Journal of Applied Psychology 2004, Vol. 89, No.

1, 52–72

Copyright 2004 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0021-9010/04/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0021-9010.89.1.52

Mutuality and Reciprocity in the Psychological Contracts of Employees and Employers
Guillermo E. Dabos and Denise M. Rousseau
Carnegie Mellon University
The authors assessed the joint perceptions of the employee and his or her employer to examine mutuality and reciprocity in the employment relationship. Paired psychological contract reports were obtained from 80 employee– employer dyads in 16 university-based research centers. On the basis of in-depth study of the research setting, research directors were identified as primary agents for the university (employer) in shaping the terms of employment of staff scientists (employees). By assessing the extent of consistency between employee and employer beliefs regarding their exchange agreement, the present study mapped the variation and consequences of mutuality and reciprocity in psychological contracts. Results indicate that both mutuality and reciprocity are positively related to archival indicators of research productivity and career advancement, in addition to self-reported measures of Met Expectations and intention to continue working with the employer. Implications for psychological contract theory are presented.

Shared understandings and reciprocal contributions for mutual benefit are the core of functional exchange relationships (Blau, 1964) and constructive psychological contracts between workers and employers (Rousseau, 1995). Although workers and employers often differ in their perceptions and interpretations regarding the terms of employment (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000, 2002; Porter, Pearce, Tripoli, & Lewis, 1998), some degree of mutuality or shared understanding is essential for the parties to achieve their interdependent goals (Rousseau, 1995). Mutuality exists, for example, where both worker and employer concur that the employer has committed to providing career development opportunities. Failure to reach an objective agreement can give rise to psychological contract violation (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1995), for example, where the worker and employer hold widely differing notions of what career development means. In addition, workers and employers typically strive to maintain a fair balance in the reciprocal inducements and contributions each has offered the other (Blau, 1964). When one party’s contributions generate an imbalance in the relationship, the indebted party experiences feelings of obligation to the other and seeks to reciprocate as means of restoring the balance (Eisenberger, Armeli, Rexwinkel, Lynch, & Rhoades, 2001; Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986; Greenberg, 1980; Shore & Wayne, 1993). For example, an employer providing career development might anticipate that workers enjoying such opportunities will recognize an obligation

Guillermo E. Dabos, Heinz School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University; Denise M. Rousseau, Heinz School of Public Policy and Management and Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, August 2002, Denver, Colorado. A Heinz Foundation Research Chair supported this research. We thank Mark Fichman and Carrie Leana. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Guillermo E. Dabos, Heinz School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie MellonUniversity,Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania15213.E-mail:gdabos@andrew .cmu.edu 52

to provide the employer a substantial return in the future. Failure to reciprocate the other party’s actions erodes the quality of the exchange relationship (Cotterell, Eisenberger, & Speicher, 1992; Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1995). Although mutuality and reciprocity play important roles in theories of relationships and employment, they are seldom studied directly. The present study examines the extent to which workers and employers share beliefs regarding specific terms of the exchange (mutuality) and their reciprocal commitments (reciprocity). By investigating the extent of consistency between worker and employer beliefs, this study maps the variation in mutuality and reciprocity occurring in an employment relationship. It provides evidence of how mutuality and reciprocity impact such employment-related outcomes as objective indicators of productivity and career advancement and subjective measures of Met Expectations and intention to continue working with the employer. This study differs from previous research in several ways. First, it matches each employee’s psychological contract report with that of his or her employer, an uncommon feature in previous research. Although there has been little work incorporating the employer’s perspective, those studies that do exist typically have used either general unit-level reports from the employer’s representative (e.g., Porter et al., 1998) or between-group comparisons of managers and workers (e.g., Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000). Second, the research site was selected to overcome the limitations of past research in capturing the employer’s perspective. Determining who speaks for the organization is a major challenge (Guest & Conway, 2000). Previous research has used direct supervisors or top managers to represent the employer’s perspective without ascertaining whether these individuals were the primary agent for the firm in shaping the terms of employment (e.g., Lester, Turnley, Bloodgood, & Bolino, 2002). Because previous studies mixed different kinds of firms or organizational activities, it cannot, however, be inferred that each employer’s representative played the same role in their firm’s employment relationship. This study focuses on autonomous research units in a university setting where each research director had primary control over recruitment, development, and research opportunities of the scientists studied.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS: MUTUALITY AND RECIPROCITY

53

Finally, because this research design is likely to introduce unitlevel variance, the present study also examines the extent to which unit-level variables might confound the effects observed at the dyadic level.

Psychological Contract Theory
The psychological contract in employment refers to the system of beliefs that an individual and his or her employer hold regarding the terms of their exchange agreement (Rousseau, 1995). These beliefs are shaped by preemployment factors (e.g., values, motives), on-the-job experiences (e.g., socialization practices), and broader societal context (e.g., norms). Psychological contracts are characterized as “schemas shaped by multilevel factors” (Rousseau, 2001a, p. 525), which affect the creation of meaning around promises and commitments workers and employers make to each other, the interpretations of the scope of their obligations, and the degree of mutuality and reciprocity the parties manifest. Much of the value in creating psychological contracts lies in their capacity to reduce insecurities and anticipate future exchanges, helping both individuals and organizations to meet their needs (Rousseau, 1995; Shore & Tetrick, 1994). When workers and employers agree on the terms of the contract, their future exchanges develop into actions predictable by each party, facilitating planning, coordination, and effective performance (Rousseau, 1995). This agreement becomes manifest in the degree of mutuality and reciprocity between the parties to a psychological contract. In the context of psychological contract, mutuality describes the degree to which the two parties agree on their interpretations of promises and commitments each party has made and accepted (i.e., agreement on what each owes the other). Reciprocity refers to the degree of agreement about the reciprocal exchange, given that commitments or contributions made by one party obligate the other to provide an appropriate return. Relatedly, the leader–member exchange (LMX) approach has recognized that managers develop differentiated exchange relationships with their subordinates (e.g., Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen & Scandura, 1987). It also has addressed the dynamics of agreement in the manager–subordinate relationship (Graen & Schiemann, 1978). Although LMX research often adopts a dyadic perspective to investigate both manager and subordinate perceptions of their relationship (e.g., Engle & Lord, 1997; Maslyn & Uhl-Bien, 2001; Schriesheim, Neider, & Scandura, 1998), it typically does not examine the nature of the commitments the parties have exchanged (Rousseau, 1998). Instead, most LMX research on agreement investigates the quality of the exchange as a function of the similarity between manager and worker characteristics (Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993), attitudes (Phillips & Bedeian, 1994), personality traits (Deluga, 1998), positive affectivity (Bauer & Green, 1996), values (Ashkanasy & O’Connor, 1997; Steiner, 1988), cognitive styles (Allinson, Armstrong, & Hayes, 2001), or implicit theories and self-schemas (Engle & Lord, 1997). Although these studies demonstrate that high-quality leader–member relationships resulted from manager–worker similarity, they did not investigate the consequences associated with agreement regarding specific exchange terms. In contrast, the present study focuses more directly on the degree of agreement in the actual commitments employer and employee have exchanged and investigates its impact on subjective and objective measures of performance and continued membership in the organization.

There is limited empirical investigation of mutuality or reciprocity in psychological contract research. Studies to date have been largely one-sided, dominated by the employee perspective (e.g., Guzzo, Noonan, & Elron, 1994; Robinson, Kraatz, & Rousseau, 1994; Rousseau, 1990) and have focused primarily on dysfunctionality in the employment relationship. In particular, the vast majority of studies have investigated contract violation and its associated consequences (e.g., Bunderson, 2001; Robinson, 1996; Robinson & Morrison, 1995; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994; Turnley & Feldman, 2000). Little attention has been paid to the potential upside of functional employment relationships, that is, the consequences associated with agreement and psychological contract fulfillment. In an initial study of joint employee– employer perceptions, Porter and colleagues (1998) found that gaps between employee and employer perceptions of organizational inducements provided unique explanatory power for an employee’s satisfaction with the organization, even after controlling for job satisfaction and individual performance. That study used high-level executives to represent the employer and to report on the average level of inducements the firm provided to specific groups of employees. In accordance, the authors assumed no significant within-group variance in inducements, or in other words, that the employee– organization arrangements were largely standardized across workers rather than idiosyncratic for individuals. Two studies examined the specific terms of the psychological contract and general level of agreement between workers and managers. Herriot, Manning, and Kidd (1997) conducted a nationwide survey using the critical incident technique and convenience samples of individuals where workers and managers represented a variety of firms and economic sectors. Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler (2000) examined between-groups differences in the psychological contracts of workers and managers from a wide range of public service departments of the same large local authority. Both studies reported considerable overall agreement regarding the terms of the psychological contract but also significant differences regarding the saliency of mutual obligations. Herriot et al. found that while both groups endorsed similar sets of obligations, managers focused more on intangible employment terms, such as humanity and recognition, whereas workers focused more on fair pay, safe conditions, and job security. Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler (2000) confirmed that while managers and work groups agreed on the general nature of the employment relationship, managers reported higher scores than workers did on employer fulfillment of its commitments to workers. Finally, in an analysis extending the same data on the public sector organization over time, Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler (2002) explored the bidirectionality of the norm of reciprocity. They found empirical support that the norm of reciprocity operates for both parties to an employment relationship, extending prior research that focused exclusively on the employee perceptions of reciprocity (Shore & Barksdale, 1998). These studies provided evidence of variations in between-groups agreement but could not investigate the impact of joint perceptions because of the absence of paired employee– employer data. To investigate joint perceptions, we next describe the distinctive context of our research, a setting chosen because its work process and structure facilitate the study of employee– employer beliefs regarding their joint psychological contracts.

Two dimensions reflect the transactional psychological contract: (a) narrow involvement in the organization.. Mittermeir. and stability built on the traditions and the history of the relationship. entails mutual promises and reciprocal commitments made and accepted by the parties.. functioning as truly independent small-scale organizations. The measurement framework Rousseau (2000) developed operationalizes these three psychological contract forms. research center directors are the primary “contract makers” (Rousseau. 305). Joint Perceptions of Mutuality and Reciprocity Mutuality and reciprocity are represented by the extent of agreement center directors and staff scientists manifest across different psychological contract obligations. 1979).. experimentation. whether it is a university or a school within the university. “The standard model for a research setting is the university.g. With high affective commitment. competence. & Anbar. 2000) to characterize the psychological contracts of research collaborations. Directors retain considerable control over administrative decisions affecting their centers by taking part in various academic committees or by influencing the selection of other colleagues who occupy critical managerial positions in the hierarchy. individual entrepreneurship. acting in effect as the primary agent of the employer and foremost contract maker in expressing commitments and evaluating performance of staff scientists (center members). 1994) in this employment relationship. 1979). publication. access to promotions and incentives). and Waller (1979) reported that university-based research centers retain most of the structural power in terms of goal setting. 1995. a self-consciously egalitarian organization that emphasizes autonomy. promotions and incentives. Whether the parties agree on specific contract terms (mutuality) and on the reciprocal contributions these terms entail (reciprocity) has been postulated to play a fundamental role in shaping the operation of an employment relationship (Rousseau. 1979). 1979. Moreover. Although certain aspects of the employment relationship are still managed at the university level (e. shared information. 1966). 1966. Research organizations tend to allow scientists a great deal of autonomy and control over their own tasks. Although psychological contract theory is predicated on a perception of mutuality. Low levels of organizational commitment and weak integration into the organization allow for high member rotation and freedom to enter new contracts. Frequent communication. Typical measures of psychological contracts have focused on whether the nature of the exchange is relational or transactional. Research centers exist in a variety of venues. directors depend on contributions from center scientists for accomplishing research goals and scientific productivity. At the same time. Although these two forms of employment agreement have proven broadly relevant to organizations over many years (e. Research directors (center leaders) play a crucial role. they benefited from a great deal of autonomy. 1995. Mutuality provides both parties the basis to align behaviors with the actual commitments made and accepted in the context of the relationship. are open-ended collaborations with only loosely specified performance terms. participation at conferences. 1985. In general. Transactional contracts refer to collaborations of limited duration with well-specified performance terms that can be characterized as easy-to-exit agreements with relatively high turnover. or career development are largely determined by the research director and his or her personal management style. Kruse. 1981. because they balance or blend features of both relational and transactional arrangements. Williamson. As Lambright and Teich (1981) pointed out. Cohen. 1995). 1990). 1990. 1994. benefits administration). actual mutuality) is essential for the parties if they are to achieve their interdependent goals. more recently. often characteristic of high involvement work and knowledge organizations operating in highly competitive markets (Pfeffer. budget and resource allocation.. Despite the variety of organizational types. and minimal administrative control” (p. often in the form of job security. 1982. Balanced terms include dynamic performance requirements and career development. as critical players of organizational politics. limited to a few well-specified performance terms. hypothesis testing. the social structure of research organizations is strikingly similar (P.g.. the relationship between research director and center scientists captures a substantial portion of the employment relationship. We used the framework developed by Rousseau (1995. Hybrid or balanced contracts. accessing promotions. This similarity has been attributed to the ethos of science and its specific norms regarding appropriate behavior for scientists in organizations (Pelz & Andrews. Relational obligations include mutual loyalty and long-term stability. 1979. from universities and government agencies to private enterprises (de Hemptinne & Andrews. Relational contracts.. Mintzberg. Knorr. and (b) short-term duration. often acts as an umbrella hosting a number of research centers. and power (Knorr et al. 1995). relational contracts exemplify many emblematic characteristics of paternalistic relationships. Psychological Contracts in Research Collaborations This collaborative relationship between research director and staff scientists. Aichholzer.e. 2001a). Rousseau. In effect they “constitute more or less independent small-scale organizations” (p. Payne. peer evaluation of performance. 98). some degree of objective agreement (i. non-uniformity. maintain the involvement and long-term time horizon that characterize relational exchanges while at the same time allowing for greater flexibility and changing contract requirements as projects evolve and circumstances change. B. strong member– organization integration. and control over research tasks. How each party perceives these promises and commitments regarding the terms of the collaborative exchange can be conceptualized as their psychological contract (Rousseau. employment arrangements have manifested a hybrid pattern. Thus. the role of research directors is “much more similar in structural terms to the role of top management than to the role of a departmental head in an industrial firm” (Knorr et al. The broader organization. In this context.. an important number of contract expectations are instantiated at the center level (e. in contrast.g. Rousseau & Greller. Rousseau. The opportunities staff scientists have for funding. writing). p. Macneil. and . a government agency. built around specific research tasks (e. The university-based research centers studied here consisted of a leader or research director (often a prestigious head professor) and a number of members or staff scientists with different levels of scholarly development. Storer. Lambright & Teich. performance requirements. scholarly development. or a research and development facility of a large corporation.54 DABOS AND ROUSSEAU Social Structure of Research Organizations The present study focuses on employee– employer relations in the context of research centers. 97). theory development.g.

1998. a scientist’s rating of the director’s balanced obligation and the director’s rating of his or her own balanced obligation) are more highly related to each other than to dissimilar obligations (e. 1997). 1999. money. love. see Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler.. and affection). affective commitment. 1990.PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS: MUTUALITY AND RECIPROCITY 55 common frames of reference (e. Hypothesis 2: A staff scientist’s belief regarding his or her obligation to the research director will be more highly and positively related to that director’s belief regarding his or her own corresponding obligation to the scientist than will noncorresponding obligations. 2000). & Liden. An employment relationship is more likely to endure and meet its goals where parties reciprocate their commitments and obligations to one another (Rousseau. Robinson & Rousseau. However. 1997). Hofmann & Morgeson. Bennett. psychological contracts can become construed as self-fulfilling prophecies reflecting anticipated future exchanges. however. An employment contract is created to benefit both parties. 2001a). Thus. & Liden.g.. 1998). Bunderson. reciprocity in commitments exists where the obligations a staff scientist has toward his or her research director are given in return (reciprocated) for corresponding director obligations to that scientist. mutuality exists where both research director and staff scientist have the same beliefs regarding the extent of one party’s particular obligation.g. and information) and/or more socioemotional resources (e. 2001. 2000). 1995. Hypothesis 3: Mutuality will explain additional variance in the outcomes associated with the employment relationship beyond that provided by the separate perceptions research directors and staff scientists have regarding the terms of their psychological contracts. little research has been conducted on the joint perceptions of the employee and employer regarding the commitments they have exchanged. yet. workers and employers often have different understandings regarding specific terms of the exchange (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler. an employment relationship is more likely to have positive consequences where its parties develop shared understandings regarding the existence and meanings of specific contract terms (Rousseau. Less attention has been paid to the positive or functional outcomes associated with agreement and psychological contract fulfillment (for an exception. 1996.. Robinson & Morrison. 2001a). goods.. 1992). Wayne et al. 2001a).. & Kaiser.. Greenberg.g. Wayne. one’s manager or the larger organization.. Hypothesis 4: Reciprocity will explain additional variance in the outcomes associated with the employment relationship beyond that provided by the separate perceptions research directors and staff scientists have regarding the terms of their psychological contracts. Turnley & Feldman. 1980). with negative consequences for both individuals and organizations. 2001. 1997. . Brittingham. Eisenberger et al. or beneficial treatment not only increase their liking for the giver but also seek to reciprocate as means of restoring the balance in the relationship (e. making both individuals and organizations more productive and their interactions more mutually supportive and constructive (Rousseau.. reciprocity typically entails the return of relatively similar types of resources. Settoon. Evidence for reciprocity exists when corresponding director and scientist obligations are more highly and positively related to each other (e. recipients of help. 2001. Under the general norm of reciprocity (Gouldner. DePaulo. Evidence for mutuality exists when scientist and director assessments of the same psychological contract obligation (e. Porter et al. Hypothesis 1: A staff scientist’s belief regarding his or her research director’s obligation will be more highly and positively related to that director’s own belief regarding the same obligation than to that director’s beliefs regarding dissimilar obligations. particularly in work relationships as opposed to family or communal ones (Foa & Foa.g. Previous research on perceived organizational support and LMX has suggested that shared understandings and reciprocity-based behaviors affect such employmentrelated outcomes as productivity. Reciprocating behavior at work is also found to be targeted toward the entity from which benefits accrue (e. Engle & Lord. When parties develop shared understandings and reliance on their reciprocal commitments. Nonetheless. 1996. Psychological contract research in general has focused on the negative or dysfunctional consequences associated with perceived breach of contract and contract violation (e.. 1995.. 2000. 1995. In general. 1995.g. Robinson. we expect that positive outcomes for both parties will occur where psychological contracts between research directors and staff scientists are characterized by mutuality and reciprocity.g. 1986. and intention to remain in the organization (Deluga. some degree of actual or objective agreement is required to meet the parties’ goals regarding the exchange. its operation is largely based on each party’s perception of mutuality and reliance on reciprocity. 1997).. an exchange relationship can involve economic resources (e. 1980).. Rousseau. Commitments made by one party to the contract obligate the other to reciprocate because both parties are expected to strive for balance in their exchange (Blau.g. 1960). 1989. Potential discrepancies in each party’s beliefs regarding what was promised and what was delivered can lead to breach of contract (Morrison & Robinson. Wayne et al. Conversely. scientist’s balanced obligation and director’s balanced obligation) than to noncorresponding obligations (e.g. a scientist’s rating of the director’s balanced obligation and the director’s ratings of his or her own transactional or relational obligations). Despite the inherent subjectivity in how the parties understand their employment relationship (Rousseau.g. 1983.. contributions. 1997. Met Expectations. Maslyn & Uhl-Bien. Shore. implicit theories and mental schemas regarding employment) are likely to give rise to high levels of perceived and objective agreement (Engle & Lord.. scientist’s balanced obligation and director’s transactional or relational obligations). Eisenberger et al.g. services. 1964). 1997). devotion. in contrast to the more generalized reciprocity characterizing family or communal relationships. Joint Perceptions and Consequences for the Employment Relationship Joint perceptions of the two sides of the psychological contract can provide important insights into the outcomes an exchange relationship yields (Rousseau & Tijoriwala. To date. Rousseau & Parks. status. 1998). Thus. Thus. 1994..

Interviews with research directors confirmed that centers were instrumental in providing the context and resources for faculty to conduct programmatic research consistent with the typical objectives research faculty have: scientific productivity measured in terms of publications and career advancement along an internal tenure track (Long. Participants responded to two sets of 12 items. we evaluated the construct validity of the psychological contract scales in this setting.04). This study used surveys administered in Spanish and archival data. center scientists worked independently from one another under the general supervision of the center director. Scientist Balanced (S. unusually large lab experiments or interdisciplinary field projects demanded the collaboration of several staff scientists from one or more research centers. All 107 full-time faculty members of the 16 research centers at the school were surveyed. This school was one of the most successful and developed units of a growing national university.. ␣ ϭ . The few ambiguities or discrepancies in meaning resulting from the comparison of the two versions of the questionnaires in the source language (English) were solved using a process of consultation and collaboration with bilingual members of the school’s top management team. & McGinnis. Director Balanced (S.44 years) for research directors and 11. employing the highest number of full-time professors and collecting the highest amount of research funding from both governmental and nongovernmental sources.86 years (SD ϭ 6. As the school developed into a research institution. nonetheless. 15 out of the 16 research directors were male. transactional obligations from scientist to director as rated by the staff scientist): This factor captured all scientist-to-director obligations along the narrow and short-term dimensions (initial eigenvalue ϭ 1. Scientist mobility between centers was unusual and to a large extent constrained by the scientist’s specialization. i.4 (see Table 1). The average center size was 6. Each center comprised a number of research lines. Cronbach’s alpha (␣) for the scale was . yielding 96 completed surveys (89.56 Method Sample and Procedure DABOS AND ROUSSEAU areas of study. Average age was 45. 2000).e. but master’s degrees were also common in more applied fields). i.. research centers replaced the traditional teaching-oriented academic departments as the central unit of organizing within the school.29 years) for directors and 5. transactional obligations from director to scientist as rated by the staff scientist): This factor captured all director-to-scientist obligations along the narrow and short-term dimensions of the contract (initial eigenvalue ϭ 2. Scientist Transactional (S.e. We used principal axis factoring with a varimax rotation to conduct an exploratory factor analysis on 23 of 24 items (1 balanced item turned out to be unclear to respondents and was dropped from the analysis). An initial interview with each center director provided information on how the center was structured. survey measures were independently translated back and forth from the original English version (Brislin. reflecting increasing demands for research in applied and emerging fields.89 years) for staff scientists. Average organizational tenure was 17. On occasion.84..e.92). i. each with eigenvalues greater than 1 and item loadings greater than . Because organizational and cultural factors may affect perceptions of the psychological contracts. staff scientists evaluated their psychological contracts by assessing (a) the extent to which the director had made such commitments or obligations to them and (b) the extent to which they in turn had made such commitments or obligations to the director. where lexical equivalence was impractical.85.98 years) for research directors and 38. Almost 60% of the researchers held a graduate degree (doctoral degrees were the standard. the school prioritized its research and development programs.e. Scientist Relational (S. its research activities..77 years) for scientists. and 6% full professors.63 years (SD ϭ 5. balanced obligations from scientist to director as rated by the staff scientist): This factor captured three out .18 years (SD ϭ 7. i.. interdependent collaborations among scientists were largely limited to data collection.26 years (SD ϭ 6.09 years) for staff scientists.82).53 years (SD ϭ 2. 6 were on sabbatical. All 16 center directors returned the questionnaire. Rousseau. either by educating them directly or by supporting their educational endeavors abroad.e. Among the 11 nonrespondents. relational obligations from director to scientist as rated by the staff scientist): This factor captured all director-to-scientist obligations along the loyalty and stability dimensions (initial eigenvalue ϭ 2. i. i.94). balanced obligations from director to scientist as rated by the staff scientist): This factor captured all director-to-scientist obligations along the dynamic performance and career development dimensions (initial eigenvalue ϭ 8. 1970). Participants were fairly evenly distributed with respect to gender (51 were male and 45 were female). average center or unit tenure was 6.. These factors comprised the following scales: Director Transactional (S. relational obligations from scientist to director as rated by the staff scientist): This factor captured three out of four intended scientist-to-director obligations along the loyalty and stability dimensions (i. Respondents represented the university’s five formal positions on the academic ladder: 21% assistant professors (the typical entry level). ␣ ϭ .40. and major goals. Director Relational (S. The initial solution resulted in the six expected factors consistent with the original English-language version of the PCI. Out of the 16 research centers. and a number of staff scientists whose scholarly development ranged from entry-level assistants without doctoral degrees to senior faculty whose status was comparable with the director.e. Research centers consisted of a research director. all research centers had been in place formally for at least 3 years. The remaining 6 units were relatively newer. Both research directors and staff scientists completed questionnaires containing identity codes to permit matching each scientist’s ratings with those of his or her corresponding research director.61. At the time of this study. usually a prestigious senior faculty in a substantive area of expertise. 27% senior assistant professors. 1993). even in these cases. reflecting the setting’s relatively low turnover. Demographic information and objective outcome measures were collected from administrative records. one of the items did not load significantly on any single factor. 10 were long-standing and well-recognized units with interests grounded in basic science. The school’s dominant human resource strategy was to “make” its own faculty. Data for this study were collected from 16 university-based research centers at a leading research-oriented school of biosciences in Latin America.50 years (SD ϭ 3. ranging from 4 to 10 (actual respondents ranged from 3 to 10 per center). Using items adapted from the Psychological Contract Inventory (PCI. relational. and for the most part. pursuing either doctoral or postdoctoral studies abroad. However. Allison. Finally.79).72% response rate). All items used a 5-point Likert-type scale response format ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a great extent). ␣ ϭ . Since its inception. Moreover.. Participants were assured that all survey responses would be confidential.27. 20% senior associate professors. representing the school’s established Measures Psychological contract scales (staff scientists [S]). initial eigenvalue ϭ 1. ␣ ϭ .e.69 members including the director. measuring first the director’s obligations to them and then their own obligations to the director across the three types of psychological contract: transactional. the process of achieving conceptual equivalence was facilitated by the bilingual first author’s intimate knowledge of the research setting’s culture (Frey. 1980). showing a high retention rate among its often internationally educated researchers and the successful creation and development of its own doctoral program. and balanced. 26% associate professors. To guarantee consistency.

Makes no commitments to retain me as center scientist in the future 3.. i.. Work in this research center for a limited time only 16. The fourth item (i. The instructions in the director questionnaire read as follows: “Consider your relationship with (name of the scientist).82 .PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS: MUTUALITY AND RECIPROCITY 57 Table 1 Exploratory Factor Analysis of Psychological Contract Scales for Staff Scientists (S) and Research Directors (D) Statement Staff scientist scale Director Transactional (S) 1.83 .64 . Similarly. Make research decisions with my interests in mind 8.73 ..75 . relational obligations from director to scientist as rated by the research director): Two items captured the Director-to-Scientist Relational obligations (␣ ϭ .73 . transactional obligations from director to scientist as rated by the research director): Three items captured the director-to-Scientist Transactional obligations as reported by directors (␣ ϭ . balanced obligations from director to scientist as rated by the research director): Two other items captured the Director-to-Scientist Balanced obligations (␣ ϭ .e.e. Only perform specific research activities for which I am compensated Scientist Relational (S) 17.e.76 .72 . Actively seek opportunities for scholarly training and development 22. well-defined research responsibilities 2.86 . 2000) and were asked to consider their own commitments or obligations to a specific staff scientist. Concern for my short.66 — ..66 . Research collaboration for a specified time period only 4.e. Support scientist to attain the highest possible levels of research productivity 7. Factor analysis was conducted separately for each group of respondents.60 . i. research directors were given seven psychological contract statements (Rousseau. without looking for a job elsewhere 20.61 .61 .78 . Take personal responsibility for making this research center more successful (dropped item) Research director scale Director Transactional (D) 1. Help me respond to ever greater scientific challenges within the field 12.89 .50 .82 . Makes no commitments to retain this scientist within the research center in the future 3.67 .71 . Contacts that facilitate opportunities for scholarly development inside and outside the university 11.76 . the seven directors’ statements were also subjected to a principal axis factor analysis with a varimax rotation. well-defined research responsibilities Director Relational (S) 5. Limit scientists’ involvement in the research center and other organizational matters Director Relational (D) 4. Build contacts inside and outside the university to enhance my scholarly career potential 23.87). The dash indicates that the item was not included in the analysis. Support me to attain the highest possible levels of research productivity 10.69 . Concern for scientist’s short. Opportunities for scholarly development within the field Scientist Transactional (S) 13.and long-term personal welfare 6. This result is similar to that reported by Rousseau (2000) in a pretest of the PCI where she suggested the need for rewording this item.86). Psychological contract scales (research directors [D]). of four intended scientist-to-director obligations along the dynamic performance and career development dimensions (initial eigenvalue ϭ 1.70 .81 . Director Balanced (D. A three-factor solution supported the construction of the following scales: Director Transactional (D.74 .and long-term personal welfare Director Balanced (D) 6. ␣ ϭ .78). i. To what extent have you made the following commitments or obligations to (name of the scientist)?” Directors were provided with a 5-point Likerttype scale. Stability within the research center 7. a reduced version of the PCI was used. Stable benefits and resources for my research work Director Balanced (S) 9. Limit scientist’s job to a set of specific. Commit myself personally to this research center (ns item) Scientist Balanced (S) 21. Limited involvement in the research center and other organizational matters 2. “take personal responsibility for making this research center more successful”) was found to convey a confusing meaning between relational and balanced aspects of the contract and thus was dropped from our analysis. along with seven statements assessing the psychological contract. Director Relational (D. Consistent with staff scientists’ measures above. Because research directors used separate questionnaires to rate one by one their psychological contract with each center scientist (varying from 3 to 9 across research centers). Stability within the research center 5. .19 .71 .87). A job limited to specific. Remain with this research center indefinitely 18. Accept increasingly challenging performance standards in research 24.11. Be a steady research center scientist. ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a great extent). Be loyal to this research center and protect its image 19.83 . Provide opportunities for scholarly development within the field Factor loading .81 Note. Fulfill limited number of research responsibilities 14. I have made no commitments to the center director regarding future research collaborations 15.90 .

including not only the psychological contract reports but also the eight relationship quality items assessing met expectations and continuity.03 Ϫ. staff scientists were asked to evaluate the future of the relationship using four items.01 3. the normalized counts of publications and publications coauthored with the research directors provided convergent validation for the scientists’ self-reported measure of met expectations regarding the research collaborations. or external scientists who also participated in the project.44** .74 1.17 .77 0.09 Ϫ.46** .19 .44** .16 .87 0. Scientist Relational (S) 10. Director Relational (D) 13.50 to . In a further analysis.40** .09 .. Formal career advancement. The two additional factors captured the eight relationship quality items with item loadings ranging from . part-time personnel. To further assess the validity of these measures.41** Ϫ. For met expectations.15 Ϫ.54** . Lee.57** . ** p Ͻ . Director Balanced (D) 14. Director Transactional (S) 6.43** .05 .16 1.20 Ϫ.13 .27 4.12 1.46** .08 Ϫ. to advance in their academic career. depending on their position.34** .4.49** .85) Ϫ.39** .54 2. refereed vs. We adapted two measures of the quality of the employment relationship from previous work conducted in an academic setting (Wade-Benzoni & Rousseau.58** Ϫ. Publications and coauthorship.48** Ϫ. Organizational tenure 2. to achieve higher scientific performance.10 Ϫ. All in all. Items assessed the extent to which this research collaboration resulted in scientists being in a better position to make scientific contributions. or the extent to which the research collaboration has been beneficial to the scientist.03 Ϫ.45 0. Scientist Transactional (S) 9.20 Ϫ. and (b) continuity.24* Ϫ.06 .58 DABOS AND ROUSSEAU Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among Variables Variable Control 1. Director Transactional (D) 12. The university used a normalized total weighted for publication’s reputation (e.07 2 3 4 5 6 7 — .52** . Formal career advancement M 11.26** Ϫ.18 .12 Ϫ.26 5. For continuity.12 Ϫ.21 . Because successfully passing an external evaluation warranted the scientist’s reappointment for another period and often a promotion to the next level.27* . In the system governing recruitment and promotion processes at this university. with little variation across different specialties.33** . Because scientific performance in this university was largely measured in terms of publications. in press). Center tenure 3. staff scientists were asked to evaluate the results of the research collaboration with their research director and rate a set of four items. * p Ͻ . and the feasibility of mutually beneficial future collaborations (␣ ϭ .09 Ϫ.16 4.26* Ϫ.32** Ϫ.11 .04 . Director Balanced (S) 8.34** (. Director Relational (S) 7. The six psychological contract scales remained unchanged with item loadings ranging from . Objective outcomes were gathered to corroborate the self-report outcome measures and to assess whether common-method variance was a concern.60** .44** . This normalized publication measure was applied as basis for distributing federal funding among the research units.02 1. publication authors included those center scientists who were actively involved in that research line and peripheral contributors. Scientist Fulfillment (D) 15.45** Ϫ.79 3. These items assessed the extent to which scientists had plans for future research collaboration with the director. national.34 3. 1998) as follows: (a) met expectations. their willingness to keep working with this director.02 Ϫ.68 to . such as student assistants.15 .82 for continuity. Scientist Balanced (S) 11.04 .04 .54** Ϫ. Directors also confirmed that the total number of publications was not expected to vary significantly across specialties because most had similar publication norms. we corroborated that more than 90% of the international publications reported by university’s archives were also represented in the Web of Science Citation Index.07 1.18 .09 2. The number of publications coauthored with the center director was an important measure because the average number of authors per publication was around 5. Educational level (PhD) Scale 5.19 5.07 — Ϫ. scientists must renew their appointments every 3 to 5 years. Cronbach’s alphas for director (D) and scientist (S) scales appear on the diagonal in parentheses.15 .37** Ϫ.31 3. Table 1).19 . Publications 18. A principal axis factoring analysis with varimax rotation on the combined item sets of both the psychological contract and outcome scales from the scientist questionnaire produced the expected eight-factor solution with eigenvalues greater than 1 and item loadings greater than .30** Ϫ.09 .37** Ϫ.04 Ϫ.22* . It was prepared primarily for budgeting and academic planning purposes. we reran the exploratory factor analysis for all scientist responses at once.92) .05. & Rousseau. international vs.. through an external evaluation process incorporating faculty reviewers from other universities.05 4.41 9.19 Ϫ.08 Ϫ.11 — .75 for met expectations and from .84 (cf. and to position themselves within the scientific community (␣ ϭ .00 3.30** .10 Ϫ. Quality of the employment relationship.15 Ϫ.50 1.05 1.18 .21 . In both cases.26* . Gender (male) 4. Typically.g.10 . This index obtained from university records represents an internal rating system completed annually by school department heads assessing each scientist’s likelihood of success in future evaluations.15 1 — . Weighted totals of individual publications and publications coauthored with the research director in the last 3 years were obtained from official university records.32** . this internal rating of formal career advancement provides convergent validation for the scientists’ self-reported measure of continuity.50 0.40** Ϫ.04 0.94) Ϫ. Continuity Objective Outcome 17. N ϭ 80 for all variables.g.44** Ϫ. these results show that the factor structure for both scientist items and director items are strikingly consistent with those reported by previous research based on larger samples (e. nonrefereed).52** .04 Ϫ.53 0.01.25* Note. their willingness to remain with this research center.47** .89 2. Met Expectations 16.24* Ϫ.25* (.50** (.13 Ϫ.40 3.37** .31** .42 3.02 1.22* Ϫ.01 Ϫ.09 .21 . staff scientists used a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a great extent).08 .89). Coauthorship 19. or the intention to continue working with the director.81 2.13 .11 .73 4.66 to .21 .27* .5 authors.03 1.88). Directors confirmed during interviews that every person who substantially contributed to a particular research line was listed on its subsequent publications regardless of his or her organizational status.41 SD 6. .12 .33** Ϫ.04 .24 1.24* Ϫ.10 Ϫ.00 .02 Ϫ.43** .17 1. Hui.10 .00 4.44** Ϫ.

. and Continuity. with those holding doctoral degrees enjoying better opportunities for scientific productivity.45** . Rousseau. center longevity. 1996. 2000). In addition to the transactional and relational obligations.30** .39** Ϫ.50** (. 2001).36** . the most commonly used conceptualization in previous psychological contract research.43** ..79) .37** .27* . Results Discriminant Validity of Psychological Contract Scales We first examined the discriminant validity of the psychological contract scales for staff scientists by conducting a confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS software (Arbuckle & Wothke.45** Ϫ.89) .82) Ϫ. 1994). in both cases. the four-factor and sixfactor models further discriminated between commitments made along each obligation according to their directionality (i. In comparison with the two-factor and the three-factor models. we reran the exploratory factor analysis for all director responses. We also controlled for gender because the effects of gender differences on research productivity and rank advancement in academic settings are well-documented (Long et al.86) Ϫ.15 . A correlation matrix of relevant variables in the study appears in Table 2.88) . replacements were center insiders. Control variables.53** — . 1995). To find the best fitting structure.26* Ϫ.44** . Group-level variables. Finally. 1993.32** .PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS: MUTUALITY AND RECIPROCITY 59 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 (.48** . how well does (name of the scientist) fulfill his or her commitments to you?” (b) “To what extent does (name of the scientist) deliver what he or she promises?” (␣ ϭ .87) .35** (.33** . director’s tenure. 1999) with maximum likelihood estimation. Scientist fulfillment (D. Then.35** Ϫ.49** — Fulfillment. As per the scientists’ questionnaire.e.59** Ϫ.24* (. In the two-factor model.05 .e.32** .34** Ϫ..43** Ϫ. including organizational tenure..67** .g.06 Ϫ.42** Ϫ. Robinson & Rousseau. CoyleShapiro & Kessler. the best fitting factor structure was the . the threefactor model also includes the balanced obligations usually related to either the dynamic performance and/or training and development dimensions of the psychological contract (e.31** .37** . behaviors. career advancement.33** Ϫ.43** Ϫ. These variables were used in an exploratory examination of group-level predictors via hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) when significant between-groups variance existed. and high [more than 4 committees]) and total number of publications in the last 3 years (normalized as per scientist publications described above). loadings of both transactional and relational items contribute to the same factor but with opposite sign. scientist fulfillment of his or her obligations as rated by the research director) emerged as an additional factor beyond those of directors’ psychological contract scales. 2000.15 .02 (. Archival sources provided data on center-level variables that also might have affected perceptions.88) .36** .40** (.49** .35** .48** .31** Ϫ. or outcomes at the individual level. Results indicate that among them. Rousseau.09 Ϫ. we compared several a priori psychological contract factor models.41** — .08 Ϫ.46** Ϫ.34** Ϫ.32** .g.48** Ϫ.66** . transactional and relational items separately contribute to distinct factors (e. Fit statistics for these models are shown in Table 3.03 Ϫ.30** . power (reflected in terms of the number of university committees the director served on which we categorized as low [1 or 2 committees].18 .35** Ϫ. several demographic variables were controlled for in order to rule out alternative explanations for the findings.. e. Two final items in the research director questionnaire assessed overall perceived scientist fulfillment.e. Rousseau. i.41** (.02 Ϫ.24* . 1985). and educational level (Bauer & Green. Macneil. gender.g.78) . Xie & Shauman.20 ..32** . The one-factor model reflects a contractual continuum with two opposite types of contract at the ends: transactional and relational (e.87) . center tenure.02 . medium [3 or 4 committees]..88).39** .32** (. his or her formal position.41** (. dyadic tenure) because only two leadership changes had occurred since the inception of the research centers and.07 . An individual’s center tenure was a good indicator of how long the research center director and staff scientist had been working together (i.g. 1998).35** . including the psychological contract reports as well as the directors’ assessments of scientist fulfillment. from director to scientist or from scientist to director. Maslyn & Uhl-Bien.. Directors were asked to respond about the extent to which each center scientist fulfills his or her commitments or obligations as follows: (a) “Overall.34** Ϫ. 1990. educational level was also expected to have a significant impact on both perceptual and objective outcomes. In the data analysis.54** . Such variables included center size.25* .

075 — 84. the absolute measure of discrepancy between covariances implied by the model and covariances observed in the data (i.07 651. In this case.76 . transactional. In addition. respectively. All ␹2 and ␹diff values are significant at p Ͻ . in other words. Tucker–Lewis index (TLI). relational.g.78 ... balanced–transactional). Finally.92 TLI .45 IFI .07 df 209 208 203 206 194 2 ␹diff ␹2/df 3. 1993). a relational factor.60 . Hui et al. The extent to which mutuality and reciprocity exist should be reflected by smaller average gaps between director and scientist perceptions along the same psychological contract obligation (e. This result was also corroborated by using the index of chi-square relative to its degrees of freedom.164 .68 2. The gap analysis yields two 3 ϫ 3 tables in which the mean difference and the 95% confidence interval of the difference were calculated for all nine mutuality gaps and all nine reciprocity gaps. relational. RMSEA ϭ root-mean-square error of approximation.96.09 445.87) than with the scientist’s perceptions of director relational or balanced obligations (M ϭ 1. For mutuality: GAP ij ϭ ͉ Director Obligation i ͑ D ͒ Ϫ Director Obligation j ͑ S ͒ ͉ For reciprocity: GAP ij ϭ ͉ Director Obligation i ͑ D ͒ Ϫ Scientist Obligation j ͑ S ͒ ͉ . Significantly higher and positive correlations were expected along director and scientist scales of the same psychological contract obligation (on-diagonal scales) than across different obligations (off-diagonal scales).. including a transactional factor.. balanced–transactional). we ran several regression models regressing each scientist scale onto all corresponding director scales and vice versa.74 2 2 Note. the six-factor model presented the lower root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) and a reasonable fit to the hypothetical population covariance matrix of optimally chosen parameter values (i..53 . which also reached the standards of good fit along a variety of fit indices. we examined the variation in mutuality (i.01. we examined the correlations among all corresponding psychological contract obligations (depending on whether the focus was on mutuality or reciprocity) and tested the significance of the difference between on-diagonal (e. RMSEA values between . variation in mutuality).121 .e. 1990). six-factor model.60 DABOS AND ROUSSEAU Table 3 Comparison of Alternative Psychological Contract Factor Structures for Staff Scientists Model One-factor Two-factor Four-factor Three-factor Six-factor ␹2 736.g. IFI ϭ incremental fit index.70 .. agreement regarding the reciprocal exchange) that occurs in the research collaborations between research director and staff scientist.e. 1999). N ϭ 80.08. As indicated above. balanced– balanced) and off-diagonal correlation coefficients (e.45 544. The three-factor structure. and balanced). When regressing a particular scientist scale (e. Starting with the gaps between director and scientist perceptions of the director obligations to the scientist (i. however. we only compared the fit of the first three psychological contract factor models given that the director questionnaire assessed the commitments or obligations from director to scientist but not from scientist to director. the corresponding director scale (i. TLI ϭ . balanced) onto all director scales. All these analyses confirm that the factor structure underlying the PCI measures used here conforms to the measurement model Rousseau specified (2000) and to results reported by previous research based on larger samples (e. IFI ϭ . in press).. where i and j represent the three different types of psychological contract obligations (i. Table 4 reveals that the smaller gaps indeed occurred along the on-diagonal elements for all scales: transactional. Browne & Cudeck. Although all results follow the same pattern.13 2.28 164. agreement regarding one party’s specific obligations) and reciprocity (i. it is important to note that the Joint Perceptions: Mutuality and Reciprocity Using several methods. was the only one reporting a good fit for the data.e. ␹2/df ϭ chi-square relative to its degrees of freedom.92. Consistent with the approach applied by Porter et al.g. and a balanced factor.36 98.g. ␹diff ϭ difference in chi-square from the previous factor structure. For instance.g. respectively).90.05 and .87 and M ϭ 1. balanced– balanced) than along dissimilar obligations (e. and CFI ϭ .g.e. We repeated the analysis of discriminant validity this time on the psychological contract scales research directors used.62 107.90..92 RMSEA . conducting the same confirmatory factor analysis procedure. we first calculated the absolute value of the gaps in perceptions across all psychological contract obligations. and comparative fit index (CFI) above the recommended standard of .47 .e. Finally. We also tested the significance of the difference between on-diagonal and offdiagonal partial regression coefficients... presented the lowest chi-square index. TLI ϭ Tucker–Lewis index.55 ..179 . These indices compare the fit of a given model with a standard model that usually has no covariance among the variables and has been confirmed to perform well even with sample sizes as small as 50 (Bentler. (1998). chi-square) reveals that the six-factor model fitted the data better or. lower means along the ondiagonal elements reflect whether mutuality and reciprocity exist in the employment relationship.65 .e. The six-factor model was the only one having incremental fit index (IFI).96..52 . as follows: . and balanced.146 .. a measure researchers have used to correct for the effect of sample size with a ratio of 2 as an arbitrary indicator of good fit (Arbuckle & Wothke.16 1. balanced) was expected to be the stronger predictor among all director scales.79 ..52 3.69 .81 281. Indeed. CFI ϭ comparative fit index.e. the director’s perception of his or her transactional obligations to the scientist displays a significantly smaller gap with the scientist’s perception of the same transactional obligations (M ϭ 0. ␹2 ϭ chi-square measure of discrepancy.61 .91 CFI .

96 .24* Ϫ.09 11.20.05 7. S ϭ scientist scale.10. the correlation between director and scientist scales was . t(77) ϭ 1. The on-diagonal-balanced-(S)– balanced-(D) coefficient was significantly higher than the off-diagonal-balanced-(S)–transactional-(D) coefficient.05 .24 (1. 2.03) Scale Director Transactional (D) Director Relational (D) Director Balanced (D) Note.90 2.44 ( p Ͻ .92.06 (0.24) 0.65.05 (0. on-diagonal mean difference between director and scientist perceptions of director relational obligations (M ϭ 0.01) for transactional obligations.90 (1.07 6.23) 2.80 (0.03.29* 2.85 (1.04 .36** Ϫ. 2.15 (1.05 Ϫ.69** . Degrees of freedom (dfs) for F are 3.05) 1. 2.27* .01) for balanced obligations.34** .23† Ϫ.28 B2 Ϫ B1 ϭ 0 B 2 Ϫ B3 ϭ 0 3. 1. Values are the mean of the absolute value of the gaps (95% confidence interval of the difference in parentheses).62. In particular.21) 0.02) 2.55** 5.01. 1.12) 0.15 . . S ϭ scientist scale.20 B1 Ϫ B 2 ϭ 0 B1 Ϫ B 3 ϭ 0 2. This overlap between directors’ beliefs regarding relational obligations and their subordinates’ interpretations of both relational and balanced obligations is not surprising. 1.91 (0. p Ͻ .22** .43** Ϫ. D ϭ director scale. ns.87 (0.28* Ϫ.15 Ϫ. Correlations among scales shown in Table 2 support the preceding results.64.01.15 0. 0.87.14 Ϫ. subordinates are likely to experience support that is at once personal (relational) as well as performancebased (balanced).94) 1.25). Bdiff ϭ difference between Bs. 76.69.45) Reciprocity Scientist Transactional (S) Director Transactional (D) Director Relational (D) Director Balanced (D) 0. D ϭ director scale.26* Ϫ. 2.31 B2 Ϫ B1 ϭ 0 B 2 Ϫ B3 ϭ 0 3.87 (1. positive correlations along director and scientist assessments of the same psychological contract obligation.48* .07) Director Balanced (S) 1.73** .74.77.93 (1. revealing strong.36) Director Relational (S) 1. but it was not significantly higher (albeit in the right direction) than the off-diagonal balanced (S)-relational (D).25) 0.38) Scientist Relational (S) 1. 1.04 B 3 Ϫ B1 ϭ 0 B3 Ϫ B2 ϭ 0 0.26* 3. Finally.88 (0.83 (0.89. .11* Note.55* Ϫ. 1. Table 5 presents the results of the subsequent regressions of each scientist scale onto all director scales.78.05) 2.63.19* 9.84** 2. † p Ͻ .12 (1.31* Director Relational (S) Bdiff Null (H0) t B Director Balanced (S) Bdiff Null (H0) t Director Transactional (S) Bdiff Director Relational (S) Bdiff t B Reciprocity Null (H0) t B Director Balanced (S) Bdiff Null (H0) t Predictor B Null (H0) Director Transactional (D) Director Relational (D) Director Balanced (D) F R2 . and .02 (1.22) Scientist Balanced (S) 1.25) 2.35.70** 2.09) 1. The tests for the significance of the difference between correlation coefficients reveal that on-diagonal coefficients were significantly higher than off-diagonal coefficients for transactional and relational obligations but not for balanced obligations. df for t is 76.61.03 (0.83 (0. 1. t(77) ϭ 3.00 (1.32 ( p Ͻ .11** Ϫ. 1. when assessing obligations from the director to the scientist.05.67** 4. 1. 2.65** .87.23 B 1 Ϫ B2 ϭ 0 B 1 Ϫ B3 ϭ 0 2.88) marginally fell within the confidence interval of the off-diagonal mean difference between the director’s perception of his or her relational obligations and the scientist’s perception of director balanced obligations (0.85.16) 1. Table 5 Regressions of Scientist Scales Onto Director Scales Examining Mutuality and Reciprocity in the Psychological Contracts Dependent variable Director Transactional (S) Bdiff Predictor B Null (H0) t B Mutuality Director Transactional (D) Director Relational (D) Director Balanced (D) F R2 Dependent variable .64.PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS: MUTUALITY AND RECIPROCITY 61 Table 4 Gaps Between Director and Scientist Perceptions Across Psychological Contract Obligations Mutuality Director Transactional (S) 0. 1. For instance. * p Ͻ .52 ( p Ͻ . ** p Ͻ .01) for relational obligations. 1.86.66.70. 2.12 B 3 Ϫ B1 ϭ 0 B3 Ϫ B 2 ϭ 0 2. In the context of the directors’ role in the professional growth and development of their staff. 2. 2.

01). Thus. t(76) ϭ 3. led to an overwhelming rejection of the null hypothesis in all individual regression equations ( p Ͻ .26. Similarly. when the scientist’s perception of his or her balanced obligations was regressed onto all corresponding director scales.26. McFarlin.05). This procedure. In the second step. In particular. agreement. results indicate that the best predictor of each scale was the same scale from the other party’s perspective. Maslyn & Uhl-Bien. scales tend to correlate (either positively or negatively).05). 1994). Because the constituent components (i. Overall. These results provide support for Hypothesis 1.28. Cohen & Cohen. 1983). two preliminary tests were conducted to rule out potential problems in the data. In cases like this. when the scientist’s perception of director relational obligations was regressed onto all corresponding director scales.g. 1994). Moreover. 1989) to eradicate most of the substantive and methodological problems associated with the use of a congruence index. when assessing their own reciprocal commitments to one another. results can also shed light on how specific psychological contract obligations are related to specific outcomes. Rice. When the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. duration and specificity of performance terms. Berger-Gross & Kraut. p Ͻ . p Ͻ . Butler.e. 1984. First.36. each type of obligation was separately entered in subsequent regression equations. director relational (D) was the strongest predictor (B ϭ 0.. results obtained using the hierarchical regressions to test the interaction term were substantiated in a third and final step by applying Edwards’ polynomial regression technique (Edwards. Joint Perceptions and Quality of the Research Collaborations Previous organizational research on congruence (i.01) for relational obligations. and when the scientist’s perception of director balanced obligations was regressed onto all corresponding director scales.01.e.e. we tested for the omnibus null hypothesis that all possible correlations among the variables in the individual regression equations equal zero.11.01) for transactional obligations.43. Moreover. or match) between two constructs has advised on the numerous substantive and methodological problems that arise when congruence indices. Our results. With regard to analyses of reciprocity (Hypothesis 2).15. We conducted follow-up tests that confirm the reciprocal effects found for both transactional and relational scales. we entered the joint perceptions (i. Table 5 shows the tests for the significance of the difference between on-diagonal and off-diagonal partial regression coefficients revealing that on-diagonal coefficients were significantly and consistently higher than off-diagonal coefficients only for the transactional and relational obligations. 2001. square difference). We examined the extent to which the joint perceptions of director and scientist provided distinct explanatory power for outcomes using hierarchical regressions to test the interaction term (Baron & Kenny.05). & Bennett. however. we used this technique to test for the possibility that curvilinear effects account for the significance of the interaction term. given that psychological contract obligations are defined based on similar or opposing characteristics along the same two key contract features (i. Similar results were obtained when regressing each director scale onto all scientist scales. on-diagonal gaps were significantly smaller than off-diagonal gaps only for transactional and relational obligations but not for the balanced obligation. p Ͻ .15 (ns) for balanced obligations. algebraic. p Ͻ . 1991). and . p Ͻ . we departed from gaps in perceptions for subsequent analyses. the likelihood of a spurious interaction increases when these higher order terms are omitted. In preparation for examining the hierarchical regressions. Correlations and regression analyses confirmed this result. director balanced (D) was not a strong predictor (B ϭ 0.01. In addition. examination of the gaps between director and scientist perceptions of their own obligations to one another (i. 1980).62 DABOS AND ROUSSEAU when the scientist’s perception of director transactional obligations was regressed onto all corresponding director scales. For that reason. The individual scales of directors and scientists were centered to minimize multicollinearity problems. in particular those surrounding the effects of its constituent components. Finally. To avoid confounding effects.43 ( p Ͻ .e. director and scientist perceptions) were measured using the same scale and were positively correlated to each other (see Table 2).. director relational (D) was the strongest predictor (B ϭ 0. For instance. and the off-diagonal balanced (D) coefficient. t(76) ϭ 4. Rousseau. the correlation between director and scientist scales was . Moreover. When the scientist’s perception of his or her transactional obligations was regressed onto all corresponding director scales. no further analysis involving these correlations should be performed (Steiger.. when the scientist’s perception of director relational obligations was regressed onto all corresponding director scales. often caused in moderator models by the very high correlations associated with the introduction of the interaction term in the regression equation (Aiken & West. p Ͻ . 1995). fit. However. we entered all control variables along with the individual scales of directors and scientists into the regression equations. Table 5 shows the tests for the significance of the difference between on-diagonal and off-diagonal partial regression coefficients revealing that on-diagonal coefficients were significantly and consistently higher than off-diagonal coefficients along all three types of psychological contract obligations. the on-diagonal relational (D) partial regression coefficient was significantly higher than the off-diagonal transactional (D) coefficient. director balanced (D) was the strongest predictor (B ϭ 0. p Ͻ . 1986). developed by collapsing two measures into a single one (e. we note other methodological issues. has been also used in previous studies of congruence (e. In addition. However. director transactional (D) was the strongest predictor (B ϭ 0. a situation likely in exploratory studies where the sample size is relatively small (J. Similarly.01). variation in reciprocity) reveals that the smaller gaps occurred along the diagonal elements for all scales (see Table 4). their interaction term was also expected to be positively correlated with the square of either component. Thus... when the scientist’s perception of his or her relational obligations was regressed onto all corresponding director scales. absolute. director transactional (D) was the strongest predictor (B ϭ 0.67.g. 1983. In the first step.48 ( p Ͻ . . Similar results were obtained when regressing each director scale onto all scientist scales. suggested by Cronbach (1958). the tests for the significance of the difference between correlation coefficients reveal that on-diagonal coefficients were significantly higher than off-diagonal coefficients only for the transactional and relational obligations.. are used as predictors in regression models (Edwards. In particular. ns).. interaction term) to examine whether the interplay between director and scientist perceptions has explanatory power beyond that of their individual scales. Hypothesis 2 is partially supported.e.

55* 0. the fact that the average intercorrelation is still high between performance-related outcomes (i.73** .01).51** 0. On the other hand.50 0..46 6.39** 0. mutuality in transactional contracts did not have a significant impact on any outcome measures.86** 0. p Ͻ ..78** Ϫ0. p Ͻ .52** 0.56** 0. D ϭ director scale.36** Ϫ0. that all remaining correlations following the first canonical variate are zero.24* Ϫ0.07 0.41 0. † p Ͻ .e. 70 12. and Coauthorship Step 1 Organizational tenure Center tenure Educational level (PhD) Gender (male) Director Balanced (S) Director Balanced (D) Steps 2 and 3 Director Balanced (S) square Director Balanced (S) ϫ Director Balanced (D) Director Balanced (D) square Ϫ0.59** 0.38** 0. N ϭ 80) ϭ 184.03 0. 1983).33 Ϫ0. On the other hand.21* 0. Psychological contract scales were centered.64** 0.35** Ϫ0.08 0. after controlling for the individual perceptions by directors and scientists (see Step 2. mutuality in relational contracts was a significant predictor of both continuity (B ϭ 0.29** 2.04** 0.15 0.72† 1. or agreement regarding one party’s specific obligations.. stronger effects of mutual balanced agreement manifest for performance-related outcomes.01.05.43 9. * p Ͻ .50** 0. explains unique variance in the outcomes associated with the employment relationship. ␹2(52. 72 .04* 0. differences in perceptions or agreement on the absence of relational obligations led to lower outcomes in both cases.44** 0. or in other words. 1983). p Ͻ . Cohen & Cohen. but not of met expectations or publication measures). continuity.09* 0. the impact of mutual relational obligations is evident around job-security– related outcomes.39** 2.PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS: MUTUALITY AND RECIPROCITY 63 Ϫ0.85** 0.e. Our results. publications.15 2. Consistent with the nature of relational contracts.02 0. Using a canonical correlation analysis including all relevant variables (e.42 7.76** 1. 70 12.01). Scientist and director reports regarding the extent of the director’s relational obligations to the scientist were dichotomized into low and high on the basis of Ϯ1 SD from the mean of each variable (J. ␹2(70. continuity and formal career advancement) raises the issue that all outcomes might in fact reflect the same phenomenon. Ϫ0.24** 0.09 0.51 0.39** 1. 70 10.10.08.01 0.32 0.10 1. The mutuality interaction terms were significantly related to several outcome variables. S ϭ scientist scale.46** 0. Table 7).50 9.32* 0.24. Cohen & Cohen.07 0.08* 0.89. 72 8.18 3. p Ͻ .g. a result plausible given the long-term focus regarding outcomes in academia.01 0.72* 0.01.44 7. Finally.42 6.30.35.39 6.10** 0. p Ͻ . a significant predictor of the total number of publications or job-security–related outcomes (i.33* 3. ** p Ͻ .93. The interactions indicate that continuity and formal career advancement were greatest when both parties agreed that relational obligations have been committed to by the director.01) and formal career advancement (B ϭ 0.93* 0.46 9. continuity and formal career advancement).10† 2. met expectations and both publication measures) and job-security–related outcomes (i. mutuality in balanced contracts was a significant predictor of met expectations (B ϭ 0.63** 1. after controlling for the individual perceptions by directors and scientists (see Step 2. square ϭ the quadratic term of the corresponding scale..01.05 0. p Ͻ .05** 0.19 4.01. met expectations.84* 0. 73 9.21 3. and the other job-security–related.46** 0.e.04** 0. To illustrate the mutuality interaction. coauthorship. Similar patterns were obtained for the effects of mutuality in Step 3 (Quadratic) Coauthorship Step 2 (Interaction) Step 1 (Main effect) Step 3 (Quadratic) Publications Step 2 (Interaction) Step 1 (Main effect) Step 3 (Quadratic) Met Expectations Step 2 (Interaction) Step 1 (Main effect) Outcome and predictor Table 6 Hierarchical Regressions Examining the Effects of Mutuality in Balanced Obligations on Met Expectations.10 0. given that balanced contracts are performance-based.34* 2.e.. In particular.42* Ϫ0. Figure 1 shows the regression lines of the effects of mutuality in relational obligations on continuity and formal career advancement.58* Ϫ0. 72 7.50 7.40** 1.49 0. 73 9. our results reveal a strong support for Hypothesis 3 (see Tables 6 and 7) suggesting that mutuality.67 1.72** 1. The mutuality interaction term for balanced was not.43** 0. Second. Nonetheless.20** Ϫ0. Publications. however. Turning to the hierarchical regressions.91** 1. Of course this effect was to some extent anticipated in our research design by deliberately choosing objective outcomes that would provide convergent validation for the self-reported measures of met expectations and continuity.04* 0.05* 0. we tested for the null hypothesis that no difference exists among all outcome variables (i.36† Ϫ0.29** 0. N ϭ 80) ϭ 98.01) and number of coauthored publications with the research director (B ϭ 0. J. Table 6). however. rejected this null hypothesis and confirmed the expected two canonical variates: one performance-related.24** F ⌬R2 Adjusted R2 df 9. Not surprisingly. given the relatively high average intercorrelation among them.46† 1.07* 0. we tested the null hypothesis that all outcome variables are the same. 73 Note. and formal career advancement).15 0.10 1.00 0.04** 1.09 0.89** 9.

34** 0.19 0.35** Ϫ0.01 Ϫ0.47** 0.44 9. balanced obligations on met expectations and number of coauthored publications with the research director.05.37 6. Psychological contract scales were centered.10 0.02 0.34** Step 2 (Interaction) Ϫ0.11 0.05 7.01) above and beyond the individual perceptions of directors and scientists (see Step 2.43** 0.44** 0.02 0. square ϭ the quadratic term of the corresponding scale. p Ͻ .02 0. Results reveal that where the interaction term was already significant.41** 0.09 0.07** 0. S ϭ scientist scale.05 0.05 0. Table 8).18 0.09 0. . Step 2.44 9.00 0. For example.21. p Ͻ .00 Ϫ0. D ϭ director scale. Step 3.24. the interaction term for mutuality in balanced obligations was a significant predictor of met expectations (B ϭ 0.64 DABOS AND ROUSSEAU Table 7 Hierarchical Regressions Examining the Effects of Mutuality in Relational Obligations on Continuity and Formal Career Advancement Continuity Outcome and predictor Step 1 Organizational tenure Center tenure Educational level (PhD) Gender (male) Director Relational (S) Director Relational (D) Steps 2 and 3 Director Relational (S) square Director Relational (S) ϫ Director Relational (D) Director Relational (D) square F ⌬R2 Adjusted R2 df Step 1 (Main effect) Ϫ0. 70 8.00 0.01 0.05.44 7.00 0.06** 0. By applying this technique.10 0.05 0. Table 6) and remained significant in the quadratic equation (B ϭ 0.73** Ϫ0. explains unique variance in the outcomes associated with the employment relationship.09** 0.38 6.62** 0. we tested for the possibility that curvilinear effects account for the significance of the mutuality interaction terms.05 0.01. Results obtained for the mutuality interaction terms were substantiated using Edwards’ polynomial regression technique extended up to the quadratic terms (see Step 3.38** Ϫ0. 70 Note.50** 0.42** Ϫ0. Hypothesis 4 addressed the extent to which reciprocity. Interaction of scientist and director reports assessing the effects mutuality in relational obligations on Continuity and formal career advancement.18.02 0.02 0. Tables 6 and 7).50** 0.01.14 0.01 Ϫ0. In both equations.48** Ϫ0.27* Step 2 (Interaction) 0. p Ͻ . 72 Step 3 (Quadratic) Ϫ0.72** Ϫ0. 73 9.73** 0. * p Ͻ .44 7. ** p Ͻ .30** 9.35** 9.96** 0.04 7. Because reciprocity entails not only commitments from the director to the scientist but vice versa. a likely consequence of the lack of shared perceptions between director and scientist regarding their reciprocal balanced obligations as described above.85** 0.41** 0.31. 72 Step 3 (Quadratic) Ϫ0. D ϭ director scale. the form of the interaction follows patterns similar to those presented in Figure 1 for mutuality in relational obligations.82** 0. it remained significant even after entering the squares of its constituent components into the regression equations (see Steps 2 and 3.78** Ϫ0. Our results reveal no significant effects for the balanced obligations.05) and formal career advancement (B ϭ 0. 73 Formal career advancement Step 1 (Main effect) Ϫ0. Table 6). S ϭ scientist scale. Significant effects did exist between reciprocity in relational obligations and both continuity (B ϭ 0. or agreement about the reciprocal exchange.42** 0. we also controlled for staff scientist fulfillment of their Figure 1. Tables 6 and 7).06 0.39** 0. p Ͻ .

1994.02 8. 1993. square ϭ the quadratic term of the corresponding scale. the most noticeable pattern was a sharp.03 Ϫ0. the quadratic equation can generate response surfaces consistent with the squared difference (see Figure 2A) by meeting the following three constraints: (a) the coefficients of the constituent components are nonsignificant.31** 8.54** 0.21† 0. characteristic of the polynomial equations studied here. we also conducted a follow-up examination of the threedimensional response surfaces to provide additional insight into the results. positive slope along the line of perfect fit.59** 0.42** 0.26** 0.40** 0.48 10. and (c) the coefficient of the interaction term is twice as large as the coefficient of either square term but with an opposite sign (for an extensive review of congruence tests and their related constraints. In this study.10.05 0. Kristof-Brown & Stevens. is consistent with the underlying dynamics postulated for mutuality and reciprocity. using the results of the regression examining the effects of mutuality in relational obligations on continuity (Step 3. our results reveal that regression coefficients were far from meeting the constraints of the hypothetical form (e.05. * p Ͻ . reciprocity in transactional contracts did not significantly affect outcomes. we expected agreement on the presence of a particular obligation in an employment relationship to have a more positive impact on outcomes than agreement on its absence. 1994).49 8. Tables 6. Results reveal that where the interaction term was already significant. Edwards & Parry. Such a relationship can be represented. 1999.04 Ϫ0. where the two paired reports match exactly).47 7. commitments as rated by center directors.07** 0. and thus response surfaces differed significantly from that of Figure 2A. From a graphical standpoint.18* 10. Response surfaces.30** 0. the interaction term of reciprocity in relational obligations was a significant predictor of formal career advancement (B ϭ 0.03 0. using a quadratic equation constrained to the squared difference between the two constituent components.50** 0. Table 8). Edwards & Rothbard.26* 0. a typical hypothesis is that congruence leads to a maximum (or minimum) level of outcome along the line of perfect fit (i.g. we expected congruence to lead to more positive outcomes than incongruence.14 8.01 Ϫ0. often used graphically and analytically in studies of congruence (e.31. 7.01 Ϫ0.01 0. This surface pattern. Step 3). see Edwards. 72 Formal career advancement Step 1 (Main effect) Ϫ0.21† Ϫ0. D ϭ director scale. and 8)..67** Ϫ0.38** Step 2 (Interaction) Ϫ0.55** Ϫ0. Similar to the case of mutuality. response surface patterns were confirmed analytically using the framework proposed by Edwards and Parry (1993) for testing the significance of the slopes and curvatures along both the line of perfect fit where director and . p Ͻ .49 10. we tested for the possibility that curvilinear effects account for the significance of the reciprocity interaction terms. showing that congruence in director and scientist perceptions was indeed related to a higher outcome value.34** Step 2 (Interaction) Ϫ0.30** 0.01.44** 0.g.44 8. Consistent with our previous findings for mutuality.PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS: MUTUALITY AND RECIPROCITY 65 Table 8 Hierarchical Regressions Examining the Effects of Reciprocity in Relational Obligations on Continuity and Formal Career Advancement Continuity Outcome and predictor Step 1 Organizational tenure Center tenure Educational level (PhD) Gender (male) Scientist Fulfillment (D) Scientist Relational (S) Director Relational (D) Steps 2 and 3 Scientist Relational (S) square Scientist Relational (S) ϫ Director Relational (D) Director Relational (D) Square F ⌬R2 Adjusted R2 df Step 1 (Main effect) Ϫ0. ** p Ͻ . Nonetheless. Step 2) and remained significant in the quadratic equation (B ϭ 0. because the coefficients of polynomial equations are often difficult to interpret (Edwards.36 7. Table 7)..33** 0.01 0.54. as illustrated in Figure 2B. see Step 3. Table 8). Edwards & Parry.06 0.32** 0.54** Ϫ0. † p Ͻ . All in all.21* 0.03 0. 71 Step 3 (Quadratic) Ϫ0.23* 0. our hypotheses do not suggest that the value of the outcome is the same (and maximum) at every single point along the line of perfect fit. Although various relationships can be investigated. results provide partial support for Hypothesis 4. 69 7.04 Ϫ0. stronger effects of reciprocity in relational contracts manifest around job-security–related outcomes.75** Ϫ0.15 0. revealing that the outcome value was higher when both director and scientist perceptions were high rather than when both were low.05 0.01.43** Ϫ0.03 0.03† Ϫ0. In addition. Psychological contract scales were centered. However.00 0. our typical response surface displayed a downward slope on either side along the line of perfect fit.08 0. 2001).11 0.19 0. it remained so even after entering the squares of its constituent components into the regression equations (see Steps 2 and 3. Finally. S ϭ scientist scale.63* Ϫ0. In a hypothetical form. 72 10.29* 0.06** 0.03* 0. the coefficients of the constituent components were significant in most regressions.52** 0.61** 0.52** 0. 71 Step 3 (Quadratic) Ϫ0.03 0. In addition.02 0. can be generated from the coefficients of the polynomial regression equations (extended up to the square terms) to map the relationship between two paired reports and a given outcome.e.85** 0.64** 0. Consistently. 69 Note. 1993). Rather. (b) the coefficients of the square terms are equal. p Ͻ . for example.01 Ϫ0.05 0. by applying the polynomial regression technique (see Step 3.51** 0.02 0..01. For example.

0321 0.989 0. 1997).e.e. S ϭ scientist scale. it was necessary to examine whether group-level variables might confound the effects observed at the dyadic level. We used HLM to determine the amount of variance residing within and between groups as well as to investigate the influence of group-level variables on individuallevel outcomes (Bryk & Raudenbush.66 DABOS AND ROUSSEAU Figure 2.142 0. ␥00 ϭ 4. Results reveal that there was no significant between-groups variance for met expectations. the ratio of the between-groups variance in the dependent variable to total variance in the dependent variable including both the withinand between-groups components. the D ϭ ϪS line). In the case of coauthored publications and continuity.15. relative power. a model conceptually equivalent to a one-way analysis of variance.083 12.e.784 6. we further investigated whether there was significant variance in the intercepts and/or slopes across groups using the random coefficient regression model.. 1992). and tenure could have explanatory power on individual-level outcomes such as objective indicators of productivity and career advancement and subjective measures of met expectations and continuity.3338 0.and Within-Group Variance Dependent variable Met expectations Level 2: Between Groups Level 1: Within Groups Publications Level 2: Between Groups Level 1: Within Groups Coauthorship Level 2: Between Groups Level 1: Within Groups Continuity Level 2: Between Groups Level 1: Within Groups Formal career advancement Level 2: Between Groups Level 1: Within Groups Variance component 0. continuity. ns.. To partition variance into its within.01.01.. D ϭ director scale.52% of the variance in continuity resided at the group level. for coauthored publications. research director’s productivity. Conversely. Hofmann.280 ICC 0. for perceived continuity but not in the slopes.0461 0. the D ϭ S line) and the line running perpendicular to the perfect fit (i. ␹2(14. formal position. Three-dimensional response surfaces relating scientist and director reports to assess the effects mutuality in relational obligations on Continuity.e. In the case of coauthored publications.128 0.40. p Ͻ . In both cases.056 1.048 0. N ϭ 80) ϭ 22.80. and career advancement). publications. t(15) ϭ 23. coauthored publications. * p Ͻ . met expectations. there was no systematic between-groups variance remaining that could have been modeled by additional group-level predictors.28. center longevity.05.21 19.1152 0. and formal career advancement. t(15) ϭ 6. Finally.986 0.. Hierarchical linear modeling provides a significance test for the between-groups variance component only. All scales were centered. ** p Ͻ . we found that once the total number of publications by the research director in the last 3 years was entered as predictor into Level 2 equation. publications.48. . results reveal that 33. Our initial model investigated the amount of between-groups variance and its significance for each of the five dependent variables used in this research (i.24 53. results show significant variance in the intercepts. Group-level variables such as center size. In Table 9 we computed the intraclass correlations for each of the five dependent variables. and ␥00 ϭ 3. p Ͻ .0423 df 15 15 15 15 15 ␹2 20.21** 26. the grouplevel variables we evaluated could not fully explain the remaining Table 9 Intraclass Correlation (ICC): Between. Group-Level Effects Finally. because all director–scientist research collaborations were formally organized around research centers. This forced any within-group variance in the dependent variable into the Level 1 residual and any between-groups variance into the Level 2 residual (i.and between-groups components.98 Note. we specified no predictors in Level 1 or Level 2 equations. A detailed description of the procedure and results is included in the Appendix. However. that is.38% of the variance in coauthored publications and 11.01. we used the interceptsas-outcomes model to assess whether the variance in the intercept was significantly related to one or more of the a priori relevant group-level variables.556 16.73* 17. scientist reports are equal (i.

behaviors consistent with each other’s expectations. Generalized reciprocity. making mutuality more likely. Although mutuality can be construed to be a joint and simultaneous occurrence. was positively related to worker in-role and extra-role behavior. where mutuality exists. finding evidence that agreement between worker and leader in implicit performance theories is related to liking and LMX quality. Both workers and firms have far less experience in relating to each other in ways that intermingle the balanced dimension’s interpersonal and professional support with dynamic and shifting conditions of performance. Reciprocity.. balanced exchanges may have rhythms that vary. making assessment intervals more difficult to capture. high-quality exchange). reciprocity in balanced exchanges appears to be more complex and potentially more difficult to capture in part because balanced contracts blend features of both relational and transactional arrangements. In all. the temporality of reciprocity is uncertain. several directions for future research are suggested by the evidence this study provides for the role of mutuality and reciprocity in the employment exchange. However. Rather. it may be a fact. further research is needed on these and other mechanisms affecting the creation and development of agreement regarding the exchange terms. Nonetheless. advanced education) and similar tasks (e.. Moreover. making it easier for both parties to align behaviors with expectations..52% of the total variance). coauthorship). Such shared mental models are likely to arise in settings that have bundles of support practices. The first is operational. that the psychological contract terms workers frequently believe to be mutual on the part of themselves and their employer may indeed be so. Engle and Lord (1997) examined leader–member agreement in the implicit theories each holds regarding leadership (what a good leader is) and performance (what a good worker does). common entry requirements (e. One important and basic issue concerns the factors that contribute to or impede mutuality of understanding between employee and employer. We suspect that in on-going relationships. such as team-building practices (e. How long a period of time must elapse before contributions one party makes to another are reciprocated? The importance of the differential immediacy of returns has been addressed in previous LMX research on reciprocity. we conclude that the results we observe for employer– employee mutuality and reciprocity in psychological contracts are not an artifact of center-level factors..g. Appropriate forms of reciprocity may be especially difficult to achieve in the balanced condition. our results suggest it is highly functional for both workers and employers. one of the Big Five personality traits. This finding is noteworthy because balanced exchanges appear to be increasingly common in employment. One mechanism underlying agreement is postulated to be shared mental models (Rousseau.g. In particular. 2000). In contrast. research) are likely to reflect mutually reinforcing support practices. Mutuality can be more than a perception. 1988). this study demonstrates it has substantial benefits for both workers (e. shared training sessions) may play a role in shaping how mutuality and reciprocity . mutuality may be more difficult to achieve. He further argued that managers and workers similar in Conscientiousness are inclined to engage in processes of frequent communication and continuous feedback that help develop shared understandings (mutuality) of role expectations and stimulate increasing levels of reciprocal support (e. In contrast. In the organizational setting we studied.. is a more complex phenomenon. particularly among highly skilled knowledgeable workers (Rousseau. this may be inconsequential given the relatively low percentage of the variance in continuity that resided between groups (only 11. Unit-level factors may play less of a role in the research context studied here because staff scientists work relatively independently. Our data suggest that reciprocity of relational exchanges corresponds to generalized reciprocity.. in settings where greater interdependence exists among employees. We note that in the present setting. significant events reflecting cycles of inducements and contributions vary in the time frames in which they occur. member participation in selection of team mates) and socialization activities (e. Deluga (1998) found evidence that manager–worker similarity in Conscientiousness.g.g. Our results indicate that reciprocity in relational terms produces the expected benefits of worker retention and career advancement. unit-level factors. promotion and development systems that cue the same kinds of behaviors and performance outcomes). Another explanation seems particularly likely to us. we found far less evidence of reciprocity in exchanges involving balanced obligations. improved performance.g. However. reinforcing similar or interrelated social cues (e. Nevertheless. and transactional exchanges may be characterized by equivalent reciprocity. For instance. Because our study reveals that in the presence of mutuality benefits accrue to both workers and employers. in that workers and employers manifest less agreement on balanced terms than on the other psychological contract obligations. Alternative mechanisms underlying agreement also have been suggested in the LMX literature.g. They also suggested that congruence in implicit theories provides the basis for mutuality or shared understandings. In organizations with more diverse employee backgrounds and heterogeneous functions. at least to some degree. There are several possible reasons for this. our findings suggest that it is the dyadic relationship between individual and employer that gives rise to the level of mutuality and reciprocity that the relationship manifests and the consequences that result. Understanding the origins of agreement in the employment relationship is fundamental for enhancing theory development in both psychological contract and exchange theory and in their practical application in organizations. Similarly. Sparrowe and Liden (1997) adopted a framework in which various forms of reciprocity are characterized by differential immediacy of returns. unit-level factors played relatively little role in shaping either mutuality or reciprocity.g.g. where mutuality does occur.. equivalent reciprocity entails immediate and comparable returns typically provided to the original giver. however. Whereas other scholars have suggested that relational exchanges are evaluated across the whole history of the relationship (Clark & Reis.PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS: MUTUALITY AND RECIPROCITY 67 between-groups variance in continuity. Discussion Our research provides support for a crucial assumption of psychological contract theory.. 2001a) in which informational cues that are mutually reinforcing make it easier for scientists of the same social system to form common understandings. advancement) and organizations (e. such as the collaborations studied here. Beyond the specific issues described above. in which returns take many forms and are not necessarily targeted to the original giver. is attributed to the indefiniteness of results and altruistic concern for the other party.

Future research should find ways to examine the level of agreement between workers and employers in cases where organizations entail multiple contract makers. We suggest that future research on reciprocity can benefit from longitudinal studies following up particular practices or events in employment where promise exchanges are the norm. policies of filling higher level positions from within). For instance. an employer may indicate a willingness to develop a worker and support his or her career advancement and yet fail to explicate what services and efforts that worker is expected to provide in return. an examination of the joint perceptions of the individual worker and his or her primary employer’s agent is crucial for understanding employment arrangements of knowledge workers.. Although research is needed on the factors that create mutuality in the first place.g. diversified corporation). pay vs. the instruments employed were Spanish translations from measures developed in the United States. both mutuality and reciprocity can be undermined. As with all cross-cultural generalizations.g. In typical organizations.g. practices of the firm. Reciprocity involves exchanges over time in which the intervals associated with the cycles of exchange vary with the nature of the resources involved (e. To the extent that these contract makers are interpreted as sending different messages regarding the nature of the employment relationship. it is important to examine how individuals respond to mixed messages between sources and the impact that the extent of convergence among these sources has on the outcomes associated with the employment relationship. performance reviews).. climate. At the same time. recruitment. mutuality also contributes to improved individual performance and career success. Another limitation to the generalizability of the results is given by the atypical nature of the research setting. First. In particular. but as our results suggest.. it remained significant when applying the polynomial regression technique. and human resource professionals as well as structural signals. career development) and the organizational context (e. To better understand how reciprocity occurs and how parties respond to lags in the exchange cycle. These “contract makers” include first line supervisors.68 DABOS AND ROUSSEAU arise.. Further. research is needed on the role that task structure and unit-factors play in shaping the degree of agreement between parties to the employment relationship.. Thus. employment paradigms have shifted from standardized conditions for all workers toward more idiosyncratic arrangements. evidence that mutuality and reciprocity do arise from the cycle of inducements and contributions reflected in psychological contracts opens up many avenues for studying not only their violation but also their fulfillment and functional consequences in contemporary employment. development opportunities. this study used recall measures of commitments or obligations between research directors and staff scientists. The design of this study overcomes several limitations of previous work through its contextualization of the employment relationship and use of paired worker– employer data. efforts to create common information and shared understandings between the workers and their managers are likely to enhance mutuality. Just as unit-level practices. interpretations and response patterns in the present sample may differ from those observed in other societies. performance reviews and the follow-ups accompanying them often induce exchanges of promises (e. Finally. our findings should be investigated in other regions and with scales in languages other than Spanish. shared perceptions regarding the work setting (e. Nonetheless. leadership style) also are likely to contribute to the degree of agreement both between workers and employers and among workers themselves. in press). this study’s design also presents certain limitations.g. our results suggest that it may be helpful to couple communications regarding employer commitments to workers with the types of efforts and contributions the employer expects from workers in return. making general levels of agreement (e. that is. results are robust in that where the interaction term was significant using hierarchical regressions. of managerial support in exchange for a change in worker contributions) providing a context for examining reciprocity as it unfolds over time. Under conditions of greater interdependence among workers. 2001b). employers may find it more difficult to obtain reciprocal contributions in response to the commitments they have offered workers. between a manager and a group of workers or a senior human resource person and the firm’s employees) less meaningful (Rousseau. research directors are the primary source of employer communication with workers. 2000) and when translated into Chinese (Hui et al. work units seldom present the degree of autonomy and independence characteristic of the research centers studied here. Rousseau and Greller (1994) pointed out that workers can derive their understanding of the psychological contract from a variety of sources presumed to represent the employer. it would be useful to focus on recurring practices in organizations where exchanges of promises occur between employer and employee. Research is needed to investigate the conditions under which individuals rely on particular sources of information regarding the employment relationship. whereas a longitudinal design might provide a stronger test of reciprocity as long as it allows for in-depth examination of significant events during which commitments and contributions are exchanged (e. Although the scales have been found to be reliable and valid in non-North American contexts (Rousseau. Another salient aspect of the study is the relative stability of the interaction term when using both hierarchical regressions and Edwards’ (1994) polynomial regression technique. and it was based on a cross-sectional design. In particular.. For instance.. such as socialization. a growing. the present study suggests that reciprocity is a more complex phenomenon than is mutuality in the context of employment-based exchanges.g. Practical Significance Creating and sustaining mutuality of understanding between employers and employees facilitates not only better quality employment relationships. Finally. a start-up firm with uncertain future vs. cultural values.g. Despite the small sample size. In the knowledge economy.g. Last. other strengths of this study lie in the consistency of results between both self-reported and archival outcome measures and in the estimation of potential confounding effects at the group level. Information regarding reciprocal obligations can be particularly warranted in the venues in which commitments to workers are fre- . other contextual factors can impair the extent of agreement employer and employee manifest. Our results also suggest that although mutuality may be more readily achieved. Although further research on reciprocity in the employment relationship is needed. This design might be suitable for assessments of mutuality. which can be interpreted by workers to create obligations on the part of the employer or themselves (e. might enhance mutuality and reciprocity. senior managers.

39. & Foa. Berger-Gross. B. 1538 –1567. Turner (Eds. Consequences of the psychological contract for the employment relationship: A large scale survey.). Inhibiting effects of reciprocation wariness on interpersonal relationships. S. Dansereau. W... 71. Journal of Applied Psychology.PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS: MUTUALITY AND RECIPROCITY 69 quently made. A. Bentler. Stanford. Person perception and interpersonal behavior (pp. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Comparative fit indices in structural models. 389 – 444). Graen. P. Academy of Management Journal.. J.). & West. S. (1998). On the use of polynomial regression equations as an alternative to difference scores in organizational research.. 3–15). S. R. F. Blau.. 189 –216. Journal of Applied Psychology. (1997). 37. & Green. & O’Connor. Eisenberger. Engle. NJ: Erlbaum. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology. K. T. T. G. Baron.. 22. V. 23. Psychological Bulletin. Bollen & J. Newbury Park. 25. M. 51–100. L. Gergen. & Kraut. How work ideologies shape the psychological contracts of professional employees: Doctors’ responses to perceived breach. Lynch. M. and leader–member exchange. W. (2001). 161–178. J. Petrullo (Eds. Hutchison. 13. Value importance as a moderator of the value fulfillment–job satisfaction relationship: Group differences. 717–741.).. 903–930. M. B. P. 25. W. R. Coyle-Shapiro. & Kaiser.. (1996). M. T. 77–94). Scientific productivity: The effectiveness of research groups in six countries (pp. M. A. American Sociological Review. Reciprocation of perceived organizational support... . L. 11. S. Annual Review of Psychology. 609 – 672.. M. 69 – 86. 647– 662. Handbook of crosscultural psychology: Vol. 658 – 668. K.. J. 36. & Cudeck. M. & Parry. & Speicher. (2001). F.). Clark.. & Sowa. Mahwah. Berry (Eds. (1992). Journal of Organizational Behavior. Value congruence in leader– member exchange. (1986). Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences. Cohen. Exploring reciprocity through the lens of psychological contract: Employee and employer perspectives. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.. Butler. M. (1999). AMOS 4. P. S. 173–294). Convergence in the psychological contracts of employees and employers as demonstrated here can serve the interests of both parties to an employment relationship.. P. 201–220. (1958). R. R. D. M. Cambridge. R. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. A. J. The Journal of Social Psychology. & Scandura. Academy of Management Journal. L. 51. Journal of Applied Psychology. In L. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. R. The study of congruence in organizational behavior research: Critique and a proposed alternative. R. Cross-cultural survey research in political science. G. Foa. P. 46 –78. Eisenberger. 137.. 62. Frey. The methodology of comparative research (pp. 353–379).. J. Chicago: Smallwaters. References Aiken.. (1993). CA: Sage. Holt & J. H. In K. The bedrock of functional employment relationships are exchanges between workers and employers characterized by mutuality or shared understanding of all parties’ obligations and reliance on their reciprocal commitments. R. CA: Sage.. Allinson. Edwards. I. & Anbar. training sessions. (1983).). 45. D. de Hemptinne. 77. CT: JAI Press. Cotterell. Brittingham. S. & Wothke. S. B. 500 – 507. Andrews (Ed. J. Triandis & J. (1982).. L. Resource theory: Interpersonal behavior as exchange. R. A vertical dyad linkage approach to leadership in formal organizations: A longitudinal investigation of the managerial role-making process. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology. Armstrong. 1045–1060. Towards a psychology of dyadic organizing. G. S. 107. Edwards. Gouldner. Eisenberger. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.. and statistical considerations. (1997). Journal of Management Studies. & Reis. New York: Plenum Press. 86. Huntington. 238 –246. Browne. The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychology research: Conceptual. Leader–member exchange quality and effectiveness ratings: The role of subordinate–supervisor conscientiousness similarity. “Great expectations”: A noconflict explanation of role conflict. The social structure of scientific research teams. & Kessler. (1990).. Long (Eds. 136 –162). Coyle-Shapiro. Interpersonal processes in close relationships.. such as performance reviews. W. J. 42–51. S. L. Ashkanasy. (2001). N. R. F.0 user’s guide. G. 9. 2. Conclusion One goal of the present study was to expand beyond research focusing on the downside of psychological contracts (i. In H. I. R. Bunderson. 69. Exchange and power in social life. J. E. Research in organizational behavior (Vol. Deluga. Translation and content analysis of oral and written materials. 58. H. G. Cohen. strategic. 261–271. J. B. Work and family stress and well-being: An examination of person– environment fit in the work and family domains. Willis (Eds. & Cohen. The international comparative study on the organization and performance of research units: An overview. N. J. affect. A. Robinson & Rousseau.. (1992). 175–208). E. and sensitivity to the helper’s nonverbally expressed needs.. W. (1984). Bryk. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance. M. (1979). W. J. self-schemas. J.. E. (1994). R. Social exchange: Advances in theory and research (pp. N. In F. Implicit theories. (1964). D. 68. P. (2000). (1960). (1991). B. M. & Kenny. M. Edwards. B. Development of leader–member exchange: A longitudinal test. (1983).). Pacific Sociological Review. 205–232. L. (2002). H. R. (1993). (1999).. 988 – 1010. & Hayes. Greenwich. S. Kruse. CA: Stanford University Press. 1994). (1986). Testing structural equation models (pp. S.. The effects of cognitive style on leader–member exchange: A study of managersubordinate dyads. Methodology (pp.g. Staw (Eds.. Y. Receiving competence-relevant help: Effects on reciprocity. J. & Haga. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Brislin. In R. W. M. Cronbach. 74. adverse consequences such as erosion and violation) to investigate the upside of functional or mutually beneficial psychological contracts in employment. C. & Raudenbush. Perceived organizational support. Journal of Applied Psychology. I. and recruiting. 1173–1182. A. Proposals leading to analytic treatment of social perception scores. CA: Sage. (1970). & Rothbard.. it can be helpful to revisit the degree of agreement regarding reciprocal obligations periodically because evidence exists that individuals are inclined to be more aware of their own contributions in an exchange relationship than they are to their partners’ (e. Arbuckle. 420 – 428. & Rhoades. G. & Kessler. M. T. (1980). (1988). C. G. A. Group and Organization Management.. In K.. Hierarchical linear models: Applications and data analysis methods. C.. Moreover. J. pp. W. W. (1987). Graen. Greenberg. (1983). & Lord. & R. J. Bauer. 85–129. & Andrews. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. DePaulo. New York: Wiley. E. Armeli. M.. Academy of Management Journal. U. Newbury Park. 1577–1613. S. Tagiuri & L. S..). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. New York: Free Press. Cummings & B. 39. (1975). Newbury Park. 40. (1980). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. N.. In R.e. Alternative ways of assessing model fit.. Rexwinkel.

Safety-related behavior as a social exchange: The role of perceived organizational support and leader-member exchange. 151–162. D. D. Greenwich. Manning. R. J. 731–744. Cambridge. & Scandura. (1998). & Parks. Administrative Science Quarterly. Bennett.. M. In F. M. K. E. S. Rousseau. A. M. P. Journal of Organizational Behavior. S. S. L. S.). A theory of indebtedness. CA: Sage. & Elron. & Tijoriwala. Rice. D. Expatriate managers and the psychological contract. Social exchange: Advances in theory and research (pp. Journal of Organizational Behavior. F.. (1978). Psychological contracts in organizations: Understanding written and unwritten agreements. (1998). R. and employee reciprocity. Journal of Applied Psychology. (1998). 23. Research in organizational behavior (Vol. Shore. The content of the psychological contract.. 591–598. L. S. (1994). L. The idiosyncratic deal: Flexibility versus fairness? Organizational Dynamics. M. and mutuality: The building blocks of the psychological contract. L. Rousseau. Human Resource Management. Robinson. C. D. (1996). Standards of comparison and job satisfaction. Academy of Management Review. The psychological contract as an explanatory framework in the employment relationship.). Lambright. A. 769 – 782. A. (1989). Allison. Not seeing eye to eye: Differences in supervisor and subordinate perceptions of and attributions for psychological contract breach. J. McFarlin. PA: The Heinz School of Public Policy and Management. D. D. Academy of Management Journal. Maslyn. Phillips.. 19. Leader–member exchange and its dimensions: Effects of self-effort and other’s effort on relationship quality. 2000 – 02). Mintzberg. Farr (Eds. 84. Robinson. Journal of Organizational Behavior. & Uhl-Bien. alternatives and measures... A. Journal of Applied Psychology. Lee. M. M. B. S. 91–109). D. Starbuck (Eds. R. A. Rousseau. 286 –296. C. 78. A. An overview of the logic and rationale of hierarchical linear models. J. In C. 23. 79.. J. (1990). United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. moderators. 226 –256. Rousseau. Rousseau. Rank advancement in academic careers: Sex differences and the effects of productivity. CT: JAI Press.. 260 –273. & Stevens. G. M. (1993).70 DABOS AND ROUSSEAU quality: The role of personal and interpersonal attributes.. E. Handbook of organizational design: Vol. M. 206 –212. L. N. D.. (1994). Noonan. (1996). Psychological contracts and implied contracts in organizations. The structuring of organizations. H. Journal of Applied Psychology. Hofmann. New York: Plenum Press. A. Thousand Oaks. (1994). Greenberg. M. New hire perceptions of their own and their employer’s obligations: A study of psychological contracts. W. M.. pp. & Liden. 41. S.. LMX meets the psychological contract: Looking inside the black box of leader–member exchange.. E. S. 662– 674. M. & Conway. E.. Journal of Applied Psychology. D. Tripoli. L. H. 37. Cooper & D. Macneil. D. Leadership: The multilevel approaches (Vol. (1995). C. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management. D. C. No. W. 219 –227. 2. J.). 11. Can an organization have a psychological contract? A conceptual and empirical analysis.. & Teich. 617– 626. Settoon. 574 –599. I. & Greller. 1. 511–541. Chichester. Wisconsin Law Review. Dansereau & F. (1985). D.. L. Cummings & B. D. M. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.. & Rousseau. Differential perceptions of employers’ inducements: Implications for psychological contracts. Psychological contracts and OCB: The effect of unfulfilled obligations on civic virtue behavior. M. & Morgeson F. Journal of Applied Psychology. (1994). 697–708. (2001). J. and measurement issues. 63. R. In K. 74. M. H. Rousseau (Eds.. & Andrews. Nystrom & W. A. W. P. Greenwich. Schriesheim. A longitudinal study on the early development of leader–member exchanges. A. Academy of Management Journal. 1083–1095. Journal of Applied Psychology. 289 –298. The organizational context of scientific research. Assessing psychological contracts: Issues. J. Robinson. American Sociological Review. (2001). New York: Wiley. 3–26).. Leader–follower exchange . & Lewis. K. L. M. D. R. Academy of Management Journal. Wayne. & Wayne. Violating the psychological contract: Not the exception but the norm. Trust and breach of the psychological contract. 19. (1994). Oxford. Pfeffer. 2. M. Guzzo. M. In F. S. G. B. A. & Robinson. Greenberg. (1966). & McGinnis. When employees feel betrayed: A model of how psychological contract violation develops. England: Cambridge University Press. W. D. 37. Rousseau. Kristof-Brown. L. H. W.. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal. (2000). (1981). 245–259. C. Competitive advantage through people: Unleashing the power of the work force. Gergen. T. (1989). (1997).. M. W. Neider. Journal of Organizational Behavior. & Kidd. 41. 385– 401. (1980).. 74. & Rousseau. L. P. & Barksdale. L. Journal of Organizational Behavior. Examining degree of balance and level of obligation in the employment relationship: A social exchange approach. Rousseau. L. L. Pelz. D. N. Psychological contract inventory (Tech. Social exchange in organizations: Perceived organizational support. 305–319). & Morrison. 8. D. Rep. Toronto. S. E.. M. S.. & Bedeian.. leader-member exchange. (2000). D. United Kingdom: Wiley. K. Hofmann. & Bolino. Guest. Bloodgood. In L.). Journal of Organizational Behavior. CT: JAI Press. Journal of Management. B. 22. Turnley. G. pp. & Tetrick. J. Journal of Organizational Behavior.). & Waller. H. 121– 139. (2001a). (2002). D. Robinson. Shore. 86. Liden. Aichholzer. & Stilwell. S.. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology. (1998).. (2001b). H. Journal of Applied Psychology... Herriot. Lester. L. M. C. & Bennett. Leadership and group performance: A positive relationship in academic research units. 990 –1001. Shore. (1979). M. Long J. West & J. E. The contracts of individuals and organizations. M.). M. M. Journal of Applied Psychology.. D. 101–122). (1994).. Payne. Human resource practices: Administrative contract makers. United Kingdom: Wiley. Commitment and employee behavior: Graen. A.. Morrison. M. Ontario. (1999). L. Englewood Cliffs. G. M. pp. A. E. British Journal of Management. Andrews (Ed. 29. Staw (Eds. The effectiveness of research teams: A review. Delegation and leader–member exchange: Main effects. (1990). 95–120). W. S. W. 137–152. Leader–member agreement: A vertical dyad linkage approach. (1997). S.. 483–525. M. M. (1995). 679 – 695.. M. & Rousseau.. Rousseau. Pittsburgh. M. J. M. In P. (1993). Knorr. Rousseau. Relational contracts: What we do and do not know. Schema. promise. Canada. W. P. Innovation and creativity at work: Psychological and organizational strategies (pp.. In M. M. 81. R. (1998). Porter. 86. C. 703–722. Trends in organizational behavior (Vol.. Chichester. Hui... Psychological contract and organizational citizenship behavior in China: Investigating generalizability and instrumentality. Kraatz. Yammarino (Eds. (1994). C. Scientific productivity: The effectiveness of research groups in six countries (pp. NJ: Prentice Hall. 1– 43). Carnegie Mellon University. 15. & R. S. & Schiemann. (1997). K. 39 –56. C. A... R. Remodeling organizations and their environments (pp. R. Willis (Eds.. 16. Changing obligations and the psychological contract: A longitudinal study. D. 723–744. Mittermeir. 15. Rousseau. 149 –154). R. L. 298 –318.. Scientists in organizations: Productive climates for research and development. M. 58. 389 – 400. (1993). K..). (in press). Goal congruence in project teams: Does the fit between members’ personal mastery and performance goals matter? Journal of Applied Psychology. D. L. 19. 33. (1979). Pearce. (1992).

and b5 to Director Balanced (D) Square. For instance. 128. b1 corresponds to Director Balanced (S). in regressions examining the effects of mutuality in balanced obligations on Met Expectations. 7. The slopes and curvatures along the two lines of interest can be obtained by substituting the expression for that line in Equation 1.. Storer. Rinehart and Winston. D ϭ S). as presented in Step 3. The constituent components S and D vary with the type of obligation (i. the D ϭ ϪS line).17 0.17 0.12 Ϫ0. S. New York: Holt. b4 to Director Balanced (S) ϫ Director Balanced (D).94 Ϫ0. * p Ͻ . M.PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS: MUTUALITY AND RECIPROCITY Comparison of affective commitment and continuance commitment with perceived organizational support. Transaction– cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. 40. (1997).65** Ϫ0. 71 Wade-Benzoni. and b5) of the surface along the D ϭ S line can be examined using standard procedures for testing the significance of linear Table A1 Analysis of the Slopes and Curvatures of Three-Dimensional Response Surfaces Along Lines of Interest Shape along D ϭ S line Outcome Mutuality in balanced obligations (from Table 6) Met Expectations Publications Coauthorship Mutuality in relational obligations (from Table 7) Continuity Formal career advancement Reciprocity in relational obligations (from Table 8) Continuity Formal career advancement Shape along D ϭ ϪS line Curvature Slope Curvature Slope (b1 ϩ b2) (b3 ϩ b4 ϩ b5) (b1 Ϫ b2) (b3 Ϫ b4 ϩ b5) 0. D.08 1. the regression coefficients b1.e.08 0. mutuality or reciprocity). .. Academy of Management Review. Tables 6. Sparrowe. & Feldman. Carnegie Mellon University. & Liden R. 82–111. 1998 –13). (1997). For sim- Then. 245–251. b3 to Director Balanced (S) Square.83** 0. although they are included in the regression equations of Tables 6.e. D ϭ director scale. C. 25– 42.20 Ϫ2. K. & Rousseau. Among other features.63 0. Re-examining the effects of psychological contract violations: Unmet expectations and job dissatisfaction as mediators. (1966). D.00** Note. b3. C. A. C. For instance. H.. R. Steiner. Test for comparing elements of a correlation matrix. b4. Following the general form of the quadratic equation (Equation 1). PA: The Heinz School of Public Policy and Management. 21. (2000).06 Ϫ0.01* 0. Shore... H.51** Ϫ1. and Z is the outcome variable being predicted.84** 2. Appendix Analysis of the Response Surface Patterns in the Quadratic Regression Equations Edwards and Parry (1993) presented a framework for interpreting polynomial regression equations extended up to the square terms (i.01. quadratic equations) in studies of congruence. the slope (given by the sum of b1 and b2) and the curvature (given by the sum of b3.. Value perceptions in leader–member exchange.e. (1979).49* Ϫ0. Xie. Sex differences in research productivity revisited: New evidence about an old puzzle. 522–552. Journal of Law and Economics. D. A. S ϭ scientist scale. 63. (1988).67 Ϫ0. we can substitute S for D in Equation 1 as follows: Z ϭ b 0 ϩ ͑ b 1 ϩ b 2͒ S ϩ ͑ b 3 ϩ b 4 ϩ b 5͒ S 2. 22.. this framework provides the basis for testing the significance of the slopes and curvatures along both the line of perfect fit where director and scientist reports are equal (i.. 87. (1) plicity. N.61** 0. 774 –780.22 Ϫ0.05. and 8. K.82** 0.19 0. & Liden. and 8.53** Ϫ0. and 8. b2 to Director Balanced (D).14 Ϫ0. T.e. J. Williamson. D.30* 0. W. L. O.. publications. ** p Ͻ . As presented in Tables 6. a significant positive slope along the D ϭ S line (visible as a surface sloping upward from the front to the back of the graph) would provide support for the assumption that agreement on the presence of a particular obligation leads to higher values in the outcome variable than does agreement on its absence. 78. 233–261. and b5 for each case correspond to the set of predictors included in the quadratic regression equations.e. 7. and coauthorship (Table 6).25** Ϫ1. Perceived organizational support and leader–member exchange: A social exchange perspective. the D ϭ S line) and the line running perpendicular to the perfect fit (i. Building relationships around tasks: Psychological contracts in faculty-doctoral student collaborations (Working Paper No. transactional. The Journal of Social Psychology. Turnley. Process and structure in leader– member exchange. M. 847– 870. Psychological Bulletin.21** 3... (1998). or balanced) and with the nature of the relationship being examined (i. & Shauman. Journal of Applied Psychology. 22. Steiger.82** 0. Academy of Management Journal. Wayne. American Sociological Review. The social system of science. J. b2. Journal of Organizational Behavior. control variables are not represented in Equation 1. 7. Pittsburgh. W.. (1980). 611– 618.e.64** 0. R. July). b4. the quadratic equation in this study takes the general form of Z ϭ b 0 ϩ b 1 S ϩ b 2 D ϩ b 3 S 2 ϩ b 4 SD ϩ b 5 D 2 . relational. Using the expression for this line (i. (1998. Y. (2) where S represents the scientist’s perception of a particular obligation. D is the corresponding director’s perception.

(3) Then.01). A similar result was found for publications. suggesting that the value of these two outcomes increased at a faster rate when reports from both parties were high. D ϭ ϪS). and 8). 2003 Ⅲ . Tables 6. Using the expression for this line (i. Table 1 presents the analysis of slopes and curvatures for all seven response surfaces generated from the coefficients of the quadratic regression equations (Step 3.05). Results provide strong support for the assumption that the value of the outcome is higher when both scientist and director agree on the presence of a particular obligaiton than when both agree on its absence.72 DABOS AND ROUSSEAU line was positive and significant for met expectations and coauthorship. suggesting that the point at which the value of this outcome ceased to rise and began to fall occurred slightly to the left (director’s side) of the line of perfect fit. the slope (given by the expression b1 Ϫ b2) and the curvature (given by b3 Ϫ b4 ϩ b5) of the surface along the D ϭ ϪS line can also be examined using the same procedure indicated above. The curvature along the D ϭ ϪS line was negative for all surfaces (showing that congruence matters). slope ϭ Ϫ0. the most noticeable pattern is that the slope along the D ϭ S line was positive and significant for all the surfaces examined ( p Ͻ .. even though it was significant for the regressions examining mutuality and reciprocity in relational obligations ( p Ͻ . In all.e. In addition. we can substitue ϪS for D in Equation 1 as follows: Z ϭ b 0 ϩ ͑ b 1 Ϫ b 2͒ S ϩ ͑ b 3 Ϫ b 4 ϩ b 5͒ S 2. Cohen & Cohen. these results confirm the patterns observed in the response surface graphs. 1983). 2002 Revision received April 1.49. Likewise. The slope along the D ϭ ϪS line was negative and significant for formal career advancement (only in the case of reciprocity. the curvature along the D ϭ S Received July 24. a significant negative curvature in conjunction with a nonsignificant slope along the D ϭ ϪS line would reveal that the value of the outcome decrease on either side of the line of perfect fit. but not for the regressions examining mutuality in balanced obligations. demonstrating that agreement in director and scientist perceptions is indeed related to higher values in the outcome variables.01). 2003 Accepted May 6. combinations of partial regression coefficients (J. Certainly. Results also provide partial support for the downward slope on either side along the line of perfect fit. p Ͻ . 7.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful