BLUE Tips 2010 (Criminal Procedure) / Atty.

Salvador
** DISCLAIMER: This is a simplified digest of the cases Atty. Salvador provided for the Ateneo Central Bar Operations 2010. I will not write the whole facts of the case, just those that are relevant to the Rules. People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Judge Jose R. Hernandez, et al. G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372 / August 28, 2006 FACTS: Judge H granted a 30-day continuance in view of the manifestation of the prosecution that it would file an appeal from the interlocutory order (validity of arraignment) of the trial court. However, the prosecution failed to obtain any TRO to stop the proceedings. The hearings of the case were also cancelled several times due to the repeated absence of the public prosecutor. Subsequently, Judge H dismissed the case on the ground of the denial of L& S right to speedy trial, without giving the prosecution the chance to present evidence. 111 days have elapsed from the time L & S were arraigned on June 15, 2001 up to the filing of the Motion to Dismiss on October 4, 2001. HELD: (1) Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA was the proper remedy. A dismissal on the ground of the denial of the accused's right to a speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious, certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal and such grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction which prevents double jeopardy from attaching. (2) The court correctly dismissed the case for failure to prosecute in violation of the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. The dismissal of the case following a number of postponements at the instance of the prosecution is not an abuse of discretion, and the 111 days that have elapsed is beyond the 80-day limit provided under Section 6, Rule 119. Moreover, "delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in harmony with Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Bernadette L. Adasa vs. Cecille S. Abalos. G.R. No. 168617 / February 19, 2007 FACTS: After conducting a reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) issued a resolution affirming the finding of probable cause against B. Meanwhile, during her arraignment, B entered an unconditional plea of not
GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 4A 2011

guilty. Dissatisfied with the finding of the OCP, B filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ which reversed resolution of the OCP and directed the said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa against B. HELD: (1) DOJ gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to Bs petition for review. Since Section 7 of the DOJ Circular No. 70 clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary. If through misapprehension of law or a rule an executive or administrative officer called upon to implement it has erroneously applied or executed it, the error may be corrected when the true construction is ascertained. If a contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous, the same must be declared null and void. (2) Bs arraignment was without any restriction, condition or reservation. When an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it. This precept is also applicable in cases of reinvestigation as well as in cases of review of such reinvestigation. Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of probable cause. For this reason, there is no need for the Court to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause. Hannah Eunice D.Serana vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 162059 / January 22, 2008 FACTS: The Ombudsman charged S and her brother for estafa, S moved to quash the information and claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. HELD: (1) The denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. When a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. The only exception is if the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. (2) Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the
1

BLUE Tips 2010 (Criminal Procedure) / Atty. Salvador

offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office. (3) A UP student regent is a public officer. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Moreover, compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Ma. Rosario Santos-Concio, et al. vs. Department of Justice, et al. G.R. No. 175057 / January 29, 2008 FACTS: The DOJ Secretary constituted an Evaluating Panel to "determine whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the basis of the documents submitted" regarding the Ultra stampede. The Evaluating Panel found no sufficient basis to conduct a PI. The NBI-NCR, acting on the Evaluating Panels referral of the case to it for further investigation, in turn submitted to the DOJ an investigation report through a transmittal letter recommending the conduct of PI for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries against C et al. (this is allegedly the complaint-affidavit not sworn under oath) HELD: A complaint for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation differs from a complaint for purposes of instituting a criminal prosecution. As provided under Section 3, Rule 112, the complaint is not entirely the affidavit of the complainant, for the affidavit is treated as a component of the complaint. All necessary allegations need not be contained in a single document. It is unlike a criminal "complaint or information" where the averments must be contained in one document charging only one offense, non-compliance with which renders it vulnerable to a motion to quash. A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent person, without the referral document having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. A complaint for purposes of conducting preliminary investigation is not required to exhibit the attending structure of a "complaint or information" laid down in Rule 110. Rebecca E. Badiola vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 170691 / April 23, 2008 FACTS: CA denied Bs petition for review on the Ombudsmans resolution proceeding with the administrative case against her despite the prior dismissal of the criminal aspect that was based on the same set of facts. B filed 2 MRs in this case which were subsequently denied by the court. She filed a petition for certiorari 343 days after she received notice of the denial of her 1st MR. HELD: Bs filing of a second motion for reconsideration with the CA, being a prohibited pleading, did not toll the running of the reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Rule 45 (the proper remedy, not certiorari) with this Court. A second MR is a prohibited pleading, which shall not be allowed, except for ordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave shall have first been obtained . In this case, the dismissal of the criminal case involving the same set of facts does not necessarily foreclose the continuation of the administrative action or carry with it relief from administrative liability. People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Bohol G.R. No. 171729 / July 28, 2008 FACTS: B was arrested after he sold s habu to a police officer during a buy-bust operation. When he was frisked by the police, the buy-bust money and three plastic sachets containing similar white crystalline granules suspected to be shabu were recovered from him. HELD: An arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. In a legitimate warrantless arrest, the arresting police officers are authorized to search and seize from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. Concepcion Cuenco Vda De Man Guerra et al. vs. Raul Risos, et al G.R. No. 152643 / August 28, 2008

GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 4A 2011

BLUE Tips 2010 (Criminal Procedure) / Atty. Salvador

FACTS: Due to Cs advanced age and health condition, the prosecution applied for the taking of Cs deposition under Rule 23 instead of conditional examination of witnesses under Rule 119. The deposition was taken before the Clerk of Court. HELD: The conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, the court no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise. While the court recognizes the prosecutions right to preserve its witness testimony to prove its case, rules cannot be disregarded since they are designed mainly for the protection of the accuseds constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules. Sharon Castro vs. Hon. Merlin Deloria etc., et al. G.R. No. 163586 / January 27, 2009 FACTS: In 2000, C was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC with Malversation of Public Funds. After he entered his plea, C filed an MTQ on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Information. C argued that the Information failed to allege her salary grade citing the decision in Uy v. Sandiganbayan (1999). RTC denied the MTQ pointing out the ruling in Uy v. Sandiganbayan (MR 2001). HELD: The Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Carmelo Lazatin, et al. vs. Hon. Aniano A. Disierto, et al. G.R. No. 147097 / June 5, 2009 FACTS: The OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution recommending the dismissal of the cases against L et al. for lack or insufficiency of
GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 4A 2011 3

evidence. The Ombudsman, however, adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution and ordering the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases against L et al. HELD: Giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution. The OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman." T he power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan and Victoria Amante G.R. No. 167304 / August 25, 2009 FACTS: The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing V of violating The Auditing Code. At that time, V was a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and was occupying a position of salary grade 26.

BLUE Tips 2010 (Criminal Procedure) / Atty. Salvador

HELD: The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. They may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. As long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office. People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F. Duca G.R. No. 171175 / October 9, 2009 FACTS: A copy of the CA Resolution which required the filing of Comment was served upon the counsels for the defense and prosecution and the RTC Judge. No copy was furnished to the Solicitor General. Subsequently, the CA acquitted defendant D. HELD: The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General . In criminal cases, the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given the opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. Where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Ariel M. Los Baos vs. Oel R. Pedro G.R. No. 173588 / April 22, 2009 FACTS: The Information charged P of violating Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code, instead of Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which amended Section 261(q). P filed an MTQ on the grounds that the Information contains
GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 4A 2011 4

averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule 117].

BLUE Tips 2010 (Criminal Procedure) / Atty. Salvador

HELD: (1) While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal. Notable features of Section 8, Rule 117: 1. Dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case). 2. The delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, and where the grounds cited are those listed under Section 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. 3. A dismissal under Section 8is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided under Section 7 , but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the special terms of Section 8. When a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply. MOTION TO QUASH Filed by the accused to question the efficacy of the complaint or information filed against him or her. Form and content are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117. Assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information for defects or defenses apparent on face of the information. Allowed before the arraignment. PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL At the instance of either the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117. These requirements do not apply to a provisional dismissal. May be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the information. Available even when the trial proper of the case is already underway provided that the required consents are present. Impermanent until the time-bar applies, at which time it becomes a permanent dismissal.
5

carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. (2) The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information . The amendment under Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 does not affect the prosecution of the accused who was charged under Section 261(q) of the Code.

An information that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to quash does not per se

GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 4A 2011