of and Union

offensive Soviet

defensive the by United

significance States

of

South

Korea was towards

to given the

the

and

respectively in these Japan

especial end of the

poignancy 1940's.

developments first of

The

developments`

130

consisted Supreme industry an the the attitude associate expansionism, wing alteration former,

of

a change for

in the

the

policies Allied

of Powers, This to from the the

General towards was

MacArthur, Japanese in of to

Commander and trade from

union the

activity. restriction by a turn latter. Union and

manifested

rehabilitation encouragement the which with increase this to prevailing tended military of left

accompanied of the Japanese and in policies as the conclude only United country. in April the siege to well apparent in the

restriction in

Given China

Soviet

to

industrial view of the

interests postwar unions, gave 16 of rise The the

influence

Japanese

trade

about-face concern in

in the

MacArthur's Soviet concerned 1949 would long-term in the to not Union

naturally as in China.

second Western with also and

development powers Japan provide naval in which for bases of only

readiness peace

a separate exclude States 17 of the leases

treaty but

U. S. S. R. of air, to this of

land, the

Juxtaposed that year,

establishment could

N. A. T. O. have attempt The leaderships by the

prospect an

stimulated to lay anxiety in

impression the Soviet within these

American-inspired and its allies. and was of the be trials tried of warfare, independent peaceful on imperialism Chinese indicated Yoshida as captive and a

Union the

generated respect of

Soviet

developments criticism

U. S. S. R. 's its its

increased that

government, war criminal,

demand sudden on

Emperor

Hirohito of

inauguration of

Japanese by the

officers Cominform's

charges instruction Party with

bacteriological of to the hitherto supplement assault

Japanese parliamentary

Communist tactics

a militant

131

and

capitalism, Soviet

in

the and

streets Chinese alignment

and

in

the over

press. the

18. possibility in the This

Most

importantly, of

concern was February of on in the any

a Japanese-American Treaty of aimed resumption state of that Alliance at of may "19

manifested 14,1950. Japanese part way of with

Sinowas

Soviet specifically and other acts the

of "the

revival

imperialism Japan or any in

aggression collaborate

Japan

aggression.

Political The on have the to the potential political quite effect and profound. stake country in Japan play also the light of scene. prospect to it bolster provided could impact could entire of of U. S. policies of vis-a-vis South Korea point by in general to it token, alignment significance few avenues in Japan. presence through might have Soviet been and to and through In of the of the Japan could view, moves Western importance Japan on and the

strategic From that an

status the was

been

American signified role the

increased make that

active

alliance of the South

theoretically Korea in

enhanced of its

proximity within same

possible political over have Korea the respect, power of to in the that the even

impact

developments By the

Japanese concern only South which this Soviet domination sufficient instil moderation line falling of

Soviet could of

the

U. S. -Japanese the one potential of the events overwhelming generated peninsula neutralist a sense pursue in the

served since

U. S. S. R. the that the

influence of the be Korean Japanese

strengthen Yoshida might

opinion of a more the United realism

government impel 20 it to

independent of Japan as a

Americans. deeper

Conversely, the arms of

event States

into

132

result the

of

Soviet

h egemony of the would balance

over

the

entire of

Korean Korea

peninsula, into the the way, to the

inclusion fold

southern serve in would

portion to the be

Sino-Soviet politico-strategic therefore, U. S. S. R.

somewhat region.

redress Either asset

South

Korea

a valuable

Initial

superpower

interest

in

Korea

1943-1945

The peninsula have the war of seems been period against the

strategic in fully leading Japan country the

and

political

significance competition Soviet of the

of

the

Korean seems during into division This the to

postwar

superpower by the the

anticipated up and into surprising for the final to the Soviet

leadership U. S. S. R. and spheres. the fact that, Japan the from which,

entry

subsequent and in view onslaught

occupation American of

hardly

as got United any in This

preparations underway, States significant effect, effectively establishing States may Korea China region between autonomous have at as power been the an was was it

against clear the that U. S. S. R. Japan preserve. the one

became determined role to left in the

increasingly to exclude of

running exclusive

postwar American with

become -the

an

Soviet in

Union Korea to

option United this option towards

of

a foothold in Japan. by and

counter-balance of

The the by the

attractiveness apparent fact base by Western that for the the the

boosted time alternative severly Kuomintang

laxity potential U. S. S. R.

of in the

power restricted and the

was the

ongoing and

struggle

powerful

ideologically

Chinese

Communist

Party.

133

The intermittent Soviet in spite

question

of

Korea's

future discussions

had

been from

the 1943 1945.

subject until

of the

Allied-Soviet entry of into the the apparent on the Pacific

War of

in

August superpower at no

However, and that any issue one, can a be

overlap

political time press during for the

strategic period particular of fact that the did

interests either or exclusive

peninsula,

superpower rights never of than which, way. future in

explicitly Korea.

Indeed, a contentious

country's significance in topic more of

future

became as will

be

seen,

interpreted The discussions Churchill the of course reflect "educated trusteeship the Tehran conveyed Declaration right Koreans 40 years, The constitute discussions that planning three the at

one

Korea's

was Chiang of

first

broached Kai-shek, 1943, the become

in and

between the Cairo

Roosevelt, Conference that, " the in latter " the

November "of

wherein

leaders of and

agreed Korea,

view

enslavement "in seemed first by due to be a in at the

people free ..

should The

independent. opinion " that

proviso should perhaps,

Roosevelt's in of

Koreans

democracy, the of great Korea's of

American-style 21 soon Soviet followed of

powers. future

participation when, year, of the that it that "

Conference to

November/December his its thorough contents, be "

that

Stalin Cairo was the

Roosevelt and Korea "all

approval and stated

should

independent, of

adding

would before stances the

require full

a period independence

"apprenticeship, might be and achieved. Tehran great of Korea.

perhaps 22 were to power Whilst

adopted basis the of

at all postwar

Cairo

subsequent future

concerning

134

the

consensus

over

the

notion may of have

of

a trusteeship

leading a sincere for the desire

to

eventual to lay the

independence foundations

represented

self-determination suggests because Union in and that each of

Korean in this

people, idea and,

tentative was achieved

evidence mainly the Soviet to own entire of the

concurrence the to a United manipulate

States the system the coafter is policies Korea policies in

especially, period in of achievement out each aftermath sought from in of its the

intended Korea

trusteeship modelled optation the borne which the

produce

political

image,

thereby into This superpowers its own

facilitate its own domain

peninsula

independence. of both in

interpretation by portion the of These political

case

them of the to the

pursued Japanese promote planning

surrender. sympathetic of the to priority the Soviet ways U. S. S. R. conclusive, may have

basically to forces However, been exclude

groups future

and those

country's the other that

with the accorded

a potential relatively to in Korea

affinity higher by additional of the

superpower. seems to have was period against to exploit plans lulling ambitions to on the

leadership during into these intended absence of Korea special the the war point to of by

manifested leading Japan. possibility the the the in opportunity part of up

several the entry by the afforded no

to

Though that

means

U. S. S. R. by for the the

apparent

the

U. S. into

occupation that it had

Americans the

thinking whilst in and the thus

no

country fill forces, If

simultaneously vacuum present such under the left the by the

preparing surrendering with have of the a fait

unilaterally Japanese accompli. at best,

Allies would

successful,

a plan

produced, Soviet

a trusteeship

supervision

135

Union as

and,

at inter

worst, pares.

a trusteeship

with

the

U. S. S. R.

acting

primus This

interpretation that concessions desire in Korea. on the the

of

Soviet

intentions

is absence

premised of intended to achieve Soviet

on

the

assumption for a

conspicuous in Korea of in was the view

demands obscure dominance political this

purposely U. S. S. R. of to the the

to

part

Indeed, of the

strategic Soviet

and Union, The

significance apparent indifference in

peninsula a little was

seems connection in the

perplexing. evident for Soviet Soviet Korea's leader aspirations, prodding" Stalin's ports. right

Kremlin's its Thus once spite by first during mention of

modesty participation the

this

from future. did not in

planning the for as to of

Tehran as writer

Conference, a candidate has termed sought

Korea one who for the the

what

"deliberate "stimulate warm-water the at discord the to the "saw Pacific. in was the which

Churchill

allegedly acquisition

appetite Instead, by Port Soviet Korea War eye' the

" use and the of

conversation of Chinese the

revolved port

around facilities of

possible Dairen between subject Pacific 'eye "24 respect again peninsula

U. S. S. R. 23

Arthur. Union was Council with The

Indeed, and the

absence powers

Western by

over report

illustrated in him on which all

Roosevelt's claimed problems Soviet by Stalin that

he major of

Stalin the

to

of

impression was given

disinterest at Tehran occasion, the list Averell

of in

Korea evidence failed submitted regards

that in to to the

December obtain U. S. a

1944. mention

On that in to

Stalin as a quid

Ambassador the

Moscow,

Harriman, as

concessions

U. S. S. R.

would

require

136

pro of in

quo the the

for Soviet [Far]

its

entry leader's East the a

into

the

war

against "that

Japan. Russia's

In

view

insistence be generally

position as "25 that it this war

should

re-established War given stubborn of 1905, that

existed omission partly ambition Thus, Soviet Yalta omitted. first detected, suspicion of in some Korea. that 30 the years, Soviet the of hint

before seems resulted over the when into

Russo-Japanese little from suspicious Russia's 26 agreement in the

imperialistic

peninsula. the the secret war

on

the was

entry

of

the at

Union in

Pacific to Yalta

concluded was entirely that can stimulated in came respect first

February However, of

1945, it was

reference at the

Korea Conference over to the The with

the be

possible this the

Soviet does

designs not Allies Far East. talks seem at

Korea have time cue

although amongst intentions forms the In of details response

Western in the

Stalin's of to the the

private proposed American might his his foreign leaders

Roosevelt scheme suggestion long for of a as 25 shorter

on for

trusteeship president's last for as

trusteeship Stalin and he also would The

period conveyed expressed be Soviet no

to

preference approval troops opinion in his talks

period, view that

Roosevelt's on the with he the

there 27

stationed on

peninsula. topic Foreign "that Korea. could possibility division was

latter Chinese stated in

subsequently Minister Soong be

reiterated on June

30,1945, troops thoughts of his or

where foreign on these

there "28 be

should

no

foreign Stalin's

policy matters over

Admittedly, interpreted of in as political that

a reflection stalemate might be

concern the about

the of long

and brought

prospect by a

Korea

137

trusteeship into aired to be the at

period country. the correct, This, U. S. S. R. time

and/or But, and they in turn,

the taken

introduction in in to conjunction retrospect, carry further intended

of

foreign with

troops

sentiments turned a to different the view out

which, begin

have quite credence to achieve

meaning. that in the Korea. The intentions Soviet May make

lends indeed,

had,

dominance

first in Korea

sign came in the

of from

suspicion Dr. Chu Ministry the Korean to escaped

as

regards head Information, had to own the by the provinces had since the

Soviet of the on to it

Hein-ming, of

department 20,1945. use of

Chinese that of

He suspected Soviet the citizens trusteeship many in from during Korea, border the trained " Dr. of whom had

U. S. S. R. ancestry its from

plans help advantage. Japanese Soviet

manipulate These occupation authorities Turkestan "thoroughly administration. experience, prestige to the Soviet following Chu, of he exploit political of people,

period had been to

withdrawn more remote but into their

regions purge and Chu with of

in been Soviet

1937-1938,

incorporated feared the that

administrative and political the control suspicion by U. S. S. R. over of Soong Like in Korea

together their the Soviet trusteeship situation intentions his believed meeting that

military might to 29

sponsors, scheme in Korea.

enable

acquire A similar was voiced

towards with the Korean addition, by up to he two

Korea Stalin U. S. S. R. political also Korean on

June

30,1945. make use

would

Soviet-trained In

and believed divisions that

administrative these trained would in the

personnel. be supplemented

Soviet military four-power of

Union

which

would

be Thus, the

left he

in

Korea

after that,

the even

Soviet with a

withdrawal. trusteeship, affairs, was these and formed in

feared would a

U. S. S. R. that once the

achieve Korean of

dominance provisional the with trustee native would event, respect scheme division Union in to of did its

Korean

government states, communists have

under

auspices

Soviet-trained other Koreans of

personnel, returning winning may of

together from power. 30 in

Manchuria, In this the

a favourable plans

chance the by

whatever were

U. S. S. R. the which it is failure

have the led the of that had

had

forestalled

trusteeship to the

materialize, Korea. indeed own

a fact However, make use of of the

eventually known citizens and of whom that

Soviet

Soviet peninsula, some Hitler's

Korean

ancestry

portion

Soviet-trained fought brought form the alongside back nucleus

Korean the into of

military Red Army

personnel, against Korea Korean probability of trained to its and

Germany, came

were to

northern the North The Soviet-citizens personnel trusteeship that

subsequently Army. the

People's that Korean in own the

U. S. S. R. and Union does was

had other to

planned Korean manipulate in itself, than may also to its

to military

use

ancestry Soviet

the prove that have of had the taste. Korea

advantage in the Korea United

not, greater

Moscow's

interest After all, use

Washington. similar political Indeed, in great reactionary plans

States elements to

to

pro-American in the country

mould own

situation following 1945, on its the

belated U. S.

occupation military

of authorities

southern relied and to help

September deal

a other it

Japanese extreme

personnel, right

collaborators, wing Koreans

and

139

administer with reference

its

portion to the fill

of

the

peninsula. of preparation void an by this the

It

is,

however, which each be the and the or whole to it quite that the to

degree in of the Japan to made. no

superpower created relative the U. S. Soviet appears by

made the

to

military that

that

would of States whilst

defeat accorded can have be had

assessment United

priority Union to military the whatever a once did firm the not

Korea In

respect, plans a part fully opened for

contingency of to that in either been

a joint or the

unilateral of Korea,

occupation seems

U. S. S. R.

have

prepared for

exploit establish evident Americans The high American into within control plans that by the

opportunity foothold Soviet intend that Soviet some

might

be

Korea. began troops Korean

This to in

became suspect

leadership to land the

Korea. might rank within U. S. S. R. anxiety of to Soviet

possibility

peninsula was recognized of late the

amongst circles war the of for country, the

priorities time Japan. Department had led before the

entry by the

against State

Indeed, over officials

1944,

U. S. postwar bilateral in

prospect there

Korea

consider of

Soviet-American an effort to pre-empt the was

military its total

occupation domination of acknowledged did not For zones seem example, of Soviet Soviet

U. S. S. R. 31 military military the concern what operations of he action

Moreover, in Korea who, State

likelihood also

ground American share outlining _ military not

by to in

leaders the

however, Department.

regarded in that the

as Far

probable East, included of General not

MacArthur only " but "all

did of also

appear

worried and

these part

Manchuria...

possibly

China,

140

Korea. quite

32 free

In to of

fact, disclose Korea.

at

this that This

stage, they was senior

the had clear officers to

U. S. no from

military plans a meeting of the for

felt the held United their Soviet may have for his U. S. in an

occupation on July

24,1945, Britain, in entry the into as

between and Far the the East war

States, strategy Union's been Korea, American forces coordination offensive replied contemplated, Fearing Korea, set " up

U. S. S. R. in preparation

coordinate for In Allies' of staff, for of would General had near be the what

against of the Soviet it would the forces "

Japan. Western chief be

intended General

a probe the "if

plans asked the Korea making Marshall not future. defense first could military

Antonov,

counterpart to operate with against that the the "such and "an the

possible shores that

against Russian peninsula, amphibious particularly last-ditch general in Kyushu, when July 26,

to

which

operations not in the Japanese it which and

been "33 of to be

embittered American

thought from Soviet "[t]here or for

necessary Korea American was no

airfields 34 met for was troops the again ground not would meeting, "areas " of

controlled. officers any for ground During demarcate naval Japan to it forces, across zones it

Thus, on

discussion (in or

of Korea)

operations that Korea

occupation Soviet immediate reached on

expected enter

either in the

American future. lines air tip according since we would "35 to and of

agreement operations "ran generally

was for the

respective the northern

which

from "36 for

extreme "[n]o lines

northern were by in our set

Korea. up military "37

However, land leaders operations that

Truman, was not out

anticipated operations

carry

Korea.

141

In Union and

spite

or,

perhaps, the the military well as in 10,

because Potsdam against

of

this,

once

the on

Soviet August 8,

formally thereby upon

endorsed entered its as

Declaration Japan, against Amphibious it

war

immediately forces took Soviet the By a the to Soviet

embarked in

campaign Korea. and the north Korea of surprise, of the on

Japanese landings day captured 38

Manchuria in Korea with base time, the

place marines, naval that fact

on the

August support in

the

following Fleet, the in not

of the

Pacific of

of

Rashin of

peninsula. Soviet only also

most rapid

northern

was which but

hands, took served in

accomplishment by

Americans emphasize strategic The military demarcation commanders line it. on 39 the whilst This night

completely the

significance

peninsula

considerations. response advance line could their line of with Inchon necessary force of in in of the United was 38th the States hurried parallel, surrender did in the so U. S. to the rapid Soviet of American of north Department with sector as the the the this of a

Korea the the

improvisation so that south to War the

near take Soviet was August a view and to

Japanese counterparts

worked 10-11, to

out

without in

consultation the American considered United incorporated

U. S. S. R., ports minimum occupation the the draft surrender of

include which

Pusan sustain

were future then

any It was 1, the

States' into for for leader and request

Korea. Order No.

General of 40

Allied sent the into he to

document Stalin

Japanese Although of the

forces, in his of

and reply

consideration. made American no

Soviet Soviet did

mention sectors

division the 38th

Korea

along

parallel,

that forces perhaps he Korea, northern

provision in still

should northern

be

made

for to

the a Soviet

surrender

of

Japanese Thus, Japan, southern to the

Hokkaido for United content to an

commander. zone in over power

hoping accepted

occupation States confine

tacitly 41 and part

control Soviet

was of the

peninsula.

Division 1945-1950 The Americans not were also made

and

consolidation:

superpower

policies

in

Korea

U. S. S. R. 's with come for the the under the task

drive of

into ensuring sway,

northern that at of of least the the

Korea southern until trusteeship peninsula to have ever the to them the at that be

landed Korea arrangements

the did

Soviet

implementation division occupation of

scheme. into doomed, coming U. S. right into

However, and from Soviet the

tentative of the If the

spheres start,

seems that

prospect original the exclusive and

scheme of period each of of

operation. was liking, over afforded defensive forego dominance pre-eminent expiry total more or of the the the to

intention trusteeship control

superpowers their exercised peninsula least they their would through such the of a own

manipulate then the

northern them needs. offensive over the position the

southern of

portions satisfying implied would But be

opportunity Admittedly, advantages entire could

this that

gained that after certainty have of

peninsula. never period

given

guaranteed the might

trusteeship over than one the over by the

anyway, of Korea

domination attractive

half

appeared complete the

uncertain the entire

possibility peninsula. and Soviet

partial

hegemony pursued

Indeed, occupation

policies

American

143

authorities spirit supposed "democracy. ensured control of Korea political the of to " that the

in the

their

respective scheme or in

zones which,

were

hardly after all,

in

the was in

trusteeship

"apprentice" Whilst communists, administrative the United

"educate" Korea

the the

Korean

people subtly

northern especially

U. S. S. R. ones, southern Government suppressing

pro-Soviet in Military about it disapproved. policies of the to with in the which practice for the

would part in all

apparatus, States went which of in of the to of the

peninsula

(U. S. A. M. I. G. I. K. ) activities Although the with tenacity

Soviet view peninsula

in strategic

northern and the

Korea political rationale States principle, of

is

understandable significance underlying

U. S. S. R., the if the

readiness abandon,

United not people in in share with to state a in a the an U. S. basis to of be to part in

seemed the in

prepared notion of more from of powers, the

self-determination American Basically, willingness process the of to by Soviet

Korea

favour is

a separate tenuous. an ostensible

client-state the switch to in Korea

southern American the other preference the south

Korea attitude

supervision great for of of as of in it a

independence notably dominance seems displayed the war against

Union,

exclusive the the country interest

a separate have the Japan of been

more in than

consequence peninsula outcome interests American reflected the Syngman

U. S. S. R. rather concrete of stage the was

entered pre-existing

assessment the Korea transience at of in the this the

Korea. in the Rhee

Indeed, southern

policy in

circumscription regime, and

U. S.

commitment on the

reluctance

144

of with

Washington that of

to

couple South

the Korea. with

security This the strategic to in

of

the

United

States to

disinclination of in for would seem, Korea the a

completely compounded States by which

identify the gave

Republic doctrine preparations which, it

was United total Korea

emergent priority war

nuclear-conventional did not The states U. S. S. R. of figure division has to very of

and

highly. Korea been to the This of the the and the into attributed spirit of Soviet to the and the American failure Moscow consisting and proposal provision for commands. recommendations on political of the which as the long, commission a given Korean and the basis parties unproductive, foundered party thus Whilst should opinion be for that their from from or be the clientof Conference of the the

commonly live 1945. up

December

gathering, U. S., Britain,

foreign Union, consulting commission purpose an

ministers formally the

Soviet (without a joint The for of and

endorsed Koreans)

trusteeship also two made

representing of this commission provisional with

occupying to make

was

all-Korean

government Korean a series

consultation groups. and over political eligible the United for 42 ultimately the criteria

democractic after

However,, sterile

meetings, to

according would qualify by that Korean "

group

"democratic" joint commission. of have opinion his Union which be and

consultation States "held any

freedom could the

respected or all against political

and the

that

own

trusteeship, and to with social trusteeship the Joint

Soviet

"insisted expressed excluded

organization should Commission "43

opposition consultation the provisional

consequently

government.

145

The was,

commendability

of offset

the

U. S. by

position the

in policies

this

respect of the

nevertheless, in

U. S. A. M. I. G. I. K. tended Union official for to at

southern the commission.

Korea stance In to

which, adopted spite the by of principle

in

practice, the Soviet

"mirror-image" the joint

Washington's of respect in basically groups United not way in for that the the the part U. S. the up the

adherence freedom part suppression for influence. of this of of of

at opinion the of those

that in

forum Korea,

American at this liberal stage and to

policy was radical accept if the

southern one and States intention, establishment of the of

peninsula independent elements The policy

support

most overall was to

likely effect, pave

a fully-fledged Thus, in one southern structure out been movement the country of of the

client-state first was that the nation-wide to set in 6,1945, convened Jurisdiction in the up wake a Seoul over fight acts to had

country. authority

of

military indigenous throughout movement occupation. committees capitulation, assembly national Korea.

Korea

by-pass sprung resistance

governmental the which peninsula had This all over and of these on

organized had

Japanese revolutionary of Japan's

September

representative and the formed whole a of

committees with to one

government According

writer,

Although Communists were members of nearly of these all (they the committees were only party with a nation-wide the themselves membership), committees contained representatives In important the of all groups. Nam Do, the by province of Cholla was headed committee 44 Christian a pro-American pastor.

However,

on

arrival

in

southern

Korea,

the

United

States

146

military Government" quisling Hodge, an was known military government pronouncements during Republic activities and of up the

authority and elements. head of

totally chose "45 the to

ignored make Hence, use on

the instead October

"People's of

Republic and General appointed Meade many United who "well States only to the When, People's its

"Japanese

5,1945, force, E. Grant

American which,

occupation to

Advisory a member

Council of the

according

U. S. A. M. I. G. I. K., 46 Five days

contained the to an groups. of the

collaborators., government in

later, itself

proclaimed Korea

be

the end "

southern of

and

urged

"irresponsible on November to dissolve Having 20,

political a Congress itself, outlawed capable the of

a meeting refused

Hodge the only

declared indigenous the

unlawful. organization

independent a provisional

performing

role took on

government, of a "Representative This Rhee, States, on the who was council, had of

U. S. A. M. I. G. I. K. Democratic headed by half right. and refused 1946, commission States with sector opponents the of Council"

sponsorship 14,1946. Syngman United based

February returned in the

recentlyhis It life was other to whilst were of of

spent the

over

extreme capitalists,

generally conservative associate Soviet-American reaching Korea the

landlords, and leading it. within in to the the 47

elements, themselves

liberals By the joint May

with

discussions the "filled 48 determination a client-regime by jails

deadlock, were being

United

rafters"

Rhee The

regime. clear up

of in

the

United southern

States Korea

government was to not, a in

to

set

however, fully-fledged

matched

a proportionate to its

willingness newly-established

make

commitment

protege

147

Seoul. Washington's creation dominated commission presented Assembly, so the

Amongst

the

early of in

indications responsibility Korea As in the

of for to the

this the

was formal

delegation of a United ground the in spite States upon Korea, at least the in to state

southern

Westernjoint Americans General in doing

Nations. a halt, of Soviet may have

U. S. -Soviet 1947 the the U. N. Although

September to

question of

Korea objections. hoped

United

to that

confer was seem to to

international emerge it in was longfor the On Temporary

legitimacy southern motivated term political,

client-state retrospect as much or the by it

would

that assume

a reluctance

economic, state 14, on the the in

military south Assembly accomplish of

responsibility the set its Commission in Canadian spite peninsula. up a

prospective November Commission Predictably, to enter

General Korea to

independence. permission of representatives, in southern in under victory, and declared in by the of division southern formal Korea of that the on strong

U. S. S. R.

refused and, and and decided

this

northern from as from the

Korea, Australian

objections as Korea, part of well it

moderate

leftist to The hold

groups an

was the of

eventually country Syngman

election

alone. Rhee, the as the

49 won U. N. only

rightists,

leadership December the Korea. Rhee 50.

a landslide General lawful in short

12,1948, Government This of north of

Assembly authority order

was the the

followed People's peninsula. political

establishment in Korea the

Democratic Hence, fact.

Republic the

became

a concrete

Having

gone

to

great

lengths

to

mould

the

political

148

situation forge conducive signs of a

in

southern

Korea in

to an

its

own

taste, that to

and was

thereby least

client-regime to one, the

environment began of Korean final its

United in respect of the the

States

show

increasing implicit Thus, as

ambiguity to May that 1947,

hitherto

commitment early American Patterson, withdrawal which concurred, be built his as

part before

peninsula. collapse of to of the War,

SovietRobert the in

joint called of United Army's adding up to

commission, upon the States chief that State

Secretary Department from

consider a proposal

forces planner,

Korea, General defence

Wedemeyer, force from should the 51 of

a South

Korean threat the

meet

whatever after later of

might

emanate

Soviet-controlled Patterson's Staff that States present which was when, "from las troops reached of defence to be stance in the little

north was

American by the Joint they

departure. Chiefs concluded the United

endorsed September of military interest in Korea. "52

a report standpoint

1947, security, in

strategic and in bases

maintaining This conclusion, upon terms

the

a political Korea that in

vacuum, a total (as

was war, well 53 time,

based in as As

the of was and these are even of doubt same

significance which thought Stewart circumstances, positions General the about time Japan of the

South of

country liability. at and the the

Taiwan) Joseph under islands By 1949, view cast At the integrating implicitly

a strategic reported "Okinawa,

Alsop

Japanese value. have an "54 inflated

equal,

if who of Asia

not

greater to

MacArthur, significance the as into he strategic was the

tended for

Western of the

security, Korea. of he

significance upon alliance

embarking Western

process system,

149

excluded he did by

Korea

from

the that

American the United

defence States'

perimeter. line of

This defence

announcing

through the fringing the runs of islands chain coast of Asia. It Philippines from the starts and continues through Ryukyu the includes its broad which archipelago bastion, Then it Okinawa. bends back main through 55 Japan the Aleutian Island Alaska. to and chain The of State 1950. Washington, _he before Pacific the areas went against initial and then him as by process the United Dean In of decoupling States was South finally Korea's capped statement National what defence Japan, security by of Press MacArthur perimeter the from Secretary January Club had in that of 12, in said the and other he areas the it the

Acheson's a speech basically outlining

often-quoted to the

reiterated the "the U. S. 's Aleutions, for the

including " Pacific, say that

Ryukyus, of Korea, these occur... to resist under

Philippines. in on the to military reliance upon of Although the the

As

military including can such people

security South

presumably "no person Should on the of "56 States for the to

guarantee an attack

attack.... must be

attacked entire world

commitments Nations. United

the

Charter

United the

did security it

not

wish of

to South

assume Korea, In a a

direct neither way, second one of the

responsibility was it prepared of

abandon assigned main the

altogether. to the was position the

Republic rate

Korea

was its

of negative

client-state; the

value strategic

denying the was indirect itself.

U. S. S. R. Korean this

advantages As far would help it as

of its only to to

controlling security assume defend

entire

peninsula. that that the it

concerned,

meant in

U. S. would

responsibility This status

contrasted

with

that

given

150

Taiwan, strategic on the

which

has

often as

been South was a

erroneously Korea. made clear statement his to country

placed Washington's by Truman to would

in

the

same

category latter's when, he aid not "pursue conflicts the by direct the aid and

position on his not and that January press give it

security in said or

5,1950, conference, "military would in of was the South

written that

advice" a course in indirect the

Chiang

Kai-shek lead However, of the whilst the massive to

which China.

would "57

involvement in United they of the case States were the and

civil Korea,

commitment fact that, even for a to of

illustrated

disavowing country, military security client-regime. or so million

responsibility initiated designed stability programme of for military Iran worth and June had army independence advisers and of

security economic the

Americans programme domestic This worth

consolidate their

external

newly-established a share in by 58 the Truman and approved of training before Up South level" army. to military South that 500 $27 on at

included aid the

authorized Philippines, assistance In terms in time 1948. to battalion South

October least between aid, Korea's country's American units charged Washington's finally and the the

6,1949, $250 July United million 1949

economic

1950.59 been for in were and

States

involved some August assigned

98,000-strong formal military "down with to

Korean and 60

regimental the task of ties January Korea Assistance.

sometimes the the

training with

Korean Rhee

military sealed on of

Syngman when an the

regime

were States

26,1950, concluded "61

United for

Republic and Mutual

"Agreement

Joint

Defense

Like

the

United

States,
151

the

U. S. S. R. 's

immediate

concern of

in

its

portion was own northern of

of to

Korea promote

following a political

the

capitulation environment into basically, the triumph specific the of

Japanese to

forces its

conducive objectives consolidation pro-Soviet Once into joint expanded force, the all, the withdrawal whilst

interests. Korea, and, this

Translated meant,

in

communism pro-Chinese

specifically,

over the

communists. the look any trusteeship slim with scheme the failure Soviet of industry, from to the is gain the an a ever coming of objectives armed the

chances began to

of to

operation commission to

make the of

progress,

include

formation heavy

competent and,

construction of it Soviet is

eventually, 62 into All in the of a all,

troops

country. insight

difficult of is clear

U. S. S. R. 's northern militarily politically However, the took making south

evaluation what

strategic that it

significance sought and, to create

Korea, and loyal in of the

economically client-state. contrast peninsula, to of keep the "that would doing of in with so, to the the as native

powerful,

above

U. S. A. M. I. G. I. K. Soviet low military as Government wings establish was Korean

policy authority possible, whilst within

in

"extreme use

care" instead

a profile

Korean Communist able to

simultaneously government control. by were local supporters under the its "63 reservoir installed figures of

ensuring councils In

the be the

the their aided who under

U. S. S. R. of as "

somewhat ancestry

Soviet office, nominal

citizens "often power, Union. 64 11-sung,

vice

ministers as was

presumably A government a

trusted set up

the

Soviet of

leadership

Kim

prominent

Korean

152

Communist One was land generated implication, influence Whilst in its northern own of a the land

and first

revolutionist acts to be

against undertaken one

Japanese by half this of 65 the a regime the

occupation. government existing fact and, of Soviet which by

reform 725,000 feeling contributed

which

divided landless

between a

peasants, for the

of

loyalty towards

entrenchment

in

the

country. the the consolidation made every of communist effort movement Thus, who win only Even in The Korea so, the in were to power promote at the 1946, mostly

overseeing Korea, proteges of those the

U. S. S. R. the Maoist Independence Yenan, Korean

within with

communist leanings. Alliance, to

expense members Korean positions those and Soviet of North Corp nucleus struggle had had been been the

of

Korean from new win of to the deepen

Communists in who did the

managed Labour

secondary many of

Party. ejected 66 in also

were

subsequently years. influence Party

purges by the

demotions Union

following its

attempt at the the

expense nascent

Chinese Korean which

Communist

affected the in Peace the

military was set force. up

establishment, by the Therein, during 1946 Union However, formed of Kim in U. S. S. R.

Preservation country as powerthose those who who a

armed

a fierce and 1947 the the

internal between war and Korean

developed in in the

Soviet

during when 1949,

China. was

People's faction,

Liberation with role. the 67 Amongst to the have degree

Army support

the was

pro-Soviet given the

11-sung,

leading

the

indications to the

of northern

the

significance Korea by the

that Kremlin the

seems was

been to

attached which

Soviet

Union

penetrated

country.

153

For in

this

purpose, with affairs.

the

U. S. S. R. specialists These

was in

aided military, were

by

a

large cultural,

embassy and by

Pyongyang

economic representatives According placed cabinet, of

supplemented economic ministries. mission including and the Ministry such through

of to one

several writer,

Soviet advisers Korean

from

this

were the

throughout the National 68 oil,

the

North Planning

government,

Commission, of came the more

Defence. and

In Soviet

some

sectors

economy directly

as

shipping joint-stock

control 69 of the

companies. measure Soviet to Democratic have the

Another Korea it set by the about the to

importance is the

accorded enthusiasm armed of

to with force

North which there.

leadership build a People's

powerful Republic

Although appear U. S. S. R., over training North

Korea pact

does with mission

not the of

concluded

a mutual a of

defence large which military was and of this

latter men, the and military. by an

maintained purpose to give

3,000

to advice

establish to the was

centres, Korean

instruction The work training were

mission

supplemented to which some 1946 of were

additional Koreans for the

programme to the

according U. S. S. R. 70 ground heavy their

10,000 and

despatched military North with guns

between In terms

1950

specialist 135,000-strong

training. Korean tanks, in

hardware, entirely and

forces artillery, arsenal. On troops securely

Soviet-equipped, self-propelled

T-34

included

71 the from within whole, the by country the Soviet the in time 1949, sphere the U. S. S. R. Korea withdrew was in the its placed Far

North of

influence

154

East. country, pro-Soviet positions. formalized "economic trade,

Not but

only within elements The on

was the

Communism ruling occupied ties 17,1949,

the party most

dominant and the of the a two

force state the countries

in

the

apparatus important were for for 72 U. S. S. R. in North United Whilst influence had been

close

between in

March cultural

10-year which

agreement provided

and technical

collaboration" and of as however, its not the regards credit Korean its

assistance, the certainty eve

arrangements. War, interests in South a similar Korea. its indeed with doing Korea to rate by Korea's that Kremlin that 7 will is now the

Thus, displayed Korea States the over its the that a

on

was

not, of did

reflected in in

assessment Soviet the real Union entire

interests succeed peninsula---if Americans

extending that were

Korean

intention---the the since kind, protege would

content of South

denying so. was give of its a United security. seems was to not of

U. S. S. R.

strategic the U. S.

advantages interest was not of in

Consequently, a negative Korean which of it direct

Washington the entail status

prepared a first

South status States As have reflected note,

client, the

the

assumption for South

responsibility out, the to greater North to

turned been in a matter

significance Korea its by the

accorded

a commitment to which

security 6 and

worthy turn.

Chapters

a

155

Notes

1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22.

23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

The layers to Slusser's four correspond of this circle zones Soviet interests in the Far East. See R. M. Slusser, of "Stalin's Goals in Korea, " The Origins War in of the Cold Asia, Y. Nagai (Columbia University Press, eds. and A. Iriya New York, 1977), 125-127. pp. Ibid., 125. 'p. Ibid., 125-126. pp. Ibid., 128-129. pp. Ibid., p. 132. Max Beloff, Far East Soviet 1944-1951 Policy in the (Oxford University Press, London, Cited in 1953), ibid., p. 25. p. 126. Ibid. Ibid., 141-142. pp. Ibid., p. 126. Ibid., 142-143. pp. Krasnyj in ibid, 52(1932), 12, n. archiv p. 76. Quoted p. 143. Ibid., p. 127. A. S. Whiting, Yalu: The Decision China Crosses the to Enter Korean the War (Macmillan, 1960), New York, p. 38. Ibid., H. S. Trial Hope Truman, Years 1946-1953 of and (Hodder 1956), New York, and Stoughton, p. 355. "A Militaristic Department Experiment, " State Bulletin XXIII (July in J. Spanier, 10,1950), The Trumanp. 50 Cited MacArthur War (Harvard Korean University Controversy and the Press, A. L. George, 1959), Also "American 25. see p. Policy Making Korean North Aggression, World " the and Politics, 211-215. January 1955, pp. Whiting, op. cit., pp. 35-36. Ibid., p. 36. Ibid., 125-126. Slusser, p. 37; pp. op. cit., Quoted in Whiting, p. 37. op. cit., Ibid; A. B. America Ulam, Russia Since The Rivals: and 19-71), World War II New York, (The Viking Press, p. 171. D. Rees, War (Macmillan, Korea: London; The Limited St. Martin's Press, 8-9; New York, 1964), Truman, pp. op. cit., p. 333. Foreign United States. The Conferences Relations at of the Cairo Cited in Slusser, 1943, and Teheran, p. 566. op. cit., Also p. 128. op. cit., p. 333. see Truman, Slusser, op. cit., p. 129. Foreign Relations States, 869. of the United op. cit., p. Cited in ibid. Beloff, Also 23-24. Harriman see W. Averell op. cit., pp. Elie Envoy to Churchill 1941Abel, Special and and Stalin 1946 (Random House, New York, 1975), 379-380. Both pp. cited in Slusser, p. 130. op. cit., Slusser, op. cit., p. 130. Ibid., Truman, 333-334; Rees, op. cit., pp. op. cit., p. 9. Slusser, op. cit., p. 132. Foreign Relations United States, VII, 1945, 872. of the p. Quoted in ibid., p. 131. Slusser, op. cit., P. 132.

156

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

Ibid., p. 130. Ibid., p. 131. States, Potsdam Conference, United Foreign Relations of the in ibid., II, Quoted 351. p. 134. p. Slusser, p. 134. op. cit., 1956), Garden City, 2 (Doubleday, Vol. H. S. Truman, Memoirs, in ibid., Quoted p. 135. p. 317. in Slusser, Quoted Truman, Memoirs Vol. 1, p. 383. op cit., p. 135. Ibid. Slusser, p. 136. op. cit., Ibid. Rees, 9-10. op. cit., pp. Slusser, p. 137. op. cit., Ibid., p. 139. United Nations: A Legal War and the T. H. Yoo, The Korean Desbarax [Anc. ], (Librairie Study Historical Diplomatic and Louvain, 1965), p. 17. A Colossus: World D. Horowitz, The Free critique of Kee, American in the foreign and war (MacGibbon cold policy London, 1965), p. 115. Ibid. in Korea, 1951, Government Military E. Grant Meade, American 59-62. in ibid. Quoted pp. Ibid., p. 116. in ibid. Quoted Mark Gayn, Diary, 1948, Japan p. 431. Ibid., p. 117. Ibid. Rees, 13-14. op. cit., pp. Quoted Years in Truman, op. cit., p. 343. and Hope, of Trial American Challenge to The R. E. War: Osgood, Limited 1957), Chicago, Press, Strategy (University pp. of Chicago 163-164. The Reporter's Trade August 30,1948. See J. and S. Alsop, (Reynal, New York, 1958), p. 125. 2,1949. March Times, Quoted in The New York Quoted in Whiting, p. 39. op. cit., War History Quoted The Hidden in I. F. Stone, of the Korean 1952), New York (Monthly Review Press, p. 20. and London, 7-14,1950, January Keesing's Archives, Contemporary p. 10450. 3-10,1950, Ibid., September 10-17,1949, and June p. 10221 p. 10748. W. G. in Quoted York Times. New Walter The Sullivan, New York, Publishers, Burchett, (International Again Korea 1968), p. 126. Ibid., p. 125. Yoo, op. cit., p. 26. Horowitz, p. 116. op. cit., Whiting, op. cit., p. 42. Horowitz, p. 116. op. cit., Whiting, op. cit., p. 43. Faber, (Faber 1950-1953 Ibid.; Korea: E. O'Ballance, and London, 1969), p. 24. Whiting, op. cit., p. 42. Ibid. O'Ballance, p. 24. op. cit., Rees, Whiting, 42-43; op. cit., p. 17. op. cit., pp. Keesing's April 2-9,1949, Archives, Contemporary p. 9914.

CHAPTER

6:

THE BALANCE

OF RESPONSES

The to can it as from plans was this the be was

responses outbreak described with the of

of

the

United

States in Korea Of Korea asset.

and on the

the June two to

Soviet

Union

hostilities paradoxical. that

25,1950, superpowers,

as

U. S. S. R. and that strategic whilst

seemed That had the

rank was

highest clear no

a political the for fact the

much

the

U. S. of

apparently country hoped once to entire left

made

military the to rapidly The hurried Soviet

occupation Union

Japan exploit Korean by the in and thus

defeated, opportunity by

evidently over the of the

achieve filling

dominance in

the

peninsula Japanese. drawing taking frustrated scheme divided relatively country having whole up

vacuum the United 38th portion

response line near

States oparallel of Korea trusteeship peninsula regimes,

a demarcation for ambitions. to materialize Soviet

responsibility Soviet failed between greater was again the in

the

southern Once and the the

proposed Korean client Soviet the

was the in the

and

American of the Whilst of decommit of South

interest evidence. possibility began to security association, embarked upon

Union United control

States, over the direct of Union

thwarted of Korea, for indirect

Soviet itself

from in Soviet favour

responsibility a more

the

Korea

the a programme and

enthusiastically North and Korea politically itself from into

aimed

at

turning powerful,

an loyal from this

economically client-state,, the angle, regime the

militarily and made no

attempt

to

dissociate Seen

in

Pyongyang. of war in Korea

eruption

158

provided influence coercion. hostilities, South United firstly, behalf to

the to

Soviet the To the

Union rest begin rapid

with of with, advance with gave the

a second peninsula the North absence

chance

to through

extend crisis stage

its

during of the the

initial Korean of the

of into

forces an

Korea, States to of provide the Thus,

together response, deter the Korea and American by

immediate

U. S. S. R. of Western once for its to the

opportunity, intervention on decided to

possibility and, secondly, support intervention manipulating

South air

the Korean its

U. S. client,

naval

confine level. superpower strategic have been

then-existing of have a direct provided which may

risk could offensive,

clash, cover allowed the for to

the the follow

Soviet North its of the the the the

Union Korean hitherto

successful during of the escalation

course. initial by ground Once Union conflict the respect, United the gave the this to

However, stage of

inactivity war so behalf the

U. S. S. R. danger way Republic to of one a of for of

the and on

reduced paved of

Washington intervention was pursue were affected, by effectively

American Korea. Soviet

options the to the

available risk the

the

manipulating reduced in

superpower containing In this

States-led stage-by-stage the U. S. crossed superpower the third

campaign

peninsula. of the Western to try each exploiting client. the well

progression more by new crisis stage took of than raising threshold in favour the war, one the

intervention to time circumscribe the the In fact,

U. S. S. R. advance a

chance stakes and of its

Americans ensuing during counterof the

when forces

Chinese-led to the south

offensive

communist

159

38th

parallel, to communist from Had would have during renounced it

the affect, terms the chosen been the the

Soviet through by United to aided previous division to the

Union crisis

could

have

used

the

opportunity fire on

manipulation, physical and its and South then set conflict and

a ceasepolitical Korean no by doubt the when

extracting States pursue by the stage of forceful that

concessions client. it

course, precedent of Korea the

Americans they committed country.

explicitly of the

themselves

re-unification

Nevertheless, geopolitical Soviet role virtually remained the States credibility The game within intervention, followers fluctuating As far as a in Union, throughout on the significance the the brink latter

in

spite of opted war. political its and

of the for

the Korean an Even almost

geostrategic peninsula totally North the to

and the

passive Korea was

Korean of

when

extinction, obvious the impact have identification which on

U. S. S. R with a Unitedof

quiescent, of Kim in and

despite 11-sung would

regime victory

Korea

probably

its

images

resolve. of that of effect, hand on the the the Soviet war leadership there did not to play take Soviet States their direct the military North and constantly means. Korean the place nonits

reluctance Korea the meant context in free goals their

a superpower gave to the

crisis. United

accomplish by

peninsula were

goals completely

concerned, changed of

military of writer interests the

venture strategic has once

Washington's South Korea could Korea. showed become

assessment As was vital one that if

significance "[w]hat

commented, considered

peripheral

attacked, could resisted. gained include, forces unification ultimately the revised

that undermine "1

victories

for

communism in the U. S. -led in

in vital

peripheral areas, military

areas unless campaign

self-confidence However, American the pursuit 38th parallel, Although to an of United war. end by as

momentum, first, north of of the

goals and

Korea

expanded of the communist

to

destruction and this the then

forcible

rewas

Korea.

self-indulgence intervention in to the a of

brought status of of the the Korean

China,

South States

Korea was

strategic permanent

calculations outcome

become

The

superpowers The responses outbreak with of to or

on

the of of

eve the

of United

the

Korean States in Korea

war and the were Soviet clearly in, and Union at the they

to

the

hostilities relative and to, With

variance degree seem seven United and and Korea. preparation hostilities from Korean

their

primary

interests significance

political accorded

strategic the the

which the

have so States

peninsula eruption taken of

over open

preceding the surprise directly in South of of

years. was over

warfare, by

apparently a number scale Union, on of

completely to of its intervene client exhibit to in the progress, in aid of

decided, on

stages,

a massive The Soviet or but,

behalf too, did prior

not

any

signs

anticipation once moves the worth war

outbreak refrained its

was

making client. The

any

mentioning

North

notion a surprise

that

the to

outbreak either of

of the

hostilities superpowers

in is

Korea more

came

as

161

interesting peninsula tension, indulged Korean of never that the the

than had as in been each

axiomatic. the of scene the and ever of

To

begin

with, rising southern

the level

Korean of

a steadily and of terms of violent it for Korea was the the war.

northern threats come to

regimes neither division was Korea of forcible a product Seoul the to as U. S. re-

provocations had the

Since the conflict was South

government peninsula, out was of most sight.

with

possibility In this in its

respect, call of This of wing order to

vociferous People's of the

destruction the much in in it

Demoratic

Republic country.

and as

re-unification of it on the was the increasing a means Truman its four of North he occupy "on it repeated call" on

precariousness of exciting right in commitment the Rhee two "firm

regime pressure to compel Korea.

Administration policy months and after Syngman within his

evaluate barely Republic defeat 1949, "can Korea defending were social Allied Minister, drive to Again, promised unify into march in

South

Hence, of army October his to troops defend than the

formal boasted weeks, conviction" three

establishment that "2 and his on

Korea, Korea

"could 7,

announced Pyongyang the borders along the

that " because be These during

within of 38th weeks

days,

Manchuria... Parallel... later

would "3 when, Supreme

easier

sentiments a "purely for the

three General Captain the Korea, take

MacArther, Sihu readiness saying Pyangyang message 31 to that

Commander Rhee's armed are a strong few days. people, territory" own

Powers, declared North up and

Sung of

Mo, his

Defence forces to enough "4 Rhee and strength"

"[w]e

within to the the "by

a New Year's on December and

Korean lost our

"regain Korea

southern

northern

162

during that 1950, situation, supporters became Secretary Rhee measure, this Korean discuss The matched northern albeit 1949 force Peninsula repeated city artillery, bombarded. signs Korea, been of

the the in

oncoming hour the as during of face

year,

5

and

two was

months

later 6

he

announced By political of his Rhee American sure "8 that One at North 11 to June

unification of a

approaching. domestic decisive

deteriorating by 30 the

demonstrated the May warlike, Dean

defeat elections,? so was of that quite 1950.

general so much "never attack

increasingly of did not perhaps was envoys unification. Republic by no of less the State

Acheson the South and been Red

provoke of the

Korean possible sent to

regime's murder Seoul

desperation of on three June

time

arrest had 9

who

Korea's bellicose These across

warlike deeds mainly the invaded 38th

verbiage on the

was part of but

more of

than its

counterpart. minor, North and forays Korean succeeded until in August. was in May more the

consisted parallel, Korean parts of an time,

frequent, in June in Ongjin that was

forces in

South

territory the

retaining

following At about the by the

month, same

act the

southern and again growing by but North had the almost

Kaesong and 10

attacked 1950 serious, and

communist same however, for was fully city were

infantry was the

Much

of of

mobilization which the silent of hostilities. as alleged Rhee ability regime in

preparation Seoul days

war aware

in the

strangely

immediately Thus, ironically,

preceding

outbreak simultaneously about their

and

his to

associates occupy Pyongyang

were

boasting "within a

163

few

days,

" of

South the respect These

Korean United of

officials

began on

disclosing Korea and their reputed

to

members anxiety intentions. public 14,1950.11 January "the mature, would May be "the in

Nations North

Commission capabilities were by the

in

Korea's

disclsoures published

subsequently on

made September that in

a report This 1950 the

Commission for instance, of

report

reveals, Army's North

South plans of was action. of the in in

Korean the only "12 the

Chief

Staff

feared to be they that in to on the a

aggressive and put that

Korean of

authorities time reveals was drawn before

it

a matter It further

into

attention made by

Commission" Korean he Defence

statement 10th troops that That meeting of Staff of

South which force danger

Minister North Parallel the a

that were

month moving

declared the

"that 38th from

Korean and North. 13

toward of

there same

was

imminent was

invasion when, during

message the and and build-up

repeated the chief

subsequent Chief gave to the at an 38th least U. S. from the superiority the U. N.

with

Commission, his detailed of army's

South of "

Korean

Deputy

intelligence which pointed on were additional clear to

"important extensive parallel. partly military South Commission of the North South. 14

information, forces these desire Korea. of Staff's and military clear he may be from to and

equipment

Undoubtedly, by for the South

disclosures stimulate This was

motivated aid Korean on Korean 15 aircraft "May and It

Chief the

emphasis quantitative equipment Rhee's were

qualitative and also

weapons was which, June "16

over May urgently

those

of for

appeal

combat because of our

claimed, the crucial

needed the life motive

period this

in

nations.

Neverhteless,

ulterior

164

should and must,

not predictions therefore, Admittedly,

be

allowed turned have having ceased, to

to out been

blur to based

the be

fact

that

Seoul's accurate

fears and

surprisingly on sound alarm 10, to of evidence. bells, draw the

sounded after

the May

the any

South further

Korean attention or had respect has to

government either the

developments of its

north military

38th of

parallel which in one it this writer

inadequacy frequently all the the

arsenal, Its because,

hitherto seems

complained. more Rhee striking was the the

silence as with a

pointed far

out, more

regime than far

faced

political which support that weeks have advanced continuing Union under

problem was the "the South

serious of with how the upon

military United States However, the

problem, would the or calm so

question in war

North. Seoul of

"17 during

suddenly prior concealed North supineness the to

descended the from Korean of

seven could

outbreak the

hostilities the for by war. and in view the of

hardly well

superpowers

then

preparations the United States

The Soviet their

circumstances, with a matter quiescence Korea devious along that can be or

especially the that of

respective regimes is,

associations therefore, The war and in

protagonist deserves the United to further States

Korean

investigation. on the eve of of the

attributed manipulative

a combination misinterpretation In officials and, the prevailing build-up, as this

genuine of

developments would seem

the whilst

38th some

parallel. American intentions of

respect, might a

it have result, or

miscalculated misinterpreted the meaning of

Pyongyang's the the significance North

tension others

Korean

military

165

may

have

wanted in order

to

encourage to force

or

even

provoke of in group, for the to the the

a the

communist Truman East.

invasion Administration's Thus, of quo from war in

a re-assessment and of commitments the latter

policies the Korea perspective would be

Far the

eruption a Status in and sense,

the

catalyst to

changing authorities strategic In this

which,

though was interests these seen

acceptable as of the detrimental United

Washington, political therefore, with the

States. were completely

revisionists

identified

Rhee

regime. the the existence 38th of peninsula credence course on the to of one parallel hostilities appears to more of a steadily during in to the rising year or the level so prior overall of

Despite tension to the along

outbreak on to likely Thus, Korean the lend

Korea, have been one the the was

situation ambiguous the states. North and nature indicate probable future. military known extenuated had the called the -never to most

sufficiently of Korean of

than between

assessment two capability acknowledged was was of such

events hand,

whilst Korea

forces

invade the

South 38th

their as

activities to give outright to begin be

along cause for

Parallel there not

a to most

concern, was by

evidence the

that option To

invasion chosen

necessarily in the North

Pyongyang the

immediate Korean was

with, along

although the border its the

gradual with South

build-up the by United the

Korea was armed right This but ready

States, fact out of that their hostilities of full

seriousness North Korean plan, June 25.

somewhat forces up to plan when for

carried

mobilization on 13 to

commencement for war the began

preparedness only six

15 divisions, had been

divisions

166

combat. force, rather invasion to

18 North

Moreover, Korea may

given have equipped

the

absence to

of

an

effective officials a full-scale

air as

seemed to

American out

inadequately at that the was guerilla and more time.

carry these

19

Together, held to by try many to

realities officials its

served that objectives political force. 20

reinforce

view likely and

U. S. obtain warfare,

Pyongyang through pressure, Such defeat three a view

psychological than have been in the via overt

intimidation only to prior at and left As raised a regime

military by the

could

underlined May 30 of the ruler has 210 with pointed why soon

decisive

delivered weeks

Rhee to the

elections---merely war---which seats only 45 out, Korea in gave the

eruption 128 Korean writer of

independents legislature supporters. election want within doubts the to 21 results attack into may Security against North 23 one have

least the one

assumed these should from These of only Nations southern perceived of South States'

doubts which to

as might

to

North be

transformed 22 boycott the

willing been

negotiate by time to the but

unification. the Soviet removed the invade least, Korean by war war. official from would be the and the invasion United its As United its

strengthened at attempt should that

Council any Korea

which

obstacle against counterpart. improbability Korea obsession failure pointed military the next

mobilize latter not

Last of an outright

North

was

doubtless at the time

reinforced with global limited planning, essentially the U. S.

consequent Ridgway has and that war "in

to out,

conceptualize all American derived involving

statements, the belief

decisions war

a world

which any warfare, policy by the

Korea event, he makers,

would

be

of

relatively "24 was

minor The totally

importance concept alien of to wars pay are the

and, limited American limited price

in

indefensible. continues, "except in of

the the

sense participants

that

all to

willingness "25 this

required. From why

perspective was apparently What is how is, such could of invasion As the to

it

is

not

too

hard

to by more

understand the North

Washington offensive.

caught however, a have gross

unawares rather

Korean to

difficult of up to the of have has it, over appointed However, in and a

comprehend

misinterpretation right of it the

Pyongyang's day the taken noted, have wide date, although Tokyo personnel North so Korean weeks as it front must of the

intentions outbreak Korean prepare. assemble prepared with have Gunther well in as South attack, preceding reports preparations

persisted in view which

hostilities and the

scale must

North to to

time

Gunther, force

MacArthur's involved, arm

biographer, and equip action on the 26

wheel

into

precalculated

perfect taken claims the Korea it the of

synchronization, at that South were would least a

month.

MacArthur's Koreans completely seem that, of and 38th and

headquarters U. S. military by the three growing of Communist did in

surprised during hostilities, scale parallel quarters that such

the or

outbreak the size of the

intelligence military some of were of to alarm

north certain

ring respect

bells

within intentions. to

American The fact was with the the his North

Pyongyang's never General downplay relayed

suspicions

Washington who, along of

sole

responsibility chose military

MacArthur the

associates, Korean

significance 168

build-up of

and

to

discount invasion. the

warnings

of

the

possible

imminence

a Communist Although

capability long been began the to

of

North

Korea a from view to and

to series early that

strike of June, the its

southwards intelligence 1950, northern objectives warfare according military the along for Agency 13.27 "extensive with an than to onwards,

had reports on

recognized, cast doubt, accepted to try

hitherto likely

regime through via

was

more guerilla

accomplish psychological For States'

activities military the time build-up and action. United "a of might in a

overt

example, leading at forces

Hanson

Baldwin, at the

commentator Pentagon, the 38th offensive " the parallel

trusted North well Central substantiated

confidant Korean be

rapid in

what

preparation Intelligence on June

war

described of June

(C. I. A. ) bulletin Six days troop later, movements"

9 and

a C. I. A. north of

field the

agency parallel,

reported couple

from the Northern of side evacuation residents of all the to a depth of two kilometres; suspension parallel from Wonsan to Chorwon freight of civilian and service line for transporting this reservation military of border to of armed units supplies movement only; shipments and of ordnance areas; of large and movement 28 to border areas.... ammunition These director of the and other intelligence reports, an Korean channels, to see according unmistakable invasion29 to them. of insistence those 30 this warning that, in was spite to C. I. A. warning and persons were in

Hillenkoetter, imminence through government of

constituted North

distributed, the U. S.

existing authorized the by

Nevertheless, undoubtedly reduced

significance MacArthur's

of

the

Communist of the

military North was Korean most its deal it was Korean with also

build-up People's to

and Army resort Since matters

the north to it in

frantic of war was Japan as the and the a

activities parallel, means General's its of

Pyongyang accomplishing duty to

unlikely objectives. security his

surroundings, and South

responsibility regarding headquarters that it discounted

to

evaluate Communist

C. I. A. military assessed would unreliable Washington This signs the resort 1950 every a goes of

information If as his

preparations. this have information

in

Tokyo

important, and "no if

assessment it as in war. "31

alerted or would

Washington,

unimportant, dare way insist

subordinate it might why prevalent Korea from brushed the future. a report attack chief it to was of South of more all

official mean the belief was unlikely early aside possibilty Thus, March Korea MacArthur's likely Korea out will ripen sent later spring that spring almost

that explaining the North at

a long war failed

towards to dislodge

ominous within to

Truman to onwards,

Administration open warfare.

that For,

least

MacArthur's report invasion in in

headquarters warning the against

intelligence

of for 10, in

Communist

immediate to "will

instance, which June stated 1950,

a comment that North General G-2, will even "

attached Korea

"

Major unit, Army that,

Willoughby, stated be if the longer that

intelligence "the fall, present content future Willoughby's complement an to People's " but,

prepared "future

invade

South bear

by the be for by to or

reports

indications, wait

Communists and let

"probably South Korea was days cited the

a while "32 office actual to G-2 A

harvest.

similar Washington bulletin

assessment fifteen which

summer Korea. North ani in 33

of

1950 Indeed,

as

possible even the

dates

for

an June

invasion 19 report as to

of

South of for

C. I. A. 's "was it was with the not

Korean conclusion

war by fashion, that,

preparations G-2... "34 in view in the and along of

used

a basis

forwarded an

Washington report reverses advisers attempt political of the a and, the an to of

a routine stated guerilla that the "35

interpretative serious "Soviet time to by reverses have of

which the believe subjugate means... guerilla change

recent Korea,

campaign now is

South opportune

South The

Korean

government that these

possibility in the on South the the

campaign of tactics

might part

stimulated Pyongyang along Such the widely-

consequently, parallel omission acknowledged Whilst might in the have crucial be face entirely of an was, is

underlain ironically, all scale the the of

military never

build-up mentioned. given preparations. MacArthur's Pyongyang's

more Communist

perplexing war that

possibility

headquarters intentions of in to hostilities doing the so in

genuinely months

misinterpreted preceding out, its mass Indeed, have been the

outbreak persistence

cannot the

ruled overwhelming

of the

evidence proposition

contrary that such by The 10,1950,

suggests miscalculations ulterior first onwards, in the an sharp of

otherwise. might motives these over contrast would is

deliberate important from for and

and

stimulated

solve

some silence,

riddles. May war.

Seoul's

Communist to its

preparations vociferous the from preceding the North.

This warnings so

stood to of

repeated four The or

U. N. Commission impending

during

months riddle

aggression

second

171

is

the

U. N. that as that

Commission's the South had invasion already until in no

June Koreans reason was the

27

report taken

to

the

Security by

Council surprise sources information made

"were to believe

completely intelligence In view but

they

from "36

imminents. Commission's 14, this its Security

of not

possession was own patently report until North of civilians between stretching of other alert

public it

September

untrue. of June five Korean salients from four to the activity, evidence the South of complacent an

Moreover, 24, days military south areas eight limits particularly of Communist and of which later.

somewhat not This sent clearly

contradicted to the

was

Council increased occupation of of be sort with

indicated the

activities, the parallel to the

including and the

evacuation to depths It that would this

contiguous kilometres of credibility

border 37 claim in for

northwards. to taken

when

conjunction war, failed to the

preparations their American no been. to in these the

to

Koreans imminent they

friends how

possibility or

invasion, have answer lies

matter

incompetent

might The

riddles, frustration

it

would and

seem

reasonable of with East, Taiwan. may have

to

surmise, U. S. Truman

dissatisfaction and in the Dulles, Far and it

certain the

circles,

including

MacArthur policy from were South

Administrations's its decommitment quarters only to way

especially As far as that be

Korea

these the

concerned, which to region, be to the the and encourage enclave

appeared could territorial reverse a

through itself in the would

administration political perhaps or in the and even provoke area.

made status

re-commit quo losses, of

some

recent invasion

communist

a pro-Western

In in

this

respect, to off of by

South Taiwan the

Korea which

provided seems to

the

ideal have it Indeed, in

arena been

since, entirely the Dulles of foreign

contrast

written status ominously Washington's policies changing situations" created view warnings that such MacArthur provoke American the Far the of

Truman class on

Administration, client-state.

enjoyed as respect States

a second alluded

June to

22,1950, Taiwan, United

commitment "are constantly "38 did

under Three

review, days policy in

taking later, on Korea. Seoul's is not the

account "changing

of

situations... which by the eruption

reverse of

the

Taiwan Thus,

were in

hostilities

Washington's of South the danger Korean

unresponsiveness from leadership within the it the North, might U. S. might then alter explain which may trust United not be

to it have

earlier unlikely advised by as invite impact policy or on in

been

revisionists and an Dulles

Administration wiser to to the

that and to would

invasion, opinion 39 May of 10 This

public East. from

States only have but of in and

South been also

Korea's at the the Korean face oftenover the also North of

silence instigation persistent attack

onwards,

well

MacArthur's of the his the

headquarters, possibility associates contrary,

downplaying by the General evidence and, of South ultimately, Korea

a North the their

and to

overwhelming repeated ability explain Korean

unfounded to defend itself.

assurances 40 It for

would the

Washington's attack. The notion Truman that

apparent

unpreparedness

seems

to

have of

been

held

by

revisionists a Communist

within

the

Administration

encouraging

invasion change the totally outbreak Americans, misguided good Kim Soviet approved counterpart. been every equipped successfully did the is

of most

South

Korea

as to

a means have-been the the Korea.

of

affecting by

desirable anyone within remained up to to have the the been

unlikely Like

shared Soviet

Kremlin. quiescent of

Washington, throughout in

Union leading in contrast to its the imply

period But, very

hostilities the Kremlin Pyongyang's with, This and

is,

not

likely given of, to

as

to

intentions, deep not have, decision such penetration be taken

generally regime that of the or

relations 11-sung. leadership of

should must Korea's if

therefore, to invade or

encouraged its southern

North For then to

encouragement the U. S. S. R. North Korea backing

approval have

had taken

granted, step and

surely that the its to

would was it However,

ensure had all

adequately needed not with 41 but, signs allies to only such once of the

strategic objectives. the

accomplish Kremlin fail

provide for it

North as

Koreans

essential hostilities preparedness political The North previous there invasion given an the were

prerequisites got or or failure underway, willingness

success showed to give they

aircraft, if any,

few, its needed.

Korean

strategic of the

support Soviet is the for most

leadership intriguing peninsula. disapprove In faced may when

to in

underwrite view of

the its

Korean ambitions many at acute

offensive over reasons

Korean it to time. problems

Admittedly, of the a full-scale first the Rhee place, regime, rather of

that

particular

political military and

by have the

'outright

invasion

seemed same objective

inappropriate bringing that

"adventuristic" down could

regime

have

been

achieved

through

174

an In

exacerbation addition, military of the the states, given time, against its Security boycott it

of there

the

guerilla was the of

struggle United South and which

in Nations

the

South. factor. be in

42 An clear pit

outright breach virtually American Moreover, at action end the would 43 move. its right the

invasion U. N. entire

Korea would,

would

Charter U. N.,

therefore, consisted of

mainly Korea of option course, action, the North and the

proUnion.

against the would North and Soviet

North

the

Soviet

boycott up the Of any before the such

Security of the but concerted U. S. S. R. to

Council U. N. could to

open Korea. veto just

return onslaught the to

Council

Korean in were would against been Security no

somewhat In any of

implicate case, even

Soviet the

Union U. S. S. R. that action have the

Korean exercise not have North

if

veto

against

sanctions, U. N. probably vote 44 from

necessarily Korea by to because

prevented the issue

concerted would

transferred Council matter of that of pursue how the it its a

a non-vetoable the General the Korean its at of risk

procedural Assembly. Soviet offensive, support Pyonyang's at Union it

Nevertheless, might is have highly stage as

strongly North withheld displeasure policy would endanger reputation given strategic disengagement the

disapproved improbable a measure for for to

this military as

venture, punishment intervention implication, a reliable of

non-intervention encouraging Northof United importance from the Korea the

disobedience and the thereby general Indeed, politicogradual of an

American and, by as

U. S. S. R. States' of

ally. the its likelihood

downplaying South Korea, and the

country,

175

initially amount have a total a of

rapid cautious

North

Korean

sweep

across by the

the Soviet

South, Union to

a small might deter of Thus, and

muscle-flexing from any Korea might for case was bring the the

appeared U. S. that in

sufficient was which risk in

Kremlin's with

angle, a

preoccupied not a central tremendous

concept

war moderate

element. political

strategic An during to

advantages alternative this time strategic intended on from one in of the to the sees

U. S. S. R. of the of Soviet any hint for Union's of stance

explanation the or absence political remove grounds which the

preparation Korea American Korea keep Kremlin was out. to a as

provide

backing any that pretext the

North for in

being intervention, civil Indeed, the of

war

conflict since

external first

powers responses was to

should of the the

hostilities non-intervention this at the this

peninsula in the well of the

invoke affairs

doctrine of to other Soviet given the this

domestic have

countries, passivity that

may stage

contributed

conflict. quiescent

However, even its period Korea after allies,

U. S. S. R. of of the the Soviet

remained United inactivity of hostilities

intervention explanation preceding plausible. This posture throughout Union offensive, to manipulate of its was

States in

and the in

immediately seems barely

outbreak

leaves adopted the most it by

one the

more

possible at

interpretation the is, North either outset although Korean to and, the plans underwrite

of

the

U. S. S. R. war. aware in This of

indeed, Soviet for an or not States

Korean probably was such not an

a position and, Or, as

offensive '

consequently, a former United

did

approve

initiation.

176

military Soviets and can't

governer in Korea let may

in were

South "like Under felt from it

Korea men

commented who have

at a lion

the by

time, the the choice

the tail Soviet but

go. "45 have itself Initially,

these it the may

circumstances, had no effective North hoped to

leadership to distance

that

prospective have also not

Korean that, by

offensive. doing so, the

U. S.

would

also

choose

intervene.

The

outbreak The

of outbreak

war: of

U. S.

recommitment in

and Korea

Soviet

inaction the their in get in the the a

hostilities the Truman to

provided with policy to

revisionists long Far sought-after East.

within

Administration change U. S. was Korean

opportunity The to problem respond As Korea had was to to far still be

thereafter the as North

Administration desirable given States, credibility the Communist of make it was the for of have that Soviet of that

invasion was with to In

fashion. South a response and

Washington associated

concerned, the United the sense,

made of

in the

order U. S.

preserve this

resolve attack its

images

significantly interests its to stage tilting in its to it own prevent into from quo there be was the favour,

changed in Korea,

Washington's in in that an it area

assessment had where However, an alibi to

strategic to protect

a move not issue

reputation so not overtly to regional as the use

expected at this

challenged. the war as

decisively

superpower revisiQnists victory in with a

balance would way the point was

interests liked, not but

a Communist a direct the ante was Truman bellum no urge,

would Union. view,

drag Since,

confrontation Administration's in the initially, Far

the

status

East to

considered

acceptable,

177

risk onslaught Korea already strategic

a conflict as and/or been

with a pretext China. assigned

the for After

U. S. S. R. making all,

by

using

the in,

North say,

Korea northern had

advances both Korea position

and in

Taiwan America's

a very Indeed,

minor

calculations. not to

though South to of the. the direct Soviet

signalling Korea to its

a strong fate, invasion in stance on the South could military faced with and to in

determination Washington's was the conspicuous Korea war, unclear. June Korean's46 supplied but to by

abandon reaction avoidance whilst the to

immediate by at its least As decision the with avoid this

Communist

involvement Union's

remained Truman's South Korea rush...

New lend

York logistical

Times

commented support to

25

tendency all any country. the

"appeared arms semblance "47

to that... of

be

to

keep

MacArthur direct

intervention a rapidly the absence

Nevertheless, in southern of the

deteriorating of of 27 to any hint

situation on the part

Korea, U. S. S. R. Truman

adopt on

a strategy June

deterring drastically in the war

U. S.

intervention, raise the level United

decided American air

of States

intervention sea forces. conflict Nationalist at to the be behest deployed units 48 in to

by

ordering and

and Korean the

provide

cover in from struggle an

support effort with Taiwan, ordered so

for to the and the that it forces

South prevent

Moreover, Korea Chinese of in

apparent

overlapping over Truman Strait on

Communistperhaps Seventh could and also Fleet repel vice policy 49

MacArthur, the Formosa attacks

Communist versa. of

Chinese This action

Nationalist ended strife

effectively in the civil

Washington's in China.

non-interference

178

As unabated, to had raise

the the the

North United level

Korean States of its

march came

into under

the

South

continued pressure since Communist the Soviet by American on June 27 a it

increasing especially

intervention, itself it find out to had the whilst dispatched to and persuade to

already

committed But, in order first, to

repelling to ascertain risks

the

invasion. position greater forces requesting for the

entailed directing a note

intervention. into Korea, the North with from South of this Soviet Korean

Thus, Washington leadership offensive, to

disavow asking it to some it

responsibility to use its its

influence forces the to reply, Kremlin, Korean forces. in Korea

Pyongyang Korea. note from two unwilling would not the the

withdraw U. S. an officials, opportunity The that its against the Korea,

According was the days to "give

purpose retire

Russia "50

gracefully which came

chessboard. later, or unable in

Soviet the North U. S. events and it in

suggested to Korea stop

although friend, It to the stated be part

intervene U. S. S. R. internal to countries. for behalf that the of

that of

considered of

affairs foreign 51

declared the this

Kremlin's concerns opened up

opposition of the other way on

intervention In Washington,

domestic reply

direct South

intervention Korea, for

of it might on to he the use also in 53 "to

American drastically precipitate following one

ground reduced

forces the

danger

such

intervention 52 Indeed, request and

a superpower day, Truman combat him Korea, thereafter " to and the bomb to

confrontation. approved team in

a MacArthur South Korea, military the was entire full

regimental

authorized Northern Shortly

"specific blockade

targets Korean authority coast.

General

given

179

use Korean

all

the forces.

ground 54

forces

under

his

command"

against

North

By internal forfeited influence the that it North the had

invoking affairs a over Korean U. S. resorted to

the of

doctrine other opportunity Korean to taken the

of

non-intervention the to try U. S. S. R. to It it extend also

in

the thus its

states,

valuable the entire offensive have had

peninsula. for

doomed unlikely measures some Korean

failure, the

seems

would to provide

interventionary Union cover for relative by would resolved the demonstrated its North

Soviet

willingness client. insignificance appears superpower initial direct

deterrence given to that had the moves This at South the

Indeed, accorded improbable crisis United confrontation. suspicion might to be a Soviet States

strategic Americans, have to the so risked deter risk in view of the a of it a

Korea

Washington U. S. S. R. by

manipulating especially that tie some the

seems the ploy time to in

Washington's invasion in order

North forces

Korean down

American other,

initiate part United North

aggression of the world. firmly

strategically'

more

important With the the

States Korean to advantage statement on July

and

directly the the

committed extent Korean Thus, war, the of war in

to the in its

aborting Kremlin's any first way full to

offensive, manipulate became on the

unwillingness its official reiterated of nations, to take own

clear. Korean its the

Soviet to the of

leadership principle other proposed

5,1950, in

adherence affairs the the

non-interference and any gave action no

domestic that to

indication with regard

U. S. S. R. conflict. 55

180

Even

after

MacArthur's to destroy 56 the

ominous the North Soviet

declaration Korean Union This on in August it forces

on

July and

13 of to on

his

intention all of

occupy its at

Korea,

continued was exemplified a

extraorinarily this in the stage U. N. by

conciliatory its introduction Council

path.

4 of proposed and

resolution to invite to the pave

Security from

which North,

delegates discuss People's the Council northern "representatives significant it accorded The diplomatic from the way the

Communist problem. of China

China,

South insertion

Korea of to

Korean Republic for that in well

Although may have

the been

intended in the

country's the as of the

participation Korean the Korean war, southern people" in with rather by an effort. kind but, to war, have 59 it of in been also in the on rifles. direct spite aimed that, the

Security to the as a very time,

and/or as

reference Korean represented for the 57 stance total Not only intervention of at first regimes

Soviet Seoul Soviet level North refrain of its which escalating

concession equal Union's was matched military any 58 status

Pyongyang. placid almost

at

the

detachment did the in

Korean from ally,

U. S. S. R. support allegations U. S. vital Indeed, North weapons, With Pyongyang apparently escalate into

MacArthur's pushing to replenish aircraft. the

seem the Korean

failed tanks hitherto a wide 60

Communist by the end

losses 1950, relying War of I

and

of

July, were

well-equipped assortment of

Korean including the

forces

World

prospect being rather free conflict. to

Soviet slim,

intervention the to on the August Truman

in

support

of

Administration wish border to

felt the

respond Thus,

revisionists' 12, American

181

bombings series on North 17 of

commenced, huge Korean miles was the

and

four

days by

later, heavy the Much 17 is,

the

first was of

of

a

"saturation" installations, from U. S. re-unify the

raids

bombers port more of to a its

made

including U. S. S. R. 61 on August that This aim of

Rashin,

merely however, to

significant, intention politically drastic intervention, North Korean

warning Korea, 62

forcibly

obliterate extension which forces was and of

North the merely restore

Korea. original to the

represented the the ante American invading bellum.

drive status

back quo

The of

turning North The Korea

point:

U. S.

escalation

and

Soviet

abandonment

announcement Korea the solely but ushered purpose to

of

Washington's in a new

new phase States'

goal in the

of

rewar;

unifying henceforth was not

of

the the

United territorial a postwar

intervention integrity of For the With Korea, regarded but a

preserve to reverse

client-state Soviet the Soviet as Union, U. S.

reality. new situation. re-unify longer be

this

created its in as

an

entirely to could of an to as the the

declaring intervention or be in

intention the war part attempt just

forcibly no

revisionist only quo

being as an

aggressive preserve Americans to was to

design, the

could status hitherto survival U. S.

seen the

postwar had been actual in the Korea a threat States,

region, Moreover,

doing. of a Soviet

threat that

the

client-state of its intention to

implied re-unify and

announcement a direct credibility

constituted to its

challenge and resolve

the

U. S. S. R. The

image.

United

182

in where

other it

words, could and its

was

putting either

the

Soviet to

Union

in its

a

position image to of

choose reputation challenge Given

sacrifice ally a direct

resolve the

as and its had

a credible risk

or

accept

American

superpower with North

confrontation. Korea, the Soviet

strong no of third the

association option. American relatively may have been

Union in persisted

Nevertheless, the U. S. S. R.

spite in in

announcement, conciliative a reference the hostilities with with the

its what

behaviour. to the

To possibility warned lead on

be

sure, of

Chinese 22 to that

counter-intervention, continuation of which 1, the will of

Kremlin "will

August

inevitably the

a widening for September

conflict lie the when, invite i. e., discuss amounted to the level North the

consequences, United leadership again, and it States...

responsibility "63 By to that of of North

however, tone

Soviet once China the the to a of and Soviet

returned proposed

its the the and 64 in

more Security

decorous Council

"representatives

Korean South This that of on it Korea,

people, " to

representatives situation further formal South delegate's In United unify measures on at his the States Korea, to try in Soviet diplomacy Korea first the

peninsula. concession the

proposal raised

concept

parity August

between 4 during

introduced upon of the

commentary absence

resolution. Soviet intention response to forcibly to the rewith Thus, landed "extend for

a decisive of its

announcement the to Truman achieve the was of

Administration this day new, on with expanded which

proceeded goal. forces to make

September Inchon,

15,1950, MacArthur north

U. N.

issued the

a directive and to

operations

parallel

plans

183

the no

occupation indication

of or

North threat in elicited to sit up to

Korea" of "65

on

condition of

that Soviet the Peking

"there or rapid that

was Chinese advance China

entry

Communist of "did the U. N. not

elements forces intend

force.

Although from with

a warning back [its] with

folded "66 27, the further within directive. the in

hands United light

and

let

Americans

come

border,

States of of the the to

seemed success ensuing destroy on the

undeterred. of U. N. the same the Inchon

On

September landing and was forces previous

progress authorized the

offensive, North Korean

MacArthur armed as from the utilizing the against the North 38th of began to northern China

peninsula, He was, forces using By U. N. on the under

condition

however, in air the or

prohibited provinces naval 30, reached day,

non-Korean border or the in from South into full

ground and from

along action with the units

U. S. S. R. 67 retreat, where, army Korea. of action the of troops regime of Chinese and the high into was North 68 the by

September forces following MacArthur's Whilst parallel U. S. S. R. were warnings Korea. closer as to

Koreans parallel the pour of

Korean North crossing

command the failed in

imminence to stimulate of aroused the its

a U. N. any

38th the

deterrence client, a series of U. S.

defence

Communist to issue

Chinese level North much Korea

sufficiently against Indeed, Moscow

introduction the Peking, Kim

although than to

11-sung collapse the abroad, of the

the

a political position

entity both troops People's

would at in

jeopardize home and

Communist presence would serious

Party's of

American the

the

north with

peninsula very

present

Republic

potentially

184

security Foreign will savagely day, Peking advance the According Moscow, because and to partly 39th he not

problems. Minister supinely invaded further that, as by Chou

Consequently, En-lai warned seeing

on that their "69 the

September the "Chinese neighbours On the

30,1950, people being following in Korean of

tolerate the

imperialists. through China

warned though

Indian the by a had been

ambassador South U. S. casus received forces

considered any crossing

inconsequential, parallel would similar and

constitute reports 71

be11i70 from partly in Peking, trying a

to

Truman,

Stockholm, Washington because the

New Delhi.

Nevertheless, ambassador China was into the 72 troops MacArthur Korea that "73

distrusted it suspected General

India's that

merely accepting

blackmail

U. N. resolution

Assembly to solve

Soviet-sponsored Chou's warnings Thus, crossing authorized event operations would did the a not seem of the to Chinese offered that, on

Korean

problem,

were October 38th

not

taken 7,1950,

seriously.

American Two days later North condition of Truman with in Korea, eventually into of which and

began was in the such It

parallel.

continue

operations

in on chance the

intervention, "a at the reasonable this stage,

success.

Administration Peking thought prevent a full-scale warning Americans even viewed that any

appreciate of

apprehension regime resolve from would developing in on spite

prospect demonstration

ahostile of

Chinese intervention. of

incursion

Consequently, from their Peking march

a further the continued

intervention with

October

10,74 This

proceded when were

northwards. for That a massive Washington

Chinese almost

preparations complete.

counter-intervention still underestimated

185

the

probable who

scale

of

such in by of the

action minimizing China. Korean

is

doubtless the

the

work of period

of a

MacArthur full-scale preceding to have

persisted

probability As the as in the

intervention the had outbreak ulterior

75 war,

General far as he in

seems was the

motives. intervention

Indeed, "could from need an to be

concerned, United to a States full

China's to ally, base would raise

utilized

Chiang the made

inconvenient hold by successor the Formosa the has

dependent as logic pointed of an of

while be as

American war... out, "76 it

undeniable

Moreover, would provide

MacArthur's for

a pretext which

implementation

MacArthur's

programme,

included

destroying Manchuria; demolishing necessary the and troops to Consequently, evidence troops advance Five into to weeks of

industrial bases in the and complex air China's Communist blockading seacoast; its industrial centers; providing all invasion to Chiang's of the mainland; support Nationalist Chinese the transportation of 77 forces there... Korea to beef up our ground on the October 17,1950, of 78 60 large in spite of of his growing Chinese forces border. hands, to 79 he 27 the 80

infiltration Korea, 40 to

numbers ordered

North within later,

MacArthur miles of the

Manchurian in of U. N.

with

Pyongyang Truman's of all

already directive prohibitions near North the Korea

deliberately and ordered of virtual hardly which

disobeyed the removal

September against

utilization The entity U. S. S. R. that return end of the

non-Korean extinction elicited as late would as

troops of any

Chinese as a

border. political from still policy towards of

decisive 13,1950, the "get To

responses was tough" sure,

the hoping and the

October give up 81

Americans to wartime the

cooperation. Kremlin

be

November,

undertook

a number

measures

186

which of its

included Siberian these the

large-scale forces were under probably

maneuvers a single, intended forces

and

the unified

consolidation command. a precaution last entire minute Korean Communist of North forces 82

However, against warning peninsula. action, November Korea into full

more than of it as the

as a

approaching the the total final

U. N.

against In which 26-27, from

occupation analysis, in the the Soviet and

was massive

Chinese

culminated that saved

offensive in U. N.

client-state sent the

political retreat. 83

obliteration

China's to the

counter-intervention: status The direct the United the by of quo ante bellum

U. S.

retreat

and

the

return

intervention superpowers States, pursuit military the to the war the of with

of an

China entirely of

in

the new the of

Korean situation.

war

presented For the

mere the

scale objective

Chinese Korean

move rewithout

rendered unification an of extension

means effort

virtually and a risk

impossible of total

war Since,

out in the to the

proportion

objective's with enemy, American quo China it

importance. over was Korea decided

Washington's wrong the war original with

eyes, the aim of goal of its made accomplish of the of

a war wrong the status

would to

be

revert was

intervention, ante Korea bellum. was of into was to

which Indeed, pursued

restoration that because would order place the

given primarily

a united

risklessness no sense to

in

view

Soviet a war sought present

inaction, with in China the itself first

it in

have to

enter that

something it

merely

because

happened

for

187

seizure. The engage existence at which in unwillingness war is the and of as the country's Korea's the far with China from of the over an the N. S. C. Truman issue meeting Administration of North of Korea's 28 to

evident

November Secretary were China...

President, the Joint

along Chiefs for Korea retained and political of June of

with Staff

Defence (J. C. S. ) war with it

Marshall "agreed However, that the North Communist China. wake allude and of to even

all "85 seem of

necessity as South

avoiding was

concerned, its uprated significance 1950. as a casus

would

Administration strategic invasion was Chinese

assessment following Consequently, bells in began with seen By

occupation Thus, the the as

considered forces U. N. of

with the to China as

advanced forces, a nuclear

southwards

retreating possibility with the the

Washington showdown which effort. Chinese the forces was

U. S. S. R., 86 Korean of

masterminding 29,1950, against instructed to Japan with South

Chinese-North the prospect looming to evacuate

December onslaught J. C. S. in Korea 87

a massive the all of

Korea

over

horizon, his

MacArthur should this of that his move the the

military was

position by the

become desire

untenable. to it write

Although the not South was without order to safety mean Korea. not

motivated out-numbered ultimately

ensure did off States

vastly

U. N. willing that its

forces, to the forces vulnerable, indication type

U. S.. was contrary, to

On the in a position its for

given reinforce

United in

Korea the of of war

rendering prepare

position

elsewhere was a further a different

evacuation for

Washington's against China.

readiness

launching

188

q1'

p

The subsequent the Soviet

intervention retreat Union With with the Korean the and of

of U. N.

China forces

in

the to

Korean South

war

and

the

Korea to recoup to of

presented recent the

a golden Americans advance could

opportunity endeavouring by have the words, with the to threats

losses. Chinese-North bombardment, threats Communist risk Soviet clear-cut credibility U. S. war may than of

check

nuclear those of the the the for . its the a

U. S. S. R. thus

counter-balanced continuation by manipulating United open the States, way bolster by risk that of it to settle 1950 time, a

facilitated In confrontation other

advance. a nuclear Union

might Communist and

have

been

able and

victory images. to Korea have

thereby

resolve

Whilst, take the

well

have

preferred South it may smaller for it

nuclear is for one, not a had

abandon that somewhat been as

altogether, willing pre-June so. of the

inconceivable South the Korea pressure However, Soviet backing efforts problem the 1951, exercise Chinese exchange Assistant U. S. truce until Union for to

been the do

than to

there in

previous from

stages providing in Korea,

Korean form of

war, strategic itself

the

refrained the bring

any and

Communists about the which

confined to

to Korean during

a favourable United lasted, the on its the terms Nations.

resolution

the

through talks July enormous allies of

Consequently, from States Koreans a cease-fire on May was

intermittently, United North for

July able

10, to their

27,1953, pressure accept prisoners. of Chiang State

and

to war

and 18,1951, that he

an

Thus, Dean Kai-shek Rusk

Secretary recognized

declared because

the "more

189

authentically and would

represents assist "tyranny. them "88 authorized Strait, the

the if

views they Two the

of

the...

people to on the get

of

China" rid of 2, Fleet for

attempted years removal that later, of

Communist 1953, from Chiang

February Seventh the the way

Eisenhower the to Formosa attack

a move

opened 89 In of

Chinese

mainland.

meantime, increasingly war 90 to the into For the use Three said for not warnings, to the may and the final have ground it is the their of a the price be

Washington serious China example, Communists of any and

maintained threats to in use and

a constant warnings to

stream extend against deliberately be restricted in the the

Korean Chinese. leaked in 91

nuclear 1953 U. S.

weapons it would in with "could weapons to the back U. S. up was not

February that the it during States

weapons later,

possessed talks

the Nehru not if its

war in

Korea.

months that failing arranged. in the

India,

Dulles

the

United to "92 use

be a

held truce threats atomic

responsible could and missiles in

atomic

Indeed, of 1953 of truce

spring island the

moved 93 of the United

Japanese analysis, been forces clear a fair

Okinawa. agreement of and American their the the

Whilst, July balance States did asset, beyond having at stake. war lies the was

27,1953, of air in to

representation China the using

between that what of to to

Korea, deprive was

threats greatest

Communists ability U. S.

which ability to pay

prolong its to

conflict without interest of of the primary the the

hold

position its

disproportionate The that the

paradoxicality responses to their Had

Korean superpowers interests

in

the

fact

were and of

inversely ambitions in been

proportionate the peninsula.

imminence

hostilities

190

detected possible invasion prospect American in the the

in for from of

Washington the United taking a Communist with

at States place. attack an

all, to

then prevent However, on South

it the

may

have

been Korean

North that

given Korea to force Far

the

presented a East, change all from

revisionists Truman

opportunity policy in

Administration's signs of war were it of

the

tell-tale lest With advance States

skillfully to undertake

concealed any warfare into to own South the

Washington, action. rapid United client-state credible to care support not ally.

they the of felt

prompt outbreak

deterrence and Korea, aid of as readiness it took its as to to risk once become of a the the its a

full-scale forces to come its the was

North

Korean impelled

in

order Initially,

to

protect whilst

reputation

U. S. S. R. 's uncertain, to of

its to

North react

Korean too

client

drastically and over Soviet the same

and a number Union's time, over did not Korea,

escalate so

intervention test the

gradually extent effort of and,

stages,

the at

commitment minimize Korea. intend the the But, to danger

Pyongyang's of it a direct became

superpower clear involved crisis dwindled. on to that on

confrontation the behalf as U. S. S. R. of North of

directly superpower substantially to

a result Accordingly, scale destruction

American the U. S. to the of

intervention felt extend North Korea. the superpowers, Korea, and Korean it its it safe its Korean

intervene

a massive the forcible

and

also of

commitment armed forces The conflict had

include the

and Soviet is more

re-unification inaction Of interests the throughout two in

Union's perplexing. greater

comparatively

191

association United U. S. S. R. North in the war States

with to

North South from

Korea Korea. providing during

was

closer

than not

that only cover

of did for

the the the

However, strategic its initial but, Communists Korea, client's

refrain offensive deter

Korean to

successful when the

stages U. S. pushed took the quite

order

U. S.

intervention, from the North its China's the south from

military right

initiative into to the the heart prospect

and it total

of of as to

seemed

indifferent extinction. forced the part States during the Whilst can U. N. Soviet in

political

Moreover, troops Union support resorted the political persisted role to still of its well

counter-intervention of the 38th parallel, direct United weapons 1951-1953,

refrained friends.

playing Even when

a more the

threatening and military in

China

with

nuclear of

stalemate its apparent by the Soviet to it strategic its

U. S. S. R. this hardly

indifference. leadership primary be context accounted of the or

peripheral be explained in the relates

chosen with

reference

secondary for by

interests looking war as it at

the

peninsula, and the

can

political to

Korean

superpowers.

192

Notes

1.

2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

States: Union Soviet Russia, the and the United J. L. Gaddis, 1978), New York, Wiley, (John p. History An Interpretive 204. War (Macmillan, The Limited Korea: B. Rees, Quoted in 1964), New York, Press, St. Martin's p. 16. London; (International Korea Again Burchett, W. G. in Quoted 1968), Publishers, New York, p. 64. 1,1949. November Tribune, Herald The New York Quoted in War Korean History The Hidden of the Cited in I. F. Stone, 1952), New York p. 64. Press, Review (Monthly and London, Quoted in Burchett, p. 125. op. cit., Rees, p. 16. op. cit., See Stone, p. 18. op. cit., World Free The in D. Horowitz, Quoted Holmes Alexander. Cold in the Policy Foreign American A Critique Colossus: of 1965), London, Kee, p. 120. War (MacGibbon and Ibid., p. 122. 1967), New York, War'(Doubleday, The Korean M. B. Ridgeway, p. 15. New is in The disclosure The the U. N. Commission's text of The quotes 15,1950. citations York September and Times, Stone, from however, here, op. cit. are taken Quoted in Stone, p. 8. op. cit., Quoted in ibid. Quoted in ibid., p. 9. February 1949, ibid., p. 8. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 11. Quoted 31,1950. July Times, The New York Walter Sullivan, in ibid., p. 66. 29, September Tribune, Herald The New York Joseph Alsop, October Tribune, Herald New York Lippmann, Cf. Walter 1950. See Horowitz, p. 122. op'. cit., 5,1950, for views. similar Situation Military Session, First Senate, U. S. 82 Congress, Armed Before the Committee Hearings on Far East: in the To Conduct Relations: Foreign Committee Services on and the Far East in the Situation and Military Inquiry Into the an Army the Relief of the Facts Surrounding of General the May Area, in that His Assignments from Douglas MacArthur See ) Senate. to as (Hereinafter 1951, referred 1992. p. Also 65. p. 14. Stone, op. cit., see Ridgway, op. cit., p. in Cited 7,1950, July Report, p. 29. U. S. News and'World Stone, Also 120. p. 18. Horowitz, op. cit., see p. op. cit., Stone, ibid., p. 65. Ibid. Ridgway, p. 11. op. cit. Ibid., p. 12. Korea Japan. the and J. Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur: 1951). London, Hamilton, Far East (Hamish In Stone, Cited 28,1950. June The New York Times, op. cit., p. 16. 13-14. Quoted in Ridgway, pp. 02-cit., Cited in Stone, 26,1950. June Times, The New York op. cit.,

193

30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40.

41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50.

51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

56.

p. 2. June 28,1950. in ibid., Cited The New York Times, p. 16. 5-6. Stone, ibid., pp. The General Quoted in A. M. Schlesinger and R. H. Rovere, and Future Foreign Policy President, the of American and the 1952), London, Heinemann, (William p. 101. Ibid., J. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy the and War (Harvard Press, Korean University 1959), p. 22. Ridgeway, op. cit., p. 14. Quoted in ibid. Stone, op. cit., p. 8. Department States Policy in Korean "United State, the of Crisis, " Publication 3922, Far Eastern Series 34, July 20, 1950 (Document 14), (Hereinafter to p. 22. referred as State. ) Cited in ibid., p. 11. Quoted in ibid., The New York Times, 23,1950. June p. 20. Stone, ibid., p. 13. As ibid., latter 7-8; this pp. point, see regards H. S. Truman, Schlesinger Years op. cit., p. 102; and Rovere, 1956), (Hodder of Trial and Stoughton, and Hope 1946-1953 p. 347. According Colonel defector Cyril Soviet Army to Dimitrievitch Kremlin by Kalinov, the the refused an appeal Central Party for Korean Communist Committee an air of the force. Zakharov had He claims General to that explained if feared him Soviet Union that, that the supplied with drag Japan Koreans the North the planes, and attack might U. S. S. R. See C. D. Kalinov, "I into Saw the U. S. war with North " France-Soar, August Korean the Army Organized, 4, Also 1950. 62,63. Cited in ibid., Stone, pp. see Horowitz, op. cit. p. 122. 23-24. Horowitz, ibid., Spanier, pp. op. cit., p. 121; A. S. Whiting, Yaln: The Decision China Crosses to Enter the Korean 1960), the War (Macmillan, New York, p. 182, n. 10. F. H. Hartmann, New York, (Macmillan The Relations of Nations 1967), p. 385. Quoted in Stone, p. 85. op. cit., Ibid., 68-60; Truman, p. 352. pp. op. cit., ibid., New Quoted York 27,1950. in Stone, Times., June p. 69. Stone, ibid., 352; Horowitz, Truman, op. cit., p. p. 70; op. cit., p. 124. Stone, Horowitz, ibid; ibid; ibid; A. B. Ulam, Truman, War II The Rivals: Since World (Viking America and Russia Press, New York, 1971), p. 174. Decision Was Made, " Harpers' Albert Werner, "How the Korean Magazine, Quoted in Spanier, June 1951, p. 104. pp. op. cit., 71, 32-33. Also Stone, ibid., op. cit., p. 26; pp. see Rees, 86. Spanier, Rees, ibid., ibid., 26,33; Stone, pp. p. 33; ibid., p. 87. Rees, ibid., Truman, op. cit., p. 360. p. 26; Stone, Ridgway, 23. op. cit., op. cit., p. 77; Truman, 361,362. op. cit., pp. Security Supplement 5th for June. July Council year, and August, 1950, 83-89. Cited in M. Beloff, Soviet Policy pp. in the Far East, (Oxford University 1944-1951 Press, London, 1953), 186-187, pp. Rees, op. cit., p. 98.

194

57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82.

69,74-75, Whiting, Beloff, op. cit., pp. p. 110; op. cit., Rockliffe War (Barrie The Korean with 76; R. Leckie, and 1962), London, Press, p. 155. Pall Mall in Stone, Cited 26,1950. July op. cit., Times, The New York p. 83. Stone, in Cited 26 and 27,1950. July Times, New York The 82-84. ibid., pp. Stone, Cited in 27 and 30,1950. July Times., New York The 83-84,85. ibid., pp. 1950-1953 Korea: O'Ballance, E. 90; ibid., Stone, p. 1969), London, (Faber, p. 42. Whiting, 99; Rees, 155; p. Leckie, op. cit., p. op. cit., 78-79. op. cit., pp. No. 22,1950, August 489th Council, Security U. N. meeting, ibid., in Whiting, Quoted 31. p. 79. No. 1,1950, September 495th Council, U. N. Security meeting, ibid., 6. See Whiting, 36, p. 102. p. Truman, p. 380. op. cit., Memoirs Chinas: In Two a of Panikkar, Quoted K. M. in This 108. 1955), London, Unwin, p. (Allen Diplomat and days two by an acknowledgement, impetus was given warning Red armies were the Chinese Korean that of veterans earlier, See Stone, fighting in Korea. p. 125. op. cit., 381-382. Truman, pp. op. cit., 128Stone, pp. op. cit., 125,126; Horowitz, pp. op. cit., 129, 107-108. in Whiting, Quoted pp. op. cit., Panikkar, p. 110. op. cit., Truman, p. 383. op. cit., 162-163. Leckie, pp. op. cit., Truman, op. cit., p. 383. Rees, op. cit., p. 109. 387-388,395Truman, 47; pp. Ridgway, op. cit., p. op. cit., 152,156,158,160,161. 396; Stone, pp. op. cit., Stone, ibid., p. 151. Ridgway, p. 145. op. cit., 109-110; Rees, 131; pp. Horowitz, op. cit., p. op. cit., Stone, 395; p. 154. Truman, op. cit., op. cit., p. Ridgway, p. 49. op. cit., Ibid., 61; Stone, p. 155. cit., op. p. ibid., in Stone, Cited 14,1950. October The New York Times, p. 137. Truman, pp. 413,414. op. cit.,

83.
84.

Horowitz,

85. 86.

87. 88.

89.

American Challenge The to War: Limited R. E. Osgood, Chicago, 1957), Press, pp. Strategy (University of Chicago 169. 172-173; Rees, xii-xiii, pp. op. cit., Rees, ibid., p. 166. J. 133; Horowitz, Ibid., 166-167,170; op. cit., p. pp. York, New (Reynal, The Reporter". S. Alsop, Alsop R Trade and 1958), p. 160. Leckie, 83; Ridgway, 180; Rees, ibid., op. cit., p. p. 245-246. op. cit., pp. in Stone, Cited May 19,1951. Times, New York Quoted in The Acheson Secretary later, days Four 278. of State op. cit., p. 278Idem, declaration. Rusk's disavowing from pp. refrained 279. (Harper, New The Inside Story Eisenhower: R. J. Donovan, York, 1956), p. 28.

op. cit.,

p.

133;

Stone,

op. cit.,

pp.

209-229.

195

90. 91. 92.

93.

Leckie, Rees, See, for instance, op. cit., p. 369; 282-283. 425; Stone, pp. op. cit., O'Ballance, p. 132. op. cit., The Inside Story Report: First-Hand S. Adams, London, (Hutchinson, 1962, Eisenhower Administration D. D. Eisenhower, Also Donovan, p. 118; op. cit., see London, 1963), (Heinemann, 1953-1956 for Change. p. Adams, ibid., p. 55.

op. cit.,

the of 55. p. Mandate 181.

196

CHAPTER

7:

THE CRISIS

SITUATION

The to the

responses outbreak the

of and

the

United of the

States the crisis area

and war in

the

Soviet Korea in

Union clearly shaping of its

evolution of in the war

illustrate superpower primary of the

importance

situation wars. In

intervention interests U. S. and in the in

grey

terms

peninsula, was nothing

the less

massive than of also

intervention a gross the over-

reaction, significance consideration, be described

when of then as was

its

post-1946 Korea scale if of of

assessment is the not any

strategic into only more

South the

taken could Even by the firstly, by in to re-unite of its order deter

intervention irrational. attempt afforded, and, of secondly,

paradoxical, the the absence

paradoxical either the joint extend United under interests peninsula, adopted seem very by to initial North its States United in

U. S. S. R. by the to the Korea primary over the stance war may

exploit North

opportunities onslaught advance in the

Korean

Korean-Chinese influence from Nations North

1950-1951 or

peninsula, to forcibly In well as and view its

endeavouring auspices. Korea as

ambitions detached Korean

the the

relatively Soviet

passive Union

rather the

throughout

perplexing. the reactions in interests the Korean Korea in war. of were the the U. S. and the not as respect, may had to have by U. S. S. R. so. the whilst been tilted against much crisis the to by

However, the their situation balance towards of the hostilities primary of

determined peninsula In this

superpower Soviet

primary Union, the

interests Kremlin

operate

197

the milieu States.

background that were, Thus, was

of

a systemic in aggregate, far as

context biased the first the

and towards of

interventionary the these United sets enjoyed the in is, the long U. S. of an and

as concerned,

variables overall its of allies, nuclear

although

U. S. S. R. over powers that was

conventional it lagged

military far

superiority behind these systems,

sphere range by with political the an

weapons This

and strategic Soviet

delivery

aircraft. fact that

inferiority leadership hostile, since the had

compounded contend

the if not

to

unfriendly, environment. tremendous of its

actively

international it United the relatively to was

Consequently, disadvantage coercive of bargaining utilizing milieu in overall the intervene Korea bias to of its the in own vis-a-vis

placed States in Union

at terms

a

position, a order

Soviet

was

incapable interventionary hostilities The war

favourable manipulate the

advantage. situation enabled the Indeed, of South of of the latter the Korea its Korean to grave and, American to as

crisis States

towards

United in to the the

decisively threat a that

conflict. survival interests the Truman

was

posed to the

corollary, made immediate it

secondary for to

protege, take

imperative measures territorial the United conduct quo shifted which

Administration the its not war. was Korean political client-

guarantee of was Korean

independence state. unrestrained with, entire American once crisis

and But in the

integrity States of ante the

completely To restored, begin the of the

its status

bellum against

situation

the directed

continuation towards

intervention,

was

now

198

I ;, I°

re-unification China between reverting or extending it the in the

of

Korea. part

With of the aim to

the 1950, goal of

counter-intervention the of U. S. re-unifying had to Korea South

of choose and Korea,

latter

either to

abandoning the the could second milieu of U. S. original war only would

safeguarding itself. the first required

China

Effectively, option, not only to a to view U. S. of the Korea for to the the

however, pursue

choose have to

interventionary continuation context favourable comparative the Europe waging many Sino-Soviet to war political that to

remain but as States.

conducive also

intervention,

systemic relatively of vis-a-vis Western of too the

was the

overwhelmingly United

opposed In of the

conventional alliance

inferiority and the

sensitivity

excessive on China and in

American order to

risk-taking, re-unite to

option posed far

strategic

dangers

make

it

worth

while.

The

systemic The

context ability in Korea to their governed the had heart emerged and Asia, structure two plausible the American a treaty of of the during 'superpowers 1950-1953 in interests systemic context wake Soviet elsewhere. had become even of to respond that ambitions of the to is

developments most was conflict. structure left each the the, power Europe, the other Korean that United in war, appropriate fundamentally

a manner and context was World the War

respective by of in the and the this the

At

bipolar II, and

States Europe, this of

Union

pitted By the tighter

against time of with of In the U. S.

integration or ten "polars" states

alternative and Soviet

centres blocs. with

into signed

alliance

199

(l Il

(the about

North the

Atlantic policy

Treaty) which rivalry, they

and

thus

put

an

end

to

debate the Western or the a Far the of was

should to

adopt

vis-a-vis that bloc" In

Soviet-American Europe "third East, Kuomintang the might force" the final in be

and to

suggestions a "neutral system. the in Communists the

able the

constitute

in

international of registered a People's by the

victory was of

over

China

proclamation and of the an this alliance

establishment in with was of a were wave of short the

Republic, conclusion

followed treaty system periphery promise these The

order U. S. S. R. to

Admittedly, witness important

international changes on the to

beginning the

superpower of at the

competition bipolar stage was to

which structure. in sweep both of the

appeared However, early 1950's. all and

loosening still

a nascent that hardly in the

independence had firmly

virtually Africa

of the

Europe's Middle allies. It that how the Europe U. S. S. R., crystallized Union. the the to

colonies East were

begun; grip

America's

European

was

within

the States

context and war the in of

of

this

distribution Union had to

of decide

power on

United deal with

Soviet Korea.

the to

Politically,

although Eastern to the which Soviet most of Latin

accession and in the by In developing view

power

China nature 1950 of

in communist parties , 'represented bonuses major of the bipolar skewed against system the of

was

heavily

Western and

Europe's the

domination hegemony meant European

countries bipolarization

U. S. 's

over politically allies,

America, pitting the

effectively Union, its East

Soviet

and

200

China

against

virtually East-West the

the issue United the

whole of States

world contention. was

whenever

there Under

was these

a

fundamental circumstances, "world" at where distinctly coup of Thus, in will. its

able its the

to allies

mobilize almost war, by by defection Europe. to muster of the the a

opinion This efforts

against was clearly to

U. S. S. R. evident end were

and during

Korean aided

that

doubtless had been

anti-Soviet Czechoslovakia, and United support the

mood the

that Berlin trials the

created the Eastern able in

blockade, in U. S. it was made

Yugoslavia, at the

purge

Nations, for every

overwhelming the same or suffer war in

move of its

respect by even

Korea---irrespective it party was assured that with 1

merits---and, Soviet it or

token, third

every which

neutral would

proposal defeat. of United the order the

disapproved

a decisive The biasness of on war in in up any the

international States during

political 1950-1953 might its in make to

environment put a heavy

in price the

favour

attempt in area.

U. S. S. R. to The advance Kremlin, it Korean probably and the

manipulate

Korea the

politico-strategic other make words, from allies pay in had providing against terms that of of such Soviet rally isolate war in time with the the Korea for Kim to

position weigh strategic the price

whatever backing it for would with the by to

gains its most

might and

Chinese to

have

cooperation support intentions, more states might,

West,

possibility and suspicion alliance,

stimulating consolidate the U. S., respect, occurred In view at of

fear the and the

work around In

Western

thereby eruption

further of

U. S. S. R. could the hardly Soviet

this have

a more its

inopportune links

Union.

close

201

11-sung moments, Korean its West Council, and Another endeavours accept a

regime, generally attack.

the

U. S. S. R. presumed to of

was, be

from implicated was the

the in

very the

first North of the Peace

One to inter its on the own the capture alia,

effect the the

this

hindering from World of

efforts through, and ban was

political activities for weapons of suspicion States

initiative of the

proposals use of

a reduction of mass in and

armaments

destruction. of allies on tension, its to the and and Korea Soviet nothing and presumed then, Union with its the later, as the they one the a

stimulation persuade the for Germany pact.

respect its

to its

United

proposals of

a four-power and other As the far

conference causes as the of of

demilitarization for their confirmed efforts more thereby "aggressive outbreak most of unwelcome allies and then in than a five-power friends their the an allow

peace were

Americans South that were alliance its

concerned, previously-held

invasion suspicion

sphere attempt the designs" war in

of to

peace divide

and the to

disarmament Western pursue Clearly the it Soviet could by trying

U. S. S. R. uncontested. Korea presented Firstly, initially, of for the out

dilemma. in the Korea, level cover beyond held the

underwrite to deter

Communist prospect by providing

U. S. the 38th the

intervention Chinese parallel. promise Korean forces

and,

strategic up to and

advanced hand, Soviet consolidating However, the it such

On of

a strategy over the also position entailed of an

extending and East. out West

influence

entire of the

peninsula in the of with Far ruling the

U. S. S. R. probable arrangement

a very amicable

risk

possibility

202

over Germany, creating countries

such not

issues to

as

nuclear the

weapons impact

and that it

the

division would have

of in those and in for The

mention

a more most the and option

fervent vulnerable hawks a more

anti-Soviet to in the

atmosphere sommunist West who

amongst

take-overs were pressing policy. was itself In have the

encouraging rearmament alternative was North this hoped Korean did. and the finally Korean strategy, that war, Once survival relied 2

assertive to is

anti-Soviet the to for Kremlin distance the best. may not

available and that

one from opting initially in

that the for

chosen, invasion the the at direct of on incensed territory Korea from

and Soviet

hope

leadership would the

United least

States not to

intervene that it

the

extent

-eventually a reality it be in save

American North the

intervention Korea was seriously the of

became

threatened, Chinese would troops thus

probably sufficiently an

likelihood by the to political price: the

that presence

American and This obliteration of on its the

adjacent

counter-intervene extinction. the very near eyes

Communist also Soviet not carried

strategy of could prestige, The than fact the a

a heavy

client-state but have and Kremlin pursuing

under adverse resolve considered the first of

patron

repercussions images this option where its of as the more is not

credibility, that cost the of

U. S. S. R. acceptable only (or lie,

perhaps but of the also its West

necessarily) a reflection in be.

a measure of its its

priorities capability; confront

military-strategic to successfully

confidence if need The during

ability

nature 1950-1953

of

the

international played

political role

environment in shaping

also

a significant

203

United for case providing following act as the

States Soviet the

intervention Union U. S. it it

in

the

Korean

war.

But,

whereas in the by

constituted

a constraint, intervention only did The impact of rearmament the the it

of

initially for

encouraged and

incentives the Chinese on

escalation,

afterwards, begin to for this amongst of

counter-intervention, American the action. positive

a restraint evolved in

impulsion which

escalation might America's West system, with was 1950's. burdens the of prices have

around the

sustaining allies, its

momentum in facilitating into of

European Germany and Japan. in and

rearming security treaty States the the early combined rise fear

integration acceptance three issue difficulties

Western peace United

winning In all

a separate the during concerned, and 1950 and trying in aroused

areas,

encountering As the of Europe of strength, of popular was for an found question Atlantic far

serious as

rearmament cost materials living of

was

heavy raw about

militarization during standards which, by

the

in in doubt

Western in respect

stimulated to through of build the

a strategy might discontent.

up back West States

military door

allow 3 troublesome,

communism The question with

rearming United

Germany pressing defence, French, this the

even a full idea

more

the to

German which

contribution most distasteful. for "Big the by the example, Three" French Europeans, 4

Western especially Disagreement

Europe's the over of on British of whom

extremely was evident,

during foreign as well as

a meeting ministers the

alliance's 16,1950, where angered day of their

September were the

reportedly previous

Americans' to rearm

announcement West Germany,

desire

204

they Atlantic

wanted

to

raise 5

about Equally on a peace for without China, or-lesser nations which its

ten

divisions controversial

for

a joint were the published which, rearm. 6

North U. S. 's on inter Apart most were all the and

command.

proposals, November alia, from important opposed, Asian disliked economic to and by 24, made being

announced for provisions drafted neighbour, a greater Pacific Britain, on then, of the early to it

September treaty that with country

15

and Japan to

consulting or the extent, plundered feared in the the Asia

either U. S. S. R., by by the

Japan's these

virtually Japanese, of Africa.? a

impact and

Japanese

revival

markets given

Clearly environment may useful policy. restoration of September fear acquiescence "the the sake to of the have way A of

international escalating Administration support on bellum for the which, the war as its basis by

political in a Korea very

1950's, the Truman could in quo win

appeared by which

foreign of the a end have meant client prestige

settlement the 1950, of the of status was Soviet the of "8 the of guns eve

Korea ante

perfectly Union, U. S. S. R. a serious This, in

achievable, for in the blow turn, of would butter arrival total victory to it would defeat to Soviet

would have of a

reduced the state, for

acceptance of peace. sustain fear more said on the the "a and for

would rearmament, have

have

made for the

it the

difficult passing of As the would

momentum

aggression and of less the

made

task one. at Korea whole been of

Justifying Truman 38th

a very of U. N. in block which

hard forces South the has

parallel, stimulate

apparent sincere

effort... program,

mobilization conceived

rearmament

long-term

preparedness

against

the

threat

205

Russia's of fact the token, thus tension U. S. Japanese the would, to As hold the to aborting that 38th

military this was parallel to allow to make thedo duly

might effort

and was

aggressive to sustain with re-unite restoration to an made to end it the

policy. the war decision Korea. of South and difficult

"9 in

One Korea, to By the

way a cross same and

accomplished and with war to forcibly the

Korea, international for of rearm

come

subside, West treaty military

would Germany

have and

the a and It States

rearm peace

force

acceptance to

permitting to have maintain made it

that their hard out on of seems

country bases for of the the

American in

there. United United

addition, and York

Taiwan New

to Times the

keep

Peking commented

Nations. 23,1950,

September will

"[w]hat the they revived increase of United are

attitude States now Japan. world

neighbours

Japan to Soviet to all would and

take upon than or

toward whether of even talk both to the give a

proposals... more "10 tension afraid In this of

depend Union

the respect,

maintain the attendant compel the Pacific and

and,

with designs,

it, " Asia

"Russian in

aggressive Europe and desires of on come Korea. the the the into nations for

French way to

of

American role

a rearmed

Germany

Japan. as war

The a constraint began into to North

international United play Whilst States' following its invasion, order for, in to action

political conduct the of

environment the Korean to was not

decision in Korea did

advance aimed have at to to had the were

repelling go the latter to great rest

Communist in world, intervene

the Justify the war,

U. S. its

lengths of the to

intervention U. S. S. R.

unlike the

chosen

the

Americans

206

merely the

defending North Korean to were be

the

status

quo. was status political apparent the Soviet

To repelled

be

sure, and ante was

even U. N. bellum, paid. of no

after forces few This the signs

offensive the and to whilst the skilfully were ignored entered the began extending U. S. of no the

proceeded protests can

reverse raised

quo price

attributed venture: anything, was warnings once war as

risklessness Union of showed Chinese by MacArthur

American of doing

imminence concealed by the United to the

counterand

intervention Peking's However, general grew

a complacent scene, States the and

Washington. danger the of a

China involving

U. S. S. R.

Washington dream the the option activities the risk the entry of political in States, war to the in of

consider Korean war

implementing into China. 11 to to In per boundaries American heavy. of bringing se

MacArthur's Consequently, abandon confine fact, carried of

came extending

under the to the into

immense war in

pressure Korea peninsula. and

its since the

instead of China

Korean the'

equation the the

a major

escalation of

beyond sustaining

Korea,

burden conflict effect, and

intervention The the United Korean

became had to find

increasingly a way end. constraint wake Initially, stood of as South one Korea which of

a prompt the most

honourable political in Europe. the

Undoubtedly, United massive all of States

important in Korea was

on

behaviour

China's almost behind may might

counter-intervention America's by start itself the line the European fear of in that

allies the invasion Communist moves the Soviet at

Washington signal manifest along the

a general similar

campaign some bloc, for other

point(s) in

bounding

example,

207

Germany, However, the march

Yugoslavia, with of the U. N.

Iran, collapse forces of

South of towards the the

East North the

Asia,

or

elsewhere. offensive, and political began of war to as be a the

Korean border, in the

Chinese Union of this

apparent extinction replaced result were of most

acquiescence of by Communist

Soviet most over the

Korea,

fear

serious

anxiety

possibility In particular, of

American incensed his

mismanagement. by the general advocation which end at the be they

Europeans MacArthur, of the

behaviour of feared of the

especially Korean the which Britain's 1950, latter potentially avoided. 12 setback to war

persistent China, to an

extension might only

into war

bring war in

Korean

expense the chief

a general victim. the

Western call at

Europe upon the

would the hands

Hence November 5, the that can a be

U. S., of

following Chinese in forces, North of

to

permit so

occupy

a buffer

zone

Korea hostilities

dangerous

escalation

Given unity its in of the

the

importance Western to of was of the

attached

by

Washington underlain security flavour in United [its] States wishes to provide the the to

to

the by

alliance---an course "lent inestimable world"13---the of had respect to of a

importance collective moral value

commitment the case that the rest

which, [its]

Korea, of

actions... with maintain allies. Soviet alliance Europeans, by offering

dealings had of to its the Western Western feelers, and by

the... level it

a certain Moreover, Union "by by to with playing peace discuss

for not

the

beware to war

opportunities on overtures the

weaken of

fears

and

diplomatic by sabotage

peace acts,

disarmament,

208

local With troops, prohibition the

acts rapid this

of

aggression retreat meant of that

in U. N. the action from

widely forces U. S. beyond threatening in

scattered the to Yalu or in from using advance face

areas. of

'"14

Chinese its most nuclear of the his

had the

maintain and,

on to against for

military refrain Chinsa. to

importantly, weapons order position Prime would pushed notbe time order U. N. south Attlee unilaterally and war with were London every "16 end

Accordingly, withdraw Truman December Korea This to

MacArthur become untanable, Attlee evacuate the sea.

Korea

should British

apparently 6,1950, unless that they the at

assured that U. N. were General least of rapid took that might of These which on to

Minister not into given being. on forces of

on from

forces actually would for the

implied bomb

permission 15

Manchuria, the despatch

Neverhteless, 29 by raised of the and and the

MacArthur's retreat them the have to of the

December which, Seoul,

subsequent 4,1951, in Britain month

January fears

Trumanbeen

agreement revised,

previous that the be by troops

bombardment imminent.

Manchuria fears, 11 and on adhered the to

China soon that effort an of the

might

however, 'assured "make peninsula, until the

allayed U. N. to

Washington would

January fight

continue

establish that

a defence was more or

position less

assurance the war. world on during

Although important Union's was,

political the the United Korean

situation States war, It was ultimate role its the

was and

clearly the Soviet

an

influence behaviour

overall

impact

nevertheless, environment played

contributory. which, more in the

international analysis, in shaping seems the

strategic to have

a much

decisive

209

superpowers' In this

interventionary respect, between each the the U. S. nature and

strategies of the the

throughout

the

war.

military-strategic during capabilities the general position declining offset by American long range an 1950-1953 and

balance conferred vulnerabilities. was one

U. S. S. R. different

superpower During the Soviet

with this Union that more of

period, enjoyed was slowly atomic

where

a steadily somewhat decreasing weapons of Soviet to come and

conventional overwhelming supremacy aircraft. military it would in A strength seem service in

superiority and the much sphere

precise at that of to any States in from by the the the over that

assessment time is number

conventional by; however, arms about no During doubt the an in the 2.8 to same even of

hard of

total

men under from 1952,

direct million

U. S. S. R. four

increased by threat. forces

1947

million atomic

counter-balance period, sharper the 1.6 United increase war;

Western

conventional number about of

witnessed as to field, whilst 40" to

combatants in atomic 1947

a result approximately the estimates "over

Korean million

670,000 In by from than in the

1952.17 600 bombs ranged less

U. S. of 100"

disposed the Soviet

of

about stockpile

1951,18 "about the the

bombs19---considerably Indeed, not only the latter's

United nuclear for,

States'. field unlike was the begun time to than

superiority but also

quantitative it of had, the

qualitative, 1949, alleged

U. S. S. R., development have that

by hydrogen

November bomb,

already at times the greater

a destructive of its

power

about 20 enjoyed

a thouand

predecessor. the advantage

Whilst

by

the

Soviet

Union

in

the

210

field Western in terms

of

conventional and the

military United diplomacy that the of over clearly where goes

power States, was very

raised its

many actual

fears usefulness

in

Europe of

coercive a fact during inability superiority power was

limited way towards

outside explaining Indeed,

the

European Soviet in

arena, passivity

some

Korean the the

conflict. U. S. S. R. West to

even its crisis Berlin

Europe,

the

translate actual the

conventional bargaining blockade of utilizing the risk of to military

into during utterly

demonstrated it proved preponderance from the this for Soviet the West, to political, Union and city

of

1948-1949, its

incapable in order to

overwhelming powers Basically, fact that, the to

dislodge the

Western war. the

by

manipulating can be as

shortcoming

attributed well as

economic, was thus at a lacked the for any risk purpose general

reasons, in relation and its the

disadvantage the war other begin conventional its the the Europe U. S. S. R. the a Soviet significance Soviet event was as credibility by using in

both of

resolve

manipulate

conventional of was its the

superiority vital security nature Strategically, of

than with,

defense there

interests. the this it as a conferred "hostage" Since recognized it the follows Kremlin

To U. S. S. R. 's derived upon in Western by the that wth roughly Europe partly the

preponderance. mainly to hold from

the

ability Europe

Union of an

Western

East-West by American on power the

confrontation. the U. S. security ground vis-s-vis and

perceived a vital advantage

area, bestowed

bargaining to

Washington attached to however, counted Western was against

commensurable by offset the United by

the

importance This

States.

power, which

several

asymmetries

211

Soviet important as air

Union. areas defence inferiority economy surpassed that War well II. for conflict potential compounded which of

They the

included U. S. S. R. 's

weakensses conventional cover, the 21 a

in armoury

certain such

and

strategic in relation the

air to

substantial

nuclear weak never society World bode

West, under of the the

a comparatively consideration U. S. 22, exhaustion did of and a of not any its

during

period that from these in

being had

three-eighth recovered to say, Union

hardly

Needless the Soviet and, towards by an

asymmetries the served States. inequality as event to

protracted coercive they the directly whereas directly had at were relative

consequently, the United

reduce

Moreover, regards to

additional of the each U. S. other.

abilities inflict damage Union damage the range not

and

the In

U. S. S. R. this capability the both a against which for gains it respect,

on

the

Soviet

possessed on the

a modest United in terms to

for latter nuclear very the the to or the Europe, than for

inflicting its and disposal long though This

States, of

means, aircraft,

weapons substantial, U. S. S. R. Soviet manipulate forestall potential would the

deliver

a disabling, reduced have considered war under though for in order these enormous the the

strike incentives worthwhile to

drastically would risk for, of far war,

leadership the losses, cost have U. S. In view of Union its been

of

make

circumstances, for Western Union

greater

Soviet

its to

strategic use the in

limitations, Korean the war Far as

the a

failure vehicle much

of for less

the

Soviet

consolidating

position

East

seems

212

paradoxical. part Chinese nature ---an a of in support allies the

Indeed, of would its

to

have North been strategic

attempted Korean very

to and,

play

an

active

subsequently, Given during partly the

have

imprudent. balance that was

superpower nuclear Soviet posture

1950-1953 offset by more U. S. S. R. where to the The

American qualified Soviet a game for in risk of of

superiority conventional would have with were had amounted blow in strike Western not to be to,

preponderance---a required the of United equal the States weight. to Soviet

active play risks Kremlin, the

brinkmanship country words, which

each other war

prepared for the the and for the the

manipulate Union, a of a much of a been costs risk seen and the that the up, a

devastating protracted more Soviet might as modest

nuclear hostilities nuclear of

coupled-with Europe, together Europe. had of the the of

possibility U. S., prospect such stake the at

with

invasion have vital been to to war, the the though the States at

Although issues U. S. S. R., the issues not risk writer of of at

acceptable security Soviet

benefits Korean warranted United

Union

stake

in

substantial, of As

were the once

a magnitude war summed with it

manipulation that time.

the doubtful that it In seems extremely retrospect, had before they great acquired Russians---especially have taken anything capabilities---would air-atomic immediate sphere direct upon their less attack than a for deliberately the occasion as of control have Total meant war would war. a total preciptating forfeiting homeland of and the the devastation of their for less opportunities and more profitable risky many it Therefore, quite Soviet seems objectives... gaining deliberately have Kremlin the improbable that would total in war... as a way as to cause such -intervened that the U. N. command believed coveted no long as it 24 Korea beyond territorial objectives ... Although nuclear the conventional of the military Soviet Union might seem and to the have modest been

capability

213

deemed either intervention conventional constraint conflict. nuclear superiority facilitated also which conflict of its

as

insufficient or the

by

the

Kremlin the Soviet have

for

the level power, acted

purposes of American especially as a

of

preventing in

controlling Korean appears war, to States' superiority have cancelled

power, on the

major the in the

United the to

behaviour of out sphere, in a limit States with in a the the the

during U. S.

Whilst field in the by was in the seems the

U. S. S. R.; s and thereby war, extent it to the cent its thin conduct military but that permit a number in the the or of wake Acheson the

conventional intervention existence, the United Indeed, forces sustained engaged on

American its mere for

Korean on to the

placed, it

prudent

escalate 80 and per with

peninsula. armed

about Korea,

effective

military logistical of effort also, depletion encourage other of areas the

operations line, war to and not 25 the

dangerously in of its its

U. S. by the

felt

constrained

only

vulnerability or Chinese by the

potential much of the of more its

Soviet importantly, defences to

interdiction, possibility might one of

elsewhere strike at any

U. S. S. R. potential

confrontation. Secretary November the conflict where 28,1950, by there

Thus, of that retaliating were air at

China's

counter-intervention, his States fear escalate in which then it on

State

expressed United the

should

against least in the the 300 Korea war. Truman Chinese

airfields

Manchuria, could the was threaten Soviet generally the

warplanes and Japan,

American Union would feared of

bases enter by

Likewise, Administration

that

introduction

Nationalist

214

troops In this

into

the

conflict it would self-interest, was

might argued

lead that the

to to

a similar extend to the

outcome. war

26 into in

respect, China of its of 27 on Korea. The

mainland defence fulfilment treaty. constraint inside the feared States' the form Soviet of It United American was of belief that North much own upheld action, of the the

compel

U. S. S. R. and, under Soviet applied

intervene most of all,

prestige, obligations of

in

its

the intervention even the to

Sino-Soviet as activities bombing it of was United port to some a

prospect

American For

behaviour instance, port of

following Rashin as the in

U. S.

North by allies

Korean the State that,

August as

1950, by of the the

Department in view of 28 amongst of belief inspired or tying Soviet of the

well

proximity attack might

Union, Soviet would

a repeat retaliation. seem that

provoke

the

vital power the the

elements as North Kremlin in a constraint Korean with Korea. who Chinese dissipate whilst It of the

in

the on

States' action

perception was the

that by it

attack the aim This thought and as its also Korean as part the of

a diversionary distracting was the upheld

ploy U. S. by "was "

down

Acheson, behind that

amongst every its one aim as

others, of the to

U. S. S. R. Moves, United "remained Truman had

Korean of forces by the

and

was

States' free from upon "30 plot it

strength for the as future very

possible "29

use. beginning

was

who,

looked

a "Russian the down

maneuver, belief the U. S.

Kremlin war the motives of was

plan. a Soviet

Underlying to which Soviet which Union. wear

that was,

Korean course, aggressive in many

presumption to the

attributed This to was

world-wide implicit the

Truman's

views

tended

portray,

215

U. S. S. R. pretext, invasion general more the in

as to of Soviet

a scheming challenge South Korea

power, the was

waiting West.

for Thus,

a

pretext, the prelude world, or

any

Communist to to under of Truman, counterwhether in or would Even a a

feared the

to

be

the

onslaught attack of the in United how the U. S.

against an area States. to had respond to -

Western or In to in mind the

selected hegemony considering

directly

indirectly words

China's that

intervention, Berlin, Iran, give without might "a the West minor

keep

Germany, incident an pressure

Japan, could excuse could

Indo-China, be created

Yugoslavia, which

easily for be the States into a general the open

Russians that, seriously for not also only

intervention. at a rate position. the Soviet Truman

increased Western to

that 31 ', Korean trap, has

endanger the be United to fall

Consequently, war but pointed would might out,

escalate presumed

precipitate

war.

As

Korean the I made in connection [e]very decision with third to prevent had this a one aim in mind: conflict bring it destruction terrible would the world war and This that we should not to the meant world. civilized the to the do that excuse provide would anything full-scale into free the Soviets nations plunge and 32 all-out war. The respond than by possibility to an that extension an the of U. S. S. R. the war might China have in chosen a way to other was by the and aircraft and its Soviet covert to air

into

launching from with have as perhaps

immediate

full-scale calculations For

intervention

precluded preoccupation Union nature Korea could such and

Washington's total war. measures of resort

instance, of a limited and submarine

undertaken the despatch even the

equipment to

216

attacks Admittedly, general retaliation, that Chinese formidable that States Union's Korean reflection but also

against such war by

U. S.

naval

units, measures steps if of the was

ostensibly might retaliation Americans not sufficient constituted than China.

by have

the

Chinese. led to counterconcluded a

limited

successive particularly

and had to

bombing troops

Manchurian and "privileged of have action that

bases the

contain more had United Soviet of was the a

U. S. S. R.

a much But, the the

sanctuary" been less

course might

considered, constrained in was not its

then by conduct considered with that This, the United

been

conventional war. 33 not of The only its

preponderance fact of lack deter to the were the that it

U. S. 's of

obsession

total its in

war, nuclear turn, States' to and,

confidence aggression. of

superiority can nuclear neutralize consequently, assault be

could ascribed forces, the to

Soviet

limitations not of

which

a sufficient

magnitude capability upon a

U. S. S. R. 's prevent the West. it

war-making from embarking

wholesale

against

The

interventionary In contrast milieu more the

milieu to of the the systemic Korean to the war Soviet the the more States was, context, on Union. parameters of the the whole, Yet, each

interventionary relatively although superpower's milieu shaping U. S. S. R. provided the seems the

favourable context to played of the the

systemic response to have

defined conflict, a far United the U. S. to

interventionary role that of in the

pronounced than

response In fact,

whilst for the

interventionary intervene in the

milieu first

impetus

217

place, especially Korea, the it

its

relative after

conduciveness U. N. forces been the

to began

Soviet to march

intervention, into North by rendered in

appears unfavourability imprudent of The its for

to

have of the

more

than

counter-balanced which

systemic to war. Korea created

context, effectively

U. S. S. R. in of the

intervene

support

proteges

endeavour quo by military

North means the

to an

change

the

regional which, on to token, North its the Korea of of military Soviet amounted and in the have the of a to the its a

status initially, scale primary association placed

environment to intervene

encouraged that was

United out of

States all By with the

obviously in Korea.

proportion same

interests of the onus the

Soviet

Union Soviet

revisionist in by its virtue local

against by Korean the support change, quo,

intervention, U. S. S. R. and In

spite

advantages proximity superiority intervention to an attempt

enjoyed to the over in to status superpower U. S. S. R. of resolve crisis. challenge balance offensive at

the

peninsula U. S. of not but North only also and

other would local status in

words, have territorial quo would as in the the regards event

Korea the the this

political regional put the

balance, a tremendous with the

itself

disadvantage States for status quo

balance superpower successfully superpower North

United

Indeed, the by providing would have

U. S. S. R. in the regional for enjoy in prospect ofthe

strategic required situation against in support

backing it to

the an 1950, of Korean

Korean

overwhelmingly it did not.

favourable Thus, by the whilst Soviet

crisis working Union

which, the

intervention

218

Communist "fact as the of

invasion, possession, of " the

the

inertia it

of easier quo,

the for to

status the

quo, United on

or

the

made status

States, behalf of

defender Korea. It was,

intervene

South

however, secondary the

the

superpowers'comparative at important that the American of Soviet was were had the failure consequently, it. Whilst that its not not was North stake in the in

valuation Korean establishing towards was it to As a far long the aimed war

of which an the at upon extent

their

interests most

constituted

element initially Korean

interventionary United the States.

milieu Since of an

biased attack

destruction the secondary than of of the those North the Soviet

client-state, the U. S.

impinged greater as the

interests of the

Union. at as stake,

survival interests Although Korea's to from lose its

Korea U. S. S. R. Union to change its

secondary affected. from North stand States no urgent other value to at else, of the South Soviet of be

seriously to quo, gain it did United under U. S., of intrinsic on

everything status as did was the was

endeavour as much success to very

not

from and, support

the

compulsion hand, its stake prompted Korea. Union June on of the the and had rivalry were the Given the

the

little with the

to

lose

U. S. S. R., and to these,

secondary more in links that what than ally than

interests anything

monumental, decision Communist presumption was in Korea States

intervene close

defence with the were the and its

Korea's in

Washington maneuver,

invasion seen to

25,1950, line

a Soviet were as

nothing a reliable

less

credibility image of

United

resolve. The United States' perception of the North Korean

219

invasion stemmed peninsula reaction world. confirm that that

as from

a the

challenge fear have region of of power big-talk

to that a political and, South people was

its a

credibility Communist domino in it was the victory effect the

as

an in or

ally the chain

would in The to the

eventually, Korea,

rest

of

the would

conquest "millions

thought, free

throughout in fact a

world, " bluff.

" and "34

"Russian "American

invincible, shameless might encourage to

was Korean they to had come "35 to victory no to

Consequently, states Soviet whatever the to might terms feel

"a North that "rush

other to on "[ilf the no and was, "to the of for it a

option terms As force from to

but with

succumb Communism

and

they were

can

get.

Truman their the resist

put way Free

it, into World,

Communists of nation by felt to Korea

permitted

Republic small aggression therefore, demonstrate United adversity. to do

without have

opposition the courage

would

threats "36 the It U. S. of in was time there

stronger that the is And in of what it

Communist was

neighbours. for

imperative that the

world

friendship value

States "37 so than

inestimable better In in the not who

opportunity the words peninsula only are in now

Korea?

of

Truman, "lend also within

successful resolution Europe shadow and of

intervention to the many countries East

would Asia but

in the

Middle

living

Communist the as to its

power. North of

"38 Korean the invasion United Resting the main on was States' the also seen in a that for

Likewise, Washington challenge the Soviet

a test resolve.

response, assumption

Union

bore

responsibility

220

Pyongyang's attack the will as of an

actions, endeavour U. S. 39 States be and dangerously would soft be gravely the

this on and to the

notion part

posited of the

the Kremlin

Communist to test and that of be Asia as for Iran, it world a

the

demonstrate it

Soviet was

strength feared its image would in

American unless resolve jeopardized, would result, additional Yugoslavia, was war. further As be the

weakness. United would

Consequently, responded tarnished, precarious undermined.

decisively, its balance 40 The out" such prestige of ,

power U. S. S. R., or as 42

encouraged spots

to

"feel 41

probe in This,

elsewhere, Burma, or

Indo-China, feared, Truman put would it,

Indonesia. lead to

eventually

another

what ... repetition Berlin. armour; embroiled It States decisively the failure With Korea, the only its the was, therefore, to

Korea in developing was of what scale on a larger for Reds were The probing thrust we had to meet their 43 in a world-wide war. of the paramount line" to Korean in defend Communist of the importance Korea44 its

like a seemed... in had happened in our weakness getting without

for by

the massively and

United and ensure

"draw intervening of the the

client-state offensive.

restoration

status ceased

quo to action.

ante be

bellum

in to not ally,

interventionary of but also and South Korea, its of and, its American

milieu

conducive Having as an

continuation secured, prestige,

military its of

enhanced image the

credibility resolve States by had in no the the domestic cross the

successfully compelling peninsula. momentum political 38th parallel of

defending reason However, its to for

United intervention factors

continue a variety success which equated

including

military

especially, to

pressures

a failure

221

with itself entity By the that

appeasement to and so, the to it

of

the

Soviet of

Union, North

45 Korea

the

U. S. as a

committed political peninsula.

destruction the forcible a threat China the

reunifaction to the

of secondary even more

the

doing

posed and to by the

interests serious

of than

U. S. S. R. constituted As with the credibility since the

that

was Korean venture

North Korean

invasion. vis-a-vis Korea the Soviet U. S. for forces, concern the United

North

States, the Indeed, gave arguably, did lacking successfully U. S. S. R milieu In States may hostile sufficiently save else. the once first reason the

American and it was

advance the affected

into resolve with

Communist of actual cause

challenged Union. it and, than However,

Kremlin a more North the

a far Justifiable attack

greater

reason for the

for

intervention

Korean necessary confront

Americans. to in a be

strategic the United

capability States

able

to the

crisis,

was to

unable the not fate on

to

exploit out

a favourable of North Korea.

interventionary

coerce

U. S. to of the an

deciding over the relied forces

risk North

a confrontation Korea, the that territory to intervene

with Soviet the

the

United

leadership presence would and if for "to thereby nothing conquer Asia, one had it up, must every of be

have

probability adjacent for China of

in

threatening Korea fact, one first for

North In world, must

reasons by

self-defence, dictum Asia; to "46 writer conquer the to

haunted must first

Tanaka's conquer

that

conquer China,

conquer Korea and

China; Taiwan, As one

conquer to be

Chinese summed

concerned. aid to China to visit

American MacArthur's

under China

the China soon after

Aid Act, General the outbreak of

222

38th Parallel by the the of the crossing war in Korea, Yalu River, to the the their Americans... approach and in interests the debate strategic on American open by islands Pacific of a return possibility and on the to these the Chiang to combined mainland---all it Americans the that Peking persuade and alert... like the intended similar, campaign an anti-communist in interventions anti-communist unsuccessful, albeit 47 1917 revolution... Russia the after Admittedly, independent whatever resolve it the may the and harm images have Kremlin timely may as hoped have could hardly have expected to own credibility Nevertheless, Western, especially as for saving Soviet North China's counteract and

counter-intervention befallen of in of 48 on its of its

a result that,

inaction. the

view China's of

American

conception by be proxy, passed

intervention the credit

intervention Korea would

some to the

U. S. S. R.

223

Notes

1.

2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12.

13.

14.

15. 16.

States-introduced United Virtually approved or all by a ratio during the Korean of war were passed resolutions bloc Eastern Assembly. General 1 7 to at the about U. S. by the not approved resolutions or other resolutions, R. See, for by the defeated example, same ratio. were Mall War (Barrie The Korean Leckie, and Pall and Rockliffe D. 161-162,253,254,255; London, 1962), Press, pp. American A Critique Colossus: World The Free Horowitz, of London, War (MacGibbon in the Cold Policy Foreign and Kee, War The Limited Korea: D. Rees, 124,134; 1965), pp. New York, 1964), Press, Martin's St. London; (Macmillan, p. KOrean War History the The Hidden Stone, 108; I. F. of 1952, 252; New York Press, (Monthly Review p. and London, The Decision Yalu: to Enter Crosses the China A. S. Whiting, 1960), 102,112. New York, Korean War (Macmillan, the pp. Korean Controversy J. Spanier, The Truman-MacArther and the The A. B. Ulam, 1959), Press, War (Harvard University p. 24; World War (Viking II Since Russia Rivals: America and Press, New York, 1971), p. 171. Affairs, Survey International Royal Institute of of Calvocoressi (Oxford P. 1951, International Affairs, ed. 1953), University London, Press, referred p. 2 (Hereinafter ) to as Survey. Ibid., 1952, p. 7. in Stone, Cited 17,1950. September The New Times, York 102-102. op. cit., pp. 102,200. Stone, ibid., pp. Ibid., 300-301. pp. Ibid., p. 102. in ibid., Quoted 29,1950. September The New York p. 105. Times, ibid., Quoted in Stone, p. 103. if China and, MacArthur's over-running of programme Union Soviet given fighting the was, apparently, necessary, "highest by the consideration careful very serious and See M. B. " States United the government. echelons of 1967), New York, War (Doubleday Ridgway, The Korean and Co., p. 146. Herald York New 14,1950; November Times., The New York Cited in Horowitz, 16,17,1950. Tribune, op. cit., November p. 132. . Ridway, War: Limited Also 148. see R. E. Osgood, p. op. cit., Chicago Strategy (University The Challenge to American of Press, Chicago, 1957), p. 170. (Hodder H. S. Years Truman, and of Trial and Hope 1946-1953 leadership's For the Soviet 444-445. Stoughton, 1956), pp. Western for the weakening potentialities perceptions of the 1,1741952, Survey, pp. op. cit., especially alliance, see 176,178,185-186. in Stone, 7,1950. Cited December The-New Times, York op. cit., 572E-9. London January 12,1951. Also Daily The New York Times, see the Both in Stone, January 12,1951. Mail (Paris cited edition), ibid., p. 244. 224

17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

War Played, " Foreign "How Z. Brzezinski, the Cold was 183,185-186. Also Survey, 1972, Affairs, October, see pp. 87-88. 1949-1950, pp. op. cit., ibid., Brzezinski, p. 186. 1949-1950, Survey, p. 87. op. cit., Ibid., p. 89. Ibid., p. 88. Brzezinski, p. 185. op. cit., Ibid., p. 184. Osgood, p. 180. op. cit., Ibid., p. 183. 166-167. Rees, Ibid., 175,183; op. cit., pp. pp. 175-176. Osgood, ibid., pp. Truman, p. 418. op. cit., Ibid., 410,446. pp. Ibid., p. 446. Ibid. Also see p. 458. in Osgood, Quoted p. 169. op. cit., Ibid., 180-182. pp. The General R. H. Rovere, the A. M. Schlesinger and and American Foreign Policy Future President. the of and 91-92. 1952), London, (William Heinemann, pp. Truman. Quoted in Leckie, p. 251. op. cit., Truman, p. 351. op. cit., Truman. Quoted in Leckie, p. 251. op. cit., Quoted in ibid. Korean North Making Policy A. L. George, "American and the 1955, 211-215. January Aggression, Politics., " World pp. 3rd ed. (Macmillan, F. H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations, New York, 1967), p. 391. 211-215. George, pp. op. cit., 40,41. Whiting, pp. op. cit., Truman, op. cit., p. 355. Ibid., p. 353. Rees, op. cit., p. 100. in Quoted 28,1950. November U. N., Chinese at the spokesman 86-87. Spanier, pp. op. cit., Since 1945,3rd Politics World P. Calvocoressi, ed. 56-57. 1977), New York, (Longman, London pp. and 206-207; Truman Stone, See, for pp. op. cit., example, 187 n. 38,90, Whiting, 421-422; pp. op. cit., op. cit., pp. Nations: A War and the United 152-154; T. Yoo The Korean Desbarax (Librarie Study Hostorical Legal Diplomatic and 1965), (Anc. ), Louvain, p. 48.

225

SECTION

B:

DOUBLE

INTERVENTION: WAR 1973

THE ARAB-ISRAELI

In have interest the Middle

contrast the

to status only has

the

Korean of

peninsula, of

which disputed invasion

seems superpower of

to

assumed

a locale the focus since

symmetry East

after the

Communist of

1950,

been

uninterrupted the

Sovietmid-, 1950's. in as terms well it and the Japan, Soviet at role has asset in as of to

American Geostrategically, its the an geographical southern area of

competition the proximity flank great This oil extent for of reserves, the energy. Eruope, East its global amongst in of the importance to

of the

the

region Union has States by

Soviet alliance

Atlantic to has which and, the been

made

into the

concern concern on U. S.,

United sharpened Europe,

U. S. S. R. East's lesser depend crossroads the added Middle to-

Middle to, Union the of also the of it into in a

Western potentially,

the

Moreover, Asia, and Africa,

being the

located pivotal

international as a

communications strategic the has

attractions rivalry. the

superpower the region

Politically, countries for

prestige made

developing conduit immense East States in the

a much the

coveted World.

potential The the the

superpower

influence and political global Union patron-client and

Third

geostrategic to the the

significance contest seek prompted influential

of

Middle United

superpower Soviet the established

and region;

to

partners that were

relationships

subsequently

the

226

resultant naturally superpower Thus, the stake interests. soon credibility territorial either was position be even met at more United in

Soviet

and

American its stature

commitments as a locale

in of

the

area

enhanced interest with States terms As became and status legitimate a the and of far

disputed

symmetry. outbreak the Soviet of the Union and, latter ground For ante bellum the 1973 had Arab-Israeli almost as much war at

primary as the

especially, were for the was concerned, the U. S., never

secondary the superpowers' although recognized attack its which other hand, arms regional had to had and six its Arab patron of the the with an its the as war

testing resolve. quo or

desirable, Soviet its

Syrian-Egyptian to

perceived and all at to

as

a direct to

challenge reputation on the of 1967 and,

a threat costs. stake.

general U. S. S. R.,

The

The the defeat military and

failure of

Soviet

patronage years clients and of

prevent

thereafter, had with position left their

political deeply

and frustrated very

stagnation disenchanted to the In

posed in of

a the

serious Middle in

threat East.

U. S. S. R. outbreak opportunity dented

entire

this the and Arab

respect, Kremlin to

hostilities to consolidate by

1973 its

provided position a and 1973 limited American war

recoup victory. in in of to

prestige The

facilitating of time of in Soviet of their the the

concurrence at the

interests reflected behalf

the the

Middle type

East and

was on In

intensity clients

intervention conflict. pattern.

their Korea, States,

respective these the

contrast the and United Syrian

followed basic task

a similar was to

For Egyptian

thwart

aims

by

227

enabling bellum, Arabs. operation of on coercive behalf

Israel but To in without this aid

to

rapidly inflicting end, it

restore

the

status defeat massive employed

quo on

ante the

a humiliating initiated State to minimize a and

re-supply a range

of

the in

Zionist order Syria. a very

tactics of to Egypt facilitate from of Once the the

Soviet

intervention the victory U. S. S. R. and, an Egypt airand began displays 1967-type October intervene the Egyptian 24

and

Conversely, limited Arab moments, equipment and Union warning the

sought consequently, and Syria. to of gain sealift

the arms tables

first military

launched to Israelis in

and

were the as

turned Soviet a

initiative, diplomacy These displays

engaged against on

minatory

excesses. when directly front. the

reached to to

a climax unilaterally advance on

U. S. S. R. unless

threatened ceased

Israel

The intervene East contrast Soviet level, decline and States could these the as the of was

ability in

and accordance

willingness with by a war, its crisis

of interests

the in

U. S. S. R. the

to

Middle in to

facilitated to it the was to expansion the political of the in Korean

situation as At

which, conducive the systemic

was almost intervention.

American of

the cohesion

international of the Western with of

system, alliance, the

the

attainment permitted

strategic

parity

United that it of to

U. S. S. R. a degree early its ability 1950's. to with perceived bellum

maneuver

not

enjoy

the to

The contribution meet an its commitments interventionary illegitimacy In the Middle

developments was which, territorial due

client-states milieu the

complemented to the widely quo ante 228

of East,

status

the and resolve the

geographical the extent images Soviets were to

proximity to which seen match to

of the be

the

U. S. S. R. Kremlin's

to

the

region, and enabled the 1973

credibility in the war, in

at

stake

American

intervention

hostilities.

I

229

CHAPTER

8:

THE BALANCE

OF INTERESTS

Perhaps Middle since For the East1 the end region

more has of

than been World itself,

any

other

area a great

outside deal of a of the new central of

Europe, importance superpowers. development. importance

the

accorded War II

by is has

each not been

this East with

Historically, to since served Asia, material Ottoman Britain region powers One French, the declining, allies Another, superpowers, recent to the the origin on of virtually the as and time an

the all of

Middle powers the

global the to the the

aspirations, Mediterranean wealth of Africa

where, Sea has and the and of the

Phoenicians, sea route

imperial its

hinterland of and the

provided Roman, the

manpower

and Arab,

resources Empires, and by of the the France. United nuclear which British This importance the of one rapidly is but,

Byzantine, outreach of the

permitted The States age, in the postwar and is

power to

importance the Soviet on

attached Union, of the the

global factors. ancient of

based also the

a number attracted

these, and

past is of

empires, is to hand,

goegraphical though and its on

location

region..

strategic, the the U. S.

somewhat European other. for of the more relate States and

both and

West the

U. S. S. R. significance

increasing Still of by

petroleum. perhaps, incurred in the

other

factors importance,

paramount each of the

commitments Union

United

Soviet

region. Middle East to

The

importance Geostrategic A perennial

of

the

the

superpowers

attraction

of

the

Middle

East

has

been

the

230

geographical actual important Organization the Kremlin of location for

location of the and the

and

features East both the by

of has

the

region. been Atlantic powers Union, underlined to considered

The

Middle of

security the Soviet

North the

Treaty and the by the

Union For for its to actually

Western Soviet is In

respectively. the region proximity the U. S. S. R. Eastern to the certain southern Donets

the security it.

importance its United with much

geographical States, two nearer Middle

contrast a and than Soviet common Iran, is the Union, the vulnerable forces Sea. has the of

shares Turkey Sea

border and is U. S. in highly to

countries, Mediterranean parts Russia, basin, East of which are and and the East

Consequently, particular industrialized attacks in it any or the over confront leaders Middle that, as the is real whether, from eastern highly threat in the

the

includes

potentially from the naval Black

Middle Mediterranean

operating Although confronted postwar terror era, and Union to Soviet from the is

doubtful from view of military or a threat the

whether Middle the

U. S. S. R. during balance of power, the it

superpower superiority

overwhelming any European such still East one

Soviet is future, likely

Middle in the

Eastern the

foreseeable of The out, an reason

consider with writer some has

prospect

attack for

anxiety. pointed

this

have Russians For reasons the and history of geography long been of sensitive over all acutely matters instinctive about concern security, and the consequent Russia been have the of southern may vulnerability by experience to this of threats of section reinforced during Second War, the Civil Soviet the the periphery War... The World War and the stages earlier of the Cold (therefore] Middle East remain must of an area concern defence because it is close to Soviet planners... simply Union, because Soviet Western to the forces some

231'

continue and highly This the concern United

to operate 2 armed. became all of the

there,

and

because

it

is

unstable by

the

greater

with nuclear

the

deployment

States in of the aircraft

Polaris

missile-launching in addition a new In to threat the to of

submarine U. S. the this, pointed from our which strategic In Middle measures period Iran stationed separatist (Tudeh) in that the armed in fleet industrial the out

Mediterranean carriers, of of the the

which, constituted 3 U. S. S. R. Soviet Navy, country important the are

centres Commander that

recognition Gorshkov, an attack

Admiral against

"defense even This of

of

the

sea

assumes

more is... navies "4 the Union

significance of main submarines, carriers

for

forces. a number

result the

of

nuclear order East, over and and right 5 to the the

missiles. counter Soviet years. to the

potential has undertaken the these and

threat a

from number

the of

During 1960's, in 1942 1945 treaty

immediate centred Soviet

postwar mainly forces a on

up

Turkey. in Iran

Thus, under in effort borders 1960's attempt Americans. from a

1946, apparently

fomented the Communist republic during on the the

movement Party region and the in an

Azerbaidjan to the Moscow to 7 that set up

through

a pro-Soviet

which early in an the

U. S. S. R., 6 and put some too Turkey,

1950's Tehran alignment over in

pressure close Soviet an

regime with

prevent In

Iranian anxiety itself intense of Kars

a potential 1947 when on

attack Foreign to in

country Molotov the the United contested

manifested exerted areas missile withdraw

Minister surrender 1962, that during the

pressure and when

Ankara 8 and

Ardahan, Krushchev

Cuban States

crisis, its

demanded

232

Jupiter Soviet
By sufficient significant the of

missiles missiles
the late military

from in

Turkey 9
the power to Thus, counter it the

in

return

for

the

withdrawal

of

Cuba.
1960's

U. S. S. R. to enable the to

was

in it

possession to undertake threat the

of

measures East. naval the being the of 10 forces United to gain

potential extend

from

Middle its

began

deployment in the order object position and of some to

to

Mediterranean Sixth favourable to the the Soviet newest Fleet

Sea there, strategic Union, type

neutralize of this

States a more

vis-a-vis degree threat.

access

routes against

protection

nuclear

The created facilities U. S. S. R. in in Indian substantial do so in the

entry a need and, in area the

of for

the both

Soviet naval

fleet and,

into especially, the

the

Mediterranean air bases of naval or the bases Union in make began the a to and areas. would that, during carrier. eastern giving Moreover, serve as useful or be ll of in

therefore, Middle East.

increased The an

interest of the well began

attainment for as

would in in presence

constitute the

asset Sea

Soviet as to it

operating Ocean,

Mediterranean which at the about by Soviet bases U. S. S. R. States, one in in the Soviet the

navy same

time the in

as

the power

Mediterranean, of to to the the air

enhancing fleets the view Soviet Middle of

flexibility these East

staying Likewise, immense contrast the The early

access value to the

the Union

fact had,

United only of such

1970's,

newly-launched especially go a long

aircraft in way there. would the towards

availability

bases, would Soviet Middle

southern air access cover to

Mediterranean, to air the bases exposed in the

fleet East

233

refueling military Angola or The naval its often of given as well the and long led

stops forces

to

the to

Soviets their allies the by Middle

in

flying in the arise.

either Horn 12 Union been to of

cargo Africa,

or

Mozambique, importance air and to area, bases persistent friction particularly to to naval

should attached in the

need the

Soviet East has end,

gaining by has

evidenced that countries finally Port After to

efforts between the Egypt, facilities military

to

this Kremlin

a fact many was and 14 only Latakia, by the

and it

13 where at Alexandria airfields. had Tartous access and ones the

access as

Said the the

half war,

a dozen the

October relatively been regime. main Soviet

1973 small deprived

U. S. S. R. ports larger Ocean are in Ethiopia. in the of

Syrian of the Indian facilities and

having Sadat the

Egyptian side in of the

On the naval of help

Middle

East, Democratic

People's These have to 15 to

Republic enormous a permanent The Middle only for

Yemen to naval the

been establish

of

U. S. S. R. in will of

its

endeavour Ocean. continue to its

presence Union

Indian

Soviet East as

probably importance

view

the if this posed

an of well

area

security, However, threat

reasons may presence to other

geographical decline, as

proximity. the strategic in the

importance by the

of areas. of and

Western The the is

forces process advanced to

Mediterranean to this began

recedes with and 6,000 defence from the the the

leading Polaris

deployment Poseidon, mile point range of

more likely

submarines as the new the

accelerate, further seas, Ocean,

Trident contact to to

submarine the the large Indian

shifts for amd

example, as the

Mediterranean

234

U. S. S. R. reduces to or cover

develops even its

a fleet eliminates naval

of the

aircraft need for

carriers land-based Nevertheless',

and

thereby aircraft these

forces. will from to not the be

technological potential U. S. Sixth threat Fleet

developments emanating will continue in American

entirely Mediterranean. deployed of and

remove

the The

there

for

the

foreseeable flank region. continue purposes its Middle In location to the interests East. to of and

future other

protection interests the Soviet

N. A. T. O. 's commitments will fleet and its to

southern in the

Consequently, deploy basic and 16 to Middle of the East the

Union

presumably for the

a significant defence give and

Mediterranean flexibility, to

protect in the

credibility

commitments

contrast of the

Soviet does United as not

Union, bear

the a direct it

geographical relevance is of a only strong a of

security importance presence threat it that led measures area. however, of Union. the is

States; the prospect be seen flank which adopt and

indirect hostile potential Ironically, anxiety protective Mediterranean Turkey, evidence Soviet in

insofar in the to this the in area the very

would southern prospect

to

constitute of

N. A. T. O. the of the and as the

generated a later in number on in Iran powers of

U. S. S. R. Iran, early

to

Turkey, Soviet by

The were

moves the Western

interpreted and at the

aggressive Coming

expansionist time of the

designs Communist of

threat in have was

Korea

and

the

"apparent power the military in

success Europe, belief "

N. A. T. O. moves may

counteracting lent prepared credence to

Russian to employ

these that along

American

"Russia its peripheries

aggression

235

whenever therefore, through United

it it the States

was

not

opposed be East.

by

adequate to This seek

military to outflank

force

and,

might Middle to

expected "17

N. A. T. O. the

realization the Soviet 1950's Union,

prompted to first

endeavour against East Pact to

throughout the

organize in the and

a strategic form then of the the

consensus Middle Baghdad and later Sea. Soviet

Defence and the

Organization Central Treaty

(M. E. D. O. ), Organization presence the United played to Sea. is a extend in

(CENTO), Mediterranean only part

establish But, fears the in

a permanent doing and so, may

the

States large the Indeed,

reinforced in stimulating of "lead to its

have

Kremlin's to the large decision 1955, per cent,

decision

deployment given be been budget turn, flank. 1960's Soviet littoral, the southern of quest up the

navy of 18

Mediterranean ship, to when which do the so

time"

a

estimated to

to have

10 years, some time

the

seems Soviet

taken was fed

between by fears has 12 of

military This, southern in and south-east some of into the the in

increased Western

and to the

1958. N. A. T. O's deployment

a threat out, the

As Mangold the for Soviet

pointed in

navy

Mediterranean, along encirclement N. A. T. O., Sixth and its

a base

infrastructure of of the of the

generated European the countries the

a feeling members of the event of to

among brought to

question these weaken Greece, erode conditions, considered the

capability in credibility and, of air

Fleet It

reinforce to to to

war. alliance's

threatened commitment and hence peace-time

Turkey, whole the to be

some

extent, Even

Italy, under three aircraft

N. A. T. O. forces of by

normal

these Soviet

countries deployed

were in

out-matched

236

Egypt At

and

attached of war or be

to

units it

of

the was

Warsaw assumed to

Pact that

in extra in offsetting

Bulgaria. Soviet Egypt and the over the air Atlantic of

times

crisis, repidly African by in the the

aircraft other

could friendly

deployed states, American

airfields thereby Sixth of

North enjoyed

advantage Soviet component, alliance's aircraft flank. Middle N. A. T. O. Unlike States necessitate Mediterranean. facilities that it of 19 East

Fleet an of the to

naval

force and

Mediterranean the cover and dilution through central

integral the

necessitating air northern in a classic major well as Union, in naval U. S. Italy,

limited from Thus, the

diversion the southern cycle, for

action-reaction strategic for the the the importance Soviet Union. by

the the

assumed as Soviet

alliance the

deployment Mediterranean

the did

United not

a naval a search

force for

Sea on had the

and Navy and

air

bases

southern to

The in Gaeta, maintain 20 Italy, and the

already subsequently presence had at its

access demonstrated

could

a permanent Air Force Turkey, Libya, (S. A. C. ), The for Middle would be

anywhere disposal

in

the bases the the

Mediterranean, in Spain, base Air of aircraft greater Ocean

Greece, Tripoli,

and, which as well

until was as of used a bases, States in difficult, in access were have the

1970, by formidable

Wheelus Strategic fleet assumed Indian of naval

near

Command carries.

question the East United

however, on the

importance side of it maintain that the of area, island the the

where,

absence if not

facilities, to In on time

extremely presence has had These but

impossible, Ocean. facilities at the 21

a permanent the of October U. S. Bahrein. War,

the to

Indian naval

suspended since been

237

restored. As probably military are and Soviet significance years with for located because Union. of much with the U. S. S. R., to view the the United Middle East States as an member will area states Sea, of military over the the most of

continue importance on it the

because northern

several shores of

N. A. T. O. the of the has it has

Mediterranean the rimland general declined for the

constitutes But, the the apart Middle same in the missiles as

a segment from Eat reasons ranges this, region as of

U. S. S. R.,

improvements ballistic Mediterranean

submarines the

and"submarineIndian area, and Ocean with of made early

launched for the

substituting a major deployment obsolete missiles the 1950's

technological Anglo-American use 19G0's. of 22
The of the military Middle the

progress bombers Eastern

rendering and American in

the

generation which and had the

Middle

bases

importance East to factor the the

of Soviet

the

geographical and Europe of

proximity is strategic has is place also in not,

Union makes the

however, significance succinctly strategically international

only to

which superpowers. it, for

region As one East central

writer

described important communications:

the

Middle its

Asia, Africa, Located the the hub of Europe, and at is It is Middle East bridge. a crossroads and a bounded by Sea, Red Sea, the Mediterranean the the Indian Ocean, Arabian Persian Gulf, Sea, the the the Sea. Black This Sea, and the Caspian geographical land for trade was of historical position significance importance for land, routes and is of contemporary sea, linking Western Eastern communications and and air Eastern Africa, Europe Indian the with subcontinent, 23 Far East, Asia, Southeast the Australasia. and

238

Although the transit United most the Persian north-west which which, Jordanian Ocean, allies points "be 1967 has of out, judged Arab-Israeli Next Suez between the It goods areas. Canal in is by of sea and is an

the air

land routes

routes are of of both

have

diminished

in and

importance, unimpeded the the is of To of States the Agaba but the Indian two as must 1956 key Reich also and

significance, superpowers, allies. to which to Europe the the and comes to Israeli the to Red Isreal East. the it Gulf played the port Sea and Western vast

interest and of of its the

particularly Perhaps powers majority

States important Strait Gulf of no

West sea

European routes

Hormuz is

through shipped of

oil the

Japan. the Gulf

Strait

Hormuz

direct

importance both the with value in the Middle of the "24 after the the Asia, role

United of Eilat

connecting port an the -the in of intrinsic U. S.

and the

Aqaba

and Jordan,

Moreover, of Aqaba in the

significance terms wars. of

importance which

Strait shortest and a

of

Hormuz shipping

comes

the route

constitutes Europe and

Western transport of an

principal to Western

route

for Europe.

Persian important Europe

Gulf route and Canal the

petroleum for the

is

also between 25

shipment and of simplifies has been Pacific direct the

of

other Ocean

Indian is also it

The to its Indian the

Suez

military task stationed the force a route Good, to Canal was of Hope. about of

importance maintaining in was supplied nearly Through the

Americans, Middle East since June United

since Force, World 1967 States and

which War June east II.

Ocean between

While 1975, this via Cape shortened of

closed

from 11,000 the

the

coast the is

nautical Suez Canal

miles this

around trip

239

6,600 could

nautical easily be if of the

miles. rotated that Canal, to equal is situated the Bab the Soviet routes the through naval as the air

Perhaps to were however, attack importance at and

even from desirable. is and to the

more the

important, Fleet The in

ships the

Sixth 26

Mediterranean importance its war.

military by of Bab Red of

somewhat blockage the

diminished in times is the Horn southern 28

vulnerability 27 Of almost which separates The of the sea

Suez end from to of

Canal of

al-Mandab Sea Africa. approaches For Eastern access the the Indian world and

southern

Arabian

Peninsula the and the gate Gulf important Straits29 Sea ports

the the

constitutes Canal the the

Suez

Aqaba. of the

Union, are Soviet which fleets Pacific of the

most

Middle control rest of for the

Turkish Black

which and and the supplies

between and

reinforcements in the

U. S. S. R. 's as The well

Mediterranean pass. forces of the is Suez though the made Canal not

Sea,

Oceans naval

maintenance by

these

all

that which, vital, of to the the

much therefore, Soviet Canal,

easier

availability another

constitutes interest the Indian First by of fog in

important, In readily Pacific and autumn of

the Ocean all, in

region. is not

absence accessible ports and Arabia Pacific Sea, are by

U. S. S. R. handicapped winter. 6,100 From

Soviet spring the south the

severely ice is in over port. the scime the Through Black : ea

Furthermore, nautical more miles favourable is nearly

coast

from ports

nearest on the

Soviet Black miles Hope from

destination

11,500

nautical of Good

through

Mediterranean-Gibralter-Cape the Suez Canal, Soviet ships

route. the

sailing

240

would point. always blocked

require

only

3,200 as of the 30

nautical pointed ease out with

miles

to

reach

the

same must can be

However, be in Another taken

earlier, which the

account Canal

emergency. Soviet one. a route As for as

interest some goods well as writers in to

in

the have

Suez noted, from

Canal the Russia

is

an

economic provides Soviet alternative major per road cent

Canal to the the of one 50

transport some Asian consists Railway,

Far

East

countries; mainly is both to

overland and more 31 somewhat are the these air may West. and the less the

route, Trans-Siberian

which

about

expensive

and

is

vulnerable

Chinese

interference: Of routes balance, Union Europe and that to

strategic of of They Pacific the

importance Middle significance direct and For in the the offer the East,

than

the

sea on Soviet from

routes be

although, to the paths

more

the Asia

provide area 32 lies from

flight good

climatic the they and

geographical of direct Europe the in the Horn to of

conditions. these flight West Africa. of a major routes paths Africa,

U. S. S. R., fact that Union

significance provide Eastern and used

Soviet Angola, would in

Zimbabwe, Thus, they

Mozambique, inevitably the Horn of or he in the

event Africa

conflagration the in

Southern U. S. S. R.

which allies

necessitates and friends

assistance regions.

to

its

those

Petroleum Perhaps Middle the East West, the is most petroleum. important This Western strategic is certainly and asset the of case the for and

especially

Europe

Japan,

241

increasingly significance growing Middle tons, tons, production. million world better of the metric production. or a over East 7.7

so of the the oil per figure By tons,

for

the region years.

Soviet in this Thus, rose world

Union. respect between from production, 34.7 per East 16.2 has

The been

strategic rapidly and 1963, metric million of world 1,210.2 per cent of is

1938 million to cent produced 51.3 these in

production cent of

390.4

representing 1973, which The when of the Middle then

represented of considered

importance they are

numbers the context of been oil,

appreciated high and by against during constituted countries Development Moreover, proven cent. world per For oil Saudi proven cent the was, indirect of oil its from oil and oil of rates 1960's, the the the

economic which to a

growth large cheap of

characteristic extent Middle had East as

the made and of 1960

1950's possible also energy oil in and cent. world's per of 11.4

availability increasing 1960's 39 the per and cent

of use early of

petroleum 1970's. total for

a source in

Whereas energy

consumption Cooperation was bulk 53 of was per per the 60.85 cent for

Organization in East In alone

Economic the figure the the for figure 24.2

(O. E. C. D. ), the Middle

1973

contained 1974,

reserves. Arabia

accounted whilst

reserves, for 9.2

Kuwait cent. 33 in

accounted

Iran

per

United until and

States, after hence European region. the the

interest Arab-Israeli

Middle war important of

Eastern 1973, than most the world's dependent of

petroleum largely that their largest

relatively friends Being U. S. for was

less who many only

Western the producer,

imported years

slightly

242

on per

oil cent

imports of total cent

from

the American

Middle

East.

These

constituted in by oil 1962, 1976 importer, from to 34 of in the

1.5 and the a

energy later. the its from

consumption 34 However, largest

mere United and

2 per States the

ten had

years become of

world's oil imports

proportion had 1975. was was oil increased The

coming in 1973

Arab per this

countries cent in

7 per

cent

strategic-military home by the

significance fact that cut provide on and of years that in off, for national 'adverse'. earlier

development 1975 imported production economy, described point result services, affected, restricted steaming As a days was of "it

brought officially

January event of oil

estimated being totally to effect

supplies be

American even

would

inadequate whose '

a wartime was This as armed adversely being number reduced. of for any Soviet the Middle more of "36 the the of a

a development as 'immediate,

security "35 when, States were

'direct'

appreciated the like "with to of Arab those of

a couple oil its for flight line of the of need for

embargo, European some training warships increasing Middle the Eastern

United allies, time and drastically

pilots short front

afterwards the

consequence importance States, main the

recognition petroleum to coming policy settle was all prevent under towards the

strategic United the

Americans from

oil-producing and the to pursue

countries an as

influence, Arabs East and problem

even-handed to peacefully oil embargo

Israelis and avert

so

another

the

underlined. A importance with much lot

37 has of of Middle the been made in the Western to the on world Soviet the of the

Eastern debate

petroleum focusing

Union, U. S. S. R. 's

243

projected In lesser but It 1967 countries, the tons cent More mid-1970's of of oil the does had marked

energy contrast the need, to it the

needs to United limited import concluded most

for Western

the

next Europe the

few and

decades Japan

or and,

so. to "wants, oil.

38 a

extent, not begun when

States, quantities petroleum agreements of the

Soviet of Middle

Union East

" in of by

from

the with was

region a Iraq

only number which, two million 0.4 rate.

important to or the

which

exported per total the annum, annual Soviet from

U. S. S. R. equivalent petroleum has Gulf benefit started States.

some of a

mere

per 39

Soviet Union some Arab

prduction to 40 from in of import

recently, of main lies of

small

quantities The imports the East freeing European

oil

current in the the

economic area of

derived exports,

these

Soviet from the

particular the oil on states East exports high makes Japan

U. S. S. R. thus to hard

burden

supplying Soviet Indeed,

countries, for export

providing currency several

increased areas. East

resources the have petroleum, to the Kremlin's

recommendation, contracts the 41 costs for

European of its of oil, this oil for Middle own the it to

concluded while West.

the has

provision increased in Far to view Eastern export oil

U. S. S. R. Moreover, of the Sovit

transportation economic and to sense import 42

for

U. S. S. R.

Middle

Eastern

domestic

requirements. However, oil it for may the become

the Soviet a net

strategic Union oil are

significance depends importer. on when

of and

Middle to what the of

Eastern extent Baku Soviet and oil

Currently, sources

Volga-Urals

areas

the

principal

244

production, importance alternative mentioned and energy production for

but before source. earlier,

these the is the costs

are end in the

expected of Far the

to

decline 1980's.

rapidly The but, drilling source of western

in main as

Eastern as it a

U. S. S. R., well viable as

transportation do not make

of

the In on order the

industrial to one would narrow hand, have Eastern The

concentrations the and to gap between on import increase may

U. S. S. R. 43 and the exports, Soviet of or

consumption the other,

production, either

Union

increasing its own the such as in The of a choice oil an

quantities production, acquisition Soviet-American oil Kremlin increased which important would extraction,

Middle both. Western or 44

petroleum, option through deals a foregone for a

second

necessitate

of

technology

detente, for cooperation

Soviet-Japanese by no means settle and make increased access

conclusion. combination

may, oil

therefore, imports

production, to Middle Eastern

inevitably Soviet objective.

Political Perhaps
asset among "Middle greater main and cultural, The East part, Algeria, and political the of the the

the

most

overlooked
East is its

and

somewhat
political one level writer of World. two Arab

underestimated
standing has prestige "45 states, of political, For noted, far the Egypt

Middle

high As a Third

non-aligned East than this states that of has and economic basis

countries. have much revolved is based factors. of the enjoyed of the around upon

a

number

prestige is,

of to

the a

Arab large

Middle extent,

amongst

developing

nations

245

the

product

of the

the

legacy of

of

Egypt's

leading nations West's region, Israel its in

role the

in midto open the

establishing 1950's, set up its

movement struggle

non-aligned against in France, Canal, 46 the the and and

brief

attempts its following fervent

anti-Soviet with of

alliances Britain, the Suez

confrontation nationalization for operating conveying image of national in on a

support those

liberation Africa. the 47 whole Arab

movements, The role and

particularly of not this just legacy Egypt for three in and

in the full

world nation

revolutionary from the West of was

struggling by Egypt, an the Arab leader the following at to These
struggle

independence factors. the state rest of

facilitated is that both to be

further with

The the

first Arab

these

common an of the

world, claimed

was

Islamic Arab

which,

moreover, nationalist leader, throughout Nasser,

progressive Egyptian the 1967 masses Arab

camp. had Arab a very world

Secondly, wide and, claim

charismatic amongst until the the factors
of which in the to the was Arab convey nation for

the could

least

defeat, of
with Arab a

legitimately Arab
one, against

represent two

aspirations
combined Algerian taking world upon

all

the
third

peoples.
the French bloody

people at the was the

colonialism, prestige by third Egypt, world

place and the

height actively image

of

Nasser's supported of one the

which Arabs the and

symbolizing political

struggle

of

developing

nations

economic

independence.

The "bastion as a

importance of revolution" of the

of

the against

image

of

the

Arab and East

world

as

a

imperialism of the Middle

colonialism within the

basis

prestige

246

Third of into it one. birth Koran attention the is

World

has, and the

to

be

sure,

steadily War of

declined, `Independence is still

as have there,

memories receded although political being the the of join

Nasser

Algerian But, the more is

history. now sustained

prestige by factors

other The the time world, and and Arab

than

the

One of place was of

these Islam,

religion. and speaking for over in in a long the

world, in the of the in the

language been many attend Zaytouna of limited, the

which focus whom

written, of Moslems pilgrimage of

has all

annual

Mecca Egypt

Islamic Tunisia. religious

universities The pillar the international of fact Arab that

Azhar

political prestige it non-Arab can will only

importance always be

however, politically

by

influence world.

insignificant
A Arabs earlier, reserves for the much is

Moslem

more

important The over 60 even is nations the are mere per

factor Middle cent

for

the East,

prestige as world's than the this world's oil for pointed

of

the out oil least most their

petroleum. contains and,

of

the

proven at

perhaps

more fact

important that on of as the be Arab a

present,

industrialized energy on Arab supply. energy within of trade amongst be even aid

dependent impression superficial

Arab Western this

The resources, the with the

dependence may be when

considered pattern prestige can financial political Nations organizations.

context the West,

of can

states' great boost This

overall to Arab

developing enhanced by

countries. the in for and lure/prospect return for

prestige of Arab

further to these of

countries Arab causes,

the at the

latter's United

support General

example, other

Assembly

international

247

Thus, most makes contest "[i]f

on

the

whole, area in

the the

Arab

Middle

East

is

perhaps

the This

prestigious it of for swaying utmost global the

underdeveloped for In of the whether prominence be overlooked. of the the

world. superpowers words of in

importance influence. opinion superpowers, is---the cannot

their

McLaurin, areas or is not, East

developing justified the "48

important---and have states acted in as these if

both it circles

Middle

The

Middle
In

East
view its of

and
the

superpower
preceding and

security
analysis, it is clear and Middle that, its East

due

to

political output a very of others, in Cairo the of in Vietnam the and high the

geostrategic of petroleum, in the This Nes, Writing stated even of the

importance, the

enormous occupies calculations by, d'affairs height significance "is the more decade pointed where come so far area than of amongst

reserves position superpowers. David 1967. war, Middle in United million -he G.

politico-strategic view United was States 1968, the expressed charge at the

in

August that

strategic era, than committed

East, defence States fighting

in Western

the

nuclear interests

more to

important which half the -a U. S. that many

has men.

presently 49 Alfred More

than Atherton,

a

later, out

Ambassador-at-Large, are and A similar few areas in

"there

the

world

today interests by the out at has a

different "50 Soviet place the

important view was

American expressed it Middle continents,

together.

U. S. S. R. that the "[w]hat junction

Supreme takes of

in in

July this and

1970, area Asian

when [the

pointed East],

African

248

direct countries peace

relation of and
Whilst

to Asia

the and

fates

of and "51
Middle its in

the to

peoples the fate

of of

all

the

Africa

general

security
the

of
value position

peoples.
of the and status therefore, interest

East large the

for petroleum

its

political resources

and entitles the and mean United

geostrategic it to a

special and,

global their region, the For, on

competition persistent it security perhaps which does of with the

of

superpowers at that States times it

explains in the of

intense is and a the vital

not the the West and,

component Union. petroleum, to Union some are

Soviet of

important Europeans, potentially, energy mutually configuration security arguments N. A. T. O. 's should the the of

exception the the supplies, assured of the Japanese, Soviet it is

extent, highly to see

the

Americans for the

dependent how, in in the

their age of

difficult

destruction, the region can

changes significantly remains

political affect the the to Russia of But either the under 1973, the whilst risk of On was real to or its the

superpowers. to or East the was the the the Western come

This potential

true Soviet to southern

despite threat

pertaining flank, Middle or

threat the

under States to wars

influence

U. S. S. R.

United irrelevant

respectively. the of into clients circumstances 1967 a and position the

petroleum which, superpowers defending direct neither either' potential, sources/potential

factor during

Arab-Israeli themselves Eastern them

maneuvered their conflict of the these U. S. long Middle between

where

was it

quite must reacting term be

substantial. emphasized, to threat Nevertheless. a

occasions, or the or sources

U. S. S. R. short of

oil.

249

behaviour occasions at relative the of stake.

of

the

United that order of it is

States something to the explain

and

the rather this East to

Soviet vital and, for

Union for therefore, the the

on them

those was the of

indicated In importance

Middle

security significance

superpowers, American In theory, give over war outcome into in the the of a and

necessary commitments or the American

assess in the

Soviet Soviet either the other

region. of U. S. an the Middle

domination or the of Pact does is the

East an limited final escalate depend, between

might edge

U. S. S. R. in the and if

respectively outbreak but immediately likely of resolve the by, for to of the

event Warsaw it conflict, on and, the types military

between of

N. A. T. O. such a war,

forces, not more

general ultimate two each

nuclear analysis, superpowers to escalate different conventional

balance consequently,

willingness example, than the resolve, of most In more resolve instance, value. this the on U. S.

confrontation of nuclear

introducing the and in relative the

weapons, of of

deployments The relative they (see in of by intrinsic a balance commitments perceive Chapter the region

U. S. S. R. is determined to their a strong a signal a certain " those

in

the by things

region. the

turn,

superpowers relevant context, to

which interests presence

as 4). is

national military of the

important to as

as defend a "trip

strength commitment

superpower's acting, military for

wire,

than

for

any

For in of the the

the

United East are

States, to

the access for its

most to the West

important petroleum European

commitments resources allies and

Middle region,

especially

250

Japan, the seen,

and foremost these The

to

the of

security which is the

of

its State

clients of Israel.

in

the As

area, will

in be

two

commitments to been the

have West

inter-related of access The firm to

purposes. Middle Eastern of the

importance already to this of of

oil

has

mentioned. has officials naval the forces Indian to serve in been

commitment by effect; Mediterranean functions wire and as a the

Americans statements presence the

goal U. S.

demonstrated to in Ocean as the this the

numerous by the Sea, are, against warning and by

powerful Sea and things,

Arabian other

whose a area, trip

amongst possible to the which Middle Until commitment to the local

Soviet radicals of designed to 1973 to test to the

intervention of the an

anti-American "Rapid for

orientation; Deployment intervention interests the oil United had to not out the the put the of an

creation is East the

so-called specifically

Force" in the

safeguard Arab-Israeli to

vital

Western war, Eastern threat

there. States been off put oil Strait Arabs embargo

access through West The

Middle an external for

supplies of

by, only

example,

blockading came war, from they and the part

Hormuz. when, supplies a

challenge the October States on

themselves on oil

during to the

United policy Arab-Israeli

Netherlands these Given two the it in was the its United Kissinger Arab oil

pending countries

more towards of by

balanced the the

conflict. that is, the fact

circumnstances carried region, commitment States' and out

embargo, of America's

that

some

staunchest only time served and again of to

friends emphasize senior State warned

Washington's in officials, Secretary of this

response respect: including Defence

Secretary Schlesinger,

251

producers including their oil The order however, For the to

of military

the

possibility ones, 52 of the threat interests on the should

of they

U. S. continue

counter-measures, or accelerate

embargo. invocation protect a rare most has to

of

direct in the of

intervention Middle the the United early Middle in the to In to constant advice internal case In Israel, with of a East

in is,

Western occurrence part, relied

part since

States. 1960's, Eastern region. their most be

particularly on individual its became from

Washington States Consequently, security, cases, manifested flow various security. Saudi instances, States of threat the of

friendly

protect it especially

interests increasingly external neither did

committed threats. nor 53 needed of a and as the

these in arms matters

commitments anything supplies relating for some

more and

than

assurance cooperation as to well be

general to external

on

This, Arabia and specifically commitments

example, of that the of

seems Gulf Jordan

with other United

States. and form,

took

a very

different in the Thus, on behalf

promises serious invoked King the at war

direct to threat in in the

American either of the 1970 of direct wake to

intervantion these states.

event

Washington of incursion who Jordan's

intervention of Syria's Palestinian family. the strongest are

Hussein country with

armoured guerillas

into were

aid royal far

Hashemite by

However, United being long of time States the

and the

most

consistent and have elements wellfor a of

commitments State been of taken Israel. for

to These

security commitments

granted

as

basic

252

U. S.

foreign

policy. and time

Although Tel and Aviv, again

no

formal

treaty presidents of an

exists and

between Congressmen commitment pointed States treaties. Israel country together.

Washington have to out, as "54 was

American spoken and, as have policy, as strong been the effort the

undefined writer the subject has United of to that put

Israel's this "seems

security, at least that actual an

one in the

many In

commitments terms of into superior

commitment to make states

translated

energetic to all

militarily In the

Arab

words

of

Mackintosh,

had become issues States the clear-cut For the United financial the to provide 1950's: and by the early herself Israel to defend that enable would aid military her build to territory up and her chosen within the to the point where and skills strength military deal foreseeable forces Israeli with all could armed 55 power. military of Arab combinations In commitment some certain national pointed the U. S. scope theory, to to the the undefined security of nature Israel of the United the Israelis not As of be in States Americans over the has in

leaves from the may

distance the of are to

themselves pursuit the many Israel: United important of

matters, interest out, there

which States.

Quandt ambiguity

areas

commitment

to any did the specific For apply commitment example, beyond the include it territory did If territory? so, to Israel Did the as lines? 1967 armistice commitment United imply that the Jewish state a predominantly the of repatriation support States not would that Did the Palestinian mean commitment refugees? Soviet intervene to offset States United any the would Americans about? threat, came of how it regardless leave to questions tended to awkward such prefer Israelis to tried precise obtain whereas unanswered, 56 success. with only partial usually answers, But, whenever it came of its public the to the U. S. in crunch, commitment favour of the maximalist, prevailed. a Just settlement Israeli Thus, of

interpretation despite

avowals

253

the means

Middle which

East

problem, it, to the any

the not colonize West talk

United only

States to

gave retain

Israel the portions

the 1967 of Golan

enabled but also

conquests, them, Heights, refugees One American wealthy States, directly the over State for

substantial Bank of and repatriating the

example, and seem to make

Syrian

Palestinian

rather for

preposterous. the to rather Israel open-ended is Zionist Congress. security the lobby Another concerns, invested has developed In the so is nature influence in the reason, that in the of of of the the

reason

commitment and

well-organized in to have an U. S.

United more because Israel Zionist

especially related Americans the as years, a credibility

politically interest element.

much in

words

Reich,

by the Arab Israel is perceived the world and many of international the of community other members as U. S. from benefiting security a strong commitment. To ensure This the expectations. generates perception United States (an the ally as an credibility of interest) important the perceived commitment security Continued be maintained. Israel for to support must American Israel,... helps to reassure other allies and Any U. S. to ensure the of the U. S. role. credibility be interpreted from that away as backing action might likely identified to Israel the commitment would widely U. S. the undermine credibility of affect and but to Israel as only elsewhere well. commitments, not United States that The the should suggests argument U. S. role Israel, in "abandon" the other situations 57 be open to question. would A major mean is, Tel States latest In problem in from Israel would such as have this the to respect literal the it, mercy any in form the is that "abandonment" of of the term, to, United of the could that as

anything leaving Aviv

definition or control of delivery

others, by Israel the

pressure to

delays military to the

conventional contrast

equipment. States, Soviet commitments in

United

254

the can being

Middle be of more

East or

are less

rather clearly

hard

to

specify, give As the with East

and

those

that of

defined nature. of the

impression the which of the Americans, may be

a rather the only to the

ambiguous feature vital But even

probably importance is

Middle interests the Soviet

of

security here, current Besides,

U. S. S. R. is of to Soviet most the a be

petroleum. rather and vis-a-vis world's energy not

interest and is likely of which most of the the

futuristic partial Union of -the

than total. the

nature, the

position

Middle oil is all them, very of

Eastern reserves different these

countries and supply to coutnries, are that

own of

proven needs

world's States. most

United the

Virtually important of

especially ruled which Europe. flow of as by are fervently

Saudi

Arabia,

anti-communist aligned Americans, from the to the

ultra-conservative United States to the the West and

regimes Western

closely " For petroleum part of also to to be its to such commit Eastern of way its could a the

a commitment Middle deal East or to general against

unimpeded could be

made which

package include the in oil-rich the latter. oil the

understanding external an or

could threats appear and amenable make no

guarantees suppliers. mutual friends But

internal would States more

Such interest and the Instead, of would, Soviet it

arrangement the United be

both

therefore, leadership could to suppliers

could either

arrangements. itself petroleum either against, relations to by

formally Middle consequences in to

the warning

"right" the oil

purchase of the

withholding the with

from, or it

or

discriminating could oil seek

any

U. S. S. R.; the

improve or it

conservative

states;

255

attempt undermine who govern

to the

change rule the to options, first one of

the the

status Kings, Peninsula future offers lack view to towards limited the Peninsula and the

quo princes, and petroleum a

by

endeavouring and tribal States, supplies. chiefs as

to

Arabian ensuring however, would in states working extremely of threat" opposition Thus, in

Gulf

a

precondition of Whilst politically conservative available alternatives semi-feudal called radical Middle changes have to to import no for these the

None solution. would not of be the scope third of the absence the soof the

promising and firm

credibility of the the given and almost within of the should of prevent cutting a it off the

conceivable oil

alignment the and obsession with

Americans, second the Gulf complete those radical Soviet it

is

rulers "communist secular East. in the

forces the

areas

of political

absence states,

oil-producing do with the hope

Union one day

would need Eastern

make

that,

substantial power the of of supplies. some the would threat sort

quantities either of of

Middle from oil doing supplies on the

petroleum, contemplate it of with in a the

so

or to

using event

confrontation in

basis

recognition energy

common

interest

non-interference

Undoubtedly the external not client and security Consequently, the Middle East threats, supported regimes principal has by

the are

most to the

important security those As East threat Israel, the it

Soviet of client

commitments regimes from all to be to

in from states Soviet Arab, their

particularly the in U. S. S. R. the external come although from Middle

emanating happened, have of an this tended type American

client. no desire

initially

Kremlin

had

256

to

become

involved as the

in

the

Arab-Israeli dispute given led assistance very few of to it no the to

conflict, direct struggle conclude the Arabs into

which concern against that, against the

it to

considered itself, Israel the Israel, world. 58 The committed Soviets contest military significant "progressive" enemy, the Near but as with aid

a national high priority

by absence it

Arab of

client substantial.

regimes

in

to inroads

would

make

Arab

extent to its

to Arab

which clients

the

U. S. S. R. has been with in Soviet allowing their "to restive Soviet the

is

seen

to by to

be the

considered regard Third World. was the

important, China for

especially influence by the for to withstand

their Thus,

provided not forces also for and far only

Union

considered so-called

Western-backed elements Union was in an

demonstrating beyond liberation'. however, anywhere commitment vagueness to. be based " has on the near to that

East of

the "59 Soviet to

exponent

'national this,

Despite Arabs has never

commitment resembling In out to of can the contrast be its

to

the

come

rather to main

open-ended the latter, it

American whose seems by "red or

Israel.

turned a policy

strength, delimited country, of the

"sanctuaries" be In such either the places case as which concept instance regime" or of a

lines. some the and the

A "sanctuary" project. has defined

a town, Middle

prestigious U. S. S. R. Aswan in time to refer to an

East,

Cairo, were "red of "a not

Damascus, to be

Dam as of war. either

"sanctuaries" 60 to The the

attacked be taken

lines" violent

can

internal

threat

established

257

to

a

situation military "61 on a In this

where collapse case, of to

"an

established in the a war with has

regime another apparently that

is

facing regional made it would termed 62 that of In of

complete actor. it not clear permit

U. S. S. R. in removal Egypt the

number

occasions cause in States' Arabs the either

past of what or to

Israel regimes" to the

were Syria.

"progressive contrast the within obliging to the aid

United to to the

commitment allowed to up to fulfil its Israel

Israel,

U. S. S. R. which the of

plenty its aims

scope without

maneuver to friends. live

Kremlin its

commitments

and

come

Nevertheless, the clients threaten which credibility because, states, to the in Israel edge Soviet during Egypt instances, Soviet activities (1967)63 the War the of U. S. S. R. did to came committed not'absolve fulfil to of almost did the be the

the

height itself the

of to Soviet

the

threshold on

above behalf from of having

with its to of of the is Arab over of the

intervene leadership the

its

commitments, generally Soviet perceived Union its major content beyond was the and 1967 and was as

accomplishment as a ally. with going the test

an

This the right

all not

of feel

conflicts without which

threshold

probability This was Attrition" In the two

direct case between these direct military in Syria

intervention 1967 and war, Israel, the intervention presented or of form of

substantial. 1968-1970 the 1973 "War war.

of

of of

1973

wars, only

threat when Israeli regimes the third actually Israel

made

a major (1973),

threat and the

to in

the

Egypt Attrition, of direct

instance, undertook embarked

U. S. S. R. when air raids

a limited on a series

intervention

deep

penetration

which

258

included An the has supplies being Israel equipment from every the This Union forces reflected in certain

the

Egyptian

capital, derivative

Cairo. of the Arab

64 commitments confrontation the pattern Syria, weapons, of smaller at the its of and by each states arms Iraq whilst military proportion stake prestige standpoint. issue defeat of for the Soviet in of 65 of

important to virtual the

superpowers been the to armed

Israel

and polarization East,

the

of with with

Middle

Egypt, Soviet

almost

exclusively a substantial

receives from the

proportion States and a

United countries. Arab-Israeli a

West round suppliers has

European of the from an the

Consequently, conflict was

military-technological sensitive continual ones Soviet of military States. the central

been

especially almost

because by

Soviet-equipped 1967 and 1970 that U. S. S. R. had and on to the

American-equipped negatively major the areas United for in of the on

between and

training

suggested the

technology Such

lagged serious created desirability military the

behind

assessments theatre,

implications doubt

European countries preference this send to

developing Soviet Concern in over to and forces

seeking 66 that Arab latter's 67 have

American prompted of and

resources. U. S. S. R. to during its the possible. The Americans of of their the their

prospect vast quantities re-train most

period

weapons reorganize manner

clients armed

train, in the

effective

been

relatively for their

less

concerned prestige of Middle has

over the East emerged

the

Issue

implications military in the

performance because

equipment region,

in Israel,

the

client

259

militarily the the

victorious and

from

all

of Arab

its

conflagrations Nevertheless, anxious supplied was in an that by

with

Soviet-equipped United should States, perform

trained the

armies. is those

like well

U. S. S. R., vis-a-vis anxiousness war when,

its the

weapons adversary shortly question attitude Israeli Kissinger you... defeated strategy,
The enhancing training resulted exclusive has better

superpower. after put would salient allegedly for one U. S. we can't
importance the as in prestige in U. S. and

This October by if the said,

demonstrated answer to a

the forward be on

Sadat

regarding proceeded bank of to the

what

the

U. S. the Canal, at before global

Egypt west

liquidate Suez strike once our

"[tjhe Soviet

Pentagon weapons accordance

will have with "68

reason: weapons allow
to

and, it
the of the the

in to

happen

again.
of

superpowers their perennial U. S. S. R. their for military

preserving equipment wars into

and and has an that more and

reflected the

Arab-Israeli being locked clients of

relationship as to the a major region.

with cause

respective the supply

served arms

The endeavoured have a

Middle 'to wide to and

East, show, range both. to of is

as

the

preceding in which are the

analysis superpowers near to of to Asia, superpowers the and military

has

a region interests Its

which

of proximity

equal the

importance U. S. S. R. significance States; makes central political it its

geographical Europe Union as of to makes well Europe, both

southern the Soviet at the important international amongst

it as

to

United Africa for and makes its its it

location

hub

strategically place prestige in

communications; the developing nations

260

of contest whole, West nature out, the

utmost for

importance global the to the

to influence. Middle Soviet

the

U. S.

and

the

U. S. S. R. thing which,

in

their on to the the

The East Union of

only

makes than of the region

greater is the in the to is is of by to Soviet the some

importance rather area. client

asymmetrical As pointed in whose and

superpower U. S. to to is a

commitments apparently

committed extent than

regimes U. S. S. R. narrower commitments factor the are as has to once Volga-Urals the and seen, the 1990's. American reflected war United highly

greater its Arab The

the much American

commitments somewhat in the

clients

minimal. region Western in for out, is

credibility enhanced

greatly

petroleum extent,

on

which States, dependent pointed substantial

Europe, contrast their the quantities viable to this be

Japan, to energy the

and,

Union, However,

supplies. is likely

been import its

U. S. S. R. of deposits exhausted,

to Eastern

need oil and

Middle in the

economically areas All in begin all, in

Baku during of Soviet be during

perhaps

general Middle

concurrence East was, strategies as

interests in their

the

will

interventionary 1973.

of

October

261

Notes

1.

2.

3.

East" be taken The to refer Egypt, term "Middle to will Iraq, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Arab Jordan, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, the Yemen Arab Republic, the and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. P. Mangold, Intervention in Superpower the Middle East (Croom Helm, London, 1978, See also M. Mackintosh, p. 22. "The Impact Middle East Crisis Super-power the of on Relations, " Adelphi Papers No. 114 (International Institute for 1975), R. D. Strategic McLaurin, London, Studies, p. 2; The Middle Books, Policy (Lexington D. D., East in Soviet Heath 1975), Lexington, Massachusetts, p. 15. and Company, G. Union Golan, Yom Kippur The Soviet the and and After: Middle Press, University London, East Crisis (Cambridge 1977), p. 5.

4.
5.

Pravda,

July

28,1974.

Quoted

in

ibid.

6.

7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

in the Middle Y. Evron, Intervention "Great Powers'Military East, " East, in the Middle Great Power Intervention M. ed. Leitenberg New York, Press, 1979), (Pergamon and G. Sheffer East: 20; D. Peretz, Imposed "Critique 'The Middle p. of Solutions Problems? "' idem, p. 298. or Imposed Institute (I. S. C. ), for Soviet the Study Conflict of Objectives London, March in the Middle East (I. S. C., 1974), p. 6. Mangold, op. cit., p. 22. I. S. C., op. cit., p. 6. Mangold, Essence Decision: G. T. Allison, of op. cit., p. 22; Explaining Brown Crisis (Little, Missile the Cuban and Company, Boston, 1971), p. 140. Golan, "Foreign Defence D. Holloway, and op. cit., p. 5; Fall Policy, Since the 2nd " The Soviet Union of Khrushchev, (Macmillan, London Kaser A. Brown and M. ed., and ed. Basingstoke, "The Future L. T. Caldwell, 1978), of p. 55; American Relations Soviet-American in the " Soviet Relations, 1980's: Trade, L. T. Superpower Politics and East-West ed. Caldwell Jr. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1981), and W. Diebold p. 168. Defense P. M. Dadant, Systems "American vis-a-vis and Soviet East: Quest for American the Middle East, " The Middle an Policy, University Press, (State W. A. Beling of New York ed. Albany, 1973), p. 183. Ibid., 182-183. pp. Sphinx The See, for Commissar: M. H. Heikal, and example, Rise East Influence in Fall Soviet the Middle and of (Collins, A. Z. Rubinstein, London, the 1978); Red Star on Nile: Relationship The Soviet-Egyptian Influence the since Press, June Princeton, War (Princeton New Jersey, University 1977).

14.
15. 16. 17.

Ibid.
See Dadant, op. cit., p. 183. Golan, 12-13. op. cit., pp. T. C. Bose, The Superpowers and Publishing House, London, Bombay, 17. the Middle East (Asia New York, 1972), 16pp.

262

18. -

See C. (Martin

The Bell, Robertson,

Diplomacy London,

of Detente: 1977), esp.

The p. 77.

Kissinger

Era

19.
20. 21. 22. 23.

Mangold,

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

183-184. Dadent, pp. op. cit., Ibid., p. 184. loc. Golan, 15-16; Mangold, cit. pp. op. cit. in the East, " Middle The Interests States B. Reich, "United Perceptions States: United the Middle East and and Rabinovich I. (Transaction H. Shaked Policies, and ed. 1980), New Jersey, Books, New Brunswick, p. 59. Ibid., p. 60. Ibid., p. 59. Dadent, op. cit., p. 182. Reich, p. 59. op. cit., Ibid., p. 60. Ibid., McLaurin, p. 15. cit., op. 6; W. Z. Golan, 181; Dadant, p. op. cit., op. cit., p. Union The Soviet East: Middle the for Laqueur, The Struggle Books, London, (Penguin East, 1958-1970 Middle the and ibid., McLaurin, Mangold, 1972), 10; p. 17; op. cit., p. 30-31. pp. ibid., McLaurin, ibid., Mangold, Golan, ibid., 7; p. 30. p. Reich, p. 60. op. cit., ibid., Reich, Mangold, 14; p. 61. op. cit., p. ibid. Mangold, Reich, ibid., p. 21; Simon, January William Treasury Memorandum by Secretary of 21-22. ibid., 14,1975. Cited in Mangold, pp. in ibid., Cited Washington 18,1974. Post., November p. 22. Policy Toward American the W. B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: California (University 1967-1976 Arab-Israeli Conflict, of M. 13; Sid1977), Press, Los Angeles, Berkeley p. and Peace or Armageddon in Silent: Ahmed, After the Guns Fall 49; J. C. 1974), London, Helm, the Middle East (Croom p. Conflict, Arab-Israeli " States Campbell, "The United and the Conflict, R. O. Arab-Israeli World the Politics ed. and 39-40; York, 1979), New Freedman Press, (Pergamon pp. "Objectives R. Rosecrance, Reich, 61-62; of op. cit., pp. U. S. Middle " Shaked East Policy, op. cit., p. and Rabinovich, 31. in Policy the "Oil See, for J. A. Berry, and Soviet example, 2, Spring Vol. No. 26, Journal, Middle East East, " Middle in the East (The Middle Armageddon 1972; D. A. Schmidt, McLaurin, 1974); John New York, Doy Company, op. cit.; The Middle from Cairo, " "A View Golan, M. Riad, op. cit., Helm, London, (Croom M. Ayoob East in World Politics, ed. Mangold, 1981); I. S. C. op. cit., op. cit. ibid., Riad, Mangod, ibid., 23; p. 30. p. Riad, ibid. Golan, op. cit., p. 8. Berry, 151-152. McLaurin, op. cit., pp. p. 32; op. cit., Berry, ibid., McLaurin, 31-33; ibid., p. 150. pp. Golan, op. cit., p. 8. McLaurin, op. cit., p. 16. World: Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab See, A. I. for example, Press, London Policy (The Macmillan The Elements of Foreign R. H. 103-104,125,126; Basingstoke, 1976), pp. esp. and A Study in Political Dynamics Nasir: Dekmejian, Under Egypt London, Press, 1971), (University esp. pp. 43,46of London 47.

op. cit.,

p.

16.

263

47.

48. 49.

50.

51.

52.

53".

54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60.

61. 62. 63.

The Philosophy See Abdel-Nasser, the Revolution Gamal of Cairo, [1954]); House, T. Y. (National Ismail, Publication Egypt's Policy Africa: Under Nasser The in U. A. R. Press, Evanston, 1971). (Northwestern University McLaurin, p. 16. op. cit., August Sun, 11,1968. Quoted in G. Article in Baltimore Interests in the Middle Lenczowski States East (ed. ) United (American for Public Policy Research, Enterprise Institute Washington, D. C., n. d. ). p. 2. Pittsburgh, Quoted in L. A. 13,1979. Sobel, PeaceApril Making New York, East (Facts in the Middle 1980), on File, p. 5. "Zayavleniya SSSR, " Pravda, July 16, soveta verkhovnogo 1970. Arms for Quoted Arabs: in J. D. Glassman, the The Middle East (The Johns Soviet Union Hopkins and War in the University 1975), Press, Baltimore P. 84. and London, Against See M. R. Buheiry, U. S. Threats Arab of Intervention Oil: Studies, for Palestine Beirut, 1973-1979 (Institute 1 880), esp. 11,12. pp. "American Search See, Campbell, for for J. C. example, Middle Partners, in the East, " American Rivalry Soviet ed. Publishers, J. C. New York Hurewitz A. Praeger, (Frederick 204-205. 1969), and London, pp. esp. Dadant, Quandt, See also op. cit., p. 10. op. cit., p. 184. Op. cit., p. 2. Op. cit., (1979), Also 10-11. op. cit., pp. see Campbell p. 39; Rosecrance, op. cit., p. 31. Op. cit., "The Middle East: 76-77. Also pp. see G. H. Quester, Imposed Leitenberg " Problems, Solutions Imposed or and Sheffer, op. cit., p. 262. Laqueur, 63-64. Also op. cit. see Caldwell, op. cit., pp. p. 168. ibid. Glassman, see Caldwell, op. cit., p. 5. Also A. Sella, Doctrine "Soviet Military and Arab War aims, " From June between East 1967 and 1973, to October: The Middle ed. Books, I. Rabinovich (Transaction New H. Shaked and 88-89. Brunswick, 1978), New Jersey, pp. Evron, op. cit., p. 39. Sella, op. cit., p. 89. See Point: Perspectives the L. B. Johnson, The Vantage of Presidency New York, Rinehart 1963-1969 (Holt, and Winston, 1971).

64.
65.

See Heikal,

66. 67. 68.

Pattern P. Jabber, Arms Trade, "Petrodollars, of and the the Major Dispute, the Arab-Israel Conflicts, Oil, " and Press, Industrial Hurewitz (Westview J. C. World, ed. Boulder, 159-160. Colorado, 1976), pp. Mangold, op. cit., p. 19. Glassman, Quester, op. cit., p. 84; p. 263. op. cit., Quoted In Search An Autobiography in el-Sadat, of Identity: (Collins, 268-269. London, 1978), pp.

op. cit.:

Rubinstein,

op. cit.

264

CHAPTER 9:
Unlike Soviet 1973 interests the situations in Union

THE BALANCE OF RESPONSES
the Korea, in was the the United States war with in and certain Middle to the of East U. S. the the their spite of of the

case

of

and

intervened that Middle

Arab-Israeli

October primary this,

a manner in the

consistent However, areas bear and the

East. in conflicts Korea both

obtaining to the in two both

superpowers' similarities. the than peninsula in the the status to the and south entire defeat, of and the the the

responses To quo begin ante

with, bellum Whilst

was in of

more Korea an

favourable the division

U. S. S. R. the setting

up Soviet in the and Arab military the

American for East

client-state hegemony the of hands that the of country the the over

thwarted country, humiliation, U. S. S. R. 's consequent safeguarded United Admittedly, Israel's and given

aspirations Middle the clients

persistent ambitions Israel, in prestige Soviet reliance the status

frustration at the of and detriment of the U. S. 's in the almost affairs the the Union's patron's concessions,

dominance interests to the

region of the

enhanced of

States in military the

Union. on quo,

view

exclusive

supremacy fact were that based of of as

maintaining Soviet-Arab solely was also in the on

patron-client security-related conducive region. Israel were in to the This remained likely return ensuring to for the

relationships factors, continued is because this

state

presence so the to and long Soviet need

U. S. S. R. conflict Arab

with proteges assistance thereby

unresolved, continue political

their

military

265

U. S. S. R. very in case, of the

a role

in basis

the for

Middle

East.

Such, to

however, its and,

is policy in

a

precarious a region there as was

a superpower as where, Israel, the Middle

premise East

important a point vis-a-vis

any

without the

a significant Arabs were with the military and

redress likely the Soviet option Israeli as Israel. even political over a forcible of the as of the a a to

balance the or,

question Union itself, pressures precondition By the

utility the

of

their

relationship of to

indeed, and for for same one,

practicability even succumb and

perhaps political

American

territorial of their

concessions dispute over with Israel,

a settlement an Arab

token, would prestige the

victory boost the its much status of Soviet

limited and world. change Arabs in

greatly

U. S. S. R. 's clients to gain quo all from in

military Thus, of and Korea, the

amongst had 1973 virtue been have like unawares, of as

Kremlin

pre-October by

favour

undertaken had

arms. of the taken the on this on

Indeed, imminence preventive incumbent occasion, part its

Washington it would

aware

hostilities, steps. administration not an so much as

then

probably Korea, though ploy but the

Nevertheless, was caught

a result such which in the

a deliberate MacArthur,

the of

of own to

insubordinate

because Arabs'

preconception force of it a change Israel to to

underestimated status such quo;

ability the ability blinded Korea,

overestimated and, war. consequently, Also of stood as the by

resist of to the

a change

warnings seems Middle very

impending known but this in

in

the war

U. S. S. R. in albeit the

have

advance it

oncoming its client,

East,

time

cautiously.

266

With the Soviet

the

outbreak Union decided and

of

war, to

both intervene so, U. S.,

the

United on behalf upon

States of the of

and their path the

respective of

clients,

in

doing the

embarked the mere

confrontation. of of balanced of all the the in the to East in hostilities the

For

fact the the need satisfy and, in

eruption instability more needs give stability respect, opportunity Middle which raison resolution credited an approach of to to

demonstrated quo and underlined which of a would Israel stake auspices.

inherent for the thereby, maintaining In with in this an the a

status

regional Arabs as well

approach as those

parties the war area

concerned under

American the United

provided

States its influence balanced would

substantially that, the if

increase successful,

a more dispute

approach remove Since would arms, the a be such

resolved d'etre of for

Arab-Israel Soviet conflict diplomacy

the the

presence along and of not

in those to

the

area. lines

American stood the Moscow. during

Soviet the

a good wisdom

chance of

persuading with

U. S. S. R. 's as

clients opposed

cooperating

Washington

However, the joint

the

first

three offensive seemed Israeli predicted its own

days

of was

the

war,

when steady

Egyptian-Syrian U. S. partly a rosy intervention on incorrect and on

making

progress, Relying portrayed over which of the were Israeli its

paradoxically bulletins an imminent

minimal.. which victory reports image

picture and partly

Arabs, still

intelligence by the pre-war

chronically invincibility interventionary victory.

distorted and Arab

impotence, on the

Washington expectation of

premised a rapid

strategy Consequently,

Israeli

whilst

exhorting

267

Israel possible, additional to strive

to the

return United

to

the

pre-October refrained tanks, lest Arab of same a

lines from Tel

as supplying

quickly it

as with

States and

aircraft for the a

Aviv

be

encouraged and thus

wholesale

humiliation post-war rather the Soviet prior merely than Union knowledge sought

foreclose rapprochement. some in form Korea,

possibility At the

Arab-American exercising which, of as its

time, on

of

coercive presumed

pressure to the United have

was

had

clients' cooperation reality decided by help quickly coercion least In Egypt, separate In the aware strategy maximum within the the United very of the of to

intentions, at the sharply the

U. S. Nations. became its its

Moscow's once the States conflict so as to as of at

Nevertheless, known, intervention the United in operation quo to to behalf ante the

situation escalate

greatly Israel as

accelerating regain popssible, the Soviet it it the

re-supply status resorting in order on to coopt with

territorial and by

bellum means or

various terminate of the

vis-a-vis minimize meantime, which political contrast first the was possible parameters States, with an the

Kremlin intervention

Arabs. with of war. a

endeavoured hoped settlement to

nurture with Israel the the

a dialogue promise the

after U. S. S. R. of

to moments real

the of

Americans, the outbreak on the by

was,

from fully

hostilities, and to draw

situation guided

battlefield, the from desire the situation. provided gains, dwindling in the this

its the

basically regional set the

benefits by the

conflagration As with

crisis war to make and

October

Soviet case,

leadership by recouping

opportunity lost prestige

political

268

influence hands and of military

incurred an American

through client

successive and which the start, weight During as the six

Arab

defeats of

at political 1967

the

years the Kremlin the first of the

stagnation right of the from

followed the behind the much for was first, still the major its and

war. to as days put the of and

Consequently, as crisis the Syrian their what then, Soviet intensifying displays and Israel. of war, much

chose Arabs three

U. S. S. R. 's permitted.

situation this war

meant

replenishing as whilst going was the on. began to

Egyptian to accomplish as

machines

necessary U. S. As,

them

objectives was the really

confused Syrians reverses, intervention by the Soviet indulging United

to and, the by in

Egyptians Union its gradually

suffer

escalated operations vis-a-vis of out" the to

re-supply

minatory The not was to

diplomacy extent "lose

States

leaderhip's in doubt directly, in defence the Israeli the 25. the of the by

determination Middle its and East apparent thereby on on

the

Americans beyond intervene all

ultimately to

demonstrated unilaterally with the

willingness risk October the of double in the an a direct 12, Egyptian entire intervention the October

clash and,

U. S., to was corp, halt

Damascus advance destruction The Soviet the the

especially, which army the created each

front, Egyptian of war where to to

threatening on States October and

United

Union end of

a situation, superpower, the risk

towards especially of a direct but also its of

conflict, endeavoured not only which area its own and

U. S. S. R.,

manipulate support its eventually tilt As the it

confrontation, to set precedents in in the

client(s), legitimize regional turned

would thus

presence interests

balance out, neither

favour.

269

superpower war sense, U. S. latter's minimum were, in and in

seemed order the the to

willing force war Union. who had for the can

to

go

right to

over back as

to down.

the

brink In

of this the the the and the

other be

October Soviet

termed

a draw that to begun

between it was

However, miserably which they of an

given failed had

proteges objectives fact, appears crisis on

accomplish the war

the to of

verge have October

ignominious as the net

defeat, loser in

U. S. S. R. superpower

emerged 1973.

the

The

superpowers The

on

the

eve war

of of

the

October occurred which, biased Thus, in

1973 in due in

war a to regional the of to the Arab one

Arab-Israeli and strategic of the status of 1967, United quo both

1973

politcal humiliation superpower, where

environment was highly

favour

States. ante

contrast

Korea, minimum

the

bellum

satisfied in the of Middle

requirements situation perceived continuation very entire Sadat's military the from repeatedly further May 1973 detrimental region.

superpowers, the outbreak by situation, the

East

the was a been

preceding as intolerable of that to the

hostilities clients; have in President

U. S. S. R. 's therefore, of the Soviet would

position was July Egypt, clearly 1972

Union by 21,000 in

the

This of from apparent

exemplified to was to expel taken

decision advisers U. S. S. R. 's undertaking defaulting illustrated of the

Soviet to Arabs by It rebuke was in to

which

response the Israel 1

endeavour action arms supply

discourage against agreements.

military on by Soviet the

Egyptian

ruler's emphasis

public on the

leadership's

need

270

settle military Kremlin's with the not in the

the

Arab-Israeli means. desire Whilst not it in also at of to

dispute this jeopardize

by

political

as

opposed

to the

preference its threatened most East. Union, importnt As

underlined growing the Arab Sadat relations position state, pointed

U. S.,

seriously the Middle the Soviet

of if out

U. S. S. R. in his the open

least the to

whole address

know... that the Our friends the continuation of must US aims in Israel the and serves cease-fire. serves .. Regarding the Soviet solution,... end. a peaceful Union know... that the peaceful the solution, which must is fictitious... United has been talking States about, Union in the Soviet to Our friends continue the believe in forthcoming the of process peaceful We appreciate the attitude friends. of our solution... 2 do so honestly. We may differ them, but we with Although an neither Egypt against the Kremlin formula were by terminating altogether, most for nor Israeli and, Syria was forces consequently, the to special they political in acquiescing in a warning in a position without in the the to launch assured of

offensive of

backing a

absence

promising

resolving unlikely their

Arab-Israeli their

impasse military with capable the the of

politically, option Soviet inflicting should quo. 1973, of it As the relations

foreclose relationship were damage in the to the with isolate Given "where again quite on

Union

substantial persist Sadat Soviet

U. S. S. R. status in July

post-1967 Kremlin the it that the for a month the Russians the

alluded Union's with the

preoccupation West movement. conference, to compete was strike increasing could "3

improvement from the fourth and

"national non-aligned Chinese of the

liberation nations would be certain

allegiance away, the of this Soviet the

developing was 4 bound The

nations" to

barely a raw

warning leadership.

nerve

in

precariousness

271

U. S. S. R. 's preceding underlined quality strains conspicuous Assad Kremlin Israel. To the Soviet The 5 the of in the

position outbreak by Soviet growing

in of

the

Middle

East in

during October in This Syria led

the was

period further the

hostilities

dissatisfaction supplies. between occurred Soviet with the in two

with to periodic the

military

relations of which the

countries, when demand match

most

September to to

President that those the of

summoned provide

ambassador aircraft

Syria

extent East in

that seemed the

the to

"no

war,

no the

peace"

stalemate of

in the

Middle Union incentive to

undermine it fact initiating was suited may

position the have United provided

region, this from situation inherent confidence

States. for measures by quo an

which refrain this in the This of of that, the

Washington that its in

any doubtless

political

may alter confidence the area.

reinforced of the mainly with turn, a led status from negative to of single-handed As at least East to turn deadlock

stablility stemmed coupled in

overestimation preconception conclusion U. S. S. R., conflagration possibility blind by "too his... source it was eye military much at to that an

Israel's the without Arabs

might, which, active not Zionist Union to end

the the

the

participation survive State. might the a

Arabs with the Arab

could the Soviet

the a

attempt the in

Middle that at risk

means, stake " arms and

Americans detente to as

believed put the it

Brezhnev on was behalf the and to pull

had of sole Syria, the

clients. of also

Moreover, military that it

U. S. S. R. for

equipment was "in

Egypt

assumed

a position

272

J

reins

on

any as

reckless Kissinger

action

they

might testified,

contemplate.

"6

Consequently,

subsequently

Sadat that had few, if was any, assessment our ... Israel's options. military superiority military Sadat his could not appeared unchallengeable. escape dilemmas by launching an all-out military offensive Though it to fail. the was bound assessment since limited Sadat that of was capable a granted attack, It there for it. military purpose seemed no rational its hence function be defeated; too sole would would to heat for be and concern pressure up international Its failure deepen the would negotiation. only diplomatic stalemate.?

Since Arabs East,
that seeds task formula sound partners sense confident at least

the as the
might of would

Soviet incapable, U. S. did

Union of not
Arab

was perceived changing feel the

as unwilling, status to
and

and the

the

quo in

Middle

obliged

come up with
thereby Ironically,

anything
the a of a "all a

redress instability have

grievances in the region. nothing Kissinger's

remove such the kind for which and "have

required with

more

than own is,

which international will of

accords

criteria one

agreement, consider... in in their (its] of

that

interest" result. "8 regional convinced

participation in for the the durability

Nevertheless, supremacy, of the Arab's

Israel's

foreseeable

future,

impotence,
sacrifice out could In fact, of the hardly for

and
detente

assured
by

of

the

U. S. S. R. 's
any of Arab the

reluctance
to

to
break States

sanctioning by force for the

attempt United in feature

stalemate have the the But, for the by the Arabs force, hoped U. S.,

arms,

a better only

situation

the of Union

area. this in

undesirable of the

situation the region.

was

continued at the

presence time, even

Soviet may

this their to regain

have

seemed failure occupied a

ephemeral, to provide

Soviets, with the were

through means already

apparent their

territories

buying

themselves

273

ticket 1972.9.

out

of

the

Middle

East,

as

had

been

shown

in

July

Thus, strategic seems taken war the

in setting

view in

of the

its

satisfaction Middle East, would to been the have

with United

the

politicoStates, certainly outbreak of By Soviet any it

legitimate every in same step at

to its

assume, disposal had it

almost the the

prevent to

October token, position but of to

1973, the

alert

danger. of the hardly military by the the of war

increasing in the its knew risked of the in its region

precariousness left it with

Union's option venture, so it

condone it

clients' advance, relations

prospective even though with

which

doing U. S. United in the of to as

seriously in seemed East. strength what spite quite

However, States Middle Israeli disregard unambiguous

abundant to the

evidence, danger its

oblivious

So overwhelming and otherwise of war. of Arab would

were

preconceptions that been it chose

weakeness have

interpreted

warnings the most

Perhaps Syrian-Egyptian 1973 to in the

ominous

these

were

the took

"coincident" place causing after "11 to in May

military vicinity some "[t]he sceptical the were U. S. this 12 approaching forces of the

maneuvers cease-fire 10 has King come Hussein

which

lines, soon a shock, of that Jordan Egyptian to the be

Israel Sadat's

mobilize that

reserves. time

Coming for

warning the

these despatch and

led a

normally to

message maneuvers merely signals and Syrian

emphasizing time too

Syrian as

realistic

considered unequivocal the annual Egyptian

maneuvers. of the armed

By September, war began appeared

most when their

conducting

autumn

274

military differed for instance,

exercises. from previous the and stockpiled setting which exercises more than up by a far

In

many

respects, On the being and carried

these Egyptian out

somewhat side, with full was

maneuvers. were

divisions being were complexity military engineers down the to the

ammunition ever field exceeded and on rubber edge units Golan defensive 2, the as before.

logistical Moreover,

support the system requirements 27 Egyptian

Egyptians of a of army

communications the normal

maneuvers, began Suez side, border their bringing Canal's army to

September rafts part being and of

bridging the exercise.

equipment On from were the moved

Syrian

were

redeployed and tanks into

Jordanian out of

the

Heights,

normal On October

positions Syrian and air the eve the its on

offensive started a time were Egypt which, the of the

formations. general the put Syrian on

government at about the

mobilization as alert. on a major well as

of the

reserves, Egyptian on

same

defence of

systems the war Canal beyond bank

Finally, exercise day, was Bar

embarked on the

towards to Lev leave line

Suez troops the east

following

supposedly Canal. . 13 On the

impenetrable

political to

front, the open

the

Arabs mind,

initiated could and, only

a range have

of lent

measures poignancy to alert

which, to their

military concerned At the a united on November ministers

activities to centre Arab 1972 of the of real these

together, of war

served in the the A of the as

everyone East. to was and form

danger

Middle endeavour start foreign

measures against a conference states as Israel.

was

front when 12

made

defence

Arab

well

275

the in This these 18

Palestine Kuwait was was to

Liberation discuss by

Organization coordination two further 12 of

(P. L. O. ) was the Arab war The chiefs to was convened its known General and to to the which of lay of

convened effort. first staff down the in Arab Cairo of of a

followed held on

meetings. between was the

December Its plan. purpose

Arab

armies. military Joint January

apparently meeting was

unified League's during was as the

The Council

second which

Defence

27-29,1973.14 of Egypt's of most of the

Amongst War Minister,

outcomes Ismail, Egyptian form launch occupied had the war on the and an a

appointment

commander-in-chief 15 But,

Jordanian, was Syria, Israeli Saudi the with and Syrian which Jordan, protect Syrian and Jordanian 1973 when the

Syrian, attempt were in

fronts. axis

important, Egypt and

consisting

which forces

coordinated Sinai money machines Israel's periphery relieve a high desert with

offensive and which and the Golan to

against Heights; finance

Arabia, and to exert

Egyptian pressure though flank by maintaining tie down on

petroleum allies; axis,

Western of Israeli state of began of and of Israel's in the

which

was on

to the

Syria's forces thereby

pressure military army the spring

readiness on the of

a

portion efforts series Arabia the Assad, Syria. writer in that

border. Sadat embarked of

These on Saudi with Sadat, and one a

intensive President

consultations Assad meeting Hussein, of of shortly relations Syria,

with

King and were 10 which

Feisal

concluded between both 16 Egypt As

mini-summit and King

September after with an

resumed put it,

diplomatic they "clearly

Jordan. important

marked and

watershed warning

intra-Arab something

relations"17 rather serious

constituted in the offing.

a plain 18

was

276

Nevertheless, concerned, East were the war

as clouds

far that than

as were an

the

United hovering over

States the

was Middle

nothing pressure the of of strategic background

more on

Arab to

ploy make

to

intensify

international Consequently, classic because the

Israel

concessions. came not but so because negative distorted As Kissinger a failure "20 of Thus, permitted quo on as "a much of

Egyptian-Syrian and "noise" U. S. the Arabs in 6 was on the which the the part tactical or

offensive surpise" deception, and created East. Israeli a highly 19 of victims. States the policy. was

deeply-ingrained of the

preconceptions vision put political through Egypt which it Unlike of Arab at to a war its and it, of

situation

Middle culmination of the its

"October analysis own Syria

predilections, to shatter its entire the and, Israel the

United of

basis regionsl

status

had

pinned the

Americans, for hands its it its little Union, war of

U. S. S. R. though may could to come have

apparently decades of doubt

aware Arab the

plans the

two led

defeats extent such thus States, For from the

it

to

which without

clients having flourishing choice the it

successfully to their with their military attention East. in

prosecute salvation the and United efforts. advisers to These preserving sudden to the had

jeopardize it had

relations but to sanction of its Middle its the its

Soviet Egypt

expulsion to in turn the to with however,

compelled of its

grievances been and eviction the

proteges subordinated detente advisers, the probable

increasingly consolidating of Kremlin Soviet of

interest U. S. served as of

The

a warning any attempt

consequences

277

to

turn

the

"no symbol by signs it

war,

no of

peace" the and

stalemate global S. A. L. T. I. to a

in

the

area

into stalemate

a

regional represented when detente, difficult of Egypt all

superpower Coming as

detente were confronted either for

it

did for a

pointing the to the

prospering leadership the incessant their of

future with

Soviet satisfy to

dilemma: and Syria

demands occupied the special also a and but latter all, set---the the

means risk the

regain demise and to

territories relationship direct restraint from seemed the Kremlin requirements the

and with superpower and entire somewhat

thereby the

United

States or

perhaps caution Egypt, of the

confrontation, risk Middle greater for being expelled As that

exercise only prospect from

not the of

East. than

the already

former---after been

precedent decided of

expulsion to go some

had way

towards

meeting

its

clinets. as from of the October weapons 21 1972, for These of the arrival delegation22 had naval Minister the Soviets SCUD decided the which Soviet the Arabs Union had were

Consequently, began been to so deliver earnestly after which 1,1973, on Soviet a visit later to supply missile, the

some

pleading. the was of

deliveries Soviet-Egyptian in Cairo and to

intensified relations February announcement the Thus, to 1968 during Moscow

"de-freezing" marked by

on the renew 23 Ismail

a Soviet same lease by day of Egyptian the with and and to

military that Sadat

Egyptian War

facilities. General

on

in

month, the

apparently surfacedeliveries to the have been

offered to-surface of military

Egypt 24

long-sought the regular said time,

resume parts the

equipment July

spare At

reduced

after

1972.25

same

U. S. S. R.

278

also mainly missiles.

concluded for 26 the

a new provision This, honoured. it

one

billion of seems, As Heikel

roubles anti-tank was has and

arms

agreement

anti-aircraft

uncharacteristically pointed out,

substantially

the latest SAM-3 and SAM-6 missiles, anti-aircraft and (Strellas tanks and Molutkas), with anti-tank weapons devices, bridging infra-red equipment, all ranging Egyptian into in vast ports started pouring quantities. It taps had been fully as if all was, said, as Sadat they to push me into looks turned "It want as if on. battle, " he added. 27 a Soviet outbreak known preceding were and Egyptians missile were the to arms of supplies war have the best on to Egypt 6. continued Amongst in 100 the the the two tanks right up to that the are

October delivered about in missiles

weapons to which armoury, SAM-6's. three at

been war are

months the aircraft, time

T-62

available

U. S. S. R. 's including to have 12

ground-to-air were also

28 20 29

The SCUD which

reported on

received or

about

launchers apparently Likewise part with

September the

thereabout, deal. 30

of

February from flow

arms mid-1972 of arms,

Syria, a steady agreement

onwards, reportedly during Union which of Israeli

the part that was were air

U. S. S. R. of year. to a $700 31 supply

maintained million As part

concluded agreement, missiles,

sometime the Soviet of airlift the in

of with in to

this SAM-3 the

Syria included components

some

apparently defence air raids

highly

publicized following

Damascus in Syria there

massive the

on

bases

and were

Lebanon certain

autumn

of of SCUD to the

1972.32 weapons such

Admittedly, as the

categories and the.

MIG-23 missile

and

MIG-25 the

aircraft, Kremlin as from

surface-to-surface withhold from the

which

continued June 1973,

Syrians.

However,

279

Soviets which sophisticated fighters. The the Arab period

massively included,

accelerated for anti-tank the

their first missiles,

arms time,

supplies T-62 and

to

Syria tanks, MIG-21

SAM's,

33 extent of to July action which the Soviet Union 1973 Israel to the the view question Hence of the reflect United means that (of the to to was willing during endorse

1972-October against and tended with with the the "34

publicly was,

military

nevertheless, the States. fight Kremlin's Thus, Israel, battle must call mission the to permanent promoting persistence in of the the a of to

somewhat concern whilst the must await April the for

ambiguous, its

relationship the persisted out and Arabs "in that

providing U. S. S. R. be a ruled

a military hostilites) Soviet

peaceful for and

solution.

14,1973, Middle of East the

a resumption for consultations Council in the

Jarring

between with a view 35

members "peaceful tended Middle status rebuke the its Soviet amenability communique Minister, affirmed disposal" territories. of

Security

settlement" to East quo May evoke lest in fears the the

region. the

Such

amongst Kremlin

U. S. S. R. 's in the by warning However, a political to the

clients freeze Sadat's on in the

acquiesce as evidenced

region, and his

public eve of of the its in Prime side their a

1973

subsequent

non-aligned proclamations leadership to an

states in

conference. favour also of

*spite

solution, Arabs Thus, Egypt's Soviet means their at

signalled military end of in a visit July "to

alternative, the to of the Similarly,

answer. by the all

marking Sidqi, the right for 36

Moscow the

1972, use of

Arabs liberation in

occupied issued at

another

communique

280

the Hafez

close

of

a trip to

by

Sadat's in any

National February references significant Israeli

Security 1973, to the a move,

Adviser, U. S. S. R. peaceful agreed from the was some Egyptian Further in war, evidence of was 30-31, of political as can from of endorsing it. was to "40 one the the no as

Ismail, from and that

Moscow making

refrained settlement, with occupied unacceptable. tantamount military indications Arab peace" throughout hostilities. the 1973, Warsaw settlement, one be the writer, Egyptian Indeed, the [Soviet] for of solved occupied "[i]t the intention Egypt

in

a politically a partial as This

withdrawal by the

territories, 37 to effort of the to

proposed has been

Americans, by an "38

interpreted "to assist

a Soviet

commitment the possible break Middle

against Kremlin's forcibly in few Of the months

Israelis.

acquiescence of the were the in of this the "no in

out East

situation the

preceding importance

outbreak respect July

particular at the the heads

communique gathering Pact

issued of countries. this referred

conclusion of Communist mention Arab-Isreali of world of In Soviets, actively Cairo at

Parties of a

Without to the

conflict which forces opinion if not opposing the time wanted war. "41 informed imminence encouraging

"sharpest only by Arab was to "full

problems" withdrawal

affairs, Israeli the

territories. clear war, that were left backed to embark leadership the response

"39 the not in by on a

resort the

impression military, Egypt the Soviet and 42 its

"that make it

Brezhnev, limited was officially of have the been

possible Once the hostilities,

by of to

Egyptians

Syrians must

281

both. in fight Union message day. 44 which

On October he be

4,

Brezhnev the alone support Syria's the country's on the as view

despatched that take of the and... a friend.

a message decision that "43 Assad also on the

to

Sadat to

"expressed for Sadat him the to sure, his of

when Soviet A similar the

must would was

to

give

delivered be fly

President leader

same

To to out been to

Soviet civilian

requested and October part of of military them explanation, of their 5.45 the war

permission dependents This Kremlin and has

advisers day, on the the

Egypt

following an attempt of to

interpreted the United force their

warn either or

States the Arabs war

imminence their

thereby

delay by

operation the element

sabotage of surprise. by was

plans

depriving

A more its

plausible civilian risk from that the

however, Soviet maintain wanted it would

is

that

evacuating taking

nationals, in order

the "to it out

leadership a certain to not be

a calculated distance aloof so United

diplomatic

attack: war broke complicity, gained

sufficiently be accused by the

when

the

States it

of

thereby detente.

endangering "46

advantages

from

The

outbreak The

of

war: of blow

U. S. hostilities for

misperception on States the October

and

Soviet 6,1973, in the was

caution came as

eruption

a

shattering For the

United

policy

Middle that could a

East. massive, take two

Americans,

immediate

shock

well-coordinated them almost prior were was still completely warning. clearly

Egyptian-Syrian by surprise even the chances with

offensive no whilst U. S. of a more

than

hours'

Indeed, under way, the

military intelligence full-scale

operations community

estimating

282

war what

as had

being

extremely began of of at Arab and to huge from be the

thin. to

47 emerge,

Once the policy

the shock in

true gave the

picture way region. U. S. of Soviet and policy Israeli control regional of to

of the In

occurred reappraisal many since of choices,

necessary the had process, rested

American assumptions 1971---the

upon

which

least

assumption of ultimate global by the

invincibility, over Arab

impotence, of the

U. S. S. R. 's so that,

priorities---had war, perceptions was virtually Naturally, that situation Arab the several embarked other capability sufficient environment. plain The political be the policy client-states, attributed, contrary, in the that problem the for progress not to of the in weakness, U. S. S. R. 's hours on the

eschewed that had of

end

the

gap the

separated the Middle East

Washington's situation

reality

closed. the inherent the Middle Soviet global of fighting, much action; self-confidence of the the status first American stability East control and it more "48 and of its assumption the "no to war, crumble no was peace"

corollaries Egypt and priorities. that the than that so of shattered would was be of its and sacrifices of Soviet be that was they was the Syria,

concerning and/or After Arabs "a raid had in itself pre-war "it broken. was "49 had or the

over regional

emerged substantial the to shakiness quo thus fact do

something

small-scale and proof With

diplomatic the might to the the United

stalemate States

whatever going but, of two to on its

subsequently ingenuity

made

diplomacy bankruptcy of

shortsightedness East, to the to the

Middle and

Soviet Since

success

arms.

283

this managed first

was to task

likely fully which

to

be

the

case their

whether military

or

not

the

Arabs the itself was to by This

achieve the Nixon the

objectives, set hostilities undertaken support. Israel to after defeat this of a return endeavour solution Arabs to goals It of of "[f]irst, secondly, us that in this to make was State his with to for

Administration outbreak of

immediately demonstrate virtue was not to to of be

following the Soviet done futility arms by

of and

military

action

Soviet or and

diplomatic helping

allowing Egypt

but was the to to the

humiliate would instability

Syria. in

Only

accomplished inevitable the situation some

the that the

U. S., would

recognition

characterize of war,

preceding foundations by

outbreak for

establish Arab-Israeli reliance cooperation tasks outlined diplomacy hostilities hostilities contribution four years. the pave taken dilemma two wars "51 United the in in

a political the and seek "50

dispute on Soviet with mind on in as in the that October the

persuading

"abandon 'through these

pressure United American 25 Middle as that the the East

States. Secretary objectives as

Kissinger country's to to end end

being

quickly a manner

possible---but would enable

a major produced last 25 that to

to

removing Arabs to "wanted post-war with

conditions and Israelis

have the

between According States way for

some a

commentators, limited Israeli negotiations.

meant defeat"52

peace Kissinger's U. S. the As that

However, of the its meant in his

conjunction confronted it quite the seems

conception trying to of outlined

which

the that

in

implement State

tasks,

Secretary he later

something memoirs,

different. was

problem

284

If Israel won overwhelmingly---as we first expected--we becoming had the focal to Arab avoid point of all We had to keep the Soviet Union from resentments. the Arabs' it do saviour, emerging as which would its that by bluster the either pretending stopped Israeli itself directly in the advance or by involving If happened the unexpected in war. and Israel was difficulty, have to do what to we would was necessary it. We could Soviet to defeat save not permit clients traditional But once friend. having demonstrated a the futility then have of the military option, we would to impetus to give to the search for use this peace. [Emphasis added. ]53 Thus, victory in only Arab Soviet Syrian settlement. utilized significant region into However, response East victory pre-October corollary Israelis, reinforced course sources. when of of and by the These Egyptian was of the as a role an a "limited less than that meant Israeli overwhelming, would defeating and then, not promote but after be defeat" " would and have the to mean "a

ending

hostilities could the to and

a manner have

a permanent not completely

settlement destroying that resort Egyptian a

armies weapons

demonstrating allowed on the to redress

would

grievances, In

embarking this means in the of way,

a search war the and preserve. days the of

for could

political be any the

actually from

excluding East

U. S. S. R. thereby

Middle American first States

turning

exclusive for the

three to

hostilities, in a or rapid even was the the a the

the Middle Israeli beyond the

United by push

situation of to This of of

determined would 6

its the

expectation Arabs lines. assumptions back

that

cease-fire Washington's in the first of

logical and it on the was the

Arabs war reports

72 highly

hours

a stream 'war spoke forces by

inaccurate and Israeli Arab

American of were an

intelligence rout54 into at the a time Sinai

imminent still

advancing

285

desert55 Sea conflict inconsistent Arabs support Kissinger supplying and so at the of

and Galilee!

Syrian 56

troops

were

a mere U. S. few of on Soviet Israeli

seven

miles

from in a little to diplomatic

the the

Consequently, those first objective relying

intervention seemed

during with futility by

days

the of

demonstrating arms and victory. hesitated have fearing of and an an

the

facilitating is reputed with impact when Tel

a modest to have

Thus, in

deliberately which could

Israel

weapons on the

immediate that to do Arab as lines much as

decisive a time would territory wished. with

battlefield, was speaking go ahead

Aviv it the

imminent

defeat Arab it Israel technology missiles, Defence aircraft delays tape Kissinger "spent of in

encourage beyond

to

occupy

pre-October whilst and including is said the be to a limited 80 have

6 cease-fire agreeing quantity Sidewinder told of such to

Accordingly, ammunition equipment, 57 Kissinger

re-supply of high-

air-to-air Secretary weapons " and of as that red by 7 subject military "59 sought that to might he

Schlesinger and should the tanks be

that should attributed 58 that the and needs

supply and "normal" is the

"slow to

deliberate,

bureaucratic corroborated of October on of the the

Pentagon. who claims with

This on Israeli that did level, not

somewhat evening ambassador

some military

time"

re-supply Israel's the

"[i]n

light

prognosis, At deter obstruct Effectively, intervention military the

appear United any

desperate. States action

superpower U. S. S. R. the this that from

the

undertaking of discouraging help thereby the

achievement meant might and

American any Arabs prolong form

objectives. of Soviet their if

sustain the war.

offensive

286

successful, the

such

a strategy and its as clients giving after to United for

would

also which,

drive as to

a wedge in its of 1972, ties

between would with the

U. S. S. R. the Thus,

perceive U. S. Kissinger sponsoring Security to pre-war

Kremlin shortly endeavoured with the calling

priority the force States a cease-fire the Soviets States course, victory. " " outbreak the a

hostilities, into in on a cothe

Soviets resolution based

Council lines. offer, irresponsibly" "to the let

return the U. S. S. R.

To he

underline the United its

costs that

of if

rejecting the have is, to " lot

American "acted but await Secretary relationships. appeal "destroy build definitive began the to first to

warned the take Israeli

would that

no

choice "simply

nature

inevitable of "60 the Security State,

"That, a for

said of

the our

"will Even Soviet Council, that it has

affect support warned taken refrained up against to a close, us

an

Egyptian would years giving which As Soviet to a

Kissinger, three from his the he warning, Arabs. told

everything up. "61 answer sound day When

the

Kremlin

Kissinger more of the like war

sharpened a threat drew

ambassador

Dobrynin, the Arab attack they to are going the as accelerate be no will which what we will see it to yet take reportedly but alone in had restore steps

is that Our the situation reading of that has been totally now contained, be pushed back and this will process is completed [Israeli] mobilization that 81 and after later [October than 6L have seen before. we To remind the about quo Soviet a joint ante the on October bellum, Arab leadership superpower the armies, 8 "that he U. S. that,

unless

second the to told holding

thoughts status devastate Dobrynin

initiative could

Kissinger was all

287

back ordering a

the

'Israeli a massive

shadow resupply

government' to enable "63 relationships cannot the He

in

Washington Israelis to reminded at stake

from launch the by

crushing that it area,

counteroffensive. the that special "[d]etente the to aware the of

also was still

Kremlin warning in any In apparently East and of were the the regional Soviet support Kremlin Israel fomented achievement dispute. Minister countries from thus its

survive East. States, "64 the

irresponsibility

including

Middle United the of more the

contrast fully the its first response

U. S. S. R. in the

was

real the

situation outbreak of to

Middle

moments was than

hostilities, the attainment objectives from in extraofficial of cautious 7 of war the on

appropriate U. S. 's. possible of the the of war was of

objectives basically to

was the the

These

draw for

maximum promotion

benefits interests

conflagration region without interests. reaction for laid whose tension of 65 In Grechko had to in was of this of the the full to

Soviet

jeopardizing Consequently, the outbreak In

U. S. S. R. 's first one

Arabs. responsibility "reckless in the

a statement for the

October

eruption actions

aggressive Middle East"

constantly prevented Arab-Israeli Defence of their The the Arab the

and of the

a political the absence later take a just

settlement of such the to a

settlement,

added, up arms

"peoples defend "66 warning deaf to of it went

national Kremlin's "[i]f voice the of The "will bear

independence statement government reason leaders

struggle. with a remain the Israel,

concluded Israel might cost should

that the Israel. on,

dear of

people "

government

288

full course. the

responsibility "67 United At this States the circles ambitions. "could detente, and or nature

for

the

consequences of the the was have This conflict, "West" only

of

such

a

reckless neither mentioned external in to its one to

stage nor indictment which "68 has at of

however, were of "those Israel according as an an

specifically; reactionary aggressive writer, preserve the of Arabs keeping to raise Thus, was the confined hardward the from acute"70

encouraged restraint,

been the the

interpreted least

attempt to the preserve

very

effort

localized a superpower were a low the at

conflict---avoiding "69 progress U. S. S. R. Indeed, and had the no so

danger as the were reason

confrontation. steady the

long

making profile, ante. this to

Americans compelling

stage re-supplying

of

the the

conflict, Egyptians sustain victory be propose not

Soviet and their might turned to its to that

intervention Syrians offensive. be into allowed defeat, clients press the a the Arabs with

to

enable

them "fears

to that

Although to slip

Kremlin's Arab and 71

hands, led it once any still 7 that

or it

even to

were ...

cease-fire-in-place, issue. would whilst Sadat ammunition the new Soviet tanks not they on Consequently, entertain were

was it

prepared clear a the to to as the be

became of

thoughts advancing, it intended

cease-fire-in-situ U. S. S. R. immediately informed airlift Similarly, in shipping the from at Iraq a

October and Union from

military suggested to

equipment that, Latakia their be

Egypt. delay

72

Odessa replenish would Indeed,

would depleted

considerable, force

Syrians which, later

should in date. turn, 73

tank by the

re-supplied the first

U. S. S. R. vessels

Soviet

carrying

289

war two

material days later in and

to

the

Arabs

left began of

Odessa reaching

on

October Washington steaming

7,74 of

and "an

reports the number ports.

increase Syrian

supply

ships

towards

Egyptian

"75

The

turning

point: of superpower

Israel's intervention

recovery

and

the

intensification

By serious war. military meeting Washington although were the in all 400 still

that

time,

a combination of the in the

of

developments Involvement by Israel of In

led in the an

to the real urgent

a

deepening First came

superpowers' disclosure the Middle 9, attache had heavy Israel's had had been tank

situation with Kissinger Dinitz the Syrian sustaining front The Bar-Lev in All and front. staggering his own and reorient the all

East. Israeli Gur halted, losses,

on

October

ambassador revealed the and that, Israelis that had or

to

and

military

advance very of

on ended

southern disaster. of the

counter-attacks either more in than smashed 20,000 consolidating told, were Israel

Egyptians line and digging all, tanks,

encircled and their had lost on

troops

tanks

Sinai, in 500 76

and was

positions. 49 the aircraft Egyptian These question counterattack began strategy victory restore to

Kissinger of which

400

destroyed

revelations rosy victory. the rapid providing assumptions "77 United achievement Israel He,

prompted about therefore, a

Kissinger quick Israeli

"to

immediately interventionary

States' of with lines. a the

towards by the urgently

limited

Israeli to

wherewithal Consequently,

pre-October

6 cease-fire

290

on speed

the up

afternoon the supply and of draw

of

October of

9 the

White air and losses reserve

House defence to so

decided electronic guarantee as to 78 stocks Israelis the status

to

ammunition, to Israel, tank

equipment, replacement Israel the armour turn quo the ante to

aircraft all upon its Israeli

the permit With of to

exorbitant and Kissinger the

stocks. reserve the restore

additional and

supplies artillery, balance by the by notion States of October failure that of on the

use

of

expected at least the

military bellum

and

13 at of date Israel

latest. to make the any progress rejection impelled complete war Kissinger consequent Israel into the a was spectre could not on by

However, the Sadat the Suez of United front the

coupled

with

a standstill a course fourth As that

cease-fire79 was to

transformation superpower concerned, of a

Arab-Israeli far and the as

confrontation. these two war matters and said "risk no the developments of attrition "a

protracted made be no suicidal

which point where

withstand would U. S.

reach hesitation

maneuverability " but "not and to talk left "pour the in

disastrous, of " that was dislodge the idea State, and no

option, " and was "80 failure and Sadat's to of

Secretary confrontation, any doubt

supplies, until be for Sinai situ the By and and

again could

there imposed. the

longer

settlement

This of

conclusion Israel to of with intervention 12, of the 18 per

probably the of

inevitable, Egyptians from in in Arabs. Egypt with 60 arms flights

rejection coincide

a cease-fire increase of the

happened level midnight, Syria military at

a sudden on

massive behalf was

Soviet

October a rate equipment

U. S. S. R. transport hour, or

re-supplying laden of

planes a total

291

over reaching response credibilty

the

previous such was and the matters beyond their a level perhaps resolve Soviet to the

21 that

hours. some

81

Clearly,

matters dramatic to

were American the

relatively in order United

necessary images Union, a head pre-war of 13, of the was

preserve

the

States. stimulus advance lines with on a deep were In the by which the Syria October salient and 12 35

For brought Israelis following 10. beyond kilometres kilometres the Syrians

principal the steady

cease-fire the Israel Golan had

recapture October

Heights occupied

By mid-day the

pre-October wide. (or lost of guns. 20

6 positions Forward miles) tanks, With at Israeli from

11 kilometres positions Damascus. of

merely process,

900 82

thousands the the the prospect hands Kremlin side and kept re-supply of 83 arms was towards New aircraft 20 of its of

other of the

vehicles, collapse

and of protege a

hundreds Soviet looming to come

client-regime over down in of the the horizon, on

an had

American little if the credibility This was choice

but

firmly Middle were its the Syrian infusion Israeli intensified. the the

the East

Syria general

U. S. S. R. 's and clearly began transport clear effect the flown tanks October a halt, "spiralled Soviet in to were 13, the that in on

position image reflected October planes this halting airlift help shipped when Soviet the prop

resolve in 10 with to the

to

be

intact. effort giant Once having it

massive despatch capital. of

which military became little

initial the was up to

advance

Damascus, were additional mid-day came to

Syrian port of

air

force,

and By

Latakia. finally Syrians

Israeli commitment

offensive to the

had

virtually

292

out

of

control.
the the of and the

"84
replenishment Kremlin offensive occupation the to of correctly capability of Golan the an additional the front the Syrian estimated of the strip Israelis in war that Syrian of machine with was the armed Syrian would

Whilst under depletion forces territory switch for their way,

the

beyond efforts

Heights, southern the to sealift with, the to

preparation 85 the Thus, Soviet with

a crushing

offensive with its

against airlift its to 86 it

Egyptians. Syrians, the

simultaneously Union a and began to

supplement airlift,

Egyptians of irritated of Egypt

substantial other

begin This as

mainly further

ammunition the to

consumables. who interpreted in of Damascus coerce began on 87 the Eastern to three the to October On

Americans resume its The advance endeavours This first

an

encouragement

offensive firmness

Sinai. the Soviet was also response reflected into with Soviet day, three state were the it of of alerted military airborne reports division that to in restraining the fleet was its alert on the the Israeli Kremlin's Israel. substantial in further airborne which, October the

towards to

Americans take 9 the shape of the

enhancement Mediterranean. reported divisions in 8 addition when the the to six. that in

following had on placed a high that lose Soviet with

U. S. S. R. Eorope divisions began number This, staff

Syrians total 88

to of

initiative, divisions that was the part already U. S. S. R. to the on of in was help first

brought alert the

coupled of to a Soviet

headquarters lent for the

Damascus, preparing defend

credence some Syrian sort

speculation of airborne 89

intervention 12,

capital.

By October

293

threat made

of when

direct the to to

Soviet U. S. S. R. 's Kissinger threats matters the United

intervention ambassador that to the

on to Soviet and out

behalf Washington, Union that of if

of

Syria Dobrynin,

was

emphasized indifferent advance As basically intensification Arabs What during was

could the 90

not Israeli

be

Damascus might States get was

continued, far as

hand.

concerned,

however,

the the

defensive of October considered per attainment challenge As one war Jews and and the chronic to therefore, by proving physical to challenge prevail to se of the Soviet

motives

that on or

stimulated behalf less of irrelevant. was an also

intervention were more

the

10-13 of which a

paramount was seen Arab States pointed not

importance only as but

the

intervention to direct cost. Arab-Israeli between Washington (and be He Nixon's) permitted was, the

obstacle as at a any the conflict between to must his never "

limited United has

defeat, to out, no be to longer of [he] Russian

countered Kissinger, "a wills reverted guns United Russians of the Middle the White of aircraft, the peril

writer was Arabs; Kremlin.

henceforth it was In

a test this,

obsession-that over resolved to them the "to and in guns teach to

of the

the

States. a hard world

lesson" "America's seeking anywhere. decided ammunition to provide

the

rest and in the 13 airlift

capacity the United

crisis

of or

States on October

East

"91 to

Consequently, launch to the Israel Israelis a massive, using with

House and and of up to 10 24 the

direct American an initial that

arms

military

consignment was to by swell that

Phantom aircraft

fighter-bombers, by the following

a figure day.

Already

time

294

U. S. Syrians, previous airlifting daily, operation Israel total

had

out-matched Egyptians, days. to 92 Israel 50

what and

the Iraqis

U. S. S. R. combined 16, of hour. the 1,000

had in United tons When it

provided all States of the had of

the the was

By October an tons average per in tons 93

armaments re-supply provided and a

or

about was

concluded some 50,000

mid-November, of military

with of 108

hardware,

fighter-bombers.

The

climax:

Israel's

incursion

and

the

superpower

confrontation The began Israeli eastwards Egypt, northern its by full the by to third unfold pressure towards that offensive might end of against the day, them for and on on final October Syria, the time and stage 14 of when, the in 1973 Arab-Israeli response to war to

a belated his army

Sadat Sinai

ordered passes.

advance for off its

Unfortunately called able forces. were forced to

Israel was, the the more

had therefore, Egyptian Egyptians

already

concentrate Consequently, to retreat, This which the passing was Third By tanks in

leaving paved began Israelis through control Army, October were Egyptian activities. up the on

behind way

than

250

destroyed

tanks.

a massive 15. able to the

Israeli After cross the much

counter-offensive heavy Canal Army, fighting, by which and the with Canal other the

October were

Suez Second

a gap of deployed 20, to the

between northern around more 20 than miles sites Almost

Egyptian sector of

the parts

Canal, of troops Suez in Soviet

the

southern Israeli of the

Canal. 200

10,000 west and

destroying disruptive

SAM

engaging the

overnight

Union's

worst

295

fears

were
Israel's

becoming

true.

94
across Soviet 16, some the 70 In of 250 to the Suez Canal prompted on to flights the and to the in United behalf Cairo per day, an of and 95

incursion of Thus, was on increased going with to indirect

intensification Egypt. Damascus most provided encourage contributions. alert and of

intervention airlift 80

October to Egypt.

them Egypt

addition, tanks

U. S. S. R. to

a present friendly At the their to

proceeded make similar began around and of Thus, fleet Moreover,

other 96 reinforce as

governments same time

Soviets and States

to the

forces the

Mediterranean, that Soviet October increased number the of unless

a warning was might the 23

Israel direct during was a off U. S.

restraint

exercised, be forthcoming.

some

form

intervention 15-19, from amphibious coast, picked had been

U. S. S. R. 's to 29 surface craft on signals on turn, alert.

Mediterranean vessels. began October that 97 the so ahead also to 17

landing and up placed in

concentrate or 18

Egyptian

intelligence divisions These to accelerate would of their " client the

Soviet

airborne

measures, its be the at

stimulated of 25 The per Israel cent

United that of the decided its

States own Soviet to was the U. S. ceaseproteges to into

re-supply least

operation re-supply continue established, and fire to its and embark

Arabs. airlift

Americans the sealift short

"until speed not be not up the

cease-fire so by their that

and

to

"would Soviets on its a war

caught

a sudden Arab Furthermore,

would of

encourage "98 to be

attrition. not

demonstrate

resolve

intimidated

296

restraining 18 to the

Israel, despatch with East the

the by the

United

States of if

responded landing Soviet

on ships

October to the

U. S. S. R. that of U. S.

Mediterranean the have Middle to The from overstep the the be

a warning issue 1"99 at this but

forces personnel

entered would

military

"rethought. problem Soviet

stage, from

however, Israel,

was which

not was

to about clear order

come to to the way or to U. S. the

Union

itself. United of them States its

By October that troops was either through endorse, extent post-war at all For objectives in he on the was for that

19/20, Egypt

it would

had

become

never that in the

withdrawal to dislodge their unwilling to

from to a

Sinai, destroy long to the do

and

only

them siege. so would

battle This the

force was Arabs American

surrender to such role an in could be to doomed. modify his

humiliate of if a

prospect

dominant such almost was

negotiations, be this possible, reason, and of accept much that of the of These

indeed would Kissinger a cease-fire east

negotiations certainly prepared which of the suffice military But its October enemy cease-fire. cease-fire observing to Israel air the left

the Suez

Egyptians Canal; army

control satisfied

of the the futility

the

bank of would

presence Canal of support. outlined who to said

Israeli to

western^shores to the by thoughts. Major-General objective we can when 338, it the Israel ceased dictate Security Arabs virtue

demonstrate undertaken different commander, his point

the

option had force 21 that the ""100

Soviet were

by on the of passed of of a

Peled, was the

country's where

"bring terms

Thus,

Council no for intention a

Resolution it. Although

had firing

couple

297

hours it

after never

the

cease-fire other supplies, Resolution.

was

supposed

to

come

into such

effect, as the as

terminated of by an used men, the artillery the right further 339 the and and Israelis

military

activities, and these

build-up required provoked Israel This of

ammunition, 101 When from start 27, the a in

armour, violations

bombardment opportunity up to to October

Egyptian major spite of

army,

offensive. the issue orders

continued two

Security 340 of to

Council October completely a similar 23

cease-fire and 25

(Resolutions and Third Army. enabled Army 102 These external fire. October "intervene force, cease-fire agreement. following signs Union States. of to 105 Israel's front For the clearly United in "103 in

respectively) the the Egyptian Second

surround fate for

threaten

violations intervention The 23 first in such which the to

compelled force call

Sadat Israel to

to

call

for the to the the

direct ceaseon to of the

respect

came

in

a message urged

Nixon U. S. use of

Egyptian even if the in that full

ruler

effectively, order to

necessitates implementation with another the

guarantee

resolution This 104 was When,

accordance by

US-USSR on the no

followed however, Egypt

request

day.

the called

Americans upon with

showed the the Soviet United

restraining directly

Israel, intervene

Jointly

violations contravened States, jeopardy, its it

of the

the

cease-fire of to Soviet as an put

on both its

the

Egyptian

interests

superpowers. Middle it East once Both

threatened and for the

strategy again

Union, ally.

challenged

credibility

298

superpowers, end did eager would its and to not to Israel's act join

therefore,

had

a mutual Yet, the the

interest in spite

in of

putting this, only for

an they too this of

transgression. jointly. the to in an the U. S. Admittedly,, in policing

U. S. S. R. cease-fire, of the

was

amount presence credibility. the precisely

American region The

recognition and it would

legitimacy its prestige to intervention

enhance was unwilling

U. S. of same to lose

however, joint reason. most the

even

consider for

possibility the stood Union have

superpower

Nevertheless, from Israel's of the violations

the

superpower was army the

which Soviet

because

destruction

Egyptian for the its SuezArmy, sending ceaseso, then

would

incalculable standing.

adverse Thus, when

consequences Israel cut the it

international Cairo the road and

thereby the to that,

completely United Egypt States in the be question To in

surrounded to join to

Third in the do

U. S. S. R.

urged

military fire the urgently steps warning, minatory 23, 339, in to as army to troops the Egypt signals and after when and Soviet

contingents warned

order U. S. faced of give an on Security

enforce to the

should "should the '"106 engaged This violation

decline with taking credibility impressive the evening Council and

Union to consider

necessity appropriate to exercise of October its in

unilaterally. the

U. S. S. R.

diplomacy. Israel's the

began of

Resolution sharp decline supplies well Soviet gave fly it rise some was

Americans of Soviet

detected aircraft about Ukraine

a sudden carrying 75 per day

number and

military to six---as three This to 24

Syria---from from the

indicating been alerted. was

that

logistical that Egypt.

units the By

had

speculation to

U. S. S. R. the morning

preparing of October

299

further troops transport total

learnt had been

that put had of 85.107

four on

more alert, the

divisions and that

of five

Soviet or six bringing sea warned

airborne Soviet the to on an the

ships number

entered Soviet So, 24 that the

Mediterranean, in Brezhnev might the that

vessels when the

unprecedented evening intervene warning The States began some to did of

October to not enforce lack

U. S. S. R. on

unilaterally front his

cease-fire

Suez

credibility. of crisis. on to and October 24 flung it it the United

Soviet into

challenge a state of restraint response resolve

Although Israel, Brezhnev's 108

immediately had to if make only the zone. by on the would Soviet point,

to sort

exercise of a tough its of

warning, to the prevent

demonstrate

determination forces to into

introduction Consequently, putting a U. S.

Soviet Kissinger

combat

conflict warning Air

responded including Three the alert109 that tolerate 110

Breshnev's

forces,

Strategic and the the by

Command, both States of his

Defence

Condition and any the Soviet

warning

Egyptian not troops Kissinger confrontation Accordingly, was that been "not it under in

leaderships

United presence thus made the a the back measures previous were " "not Kissinger

circumstances Middle East. to showing 25

Having de-escalate the

proceeded by on asking has October the done, by in that is nature. had no Soviet " the

superpower way out. States anything that day directed reasoned back off had "were at

Kremlin that pull the the they taken, any

he

stated to

United from

Union and that on

undertaken

U. S. "

precautionary any that actions "there

Since been for

already reason

country

to

300

anything Defence

that Condition

it

has

done... alert Soviet it

"ill was

On the called of the

following off. 112 24 States October that

day,

the

Three the in that

Nevertheless, desirable an end to effect Israel's were permitted Third a U. N. of given

warning forced

October

had to 26

one put the

United on warned to the the

transgression. an ultimatum

Thus, which supplies nine "that 338 Aviv and had hours, will 339. no

Israelis they Egyptian support enforcement this to Israeli

unless

non-military Army within

beleaguered U. S. with Faced would the with but Arab-

resolution

deal "113

[Resolutions] Tel duly did

daunting comply, war.

prospect, which it

real the

alternative fourth

thus

ending

301

Notes
Identity: An Autobiography Search In A. of el-Sadat, Heikal, M. 229-230; 1978), London, (Collins, pp. esp. Influence The Rise Sphinx of Soviet and Fall and Commissar: Both these London, 1978). (Collins, East in Middle the defaults books on arms of Soviet examples with are replete during the 1967-1973. Egypt period with agreements supply Yom Kippur in G. Golan, Quoted May 1,1973. Radio Cairo, and Middle East Crisis the Union After: The Soviet and 45-45. 1977), London, Press, (Cambridge University pp. Freeman, Soviet Cited in R. O. Cairo 22,1973. Radio, July (Praeger Since 1970, East Toward Policy the Middle ed. rev. New York, 1978), Publishers, p. 128. Ibid. Golan, p. 64. op. cit., United An Interpretation of S. Brown, The Crisis of Power: Years (Columbia Kissinger During the States Foreign Policy 88-89. 1979), New York, University Press, pp. (Weidenfeld Upheaval H. Kissinger, and Years and Nicolson of 1982), Michael Joseph, London, p. 206. Ibid., p. 214. in the the "no war, The favourability situation no peace" of by illustrated States United Middle East the a to was in May 1973 to in Cairo out computer carried exercise benefitted to which the countries various evaluate extent the All were from the considerations relevant status quo. Israel 420 the fed into awarded the result and computer, Union 380 points, United States the and the Soviet points, (Collins, Ramadan The Road to 110 See M. Heikal, points. London, 1975), p. 164. Israeli Decades Three Peace: G. of Rafael, Destination (Weidenfeld Memoir Foreign Policy---A Personal and Nicolson, London, 1981), p. 280. diplomatic Borchgrane, Interview de to Arnaud senior Newsweek published magazine, correspondent of the American declared: Sadat interview, the April During 9,1973. on West Europeans All The time are has come for a shock... the has fallen telling asleep over that everybody us But they Middle East will soon wake up to the crisis. The has left fact America way out. that us no other is the hostilities the out. only way resumption of for is now being Everything in this mobilized... country is now inevitable. the which of the battle resumption Kissinger, p. 461. op. cit.,

1.

2.

3.

4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14. 15. 16. 17.

Golan, op. cit., p. 38. Kissinger, p. 205. op. cit., (K. C. A. ), Vol. XIX, Archives Keesing's Contemporary 26158. Arabs: The Soviet Union J. D. Glassman, the Arms for Hopkins University in East (Johns the Middle

Whetten, "The Arab-Israeli L. L. Brown, 90; op. cit., p. No. 128 Papers " Adelphi Dispute: Power Behaviour, Great London, Studies, Strategic for (International Institute 1977), p. 28.
1973, p.

and War Press,

302

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

Baltimore 1975), and London, p. 119. Brown, 89-90. op. cit., pp. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 459. Ibid. Heikal (1978), p. 253. op. cit., Golan, op. cit., p. 39. Whetten, Brown, op. cit., p. 25; op. cit., p. 89. Sadat's, interview to Arnaud de Borchgrave, Newsweek, April 9,1973. Ibid. General Ahmed Ismail's interview to Al-Hawadess, August 16, 1974. Cited in Golan, op. cit., p. 39. Heikal (1978), 253-254. Indeed, in the pp. op. cit., same interview to Arnaud de Borchgrave in which he that warned "[t]he time has come for " Sadat declared that a shock, also "[t]he Russians that's are providing us now with everything to for them And I possible supply. am now quite " See Newsweek, April 9,1973. satisfied. D. A. Schmidt, in the Armageddon Middle East (John Day Company, New York, 1974), p. 219. Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 22, November 5, 1973. G. Golan, "Soviet Aims in the Middle East War, " Survival, Vol. 16, No. 3, May-June 1974, 106, Glassman, p. n. 4; 101-102; Schmidt, op. cit., ibid. pp. Golan (1977), 43,57. op. cit., pp. Glassman, 96-97. op. cit., pp. Brown, op. cit., p. 90. Middle East News Agency, April 3,1973. Pravda, April 22,1973. Quoted in Golan (1977), op. cit., p. 46.

36.
37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

TASS,

July

14,1972.

Quoted

in

ibid.,

43.

44. 45. 46.

47.

Pravda, February 11,1973. Quoted in ibid., p. 40. Glassman, op. cit., pp 98-99. Izvestia', August in ibid., 1,1973. Quoted p. 101. Glassman, ibid. Heikal (1978), p. 254. op. cit., According to Heikal, the U. S. S. R. was officialy informed by Egypt imminence 1,1973. of the of hostilities on October Sadat, however, Moscow was that told contends not until October 3. In 4, Syria formally any case, on October the Soviet Union notified date of the exact on which hostilities See Heikal to commence. (1975) were op. cit., 24,208; pp. el-Sadat, op. cit., p. 246. Heikal, ibid., Also General Ahmed Ismail's see p. 34. interview to Al Akhbar, September 15,1974. Cited in Golan (1977), op. cit., p. 69. Heikal, ibid., 208-209. pp. Ibid., 247. p. 34; el-Sadat, op. cit., A. Z. Rubinstein, Red Star The Soviet-Egyptian on the Nile: Influence Relationship Since the June War (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, Princeton, 1977), p. 261.

p.

23.

According

to

Kissinger,
taking operations the clearly place, had been the repeated what position all the full chance of a deliberate scale

Even with military agreed estimate long, that week war was low:

"We [the evidence

intelligence of a major 303

agencies] coordinated

can

find hard no Egyptian/Syrian

48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55.

56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61.

62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

See Ibid. Ibid., p. 468. Ibid. (November 12,1973), No. 1794 Department Bulletin, State of 92-93. 69: in Brown, 583-94. Quoted pp. op. cit., pp. East Insight War Sunday Team, Times Insight on the Middle (Andre 1974), Deutsch, London, p. 132. Kissinger, p. 468. op. cit., The October L. A. Arabs: 1973 Sobel Israel (ed. ), and the Kissinger, War (Facts New York, 1974), pp. 91,92; on File, ibid., 477,485,488,490. pp. (Belknap Press Ally N. Safran, The Embattled Israel: of 1978), Harvard Massachusetts, Press, University Cambridge, 291,299. pp. Ibid Sobel, 296,298,300; p. 93. pp. op. cit., Kissinger, 480,485-486. op. cit., pp. Kissinger Henry R. Morris, Uncertain Greatness: and 1977), American (Harper Foreign Policy and Row, New York, p. 255. Kissinger, p. 485. op. cit., Ibid., p. 492. Kissinger told Ibid., Shortly ambassador p. 472. afterwards, General States Dobrynin that the United a consider would "[i]f it turns Assembly debate act, " and that a "frivolous let it take its then into debate, Assembly we will a General to be a turn it We are will out military course. certain Then everyone Israelis. for the come to witll us. victory for If it turns off a shut communications we will nasty Idem, while. p. 473. Ibid., p. 474. B. Kalb, Morris, Also 255. and see M. Kalb op. cit., p. Boston, Toronto, 1974), Kissinger Brown (Little, p. and Co., Kissinger: 466; Conversations M. Golan, The Secret of Henry Ruth Geyra East, trans. Step-by-Step in the Middle Diplomacy Times Book Co., New York, York (Quadrangle/New and Sol Stern 1976), 46-47. pp. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 491. Quoted East Confrontation: The Middle in W. Laqueur, and World London, 1974), House, 166-167. Politics (Wildwood pp. Pravda, Quoted in ibid., October, 8,1973. p. 166. Quoted in Laqueur, ibid., p. 167. Pravda, in Soviet Quoted K. Dawisha, October 8,1973. Egypt (Macmillan, London Foreign Policy Towards and Basingstoke, 1979), p. 67.

the Canal Golan Heights and in the offensive the weight indicates of evidence an area. where a series of responses situation action-reaction to threats by perceived created an side each for dangerous increasingly confrontation. potential hostilities The current apparently are a result of that in a position to clarify not we are although situation, It is that the the possible events. sequence of latter, the Egyptians particularly may have or Syrians, " been preparing small-scale or other action. a raid Kissinger, p. 458. op. cit., across Rather,

69.
70. 71.

Golan

(1977),

Heikal (1978), op. cit., Ibid., 208-209,212,213; pp. 257; el-Sadat, op. cit.,

op. cit.,

p.
pp. pp.

79.
256-257. idem 252-253; (1978), Whetten, 256op. cit. pp. op. cit., p. 30.

304

72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

77. 78.

79. 80.

253-254. ibid., pp. el-Sadat, Heikal (1975), p. 212. op. cit., Glassman, p. 130. op. cit., Kalb, Kalb p. 467. op. cit., and 490-491; Kissinger, pp. 468; op. cit., Ibid., p. Deutsch, War (Andre The Yom Kippur Team, Insight Times York, 1975), p. 273. ibid. Kalb and Kalb, M. 495; Kissinger, 467; p. Ibid., op. cit., p. Richard The Memoirs R. Nixon, of 49; p. op. cit; 1978), New York, Dunlop, p. 922. (Grosset and 517-518. ibid., Kissinger, pp. Ibid., p. 518.

Sunday New

Golan, Nixon

81. 82.
83.

84. 85. 86.

87. 88.

89. 90. 91.

92. 93.

94.

95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102.

103. 104.

Also op. cit., p. 497. Kissinger, see Whetten, p. op. cit., 130; 85; Glassman, p. op. cit, 29; G. Golan, p. op. cit. Schmidt, 468; p. 218. op. cit., Kalb, Kalb pp. op. cit., and Team (1975), p. 277. Insight Times Sunday op. cit. 226-227. Ibid., pp. Glassman, G. Golan, p. 85; 134; Ibid (1974), cit., op. p. 467-470; Kalb, pp. Kalb cit., 130; op. and op. cit., p. Schmidt, p. 218. op. cit., ibid., Kalb p. 467. and Kalb, in Intervention Superpower P. Mangold, Ibid., pp. 470-471; 128; 1978), London, p. Helm, (Croom East Middle the 58-59. M. Golan, pp. 31; Whetten, op. cit., p. op. cit., 128-129. Mangold, ibid. pp. Kissinger, p. 508. op. cit., A Kissinger: Israelis, Arabs, and The E. R. F. Sheehan, East Middle in the Diplomacy American History Secret of Also 1976), New York, see p. 34. Press, Digest (Reader's 515,521. ibid., Kissinger, 33; pp. Mangold, p. op. cit., Kissinger, ibid., p. 525. Also 219. Schmidt, see 152; op. cit., Mangold, p. op. cit., 149; Laqueur, p. 131; op. cit., Glassman, p. op. cit., the For of 927-928. aspects other Nixon, pp. op. cit., Kalb, Kalb 244; and (1975), op. cit., airlift, see Heikal M. 148-149; Laqueur, pp. 477-479; op. cit., op. cit., pp. Rafael, 61; p. 306. op. cit., Golan, op. cit., p. Also pp. op. cit., 106-107. Sobel, see Safran, pp. op. cit., ibid., (1975), Heikal 525; 304-311; Kissinger, p. op. cit., Team (1974), p. 183. Insight op. cit., 247; Times Sunday p. Golan, p. 108. op. cit., Heikel (1978), p 259. op. cit., 108; Golan, 128; p. Mangold, op. cit., p. op. cit., 162-163. Glassman, pp. op. cit., 531,542. Kissinger, pp. op. cit., Cited in Golan, 19,1973. pp-cit., New York October, Times., 108-109. pp. Quoted October 23,1973. Tribune, Herald The International in Whetten, p. 31. op. cit., Team (1974), op. cit., Sunday Times Insight p. 198. 173; M. Laqueur, 30; Whetten, p. op. cit., p. op. cit., 249(1975), Heikal 87-88; pp. Golan, op. cit., pp. op. cit., 568-569,575,601,604. 250; Kissinger, pp. cit., op. 573-574. ibid., Kissinger, pp. Ibid., p. 576.

Sunday Safran,

Times Insight p. op. cit.,

Team (1974), 300.

op. cit.

p.

134.

305

105.

106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113.

Kalb. Kalb Ibid., 489; 579,583; and op. cit.., p. pp. Times Sunday Insight (1974), Team Nixon, p. 937; op. cit., op. cit., p. 204. Also Kalb, ibid., Quoted in Kissinger p. 583. see Kalb and ibid., 489-490. pp. Kalb ibid., and Kalb, p. 488. See Kissinger, p. 576. op. cit., 491-492. Ibid., 587-589; Kalb op. cit., and Kalb, pp. pp. Kalb 588,591; Kissinger, ibid., and Kalb, op. cit., pp. pp. 492,495-496. Kissinger, ibid., p. 595. Kalb and Kalb, p. 497. op. cit., According to some Kissinger, 608-609. reports, pp. op. cit., Kissinger in order to pre-empt Soviet that a possible warned American weaken seriously would supply which operation, itself U. S. would East, the in the Middle supply prestige Egyptians to send the Third the Army unless Israel permitted is claimed, it This it warning, was non-military supplies. from by the diversion planes of U. S. transport underlined in preparation bases for Israeli to European the a airlift Sheehan, See Mangold, op. cit., p. 153; possible airdrop. Laqueur, 164-165; 371; Glassman, pp. op. cit., op. cit., p. Kalb Kalb, Kissinger, However, and op. cit., p. 187. neither Nixon nor of this. make any mention

306

CHAPTER 10:
As 1973 crisis crisis in

THE CRISIS
the

SITUATION
the in the October by war, the the

Korea,

role war

of was

superpowers

Arab-Israeli situation situation was of in highly

significantly In in the

moulded Korean its Soviet

the general,

conflict. and

particular to the from with in the

systemic Union and to primary peninsula. States to in war and, with

component, thus the

unfavourable the

effectively conflict and same in the the in

prevented a manner of it virtually situation congruent allowed interests them in case

Kremlin consistent

responding the

interests By the

ambitions token, war

the

U. S. S. R. the

permitted with of to to the of the

United

intervene contrast, was

impunity. 1973 both

However, Arab-Israeli superpowers

crisis

approximately

consequently, their primary Thus, 1973 milieu American conflict, activities whereas almost U. S. S. R., the cause. intervene worry about 1973 in occurred which, as and of Korea

intervene area. Korea, context the

in

accordance

unlike within

the

Arab-Israeli and

war

of

a systemic were were to imposed of these

interventionary conducive in on begin to the the with, was to the of Arab to to sure,

together, they which each the

more Soviet

or

less

as

intervention constraints To

similar superpowers. political to the quite world

international hostile East

environment and setting to was the able having To be

overwhelmingly in the Middle was

communism political

war

generally the of Egypt

favourable Union Syria doing without so.

Consequently, on the behalf political

Soviet and of

cost

307

the effects than

U. S. S. R. of the

had

to

take on

into

account

the which it to

possible needed have of of a

adverse far more its

intervention United during in States, the view

detente, this

and war with of

seems

imbued caution.

behaviour Nevertheless, propitious much than and The less it that, did

a certain the impulsions the

degree

rather to lose

interventionary from from putting sacrificing appears inclination by contrasted 1950's, parity in with an international with 1973 the that The its

milieu, weight them to have to

Kremlin its altar order

stood Arab of of

behind on won the the

clients detente, the day.

indeed,

resulting

intervene strategic

was environment war. enjoyed

doubtless that the

encouraged sharply early nuclear crisis Admittedly, the Korea. than an was advantage

of Soviet and

the

Korean Union

Unlike strategic enhanced Americans. not it

U. S. power

this vis-a-vis

certainly the did which the it

its

bargaining in the of Middle contiguity it

East to still and, for

the its

U. S. S. R. proteges to

possess held in zone of which

However, the United

was States

closer in any

conflict disposed

case,

impressive

capability for

long-range disadvantage

intervention of distance. war on at Union, it thing, had been in spite

somewhat The likewise of Israel.

compensated crisis conducive But to less war.

the of United the

situation to to

the States

1973

Arab-Israeli intervention

was

behalf as was during of

extent by to the

that the U. S. for

it Soviet than one

was

least it

favourable obviously the an that Korean increasingly had

intervention conducive

Nevertheless, adverse international of

political

environment and

grown

weary

Israel's

intransigence

308

disenchanted client's their Latin whose anything. lever Egypt no the was with and longer

with occupation

the of

United Arab retained Europe,

States' territories, a hard and they U. S. Soviet whilst superior the

indifference the core of Israelis followers area for a in

to

its and in upon

American America, instrumental In

patron Western

Pacific count in detente

support addition, to the moderate

could found

almost useful aid of was

which Syria. in the which to

involvement the United position the early on

Furthermore, strategically it project greater this had enjoyed military than conferred

States vis-a-vis 1950's, and

U. S. S. R. still able far

in

it at a

power the upon Soviet its by

a scale Union.

distance credibility conflict milieu involvement

The during the

which was that on

posture an

undoubtedly remained the side

enhanced fairly of Israel.

interventionary to American

'sympathetic

The

systemic In contrast

context to the in Korean a systemic of period, been of,. was of case, the Arab-Israeli which, and become States conflicts. restructuring 1973 had become the by lessen early two the and military as due war to power tolerant in, centre of far the less 1950's. principal U. S. 's thereby of a

1973

took

place

context political had

widespread during of and of Soviet the

redistribution interjacent as it had

nearly

United area certain by been was

interventions At the

manipulations this change

grey a which it shift together,

international tightly The polarized impetus

system than for which, influence this

had

during provided to

developments overall

served

over

international

affairs

309

free pitted the

the it Korean

U. S. S. R. against war. that the

from

the

political the entire of these Asia by of

isolation world was during the pro-Soviet nations forums. of the world the early at the the

that time wave the

had of of late

virtually The swept 1960's insubstantial group other

first Africa and

independence 1950's produced well United effects balance States itself to as as and

and

which, lobby of

1970's, states at Amongst political United for came as the the

a not a

sizeable and was the longer

non-aligned

Nations of this

international redress

a partial Americans.

away could and

from no

Consequently, international Union superpower immediate began local in purely issues

guarantee for the Soviet

backing whenever it

opprobrium war the such to the war in merits rather theory case

a client-state had been

stimulated in the

confrontation, postwar to at be stake terms. a in and reduction reality to stand interest motives. was followers a national authority, their what it of it up period. judged in the

Increasingly, according client-state Although in set to the the the

confrontations of than this sway over the

East-West marked affairs,

development world to

superpowers' scene U. S. without whereas for in the

U. S. S. R. of

challenge or having Communist

areas being in

disputed of

uncertain aggressive offensive and not their as

symmetry Thus, successfully as Soviet

accused Korea by the by the

portrayed expansionism over Middle territories the legitimate East the

Americans proxy exercise and of

dispute in the

government to mostly regain for

Arabs' Israel

endeavour was and seen

captured was.

from the

Admittedly,

political

ideological

affinity

310

North that this of terms, amounted States by of

Korea Egypt,

to

the Syria

Soviet or,

Union indeed, to

was any the

immensely other contrasting in Arab

greater country,

than and

undoubtedly the a two

contributed wars.

perceptions

Nevertheless, Arab of victory over gain in Korea during Syria of the Soviet of this,

politico-strategic Israel would the have, 1973 of and change Arabs effort both from to by the as war military diplomatic in to the win from amongst either fact have United shown to

clear-cut to as much

a Soviet

vis-a-vis would the futility arms the the their

as

a Communist

triumph

Kissinger's to undertaken However, political international of varying as This

determination Egypt by and virtue in spite

demonstrate action support. world massive countries the

environment support political well is no as those

permitted for persuasion, with

non-aligned

connections than 1973 their backing far as these of of nearly increasingly Arab a as the 22

superpower. that African Israel, Syria were nothing essence as its 1 between states many

better and or

illustrated November

September severed of the which October the an which

sub-Saharan with Egypt countries war was the and

suspended unequivocal

relations to

gave

during concerned, but of

war.

As

superpower

dimension aspect

inconsequential had come for the to be their

conflict significant important countries. of and

seen

implications with the and the

relations Consequently, United Arabs the other States

petroleum-rich involvement U. S. S. R. clouded of been the on and the the the case

intervention side of Israel

the the and for

respectively possible countries,

never ramifications as had

fundamental outcome with of the the

issues war

superpowers'

311

association Soviet behalf even the Union's of

with

the

protagonists high may well

in

Korea.

Indeed, intervention

the on

unprecedented and Suria of the

profile have clients

Egypt

boosted who

its decided

prestige to back

amongst Arabs. The

those

U. S. 's

proliferation states involvement and in

of the grey over

non-aligned resulting area the in wars right spite

and gradual naturally to of was

other acceptance eroded in shift,

newly of the such the

independent Soviet United conflicts. international more begin powers network U. S. S. R. albeit for to the its amenable with, of of and

States'

monopoly Nevertheless, political to the American U. S.,

intervene this still intervention. to the more than of a

environment than being Europe, and therefore, unreliable, activities. whose military superpower capability, array the to Soviet

relatively To imperial extensive did substantial, of in support contrast almost States especially to exercise but also the

successor a far

Western clientwas,

enjoyed

dependent-states assured minimum

increasingly international Soviet on of an Union its

amount

Moreoever, status the of was only power, able was

based

completely disposed economic considerable Soviet-inclined world. of the such As pariah same

United

impressive and,

power,

consequently, over not

influence regimes, a result, states level in of support

non-aligned in the even liable as earlier.

particularly intervention, was never

developing on to behalf quite Soviet

American as Israel,

international of proteges

censure a decade

intervention

Thus,

with

the

outbreak

of

the

1973

Arab-Israeli

war,

312

the

international a on with to cause the efforts Middle either . Arab " or by Arabs it "2 for Israel was, and little the as it

political serious behalf of

environment impediment Israel. Nations was

was to

not United

such

as States U. S.

to

constitute intervention to contend

Admittedly, membership as with

the

had in the

a United Korean was

which, of

contrast Arab towards strenuous . on meant the.. lawyer, Council of to the veto the

situation, disillusioned dispute. the 1973 which, of the of or thereby its whatever engender to substantive that the

supportive American Hence

policy

Arab-Israeli during East "a position an "the

Kissinger's a U. N. would in as support the Arabs' Security in support States the Arab debate have of

war he

to

avoid feared,

problem

diatribe with

nonaligned acting

Soviets

introduction Soviets,

a resolution of theirs,

in

the "

a proxy

programme, and

compelling position

the

United with

undermine However, could

"moderates. support community rhetoric was to there seriously

resentment within transcend action, most in the clout of the

American international the for stage not could East, so great of only do but, as or

most develop of

unlikely into

consequence U. S. latter's policy

countries Middle was

influence the significant on United core amongst which to the

more to

importantly, any nature the a hard and states approach

general action Arabs Israel in

render

coercive of the and

a political imprudent. able

economic Moreover, count Europe, European handed on

behalf States of

somewhat were still America, within a to

to

followers influential were tending

Latin

Western those more uphold West eventhe of

circles towards dispute the

Arab-Israeli belief in

Anglo-Saxon-inspired

moral

rectitude

313

standing behaviour, respectability Zionist support disappointed this Israel's remove nevertheless characterized Israeli exception by states and a latest

by

Israel, and upon

almost thereby U. S.

irrespective confer intervention a

of minimum in

the

latter's of the

degree of

support United war

State. for Israel many round occupation major

Consequently, during countries of of obstacle met the with U. S. 's The the Arab had only oil the that hostilities Arab to

although October had 1973 entertained would territories peace in same the

States certainly hopes that end to

bring and, Middle silence

an

therefore, East, that it had Arab-

the stances notable, boycott, to put part

during albeit but their and that lot parcel

previous very was behind of

wars. was which were, axis. whilst 1973 to to its less had been

important, undertaken Egypt the and Arab

chosen therefore,

Syria

confrontation However, of the

the

international war States in to Korean was as support punitive war.

political not to of form Israel,

environment sufficiently a serious it was action which, to wars the decline Unlike and the was in the United the division

Arab-Israeli the United

unfavourable deterrent significantly than in . it the

intervention responsive the afflicted in grey

American The erosion flexibility

during had impunity

meantime, with by

Washington's area client-state was

intervene

hastened the political

a further cohesion which united war came

development, of at the these the

which

Western when of

alliance. Eruope

Korean States October

war, were

a time fear

by found

Soviet in

aggression, a state of

1973

allies

314

and

mutual

recrimination. pursuit its failure secret 1973 about of to detente keep

For with its

one the

thing, Soviet allies the

the Union,

U. S. 's in

singlehanded particular of led second serious commitment which the the to

European with

informed that

1972/1973 the thoughts doubts to June

negotiations Brezhnev-Nixon the desirability the This

U. S. S. R. 3

agreement, of future detente of in the

produced and raised

concerning Europe. 4

American of one

difference of in one. detente

approach, were of but regional one upon which,

varying was such as States, from the

perceptions also evident

manifestation, disputes the disputes often West the United

respect On the looked perspective of more these

Arab-Israeli being

hand, such more

a superpower, global the

a predominantly not, overlooked on and, the other

than

essence were economic

disputes. with of economic

Eruopeans, political

hand, the

concerned

especially on

repercussions Being was, an

international rather highly being, stance which gave than

conflicts a military on Europe the was

themselves. that

colossus international more in the

nevertheless, for a its well

dependent Western towards focused secondary on

system to East of these

inclined Middle nature

adopt and

regional elsewhere and the

problems the

intrinsic to

problems for

importance rivalry.

their

implications

Soviet-American

The the

impact

of

these political

differences

on the to

amenability United war was all to

of States quite of the

international in In

environment Arab-Israeli to the

intervention momdntous. U. S. 's facilities

the

1973 contrast except

sharp allies the

Korean

war,

European for

Portugal to

refused Israel.

provide and

American 315

airlift

Greece

Spain thereby the granting Arabs, additional German purely European North a local

declared preventing re-supply

their the of

neutrality use of

in United Turkey to the

the

Middle States went Soviet refused to

East bases

conflict, there further to consent for by the to from war in

Israel; rights 26 of the and as West

even airlift to

over-flight and on October

Germany

shipments ports. 5 Whilst terms

military U. S. thus indicative the

supplies saw the

Israel

Arab-Israeli the lack

East-West cooperation Atlantic affair from

interpreted of

of of war to

West the as

a break-down the

alliance, and not

Europeans entitling the

perceived Americans for to pressure

one of war exert the

invoke West

loyalty European failure to make

members the 1967 to

N. A. T. O. was the due

Moreover, basically

some

states, since it

Washington's on so 6 rather the own the of and, and in Syria, and threat, Israel as to than regional favour. United Israel fact, its not as

necessary

withdraw

from

occupied with the

territories, Arabs, tilt its

achieve to an

a political atttempt balance by

settlement the of

U. S. S. R. interests in the final

to in

superpower Consequently, States regardless managed actions as was a joint the This West case to

although in the the clearly response its

analysis, on behalf

persisted of exceed out

intervention of airlift as isolated to its

sentiments Soviet

allies to Egypt

came

American

ones

Western in

a perceived

common

Korea. was states most to of evident accept Egypt and in the Syria the readiness Soviet as a Union's local earlier as of

perception

European on to an

intervention opposed

behalf

East-West

affair.

Whereas

a decade

316

such state rally common

involvement war most effort would

on

the

part have

of

the

U. S. S. R. more the have than United been

in

a

clientto in "Soviet of the of a

probably countries

been behind

sufficient States seen as

N. A. T. O. to by was

combat proxy, more dispute or

what " in less rather image on

would 1973

expansionism Soviet the Union Arab-Israeli

the

intervention in that of and map, the the Syria which

interpreted than of

context superpower as was was Soviet widely largely

competition. satellites, diffused shunned countries' resolve Arab-Israeli preventing superpower U. S. S. R. or indeed the their in in

Thus, coloured the late

the red

Egypt

the and

world early

1950's of as the Soviet with was, East

1960's, which to

favour status dispute problem Middle

notion clients Israel.

ascribed their need of the area

these to the to high the

A resolution seen into the as an

consequently, from turning in of of which legitimacy pronounced the

key of of

interest would into assume a From to and allow Syria which,

symmetry, an locale this the to aura

presence and Soviet United

permanence, interest States' in the towards aid 1973 the

asymmetry. disposition of Egypt

viewpoint, fact of Soviet its

intervention response to

determine thereafter,

Arab-Israeli counteraction intervening symptom impact polarize that, position it rather of the the was of Although

war of on

was

directed by

Soviet behalf of

involvement Israel, of the it pro-and do the nothing region. of was

whole-heartedly as tackling, The would camps overall be to and the a

seen

than American Middle believed, the

the

cause approach,

problem. was feared,

East

into would in

anti-Soviet but

consolidate

U. S. S. R. this

conception

superpower

involvement

in

317

the

Middle

East regional

seemed

more

appropriate of the West during of

to

the

mediumthat 1973 of war

and the was

long-term United to

interests immediate the

than the the

States, somewhat

its increase

impact amenability

international in that the West support to said world on for behalf Israel when Soviet Western to political of the as have

political conflict. European of Israel

environment This states on in to to by the the the the is resented grounds Middle

to

Soviet to the

intervention extent uncompromising detrimental can the be

because the that

U. S. 's it was they of the of

interests contributed setting Arabs basically help for the

East,

conduciveness of an American was passed of image

intervention

U. S. S. R. support at an to

presenting isolated Arabs the of support the of must backing

action, on as was dispute.

a time essentially disappear Coupled

ephemeral with with the in the the the Arab its 1973

phenomenon resolution general cause,

impact Middle the have

which East

non-aligned encouraged of Egypt and

community the Syria

for Kremlin during

this

unprecedented war. Undoubtedly, politcal clearly constraint to the early

the

one of the

aspect 1973 for was

of

the

international war States In that and contrast a state detente and with of or the a and a

environment constituted for the

Arab-Israeli the United

a net Soviet where and

asset Union the

detente. were

1950's

superpowers the

in of

intense the

suspicion bilateral during

hostility, relationship

existence between the

special

U. S.

U. S. S. R. useful

the with

1973

war

provided to confine

the

Americans

instrument

which

Soviet

behaviour

318

also

induced

the In to the is

Kremlin view of special

on the

to

a

course

of' relatively with

self-imposed closer the need United to " gain the war of sure, in of much an of the the a

moderation. attachment States, direct overall was its the United special political bonus a for to which access effect place

U. S. S. R. 's relationship by, inter capital alia, and the 1973

underlined to of American detente U. S. S. R. position of at the the

its

"know-how, Middle in To East respect be

during at

the

a disadvantage the political rendered the Soviet as the Union it U. S.

bargaining exigencies States

vis-a-vis domestic time with for

situation success as was its

relationship necessity Moscow, for and

Washington may with have the ever

economic as as the

this

impaired

utility

lever

bargaining

Kremlin. deeper into becoming House with the at masters Soviet

Thus, the

Nixon scandal, implicated more grounds adviser, However, the

Administration with in the the to

sank President affair, emphasize

Watergate increasingly more on and the his

himself the White

became

inclined that,

detente

U. S. S. R., home, of

whatever

Nixon's were detente when by the that United of created and, of

failings proven from

he and diplomacy.?

Kissinger, to decouple war,

behaviour was as constantly

during and to June the 1973 House the

Arab-Israeli denounced if not

behaviour States May

publicly spirit, agreements, weakness domestic Consequently, as the

contrary and of the

the

letter, have

the an

1972

would and

impression therefore, and his issue with Syria

White

irresolution

compounded associates. of the and what it

position the incompatibility on behalf United

Nixon States of of made detente Egypt

an

saw

U. S. S. R. 's sought, by

intervention

and

319

stressing terminate Hence 1973,

the or Kissinger's in which at

inseparability least minimize to that the

of Soviet

one

from support Union

the for on

other, the October Arabs.

to

warning he pledged

Soviet the U. S.

8,

is used as a cover if of tensions relaxation will react in international trouble to exacerbate spots. conflicts disregard [of Union these The Soviet principles cannot imperilling detente] in any area without of the world the United its with entire relationship to to have States... Coexistence us continues a very the attempt oppose of any we will precise meaning: to achieve of predominance either a position country 8 globally or regionally. Nevertheless, American behaviour war should threats on not the be the to actual link it policy impact to the during of detente U. S. S. R's the October the itself from and regional 1973 Soviet the of the

Kremlin's

over-estimated. took care the to war

Admittedly, distance the public were

leadership Arab Soviet devoid continuing However, situation the at in attack,

initially and

throughout and

utterances scrupulously instead United

officials of polemics importance the the

propaganda or of of the East, position and prestige the invective, detente day,

organs

stressing with the the

the States. of the of

end Middle

requirements the the in precariousness consequent the than with the like its area, the U. S. the friends Concrete when put

namely, and

U. S. S. R. 's its

regional

need were risk As

to more of one

restore of a

credibility force special it, deeply the out over

compelling the put "was too for won

for

Kremlin

jeopardizing commentator States, sacrificed interests test. "9

reältionship the Soviet

Union, to allow

United to local to the be

committed spirit global of

detente. abstractions

320

As setting the Soviet

in in

the

Korean the to

war,

the

role of

of the

the

world

political States was and mainly

shaping Union the the in was

responses the 1975 and of with

United war of those to

Arab-Israeli contrast the its

complementary; in the Middle strategic where Union came nuclear intervening significant equal it still to the lagged to the at at particular conflict East,

nature ability

responses, intervene in in the

U. S. S. R. primary by

accordance principally

interests the the placed

determined However, unlike

international early the the 1950's Soviet 1973 war and In from or less the a

environment. U. S. 's a considerable the parity outset of nuclear

preponderance strategic the the new two U. S. S. R. to

disadvantage, era of

conventional

between period, regional United behind launch and the

superpowers. had evolved more in some it

power States. the and was

a superpower Admittedly,

respects the in in 10

U. S., sustain

for a

example, large by nuclear

lacked

capability very terms distant of

intervention the Americans warheads. airlift the United Indeed, countries 1969, doctrine

places strategic it and

out-numbered and of an shared assured between as first early time in as

bombers -disposed

Nevertheless, capability States the new the

impressive with

most for

importantly, mutually

power

destruction. the two

strategic by

relationship Washington for the

was when of the Soviet

acknowledged Nixon strategic American Union"11 For words the referred

January to the

sufficiency, claim and to

"thus strategic the state

effect

renouncing over strategic permitted the

superiority notion of affairs "to of

accepting this

symmetry. it, in the

U. S. S. R., of one

Soviet

commentator,

half

imperialistic

321

efforts It of became the

to

achieve quite clear, of issues suicide

its

objectives he the goes on

by "that

nuclear nothing rulers or that to

blackmail. would to nuclear start of the 1950's, not to only limit of by to the urged and it.

" come

attempts

imperialist force those led of who to arms,

settle war "12

international would This security task protect actions globe. Soviet advent the to United terms You very you'll and have That Thus, itself superiority preponderant the U. S. had by "13 foreign of of spell newly-found

by for

ventured a widening to was " but other neatly who, the of the seen also

confidence In armed

Soviet the "to "the the a

perspective. the the of Soviet socialist the This

contrast forces

early as

commonwealth, imperialists new ministry parity to shun the attitude official between illusion in was

regions summarized referring superpowers, grandeur

strategic States

come

with

reality:

to yourself and to us a role a global assign still influence. Well, limited of sphere regional It's that to get have outdated notion. over We too power, and we are now a global unjust. to compete the scale. you on a global with right 14 truly if fair is only equals. your we are unlike the of in United to the crisis States, reckon risk of with early credibly 1950's, where the its with late same war an U. S. S. R. found

incapable

utilizing

conventional atomically 1970's constraints so the the long had

bargaining by the the

1960's/early strategic

imposed restricted immediate Union which became

nuclear

which

for to

effective sphere was was able to of

Soviet influence.

intervention

U. S. S. R's Soviet activism This pilots first were

Consequently, policy Europe. Soviet

assume

a foreign/defence outside Eastern 1970 when

unprecedented in Egypt

evident

in

322

directly deep coercive during latter matched Egypt assertion resulting confrontation as the many area.

involved penetration diplomacy the case, and, and 1973 United

in raids15 and

defensive and re-supply was

operations clearly operations war. To on be

against demonstrated of the sure, of support

Israeli in the

U. S. S. R. in the

Arab-Israeli States

intervention exceeded the However, in the war, American barely have a major the chances imposed, as a been on

behalf

Israel for the and the

ultimately, Syria of Soviet increase and nuclear on that would

U. S. S. R's as Middle of for Soviet

combined. power in

elsewhere, East a the

superpower first behaviour time, in such in fo a power grey in a

constraints Given of risks

decade inconceivable

earlier

symmetry area, favour this of

represented the U. S. S. R.

redistribution

The

interventionary As with of the to the 1973 the

milieu systemic Arab-Israeli United the is States U. S. S. R. the U. S., context, war and is was the the more Soviet interventionary or less Union. closer it a it than an equally For to with clientcould the

milieu favourable one the a state transport Americans. both the

thing, Middle marginal war

although East than

geographically only event In confers of that

this in the

strategic stimulated heavy In the

advantage superpower by

crisis, sea much however, the respect States

weapons final could air, and over

quicker in

analysis, despatch in the this

emergency to

superpowers region by

necessary the in

hardware Soviet terms Union's of

marginal

advantage

United

its

323

greater the fleet, larger as

proximity capacity shown

to

the

Middle longer

East range war. of

is

somewhat the American

offset airlift

by

and

during differences and the

the

1973 in the

Likewise, United large-scale the each abilities and make that 1973 other States

relative to the to an of it so is

abilities launch Middle approximately and

of sustain

the a

Soviet

Union in tended

direct Arab-Israeli out. involves

intervention war Admittedly, comparisons factors overall that

East

during cancel

assessment many almost

of

these

non-quantifiable impossible to to say

unpredictable a meaningful the various of another the

evaluation. between tended that sides. the and marines, Indian to integrated highly and Ocean provide intervention. that highly of

Consequently, the to there For

asymmetries superpowers way on of saying

interventionary offset were the nature trained each other

capabilities is and simply

advantages U. S., of potential in the the its

disadvantages advantages

both were

principal substantial, interventionary Mediterranean which power say, have "tail" advantage, conflict potential lacked the could in

well-developed force, Sea be and the the upon a major was and

the of air

presence carrier cover

groups and fire to would

called of

the main

event

Needless distance, which

disadvantage a very long of other the

meant in the

vulnerable The principal proximity were

logistical Soviet to of which cover. East its the a

event the and

hostilities. hand, main was that

on zone

of

disadvantages the fire airborne

those troops, and air

interventionary combat experience, in was view in of a fairly

force, organic its

power, to the to

Nevertheless, the U. S. S. R.

closeness good position

Middle reinforce

324

airborne intervention, conditions intervention The of

units,

which with

would

have better

been suited in the

used to event

to the of

spearhead battlefield a prolonged

an

forces Middle

of

the

East,

here. role of the of war is war. a little In which by trying the was be said strict the on inertia interest the more of the in status dispute quo, during milieu in the the case Soviet change the captured that U. S., for the the relative U. S. S. R. Americandefeat of their their the or the the of of "fact 1973 the the

possession"

Arab-Israeli conflict Korean Arab quo, Israel target, attempt regional strength Indeed, Israeli Israel to

interventionary complex terms, to the To it than was forcibly territories the extent with

Union's status by

clients namely during Israel, can

endeavoured to 1967 closely to have regain war.

associated had and, the intimate serious therefore,

the

implications for and of a the limited have images of

superpower of in motivation view of

balance of the

United

States nature even

patron-client at the hands blow and for in

relationship, of the this the the had or by Egypt and

Syria and the

would resolve "fact milieu

amounted of the

a serious States, have U. S. to

prestige respect interventionary status been

United may the trying United

possession" in favour of were by of the the In principle territories the United

influenced However, reverse

quo

which

the either majority

Arabs

never the as

recognized

States

overwhelming legitimate always or

international fact, the whilst need for during the

community Americans Israel the to 1967

permanent. in the of

had

conceded from members

withdraw war, most

occupied

325

Nations territories right of

deplored and the

Israel's a very to

continued substantial regain these the "fact of

occupation minority territores of

of

Arab the force. may the

supported by possession" during widespread which token, that

Arabs whatever

Consequently, have 1973 given war to was of were

impetus

Washington's probably the

strength counter-balanced of

motivation by the quo same

perception Arabs debilitation have were probably Egyptian desert Israel's As comparative constituted interventionary one writer been trying

illegitimacy to Soviet by the change. strength fact the

the By of

status the

the any might

trying of incurred to offset and

motivation the

that

U. S. S. R. 's status world recognition occupied and of the at in

proteges quo was of Sinai of areas.

reverse by the

territorial

prevalent over

Syrian Golan

sovereignty Heights and partial conflict, of their

the

and

respectively colonization it was

rejection these

occupation in the

Korean

superpowers' stake which the As

valuation the most milieu has put it,

interests element 1973 in

important of at the issue

establishing war.

Arab-Israeli the conflict

the willingness of commitments---the were credibility to the support and Moscow of Washington and ability These their were essential psychological clients. balance East-West and were of power, components of the for two superpower in the capitals closely monitored determination the adversary's indications mood, about implications the intentions, future about and for and The latter by others. be drawn these was which might lent sensitivity, and one which a point of particular 16 itself to over-reaction. Indeed, States Israel testing in and and the view the of the depth Union's and longevity of on East the behalf became resolve United of a

Soviet Arabs and

involvement the of the Middle

respectively, a major gauge

ground

superpowers'

326

and U. S. it

credibility. had by to the bear in

As Kissinger mind was that

once the

pointed

out,

what

the judge

U. S. S. R. of its Middle

would

general "What "poses and the therefore

purposefulness they are doing threats... the in

performance East, " he

everywhere. stressed, and Japan of

the for

gravest for in and in on that which

Western Thus, with were for the

Europe the soon

U. S. "17 1973,

outbreak drawn on the

hostilities Israeli

October European the

parallels

between

dependence of

survival hostilities

Americans, to it had Kissinger's Soviet over arms depend the

outcome

"seemed that Hence allow limited, Washington's the Israel to the need

side's means to

protector stay United victory, Consequently, the eruption in States no

would the

ensure field. "18 not how of of

military dictum to

that achieve arms. 19

the a

could matter in spite of of the as extend to its well war,

American recognition,

following a political acceptable it of

to

arrive that

at

settlement to the

Arabas every Israel, ultimate

dispute Israelis, assistance though

was it short felt

Arabs to

imperative direct

possible even political As conceived ground would resolve debacle, Soviet would in be

intervention

that

clearly in United Arab-Israeli performance the

contradicted Middle States, war on gauge a East. the of

objectives with of which taken in after Union have as had in the the its as crises. which the an

Kremlin 1973 of its as Egypt credibility of prestige as the to the never image U. S. a

probably testing and Syria and the of 1967 the

behalf of

important Indeed, the Middle

repetition and plummeted for

credibility East

before, of and the as

disastrous

consequences of equal weight

U. S. S. R.

a superpower

327

a were

protector seeking war Soviet a less had

of to much

those fight more At resolute

in

the

Arab

world " a regional level,

and

elsewhere

who the for

"imperialism. than the just regional Soviet even stance more

Consequently, significance the implications the In the period of the view conflict of

1973 the of would

Union. than

during

probably

have

been that

serious.

the

widespread in when United Syria well the in have Middle respect it

doubts of the to

had

grown

during and resolve

1967-1973 U. S. S. R. with Egypt the and could Union from the of war its was of

credibility the a risk failure to total Thus, have and had image the of to regain eviction of

comes States, their meant

a direct resolutely their of the more

confrontation support lost the two at territories Soviet

effort the

East. seems to

superpowers, stake in the terms 1973 of onus

U. S. S. R. its than clients firmly its that, Israelis Soviet 1973 Israel.

much of

credibility did the in U. S. previous on

resolve disastrous with

during

Given

performance Israel, the worthiness towards commitment to Syria of the the during

confrontations Moscow This to may wider to on that behalf time

placed patronage. in spite

demonstrate-the go some way States

explaining to the

of

the

United of the of

compared intervention war for the

U. S. S. R. Egypt and that

Arabs, the to

first

matched

U. S.

328

Notes

1.

broke African off In all, 27 sub-Saharan or suspended states See International 1973. during Israel their with relations Survey 1973, Strategic Studies, Strategic Institute for London, Studies, Strategic for Institute (International Strategic to as (Hereinafter 9,103. 1973), referred pp. Peace: Three Destination G. Rafael, Survey). Also see Personal Memoir Policy---A Foreign Decades Israeli of 1981), London, (Weidenfeld Nicolson, p. 279. and

2.
3.

H. Kissinger, Years of Michael London, Joseph,

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16. 17.

Union Soviet to States These the United and the pledged in 1974 Arms Limitation agreement reach strategic a second danger there together a of was to whenever and consult 1973, September/October See Survival, pp. nuclear war. 243-244. 63-64. Strategic 1973, Survey pp. Ibid., 4,62. pp. Ibid., p. 61. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 30. Policy Toward American Decisions: W. B. Quandt, Decade of (University 1967-1976 Conflict the Arab-Israeli of 1977), Berkeley California p. 201. Press, and Los Angeles, World Institute, Research Peace Stockholm International Press, (MIT 1974 Yearbook Disarmament Armaments and Almgvist Cambridge, and Wiksell, Massachusetts, and London; to (Hereinafter 106-107. as Stockholm, 1974), referred pp. SIPRI Yearbook). The Paradox 1962-1973: Policy, Foreign R. Edmonds, Soviet 1975), London, University Press, p. Super Power (Oxford of 79. trans. Relations, in International N. I. Lebedev, A New Stage Oxford (Pergamon, V. M. Scheierson D. and Ya. Skirvsky and New York, 1978), p. 37. Union Policy, " The Soviet D. Holloway, "Foreign and Defence M. A. Brown and 2nd ed., Khrushchev, Since the Fall ed. of 56-57. 1978), Kaser (Macmillan, London pp. and Basingstoke, V. V. Also 29. 23,1980, Quoted June see in Time, p. World Union, " Soviet Policy Aspaturian, Foreign "The of the (Free J. Rosenau, Politics: Introduction, al. An et ed. Whetten, L. 62; 1976), Press, New York, p. esp. Military Utility Political "Bilateralism the of Soviet and Power, Military Implications Power, " The Political of Soviet London, 1977), idem (Macdonald p. 9. esp. ed. and Jane's, From Behaviour: H. Adomeit, Risk-Taking "Soviet and Crisis No. 101 Adelphi Papers ", Confrontation Coexistence? to London, Studies, for Strategic (International Institute 1973), p. 14. Middle East in Intervention the P. Mangold, Superpower (Croom 1978), Helm, London, p. 18. June 26,1970. Quoted in San Clemente, Background briefing, Wants, " Middle East Crucible: E. Washington Ahmad, "What War of October 1973, Studies N. Aruri in he Arab-Israeli ed.

Upheaval 1982),

(Weidenfeld p. 471.

and

Nicolson

and

329

(Medina 1975),

Universty p. 241.

Press

International,

Wilmette,

Illinois,

18.
19.

The

Economist,

November

3,1973.
Insight London, Team, 1974), Insight p. 238. on the

See, for instance, War Middle East

Times Sunday Deutsch, (Andre

330

SECTION C:

UNILATERAL THE ETHIO-SOMALI

INTERVENTION: WAR 1977-1978

In East, global somewhat Korean outbreak the

spite Horn

of

its of on

geographical Africa's the eve In status of the

proximity within

to the

the

Middle

superpower war was the the

contest uncertain. peninsula of war. in

Ethio-Somali it

this period

respect, immediately

resembled preceding

in

the

However, political acknowledged Union value, closeness international and hub to of the Asia Indian at the to one

contrast of the the the

to Horn United other. much East lanes as of and

Korea, of

the Africa

strategic was explicitly the

and

significance by time Horn the either or

States In its its terms

and/or of

Soviet

geostrategic from to with its the Asia, at owes principal being to the the the its

derives Middle

importance oil deposits, Europe its the of the its

shipping Ocean, Africa. the

connecting well as from

location region two

and to

Politically, distinctiveness and Somalia; Africa of the

significance countries, oldest headquarters whilst Sahara the which state

Ethiopia in of the

former and host Unity state

sub-Saharan Organization constitutes

African only

(O. A. U. ), of the

latter is

south

ethnically in

homogeneous. contrast perceptions of the Horn of to the of Middle the East, strategic at the time the and of

Nevertheless, superpowers' political relative significance

Africa

331

the States, from Garcia, afloat

Ethio-Somali the Britain and support

war development in the 1971

were of of

rather satellite Indian the it to facilities

unequal.

For

the the of

United lease Diego in its

technology, Ocean navy's island

the of

growth permitted and naval

U. S. largely

capability with traditional the

dispense in its

communications protege of the in the

region, Selassie military

Ethiopia. regime junta and

In its

addition,

demise by a

Haile

replacement to lessen to the of the it

Marxist-oriented political it even value further interest

served and

Ethiopia's distance Soviet Africa in

to from

Washington Addis and

consequently, In in firstly, with and, contrast, the Horn with which secondly, Junta regime radical Moscow country, with of in

Ababa.

Union's witnessed 1969 a of

involvement

a steady the Barre

development, regime in of of the the in

advent concluded with

Somalia, 1974,

friendship in the its

treaty 1974

the

emergence Indeed, with

military military and in

in Addis

Ethiopia. Ababa,

oncoming Marxist raised the it Horn's to the

rhetoric prospect most provide

socio-economic an and political additional eventually and

programme, client in

important Ethiopia

encouraged military Thus, the

support. with the imminence commitments on a par. within the United of in hostilities the Horn since clique had been of the in in July Africa rise Ethiopia exploring relationship once the latter of 1977, were the in the

superpowers' but faction 1977, of the Somali

anything Mengistu February possibility with

Although, the ruling States a it soon

establishing Republic,

patron-client relented

332

embarked inhabited U. S. S. R. a while

on

a fully-fledged region pre-eminent the use its outbreak military Ababa two of

effort

to

capture This in the

the left

Somalithe and for

Ogaden as the

Ethiopia.

superpower of open and in capitals an

area, the leverage

after to and between of policy and

warfare political

Kremlin over modus the Africa. well as in latter. of direct military success anxieties of the of

endeavoured Mogadishu vivendi establishment Once Ethiopia both this

Addis the

attempt as in a the

to step Horn

find

a

towards of as

a Pax began

Sovietica to antagonize the

Somalia U. S. S. R. 's to vouch airfor

thereby the it

threaten Kremlin

position the

countries,

decided upon

Consequently, arms and

embarked

a massive and other mode, Inevitably

and

sealift the

military of to

equipment Cuban and The

facilitated Soviet scale, and bloc the

intervention personnel the in

Ethiopia. Intervention and on But, amongst the

U. S. S. R. 's Washington impact

generated in respect of in the

West

Eutopeans

possible and the and the resolve. U. S. scale

United

States' a firm

images commitment at it

credibility the same solely region, level at Ocean to Soviet of have it have Horn a of

lacking to

was as

unable the

counter-intervene Instead, terminating Soviet detente and by Union, and arms

U. S. S. R. level by the as

responded the by Indian

superpower' Talks issues in the

Disarmament link other

with such

threatening to displays may friends, to the

control in strategy and late in

behaviour minatory helped lacked significant Africa. its the

Horn,

engaging this allies too

diplomacy. general credibility effect

However, image amongst and on Soviet

whilst its

also

came behaviour

333

The the

alternatives war crisis the in war, the 1977

available were severely

to

the

United

States by other conflict the of a 1973

during a highly things was as

Ethio-Somali

circumscribed Although,

unfavourable being conducive Israeli equal,

situation. systemic as it context had violation borders which strongly intervention been

of

the

during by Somalia created discouraged on

Arab-

blatant

Ethiopia's regional for

internationally-recognized political Mogadishu In addition, setting and

support of war either had Ethiopia. was

encouraged the to

behalf of the of

interventionary U. S. although intervention the it with side quo U. S. in the

milieu in

also side.

unfavourable For itself one thing, from

aid

United had not

States had time and

disengaged establish had whilst support no the for Ababa's radical Ethiopia. vis-a-

Ethiopia, linkages to either status the violations, programme United in that willing Ethiopia. situation conducive the States terms it

to thus

compensatory commitment inertia Somali human of

Somalia, war.

Moreover,

the

clearly was

discouraged constrained rhetoric, its also distance at by

revanchism, rights

Addis and from

Marxist to keep was of did to

socio-economic Thirdly, vis the the

a disadvantage local interventionary a same

U. S. S. R. in and in crisis very States, against token, it

relative not have

capability, force Cubans able were The contrast, the United

available on the

surrogate as the

intervene

scale

of to regional

the Soviet

Ethio-Somali intervention. setting Somalia in

war

was, As acted

in with as the of a

political for

constraint same

Soviet encouraged

support

but, defence

by

intervention

334

Ethiopia. the U. S., the

With

a different

operational chose intervene

code to

from forego on

that Its behalf

of preof and In

U. S. S. R. in in

consequently Somalia and

eminent Ethiopia political doing

position which,

terms

of seemed

ideology, a much by other inertia as

geostrategic, better bargain. of status and of Cuba.

significance, so, it was milieu widely of

aided such recognized as

elements of a

the quo the

interventionary that availability was

the

legitimate the form

a surrogate

force

in

a

335

CHAPTER

11:

THE BALANCE

OF INTERESTS

The

origins When

of

superpower broke

alignments out

in

the

Horn

of

Africa and

hostilities of the

between Western

Ethiopian Somali summer been involved

troops Liberation 1977, in

the Front United Horn is, and of the the

forces

Somali-backed in the 25 the late Soviet years period in Arab-Israeli in earnest with of for in

(W. S. L. F. ) States of Africa than and for

spring/early Union and had

the the that U. S.

14 years the

respectively, first serious and the-

longer Soviet October Horn

between the Middle war.

involvement 1973

East

outbreak in two These and a half

American when on

interest May 23

began were define in The for armed the

1953

agreements were to

concluded the nature region was

the the the

Ethiopian U. S. next

regime. involvement two and

commitment decades. that catered

first American forces. for

a military aid The in training

assistance and

agreement equipping was a sort for Asmara, was the of the known at the its and storms radio in

Ethiopian quid pro

second it

agreement provided base out, at

quo of 1 As

the

first; communications has a very and

establishment as time distance its made location it Kagnew.

a U. S. one to

writer be

pointed

this facility;

considered from the in ideally

valuable

northern a zone

southern free the 1953

magnetic of

poles,

comparatively for From constituted Arlington, to

magnetic global closure a

situated network.

U. S. 's until part Virginia, of its

communications 1977 circuit American the Kagnew running bases

base from in

world-wide the to the

through then on

Morocco

Asmara,

and

336

Philippines. In the interest. Paul I and

2 contrast of Alexis Catherine officials all in. the of Djibouti pursued Mediterranean establishing in 1889.3 to Somalia by within death in of the to Africa and the the United reflects Peter Great Czar notion and the the in States a Great the Soviet involvement Russian 17th century, in up the in the in United of the "blue latter present 1945 Nations' Eritrea, U. N. sphere advent the revived in in paid of state rest of of of with the 1956 a and century, and 19th sea to in

Horn

long-standing in the

mid-18th III

Slarophile century, ports" the state 1946, trusteeship but which influence. Khrushchev, the his efforts kept 4

under the

Alexander of setting Red

Seas,

extent of

a Russian More acquire or the

colony recently, a the

Stalin

endeavoured over Italian were the

colony

thwarted

Western-dominated the Western and as was the in

territories With the interest

Stalin Horn, states, initially Ethiopia. 1959

Soviet

newly-independent vigour. early were Moscow, 5 In a of flirtations exchanged the that loan

developing This was with and in

unprecedented U. S. S. R. 's embassies visit to the took Assab, initial political despite Ethiopia's its do to so.

reflected Thus, Selassie head also

Haile African

first same of

sub-Saharan year, $102m the in the and

U. S. S. R. by the early only

granted 1960's it at this into out, of unable

Ethiopians charge which interest

constructing completed in Ethiopia As

country's 1967.6 was never and and Its the

refinery

was

Nevertheless, translated point

influence. economic place in

Halliday

Molyneux

assistance African politics,

acknowledgement Kremlin was

337

to

persuade or his his It to

Haile criticize in with not

Selassi

either U. S. policies

to

opt in

for

a

non-aligned Indeed, wedded

posture until to

Vietnam.? firmly

demise

1974, the

the United

Emperor States. the Into this assistance as in the

remained

alliance was Africa

until began to

1963

that

Soviet relatively was the and case their bloc men.

interest more young the of

in

the

Horn

of

develop for

regular Somali of eight in

linkages. Republic's the years 1960, in United million men pledged sources. conditional ensure ambition Kenya Afars as and the Somali stepped, military whilst The the and and Somalia an Soviet earlier, the building States, offer internal not

The quest

pretext for military was,

genesis Egypt

involvement by default. turned

Following to army the of Western 20,000 Germany creation

independence for assistance However, with a

Somalis

a standing Italy, to provide

the $10

and

West for the

responded of a that

5,000-6,000Mogadishu from allies, other the to

security to For and accept the limited the re-unite Ethiopia Issas was (which concerned, on by It the most

force

on

condition assistances and their offer

military Americans nature forcible of

the

was

necessary of Somalia's regions

against to

implementtion the Somali-inhabited then became the French Djibouti).

with and the

of the far

Territory 8 were an insult division that the million as But an

of as affront added of

later

restrictions

impingement caused

its the was

independence, colonial at this offer would be the repaid training powers' point of be

to the

injury

nation. in with aid,

U. S. S. R. worth a of

attractive of was to which to

$32 treated

grant period. of a

remainder was

over

a 20-year and equipping

programme

cover

338

10,000-man jet aircraft.

armed 9 by

force, The

including Soviet defined were to

a small offer, the

air which

force was of

using readily

accepted which years. qualitative its for military naval the

Magadishu, countries 1969, with

type for

relationship the entered next a six new

two After

maintain relations

Soviet-Somali the

phase and and air

U. S. S. R substantially assistance and, to perhaps, Somalia political

increasing in return support.

economic facilities

The

attraction As in the

of

the

Horn of to the

of

Africa

to East, the

the the

superpowers initial of can Africa, be explained and, of to the a desire and

case

Middle

of their

the

superpowers subsequent in lower to each terms extent, of

penetrate in the

Horn

rivalry of the

area,

basically much region

geostrategic, economic

political, importance

potential them.

Geostrategic The a is, the that Arabian shipping Asia, the put and junction by V. lot to geostrategic its geographical underlined of its the United importance proximity by many of and of the to the the Horn the of Africa East that Union of owes and drew to the

Middle factors Soviet deposits the

therefore, interest region: Peninsula lanes to the of

States to Persian Europe the

closeness and linking Indian Asia and the

petroleum Gulf, to southas to

international and its was south-west location succinctly of 3,1978, the at

with as well

Ocean, Africa. of

This the press stated

point

Sofinsky,

head Ministry,

department on February

U. S. S. R.

Foreign

who

339

that is first Horn of Africa The and foremost of military, The importance significance. economic and political junction location in its lies at the of the the area of There of two continents and Africa. are a lot of Asia Indian Gulf Ocean. Persian in the and the good seaports link Moreover, there oil-producing which are sea-lanes 10 America and Europe. with countries Like of Africa Gulf the to Middle the and constitute and at America's of the Japan's route European greater until point the East, it is the proximity countries which, source and, it of of the of will Horn the be

petroleum-exporting Arabian the oil linking Peninsula principal supplies, the

Persian recalled, Europe location with region U. S. S. R. in Soviet terms oil.

Western its states make to the the

especially,

petroleum-producing that to the largely on balance than self-sufficient

partners,

importance now, was has

U. S.

which, This

been

implicitly the U. S.

acknowledged interest in the

by Horn

one in

writer of the

who fact

explained that

Mediterranean from the The important sea-lanes most Ocean Indian the Suez Canal pass through the and into 20,000 Each year Red Sea. through the up to ships The countries this on the eastern through sea. pass Persian Gulf, Red Sea and the the possess shore of in two-thirds reserves petroleum proven of the nearly US the the with oneprovide which world, capitalist American Colossal it fourth the consumes. oil of billions in tens investment of of measured capital is behind All this there. dollars are concentrated 11 in the Washington's area... activity military However, communications Union. Chapter a degree is petroleum 8, For the is one Horn also thing, of of the importer between necessary of the the to Africa's some place importance is, as in to international the Soviet out and Red access to this, in so Sea to

U. S. S. R. of

pointed oil the

a potential of balance

Middle

Eastern in future In addition

superpowers guarantee area.

region the

perhaps

resources

340

the the

Horn Soviet

of

Africa Union in

has view

also of

been the world

of latter's

increasing expanding amongst It countries of ships

importance shipping other is as things, also

to

business brings potential which revenue waterways it

in

the

developing

which, exchange. on such

much-needed source of a

foreign pressure

a

Egypt

obtain from like

substantial tolls imposed Suez Canal.

proportion on 12

their passing

external through

the

The deposits of has the the the gaining threaten Red Sea, the

closeness of the Middle

of

the East

Horn and

of its

Africa location to interest and

to

the at the

petroleum centre world part or of less

sea-lanes

linking stimulated the U. S. S. R.

these anxiety

deposits and

the

Western on the

naturally U. S. and

respectively the the Americans prospect from of the which vital the of the the

for and

more their Soviet be lanes Good Africa of

opposite main fear

reasons. has been

For of

allies, Union able of Hope. for to the 13 the a the wellmost at

of it

the would

a strategic the interruption Indian one has from As of

position

shipping Cape Horn of of

Ocean, the

and lures been

Conversely, U. S. S. R. position West. established unlikely the to

presumably which one Soviet interdict risk threat of writer it

possibility the out, in

obtaining of a is except nevertheless, states would Western

could has

threaten pointed presence petroleum war, the it

lifelines although the area

naval

Western provoking which

supplies would,

immediate a to

provide have defence As

against and 14 its location would,

N. A. T. O.

guard planning. well as

therefore,

complicate

at

the

route

linking

the

Middle

341

Eastern also proximity such range

oil been

fields of to

to

Western

Europe,

the

Horn

of

Africa due to 8, of missiles

has its with the

increasing the Indian

geostrategic Ocean. As as

importance noted the in

Chapter

technological of nuclear and

developments submarine-laucnhed the away Sea, consequent from the relevance case for

lengthening ballistic

(S. S. B. N. 's) point the ever is of

movement

of

the areas been

defense like

contact

relatively Indian to the launched rapidly A3 to

confined Ocean the has

Mediterranean greater particularly to in the strategic the

assuming This whose

superpowers. Soviet from growing, which, from Union

vulnerability stationed the the then, range Indian II, even from Soviet the of world, US

S. S. B. N. 's has been

submarines first a site vulnerable; 4,000-mile much of 6,000 be of the with in

Ocean of the much

development Arabian with missile Ocean which greater a larger Union it Sea, the

Polaris of the of in with

U. S. S. R. Trident jeopardy the

becomes I whose from

deployment puts Moscow and now,

basin, carries stretches area is can also be,

development of

Trident miles,

a missile of of the the

with

a range

U. S. S. R. 15 from To

would be

vulnerable since parts prospect be the that case West's Ocean in to the of

Ocean.

sure, other

vulnerable therefore, in the Indian "16

many

surmised Ocean However,

that

"the

submarines to the

cannot as of the the inter in the

terrifying of a Soviet

U. S. S. R... within an be American that

presence routes, not but it

striking presence terrifying

distance in to serve,

petroleum may Indeed

Indian Kremlin alia,

peacetime complicate Indeed,

would, military of

nevertheless, planning. the Soviet

Soviet

evidence

Union's

concern

over

the

342

presence of to

of

Western

naval Thus,

units not in

in long the

the after

Indian the

Ocean Americans the to that the the

has

been began

long-standing. deploy the Polaris

A3 in

Pacific

Ocean,

Soviet United Indian at that of its the By the of the

government Nations Ocean time ballistic Kremlin 1968, Indian the region, feature. apparently strengthened Indian part escalated useful the in subject of the be on

included December

a memorandum 7,1964,

presented

a proposal zone. a desire in preclude the the that to

declared U. S. did

a nuclear-free not indicate submarines sought to about itself for the

Although deploy

any Ocean, 17 from when

missile clearly Soviet Ocean

Indian prospect. threat

concern manifested navy

potential more concretely time

units

U. S. S. R. 's

first

began became navy and, in

to a in in the in

patrol

a phenomenon The played the

which of

subsequently the in of Soviet

permanent the any Ocean case,

presence a part position disarmament 1970's. naval it to could some for to the

initiating the U. S. S. R. which are in either now the to

U. S. -Soviet the latter but still an be on self-

Ocean the Soviet that or

talks These presence lead form of

began

suspended, area new may

negotiations power

a regional excluding of the

great aircraft

denying that neither military undersea Soviets... be Thus, done

ordnance, would of be these

example, advantage

carriers, Even purely in the must "19 to if

S. R. 18 U. S. "[f]rom is the no next

possibilities even if

materializes, there in

considerations, surveillance may in for feel the the that Indian time

breakthrough decade,

technology something, Ocean being, the to

however counter Indian

ineffectual, the Trident... is likely

Ocean

343

remain

of The

strategic-military strategic is is clearly importance not

interest of as the

to

the

U. S. S. R. Ocean is to it. the to the

Indian as it to

United Union it For is

States which of one

great

Soviet However,

geographically importance it linking the Persian sea-routes south-west Europe. allies and Taiwan, U. S., the that naval is within

much to

closer warrant

sufficient thing, lanes and to Japan

American distance with to the in it in the the Ocean is, the is the

interest. of the

striking Europe In which Asia addition connect and,

shipping Peninsula adjacent U. S. latter off and

Western, Gulf.

Arabian it of of not such is the the far as

this, rest case

those with with Western

country, other

Moreover, friends

also area

Australia, and a Pakistan. relevant

New Zealand, For arena a fact the for

Thailand, Indian of

Philippines, therefore, Western to the

the protection

important contributed

interests, increasing A geostrategic location the which and or Africa, Yemen in The Asia much Union. and more past is then another and at third

has

probably in the the

American factor importance the

interest makes the of by

region. Horn of derives This most first Africa from has of its in of

which to

superpowers Asia and states, influence exert Africa. the

junction

been Libya, in

exploited which

other sought to

recent in at Somalia one Uganda and Yemen. junction

has in

Ethiopia on on the

order

pressure and States, and South at be the

time in North

Sudan,

Egypt, the

Tanzania, Gulf

Saudi Asia of can,

Arabia, via Horn

south-west location Africa

Ethiopia of Africa no United of

the

of perhaps Soviet in the

therefore, by of the either

doubt States the

used, and the

effectively, The influence

superpowers

344

region presence, regimes in the

could,

especially enable it to

If both the could

it

is protect

supplemented and of enable the it

by

a military client superpower spread and its its of than

consolidate other to

and area.

undermine It other This

position also

Influence surroundings. the to Horn the is

Into

parts of

of the

the

continent

aspect of greater of and the the

geographical to the of

location U. S. S. R.

perhaps in Africa in view

interest proliferation Arabian Africa or put

U. S. in presence the

pro-Western A for on in strong example, unstable countries Arabia, moreover, with the

regimes Soviet enable or like the make

Peninsula. could, pressure regimes as well It "link as

north-eastern to undermine

U. S. S. R.

potentially Kenya, Gulf it Egypt,

unstable and and for liberation direct In such the for the addition, friendly Congo, military an It easier friends pressurize South American for in and, the

pro-Western Sudan

Saudi could, up and over

sheikhdoms possible

North the

20 Yemen. U. S. S. R. wars in to

Soviet-backed Africa Africa... to support and "21

central

southern ... South

final it

confrontation would regimes also as enable those by

the in

Soviets Angola, a 22 Africa its and Angola, to

Mozambique, staging post Likewise, would clients undermine Mozambique, make and

perhaps, and other

Zimbabwe types in the of

providing

assistance. Horn to of protect Asia, as

presence the United and

States south-west

Africa such

or

pro-Soviet

states

and

Yemen.

Political Unlike the Middle East, the Horn of Africa is not an

345

area its part

that

is

noted states Thid

for

its neither World's

international having struggle role and nor its played

political an for in setting

prestige, outstanding independence up support the the for wealth some

component in the to of

comparable movement national which pressure However with the

Egypt's

vanguard nations movements,

non-aligned liberation

fervent

possessing states to poorer

enables on the Horn

the

Arab West of

oil-producing and to buy support

exert

of Ethiopia

nations. is invested more regions. in the rest the former moreover of subHorn, of

Africa,

especially which other two are the make

certain

characteristics than most the

it

politically African

significant In the first and by

sub-Saharan principal distinguished fact in that black five Somalia, is Somalis, ethnically the more

place,

countries from whilst Africa years is

Ethiopia Africa constitutes has been

Somalia, of oldest to

the

virtue the

state no the more latter, which for the

and,

subjected domination, African

than

(1936-1941) the only

foreign Saharan But,

state

homogeneous. prestige that by and is the its with

unfortunately upon abject ambitions African has almost of as Horn in 30 left this

consequent country's Irredentist most other This which population nine force Haile by times in the is

fact

has its have

been

than

offset

poverty, which states. Ethiopia, twice million as

sparse put it

population, at loggerheads

a large

potentially as Somalia making as least the until

rich and it main the was

country with virtually political demise reinforced of the of a

inhabitants as Somalia, At

populous of Africa.

Selassie its position

1974, as

Ethiopia's host to the

attraction headquarters

346

O. A. U. other endowed Ethiopia's logical and Through Ethiopia latter claims Addis secessionist Somalis An

This African the

made and

it Middle

a strong Eastern with a

base

from

which

to

influence it also As the leverage Ethiopia.

states. political Somalia some

However, advantage. offered of

Somalis traditional

adversary, which to the external a great persuading or to foment of exercise

base influence

from

sort

over an exercise example, the by Ogaden aiding

ethnically-divided power seeking of influence pressure to

Somalia, could by, over Ababa for

over over the its for

amount

Mogadishu domestic Ethiopia's to

press trouble

some and then political

numerous restrain from when Ethiopia. Soviet his not visit attack with Issas Soviet Territory but the

movements in return of reportedly in October Addis the for this

promising favours was present

some

element

scenario assured 1973 Ababa French Halle that made Territory

officials to Moscow

Selassie Somalia a bilateral of the

during would

Ethiopia France to

unless annex upon at be the

agreement Afars and The of nor by the

(F. T. A. I. ) position should be referred

the time

French's was that the by

departure. future France 23

determined to the

neither United

Ethiopia

Nations.

Economic The its poverty, Horn of Africa that famines the potential region for is a region is underlined and appeals which by for is renowned Ethiopia international for and

a fact perennial

Somalia's aid. insignificant

However,

does

appear

to

have To

a

not begin

economic

wealth.

347

with, values) are addition raw

it

is worth

in of

the

vicinity zinc, the are

of

some lead, of

$3.4 silver, the

billion and Red vast in account,

(in gold 24 Sea. deposits Somalia Somalia mines, been

1975 that In of and, is where granted

copper, lie at there are

said to

to this,

bottom the

reportedly exploitation to largest one

materials

that Ethiopia.

awaiting According

especially, the the virtually site of

one

of

the

world's

uranium has

American monopoly However, it

company, rights is Ethiopia thing,

Westinghouse, to work. which it 25 has the

greatest contains

economic a gold of wide and which

potential. range platinum traces Eritrea iron the ore port of raw and, have is

For

one

reportedly includes and Ogaden potash,

materials possibly, been found with with 26 for

which petroleum in salt, the the

deposits natural desert. copper, of the lie in has Ethiopia level size of and

of gas,

Moreover, and, perhaps, oil near

endowed zinc,

and of

possibility But Ethiopia As and one perhaps

offshore most its

Massawa.

promising undoubted

economic agricultural "[w]ith its

prospects potential. proper

writer

pointed can agricultural population,

out, feed

investment still

management, a decent its and

people

and "27

maintain with mineral

exports... Ethiopia's convey upon

Together

untapped it a credible with to 28 States repay This than a

agriculatural for economic

resources growth and with in to only exports for and the the the does but

potential market for

development, potential long-run. United not is need unable

large foreign is to

products,

investments, of greater Union mostly country's

particularly importance which coffee, demand not

probably the Soviet

Ethiopia's to satisfy

agricultural, the

consumer

348

goods material if it

and

whose imperialism'

"vast of

resource the classic "29

base

...

makes

the

'raw even

kind

unnecessary

was The

ideologically prospects and of

possible. economic however in isolation

growth long-term from which and exploit for its

and

development they might of unattractive amount mineral the potential the fact

for be, their

Ethiopia should abject targets funds agricultural promising growth its chance for of not

Somalia, be seen and external

the make the

extent them huge their

poverty for that

instability, investment, required to As countries, is diversity, and and [multiply]

of and most for that the

would

be

resources. of and the two

Ethiopia, enormous offset poverty the by

development size, failure social the played the

somewhat and

"great for rapid this,

[increase]

investment "30 Horn of

required In view Africa in to

economic

transformation. of very initial the

economic at

importance best a

probably influencing penetrate

subordinate endeavour to

part try

superpowers'

the

region.

Soviet

and The

American

commitments development and and the the of

to

Somalia

and on to conversion

Ethiopia the Ethiopia of part of and these was of

gradual States

a commitment Union

the Somalia states perhaps the

United

Soviet

respectively into inevitable American-Ethiopian As and credibility in

consequent for narrow,

elements view of and pointed out the

the

superpowers military basis patron-client section, superpowers

Soviet-Somali in a previous to the

relationships. the Ethiopians

both in

the

Somalis

looked

349

order traditionally their political Americans at

to

satisfy fearful

their of and

security the

needs.

The Moslem a stable thus

Ethiopians, world source offered to of the base of the

predominantly wanted and

north, and use in

east, military the

west, support

of return

valuable for and U. S. the

military aid. With

communications the eruption of traditional by This a hostile provided with turned earlier, with them the to the it the

Kagnew

Eritrean Republic image Moslems another States. Soviet after which themselves presumably, territories, Ethiopia, for their ' as

rebellion in the early

establishment Ethiopia's surrounded

Somali selfsea of with United to the only arms defend and, "lost of

1960's, island reinforced. to strengthen on the

a Christian was further

incentive The Union the they for West thought against to " work that

its other

ties hand, as

Somalis, military had

assistance, to provide to

noted them

refused were their towards is, the the

necessary hostile the

enable

neighbour, re-unification

Ethiopia of the

Somali-inhabited then to F. T. A. I. the The Ethiopian reasons: influence with the in

territories superpowers, and to an logic

Kenya, part, also for

and

responded

Somali obtain

requests military region

security-related and political accordance

facilities of the global nature of world

important of the

in

U. S. -Soviet The responses, from the Soviet for a sense Somalis, and a firmer

competition. the stimuli that is, on which the the elicited fact part that of the the they superpower emanated and further and and

however, of insecurity contained American

Ethiopians for of Africa, Ababa

a natural involvement to the in

imperative the Horn in

commitment

regimes

Addis

350

Mogadishu.

As

Halliday

and

Molyneux

point

out,

has involvement Outside been brought about not ... forces through the use by local merely of material from but because the the supplied outside, also of local to the that ongoing political commitments states have The in engendered. such supplies presence Somalia times, American, at different and Ethiopia, of Cuban deemed to assist personnel and Soviet necessary 31 local index forces has been one clear of this. Thus, it the was in order to maintain for their also through military intervene perhaps the clients to a presence superpowers for guarantee form on their evident To begin or of near behalf in in not military the the only and security such territory, necessary. of the were amounts of its 1976, in aid U. S. the of Haile first the Horn to of Africa, to of

necessary of but either of to was

respond types of as or

demands

other

assistance, clients presence a promise This Ethiopian regular American Selassie two or

these the by

some units on most

"trip-wire" their

whenever the with, extensive case

relationship. and, generally, and to

there

relatively military of its aid to

economic and so also years. reportedly a further

the

regime during and

that

successors 1951 $350 military the largest

Thus, received $279 million by

between over in far

Ethiopians aid United American
military military between forces the

million

economic from the of of
Ethiopian

and

States, aid
aid

making in black

them Africa.

recipients part

A substantial
spent 3,744 This on were made training trained the Africa.

the

programme of 1976. in

was whom

personnel, 1953 best and trained

in Ethiopian 32

the

U. S. armed

sub-Saharan

American

military

assistance

to

Ethiopia

continued

even

after

the

ousting

of

Haile

Selassie.

To be sure,

aid,

as

351

opposed until a

to

sales

deliveries, and then

remained sharply

more

or

less However,

constant after for the or

1975-1976 three-months'

declined. in retaliation Council's former regime, civilian in to their $135 aircraft. extra approved fighters supply was in of Addis

suspension Military Administrative of the to 52 leading Selassie arms

Provisional Dergue) officials U. S. that arms used to decided year sales to this,

(P. M. A. C. and March Ethiopia, largest milllion In $53 the from the military 1975 and American and addition

execution of

Haile resume Ethiopians This M-60

the in

deliveries

the credit.

received amounted'to and F-5E an

was

purchase Congress over of

tanks authorized

million transfer Iran.

of

equipment to Ethiopia

a two-year a squadron to

period of old

and F-5A to

Washington's armed in to forces January reconcile to by

intention with 1976 military when the some of

continue equipment sources

Ethiopian confirmed attempted military actions and

further Ababa

U. S.

continuation the Dergue's that of since war and the

American

assistance utterances current programme policy. Government the planes, weapons, year, totalled proportion the United provision

objectionable so much of a represent month, by

arguing was

Ethiopia's replacement any the new U. S. in fighter infantry of the

equipment was now

Korean

vintage, not

long-overdue in its new patrol value of arms

did same

Accordingly, expanded of

commitment mainly and million. to Finally, military received Ethiopia a more

acquiescing tanks, advanced

equipment, craft, $22

coastal to American $79 of States the

By

the

end

military million. the

sales

during relatively

1976-1977 large trained in

Ethiopian since 1953

personnel their training

between

352

1974 cent

and of As

1976. of as

This

amounted

to

some

469

or

over

12

per

a total well

3,744.33 the and States guarantee Thus, Eritrea with to it and that firmly refused as amalgamation took a new as bulk training also the early of the equipment all a of of number the its of and

providing forces United to

Ethiopian personnel, additional territorial the federation of 34

armed the measures integrity. of

almost undertook country's as and 1950

security it

supported the United

Ethiopia effect

facilitated the

passage Nations. integrity for protest in the Ethiopia of the

a resolution Henceforth,

through the

endorsed to

territorial any its with demand lack Ethiopia shape with between terms that it of

of Eritrean at the

Ethiopia separation, forced This in the were the

countenance by

evidenced of Eritrea

1962.35 conclusion and accord

endorsement 1960 of

a more military Although

formal agreement the it is the case the a of

United only U. S. 's Ethiopia Israel,

States. partly

precise known

revealed, to the

emphasized integrity commitment direct integrity. of the deal, of

commitment but, as in

territorial the U. S. to this spirit unwritten, to it after deny it stand the the also the

to

without in the in as States

committing event of

Americans threat to the

intervention

Nevertheless, as the this Addis coup the in threat. Ababa against means some sort to of in well United

accordance with

with

previous, worked not need in

commitments, minimize behind attempted Somalis engaged

energetically only such 1960, 36 did as and but

Consequently, times Haile of

Selassis

threaten front-line

Ethiopia,

involvement

against

353

main As U. S. the

threat one has Israelis,

to source tended

Ethiopia's has to in pointed leave

integrity, out, the three the main years

the although

Eritrean on the

guerillas. whole work of over of "37 to the aid two the to the a to

counter-insurgency after sent for as "Plan States' economic security by the to eruption Ethiopia

1966,

Eritrean hundred three

uprising, counter-insurgency years The under

Americans "experts" known United by country's its

a period Delta.

a scheme of manifested of the the

credibility as

commitment and and perceptions to Washington. military

Ethiopians, and guarantees

territorial of the A

integrity, importance number was with, the of

was of the

very

much

affected

Ethiopian indicated

connection that by to

factors held in was States until with

U. S. -Ethiopian the-Americans. Israel and the in its Middle

friendship To affinity East, a in begin to and, close

indeed Ethiopia United

high second in all about the

regard only of

Africa 1977/1978 State. place

moreover, relationship with host Ethiopia's to the

maintained This, in African made Addis the was, possibly to as it

Zionist and of that the

conjunction politics seem to "had East above, on put as the a and the other down to was to

prestige headquarters of State

O. A. U., for both there

Department number Africa. despatch occasions the risk Eritrean being of "38 by

support

Ababa Middle noted also help

benefits More the

vis-a-vis concretely, U. S. In 1966

and

of

couter-insurgency uprising, stuck of the in and the

"advisers" consequent

willingness This commitment However, importance

a Vietnam-type strength and of the

quagmire. American integrity. of the

illustrative Ethiopia's perhaps the

security most

territorial indicator

credible

of

354

the

Ethiopian the

connection role

to that

the was

United

States by to

was,

as

noted in

elsewhere, American geographical to and station United As the the U. S.

occupied due specifically, and naval form was not

Ethiopia country's provision

strategic location of extensive

planning and, more military in value

the its

communications of attached the Kagnew by the

intelligence at States American later Asmara. to

facilities The facility to out,

the that

this

should Ethiopia

be during

underestimated. the period of

Ambassador pointed

1963-1967

Ethiopia for in then interest The US was simple it defined "the Government The Washington. as " The facility was station. unhampered use of Kagnew United to the deemed to be "strategically then vital" installation Black in States, the military only such Africa. We had 1,800 men officers, and civilians 2,500 800 dependents; there, a total of plus working during to my briefing period advanced with well plans did to 3,500 that within a year, as raise number 39 occur. Finally, Red these the and were Soviet there Arabian deployed Union Asia, served of whenever As principal Somalia increasing the large country. as that with indicator has been of Although of the was the presence and in for the other of U. S. naval Ocean. connected in is southalso units in the

Seas

Indian reasons interests in such to the as the

Although with and likely the Addis

mainly and their other with

American

south-west to have

existence purposes commitment

area to

underline in

credibility Ababa

the

U. S.

regime

necessary. the American-Ethiopian of the Soviet in the commitment and, and terms States of connection, the until military this to was Ethiopia, U. S. S. R. 1976/1977, aid not into as its the to

regular economic absolute

inputs

United

355

significance period as well during as ten to

must which the times

be

seen the

with Soviets

reference were latter's as that of

to involved

the

shorter with

time

Somalia, which and is its

size as

of

the

population, Ethiopia, Indeed, to to quite sub-Saharan the

nearly

small

comparatively by the military On during These included printing milk-processing of 1975 in of agricultural when economic Africa) the the standards contribution

small of

absorptive Soviet of of the

capacity.

judging Africa, and

assistance U. S. S. R. was Soviet totalled range

economic

development the the were economic period invested of

Somalia front,

substantial. to $87 projects two radio and hospitals, station, a variety in million for and all meat "Giuba to help Somalia million. which a a

assistance some of

1963-1973 in a wide

secondary plant,

schools, fishing plant,

a fish enterprises,

cannery, a

a meat-packing 40 the (out This

plant, was

programmes. U. S. S. R. credits for provided grants

supplemented with million milk infamous $63

Somalis of such and $67 as the

and

project

development operations, as for 41 the additional Soviet latter in the

factories, Dam" re-settle direct the

port-dredging scheme, as well

assistancee assistance, effort did and much to

drought participation, prestige of of the

victims. in the

including to raise

U. S. S. R. strength it, with the of

Somalia

reinforce connection.

perceptions As one source was

Soviet-Somali land for the new and aircraft. and tankers, to

described cleared to

"the

collective the A was the famine fleet also Somali

farms victims of used 165

Russian sites in

equipment Russian

brought vehicles, in the

including operation and

ambulances afterwards

donated

356

people. into

"42 1976

Soviet when was in

economic July with a the out,

assistance new

to technical 43

Somalia and All in

continued economic all, as in

agreement one Somalia powers, only efforts. substantial never drew However, important sphere. the army coup supplier power of 1963 of d'etat of in writer

signed pointed

Somalis. the that

has "far

U. S. S. R. 's of States, the other which and make in credits, one

investment interested was or involved two

overshadowed the the Although sum of these. by far $109 44 the harbor

particularly dredging "

United at China million

Kismayu did

minor the Somalis

available the

upon

biggest to

and Somalia section, loan to

perhaps was in the

the

most

Soviet As offer 10,000 of the

contribution noted of men, 1969 in

military with an

a previous million from that

this train until virtually With the aid growing to

began and the equip

a $32 and the

date remained

military the sole to

U. S. S. R. armed 1969, in

Somali Barre increased in

forces. Soviet response whose "scientific Thus, with

ascension to Somalia requests govern won and worth bombers, personnel military February it

Siad

military to the

dramatically of the new by the

Somali principle ear in

leadership of

promise

the a

country sympathetic the military MiG-15 carriers, assistance 1972 Minister between in

socialism" between $10 several 1969 million IL-28 armoured 45 increased Mogadishu Grechko. Soviet after by the

Moscow. Somalia which P-6

1972, of

U. S. S. R.

provided

equipment fighters, and to the of that

included

torpedo

boats, artillery.

anti-aircraft Somalia of the was

further to

wake

visit Marshall

U. S. S. R.

Defence, time and

Consequently, the Somalis

1974

the

Soviets

supplied

357

for MiG-21 system. enabled

the

first interceptor 46 the with By

time

with and

such the Soviet muster

sophisticated SA-2

weapons

as

the

surface-to-air aid of

missile programme 20,000 24 MiG-21's; personnel of 60 per field cent The be had men

1975,

the to

military an army

Somalis 52

some

equipped 250 carriers; artillery of Somali T-34,

combat and coastal T-55

aircraft, tanks; batteries, weapons. trained of Soviet in by

including 300 and 47 the armoured a variety Some

T-54, 200 and

anti-aircraft were

officers significance by the

U. S. S. R. 48 can the of

military illustrated armed of forces

assistance categories inventory 49 to Somalia Ethiopia, was

fact the

that

many

Somali those

surpassed which were of Soviet the

corresponding their U. S. size. commitment to

Ethiopia As in

twice the

the of

case the of Union, several

the coloured to

credibility by the perceptions Soviet

commitment value and, of like pointed the role

Soviet-Somali the to

relations American-Ethiopian the First in planning. importance of all, the

connection, Somalia's was Union's establishment especially when foreign ability policy in the the

factors with potential

of there Soviet The

friendship role global and after or

U. S. S. R. of Somalia

strategic-military consolidation the advent was of of

Soviet-Somali took assume place an

relations, at a time

Barre, to

U. S. S. R. policy to use

beginning by power as

assertive and foreign Soviet Amongst of what

characterized military with thinking

a growing an instrument

willingness of in

accordance

changes during these was

which the the

occurred

politico-military the most important

mid-1950's. development

of

358

subsequently doctrine, U. S. S. R. carrying innovations The adoption "

came which was navy in the of the

to stressed creation "capable enemy this

be

known that of of a

as a key

the to the

"Gorshkov defence nuclear with the the globe. and of

naval the

modern, dealing

missile latest `"50 its

camp doctrine

in

any by part

part

of

Khrushchev, of the 1960's in of facilities Firstly, staying and the the fleets power Arabian acquisition with the it the

implementation the question to 51 the

during of Soviet paths

the

latter military

raised countries Soviet was would of the Sea. of muchtheir of words the of in "vivid" of value of the a

facilities areas such

adjacent fleets. considered greatly Soviet Secondly, air needed American powerful Gorshkov, friendly demonstration country against equipment them, but

and

deployment of reasons. and Ocean importantly, Soviet abundantly enjoyed

The important enhance the the

acquisition for three

flexibility Indian more provide was which force. of

navy and

in

perhaps would

facilities air

cover counterparts U. S. the

that

available the protection in naval lay military in the the facilities in the

to

carrier importance

Thirdly, obtaining the world and and "by the

countries of beyond potential being also its

around "the own

economic borders"

power deterrent

enemies exhibited, to support to

perfection them, "52 to

undermine states.

intimidate Given importance the

friendly and it potential

geostrategic, of the Horn fits With of Siad the Barre

political, of into Africa, Gorshkov's of the

economic to

is'not strategy. leftist, 1969,

difficult

see

where

Somalia

advent in

Soviet-oriented the U. S. S. R. got

regime the

October

359

opportunity the interest the Horn of in, region,

to

basically and commitment

realize so give to, The

its

strategic

ambitions to client in Mogadishu much As with February a quid air

in its in

Africa, and

concrete its then

expression principal

Somalia. and, aid than as

new above,

government was granted

requested extensive quo, naval trip Union return mid-1970's, deep-water people, estimated have facility missiles. February the and making conclusive occasion Arab verify facilities that some they of the and its in 53 it

mentioned its civilian to Thus,

more pro and 1972 Soviet in the of 1,500 for an to and a a

predecessor. the Soviets

was facilities.

prepared

provide during was

Grechko's signed airfield facilities.

to

Somalia,

an

agreement the access port to

whereby of

the Berbera

would for

modernize future the port,

and the

new

By consisted

Berbera

complex

allegedly for

accommodation facility, of feet fuel, of

approximately facilities eventually runway, of was a similar both the the

a communications 175,000 13,000 for In that port to the barrels 15,000

storage an airstrip

surfaced storage it doing Although that in to the the of

handling addition the Soviets Kismayu. 54 to

and this, were

tactical claimed job Kremlin was in to

1976

southern the

of

Somalis use of

consistently military has for

denied installations pointed instance, party

U. S. S. R. 55

Somalia, contrary. Somalis

fairly On one an to

evidence June 1975,

invited in order military declared alleged, been

international denials in the of country, seen no the

journalists of the of that the they Soviet

existence and although

parties kind had

had

installations complained

journalists

denied

360

access consequently delegation Senate Somalis military a

to

one raised headed

military were by Senator Committee, their denials actually missile was of in the later

building. reinforced Dewey which of Bartlett, was the also

The when an

suspicions American of by the the

a member Invited of existence to Secretary the far

Armed to

Forces verify

presence the addition U. S. of thought

Soviet of these of

installations, Soviet there Schlesinger complex own

confirmed 56 In by

suspected

base. revelation

allusions, Defence military Somalia's The facilities commentators been Forces military balance assessments Western of funds

aerial

photographs which many

extensive exceeded

Berbera 57 to the

needs.

importance in

U. S. S. R. been

of

naval

and by

air many has Armed

Somalia amongst who, on in Indian been in the and be little in the

has most

underlined of

emphatic to the claimed threaten Although in

whom

Schlesinger Committee facilities in the have intrusions to

a testimony 10,1975, "could "58

Senate's that the many order the to

June Somalia

Soviet military of those justify

Ocean.

exaggerated area, enlarge doubt political one writer especially the

expropriation base at facilities value out, for to the Diego

maintain can of

American that and has military strategic pointed

Garcia, in the Somalia Soviet

there were

great As

Union. access to

U. S. S. R.

Berbera

improvement be the would existing a considerable on the naval auxiliaries off of stationed arrangement in the Gulf South island Yemeni of Socotra of Aden and For the first Soviet Mauritius. time the near navy Indian Ocea, Berbera have a home in the ' would although base under Soviet be a Soviet would control not and docking traditional privileges offer much than granted 59 in Aden and elsewhere.

361

Moreover, capable the of

Soviet handling

access all

to

the

airfield of Soviet and

at

Berbera,

which including

is

kinds

aircraft, the would military naval well in facilities to and the Strait to that of or exercise Middle TU-95

"Backfire"

medium-range bomber/reconnaissance

bomber

"Bear" the

long-range U. S. S. R. in. the the the area Arabian

aircraft, eye on Western for Ocean. Western

enable

to

both and Sea to the

keep provide and the

an air

movements units as the aiding seas in some Eastern in

cover

Soviet As presence military

Indian the of

U. S. S. R. to would

counter Horn

adjacent Somalia political states. proximity Mandab, the seas in it of the would Africa, 60 ', In the factor Soviet been Russian influx Grechko's approximately dependents), the Red near

Africa, the

also

help over

Soviets African out,

influence As of through Sea the must Strait of Albright Berbera

certain has to all pointed the

geographical of coming Bab alfrom the

strategic going a state a lot littoral.

which pass, to the

vessels

enables possess Red to in Sea

dominated influence other in Middle the

potential "In

countries be in as

words, Horn

a position well as

affect

developments of key

a number

Eastern

States.

addition

to global may

the

role/potential

role

of

Somalia a

in second

U. S. S. R. 's that

politico-strategic have to of underlined the a Somalis relatively advisers began 1972, citizens to 1,400 almost and by in the after

planning, credibility the large in the 1969

of coup

the has of The after were

commitment presence civilian of trip these of and

contingent country.

military

experts February Soviet

immediately mid-1974 Somalia were thought there

3,600 of

(excluding to be

whom

1,200

362

military size Whilst development either military helping Their had the its Soviet of in of

personnel---a the most of Somali the

considerable population civilians the and operated military and

number its on personnel operation the Somali Soviet-built such

in

view

of forces.

the 61

armed

Soviet-sponsored were of armed the forces equipment. numbers Somalia the U. S. S. R. especially Moscow it was and a engaged Berbera and

projects, the

construction or to on in training

complex them presence

maintain Somali and soil

their in

considerable for it both gave of

advantages Union. control the

disadvantages one hand, freedom Ethiopia, at the in of and the

On the over conflict to avert,

degree as

Somali with but

action which

regards anxious risk Somalis of

always the the

same adventures

time

increased by and in

Soviet with of hand, the

implication the help

undertaken equipment of the

Soviet interests

contravention On the personnel reinforced ties, credibility impelling circumstances Whatever commitment politico-strategic numbers been 1974 of Soviet to the thus other

desire

U. S. S. R. of it Soviet also

whilst did

large-scale Somali strength

presence freedom, of of and, Somalia rather to not the role presence is likely

probably perceptions generating element latter where it

constrain of an the

Soviet-Somali Somalia as a

impression U. S. S. R. stand normally was given latter's and in the the country, by Treaty the by

for to

the

consequently, even do so. under

would

credibility Somalia by

U. S. S. R. 's in of to in Soviet large have July and

the

planning, advisers and

confirmed of the

strengthened

conclusion of Friendship

Soviet-Somali

363

Cooperation. association foundation between Republic], against liberation writer by the has Soviet Finally, connection, Somalia presence area the the taking which regime Arabian any is of the likely the served, in the and imperialism and for of the

This the further

basically two countries development and the

pledged by of

the laying friendly [Somali

continued "a firm

relations Democratic

U. S. S. R. [making] and

S. D. R. to and "63 Its it

a contribution colonialism

the

joint peace,

struggle national as one

for

social out,

progress. lay in

importance, was the first 64

pointed Union as

that

signed

with in the

a black case of been in other as

African of the the

state.

American-Ethiopian commitment by the permanent Ocean to in to

credibility to Soviet have navy

Soviet

strengthened the Arabian things, a warning in as to the

Sea/Indian a reassurance its opponents

amongst and and

Mogadishu Peninsula

elsewhere

region

against

hostile

acts.

The Horn

decommitment of The Africa influx of and backing part and into at in in two least

and

realignment

of

the

superpowers

in

the

U. S.

and

Soviet coupled countries the the

economic with

and the

military superpowers' played Ababa

aid

to

Ethiopia

Somalia, of those

political important Mogadishu forces However, superpowers' conversion times, into

obviously in Addis

an and armed

sustaining turning of the an for regimes

regimes Ethiopian powerful important and

and in

Somali black

most equally Ethiopia in

Africa. of been different U. S. S. R. the the

outcome Somalia has at of the

support of the

those for

countries, each

credibility

elements 364

and

the

U. S. in the

As

in

the

case East,

of the

the

American

and

Soviet of can those

involvement the be superpowers said to

Middle the

long-standing in the Horn perception security This reference of

support Africa of

for have

opponents

generated

a general from and a strong Moscow. in

opponents on the part in

as of

benefitting Washington 8 Israel, in order

commitment perception, to the as U. S. and, superpowers' clients war say of in before then and respective place Union at were and clearly war long way during a in 19771973, the it the

noted

Chapters to

and

10

commitment consequently, credibility times 1978 that United would of

generates to maintain them to

expectations the back their

as need.

allies, Thus, earlier Grechko's began its to

impels had on the

Ethiopian-Somali the to 1970's, but Ethiopia, the by their took Soviet

occurred is, after

during trip

Mogadishu from both

States be

decommitment assume or The less war, that

reasonable would in the both have region. the stages in the between of the

U. S.

U. S. S. R. clients time at

more

stood

however, and the of a the

when different

United of Horn the

States a of case

process Africa, of conflict, of the

decommitment fact that Arab-Israeli goes a

realignment differentiates and towards the latter that

1973 and

Ethio-Somali the

explaining hostilities.

responses

superpowers

Decommitment The began reference as decommitment early to a as of the United and factors. States can be from explained the Ethiopia with most

1970-1972 of

number

Perhaps

365

important importance of 1971 was facilities subject facilities the Kagnew to satellite of able the

of of

these Ethiopia.

was

the First and island

decline of the of all,

of with lease

the the from

strategic development Britain the in U. S.

communications Indian to and enjoy an Ocean both

Diego

Garcia, superior

qualitatively security by a littoral the to decision dependence military in the of

military that as was were not the of rapidly in

indefinite denial

tenure state,

potential in Ethiopia.

Consequently, its location 1971 the of of for the

significance Americans was on the

station and to by phase the

and about out number a peak

declined, Washington Accordingly, Kagnew in facility contributed Ethiopia American growth capability greater support development Garcia. weakening characterized relations have officials grounds of to 1976 fell

reached station.

U. S.

American over 3,000

personnel 1971 to a mere from factor importance dispensability

at 35 the which of of

from in in

readiness the to the following the

complete year. of the 66 the

withdrawal A second strategic

decline was

U. S. facilities United afloat for its

increasing there. This

naval the in distances than

was

due

to

the

States support longer

navy's which periods allows of 67

already it time as to

substantial operate at shore to the Diego was the as

without well as at there connection

Soviet alternative

counterpart, naval to these

of In of by with the

facilities factors

addition the Haile Zionist "[i]t Washington the

Ethiopian-Israeli Selassie's State was to country now argue was in no for severance October longer aid important to

of 1973. so

diplomatic As some for on Israel's the

observed, in that

feasible

Ethiopia for

366

strategic underlying to the United

posture. the

"68 of was the

A the

fourth strategic

and

related value of of of its Africa. to interest the

factor Ethiopia role in As the in of the

reduction States

general in the

decline Horn of the Horn was Red and

offsetting Legum Americans maintaining the Soviet has

Soviet pointed had

influence out, the

importance as in the

Ethiopia U. S. in

steadily of

declined power in

a balance arms build-up of Egypt, on the

face by community, Israel

Somalia

"overtaken Sea

determination particularly looking particular, in the In Ethiopia to have region. addition to the

immediate Arabia keep influence in

Saudi

Sudan---with Russian general, influence to

encouragingly---to and Communist

in

a minimum

"69 to United the the decline States, American in the strategic factor which was the due value appears growing to the as of

a second

stimulated over

decommitment political future Selassie the

uncertainty increasing illustrated campaign Ababa in

Ethiopia's of

precariousness by and, dealing the steady

the

Haile of

regime7° guerilla of

progress the gross

Eritrean

especially, with the

incompetence of the 1972-1973

Addis famine.

disaster

As Halliday

and Molyneux

put

it,

discouraging factor immediate Washington the from ... Selassie for Haile the support was manifest crisis his through in 1972-3: the country was passing which famine inability the to face the regime's to and up disaster. An looming in upheaval was evidently Ethiopia, that Haile Selassie a kind of would sweep It in Washington's interests to away. was thereofore its distance from Ethio take ian regime the and to wait 7ý for to run their events course. The compounded anxiety by an generated increase in the by the activities famine of crisis the Eritrean was

367

Liberation their initiated expected, States the avoid Africa. to zenith.

Front

(E. L. F. ) which The E. L. F., at

by the

the

end same

of time,

1970

reached purposely

an

anti-American Journalists the

propaganda and

campaign in

which, the United

as

prompted call for of

politicians of the Kagnew in

evacuation aid to

station an in effort the Horn

and to of

termination entanglement 72 The

military in

Ethiopia quagmire

a Vietnam-type

detachment clearly Thus requests tanks, visible as

of

the even as the

United before May supply 1973 of

States the the new to downfall

from

Ethiopia of Haile refused aircraft them with

became Selassie. Ethiopian and

early for

Americans fighter provide of

M-60

although missiles

they and

agreed a of new

surface-to-air cars. distance Selassie's Addis Instead, With 1974-1975, rationales already country, "moderate view proclivities both maintain obvious of Ababa it 73

brigade

armoured to Haile to 1974. 74 in

A further itself reign during was the the for decided it could from was

indication Ethiopia its the reluctance crucial by of States continued phase now in no out longer the

Washington's the post after charge an end

attempt of

towards to months a mere Haile one

ambassador January

represented overthrow United its to

d'affaires. regime few

Selassie of of the

lost support Its

remaining having in the

Ethiopia: presence Addis particularly

military even affairs, assume "75

Ababa's in radical initially,

leadership the and new

African

military To Dergue

rulers' be had sure, good For supplies:

apparently at least

rhetoric. and the

Washington a cordial reason

reasons the they

to

want

to the

relationship. military

Ethiopians, had to keep

was

up

368

with

the

growing military the paid delivery for, weapons.

Soviet threat of and 76 friendly in of the

arms

build-up from $40 the million the flow

in

Somalia

and guerillas;

the

increasing ensure already their wished number to would long-time Somalia Ethiopia, and, littoral, allowing indirectly principal colonial incentives the Dergue by

Eritrean of of on with U. S. spare the the were

some maintain The

equipment parts for hand, for desire that of a in in a

U. S. to of

Americans, relations

other Dergue the clients

maintain reasons, the loss

foremost

of with

which other an

avoid

credibility from desire some to Arab the too to

probably ally; by 78 77

result the

quick counter

abandonment Soviet of influence their

maintaining and the desire

influence prevent control of

own

Eritrean of black the

independence entire Red states and of a Sea for

' therefore, and the to

possible avoid

blame of an

African state

bifurcation assisting in O. A. U., 79 United more or

African

thereby cardinal of

the

contravention that of the

of

the

inviolability by its or had it to Aman 1976 support been had

boundaries. for the had

Nevertheless, States less to continue

the for outbecome

disappeared To begin with,

weighed increasingly the

disincentives. aware of its

diminishing The execution July the of

ability of 1976 new

influence Andom in what rulers Mariam 1977 with to had the

Dergue's 1974

behaviour. and Habte Sisai had the of the

November contacts and, the 80

in with

had

removed

Washington even worst,

military Haile Fabruary course

rise

Mengistu in

chairmanship placed As one source

P. M: A. C. on pointed

effectively U. S.

Ethiopia has

a collision out,

369

The manner of Mengistu's consolidation of power was ... bloody; his the ties new policies opened way to closer Union the Soviet doubts the with and removed some of Russians had till harboured. the then For these two have it been more difficult for the reasons... would [between Ethiopia United previous relationship and the 81 States] to have been maintained. In the to addition P. M. A. C., discontinue opposition those support of that states beleaguered greater to The marriage approaching warned went Eritrean launched August William violations deteriorating incipient that ahead that first of its the now for in to its inability reason support of the for to influence which the the policies Washington was the of

a further its

encouraged Ethiopians Arab and any interests, to align

growing especially American tabulation obvious Arab the give than

conservative Saudi Arabia, "[i]n

regimes, Sudan, elementary it with than chose was the with to to

Egypt, Ethiopia.

Since and strategic reason

economic U. S. A. increasingly Derg"82 the the had

more

opposed Americans wish junta that, between in would as the May be of the in

to

Ethiopia

naturally Arab Addis writer the the if

weight of the

to

conservatives Ababa. put it, Dergue "the was

military

indication convenience"

one

US and 1976 affected march" later of for the

an

end83

appeared

when

Americans the Dergue the

arms with guerillas.

deliveries the 84 planned Six yet

"peasant months criticism of it incapable State as

against the Dergue

Americans when Affairs prone Ethiopia's and that the to on

their

strongest

6 Assistant Schaufele of human

Secretary described rights,

African

"unstable, of by managing insurgencies on to warn

economy, insurgencies. "

and

beset

He also

went

370

United Ababa However, ideal completing Thus, listed violated ineligible 25,1977, American reduced violations be if

States the it pretext the in by

would regime was in for

reconsider there "human took rights"

its an

cooperation anti-American the Mengistu from of 19 U. S.

with

Addis turn. 85 the and

that the

found regime Ethiopia. countries

attacking of Ethiopia Senate to an

process 1976 American rights U. S.

decommitment was and extent one House which Accordingly, State Vance amongst its it

October the human for

committees rendered on announced others, was

that them

assistance-86 of Ethiopia, of although $10 million

February that being

U. S. foreign ostensibly of

Secretary aid to

because rights,

allegedly would in or even to

consistent probably military probable of still sales that an

human to It is,

eligible 87

receive however, was more

credits. the alleged by

possible in response deal of

announcement Ethiopian-Soviet reports of and The formally 22, 1977 Group to and

knowledge 1976,

arms Ethiopian Yugoslavia

December

backed from rights by a

military than to

purchases the was Ethiopian Kagnew station human followed

Czechoslovakia issue88 decision, on April

February

announcement to the the half the

communicated close to down

government before Assistance with the

September Advisory congressionally The an left

reduce

U. S. "in

Military compliance "89 set

(M. A. A. G. ) by mandated

worldwide of February that

reduction. and finally April

announcements

in what

motion was the at the

action-reaction of the

process

destroyed and

American-Ethiopian of years the U. S. earlier. from

connection the country in

completed began to

decommitment least four

which response

Thus,

371

American immediate facilities---the station, United

moves,

on

April of

23,1977, five

the United the

Dergue States

announced

the

closure

Government communications

M. A. A. G., the Naval Medical

Kagnew Unit

Research Service

(N. M. R. U. ), and the

the U. S. to led

States

Information in

(U. S. I. S. ), ordered their This, on

Consulate-General leave the delivery including move May leader sworn American Ethiopian ordered office United of up the four the in States marine days that 4-8 of the country to Ethiopia jet

Asmara---and four by nearly

personnel in April worth of turn, 27

within retaliate of fighters,

days.

90

Americans to F-5E

suspending $100 million

the arms, 91 his and a

M-60

tanks,

and

ammunition; during

probably trip to

encouraged Moscow that internal

Mengistu's "(t]he and tutor, external

outburst

coordinator enemies] is especially drift 28 the in

[Ethiopia's of

the

enemy

oppressed "92

peoples---imperialism, The downward when American reduction and the by on May

imperialism. relations closure Addis Ababa,

U. S. Dergue

continued of the staff, at the the

military 50 per cent of was the the summer, the

attache's of the

Embassy guards later military by

departure 93 recall This home in of

two-thirds followed last United 1977, United 81

Embassy. to

a decision personnel by the

Ethiopian States. virtually States and Unlike decommitment begin was until not 94

training beginning ties severed.

Thus, all Ethiopia the of after premeditated case the the

military/security had of Soviet start on the been the

between

United Union of

States from

and

Ethiopia, did not Horn, in

the really and the

Somalia in the

hostilities part of

the

U. S. S. R.,

372

sense friendship in

that

the of,

Soviets and to their

would

have

preferred position close did

to

maintain in,

the

influential increasingly the part decommitment to Somalia's

Somalia, with the take the

addition The was due

their that large

ties in the

Dergue. place Soviet military Ababa. willingness Somalia section Africa. seriously number close of to

fact in

end at

resentment and, regime reasons with its in the in the

Union's cooperation A full, of must, of the the

increasing with examination U. S. S. R. to

political the of military the

especially, in behind position following Horn of to a Addis the in

dispense the the analysis

therefore, realignment even to

await of

superpowers the new from to

However, attempt factors the

before the it

U. S. S. R. rulers becoming of

began Ethiopia, sufficiently satisfy

coopt

prevented Somalis for allay of either

substantially economic, and of gesture factors initial the

Mogadishu's assistance and reliability or

desire to

political, Moscow's

military genuinness

suspicions friendship of both of later and these the

Somalia's

towards is response in the lot in the war, with

the thus of Horn, to the in

U. S. S. R. necessary the and turn Soviet its its in

A

consideration order to to the explain outbreak

Union subsequent back the

hostilities on throw of the during its

willingness, on the Soamlis

Ethiopians, the region. Perhaps Irredentist Somalia's territories, one writer

traditional

clients

United

States

the

most

serious of with the

of

these foreign the region

factors policy, so-called of Ethiopia.

is that

the is, "lost As

determination preoccupation " especially

Somali regaining Ogaden

explained, 373

fact in The the tangled of life simple really one Africa... is Somalia's the Horn of that of politics by events is written in the Ogaden. No foreign policy in Mogadishu independence in Minister Foreign since had 1960---and for that no President---has matter ever freedom the to take of movement any other into There is account... considerations very much Somalia that probably no principle would not sacrifice "unite if by doing back the nation"---win could so it Ogaden from Ethiopia; is the there certainly no hesitate it in to make or break that allegiance would 95 furtherance cause ... of this This minds close the client U. S. S. R. relations Horn desire equipment as Somalia of fact of presumably Soviet created tremendous as regards To of the begin uncertainties the with, wisdom in in of view patronto of of the advanced to be the these the the too of

decision-makers with military it Somalia. basis must or

a connection essentially relationship, that

Soviet-Somali been apparent

have even

a consolidation the very substantial

continuation circumstances

under Africa for

quickly-changing much depended quantities would by and on,

firstly, of

Somalis' military as on, long its to of absence as

which felt

presumably threatened the and, of arms the what

continue had

ambitions of the the

neighbours; satisfy alternative of to with the latter this

secondly, desire sources option, and to On the to

willingness thirdly, to Somalia. was it This placed wished put could reducing prospect it

U. S. S. R.

availability Given on its on the the the

onus extent

Kremlin relationship horns to of

whether Mogadishu

continue. one hand,

a

dilemma. Somali to

it by

attempt the of

moderate of arms

irredentist and military at the same the thus

ambitions avoid the

supply an a displeasure in Somalia.

Somalia

embarrassing neighbour, and, The

Somali but

adventure time risking of

against

Mogadishu's the U. S. S. R.

consequently,

position

374

alternative with prospect weapons risk which the would all the of and,

option

was

for it

the

Soviets and

to thus

provide encourage with as African helping a

Somalia the Soviet result, states Somalia to the about solve that of as 97 in United from

hardware a by military implication, of blame

wanted adventure

undertaken and, the for

blessing, all of

antagonism likely a cardinal of the by

almost the

U. S. S. R. of the

contravene inviolability 1975/1976, this is, arms, dilemma by 96

principal colonial

O. A. U., Prior to

that to

of

boundaries. Union more managed towards

Soviet leaning Somalia hoping on of the

temporarily latter option, quantities mechanisms spare in of

the

supplying whilst

with that of military and firm

substantial such control and

restrictions the addition States undertaking However, from early were Ethiopia uprisings implement programme, opportunity inhabited the by Ethiopia summer all but at and Ja to presence to

supply

petroleum advisers

parts,

Soviet presence

Somalia, the

the

commitment the the U. S. has with chaos dozen to or

Ethiopia, any the rash

would military the underway

discourage moves process and, relations to to the the against of as

Somalis Ethiopians.

mid-1970's was 1977 well

decommitment shown, by Ababa in domestic forcibly

been

Washington's Added time Dergue's due

Addis prevailing so and

broken. that the

endeavour and the seize It maintained

quickly

thorough this to try of that be too provided and

wide-ranging Somalis the was with

socio-economic a golden Somaliclear in, Somalia, to and it

long-sought henceforth a presence with,

areas

Ethiopia. if it

U. S. S. R. to

continued

strongly

associated

375

would possible might expulsion

willy

nilly Somali

be military

involved

or

at

least in the the the

implicated Ogaden cost absence of which

in it

a

adventure but and, Dergue, and influence by spring/early only in at

be

able from

to

prevent Somalia the

ensuring of firm a Horn. the

connections compensatory Thus, option realignment lurking Indeed, over greater Liberation to reassess The irredentism expression likely concerning friend Soviet uncertainties instinctive which of as early of to the in as almost of

with presence

without elsewhere

guaranteeing in the 1977 a possible

certainly decommitment with the Ethiopia back as of 1976,

summer and been

from must Soviet when border

Somalia have

increasingly minds. to began Western gather to give 98

decision-makers' war clouds started

early

Ethiopian-Somali attention Front many anxiety and in have the the the of to the

and

Mogadishu of the

organization the

Somali began 99 Somali find is

(W. S. L. F. ), its economic

U. S. S. R. commitments

reportedly to Somalia. by might Ethiopia, uncertainties regime status of and of

generated prospect

in in adventure by of the

the 1977

Kremlin that against this

a military been

compounded

additional Mogadishu the sources

reliability U. S. S. R. in were and,

as the these the

a

therefore, The the Islamic of of had and the several entry the led the

position

Somalia.

basically orientation100 1974, the

background Somali Soviet-Somali President

Western as and a series states, as well

leadership Treaty Barre a to

year

Friendship on

Cooperation, of wheelings

embark of Arab

dealings'with arch-conservative Western to the

number Saudi

particularly as in with Somalia's

Arabia, These

countries. Arab

101 League

culminated

376

in eight of the of

February months Kismayu north.

1974 later to 102

and of

in

Barre's

offer

to at facilities

the the

United southern at Berbera

States port in source

naval the though the with

facilities Soviet

balance A third for

relatively was "whose A reminder same its time flirtations West,

less Somalia's aid of as

serious

uncertainty relations very 1977, to

Kremlin China, " the

apparently projects this came were in was Arab sent that "the and doubt for loyalty to a was giving with and it has Ogaden, also pointed and or connection Arab states side, the without if its the a

excellent considered January beginning conservatives congratulatory militant understanding be further

successful. at about

Mogadishu with Barre

accelerate and with to the

when Hua of

message friendly relations

Chairman and and bonds

saying

co-operation without

between consolidated. was the that West, they the China. the an it may

Somalia '"103 had to

China Thus,

would the for

problem Somali and,

Soviets against lesser healthy the

compete Arab in

conservative Although

States, one sense since, their

extent, for Somalis

this by

Soviet-Somali added have leverage increased with their break. manage the virtual its

connection in their giant As to one

dealings

U. S. S. R., sense threatened out, this once of

self-confidence partner, writer the of the "Since on the

equality an the ultimate Somali's with into much of match

capture

coincided

truncation anarchy,

Ethiopia Soviet the

degeneration would could' with Arab lose easily the

attraction. Soviet of largesse

economic diminished,

importance could

military

assistance "104

temptation

prove

overwhelming.

Even

377

the the

capture diminution could their for

of

the of the

Ogaden,

the

truncation of sure military "when Saudi presence have toyed have during the

of

Ethiopia, assistance, Somalis support the Red for particularly spring/early

and the would in Seasome

importance really of the be

Kremlin exercise exchange an time. worrying summer, option "105

never option expelling that This the

accepting Soviet

Arabian from with

Somalis must leadership the

prospect Soviet when

been the

for 1977,

the

Americans and, of as will

completed be Somalia seen, with

their began arms.

decommitment signalling the

from

Ethiopia

possibility

supplying

Realignment The traditional attempts United in at, States Ethiopia of to decommitment clients and sought by the in the of the Horn of superpowers Africa of, for was from accompanied as of influence at initially by guardianship with threw its coopting and their lot the their by the

a certain to

degree

realignment its into loss

compensate some Union, influence inroads and in

making Soviet its to to

Somalia latter

expense tried Ethiopia, then, traditional behind

as the

the

maximize in addition failed

region its

Somalia, reconcile the

under the Ethiopians,

having

Somalis

adversaries, Addis Ababa. for as this 1972-1973, itself to and try

The to as

stimulus far back

realignment when from to the

can

perhaps began thus it it

be to paving

traced move the to until

U. S.

towards way do the for during advent

decommitting the the of U. S. S. R. 1950's the

Ethiopia, what

achieve

had was

failed not a

1960's. which at

However least

Dergue,

symbolized

break

378

from

Ethiopia's that of Thus, had country fully in offered regime was

past the replacing as

with

its

post-World Union United September Selassie began States

War to as 1974, and began

II

Western probe Ethiopia's the

connections, possibility patron. Dergue the

Soviet the as Haile

early

before to the arms

the steer Soviets

ousted a

revolutionary to supply its rejected continuing 107 Ethiopia ties

direction, with with by the the Dergue

reportedly the This the new offer

provided 106 of its for both and To once to the

terminated apparently then

Americans. because of

U. S. S. R. 's enemy, next couple

military Despite of this, factors

support however, impelled each

principal the the

Somalia. of and years the alignment Ethiopian fully

a number Soviets by side, ousted

Ethiopians in with, Selassie a their on

towards late

other 1977.

culminated begin Haile implement country's regime cloak and and

1976/early there was a

the was

need, began lessen the if

and

the policy,

Dergue to of power,

radical

socio-economic on the leading in that was chief

dependence the world's rationalize process was by then and external

benefactor capitalist ideological

imperial only to the States a sense overall was the

rhetoric by the thus United give

decommitment and of which

initiated

well planning policies.

underway, to the

and

consistency and that the more within land

P. M. A. C. 's to of this the of This of of the the was

internal fact appeared faction on was drastic deemed

Related and ideology proclivities Mengistu.

orientation compatible the Dergue and for with led the the

U. S. S. R. rising intent which

the by

reform

continuation survival

terror

necessary

revolution.

379

The likely and its

Soviet to his West

Union, accept colleagues European propitious inside called the

it

was goals than allies;

presumably and either methods the

thought, advocated

was

much by or East rebellious

more

Mengistu any of was,

United to view

States the of from the

a switch in the threat source encouraged of

therefore, situation of which

particularly Ethiopia for and

Somalia,

both support. to move desireEritrean the

a reliable may bloc Pact provide their important have

external the Dergue was for of the the

A third towards to

factor the

which Soviet Warsaw

throughout and radical the

1975-1976 support

undercut

guerillas Soviets perhaps Ethiopia's growing especially which, criticism The alignment which, new for as to the

and

to

opportunity client single in

getting Finally,

restrain most increasingly

Somalia. that was of the

factor stance

prompted P. M. A. C. 's support, deliveries increasing

pro-Soviet with the drop

dissatisfaction with has of the the been

record in U. S. coupled and of the with of

American

rapid shown,

weapons with

was

Dergue's disposition the part, with from revolution

domestic

foreign Dergue

polciies. towards in forging As Union to

108 an Moscow a

growing with its

U. S. S. R. had the its

was

met

enthusiasm for

a number Ethiopian inception, a unique in Somalia

reasons regime. the Soviet

connection above,

briefly saw try in to its far and been the

mentioned the

Ethiopian its in the

opportunity by not adding only

supplement umbrella greater strategically109 most important of

influence Horn

under was of

a country politically,

that

importance than American Ethiopia

diplomatically, but in black also had once

Somalia ally was,

Africa. presumably

A successful seen as a

cooptation

therefore,

380

way rivals, extent, affairs, strategic

of

winning especially China, and'as

influence the and a first in of the of

in 'United gaining step the the Dergue

the

Horn States a major the 110

at and,

the to

expense a in lesser African of initially gained

of

voice

towards area.

establishment This to be

a

foothold assessment ties of with additional of and the in rise policies of

favourable promoting by most a number important

advantages was

from

subsequently Perhaps increasingly regime, chairmanship rapid

reinforced amongst leftward especially of the in same of of the the year these the

developments. these of Mengistu 1977, were the to and the by Whilst the military the

orientation after

P. M. A. C.

February relations but gave

deterioration of first more the

U. S. -Ethiopian were all

which

April-May the

broken. the perhpas to the Ethiopian any

developments character though downfall truncation its "international "111 for to very of

revolution other in Africa,

a Marxist second, imminent of the with

than

welcome the of

U. S. S. R., Dergue and

threatened the possibility in

beleagured Ethiopia. duty the Ethiopia implement to

Consequently, assist Union progressive decided since national liquidate "112 relations

accordance revolutionary to "its and extend people

movements, support started revolution, foreign meant traditional client support in the

Soviet

its had

particularly their to the

democratic and of oppose course,

the domination risking

struggle of the

feudalism This, with then in apparently

country.

U. S. S. R. 's and the

Ethiopia's principal deciding deluded to

adversary the region,

Soviet

Union's However, were

Somlia. the Soviets

Ethiopians,

381

by

their

failure of

to

fully

appreciate feelings incompatibility simultaneously in

the the of could and to the

strength Horn of

and Africa the by to

predominance into thinking

nationalistic that the Somalis in traditional ideology. to 113

backing be solved Ababa ostensibly in

Ethiopians inducing subordinate common and and the will April South mounting be The its from bloc the dealt

and the

the

regimes their

Mogadishu enmity Hence Ethiopia, however, the following to try was

Addis their

Marxist 1977

endeavour Somalia, also in

March

confederate This, along in the

Djibouti, response and to so

Yemen. tension with

Ethio-Somali chapter. to began in bring to the and scientific, Thus, one shift a the long

border,

Kremlin's of friends

decision in of the

Ethiopia manifest form in of a wide political, of came the on

into itself numerous range 115 first December with in case deal of Horn, by an plan of had the Ethiopia

Horn onwards

beginning of support technical,

1975 and

statements of and economic, military

solidarity114

cultural,

agreements. indications when TASS Banti, out and towards at during the of the

significant 4,1975, Lieutenant-General which on. he Eritrea set

Soviet

published then

interview Chairman,

P. M. A. C. 's the

considerable which he

detail displayed main up

Ethiopian a great

hostility Somalia. official for Eritrea, hitherto most was what 117 116

U. S. S. R. 's was of followed the the

client in June

in

the 1976 peace region"

This

endorsement was the termed

Dergue's

nine-point

"administrative of which However, shift Ethiopian the

independence supported. of to the

U. S. S. R.

indirectly important its sign

undoubtedly towards

Kremlin's the

readiness

supply

regime

with

382

substantial Thus, delegation negotiated which the it was

quantities reported which a Soviet with and

of that visited

weapons an

and

military Ethiopian

equipment. military 1976 according to supply between ratified The from that T-34 at the evidence French at and the DjiboutiEthio-Soviet in Major February Abate, from on in began the the the to the T-54 port had to the $100 by

influential in

Moscow assistance is said to

December

military Union arms and

agreement have agreed worth

P. M. A. C. million Mengistu for this

military This trip to

equipment was the

$385

million. his May

apparently U. S. S. R. deal came

during first

Ethio-Soviet sources in Djibouti,

military which

intelligence start tanks and Addis military 1977 the of as had Ababa

claimed of

May well been

1977 as

several

consignments cars to were Ethiopia of the

armoured

delivered along Secret when

transported 118 were

railway. agreement Vice-Chairman that Ethiopia thus 119

Reports later of had the begun its

confirmed

P. M. A. C., to obtain

announced Soviet-bloc, United security rapidly trip he and of

weapons dependence

terminating Henceforth, of the

total of to

States.

signs U. S. S. R. after U. S. S. R. Soviet including

an

increase

commitment proliferate, May 4-8,1977, to obtain policies, 121 the

Ethiopia

especially to general 120 the

Mengistu's During of this his

momentous visit, external the

managed internal

approval his a new a policy

towards

Eritreans; with Principles the alia, Soviet

reportedly 122

signed and Relations

military "Declaration

agreement on between " for inter regular

Kremlin, of Friendly

adopted and This Ababa to

Cooperation" "Declaration, "strive

Union

and

Ethiopia. and Addis

pledged

Moscow

383

exchanges international questions reference irridentist reaffirmed

of

opinion questions

with of

one mutual

another interest, " and, and region that

on as in well a to of

important as veiled Somali Ethiopia, on

of to

bilateral the Eritrean on countries' the

relations,

rebellion Ogaden belief

claims the two

interstate be based, in particular, should relations on such principles of the use of force as renunciation or for the threat the use, respect sovereignty, of its inviolability integrity territorial of states and the in internal boundaries, noninterference of state by the of disputed questions settlement affairs and 123 peaceful means. Allegations Ethiopia Ethio-Somali leader, Ethiopian pretext of Osman of continued war. Sabbe increased right Thus, accused troops with Soviet until in the June the military opening an Eritrean of support stages of separatist providing "under the from reported the for the

U. S. S. R. weapons

government safeguarding

100,000 socialist

Ethiopia's "124 and to per to the

revolution it had was

counter-revolutionaries, that rate Soviet of five had flown increasing infuriated actions grew regime. that, its informed followed arms deliveries

by

July

Dergue and Addis that

reached military

planeloads begun there

week125 in from the

Soviet Ababa, 126

advisers tactlessly The naturally Kremlin's the Barre

arrive

sometimes

directly shift, the in of

Mogadishu.

U. S. S. R. whose to May not supply

towards concern

Ethiopia over support President to thewith This his seek the for

Somalis proportion Thus, on he

Soviet

Ethiopian stated against he had was Minister,

16,1977, protested Ethiopia

although decision it by of

had to

U. S. S. R. weapons, statement Defence

Somalia's that

concern. he on May had

127 sent to

reports to

Samatar,

Moscow

25

384

assurances Ethiopia. the his

from 128 had

the By

Kremlin late June

that the

it tone

was of

not

planning

to

arm to that the " he of to the to the

Somali when

warnings said if not,

U. S. S. R. government

substantially would to to make arm "a

hardened historic

Barre

decision" "We would of In the

U. S. S. R. stated, the Soviet

continued "be able Union's the are

Ethiopia. idle in the

remain arming of

face "129 the

danger

Ethiopia. arming

addition

warning Somalis the

U. S. S. R. also over terms for of known the

about to have

Ethiopians, their support concern for

expressed press's of as the "a

Kremlin

Soviet a settlement the Council

P. M. A. C. 's and its

Eritrean truly

problem, revolutionary

portrayal "130 support and of

movement. Soviet Washington the Horn

for

the

Dergue re-stimulated

also

rang

alarm

bells interest

in in retime

eventually Africa, of thus the

American the seeds dispute, the other's for

sowing

the this

internationalization with traditional Administration succeed Ethiopia victory However, determination refusal prospect slim. back 132 to where of of the in and in each superpower client in officials maintaining Somalia

Ethio-Somali

supporting the region. feared patron-client simultaneously, region became U. S. S. R. to come in this during at the

erstwhile some Soviets Carter might with a major 131 U. S. apparent and that was the the rather

Initially, that the

relationships thereby expense from by the scoring of the Dergue this, Africa the the United the

a strategic it of soon the

evident to to the did stand terms Horn not

Somalis

with of pull when

a Pax

Sovietica

Nevertheless, it was

situation States

1974/1975

385

was to let

decommitting the

itself remain

from in

Ethiopia Somalia.

whilst This for in which enhance of that not near in the a

being is

content the

U. S. S. R. and to country itself, Union which for quality

because the

quantity threatened powerful excluded the States, counteract For during from client influence this as came having the this the Soviet

of

Soviet the

support U. S. S. R. from

Dergue

entrench in and a thus at the the time

potentially the U. S. prestige the position same scale. sometime away patronSoviet of reported Foreign United to had of

region to

greatly

the of a

expense being on

was

Soviet reason early U. S. S. R. relationship in in it

moves was spring and to so

anywhere

apparently of 1977,

decided, to try with be of able the first to it to

probably lure a type counter indications was for

Somalia of

establish as to

Ethiopia. April 1977

One when his National Mondale,

President of

Carter State Adviser, move "133 in In at

instructed Vance, his

Secretary Security "to

Affairs, and way May, his to

Brzezinski, every the the in possible following behest years on only also June seeking "trying '"135 is Soviet that 15 to we 20 He to Union feel years such a their 11 of

Vice-President, get Somalia to European signalled to claimed its sell that his be

our allies, for

friend.

America's

probably first Somalia, time 134 was but in

Washington, willingness Carter to to also

the to

arms

and not was

Administration with Somalia, movement his in in or the "own

improve understand

relations the Eritrean that challenge,

Ethiopia. inclination...

indicated

aggressively and'others are from crucial now. " for

a peaceful areas of

way... the crucial where he

the

influence us now

world

to

potentially countries

Amongst

thought

386

challenge proved out too feelers

was

possible for the

was the

Somalia. Somalis of in return in

136 who receiving for a

Such

overtures put and or

appetizing about arms, of 137 Soviet

immediately British reduction

possibility

American elimination

presumably influence

Somalia.

387

Notes

1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6.

7. 8.

9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20.

F. Halliday The Ethiopian Revolution (Verso and M. Molyneux, Editions 215-216. 1981), pp. and NLB, London, Ibid. C. Horn Legum, Africa, " "Angola Diplomacy of and the of Power: Soviet Instrument, Armed Forces as a Political ed. S. S. Kaplan Institute, Washington, (The Brookings D. C., 1981), "Soviet 609-610; G. D. Payton, Military Presence pp. Abroad: " Military The Lessons Review, Vol. 59, of Somalia, No. 1, January 1979, 68-69. pp. Payton, ibid., p. 69. Halliday p. 239. op. cit., and Molyneux, "The USSR, China Ibid., Horn R. Lyons, 239-240; and the pp. No. Political Economy, Africa, " Review 12, of of African May-August 1978, p. 9. Ibid. in the Payton, "Realignment S. David, Horn: op. cit., p. 69; Security, Vol. The 4, Soviet No. Advantage, " International 2, Fall 1979, p. 72. T. J. Farer, Horn The Widening War Clouds of Africa: on the for International Storm, Endowment (Carnegie 2nd, rev. ed. D. C., 1979), J. B. Peace, New York p. 115; and Washington, Presence Soviet Bell, "Strategic in Implications of the Somalia, B. Crozier, "Soviet "Orbis, 1975, p. 403; summer Presence February Studies, 1975, in Somalia, "Conflict p. 4; Payton, ibid. Quoted (K. C. A. ), Archives Contemporary Vol. in Keesing's "Imperialist XXIV, 1978, Also see V. Kudryavtsev, p. 28992. Moves April 16,1977, in Red Sea Assailed, " Izvestia, 4, p. Press in The Current Soviet (C. D. S. P. ), Vol. Digest of the XXIX, No. 15, May 11,1977, 5,13. pp. G. Afanasyev, Diplomacy' in the Red Sea, " "'Gunboat Za 24-March 2,1978, 7, No. February 9, in rubezhom, p. C. D. S. P., 29,1978, Vol. XXX, No. 9, March p. 7. Lyons, op. cit., p. 17. See, Development "Somalia for D. Chaplin, and the example, Ocean, Indian "Military Review, Soviet Activity in the of July 1975, The Horn of Africa in C. Legum and B. Lee, p. 6; Continuing New Publishing Company, York, (Africana Crisis 1979), "Soviet into P. Vanneman thrust and M. James, p. 6; Targets, "Strategic Review, the Horn The Next of Africa: Spring, 1978, p. 34. C. Clapham, in the Horn " Experience "The Soviet of Africa, The Soviet World, Third E. J. Feuchtwanger Union ed. and the London 1981), (Macmillan, and P. Nailor and Basingstoke, pp. 215-216. Also op. cit., p. 408. see Bell, Bell, ibid., p. 409. Chaplin, op. cit., p. 5. Bell, op. cit., p. 409. Ibid. Also Chaplin, Valenta, 5; J. op. cit., p. see "Soviet-Cuban in the Horn Africa: Impact Intervention of " Journal Affairs, Vol. 34, No. and Lessons, of International 2, Fall/Winter 355-356. 1980/1981, pp. Bell, ibid. Legum and Lee, Vanneman p. 6; op. cit., and James, op. cit.,

388

21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

"Soviet Policy, Also " Problems p. 34. see D. E. Albright, of January-February 1978, XXVII, Communism, 33; Vol. C. p. " idem., Environment, Legum, "The African p. 1. Legum and Lee, ibid. Albright, 31,32; Legum (1978), op. cit., p. 1; pp. op. cit., Valenta, 355-356. pp. op. cit., Crozier, p. 15. op. cit., Lyons, p. 16. op. cit., Nairobi Quoted by TASS, December 12,1977, in Pravda, Times, Vol. December XXIX, No. 13,1977, 50, p. 5, C. D. S. P., January 11,1978, p. 21. Lyons, op. cit., p. 16. Farer, op. cit., p. 135. Ibid., Valenta, 359-360. pp. op. cit., Lyons, op. cit., p. 16. Farer, Also op. cit., p. 215. see Clapham, op. cit., p. 135. op. cit., p. 213.

32.
33.

Ibid.,

34.

35. 36. 37. 38. '39.

40. 41.

42. 43. -44. 45.

46.
47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

Crozier,

Arms Policies States in David, United 74; ibid., the p. Persian 172,175. Red Sea, Cited in Gulf the pp. and C. Holliday Crooker, ibid., "The Molyneux, p. 221, and African " Ocean Policy, Orbis., Fall, Dimension of Indian 211,212; 1976, African 658-659. Clapham, pp. op. cit., pp. Contemporary Survey Vol. Annual 8, Record: and Documents, 1975-1976 (Rex Collings, London, C. Legum (A. C. R. ), ed. Vol. 9,1976-1977, 1976), A. C. R., B190, B205; p. B211; pp. K. C. A.., Vol. 1976, XXII, p. 27653. Cao-Huy-Thuan, Etats-Unis "Les " et la question erythreene, in Alain Cao-Huy-Thuan, Tran-Van-Minh, Fenet, La and Cited in Halliday 1979). de l'Erythree (Paris, question and Molyneux, ibid., p. 217. Halliday ibid. and Molyneux, Ibid., p. 216. Ibid., p. 217. Ibid. p. 216. U. S. Foreign Relations, Congress, Committee Senate on Ethiopia (Washington, 1976), Horn 36. p. of Africa and the Quoted See also Crocker, in ibid., 217-218. n. 2 above; pp. David, op. cit., p. 71. p. 658; op. cit., Bell, op cit., p. 403. United States Agency, "Communist Aid to Intelligence Central Less the 1976, " ER77Developed Free World, Countries of the 10296 Cited in (Washington, August 1977), 12. D. D. p. Laitin, Implications for Siyaad's "The War in the Ogaden: Role in Modern " The Journal African Somali History, of Studies., Vol. 17, No. 1,1979, p. 99. A. C. R., 1975-1976, p. B308. op. cit., Ibid., 1976-1977, p. B332 Bell, op. cit., p. 403. Ibid., 405. Also David, 72; p. see op. cit., p. Farer, op. cit., p. 116.

p.

215;

David,

op. cit.,

p.

71.

David, Laitin, op. cit., op. cit., p. 73; Farer, op. cit., p. 653, op. cit., p. 116. Bell, Laitin, ibid. op. cit., p. 405; David, Crozier, op. cit., p. 73; op. cit., Quoted in Lyons, p. 14. Also op. cit., op. cit., p. 610. See, for Albright, example. op. cit., p. 389

op. cit.,

pp.

4-5;

Payton,

op. cit.,
p.

pp.
99;

69-70.

Crocker,

p. see 29;

4. Legum Legum

(1981), (1978),

52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65.

66.

67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

Also 14-15. Quoted in Lyons, op. cit., see Bell, pp. op. cit., Chaplin, 408; p. 6. op. cit., p. 403-404; ibid., Also pp. Albright, see Bell, p. 30. op. cit., 69-70. Payton, pp. op. cit., Also David, B308. 1975-1976, A. C. R., see p. cit., op. op. cit., p. 72. Ibid. Ibid. "Sinoin Somalia, Presence "The Soviet F. Bartlett, 'Dewey (Council R. Pearson in Africa., Intervention Soviet on ed. Cited in 1977), D. C., Washington, American Affairs, p. 76. Payton, p. 70. op. cit., ibid., Payton, 70A. C. R., 1975-1976, pp. p. B308; op. cit., 71. Bell, p. 404. op. cit., Payton, Also Op. cit., 31. p. 356; op cit., see Valenta, p. Molyneux, Halliday 68; p. 242. op. cit., and op. cit., p. ibid., 70; 4. Also Crozier, p. see Payton, p. op. cit., Laitin, p. 99. op. cit., R. B. ibid., Payton, for On this issue p. 73; example, see, The Decision Horn in the Policy Remneck, "Soviet of Africa: Third World: The in Union Soviet " The Intervene, to (Westview Press, R. H. Donaldson Successes Failures, ed. and England, 1981), London, Croom Helm, p. Boulder, Colorado, Power "Considerations and Arab 136; H. Desfosses, of Naval Chinese " Soviet in the Horn and in Soviet Policy of Africa, Henriksen W. Weinstein Nations, Aid and T. H. to African ed. 1980), (Praeger, New York, p. 36. 1,4, July 13,1974, Pravda, Soviet-Somali pp. communique, 7,1974, August No. 28, XXVI, in C. D. S. P., Vol. p. 14. Payton, p. 70. op. cit., To be Somalia as perceived a generally was not precise, for, by implication, element a credibility client of, and Berbera the Soviet Union the of the completion after until Soviet-Somali the the of conclusion and military complex date, After that Treaty. Friendship about and cooperation began impression Somalia the of the U. S. S. R. as a client of instance, for 1975, the In March firm to take root. a by findings the B. B. C. Somali of a report reported service Study for the London-based Institute which, the of Conflict to Somalia the inter that way on was alia, concluded 1975-1976, in A. C. R., Cited becoming "Soviet satellite". a B307-B308. op. cit., pp. "View Oudes, B. 8211; A. C. R., 1976-1977, p. op. cit., 26, February The Times., May 1971; Point, Report, " Africa M. " Cited in 19,1971. January 1971; (Israel), Ha'aretz 93 No. Papers " Adelphi Politics, Abir, Sea "Red Studies, ' London, Strategic for (International Institute 658-659; Crocker, 26; December 1972), pp. op. cit., p. Halliday p. 219. op. cit., and Molyneux, Crocker, ibid., p. 659. Halliday Molyneux, p. 219. op. cit., and A. C. R., 1976-1977, p. B211. op. cit., Crocker, op. cit., p. 658. Op. cit., p. 219. "Rumblings Red Oudes, J. F. Campbell, the along op. cit; Cited in Abir, 1970. April Sea, " Foreign Affairs, op. cit., ibid., Also p. 658. p. 26. see Crocker,

op. cit.,

p.

1-2.

390

73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

92. 93. 94. 95. -, 96. 97. 98.

99. 100. 101. 102.

103. 104.
105. 106. 107.

Quoted Farer,

Halliday op. cit., p. 219. and Molyneux, Ibid. Crocker, p. 658. op. cit., David, Ibid., 74-75. Clapham, p. 211; op. cit., op. cit., pp. Clapham. ibid. 1 Halliday David, 74-75; op. cit., pp. and Molyneux, op. cit., A. C. R.; 1976-1977, p. 220; op. cit., p. B211. Halliday ibid. and Molyneux, Ibid., p. 222. Ibid, 1976-1977, Also p. 224. op. cit., p. B211. see A. C. R., Halliday ibid., and Molyneux, p. 222. Legum, A. C. R., 1976-1977, p. B210. op. cit., K. C. A., Vol. XXII, p. 27912B. A. C. R., B210-211. 1976-1977, pp. op. cit., Ibid., p. 211. Ibid., 223; 210; Halliday op. cit., p. and Molyneux, p. Legum and Lee, p. 52. op. cit., Lyons, David, op. cit. p. 75. op. cit., p. 11; The New York 24,1977, Times, April p. AS. Ibid., A5. pp. Al, Halliday Ibid., A3. Also April 28,1977, see p. and Molyneux, Legum and Lee, 52op. cit., pp. op. cit., p. 223; 53. Vol. XXIX, No. Pravda, 18, May 5,1977, p. 4, in C. D. S. P., June 1,1977, p. 9. The New York Times, May 29,1977, p. A7. Ibid., June 2,1977, p. A8. Graham Hancock Report, February in MEED Arab 28, writing 1979. Quoted Vol. 11,1978-1979, in A. C. R., C. Legum ed. (Holmes 1980), New York and London, p. B383. and Meier, A. C. R., B206; idem, 1975-1976, 1976-1977, p. op. cit., op. cit., p. B209. Crozier, Payton, op. cit., p. 73. op. cit., p. 72; Legum (1981), C. Legum and B. Lee, "Crisis p. 629; op. cit., in International the Horn Dimensions the of Africa: of Somali-Ethiopian " A. C. R., Vol. 10,1977-1978, Conflict, ed. C. Legum (Holmes New York 1979), and London, and Meier, pp. A34-A35. D. Ottaway, February Post, 10,1976. Cited Washington in Laitin, op. cit., p. 100. Farer, op. cit., p. 135. Lyons, Valenta, 15-16; op. cit., op. cit., p. 360. pp. Halliday p. 224. and Molyneux, op. cit.,

Legum, Also Crozier, (1981), see p. 629. op. cit. op. cit., p. 4. Legum, ibid., 1975-1976, A. C. R., op. cit., p. 627; p. B205. Legum, ibid., According to Halliday p. 613. and Molyneux Ethiopians it and to Yodfat, was the who requested in September Soviet 1974, the substantial aid military which Russians because initial to give were prepared not of their suspicions of the new military of the nature regime, and their desire Arabs, to antagonize the not who disliked Ethiopia's Israel, connections with and Somalia, with whom they had just signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. However, in view Soviet from subsequent of the willingness, 1975 onwards, Ethiopia to provide with some military despite the assistance Arabs the risk of antagonizing and

in Lyons, op. cit.,

p. op. cit., pp. 134-135.

15.

391

108. 109.

110. 111. 112. 113. 114.

115.

116. 117. 118.

119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129.

130. 131. 132.

Somalis, it the it that Russians seems more likely was the Ethiopia the of supplying who first possibility probed with See Halliday 244-245; A. arms. and Molyneux, op. cit., pp. Yodfat, Union " Northeast "The Soviet and the Horn of Africa, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring African II, Part Studies, 1980, p. 32. David, 74. p op. cit., On importance Ethiopia the strategic realtively of greater Farer, for to Somalia, compared example, op. cit., see, pp. 140-142; Legum (1981), p. 629. op. cit., Valenta, Albright, op. cit., op. cit., p. 35. p. 357.; Radio Moscow, Quoted December 29,1978. in Legum (1981), op. cit., p. 630. V. Kudryavtsev, Moscow, in French, December Radio 28,1978, 29,1978. Quoted in ibid. December and in English, David, Valenta, op. cit., p. 358. op. cit., p. 77; See, for 1975-1976, B205; A. C. R., p. op. cit., example. B211; idem, idem, 1977-1978, 1976-1977, p. op. cit., 50-51; B244-B245; Legum and Lee, op. cit., op. cit., pp. pp. Policies D. Morison, in Africa, " A. C. R., "Soviet and Chinese 1977-1978, May 5,1977, Pravda, in p. A97; p. 4, op. cit., C. D. S. P., idem., Vol. No. 18, June XXIX, 1,1977, May p. 9; XXIX, No. 18, June 9,1977, Vol. in C. D. S. P., 1,4, 1, pp. 1977, 9,10,11. pp. See, ibid., for idem, 1975-1976, A. C. R., p. B205; example, ibid., 1976-1977, idem, 1977-1978, ibid., p. B245; p. B211; Pravda, XXIX, No. 18, Vol. May 9,1977, in C. D. S. P., June 1,1977, May 7,1977, Times, The New York p. A3. p. 10; A. C. R., 1975-1976, ibid., p. B205. Legum and Lee (1979), p. 50. op. cit., David, 74; Legum (1981), 615; op. cit., p. op. cit., p. idem, Revolution, " The "Realities Ethiopian World of the 311-312; Legum and Today., 1977, Vol. No. 8, August 33, pp. Lee, Halliday op. cit., and Molyneux, op. cit., p. p. 51; 245; Laitin, Lyons, 100; op. cit., p. 11; p. op. cit., Albright, Times, 20,32-33; The New York April op. cit., pp. 25,1977, Vol. XXIII, 1977, K. C. A., p. 28423. p. A3; Times, February A. C. R., The 1976-1977, p. B207; op. cit., 14,1977, p. 5. XXIX, Vol. No. Pravda, 18, 4, in C. D. S. P., May 9,1977, p. June 1,1977, Morison, p. A97. op. cit., p. 10; Pravda., ibid., ibid. Morison, Legum and Lee (1979), p. 13. op. cit. Pravda, Vol. 4, in C. D. S. P.., XXIX, No. May 9,1977, It pp. 18, June 10,11. 1,1977, pp. The Times, June 24,1977, p. 7. Legum (1981), p. 615. op. cit., Clapham, op. cit., p. 213. K. C. A., The Times, 20, Vol. May XXIII, 1977, p. 28423; 1977, p. 8. The Washington 22,1977. July Post, Cited in Legum (1981), op. cit., p. 616. Al-Yagza June 27,1977. Quoted [Al-Yagathal, in Legum, ibid., Also and in Legum and Lee (1979), op. cit. p. 75. see K. C. A., Vol. 1977, 28636; XXIII, A. C. R., 1976-1977, p. Legum (1978), op. cit., op. cit., p. B332; p. 17. A. C. R., ibid. The New York 23,1977, March Times, p. A3. Some Carter Administration had argued officials all along that Ethio-Somali dispute the depth did for of the not allow

392

133.

-134. 135. 136.

137.

the creation of a Pax Sovietica or anything that else of in the Horn of Africa. See ibid., The Times, May sort 26, 1977, p. 1. The 17,1977. Sunday April Quoted Times., in Halliday and Molyneux, Also "The United p. 226. see B. Oudes, op. cit., States' Year in Africa, " A. C. R., 1977-1978, op. cit., p. A74; Laitin, op. cit., p. 106. Halliday ibid. and Molyneux, International Herald-Tribune, June 13,1977. Quoted in ibid., 226-227. pp. The New York Times, June 12,1977, 1. Also p. see International Herald-Tribune, June 13,1977, in Halliday and Molyneux, ibid., p. 226. The Times, July 28,1977, p. 6.

393

CHAPTER

12:

THE BALANCE

OF RESPONSES

The to of that As in the

responses

of

the of

United

States

and resemble

the

Soviet their closely in

Union pattern than reverse. of the

Ethio-Somali during the Korean in the of made this have it

war the

1977-1978 conflict

behaviour during the

Korean

more albeit

1973

Arab-Israeli the Africa to the

war, primary were

peninsula, Horn the of of region

interests roughly equal, fields

superpowers the Middle U. S. interests type the time, of proximity East Whilst

though of to the the of

petroleum greater

marginally

importance disputed, elicit war, at that the that was in

approximate, been expected

albeit to in in the the area

parity a symmetrical nature particular generally unilateral

would superpower

intervention commitments

of

superpowers' together to by both ante to of the

with the the

a crisis United

situation States,

unfavourable intervention Unlike status congenial replacement radical, of an quo

culminated

U. S. S. R. Korea bellum Soviet and in the the Union Middle Horn than monarchy deprived the to to its area East, of to in the and the Africa the immediate was U. S. by States the the adding Somalia. was the more The a

the

pro-Western regime client in

Ethiopia United provided tilt by

Marxist-inclined influential with an

U. S. S. R. regional Ethiopia Although bound to

opportunity balance

significantly own in advantage the the Horn,

superpower to the its

traditional Soviet the attempt latter's

protege to entice

Ethiopians adversaries,

antagonize

long-time

394

Somalis, Somali the

and Republic, as

so

risk that

the risk taking,

position seems to

of have

the

U. S. S. R. been considered of

in

the by

Kremlin

worth

doubtless and strategic

because

Ethiopia's At

relatively the same

greater time, placed client to the to by

political Somalia's serious of the of

importance. and its comparative as whilst States

irredentism limits on its

weakness alternative prior

attractiveness Consequently, the loss with in the its states the of United influence Somalia,

an

Americans. open for some warfare its linkages

outbreak

endeavoured Ethiopia the in fear about for in latter the that their themselves the continent.

compensate

in once war in

establishing became the clearly U. S.

implicated was quick other to

W. S. L. F. 's distance sensitive implications boundaries

Ogaden, it

keep

might own

antagonize minorities

African and about of

ethnic of flagrant

violations

colonial

Nevertheless, of Union, the Horn 1977 presented with of in to the an

the each opportunity Africa view of

outbreak superpower, to and the its

of

hostilities and not just its that status and support a task the could fluidity of at

in

the the

summer Soviet in other. time as to

consolidate

position the the

undermine Kremlin's affinity political of such given the spite the Ababa, to

Admittedly, patron provide assistance, underestimated. superpowers' juncture and

Somalia Dergue the

and with

willingness and military hardly of at

difficulty Even relations so,

be the that of

with that, in

protagonists of U. S. the the still

the

fact

deterioration maintained States U. S. S. R.

American-Ethiopian important have utilized ties with the

relations, Addis conflict 395

United the

could from

prevent

making own have scale place to been the as

a significant in the

advancement, region. coercive bloc For

as one

well thing, in which with

as

to the

enhance U. S. to deter

its could the took

position taken of but

effective Soviet without the by of target If

measures

order

intervention itself of

eventually Somalia's This could venture out the

identifying Ogaden region

attempt have from latter

capture done issue the

Ethiopia. Irredentist and singling

decoupling Soviet of

Somalia's

intervention United by such in for which an end States

deterrence/compellance Ethiopia could have its have been predicament. option wrath of East its Soviet leverage dispute. military short defeat Egypt been in the run it on to would Africa and full from put forced muchAddis to An have as counter weight designs, affect Although potential was strife-torn Middle with for East, the an less States support. to of quite a it

efforts. needed Ababa approach alternative been had Soviet behind using political in the for risked the Soviet in

successful, support,

depriving a policy it may to attractive risk in the by the

a position the U. S. and United Arab

somewhat States indignation in and then, with of the

less to

Middle putting

intervention Somalia its

Ethiopia after

frustrating as

influence settlement long-term it of a bad inflicting Consequently, might

Mogadishu Ethio-Somali limited in the

Somalia's bargain,

rendered capable Ethiopia. the aid latter of

a substantial as with have to A would have third been by

subsequently enticements,

persuaded, to Washington politically the United in

American

look

acceptable unattractive try to outflank

solution. option the

and for

U. S. S. R.

intervening

396

Ethiopia. contemplate rhetoric conservative Dergue had

To in and

be

sure, light

this of have

would the

have

been

difficult anti-American Somalia's that with and

to

P. M. A. C. 's enraged the growing United overtures

would Arab

certainly However, its the

backers. despite ties with

fact links States

the the had its

been to

careful,

U. S. S. R., indeed amenability respect, Union over Ethiopia. impotence the any very initially aid the in of United the face anger

maintain welcomed to U. S.

always

American and economic it event with of

indicated " over the In

influence States'

"moderation. edge an

this Soviet

the would the

United have

conferred in the the

important

advantage scramble the for general in that been and in for

latter As of of over for

a superpower Arab factor,

conservative and U. S. backing Indeed, other

Saudi persistent

Arabia

Arab for Ethiopia

conservatives Israel would the shows have

support for in the

American

short-lived. cautious Ethiopia, States Horn of it to

view

of

gradual

nature would

of

U. S. S. R. 's been perfectly

intervention possible Soviet its lot strategy behind

have

significantly by

undermine throwing in

Africa

Ethiopia. However, 23/24,1977, disengage embargo force on throughout of on itself both with the the United from Somalia the the the the outbreak States situation and Ethiopia. and on the in side of full-scale war took on steps an remained of the massive The July to arms in

immediately by

instituting This spite of an to time,

hostilities U. S. S. R. other the start

intervention Soviet strategy assisting Union, right both

Ethiopia. interventionary begin it with,

hand, of At

pursued the the war;

from

by

protagonists.

same

adopted

397

a use bring and

public its

stance influence them to the

in

support the

of

Ethiopia parties

and in

endeavoured an attempt auspices of results well full supply by facilitating bloc on as to of of the as Africa.

to to

with

warring table Sovietica produce the decided by

negotiating a Pax failed to to

under in the the

Soviet Horn

thereby-establish this fact policy began the Ethiopia, military of the

Once in

required as its its

and the

antagonize

Somalis to put

Ethiopians, behind and direction direct The Ethiopia threaten This to with level order level

U. S. S. R. firstly, equipment, Ethiopian of mode of

weight of arms

accelerating and war subsequently effort other and

assuming the forces. behalf seriously the the U. S. war, of

intervention and ultimately the compelled

Cuban Soviet

and

Soviet

intervention a character resolve the final images stages against

assumed credibility Washington,

such and in

undertake the of to

coercive aim Soviet of

measures

directly and

U. S. S. R. the in the had use of its vis-a-

restraining and its allied

eventually in But, its allies the image its by the

reducing region time, already

intervention

safeguard of on the the

reputation. and and

that had

intervention its linkage friends vis the impact

U. S. S. R. ground, may it in have hardly the

though its

U. S. 's

politics and Soviet allies, Union

helped restored Horn of

amongst

position

Africa.

The

superpowers In contrast

on to

the the

eve

of

the of

1977-1978 Korea to have and

Ethio-Somali the Middle well and aware

war East, of

cases

both the

Washington imminence of

and

Moscow

seem

been

hostilities

between

Ethiopia

Somalia.

398

Indeed, to take

as the

soon

as form

tension of

between

the

two

countries each in of

began superpower order the other. war it was troops against to

sporadic the

violence, situation the warning in February up and to 1,500 position of the

endeavoured consolidate Perhaps in the Horn that with its

to

manipulate own first Africa and

undermine serious came

the of

impending when

1977,

alleged along Ethiopian relatively picked between infiltrated important government involvement fighting quite for artillery Somalia such signal Somali five cutting to shift as or the

Somalia tanks on in lull, in and Ogaden after

had

sent

uniformed mission desert. Ethio-Somali amid the reports W. S. L. F. capturing the had and Ogaden's no that 1

a "search the

destroy" Ogaden the May of

outposts brief up again 3,000 the town insisted in was substantial Front's which by Syria for patron bridges Ethiopia's its from from an some and the

disputed along

After border that

a

tension the 6,000 region another. at the

following troops from

had one Somali direct the

Somalia, Although that adventures by the to it

time

W. S. L. F. 's done evidence operations entirely pointed by have

being

Somalis, support tanks either Somalia, 31, and the its up thus it arms itself Eritrean move only and by

considerable

Soviet-built been supplied which 2 the backed

could of the

only Arab via

states Somalia. by

Iraq,

On May W. S. L. F. in

all-out came on when the main import-export the port Addis

offensive the Front

succeeded

blowing

Addis lifeline

Ababa-Djibouti to trade of as the well to stretches traffic sea

railway, and as forcing Soviet

supplies separated guerilla-held

Djibouti by which

Assab, of could

Ababa across

territory

399

under claiming "Somali the

armed to territory end of of to fight

-escort. control

3 60 under

By per

mid-June, cent of what

the it

W. S. L. F. termed " and the into reports troops their way as

was the

Ethiopian the Ethiopians

occupation, accused

towards Somali the from had to

the

month

Republic Ogaden Kenya attacked infiltrate The of hostilities,

sending alongside that of its

additional the 3,000

uniformed W. S. L. F., regular posts

troops whilst Somali on

alleged one the response

some border 4 the to try

police

Ogaden. of was

Soviet and

Union alleviate and

to

this the

initial possibility and thereby whereby but with

spate of give it

full-scale itself could

war additional consolidate

between time its its

Somalia to work

Ethiopia a

out in

formula Ethiopia

position

without Somalia. Addis of in have as

jeopardizing Thus, Ababa Djibouti which its and first

patron-client reaction to Yemen the was join and to the

relationship attempt to

persuade Republic confederation

Mogadishu and South and

prospective a

establish Ogaden at a "search Somali country

Eritrea status. were

disputed

desert the

would same time

autonomous the against loudly Ethiopia's territory, the Horn Somalis

Accordingly, engaged and that in whilst his

about and

destroy"

mission Barre was accept Somali visit of to a in Soviet

Ethiopia, proclaiming

President could no longer of began the was by a

"continued "5 of the Africa Cuban in an

colonization leader, effort Castro, to This this advance visit time

notion followed the

"progressive" April President, by a

confederation. similar 6 endeavour,

Podgorny.

400

Not foundered this policy the failure in

surprisingly, on the did the Horn of, rejection not lead since and

this of to the the

rather the an

too Somalis.

ambitious

scheme

Nevertheless, change to of in call Soviet for

immediate

Kremlin peaceful in the and

continued settlement region Somalia. and

solidarity

disputes in the the were of Horn, any in of

between, supplying still-birth mounting probably hope that the for they

progressive arms of hostilities seen the as to the both

forces Ethiopia

persisted However,

confederation between ushering up of the

scheme, Ethiopia beginning Sovietica of region. the notion as a and

together and of the in

with

Somalia end the on was, a the

setting

a Pax loss that

indicated over

a certain events that time in

control It of means Addis

part

U. S. S. R.

therefore, substantial of gaining began to

probably Soviet additional float

about tilt

that Ethiopia

towards influence over Kremlin. to to was, coopt presence the the

Mogadishu

Ababa

around In

the

contrast States border to

Soviet

Union, violence to add

the

response along to the the fire establish by

of

the

United Somali effort

increasing

Ethioin an a

initially, Somalia in the

fuel thereby of in

and Horn

countervailing approval campaign Somalia. reportedly Personal a tessage of

Africa the

expressing Ogaden for

Mogadishu's hinting in

involvement at mid-June a certain the possibility 1977 Dr. friend came was Ogaden. from the

W. S. L. F. 's of U. S.

and Thus,

arms

Carter Kevin of Cahill,

Administration a longtime Barre, top" to with and further is

despatched physician which that pressure and

close

President "the very

allegedly Washington in the

indicated guerilla

"not "

averse The same

emissary

401

also States defence advance military some who Barre reports Western consistent the

said was needs in

to

have

told to assured Ogaden to

the consider him desert

Somali

ruler sympathetically

that

the

United Somalia's

willing and the

that the

in

the

event would

of not

a

Somali resume given Addou, assured Although

U. S. The

supplies credence reportedly that of by the

Ethiopia.? Somali with words were ambassador Carter

messages to Washington, and

were

conferred Cahill's the Cahill in official

twice

then 8

authoritative. were subsequently 9, States position issue of to in on the they

affair

denied are, however, made the supplies he of the for termed Africa, United Carter

by

diplomats with time

Mogadishu, United the the in

statements of arms what Horn 1 that

at

concerning vis-a-vis For instance, of of State consider in the area and the principle" an offer that that arms This in to sort of growing Vance

Administration Somalia. the dangers

to as

reference

conflict stated

Secretary States from military long willing weapons, Somalis if would states

July

sympathetically threatened advisers officially provide was they were response is a on by

appeals a build-up

assistance of 10 that it defensive by indifferent against have been the foreign Not was

equipment afterwards, "in 11 who

their

borders.

U. S. to

announced Somalia with

immediately "could used could said to not by

accepted remain Ethiopia not have but

claimed

Soviet-provided "12

Somalia. welcomed its the offers latter

Washington, Mogadishu its

which with friendship

accompanied that 13

thinly-veiled with the Soviet

condition Union.

ended

At

the

superpower

level,

the

United

States

endeavoured

402

to the

press Horn

the region in

U. S. S. R. by the

into

curtailing at the a possible then the that

its

intervention linkage of Indian Thus, Soviet

in

hinting area with

activities Demilitarization March 24,1977,

ongoing superpowers.

Ocean on

Talks Carter

between declared

demilitarizing the We're to move toward to try going Indian Ocean.. to express our concern and we're going . Soviet Union to future the about of Africa and ask the join ith from troubled that continent us in removing to interference which might coDntribute warfare outside 14 in the countries involved...

However, in Carter justify confining a move the

in Horn

view of

of

the

absence at seems that to

of

a strong particular

U. S.

commitment the to sake when on of such the in

Africa

juncture, it for especially effect intervention a superpower conflict. difficult the

Administration wrecking Soviet was the

have

found talks

Indian in have the

Ocean the the issue to

behaviour unlikely to

Horn,

required of Soviet into

Kremlin. the crisis, region at

Consequently, was least not at

allowed this stage

develop of the

Ethio-Somali

The towards

outbreak Ethiopia With the and of

of

war:

U. S.

detachment

and

the

Soviet

tilt

outbreak Somalia the

of on

full-scale, July 23/24,1977,

open

warfare and the

between rapid which, areas States arms countervail Thus, on its and

Ethiopia progress by of October,

Somali-assisted threatened total to woo seizure, the

W. S. L. F. 's the

campaign

seriously with its cover attempt and,

Somali-inhabited 15 the regime effort of United with to Africa. a freeze

Ethiopia

abandoned strategic the as growing early

Barre its the Horn

consequently, presence 4, the in U. S.

Soviet as August

announced

403

plan State had after into

to

supply Department

Somalia officials its

with

arms. contended decision

In

explaining that the only began States its

this White eight

move, House days

to it the

reverse was made

July

because army United inside the regular

public

the

Somali the

incursion knew that they of was the not of into Hodding providing are time, more the the third to one a

Ogaden. guerillas had Republic to not

Although were foreseen would also such

W. S. L. F. said, Somali prepared September, definite Carter arms III at it

operating that be

Ethiopia, army and the

committed, By was

support this initial

action-16 freeze

beginning

transformed spokesman that we same not Somalia States with a

reversal announced this in made of 18 Somalia Britain, of which "defensive and under
U. S. for the

when that

State "[wle add out. that

Department have fuel decided to At

time putting it

would

a fire the

interested Americans transfer countries. provide from offer fighting, assistance
The compensated outflank Ethiopian October, embargo an 20 on

"17 they

clear

would to

approve from decision similar a

any

U. S. -supplied The reversal with said arms that arms" which of

weapons the

United

"coincided" it was

withdrawing an its end offer to

previous Ogaden military

pending placed study.
from

the of

France, "continuing
detachment by Soviet any

"19
was Ethiopia in spite September maintain instance, States on military September in their response assistance 18,1977,21 not, and of however, thereby repeated and early strict to

Somalia to coopt

effort Union.

Thus, during chose For United to

gestures, the arms

especially Americans

to request

Ethiopia. for

Ethiopian by

announced

Mengistu

personally

404

U. S. not with This

officials supply the was

reportedly Ethiopia Dergue partly as with long

stated any as

that weapons

their nor

country reconcile in when States Horn

would itself power. a did conflict the ensure of 1977 a 22

Mengistu on that

remained 6

confirmed said to

October the side by United in them. the

State not

Department intend until extent this against few in a to was to

spokesman supply cease-fire which illustrated Yugoslavia's M-47 24 the arms

either accepted were

was

23 to the to

Indeed, go to

Americans by their

prepared in on

protest to pass

summer the

decision tanks that

Ethiopians to Belgrade

U. S. -built the 1950's. The

had

been

supplied

disengagement war by left the

of Soviet

the

United Union at

States free to

from

the

Ethiothe that is,

Somali conflict without Accordingly, persisting Ethiopia

manipulate level, the

intervening having it in to responded its Somalia for some and

solely interact to the to

a regional with outbreak

Americans. hostilities by its which by both

of way under

efforts would time

find

a

and

coexist after the

umbrella. successes Front's continued different was be able in a

Consequently, in the Ogaden became both

W. S. L. F. 's in Soviet albeit this for to lay it the

Somalia's knowledge,

implication the arms, aim of

campaign to provide

common

Union in

protagonists The principal sufficient and

with

quantities. presumably to persuade to

policy to

acquire Mogadishu

leverage Addis and Ababa thereby Sovietica months of

acquiesce the in

Kremlin-sponsored for Thus, the

settlement of first

foundations the region. the

establishment the

a Pax three

throughout

hostilities,

405

U. S. S. R. Somali maintained in the

not Republic its country.

only

kept "if

to a little

its

military behind

agreements schedule, and technical the of Soviet "

with but

the also

3,000-6,000 25 with tanks, At the a AK-47

military same wide

advisers Union which machine and few and war in late

time, range

supplied included pistols, bazookas, weeks limited. machine August/early with which advanced tanks, missiles,
At political basis mutual territorial translate conflict immediately harboured Africa. leadership 31,1977, meeting of the

Ethiopia T-54 light 26 of 27 during the though

weapons rifles, missiles,

self-loading guns, anti-tank during were boost of the the of conflict the

machine deliveries

crucial

first slow

Somali The main this September Ababa

assault Soviet stage when

reportedly the

Ethiopian came

Kremlin arms for almost

reportedly deal, the 200 SAM-7

concluded according to of and 48 T-55

Addis they

a $385 to

million provide

undertook MiG-21

delivery T-54

interceptors, number of SAM-3

an

unknown and

and

surface-to-air 28
to press for on the and and tried to the it in the the his an August Ethio-Somali future of the to the a

wire-guided
time, the of withdrawal for integrity. sovereignty, 29

anti-tank
Kremlin the

missiles.
continued

same settlement Somali

Ethio-Somali from Ethiopian political The of a way it

dispute territory independence, allegedly solution as during

respect

this into

conception reality

political that, of Pax

indicates the to set outbreak up to President the a

period still Horn Soviet 30of

preceding ambitions Thus,

hostilities, Sovietica sources, during of the

according to to Soviet

diplomatic Barre convening to discuss

proposed visit under

Moscow auspices

406

Ogaden, confederation Yemen Sea. " rejected The sole impose only Soviet indeed onwards, both danger Revolutionary saying relations role declared, that -in "to

and

also

asked

him

to

reconsider Ethiopia,

the Eritrea, alliance

notion and on the

of South

a

between strengthen Needless by Barre. to 30 of of arms

Somalia, the

Soviet-African say, both of

Red were

these

proposals

inability

the to

U. S. S. R. Ethiopia of for The signs,

to and the

utilize Somalia Horn

its in conflict

status order

as to could

provider a have policy underlined that protagonists of

political pointed in the by the dual in to

settlement the region. growing need

a fundamental urgency from of this

change need

in was 1977

mid-September strategy of in 3

interventionary the Horn with

supplying serious Somali as

weapons on

was

backfiring. Socialist whether with or not.

Thus, Party his

September Farah broke extent was off of

member country on the

quoted diplomatic the Soviet himself

that

Moscow 31

depended Not long

Ethiopia. in

afterwards, warning to

Barre the

a thinly-disguised

U. S. S. R.,

backing Those forces who are actively that be reminded unjust should cause dimensions develop larger into which We request for all... consequences The situation their role. reconsider 32 up to their conclusions. Dissatisfaction Horn instance, conference, resume countries arms are of Africa on at with was September which he to Soviet also interventionary manifested 18 Mengistu also his requested country, arms 33 to in

Mengistu in his the matter could serious may have deeply to them come might not in the For a news to

strategy Ethiopia. at

remarked the that Somalia, United "[i)f

States socialist

supplies still

supplying 407

then

this

is

not

only

violating with the

one's

principles,

but

also regime.

tantamount ""34

to

complicity

reactionary

Mogadicio

The and

turning the This

point:

of

total the

Soviet Ogaden with in for the

alignment desert its Horn inherent of Africa, of of

with

Ethiopia

recapture state of the of

affairs,

threat

to

the the

position Soviet with could thing, start left 40,000 split made the a

U. S. S. R. to From opt the at

prompted total alignment this For were at

leadership Ethiopia. not it of have came what large Eritrean between one large

a strategy point opportune the

latter's

view,

shift one the which some

come at

a more when to of

moment.

a time

Ethiopians

promised proportion fighters defending but of abortive Bale, of

be a gruelling their in the army north the to pinned and

stalemate against the

remainder had just of

Harar,

which

Somalis and This

attempt and in

capture,

parts situation

provinces the

Sidamo, mutinies

Arussi. the the The

increased disaffected already timely advantage

chance and,

country's vulnerability

large of was could

but the also take Somali

army shaky hecause of

consequently regime. came at

Mengistu it

Soviet when

swing it

a moment

the lines,

already which 225 were kilometres States

over-stretched based east in of the Harar.

communications Somali city Thus, position European Ethiopia. defence of of with

northern 35 in its its East into air of

Hargeisa, the

United the began to

firmly

entrenched with

neutrality,

U. S. S. R., pour tanks, all

together types rocket of

allies, These equipment,

weapons artillery,

included and, most

importantly,

large

numbers

408

advanced began expressed Ethio-Somali military of a to

aircraft. circulate his

36

Reports almost with 37 Ethiopia of in the by were the The

of

the

latter after policy influx with and further

deliveries Mengistu towards of the Soviet reports Yemeni of the

immediately Soviet sudden

discontent conflict.

supplies large

to

coincided Cuban, and

presence

Soviet, Ogaden late claiming Ethiopians 38
towards in

South parts 1977

military country. intelligence actually and

personnel Indeed, sources fighting heavy
Kremlin's was 19,1977, to Somalia. also

other

September that in many

Western were tanks

Cubans

with

Soviet-built

operating
The

artillery.
move manifested to "officially 39 the This Somalis

total the and decision, formally"

alignment announced end followed consequences ended of Ethiopia. these its

with on arms by for their ^40 actions Thus, that on all a

Ethiopia October supplies message Soviet-Somali "interference Rather prompted November Soviet that the the

was with unless

reportedly "grave they affairs however, measures. in Mogadishu were and the to in of be the the to sea

threatening

relations" in than them 13,1977, military use of and all was intimidate into it the internal the taking was civilian Somali to the the to the air, cease; two Soviet size the off hours

Somalis, decisive announced advisers land, that states

be facilities

expelled; by of and capital embassy that Cuba the

U. S. S. R.

1974

treaty

friendship that was in they and to the be

between staff reduced 41 of

was

abrogated, Somali Somali announced with in

embassy of that

Moscow. had to

Moreover, to within break 48

Somalis diplomatic all

also

decided expel

relations Cubans working

409

country troops propaganda

because on the against

of side

Havana's of the "42

"brazen Ethiopian

decision

to

commit and

its its

Government

Somalia.

Somalia's Union and in in the Horn

actions of

rendered Africa on the United growing the to a entirely fate

the

position dependent

of on

the

Soviet Ethiopia, regime.

particular with the the conflict, Ethiopia, inflict around upon equipment the

of

the still

Mengistu showing no

Consequently, of counteracting

States Soviet

signs in the full the Thus, Union

intervention decided which on to would Somalia. the sea-lift Soviet of war. it of the was the put its

Ethio-Somali weight latter beginning embarked military time that Soviet The the behind to

U. S. S. R. an extent defeat 26-28,1977, air-and 1973

enable

major

November biggest since ended in or the

arms

and

Arab-Israeli 1978, cent in

By the estimated entire

airlift 225

mid-January about 12 per

some

planes, fleet, Soviet sea where

transport bulk of by

had military it

participated supplies, is said 30 and All was In tanks, rocket terms several that 50 in

operation. was and the

however, the ships all, an U. S. S. R. during

transported its period $1.5 allies June billion

utilized 1977-January worth during to about this 550

between 1978.43 of

estimated to the this other and

weapons

transported of hardware, thousand

Ethiopians amounted armoured 40 and MiG-23 other
Perhaps which the

period. T-54/55 100

vehicles, fighters, small
the U. S. S. R.

about and 44

launchers, 200,000

60 MiG-21 AK-47 rifles

approximately

arms.

most was

surprising prepared to

aspect intervene

of

the on

extent behalf

to of

410

the

Ethiopians in combat 45 the number the

was

its

direct and

assumption the

of

the of bloc

counterthis military February 400 to of by

offensive Cuban personnel. 1978,

Ogaden, and

spearheading Soviet 1977 swelled overall deputy allegedly Harar

forces Thus, of These Ivanovich ground military

other

between Cubans came in

November Ethiopia the first who in had was the

and from

10-15,000.46 General chief of Vasily Soviet of

under

direction commander-inin region, been in "direct 47

Petrov, forces, operations who to the of

command" General of Soviet The intervention first

and

Grigory military impact on

Barisov, aid on behalf

previously 48 of soon was the became launched

charge

Somalia. ground Ethiopia

Soviet clear. on

bloc The January

Ethiopian and by

counter-offensive on February Cuban of this Dire had 3a armoured Dawa and

21/22,1978, spearheaded was than forces February the which March strategic after played the two launched three

second and east in some Railway

counter-offensive motor-rifle of Harar. brigades In less

three

north days

succeeded who lost

destroying 3,000 Company railway earlier, recaptured this town dead.

Somali On

encircling 25, the

Harar,

Franco-Ethiopian of by the the Addis W. S. L. F. announced Jijiga. of role in that Ogaden, the fierce and the

announced line, and on the came forces of the their by

reopening was 5 cut

Ababa-Djibouti nine that The fighting months it had of which marked 49 begun that States Thus, to was State

Ethiopia town days of

recapture in

Cuban the

a leading

effectively Ogaden. they had

collapse 9

Somali

campaign ammounced

on March withdraw completed

Somt1lis forces March

from 14/15,

the

50

a process United

when

Department

411

confirmed Africa. 51

the

cessation

of

hostilities

in

the

Horn

of

The

aftermath: The

U. S. implications in and and, the image

anxiety of Ethio-Somali of

and the

linkage unilateral war raised threatened for

politics Soviet the serious to of this United bloc States' in a

intervention credibility Washington backlash into been deter European of got from the Africa. underway, their Ministry their 52 and

resolve

anxieties produce the conflict

consequently, transform crisis. by the The U. S. S. R., the

thereby

aftermath of took relieve intentions as its top and and the

a superpower recognized Western fears

danger which and

happening to

had both and Horn

measures American in Soviet the

counter-action in On the the respect of

Soviet side,

deterrence

airlift leaders East them of to to

Kremlin in

summoned Central in at in bloc

military the Far

commands of

Europe Moscow the

Defence forces

ordered level for a

maintain readiness, augmentation need Indian which arise.

highest

combat possible

presumably of Soviet

preparation forces the per cent, Red
were

in

Ethiopia

should increased proportion

the its of

Simultaneously, squadron by in 50 the

U. S. S. R. a large

Ocean was
These

concentrated
measures, anxieties; to defend the of

53 Sea.
hardly likely the integrity, consequences intervention Kremlin endeavoured for in to reduce

however, whilst Ethiopia's possible an unopposed

Western resolve also United Horn of

emphasizing territorial adverse Soviet the

U. S. S. R. 's they the the to

stressed States Africa.

Consequently,

412

confirmed Africa. 51

the

cessation

of

hostilities

in

the

Horn

of

The

aftermath: The

U. S. implications in and and, the image

anxiety of Ethio-Somali of

and the

linkage unilateral war raised threatened for

politics Soviet the serious to of this United bloc States' in a

intervention credibility Washington backlash into been deter European of got from the Africa. underway, their Ministry and

resolve

anxieties produce the conflict

consequently, transform crisis. by the The U. S. S. R., the

thereby

aftermath of took relieve intentions as its top and and the

a superpower recognized Western fears

danger which and

happening to

had both and Horn

measures American in Soviet military the Far

counter-action in On the the respect of

Soviet side,

the airlift

deterrence

Kremlin in

summoned Central in at in bloc

leaders East them of a to to

commands of their 52

Europe Moscow the

Defence forces

ordered level for

maintain readiness, augmentation need Indian which arise.

highest

combat possible

presumably of Soviet

preparation forces the per cent, Red in

Ethiopia

should increased proportion

the its of

Simultaneously, squadron by in 50 the

U. S. S. R. a large

Ocean was

concentrated

53 Sea.

These Western resolve also United Horn of

measures, anxieties;

however, whilst Ethiopia's possible

were

hardly

likely the integrity,

to

reduce

emphasizing territorial adverse Soviet the

U. S. S. R. 's they for in the the to

to stressed States

defend the of

consequences intervention Kremlin

an unopposed Consequently,

Africa.

endeavoured

412

to similar

the

long-term view on was May in these later of Africa the

interests voiced 28 when Horn he was was he

of by

the

Western

alliance. Security

58 Adviser

A

National that

Brzezinski intervention One few the might the of

contended causing

the

Soviet concerns.

bloc "59 a in day Iran in

"strategic by the

concerns when and by

underlined

Shah

of

Iran

weeks Horn be area

criticized his forces 60 was the

American fears if that Soviet

inactivity one

expressed hostile unchecked.

surrounded continued worries, Union for might political was a new this

influence the biggest that politics whilst interest Moscow. which Carter as continuing increased

Amongst possibility of linkage the globe by with its

American Soviet pressing United concluding is was perhaps

however, be using gains

the by the in It

a form around

States

politically strategic problem of he

neutralized arms agreement

linkage-in-reverse declared seems that, to as mean

referring was

to concerned, struggle in a variety

when

far a and

the

U. S. S. R. aggressive influence

"detente for of in political ways.

advantage "61, of these worries,

Nevertheless, States the Soviet repeatedly unwillingness be the with weapons. sure, Ogaden upon on did not alter

spite its

the stance

United towards of officials country's 62 To from the

non-interventionay Indeed, in the even Horn, stated into of the possible were Somalia's U. S. the at the

Ethio-Somali bloc

war. intervention and to the March over These,

height

American their conflict. withdrawal resumed of

unambiguously interject completion 15,1978, the however, itself

discussions "defensive" the end

Mogadishu 63

supply terminated

towards

414

of

June

in

view

of and

the the

continued W. S. L. F., activities,

fighting and 64 the

in

the

Ogaden of

between Somalia warnings.

Ethiopia in 65 the to image, and navy " and off a total cruisers action most on be the

involvement despite American

Front's

Instead, to be seen

United doing by

States something, opting for

sought and a Thus,

to

satisfy

the recoup of

need its

thereby mixture on the "moral forces In

tarnished diplomacy the urgent Somalia, maneuvers exercises, launching on joint The impact linkage behaviour superpower the United intervention on January latter U. S.

minatory 7,1978, "on an to naval latter missile-

linkage

politics. a frigate to

February Red Sea

despatched ostensibly in the of April

to

basis, 66

render

support" began the seven

N. A. T. O. coast.

Ethiopian 14 warships, two units type of

including took ground

and with air

destroyers and

part troops.

and 67 in the of aspects

worked

important U. S. image,

American emerged the with to exploit

action in coupling other

terms form Soviet

of of

however, involved of an Africa effort the

politics. in the

This Horn in

of in the Soviet Thus, Party

relations to States in

asymmetries begin or link detente. Communist the U. S. reduced Africa. whilst Soviet the political 68 with,

influence endeavoured the Horn Carter that

former. to the informed couple

To

with

superpower Soviet between the the Horn out " "affects the latter of

25,1978, Ponomarev could military of weeks "any on not

secretary U. S. S. R. growing couple suggesting intervention

relations unless in

and

the its A not bloc

improve

involvement later,. direct behalf of Vance

pointed linkage,

that

Ethiopia

415

atmosphere" theme warned cannot relations.. The intervention Indian high-ranking Washington agreement it into region Ethio-Somali following intervention will the States period. obviously Indian would an Ocean was

between again raised

the in

U. S.

and 31

the

U. S. S. R. 69

The

same which

a May for the

N. A. T. O. indivisibility improvement

communique of of

that but

"[disregard jeopardize 70 the

detente East-West

further

United in

States the

also Horn

coupled of Africa

the with

issue the

of

Soviet

bloc ongoing a that

then 9,1978, said reach Ocean U. S. power to a

Disarmament Carter was

Talks.

On February official to Indian for its the naval to was that was "a

Administration endeavours forces inconsistent" that limited continud position warned conflict as not in the

abandoning naval

quick because enter in in on the the the Cuban we in United

limiting be "totally

arrangement whilst the war. day in keep Ocean. terminated " the 71

U. S. S. R. This Vance Horn in mind

intervene reiterated Soviet matter with the and

when the

which talks the

we proceed long

Indeed, Indian

afterwards, talks for an

Ocean

indefinite

72 However, undoubtedly threatened was hint he stated the of the to most link to important Soviet Arms from topic behaviour Limitation Brzezinski on which in the the

United Horn The

States of first Africa strong when

Strategic this that came

Talks. March

1,1978,

intrusion into the unwarranted of Soviet power a ... local inevitably the will purely conflict... complicate [S. A. L. T. ] negotiating context only of the process not itself but follow that the of any ratification would 73 successful conclusion of the negotiations.

416

As

with

the

subjects claimed but of

of that

detente the

and

the

Indian is by

Ocean "not

talks, imposing

Brzezinski linkages... exploitation purposes. March 2,

Administration may be imposed for were the U. S. larger

linkages local These he declared

unwarranted international by Carter on

conflicts utterances that

"74 when

echoed does

not

between the has a linkage that initiate policy any... in Ethiopia... involvement one hand, and Soviet on the ban test the negotiations, S. A. L. T., comprehensive or if Obviously, negotiations, any the other. on level would at the executive successfully concluded be Congress by the be who would have to ratified 75 American by opinion influenced people. heavily of the Whether policy rather position that it of or not the " by it the control it fact linking Horn that but it said that the Carter claiming certainly Soviet over were Administration that linkages its it opinion the claimed talks to these a policy actually are had imposed bargaining could and linkages. that Soviet talks of it plead the a

"linkages, devised

than

enhanced Union the since

vis-a-vis had no whom the of the

public "imposing" also Ocean to did

Congressmen Nevertheless, had no policy in

Washington Indian

behaviour anyway linkages. In politics allies did the the by nothing Horn end

proceeded probably

terminate have

indicates

any may

case, have it alter

though helped seem Soviet its

Washington's image amongst with the or the conflict

use its Soviet the

of friends

linkage and it in at

making to Africa. the in the

"tough"

Union, situation emerged dominant

behaviour

of of

Consequently, Ethio-Somali Horn of Africa.

U. S. S. R. as the

superpower

417

Notes

1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7.

S. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15.

16.

Annual Survey Documents, Record: African Contemporary and York New Vol. 10,1977-1978, and Meier, ed. C. Legum (Holme (Hereinafter to 1979), London, referred as p. B212. and A. C. R. Vol. XXIII, 1977, Archives., Contemporary Keeping's p. to as K. C. A. ) 28633. (Hereinafter referred Ibid. Crisis in Continuing The Horn C. Legum and B. Lee, of Africa New York, 1979), Company, (African Publishing p. 32. Ibid., p. 69. in Horn Intervention the J. Valenta, "Soviet-Cuban of International Journal " Lessons, Africa: Impact of and 1980/81, C. Vol. Affairs, 34, No. 2, Fall/Winter, p. 358; " The World Ehiopian Revolution, the Legum, "Realities of R. Lyons, "The 1977, 33, No. 8, August Today, Vol. p. 311; African " Review USSR, China the Horn of of Africa, and 1978, No. 12, May-August Political Economy, p. 15. September 26, " Newsweek, Wires, "Cross A. Borchgrave, de see W. S. Thompson, Nexus in "The African-American 1977. Also Communism, Soviet " Africa Strategy, ed. and International 1980), London D. E. Albright (Macmillan, pp. and Basingstoke, in Conflict the 200-201; B. H. Selassie, and Intervention New York London, Press, Horn Review (Monthly and of Africa War in "The Ogaden: the D. D. Laitin, 1980), 140; p. History, in Somali " The Role Implications Siyaad's for Vol. 17, No. 1,1979, Studies, Journal African p. of Modern 106. A. C. R. in Africa, 1977Year States' B. Oudes, "The United 1978, op. cit., p. A74. The New York November 18,1977, Times, p. A4. The New York Times, July 28, The Times, 2,1977, July p. 4; 1977, p. 5. 28,1977, 27,1977, The New York July Times., p. A3 and July 28,1977, 27,1977, July The Times, p. p. 7 and July p. Al; 6. The Times, July 29,1977, p. 7. Revolution (Verso The Ethiopian F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, Laitin, Editions 1981), NLB, London, p. 223; op. cit., and Horn: Somali for battle the "The 106; J. Mayall, p. " The World Today, diplomacy, irredentism and international 1978, Vol. 34, No. 9, September p. 340. Vance's to Statement visit preceding conference at news March 25,1977, A10. Moscow. Times, Al, The New York pp. B216; 1977, See K. C. A. A. C. R. 1977-1978, p. op. cit., 32Legum and Lee, 28633,28634; op. cit., op. cit., pp. pp. D. E. Albright, 34; "Soviet Policy, " Lyons, p. 11; op. cit., XXVII, January-February Problems Vol. 1978, p. of Communism, in The Soviet 37; Horn: "Realignment S. the David, Advantage, Vol. 4, No. 2, Fall Security, " International "Angola 1979, Horn Africa, C. Legum, " 78; and the of p. Diplomacy Armed Forces Political Soviet Power: as a of Instrument, Kaplan S. S. (Brookings Institute, ed. Washington, D. C. 1981), p. 617. Halliday Molyneux, Also The New op. cit., p. 227. and see 418

17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

28, July The Times, 3,1977, October Times., York p. A3; 19 77, p. 6. 2,1977, September Times., The New York p. A2. Oudes, op. cit., Legum and Lee, p. A74. p. 78; op. cit., ibid. Legum and Lee, 3,1977, September The Times, p. 4; Ayalew Ato the following of For appointment example, in September to Washington Ethiopia's Mandefro ambassador as in Feleke Minister Foreign 1977, Ethiopian an stated his . country Post that The Washington interview wished with Africa) (of in this become "a kind region to of Yugoslavia United States the kind have the which of relations same and 28636. " See K. C. A. 1977, has with that p. op. cit., country. 3,1977, October Times, The New York Also p. A3. see K. C. A., ibid., p. 28635. September 30, The Times, 1978, Vol. XXIV, Ibid., p. 28761; 1977, p. 9. K. C. A., ibid. A73-A74. Dudes, pp. op. cit., The New York Times., 30,1977, The September Times, p. 9; September 16,1977, p. 193. Lyons, p. 12. op. cit., in R. B. 12,1977, August Post., The Washington p. 21. Cited The Decision in the Horn Policy Remnek, "Soviet of Africa: Third World: in Union the Soviet "The Intervene, to (Westview Press, R. H. Donaldson Successes Failures., ed. and London, 1987), Croom Helm, p. 137. Boulder, Colorado; 2,1977, September The New York Times., p. A2. 4, in The 14,1977, August Pravda, See for instance, p. XXIX, No. 33, Vol. Press, Soviet Current Digest the of [Hereinafter to September 14,1977, referred as p. 6. 28636; V. K. C. A: 1977, C. D. S. P. ] Also p. op. cit., see 17,1977, August " Izvestia., Fire, Out the Kudryavtsev, "Put ibid. p. 3, in C. D. S. P., K. C. A., ibid. 8,1977, The Times, September p. 6. in The New Quoted 14,1977. September Speech in Mogadishu, 15,1977, York Times, September p. A3. K. C. A., 1977, p. 28635. op. cit., Quoted in 27,1977, September The Washington Post, p. -A14. Also 138. p. 79, and Remnek, op. cit., see David, p. op. cit., K. C. A., ibid. Legum and Lee, Legum (1981), pp. op. cit., p. 620; op. cit., 34,72; K. C. A. 1978, p. 28761. op. cit., 13,1977, 6,1977, The Times., p. October p. 8, and October Remnek, Lyons, 616; 9; Legum, ibid., p. 12; op. cit., p. Valenta, 138; p. 363. op. cit., op. cit., p. The 6; Economist., 22,1977, The Times., September p. ibid. Legum, October 8,1977; Legum and Lee, 617-618; Legum, ibid., op. cit., p. 14. pp. Remnek, ibid., Legum, p. 138. op. cit., p. 618; Quoted 28,1977. in Legum and November Afrigue-Asie (Paris), Lee, op. cit., p. 77. 79; David, K. C. A. p. 1978, op. cit., p. 28760; op. cit., ibid., Legum and Lee, 618; Legum (1981), p. 76. p. op. cit., ibid., 76-77. K. C. A., Legum and Lee, ibid.; pp. Times, The 14,1977, December The Times, New York p. Al; Albright, K. C. A, ibid., January 25,1978, p. 28991; p. 9; 246; Halliday 37; p. and Molyneux, op. cit., op. cit., p. Legum (1981), ibid., Legum Lee, pp. op. cit., p. 13; and 419

44.

45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50.

51.

52. 53.

54.

55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63.

64. 65. 66. 67.

Remnek, 620-622; Mayall, p. 341; p. 139; op. cit., op. cit., Valenta, p. 362. op. cit., Service), (B. B. C. Africa the Patrick Gilkes at a talk at Affairs, London, 3, April Royal Institute of International "The Experience in Soviet Cited in C. Clapham, the 1979. Union Third World, " The Soviet Horn and the ed. of Africa, London P. Nailor (Macmillan, Feuchtwanger E. J. and and Also 213. 1981), Basingstoke, see, amongst others, p. ibid., ibid., Valenta, Halliday and Molyneux, p. 247; p. 363. Cited in Legum 1,1978. (1981), Telegraph, March The Daily December 7,1977, The Times, p. B. op. cit., p. 624; Legum, 28991-28992; ibid., K. C. A. 1978, pp. p. op. cit., Lyons, Legum and Lee, 620; p. 14; op. cit., p. 12; op. cit., Remnek, p. 139. op. cit., February 27,1978. Cited in International Herald-Tribune, Legum, 623-624. ibid., pp. ibid. Cited in Legum, 11,1978. The Guardian, February Legum an Lee, k. C. A. 1978, op. cit., p. 28989; pp. op. cit., Valenta, 35,73-74; p. 363. op. cit. Times, The New York March The Times, March 10,1978, p. 11; Legum Legum (1981) Lee, 10,1978, op. cit.; and p. All; ibid.; Mayall, p. 344. op. cit., The Times, March 15,1978, March The New York Times, p. A2; 11,1978-1979, C. Legum A. C. R. Vol. 16,1978, ed. p. 9; 1980), (Holmes New York Meier, p. B219. and London, and November 25,1977, The New York Times, p. A8. in Policies Africa in "Soviet D. L. Morison, and Chinese A. 75; Valenta, 1978, " A. C. R. 1978-1979, op. cit., p. op. cit., p. 363. York The New Times, 11,1978, The Times, February p. 4; A10; 3,1978, March Pravda, February 11,1978, p. p. Al, ibid., in Morison, February Cited 12,1978. p. A74. Legum (1981), The New York March 11,1978, Times, p. Al; op. cit., p. 625. Africa became "How Charles Douglas-Home, a question of June 14,1978, American " The Times, p. 16. credibility, The New York Times, March The Times, March 18,1978, p. 5; 18,1978, p. A9. The New York May 31,1978, Times, p. A14. Ibid., May 29,1978, p. A4. Ibid., June 19,1978, p. A8. Ibid., June 8,1978, p. A22. K. C. A. 1978, Legum pp. and Lee, op. cit., p. 11; op. cit., 28760,28989; Times, March 10,1978, D12; The New York p. The The U. S. Times, 10,1978, March p. 11. warned also Egypt to to supply arms or military and Israel equipment not Somalia Times, See The New York respectively. and Ethiopia February February The Times, 8,1978, 8,1978, p. 7. p. A4; The Times, March 15,1978, 21,1978, June p. 5, March p. 5, 15,1978, The New York Times, March A7, 17,1978, p. 8; p. June 2,1978, p. A9. K. C. A. 1978, A. C. R. 1978-1979, p. 20350; op. cit., op. cit., p. B385. The Times, 8,1978, The New York June Times, June 21, p. 5; ibid., 1978, A. C. R., p. B220. p. A6; The Times, February 8,1978; Izvestia, February 7,1978, p. 4, in C. D. S. P., Vol. XXX, No. 6, March 8,1978, p. 19. A. Maslennikov, "Provocational Action, " Pravda, April 6,

420

68. 69. 70.

71. 72.

73. 74. 75.

Vol. XXX, No. 14, May 3,1978, 5, in C. D. S. P., 1978, p. p. 17. 26, '1978, January Times, The New York p. A3. 11,1978, Ibid., February p. A3. 1. June 1,1978, The Times, Al; p. 1,1978, June Ibid., p. March 26,1978, February Times, p. Al, Also The New York see Al, May 18,1978, May 7,1978, A21, pp. 5,1978, p. Al, p. 5, March 18,1978, The Times, A9, May 31,1978, p. p. A12; Legum Mayall, and May 15,1978, p. 342; op. cit., p. 6; 11-12. Lee, pp. op. cit., 10,1978, February Times, The New York p. A8. 1978, K. C. A. Also 633. (1981), Legum see p. op. cit., March 12,, 1978, Times, The New York p. 28989; p. op. cit., E3. March The Times, 2,1978, March Times, The New York p. A6; 2,1978, p. 6. Ibid. Also the 3,1978, March see Times, York The New p. A10. p. A22. issues May 26,1978, and June 8,1978, p. A10, of

a

421

CHAPTER

13:

THE CRISIS

SITUATION

The after of the the the

occurrence 1973

of

the

Ethio-Somali war rendered the East. any of factors

conflict it crisis liable

so to

soon many of

Arab-Israeli that in the had

influences

moulded Middle

situation Indeed, in

hostilities

the

interiacent structural, systemic sufficiently available intervene distribution superpowers early of the the 1970's. for in

period, political, context as to the the of was of

hardlyor the strategic

the that war impact

international made had on the Union international for, been Cuban de had Angola helped quarters involvement intra-African venture by whilst stand their and the in they the also General the on in the the up the

Arab-Israeli a significant States and

altered scope to

make United

the

Soviet the support it had

conflict. influence virtually Admittedly, Popular

Politically, of, the the para and same as

Soviet-assisted a Libertacao in amongst for friends Soviet-Cuban as in July evidenced 1978 states not United advances thus 1977 were as that "to 1975 certain future in

rescue from to in

Movimento

South the and the

African-aided U. S. S. R. 's had also Union However, a of and degree Nigeria's Cuba of set

onslaught prestige

enhance Africa by

a precedent and the weariness, warning its

Soviet

conflicts. generated Obasanjo U. S. S. R. their welcome. Soviet since position

should

help "they

African should the

own, " "1 Union the

nevertheless Strategically, made more or

overstay States in

both less

equal war and in

period a similar had been

latest in relation

Arab-Israeli to each

other

422

in

1973.2 Yet, in spite primary only dispute whilst and the the the erupted primary U. S. S. R. strategic have the war, and were States. wars, the than status the the been nature of this interests U. S. S. R. into and of and the approximate in the July equality the Horn Ethio1977. of

of of

superpower Africa,

commitments once in the the the double political to

intervened open warfare and area,

Somali Indeed, the U. S.

interests in the

commitments international Ethio-Somali superpower setting by of by the attempt of case of nothing of Somalia's precedent call

and of to

political conflict intervention, of the

and may

environments conducive of the regional ascribed the skewed either

importance and

this milieu

both the the

Washington conflict United Israeil change less

Moscow, all heavily Unlike

interventionary against the

intervention Korean of or the were the

Arabto

regional quo in the

implications Horn of Africa In

a cataclysmic conflict, objectives other remainder Consequently, rhetoric endeavour opprobrium a conservative Ethiopia. of to

magnitude. the would ethnic of the have groups

the

Ethio-Somali irredentist by encouraging the

achievement set in

a dangerous Africa to

into drawn

question boundaries. the

continent's despite the

arbitrarily sanguinary regime, Ogaden desert the style

and Somali

Marxist

the capture

Ethiopian the

Republic's with rallied around total many

was Africa

met and Kenya

throughout pro-Western

sub-Saharan state such

as

"Socialist"

This environment

state of

of

affairs the

naturally

rendered war

the

political to

Ethio-Somali

unfavourable

423

intervention far as the by the

by

either

superpower States was

in

aid

of

Somalia. the constraint flexibility by additional which,

As

United regional the from

concerned, setting was on

imposed to

political conflict the to

its

manipulate

Horn within

reinforced milieu, of the the

variables, aggregate, The "fact illegitimacy debilitated obstacle Ethio-Somali as an first of

interventionary a policy of in

in

combined of these

produce the " inertia

non-intervention. status Middle quo ante quo, East or the the bellum as in of a of of a an the

was

possession; of much to the of

whereas territorial the potency on the behalf

status of this of the

variable Arabs,

intervention conflict

widespread to make it

perception into in absence aid

Somalia

aggressor to

served American

significant Mogadishu. prior with, element U. S. the been ignore African on were the at in any of was from of the

impediment Furthermore, commitment Somali involved, the adverse

involvement the total

there to, Republic. then or

was

patron-client Had such could political on of behalf a

relationship credibility well have setting, of the and States the by force intervening the prevented grounds

Washington regional and intervene images the to lack have the

chosen risk Somalis resolve

to

indignation, grounds stake. the Horn that

its

reliability of a United taken

Indeed, seems to

commitment out in of aid

also

compulsion Ethiopia. constrained intervening latter's programme setting,

outflank In by on addition an

U. S. S. R. to these code Ethiopia and

variables, which on the

U. S. it

operational of

behalf rights which,

human and

violations by aiding emphasizing

radical the

socio-economic African political

discouraged

Somalia.

424

In less war. Somali opinion could Sovietica continent. operational this

contrast

to by sure,

the the the

United crisis

States, situation

the of problem

U. S. S. R. the of

was

far

constrained To be

Ethio-Somali reconciling of to African it Pax the

insurmountable the overwhelming on war without in its an view of in the order

revanchism imposed seek to in

with

sentiment extent to

a restriction utilize the

which a of flexible Dergue, Soviet

establish the rest more to for the the

the

region

alienating the Kremlin's affinity dilemma found Ethiopia's significance put the its full

However, code and

ideological impossible case, political and

hardly

posed which, in

leadership greater for Addis by to other it

any and

relatively sufficient weight Union was which the behind aided helped side strong Ethiopians quo, in and zone. the not the of

geostrategic to Ababa. elements its These with to of abandon In

Somalia this of the

respect,

Soviet

interventionary intervention its the the pool could generally fact

milieu on

facilitate

massive included the Dergue,

Ethiopia. association were fighting

perceived that the status combat as the troops

defend

territorial of Cuban be used to

availability too relative distant

a large which of the

Angola

proxies, conflict

proximity

U. S. S. R.

The

systemic Unlike

context the cases the of either the amenabilty conflict Soviet Union and to was Korean of or the the Arabsystemic by less by the the the

Isreali context United distribution

wars, of the

relative

Ethio-Somali and of the political

intervention defined power

States

military

between

425

superpowers hostilities. in in of Korea, victory principal a crushing war influence Korea shaping the and the U. S. concern on

than

by

the

regional the East

political regional also played of, those impact Far East

setting contexts an and of important the

of the

the wars role

Admittedly, the Middle

political and/or the about

environments U. S. S. R. the potential in the to,

responses In communist of to the to the deal Arabpromote the it to fear it and, Syria of a

conflicts. of was a one

other

countries behind to 1973, within the the the of Israel, and

factors blow of

Washington's northern United Arab its regime. States' world Arab whilst in

determination During desire and to

Israeli its

ensure

enthusiastic act for into, secondly, soon these decisive responses the mainly political States, U. S. of the and in after earlier as its

allegiance on

clients the the

encouraged Soviet area to of But take Egypt in Union's prompted place and neither setting of Whereas to the of parity a the

a restraint reputation firstly, massively the

position the Arab on hostilities. the

allowing

attack behalf

intervening of was

outbreak cases in the of to

regional the in

political pattern

factor to

moulding

U. S. -Soviet in war Korea was

conflicts the the strategic Middle

question. reaction of in favour

asymmetry due and the

superpowers' lopsidedness balance East the

international the United of derivative to of the with the

approximate was principally equally However,

Soviet situation States the

interventions that and the was

a crisis United

roughly

conducive in the Horn at together

U. S. S. R. between and the

Afnica, international the fluidity

'balance political of their

superpowers levels, with the

strategic

relationships 426

protagonists,

in

particular in a source

the the

absence area, of how major best

of

a firm the

Soviet regional on to the the

or

American political

commitment milieu

rendered influence to respond

superpowers' Ehio-Somali

consideration hostilities. This whose of choice was

of

especially to the

the Dergue, 1977,

case

with

the

United since left it the with

States rise the of

antipathy Mengistu of in either

particularly effectively or conflict. to

February to in the support the Carter

Somalia Horn

pursue The into

a policy resultant two

non-intervention dilemma with favouring who Souncil policy Ethio-Somali competitive Soviet continent, policy and Africa both and whose Union included Young of the divided

Administration " and at State For seen led the the

camps,

so-called assistance U. S. and

"globalists, for Somalia,

by

Brzezinski, "

"regionalists, U. N. pressing globalists, terms of Security for the general of of of the the

representative Secretary of 3 basically relations. Horn of Africa, perceived is Horn they are offer to undermine the board the

Vance, the in The as as

a

non-intervention. war was

superpower in was the

involvement in the rest

accordingly

a consequence Western

a

objective and the

influence, the game is for Africa's Kremlin's in

on

which

played, political apparently search view proximity the racial

because strateguc

ripest and

opportunities because of The seen, the desire the

advancement intrinsic in Africa as

growing for influence such to interests Western

importance. had to to be

therefore, continent's to expense exploit of

of

access

bases, the at

shipping in southern

lanes, Africa

conflict

the

427

West, Marxist the Thus, towards Soviet and political, only

to

deny

mineral

resources regimes, and

to to

the

latter

by

promoting as 4

and

radical

develop of United should on plans,

a reputation African States be behalf protect interests, to of causes. policy counter

reliable according the aid to

and to

credible the

champion

globalists, conflict by the intervening Kremlin's and of in and the the their earn the strategic U. S.

Ethio-Somali Ethiopia

Somalia Western and as better and on the the Horn

thereby

frustrate economic, the Such lasting resolve a policy, gains than

demonstrate an and friends sidelines for the sake ally. more

and

its would

credibility yield of allies

view,

respect one a free of

world-wide and of giving not

negative

staying in

the alienating the

U. S. S. R.

hand

African were as one

states. the regionalists conflicting by of who

Pitted saw the

against Ethio-Somali rather gave

globalists war

between

nationalisms proxy, the and

than to For

as the this

a superpower regional faction States a manner terms. ally, militarily, the best

confrontation. political within had that Thus, was an was interests to setting the do Carter was sense

primacy

hostilities. what the as Horn well

Administration, respond a regional was seen it to not to was be not, to

the conflict as in

United in global American and,

to in

made since

Somalia and

a traditional so in it for in the well in Africa,

aggressor a bad of United

bargain, the U. S. States only as Africa

their in its

view, war the

in

support

against regionalists of of such the

Ethiopia. argued, close rest of As American

support result Kenya, without 5

Somalia, alienation as any

would friends

as

most

sub-Saharan for the threat

yielding

concrete

gains.

of

428

Soviet that nationalism permanent Soviets Therefore, response would be Had East security client-states,

advancement the strength would zone might according for not the the of the to

in

the of

Horn, African, the

the

regionalists especially

believed Ethiopian, establishing any be gains temporary. the best the a

prevent of influence

U. S. S. R. in thus line to the of the

from

area; only

make

would to this

argument, Ethio-Somali

United intervene.

States 6 in States

conflict

conflict United and then might Soviet and

question has the

been a strong

in,

say,

the

Middle to the Arab Carter

where

commitment of conservative the the

Israel

to the have

stability globalists held sway, for have of the the been any

within since

Administration unilateral credibility However, commitment in the

danger images to risk.

of of

intervention resolve the would absence diluted war, to the

U. S. 's too form for great of

whilst to

American involvement of a black

Somalia

argument

Ethio-Somali opposition against Thus, for of a policy the growing after of

virtual cause

unanimity provided

African disincentive Somalia. opted spite and Instead, on were Sudan "moderate" the

Mogadishu's United some States

powerful behalf of House war, Ethiopia Republic. in

intervention the in of the the

on

consideration,

White Ogaden in

non-intervention involvement

U. S. S. R. the Somali policy Kremlin's like be and

its

continuing the United

military States

ties premised

with its

in

the

Horn efforts

regionalists' bound before its to fail it,

assumption and would polciies that the

that

the

Dergue, or later

Nimeiry compelled to

of to the

sooner and

rhetoric

return

429

American The Ethio-Somali the once Soviet it

fold. nature war Union decided in in the of the regional a most on the of political appropriate the side of Whilst to totally of a setting background Addis of the for Ababa,

provided to to the

intervene eschew Horn

notion Africa.

"progressive" the align and decisive itself political, milieu of to immense the to the

confederation factors with the

Kremlin's seem to have of behalf of

decision been the Ethiopia directly,

Ethiopia

geostrategic local was political doubtless in To setting

conduciveness on

intervention help, final extent against involvement Soviet less in risky Moscow. for both shift that the

indirectly on the October regional

and

facilitating with, weighed United option appear to the of that

19,1977. political of a it

begin

heavily States massive much

prospect with

countervailing made of the

Somalia, on therefore, behalf

intervention and,

Ethiopia

more same token,

attractive it the with of allowing both states O. A. U. 's in the

leadership encouraged that in would such Africa. give that

By Ethiopia of action

the

positively likelihood approval Ethiopia it its defend principle Africa. to

support a course

by

increasing be met in aid by with

would

Indeed, the it Kremlin was

Soviet an

intervention added in advantage accordance sovereign and colonial to in by escape facilitating arming 7 and the

claim

acting to aggression of it

international themselves of It for in nonwould its the

obligation against violability also enable

help

boundaries some of

responsibility aggression the Republic's

contribution first army of place 20,000

Somalia's training

modern

men.

430

The the

conduciveness war the to

of

the

regional in

political support opportunity Africa Middle the similar East. of

setting Ethiopia to acquire to As ability because the influence place Somalia Kremlin

of also a that one to of

Ogaden

intervention Union in the States out, of in the with Horn in view Arab

provided diplomatic enjoyed writer attract its might an local be such the respect, and Cuban likely

Soviet status

an of the

by has the

the

United

pointed interest over hoped

of

U. S. 's partly Israel,

states dominant

influence have Ethiopian -hegemony, to

a militarily that in the

event to of its

of

Soviet traditional with The

over of would of way In for this

state

restored

a renewal to

friendship 8

appeal

Mogadishu. of course, bloc

materialization pave region. East would dispute In would proper particular, be and after Moreover, attacks, and leverage able inhibit the

a situation creation the of

would,

greatly in of the Soviet, conflict the whole East. it

a Soviet

direct

involvement personnel of have in control in the in

European, give the which

military a degree did put Ethiopia reprisals defeat not it

the

U. S. S. R. the it U. S. would

over Middle

a position invading against

where Somalia Ogadeni armed

to

restrain Ethiopian inevitable would would future

from

tribesmen forces.

the it it in

of

the

Somali future significant 9

discourage give the

possible U. S. S. R. with

Somali potential

dealings

Mogadishu.

The

interventionary In contrast the to

milieu either the Korean milieu or of the the Arab-Israeli Ethio-Somali

wars,

interventionary

431

conflict Soviet set of

was Union.

heavily

biased

in

favour were hardly 1973

of

one

superpower, elements of from war and

the this the thus of

Admittedly, that context account responses of for geographical intervention, and and the in the Soviet for to of the the

there were the

some

variables

different Middle in East the

interventionary could not

difference two proximity the conflicts.

patterns For instance, national of

superpower in terms

and comparative during

relative position the was

capability United war of

the

States 1973

Union

Arab-Israeli very did of particular pattern of the similar. enjoy its

Ethio-Somali the latter over intervene this does

conflict case, the the U. S.

Nevertheless, important relative conflict, of Soviet

U. S. S. R. In in the the have respect that final

advantages ability and to whilst

effectively not explain to to

and in of the the

American Horn, regional it

responses is likely

outbreak reinforced on

hostilities dictations and Moscow's

political

setting

Washington

choice

preferences. amongst the presence the of a most large the and forces protection mid-1978, important reserve of of of these Cuban Havana of the and

Undoubtedly, advantages troops to use in not them to was too in

distant aid of

Angola, Ethiopia, these and with By Ethiopia. from and official maintained

willingness the with readiness logistical from some

U. S. S. R. transport hostile troops were flown Thus, Ogaden

provide

facilities external were operating

potentially 17,000 some of Cuban these was

forces. in directly

Although Angola, Cuban Somali over a large

transferred from by in the Cuba time

number aircraft. from troops

by of

Soviet the

passenger withdrawal 40,000

the in

March

1978,

Cuba

432

Africa. supported Soviet units

The during air-and of the

Cuban the

contingent Ethio-Somali logistical which

in

the

Horn by

of a

Africa substantial protected

was

conflict effort were involved a discreet of in the

sea-based Soviet missions navy,

and

by and to the

in

denial

interposition sealift the forces. U. S. S. R.

and The

provided

screen troops war the

10 to

availability directly global the onus placed a distinct 11 States level own, act as such a proxy in on quell even Africa, of probably of

Cuban

enabled without United

intervene or

Ogaden with a

prompting States. confrontation consequently, vis-a-vis

a regional As a result, was were the Soviet the at force willingness a

confrontation of initiating the bargaining

superpower who,

firmly put at Union. Unted

with

Americans

disadvantage

Admittedly, intervened surrogate Rabat's had

could risk as for April behalf rebel if the King

have by

countera Indeed, countries when Paris in it and the were have to to To of quo, against to overcome as

similar of to its

utilizing

Morocco. other 1977, of

already

been some to of help Shaba. in from

demonstrated 1,500 Zaire's troops Mobutu However, the Horn of

despatched Washington province willing had the have begin which the Ethiopia the inertia to to

forces Hassan would

fight

U. S. in

operate Union,

a position which is

inferiority why it does by the

relation not proxy. seem

Soviet

contemplated with, was use in by and in contrast

a counter-intervention to of the States would quo the U. S. S. R.,

intervention status forces

defence the its of United

regional of not that

territorial surrogate only was have widely

allies a status

had

accepted

433

legitimate, for would side addition balance, would Soviet significant and other have bloc Somali have in the to any

but

also

would and impaired of

have

been

tantamount and that, of of the behalf scale it For, the were which total were the local the

to in

support turn,

revanchism seriously event this,

aggression the

resolve

American war. military of Somalia than to have Cuban part by in an some strength was far the a In

a major to the by a much in the

escalation nature proxy more of on

due

intervention to be on

had

massive if

intervention impact Soviet on bloc

Ethiopia,

battlefield. played they forces Somalia's and in

whilst

personnel

leading backed totalled

Ethiopia's Ethiopian 84,000 did less not

counter-offensive, army men. exceed and In para-military

contrast, men, than in

military of hardware,

43,500

terms 12 Somalia,

better

equipped

Ethiopia. aid at of

An effective therefore, that would or as an of

direct would Cuba have justify, aggressor. in been

counter-intervention have terms extremely particularly Moreover, superiority have of carried prolonged had of to both be on men

a scale and

least

double and that affect role

equipment, to either Somalia's

difficult in given over a very view Ethiopia's Somalia,

of

overwhelming such risk

military-strategic would in the event the and a large of

counter-intervention of Unlike escalation the advanced enabled in them to short

serious

hostilities. enjoyed capacity a relatively which ordnance their

Somalis, technical absorb

Ethiopians administrative quantity time, the in Dergue a of

Soviet of

a rather training. an of

period Furthermore,

spite had

American demonstrated number

already

amazing for

ability military

to

mobilize

substantial

peasants

434

service. inferior capacity, Soviet participation of was could important in retaliation striking itself ignore

The position and material

Somalis, in geography, and, in logistics.

on

the

other of were

hand,

were

in

a

vastly

respect and

population, also on deeply direct whilst the Ethiopian and such of become the press an Somali

absorptive dependent Soviet incapable Republic which into occur in the on

reputedly,

Consequently, heartland, a sustained of the 13 participation Ogaden Should

at

the

Ethiopian to wastes territory.

vulnerable the

attack right attack

Somali

for then

the

surrogates totally

Ogaden on

fighting, foreign

Somalia

would for it was its

dependent of its of

direct

intervention since expanding of United stimulate and the the States

preservation incapable or

territorial either large in the turn, way The United imbalance the the state

integrity, significantly quantities would for an

inherently armed forces

absorbing This, and pave

military of war

hardware. escalation of milieu attrition. against

both endless of at

a cycle exhausting

biasness States of

interventionary local regional the level was

the by an of and a

compounded in of were very 1977. the favour

superpower To be with least at any sure, the

commitments relationships

U. S. S. R. Soviet of flux,

U. S. much in

Union at and had

protagonists early by

until rate

autumn, about

However, the Mengistu was made

increasingly, U. S. S. R. regime between Consequently, became at stake in

October/November, with connection the

become

strongly whilst States no

identified similar and of the the Soviet

Ethiopia, the United the in

Somali Union defeat,

Republic. as an or ally even

credibility Ethiopia.

An Ethiopian

435

a

stalemate in

in danger

the of

Ogaden, being

would toppled, the

have and

put this and

the

Mengistu would have of was in put the it, "Arab

regime almost its

certainly patron,

Jeopardized in view

prestige of the fact

credibility Ethiopia

especially American-supported

that policies

fighting Horn were lake. of

Saudi as Red one Sea

Arabian Soviet into

Africa. at

14 turning

These, the

commentator a reactionary

aimed "15 Last

but

not and

least, willingness Ethio-Somali To

in

contrast of war the was

to

the United

Soviet States confined

Union, to by "human policy judged, the option to the in the was human and its reand

the

ability in

intervene domestic rights" should the of be

the

severely by which

constraints. as a criteria and

begin

with, to

emphasizing foreign

according other

conducted Administration support in in its acute aid the

countries'

performance precluded

Carter U. S.

automatically for of Ethiopia Somalia. as

an Thus,

alternative although argued still Africa, that,

intervention regionalists spite most of

administration difficulties,

rightly Ethiopia

remained 16, regime's it

important

country concluded

in that

the the

Horn

of

apparently rights chronic establishing thereby posing general Ethio-Somali post-Vietnam, States at record,

Mengistu

its

radical, were

pro-Soviet sufficient relations

proclivities, reasons with whilst Addis for

instability, patron-client outflanking as defenders

not Ababa

the of against was,

U. S. S. R. the an

simultaneously principles. torwards by the utility The the the

O. A. U. 's active

inhibition war

posture

moreover,

probably mood prevailing

reinforced in the

post-Watergate the time 17 which

United of

questioned

436

intervention somewhat
under

as sceptical

an instrument of the

of

foreign ability

policy to

and keep

was it

executive's

control.

437

Notes

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17.

Institute for Strategic Studies, Quoted in the International Institute Strategic (International for Survey 1978 4. London, 1979), (Hereinafter Strategic Studies, p. ) Survey. to as Strategic referred Strategic See Institute for Studies, The International (International 1973-1974---1977-1978 Military Balance Studies, London). (Hereinafter Institute Strategic for Balance. ) to as The Military referred Soviet Perspectives Intervention See H. in Bienen, on Vol. 95, No. 1, Spring Quarterly, Africa, "Political Science 29-34. 1980, 29-42, pp. pp. esp. in Horn B. H. Selassie, Conflict the and Intervention of New York Africa Review Press, 1980), (Monthly and London, p. 125. The Ethiopian Revolution See F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, 1981), Also (Verso Editions p. 227. see and N. L. B, London, Implications Ogaden: War in the for D. D. Laitin, "The History, " The Journal Modern Siyaad's in Somali Role of 17, No. 1,1979, The Vol. Times, African Studies, p. 106; The New York Times, October 3,1977, July 28,1977, p. 6; p. A3. Selassie, Bienen, op. cit. op. cit.; Horn Africa, " Diplomacy C. Legum, "Angola of and the of Instrument, Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political ed. Institute, Washington, D. C., 1981), S. S. Kaplan (Brookings "Soviet-Cuban Intervention in 629-630; J. Valenta, the pp. Lessons, " Journal Horn Impact Africa: and of of Vol. 34, No. 2, Fall/Winter International Affairs, "Soviet Thrust P. Vanneman 1980/1981, and M. James, p. 359; The Next Targets, " Strategic into Horn the of Africa: Review, Spring 1978, p. 34. Horn Widening The T. J. Farer, War Clouds of Africa: on the International (Carnegie Endowment for Storm, Ed. 2nd, Rev. D. C., 1979), Peace, New York p. 132. and Washington, in the Horn Africa: R. B. The Remnek, "Soviet Policy of Union in the Third World: Decision " The Soviet to Intervene, R. H. Donaldson (Westview Press, Successes ed. and Failures, London, 1981), Croom Helm, Boulder, Colorado; p. 140. 13-14. Strategic 1978, Survey pp. Ibid., p. 14. 44,46-47. The Military 1977-1978, Balance, pp. Farer, 133-134. op. cit., pp. Valenta, op. cit., p. 357. V. Kudryavtsev, " Izvestia, Colonialists' "The Strategy, Soviet August Digest 2,1977, the of p. 4, in The Current Press, Vol. No. 31, XXIX, August 31,1977, p. 18. The New York 3,1977, Times, October p. A3. Valenta, Also The see C. Legum and B. Lee, op. cit., p. 361. Horn (Africans Publishing Crisis Africa in Continuing of Company, Times, March New York, 1979), The New York p. 6; 23,1977, p. A3.

438

PART

III

CHAPTER

14:

CONCLUSION

The phenomenon client-state uncertain this task

purpose of

of United

this

study States

has and in

been Soviet areas

to

investigate intervention of The disputed stimulus posed stable by

the in or for the

wars superpower was of provided such

which interest by

occur

symmetry. apparent in and on the an

the

paradox era of

persistence deterrence and the irrelevant out the in especiallly

intervention political

nuclear per U. S. se, and

where in

territorial periphery has

change of the

regions alliance security to some

U. S. S. R. 's to Chapter of the 1, an

blocs, of the

ostensibly As

become pointed

superpowers. relations between and political

international link one hand

theorists, and/or security from United

notion

inextricable on the

territorial on that States change wars is the other

change seems

superpower Consequently,

rather the

outdated. continued Union in interest affecting

perspective, and in an the grey

of or in in of great

the

Soviet areas that

preventing client-state

through is more the

intervention appropriate security terms. from the

anomaly system in work,

a non-nuclear powers can

international be defined This seeking and the the to

where

tangible, however, the in

territorial set link grey out

opposite by

angle the

by U. S. in in

explore

between areas of and

intervention superpower

U. S. S. R. age. wars were and then can

security intervention

nuclear

A model was

superpower using depth as in four

client-state These chapters,

constructed in

propositions. theoretical

elaborated be summarized

three

follows:

439

between the The clients of of hostilities outbreak in areas Union States United of disputed and the Soviet interest symmetry generates a superpower or uncertain the the disposition of each and part of the U. S. on its intervene to U. S. S. R. on behalf of respective Underlying inclination this in the war. protege(s) the firstly, of achieving regional prospect are, the gains at the expense of or strategic political the to need secondly, safeguard other superpower, that the the superpower second possibility against intervene accomplish consequently, such and, might importantly, the most general and, gains alone territorial political and/or regional of perception to the relative credibility of, and as an index change the United States between, the balance and of resolve Given 1 and 2). that, in (Propositions Union Soviet the U. S. "rules type this permit of the game" of area, the by expulsion of each other and the U. S. S. R. to seek becomes the intervention indirect rational means, during to pursue for a client-state a superpower option equally rational, are such superpowers war, and as both Soviet-American high risk of a relatively wars entail As a result, the war. and, perhaps, nuclear collision tends to area war in a grey of a client-state outbreak United the States between and aura of crisis create an the Union Soviet the anticipates as each superpower Since, of its own. actions of the other with measures danger the these of collision. circumstances, under the through miscommunication, or misperception, is very the great, moves of incremental accumulation war stimulated superpower of a client-state eruption U. S. S. R. S. and the with of the-U. each crisis provides to instigate political or prevent and/or an opportunity through in the the territorial grey area change to protect and thereby of war, risk of the manipulation. images its of credibility and resolve or enhance incidence the From this 3). (Proposition perspective, intervention can be explained of or assymetrical nonin terms crisis situation, which would of an adverse irrational interventionary response render an (Proposition 4). For to the purpose this of this model in first Part conclusion, in II the of it light this would of study be the in two the deal and in convenient empirical separate subject with territorial the nuclear the

consider

analysis sections. matters relationship change in

undertaken The of

section, 1,2, intervention, and

encapsulating and 4, will

Propositions between

political security

grey

areas,

superpower

age.

The

second

section,

comprising

the

theme

of

440

Proposition crisis prevent symmetry. as

3,

will

focus by areas

on

the the

relevance superpowers or

of

the

concept

of or

a means in

which of

instigate interest

change

disputed

uncertain

Intervention, It work stable Union outside vital nuclear sufficiently their terms direct immediate of seems that, nuclear still their security age,

change, clear in spite deterrence, consider alliance interests. the concerned spheres and

and from of

superpower the being the case

security material by a analyzed relationship and political relevance powers in have areas huge as well to the the Soviet change their prebeen outside efforts as in more to the of have that had in this of*

bound United

States and

territorial blocs as As U. S. about of and of with the

direct great

U. S. S. R. in exert

developments to assistance, as political

interest

economic

military such the in areas.

security

transfers and represented in those to

commitments integrity of positions concern

client-regimes states they

territorial order to

establish this

predominance been many of

Underlying and in the of political past. Korea, capability, of total, or the

the global

geostrategic powers in the

factors

preoccupied Admittedly, development preoccupation resulting more prompted assign denied a any

case

United its

States' consequent

of

an with

atomic/nuclear the to notion conceptualize of the rate warfare late

global foresee the early

war, a future

and for

the a

failure limited it form during second significant

between 1940's to the value, and

superpowers 1950's which embark to was upon a

status strategic

peninsula, and to

441

degree This interest the Soviet peninsula China's Yalu

of attitude

decommitment contrasted Korea had the in its

from

its with to its

client-state that of the itself

in

the

south. whose after For the

Kremlin, even

in U. S. S. R. Union, lay

continued exploded primary proximity hydro-electric

manifest first atomic

bomb. of its the contiguity

significance to Japan, power with to of in have warm

Korean to the These to entire first in is the to the said Far the from With the Japan extending Thus, and of on by the

strategic River, and its

complex water the over ports.

along

endowment appear form

geostrategic try country. articulated period to East have should to achieve

factors some

driven

Kremlin the were States

hegemony this with the Japan

Its during preceding insisted be

ambitions discussions the that war the

respect United when position existed partly Korea. the no war time

against

Stalin in prior resulted 2 against in

U. S. S. R. 's as which over into wasted Korea troops as on it

re-established war of 1905,1 designs Soviet the as Union Kremlin of

Russo-Japanese Russia's formal on its August the country entry August control 10 following was Although custody Korea, of the of, prompted peninsula, it the in it

imperialistic of 8,1945, over began day Soviet the and the its the

much to land

possible. the peninsula, portion

most

of

the

northern

hands. Soviet Union's assumption entrenchment to they until began the to secure the in, southern established of major war in June of direct northern portion a

subsequent Americans where

eventually outbreak impute

client-state, 1950 that

was

not States

United

strategic

442

significance due to some

to

its

protege of

in

South

Korea. of or

This the even doctrine,

was country's to

not

sort or of the in

a reconsideration value, strategic-military that to ally put way it, into the the and to

geostrategic reassessment to Korea United resolve. Communists opposition the that world a

geopolitical U. S. 's

a but

perception posed States As to from that

Washington threat reliable source their U. S. would power

invasion credibility to have its

by of image allowed

North the of the without rest " of and "3

a considerable as one force the a

South confirmed

Korea to the

have was was States of

"Russian big-talk the to the

in a

fact

invincible,

"American

shameless committed Korea at War II and, the

bluff. itself to time, and in the

Consequently, unequivocally end, second even Vietnam In up the directly only now, war. view of is to

United defence on

South which, World

that was which, long

intervened Its

a scale in by its

involvement only

rivalled

intervention

the

Soviet People's

Union's

leading of

role Korea

in

setting and the

Democratic establishment

Republic of a strong the

subsequent patron-client resolve remains neither invade forces reputaion the direct United

Soviet-North credibility war. the decision

Korean and This Kremlin to

relationship, images so were even if also it nor at has

U. S. S. R. 's in the

stake to be

Korean that

assumed of

encouraged South were was Korea. fighting not as

approved To on be sure,

Pyongyang's whilst Korean territory, as

Communist Soviet was not was that in of any not

South in

Korean the conflict

involved firstly, secondly, 443

States danger

since, and,

North the

Korea

was

U. S. S. R.

necessarily However, Communist declared the North once

committed the

to

its

client's

military extended once the

venture. into

U. S. /U. N. and, war in

counter-offensive particular, as forces the total and and much that northward as the

Korea their

Americans of reof the

objectives armed the became the

destruction forcible images in the the ally

Korean of Korea,

unification the conflict. underlying to tarnish Soviet

credibility very

resolve

Union Indeed, the the power United

implicated amongst drive was

possibility States'

motives desire and

U. S. S. R. 's could not

reputation be entirely

a reliable ruled out.

a resolute

Nevertheless, refrained of its from own. border, action, against to ward

in

spite

of

this,

the actions

Soviet with

Union measures the for as muscleas direct which map. a a

countervailing Admittedly, the but the off In of China of

American as U. N. began

troops to visibly

approached prepare more as Korea was the Union the was world indifferent Indeed, its

Chinese military precaution flexing political intervention prevented However, to the

U. S. S. R. this

was probably U. N.

intended forces of than North it Soviet from

oncoming the the

annihilation final and not analysis, the

entity.

the this

removal does not

Communist

Korea the North

mean that of could Korea The the the war crisis

Kremlin Korea.

political doubtful American of itself the

extinction that forces U. S. S. R. from of China in

it

seems against support kept seen where,

have without

stood the the

ground and largely

commitment latter

fact in

that the

aloof context an

peninsula of the

should conflict military-

be

in

the

situation -political

from

international

and

444

strategic disadvantage consequence, intervened of far that general better the

standpoint, in the in defence with

the relation

Soviet to the

Union

was

at

a considerable As effectively creating were the a risk in fact border came an a a

United not without the

States. have

U. S. S. R. of the to of North U. S. credibly forces

could Korea which

war position presence to

Americans Thus, the regime Manchurian in

manipulate. along

U. N. the

happened as a

incense for to save

new

Communist in

Peking them

blessing

the

Soviets, their

that

it in

gave North

opportunity without United

client-regime ina were confrontation ill-prepared. and the

Korea the

embroiling States The for

themselves which of they

with

significance

political of the

territorial was war and of

change

in

the better 1973.

strategic

considerations during

superpowers

somewhat October the and in II. best over for the in the for

illustrated Geostrategically, East Soviet early the was Union 1950's case of by far in or the its

Arab-Israeli

politcally, more 1973 at important than was to the time

economically, United States peninsula World is perhaps War

Middle the the In

the

Korean since

any

other this

U. S.,

importance to of Israeli Arab

illustrated all foreseeable it

commitment combinations

superiority power, and

U. S. S. R. 1973 United war position. and the in to

is

testified its acquiescing avoid

to

by

the

Kremlin's relationship

readiness with plans its war, regional the to, than Korean

jeopardize by to

flourishing in Egypt

States order

and

Syria's of 1973

a further by were the far and the time

weakening of the

Moreoever, Soviet with, the case Union Israel of the

U. S. and they war.

more

deeply

committed

identified were in

Arabs

respectively during the

protagonists

445

As

a consequnce, were parties opponents time

the

credibility more Middle Korean again perceived the U. S. by tied East

and to

resolve the

images fortunes

of of to

the the those was of as which a

superpowers warring of the

much in the

than

they

were This

in-the and who between not be

peninsula. United the and to States Arab-Israeli the

point

emphasized State "test Soviet United

Secretary war in

Kissinger of wills" must 5 in the to

4 U. S. S. R. over

arms States. However,

allowed

prevail

those

of

the

contrast 1973 Soviet

to

the

Korean war was to

war, more

the or

crisis less States able to as

situaion favourable intervention. intervene with the their mode

of

Arab-Israeli as it both in

was

United were was East. and

Consequently, in the conflict interests intensity can assessments be taken of the of

superpowers that Middle Soviet of of

a manner in the the

consistent Hence, American and in respect, of and their both headin of to against Union in to the march the

primary and

interventions Moscow's region both to

as

measures

Washington change In this

significance interests. intervene as the in need

their

vital

security rushed as to sake to soon sacrifice of merely began

superpowers client(s) as for East. the and Syria, that years Heights to

support arose, and risk

respective were on the equally collision Middle

ready the

detente their respective after

a

positions the war eruption material

Thus, U. S. S. R. in has build

a day to of

hostilities, Egypt everything three Golan

despatch American

spite taken up. 6 the

threats the Soviet advance began

U. S. As the the

and Syrian Israelis

was

reversed

and

446

towards of arms

Damascus, and military

the

Soviet equipment

Union to and included

launched help also replenish initiated alerting fleet, of the were

a huge the

airlift rapidly of

depleting coercive troops, to

Syrian measures augmenting

war

machine, which

a number its and Syrian airborne threatening capital.

its

Mediterranean in defence

directly albeit were crossed

intervene more reversed the

Similar, fortunes Israelis threatened were

drastic, on the

steps Egyptian cut the of off

undertaken front when Army, of

as the and which on

Suez fate

Canal, for bank logistical

the Army,

Third both

a similar on the

Second the line. its

deployed

east

Canal

and

surviving occasion, to but an alerting in end

a perilously the

vulnerable not only to

On that airlift level, to put by its

U. S. S. R.

increased an unprecedented in up its

its also to its the

beleaguered threatened Israeli airborne adjacent

client to activities, forces seas. with of the to of least directly

intervene and backed

order threat

and

further

reinforcing

ships

Although, three similar latter exhibited to risk days

the war, that the as

possible Israel of its was Arab

exception never

of confronted

the

first with a the States Union

plight stages at

adversaries the as United the

during

hostilities, much willingness by to injecting the

Soviet into of

a superpower Being of its of

collision accustomed

itself

the

conflict. supremacy have feared

position the

regional could the only U. S. not untold fear

Zionist in respect less

client of than

that its an over image

U. S. S. R. proteges,

dreamt that

own

anything Israeli

unambiguous the of Arabs resolve.

(though would do This

overwhelming) harm to its

victory and

credibility

447

was Egypt military or the

compounded and Syria action least the

by

the

presumption not have did

held embarked

in on

Washington such large-scale

that

could as

they

without of for the its

the

prior

acquiescence Union, soon and after by the "to to capacity the United as it " that and had on the the of cent was disaster of security perception intervention brought 24. directly the U. S. out on in the edge in them in

at

foreknowledge prompt support Hence a hard the world of East learnt in

Soviet clients

U. S. S. R. 's

hostilities teach and crisis States soon resolved and no "not to the the and in as the the to talk

started. Russians rest the of

Kissinger's lesson" by

determination demonstrating physical challenge "7 initial "risk no longer of

"America's to

peril

seeking or of

Middle U. S. "pour again could support.

anywhere. Israel's " and was by

Consequently, reverses, confrontation, any Soviet doubt arms doubt was Egypt,

supplies, there imposed" Even

until be 8

settlement

virtue all

diplomatic evaporated verge Americans Zionist over fact for the aimed Egypt of as

when the

such and on re-supply a 25 per 9

Israel

regained

initiative defeat their

inflicting continued State total at with Soviet nothing and in of the Syria. the United impact credibility its to the

a humiliating to accelerate aim re-supply more than of

achieving of the

Arabs,

which

avoiding the for

a military significance the vital

Indeed, Middle States, of East and

developments Interests of its full the the

Washington's Soviet were of October

potential images relief Soviet of

unilateral and resolve alert

with threat the alert

nuclear unilaterally was

Though which still

intervene in nature,

stimulated

defensive

448

felt what to the

compelled the force Suez Kremlin an end

to

raise

the

ante, in the

but

then first of

proceeded place, the which

to

do was on did

had to

intended Israel's Thus, it failure

violation would to but Soviet effect. the impact and United of seem meet that as

cease-fire not Soviet only challenge feared to

front. suspect its

that the it

Washington would Israeli pressure The Union change explicit been Indeed, geostrategic special between superpowers' high resolve which region, they the were outbreak a they state at with on

that

tarnish

reputaion, under a similar of

also

that American

compliance would have

opposed

preoccupation the their during the time potential credibility the of

States political of of war

and and resolve

the

Soviet

territorial was as it earlier. of enjoys the when were in the a war the a and the from conflict Thus, U. S. the as with not as had

images war

Ethio-Somali the the Arab-Israeli Horn of of within Somalia with As the

1977-1978 four years

although

Africa the Middle

shares East

much and Africa,

significance political Ethiopia status and relationship of images flux. of

sub-Saharan came the at a

time

protagonists the in

a consequence, and,

credibility

U. S. S. R. completely

particular, itself in the

had were

almost not either of open

disengaged implicated or the Middle the neutrality do by so the without fact of as as the that

as

deeply Korea

in

East. Americans in the fear whilst

hostilities, of strict to

immediately conflict. for their Ethiopia States protege, of and the the

assumed That

position were was able facilitated

reputation nd was, Somali longer indeed,

enjoyed beginning was

the

patronage to be seen

United

a Soviet

Republic

still

perceived

a client-state

449

U. S. S. R. Nevertheless, Horn resolve Washington's Somali persuade modus choose that identified latter the ally which seriously credibility jeopardized of Africa. all on and credibility became left at most war. Somalia vivendi between time, the with the the Somali and stake. of the the of Africa did on play the the potential superpowers' in to Soviet Ethiopia to of its nothing, two determining developments Union, to impact images of of some during once a became clients. had relations reached the become the events credibility of Moscow the attempt in the and and Ethioto

a role

responses For the

and came one

accept it

Kremlin-inspired imperative Since, strongly between a very low as the ebb, an to by

warring

Mengistu U. S. S. R. Republic decisiveness An

regime whilst had of

Soviet or hands Ababa, and

Union a

Ethiopian in in

defeat Somali Addis

stalemate would risked certainly have the

Ogaden regime of position its

endangered and the As prestige entire

patron, of the to the

almost in

U. S. S. R. Union and

the

Horn to

a consequence, supplies of Ethiopia. States full

Soviet Somalia

decided to massively

terminate intervene

military the the side

Although the was to Ethio-Somali arming have both

United war in

chose

not that

to the it

intervene Soviet does not in its

in Union seem the huge 1977, of

knowledge in the

protagonists the once scale the in aid

region,

anticipated Thus,

of

Soviet

intervention embarked in upon

conflict. interventionary fears the were possible

U. S. S. R. of in

effort immediately impact

Ethiopia Washington credibility

November in respect and

evoked on the

resolve

450

reputation European to from of the

of states Soviet

the over Union

U. S.,

amid

growing the else.

doubts

amongst "would stand

West up

whether anywhere 1978

Americans "10 the the As U. S.

a

consequence, a range order alike. to to

about coercive its

February measures general the

onwards, against

undertook in friends and of Whilst

U. S. S. R. foes and

improve These link relations assertive influence to may credibility The Union clearly as great achieve their mass reluctant war engage But grey raw than it has with be

image use of

amongst minatory and other in of

included detente, to

diplomacy aspects

threats superpower this

S. A. L. T., Soviet on policy be "doing to behaviour the

Africa. the U. S. it " and did in

more to need it of

stance Soviet seen have to

part in the

came fulfil this

too

late the respect

Horn,

something, repair

served and resolve.

Washington's

images

preoccupation political as intense during of the of had and in

of

the

United

States change

and in

the

Soviet areas is

territorial age of

grey

the the

stable era. do in the they not

nuclear To fight be in grey of been to been such fought places the symbolic locales risk to

deterrence sure, order areas weapons no the to as of less nuclear actually positions. to in U. S. control terms and of the

been

pre-nuclear age

powers positions counterparts destruction. to their in war the

nuclear

predominance done before

distant advent have and have

However, their

jeopardize previous in order

relations

counterparts to attain of or the of

defend past such

whereas areas materials

global of

powers the

because and more or

value

transport concerned with control

routes, the over

U. S. S. R. of retaining

are

significance of disputed

achieving

451

or

uncertain as that,

interest allies the the to on

symmetry and age capacity to of of their

as

an

index as " the States

to

their

credibility Given deterrence, Soviet depends to take Union more risks

resolve

superpowers. balance and provocation of their resolve nuclear and the the make to in U. S. premore be grey bound of the

in or

"overkill, the United or

deter

aggression superpower physical

extreme perceptions of of security to it that

reciprocal on

than

comparisons image to the

stockpiles, resolve and nuclear sense interested areas by the is

maintaining perhaps more than

a good vital real this the and/or not despite, nuclear

credibility of of

U. S. S. R. great to

was In that

estate respect, superpowers political the

powers.

would continue change

conclude in territorial of,

because

and of

fact

of

being

a relationship

stable

deterrence.

Crisis

as This

a mechanism raises the

of

change

or of

change whether

by

proxy? crisis either strategic superpower through In the crisis, intervention misperception, case the of such the

question for could other to of war,

superpower by which its

has U. S.

become or

a substitute the U. S. S. R. the resolve the

a means to

seek

improve mutual risks war.

position perceptions manipulation client-state danger and the

vis-a-vis of of

by. changing take nuclear

danger stimulated the risk

war arises from

Soviet-American of double

possibility of collision

consequent or the a

through of the past

miscalculation, Given war that as

the

accumulation powers of or

incremental often a

moves. to of

imperial of

resorted position

means

achieving

defending

452

predominance the global

somewhere powers war of

abroad, the nuclear

then age

is

it

not the

the

case

that of

use

uncertainty equivalent of superpower

client-state goals war?
Of of the was the

stimulated

crisis

to

accomplish risk

in

grey

areas

by manipulating

the

three

conflicts collision war one and of where 1973. the

examined was

in

this

work, greatest the intervened

the

risk during

Soviet-American Arab-Israeli the only

undoubtedly For one thing,

1973

war both the

superpowers In to than their to those

symmetrically commitments Middle or cases, becoming region Admittedly, the of the East Horn the very one in of were of

simultaneously. superpowers stronger

addition, clients in the Middle presence the Soviet was either latter East in in

the much Africa.

the Korea two was the

Moreover, ante to bellum the

unlike in the

status

quo

detrimental of the

continuing namely, quo in ante the

superpowers, the have status liked, up of

Union. not of as the in hegemony

Korea, would the

bellum division

U. S. S. R. and

that

peninsula the over the more those and with However, satisfied of partly Africa the was south the

setting the

an

American aspirations in of of the itself the

client-state for Horn of

thwarted entire

Kremlin's Likewise, the outbreak

country. preceding to U. S., the which from by in the Korea needs of

Africa, was than Ethiopia linkages policies. far to

situation conducive of the

hostilities U. S. S. R. from

interests had

excluded

discouraged Somalia whereas the the result

establishing latter's the of the partition the

compensatory Irredentist of the in was by the

peninsula the at Horn least

minimum exclusion of

superpowers, States

United

a conscious

assessment

Americans

453

of

the

implications developments In Soviet contrast, Union very product in the of was to

for

their that in the

wider were Middle only but

interests largely East, and the

of beyond

regional their

political control. of the

predicament and Indeed, the Kremlin's of of the the the the

was serious, of six

not

acute also during

politically

strategically being clients consequences U. S. S. R. leadership risk with peace" the

ameliorable. which the

years to

region the

had 1967 due

suffer the

humiliation

war, the

vulnerability of with

mainly jeopardize

to its

reluctance

Soviet U. S. and war, and Syria no

relationship by break providing out of

a superpower the means

confrontation to in forcibly the the area. Soviet and to

Egypt the "no

situation Thus, once by it after were

leadership of them of war, and this low as of the and,

was

officially of almost and and

notified hostilities, immediately aircraft military was that both it

Cairo resolved the

Damascus support

imminence indeed, ships arms intervention the mere were confrontation in the first

outbreak to Egypt

Soviet Syria initial with

despatched Even and

equipment. indirect occurred, raised the

though

relatively especially prospect

profile, forces

fact still

Arab

advancing, and or so collision. days

superpower that was hold still its keeping reason either superpower

Nevertheless, of the hostilities was was very had managing confused no

given Egypt to

two steady

making ground, a low to Israel

progress, United U. S. S. R. ante U. S. by

Syria States

and key, raise or

the the the the

and

obviously using In this crisis

compelling against a

coercion from

respect,

perspective,

454

change implication, power

in

the in being of

status the

quo of regional

the

Middle

East

and,

by of

Soviet-American by proxy, the that

balance is,

was

implemented the U. S. local and

through fighting

client-states to resolve
Once military began equipment Soviet the to

U. S. S. R. who were

a purely
the situation despatch to Israel, United

dispute.
States was East apprised on October other the of the 9, it military pattern increasing The against beyond front as Israeli set the the forces resorted in of real too

in

the

Middle

arms, thus in of of the a

ammunition, "mirror-imaging" war and

and

intervention probability inability whilst cease-fire such to

significantly confrontation. make any progress

superpower Israel to

subsequent the Egyptians

simultaneously lines on the

advancing Syrian

pre-October scene continued to Syria. airborne Soviet Kremlin indifferent afterwards, called more a to off, Soviet crisis for

a confrontation. march towards in order

Indeed, Damascus, to were the avoid sent the

U. S. S. R.

coercion Additional units division warned to the it is crisis war of were were the the

a serious to the

setback Mediterranean, staff and not not front this in Tel was Aviv of

warships alerted, reportedly

headquarters moved that to it

a the be long was due of

Damascus, could Although,

Americans fate of

Syria. on clear or for to the by the

Israeli not

advance precisely coercion

Syrian whether fear about

prolonged

attrition, from the

October and began the other

11/12 Arab

substantial countries alongside perceived

reinforcements had the the reached Syrians. Soviet

Iraq,

Jordan, and is that

battlefield is clear

fighting Americans had to be

What moves as

a challenge

which

455

met

if

their and, on when failure 15 Canal, and

credibility as the the of and the the the the a result, side final of

and

resolve intensified

images their

were

to indirect

be

maintained intervention Thus, with on the the risk the the October Suez U. S. of

Israel. stage of the 1973 offensive incursion and high. suspicion The increased States client(s) as continued the war unfolded in Sinai across between resulting as first

resumed subsequent

Egyptian Israeli

level U. S. S. R. collision and then

of

tension very

was was the effort

superpower Union its Under on the west began navy

further United to its

Soviet

massively in Israeli unabatedly, the

accelerated conflict. advance the

re-supply these bank to in

circumstances, of the Canal in

U. S. S. R. its its that

engage and

coercive the

activities and U. S. form

by by and of than

reinforcing alerting Isreal direct respond the Soviet However, west bank of the to

around as is not

Mediterranean to the some But, rather

airborne if restraint

forces

a warning exercised,

intervention in the desired

might

materialize. the U. S.

manner,

simply

reciprocated

moves. the of the Third the to to intention of Egypt, the an the continuation Suez Canal road Sinai of the and, and posed position of request, the the an Israeli in advance particular, on the the cutting serious and a result, notice on further a

severance off threat challenge in of behalf response its of

Suez-Cairo Army entire credibility Egyptian to in

consequent extremely of Egypt As gave directly by

military

U. S. S. R. the Kremlin

unilaterally backed its

intervene warning

and

456

reinforcing airborne United Defence and to units States

its

Mediterranean in a state by alert, on Israel, of

fleet

and

putting

additional Although the on immediate only to allow forced nonThird a

readiness. its also which but to be was also the armed exercised was not

responded Three

placing it

forces

Condition

effective stop violating

restraint the to sure, Zionist to it

cease-fire go through could State humiliate in end U. N. did chose therefore, the

made

military Army. restraint latter's interests Israel's earlier, 338, fact on the direct Soviet Soviet whose to of but that October

supplies To of be the

beleaguered that affected

argued only

Washington's because the U. S. However, some days

endeavour and effort when the it

Egypt

was

contravening East. earnest Council

objectives to that

Middle in

began Security

violated

Resolution then. transgression attributed to of a a the The

Americans

nothing to end be

to Tel

stop Aviv's

it

Washington 26 can, by with

reasonably of

manipulation collision client-state, warning client heed crisis to in own image the it. had In

the the

Soviet United on

leadership States. the verge

the

risk Egypt,

Since of and

seemed appeared made this highly substantial respect,

ignominy, the gains, Americans,

credible territorial it can be

decided the use

said avoid the thereby as without

that an gains to an

coercion allow initial

enabled Egypt to

the

U. S. S. R. some war, credibility

to of

Egyptian it had uphold and to

defeat, made its its actually

preserve of the its

phase position, resolve as

and

regional of fight.

ally having

a superpower

The Middle

outlines East,

of

the

picture

which

emerges by

from proxy

the but

whereby

change 457

was implemented

serious evident the Korea, client quo in as view

loss during Ethio-Somali the the it

avoided the Korean conflict. does to with intimate relationship, change

through war

crisis and, to

coercion a much in given the in the the lesser the its

were

also extent,

Admittedly, not seem to have in

case northern status However,

of

U. S. S. R. go had of ahead done the

force Egypt

a change and Syria of then Communist had not the

regional 1973.

nature

Moscow-Pyongyang territorial Korea would and have

patron-client political undoubtedly to the defend Soviet

which

accomplished South Union. balance even of the though North to loss Korea would In

Americans to in the the

intervened benefit regional implemented to have of

have

rebounded change have

other of the

words, would

Soviet-American by proxy,

power

been not

U. S. S. R. attack. East

appears

approved In avoided the United

Korean the by in

contrast serious

Middle manipulating Korea scale. the

where the risk did the posture recoup with the so

the of by

U. S. S. R. war with

States, on to to a massive assume intervene risk a risk

U. S. Although

directly of the losses Union, But, to Soviet U. S. offensive otherwise not

intervening the Kremlin

reluctance enabled their Soviet

a more and of

assertive thereby

Americans without elements because the

a serious of of such the

collision

were,

nevertheless, of the served crisis to

present. situation deter the on the

unfavourability these and, its as elements

U. S. S. R.,

counteraction only and would to recover

a consequence, but Korea, also

permitted to go

position of North

occupy have

most

actions triggered

which a

almost

certainly

superpower

458

confrontation. the the been Americans reverse able and logic to to that U. S. S. R., quo ante

Once their

China allies

counter-intervened south For the of United it the 38th States would itself. of

and

forced

parallel, to have have been

worked. retain North the war

Korea, into serious do with China risk the

necessary since the status Soviet U. S. stage or action constrain The Africa forcible region the was at the in of

extend

However, collision of whilst with the of take that with the the the third risk, decisive to

entailed it had bellum did to Korean

a very to make in

restoration Thus,

the

peninsula. the risk

Union order the

not

manipulate

of during

war

determine war, that the the an

developments latent Kremlin attack on

presence would China,

probability in the the event United

of States.

sufficed

political the revision detrimental outset

position of of to the the Soviet patron such of

of

the

U. S. S. R. war status

in

the

Horn

of any

Ethio-Somali territorial interests. to Somali, was

rendered quo is country to in

the

This the trying

because that coopt

Kremlin, trying the had of would the

long-time to force target the

a revision, Somali permitted it had

Ethiopia, However, parts that

irredentist Somalia occupied, in would the to then the have

ambitions. retain the those change

U. S. S. R. that been the To have Horn be

Ogaden have of

accomplished of sure, Africa had

territorial qualified Union opportunity alienated same time, in done as so, of the it the

configuration change then it by proxy. would

Soviet the have at its the

certainly and Africa.

forfeited also would But,

befriending remainder would of have

Ethiopia, sub-Saharan tremendously

consolidated

position

459

Somali long entire

Republic before, African
The

at

the

expense the

of

a country American

which, client

not in

so the

had been continent.

closest

non-intervention opened with the the way help

of for of

the the

United Soviet

States Union forces, was

in to on

the

Ethio-

Somali intervene, Ethiopia. the who

war

massively the to side regain forces, had no of

surrogate the latter desert Given irredentism to

Consequently, parts decisively to again, confine In help Somalia, it its fact, in was was of the

enabled Somali the it

captured were

Ogaden

from that

defeated. whose unwilling

U. S. had

commitment time order of not no and to Africa. to

condemned U. S. S. R. in

confront activities repeated

the

interventionary Washington's its war

in public

the

Horn avowals

Somalia crisis the

against by and out the

Ethiopia

meant

that war. got

superpower as the impact resolve

generated Soviet

Ethio-Somali intervention over credibility of the

However, underway, possible and

massive United of the

allied of

States, Soviet began to

nervousness on its

the

bloc engage

effort in

images, which Whilst

a range off

coercive Ethiopian to nor a

activities, coast. reverse of an

included these of or they

naval

maneuvers were intervention

activities Soviet level did

neither in, have of

intended the war, ignited indicating elsewhere deterring consolidate

the

outcome

intensity crisis, of

that serve the in have of the

could purpose the

superpower the in further its limits Africa.

American Thus, they the

tolerance may part

Horn

and in to

succeeded U. S. S. R.

attempts in in all,

on the it

position All

continent. would seem that military intervention is

460

as Soviet

important Union age.

an as

instrument it In to had view been of

for for the

the the

United global

States powers

and of

the the of the these of these

pre-nuclear the world, areas the images postures, which preserve requires status the and quo the, the a

widespread in many grey

commitments areas change resolve of in images of

superpowers the as U. S. to role an

client-states political to the and credibility and of has States of in area, the

of

territorial and the

index the

and the

U. S. S. R.,

significance superpowers'

credibility

deterrence means seek an effort by to

intervention United stability change of a grey to for use

become and the

an

indispensible Soviet Where and/or is for of for change, use of on the restore quo. of the Union such

deterrence. the the political tendency as that accomplish proxy. manipulation seems, intended status

territorial U. S. and

U. S. S. R. support

intervention

a means wish, the The

encouragement their which intervention war to prevent be own, is,

client-states to by the crisis it is

independent therefore, as an

reasons, implemented instrument superpower when in for

client-state other or hand, to

stimulated most drastic effective

to

change

a regional

461

Notes

1.

2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

(Oxford in the Far East 1944-1951 Policy Max Beloff, Soviet W. 23-24. Also University London, 1953), Press, pp. see Envoy Churchill Abel, Special Averell Harriman to and Elie Stalin (Random House, New York, 1975), 1941-1946 pp. and Goals in "Stalin's 379-380. Both in R. M. Slusser, cited Y. Nagai Korea, War in Asia, " The Origins Cold of the eds. University New York, 1977), (Columbia Press, p. and A. Iriya 130. Slusser, ibid. The R. H. Rovere, General A. M. the Schlesinger and and Foreign Policy American Future President, the of and 91-92. 1952), London, Heinemann, (William pp. Kissinger: Israelis, Arabs, A E. R. F. Sheehan, The and in Middle East Diplomacy the Secret History of American Also P. New York, 1976), Press, (Reader's Digest see p. 34. East (Croom in the Middle Mangold, Intervention Superpower Years H. Kissinger, Helm, London, 1978), of Upheaval p. 33; London, 1982), Joseph, (Weidenfeld and Michael and Nicolson Wants, " Middle E. Ahmad, Washington 515,521; "What pp. War of October Studies in the Arab-Israeli East Crucible: International, Press (Medina University 19 33, ed. N. Aruri Wilmette, Illinois, 1975), p. 241. East War Insight Sunday Times Insight. Team, on the Middle London, 1974), (Andre Deutsch, p. 238. Kissinger, p. 472. op. cit., Sheehan, p. 34. op. cit., Kissinger, p. 518. op. cit., Ibid., 531,542. pp. "How Africa became Charles Douglas-Home, a question of June 14,1978, American " The Times, p. 16. credibility,

462

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Newspapers. The The The The

Magazines,

and

Digests

Guardian Times New York Times Sunday Times and Space Technology

Week Aviation The Economist Newsweek Time The Current Keesing's

Digest of Contemporary

Soviet the Archives

Press

Books

and

Articles "Red

No. 93 Papers " Adelphi Sea