11. In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Edward E.

Christensen, Deceased; Adolfo Aznar, Executor, and Lucy Christensen, Heir of the deceased, vs. Helen Christensen Garcia 7 SCRA 95 No. L-16749 Jan.31, 1963 Doctrine: The national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them. FACTS: Labrador, J. The deceased, a citizen of the US and of the State of California but domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his death, left a will instituting appellee Maria Lucy Christensen as his sole heir, to whom he bequeathed all his properties. He also made a provision bequeathing the amount of P3,600.00 to appellant Maria Helen Christensen-Garcia. In accordance with the will of the deceased, the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of P3,600.00 to Helen and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to Lucy. Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by the Court in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased. The legal grounds of opposition are: (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. Helen alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. The CFI ruled that the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the deceased’s will were to be governed by the internal law of California, which provides that a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires. Helen filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal. It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines. ISSUE: What law should govern the will of the deceased – Philippine law or California law? HELD: Philippine law, particularly, Art. 16 of the Civil Code in accordance with the doctrine of renvoi. There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California. The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The doctrine of renvoi may be invoked when a jural matter is presented, which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum.

The Court noted that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule invoked by the appellees, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the internal law should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner. The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that the Court should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If the Court must enforce the law of California as in comity the Court is bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of the Philippine Civil Code, then the Court must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad. It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of the Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them. Therefore, as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.

HUMAN RELATIONS 24. Gashem Shokat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals & Marilou Gonzales 219SCRA115 G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 Doctrine: Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. FACTS: Davide, Jr., J. Private respondent Marilou Gonzales, a barrio lass of good moral character, then 21 years of age, met petitioner, a 29 year old Iranian citizen and an exchange student taking a medical course in Lyceum Colleges in Dagupan City, through one Rabino, the manager of Mabuhay Luncheonette where the former was working as a waitress. Private respondent claimed that she was a virgin at the time and she never had a boyfriend before. Petitioner started courting Gonzales just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage several times which Gonzales accepted on August 20, 1987. On this same day, they went to Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, to meet with Gonzales’ parents. The intended marriage was to take place during the semestral break in October 1987. Private respondent’s parents thought petitioner was good and trusted him, thus they agreed to his proposal of marriage to their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with private respondent during their stay in Bugallon. Upon being informed of the nearing wedding, private respondent’s father already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends. Upon their return to Dagupan City, the petitioner and private responded continued to live together in the former’s apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, petitioner would tie Marilou’s hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this livein relationship, Marilou became pregnant, but petitioner gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still Marilou continued to live with him and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time Marilou left petitioner, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Marilou, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to petitioner to still convince him to marry private respondent, but petitioner insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that he is still single. Thus, Marilou filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the latter’s violation of their agreement to get married. The CFI, applying Art. 21 of the Civil Code, ruled in favor of Marilou and ordered petitioner to pay her P20, 000, among others, as moral damages. Petitioner appealed but the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the case at bar. It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. Additionally, he avers that private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Lastly, petitioner posits that even if he had promised to marry Marilou, his breach thereof is not actionable. ISSUE: W/N Art. 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. HELD: YES. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, this Court is of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction. Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. (The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.)

CIVIL PERSONALITY 37. Antonio Geluz vs. Court of Appeals 2 SCRA 801 No. L-16439. July 20, 1961 Doctrine: Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked of juridical personality under Article 40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently alive. FACTS: Reyes, JBL, J. Nita Villanueva came to know the petitioner, a physician, for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. The said physician made three abortions on Villanueva on the following circumstances: (1) In 1950, when she became pregnant by her present husband, Oscar Lazo, before they were legally married, and she deisred to conceal her pregnancy from her parents; (2) after their marriage, her second pregnancy proved to be inconvenient as she was then working for the COMELEC; and lastly (3) on February 21, 1955 – she was aborted of a 2-month old fetus for the amount of P50.00. Upon knowing of the last abortion, Lazo filed a complaint for damages against Geluz, claiming that he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Lazo and against Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the award. ISSUE: W/N the award of damages was proper. HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This the Court believes to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality; being incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked of juridical personality under Article 40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently alive. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because of Lazo’s indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the petitioner herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee Lazo was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated. It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

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