Araceli Yal Noriega Curtis MATS, University of Salford

ETHNIC TERRORISM: A USEFUL CONCEPT?

What separates us from the animals, what separates us from the chaos,
is our ability to mourn people weve never met.

David Levithan, Love Is the Higher Law Ethnic terrorism is a relatively new concept, introduced to the world in 1998 by Daniel Byman in an article entitled 'The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism'. However, it has not caught on in the literature and research of terrorism, much less in the policies informed by them. In the present paper I will discuss whether this concept could be used by researchers and policymakers to bring an end to protracted ethnic conflicts around the world. I will review the definitions, structure and characteristics of ethnic terrorists, as put forward by various authors, exemplifying them with some of the worst instances of ethnic conflict in the past few years. I will also look into the international law mandate known as Reponsibility to Protect and whether the international community would react more promptly to events such as the Rwandan genocide or the war in Darfur if the concept of ethnic terrorism is more commonly used. By changing our understanding of the violence displayed in these conflicts and looking at it from the perspective of terrorism/counter-terrorism, we could effectively end war crimes and gross violations of human rights between ethnic groups around the world. This would only be a means to stop the conflict, but would not solve the basic question of hatred among ethnic groups. Further steps should be taken to repair the social fabric of these nations, if at all possible; that, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper. Before going into the possible applications of the concept, it is necessary to define ethnic conflict, as terrorism is but a tactic used in it, and we also need to provide a definition for terrorism itself. According to the Encyclopedia of World Terrorism (2003: p. 537), ethnic conflict is a conflict between two or more ethnic communities. These conflicts exist all over the world: the Fur against the Zaghawa, the Turks against the Kurds, or the Tutsi against the Hutu, to name but a few examples. Large-scale ethnic conflicts are occurring today in several corners of the world; we know about

Darfur in Sudan, and the ethnic violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While these conflicts unfold, the international community sits idly by, supporting interventions in states that may not pose an important threat anymore. This is unquestionably the case of the war on Iraq, and could very well be the case of a war on Iran fairly soon. So far, the academic community has not reached consensus on a single definition for terrorism. A debate has been going on for years between different authors, but it is too long to go into in this paper. Therefore, I will use my own definition of the concept, based on what seem to be the main points of agreement among authors. Terrorism is a tactic that spreads fear through violent action against civilians people who are not directly involved in a conflict, who do not wield weapons - to achieve a political goal. Byman (1998) states that ethnic terrorism uses this kind of violence to create a particular, local identity. He goes on to establish that ethnic terrorism seeks to undermine other possible identities and that this tactic has been associated with nationalist movements, as the end result is a redrawing of state borders to contain one specific ethnicity. On reading this, I think of the former Yugoslavia and the current use of the term Balkanization. Apart from Byman's article, where he introduces the concept of ethnic terrorism, there are relatively few articles on the subject. One writer who seems to support Byman's theory of ethnic terrorism is Jeffrey Kaplan. In his article on the fifth wave of terrorism (2008), he introduces ethnic terrorism as the newest expression of terror, coming after revolutionary/anarchic and religious terrorism, and he accompanies his introduction with examples of terrorist groups that are mainly concerned with their ethnic identities. He stresses the importance of rape, as used by those groups, to further their goals, implying that rape, currently considered as a war crime, should be considered a terrorist act, at least in the context of ethnic conflict. In the same article, Kaplan states that ethnic terrorist groups share several characteristics. These are: terrorists have, in general, moved to isolated areas inside their countries; they are motivated by and seek to establish racial or ethnic purity; they will not compromise, even when there are differences among themselves; they will pursue genocidal tactics; they are obsessed with women (hence the rapes) as reproducers of race; the violence has become so widespread that it has lost the power to convey its message; the rapes and killings make it impossible for former terrorists to be reintegrated into their communities; they find refuge in neighboring states; they are authoritarian and their power is based on charismatic leaders who interpret religious and other tropes for their followers. Although Kaplan acknowledges that it is nearly impossible to find one single ethnic group that contains all of these characteristics, he mentions Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army and the Khmer

Rouge before it came to power as examples of ethnic terrorists. In fact, one could plausibly argue that the Rwandan genocide of 1994, or even the conflict in Darfur or the Democratic Republic of Congo fit the bill as well. The conflict in the DRC, particularly, has been well known for its systematic rape of women; indeed, I believe this is a perfect example of Kaplan's concerns and should definitely be considered terrorism. You cannot rape half of your population to send a message and expect them to not be terrorised. Going beyond the definition for ethnic terrorism, Ackam and Asal (2005) have looked at how this phenomenon is structured. They establish relationships between different variables that affect the development of ethnic terrorism, including rebellion, repression, the importance of identity, opportunities, support, discrimination and leadership, among others. These are all integral to the funtioning of an ethnic terrorist organization and to the perceptions that both its own ethnic group and the rival state have of them and their activities, as this will determine the success or failure of the terrorists' goals. Terrorist techniques currently in use by ethnic groups in conflict include the already mentioned widespread use of rape as a weapon of war, attacks on civilian communities belonging to a rival ethnic group, and the targeting of refugee and internally displaced persons camps. These attacks ocurr with despairing frequency, even in cases where cease-fires have been agreed upon. Should they not be considered terrorism just because they are not a direct threat to the economic or political interests of Western countries? It might seem that creating a new label, such as ethnic terrorism, is like splitting hairs; after all, the concept is very similar to that of nationalist terrorism and some authors, such as Pluchinsky (2006), use the term ethnonationalist terrorism. For the purposes of this essay, I will not conflate both terms and use only ethnic terrorism, while acknowledging that the line between the two is fine and one should tread it carefully. I believe the main difference between ethnic and nationalist terrorism is the fact that ethnic terrorist groups may not want to create a state of their own. Here I disagree with Byman and other authors because I consider that ethnic terrorists want to achieve full control of the state within its current boundaries, dominating any other ethnic identities living in the same space. Nationalist terrorists, on the other hand, seek to create a separate state that belongs exclusively to them. Despite the difficulties posed by this differentiation between kinds of terrorism, I believe that having more specific definitions could be useful in that they could prompt the international community to stop protracted and extremely violent ethnic conflicts wherever they occur. Perhaps it should not be necessary to create another term for this specific kind of violence. Currently, one of the most important mandates of international law is know as Responsibility to

Protect. Established at the beginning of the XXI Century and usually accredited to former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, R2P (as it is commonly know in international relations circles) has two basic principles: A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of nonintervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. (Evans, 2008: 40). Responsibility to Protect was conceived with very two specific cases in mind: Srebrenica and Rwanda, which are perfect examples of ethnic conflict reaching the level of terror. Indeed, the mandate specifically mentions cases of gross violations of human rights and ethnic cleansing as sufficient basis for intervention. As has been argued, in both cases there are elements that can be considered terrorism, such as the widespread raping of women and the targeting of rival ethnic civilian populations. In other words, the obligation created for the international community through R2P includes situations that fit Byman's and Kaplan's conceptualization of ethnic terrorism. That we have failed to comply with this responsbility speaks volumes about our priorities; after all, the international community has had no qualms about intervening in other states without evidence of actual crimes, but only on the grounds that said state was somehow supporting or harboring terrorists, while remaining impassible in the face of genocide or ethnic cleansing. Unfortunately, Responsiblity to Protect does not seem to be enough basis for an international large-scale, committed intervention. Ethnic conflicts -where the reasons to apply Responsiblity to Protect largely surface- are usually considered parochial and therefore non-threating to international (read: Western) interests; as such, the Western world pays little attention to them. It is likely that there will be words of condemnation, and international organizations will establish a humanitarian mission or two, which will inevitably be underfunded and understaffed. Darfur is the clearest example of this situation: international organizations, non-governmental as well as inter-governmental, received reports of the atrocities committed by all parties to the conflict; an African Union mission was sent, followed by a United Nations mission; and yet the humanitarian situation remains dire, as the violence has not abated. Indeed, the international community seemed reluctant to even consider the conflict in its

genocidal proportions. In general, the reaction of the international community towards ethnic terrorism is of shocked indifference. Shock at the crimes committed against other human beings, but ultimately indifferent about intervening to stop them. There might be online or offline petitions and campaigns, requesting the United Nations or a particular government to 'do something about it', but they are usually over once the international organism passes a resolution. On the other hand, that terrorism is considered a global threat and as such, it warrants swift international action. A terrorist threat can be real or perceived, but once a politician decides to use the term for a specific situation or cause, there is instant mobilization: military interventions, economic sanctions or other measures are taken against states that are viewed as sponsors of terrorist groups. These international actions are sometimes cloaked in the language of Responsibility to Protect and are disguised as humanitarian interventions: defense of human rights, freedom from a dictatorship, bringing democracy to the world. It might seem contradictory but the fight on terror was also supposed to be about freedom and human rights. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the on-going economic sanctions against Iran were justified at the beginning as a means to bring about democracy in those countries, and the 1998 international military intervention in Kosovo was explained clearly as the only possible way to stop the ethnic cleansing. It makes one wonder where do Western powers draw the line for intervening in other, nonWestern nations, as they have not demonstrated the same level of commitment for ridding African and other countries of the war crimes and gross violations of human rights carried out by conflicts among ethnic groups. Sudan, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo have already been mentioned, but there are ethnic conflicts in other countries as well, some of them began as ethnic groups spilled over the border fleeing the violence. Such is the case of Chad. I firmly believe that it is time for the international community to take a long, hard look at those issues we claim to care about and actually set about solving them. Considering that ethnic conflicts could involve terrorist tactics to achieve the political goals of the armed parties would likely mean a likely and effective mobilization by the international community. To do this, we need to use Byman's concept to analyse the ethnic conflicts that are happening around the world today. This would help politicians to garner enough popular support for an intervention if they presented the horrifying acts of violence committed during the course of an ethnic war in terms of terrorism. It would also help the general public to understand and relate to what is going on in such remote parts of the world. Here is where Kaplan's conceptualization of the characteristics of ethnic terrorist groups

becomes most useful for the analysis of any specific situation. In the case of rape, for example, the International Criminal Court has begun to recognize its widespread use as a war crime. We should now take the next step and consider it a terrorist tactic, used to intimidate and spread fear within a population, as well as sending a message about which ethnicity is worth protecting and reproducing and which is/are not. The abduction of children into armed militias should also be considered an act of terror, as it affects their psyche and their ability to later reintegrate fully into their communities. This is another characteristic that Kaplan considers fundamental for ethnic terrorism. These children grow up knowing nothing but violence, they are trained to view those people from a different ethnic origin as inferior, and their acts of aggression against them as justifiable and even desirable. We can well imagine that building a culture of peace is simply not possible under these circumstances, unless we can prevent the abductions from happening in the first place. Pointing out to cases such as that of rapper Emmanuel Jal (originally from South Sudan) as a former child soldier who has managed to reintegrate into a community does not excuse the abducters nor does it in any way reduce the impact that the abductions and forced militarization have on children. Neither should it imply that because there are a few cases of successful reintegration, the abduction of children into armed groups should not be considered an act of terror. Another case that we can use to examplify Kaplan's and Byman's conceptualizations is that of Darfur, where militia attacks against refugee and displaced persons camps have become commonplace, even when these places are guarded by international peacekeeping troops. The logic behind the attacks is the eradication of undesirable ethnic groups. The attacks should, by all means, be considered terrorism: the goal of the attackers is not only to eliminate their perceived enemies, but to send a message to whoever might decide to challenge them by supporting the rival ethnic group. We can see that both Byman and Kaplan provide solid frameworks to look at ethnic conflicts from a new, different perspective, and this would allow us to consider that the acts of violence mentioned above are as much terrorist acts as are the attacks on a country's embassies or representatives. Even applying the system dynamics put forth by Ackam and Asal would provide another, more in-depth understanding of, for example, Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, as the authors stress the importance of leadership and perceptions of the ethnic terrorist group at home and abroad. The belated 2012 Stop Kony campaign could be used to illustrate the point about international reactions. Ethnic conflict is currently the most pervasive type of conflict in the world, claiming thousands of lives every year. The kind and level of violence perpetrated between warring factions is varied, but

in some cases it has reached alarming levels, which should be considered terrorism. These actions, perpetrated against unarmed peoples, simply because they belong to a different ethnicity, are sometimes used to send messages to both the ethnic group in general and the armed militants in particular. Escalation of violence means that no one is safe. Is this not what we consider terrorism? Should we only act when violence affects directly some economic interest of the West? And what do we make then of our claims to seek peace, freedom and democracy around the world and for all peoples? If we begin to think of our common humanity in terms of national interest, compounding it with already-established economic, political or social interests, it would be easier to apply the label of terrorism to ethnic conflicts and intervene in a decisive and timely manner. The concept of ethnic terrorism, as I have sought to show above, could be useful when analysing a situation of violent ethnic conflict in terms of terrorism. Doing so could spark a response in the international community, especially at decision-making levels, to intervene and stop the atrocities. This would mean that the international community, at decision-making levels as well as the general public, has to change its paradigms: we should not consider that rape is a "private" or domestic problem, to be investigated and solved at the local level, if at all; that specifically targeting civilians from a different ethnic group, even when they are not part of a militia o supporting them, is terrorism; that kidnapping children to turn them into soldiers is monstrous. When these atrocities occur anywhere in the world, they are an affront and a threat to human dignity. For how can we say we are committed to making the world a better place, to bringing democracy and freedom if we are unable or unwilling to mourn for those affected by ethnic terrorism?

References Ackam, B.K., & Asal, V. (2005) The Dynamics of Ethnic Terrorism. Paper presented at System Dynamics Society 2005 Conference, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States of America. http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2005/proceed/papers/AKCAM225.pdf Byman, D. 1998. The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 21(2). pp. 149-169. Doi: 10.1080/10576109808436060

Encyclopedia of World Terrorism. 1996-2002. (2003). Ethnonationalist Terrorists. 1996-2002. (pp. 537541.) Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference. Evans, G. (2008). The Responsibility to Protect. Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Kaplan, J. (2008). Terrorism's Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma. [Electronic version] Perspectives on Terrorism. 2(2). Retrieved from: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/26/html Pluchinsky, D. (2006). Ethnic Terrorism: Themes and Variations. In Tan, T.H.A. (Ed.) The Politics of Terrorism. A Survey. pp. 40-54. London: Routledge.