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Steinbruner, Gary Ackerman, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael Stohl, Jerrold M. Post, Joshua Sinai, Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, Derrick Franke, Bartosz H. Stanislawski, Gabriel Sheffer, Mark Irving Lichbach, Todd Sandler and Walter Enders Reviewed work(s): Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 2005), pp. 133-170 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3699642 . Accessed: 04/12/2012 11:01
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International Studies Review(2005) 7, 133-170
Nonstate Actors, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
EDITED BY ANDREW BLUM
Centerfor InternationalDevelopment and ConflictManagement, Universityof Maryland
RockefellerCollegeof Public Affairs and Policy, at Albany State Universityof New York
Centerfor InternationalDevelopmentand ConflictManagement, Universityof Maryland Editors' Introduction new one, theeffortto stop Whiletheterm"weapons (WMD)is a relatively of massdestruction" thespreadof armsand weapons thatcan inflictmassharmis byno meansnew.Indeed, systems and possibleuse of thesemost effortsto stoptheproduction fatal weaponshave beensuccessful I to ban mustardgas to the esWar World by many accounts.Fromagreements following tablishment of the InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency to the nearly universal acceptance Conto the inaugurationof the ChemicalWeapons of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty states' ventionin 1997, the international in strides made has limiting ability great community to pursue, and interestin pursuing, WMD. Libya'srecentdecisionto dismantleand allow internationalinspections of of its own WMDprogramservesas evidenceof the effectiveness today's nonproliferation regime. are and institutions at the core of this nonproliferation The agreements regime,however, designedto affect the decisionsand policies of only one type of actor in the international do not do enoughto halt thespreadof thatis, states.As such,currentarrangements community, WMDto nonstateactorsin the international that WMD And, yet, it is widelybelieved system. and secessionist nonstate as terrorist ethnic actors-such groups, proliferation among groups, years. religioussects-will be the criticalnonproliferation challengeof the next twenty Manand Conflict Withthis challengein mind, the Center for International Development and on nonstate convened a conference actors,terrorism, agement of the University of Maryland a made was mass destruction on October 2004. 15, possible by grant weapons of Theconference Peaceand Security of New York.1 from theInternational Corporation Programof the Carnegie was to gather a small group of leading social scienceexpertson The goal of the conference nonstateactors, terrorism, and weaponsof mass destructionin a setting conduciveto the
'The conference organizers would like to thank Amy Benavides, Bidisha Biswas, Derrick Franke, and especially Jane Schmitt for their help in organizing and working at the conference. ? 2005 International Studies Review. PublishedbyBlackwellPublishing,350 MainStreet,Malden,MA02148, USA,and 9600 GarsingtonRoad,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.
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NonstateActors,Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
generation of new ideas and approaches.We consciouslymixed substantiveand methodological expertise-comparative case studies, including ethnographicapproaches;aggregate subnational and international approaches; experimental techniques, including simulations;formal and agent-basedmodeling-in an effort to promote creative new thinking. The organizers askedeachparticipanttopreparea briefdiscussion paper of the conference or thinkpiece. The purposeof thesepapers was to serve as a catalyst for discussion,not to research.The participantswereprovidedwithfour thematicquestionsto present completed addressin theirconference of varioustypes papers:(1) How do the underlyingcharacteristics with contextual combine their nonstate with the motivations actors, of leadership, together of factors to increaseor decreasethe likelihoodthat WMD may be sought? (2) Under what circumstances, for what purposes,and against which targetsare such groups likely to use WMD? (3) Whatpolicies and strategies are mostlikelyto deter WMDproliferation? (4) To such data what is and to these what data are degree confront questions, necessary, typesof available? After the conference, participantswereaskedto distill the majorpoints of theirdiscussion we will summarize which the heart papers, form of thisForum.In the restof thisintroduction, the majoraras advance the conclusionsthat emerged as well the discussion from day of thatfollow and indicatewho makeswhicharguments.Both the gumentsin the contributions discussions can be usefullydividedinto threeinterand the Forumcontributions conference in relatedthemes: the WMD, (1) (2) group-level analysis,and (3) theenvironments conceptof can be viewed at http:// whichgroups operate.Thefull papersprepared for the conference id =37. www.cidcm.umd.edu/announcement.asp? initial discussion The Conceptof WMD.As is not unusual at such conferences, focusedon in for critcame Mass Destruction the term fundamentalconcepts. of Weapons Immediately, icism. The gist of the criticismwas that the term is misleadingin two ways: (1) chemical, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons,to whichthe termWMD often refers, biological,radiological, are not necessarilymassivelydestructive,and (2) non-CBRN weapons can be massively destructive. was too narrowto capturethe it was arguedthatthe term"destruction" Moreover, raised the range of impactson societythat terroristevents can generate.John Steinbruner eventsinducing a societalautoimmune potentialof terrorist effect,in whichthe damagethat in the societydoes to itself may be larger than the terroristact itself (see his contribution could createan Forum).For instance, a threatto attackshoppingmalls during December enormousimpacton the economics of the holidayshoppingseason. In responseto these critiques,othersat the conference(GaryAckermanand Ted Gurr) suggestedthe conceptof Mass ImpactTerrorism definedas:
a terrorist actthathasa significant on thenormal anddirect of thelives functioning impact attack in a substantial results of a dramatically largenumber of people. a massimpact .... diminution in thephysical, social,and/or group well-being of a largeenough psychological as a core characteristic observers suchthatthis ofpeople bymost feature of theactis regarded (Ackerman, 2004:2) of theattack.
thelinkedconcepts was identifying at theconference Perhapsthemostsignificantbreakthrough assentthat and societalautoimmune of Mass ImpactTerrorism effect. Therewas widespread thispair of conceptscould serve as a useful core around whichto organize future research efforts. was to examinehow to Group-LevelAnalysis. One of the statedgoals of the conference (see developbetter profilesof groupslikelyto acquire,or to wishto acquire,WMD.Ackerman his Forumcontribution) calledfor the creationof standardized methodologies for assessing threatsto use in identifyingterrorist groups likelyto employWMD. Developingsuchprofiles a betterunderstanding groups engenderbotha desire requires of terrorist of what attributes threat-assessand a capacityto acquire WMD. such a profile-based, establishing Moreover mentsystem thepriorcreationof a catalogueof terrorist and potentialterrorist groups. requires Currently,datasets on WMD terrorist incidents--which include the WMD Terrorism
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but be sustained contribution Not only can weapons of Stanislawski). Severalof theForum contributions (TedGurrMichaelStohl. discussions devotedthe sustainedattentionto this issue that it (nor the Forumcontributions) to the size and complexity deserves-testimony of the overalltopic. (BartoszStanislawski. Forinstance.edu/dbinfo/about.htm#wmdt). organizational to the Forum Environments in Which Groups Operate. (seethe spotsoperate in suchplaces.and capacities. and the ITERATE data (http://www. organizational as well. in turn. of the structure WMD a Post)touchon a thirdimportant of the aspectof profile. Thefirst two steps have alreadybeen discussedabove.The contribution Asal and AndrewBlum as well as that of GaryLaFree.Laura Dugan. and DerrickFranke in part to createstrategies use mass casualtyterror(MCT) as a proxyfor WMD terror. The standardized used byMAR to trackethnicminorities could serve as a model for the typeof methodologies threatassessment thatAckerman describes. JerroldPost.discussion spots" focused on "black in astronomy exercise holes" minimal muchlikethe "black theseblack control. have in commonis an Whatall of theframeworks in the various contributions described side not demand an exclusive on the one. typesof groups.html). 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .andJoshua Sinai) a profile the interrelated issuesof motiveand capabilities as a steptowardcreating for confront to lay in an attempt terrorist a theoretical framework groupslikelyto seek WMD. however. from acquiring or using WMD-provide a pragmaticframe of referenceby which to analyze a group's motives.206 on Tue. dictates a shift in focusfrom theweaponssystem to the terrorist or potentialterrorist group as the unit of analysis. It was noted at the conferencethat. groupsare morelikelyto beableto obtainWMDresources neitherthe conference are less likelyto be able to concealWMD activity. although necessarily as theunit of analysis Thisemphasis. Global Terrorism than datasetson potential WMD terDatabase-are morecomprehensive roristgroups. but instead on the ers) focus not on the characteristics groups themselves. The next steps in the procdetermining if a group is ess-determining whethera group'sgrievancescan be addressed.THE FORUM 135 Database(http://cns. publicly available datasetfor potential terroristgroups.org/-conflict/newsletter/feb2002/iterate. of parametersregardingthe historical pieces recordof MCTfor which mustaccount.future profilesand threatassessment religiousand ethnicmotivations must be able to accountfor thefact that the strategies for MCT and byproxy WMD terror.Eachpresents out waysof constructing a WMDprofile. Suchframeworks need to be assessed will eventually althoughthisis difficultto empirically.particularlycriminalenterprises to terrorist response groups. structure. and determiningif a group can be physicallyblocked deterrable.cult-likegroups are more likelyto be able to keep WMD activity but whereas transnational concealed. in Figure1. of WMDacquisition. emphasis.it is important programs require. of the terrorist include: in whichtheyoperate. Near theend of theconference. programs that weapons theseareasoftenalreadycontainpeoplewiththe skillsand accessto the materials in thatit theconcept is similarto thatoffailed states. do as therehas beenno true WMD terrorist to the Forumof Victor attack.Keyelements environments of relevancein theseenvironments and other terrorist thelackof stateauthority between in certainregions.thereis potentialeruptions no analogous.Onefinding. TamilTigersand al-Qaedabothengage in highlylethal attacks.168. The question of organizational was noted that secretive. arrivedat theframework presented participants and on terrorism whichall believecouldserveas a usefulguide tofuture group-levelresearch WMD. programoutsidethe reach of state and international environments or criminalenclaveswherestates are located.apsanet.therelationship groups and the nature of thepolicy and diasporas. Several of the contributors Endand ToddSandlerand Walter GabrielSheffer. for Both to establish sets serve large-N analysis. whereasthe Minoritiesat Risk (MAR) datasethas playedan important role in tracking of ethnicconflict.jsp).is that both future research can lead to MCT Thus. two thesesamecontributors (Gurrand Moreover. a sustained Thecomplexity theneedfor groupsto develop weapons of producingWMDcreates In considering wheresuch authorities. Base theMIPT Terrorism Knowledge Events Terrorist or Attributes the International Terrorism: of (http://www.Mark Lichbach.82.for instance. Although drawsattention to thefact thatlawlessregionscan be quitesmalland can existas part of border This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.mils. In general.it structure aroseat the conference group.org/Home.tkb.
206 on Tue.thefact that the goals of diasporasare usually highlypoliticaland theiractionsare highlytacticalmakeit unlikelythattheywouldsupportthe to this Forum).thatthereis a (in If spot operating group the questionof the impactof policiesand institutionson potential WMD politicalauthority).Althoughit them is theseseriousgrievancesthatare the mostdifficultto address. of regions. existingcriminal The importanceof these criminal networksillustratesthe relevanceof terroristgroups' with othertypesof groups moregenerally.Indeed. Consideralso the impactthat diasporascan nologicalexpertise necessary have on the actions of terroristgroups.An argumentis madethat the politicalinstitutions terrorist groupsmostlikelyto use WMDare thosewiththemostseriousgrievances. seekersremains. 1.Terrorism. and Weapons of Mass Destruction IdentifyGroup Identify Motive/Grievance Canmotive/grievance be addressed? NO YES Can groupbe deterred? NO YES Cangroupbe blocked physically fromacquiring WMD? NO YES FIG.and Sandler and Enders) elements the terrorist interaction between analyze of groups and the basketof policies and thathave beendeveloped to confrontthem. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .82. a desire to seek may groupsawayfrom Alongsideongoingefforts disruptthe This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. the interactionof extremist relationships groups can greatlyincreasethe capacityof any one group to obtainthe materialsand techto produce WMD. Several of the contributors (Gurr. Processfor Analyzingand AddressingThreats from a Group-LevelPerspective to theimportance suchas theTri-border It alsodrawsattention Areain SouthAmerica.168. Lichbach.evenpartiallyaddressing to move WMD.136 NonstateActors. use of WMD as part of a terrorist strategy(see Sheffer'scontribution other we assume a is a terrorist not in black words. networks thatmayor maynot existin a failed state. Even though diasporagroups may contributeto violence and terrorism in their homelands.
conference that we. Viewing the interactionbetweenterroristgroups and political authorities as a strategicinteraction. lawski. Universityof Maryland Terrorism is obviously a term that is widely used and poorly defined.and the environments and Enders.Sheffer. LaFree. Stohl. This conclusionis interesting we view this becausesuch terrorismis inherentlydifficult and costly. In Sum. Instead. This result is not ideal but. Sandler Lichbach. Reviewsof the literature on WMDterrorism suggestthatthereis a needto rethink what we know and to revisit the ways in which we are interpretingwhat we know. Sinai Asal and in whichgroupsoperate-StanisBlum." ear. theproblemor is masscasualty/mass theproblem? impactterrorism More generally.left the conference moreimpressed byhow muchthereis left to do than by how muchhas beenaccomplished. thatfollow shouldnot be viewedas Thus. The it is true on whichthisForumis basedwas an attempt to dojust that. tipping-point-like groups will be slow and incremental phenomenon.Ackerman. group-levelanalysis-Gurr.it is this dynamic.Nonetheless.How optimistically is WMDterrorism conclusion relatesbackto theconceptual issuesdiscussed above. analytictechniques capableof addressing questions. the contributions providing some sort of comprehensive understandingof the relationshipbetweennonstate and WMD.an intriguing finding behavior. results:thepressure 11 has causedthemto eschew"difficult on since put al-Qaeda September and costlyattacks withhigh bodycounts"(see [particularly for simplebombing hostage-taking] the contribution in the WMD context of Sandlerand Enders). it is of knowledge. as editors.THE FORUM 137 actionsof terrorist whatstrategies understand are groups. if any.Whereas the bargainingtheory wouldcounsela stateto increase transparency and trust. Consider rational choice models-the bargaining theoryof war and the rebel'sdilemmatheoryof of the impactof certaintypesof policies differentunderstandings" dissent--"offerstartlingly and institutions.Post.interactiverelationship that terrorist groups have with theirenvironment that led Ackerman to call for the development in his contribution of new or nonlinorder "second Second-order.illuminatingonepart of a actors. and Franke. the existing literature does not provide either a generally agreed This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. on terrorist Whenonedoessuch an analysis. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .Dugan. Terrorism: Practical Distinctions and Research Priorities JOHN STEINBRUNER Centerfor Internationaland SecurityStudies.206 on Tue. as was articulatelystated by one of the we maynot have theliberty buildinga body conference participants.analysis is necessaryto understandwhetherthefuture transitionto WMD by terrorist or a moresudden.82. As best I can judge. complexlandscape.terrorism.specifically. The contributions to the Forum appear in the following order by theme:the concept of WMD-Steinbruner.168. In additionto lookingat specificpolicies.we see each as a spotlight. the rebel'sdilemmamodel would urge creatingpolicies that checkthe ability of terrorist groups to increasetheirpower throughthe mobilization of new resources(see the contributionof Lichbach).a keyresearch challengeis to better the in and extremism at radicalization effective preventing first place. it is possibleto examinethe impactvariouspolicyshifts have had.appeasement thefact that two different institutions shouldbe effectivein undermining terrorism. Althoughsuch a bodyof knowledge also necessaryto createpractical knowledgein the short term that can help prevent the proliferationof WMD to terrorist groups. of slowlyand methodically mustalwaysremaina long-term goal.thesecontributors also askfundamentalquestions and whichpolitical versus repression) regardingwhichpolicies (for example.
It is nonetheless a legitimate concern given that. The core problem obviously is distinguishing them from legitimate activity and exercising prudent judgment in doing so. readily imputable bargaining reasons.206 on Tue. It may be questionable whether there are any exclusive manifestations of this phenomenon distinguishable from ordinary crime. or even any serious attempts if long-standing nuclear deterrence practices are exempted from inclusion. (C) Violence done for strategic reasons. but there clearly is a widespread.168. (2) Actions designed to limit or to eradicate those terrorist organizations that do form. As far as imputed intention is concerned. This type of violence depends essentially on inducing a decisive societal autoimmune effect. impression that the events of September 11 and al-Qaeda activities in general reflect an underlying purpose that could not be resolved by any imaginable political bargain. Presumably this set of actions includes analysis of the individual motives and social incentives that generate terrorists as well as assessment of the measures required to mitigate such determining conditions. Conceptually drawing a distinction between this and the previous category may be difficult. Most episodes of terrorism encountered to date fall into this category. they have mainly to do with the exchange of information. There are nonetheless some commonsense distinctions that can be used in considering an appropriate research agenda on the topic. it would seem. one can argue for organizing analysis according to the following distinctions among the imputed purposes for the activity: (A) Violence perpetrated for its own sake. social pathology. The apparent intention of strategic terrorism is to provoke self-destructive reactions in a society that are too strong to be directly defeated. but such behavior is probably a significant feature of most sustained terrorist episodes. in principle. Actions falling into this category are basically the work of serial killers. the more consequential of them are embedded in the general problem of civil conflict. might best be done by specialists on psychopathology. a clandestine organization capable only of small-scale operations might achieve massive social destruction by using nuclear explosives or a virulent biological pathogen. (D) Violence done to achieve catastrophic social destruction. The assessment of this type of violence. and Weapons of Mass Destruction upon definition of the term or a categorization of the meaningfully different circumstances to which the term has been applied. and at least plausibly valid. Valid assessment of this type of terrorism presumably should be considered part of the appraisal of civil conflict with all its many subspecialties. Relevant Distinctions Assuming that the fundamental concern of terrorists has to do with deliberately initiated violence judged to have broader social consequence than ordinary crime. Inducing attack on innocent victims in attempting This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.82. Terrorist operations can be eliminated if they can be identified. this category would be a combination of the first and the third.138 NonstateActors. but its distinguishing feature is the use of means that can achieve massive social destruction directly without depending on autoimmune effects that in principle could be controlled by the target societies. To the extent that these actions extend beyond standard criminal justice.Terrorism. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . To date there are no instances on record of this kind of violence. One can also argue for a complementary set of organizing distinctions having to do with the protective reactions of terrorist victims: (1) Actions designed to prevent the formation of terrorist operations. and criminal justice. (B) Violence done for specific.
This category is the most poorly conceptualized and least developed of all the relevant categories. the corresponding dangers of promoting a societal autoimmune effect are a less prominent consideration. High standards of protection are technically feasible in each instance. of course. In principle. Biotechnology is much more demanding. Chemical agents and other technologies that are commonly given the mass destruction label do not belong in this category. by forms of warfare largely contained within a single. The US political system has demonstrated itself to be quite susceptible to provocation and so far has essentially refused to acknowledge this problem. most of the terrorist incidents that have occurred to date have been generated by active civil conflicts--that is.206 on Tue. The practical implications are very different for these two applications. representing the intersection C and 4 in the array of motives and actions listed above.82. might usefully be termed immunization. First. there is a strong presumption that extremely high standards of protection can and must be achieved.168. (4) Actions specifically designed to contain the autoimmune effect. in terms of magnitude of risk. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . This refusal. but they share some common features. in terms of potential probability. The basic problem in this regard is the exercise of prudent judgment. sovereign jurisdiction (the intersection of B and 2 in the categorization scheme). it is less evident what a responsive and effective research agenda would be. (5) Actions designed to prevent terrorist access to mass destruction technology. (3) Actions designed to prevent destructive access to critical social assets. but it is prudent to assume that the danger is serious enough to justify the overriding priority that would be required to develop dramatically higher standards of managerial control over the two technologies of greatest destructive potential--nuclear explosives and virulent biological pathogens. Inducing excessive efforts to protect critical assets is another major method of promoting an autoimmune effect in society. Third. the most urgent concern in the aftermath of the September 11 events has to do with recognizing and controlling the societal autoimmune effect. In this case. the application of advanced monitoring techniques on a global scale. but their development and application would require a conceptual and institutional revolution in existing international security arrangements. nuclear explosives can be more effectively sequestered than they currently are. Although the basic idea is specific and compelling. In this case. the extended implications are very broad and very poorly understood at the moment.THE FORUM 139 to eradicate terrorists is one of the principal methods of achieving a societal autoimmune effect. Priority Research Topics The intersection of these distinctions (types of deliberately initiated violence and kinds of protective reactions of terrorist victims) can be used to argue for certain research priorities. the threat of deliberate mass destruction (the intersection of D and 5 from above) is clearly the matter of greatest concern. The actual probability is difficult to judge. To the extent that it goes beyond the exercise of good judgment with regard to the previous two categories. My own judgments in this regard are as follows. The topic. There is a strong presumption that any successful policy for dealing with terrorism of this type would have to be embedded in policies This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. it presumably has to do with calibrating public fears and managing attitudes about risk-very difficult matters indeed. at least nominally. but the development of such an agenda is clearly an urgent matter. provides substantial incentive to those who want to exploit such a vulnerability. Second. most notably. particularly those whose destruction might have some substantial cascade effect.
Despite such extensive attention. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . There is considerable promise in treating terrorism embedded in civil conflict as an emergent phenomenon more susceptible to adroit localized response than has yet been appreciated. necessarily remain within the realm of the speculative as long as we do not experience any major attacks--and hopefully this will continue to be the case. given the paucity of serious chemical.168. At the moment. virtually no one considers the problem to be adequately understood or operationally mastered. is generating some localized innovation among those who are involved in military. monographs. however. of course.206 on Tue. There are." A recent survey of more than 120 books. WMD Terrorism Research: Whereto from Here? GARY ACKERMAN Centerfor NonproliferationStudies. the topic has emerged as a preoccupation of security policy as well. but far from evident. the most demanding variant of this problem has to do with achieving viable social reconstruction in the aftermath of a conflict whose major combat phase has been terminated by international intervention. or nuclear (CBRN) incidents and the absence of any true WMD attacks by terrorists upon which to base studies and against which to validate assertions. is what innovation would be productive. It is evident that some productive innovation is needed. I offer the following three examples. To some extent this is understandable.82. and major instances of intervention have produced formative practical experience. The answers to some of the questions surrounding WMD terrorism must. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.Terrorism. and Weapons of Mass Destruction for mitigating the underlying conflict. In the aftermath of the Cold War. in fact. several aspects that seem to have been overlooked or given scant attention in the research program thus far. Extensive efforts have been made to develop analytic assessments of the problems involved in civil conflicts. Very few would care to argue that either analytic comprehension or practical mastery are likely to emerge from a simple continuation of past efforts. Civil conflicts have. biological. however. in particular. preliminary work applying adaptive agent models to civil conflict situations suggests that localized interactions may be substantively more significant and analytically more comprehensible than yet realized. therefore. My own suggestion in this regard has to do with perspective. This is not meant to denigrate several excellent works that have emerged. Extensive engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. MontereyInstitute of InternationalStudies Despite significant contributions in the past decade to our understanding of various aspects of WMD terrorism. the topic seems to have reached something of an "interpretive impasse. provided the principal combat experience for the major military establishments in the world for several decades. and government reports dealing with WMD terrorism indicated that the scholarly and policy-related literature has increasingly begun to recycle the same interpretations and staid shibboleths. journal articles. and humanitarian relief operations.140 NonstateActors. radiological. Moreover. merely to point out that truly novel insights into WMD terrorism are becoming few and far between. With the hope of broadening the research agenda for WMD terrorism. reconstruction.
scholars should not shy away from undertaking close qualitative studies themselves. potentialsuperterrorists Another way in which scholars can leverage their collective knowledge in the above mentioned pursuit is to combine empirical research (both of the large-N and case study varieties) on terrorist motivations and capabilities with the existing body of literature relating to terrorist decision making in order to produce usable and useful analytical tools. to mention only some. cognitive and affect-based distortions to perception and information processing. Moreover. In addition. operational capabilities." A task that scholars should set for themselves in this regard is to actively work to incorporate the knowledge and insights we have gained over decades of study regarding motivational and other aspects of WMD terrorism into threat assessment methodologies that can be used by analysts with less experience and smaller knowledge bases than most scholars possess. even those based solely on information found in unclassified sources. or merely heuristic-could enable those involved in counterterrorism to reach a level of understanding that is both specific to the dangers of the terrorist group under This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. In many ways the threat of WMD terrorism resembles a chaotic system. What is required is a synthesis--a marriage of the quantitative and the qualitative. lifecycle status. despite the intent to provide analysts with analytical aids. the vast majorityof terroristorganizations can be identified well in advance .. in the strict sense of the term. and operational objectives. including recent indications of terrorist interest in using WMD. Such efforts.. the model and the empirical "actual. environmental factors. nature. wherein tiny perturbations in any of a myriad of factors can result in significantly disparate outcomes. carry out-should have been more than sufficient to alert domestic and international authorities to the dangers posed by the organization.THE FORUM 141 (1) Operationalizing WMD Terrorism Research by Informing Threat Assessments The current security situation. given that intelligence and law enforcement analysts rarely possess the time or resources necessary to conduct comprehensive profiles of this sort. statistical. investigators.168. a serious investigation of Aum Shinrikyo-which several Japanese newspapers did.82. the 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway could undoubtedly have been prevented. resources. the traditional analytical methods of the past have also served us rather poorly in predicting terrorist behavior--the failures in foreseeing such events as the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin release or the September 11 attacks were not solely the result of faulty intelligence. or location of future WMD attacks with any degree of scientific certainty.Ample early warningsigns should make effectiveinterdictionof much easier than today'sprevailingrhetoricsuggests. in fact. To provide but one example. can yield considerable indicators of a group's or individual's future potential for various types of violence. If those warnings had been heeded and promptly acted upon. Basic research needs to be operationalized as soon as possible in a form that analysts. They were in many ways the consequence of a lack of imagination and innovation in thinking about such threats. qualitative studies of particular extremist groups so that threat assessments encompass such factors as a group's history. ideology. organizational dynamics. It needs to be emphasized that. there is no way to predict the timing."Combining real-world data with a new set of analytical tools--be they computational. As Ehwd Sprinzak (2000:5-6) has argued. and policymakers can deploy "in the field. organizational structure. including the use of WMD. makes it untenable for scholars to act leisurely in applying their insights to practical purposes.206 on Tue. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . One means of informing threat assessments is to develop standardized methodologies for conducting in-depth. and the numberof potential[WMD]suspectsis significantly less than doomsayers seem to believe.
at present. it is that terrorists are nimble actors who can be innovative when necessary. question. technological development is also inherently dynamic with one of the negative externalities of this dynamism being the opportunities it can provide for malefactors. If WMD in the context of terrorism is likely to act as a disruptive technology (which primafacie indications suggest). in other words. consider a concept such as disruptive versus sustaining technologies (developed by Clayton Christensen at the Harvard Business School. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . bioinformatics.168. Terrorism. Even if one accepts that terrorists will eventually succeed in using WMD to cause mass casualties. the transition to the terrorist use of WMD as the strategic weapon of choice would be both sudden and permanent.206 on Tue. may shed some light on the rate of WMD adoption by terrorists. Thanks are due Bale for providing many of the observations noted below. nor is it within the capabilities of. network-centric. (2) The Need for Second-Order Analysis and Beyond The consensus among scholars as well as in existing empirical evidence seems to suggest that. many people assume that any transition to WMD use will be incremental and perceptible. yet underresearched. if not entirely distinct from one another. It is generally assumed that different types of violent extremists and terrorists operate within discrete ideological and cultural milieus that are relatively insular. (3) Where Extremes Touch2 Another area that has thus far remained largely unexplored in the context of WMD terrorism involves the potential for and consequences of collaboration between terrorist groups. most terrorists. how quickly this can happen is a very important question. and eminently adaptive set of groups and individuals as today's amorphous terrorist groups. if recent trends have taught us anything. Examples of such technologies include cheap. then changes in terrorist behavior can be both swift and comprehensive instead of gradual and infrequent. accessible sprayers for chemical weapons. often based on a modified rational choice approach. and Bose-Einstein condensates. Will this necessarily be the case. WMD will not be the first choice of. Five years? Ten? Fifty? The speed with which a shift to possible WMD use might take place in the context of emerging technologies is a very important. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. with WMD incidents gradually increasing in frequency and severity. This is especially true when considering such a diffuse. see Bower and Christensen 1995). Yet terrorism is an inherently dynamic phenomenon. At the same time.82. nanotech. Various models of technological change. single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). Consideration of second-order questions may entail new analytical techniques and require a more diverse set of skills than scholars are accustomed to applying to the problem of WMD terrorism. or can technological or motivational developments cause a sudden shift toward WMD use? What we need to do is to consider "secondorder questions" regarding when a potential transition to WMD use might occur and by what mechanisms it might take place. As an example.142 Nonstate Actors. One potentially fruitful source of insights in this regard is found in the business development literature that focuses on the impact of technological change on patterns of behavior. Also. aerosol vaccine delivery. proteinacious microspheres.and Weapons of Mass Destruction consideration and sufficiently comparative to discern valuable trends and indicators that would otherwise go unnoticed. A remarkable feature of the broader discussion regarding the likelihood of WMD terrorism is that hardly any commentators who believe terrorists currently lack the capacity mention anything about future developments. and. This simplistic assumption 2The following section is based on work prepared by Jeffrey Bale and the author (see Bale and Ackerman 2004).
the establishment of symbiotic relationships with their counterparts from other ideological milieus and the possible combining of their efforts could result in groups that otherwise would lack the requisite capability to move beyond the WMD threshold. Any type of operational cooperation between separate terrorist organizations is a potentially worrisome development. if WMD had been available to these groups. Universityof Maryland Departmentof Government I am not aware of WMD use by any of the 300 politically significant minorities that have been tracked since the 1980s by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project (data are available at http://www. (2) the extent to which the group has collectiveincentivesfor political action.82. Another potential motivation for adopting this collaborative approach would be to circumvent security measures taken against their own groups by engaging proxies to carry out attacks on their behalf. And. The specifics of the four variables shape leaders' choices concerning strategies and tactics for political action and also determine the extent of the active support that they are likely to receive from members of the identity group they This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. biological. given that elements from different extremist milieus have frequently interacted and lent one another assistance in the past. (3) the extent of the group's capacitiesfor collective action. they probably would have used them. within each milieu to find ways to justify collaboration with one another. indeed. The framework is adapted here to suggest the circumstances in which such groups are at risk of using WMD.umd. even though the majority of the respective ideologies' adherents continue to regard each other with antipathy.THE FORUM 143 ignores a far more complex and fluid reality.168. None of these MCT attacks used nuclear. Four general variables shape the potential for group political action: (1) the salience of ethnocultural identityfor members and leaders of the group.cidcm. Which Minorities Might Use Weapons of Mass Destruction? TED ROBERT GURR and Politics. My point of departure is a four-variable framework I have used to assess the likelihood that politically mobilized communal groups will engage in disruptive political action (Gurr 2000: ch.206 on Tue. or chemical agents-but we can speculate that. All that is necessary is for a small subset. but it is even more ominous in an era in which terrorist attacks are becoming ever deadlier.edu/inscr/mar). there are indications that new patterns of ideological cross-fertilization and collaboration are presently emerging among terrorist groups. however. It is important to recognize that one of the oldest alliance patterns adopted by states within the international system-that based on the notion that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"-also influences the behavior of nonstate actors. Asal and Blum (2004) identify thirty-four Mass Casualty Terror (MCT) events during the last thirty years. So it is reasonable to assess the risks that some kinds of minorities might seek and use such weapons in the future. perhaps even fringe elements. eight of them perpetrated by ethnonationalist Chechens and Tamils. 3). It is not necessary in this regard that the bulk of or "mainstream" factions within each milieu find common ground. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and (4) the availability of opportunities in the group's political environment that increase its chances of attaining group objectives through political action. Given the growing interest expressed by terrorists in using CBRN weapons.
First. Therefore. Salience of Identity The salience of the group's identity comes into play in one essential way: some of the group holds an exclusionary. people with the skills to create clandestine organizations can function in almost any political environment. The greater their collective sense of loss. Second. and the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers."The two traits. tend to reinforce one another. but with passion. So they need to play careful This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. Solidarity and absolute commitment to "the cause" are essential for planning and executing highly risky and deadly attacks.144 Nonstate Actors. Incentives may arise from resentment about losses suffered in the past. Whether deeply and widely held or not. but those that have an intrinsic affective component. or hopes for relative gains. Members of disadvantaged minorities seek redress not only with self-interest in mind. and in solidarity with their kindred. Such worldviews are held by some ethnonationalists. some Islamists such as the Sunni militants in Pakistan (whose beliefs justify deadly attacks on Shi'i and Christians). Key is the belief that justice (or revenge) can only be attained by destroying or grievously harming one's opponents. Two key points need to be made here. But such groups are most likely to be found in weak and autocratic states as well as in societies with (sub)cultures with precedents and justifications for violent conflict. self-righteousness. leaders of ideologically driven ethnocultural and religious identity groups are disposed to use deadly terror against any targets associated with their enemies.168. Chechen rebels. Small and secret groups help reduce the risks of infiltration and detection. One can question how widely such worldviews are held by leaders or their followers. These are not merely "collective interests. for such cells to persist they need a support base of people--a larger identity group--whose members accept their goals even if they reject terror strategies. Capacities for Collective Action Sustained political action requires some degree of cohesion and mobilization among members of a communal group. Terrorism. These group traits increase the likelihood that some of the leaders and members may seek and accept the use of WMD." as Charles Tilly would describe them. and among India's most extreme Hindu nationalists. Governments motivated by such beliefs are at risk of committing genocide and ethnic cleansing. the promotion of such exclusionary views by opinion leaders in a group is a necessary precondition for strategic choices to seek and use WMD.and Weapons of Mass Destruction claim to represent. of course. Collective Incentives The choice of any political strategy-lethal or nonlethal--depends on the shared perception that the group has valid claims that are being ignored or denied by others. and the greater their hoped-for gains. But WMD are not likely to be deployed by mass movements. for example.206 on Tue. rather they are more likely to be the choice of nuclei of activists nested within larger political movements. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . any movement based on any kind of identity group could in principle provide the context for a terrorist cell using WMD. the most deadly combination is an exclusionary ideology harnessed to a deep sense of grievance or injustice that needs to be remedied by attacks aimed at destroying the "other. What incentives might justify a willingness to use WMD? Such a willingness follows from the Manichean ideologies mentioned above.82. In sum. Manichean worldview by which their opponents are irremediably evil and can as well as should be opposed by all means available to the group. fear of future losses. the stronger their motivations to support political action. supporters of the Spanish Basque ETA.
if so. Comparable doctrines can emerge in other contexts--extreme Hindu nationalism was cited above-and should be monitored in a similar way. Nonetheless. Third. One private organization. In Sum This sketch has implications for domestic and international strategies for minimizing the risks that communal militants will employ WMD. One is to focus security efforts narrowly on the most dangerous of ideologically driven militant organizations and to lay out. The "skills"factor is an unknown. they do undercut the appeals and support base of militants. The strategies include symbolic and substantive concessions and reforms that help address grievances. the first line of defense must be to keep WMD materials and technology out of the hands of communal and other militants. even those that have escalated into open rebellion. Such tactics have normative and political risks. what information strategies and policies can be devised to challenge them and provide alternative courses of action? Fourth. scholars. They may also help motivate new generations of militants to seek revenge. or defection by. and negotiated power-sharing and autonomy agreements (see Gurr 2000: chs. This should include local and international policies that block such organizations from acquiring WMD materials and technology. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Second. Those who reject accommodation and continue to fight are more easily isolated and dealt with as a security problem until they. MEMRI (http://www. It is impossible to say how often potential users of WMD have been thwarted.206 on Tue. Opportunities for Acquiring and Using WMD Two kinds of opportunities are preconditions for any future use of WMD by communal groups: (1) acquisition of usable weapons. There are two strategies for reducing--not eliminating--these risks. after the fact if necessary. and lack of technical skills to employ them. Do the ideologues have a resonant mass of potential supporters and recruits? And. Many would-be terrorists have died when mishandling explosive devices before reaching their targets. there are numerous and demonstrably effective strategies for responding to communally based demands. analysts. First. Hardening security at potential targets is a costly and ineffective alternative precisely because there are so many of them. Although these responses seldom satisfy all group members.82. So we end up focusing on the supply side of opportunities: the diligence and luck of security agencies in keeping nuclear and deadly biological and chemical technologies out of the hands of militants who have the motivation and skills to use them. too. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. and (2) availabilityof targets.memri. very likely explain why no communally based militants have employed them to date. intelligencegathering on their plans and capabilities. these ideologies need to be interpreted in their political context. The other. and preventive actions that thwart or decapitate their leadership. their supporters. Potential targets are too numerous to be secured against engineers of death who are determined to use WMD. Lack of access to such weapons.168. either give up or accept a political buyout.provides current reports on militant Islamist writings and also on moderate Islamist rejoinders to jihadists. 5 and 6). institutional changes that improve opportunities for political participation by minority group members and leaders.org/). Some will offend civil libertarians and advocates of human rights.THE FORUM 145 political and security games to ensure that they contain potential opposition from. militant communal organizations need the full and close attention of security agencies. the evidence justifying preventive action. not by failure to obtain radioactive or biological agents but by their own technical ineptitude. and security personnel need to track closely the emergence of communal ideologues preaching hatred and calling for destruction of group enemies.
is to implement policies that open up alternative strategies and opportunities for communal group members who might otherwise rally to the militants' support. are increasingly "stateless.206 on Tue. However.3 There is no doubt that many of these new groups do not talk of their use of terrorism in the same ways that the "old" terrorists did." These analyses have suggested that the new terrorism is caused by the emergence of "religious" and "millearian" terrorists in contrast to the "political" terrorists who dominated the "old terrorism" (see. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and the target audience can be wider than the attacking party may have intended when choosing the victims and the actions. not a lot of people dead. for example. And beyond the events of September 11.000 terrorist events transpiring between 1968 and 1999 showed any indication of terrorists seeking to use chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and those of the National Commission on Terrorism. which projected a growing trend in lethality and interest in using CBW. and the probable cost of engaging in the action. An expected utility approach provides useful insights into the process of understanding why oppositional organizations might choose terrorism as a tactic or strategy and which groups are more likely to seek mass casualties as opposed to using their violence with relatively more economy. Terrorism. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. but the fear. Response costs are those that are imposed by the target group or sympathetic or offended bystanders. many scholarly and policy analyses have focused on the causes and consequences of the "new terrorism." Compounding the problem. despite the escalation of the rhetoric (and the increasing silence on particular events). some suggest that there has been a desensitization of the audience such that greater lethality is required to obtain not only coverage. but their annihilation. that these new terrorists are seeking (see. for example. and Stohl (1986) has advanced its usefulness in examining state behaviors in the international realm as well. the believed probability with which the action will bring about the desired state of affairs. there have been a number of additional mass casualty events.82. It is particularly important to employ both these strategies simultaneously. Is the Past Prologue? Terrorists and WMD MICHAEL STOHL Department of Communication.168. Morgan 2004) and that the consequence is greater lethality. Lesser et al. Center for Counterproliferation Research 2002:6).146 Nonstate Actors. Much of the debate centers on conflicting evaluations of the continuing relevance of Brian Jenkins's (1975:15) observation that "terrorists want a lot of people watching. unlike the old.and Weapons of Mass Destruction referred to above. Some explicitly call for not only the defeat of the enemy. 1999. University of California. Two kinds of costs--response costs and production costs--can be distinguished. thus far the trend line does not indicate a consistent escalation in death and devastation around the world. Raymond Duvall and Michael Stohl (1983) have argued that an expected utility model is useful for understanding a government's choice of terrorism as a tactic or strategy in domestic affairs." thus removing restraints imposed by their territorially defined supporters. which notes that fewer than 100 of the more than 9. Many have argued that these new terrorists. Such an approach calculates the benefit thought possible from the desired outcome. The bystanders can include domestic and foreign audiences. and thus impact. Production costs are the costs of taking 3Chris Dishman (2001:305) cites the gap between the conclusions of the Gilmore commission. Santa Barbara In the years immediately before and certainly after September 11.
do they have the resource capabilities to clear the technical barriers? What types of groups in which contexts are these likely to be? As indicated earlier. and that they could. appear to be some features associated with the potential for violence. Dispositionalvariables are conditions that can be expected to influence how organizations regard the acceptability of strategies of violence and terrorism.""symbols. On the one hand. but also what their potential capabilities and impacts might be. to gain access to them (through theft.168. or the largess of a state or other group). In addition to economic and organizational costs-paying the participants. Michael Barkun (2001) argues that "there do. however. under normal conditions. the religious terrorists have not been particularly inventive when it comes to using new types of weaponry in their arsenals. obviously concerns with al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden have replaced concerns with Aum Shinrikyo in Japan and Christian Identity groups This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. Gurr (1986:62-67) identifies three sets of conditions that affect the decisionmaking calculus of the potential terrorist actor within this expected utility approach (see also his contribution to this Forum). Norms supporting the use of violence are shaped by direct or mediated experience with violent means of power and are potentially inhibited by values held by supporters of the cause.206 on Tue. as in a barricade situation. surveying the actual behavior of such groups. and who are its referents? (6) Readings-How does the organization perceive and interpret its and its opponents' "reality. Situationalconditions include the political traits of the challengers (the status and strategies of the opposition) and the terrorists' own political resources for countering these challenges (organizational strength. observes that "in comparison to their secular counterparts.THE FORUM 147 the action regardless of the reactions of others. acquiring weapons. and to attack installations and cause damage from the attack itself (for example. purchase.82. but they may also feel trapped by time if they feel history is literally coming to an end" (see also Stern 2004). and public acquiescence). instead relying on the traditional bombs and bullets. characterize as unacceptable. Ranstorp (1996:59). They may feel physically trapped. One is the existence of a belief that the faithful are trapped and must act now or be destroyed. The eight R's include: (1) Relationships-What is the organization's network? (2) Rules-How do systemic structures affect the organization. We also need to determine if these groups have the organizational capacity to create and deploy the weapons. and who are its potential opponents? (4) Record-What is the history of the organization and the history of the region in which it operates? How do these affect the organization's choices? (5) Region-Where is the organization's zone of operations. They can be applied to terrorist behaviors and organizing to identify the key characteristics that should be considered in understanding not only the choices of action that terrorists may take. religious-based terrorist organizations are often cited as the archetypal "new" terrorists. destruction of a nuclear power plant). Stohl and Stohl (2005) extend the ideas found in Gurr and identify "Eight R's" for understanding global organizing. But analysis of simply "religious" terrorists leads to mixed results. Structuralconditions are those that define organizational relations with one's opponents and supporters and determine or constrain response options." and "routines"? (7) Rationales-What provides meaning and understanding for the organization? (8) Responsibility--How does the organization justify its actions to itself and to potential supporters and others? Let us stipulate for the moment that there are terrorists and terrorist organizations that would like to acquire and potentially employ WMDs. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and its opportunities? (3) Resources-What are the organization's resources. and the like -there is the psychological cost of behaving in a manner that most individuals would." Since September 11. In short. Individuals in such a situation may feel that they have nothing to lose by resorting to violence. On the other hand. we have good reason to suspect that certain characteristics of religious-based groups suggest a propensity for mass casualties. its network. support.
The crucial psychological barrier is not the choice of weapon but rather the willingness to cause mass casualties--a threshold that has already been crossed by some groups. and Weapons of Mass Destruction within the United States regarding which terrorist organizations are likely to use WMD.Terrorism. (d) a limited-scale chemical or biological attack or radiological dispersal.148 NonstateActors. (b) CBRN hoaxes. But al-Qaeda itself demonstrates why we have many more questions than answers with respect to terrorists and WMDs. which suggest that the R's related to capability. These groups are not attempting to influence the West but to take revenge against the West. Rationales)? (3) Which of the organizational members of the "al-Qaeda" network support its Responsibility)? global as opposed to their own local aims (Relationships. Given the skills and hazards in working with radiological and nuclear materials This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. (1) In the short and long term. their incentives. terrorists must possess the technical and financial capabilities to obtain the materials and skills to weaponize such materials and carry out an attack. are central to our evaluation of the WMD threat posed by terrorists old and new. biological.168. Region.82. In considering which in the spectrum of terrorist groups might be inclined to carry out acts of chemical. and constraints. (e) a large-scale chemical or biological attack or radiological dispersal. along with the expected utility of potential strategies. In lieu of a conclusion. I pose a set of questions. it is important to differentiate the spectrum of such acts as well. (4) What are the potential tensions and schisms in the global network (Record. Besides the motivation or the willingness to inflict mass casualties by any means. and (f) CBRN strikes (superterrorism) in which thousands of casualties may result. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . drawn from the eight R's above. radiological. Chemical and biological weapons may pose a risk to the terrorists themselves and caution might deter them from using such weapons. Resources)? (6) How do the actions of its opponents and the international "community" affect policy choices (Rules. with scant attention to terrorist motivations. Responsibility)? The Psychology of WMD Terrorism JERROLD M. motivation. POST Elliott School of InternationalAffairs. Consider the following categorization: (a) largescale casualties with conventional weapons. and what impact does this have on the organizational abilities of al-Qaeda and its ability to escape detection and infiltration if it seeks WMD (Regions. or nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. The technical hurdles and lack of "knowhow" can prevent even a willing terrorist from staging a mass casualty terrorist act. George WashingtonUniversity The concern for superterrorism using CBRN weapons has generally focused on what terrorists can do and what our societal vulnerabilities are. does al-Qaeda seek the destruction of the West? Or does it seek the destruction of the Israeli state and US (and Western) support for Israel and the apostate regimes of the Muslim world (Rationales)? (2) Is al-Qaeda interested only in destruction and violence or is it (or any of its parts) interested in any political bargaining (Record. Responsibility)? (5) Do local aims and local political struggles inhibit interest in acquisition and use of WMD as opposed to other violent alternatives.206 on Tue. (c) a conventional attack on a nuclear facility. and resources.Readings.
which is uncritically accepted by his "true believer" followers. In evaluating the risk that terrorist groups may use chemical or biological weapons. and the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. responsible for these events. Thus.THE FORUM 149 in particular. Radical Religious Fundamentalist Terrorists. the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. In evaluating the risk that terrorist groups will use CBRN weapons. they are driven to expel secular modernizing influences and achieve revenge against the West. focused especially upon the United States. But discriminate acts against government or symbolic capitalist targets can be rationalized by these groups. Osama bin Laden. He observed that there is a distinct difference between discriminate and random target selection. in areas where their constituents are not present. But discriminate acts against their adversary. the constraints against CBRN mass terrorism are not present. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Social-Revolutionary Terrorists. Although all these biological weapons attacks failed because they made mistakes in production or dissemination of the biological agents. at the same time. can be rationalized. The radical cleric provides interpretation of the religious text justifying violence. the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. it is useful to employ this distinction in differentiating among terrorist groups. This type of terrorist group is considered especially dangerous. some groups might question the necessity to move into this technologically difficult and dangerous area when they could inflict mass casualties and mass terror by using conventional weapons. But secular Palestinian terrorists launching a chemical or biological weapons attack in Jerusalem that might affect their own constituents is considered highly unlikely. two with anthrax and seven with botulinum toxin. For each of the terrorist group types to be described here. Sham attacks or hoaxes lack the psychological constraints of radiological and nuclear attacks but. it is helpful to consider the distinction between random and discriminate violent acts. even if there is no release of ionizing radiation or large-scale firestorms or explosive yields. "New Religions" Terrorism. in contrast to the social revolutionaries and the nationalist-separatist groups. Just as the rash of suicide bombings in Tel Aviv and other predominantly Jewish cities in Israel was implemented by absolutist Palestinian groups. Moreover. They have shown a willingness to perpetrate acts of mass casualty terrorism. such threats can cause devastating psychological effects.82.206 on Tue. they This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168. Mengel (1977) distinguished four different means by which terrorists attempt to achieve their goals. The millenarian cult Aum Shinrikyo attempted to use aerosolized biological agents against nine targets. has actively discussed the use of weapons of mass destruction in public interviews. the prospect of tactical chemical or biological weapons in such areas is also quite conceivable. These organizations are hierarchical in structure. as was vividly demonstrated in the attacks of September 11. and Terrorism R. These groups are particularly dangerous because they are not constrained by Western reaction. W. Writing in the Reportof the TaskForceon Disorders more than twenty years ago. indeed. Insofar as these groups are seeking to influence their societies. they are significantly constrained from indiscriminate acts that cause significant casualties among their own countrymen or cause negative reactions in domestic and international audiences. there is no ambivalence concerning use of violence that is religiously commanded. there are constraints against the use of CBRN weapons and mass casualty terrorism. such discriminate attacks could be implemented in revenge against US targets. Nationalist-Separatist Terrorists. random targeting is associated with the motivation to cause social paralysis-or inflict mass casualties. Whereas discriminate target selection can be used in support of bargaining or to make a political statement. as exemplified by the bombings of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in the United States. These groups are significantly constrained from performing acts that indiscriminately involve mass casualties and will negatively affect the group's reputation with their constituents and their international audience. some of which were radical Islamists.
Individuals in this category are a significant threat for low-level chemical and biological attacks. and animal rights radicals have not used mass casualty weapons to make their points. Right-Wing Terrorism.000 in April 1995 when they used sarin gas on the Tokyo subway. Tucker 2000) were acts committed by individuals with a right-wing ideology who did not belong to a formal group or organization per se.and Weapons of Mass Destruction were more "successful" in their use of chemical weapons. Because right-wing terrorists generally dehumanize their enemies. To date. and had bought nuclear weapons components from individuals in the former Soviet Union. Single-Issue Terrorists. government facilities are targeted by such groups. v/* X Designates major constraints against WMD terrorism. Terrorism. eco-terrorists. Moreover. is represented in Table 1. hoped to precipitate the final struggle from which he and his followers would be resurrected. and Radiological. Many of the case studies of chemical-biological terrorism developed by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (see. including attacks on the seat of the federal government as represented in The TurnerDiaries. was shopping for Ebola virus in East Africa. or. CBRN Chemical. probably do not represent a threat for using mass casualty chemical or biological terrorism. Biological. Radiological. Various Motivations. the singe-issue terrorists such as anti-abortion terrorists. are justified by their ideology. feel he or she is not alone. CBR Chemical. but because of resource limitations. Soko Asahara. It is possible that such terrorists would not want to inflict extreme levels of damage because it would adversely affect public acceptance of their agendas. A few points should be TABLE 1. attacks on target groups. The role of the Internet in propagating the ideology of right-wing extremist hatred is of concern because an isolated individual consumed by hatred can find common cause in right-wing web sites.82.168. but that they are less constrained from doing so. Differentiating Motivations for WMDTerrorismby Group Type and Constraints Group Type Large-scale Conventional CBRN Hoax Limited Large-scale Scale CBR CBR Superterrorism/ Catastrophic CBRN Various Groups. Their chemical attack killed twelve and injured more than 1. not just those to whom they object most strenuously. their earlier sarin attack in Matsumoto killed seven and injured another 500 persons.150 Nonstate Actors. for example. enclaves of foreign workers. some might be deterred by the amount of government pursuit that such actions could catalyze. This differentiated motivational spectrum Social-Revolutionary Nationalist-Separatist Religious-Fundamentalist New Religious Extremists (closed cults) V* V* V N* V V V V V/ X * /* * V V X X X X X V X X /* V X X Right-Wing Single-Issue Extremists V Designates reduced constraints against discriminateWMD terrorism. or Nuclear. such as black people. probably because these are indiscriminate weapons that target too wide a spectrum of victims. Biological. They also owned a uranium mine in Australia and obviously had future nuclear weapons aspirations. and be moved along the pathway from thought to action--responding to the extremist ideology of the virtual community. the guru of Aum Shinrikyo. in Europe. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . This group was also experimenting with Q Fever. V Designates reduced constraints against WMD terrorism. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. It should be emphasized that a checkmark does not indicate that these groups are strongly motivated to carry out CBRN terrorism attacks. Because of their delegitimization and dehumanization of the government.206 on Tue.
to physically destroy as much of their adversary as possible and. In addition. remove the source of the conflict itself. In postmodern terrorism. The strategic calculations that terrorist groups employ in choosing a relatively low impact form of "conventional" warfare versus the greater lethality represented by the use of chemical. whether conventional low impact. An important underlying characteristic in determining a terrorist group's warfare proclivity is whether its operations exhibit classical. Destruction is low impact and involves the use of conventional weapons. conventional weapons are used to inflict mass casualties. determining whether a group--through its ideology. strategy.4 In classicalterrorism. and Denny 2003). Modern terrorism uses a more indirect approach in which targeting is more indiscriminate and casualties and physical destructiveness are far greater than heretofore. or postmodern terrorism can assist in ascertaining its likely warfare proclivity. modern. modern. radiological. or CBRN (or a mix of the three). Certain distinct accelerators and triggers provide the contextual factors or "circumstances" to propel a group to use CBRN. even here. thus. biological. reaching hundreds of fatalities. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .206 on Tue. conventional high impact. The methodological framework presented here is intended to provide a means to ascertain some of the factors in a group's decision making that are likely to propel it to embark on a spectrum of warfare ranging from conventional low impact (CLI) to conventional high impact (CHI) to CBRN to advance their strategic objectives.82. terrorism is also a form of psychological warfare in which a localized incident is intended to spread fear and anxiety throughout the wider society. Within the context of CBRN. and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and devices are the crucial unknowns in counterterrorism analysis. and modus operandi-fits into the categories of classical. Yet.however. Sprinzak. represented by CBRN. Israel.THE FORUM 151 kept in mind. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. 4This categorization was developed by Boaz Ganor. However. terrorist groups aim to transform the reality of the conflict with their adversary by the very act of terrorism. As a result." and several indicated that the Koran prohibited the use of poisons (see Post. These factors contribute to the decision making by terrorists regarding the calibration of the weapons and devices they will use in their warfare.168. for the most part said: 'Just give me a good Kalishnikov. The warfare is aimed at facilitating the achievement of the group's primarily political objectives. Executive Director of the International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT). The horrors of September 11 demonstrate that conventional attacks may be sufficient to cause mass destruction. Herzlia. with intention of the targets inflicting few casualties and relatively little damage on rather nonsignificant facilities. incarcerated radical Islamist terrorists interviewed under the auspices of the Smith Richardson Foundation. although open to considering weapons of mass destruction. such as using weapons of mass destruction. or postmodern a group's warfare is direct and focuses on specific terrorism. Forecasting Terrorists' Likelihood to Embark on "Conventional" to CBRN Warfare JOSHUA SINAI Departmentof Homeland Security Terrorists primarily seek to cause physical and economic damage to their more powerful adversaries in order to extract political or other demands.
proclamation by a group advocating a millenarian. one must always anticipate new and innovative tactics and weaponry by a This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. and (3) they or their supporting constituency might feel a moral revulsion about using such weapons. or habitual procedures the group uses to achieve particular objectives. which could lead to their demise (what happened to Aum Shinrikyo after the 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo). Thus. hasten the decision by a group to embark on CBRN warfare. excessive government retaliation or crackdown causing a group to become desperate to maintain its independence with the resort to CBRN warfare the only remaining alternative in its view. devices in foreign black or grey markets. to forecast a terrorist group's likely resort to CBRN warfare. particularly when the use of "unconventional" weapons might produce a massive retaliation by the targeted adversary that would eliminate the perpetrator and its allies and damage its constituents' cause and well-being. (4) difficulties in acquiring CBRN devices from foreign suppliers.168. The following purposesare likely to drive a group to embark on CBRN warfare: a willingness to take high risks in its warfare. apocalyptic. weapons. it is necessary to acquire certain qualitative and quantitative data about several components of terrorist behavior and activities. (5) the refusal by a potential state sponsor to cooperate with their operation. Examples of accelerators would include success in recruiting specialists with CBRN-related skills and acquiring CBRN agents. such as precipitous events. In the case of terrorism. (2) in the case of biological.82. chemical. In assessing a group's likely proclivity to embark on CBRN warfare. and an amorphous constituency that is willing to support CBRN warfare. The confluence of certain ideological or religious motivations as well as strategic objectives often generate the "purposes" driving a group to resort to CBRN warfare as opposed to "conventional" warfare. a group may delay or give up on CBRN warfare. or. generally the unvarying. As this discussion suggests. Among the external factors preventing a group from embarking on CBRN warfare. as occurred to Aum Shinrikyo.and Weaponsof Mass Destruction accelerators serve as the technical enablers that provide a group with the opportunity to acquire CBRN weapons and devices. leading to exposure of a group's CBRN program. routine. One could even argue that for terrorists the conventional definition of modus operandi does not apply because they attempt to learn lessons from their-and others'--previous terrorist campaigns in order not to repeat them. certain internaland externalhurdlesneed to be overcome not only to develop an operational CBRN terrorist capability but a willingness to use it. an interest in completely destroying a particular political system and inflicting catastrophic casualties. Terrorism.206 on Tue. (6) monitoring of a group's activities leading to its penetration or deterrence by foreign counterterrorist and intelligence agencies.152 Nonstate Actors. (3) as a result of the clandestine nature of their operations and constant surveillance of their activities by government agents. (7) bad relations with local residents who inform on the group's activities to the authorities. the past may not always be the best predictor for future terrorist actions. As an example of internal hurdles. (2) a group's attempts to recruit foreign technical and warfare specialists may fail or may be reported to intelligence and law enforcement authorities. consider the following: (1) counterterrorism and intelligence agencies may succeed in influencing some of their operatives to defect. or messianic ideology that the millennia or messiah have arrived. groups are inclined to use a blend of old and new tactics to achieve their objectives. and radiological weapons the time delayed effects are not instantaneous or simultaneous. One final piece of qualitative data that is essential to acquire concerns a group's modus operandi--its particular way or manner of operating. As a result. Specific types of triggers. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Examples of triggers might include: a heightened sense of imminent threat. groups might believe that it would be disadvantageous to use CBRN warfare because (1) they might lack control over the effects of these agents after their release. thus preventing immediate media coverage.
THE FORUM 153 terrorist adversary to avoid getting blindsided. namely that there has been an emergence of transnational. Al-Qaeda and the attacks of September 11 epitomize the new terrorism.net/terrorism/wrjp394. We thus coded the MCT events for motivation. Nevertheless.html. They are therefore more willing to inflict large numbers of casualties. goals that are willing to engage in massively destructive attacks. As in the past. Universityof Maryland The starting point of this contribution to the Forum is the oft-cited distinction between "old terrorism" and "new terrorism" alluded to in earlier contributions. assassinations.168." in contrast. counterterrorism planners still need to examine a group's tactics in previous attacks to learn its modus operandi. although knowledge of. The compiled data used in this particular analysis is available from the authors upon request. we have compiled data on thirty-four mass casualty terror (MCT) events from 1970 to 2003. normally with a state. the technologies of WMD are enabling terrorist groups to continually revise and update their methods of operation to a greater extent than ever before. and access to. State Universityof New York at Albany AND ANDREW BLUM Centerfor InternationalDevelopmentand ConflictManagement. goals. The religious or pseudoreligious motivations of these groups mean they are less constrained by political concerns. almost apocalyptic. Practitioners of the old or traditional terrorism-ETA in the Basque region of Spain and the IRA in Northern Ireland are often given as examples-are involved in a localized conflict. while at the same time anticipating any new procedures it may decide to use. normally defined in religious or apocalyptic terms. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. hijackings. or even cosmic. Holy Terror and Mass Killings? Reexamining the Motivations and Methods of Mass Casualty Terrorists VICTOR ASAL RockefellerCollegeof Public Affairs and Policy. It is argued that groups such as this calibrate the level of violence carefully so as not to alienate their supporters or remove the possibility that they will eventually be offered a place at the negotiating table. over fundamental political questions. are said to be fighting a global.82. religiously motivated terrorist groups with expansive. battle against forces of evil. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . What emerges from the literature that relies on this dichotomy is a tightly linked causal story. In order to critique this causal story.5 MCT events are defined as events in which 100 or more people have been killed on one day by the same nonstate actor attacking a primarily civilian target. and organizational structure. including the need to maintain a constituency. it is possible that such groups will seek to acquire and use WMD.johnstonsarchive. Practitioners of the "new terrorism. A key component of the causal story is the religious motivation of the new terrorists. using the following 5The data we use is primarily taken from the online source "Incidents of Mass Casualty Terrorism." created by Robert Johnston and available at http://www. Because of the nature of their motivations. and bombings will probably remain staples in the arsenal of terrorist tactics and procedures.206 on Tue.
94 23. sixteen. Regarding trends.39 categories: rightist. The primary purpose of bringing these questions to the data is to provide a set of parameters regarding the historical record for which future research must account. We can obtain similar results by looking at the past five years. it cannot account for the majority of MCT events. Terrorism.71 8. the extended paper on which this discussion piece is based reviews the same MCT data to further explore the nature of the MCT historical record. both religious motivations and ethnonationalist motivations are capable of spurring groups to mass casualty attacks.53 32.35 14. 2004 Motivation Leftist Rightist Religious Ethnonationalism Ethnonationalist/Religious State Agent Narco-terror or other Criminal Intent Unclear Frequency 1 1 8 11 5 3 3 2 Percentage 2. the number of groups involved.168. the data show that religiously motivated attacks have been more common since 1994. an outlier event in terms of the number of fatalities. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . state agent. Specifically. The data in Table 1 show that a plurality of MCT attacks have been motivated by ethnonationalism and only eight of thirty-four attacks have a solely religious motivation. in which we find four religiously motivated attacks.91 55.1970-July22.82 8. religious. and the geography of MCT attacks. religious. and the four attacks in Iraq. The causal story described that links religious motivations to MCT and therefore to WMD may be able to account for a certain type of attack. are preliminary and are meant to be issues for future research. an important caveat must be noted.206 on Tue. This finding suggests that many MCT groups have yet to devote substantial resources to This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. Since 1994. producing six times more than the second most deadly attack. according to our data. but.12 1.17 2. airplanes). Moreover. However. Clearly. Motivation for MCTAttacks. there have been six MCT attacks that were religiously motivated. In contrast. ethnonationalist. three attacks motivated by ethnonationalism.and Weapons of Mass Destruction TABLE 1.28 4.82. As a first step toward this more complete understanding. The high percentage of fatalities due to religiously motivated MCT is driven almost entirely by the events of September 11. religion was generally lacking as a motivation for MCT during the 1980s and early 1990s.77 18. at least for now. which are based on the data. If we look at fatalities.94 2. or criminal motivations. have been carried out by groups with an ethnonationalist or ethnonationalist/religious motivation as opposed to leftist. there have been six attacks with nonreligious motivations and four attacks in Iraq motivated by a mix of nationalism and religion.154 Nonstate Actors. (1) The methods used in MCT attacks are almost invariably low-tech or involve weaponizing existing societal resources (for example. rightist. leftist. We conclude that the motivations for MCT are more complex than the traditional/new terrorism dichotomy would lead one to believe. and narco-terrorism/other criminal intent. September 11 is. the link between religion and MCT looks more compelling.677 835 556 369 212 Percentage 1. Twice as many attacks.82 5. religious/ethnonationalist. it assesses the methods used in the MCT.42 6.88 Fatalities 100 169 4. Since 1994.93 9.941 1. It is apparent that we must move beyond this dichotomy in order to gain a more complete understanding of why terrorist organizations engage in MCT. Our own conclusions that follow.
(For further discussion of rationales and the related concept of "readings" of the opposition. Including Iraq. At best. Even though these attacks have run the gamut of religious and ethnonationalist motivations. The Interplay between Terrorism. it is necessary to also examine the contextual factors that give rise to particular MCT attacks. these factors can explain what groups are willing to engage in MCT. groups engaging in MCT attacks have achieved this symbolic impact through their choice of targets.) These tentative conclusions suggest two more general insights that can be derived from our analysis. Russia.000 terrorist events recorded for the entire world from 1970 to 1997. and data furnished by PGIS clients. US and foreign government reporting sources. India. and the United States). the willingness of traditional terrorist groups to engage in MCT indicates that they may be more likely to acquire and use WMD than has been assumed by the majority of analysts. Second. and DERRICKFRANKE and CriminalJustice. the United States. The data retrieval protocol remained substantially consistent during the entire twenty-eight years of data collection. Sri Lanka. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. In four of these countries. The fifth. not their choice of weapons. For nearly thirty years. to understand the motivations that lead to MCT in general as opposed to WMD terrorism specifically. therefore. A similarly small number of countries have been the target of MCT attacks. A (2) very small number of groups engage in MCT attacks regularly. To date at least.206 on Tue. LAURA DUGAN. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . First. foreign and domestic newspapers. Universityof Maryland Departmentof Criminology During 2003-2004 a research group led by Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan at the University of Maryland coded and computerized a database originally collected by the Pinkerton Corporation's Global Intelligence Services (PGIS) comprising more than 69. only five countries have suffered MCT attacks (Iraq. this plurality nonetheless raises interesting questions about the rationales for justifying mass terror that groups may be finding in Islam and the Islamic world's interaction with the non-Islamic world. which is consistent with the argument that terrorism is the weapon of the weak against the strong. (3) The data show that a clear plurality of MCT events has been perpetrated by terrorists from the Islamic world targeting the non-Islamic world. This finding indicates that group-level factors can only partially explain when groups will use MCT. It is crucial. and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Exploration of the Pinkerton Database GARY LAFREE. there are serious conflicts with a high number of civilian casualties. PGIS trained researchers to record all terrorism incidents they could identify from wire services.168. It also casts doubt on the argument that certain terrorist groups are concerned with the symbolic importance of the weapons they use. information provided by PGIS offices around the world. see Stohl's contribution earlier in this Forum. the analysis of MCT illustrates the destructive potential of conventional means of attack. only three groups have initiated more than one MCT attack.82. is a superpower. Nonstate Actors. Given the fact that even these groups use the strategy very rarely.THE FORUM 155 acquiring their weapons systems.
The PGIS database is more than seven times larger than any other existing open source terrorism incident database. This contribution to the Forum briefly summarizes a preliminary examination of the data from the perspective of issues pertinent to nonstate actors. eight were unsuccessful. First. indicating thwarted attempts where the actors.82. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. it follows logically that groups that have used these weapons in the past both (a) have the ability to acquire them and (b) will be more likely to use them in the future. chemical attacks typically included the use of mercury. and chemical weapons but also sophisticated explosives and long-range missiles that are intended to kill a large number of people and to create mass disruption. napalm. because conference participants agreed to abandon our seemingly irreconcilable definitional argument concerning WMD and focus instead on a broader concept of mass impact terrorism (MIT).6 Most involved long-range missiles capable of carrying warheads. and most important. Third. often intended to disrupt the targeted nation's economy. Weapons of Mass Destruction (PGIS Database 1970-1997) FIG. we believe that our inclusive definition of WMD more accurately reflects this notion of mass impact terrorism. unlike most other databases on terrorism.) n=l (2%) 1. However. There are three main reasons for this.5%. Terrorism. unlike any other open source database. we use the PGIS data to explore several issues related to past terrorist events and the ability and willingness of nonstate actors to use WMD. weapons. and social acts of terrorism as well as political acts. only forty-one of the 69. the data collectors were under no pressure to exclude some terrorist acts because of political considerations. Means of Acquiring and Using WMD We employ two methods for discovering which terrorist groups are more likely to obtain and use WMD.and Weaponsof Mass Destruction El Long Range Missile El Chemical n Sophisticated Nuclear 27 (66%) Explosive n. incidents involving these weapons remain a rare occurrence. economic.=2(. or plot were discovered before the event could take place. In fact. In this exercise. First.206 on Tue. Second. acid. because the Pinkerton data were collected by a private business rather than a government entity. and WMD. cyanide (found in water supplies). Whether these weapons truly represent WMD is a point of contention. Second. the PGIS data include both instances of domestic and international terrorism. the PGIS data include religious. Weapons of Mass Destruction In light of evolving definitions of WMD.156 Nonstate Actors. and chemical bombs.000 cases in our database used such weapons. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . we examine not only nuclear. Figure 1 shows that despite our inclusive definition. biological.168. Fatalities are not necessary for an event to be labeled successful. terrorism. we believe that groups that have attacked "Among the forty-one incidents involving WMD.
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance. more than tripling the mass killing incidence of any other WMD group. which committed the most total incidents (3. examining the interplay between nonstate actors.206 on Tue. although making no statistically formulated arguments. Hizballah. Among the groups that have used WMD. 7For example. (3) willingness to kill large numbers of people. Further analyses will control for number of incidents as well as outliers. In Sum The purpose of this analysis was to provide an exploratory look at a recently computerized database. Nonetheless. the Irish Republican Army (IRA). we also identify the groups that (a) have killed a large number of people in previous attacks8 and (b) tend to achieve maximum lethality per incident. eleven. the most lethal appear to be the Tamil Tigers and UNITA. averaged just over three deaths per incident. it is fiftyfour. Along the way. The database identified seventeen groups that have used WMD in the past. eighty-two groups that have not used WMD have committed attacks killing at least fifty-four people. the qualification is fifty deaths.82. Among non-WMD groups.THE FORUM 157 targets in countries away from their base of operations are also more likely to use WMD. the Peruvian group. 9In fact. and the Hutus (whose average of 42. having done so on twenty-seven and twenty-six occasions. there appears to be wide variation in the mean number killed among both WMD groups (from 0 to 8) and non-WMD groups (from 0 to 43). the data discussed here nonetheless serve as a point of departure for a better understanding of a host of issues of concern in both the academic and policy fields. respectively.7 For this reason. Sendero Luminoso.8 mostly reflects an outlying incident that killed over 1. including the Nicaraguan Democratic Force. In short. (2) a history of willingness to launch attacks outside of the country of origin. On the first front. Further. According to the database. and (4) attempts to achieve maximum lethality. Desire to Use WMD Not all terrorist groups with the capability to inflict mass destruction have the desire to do so. the non-WMD groups display higher frequencies and incidences of mass killing attacks. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . four averaged over thirteen fatalities per attack. only nine of the seventeen groups that have used WMD have also killed at least fifty people in one or more of their attacks. we have identified certain groups that fit these criteria and thus may be candidates for mass impact terrorism in the future. among these. Mozambican National Resistance.000). Sendero Luminoso. In this brief overview. we have concentrated on the following risk factors: (1) previous use of WMD.374) and inflicted the largest number of fatalities (over 11. We also examined the database for groups that tended to kill a high average number of people per incident. For groups that have used WMD. Dev Sol. Also. thirty-nine terrorist attacks (16 percent) in this category were committed by groups not identified in our database.9 The Nicaraguan Democratic Force and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil top this list. averaging approximately eight deaths per incident. for all other groups. including three Palestinian groups. only seven have done so five or more times. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. 77 percent of non-WMD groups have committed mass fatality attacks only once. has exceeded this threshold twenty-one times.168. and WMD. and Sendero Luminoso. have struck in at least six countries other than their own. terrorism. Compared to the groups that have used WMD.000) from 1970-1997. 8We use the 99th percentile of all incidents involving at least one death as the criterion for having killed "many people" in the past. the IRA often warns their intended target before each attack to allow time for civilians to evacuate the area. however.
justify. terrorists and criminals are driven by different motivations: political. of the nine groups that have both used WMD and killed at least fifty persons in an incident. Presently it profits from drug trafficking. Maxwell School. operate on the basis of political. for instance. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . more interestingly. Its members have always acted criminally in order to support themselves financially. and military authorities have been unable. Based on this difference. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. only once. Syracuse University Traditional approaches treat terrorism separately from organized crime for at least two reasons. This tri-border area is not an exception. and at times corruptly unwilling. Asia. and WMD BARTOSZH. Hizballah. 23 percent (n = 19) of these groups committed an incident of mass killing only once. Transnational Organized Crime. many find it fairly easy to distinguish between these two phenomena. and Paraguay come together. of Mass Destruction Avenue for Future Research An interesting observation deserving of further examination regards groups that inflict mass casualties only a few times or. the focus on this criminal enclave or "blackspot" (Stanislawski2004) is still not strong enough to curtail the area's attractivenessto "globalbads. and opinions are divided both theoretically and in the policymaking world. Not all so-called terrorists. Similarly.Terrorism. Not anymore. weapons. or ethnic goals. has for a long time maintained a significant presence within the Arab community in the tri-border area in South America. North America. and ethnic "causes" versus money. law-enforcement. of the eighty-two non-WMD groups that have killed at least fifty-four. These fund-raising operations are often based on voluntary contributions for the "cause. maintain a "legitimate" public image. First. Second. ideological. for example. while still pretending to be rebels to recruit new members. ransom-motivated hostage-taking was and still is a significant part of the FARC funding. many would argue. In this place. and South America. anyway. to control the traffic in illicit products crossing the three borders. fewer than half (n = 40) have done so more than ten times. and al-Qaeda all operate sophisticated fund-raising networks in the Middle East.206 on Tue. For example.168. respectively." Criminals trade there with terroristswho are able to receive whatever they might need: materials. and other criminal activities. Hizballah. the organization benefits monetarily from this enterprise and is unlikely to give such activity up easily. some of their own acts to themselves. ideological. used to be a politically motivated guerrilla organization. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)." but they also frequently involve extortion. Europe. however. Hamas. where the borders of Argentina. judicial. With the ability to inflict this level of impact.158 Nonstate and Weapons Actors. The political rebels have become pirates. and information. considering terrorism as a form of crime is controversial. it becomes important to discover the reasons why some groups suddenly desist. there are many such criminal enclaves (Sullivan and Bunker 2003) or "black spots" across the globe. Although the situation in this region has been shifting over the years as a result of outside pressures. Terroristorganizationsoften maintain groups composed of organized criminals that help the "political"wings function. only four have inflicted mass casualties more than once. STANISLAWSKI Moynihan Institute of GlobalAffairs. blackmail. religious. Brazil. But they seem to have crossed a line. mainly from the United States. religious. Terrorism. In fact. hiding illicit activities.82.
168. In such relationships. Other reports signaling criminal penetration of the Russian armed forces include the attempted theft of 4. for example. if not most. they provide relatively protected places where such devices can be developed and where people with the skills needed already reside. increasing both the terror effect and the "theater" surrounding an incident. and General Alexander Lebed's letter to the US Congress in 1997 warning about missing Russian suitcase-size nuclear bombs. transnational criminal and terrorist entities are rarely limited by such jurisdictional boundaries and use them to avoid the legal reach of a particular country. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . The submarine was intended as a means of transporting up to ten metric tons of illicit drugs at a time (US House of Representatives 2000). near the border with Afghanistan. Consider the US government forcing Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda out of Sudan only to see them relocate to Afghanistan. Indeed. control over these areas for historical. What seems more likely. "squeezing the balloon" in hopes of eliminating these organizations in one place often makes them pop up in another. slowing down the states' development and endangering their democratic progress. Southern China. There is evidence that engaging in psychological disruption. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas located near this city are another case of a state within a state. Nigeria. particularly those like al-Qaeda that are intent on achieving high levels of destruction and martyrdom. less-developed and transitional societies. The current relationship between Russia's transnational criminal enterprises and its underpaid military personnel is particularly problematic. in turn. information operations. Networks provide flexibility. to consider seeking such weapons." putting components that are more accessible and less expensive in combination with an improvised explosive device and. and Italy" (Shelley 1999:13). adaptability. Here is where the criminal enclaves or black spots mentioned earlier become particularly useful. is the creation of a "dirty bomb. Russia is a logical source of weapons and weapons materials for terrorists. biological. It is believed that Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants have found refuge in this area. Japan. cultural. and perception management have grown in importance (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996. a city in northern Pakistan. This nexus between criminals and power brokers "exists in many Soviet successor states. These conditions make it possible for transnational terrorist and rebel groups in South Asia. this incident demonstrates the possibility for a terrorist organization to acquire such a weapons platform to use in an attack. Although governments still typically perceive that the world is organized around international borders. often through surrogates. However. Colombia. and geographical reasons. and the capacity to do things at a distance. major threats are posed by the links that criminals have developed with politicians. It is important to recall that as both transnational criminal and terrorist organizations have evolved into networks. Consider.206 on Tue. Russia. the discovery of a partially constructed Russian submarine by the Colombian police in 2000 in a warehouse in Bogotai (BBC News 2000). 1997). it is possible for corrupt high-ranking military officers to provide weapons or the elements to produce chemical. Such links exist in many. and corruption levels are high. deniability. if any. radiological.82. and the military. Although no links with terrorist organizations have been proven. a cost-benefit analysis might lead terrorist organizations to decide that there is greater payoff in talking about having this capability or acting as if one did rather than going about actually acquiring it. The Pakistani government exercises minimal.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from the naval shipyard in Murmansk.THE FORUM 159 Among them is the area around Peshawar. Its border control remains unsatisfactory. resell them to terrorist groups. police. multidimensionality. or even very likely. thus. or nuclear weapons to transnational criminal organizations that. In addition to the links between terrorist and criminal organizations. This phenomenon raises a key question: Does it take a network to "fight" a network? Because governments tend to be organized This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. Mexico. they have become more subtle in their use of violence.
as John Kerry proposed. the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Islamic Group (IG). the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). twenty-five ethnonational groups that are involved in conflict or rebellion in either their homelands or countries of residence and that. they strive to gain political and economic rights and autonomy in their hostlands in order to actively cope with the repressive measures taken against them by hostile organizations. in many instances. terrorism. Terrorism. tactics and strategies will differ. the Indian Barbar Khalsa International (BKI). Diasporas.ethnonational diasporas are deeply involved in trans-state conflicts. state. and global levels provides opportunities for the use of violent strategies and tactics by such individuals and groups. Indonesia (Aceh). The dilemma is exemplified in the differences regarding the war on terrorism between the 2004 US presidential candidates.168. Those states that harbor terrorist groups and organizations within their borders need to be forced to exercise control over them. In fact.206 on Tue. money. Ireland. Greece. it is primarily a military problem and a problem between states. Hebrew University As part of their growing involvement in transstate and intrastate politics. in general. and to achieve independence or autonomy in their homelands. paradoxically elevating what was essentially a criminal enterprise . insurgents in Egypt.Thus.Algeria. Thus.. is the war on terrorism.Terrorism. India (in the Punjab and Kashmir). With regard to the development of policy to deal with nonstate actors. twenty-seven constitute either segments of ethnonational or religious diasporas or are supported by such diasporas. Or. and al-Qaeda. and in the inseparablyconnected spheres of cultural. Israel. as George Bush believes. economic. Turkish Kurdistan. in addition to nonviolent tactics. cooperation among agencies is made more difficult and sharing of information becomes harder. Russia. societies. Palestine. and social conflicts. there is also an issue concerning how the problem is framed.160 NonstateActors. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Iran. out of the fifty most active terrorist organizations and groups. "New politics" on the local. and people.Iraqi Kurdistan. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. and Ireland have received various kinds of support from their respective migrant and diasporic communities. and WMD.. Lebanon. not really a war at all. Pakistan. and Fatah-Tanzim. regional. into the ideological successor to Hitler and Stalin" (Bai 2004:52)? Depending on the frame one chooses. IslamicJihad. the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Kosovo. the Lebanese Hizballah. Among the organizations using terrorism that have links to diasporic entities are the Palestinian Hamas. and governments. given that the enemy is not another state and.Sri Lanka. Have we "overrated the military threat posed by al-Qaeda. Is the war on terrorism. and WMD GABRIEL SHEFFER Departmentof Political Science. use violence and terrorism are linked to ethnonational and religious diasporas. in particular. and Weapons of Mass Destruction hierarchically and into bureaucracies with different functions and foci. the Irish IRA. is intent on disrupting the functioning of states? In this view. weapons. Azerbaijan. a war "between those states that would promote terrorism and those that would exterminate it" (Bai 2004:45)? According to this perspective. Furthermore. and terrorism.82. the emphasis is placed more on law enforcement than on the military and on international cooperation in attempts to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs. the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA). insurgencies. for example. the Philippines. The motivations and incentives for insurgent and terrorist actions by diasporic individuals and entities are connected to their desire to overcome the inherent disadvantages involved in being "others" in their host countries as well as difficulties in their homelands.
organizations. and global attitudinal contagion. Notable examples of such impact are the policies of the United States and Russia vis-A-vis groups of "others" that they regard as actual or potential menaces. their goal is to influence the positions of both their opponents and supporters. third. However.168. especially those from countries viewed as breeding grounds for terrorists. Like other groups. generally.and fourth-party states. social. and patterns of political.stateless diasporic entities that support irredentist. trace. and economic behavior are quite complex and unclear as it is. Thus. and money to their fighting brethren. in an attempt to assess the use of violence and terrorism by "others. on the other hand. 2001. in particular." it seems that. national origin.206 on Tue. and monitor the planned clandestine activities of these groups whose structures. emergency legislation initiated by the United States. diasporans and diasporic entities do not use violent tactics to physically defeat their opponents in the conflicts that they are engaged in. Yet. in most cases. or support. a distinction must be made between innocent tourists. These networks make launching attacks in both their host countries and other states an easier task. these fighters were engaged in terrorist activitiesand in other kinds of insurgencies against homelands and host countries. not its perpetrators" (UNHCR. positions. refugees.by "tourists"of the same ethnonational entities or by various types of nonresident migrants. in general. Third Committee. terrorist networks. new politics means the weakening of nation-states. November 19). in particular. some terrorist activities are carried out not by permanent diasporans but. and in regional and international systems. rather. which. intelligence. The substantial volume of such actual and potential activities has a significant impact on policymaking in their homelands and hostlands. Their ability to determine their tactics and to obtain support on their own further complicates the capability of outsiders to predict. especially in the United States. asylum seekers. the UN 56th General Assembly. and to their plight. and host countries are induced to act against homelands and other relevant states that have been involved in motivating their diasporas to act or in hosting and supporting such groups. refugees and asylum seekers are more likely to be escaping terrorism than perpetrating it. They use violence mainly to draw attention to these conflicts.) However. they know they simply cannot achieve such a goal. Still. and national liberation movements are agreeable to the use of terrorism. In various instances. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has declared in one of his reports-"refugees are victims of terror and terrorism. and other democracies may lead to the exclusion of such people from the asylum-seeking and refugee process on the generally slim grounds of having certain religious. On certain occasions. or political affiliations. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.THE FORUM 161 (In this context. enhances the assertiveness of individual diasporans and diasporic entities. and demands. secessionist. Hence. Furthermore. They use their highly developed transstate networks to transfer or extend a variety of resources including fighters. are the least inclined to use such tactics. homelands. it is also a fact that in certain cases in the first influx of refugees have come a mix of harmless refugees with both armed and unarmed troopers. this does not mean that all diasporans are active or potential combatants or that new politics is a fundamentally dangerous phenomenon. Both stateless and state-linked diasporas engage in a myriad of tacticalpursuits that may affect the security of all those they regard as opponents and of all those whom they perceive to be supporters. these groups autonomously and secretly make their own decisions and act accordingly in their host countries. In fact. At most. homelands are implicated. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . the legitimization of pluralism. In contradiction to a widespread view. weapons. refugees and asylum seekers. and members of universal religions. on the one hand. increasing demands for political and social rights. in turn. This pattern has caused the toughening of criteria for granting visas as well as other security measures on the borders of many countries.82. and ethnonational diasporans who belong to. liberalization. ethnic. they are subject to real risk from over-caution on the part of host governments. the European Union. Significantly.
and their homelands.206 on Tue. these groups are tempted to continue using violent tactics and terrorism." Established or incipient stateless diasporas and. essentially. Information. However. and the growing surveillance of extremist core members carried out by many hostlands. illegal migrants and tourists who are members of such stateless diasporas or of religious fundamentalist organizations constitute the main groups that are more inclined to use violence as a means to promote their ideas and interests. such stateless diasporas might be tempted to use WMD if and when they realize that the hopes they have that their brethren in the homeland will be able to establish a sovereign state are not going to be fulfilled. As for the general question whether these are. one cannot generalize that entire diasporic groups or entities partake in these activities or support them. Trust. only a small number of individuals and small groups of core members support such activities. Universityof Maryland Departmentof Government When does a country's history of conflict encourage terrorism. and Power: The Impact of Conflict Histories. it seems that even though such diasporas may continue to use terror as a tactic to achieve their goals.82. such groups will not use WMD. first and foremost. it is difficult to regard most of the existing diasporas as tightly knit homogenous entities that collectively pursue a single strategy. in most cases the use of terror as a tactic is confined to relatively short periods of crisis in their homelands or host countries. it should be remembered that many of these groups are. Turkish. or groups that support or participate in transstate terrorism. their host countries.Terrorism. the lack of knowledgeable and experienced persons who can produce and use these weapons. these are. Consequently. such as WMD. everybody should be careful not to stigmatize entire groups. in most cases. Policy Regimes. or Kurdish diasporas. engaged in activities whose purpose is to enhance the cultural. Third. the tactics change. and when is its legacy a deterrent? When does a government's policy of appeasing terrorism This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. essentially. entire communities and groups into warrior communities. tactics intended to achieve social and political goals. terrorism and violence do not constitute a permanent strategy. Second. a few additional factors should be mentioned here. and economic well-being of their own communities. noncombative entities. refugees and asylum seekers find themselves detained or deported or their refugee status revoked for no reason than their "otherness. Though it is perhaps unwise to make any clear-cut predictions. on some occasions. in most cases. Fourth. Hence. the difficulties in obtaining the materials to produce such weapons. and Political Institutions on Terrorism MARK IRVING LICHBACH and Politics. and when these are achieved. civic.168. In fact. especially terrorism. in particular. such as the Irish. It is very difficult to envision any other plausible scenario. Finally. interconnectedly.162 NonstateActors. The main reasons for their reluctance in obtaining and using WMD are their tenuous positions in their hostlands. As long as the basic situation involving their ethnonational entities is not resolved. such policies are adopted without a close examination of the evidence related to particular individuals and groups. thereby creating a permanently hostile environment that can make the lives of diasporans and diasporas even harder than they usually are and push these people to use even more dangerous tactics and means. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . the use of terror and violence does not transform certain or. Therefore. freedom fighters. and Weapons of Mass Destruction Unfortunately. First.
induce credible commitments. and when is a policy of repression effective? What sorts of political institutions turn terrorism into legitimate dissent? These questions have troubled the contentious politics literature from Gurr (1970) to Lichbach (1995) to McAdam. Two rational choice models-the bargaining theory of war and the rebel's dilemma theory of dissent-offer startlingly divergent understandings of the mechanisms involved. policy regimes. can ask." Whether a state's opponents pursue violent means like terrorism depends on whether histories. The two theories reveal a great deal about the conflict history-terrorism. and political institutions-terrorism relationships. Contentious politics sometimes breeds terrorism. nearly three decades of scholarly and policy reflection have not located the underlying mechanisms behind the crucial conflict history-terrorism. or accelerate power shifts? Similarly. Appeasement.and overestimated power resources-that are nists' trusting one another. narrowterms. Unobservable private information promotes conflict. principal-agent 1"Since problems. and Tilly (2001). sometimes works.thatis. The rebel's dilemma theory of dissent proposes that appeasement and repression influence terrorism by 1'Formalizations of these models are available elsewhere (Fearon 1995.168. Participants must be able to make credible commit- responsiblefor war. Tarrow. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and institutions that increase transparency and minimize secrets allow actors to coordinate expectations.and Armstrong2004). elitesin chargeof regimesand oppositionsare subjectto opportunism. and sometimes forestalls it. policies. and political institutions thus figure prominently in narrative accounts and statistical analyses of terrorism. and sometimes fails. policy regime-terrorism. and others configuratively immune. the bargaining theory of war suggests that policies of appeasement and repression affect the chances of terrorism by changing information and altering the parties' abilities to forge credible commitments. also see Lichbach. thereby reducing the false expectations--the under. and revealable public information promotes cooperation. The issues are fundamental. Some states seem constitutionally vulnerable to terrorism. as does repression.82.THE FORUM 163 decrease terrorism.206 on Tue. Does a history of conflict increase information. policies. policy regime-terrorism. Davenport. then today'sinformationand crediblecommitmentsmean little. It is the Why not increase my power?is the second questionprotagonists foundation of a realistic form of rational choice theory-the rebel's dilemma theory of dissent--centered around the unending conflict between regimes and dissidents. If regimes and dissidentsbelieve that they can increasetheir power in the future. Lichbach 1996. The bargaining theory of war suggests that conflict histories affect the future of terrorism by changing information and altering the parties' abilities to forge credible commitments. The rebel's dilemma theory of dissent indicates that conflict histories influence terrorism by changing the relative power of conflict protagonists. and political institutions-terrorism relationships. and institutions encourage the mobilization of new resources that can shift the relative power of the protagonists. Whether bargainscan be struck also depends on protago- ments to enforceablebargainsthat bring peace. consider the two questions pondered by protagonists in an enduring conflict vulnerable to terrorism: Why can't we all get along? is the foundational question of an idealistic form of rationalchoice theory-the bargainingtheoryof war-that explores cooperation among protagonists. Histories.Whether peaceful bargainscan be struck depends on the ability of participants to extract relevant information. Even though conflict histories. The fundamental differences over when conflict histories turn into terrorism are therefore about whether such histories facilitate bargaining or inspire power plays.10 To appreciate the differences and their significance. they are prone to ask this questionin particularly This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.
and shifting positions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. or increase or decrease relative power (that is. Repression and appeasement succeed when states guess right about how public information. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. repression involves war and policing. The second is appeasement: make policy changes to accommodate underlying grievances. credible commitments.82. Their policies fail when unintended consequences overwhelm intended ones. We begin with the bargaining theory of war and briefly discuss how the issues of information and trust help explain the etiology as well as the successes and failures of repression and appeasement. For example. whereas the rebel's dilemma theory of dissent proposes that autocratic and uninstitutionalized states create the political instability that leads actors to attempt to shift power in their favor. credible commitments). thus. When you have nothing. Hypothesis 3: States repress to make credible commitments. demands. Do appeasement and repression increase or decrease information (that is. Regimes can adopt two basic strategies toward terrorism. for example.and Weapons of Mass Destruction stimulating change in the power differentials among the protagonists. public bargaining). States also use appeasement to spread information about their strengths and terrorists' weaknesses. Hypothesis 1: States repress to increase information. The rebel's dilemma theory implies that government policies aim to shift power. Turning to the rebel's dilemma theory of dissent. we then briefly explore how power shifts explain choices and outcomes. and negotiation. increase or decrease trust (that is. we present here six hypotheses. Bargaining theory indicates that states use repression and appeasement to increase information and make credible commitments. or claims. if a regime makes an irrevocable commitment to repress terrorism. convict. and power shifts affect terrorism. kill) terrorists. tell us a lot about how a war on terrorism will be fought. Hypothesis 2: States appease to increase information. with violent and nonviolent means. A repressive policy regime can increase such information. the terrorists and their supporters.168. the costs of engaging in terrorism become manifest. the bargaining theory of war suggests that democratic and stable states provide the information and induce the trust that turns terrorism into legitimate dissent. threats that are convincing also reveal costs.164 Nonstate Actors. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . The bargaining theory of war and the rebel's dilemma theory of mobilization offer different perspectives on the etiology of government response strategies toward terrorism. therefore. States aim to spread information about their strengths and terrorists' weaknesses. terrorists and their supporters will permanently shift tactics to more legal and conventional forms of participation. With respect to al-Qaeda. and how it should be waged. whereas appeasement involves quitting Iraq. if a state demonstrates that the root causes of terrorism are being addressed. you have nothing to lose. removing troops from Saudi Arabia. The first is repression: attack.206 on Tue. terrorists will stop being terrorists. about whether a policy facilitates bargaining games or power games. When a state increases its efforts to detect. To give a flavor of the argument. Our arguments about state responses to terrorism are particularly important and bear brief elaboration here. The two theories. States also repress terrorism by making credible commitments that solidify their position. The fundamental differences over whether or not appeasement or repression works are. and punish (imprison. capture. injure. Terrorism. producing state violence and oppositional terrorism. resources) and thus increase or decrease terrorism? Finally. An accommodative policy regime can also increase such information. influence.
Nearly 3. the financial losses and repercussions of 9/11 were far greater than any previous terrorist incident or insured natural disaster (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2004). we find a very different perspective on the etiology and consequences of regime response policies toward terrorism: states repress to shift power in their favor. 9/11) represented a watershed transnational terrorist event for many reasons. Third. Hypothesis 5: States repress to shift power.000 people died on 9/11. Hypothesis 6: States appease to shift power. states will find a repressive policy regime quite attractive. For example. These hypotheses develop further the two competing theories of government responses to terrorism. and negotiation. The distinction between the theories is significant. the latter question appears to be just as important as the former. if a regime makes an irrevocable commitment to appease terrorists. When they believe that repression influences key actors and thereby increases the likelihood of power shifts. For example. First. Second. they will shift resources from attacking the state to protecting themselves. States hoping to employ credible commitments to end terrorism may be more likely to appease than to repress. Finally. In the popular press and policy debates. influence. Collegeof Commerce Universityof Alabama The four hijackings on 11 September 2001 (hereafter. the rebel's dilemma theory of dissent indicates that states also appease to shift power.82. Universityof SouthernCalifornia AND WALTER ENDERS Culberhouse and BusinessAdministration. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . By elaborating their implications.206 on Tue. For 9/11. An accommodative policy regime increases the likelihood of such power shifts in several ways. because repression puts terrorists on the defensive.168. Even if we assume that regimes and oppositions are rational rather than cultural beings. September 11 and Its Aftermath TODD SANDLER School of InternationalRelations. the idealistic question-"why can't we all get along?"-and the realistic question-"why not increase my power?"--are usually the two starting points for discussion. appeasement is a divide-and-conquer strategy that promotes splits among the terrorists and their supporters. Each has implications for the choice of strategy that a government selects and the success or failure of the resulting policies.THE FORUM 165 Hypothesis 4: States appease to make credible commitments. the hijackings on 9/11 made the global community more aware of the potential threat posed by modern-day transnational This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. we help structure the debate. encouraging reformists to defect from the radicals. For instance. the terrorists and their supporters will permanently shift tactics to more legal and conventional forms of participation. are they idealistic or realistic? Although neglected nowadays in the conflict literature. the consequences of the event in terms of casualties far surpassed any previous terrorist attack. whereas fewer than 500 died in the deadliest terrorist event prior to it. these direct and indirect costs are estimated to have been between $80 and $90 billion. Turning to the rebel's dilemma theory of dissent.
and other variables. The US budget for DHS is growing at 10 percent per year and does not include spending on intelligence or proactive operations (for example. because this latter event marked the end of the support of terrorism by many state-sponsors. or reducing terrorist financial resources." with its subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. bombings. their quarterly time series from 1970 to 2003 included all transnational terrorist incidents. Fourth. however. one or more deaths or injuries). is clear testimony that things are now different. the crash of a fuel-laden commercial aircraft. proactive responses are offensive and may involve destroying terrorist training camps. type of event. skyjackings. incidents with deaths. assassinations. incidents with casualties (that is. including hardening targets. 9/ 11 set the bar for future terrorist attacks as terrorists escalate carnage to capture and maintain media and public attention. which should have compromised the network's ability to direct logistically complex terrorist incidents. Sixth. infiltrating a terrorist group. punishing terrorist sponsors. To outdo the newsworthiness and shock value of 9/11. many left-wing European groups stopped operations around that time. These policies try to deter an attack by either making success less likely or increasing the anticipated costs to would-be terrorists. compiled by Edward Mickolus and colleagues (2004). 9/11 demonstrated to the global community that catastrophic damage could stem from conventional means-that is. Enders and Sandler (2005) extracted eight primary time series to test for structural changes before and after 9/11. In contrast. Enders and Sandler forthcoming). which consists of terrorist attacks that impact two or more countries. securing borders.82. of which 61 percent goes to homeland security (DHS 2004. 2005). host country. 9/11 changed public perceptions and governmental responses to terrorism. The bomb attacks on the commuter trains in Madrid further underscored that horrific consequences can follow from conventional bombs planted where casualty counts will be high. US spending on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is $40 billion for fiscal year 2005.168. In addition. for which high casualty counts are an objective. bombings with This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. Enders and Sandler 2000) as well as the impact of the end of the Cold War at the start of the 1990s. we used data on transnational terrorist incidents drawn from the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) database. such as hostage-taking missions. Defensive counterterrorism measures involve actions to protect potential targets. ITERATE records the incident date. and increasing surveillance. the war in Afghanistan). 9/11 locked rich countries into a large and growing outlay on defensive measures that could increase further.166 Nonstate Actors. Unquestionably. A more difficult question to answer is whether the pattern of transnational terrorism. The war on terror killed or captured a significant portion of the al-Qaeda leadership. most likely chemical or radiological in nature. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . hostage missions (such as kidnappings.206 on Tue. In particular. the terrorist group. Methodology To explore these effects. Many of the contributions to this Forum. In what follows. we report on two projects in which we examined the pattern of transnational terrorism before and after 9/11 (Enders and Sandler 2004. have doubted that terrorists will resort to WMDs owing to a lack of capability or constituent-support concerns. has changed in light of 9/11 and target nations' actions to reduce the threat of terrorism. We were also interested in isolating the influence of the rise of fundamentalist terrorism at the end of 1979 (Hoffman 1998. Terrorism. Such responses are either defensive or proactive in nature (Arce and Sandler 2005). deaths or injuries). Fifth. and barricade and hostage-taking events). actions by the world community to freeze al-Qaeda financial assets were intended to reduce the terrorist network's ability to mount their campaign of terror. Indeed. the US-led "war on terror.and Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorism. casualties (that is. terrorists must resort to an even larger conventional attack or weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). erecting technological barriers.
As before. there was little further substitution that was possible for the overall time series. US person or property). Enders and Sandler (2004) found no convincing evidence that there had been a substitution of overall terrorist events from rich to poor countries in response to 9/11-motivated increases in homeland security upgrades in high-income countries. This break occurred during the post-Cold War era in 1994 as transnational terrorist events fell precipitously in number with the demise of many leftist terrorists and reduced state-sponsorship. Such transfers of attacks may mean that US citizens are safer at home because of enhanced security but more vulnerable abroad. Enders and Sandler (2004) extracted four quarterly time series (for 1968-2003): all transnational terrorist incidents. Thus. In effect. Enders and Sandler (2005) uncovered findings consistent with those that prejudged 9/11 as a structural break. We. they specifically chose 9/11 as a structural break or intervention point and applied an autoregression estimation to determine whether the time series displayed significant changes in their pattern following 9/11. Enders and Sandler (2005) approached the problem in two alternative ways. Second. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . this research tried to ascertain whether post-9/11 defensive measures by rich countries altered the pattern of transnational terrorism. things were different in the pattern of transnational terrorist attacks after 9/11. the substitution had occurred well before 9/11 and. the stressed al-Qaeda network and other terrorist groups responded to the greater risk that they faced by the war on terror by eschewing difficult and costly attacks for simple bombings with high body counts. Each of these studies employed time series methods to ascertain what. if anything. little has changed in the time series of overall terrorist incidents and most of its component series when 9/11 is prejudged as a break date. incidents with a US target (that is. they employed the Bai-Perron (1998. whereas simple. By 9/11.206 on Tue. but deadly. however. First.168. and casualty incidents with a US target. uncovered This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. however. Enders and Sandler (2004) also relied on autoregression intervention analysis to identify crucial structural breaks at and before 9/11. 2003) method in which the data identify the significant structural breaks. at the time when the proportion of deadly bombings increased. In another study of post-9/11 terrorism. changed in light of 9/11. found that logistically complex hostage-taking events fell as a proportion of all events. and the proportion of deadly incidents) in the mid-1970s as transnational terrorism started to heat up. bombings increased as a proportion of fatal incidents after 9/11. Have these measures shifted terrorist attacks from rich to poor countries as terrorists sought softer targets? This study also investigated if there have been geographical shifts in transnational terrorist attacks. We. casualty incidents. Other time series were constructed by taking proportions-for example. the overall time series for transnational terrorism displayed a lone structural break-but not at 9/11. proportion of assassinations. if any.THE FORUM 167 deaths. in particular. Much more noteworthy changes to this pattern occurred in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s. then the Bai-Perron method will locate 9/11 as a structural break for some of the extracted time series. began with the rise of fundamentalist terrorism in late 1979. Thus. When the Bai-Perron method was applied. and bombings with casualties. Structural breaks took place for a number of time series (that is. proportion of deadly incidents due to bombings.82. the study demonstrated that the pattern of transnational terrorism did not change greatly after 9/11. hostage missions as a proportion of all incidents. incidents with deaths. therefore. If. This unexpected finding is due to the very high level of transnational terrorism in poor countries and the low level of such attacks in rich countries at the time of 9/11. the proportion of hostage-taking incidents dropped around 9/11. Results Perhaps surprising. Unlike their other study. In particular.
our two studies showed that the overall patterns for most key time series are no different than those prior to 9/ 11. CENTER FORCOUNTERPROLIFERATION RESEARCH. and Eurasia). This research established that the geographical transfer has been to those regions with the largest Islamic populations. from high-income to low-income countries) for the subset of attacks that included deadly incidents involving US targets. There have been two notable changes in patterns: (1) deadly bombings are more prevalent. VICTOR. Information Age. BARKUN.168 Nonstate Actors. In particular.Availableat (AccessedOctober 1. AND PIERRE PERRON.Journalof Applied Econometrics 18:1-22.edu/centercounter/CBRN_Annotated_Bib. BBC NEWS. 2004). AND GARY ACKERMAN. L.healthsystem. M. Available at http://www.MATT. (2002) Chemical. (2004) Kerry'sUndeclaredWar.edu/internet/ciag/reports/reportterr-millen. RAND:MR-678-OSD. ASAL. GARY. BOWER.October 15. (2004) Recommendations on the Development of Methodologies JEFFERY. http://www. fundamentalist terrorists can blend in and establish excellent logistical support. BAI.pdf. (2000) Drug-Carrying-Submarine September7.206 on Tue.Unpublished Terrorism: ACKERMAN. References A DubiousDefinition. RAND:MR-880-OSD/RC. Europe. Journal of Resolution 49:183-200. Manuscript. Concluding Remarks Although 9/11 has changed public perceptions of the consequences of transnational terrorism. it has not had a strong influence on the patternof transnational terrorism.Econometrica 66:47-78. Radiological. (2004) Holy Terror and Mass Killings?Reexaminingthe Motivations and Means of Mass CasualtyTerror. JOHN.and WMD. In such regions. whereas hostage missions are less prevalent. virginia. In fact. Models. there has been a shift in transnational terrorist events away from the Western Hemisphere and Africa to the Middle East and Asia since 9/11. (2001) Millenialism and Terrorism.Report prepared for Los Alamos NationalLaboratory. Terrorism. BALE. (2004) Weaponsof MassDestruction Center for Nonproliferation Studies.168. of Netwar. Found in Colombia. ANDCLAYTON (1995) DisruptiveTechnologies:Catchingthe JOSEPH Wave. AND TODD SANDLER. Transnational terrorism is more deadly per incident with the rise of religious-based terrorism (Enders and Sandler 2000). tural Changes.Universityof Maryland. ARCE. Moreover. Times October 10.and Nuclear Terrorism:The Threat Accordingto the Current UnclassifiedLiterature. there was clear evidence of transfers based on geography following 9/11. DANIEL. Harvard Business Review 73(1):43.Terrorism. and (2) there is a geographical transfer of attacks to the Middle East and Asia. Biological. BAI. and Attributesfor AssessingTerroristThreats of WMD Terrorism. the Middle East. (AccessedOctober 1. (1996) TheAdvent JOHN.ndu. when countries are classified into six regional groups (Western Hemisphere. This shift is especially pronounced for terrorist incidents with a US target. 4 Dec 2012 11:01:14 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . MICHAEL.82.New York Magazine. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192. AND PIERRE PERRON. Big structural changes to transnational terrorism came well before 9/11 with the rise of fundamentalist terrorism and the end of the Cold War.CIDCM. Africa. meaning that US citizens may be less safe abroad. (2003) Computationand Analysisof MultipleStructuralChange JUSHAN.BBC World Service. DAVID ARQUILLA. Asia. EDS. MonterreyInstituteof InternationalStudies. 2004).. (1998) Estimating JUSHAN. Paper prepared for the Workshopon Nonstate Actors. (2005) Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. and TestingLinearModelswith MultipleStrucBAI. There is nothing in the data that hints at terrorists resorting to WMD. but this is a far cry from foreshadowing the eventual use of WMD. Conflict AND RONFELDT.and Weapons of Mass Destruction some evidence of substitution in the anticipated direction (that is.(1997) In Athena's Camp: Preparingfor Conflict in the ARQUILLA. CHRISTENSEN.cfm. AND DAVIDRONFELDT. AND ANDREW BLUM.
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