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Munn Source: Classical Antiquity, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Apr., 1987), pp. 106-138 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25010860 . Accessed: 15/08/2013 13:21
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MARK H. MUNN
Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns and the Theban Stockade of 378- 377 B. C
BETWEEN THEconclusion of the CorinthianWar in 387/6 and the outbreak of the Boiotian war in 379/8 the Spartan hegemony reached the height of its strength inGreece, and King Agesilaos was the chief architect of that strength. The tensions that erupted in the coup at Thebes in the winter of 379/8 were largely a product of Agesilaos' policy of supporting, with force, oligarchies sympathetic to Sparta. The war against Thebes which followed this coup was begun in accordance with Agesilaos' designs (though it soon became fraught with unforeseen complications), and for a time itwas carried out under his own leadership in the field. Though strategic initiative at the outset of the Boiotian War laywith the Spartans, the war itself failed to advance Spartan objectives. But with the settlement eventually reached at Sparta in 371 came the opportun ity for Sparta to reduce Thebes to the dependent ally she had been before 379/8. This was Agesilaos' design, and the catastrophic failure of this design at the battle of Leuktra is generally adduced as proof thatAgesilaos' policies contained the seeds of their own destruction.1 Before judgment is passed on
I wish to thankmy wife, Mary Lou Zimmerman Munn, and Darice Birge, who accompanied and aided me in my fieldwork around Thebes in 1983 and 1984, and to thank J. K. Anderson, Lionel Pearson, W. K. Pritchett, andMichael H. Jameson, along with two anonymous reviewers, all of whom read drafts of this paper andmade comments that have contributedmuch to improving the finished product. 1. R. E. Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaus's Foreign Policy, 394-371 B.C.,"Historia 2 (1953-54) 274-88; J. G. DeVoto, "Agesilaos II and the Politics of Sparta, 404-377 B.C.," Diss. Loyola University, Chicago, 1982, 211-52; C. D. Hamilton, "Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan ? 1987 BY THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
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MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns
Agesilaos for the outcome of Leuktra, where he was not in command, atten tion must be given toAgesilaos' attempts to break Thebes by force of arms in person, in the campaigns of 378 and 377. While the circumstances of the engagements of 378 and 377 were deter mined by the diplomatic activities that preceded them, Agesilaos was the first to recognize that success inwar provided the best opportunities for successful diplomacy.2 The present study is a detailed examination of Agesilaos' ability to advance his aims in the opening campaigns of the Boiotian War through his efforts on the field of battle. These campaigns have not yet been the object of the sort of close study that has been accorded to themore decisive battles of antiquity. As a consequence, we are largely dependent upon the overt judg ments of our sources for our assessment of these events, and those judgments (chiefly of Xenophon, Diodoros, and Plutarch) are by no means in agreement with each other.3 One of the objectives of this study is tomediate the conflict ing impressions left by our sources on these events. The chief means to that end is to set forth a clear account of the events themselves, which requires fundamental work on the topography and tactics of these campaigns. Not that these have gone without notice in recent scholarship, for several places and events belonging to these campaigns, such as Chabrias' celebrated stand against Agesilaos, and the locations of Skolos and Graos Stethos, have been treated elsewhere. But our knowledge of all such places and episodes gains claritywhen they are studied in detail and in context. This study is as much an analysis of the strategies and tactics of Agesilaos' opponents as it is of Agesilaos, for it is against the reactions of his opponents that Agesilaos' abilities and shortcomings must be measured. The rivals of Sparta in the first half of the fourth century were keen to devise means of countering Spartan superiority on the battlefield, and this ambition is perhaps most dramatically reflected in the remarkable cross-country stockade and ditch prepared by the Thebans and Athenians to guard Theban territory in anticipa tion of Agesilaos' first campaign against Thebes in 378.4Although passes had long been defended and blocked by walls, an extensive cross-country fieldwork
of this sort was a novelty.5 It may be argued that the Theban stockade was an Hegemony," Ancient World 5 (1982) 67-78; Hamilton, "The Generalship of King Agesilaus of Sparta," Ancient World 8 (1983) 119-27. 2. See, in addition to the works in n.l supra, G. L. Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta," CQ 26 (1976) 62-84, and Cawkwell, "TheDecline of Sparta," CQ 33 (1983) 385-400. 3. DeVoto (supra n.l, 237-52) has given a chapter of his dissertation to a discussion of these campaigns and has examined the relationship between Xenophon's and Diodoros' accounts. His effort to reconcile these two accounts is only partially successful, however, while his understanding of the events themselves is undermined by the fact that he has made no advance in understanding the topography of the campaigns. 4. Xenophon Hell. 5.4.38-41, 48-49. 5. On the novelty of this fieldwork, see J. K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970) 132-36, and V. D. Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece (Pisa 1983) 67-74. A. W. Lawrence, Greek Aims in Fortification
This content downloaded from 188.8.131.52 on Thu, 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Bibliotheque des Ecoles Frangaises d'Athenes et de Rome 223 (Paris 1974) 80-81. Melber. 7. H.1. Sackett. 12. 180-81. is our chief source of information on these campaigns. 2. The principal reason for thismultiplicity of viewpoints. and even if it was not an unqualified success.5) 134-35.7 Since the stockade was a defensive work overcome by Agesilaos." BSA 52 (1957) 176. Xenophon. Y. The Dema wall inAttica has often been compared to the Theban stockade: see J.88. R. Polyainos also mentions the stockade in his catalog of the stratagems of Agesilaos.5. University of Pennsylvania 1983. J. Recherches de poliorcetique grecque. Ages. since Agesilaos was able to cross it in both of his campaigns. Eliot. the opportunity to praise the generalship of Agesilaos in these campaigns seems to have been the sole criterion used by Xenophon in selecting episodes for narra tion whenever the king himself was in the field. W. none is quite as ambitious in its length as the Theban stockade. The Theban stockade was not the only such fieldwork employed by Greek armies of the fourth century. Xenophon Hell. 8. An derson (supra n. 2. Victories were claimed by both sides. often for the same encounters.11 and 25 (stockade). certainly. In part Polyainos' refer ences derive fromXenophon. is that no decisive battles took place in these campaigns. 7. we do have a variety of sources that comment on the campaigns from several different view points. I have argued that the resem blances between the description of the Theban stockade and the remains of the Dema wall are more than fortuitous and that the two fieldworks were in fact built at the same time: seeMunn. 183 n.AJA 85 (1981) 208-9. L. "The Fourth-Century Defenses of Attica: The Dema Wall.22. "TO AEMA: A Survey of theAigaleos-Parnes Wall. A similar barricade was erected to close the Isthmus of Corinth against Epamei nondas in 369: see Diodoros 15. 24 (other references to these cam paigns). the Theban fieldwork had its influence on the course of these opening campaigns of the Boiotian War.88. J. Fortified Military Camps inAttica. 2. but it is an advantage in that we are not dependent upon only one point of view. Nevertheless." abstract. Jones. "Uber die Quellen und den Wert der Strategemensammlung Polyans. Munn. McCredie. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ." Diss. lists numerous Greek barrier walls known either archaeologically or from ancient descriptions.2.1. "Studies on the Territorial Defenses of Fourth-Century Athens. 1/April 1987 experiment that failed. and on the Theban stockade in particular. E.42 on Thu. Polyainos 2. 6.108 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. Garlan.8 (Oxford 1979) 167-72.1.4. its construction was a significant indication of the resolve of the Thebans and theirAthenian allies to resist Spartanmight by land. Hesperia Supplement XI (Princeton 1966) 96. 21.6 SOURCES It is remarkable that although no surviving ancient source describes all noteworthy episodes of these campaigns in a connected narrative.106.68. J. 5." NJbb This content downloaded from 65. cf.35-55. Indeed. whose partiality for Agesilaos is well-known. 7.3. and C. but Polyainos alsomentions details and episodes that come from at least one other major source. 178-313. This fact gives rise to a number of difficulties in reconstructing a unified account of events. so that accounts vary according to the interests of the several authors who mention these events. mention of it serves to highlight that commander's tactical skills.15. Xenophon Hell.
"The Sources of Plutarch's Pelopidas. Polyainos must certainly have been relying on an intermediarywho did.9 Diodoros derived his account of this period from the history of Ephoros. Cf. 75-76. esp.12 A Theban viewpoint on these affairs is presented by Plutarch in his life of Pelopidas. but if he did not. in view of the popularity of Ephoros' work. followed by Lammert (supra n.25g). 24 and 36. D.1-33) is less straightforward than On Nepos' use of Ephoros. Buckler.14Like Ephoros. 66. 14. J. 71. Bradley. part 2 (1919) 1707. to find evidence that later authors extracted episodes from these campaigns from Ephoros' history. part 2 (1952) 1433. R." CQ 33 (1939) 11-22. Diodoros 15. G. F. It is generally recognized that Polyainos did make use of other collections of stratagems: seeMelber. 14 (1885) 526-54. "The Sources andMethods of Polyaenus. Jacoby. esp. but on balance his account prefers the accomplishments of the Athenians. Westlake. "Plutarch on Leuktra.32. 541-45. 12.11 andXenophon Hell. Phillips. This content downloaded from 65. "Callistene di Olinto e la vita di Pelopida di Plutarco. 284d. and this is also reflected in his life of Agesilaos. while the emphasis is placed on the skill and disci pline of the Thebans who defend their own land. F.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 109 Diodoros describes successes on both sides. In the absence of Ephoros' textwe are unfortunately unable to make our own judgment on Polybios' point (Polybios was inclined to be harsh in his criticism on this point. Fuscagni. "Polyainos (8)" inRE 21. see J. Untersuchungen uiber die Quellen der griechischen und sicilischen Geschichten bei Diodor. On Polyainos' use of Ephoros see Phillips (supra n." SymbOslo 55 (1980) 75-93. 5. stratagems of Agesilaos (2. J. though he feels that Ephoros was less sucessful in his comprehension and description of the complicated maneuvers involved in land engagements (Leuktra andMantineia are the examples cited). fur Philologie und Padagogik Supp. who seems to have devoted an entire book to the Boiotian War of 378-371. they are credited with engendering in the Thebans the skills that they would later use decisively at Leuktra. 11. it is not surprising. 10. Melber. see Barber. cf.. Kallisthenes' Hellenika has been recognized as the chief source for Plutarch's life of Pelopidas. but from itwe may at least be sure thatEphoros offered detailed descriptions of military affairs on land.1.1-34." inRE 10.1.13 Here again the stockade is not mentioned. Chabrias' generalship wins the greatest praise. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .88.8).2. On the title and content of Ephoros' Book XXI.Ages. 13. "Kallisthenes (2). Volquardsen. Barber. e. pp." HSCP 73 (1969) 308-9. the close verbal parallels between Polyainos 2. S. 26.8). 9. emphasizes the dependence of Polyainos' first two books on Ephoros. identifying the source of many of his Melber has suggested (540-41. though these campaigns are said to have been relatively undistinguished in terms of immedi ate results. Polybios 12." Contributi dell'Istituto di storia antica 3 (1975) 31-55. 58. H.g. "The Sources of Cornelius Nepos: Selected Lives. Demosthenes 20. TheHistorian Ephorus (Cambridge 1935) 24. 35-38. R. 545). 18-22.4. See.1? Since Ephoros' history of this period is known to have included full descriptions of battles.76 and Aristides Panath. On the dependence of this part of Diodoros' history on the work of Ephoros see C." HSCP 76 (1972) 297-98. Buch XI bis XVI (Kiel 1868) 51-71. Plutarch Pel. Lammert.88.49.11Ephoros was perhaps the primary source of the information given by Polyainos where he diverges from Xenophon. 15. while the defensive stockade is never explicitly mentioned.42 on Thu. Because of Polyainos' reliance on the works of other compilations. 12. and Nepos certainly used Ephoros for his account of Chabrias' stand. esp. L.25f remarks that Ephoros had a certain aptitude for describing naval battles (Konon's battles off of Cyprus and Knidos are cited). A. has concluded that Polyainos did not consult Xenophon. In this regard.
1126c. and Jacoby (supra n. at a time when many eyewitnesses still lived and. p. infra nn. and probably encountered Chabrias and Phokion. Essai sur la vie de Xenophon (Paris 1957) chaps. 68 T1). Diogenes Laertius 3.110 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. and this probability makes it impossible inmany cases to determine which of these two authors was the source of episodes found in the compilations of Polyainos and Frontinus. see PlutarchMor. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Androtion (like Ephoros. at a timewhen many other historians had recorded or were recording the same period in history. Anderson. Xenophon (New York 1974) 165 71. 74). 1/April 1987 Kallisthenes provided considerable detail in his accounts of military events. Delebecque. 6. must have been familiar with the circle of the Academy.12 and 24 and Frontinus 1. On Kallisthenes' upbringing.11).17-22. and FGrH IIc. moreover. 12. S.17 For military matters Xenophon's narrative.1-7. 4. that each of them. see Polyainos 2. see Anderson (supra n. see K. writing some twenty to fifty years after these events. though he draws criticism from Polybios. 6-8. see Buckler (supra n.4.24. both coming of age in the generation after these events and not known to have had military experience themselves.4). Chabrias (Diodoros 15. Phok. Polybios on theWriting of History. raised by his uncle Aristotle (PlutarchAlex. very likely derived his circum stantially detailed information from fellow-officers who had served with Agesilaos. 55.4. 124 T33. 837c) and perhaps Timotheos' sometime colleague in generalship.18 Ephoros and Kallisthenes. though highly selective and for that reason at times tendentious.10) 1-16. begun during his sojourn in the Peloponnese among the allies of Sparta and revised after 358. Brown. especially with regard tomilitary affairs. Sacks. 20.14) 1706. should be considered authoritative.20 15. cf. "Callisthenes and Alexander. On the values and limitations of Xenophon's writings. since he was a mature contemporary of the Boiotian War and a former companion-in-arms of Agesilaos'. On the relationship of this passage to Polybios' criticism of Ephoros (supra n. Ephoros is said by Porphyry to have copied extensively fromKallisthenes.14).42 on Thu. see E. did consult informantswho had been present. Ephoros must have had contact with men likeTimotheos (also a student of Isokrates: see [Plutarch] Mor. see Barber (supra n.19Details surviving from their accounts may be presumed to have been recorded at no more than second or third hand from men who had participated in those events." AJP 70 (1949) 226-32. and T. and both may have covered theBoiotian campaigns of 378-77. Kallisthenes. 18. 1685-86.14) 1675-76. however. There is some probability. Kallisthenes gave a detailed description of the battle of Issos.88. FGrH 70 T17. 19. On the composition of this portion of Xenophon's Hellenica. nevertheless moved in intellectual circles that included men of action.16 There is no reason to believe that any of the contemporary historians named above were eyewitnesses of Agesilaos' Boiotian campaigns.7).29. 31. University of California Publications inClassical Studies 24 (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1981) 195 202.88. Xeno phon in particular. 16.10) 131-33.5) 9-12. there fore probably covering the Boiotian War (FGrH 67.15 It is likely that Kallisthenes' work was the source of some portions of Ephoros' history of these affairs.62. for inconsistencies and omissions. 17. Daimachos of Plataia and Anaximenes of Lampsakos are cited as sources used by Epho ros (FGrH 65 T1 and 72 T28). Cha brias' prot6g6 from the time of the Boiotian War. K. As a student of Isokrates. The Boiotians Dionysodoros and Anaxis are known to have written histories ending in 361/60. see Jacoby (supra n.3 (cf.2. For similar but not identical passages thatmight have come from either Ephoros or Kallisthenes.1. and J. said to have This content downloaded from 65. see Barber (supra n. In defense of Kallisthenes' account of the battle of Leuktra. On what little is known of Ephoros' life.
Plutarch. 2.4. Unable to proceed.4. 5. This content downloaded from 65. 21.42 on Thu. 5. the diverse strands of information that have come down to us and combine them. 6.4. 20. by marching out at daybreak before the defenders could anticipate his movements. evidently. 5. KYNOSKEPHALAI In the campaign of 378. and likely gave due attention to the famous successes of Chabrias in his Theban campaigns (cf. Even tually. Agesilaos began by following the same itinerary traced by the army under Kleombrotos the previous winter. 00-00. he managed to cross the stockade and went on to destroy Theban property within its perimeter.4.48-49). from Xenophon and through intermediate sources.5. according toXeno phon.38-41 and Ages.48).32. Ifwe take up. that "the plain and the most valuable part of the [Theban] land was protected round about by an entrenchment and a stockade" (Hell.27.14-16. Can this place be located? been a student of Isokrates: FGrH 324 T2) devoted considerable attention in his Atthis to the foreign affairs of Athens. On Kleombrotos' campaign. particularly military affairs (see FGrH 324 F8-53). 00.2 After arriving at Thespiai by way of Plataia.14.4. intending to enter it in the vicinity of Kynos Kephalai. There he found. in anticipation of Agesilaos' second campaign (Hell. 5. and the place is named Kynos Kephalai (Ages.22.4. pp. therefore. This was also the place where the Thebans encamped in the spring of 377. Xenophon. moving his camp frequently over a period of days while he devised a stratagem for outmaneuvering the defenders of the stockade. "the entrance [to Theban territory] toward phon as i n Thespiai" (Hell. "up to the city" (Hell.41). he proceeded towardTheban territory.4. as Polybios advises. Although much of what is reported inDiodoros.4. and Polyainos is greatly compressed or fragmentary in nature.6. describes Agesilaos' progress in 378 (cf.88. Polybios 12. withdrawing after sixteen days without having effected any action against the Thebans (Hell. the obscurities and apparent contradictions among their accounts can be clarified to a great extent and can yield a coherent account of these events. Kynos Kephalai was. see Hell.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 111 We have. 22.1-6). themost suitable place for the passage of an army from the territory of Thespiai eastward into Theban land. then. 6. 2.76. 5.21we canmove beyond the narratives and judgments of our sources in reconstructing and assessing Agesilaos' campaigns against Thebes. 5.88. Demosthenes' rhetori cal praise of Chabrias soon after the latter's death. and note thatAndrotion made mention of Chabrias' early career: FGrH 324 F48). Hell. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .4.38). a good deal of information that was first committed to writing within living memory of these campaigns. with firsthandobservations from the site of the events. Peloponnesian con trol of the Kithairon passes is discussed infra. The point where Agesilaos crossed the wall in 378 is described by Xeno t6os 0eowulv elflokX. Kynos Kephalai iswhere Kleombrotos encamped inTheban territory the previ ous winter. 28. he devastated the property of theThebans that lay outside the stockade. 5.22).1-6. Diodoros 15.5).
Pausanias's Description of Greece (London 1898) vol. W. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . two-at least not and through this zone for an army moving there the lay no good route between in hostile easier territory. the vadtrl This content downloaded from 65. The escarp ment itself ismore rugged ground than the area to either the north or south.24 Much 23.2). see the commentary by Frazer. 136.42-45 (cf. 24. being punctuated by hills and numerous deep-cut ravines.5-26. South of the escarpment is a plateau of gently rolling hill country.6. 140. drained in its eastern portion by the Asopos River.4. and P. the ancient Thespios. Below this escarpment to the north lie the broad Aonian plain and itswestward continua tion.TENERIC '~ THESPIAI I----SK * LOUTOUFI * NEOKHORAK I MS ~ . Polyainos 2. 500-512. 67. through the escarpment and into theAonian plain.5. Wallace. is exemplified in the account of the death of Phoibidas given in Xenophon Hell.23 The direct line between Thespiai and Thebes runs through this rugged zone of the escarpment. Die griechischen Landschaf ten (Frankfurt 1951-52) vol. which drain waters toward the lower ground to the north. On the geography of this part of Boiotia see A.88. especially in traversing the narrowKanavari ravine. easiest and with ravine to Thespiai way from Thebes follow this up into the Thespiai a short detour to the is to follow This valley. the Teneric plain. SKOLOS so O'" Q--i :DAFNOULA 6 *PYRGOS ERYTHRAI KREUSIS AIGO TH rates two distinct regions in this part of Boiotia (see Figure 1). Strabo's Description of Boiotia.112 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. The Kanavari (9. of sanctuary the edge of the Aonian is the route followed near plain to the by Pausanias the mouth of the the Kabeiroi. Philippson." TANAGRA THESPIAI LEUKTRA '. 5. 1:2. Kanavari. and with comments on the way toward Onchestos).88. 1/April 1987 ONCHESTOS A / N A I N PLAIN .25. The difficulty of thisway for military forces. 5. a Commentary (Heidelberg 1979) 5-6. The deepest of these ravines between Thespiai and Thebes is that which leads the Kanavari stream.42 on Thu.
24. alternatively. To the south of the escarpment lies a much more open countryside.39 and Thucydides 3. that plowing near Loutoufi has recently turned up artifacts fromMycenaean. as does S.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 113 ground lay both north and south of the straight line. the steep-sided Kanavari ravine to the north. since the steep slopes on either side of the pass would prevent a larger invading army from outflanking a defending force drawn up in the pass. 27. the more famous Kynos Kephalai in Thessaly. and later of Agesilaos with his army of some eighteen thousand foot and fifteen hundred cavalry. the land does rise to its highest elevation locally at a point almost precisely equidistant fromThebes and Thes piai. near where theKanavari ravine emerges. 5.9. Kynos Kephalai. 25.25 This way is passable.3. This latterway. Kuvvo There are no grounds for identifying the site of Pindar's house at Thebes (Pausanias KeWpcta(a. This must have been the route of Kleombrotos. 1.26 Although this region of theAsopos basin has no especially prominent summits. and the territory and town of Thes piai to the west-northwest (see Figure 2 and Plate 1). Cf. was the name of theKithairon pass leading to Plataia: see Herodotos 9. and itwas this route from Onchestos through the Teneric plain thatAlexander took in his march on Thebes in 335: Arrian Anab. Ephor of Antiquities at Thebes.1.25. confirming the above hypothesis. 26. which was the birthplace of Pindar.42 on Thu. but also easily defensible. Andriomenou.88. to be located somewhere hereabouts. The kephalai here most likely refer to summits above the pass. A.27 Command of this height would have ensured passage east and west for an army (or. entering the countryside inwhich Mardonios had once arrayed his army for battle. This content downloaded from 65.TxaXeig6'E/io xai X aqg CoOg ixavov avaxzevovxeg. where a way some four kilo meters wide (between the bed of theAsopos to the south and the drop into the Kanavari ravine to the north) leads from the area of Leuktra in the territoryof Thespiai into Theban lands.9: 6(pol xakXoOvtalav Kuvog KEqpaXai. 1. The Topography of Thebes from theBronze Age toModern Times (Princeton 1985) 140. the scene of Flamininus' victory over Philip V.26. would have blocked it for an oppo encountered by the Theban cavalrymay have been the narrows of theKanavari ravine &a6dpaTxoS itself or some side ravine on the southeastern side of Kanavari.10) as Kynos Kephalai. To the north. Archaic.v. at least to the extent of demonstrating that there was an ancient settlement in the vicinity of Loutoufi. Dryos Kephalai. The modern village Loutoufi is not far from the summit of theRakhi Kendani. and Classical graves. the way into Theban territory narrows down to a pass barely a kilometer wide at the beginning of theAonian plain. xali t?pzeQLxxxaoevoL or Treis Kephalai. described by Polybios 18. A summit at 388 meters is reached along the Rakhi Kendani. but the group of hills known today as the Rakhi Kendani) is the most suitable candidate for the ancient toponym Kynos Kephalai.88. Arrian Anab.7. Loutoufi is perhaps the successor of the ancient XowQovof Kynos Kephalai. "Dog Heads. is certainly themore suitable way for a large army to proceed from Thespiai towardThebes. Symeonoglou. 9.22. This eminence (perhaps not the summit at 388meters specifically. through the Teneric plain.1.7. 198. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . most likely a group of summits or a ridge. This is the way from Thebes to Onchestos mentioned by Pausanias 9." is a name appropriate for an eminence. according to Stephanos of Byzantion s. Close at hand inBoiotia.When this article was already inmanuscript I was informed by Dr. a ridge of rounded hills which overlooks the Asopos basin to the south and east. and plate 2.
... assis probably with Athenian the fieldwork which they hoped would prevent the other devastation of their territory.~A. wise the time of the midwinter campaign in this fieldworkr of and the of Kleombrotos of Agesilaos had prepared inevitable in late spring the Thebans. Indeed...... must the assistance that the Athenians gave This content downloaded from 65..... and Eliot (supra n. Sackett..-: ..McCredie (supra n.. orse o the eteen e probable te Theban o te e te of 378: and loaton robable h course of eban stoade 2. even to the point of assuming thatChabrias himself directed the work: seeM. Cary inCAH VI 68.... 1/April 1987 1vK 1 - ~~..: "Itrt :/... ..'.:::::::laespig !::-:: wise invitabledevastaion oftheir territory We now thathis feldwo_ ent) in thenian arrival of Agesilaos in late spring the observation Ave of with movements allowed Thebans.. woulprepared hoped encampment prevenprovided just withine of bouwise inevitable Thebtheiran devastationds We cautious knowforthe Kleombrotos THE COURSE territory..6) 176.114 CLASSICALANTIQUITY Volume 6/No...oerba tance. since the defense of such a fieldwork the Thebans would not have been conceivable if the Thebans did not have the substantial support of the Athenians... !:"C ........ .kwhc .. Jones. Campaign of stockade i '.= .....r hy wudpevn heohr .28 OF THE THEBAN STOCKADE Between arrival tance.rva location of Figure ampaign Tebn. r?.6) 96..."C~ :. No surviving source specificallymentions that theAthenians had a hand in the construc tion of the Theban stockade.. Contour interl habrias' THE C OURSE OFTHE THEBAN STOCKADE 0. "SOUL... theAthenians must have been involved in every stage of the planning and construction have been of the wall. stand.... ..: :~:~o. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . in large part....88. probably assis-ng a It the fieldwork which they secure would other cuntryside. We know that this fieldwork i 28._ ^^li^^^^^^. At:. This. but this is widely assumed to be the case..' 50 m.42 on Thu.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. .88...
W. Potniai.1. No trace of this earth-and-wood barricade survives (or.50).25.2 on Mardonios' fortified camp along theAsopos. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .30.5. see H. 5. This content downloaded from 65.29 the latter probably of brushwood and stakes embedded in themound thrown up behind the ditch. variously referred to as xa oavQ'xa'ca xai Y TldqpQog xai tdqpQovu (Hell.32 The line of the stockade is associated with specific places: Kynos Kephalai.3. W. and T6 xaQaxwoua (Hell.42 on Thu. 5. 5. 5.38 and 39). Skolos. it is clear that it v ov Texal ateoaetragcotvov xVxXW was a uniform and continuous work (d&joTExacQpgeu t6 jtebiov T xai ta Aksioov &OLa TtS X5oQag. vol. and. W. McCredie (supra n. Pel.49). 60. 26. 5. Catling). 30. Lawrence (supra n. to fix the approxi mate course of the stockade with reasonable certainty.7. at least. which must have been evacuated. Inspiration to build the stockademay well have come from Chabrias.29. 68. beginning with Kynos Kephalai. 32. 29.62.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 115 consisted of a ditch and stockade. cf.6. 5.4.38). His role in its defense was a prominent one (he is the only allied commander mentioned by Xenophon).. 2.4. none has been recognized). 5. Chabrias had recently returned from a successful campaign against Persian forces on the frontiers of Egypt: Diodoros 15. 5. 31.38). all of these resources were immediately at hand (cf. 2 (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1974) 133-46.1. the stockade and ditch at theCorinthian Isthmos in 369: Diodoros 15. Though Xenophon varied his vocabulary in referring to the fieldwork. in the same area covered by the Theban stockade).6) 97-98.25: Or3lctotozT e6iov 6lexTapgevoav xai anexagdxcooav.33 and commenta tors so far have had little to add to Xenophon's account of it.4. T6 oTaug5woa (Hell. Aerial photographs taken under the right conditions might reveal evidence of the ancient ditch.33. Pritchett. The deep soils on hills of theAsopos basin are well suited to this sort of excavation and earthwork. 5. 33. Herodotos 9. Xenophon Hell.29. and the cutting of trees.29). Stakes would require scavenging from among vine props. Oxy.4.68.15. consisting of a stockade and ditch. cf.38 (quoted supra n. Greek Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford 1933) 59-62. which I have been able to examine at the British School inAthens (through the kindness of H.18. 12.34. Unfortunately. and Skolos. and Cary. That campaignmay have involved the use of entrenchments like the Theban stockade.2-4. Cf.88. North of these heights the escarpment of the Kanavari ravine-a steep climb of two so enthusiastically after the trial and acquittal of Sphodrias: Xenophon Hell.22).1.4.1. with brushwood available in gullies and on hills round about. from the hamlets of Kynos Kephalai. It should be possible. Xenophon Hell. 6.2.1. Hell. Graos Stethos. Diodoros 15. 15. Trtdqpog xai ti6 oTauQgo)a (Hell. by reference to the natural topography of the Thebaid and to the places noted above. Polyainos 2. cf.68) which probably originated in this campaign of Chabrias in Egypt: see Parke.g.1-3. were taken at too high an altitude and at thewrong season (August) to reveal the sort of vegetation marks that might indicate the line of the buried ditch.4. 3 [Lon don]). The reasons for identifying the Rakhi Kendani as Kynos Kephalai are also reasons for placing the beginning of the stockade on these same heights. Ta oTCautbQaTa (Ages.4. T XaQaxdcaTa (Hell. Xenophon Hell. Polyainos then refers to the stockade as TO XaQaxwo)a. The Greek State atWar.4. Chabrias is later associated with another fieldwork evidently resembling that around Thebes. theRAF aerial photographs of the area of Thebes. Nepos 12.31 Of its course we are told in general terms that it "encircled the plain and the most valuable parts of the land" of the Thebans.39.88.41).Hell. Polybios 2.30 and that itwas punctuated at intervals by sallyports which allowed horsemen to charge out from behind the wall. however.5) 162. Polyainos 2. K. On the typical construction of Greek stockades see Polybios 18. timbers from abandoned buildings (e. Plutarch Ages.4. Parke. Pliny NH 5. This may be adduced from references to a place called Xacptiov Xdcat (Strabo 16. less directly.
the Souleza ridge also gave them added cover to hide themovement of their forces behind the stockade. This content downloaded from 65. given the amibitious nature of the Theban fieldwork.36 and since the bed of the Asopos the river for most. 36. 5. Polyainos 2. to block the kilome ter-wide gap at the junction of theAonian and Teneric plains. Pausanias 9. It is possible. where it is within a few hundred meters of the bed of the Asopos (today the village of Loutoufi stands near the center of the Souleza crest. It is conceivable that the stockade angled northeastward to reach the gentle heights of theGolemi crest. thisway was never tried by the Peloponnesian army.88.4. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . It was in front of this line thatAgesilaos moved. The Sou leza crest was probably the line followed by the Theban stockade to the south west of Thebes.More likely.34 Kynos Kephalai (the Rakhi Kendani) was certainly protected by the stockade. "until then hidden from view.25).4. dropping to ten meters or so over its last kilometer.More probable is that the fieldwork.88." charged through the sallyports and succeeded in cutting down a number of Agesilaos' own cavalrymen and peltasts before being driven off (Hell. From the end of the Souleza crest eastward there is no obvious line of high ground for the stockade to follow. which must have begun near the edge of the drop into the Kanavari ravine. that a stretch of stockade was also built further north.4 specifies that the Asopos was xcai vv eTl the border between Plataian and Theban territory. This supposition is supported by the likeli 34.42 on Thu. shifting his camp several times a day while attempting to find a weak point at which to cross the stockade. This was probably a factor in a surprise attack of the Theban cavalry. having approached theAsopos by following the Souleza crest.1. which runsmore or less parallel to the Asopos at a distance of two to three kilometers from the river. see Figure 2 and Plate 1). 5. the unexpected appearance of the Theban cav alry was made possible by the fact that theywere able to move from point to point behind the Souleza ridge. Xenophon Hell. below the line of the stockade.38. From the height of the Rakhi Kendani the Souleza crest runs east-southeast for about five kilometers. This crest would have provided the Theban and Athenian forces the sort of defensive line-along higher ground-which we know they preferred. 1/April 1987 hundred meters over ground deeply cut by numerous watercourses-provided The Theban and Athenian camp on an obstacle that needed no fortification. followed a line along its north bank. The Asopos here defined well have the border of Theban territory. cf. beyond the end of theKanavari ravine. Through this gapAlexander's army passed in 335 (supra n. and thismust have been the case in 378 as well. standing some sixtymeters above theAsopos plain at its beginning.35 In addition to giving the defenders of the stockade the advantage of higher ground. if not all.21. On one occasion when Agesilaos was withdrawing toward camp. Whether fortified or not. of its is themost substantial natural barrier in this part of the plain the stockademay taken advantage of it and followed eastward course from this point. It is a more defensible gap than the way into the Theban Parasopia by Kynos Kephalai. It is difficult to believe that this stockade was everywhere sufficiently tall to have masked movements of cavalry behind it.4.116 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. the Theban cavalry. the one engagement along this line that Xenophon describes. 35.39-40).
With enemy forces standing on higher ground and evidently more prepared and eager for battle in this advantageous position than his own allied army. although seeing it in a different light than Diodoros.4-6 augmented by the very similar accounts. 5. resting against their knees.88. however. This content downloaded from 65.4. all probably derived from Ephoros. Diodoros says that when the Theban and Athenian forces had assembled. oTa6ioLv rv TOdV jtiXeovta 5ri t6iX5c. The placement of Skolos and the evidence for the eastern extent of the stockade will be discussed below in connection with the campaign of 377. the easternmost known location for the stockade. xaicgptOXrLa JTOLrc. Chabrias. The precision with which this command was executed and the confidence the stance implied convinced Agesilaos that the enemy were going to hold their ground.3-33. however.49. Instead he withdrew his phalanx to the plain. given by Polyainos 2. and Agesilaos sent his light troops and cavalry out to plunder the countryside. This is the account of Diodoros 15.39 37.L'EVOl tag bvoaXw(Oag &vRLCevov Eqpo6ov. It is likely. After dispersing the Theban and Athenian light-armed troops and harass ing their hoplites with his own skirmishers. according toDiodoros 15.epiov 184.108.40.206.g elxool. for in the ensuing en counter none of our sources makes reference to the stockade. This is probably not the case. Agesilaos judged itwiser not to engage the enemy at this point. Xenophon Hell. Diodoros 15. They did not choose to do so.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 117 hood that Skolos. evidently expecting them to give way in the face of the greater size of his army.32. they "occupied a certain elongated hill. CHABRIAS' STAND Xenophon's account in the Hellenika of Agesilaos' first campaign against Thebes omits any mention of Chabrias and makes no reference to the en counter with Agesilaos which. Agesilaos advanced his phalanx toward their line.1 (who mentions the flight of the Theban andAthenian mercenaries. This becomes clear when the sequence of events of the campaign of 378 is untangled from the selective narratives our sources provide. they awaited the attack of the might be interpreted as enemy."38This cp6(3Xqta (here translated "bulwark") a rather imprecise description of the stockade and ditch. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . events connected with Agesilaos' successful crossing of the stockade in 378 deserve discussion.2 (who mentions Gorgidas as the Theban commander) and Nepos 12. behind which. twenty stades from the city. as we know fromXenophon. and having made a bulwark of the difficult terrain. that Xenophon does refer to the encounter with Chabrias in his Agesilaos.1.3: oi [ eV Or)3aLot X6cpov tlva xaxeX6povTo jraQa4jxri.42 on Thu. Before that. the Thebans andAthenians did await the first approach of Agesilaos.37 lay on the north bank of the Asopos. won praise for Chabrias from Thebans and Athenians alike. 7io. 38. offering the Thebans and Athenians the opportunity of engaging him on level ground if they chose. com manded his troops to stand at ease with their spears upright and their shields off. followed by the Theban Gorgidas.4.
21. should be enough to demonstrate thatChabrias was the principal commander of Athenian citizen soldiers-hoplites and otherwise-on this occasion (cf.1.5: Xaciactg 6' 6 and Xenophon's association of Chabrias with peltast 'A0rivaiog TCv ito0oqxSoQv &qpqryouFevog) mercenaries in 377 (Hell. This content downloaded from 65. will have been the first time that the Theban and Athenian allies confronted Agesilaos face to face-hence the particular thrill of danger associated with the event." AJA 67  411-13). saysNepos 12. which is specifically associated by Diodoros andNepos with this encounter.5.4 For Diodo ros reports thatAgesilaos now took possession of "a great quantity of plunder" (15. e.1) reports this as the most memorable of Chabrias' deeds. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . offering to do battle with the Thebans both in the plain and in the hills. I follow Anderson (supra n. 5. The Peloponnesian army had already been con i.29.32. it is clear fromwhat followed this standoff that Agesilaos already had his army well within the territory of Thebes. if they chose to fight" (22. as your commander. peltasts).88. in understanding Chabrias' stand to be the drill of a hoplite phalanx (reliquamphalangem. after crossing the stockade by Kynos Kephalai. The reference by Dio doros on this occasion to Chabrias as a mercenary commander (Diodoros 15.g. by J. Here is a reference to the encounter with Chabrias and the Boiotians-battle was offered to them. and Demosthenes.7 (=Plutarch Ages.3).42 on Thu.e.28). 19. see also J.1) 241. Rolfe in the Loeb). The noteworthiness of this encounter derives from the fact that Chabrias faced the stronger force of Agesilaos without any fortifications protecting him and. see the note ad loc.. some twenty years after the event and soon after Chabrias' death.88. on the less thanwholehearted enthusiasm of Agesilaos' Peloponnesian troops at this time. which must correspond to Xenophon's report that after successfully crossing the line of the stockade he "devastated and burned the region within up to the city" (Hell. which may be 378 or 377. Demosthenes 20.1.41). presumably. C. Diodoros 15. without any fortifications just to his rear to which he could retreat should Agesilaos have pressed the attack. 26) and 2. "A Second Look at the Chabrias Monument.7).. 245.5) 134. 89-90.1. It has sometimes been assumed that Chabrias' stand took place at or before the line of the stockade. and DeVoto (supra n. This. Anderson (supra n. Buckler. and 2. which most likely belong to the campaign of 378.54) should be taken to show that Chabrias also had mercenaries under his command. 1/April 1987 Chabrias won praise.15. which may have been both hoplites and light-armedpeltasts. Even clearer is the report in Xenophon's life of Agesilaos that. but they refused to fight in defense of Theban land. Agesilaos "devastated the countryside up to the city.33. 40. beginning with this encounter: "How skillfully. and in particular Polyainos 2. referring to the formation of the hoplites that remained in place after the dispersal of their light-armed support troops.4).32. Indeed.76). reminded theAthenians of Chabrias' accomplishments on the battlefield.76 and the statue of Chabrias. and "The Statue of Chabrias.6) from the countryside." Hesperia 41 (1972) 466-74. and Chabrias now probably used these mercenary hoplites as drilled cadres in the front ranks of his phalanx.2).4. from the Thebans for saving them in this encounter by the skill of his generalship. inside the perimeter of the stockade.2. according to Diodoros (15.4.1. just as Gorgidas used the Sacred Band (see Plutarch Pel. Nepos (12. see in general Isokrates 14.20.118 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. 5. These mercenar iesmust have included troops who had served under Chabrias inEgypt (supra n. that is. he drew up your ranks at Thebes to face the whole power of the Peloponnese" (20. then.
even with his overwhelming numbers.Ages. Diodoros locates the stand on "a certain elongated hill. and the possibility of a decisive defeat for the Thebans and Athenians was real. It is hard to escape the impression from the passage in Diodoros that the q0o6p5. But I believe this is shown not to be the case. the stockade. having passed through the stockade by a ruse. Now.22) of Theban territory.42 From the ridge that runs above the south bank of the Kanavari ravine. out into the open plain southwest of Thebes: Souleza. twenty stades from the city. 2. On the basis of the length of Greek feet cited by F. In thismanner they had "made a bulwark of the difficult terrain. Their response was tomake of the terrainwhat they had made of their wall. Konizos. to contemplate a direct assault on his enemies. 5. three elongated crests run eastward. where themain entrance to the city and to the Kadmeia on the south side lay. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Agesilaos could not be held back at will. (Tx XoLra." This hill most likely lay somewhere to the west of Thebes. stripped of the protection of their stockade. taking account of the location of Kynos Kephalai as determined above. but they could not prevent Agesilaos' forces from plundering the open countryside. and the plain that his troops devastated after his phalanx with drew from the Theban andAthenian position on the hill was certainly the open ground south and southwest of Thebes. Accepting the distance of twenty stades from Thebes.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 119 fronted along the line of the stockade. Ephoros' account thenwent on to suggest justwhat I have pointed out here. were the objectives of Agesilaos' sec ond campaign.42 on Thu. who had previously made mention of the stockade.996 meters. This was the direction from which Agesilaos made his entrance into the Thebaid.88. retaining some of the original wording. but allowing some leeway both for the possible imprecision of this figure and for the variable length of the stade. it may be assumed that this hill lay to the southwest of Thebes. Pryce andM."41 They could thus defend themselveswherever the ground was suitable. from the fuller account of Ephoros. twenty stades comes to between 3. In fact. we may look for a suitable location for the elongated hill between three and four-and-a-half kilometers to the southwest of Thebes. that the Thebans and Athenians.ljja "bulwark.49). "Measures" in the OCD (Oxford 1970) 659.528 and 3. namely. but this fieldwork had made it impossi ble for Agesilaos. Skouliki.1 says thatPotniai is This content downloaded from 65.88. The greater part of the northernmost of these crests.8. namely. 43. falls within the arc from Thebes prescribed by Diodoros' informa tion. N. which was an artificial cjto63rklca.Hell.43The location of Chabrias' stand against Agesilaos was probably some 41. The explanation may well lie in the fact that here Diodoros has excerpted the description of Chabrias' stand. between the Rakhi Kendani (Kynos Kephalai) and Thebes. and to stand against Agesilaos only at those points where they had the advantage of position-where they held Toz6oL'?E6Q&eLOL (Diodoros 15. The arc ismeasured from the center of Thebes' southern flank. nonetheless could make a "bulwarkof the difficult terrain." refers to an artifical barrier.4.32. and Konizos. Lang.Note thatPausanias 9." 42. for itwas principally this area that the Peloponnesians must have plundered in this cam Eo paign. since Xenophon specifies that "the parts east of Thebes" (a nQO6g also described as "the remainder" TrigTOyv Ol3a(cov rto6swg.4).
which stands about halfway between Thebes and Konizos. tired to the same campsite each evening. Xenophon Hell. toward the right (i. as Polyainos says. with a way into the western side of Thebes still open at their back. incidentally. 1/April 1987 where along this crest (see Figure 2 and Plate 2). In the present instance the accounts of Xenophon and Polyainos make good sense as complementary partial descriptions of the same event. This content downloaded from 65. 4. Here. fig. which can be understood as follows.3. probably the same source that provided details about Agesilaos' formations in his campaign of 377 found in Polyainos 2.42 on Thu. Agesilaos began moving well before the customary hour of themarshalling of his opponents. This position in fact makes very good sense of the sequence of events of Agesilaos' first campaign. from the backside of Konizos): see Symeonoglou (supra n. and even more concern that their own line of retreat towardThebes might be cut off. directly toward Thebes. At the same time their peltasts were probably sent against the Peloponnesians to harass and slow theirmarch. Agesilaos sent a column from the rear of his formation toward an undefended opening in the opposite direction. by which he eventually passed through (for related formations and maneuvers executed by Agesilaos.25 credits Agesilaos' passage through one of the openings in the stockade to a deceptive maneuver in the face of the enemy.41) suggests that the defenders normally re &QLcQov. facing southeastward toward themore open plain.4. 5.44Agesilaos' passage through the stockade was therefore achieved by beginning to move at dawn. toward the northern end of the plain south of Thebes. a decision which would have recommended itself to the allies all themore because it enabled them to keep to the high ground. The obvious and necessary decision was to withdraw at once.1.18-19).67). toward the east). Xenophon's description sums up the action without providing details. that he passed the barrier unhindered. as is suggested above. see Hell. as Xenophon notes. 5. 45.5. There was probably a gate in the southwest corner of the walls of Thebes on the line of march of the allies (amodern track still approaches Thebes from this direction. in order to cross the stockade. As soon as thismovement of the Peloponnesian army became known to the The ban and Athenian allies. as they can now be reconstructed (see Figure 2). and. The circumstantial detail in Polyainos' account probably comes from a good fourth-century source (Kallisthenes or Ephoros?). and moving quickly to the east of Kynos Kephalai.120 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. 6.4.e.6. 44. Though the main force of Agesilaos' opponents never assembled until sometime after dawn.. Potniai is located at modern Takhi (infra n. These were the forces thatAgesilaos effectively scattered before sending his own peltasts against the allies. and his eventual movement across the line was.1. crossing the stockade toward the lower end of the Souleza crest. but.4. implies that the Thebans (he never mentions the Athenians in this campaign) were more culpably negligent than they actually were.45 the about ten stades from Thebes. Agesilaos' observation that the enemy only appeared within the stockade after breakfast (xewT' Hell.24 (infra n. A march from the Rakhi Kendani directly toward Thebes would have taken the allies across the crest of Konizos. Hence Agesilaos effected a ruse through the maneuver Polyainos describes. site 257. While threatening an entrance toward the left of his front. Agesilaos still needed to catch the picket force off guard. that is. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . to their original encampment somewhere on the heights of Kynos Kephalai. Polyainos 2. 3. there would have been concern for the safety of the city.88.62). deceiving enemy sentries as to his intentions.27) 115.88. by which time his opponents customarily appeared in force.41 says that it was on account of the speed of Agesilaos' march before breakfast. they must have maintained a sizable picket force on watch throughout the night to guard against any surprise attack.
Most of the devastation wrought by the Peloponnesians was accom plished by setting fire to the ripe grain. however. With that danger averted. was probably not extensive. sometime between mid-May and late June: see Hanson (supra n.82. and the Peloponnesian cavalry must have been chiefly occupied with keeping the enemy cavalry in check. which incidentally confirms that Agesilaos' invasion followed the traditional pattern of arrivingwhen the grain was nearly ripe but not yet harvested. and this. according to Diodoros 15.41 specifies that fire was used on Theban land. but is perhaps misleading for what it omits. the two armies no doubt continued to confront each other in a standoff while Agesilaos' light troops and cavalrywere engaged in plundering the plain south of Thebes. he had con trived a ruse to enable his force to cross the stockade unopposed. see infra n.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 121 Theban andAthenian allies drew up their ranks to face the forces of Agesilaos. 5. Xenophon Hell. This content downloaded from 65. being confronted by the enemy.88. the pride of the Thebans andAthenians at their accomplishment is understandable.4. and it would have been possible to blockade Thebes.88. Agesilaos contented himself with this distinctly limited success. the phalanx must have been unable to participate effectively in the devastation of fields within the stockade.5) 21-25. while hoplites main tained their formations as long as hostile forces were abroad: see Hanson (supra n. On the comparative sizes of the two armies. despite Xenophon's andDiodoros' accounts. Xenophon's report that Agesilaos "devastated and burned the region within the enclosure up to the city" (Hell.42 on Thu. and upon his withdrawal to Thespiai his Spartan advisors criticized him. He had sent 46. 5. which probably approached from the southeast. the ensuing devastation of Theban landswould certainly have been more thorough.1. was only post poned until the next year.4. By the actions of Chabrias and Gorgidas the Peloponnesian phalanx was unable to engage its numerically inferior enemy in decisive combat. 47. and. After Agesilaos decided not to attack. Agesilaos again led the Peloponnesians across the Isthmos to Pla taia. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . for not decisively engaging the enemy. Because of the strength of the enemy cavalry. The threat.33. SKOLOS In 377.Knowing the obstacle he had to surmount before his army could proceed with theirwork. the Peloponnesian light troops could not disperse widely.41) is probably true as far as it goes. Devastation was in any event normally carried out by light troops.47and this damage was probably con fined for themost part to the level plain south of Thebes.46 The destruction wrought by Agesilaos on this occasion was essentially limited to what could be plundered or burned by his light troops and cavalry. If Agesilaos had successfully done so. east of the Souleza Konizos heights and west of Golemi. intent on devastating more of Theban territory.5) 30-35.
.23) 94-96 on Therap nai. repeated by Polyainos. 97-101. He marched along the road to Erythrai. Arriving at Plataia. Then. and requesting all embassies to await him there. he prepared tomove his army at dawn. Wallace (supra n. Cv rasg &yvexo. vol. Polyainos 2. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . without a full night's rest. 4. 1. The evidence of this episode supports the view of those who have placed Skolos on the north side of the Asopos River. in what clearly was Theban territory at this time. 5.51 Wallace has in fact supplemented Pritchett's observations of the remains in 48. Yet Xenophon clearly thought that there was something re markable in the distance covered by Agesilaos' army in the space of a day. 107 9. To account for this I suggest that. Evidence in favor of this location for Skolos has been marshalled most effec tively in the several studies by Pritchett on the topography of the Parasopia.Wallace (supra n. 51. but in fact he must have set up this rusewell before his arrival in Plataia.23) 87-90. Studies inAncient Greek Topography (Berkeley 1965-1982) vol. Xenophon Ages.M. That Agesilaos did move quickly from Plataia is the only way of explaining the perplexing statement by Xenophon.48 The location of Skolos has been the subject of some debate. 1/April 1987 word ahead to Thespiai calling for a market to be prepared there for his army. of dawn. followed closely by Polyainos 2. anticipating that this invasionwould begin as the previous two had.22. Agesilaos arrived at Plataia in the evening of what had been a full day's march.49 The opposing view that Skolos is to be identifiedwith remains two-and-a-half kilo meters south of theAsopos. and I have so indicated in Figure 1). "Therapnai and Skolos inBoiotia. that when he had reached Skolos Agesilaos had "completed in one day a two-day march for an army" (Hell. com ing from Thespiai. and turned north to cross the stockade at a safe distance fromKynos Kephalai.122 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. and his testimony is of uncertain value: see J. which is not even a full day's march. vol. Agesilaos could probably see their camp. Pritchett. Xenophon Hell. for nITxzaLgais his movement from Plataia to Skolos was almost immediate. 1. Pritchett has placed Skolos in the vicinity of the chapel of Ayios Georgios south of the village of Neokhoraki.47-49. probably the first dawn after his arrival at Plataia. let alone a two-day march. around theMetokhi of Hosios Meletios justwest of Dharimari. The Thebans took the bait and. Wallace. 50. 5. is defended by P. Fossey. they encamped at Kynos Kephalai. he prepared his army to move again next at the break day's march. cf.4. 289-94.. 3.2. Knowing that all was according to plan. while Wallace argues that Pritchett's site is to be identified as the obscure settlement of Therapnai.50 Pritchett regardsWallace's site to be the ancient Erythrai (a view I accept.4. This content downloaded from 65. 2.24 is the only source to report a place named Therapnai inTheban territory.42 on Thu. directly away from Thespiai. 49. 178-79. This he did so that he arrived to ensure at Skolos still in the morning.1. by Skolos (see Figures 1 and 3). while a period of a few days would have been needed for Agesilaos' message to have had its desired effect.1." BICS 18 (1971) 106-9. The march from Plataia along the road to Erythrai and on to Skolos is a distance of some fifteen kilometers. above the north bank of theAsopos.11). Pritchett (supra n. Xenophon reports that Agesilaos sent his feigned command to Thespiai tine 6E. 103-7 on Erythrai.11. Strabo 220.127.116.11. having made his crossing of Kithairon. K. at a place at the hour when and a time an army which had just crossed Kithairon the day before would normally be expected to begin the that he crossed the stockade that the enemy would not have expected.49) vol. W. 2. vol.
15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . See Pritchett (supra n.15) and which was still there to be seen in the time of Pausanias (9. a place that saw the arrival of the army of Mardonios into Theban territory (Herodotos 9.54 Likewise. a deviation which would afford no compensat ing advantages to the defenders. We shall see shortly that the testimony of Xenophon favors that the Theban stockade did in fact follow end toward the Tanagran frontier.52I have been able to confirmmuch of this in a brief inspection of the site. there was once a substantial settlement with a long history of occupation. On this spotWallace has noted "ancient sherds and roof tiles in great abundance" over an area of some two hundred by four hundredmeters.42 on Thu. where I found Classical. and fourth-century sherds. the most north bank of the Asopos would have been the defensible line for the Theban the view stockade as it extended eastward from the end of the Souleza an east/west crest (see line until its supra. This evidence is more in keeping with what we know of Skolos.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 123 the vicinity of Ayios Georgios to show that therewas a sizable settlement some five hundred meters southeast of the chapel of Ayios Georgios. 96. includingGeomet ric.49) and Fossey (supra n. 54. the evidence of Mardonios' march in 479 and Agesilaos' encounter with the stockade at Skolos in 377 both favor the conclusion that Skolos lay on the north side of theAsopos.15. and a deviation which would not make sense of Xenophon's next reference to the stockade. also favor the identification of the north-bank site as Skolos. the ground north of 52.51) 107 on Mardonios' movements. Wallace's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding.53 This is not the place to reviewMardonios' movements. fifth-.23) 95.88. A Skolos two-and-a-half kilometers south of the river would require us to understand a considerable deviation from themost advantageous defensive line for the stockade. we need only note that his march from Tanagra to Skolos and his encampment on theAsopos allmake best sense when they are confined to the north side of the river. An inspection of the opposite bank failed to reveal any comparable concentration of sherds on the south side of theAsopos. Moreover. Ibid. Wallace (supra n. as it would have affected the movement of Agesilaos' army. as we know it was. Hellenistic.71. and cf. as described by Herodotos 9. This content downloaded from 65.4). on the north bank of theAso pos. pp. as is discussed in the next section. infra n. 116-17). than it iswith what we know of Therapnai. on the north bank of the Asopos where it is crossed by a bridge south of Neokhoraki.88. A Skolos on the north bank of theAsopos would naturally have been incorporated into such a line of the stockade. for up to two kilometers west or east of the bridge below Neokhoraki and theAyios Georgios chapel. which is practically nothing. Considerations of the terrain around Ayios Georgios. These investigations demonstrate that here. and Roman sherds as well as a roughly worked limestone column drum and a segment of Roman cemented brickwork. Here. 53.4.
but they have no bearing on the question of the o'x eXcovat the location of Skolos itself (which Hell.88. inside of-the line of the stockade. however. ICXQTg v. This opening extends northward for some three kilometers. 55. If this TeiXog is to be identified with the orauc6opQa. combined with the fact that a bridge must have crossed the Asopos at Skolos just as one does today. on his returnmarch. from the Parasopia down into theAonian plain.49). Oxy. deny that To TeiXog of Hell. up to the glen in which the modern village of Neokhoraki lies.4. because of the difference in terminology and the difficulty of understand ing the spatial relationships between the points mentioned in this passage. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .4. strictly speaking all southeast of Thebes.124 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. This content downloaded from 65. 5. Fossey (supra n. Agesilaos laidwaste the land east of Thebes. These conditions. because it does not allow satisfactory sense to be made of the accounts of the ensuing movements of Agesilaos. "as far as the [territory]of the Tana TavayQaLct graioi" (Xenophon Hell. 5.4. From this area Agesilaos could easily proceed eastward.42 on Thu.88. TANAGRA AND TO TEIXO0 After entering Theban territory by Skolos. There is no evidence that Agesilaos attempted to pass north of the heights of Soros-Moustafades-Petra Stavraetos-Monovigla to enter the Aonian plain. 1/April 1987 the river ismore nearly level and open than it is to either side. strategy of Agesilaos' campaign. below a fortified enclosure on Soros which he considers to have been the acropolis of Skolos.50). more important. 12. This point of interpretation.the stockade by Skolos.49 is the same as the Theban stockade. to head west. would have favored themovement of a large army into this quarter of Theban territory. Xenophon goes on to note that Tanagra was at that time still controlled by Spartan allies. 106) believes that the stockade at Skolos was intended to prevent the passage of Agesilaos north of Soros. The remains beside the Asopos belong to a substantial settlement. The territory east of Thebes referred to here must all have lain in the Parasopia. He bases this on the supposition that the settlement of Skolos was located at modern Neokhoraki. mentioned just before. 5. Instead. The remains on Soros may still be considered to be those of an occasional refuge for the inhabitants of Skolos.59). ev aQLateq eXcov6T teiXog. 3 [London] describes as TeEXog no on the have and of the bearing topography and they certainly beginning Peloponnesian War).4.e. and again just after (Hell. as we know he did.55 After reporting that he reached as far as Tanagran territory. 5.51. is controversial. and no such remains are known at Neokhoraki. Agesilaos then turned back. presumably to account for why Agesilaos did not continue his plundering into the territory of Tanagra. toward the frontier with Tanagra. A location for the stockade as far north asNeokhoraki or Soros is unlikely both because itmeans thatmuch good land north of the Asopos would have lain outside the protective stockade and.. staying north of-i. "keeping the wall on his left" (Hell. Most commenta tors. he is certainly still southeast of Thebes (see below on Graos Stethos). for when we can next locate him. then Agesilaos can be understood to have turned back from a point somewhere east of Skolos.
as Xenophon says. Note that Agesilaos had made a point of having a market prepared for his army at Thespiai (Xenophon Hell.1. Breitenbach. TOTeLXog here is generally as the wall of interpreted Tanagra.88. 307-8. we may wonder. though he prefers to accept this interpretation. Polyainos 2.42 on Thu.48.11). Yet Agesilaos can only have had the wall of Tanagra on his left for amoment. TO t?iXoS. Brownson. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .5) 307-8 n. esp. T6 TrXog is cited here as a point of reference for Agesilaos' returnmarch. W. His object was to devastate Theban territory. as he began his returnmarch. Nor is the sense of this passage improved by assuming that this TeiXog is the wall of Tanagra. Underhill. the VX. if Tanagra were indeed the point of reference intended by Xenophon. After reaching Tanagran territory.82. L.57 surely be called a TeXXOg. E." AJA 78 (1974) 152-56.1. Anderson (supra n. Another objection to seeing T6 zTiXog as the wall of Tanagra is that this interpretation would require us to understand that Agesilaos marched as far east as the city of Tanagra and not just. This content downloaded from 65..v.88.32 a wooden stockade improvised overnight (Exx6o'rovxTE. oxTYvdOeva xaL aooxravuQovvTeg) is called TO teiXog. however.40. Roller.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 125 because of the proximate mention of Tanagra.4. L. trans. Roller. "The Date of theWalls at Tanagra. 261 with n.4. Roller. 5.Anderson (supra n. taEXog. and Xwovimplies that this relationship between Age silaos and n6 txeiog continued to hold true for the duration of hismarch back. esp. vol. This compromise still leaves us wondering about the purpose of the maneuver. Cf. "The Location of Xenophon's rFQog orf0og. 56." supra n.4.56 To reject the identity of TO teXog with the Theban stockade simply be cause of the difference in terminology is not compelling. InHell. D. Libra III-VII (Leipzig 1863) 229 s. Hellenica Books V-VII (Loeb Classical Library. for the stockade can as Xenophon elsewhere calls temporary stockades. 58.82) notes the awkwardness of To6 TeXog as the wall of Tanagra in this context. 59.v. his armywould probably have brought unwelcome damage to the properties of his allies inTanagra. thus keeping it on his left. and the taqcpog and reIXogof Hell. It is by no means clear what advantage Agesilaos would have gained by marching to Tanagra itself.59 If he had entered Tanagran territory and encamped there before returningwestward. and why Xenophon should describe it in such an oblique manner.5) 25-28. this reference to a linear east/west fieldworkmakes perfectly good sense. Hanson (supra n." Hesperia 43 (1974) 260-63. Xenophontis Hellenica. n.Xenophon..G. where T6 xTeXogis simply translated as "thewall of Tanagra". cf. so it is doubtful that another could have been provided impromptu at Tanagra. London 1921) 101.2. and forcing his troops to forage and to provide for them selves off the enemy's land was the most effective way to do so. Polyainos 2.3.5. TO6 TdXog is understood to be the Theban stockade. Roller ("Location. To C. as far as the territory of the Tanagraioi.4.60 Finally." AJA 82 (1978) 107-9. A Commentary on theHellenica of Xenophon (Oxford 1900) 212 s. 1. 5. 60. "A New Map of Tanagra. Agesilaos a&r'el ev LaQLOTeQL EXcv TO tIXog.21. ed. Ta 6blaExovrlqpEva 57. until he moved off toward the northwest.13. 2. 107-8) suggests that the sense of continuity implied in Xenophon's description can be understood ifAgesilaos marched around Tanagra in a counterclockwise direction. 7. 155 with n.58 If. why would it have been referred to as TO6 Teiog rather 56.Lvov TEiXog of Hell.
44). but the redundancy and the blunder over the date in 2. and soon to be mentioned again.34.1.61The second (2. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .4. Most editors assume that 'Peas is a textual corruption of rFa6g or Fraila.88. and the evidence of Stephanos confirms that 6bog is an estab lished variant of this toponym. This is a reasonable assumption. 66. and cite Stephanos of Byzantion s. 63.24 are probably best accounted for by assuming that Polyainos excerpted them from two different collections of stratagems.50).] c:tleixsg xcai i6ofalov TOxwQCov. 5. which Polyainos gives as PaSg Eogs.12 and Xenophon's account is the name of the hill.1. see infra n.126 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. 1/April 1987 than simply as / Tdvayga. they sought to prevent the devastation of their country side (15. and it does not figure in any of the action connected with the stand on Graos Stethos. but after this emendation of the text of Polyainos the hill is still called 6bog. not daring to face the en emy on level ground.24 is so detailed that itmust have come from a fairly comprehensive fourth-century history (cf. They did so. and the tactical information provided in 2. the Athenians) had come up and taken a position on the hill called Graos Stethos.24) ismistakenly introduced as an episode fromAgesilaos' Boiotian campaign of 394. the first of which (2. in TavayQacoLv? view of the number of ways inwhich the stockade is described by Xenophon (supra n.1.62).3 (cf. we may presume. Aside from the confusion over the occasion. GRAOS STETHOS As Agesilaos was making his way westward again. echo ing his description of the spot on which Chabrias and the Thebans had made their stand the previous year. The presence of two versions of this incident in Polyainos might indicate two different original sources. or / nroLkg tWV On the other hand.12) seems to be a condensed version of Xenophon's account. 5.50: xc i yaQ orev6v Av cTacvn[sc. Hell. The conclusion to be drawn is that Polyainos' account in 2.1. infra n.1.42 on Thu.29). "oldwoman's breast. because they considered this a suitable place to challenge Agesilaos to battle (Hell.1)." where the ditch and stockade lay behind them."63Polyainos notes that the Theban position on the hill overlooking the road made it "difficult [for Agesilaos] to array for 61. This content downloaded from 65. TdvayQa: IV & 6FQotav E'VLOL XyovoL TO vOv Tg OrSija'Cig xao5uevov E6og (soWoefflin andMelber in the Teubner edition). but it clearly describes this episode.not o-rnOogas inXenophon. Polyainos gives two accounts of this incident. Diodoros.62Xenophon is the only source tomention the stockade in this context. A similar and even briefer version is given by Frontinus Strat. there is nothing contradictory between the two versions. Xenophon says. 62. to refer to the same oaxuctQoa mentioned only shortly before. the Thebans considered this to be an advanta geous position because "the way was rather narrow at this point. the Thebans (and.74). says that the Thebans occupied "certain other difficult terrain" (6uaoxowiag TLva'g ecTQag) where. supra n.4. 1.12 is derived from some source other than (or in addition to) Xenophon (Kallisthenes or Ephoros?. though it differs in certain details. and the area was difficult to pass through.4.88. adding details not found in the first version. The most striking difference between Polyainos 2.1. TOrEiXog is readily understandable as a term chosen by Xeno phon for the sake of variety.v. According to Xenophon.
.5) 136-37. 5.12: iv xa~i TO JtaQaTdoeO0aL 6oauXoaov xai TO nrQoxcoQev &&vaLov. on Graos Stethos). Polyainos 2."64As in the previous summer. Polyainos 2. reports that the tide of the battle turnedwhen the Thebans were reinforced by men from the city." It here must mean "surer. 24.. and this company was forced to withdraw before the advancing Theban force. in an account which is both brief and confusing.12. 5.51-54 is the chief source of information for these events.51). Consequently the Thebans.34. cf. 66. But soon the retreat ceased. and since they had forced the enemy to retreat from that point. Instead. Polyainos 2. on the very spot where before he had seen the enemy drawn up against him (i.12.e. Xenophon adds.88.66 Two essential circumstances emerge from the accounts of this incident (chiefly that of Xenophon) to indicate where Graos Stethos and these events are to be located. fearing for the city." in the sense that seems. The van guard of the Peloponnesians. iv yaQ aixrj a&cpaXesoxTa. Meanwhile Agesilaos withdrew and regrouped.4. left the Thebans ex posed to attack. .42 on Thu. Graos Stethos cannot have been any great 64." thereby causing the Thebans to abandon their strong position for fear that Agesilaos might attack Thebes.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 127 battle and impossible to proceed [without a battle]. toward the city.2. the road to Potniai. The next day he led his army onward to Thespiai. they erected a trophy. "having turned aside he proceeded toward the city.4. The first is that. the Thebans yielded the heights to the advancing forces of the Peloponnesians. and one of the Spartan polemarchs was struck down when the Thebans hurled their spears from above. The Thebans. rather.1. which is usually translated "for thiswas the saferway. Continuing their retreat toward the city. were moving across heights. Xenophon says. 5.1. when he realized the situation Agesilaos did not force the issue. By this point the Skiritai were the most advanced of the Peloponne sian foot. Diodoros." Safer inwhat sense? It seems probable that this was the very road thatwas just described as "rather narrow . Polyainos says the same. that aoqpaXeoeOQca this was a better or quicker way to reach Thebes than the way Agesilaos was attempting. Xenophon notes. This content downloaded from 65. The episode is discussed by Anderson (supra n. and made camp.50-51. however. The Thebans reoccupied the last height fromwhich the Skiritai had attacked them. Xenophon states that as the Thebans neared the walls of their city they drew up their forces to face the enemy.5 Agesilaos moved away from the Theban position by a route which could have taken him to Thebes.4. for some of the Spartan polemarchs led theirmorai in a charge upon the Thebans. "left the place where theywere arrayed at a run and hastened to the city by the road to Potniai" (Hell. with armies moving at a run from Graos Stethos to the vicinity of Thebes. Hell. Their retreat along this route. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .88. Xenophon Hell. themselves dealt blows from the heights on the last of the Thebans as they ran past. and difficult to pass through [for an army in battle formation]. Diodo ros 15.1. 65. the Skiritai accompanied by some of the cavalry.
4. and this is where Graos Stethos is to be sought. about ten stades from the city on the road from the Asopos. This is the road to Potniai. 68. On Potniai see Pritchett (supra n. see Figure 1) and places the Theban defensive position on its north eastern slopes. 1/April 1987 distance away from the city. The line of the modern road from Neokhoraki to Thebes exactly meets these requirements. Roller suggests thatAgesilaos kept thewall of Tanagra on his left bymarching counterclockwise around Tanagra before mov ing away to the northwest along the level plain (now occupied by an air base) parallel to the line of the present-day national road.4. 69. the improbability of this identification ofMonovigla as Graos Stethos can be seen by its distance. The second is thatGraos Stethos lay above a road to Potniai. "'Tcl6oSg rjosg.88. This would lead him toward the Theban Aonian plain from the east. along the line of a road coming from the east leading. Potniai still lay ahead of him. toward Thespiai (see Figure 3 and Plate 3). 5. This would have been the main route between Thebes and Skolos. an important local route and incidentally a continuation of the way from Tanagra traveled by Mardonios (Herodotos 9. some sixteen kilometers as the crow flies. so he must have been somewhere to the south and east of Thebes.88.Wallace (supra n.15.1-2)."AJA 82 (1978) 107-9. The loca tion of Potniai is known. Bolte. to Potniai and Thebes. Through similar reasoning Bolte long ago suggested thatGraos Stethos lay in this area. and on that basis he traces a rather different course forAgesilaos' march than that suggested here. Today this road is on the main east/west route in the northern Parasopia. or. Roller identifiesGraos Stethos with the most prominent hill northwest of Tanagra. as Pausanias (9. from Thebes." inRE 7.49 is thewall ing. and. a kilometer and a half south of Thebes. fig. Roller begins from the assumption that TOx6 of Tanagra. 70. 94 and 102.68 From the open fields north of Skolos and south of Neokhoraki this road runs west-northwest through a valley which gradually grows narrower as it is enclosed by the heights of the Mikri Psilorakhi on the north and the Rakhi Ambelia-Golemi crest on the south. D.67 At the time of the encounter Agesilaos was moving generally westward. as Xenophon 67.70Besides the slight likelihood that any defensive position on Monovigla would be opportune for halting Agesilaos' advance into Theban territory. it lay in the area of present-day Takhi. probably the road along which Agesilaos was going to procede when he was opposed by the Thebans drawn up on Graos Stethos.23) 93 94. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 4.128 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No.49) vol. It is difficult to envisage the Theban army moving.42 on Thu. part 2 (1912) 1827-28. and such a way must have been used in antiquity as well. who has followed a different line of reason aog of Hell. on the other hand. "The Location of Xenophon's rFQog oTrtogs. between Neokhoraki and Thebes. and Symeonoglou (supra n. A logical place to locate this encounter would be generally east of Takhi.8. This content downloaded from 65.27) 174. on the one hand.1) specifies.69More recently another candi date has been advanced by Roller. Monovigla (elevation 466 meters. Roller.
15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . This content downloaded from 65. it evidently had no part in the action which ranged from the area of and from those places Graos toward the road to Potniai. Since the stockade is not again mentioned inXenophon's account. 5.23) 91-92.88.50). Roller (supra n. only that he was stillwithin its line. both of which lie north of the road from Neokhoraki toward Takhi (Potniai) and Thebes. suggest thatGolemi (elevation 340meters).Herodotos 9. the eminence on the opposite side of the road from the Psilorakhes. virtually impassable for an army.72 It has already been suggested that the stockade generally followed the course of the Asopos River to the south and southeast of Thebes (supra. and the countryside north of theAsopos is by no means impassable for an army. Stethos. Xenophon's refer ence to TO xTEiog on Agesilaos' left does not require us to understand that Agesilaos was moving immediately alongside it.42 on Thu. It is possible that the beginning of this gorge and the hilly countryside throughwhich it cuts mark the boundary between Theban and Tanagran lands. In fact.69.71There is no reason to assume. was Graos Stethos where the Thebans drew up their forces. The Thebans need not have been drawn up in the immediate proximity of the stockade. 108) objects to Bolte's placement because "such a loca tion could not be reached from Tanagra except by traversing the rough gorge of the Asopos. p. the Thebans (and their Athenian allies) had the ditch and stockade behind them (Hell. Xenophon may have intended only to specify that the Thebans were making their stand inside the perimeter of the stockade (the first time in his narrative that they are said to have done so). and which are the most prominent heights in this vicinity. and specificallyXenophon's reference to the Theban stockade behind the Theban position (which Bolte did not take into account). Roller has argued above. 71. along Thebes. and it is quite unbelievable thatAgesilaos would have brought his own forces back from the chase some sixteen kilometers to encamp them on Monovigla before marching westward again to Thespiai on the next day. incorrectly so) that TOTCsXog in relevant of Graos Stethos. an area which is . information his identification ignored making Bolte suggested that Graos Stethos could be identified with Psilorakhi (elevation 406 meters) or Mikri Psilorakhi (elevation 407 meters). 72. west of Soros (elevation 547 meters.. or in any other.2.Mardonios brought his army from Tanagra to Skolos by this route in 479. see Figure 3). From their position on Graos Stethos. however.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 129 reports. from here at a run until it was close to the walls of Thebes.15.70.4. Supra n. descriptions of the engagement here.61) was themost prominent height in the area. Similarly.. Having assumed (as is is the wall of Tanagra." The gorge of the river itself need not be traversed along such a route. seeWallace (supra n. that Graos Stethos (which seems also to have been known as Graos or Graias Hedos: see n. There is a natural topographical limit for a stockade following the Asopos: at Dafnoula (see Figure 1) theAsopos River enters a deep gorge which would make fortification of its banks to the east unnecessary. By this reference. The stockade provided no protection for Thebes and its territory facing Tanagra.88.
42 on Thu.1.24) specifies thatAgesilaos lengthened his phalanx by leading it off in double file.12: njLotGcoocag 6i Xooasg TIv oxoaTcLv &yeLv im x6 auv TCov M Ellaicov (note that Frontinus 7QoooLteL?cTal Strat.130 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. 5. itwould form a line just over 1. Xenophon and Polyainos (2. so the Thebans standing on Golemi and facing the road below and to the north had the stockade behind them. 1.3 kilometers in length. away from the Thebans. He may have approached the Thebans until he reached a point about two and a half kilometers from the summit of Golemi.5) 145. as seems possible. Polyainos 2.1.1. from the hills beyond Neokhoraki. Such a linewould span the open ground just southwest of Neokhoraki. Agesilaos' reaction may be described as follows (see Figure 3 and Plate 3).73 Agesilaos then began the movement towardThebes that forced the The bans to abandon their position.4.1 for Agesilaos' first campaign) was drawn up sixteen deep (as at Leuktra. Polyainos 2. Golemi is the highest hill of a crest which stands generally twenty to thirtymeters above the floor of the valley inwhich the road runs. and by thismove Agesilaos began a divi sion of his forces into two: the left wing remaining astride the road leading 73. therefore. 6Q@Pav eMLrpVlxjvacg This content downloaded from 65. 1.4.50: 6 6' 'AyeoCictao i6div tOaTxca JQo6geXEvoUVg kv oux AyEv. in fact.12) describe this movement as "oblique" or "sideways" (with reference to his original line of march).24: 6 e rfv qpaXayya iyev nmi ooo td ag. and Xenophon adds that it was a movement away from the Theban position. The whole ridge of the Psilorakhes. JaQayyicrag q(pavexobg sii rYv U6OkIv. The slope is gentle--easy ground for an army to assemble on and move across-and it generally resembles the terrainof the slopes of Konizos where theThebans and Athenians made their stand against Agesilaos the previous summer (as was suggested supra. On the width of the Greek hoplite file. 1971) vol. The Theban stand on Golemi seems to have been calcu lated to press Agesilaos between this impassable ground and their own strong position above the road. Polyainos' second version (2.88. Xenophon Hell.1. and Pritchett. probably formed his army into line as he entered the plain of Neo khoraki north of Skolos. the southernmost wings of the two armies may have stood less than a thousandmeters from each other. and thus is a considerably more difficult place for an army to assemble and maneuver. Golemi is the first height north of the Asopos. If. The opposite slope of the Mikri Psilorakhi is much steeper (rising sixty to eighty meters above the valley). 1/April 1987 116). pp. 119-21). the Theban line extended southeast along the Golemi ridge to the height of the Rakhi Ambelia.12). 74. IfAgesilaos' entire force of eighteen thousand foot (the figuregiven by Diodoros 15.74 This lengthening of the phalanxmust have been toward the north.32. 145-54.51: J6OQO) &d7ayaywv&dn6xiv xoreAtowv. & jc6g 'XvJU6iLV fet.4. Agesilaos.4. from the foot of theMikri Psilorakhi ridge south to theRakhi Ambelia.3 also reports thatAgesilaos pretended tomove against the city). The Greek State atWar (Berkeley and Los Angeles.88. having openly given the command to charge on Thebes. see Anderson (supra n. stands as a natural obstacle to an army's orderly movement. 6. Xenophon Hell. 5. where the way begins to narrow appreciably. The Theban position on Golemi (Graos Stethos) would have been visible for up to five kilometers to the east. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .
The extension and separation of the rightwing from the rest of the phalanx by marching in column to the rightwas a characteristic Spartan maneuver. employed at Nemea and at Leuktra as a preliminary to outflanking the enemy: see Anderson (supra n. of his Skolos."''.75 Thebes lay to the northwest.::. by virtue of the topography. toward could not allow his movement As Agesilaos the Thebans realized. gate of Thebes..:.::-EOKY..5) 145-46...'.. Campaign of 377: attacksnorth then and west. such a flankingmovement could not be carried out against the enemy phalanx. Once not so heavily eroded. 181-84. . --. under his command. well to a halt.. Thebes ground by column was probably Agesilaos' who perhaps intended the by Agesilaos. / X// . : . but the descent is steeper away from along the gentle toward Thebes difficult.IO . and the right wing. force as a whole was to go unchecked.. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . . Psilorakhes from between and more the walls Here.'/ . Rackham. This content downloaded from 65.. We know that the Theban 75. "Observations on theHistorical Ecology of Boiotia. 76. Contour interval 50 m... along way a route which is easy indeed leads toward the southeast ascent over on going at first. moving away toward and this must have been the direction the north. ^ -t^^^^ . This the north side of Mikri the summits scored of the ravines.." :OR'":'[I o 3' kilometers 5 encounter with and Agesilaos' Figure 3. " . 351." BSA 78 (1983) 344.^^ 'v^MOUSJ [-Y * f4 . but it could be used to direct a column against Thebes itself. '. of Thebes.':...88./.76 Psilorakhi.: . around the back Graos Stethos..". if not brought move only as a feint. 210-15..42 on Thu. the Thebans of at the Mikri Psilorakhi~~~~~~~~~~~~ toward Potniai. of his attack-north around the back of the Mikri Psilorakhi and then west.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 131 THEBES ' " I:'. slowed down.. this "Theban badlands" region has seen the formation of gullies since Roman times: see 0.88.. Here.'? . plate 38f.
Chabrias' force here is usually taken This content downloaded from 65. littlemore than a kilometer away on the Lakka Bovali ridge. This would be the position towhich the attacking Lakedaimonian moral and cavalry eventually withdrew. Following closely on the heels of the Peloponnesians. were forced to give way when theThebans re-formed in strength closer to Thebes. toward the stockade on the Asopos. seems to have had no part in the skir mishing between the Thebans and the Lakedaimonian units that had charged. according to Xenophon's description. the peltasts called upon Chabrias to sup port their attack with his hoplites.88. beside their trophy and guarding the approach to Thebes. as the Thebans filed out of their position on Graos Stethos and down onto the road toward which the Peloponnesian phalanx was facing (excellent ground for a cavalry charge). Xenophon Hell. 78.132 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. unsup ported in their advance. The next morning Agesilaos moved on towardThes piai. and Lakedaimonian morai from this part of the line. whose real or pretended movement towardThebes had come to a halt. since these together with the cavalry were able to charge the Thebans raQaieovTag. took the opportunity to charge the Thebans as they abandoned their advantageous position. Note also that Agesilaos' column. In the meantime. The attack on Thebes had been stopped-both columns of the enemy were now retiring-so a trophy was erected on the spot.88.54 says only that the peltasts of the Thebans called out to Chabrias because he was not following (them or the Peloponnesians?). that the company of the Skiritai and the cavalrymade their farthest advance in pursuit of theThebans. It is possible that at the same time peltasts were sent across the road and up theMikri Psilorakhi. I conclude that these morai must have come not fromAgesilaos' column but from the phalanx still facing Graos Stethos. and where Agesilaos. to the crest known as Lakka Bovali (today within an army base astride the old road). in an attempt to interceptAgesil aos. Perhaps Agesilaos' force seemed vulnerable as it negotiated the delicate maneuver of passing through the stockade and crossing the Asopos without losing order. eventually met them.42 on Thu. and the Thebans opposite them. due either to Theban opposition or difficult terrain or both. and it was probably here.78 This Chabrias did not do. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . across the crest of the hills and down into the level plain. with cavalry support. Xenophon says that "when it was time" he withdrew and encamped where the Thebans had previously been drawn up.77 The road to Potniai led across thewestern end of the Psilorakhi ridge. From Agesilaos' point of view. Overnight the two sides were probably encamped facing each other: the Peloponnesians on Golemi. As forAgesilaos. Agesilaos was leading a column away from the Theban position (obliquely) by a route that led towardThebes but was separated from the line of theTheban retreat by the heights of theMikri Psilorakhi (groundwhich would be difficult for cavalry tomove across). 1/April 1987 withdrawn from Graos Stethos along the road to Potniai-the direct route to Thebes from that point. that is. and the dis 77. Both sides could claim a measure of success. The peltasts of the Thebans. Xenophon tells us. These latter. his army had been able to advance and occupy the position previously defended by the Thebans.4. were enthusiastic in their harassment of the Peloponnesian withdrawal. 5. probably avoiding a direct encounter by moving southwest. and the Thebans regrouped to drive the Skiritai back from the Lakka Bovali ridge as well. by retracing his steps. By this time the advance on Thebes led by Agesilaos must have come to a halt. the left wing of the Peloponnesian line was still in position at the entrance to the narrow way.
1 gives the strength of the army led by Agesilaos in 378 as more than eighteen thousand foot and fifteen hundred cavalry. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .80 This could be achieved either by decisively beating the Thebans in battle or by isolating Thebes and starving the Thebans into submission.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 133 persed peltasts were caught when the Olynthian cavalry of the Peloponnesians wheeled about and charged up the gentle slopes. He then relates the quip by Antalkidas upon Agesilaos' return from Boiotia with a wound that the Thebans were paying the king well for teaching them to By such observations and anecdotes Plutarch was indulging in a form of fight. Greek Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford 1933) 76. in his life of Pelopidas. by such encounters the Thebans were developing their confidence. 24. With this truismXenophon's account of Agesilaos' second campaign inTheban territory ends.4 he cites a figure of not fewer than twelve thousand hoplites and over two thousand cavalry on the This content downloaded from 65.21-26. and a circle of garrisons in allied cities around Thebes-Thespiai. in terms of his achievements? To begin with. 81. for the Thebans andAthenians.1. By the latter method the Spartans had recently succeeded in reducing Phleious and Olynthos: Xenophon Hell. and skill.88. Isokrates 14. cf.82The strategy of to be another group of mercenary peltasts. 82.88.1-2.Without letting the eventual outcome of Leuktra govern our viewpoint." Yet. Plataia. P. he goes on." Xenophon concludes. H. killing many of them.81The Spartans possessed the means to do either: a numerically superior army to command the field of battle. 5. Plutarch Ages.79 hindsight which few historians who did not share the pro-Spartan bent of Xenophon could resist: these events are seen as foreshadowing the decisive and revolutionizing outcome of the Theban engagement with the Spartans and their allies at Leuktra a few years later. Xenophon Ages. Best. how are the campaigns of 378 and 377 to be evaluated in terms of Agesilaos' objectives and. but he might well have been leading the vanguard of the allied hoplites who were being called upon to give the sort of supportwhich the hoplites of Kallias had provided for the peltasts of Iphikrates in their destruction of the Spartanmora at Corinth in 390: see Anderson (supra n. 15. 5. G. aptly sums up the nature of Agesilaos' engagements with the Thebans and theirAthenian allies in his two campaigns when he calls them "no more than skirmishes. Plutarch Pel.55). "For foot soldiers. Parke. "Agesilaus" (supra n. 2. Diodoros 15.g. e. 80.5) 138 on the former incident. and 123-26 on the latter. In this instance Chabrias did not wish to risk a general engagement with a much more powerful Peloponnesian force. CONCLUSIONS Plutarch. strength.42 on Thu. at 15. and Orchomenos-to cut off Thebes from outside support.4.22. See also Cawkwell.4. 79. Hell. Tanagra.32. W. "are quickly caught by cavalry ascending a slope where the riding is good" (Hell. 5..3. Thracian Peltasts and Their Influence on Greek Warfare (Groningen 1969) 18.104.22.168-14. in the face of Theban and Athenian counter-measures. the overall objective of Agesilaos and of the Spartan state was to break the power of those Thebans who had overthrown the Spartan garrison and the pro-Spartan partisans of Thebes.2) 77-80. and J.
20. after Sphodrias' attack in the spring of 378. Diodoros twice reports that the Athenians sent a force of five thousand foot (once with five hundred horse. as elsewhere.1. Here. The Thebans and Athenians had to offer effective resistance toAgesilaos and the Peloponnesians in the field. In the short term. Agesilaos showed himself to be a true son of Archidamos and student of his brother. Hamilton.48. 32.88. 14-16. The entry of the Athenians and their growing circle of allies into this conflict eventually had the effect of diverting the pressure of Spartan might from Thebes. with Thebes a landlocked city surrounded by hostile bases. and generally "old-fashioned" (dxxaioS). and C.7 puts at twenty thousand foot and five hundred horse (Polybios 2. despite the numerical inferiority of their own forces. which is probably their strength in the summer of 378 instead (cf.2). For the suggestion that the Dema wall was prepared inAttica at this time.2. "obvious" (ncooqpavl). a factor which grew in importance as the Boiotian War pro gressed.42 on Thu.26. It is appropriate to ask why the Thebans and Athenians did not take measures to hold theKithairon passes and prevent Agesilaos from crossing into Boiotia. 33. for. as they had attempted to do against Kleombrotos in 379/8. according toDemosthenes 9. and possibly is an overestimate in any event.19.76. see Xenophon Hell. once with two hundred) to the aid of theThebans: 15.26. This content downloaded from 65. see supra n. Agesilaos was a proficient practitioner of conservative forms of war-warfare that was "traditional" (vO6ttov).6 cites the figure of ten thousand stratiotai).62. 41-47.2.13-14. in his employment of traditional Spartan strategies.2 and 32.1. On Athenian apprehensions about the danger to Attica see Xenophon Hell. See Anderson (supra n. 84. Agis. Demosthenes 9.2. It was essential for the Thebans to oppose the Peloponnesian army in the field. "TheGeneralship of King Agesilaus of Sparta.15.5) 6-9. still less.4. 140. Diodoros 15. This is out of a total levywhich Diodoros 15. yet not even the sizable reinforcements theAthenians promised to send would enable the Thebans to confront the Spartans on an equal footing. itwas Athenian support for the Thebans in the campaigns of 378 and 377 that enabled the Thebans to withstand the immediate onslaught of the Peloponnesian armywithout decisive setbacks and without allowing a siege of Thebes to develop fromwhat was initially a strong Spartan position inBoiotia." Ancient World 8 (1983) 119-27.47. 5.6. and as they occasion of the overthrow of the Spartan garrison. 6.88. D. after all. 1/April 1987 epiteichismos applied against Athens in the Peloponnesian War and against Corinth in the Corinthian War must have seemed to Agesilaos even more certain to succeed in this case. in the event of a siege. they had to ready their own defenses for a possible Peloponnesian invasion of Attica.134 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. On Spartan garrisons and commanders in Boiotia. the Thebans could afford to retirewithin their city walls as the Athenians had done during the Peloponnesian War. 83.83That this strategy did not succeed was due to the intervention of Athens. could not commit their full strength on land to the defense of Thebes. Plutarch Pel.29. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Isokrates 14.2. 5.6. the similar sizes of theAthenian contingent reported at 15.32. 34. while the Thebans might well fare worse. see Anderson (supra n.5) 197-98. The Athe nians could no longer so easily bear the devastation of their countryside.2.84Neither theAthenians nor.4. The Athenians. however. 37.
it is referred to as a orrdtevluartCloXuOvon the occasion of the surprise invasion of Attica: Hell. in addition to peltasts. referring to the oQdraevRaat at Plataia). 86. IfAgesilaos had not been able eventually to outmaneuver the Thebans and Athenians and to enter the plain south of 85. These were the circumstances that led to the innovative and ambitious device of preparing a stockade and ditch around these quarters of Theban territory where the forces of Agesilaos were likely to appear. Agesilaos commanded his pole Hell.1. even those leading intoAttica.78) 84-85.4. to hold ground thatwas essentially already secure. Theban precautions before Leuktra: Pausanias 9.15. the comments of Demosthenes 9.33.10. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . useful for operations inmountainous terrain. 5. and Theban territory inside the stockade was spared the destruction which was inevitable without the stockade.88. why were there not already Theban and Athenian garrisons guarding them? The answer must be that after Kleombrotos' campaign in the winter of 379/8.14.57-58.2. and Agesilaos could count on these reports to prompt the mustering of the Thebans and Athenians.4. 5. The assembly and progress of the Peloponnesian armywere bound to be reported to the Thebans and Athenians as theywere occurring.3. 5. while themercenaries continued to hold Kithairon to insure his safe withdrawal within themonth. Hammond. 4. The mercenary force sent by Agesilaos from Kletor in 378 to hold Kithairon for a month did not have to gain possession of heights held by the enemy but.5) 132. L.87 measures were sufficient to anticipate themain force of his opponents at these strategic points. were under his control. as were the Kletorian mercenaries hired by Agesilaos: see Parke (supra n. with money to hire a mercenary force: Xenophon Hell. and the Thebans and Athenians had to adopt other strategies of defense. Xeno phon Hell.48 (cited supra n. both in 378 and in 377. "The Main Road from Boeotia to the Peloponnese through the Northern Megarid.22.214.171.124. On the public nature of Peloponnesian musters. G. and Anderson (supra n. Kleombrotos left Sphodrias at Thespiai in command of a force consisting of one-third of the allied contingents in his army. but itmay have consisted of at least half that many hoplites. Note that the Athenians did not even send their contingent to Thebes until they knew that the Peloponnesians were in Boiotia: Diodoros 15.42 on Thu.36-37. Xenophon Hell. Cf. 5. The mercenaries hired by Sphodrias were probably peltasts.13.4. given the importance of the passes. In 377. 5.86 He therefore made arrangements to have the Kithairon passes These occupied several days in advance of his arrival. but. This content downloaded from 65. 5.85The possibility was certainly a concern toAgesil aos. cf. In 378. At first this measure actually worked.13-14.29. 87." BSA 49 (1954) 103-8.1. The fact that Sphodrias was able to surprise theAthenians Thespiai and the cpQovuQ demonstrates that the Kithairon passes. The size of Sphodrias' force is given as ten thousand OQaTUtzwTa by Diodoros 15.7. Agesil aos was thus able to add the forces already in Boiotia to his army when invading the Thebaid.4. Isokrates 14.83). Agesilaos arranged to have the mercenaries at Kletor proceed to Kithairon eri 6E t &l 6iacpaQla t vexo: Xenophon Hell.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 135 succeeded in doing in 376. 59. during Kleombrotos' campaign. xai Tx 6iLap3aQTia march at Thespiai to occupy Kithairon ncQiv O6eoOaL: 88.4. cf. see Thucydides 2.88 In the spring of 378 the Peloponnesians were clearly in control of the way across Kithairon.9-14. in contrast with the situation earlier. rather. 5. 5. The route taken by the Peloponnesian armies crossing Kithairon to Plataia is that described by N. For several days the Peloponnesian armywas kept at bay.6. this is probably an exaggeration.32. the Peloponnesian forces in Thespiai and Plataia kept watch over the route across Kithairon and were able to prevent any garrison force of Thebans andAthenians from occu pying the summits.21 (cf.
124.31. 1/April 1987 Thebes.39. This criticism of Agesilaos is all themore pointed since Diodoros has just described the reputation of Agesilaos (courageous. Xenophon says thatAgesilaos ravaged "the rest of Boiotia. 15.32.3-4. as seems probable. The defensive strategy of the Thebans and Athenians exemplifies the advice given by Aeneas Tacticus 16. practically undefeated. 2. then it is not at all unlikely that he had served inAgesilaos' Peloponnesian ranks during one or both of these campaigns. Xenophon Ages. 90. 94.90 this occasion. able to overcome even larger enemy forces).55.88. including five out of the six Spartan morai: Diodoros 15. the effect on the morale of his Peloponnesian allies-who were al ready on the whole unenthusiastic toward thewar-would have been devastat ing to the Spartans. realized that if his forces were to be driven back. 93. 4-7. see the introduction to the Loeb edition by the Illinois Greek Club. Agesilaos was content to proceed along the slower course of devastating Theban land. to the southwest and southeast of Thebes. when their entire levywas in the field.22. skillful. Aeneas was the Stymphalian general mentioned by Xenophon Hell. and his manner of making use-both explicitly and implicitly-of examples from recent events. Supra.92But Agesilaos. and entered no part of the broad Aonian plain to the north. 127-129. 7. recognizing how determined the resistance was that the Thebans and Athenians were offering.42 on Thu. this defeat would have even more disastrous effects on Spartan war plans. for which he was chosen to lead the Spartans on this occa sion. 121. any thought of besieging Thebes which may have been entertained at the outset of this war was now clearly an impossibility. On the date of Aeneas.16-20. 91. On Peloponnesian morale see supra n. This force certainly included the contingent that had been left at Thespiai with Sphodrias (supra n.76).89 Even after this breach of the Theban defenses.33. We have seen fromXenophon's own account that there is good reason to believe thatAgesilaos devastated only the Parasopia. the &anavxag rIeXoovvowioou.94 This was probably because the entrances 89. the reference to "the rest" of Theban land (in continuation of the work started the previous year) is certainly also an exaggeration. These campaignsmay well have been inAeneas' mind when he wrote this passage some twenty years later. and n. Agesilaos had with him ToiuoujicavTag acrtcatiTag.136 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. the Thebans andAthenians continued to confront Agesilaos where the terrain afforded them an advan Agesilaos was criticized for not leading his larger army to the attack on tage.With the dogged opposition offered by the Thebans and Athenians.1. devoting his attention to the devastation of Theban lands and avoiding a face-to-face con frontation wherever the Thebans had their choice of terrain. 92. of Demosthenes 20.3. If."93 Leaving aside the lapse in accuracy revealed by the reference toBoiotia where only Theban landwas involved. This content downloaded from 65.1.1 (cf.88.91 If ever the Peloponnesians were to press their numerical ad vantage to a decisive settlement it was now. Diodoros 15. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Rather than risk a battle under the less than ideal circumstances which the Thebans and Athenians forced upon him.88). In the brief notice of this campaign given in his life of Agesilaos. Agesilaos pursued the same course in his second campaign. pp.
56.99 Xenophon implies that Kleombrotos failed because he lacked the foresight of Agesilaos. 5. Plutarch Pel. Contrast Hell.20. 5. since they had not gotten crops from their land in two years?95 The explanation must lie not so much in the efficiency of Agesilaos' depredations as in the fact that no Thebans were safe cultivating fields very far from the city during this period. Diodoros 15. 16-17. 37. The influx of democratic partisans to Thebes from the rest of Boiotia (Xenophon Hell.59.42. 5. Xenophon Hell. must have limited the ability of the Thebans to cultivate their own lands and have forced them to rely on imported grain. The Thebans responded by retaliatory raids and by meeting enemy forces wherever they could.4.4-5. Xenophon Hell. and thairon. 99. 5. In 377. Plutarch Pel.4. 126.96.36.199. but itwas practically useless against such desul tory attacks.88).46) together with the evacuation of the smaller towns round about (supra n. Plataia.MUNN: Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 137 to the Aonian plain all lay through the sort of broken terrain in which the Thebans and Athenians would have been delighted to catch Agesilaos. who had secured the passes before arriving at Ki Kleombrotos was heir to a deteriorating situation.33. and Tanagra. however.88. Tanagra.4.4. 5. Xenophon Hell. 134-35 and n.30) certainly exacerbated the food shortage at Thebes. 15. 15. and Thespiai were either destroyed or neutralized. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .10' In 377 Agesilaos left Peloponnesian interests inBoiotia in a much weaker count state than he had found them 376 could on no support from forces already in in 378. 96. 102. On the fate of the Spartan garrisons. Xenophon Hell.3.4. and consequently Agesilaos found himself already being pressed by the enemy upon his return across Kithairon: Polyainos 2.88. This force was certainly incorporated into his army as it proceeded against Thebes. Xenophon Hell.102It is not easy to say precisely who was responsi 95.42 on Thu. 5.42-46. 27. Ages. 101. These garrisons prosecuted the war between annual invasions both by sending out sizable organized forces and by encouraging freebooters to plunder Theban lands.4. Supra pp.102.5-6.98 In the spring of 376 the Thebans and Athenians were able to prevent the Peloponnesians under Kleombrotos from crossing Kithairon and entering Boiotia. The strength of Peloponnesian garrisons inBoiotia after Agesilaos' departure in 377 is uncertain. 100.5 with the passages cited supra n. 5.1.9 The Theban stockade was useful only when manned in strength against an enemy force whose movements-within certain limits could be fairlywell predicted. How does this conclusion square with the report by Xenophon that after the campaign of 377 the Thebans were pressed by the lack of grain. so that Kleombrotos to secure his way in Boiotia across Kithairon in advance. 97.100 such a judgmentwould not be entirely just. when Theban land was hemmed in by Spartan garrisons in Thespiai.87. but had to rely on the harmost from Thespiai to secure his crossing: Xenophon Hell. until the Spartan garri sons at Plataia. 98.97 But the continuing threat from raiding parties over this period.59 and 6.55 mentions only that Agesilaos This content downloaded from 65.47.4. Agesilaos' way into Boiotia in 378 had been secured more by Kleombrotos' previous campaign than by Agesilaos' own preparations.88.1. see infra n. Agesilaos did not have a mercenary force to leave on Kithairon as in the previous year (supra n. with some notable successes.
Spartan forces from Plataia and Tanagra suffered defeats. Hell. 5.76. Diodoros 15. Thespiai and Tanagra were brought into the Theban alliance. as Demosthenes recalled.4. a well-disciplined Athe nian and Theban hoplite army had stood its ground. when he led his allies and T6 ztOXLTLXOV orxdTevua (Spartan troops) back home. cf.46). but even this is uncertain. Diodoros 15. 5.4-16. 15.4.39. Plutarch Pel.1. 103. But hereafter.60. according to the spokesmen of Sparta's allies (Xenophon Hell.6. the war continued to be fought between the Thebans and the various Spartan garrison forces and their allies. 5. Kleombrotos' failure compelled the Spartans to convene their allies and discuss new strategies for the future of the war. The skill and tenacity which Plutarch praises in the Thebans had paid off: it was too difficult and too risky for the Spartans to lead the Peloponnesian levy into Boiotia each year. 104.4. 1/April 1987 ble for this state of affairs-a general [taXaxia in the conduct of the war. "against all the Peloponnese.41-45. replaced by a Spartan mora after Phoibidas' death.88. It is possible that he left amercenary force at Thespiai as he had the previous year (Hell.What is certain is that between 377 and 375. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . the main Peloponnesian might was no longer brought to bear directly on the Thebans.9.103Itmay well be.1. however.42 on Thu. cf.1."l04 It was a proud moment for theAthenians and for the Thebans too.33. until the army under Kleombrotos entered Boiotia from Phokis in 371. though their finestmoment was yet to come. Xenophon Hell. Through skillful use of terrain and innovative tactical fieldwork.4. and the Spartan garrison closest toThebes was removed toOrchomenos: see Isokrates 188.8.131.52)-but the lack of any notable Peloponnesian victories despite Peloponnesian strength under Agesilaos' command was certainly a significant factor.138 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. and soon in Phokis. 5.1. 6. that the experience of the previous two years had already encouraged Peloponne sian leadership to think of alternatives to the conventional approach adopted by Agesilaos. Some part of the credit for this success in checking Spartan might belongs to theAthenians-and especially to Chabrias-who stood together with the Thebans against Agesilaos. In Boiotia. Demosthenes 20. Xenophon Hell. Deinarchos 1. Stanford University settled internal affairs at Thespiai before his departure. This content downloaded from 65.
42 on Thu.88.PLATE I MUNN 0 0 U. ' OZ O w 0 0 z O C ~g Xt CO Plate 1. near Pyrgos. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .88. near This content downloaded from 65. Rakhi Kendani (Kynos Kephalai) and the Souleza crest seen from the south. Pyrgos.
This content downloaded from 65. .88.- 4c -J -C Plate 2.88.MUNN PLATE II ! l I 4z' ro . N ' _ _ Ca. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . View southeast from the slopes of Konizos (approximate location of Chabrias' stand).42 on Thu. c-J Io icI _.
88. road toTakhi (Potniai).42 on Thu. 15 Aug 2013 13:21:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . This content downloaded from 65. ~~~~I )1~z 0 ~ ~.88. EI r 0 0 41 0W.PLATE III MUNN ..
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