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Tanada vs Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997 Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification

of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO. Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention. Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement. Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic selfdestruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make

their free choice. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995 Facts : Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, coproduction, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources. The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court. Issue : Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid? Ruling : Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous.

Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus: Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect. Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest G.R. No 127882 Facts : On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate

recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements. On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996. On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. They pray that the Court issue an order: (a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements; (b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void; (c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and (d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void. Issue : Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.

Ruling : The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void: (1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit: Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit. (2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement, (3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance agreement; (4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement; (5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement; (6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement; The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their own: (1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement. Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement proposals; Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA; The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors; When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Isagani Cruz vs DENR

Land Titles and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine

Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine

MULLER VS MULLER Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany onSeptember 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but decided tomove and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house inGermany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo,

Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipoloproperty was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinkin g, and maltreatment, the spouseseventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition 6 for separation of properties beforethe Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them andordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired bygratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because theproperty was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial courts Decision. As regards the house,the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring thesame.Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merelyreimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage topetitioner; that the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that respondent should bereimbursed of his personal funds. ISSUE: WON respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipoloproperty.

HELD: in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear thathe willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exerciseon respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a propertywhich he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman v.Intermediate Appellate Court: 16Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the publicdomain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus,assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no rightwhatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land,vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In anyevent, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by hiswife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugalproperty. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If theproperty were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest andright over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that theConstitution does not permit him to have.As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and willnot, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife hadused conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on high constitutionalgrounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in suchan event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her withunauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in thepremises, a purely academic exercise. (Emphasis added)WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2001of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse

respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denyingreconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of

absolute communitybetween the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering thepartition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED

Case Digest: Chavez v. National Housing Authority Posted: August 4, 2010 in Case Digests Tags: case, constitution, digest, land, law, nha, Philippines, territory 2 G.R. No. 164527 15 August 2007

Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS: On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc. On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state. As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).

Notices of public bidding to become NHAs venture partner for SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.

Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties. To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite. Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project. Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.


Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the SMDRP Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position HELD:

Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279). Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.

The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos. Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be disposed to qualified beneficiaries. Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate. There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted that notices were published in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards Committee on May 18, 1992. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition, when the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified person. This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution. When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in question after the passage of around 10 years from the start of the projects implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.

Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS Supremacy of the Constitution Filipino First Policy National Patrimony Qualified Filipinos

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 3051% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs bid was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at

P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution**, but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that: Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is merely a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing); Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony. ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as the legit buyer of shares. HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino First Policy. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

**Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities

Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy

Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined

petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional. HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated thatprovision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream. RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

J.G. Summit Holdings vs. CA JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST and PHILYARDS HOLDINGS G.R. No. 124293. November 20, 2000 FACTS: National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries entered into a Joint Venture Agreement in a shipyard business named PHILSECO, with a shareholding of 60-40 respectively. NIDCs interest was later transferred to the National Government. Pursuant to President Aquinos Proclamation No.5, which established the Committee on Privatization (COP) and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), and allowed for the

disposition of the governments non-performing assets, the latter allowed Kawasaki Heavy Industries to choose a company to which it has stockholdings, to top the winning bid of JG Summit Holdings over PHILSECO. JG Summit protested alleging that such act would effectively increase Kawasakis interest in PHILSECOa shipyard is a public utility--and thus violative of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents act is valid. HELD: No. A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law, the following provision of the Article XII of the Constitution applies: Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association shall be citizens of the Philippines. xxx Notably, paragraph 1.4 of the JVA accorded the parties the right of first refusal under the same terms. This phrase implies that when either party exercises the right of first refusal under paragraph 1.4, they can only do so to the extent allowed them by paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of the JVA or under the proportion of 60%-40% of the shares of stock. Thus, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock of SNS or PHILSECO. The NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares. As a government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corporation, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization.

Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011





This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment management and holding company and a shareholder of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).

The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%, thus:

Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)



Does the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to the total common shares only, or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility?


[The Court partly granted the petition and held that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors of a public utility, i.e., to the total common shares in PLDT.]

Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term capital shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.

To construe broadly the term capital as the total outstanding capital stock, including both common and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. A broad definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the public utility.

Holders of PLDT preferred shares are explicitly denied of the right to vote in the election of directors. PLDTs Articles of Incorporation expressly state that the holders of Serial Preferred Stock shall not be entitled to vote at any meeting of the stockholders for the election of directors or for any other purpose or otherwise participate in any action taken by the corporation or its

stockholders, or to receive notice of any meeting of stockholders. On the other hand, holders of common shares are granted the exclusive right to vote in the election of directors. PLDTs Articles of Incorporation state that each holder of Common Capital Stock shall have one vote in respect of each share of such stock held by him on all matters voted upon by the stockholders, and the holders of Common Capital Stock shall have the exclusive right to vote for the election of directors and for all other purposes.

It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that foreigners hold a majority of the common shares of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDTs 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS), which is a document required to be submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange Commission, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 common shares. In other words, foreigners hold 64.27% of the total number of PLDTs common shares, while Filipinos hold only 35.73%. Since holding a majority of the common shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.

As shown in PLDTs 2010 GIS, as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT common shares is P5.00 per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares is P10.00 per share. In other words, preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares but cannot elect directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares. Worse, preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT while common shares constitute only 22.15%. This undeniably shows that beneficial interest in PLDT is not with the non-voting preferred shares but with the common shares, blatantly violating the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership in a public utility.

In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that [n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x x organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens x x x.

To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDTs common shares, constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn; (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%. This kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery of the Constitution.

[Thus, the Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission was DIRECTED by the Court to apply the foregoing definition of the term capital in determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.] Liban v. Gordon G.R. 175352 January 18, 2011 FACTS Richard J. Gordon (respondent) filed for a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration on the promulgated Decision by the Court on July 15, 2009. The case brought about by the petitioners was regarding to Gordons forfeiture of his seat in the Senate when he accepted the Chairmanship in the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). The court ruled that it was not the case, as PNRC is not a government-owned and controlled corporation for the purpose of prohibition in Sect. 13, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Court, however, further declared void the PNRC Charter (as in R.A. 95) insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and consequently ruled that the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. 95 was not an issue in the aforementioned case; the petitioners did not raise its constitutionality. As the court decided, the petitioners did not have standing to file the instant petition. Hence, the pronouncement of the Court on the validity of R.A. No. 95 should be considered obiter. ISSUE

Are the provisions of R.A. No. 95 valid and constitutional? HELD Yes. Richard J. Gordons Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration and movantintervenor PNRCs Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision in G.R. No. 175352 dated July 15, 2009 were granted. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 95, as amended, the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, was not raised by the parties as an issue and should not have been passed upon by the Court. The structure of the PNRC, being neither strictly private nor public in nature, R.A. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety.

Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay 540 SCRA 424

FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice? RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no

charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]. Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues; the payment of professional tax; the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and the retaking of the lawyers oath.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,Mo dernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and theDelfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision onpeoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed byCongress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to theConstitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it isoutside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention. Issues: (1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or anamendment of the Constitution. Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementingl egislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule thatwhat has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). Thedelegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rulesand regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it

would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guaranteeof equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revisioncannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971 FACTS: The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. ISSUE: Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s. HELD: The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many

"elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory. No costs Lambino & Aumentado vs COMELEC Amendment vs Revision Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number of votes comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters. This has been verified by local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within that case. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 ArtXVII of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed

amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments. Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be parliament to enact more rules. There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.

***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by the Lambino Group 10 (ten) Justices of the Supreme Court voted that Republic Act 6735 is adequate.

****RA 6735: An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor