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8onSthe Combat Vehicle Command and Control System: Operational Effectiveness of an Armor Battalion

AND Su TmES. 4.

N61339-91-D-0001/0025 63007A 795



Lelbrecht, Bruce C.; Meade, Glen. A.; Schmidt, J. H.; and Doherty, W. J.


BDM Federal, Inc.
P. O. Box 967 Fort Knox, KY 40121-0967



U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences ATTN: PERI-IK 5001 Eisenhower Avenue Aexandria, VA 22333-5600

Contracting Officer's Representative, Kathleen A. Quinkert

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 wonr

In support of Army Initiatives to meet future command, control, and communications (03) challenges, the Combat Vehicle Command and Control (CVCC) research and development program has evaluated automated C3 technology, using soldier-in-the-loop simulation. The CVCC system includes a digital Position Navigation system, a digital Command and Control Display, the Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer, and digital workstations In the Tactical Operations Center. The evaluation reported here compared the CVCC system with Baseline (conventional) capabilities In terms of a battalion's operational effectiveness. Using M1 tank simulators In the Mounted Warfare Test Bed at Fort Knox, Kentucky, unit commanders and executive officers with crews were integrated with semiautomated vehicles under their control to form complete tank battalions. Each battalion completed four days of training and testing culminating In a simulated combat test scenario. One of a series, this report documents Improvements In the performance of unit and vehicle commanders, along with lessons learned. Companion reports address training Issues, soldier-machine Interface findings, and performance from a tactical perspective. The collective findings help determine combat doctrine, materiel requirements, training requirements, and operational effectiveness parameters for future automated C3 systems supporting mounted warfare. Vt ECT CiTV M1 tank

RMS Command and control

C3 training requirements Soldier-In-the-loop



Operational effectiveness
Distributed Interactive simulation






NSN 7540-01-280-5500



Standard Form 298 (Rev 2-89)
by ANSI Std. Z39-10


Technical Report XXX

Evaluation of the Combat Vehicle Command and Control System: Operational Effectiveness of an Armor Battalion

Bruce C.

Leibrecht, Glen A.

Meade, Jeffrey H. Doherty


and William J.

Accesion For

BDM Federal,




DTIC TAB Unannounced Justification


Distribution y Availability Codes

Field Unit at Fort Knox, Kentucky

Barbara A. Black, Chief



Avail arnd / or


Training Systems Research Division Jack H. Hiller, Director U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600 Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Department of the Army September 1993 Army Project Number

Training Simulation

Approved for public release; distribution is




The Fort Knox Field Unit of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) investigates Training Requirements for the Future Integrated Battlefield, using soldier-in-the-loop simulation. Research under this program is supported by Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with (a) the U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Subject: Research in Future Battlefield Conditions, 12 April 1989, and (b) the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM), Subject: Combat Vehicle Command and Control (CVCC) Program, 22 March 1989. The CVCC research program investigates advanced digital and thermal technologies to enhance mounted forces' command, control, and communications (C3) capabilities. The CVCC system integrates a variety of digital features--report preparation and management, tactical map and overlays, transmission of reports and overlays-together with positioning/navigation functions and independent thermal viewing for unit and vehicle commanders. This system provides an excellent paradigm for investigating training requirements of future automated technology for mounted combat units. The research reported here used distributed interactive simulation to conduct a battalion-level evaluation of the CVCC capabilities. * One of three reports resulting from the evaluation, this report documents the CVCC system's impact on the operational effectiveness of an armor battalion. Companion reports address training issues, soldier-machine interface questions, and tactical performance. The findings presented in this report support Army developers in determining user requirements, specifying training requirements, and assessing operational effectiveness of automated C3 systems for mounted forces. In addition, the training and simulation techniques developed for this effort are of use to other Army training and testing agencies. Information resulting from this research has been briefed to the following personnel: Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center and School; Deputy Commanding General for Combat Developments, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command; Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; Director, Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Armor School; and Director, Mounted Warfighting Battlespace Lab.


EDGAR M. JOHNSON Technical Director


FBC Team members. and MAJ James Whitehead. supported simulation equipment and data collection/analysis. Ms. Harold Wager. Thomas Radgowski. Dr. Mr. Mr. Ms. Paul Monday. Mr. Daniel Schultz. Leader of the Future Battlefield Conditions (FBC) Team. Ms.ACINOWLEDGMENTS The following members of ARI's Fort Knox Field Unit provided invaluable input to this evaluation: Dr. Ann Cash. Personnel of the on-site support contractor. Mr. Silver Campbell. Gary Elliott. and Mr. Michael Krages. Brian Gary. Khristina Orbock. Robert Pollock. Kenneth Fergus. and Ms. Mr. William Myers. In addition to the authors. vi . Timothy Voss. Paul Smith.) Charles Heiden. Mr. Charles Sawyer. John Jawor. Carl Lickteig and Mr. Frederick Brady. Alicia Sawyer. Rob Smith. Diane York. Mr. Mr. Loral Training and Technical Services. Beverly Winsch. Frances Ainslie. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Gary Gulbranson. Mr. and Mr. Laura Ford. . Kathleen Quinkert. Field Unit Chief. MG (Ret. Mr. Dr. the BDM Federal. Michael Gustafson. Owen Pitney. David Clippinger. Inc. Ryszard Lozicki. Barbara Black. Mr. Mr. Research Assistants supporting the project included Mr. Ms. Nancy Atwood. Mr. Robert Sever. Ronald Reyna. Mr. Mr. research staff included Dr. Jimmy Adams. Dr. These included Mr. Dr. Mr. Mr. Charles West. Mr. David Johnson. the Field Unit's Research and Development Coordinator.

followed by a The same set of training and simulated combat test scenario. and three company executive officers. digitization of the battlefield. using conventional C3 capabilities (voice radio and paper map-based techniques). modeling Baseline tools plus a digital Position Navigation (POSNAV) system. Using simulation-based. three company commanders. C3 challenges has been the focus of recent U. soldier-in-the-loop methodology. and semiautomated elements under Each of the eight crews operated an unit commanders' control. vii . including automation of C3 functions. test scenarios was completed by all battalions. companies.. and communications (C3) capabilities. intensity. and dispersion of the future battlefield will severely challenge combat units' command. the Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV).S. Findings: The results of the evaluation revealed that the CVCC capabilities significantly enhanced battalion performance across The CVCC system's digital a broad range of measures. while reducing substantially the volume of voice radio traffic. a digital Command and Control Display (CCD). and digital TOC workstations. and horizontal integration of combat activities. platoons. Army initiatives. The need for data on performance of unit commanders and executive officers led to the battalion-level evaluation. . EVALUATION OF THE COMBAT VEHICLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM: OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF AN ARMOR BATTALION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Requirement: The speed. communications capabilities enabled more rapid dissemination of orders and more complete dissemination of INTELLIGENCE reports. which integrates advanced digital and thermal technologies. and the battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC). autoloading tank simulator in the Mounted Warfare Test Bed (MWTB) at Fort Knox. a limited TOC staff. a tank battalion was formed by integrating eight qualified armor crews (battalion commander. Procedure: O The evaluation compared tank battalion performance under two conditions: (a) Baseline. Kentucky. and (b) CVCC. battalion operations officer. each working with a gunner and driver). Overcoming future control. During each test week. The overall volume of usable information contained in CONTACT. previous CVCC research evaluated performance of tank crews. Research and development efforts supporting these initiatives include the Combat Vehicle Command and Control (CVCC) program. Six Baseline and six CVCC-equipped battalions each completed three days of training. with only the available C3 equipment differentiating the two conditions.

and completed combat missions more quickly. Further. They also maintained safer end-of-stage stand-off distances. CVCC participants exhibited greater freedom of movement during combat missions. materiel requirements. Utilization of Findings: The battalion evaluation's findings provide useful information for Army developers determining combat doctrine. The advantage afforded by earlier target acquisition appeared to enable CVCC crews to select ammunition more effectively. and operational effectiveness parameters for future automated C3 systems supporting horizontal integration of the battlefield. produced more accurate report elements representing location and type of enemy vehicles. The automated reporting of friendly vehicle locations and logistics status greatly reduced the need to report the unit's status.. AND SPOT reports increased considerably. Due largely to POSNAV capabilities. especially precise location information. The use of CVCC equipment did not distract crews from participating in the battle. The CITV's hunter-killer capabilities produced faster target acquisition at greater maximum ranges. training requirements. viii . with clarity of orders benefitting greatly. achieved greater consistency in timing their movements. SHELL. the training and simulation methods are of use to other Army training and testing efforts. The CVCC system's advantages in acquiring information. CFF (Call for Fire). The consistency and completeness of digital transmissions constituted a major advantage. CVCC-equipped battalions reached counterattack objectives more quickly.

. I 4 4 10 12 17 21 21 22 23 25 25 27 43 47 58 63 66 69 70 89 114 118 125 125 129 136 136 137 140 Test Battalions ................................................................................................................. Command. Maneuver BOS ...................... ix ............................ References ........................................................... Conclusions and Recommendations ..................... Operational Effectiveness ...................................... Command and Control BOS ........... and Communications .. Performance Measures ................................ Recommendations for Future Research ......... The Combat Vehicle Command and Control Program .Is EVALUATION OF THE COMBAT VEHICLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM: OF AN ARMOR BATTALION OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS CONTENTS Page Introduction .................. Procedures . Method ..................... Fire Support BOS ......................................................................................................... Lessons Learned ...................................... Support Staff ...................... Conclusions ......................... Approach ............... Control.................................................................................................. The Mounted Warfare Test Bed ......... Training and Test Materials ........ Research Issues ......................................................................................................................... Test Facilities ................................................................. Intelligence BOS ............. Evaluation Methods . Background and Review of Key Literature .................................................................. Results and Discussion .. Design of the Evaluation ........................................... Methodological Limitations ........................ ARI-Fort Knox CVCC Research Program .. Experimental Design ..............

............................................... Summary of Individual Training Modules ............ 6................ Analysis of Variance Summary Tables ........ The MWTB's Major Features ............... 7.... 33 11 14 31 Capabilities of the CITV configuration .....................CONTENTS (Continued) * APPENDIX A... Page Sample Data Collection Instruments ... C3 capabilities of the CCD and POSNAV configuration . 10.................... Descriptive Data Tables for Performance Measures ..... B. Comparison of Baseline and CVCC M1 Simulator Capabilities .... 5.......................... Major C3 Features of the CVCC System ............... 2............. 60 61 62 63 64 Operational Measures by Command and Control BOS Function ..... A-1 B-1 C-1 D-1 E-1 LIST OF TABLES 1.. E........ Operational Measures by Intelligence BOS Function ........ D................... Selected Performance Measure Definitions ................... 9........ ......... Tactical Structure of the Battalion Test Scenario .. 3.... Responsibilities of the Exercise Control Staff During Scenarios ...... 12.... 13................... C............................. x .............................. 8... 4...... List of Exercise Control Equipment ................... 11. List of Acronyms .............. 35 41 44 46 Operational Measures by Maneuver BOS Function ..... Operational Measures by Fire Support BOS Function ................

........ Performance Data for Receive and Transmit Enemy Information Hypothesis...... by Stage and Condition . Mean Performance Data for Move on Surface Hypothesis........ 21..... 103 24... Page 72 15. Mean Performance Data for Assess Situation Hypothesis.... by Stage and Condition ..... 27........... Summary of Major Intelligence BOS Findings 124 xi ... Mean Performance Data for Process Direct Fire Targets Hypothesis........ by Condition ............ 110 25...... and Network ....... Condition.. Mean Performance Data for Engage Direct Fire Targets Hypothesis.......................... by Condition .... Mean Performance Data for Receive and Transmit the Mission Hypothesis..................... Summary of Major Maneuver BOS Findings .. 26... by Stage........ 74 16. by Stage and Condition .............. 90 90 98 23.......... 22................. 119 ................. by Stage and Condition ... 113 ............ by Stage and 117 condition ..................... 80 85 88 18............... 19... 28......... Mean Performance Data for Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information Hypothesis... Summary of Major Fire Support BOS Findings Mean Performance Data for Collect Threat Information Hypothesis..... Mean Performance Data for Manage Means of Communicating Information Hypothesis............... Summary of Major Command and Control BOS Findings ................. 20. Mean Performance Data for Navigate Hypothesis...... by Stage and Condition .. by Stage and Condition .......CONTENTS (Continued) O 14............................ 76 17..... Mean Enemy Kills in Primary Engagement Areas.... by Stage and Condition .

................... Basic Ml simulator used in the evaluation ... and 3 ................ Schematic of the basic distributed simulation networking environment in the Mounted Warfare Test Bed . 9....................................CONTENTS (continued) Page LIST OF FIGURES 1. Volume of voice radio transmissions on company nets ... 3........................ 17.. Floor plan of the Exercise Control Room (ECR) .. 40 42 49 81 Weekly training and testing schedule for the CVCC condition .. Vehicle commanders' crewstation as seen in interface the 34 36 37 38 CVCC condition ............. 81 91 96 99 Maximum lase range means ...... 18...... 6............... 5................................... Floor plan of the battalion Tactical Operations Center used in the Baseline condition ............. Automated workstation used in the battalion Tactical Operations Center for the CVCC condition ... 15 26 28 29 32 Floor Plan of the Mounted Warfare Test Bed ........ 15.... 10. 16......... 7. Command and Control Display (CCD) Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV) interface ................ 14...... Diagram of the tactical radio networks (voice) implemented in the evaluation .... Mean time to complete Stages 1........... 8. 13....................... 2...... Illustration of the battalion configuration ....................... 39 11... 12............... 2............................. Floor plan of the battalion Tactical Operations Center used in the CVCC conditon ........ Volume of voice radio transmissions on battalion nets .... Mean end-of-stage distance between BLUFOR and OPFOR center of mass ... xii ...... 4...

............. 22............... 24.............. Mean percent of CONTACT reports with correct vehicle type .......... 23...... Mean percentage of CFF reports correctly identifying vehicle type ..... Mean kills per hit ratio for manned vehicles Mean accuracy scores for enemy locations contained in CFF reports . 20.... Mean time to acquire targets .CONTENTS (Continued) Page 19...................... 21....... 100 108 115 116 120 123 xiii . ... Mean deviation (in meters) of enemy vehicle locations reported in CONTACT reports ..

confusion about friendly and enemy locations. The key to these efforts is innovative research and development.S. 1990). delays or interruptions in disseminating information. in order to support shorter planning and decision cycles. and horizontal integration of the battlefield (Foley. timely and accurate logistics information will be required to sustain rapid. and Organizational Concepts Team. Knudson. effective massing of direct and indirect fires while avoiding fratricide. The C3 challenges of the future battlefield have led to important modernization initiatives capitalizing on advanced digital technology.S. such as navigation difficulties. 1993). Goodman. The program is managed by four teams. and deadly examples of fratricide (Department of Defense. Such a combat environment will severely challenge the command.g. and communications (C3) capabilities of combat units. accurate.EVALUATION OF THE COMBAT VEHICLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM: OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF AN ARMOR BATTALION Introduction The future battlefield will be characterized by rapid.. intense. Army's Combat Vehicle Command and Control (CVCC) program. Operational. digitization of the battlefield (e. with combat elements widely dispersed at times (Department of the Army. C3 systems must support highly flexible. Across the battlefield. Army Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM). highly fluid battlefield. 1992). Army Armor School. each with a counterpart German team: the Data Elements. 1992).S..g. up-to-date situational awareness will be essential to achieving timely. control. The lessons learned in Desert Storm graphically illustrate many of the C3 problems of a rapid-tempo. U. chaired by the Directorate of Combat Developments. especially during engagements with enemy forces. and highly fluid operations. with a focus from the outset on training requirements to ensure fielding and deployment of combat-effective digital systems on the combined arms battlefield (Knudson. dispersed maneuver while guarding against electronic surveillance and electronic countermeasures. In the midst of a highly fluid battlefield. highly mobile initiatives. this effort addresses automated C3 requirements for ground combat vehicles. Prominent among the C3 automation efforts has been the U. more reliable gathering and exchange of tactical information. 1990). These initiatives include development of automated C3 equipment (e. A United States-German bilateral research and development effort sponsored by the U. High-mobility mounted warfare operations will depend on timely. A common thread among these thrusts is reliance on an extensive battlefield network of digital nodes which are to be capable of rapidly and reliably exchanging combat-critical information. the Communications 1 * . effective coordination with adjacent and supporting units. In response to advanced threat systems which will severely jeopardize the survivability of friendly forces. 1993). The rapid operational pace will demand faster.

in preparation) analyzes combat performance in the context of armor doctrine and tactics. the Soldier-Machine-Interface chaired by the U. more effective C3.S. to provide near real-time acquisition. Quinkert. Army Communications-Electronics Command. chaired by TACOM. focusing on unit commanders and executive officers as well as overall battalion capabilities. The efforts of the four teams are interdependent and mutually supportive. 1990). The full-scale battalion evaluation described in this report was a logical extension of the earlier experiments. 1989. in preparation). digital reporting capabilities.. both digital and thermal. The CVCC program combines advanced technologies. including unit standing operating procedures. The principal components include a Command and Control Display (CCD). and automated battalion staff workstations. catalyzed by a focus on performance of unit commanders and executive officers. this report presents the performance findings in an operational effectiveness framework.S. Winsch. wide-dispersion battlefield. 1991. Sawyer. a Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV). and (c) identify critical soldier-machine interface (SMI) issues. processing. robust automated navigation features. more accurate. a Position Navigation (POSNAV) system. Building on the earlier CVCC research. & Meade. and the Vehicle Integration Team. and dissemination of combat-critical information. The system integrates digital map functions.. The next effort advanced the research to the battalion level.. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). the goal of the final evaluation was to compare the performance of CVCC-equipped armor battalions with that of conventionally-equipped battalions. * . (b) investigate training issues. A second report (Meade. chaired by the U. A third report (Atwood. Part of a family of reports documenting the battalion evaluation. the research progressed to an evaluation of integrated components at the company level (Leibrecht et al. Together these reports provide a 2 and Simulation Team. in preparation) discusses training considerations and SMI issues. Initially evaluating individual components at the crew and platoon levels (Du Bois & Smith. meeting critical challenges of a rapid-pace. 1992). Team. Specific objectives were to (a) evaluate operational effectiveness. high-mobility. thermal viewing for the vehicle commander (independent of the gunner's sighting system). and digital battalion staff planning capabilities (Leibrecht et al. with a limited evaluation focusing on the role of the battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC) equipped with automated workstations (O'Brien et al. & Smith. 1992). The Future Battlefield Conditions Team of the ARI Fort Knox Field Unit has conducted a series of experiments systematically evaluating the CVCC capabilities during the course of the system's evolution. Lozicki. The CVCC system's capabilities are designed to enable faster..

Conclusions and Recommendations . distributed interactive simulation capabilities. facilities. Background and Review of Key Literature .O comprehensive account of the battalion evaluation's methods. along with the research approach and the experimental design.discusses the objectives and issues underpinning the evaluation. Lessons Learned . 3 . equipment. materials. findings. S6.discusses operational and methodological lessons learned during the course of the evaluation. Results and Discussion . and recommendations.describes the test battalions. 5. 3. conclusions. Method .highlights key findings and outlines imperatives for future research. and performance measures supporting the evaluation. and previous CVCC research. with emphasis on operational effectiveness. Design of the Evaluation .reviews operational and research publications dealing with conventional and automated C3. Army combat digitization efforts. Six major sections provide the organizing structure for the remainder of this report: 1. procedures.presents and interprets the findings regarding performance of unit leaders. 2. 4. horizontal integration of the battlefield. discusses methodological limitations.

in which one of seven Battlefield Operating Systems Indeed. 1990. 1993). conclusions emphasize that the commander must "SEE" the battlefield--that is. for the singular purpose of accomplishing the unit's The importance of C3 to mission (Department of the Army. and Communications . techniques. form the An overview of the CVCC larger context for the current research. facilities simulation interactive distributed the program and supporting the evaluation set the stage for a review of previous CVCC research. Observations and lessons learned from the U. 1993). 1990). know the location. and controlling a combat unit's activities. battalion evaluation. 1985). authorities identified several .. * to assist executing them in a manner to accomplish his mission" (Knudson.. directing. The enhancement of C3 processes in a mounted warfighting environment forms the heart of the research presented in this report. Department's final report to Congress on the Persian Gulf War These shortcomings shortcomings of the MlAl main battle tank. with a focus on automated and digital technologies.S.Background and Review of Key Literature This section develops the background underpinning the CVCC Recent Army developments relating to C3. coordinating. and with the support of the TOC for information processing. and in Army field manuals and tactics. C3 The literature on conventional C3 is found mainly in articles published in Army periodicals such as Military Review (e.Conventional C3 encompasses the process and means for planning. included the lack of an on-board navigation device and the lack 4 (Department of Defense. 1992). common thread in terms of purpose and outcome of the C3 system: the commander in making reasoned decisions and ". in informal papers originating in the combat development/training development communities. which concludes the section.g. More recent observations of combat operations during Desert In the Defense Storm support the 1985 NTC conclusions. argues that C3 is the crucial key to winning on the battlefield. and coordination (Department of the Army. accurate reporting. Burkett (1990) deals entirely with command and control. C3 comprises systems and procedures designed to achieve a common successful accomplishment of the current mission while goal: retaining sufficient combat capability to continue follow-on missions in accordance with the commander's intent. Army's National Training Center (NTC) highlight the critical These relationship between effective C3 and battlefield success. planning. Department of the Army. the successful accomplishment of combat operations is reflected in the Army's Blueprint of the Battlefield (Department of the Army. Control. p.g. and procedures (TTPs) All have a publications (e. and status He does this through fast and of both friendly and enemy forces. Burkett. activities. 19). Command. 1991b).

grease pencils. The cumulative findings of this program. A driving goal is the thermal sight with higher resolution to improve target detection. In discussing future armored force technology. * previous CVCC experiments appears later in this Background and A review of Review of Key Literature section. 1991). high-speed. Automated C3 Under the Army Command and Control Master Plan. and display of critical in a subsequent subsection--The Combat Vehicle Command and Control Program--of this report (see Table 1).. real-time information exchange technology. 1990. the Maneuver Control System).g. importantly. 1990). Solutions to these shortcomings are being implemented in the M1A2 by fielding a CITV and a POSNAV device for each vehicle (Garth. Conventional command and control procedures depend typically on the Army's fielded. automated tools using improved communications linkages have the potential not only to enhance the accuracy and speed of the command and control process. spanning performance. At the corps level and below. and workbooks (Lickteig. The CVCC program introduced in the preceding section represents a pioneering effort in automated C3. 1992). portable. In line with the central role of automation. secure communications capabilities (Knudson. Army Armor Center (USAARMC) has forged a leadership role in developing automated C3 concepts. 1991). real-time processing. orders. and. but. voice-based radio systems as well as manual tools--mapboards. and presentation of battlefield information and the means to simplify the generation of reports. The MIA2's advanced systems--which include an Intervehicular Information System (IVIS)... journals. to enable the commander and his staff to "see" the battlefield in a much more comprehensive manner (Lickteig. 1990). . research and development targets include artificial intelligence applications (e. including capabilities to streamline fusion. decision aids). in the heat of battle. battlefield information. 1992). training implications. and continuous. and 5 . of a positive combat vehicle identification system (such as a recognition and identification). synthesis. Knudson. automation of C3 functions is a prominent thrust (Anderson. may result in the loss of critical information or misinterpretation of instructions or intent. These procedures are cumbersome and inefficient at best. The range of functional capabilities integrated in the CVCC system is outlined integration. and a CITV--all incorporate significant advancements in C3 automation.S. rugged computers. the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) integrates five functional systems (for example. robust.g. Foley (1991) outlined requirements for new C3 developments. and overlays. acetate. each with its associated battlefield automation system. In contrast. The U. a POSNAV system. Nowhere is that role more apparent than in the Army's new MIA2 main battle tank (e. Garth. and handwritten/maintained logs.

Army. and automated battalion staff workstations form a high technology foundation for research and development efforts. 1992a. Among past and current efforts contributing to this foundation are the just-concluded series of CVCC evaluations. engage. provide a solid foundation for future research on automation of C3 functions. 1993). encompasses technology digital battlefield. high speed communications networks capable of transmitting digitized data. 1993). 1993). the modern of context portable computers. the French Army is working technology (Tusa. This modern technology contrasts dramatically with voice radio technology and manual processing of information. The German efforts under the bilateral CVCC program led to a joint demonstration in late The British Army is developing a 1992 (Hewish. aerial unmanned by generated The emerging automated command and control tools coupled with improved communications equipment (e. 1993). In developing automated C3 concepts. Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System using digital Similarly. The planned efforts include a Combined Arms Command and Control initiative sponsored by CECOM.. As stated in a recent Army concept paper. The soldier-in-the-loop nature of the distributed interactive simulation environment has provided a distinct advantage in these efforts. 1). processing at part large in aimed are efforts British and French data targeting of quantities expanded the and disseminating vehicles. IVIS. Future efforts are planned to capitalize on established automated C3 building blocks plus the distributed interactive simulation capabilities.. and an assessment of the MIA2 and its C3 enhancements (Department of the Army. the introduction of devices such as the IVIS "is expected to provide an exponential increase in the ability of the commander and staff to plan.* SMI issues up to the battalion level. and destroy enemy targets" (Department of the Army. a recent demonstration of IVIS in a combined arms environment (Courtright et al. . Diaitization of the Battlefield Recent trends in Army modernization have set the stage for In the "digitization" of the battlefield (e. p. not long ago the standard among combat units. Goodman. CCD. 1993). CITV. interactive integration with a Fort Leavenworth corps battle simulation exercise. and specialized display devices for presenting combat-critical information. simulation building blocks such as POSNAV. Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System--SINCGARS) offer significant improvements in the processes and outcomes of command and control in combat. International efforts addressing automation of C3 functions are paralleling those in the U. as well as enhance the ability of the crew to acquire. and support missions.S..g.g. execute. 1992b). and "seamless" support to large-scale Army training exercises. on an artillery-oriented system to accommodate expected Both the improvements in targeting capabilities (Tusa. 6 . .

The Maneuver Control System (MCS) is designed to provide combat maneuver elements with digital planning and control capabilities down to the battalion level The MCS supports exchange of information among (Anderson. technology provides powerful capabilities to acquire. the ATHS interface with other battlefield systems. highly fluid combat environment. on voice radio communications to relies TACFIRE linkage.S. will link mortar.g. field artillery. and This system links some graphics (Department of the Army. such as the MCS and IV'S. it is to be interoperable with German and British automated fire support systems. The planned replacement for TACFIRE is the Advanced Field Part of the ATCCS Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). ruggedized computers. On balance. and manage large quantities of battlefield information. miniaturized. Robinson. integrates aviation and indirect fire systems by means of callfor-fire protocols compatible with TACFIRE. This system was used by some divisions TACFIRE is a during Desert Storm operations (Robinson. Army. fire support officers. and aviation. Payne. 1993) and in the lessons learned from Desert Storm (Robinson. this system is designed to integrate fire support command and control throughout the combined arms and joint battlefield Digital communications (Association of the U. 1992). and aviation units with close air support and naval gunfire elements.* Digital technology has given rise to the term "electronic This battlefield" (e. engineer. and automatic reporting of selected data (e. maneuver fire support teams. and indirect fire units communicate and coordinate using a network of digital C3 nodes. 1991). service operations. Department of the Army. automatic posting to digital map displays. thus facilitating indirect fire targeting from airborne forward observers With the exception of the (Department of the Army. as well as with offensive Not only will AFATDS support multielectronic warfare systems. disseminate. Providing a digital network among Army aviation elements is This system the Airborne Target Handover System (ATHS). The speed and reliability with which these functions can be accomplished offer great potential in a rapid-paced. 1990). well-known system enabling fire support personnel to coordinate indirect fires by digitally exchanging reports..g. With the advent of powerful. family. messages. military police units. the Army has made great strides to incorporate digital technology in combat systems.g. 1990). 1991). 1992. with updates occurring more quickly.. 7 O . process. ammunition and fuel status).. tactical fire support elements across the battlefield: forward observers. The importance of capitalizing on digital capabilities is reflected in current-generation Army Field Manuals (e. digital technology can enable the commander to "see the battlefield" more comprehensively and accurately. signal. armor. 1991a). display. 1991). correlate. infantry. Other advantages include greater accuracy of input information. chemical. integrate. .

the system was used successfully in combat aircraft. Recent developments in digitizing the battlefield have led some to talk about providing the "battlefield picture at a glance" to commanders at all levels. 1992). It is intended as the primary communications means within the brigade. integrate. Collection and transmission of large quantities of battlefield digital data require secure. both rotary. One such system is the Position Navigation (POSNAV) system developed for the MlA2 tank (Garth. Two such systems recently fielded by the Army are notable. Army. In large measure. highcapacity data distribution systems. Army. portable systems to support the difficult task of tactical navigation.* An important facet of digitizing the battlefield has been the development of accurate. The Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) system is designed to provide secure voice. with a C3 support role among combat support and combat service support units at the division and corps levels. p. 39). 1990). In addition to both mounted and dismounted ground operations. Using on-board inertial technology. in preparation).and fixed-wing. 1992). 1991). data. This all-digital network supports mobile as well as stationary users. display. 1992).. Horizontal Intearation of the Battlefield Current military doctrine emphasizes combined and joint operations as essential to meeting a wide spectrum of threats to national security (Anderson. and disseminate large quantities of battlefield information during tactical combat operations. m m.. POSNAV functions. A family of vehicle-mounted and man-portable receivers is being fielded.S. Another navigation aid is the Global Positioning System (GPS). The SINCGARS system handles data and voice transmissions by means of digital burst technology (Association of the U.. GPS units were in great demand in Desert Storm. have been integrated in the experimental CVCC system (Leibrecht et al. success of 8 S. the GPS can display the user's location with a horizontal error of only 5-10 m (Robinson. The system also enables the tank commander to create graphic navigation routes which are used to display steering information to the driver to guide him to established waypoints. Both the SINCGARS and ESE systems were deployed in Desert Storm. where they played key roles in tactical C3 activities (Robinson. including advanced capabilities. including hand-held units. 1991). 1993. • m m .--mmj - • -- - m .S. POSNAV provides the tank crew with precise information about the location of its own tank and other friendly vehicles. This graphically reflects the striking trend towards powerful capabilities to rapidly collect. Designed for a broad range of applications. as well as to aviators and air defense crewmembers (Keller. 1991). where they were a critical factor in combat success on the relatively featureless desert terrain (Robinson. and facsimile communications at the division and corps levels (Association of the U. high-speed. capitalizing on orbiting satellite technology.

. This highlights the importance of synchronizing the combat activities of separate units which will Battlefield synchronization-often be widely dispersed. This concept refers to the establishment of a common C3 1993). artillery. For example. The immutable relationship between C3 processes and the synchronization of battlefield activities has been articulated by many. used CVCC technology to create a common digital network among elements _E a combined arms The combined arms components included armor. p. attention has focused initially on extending established automated technologies to platforms beyond those for which they were originally designed. combat effectiveness.. real-time exhange of information) among diverse collaborating units. company/team. 1993). The kick-off research effort. up-to-date picture of the battlefield.. Goodman. the Army plans to adapt the IVIS. the Army Command and Control Master Plan calls for separate automated C3 systems (for example. for Bradley fighting vehicles and for scout and attack helicopters (Hewish. For example. a soldier-in-the-loop simulation demonstration of battlefield synchronization (Courtright et al. 1990). . and TTPs. outlining several key elements: real-time gathering of intelligence. the MCS and AFATDS) to interface electronically. 61) writes: "The command and control battlefield operating system is an umbrella system that must be designed and equipped to produce synchronized operations. Acknowledging this. network capable of linking combined arms and joint forces so that all elements will have an accurate. The parallel emphases on combined and joint operations and on synchronizing activities of disparate and dispersed combat units are two sides of the same coin. The demonstration focused on the potential contributions of an IVIS-like device on communications." Foley (1992) discusses the future battlefield from a mounted warfighting perspective. Burkett (1990.. originally developed for the MlA2 tank. As Robinson (1991) notes. the USAARMC has taken a lead role in horizontal integration of the battlefield. anti-armor (Line-of-Sight/AntiTank). interoperability with C3 systems of other military services. to support automated sharing of information A further requirement exists for (Knudson. and constant automated communications across the combined arms team. Under this new thrust.e. They represent concerns which have set the stage for an emerging Army focus on "horizontal integration of the battlefield" (e. including those of our allies. synergistically focusing combined and joint assets in space and time--will be a key in maximizing the available combat power to bring the greatest pressure to bear against the enemy. mechanized infantry. rapid massing of fires on enemy targets. 1993).g. . 9 . combined and joint operations depends on robust capabilities for coordination (i. electronic battlefield capabilities such as the MCS and GPS provide the technological basis for enhancing the synergism of air and ground forces. As with the development of automated C3 technology. and aviation.

extended the feasibility envelope for digitizing and integrating combined arms C3.g. automated positioning and navigation features. navigation. in the simulation conducted battlefield synchronization efforts field (Goodman. real-time intelligence gathering. battle monitoring. and horizontal integration--is the CVCC program. a fire support team vehicle. digitization of the battlefield. overlays. this bilateral (United States-Germany) research and development program has systematically investigated requirements and specifications for automated C3 systems for ground combat The vehicles (e. Actual vehicles (MIA2 tanks. massing of direct and indirect fires. Overlapping all three thrusts just discussed--automated C3. At the heart of the system. M2 infantry fighting 1993). independent thermal viewing for the vehicle commander. The Combat Vehicle Command and Control Program . and OH-58D helicopters) of a combined arms force were able to exchange digital data and The field demonstration clearly reports using a common network. the CCD integrates digital reporting and The CITV affords the map functions with the POSNAV system. and automated planning and control for the battalion staff. The primary functional features (Table and target acquisition. and hand-off of targets from one force to another (Goodman. The capabilities of the CVCC conceptual system span communication. Quinkert. Presentation of processed information in graphic or pictorial form makes it easier for users at all levels to assimilate. and messages and by digitally monitoring the battle. mission planning.. the CVCC technology provided the foundation battlefield. for the distributed simulation demonstration of battlefield synchronization (Courtright et al. In keeping with its leadership role in automated C3 and horizontal integration of the battlefield. the USAARMC has established a horizontal integration initiative to develop and Building on the demonstrate suitable concepts and TTPs. this initiative supporting the enhancement and integration of C3 across combined In terms of battlefield payoff. 1990). 1993). vehicles... program has aggressively pursued innovative applications of advanced technology to meet the harsh C3 challenges of the future Indeed. 1992. Exchange of information among vehicles and staff elements is accomplished via 10 . initiative is expected to improve situational awareness. the arms and joint forces. Spearheaded by TACOM and closely supported by ARI's Fort Knox Field Unit as well as other organizations.. 1993). 1) include digital reporting capabilities. Battalion TOC workstations enable the battalion staff to support the maneuver elements by preparing digital orders. vehicle commander his own capability to search the battlefield. in the and al. 1993) et environment (Courtright foundation the expand to designed is 1993). Leibrecht et al. digital tactical map and overlay functions.* The USAARMC followed the simulation demonstration with a field demonstration of battlefield synchronization (Goodman.

Automatic logistics reporting The overall goal of the CVCC program is to improve the speed.Graphic display of key information . spanning crew-level to battalionlevel efforts. following subsection describes the MWTB and its capabilities. 0 11 . Battlefield lethality will benefit from more rapid and more accurate application of decisive combat power. Improved situational awareness. The soldier-in-the-loop research on the CVCC system has been The conducted using USAARMC's Mounted Warfare Test Bed (MWTB). will reduce the incidence of fratricide. thereby The greater accuracy and enhancing combat effectiveness. due largely to precise information on locations of friendly and enemy elements. and effectiveness of tactical C3. consistency of information transmitted across echelons will improve the overall quality of C3 processes. efficiency.Precise location input .. and dissemination of combat-critical information. The concluding subsection reviews the previous CVCC evaluations conducted by ARI-Fort Knox.Graphic routes . together with better coordination of direct and indirect fires. These anticipated battlefield benefits can be expected to bring about striking improvements in force effectiveness. including direct and indirect fires. The near real-time exchange of combat-critical information and graphic presentation of processed data will enhance situational awareness.Driver's steering display . enabling commanders to react more effectively to mission changes in a dynamic environment. This in turn will enable more effective mission More rapid exchange of information will planning and execution.Graphic display of friendly vehicle locations Independent thermal viewing for vehicle commander Automated battalion staff planning and control Secure digital burst transmission . digital burst transmission. The collective capabilities of the CVCC system provide near real-time acquisition. processing. Table 1 Major C3 Features of the CVCC System Digital reporting Digital tactical map with graphic overlays Automated navigation . speed the plans-orders cycle. Force survivability will increase through enhanced tactical dispersion and reduced electronic signature.

production. now supports a variety of initiatives sponsored by DARPA (now known as the Advanced Research Projects Agency). (Training) was developed to support operational training of troop units. training. originally the SIMNET-D facility (and.. 1991). and organizational concepts. 1992)." (Loral Systems Company. The MWTB represents distributed networking architecture that can be modified to accommodate a broad range of soldier The evolution of the performance research and development (R&D). DARPA and the U. much was developed for specific purposes and was often unique and/or proprietary. and materiel developers can put in the MWTB environment before locking in their ideas on trial More specifically.. called the Close Combat Test Bed-CCTB). however. The SIMNET architecture was designed specifically to accommodate the introduction of newer and more powerful equipment as it became available. Training. MWTB is today closely involved with the development of and compliance with those DIS standards. Training Devices) initiated a project to establish industry standards for the SIMNET protocols. interact with each other in a well managed and validated combat The simulation environment. Army Simulation. designed to provide low-cost. Army Armor Center. training approaches. SIMNET-D (Developmental) was established to apply SIMNET technology to developing and testing warfighting concepts. until recently. and field implementation. full mission simulation using extended local and long-haul networking and families of simulators supported by site-specific microprocessors (Du Bois & Using a soldier-in-the-loop Smith. structure through which ". battlefield doctrine. demonstrate the feasibility of linking manned and unmanned SIMNET-T simulators via computer network (Alluisi. 12 . ARI. called Distributed The DIS architecture provides the Interactive Simulation (DIS).S.The Mounted Warfare Test Bed The IWTB is a pioneering battlefield simulation environment supporting Army research and development efforts..S.. the Mounted Warfighting Battlespace Lab and the Combat Developments community at Fort Knox. combat. MWTB began with a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiative called SIMulation NETworking (SIMNET) to . and others. The MWTB. For example. In 1989. the MWTB was formerly known as the Close Combat Test Bed. and prior to that. the MWTB is concepts or system designs. Miller & Chung. 1989. independently developed systems may IAn asset of the U. A huge increase in both simulators and simulation technology occurred in the late 1980's. combat materiel. the MWTB emulates a realistic C3 and battlefield environment in which to conduct combat simulations to assess the battlefield contributions of experimental configurations and training approaches before final design. unit-level. 1987). SINNET-D. approach. and Instrumentation Command (then Project Manager.

Leibrecht et al.. 1992). including its: Flexibility in allowing crews to perform a broad range 1. collective training. Automated capability to capture and analyze objective performance data.. 6. Table 2 summarizes these capabilities. components reproduce key aspects of the battlefield operating A variety of computer-based systems provides environment.. battlefield-oriented perceptual cues within the test bed to be exploited without having to employ more expensive operational technology. Dickens.The MWTB's automated C3 capabilities (including the CVCC technologies) are characterized by selective fidelity of components. Versatility in providing realistic engagement interaction in a variety of simulated battlefield settings. Du This is directly Bois & Smith. 4. of missions. MWTB Capabilities The MWTB's research capabilities are thoroughly described by Central to the test bed are the Atwood et al. O'Toole. Relatively low cost in evaluating experimental configurations of C3 and related systems. (in preparation). Value in identifying training requirements. experimental procedures. 8. 1988). which model actual vehicles to the minimum degree necessary for soldiers to accept them as realistic Sound and visual simulation and useful (Chung et al. 2. manned vehicle simulators. 1988). and Figure 1 shows a schematic of the basic system architecture. the required levels of be sufficiently emulated to elicit perceptual realism among users (Chung. 7. and an iterative approach to Selective fidelity enables system performance to system design. MWTB Advantages Armor crew and unit performance-oriented research carried out within the test bed in recent years has produced data of substantial operational significance (Atwood et al. 1992). tactical communications. & This "psychological fidelity" enables the Chiang. 1991. Fidelity of tactical communications. 3. 13 . and robust data collection and analysis support. scenario control and monitoring capabilities. Adaptability in ensuring standardization of 5.. related to the MWTB's inherent advantages (O'Brien et al. Capability to present tank crews and units with operationally realistic task and mission loading levels. 1991.

and control stations.Table 2 The MWTB's Major Features Features Manned simulators Description Selective fidelity crewstations. Includes DataLogger. supports playback. Scenario monitoring Plan View Display providing a "bird's eye view" of a simulation exercise. TOC workstations Tactical communications Surrogate vehicles . with supporting hardware and software. and RS/1 (Registered trademarks of BBN Software Products Corporation). Data recording and analysis Utilities 14 . Stealth station for out-thewindow viewing of the battlefield. LISTEN system to record digital messages. supports map manipulation and event flagging. Simulated SINCGARS network for linking manned simulators. DataProbeu. capability to save and restart exercise states. both friendly and enemy. Command and Control (MCC) system for initializing and monitoring manned simulators and implementing fire support. SAFOR report generation. Data Collection and Analysis system for on-line recording of automated data and off-line reduction and analysis. capable of both voice and digital burst transmission. provides digital message traffic. Semiautomated forces program for creating and controlling unmanned vehicles and aircraft. Workstation for inserting and monitoring digital messages. TOC workstations. including large-screen display and screen printer. with supporting hardware and software. Automated workstations for selected TOC staff. and playback support. including terrain database. Network control station. Scenario control Management.

o 8. 15 . and PVD (Plan View Display) elements are exercise control systems. DataLogger.LoWpo Dat-a hnalyui. Figure 1.Workstationtcz Bar=--nt Opeaton VVD ~l°'C°•'a° £ta Datax. Schematic of the basic distributed simulation Tank networking environment in the Mounted Warfare Test Bed. and Control).a Wokkstaattaon Fit.rvez LZ'S'JlI . SAPOR (semiautomated forces). 14CC (Management. simulators and battalion TOC workstations represent the battlefield environment. and file server are part of the Data Collection and Analysis system. Command. data analysis workstations.

3. 12. 8.. Limited visual fidelity of the computer-generated imagery. and failure to use cover and concealment when moving. including perfect identification of targets. long-range target identification. which limits depth perception. when the computer image generator is overloaded. 10. resulting in Lack of the gunner's auxiliary sight (GAS). 11. Inability to conduct open hatch operations. resupply). . It is important to note that these constraints applied at the time the CVCC battalion evaluation was being planned and 16 . Unique analysis capabilities afforded by playback. resulting in a potentially misrepresented horizon. 9.g. 2. Unrealistic behavior of semiautomated vehicles. problematic identification of friendly vehicles. 6. These limitations. Loss of vision block imagery. Simplistic implementation of fire support (mortars and howitzers). especially for the driver. such as difficulty in maintaining proper bore sight and unrealistic implementation of target lead functionality. together with a limited number of cupola vision blocks. battlefield orientation. many of which have been addressed by Du Bois and Smith (1989). Absence of machine guns and smoke grenades. combat engineering). include the following: 1. 4. constraining the use of terrain for protective positioning. Problematic performance of the sighting and fire control systems. which. Potential for vehicle commanders to follow semiautomated vehicles instead of navigating on their own.g. absence of weather variations and atmospheric degradations. combat support (e. unrealistic fire control and distribution. constrains the vehicle commander's view of the battlefield and complicates navigation. limited representation of combat noises. and certain tactical maneuvers. 9. and combat service support (e.. and lack of dynamic terrain. 7. Maximum simulated viewing distance of 3500 meters. Limited fidelity of the dynamic battlefield environment. MWTB Constraints As with any large-scale simulation. the MWTB has several constraints in its representation of operational combat settings.. 5. Lack of vehicle identification plates. including a zero-motion platform.

special tactical guidelines have been developed to mitigate the limited viewing distance. The performance of armor crews using these formats was compared with that of crews using conventional navigational techniques. Also. 17 . roads. ARI-Fort Knox CVCC Research Proaram The ARI-Fort Knox Future Battlefield Conditions Team has pioneered and sustained the use of the MWTB's capabilities to evaluate emerging armor concepts. implemented. providing cues that are critical for positioning. Ongoing technical efforts continue to improve the simulation technology. training approach. perform map terrain association. Several special features help offset the MWTB constraints. As this iterative approach has refined and advanced the CVCC's functional capabilities. determine locations of other battlefield elements. Du Bois and Smith (1989) empirically evaluated an automated POSNAV system configured in either grid or terrain map format. Early work with promising components led to progressive evaluations of the fully integrated CVCC system. along with navigation training. Based on the lessons learned in each evaluation. the research methods have been modified in parallel. . By using POSNAV. a grid azimuth indicator and a turret-to-hull reference display (provided in each simulator) help compensate for the closed hatch constraint. An iterative design-evaluate approach has ensured the systematic evolution of the CVCC system. This subsection summarizes the research leading up to the battalion evaluation. both POSNAV groups performed road marches significantly better than the control group. For example. In a ground-breaking study. POSNAV crews were better able to determine own-tank location. based on input from armor subject matter experts and on feedback from qualified tank crewmembers with hands-on experience using the system. measures of performance. maneuvering. and data collection instruments have all been revised and expanded in concert. navigate point to point. Differences between POSNAV and control conditions in their questionnaire responses were statistically significant for 32 of the 36 measures analyzed. rivers. as they appear on the simulated battlefield. Relative to the control group. The research clearly suggests that POSNAV systems can be expected to significantly improve the performance of tank crews and platoons on the battlefield. and react to enemy fire. especially in the areas of semiautomated forces and combat support capabilities. simulated combat scenarios. the experimental design. maintain own-tank orientation.. bypass obstacles. For example. crews were able to navigate more accurately and efficiently than crews using conventional means in virtually all battlefield situations. To counter the limited visual fidelity. and navigation. crews can be provided with special topographic paper maps which represent buildings. etc.

battle position occupation. using the MWTB. It allows a vehicle commander to independently search a sector. Gunners did not feel it necessary to take more time to engage the targets. The benefits of IVIS were attributed almost solely to the system's POSNAV capabilities. report times and accuracy. control crews.e In a similar effort.ot improved by using the CITV. lVIS. but perhaps more importantly. Recommended improvements to the CITV included a directional orientation capability for the own-vehicle icon. The CITV is a surveillance and target acquisition system for use in the Army's main battle tank. 1990) indicated that the CITV's principal advantage is for those targets that are acquired and engaged after the initial target. shorter fire control commands. including fuel use and mean velocity. This advantage was represented by an increase in the number of detections and subsequent kills accomplished at a significantly faster pace. because the platoon level used in the evaluation was not high enough to fully reveal the advantage of the automated C3 equipment. identify and hand-off targets to the gunner. This reflected their high level of confidence in their gunnery skills. they also performed more consistently as indicated by smaller standard deviations for Significant differences in favor of IVIS-equipped all measures. fragmentary order (FRAGO) execution. 18 . as defined by gunners' aiming error. Quinkert (1990) examined the performance enhancement capabilities of the CITV. Findings of the IVIS study indicated that tank crews and platoons equipped with IVIS performed significantly better than conventionally-equipped control crews Specifically. was i. and continue The searching for targets while the gunner engages another. distributed information management system designed to provide improved capabilities to assess both friendly and threat battlefield situations. It was also suggested that emphasis should be placed on training to improve the coordination between the vehicle commander and gunner for tasks involving the CITV. This underscored the importance of extending the research to the company and battalion levels. Accuracy. at least in part. crews were also found for a number of process measures. and ergonomic enhancements in the palm and designate switches on the control handle. even though the shorter vehicle commander search times nominally gave them more time. This may have resulted. using Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (U-COFT) facilities. Du Bois and Smith (1991) evaluated the IVIS is a an automated C3 display. Results of the CITV assessment (Quinkert. IVIS and platoons in virtually every capacity. as opposed to the automated report functions. significantly improved unit performance in mission execution time and success. and obstacle bypass IVIS crews not only performed better overall than efficiency. CITV led by the afforded efficiency in "hunter-killer" increase to a reduction in the time to detect and engage multiple threat targets.

(e. Leibrecht et al. integrating the CVCC into battalion C3 activities. Participants indicated they received too many reports and that creating and reading reports consumed too much time. of the CVCC experimental configuration enabled companies to complete both defensive and offensive missions in significantly As a result. extending maximum lasing range as well as ranges for These improvements were significant hitting and killing targets. more timely unit only during defensive missions..g. The CCDdisplacement during the delay mission was observed. the net-wide routing and INTELLIGENCE reports.* In a follow-on effort. soldier-participants reports. 1992) built on previous CVCC efforts by extending the research to the battalion To level. whereas only 25% of the Baseline companies were able to complete offensive missions and 50% were able to complete The POSNAV capabilities led to CVCC defensive missions. of digitally transmitted reports and the absence of confirmation of reception by the addressee resulted in numerous duplicate Directly related to this. related C3 demands on CVCC leaders did not decrease their vehicles' participation in firing activities. digital reports by lasing to a target or by touching the digital Digital transmission improved the clarity of FRAGOs map display. every CVCC company was able to complete less time. and monitoring the unit's position. effort integrated the POSNAV. 19 . fully achieve this integration. indicating a need to provide free text capabilities on the CCD.. The CVCC capabilities enhanced target engagement performance. This effort established the foundation for a full-scale battalionlevel evaluation. the TOC with the other CVCC elements were developed and assessed. monitoring and directing navigation. especially for determining battlefield locations. (1992) examined the The company-level CVCC's impact on company-level performance. At the same time. Further. and CITV components in each The study found that the enhanced capabilities crewed vehicle. particularly Questionnaire responses indicated the CVCC during engagements. frequently transmitted voice radio messages (e. filtering based on report identifiers) and to provide CVCC vehicle commanders verification of report reception. brief orders or queries) that did not fit the established report formats. significantly reduced some of the workload on unit commanders. The battalion TOC evaluation (O'Brien et al. automated TOC workstations were developed to interact with the digital data capabilities of the Procedures for successfully integrating CVCC-equipped vehicles. IVIS. less distance and consuming significantly traveling companies significantly less fuel in executing both defensive and offensive missions. frequently complained about receiving excessive numbers of This pointed to the need to reduce redundant reports reports. The CCD's automated reporting functions significantly improved both accuracy and timeliness of FRAGOs and CONTACT Especially useful was the ability to input locations to reports. all missions..g.

battalion. modeled the full tank The evaluation described in this report. et Leibrecht by reported database have been This report and its companion reports (Meade et al. executive and focus on performance of unit commanders CVCC the substantially extend to the evaluation was designed the of subset a from data Preliminary performance database. in preparation) document the The reader is battalion evaluation's complete database... ARI-Fort Knox's CVCC research program. Applying the cumulative lessons learned from the preceding research. Atwood et al. in preparation. preparation). encouraged to consult all three reports to obtain a complete account of the evaluation's methods and findings. including enhanced vehicle-based With a digital functions and expanded staff planning tools. which concluded 0 20 .. officers. the battalion evaluation integrated the full range of CVCC capabilities. (in al.

the battalion evaluation was designed to establish a database to help guide TTP and training developments to support utilization of the CVCC system in the armor environment. (O'Brien et al. Because of the expected contributions of the CVCC system to armor battalion operational effectiveness. especially flow of information? What might be the impact of operational utilization of CVCC capabilities on armor battalion TTPs? How will the CVCC system affect requirements for training armor unit leaders and crews? What modifications in CVCC design are necessary to optimize utilization by unit commanders. The framework consists of seven Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs). and to provide input to decisions regarding design of the CVCC system itself. 1991b) provided an established doctrinal basis.Design of the Evaluation I. 1992) and contemporary developments in armor doctrine (e. In generating the research issues linked to the operational effectiveness objective. Each of these objectives formed the basis for specific research issues.. Evaluate the operational effectiveness of armor battalions using the CVCC Experimental configuration. the Blueprint of the Battlefield is a systematic framework for organizing tactical activities. the planning and execution of this evaluation incorporated three overall objectives: 1.. . each of which encompasses a family of related functions required Meade et al. the Blueprint of the Battlefield (Department of the Army.g. The cumulative findings of that research led to an emerging interest in the CVCC's impact on In battalion commanders interacting with company commanders. Investigate operational training issues and concerns 2. converging factors led to the current battalion evaluation. 3. associated with the CVCC. Based on the questions of interest. 1992) brought into focus the These potential role of the company executive officer (XO). XOs. the following four BOSs were selected 21 . An integration of current warfighting principles. compared to conventionally-equipped battalions. with several questions of primary interest. discuss the BOSs in greater detail.Research Issues Previous CVCC research focused on battlefield contributions at the company level and below. and TOC personnel? With these questions forming a foundation. How does the CVCC system impact combat effectiveness and performance of tank battalions? How would the dynamics between company commanders and their XOs influence C3 processes within the battalion. including their relative utility in the context of the battalion evaluation. (in preparation) for effective combat operations. Identify critical SMI concerns and make recommendations regarding CVCC design and utilization. Faulconbridge. evaluation TOC battalion the from learned lessons addition.

What training considerations and implications are important in training unit commanders and crews to operate and utilize the CVCC system? O Hypotheses for each of the BOS-based issues were developed to articulate expected performance impacts of the CVCC system. half of the participating armor battalions used Baseline-configured simulators while the other 22 . Following an independent groups approach to compare the Baseline and CVCC conditions. and manual recording and processing of messages. 4. Does the CVCC system enhance the Maneuver BOS? Does the CVCC system enhance the Fire Support BOS? Does the CVCC system enhance the Intelligence BOS? The training and SMI objectives gave rise to the remaining research issues. Does the CVCC system enhance the Command and Control BOS? 2. and Intelligence. Both Baseline and CVCC conditions (conventional C3 means versus automated C3 tools) were simulated to enable realistic quantification of CVCC contributions to unit leader performance. C3 functions were accomplished by means of voice radio. and a digital link between the CVCC system and the SINCGARS communications system.. Maneuver. These workstations simulated the link between the maneuver elements and the TOC staff. (in preparation): 5. and how do they impact CVCC design? 6. principally the CCD integrated with the POSNAV. for use in this evaluation: Command and Control. as follows: 1. 3. addressed in the companion report by Atwood et al. In the CVCC condition. The CVCC TOC incorporated automated workstations designed to support digital processing of battlefield information. providing a robust capability to exchange digital information. In the Baseline TOC. four research Support. In the Baseline condition. What SMI factors critically affect utilization of the CVCC configuration. These hypotheses are presented in the Performance Measures subsection of this report's Method section. (in preparation). battlefield information was processed manually with the aid of wall charts and staff journals. manual navigation techniques. the manual means available in the Baseline condition were supplemented with the CVCC's enhanced capabilities. paper maps. the CITV. and their rationales are discussed by Meade et al. Fire Based on these BOSs. issues were generated to identify key areas where the CVCC system was expected to improve performance relative to the Baseline system.

Providing the environment for test data collection was a single multi-stage simulated combat scenario. modeling an autoloader. executed. incorporated classroom. manned simulators were not permitted to be killed. and fire support officer (FSO). and three company XOs. Serving as participants were qualified armor soldiers. adjacent Semistutomated opposing unit commanders. assistant operations officer Other support (assistant S3). battalion executed the test scenario only once. each working with a gunner and driver (the This autoloader eliminated the need for a loader/crewmember). incorporating both defensive and offensive stages: an initial delay mission. the relative availability of supporting troops. This structure sampled different types of combat activities. condition. __23 . then a counterattack. forming the following crews within the battalion: battalion commander. subject matter experts (SMEs). The complete test scenario was constructed to be briefed. interacting with battalion The methodology combined MWTB tank simulators TOC elements. and a variety of data collection methods. Experimental Design The primary independent variable. and platoon leaders. and crew and unit practice exercises. battalion S3. three company commanders. by integrating the eight crews formed by the participants with semiautomated forces (SAFOR) under the control of the battalion Progressive training commander or company commanders. These conditions were defined in the preceding subsection. followed by a concluding delay operation. a doctrinally-based combat scenario designed to fully exercise the C3 capabilities of an armor battalion.* half used CVCC-configured simulators. Test support personnel role-played other battalion personnel. A secondary independent variable resulted from the two echelons of manned positions within the battalion's organizational structure: battalion command group (battalion commander and S3) and company This structure command elements (company commanders and XOs). company and battalion among interactions evaluation lessons regarding the importance of the company XO. To optimize scenario consistency. the C3 focus on evaluation's by the shaped was structure manning TOC battalion leaders. generally corresponding to key TOC staff and SAFOR The TOC staff. formed a between-subjects variable with two levels--CVCC and Baseline. supervised hands-on. Each week's participating and debriefed in two-thirds of a day. . staff members played the roles of the brigade commander. assumed the roles of the battalion XO. intelligence officer (S2). Multiple stages within the scenario enabled repeated observations of performance. forces (OPFOR) units comprised the entire enemy force and were controlled by test support personnel to simulate a realistic threat environment. which included military vehicle commanders. and the number of A full tank battalion was constituted available tank simulators.

completed the design. delay--represented requirements resulting primarily from widely varying enemy force structures between the delay and counterattack stages. Data collection was accomplished through a combination of direct observation. automated data collection. but for which no statistical comparisons were planned). one incidental variable. . counterattack. The test different types of combat missions sharing a unifying overall structure. Hnwever. Thus there were three levels of this repeated measures variable. resulted in a between-subjects variable with two levels. In addition. due to the dissimilar performance scenario's three stages--delay. 24 Zu. selfreport questionnaires. and post-scenario debriefings. transcription of recorded radio traffic.. stage (for which data were analyzed separately. Measures of performance were designed to provide quantitative information regarding the four performance research issues outlined earlier in this section. the number of subjects varying between echelons by the ratio 2:6. direct comparison of the stages was not a focus of interest.

all of D Company. held an armor Area of Concentration (AOCs) or were currently qualified in armor Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). materials. One enlisted person served in two separate test weeks. Each officer commanded two crewmembers (gunner and driver) assigned by the battalion commander from the available enlisted personnel. Battalion Configuration In each test week the participants were organized into a test battalion forming the core of the evaluation. members of a given crew had not worked together before. Army personnel and one U. company commander (three). differentiating between the manned simulators and SAFOR. Kentucky. the tank platoons. or company XO (three). and procedures supporting the evaluation. descriptions of the performance measures. including the Marine Corps officer. and methodological limitations are presented. Test Battalions PArticipants A total of 282 U. 25 * . Each group included one major who served as the battalion commander. BLUFOR and manned vehicles collectively can be referred to as Friendly forces. This total included 95 commissioned officers and 188 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted men. support staff.. Blue Forces (BLUFOR) were comprised of all non-manned SAFOR vehicles.Method This section describes the participants. For ten of the twelve test weeks. The unit modeled a tank-pure armor battalion composed of four tank companies. In one of the Baseline test weeks.S. The battalion's remaining combat vehicles (i. B. In addition. In one CVCC test week. all participants were active duty male soldiers stationed at Fort Knox. and a command group. as well as the company commander and company XO vehicles in A. only seven gunners were available so the S3 crew operated without a gunner. no S3 was available.S. 24 personnel (eight officers and sixteen NCOs or enlisted personnel) were provided by supporting units. this resulted in one three-man crew being dropped. and the scout platoon) were represented by SAFOR elements controlled by unit commanders and operated by role-playing test personnel. Figure 2 illustrates the battalion (BLUFOR) configuration (minus the scout platoon and the battalion TOC). * All participants. a six-vehicle scout platoon. and C companies. The remaining officers were assigned the roles of battalion S3 (one). The OPFOR (Opposing Forces) consisted of SAFOR only.e. In general. Marine participated in the twelve test weeks (six Baseline and six CVCC groups). facilities. Participants manned the battalion commander and battalion S3 vehicles in the command group. Ranging in age between 18 and 43.

Illustration of the battalion configuration (minus the Tactical Operations Center and scout platoon). Figure 2. 26 .00 80 .

the TOC. of the to members assigned of the responsibilities detailed list battalion TOC staff can be found in Atwood et al. the Exercise Control Room (ECR). (1992). these staff members performed A communicated with the simulators solely by voice radio. depicted in Figure 4. MWTB facilities used in this evaluation (Figure 3) included a classroom. tasks manually and their condition. role-played The the positions of battalion XO. and loader. These personnel. operations. along with information from other simulation 27 . emulating the functions of a battalion main command post. and several interactive device controller (IDC) boards. gunner. eight vehicle simulators. M1 simulators in the MWTB contain the a simulation host following major functional components: computer. a computer image generation (CIG) system. 1987) while CVCC simulator documentation may be found in the SIMNET Users' Guide (Department of the Army. following paragraphs. and FSO. More complete facility descriptions may be found in previous CVCC publications. The turret crew compartment has stations for the vehicle More detailed descriptions of the commander. TOC staff provided C3 support for combat operations in a standardized and doctrinally-based manner. CVCC condition. IDC boards read the status of crew controls and send the The host processes this information to the host computer. especially O'Brien et Details on these components are presented in the al. and in the SIMNET Combat Vehicle Command and Control (CVC21 System User's Guide (Smith. Test Facilities This subsection describes the test facilities and equipment It also used to control and support training and testing. (in preparation). S2. 1990). a sound system. and fire support. these individuals performed their tasks using the In the Baseline TOC workstations augmented by voice radio. performing as an In the integral part of the battalion organization for combat. The kinematics. and the Data Collection and Analysis (DCA) system. 1989). and fuel systems. the Ml simulator consists of two major sections:' a driver's compartment and a turret crew compartment. Baseline M1 simulators As Eight Ml tank simulators were used in the evaluation. a Stealth station. and the hydraulic. basic simulator components and operation may be found in the NJ SIMNET Operator's Guide (Department of the Army. intelligence. SMEs in the areas of command and control. electrical. information. * . The simulation host computer simulates the vehicle dynamics. assistant S3. describes the equipment used to collect and analyze the data from this evaluation.Battalion TOC Staff Four test personnel (contract employees) staffed the battalion TOC. As a general rule.

elements transmitted over the simulation Ethernet.LOBBY Figure 3.. 28 . The host then sound system (what sounds to transmit). to the STEALTH Eme LOSAI CONTROL ROOM AREA I CLASSROOM MI I . and to the IDC boards (current status of crew controls). Floor plan of the Mounted Warfare Test Bed. Messages about the current vehicle status are transmitted over the simulation Ethernet to other simulators and exercise control systems. sends messages to the CIG system (what views to display).

Basic MI simulator used in the evaluation. The simulator is equipped with a 105 mm main gun capable of firing HEAT and SABOT rounds. the loader's position was occupied by a research staff member (trainer/ observer). The visual system is nor open-hatch views available on the fielded Mi.Gunner Commander Figure 4. limited to views out to 3500 meters. The MWTB simulators were developed using a selective fidelity approach. and a single rotatable view in the loader's station. Gunner's Auxiliary . That is. Sight (GAS). three out-the-window views in the driver's and vehicle commander's stations. Muzzle Reference System (MRS). showing the turret crew compartment and driver's compartment. A headset with boom microphone is used for radio and intercom communication. Because the autoloading simulator required no crewmember/loader. a GPS extension (GPSE) at the commander's station. The Ml simulators do not have the machine guns. a gunner's primary sight (GPS). The vehicle commander's station also includes a rotatable cupola allowing him to manipulate his three out-thewindow views. the simulators do not include all functions and controls found in an actual Ml tank--only those necessary to fight. 29 .

The full cycle time to reload a round after firing is approximately eight seconds. 30 . turret/main gun movement. CVCC simulators used in both the Baseline and CVCC conditions contain several modifications not found in other MWTB Ml simulator configurations. indirect fire. aerial fire. weapons fire. illustrated in Figure 5. POSNAV. In the remaining four and one-half seconds. Weapons fire sounds include direct fire. The sound system recreates realistic battlefield sounds from Vehicle sounds include engine whine. and own-vehicle fire. and the opening or closing of the ammo doors. and impacts. Impact sounds include impacting rounds and misses. The major components distinguishing the CVCC M1 from the Baseline M1 are the CCD. The autoloader is also capable of unloading a round when the gunner changes the ammo select switch before firing. The radios convert voice transmissions into digital signals. The simulator also includes a simulated autoloader. loads a round of the selected type. the simulators used in the CVCC condition include several other major capabilities. CVCC M1 simulators In addition to the basic Ml simulator hardware and software described in the previous paragraphs. and closes the breech and ammo doors. which are broadcast over the simulation Ethernet. and CITV. Each simulator is also equipped with two simulated SINCGARS radios.simulated vehicle operation. Table 3 summarizes the key differences between the M1 simulators used in the Baseline and CVCC conditions. the system opens the breech and the ammo doors. During the first three and onehalf seconds. track movement. This capability also allows voice transmissions to be captured with . These radios replace the CB radios found in other MWTB simulators. the system waits for the gunner to select the desired ammunition type. These components make up the CVCC integrated crewstation area. The gunner's sight is equipped with a Thermal Imaging System (TIS) which can be toggled for the normal daylight view. simulation data broadcast over the Ethernet.

. magnification. main gun LRF) Turret-to-hull reference display CITV (with LRF. Table 3 Comparison of Baseline and CVCC Ml Simulator Capabilities Baseline CVCC Out-the-window views (vision blocks) Paper map with overlays Odometer Grid azimuth indicator Turret-to-hull reference display Main gun laser range finder (LRF) CCD tank icon and status information Digital terrain map and tactical overlays Digital navigation routes Driver's navigation display Taraet acauisition and engaaement Out-the-window views (vision blocks) GPS/GPSE (with TIS. 3 scan modes. polarity) CITV target designate X X X X x X X x X X x x X x x X X X X X x X X X Communications Radio intercom (communication with crew) SINCGARS radios (voice communication) SINCGARS radio interface unit (data communication) Digital combat report communication Digital tactical overlay communication Digital navigation route communication X X X X X X X X 31 . magnification.

functionality modifications have been made to capitalize on 32 . and the platoon evaluation (Du Bois & Smith. the CCD hardware platform has also been upgraded from Iasscomps with approximately 16-20 megabytes of memory to SPARCstation IPXs with 48 megabytes of memory.Figure 5. in preparation). Vehicle commander's crewstation as seen in the CVCC condition. (in preparation). Since the battalion TOC evaluation. A capabilities can be found brief overview of the CCD in the form of a job aid (BDM Federal. Table 4 lists the basic capabilities of the CCD and POSNAV systems. detailed description of functional in Atwood et al. A guide to the functionality and operation of these systems has been prepared Inc. 1992). A and POSNAV systems follows. 1991). al.. At the same time. The new platforms and increased memory have greatly enhanced the processing speed for the CCD and POSNAV components. the company evaluation (Leibrecht et.. Command and Control Display (CCD). The CCD is designed to provide commanders with rapid access to accurate battlefield information and to speed the unit and vehicle commanders' decision cycles. The CCD configuration used in this experiment (SIMNET Version 7) has been upgraded from previous versions evaluated in the battalion TOC evaluation (O'Brien et al. 1992).

the Map menu) and the submenus (e.5-inch diagonal SPARC cathode CCD interface overview. its CCD and shows the display with When the unit function keys.g. the Map Features submenu) when primary keys (e. and terrain features Digital tactical overlays Own-vehicle location (grid and icon) Own-vehicle orientation (azimuth heading and directional icon) Friendly vehicle location icons Report-based icons Graphic navigation routes with waypoints and storage/retrieval Navigation waypoint autoadvance Driver's display (with steer-to-indicator) Diaital Communication Combat report preparation Laser range finder location input to combat reports Send/receive/relay combat reports (including report icons) Receive/relay tactical overlays Send/receive/relay navigation routes Friendly vehicle locations (mutual POSNAV) Automated logistics reports.g. the main display are bottom of the or vehicle commander presses a function key. Table 4 (in preparation) describe the recent changes in the CCD and POSNAV functionalities. Figure 7 by 5. the corresponding The variable menu area menu appears in the variable menu area. C3 Capabilities of the CCD and POSNAV Configuration Digital tactical map with selectable grid lines. findings and lessons learned from iterative CVCC research..75 inch rectangular working area of the CRT.. scales. Back. MAP) and The secondary keys (e. 33 . ray tube (CRT) mounted to the right of the vehicle commander The interface display encompasses only a houses the CCD display. At the POSNAV components.g.g... and Cancel) are pressed.. In the upper-right corner of the display the Information Center displays date/time information along with own-vehicle status elements. tactical map area comprises most of the left portion of the display and shows the features of the terrain database in color. with autorouting General Characteristics Thumb (cursor) control Touchscreen input A 10. Atwood et al. displays the menus (e. Exit.

POSNAQV. The POSNAV component provides vehicle commanders with automated. digital map as well as grid locations and vehicle headings. accurate updates of critical positioning and navigation information. The status information will update as the vehicle 34 * . The Information Center augments the graphic vehicle status information shown by the POSNAV own-vehicle icon. time of day. the platoon evaluation (Du Bois & Smith. such as own-vehicle and other friendly vehicle locations on a tailorable. interface. the company evaluation (Leibrecht et. 1989). See text The unit or vehicle commander controls the operation of the CCD by manipulating a cursor appearing on the display screen. Command and Control Display (CCD) for description. The POSNAV configuration used in this experiment has been upgraded from previous versions evaluated in the battalion TOC evaluation (O'Brien et al. al. 1992). vehicle call sign. The driver uses this information to steer to the next control point. This center displays the date. He selects menus and functions by positioning the cursor on the desired key. 1992). 1991).. The CCD has two input modes. POSNAV also provides the means to create routes and to send navigational information to the driver. own-vehicle heading in degrees. finger touch control utilizing the touch sensitive screen and the thumb control mounted on the commander's control handle. and the six-digit own-vehicle UTM grid location. and the crew evaluation (Du Bois & Smith.-| m - 22 1230 A24 Hdg 221 ES 8463 0279 Route saved 1RCI7 ONFORMATION CENTER IMAIN TACTI FUNCTION KEYS Figure 6.

Table 5 Capabilities of the CITV Configuration Independent thermal search 3X and 10X magnification White-hot and black-hot polarity Gun Line of Sight (GLOS) lock-on Manual search Autoscan Independent LRF Identification iriend or Foe (IFF) Target Designate Own-vehicle icon (directional. 1990) explains the operating features of the CITV. (c) push-button selector switch for basic mode (CITV. The CITV affords the vehicle commander an independent battlefield viewing capability and an independent laser range finder (LRF). functional capabilities of the CITV configuration. GLOS [Gun Line of Sight]). The interface components consist of: (a) rectangular (6. The CITV's capabilities assist in the performance of navigation. described by Quinkert (1988). The commander controls operation of the CITV via inputs from the functional switches and control handle buttons. The SIMNET Combat Vehicle Command and Control User's Guide (Smith. 1992). The control handle is also used to manually control movement of the CITV sensor. BLACK-HOT).88 inches) monochrome CRT display screen with own-vehicle icon and sighting reticle. 1OX). (f) Autoscan control switches for setting sector limits and adjusting scan rate. The interface also includes several target stack push-buttons along the bottom. battlefield surveillance.moves along the terrain or at a rate of approximately every ten seconds. and ON).5 X 5. target acquisition (including the Table 5 lists identification). and fire control tasks. Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer. GPS). all parts moving) Mounted directly in front of the vehicle commander. and designating targets. As in the battalion TOC evaluation (O'Brien et al. the target stack function was inoperative in this evaluation. 35 . MANUAL SEARCH. STANDBY. (d) push-button selector switches for operational mode (AUTOSCAN. (e) two-position pushbutton switch for polarity (WHITE-HOT. (b) three-position toggle switch for power (OFF. (h) control knobs for adjusting brightness and contrast. the CITV display includes control switches around three sides of a central display screen (Figure 7). operating the laser.. (g) control handle push buttons for switching magnification (3X. A brief overview of the system follows.

36 .. interface... . ( AUTO MANUAL GLOS SCAN SEARCH 1 .. Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITy) (Target stack functions. in a Standard Integrated Command Post System (SICPS) tent.) Tactical Operations Center In addition to the vehicle simulators. a battalion TOC supported tactical operations in both the Baseline and CVCC The battalion TOC was located conditions (see Figures 8 and 9). Figure 7.. . See text for description... The following paragraphs describe the battalion TOC configuration for each condition.O PS RAE SET IIiLE r E~FOCUS 1250 (r- MODE) . the same type used for a field-deployed TOC. in the bottom shaded area... The automated TOC (CVCC condition) provided an extension of the CVCC technologies available in the vehicle simulators. . were inoperative.

. unit locations and among units in the field. and the FSO. Floor plan of the battalion Tactical Operations Center Used in the Baseline condition. A fifth workstation. 37 . TOC local area network. the battalion command net and the battalion O&I net. status. The radio configuration in the battalion TOC permitted voice communications using the brigade command net. brigade operations and intelligence (O&I) net. The automated TOC (Figure 9) included four automated workstations and a large-screen Situation and Planning Display (SitDisplay) in lieu of paper-based maps and wall charts. was located just outside the TOC. workstation was located in the ECR and was used to emulate higher The workstations exchanged data on a and adjacent headquarters. which in turn connected to the CVCC Planning Map FS Map FSE Work Area ca V) 0 Cdr/XO Work Area S2 Work Area [S3 Work Area S3 Status Charts SrTMAP O Figure 8. the S2. and other pertinent information were maintained on wall charts and maps. called the SitDisplay It controlled the workstation. The Baseline TOC (Figure 8) was configured to represent the current conventional capabilities Battle reports. The SitDisplay provided a centralized location for individual workstations to post various mission A sixth overlays to gain a composite tactical picture. view shown on the SitDisplay screen and served as a technical "troubleshooting" station. the assistant S3. CVCC battalion TOC . Baseline battalion TOC. The TOC staff updated staff journals manually. The four workstations supported the tasks and responsibilities of the battalion commander/XO.

S2 Workstation

FSE Workstation


S3 Workstation

Cdr/XO Workstation


Figure 9. Floor plan of the battalion Tactical Operations Center used in the CVCC condition. network. This linkage provided the means of implementing command and control procedures and coordination and exchanging information with the vehicle commanders in the manned simulators. The battalion TOC workstations each consisted of a central processing unit, two 19-inch color monitors, a keyboard, and a mouse (Figure 10). The left-hand monitor was a Map Display, portraying a digital military topographical map and manipulated through the keyboard and mouse. This display allowed the user to create, edit, store, and transmit overlays and reports generated from his workstation. The right-hand monitor, called the Communication and Planning Display, presented textual information received from other sources and enabled the creation and processing of overlays. The TOC workstations permitted TOC personnel to perform key command and control functions such as receiving combat information, generating combat orders and overlays, and communicating information within the TOC and throughout the battalion. All TOC workstations had common hardware and functional features, described in Atwood et al. (in preparation). A complete guide to the functionality and operation of the TOC workstations may be found in the Battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOCI Job Aid (BDM Federal, Inc., 1992). 38






.. ............



aI t

• .' " "



Figure 10. Automated workstation used in the battalion Tactical Operations Center for the CVCC condition.

RAdio network
The simulated SINCGARS radio network supported six voice radio nets--brigade command, battalion command, battalion O&1, and three company command nets. Figure 11 shows the radio networks and configuration used in the Baseline and CVCC conditions. All but the battalion 0&i net were available for digital burst transmission of reports and overlays. There was only one battalion digital net, but there were two battalion voice nets, with company XOs on the 0 & I voice net. Seven stand-alone radio-transmitters were used to monitor operational radio nets in the ECR. Six of these were stand-alone SINCGARS simulators. The brigade command net, located at the brigade PVD station, was used by the Battle Master to control the execution of the scenarios and to represent adjacent battalions. During training and the test scenarios, the battalion command net, located next to the battalion PVD, monitored voice messages (e.g., crossing phase lines [PLs], reporting SET). An additional CB radio at the Battle Master's position (brigade 0&I net) permitted private radio communication between the battalion TOC and the ECR.


SAFOR operators monitored the nets appropriate to their roles. During training and the test scenarios, five nets were monitored: three company nets, the battalion command net, and the battalion 0&I net.




Brigade Command Not
Brigade Operation3 & Intelligence Net


A Company Command Net B Company Command Not

Battalion Command Net
Battalion Operations & Intelligence Net


C Company Command Net


CA I note T.






I.¢cmfd in the

.Co Cc

Figure 11. Diagram of the tactical radio networks (voice) implemented in the evaluation. During both conditions, RadioTelephone Operators (RTOs) platoon leaders and the D company role-played subordinate ~~10 SAFOR software routines automatically commander and XO. generated and sent event-driven digital reports to the mannedIn the Baseline condition, simulator CCDs in the CVCC condition. the same reports appeared on the SAFOR workstation and wer then This automated information relayed by the radio operator. During both included CONTACT reports, SPOT reports, and SITREPs. conditions, coordination items (e.g., SET on BP 41) were also sent by voice.
-u I iI i • a.m tl II



Exercise control eauioment The stations controlling the training events, training exercises, and training and test scenarios were located in the ECR. Table 6 lists the control equipment operational during the evaluation. One PVD was used for brigade-level monitoring and one for battalion-level monitoring. The six stand-alone SINCGARS simulators and one CB unit supported administrative control, as well as tactical radio communications. The Management, Command, and Control (MCC) system monitored and controlled the status of the simulators, while a LISTEN station monitored the digital Table 6 List of Exercise Control Equipment Equipment Plan View Display (PVD) SINCGARS simulators (stand-alone) CB radio Management, Command, & Control terminal SIMNET Control Console Semiautomated forces (SAFOR) workstation Battalion TOC workstation (CSS) LISTEN station Quantity 2 6 1 1 1 3 1 1

message traffic. The three SAFOR stations (two for friendly SAFOR and one for OPFOR) supported implementation of all SAFOR activities. A Combat Service Support (CSS) workstation allowed digital communication (e.g., transmission of messages and overlays) between the TOC and ECR. The CSS workstation also accommodated the SEND utility for preparing, retrieving from storage, and transmitting electronic reports from higher and adjacent units. Figure 12 depicts the configuration of the ECR during the battalion evaluation. Descriptions of each station and its use can be found in Atwood et al. (in preparation). Remote communication devices. Each vehicle trainer wore a Maxon 49-HX communicator. These communicators operated as single-channel two-way communication devices permitting each vehicle trainer to communicate with the Floor Monitor. The Floor Monitor could pass administrative information such as the status of a breakdown to the vehicle trainers using the walkie-talkies in order to minimize disruptions and sustain operations. Automated data collection and analysis (DCA) system. The DCA system provided automated data recording, reduction, management, and analysis capabilities. O'Brien et al. (1992) "41

Floor plan of the Exercise Control Room (ECR). showing the layout of exercise control equipment.. These recordings were then available for later reduction and analysis. DataLogger. periodic vehicle appearance DataLogger packets conveying location and orientation). CCD report contents as well as voice radio transmissions broadcast over the simulation network were available for subsequent analysis. The two PVD stations in the control room were used to These flags embed event flags in the DataLogger recordings.ccMonitor Video MCC S• BArray Dde PVD . DataProbeUm included a SIMNET Data Dictionary to der. analysis software package. .g. provide a detailed description of the data collection. A variety of data packets were generated by operator-initiated events (e. one of the elements of the DCA system. a data management and DataLogger recordings. Two DCA subsystems processed the reduction and analysis of DataProbem. extracted data elements from the DataLogger recordings and structured them into intermediate files.g. or crossing of a PL. enabling the accurate 42 .. a radio transmission.LIS•N St~on SINCGARS-• •/ SAFOR Workstations CSS Workstation SSCC .ne and label the various data packets. permitted real-time digital data recording by storing all data packets broadcast by every simulation element on magnetic tape. recorded simulation network data traffic transmitted over the Ethernet in the form of data packets. reduction. Figure 12. a CCD soft-switch press) or by timed cycles (e. indicated key events such as the start of an exercise. and analysis procedures developed for this evaluation.

included general guidelines for participants regarding maneuver. Participant training followed the "crawl-walk-run" approach. navigation aids. crews were encouraged to use POSNAV capabilities and digital reports to meet the training objectives. combat service 43 * ." each crew negotiated a route consisting of a series of checkpoints. and battalion exercises. The scope of this wide range of activities required a variety of training materials. (in preparation) outline the unit training scenarios. Table 7 summarizes the various modules used for individual training. lesson plans. an interactive. company. briefing charts. Training and Test Materials Training Materials isolation of data elements of interest. (in preparation).g. Atwood et al. and operational exercise-control specifications for unit exercises. evaluation instruments) used in the course of this effort. Fuller information on the crew training exercise is available in Atwood et al. In the CVCC condition. RS/lIu. provided in paper form to all commanders. operating in a 5 km by 5 km terrain "sandbox. duct tape for securing overlays to the map cases. Each sandbox also contained BLUFOR vehicles to reinforce proper vehicle identification procedures. trainer checklists. erasable markers for drawing on overlays and maps. Inc. These included: SIMNET terrain maps encased in clear plastic map covers. outlines and performance-based skills tests for hands-on training. Each vehicle commander was provided with a standard set of materials to help him navigate during navigation training and tactical exercises. crews sent tactical reports and engaged enemy vehicles. The support package for the battalion evaluation (BDM Federal. Navigation aids. Every effort was made to provide equivalent training for both conditions despite content differences. engagement. unpublished) contains the actual materials (e. The battalion SOP (actually an SOP "extract"). was used to analyze data from these intermediate files using software routines developed specifically for CVCC databases. beginning with individual training on the use of the various systems and progressing through crew. programmable advanced statistics software package. Unit SOP. communication and reporting. In addition to navigating. unit SOP. Descriptions of materials for individual and crew training can be found in Atwood et al. Crew Training Exercise. operational overlays drawn on clear acetate sheets. (in preparation) describe the materials in each of these modules.. combat support.. Individual training modules. These included detailed lecture materials for classroom training. (in preparation).. and Meade et al. and map protractors for plotting azimuths.

CITV. O Collective training checklists. company. Table 7 Summary of Individual Training Modules Module Introduction/Overview M1 Tank versus Simulator Seat-Specific Orientation SIMNET Navigation (Baseline only) SIMNET Skills Test CCD Demonstration Description Group briefing using script and viewgraphs Group briefing using viewgraphs In-simulator explanation using outline for each crewstation Group briefing using practical exercises Trainer-administered pass-fail task performance Group session using outline and large-screen projection of interface In-simulator orientation using outline (explain-demonstratepractice) Trainer-administered pass-fail task performance Demonstration. CCD. and POSNAV functions the crewmembers were expected to exercise. The SOP for both Baseline and CVCC conditions specified the formats to be used for combat reports. During crew. The checklists also 44 . and command and control. a checklist served to remind the vehicle trainer of the Ml. and battalion training.. in-simulator practical exercises Group briefing using viewgraphs In-simulator session using outline (explain-demonstratepractice) Trainer-administered pass-fail task performance CCD Hands-on CCD Skills Test CCD Refresher CITV Orientation CITV Hands-on CITV Skills Test support.

Table 8 presents an overview of the counterattack. report sent) and entered the flags on logs.. This scenario was based largely on an earlier version Kentucky. (in tactical structure of this scenario. a delay. U. operations orders (OPORDs). In addition to the DCA's Manual data collection loqs. scenarios were based on current doctrine and combined typical elements of realistic offensive and defensive combat operations For these staged on the terrain surrounding Fort Knox. Test-personnel in the of these logs appear in Appendix A.S. control room sent flags (electronic event markers) using the PVD CONTACT to identify key events in the scenarios (e. exercises are described in detail in the battalion evaluation support package (BDM Federal. preparation) for a more detailed description of the scenario. Refer to Meade et al.g. and all supporting materials used to conduct the The company STX. as well as the conditions. Fort Knox. automated data collection capability. Test Materials (in The test scenario was developed Battalion test scenario. standards. Vehicle monitors . and battalion TOC scenario event lists. preparation). Inc. the company situational training exercise (STX) evaluation: (concurrent with battalion staff situational training). and Vehicle logs were completed by ECR and TOC personnel as well as test Copies personnel observing crew activities (vehicle monitors). It was executed in three stages: unpublished). Battle Master. with the assistance of and approved for use by the Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD). Detailed descriptions were developed for each training exercise describing the tasks to be trained during the exercise. the All of these battalion STX. Behavioral Observation. and delay. The tactical training exercises Unit Trainina Exercises. and battalion training exercise.required the vehicle trainers to make judgments on whether or not the equipment was being used correctly and provided vehicle trainers with opportunities to practice report tallying. and the battalion training scenario. unpublished). various manual data collection instruments (summarized below) were used. the first entered manually recorded data for selected performance measures such as the number of CCD-type reports sent over the radio by 45 . These materials checkpoint files (CVCC only) were prepared. . (Smart & Williams. helped the support staff initialize and execute the exercises in A more detailed description of the a standardized manner. Army Armor School. instructions (for the test personnel). developed by Microanalysis and Design. exercises. SAFOR exercise files. provided the participants with opportunities to practice using the equipment to accomplish critical C3 tasks during a tactical Three unit training exercises were used in this mission. collective training events is contained in Meade et al. detailed overlays. Inc. battalion STX. Kentucky. PVD..

reinforced. See Atwood et al. leader's Set up defense Fight two bMRBs(+) Move to Phase II BPs 2. vision In addition. 'Battle positions. move to BPs Fight two MRBs Delay to subsequent BPs bkotorized Rifle Battalion. move to OBJ plan 3.Table 8 Tactical Structure of the Battalion Test Scenario Stage Initial Planning 1. Displacement Counterattack to cOBJ A. Enemy engagement C. Logs were also used to note equipment breakdowns interfering with established test procedures. Enemy Engagement C. plan. information the DCA system was unable to collect (e. Vehicle monitors also gathered their vehicle commander. recon planning. Chemical Attack Major Activities Mission briefing.. -Phase line. Pre-engagement B. Refer to Atwood et al. they recorded any block versus GPSE usage).g. preparation) (in for a copy of the biographical questionnaire.g. Situational assessment guestionnaire. (in preparation). CObjective.. Biographical questionnaire. Receive FRAGO. Delay to Phase II aBPs A. Training assessment questionnaires. a vehicle commander who complained about The PVD and Vehicle lack of sleep after pulling night duty). plan. Fight MRB(+) Receive FRAGO. A copy of the situational assessment questionnaire appears in Appendix A. Pre-engagement B. Receive FRAGO. SMI assessment a'uestionnaires. (in preparation) for a description and copy of the training assessment questionnaire. Pre-engagement B. The SMI assessment questionnaire can be found in Atwood et al. Prepare FRAGO 2 Delay to dPL A. Enemy Engagement C. observations they felt might help explain any unusual performance by a crewmember (e. 46 .

All participants were given a point of contact and telephone number in case any conflicts with their participation arose later. General Instructions to Participants Instructions at the start of the evaluation. (in preparation) for more complete descriptions of the test procedures. preparation) for detail regarding training procedures. Trainina exercise instructions. (in . These briefings were presented to all participants using the actual OPORD as a guide to ensure standardization across rotations. Prior to each training exercise. Copies of the control staff operating guidelines and the contingency rules can be found in Meade et al. data reduction or analysis was adjusted to account for departures from planned procedures. Graphic training aids 47 . Any immediate schedule conflicts of personnel were addressed with the aid of the battalion commander. Each participant received a weekly schedule and the general requirements regarding their support were discussed. and to Meade et al. the battalion received a briefing by the Battle Master. readiness condition [REDCON] 1 time.. training and test procedures. two documents The first specified the procedural rules for control personnel. The second type of exercise control document. and data Control staff oDerating rules. Especially important in the ECR were the SAFOR operating guidelines. evaluation schedule. mission start time). including voice radio protocols. Any significant departures from established control procedures (as might be necessitated by equipment problems) or contingency rules were noted in writing and later reviewed by the research staff for impact on the data collected. This included training objectives for the session and key milestones (in-simulator time. specified the decision process and options for handling contingencies related to technical and personnel problems. To ensure consistent collection and analysis methods. type included operating guidelines for the ECR and TOC staff. implementation of training and testing exercises. contingency rules. Upon reporting to the MWTB. participants received a presentation providing an overview of the evaluation. Scenario instructions. Where necessary. Refer to Atwood et al. such as exercisespecific communication or coordination provisions. Each battalion received a brigade OPORD briefing by the Battle Master followed by a battalion OPORD briefing by the battalion XO. (in preparation). Procedures This section describes the participant instructions. A summary of the procedures follows. The contingency rules helped to ensure personnel and technical problems were handled in a consistent manner across test weeks. The Battle Master also provided special instructions for the exercise at hand.

At the end of the session. All participants received the general introduction as a group.presented the unit's task organization. A uniform sequence was followed for each function: an explanation and demonstration. le: CCD training (CVCC condition only).. requirements. This classroom session O of the function's purpose. An instructor's assistant manipulated the CCD workstation in accordance with the demonstration outline and instructor cues.g. highlighted major differences between the M1 simulator and the M1 tank. describe the importance of the battalion evaluation to the Army's long range goals for improving battlefield performance. the turret-to-hull reference display and the grid azimuth indicator). Copies of all lesson materials are available in the support package for this evaluation (BDM Federal. All vehicle commanders participated. the following sections describe each event. enemy composition and disposition. lc: CCD demonstration Jcvcc condition only). allowing a group to easily view the CCD during the demonstration. and ending with practice by the vehicle 48 ib: M1 tank versus MI simulator. followed by a step-by-step explanation . This equipment training provided detailed instruction and hands-on practice to vehicle commanders in the operation of the CCD and POSNAV. Figure 13 provides an overview of the schedule of events for the CVCC condition. the large-screen monitor mimicked the display of the stand-alone workstation. The objectives of the general introduction were to provide an overview of the battalion evaluation program and schedule. This lecture demonstrated the functionality and operation of the CCD to CVCC commanders. operational graphics on map displays. and reporting Day I events la: General introduction. commander. Id: Vehicle commander seat-specific training. All commanders received training on the M1 simulator's unique features. Evaluation Week Schedule Each evaluation week consisted of a standard sequence of training and testing events. While the vehicle trainers gave a global orientation on most simulator features. they focused on features different from an actual Ml's (e.. Through an electronic interface. A TOC workstation was configured as a stand-alone CCD with a functional CCD screen (mouse-controlled cursor) and the overlays needed for the demonstration. each participant completed a Privacy Act statement and the Biographical Questionnaire. Inc. CVCC-SEND message files were transmitted to the stand-alone CCD during the demonstration. unpublished). describe the test facilities and general procedures to be followed throughout the evaluation.

..~.... W..... Weekly training and testing schedule for the CVCC condition..... in preparation)........ 49 .. Figure 13.... .4! II *.. DataCollection Exercises (DCEs) are addressed in a separate report (Lickteig.. .....

in accordance with the mission. until the commander could perform each task. responding to control staff queries requiring determination of current location or identification of prominent terrain features. to include 50 . and specific directives. for commanders only. This 2b: Gunners/drivers simulator orientation. resection) plus the special tools available in the Ml simulators (e. as needed. This session began with a classroom presentation reviewing conventional navigation procedures (e. The lecture explained the coordination required between the commanders and BLUFOR operators who would. The vehicle trainer read each task to the participant and observed his If performance.. the vehicle trainer conducted remedial training. Hands-on training followed a uniform sequence for each function: an explanation of the function's purpose. intent.if: CCD Skills Test (CVCC condition only).g. the vehicle trainer conducted remedial training until the participant could perform each task. LRF. SIZNET navigation training (Baseline only).g. 1g: CITV training fCVCC condition only). The capabilities and operating characteristics of the SAFOR were addressed in detail. polar plotting. Hands-on training in simulators followed. Day 2 events 2a: CITV Skills Test (CVCC condition only). M1 tank versus M1 simulator lecture. and ending with practice by the vehicle commander. CVCC commanders' proficiency in CITV operation was tested immediately Tuesday morning. An initial classroom session introduced CITV functions and suggested uses. Following administration of the test. grid azimuth indicator). While inside module consisted of a classroom briefing and orientation to BLUFOR (SAFOR) operation. Instruction emphasized command was exercised by the unit commanders in the manned simulators through immediate intervention or FRAGOs. gunners and drivers were given an orientation to the features and functions of their respective simulator crew stations. This test evaluated commander proficiency on CCD operation. simulators. upon completion of the test. Following the . with participants paired so one drove while the other navigated. This training provided detailed instruction and hands-on practice to commanders in the operation of the CITV. control their subordinate forces during tactical execution. Each participant navigated to at least three checkpoints. the Baseline vehicle commanders received training on navigating in the SIMNET environment. necessary. followed by a step-by-step explanation and demonstration.. recording a "Go" or "No-go" on the form. The vehicle trainer conducted this session in the same manner as the CCD Skills Test. 2c: Vehicle commander/SLUFOR operator coordination.

Each crew navigated a six-waypoint route laid out in a 5 km by 5 km terrain square or "sandbox. becoming familiar with the capabilities and procedures of TOC operations. S2. Limitations such as lack of platoon fire commands and inability to split sections were also addressed.I.. and (c) practice providing TOC support to the maneuvering tank companies. Company commanders. the command group (i. and a battalion command group briefing conducted by the Exercise Director and battalion XO. Pre-mission activities for the company STX included an overview briefing by the Exercise Director. company commanders and scenario XOs practice in working with SAFOR 29': Battalion staff situational training. (b) provide the TOC staff an opportunity to understand the operating "style" of the commander and S3. battalion XO. the command group operated "off-line" (i. Assistant S3..e. Training objectives were to (a) orient the command group on TOC capabilities and limitations.I formations. The was designed to provide the platoons.. Participants were briefed on the overall performance of the unit during the company STX.I. In this two-stage exercise. the command group could rotate at will between their simulator and the TOC.I. In 51 . 0 2f: Company STX. there was a brief review of battalion SOP and the role of company XOs in reporting. speed (both rate of movement a. Concurrent with the company STX. 2h: Company ST2 debrief. 2d: Tank crew training. Opportunities for initial practice of target engagement and combat reporting tasks were also provided." SAFOR elements provided engagement opportunities and commanders were instructed to send reports based on events encountered during the exercise. focusing on proper responses. When a crew completed its route. All participants practiced collective crew tasks and skills focusing on crew coordination. battalion commander and S3) and the TOC staff (i. mission preplanning by participants. and terrain negotiation... only interacted with the TOC while the Battle Master role-played the commander/S3). an OPORD briefing by the Battle Master.. This process continued until the time allotted for the module had expired. .•i response time). At the end of crew training. coordination of fires. the commander and the S3 were restricted to their respective simulators. and FSO) practiced working together in parallel with the company STX battlefield activities. navigation. but remained in an observer role.. During stage one. its simulator was re-initialized in a new sandbox to negotiate another route.e. During stage two. XOs and their crews executed the company level scenario with minimal involvement of the TOC.e.II.. The Battle Master pointed out instances in which participants did not act in accordance with the battalion SOP or scenario instructions and described procedures for correcting these discrepancies. 2e: Company STX =re-brief.. observing activities and listening to communications as the STX unfolded.. and engagement criterion.

manned simulators from being killed. a refresher (for unit and vehicle commanders only) followed the battalion STX This session began with an abbreviated CCD debriefing. battalion commander was given options in conducting the All elements in the battalion. and to allow research staff members to answer participants' (a) the protection of The key issues addressed were: questions. Day 3 events 3a: Battalion STX pre-brief.addition. with the TOC staff taking part in coordination and As part of the mission preparation for the Baseline preparation. with emphasis on navigation tasks. demonstration highlighting common problems. is feedback was provided from the test support staff and participants regarding issues such as reporting performance. condition. Each crew used the same sandbox as they did during crew training. execute a defense. Pre-mission activities for the battalion STX followed the same general structure as other The battalion XO briefed the training and test scenarios. 3c: Battalion STX debrief. battalion OPORD. repeated the crew sandbox exercise. training session reinforce CCD operating procedures. navigating on their own. negotiating the checkpoints in reverse order. To Navigation refresher training (Baseline condition only). the potential impacts on the evaluation's findings were discussed. playing responsibilities. To 3d: CCD refresher training (CVCC condition only). battalion TOC staff. The purpose of this session was to clarify rolecommanders. the basic research concerns were explained. with special reference to key issues. Phase one required the participants to included two phases. For the CVCC condition. an execution matrix was provided to the battalion commander and the S3 depicting the phases of the operation and indicating the sequence of activities for each subordinate unit. (b) the possibility of unrealistically aggressive behavior (dubbed "Rambo" behavior). and (c) the potential for crews to follow SAFOR instead of The . For each of these issues. and guidelines for role52 . the Course of Action (COA) overlay was activated on the large-screen monitor in the TOC where the battalion XO "walked through" the operation for the commanders and S3 using sequenced phasing techniques of the COA module. and participants conducted mission planning and preparation. each Baseline test group received a navigation refresher training session following the This crew level exercise basically battalion STX debriefing. The battalion training exercise 3b: Battalion STX. The battalion STX debrief was conducted in the same manner as the company STX debrief. and concluded with a message processing exercise. reinforce SIMNET navigation procedures. while phase two required a counterattack. participated in the exercise. including the counterattack. A mid-week officers call was held for all Officers call.

During stage one. This permitted the battalion XO to lead the commanders and staff on a standardized reconnaissance over the simulated terrain. The battalion training scenario was executed in two stages. the commanders received a short orientation to the Situational Assessment questionnaire. The S2 was available at the Stealth to respond to queries about the enemy or terrain.playing behavior were provided. The battalion XO attached the Stealth sensor to a vehicle simulator which moved according to a previously recorded route. The battalion training scenario debrief was conducted in the same manner as the company STX and battalion STX debriefs. the Stealth followed. To ensure consistency of the starting conditions at each stage for all rotations. Pre-mission procedures for the battalion test scenario followed the same 53 . In stage two. the battalion executed a delay operation. the brigade issued a warning order followed by the counterattack FRAGO. enemy avenues of approach (no OPFOR vehicles were visible) and areas of terrain masking. The Battle Master briefed participants on the brigade OPORD. the S3. The participants were given a brief reorientation (if required) prior to beginning stage two. 3a: Situational assessment. structure as for the training scenarios. This reconnaissance technique immediately followed the battalion OPORD briefing. 3h: Battalion training scenario debrief. In stage one. which initiated the battalion planning process during the conduct of the delay. The TOC staff was available and participated in coordination and planning. Pre-mission preparation included a leader's reconnaissance conducted for the battalion commander. highlighting friendly positions. and the battalion XO briefed participants on the battalion OPORD. informal manner. a standardized FRAGO was issued in lieu of the one developed by the commander and staff. Day 4 events . 3f: Battalion training scenario. engagement areas. and the three company commanders. they executed a brigade-directed counterattack. 4a: Battalion test scenario pre-brief. broker" role. This session was conducted in an with the research staff exercising an "honest- 3e: Battalion training scenario pre-brief. As the vehicle maneuvered on the battlefield. Details of the questionnaire were addressed earlier. At the end of the battalion training scenario. Pre-mission activities for the battalion training scenario followed the same general structure as the other training and test scenarios. Stage two was initiated with the issuance of the battalion counterattack FRAGO.

This self-paced questionnaire also solicited . counterattack. and the Battle Master supervised collective training in order to maintain quality control and standardization of procedures. A detailed questionnaire asked all participants to rate the quality and effectiveness of the three days of the training they received during the first opinions for improving each of the training modules.. in preparation). tactical scenario with three stages: 4b: Battalion test scenario. At the end of the test scenario. target detection and identification. Evaluation Week participant's role. brigade warning order/FRAGO. navigation methods). outlined the training events and participant involvement. condition. 4d: Battalion test scenario debrief. and unit training. 4c: Situational assessment.. Atwood et al. An earlier subsection. The same completion of the brigade-directed counterattack. stages in the battalion training scenario (force orientation was Stage three was a continuation of the delay after different). questionnaire was also self-paced. outlines the materials used to accomplish individual. Schedule. Training of Participants The training program was tailored by test condition and the The preceding subsection. To ensure realistic command and professional role playing was 54 evaluation.g. similar to that presented in the orientation at the conclusion of the battalion training scenario.e. crew. The battalion executed a delay. The battalion test scenario debrief was conducted in the same manner as the debrief In at the conclusion of the battalion training scenario. The Floor Monitor supervised individual training. participants were queried as to techniques used to accomplish certain tasks (e. addition. In the CVCC 4f: SMI evaluation (CVCC commanders only). sequence of events linking stages one and two (i. a detailed questionnaire was administered to the commanders to obtain their opinions and insights about the design Completion of this and operation of the CCD and CITV interfaces. 4e: Training assessment. IFF. Data Collection Exercise events on Day 4 and Day 5. Training and Test Materials. Participants in this evaluation also completed a series of These exercises are special Data Collection Exercises (DCEs). (in preparation) discuss the training procedures in substantial detail.. described in detail elsewhere (see Lickteig. each commander completed a Situational Assessment This questionnaire was questionnaire outside his simulator. and Stages one and two were similar to their counterpart delay. battalion planning/FRAGO) was also used to accomplish the transition from stage two to stage three. control and combat performance. Professional role plaving.

significant equipment breakdowns. entered flags corresponding to key tactical and administrative Examples of these events included the start and end events. role-played by members of rotations. This behavior is commonly referred attitude of invincibility). and selected data elements. unrealistic force attrition or tactical maneuvers). served as important sources of data during manual data reduction. synthesizing critical battlefield information. The officers call.. The flags and logs were used to break scenario recordings into discrete mission stages. use of the chain-of-command. 1992) indicated some test participants exhibit unrealistic risk-taking behavior This evaluation utilized a kill-suppress during evaluations. and to adjust PVD logs also performance measures for unscheduled breaks. also kept a log that provided additional information related to the flags. to as "Rambo" behavior.g. assisted the battalion commander by preparing tactical overlays. discourage to factor "Rambo" on the emphasis was placed unrealistic risk-taking. . pace of battlefield activities realistically commander that the commander or S3 visits to the TOC.e. Data Collection Standard DataLogger procedures were employed in collecting All test exercises were recorded on magnetic automated data..d control procedures to maintain consistency between conditions and The battalion TOC staff. this option is suspected to contribute to that risk-taking behavior (i. however. and maintaining a broad picture of the entire battlefield. Unrealistic behavior had a strong potential to As a result. 55 . significant vehicle/unit movement events (e. and non-attributed examples at the debriefings. The PVD operator crossing the LD). battalion did not accommodate Detailed discussion of the procedures followed in executing and controlling training and test scenarios can be found in Meade et al. scheduled breaks.. PVD operators tape for subsequent reduction and analysis. specifically emphasized the importance of professional role Special playing and the potential impact on the test results. compromise test integrity and skew test results (e.g.O mandated. points of the scenario. addressed earlier. option to protect manned vehicles. Past CVCC research efforts (O'Brien et al. While exercise participants could conduct pre-mission planning and coordination in the TOC. Scenario Execution Each scenario was executed according to establishe. (in preparation). the support staff. they were not permitted to enter the TOC The Battle Master advised the battalion during the exercises. implemented and participants monitored staff the test support corrective action when unrealistic behavior was observed.. Feedback to the participants included individual counseling.

team. Test collection instrument (e. and descriptive analyses. and interactions among crewmembers. Each step is summarized below. Data Reduction and Analysis al soldiers.. data. each To protect the privacy of individr. participant was assigned a unique number at the start of the This number was used in place of the individual's evaluation. To organize the manually collected Database management.. Reduction and analysis of data proceeded through three steps: database management (data entry and quality control). B Company commander. provided intermediate data for the reduction process described in the following section. radio reduction forms were developed to guide the data reducer carefully through each step. When the data reduction forms were complete. two steps of The first data reduction. comments and suggestions were participants' scenarios.g. Recorded observations of the B Company XO) in the test scenario. collected data (e. control procedures were implemented to verify the accuracy of data entry. manual and automated for this sequence were tailored . name on all data collection instruments. In the case of automated data collected by DataLogger. data. using 100% review of print-outs. individual cases in all database activities. Biographical Questionnaire). Test personnel received training in Data reduction forms were also spotadministering these forms. data each For messages). use of paper map and visual display devices. A number of measures required hands-on Data reduction. vehicle monitors completed simulator logs for selected vehicles (battalion commander. Research team members reviewed printouts of these files.g. except for the This numbering system identified Biographical Questionnaire. directly entered into DBMS files. respectively. radio communications.In addition. participant's behavior included actions such as equipment operation. checked by experienced behavioral scientists on the test support . transcribed by test support personnel. counts of voice manually processing of measure in this category. support personnel entered data into these files using dBASE III+1V Quality customized data entry screens on a personal computer. S3. These files checking for out-of-range or inconsistent data. Test personnel administered the previously-described questionnaires to participants at designated points during the During the debriefs following the training and test test week. DataProbeU extracted raw data from magnetic tapes recorded during the test scenario and RS/lm organized the resulting data into files. a set of database management system (DBMS) files was Individual files were created for each manual data created. the data were 56 .

parametric analyses of individual measures were accomplished The principal using SPSS' univariate ANOVA procýedures. handling both missing and contaminated data was to omit the Only those measures/values affected measures from analyses. distributions. transmission time. COMPUTE.g.g. echelon (two levels. playing through individual transmissions as many times as necessary to verify what was said. radio communications automated data. then entered them into a database for later analysis. medians. literal observing tactical progress on a PVD. Inferential analyses. Special A time stamp was obtained for each transmission. data packets from the DataLogger-recorded files established during creation of the automated database were combined by RS/lTM to produce specified The data elements defined for each performance measure measures.ta could be produced by equipment malfunctions or crew The general rule for adjustments due to participant absences. support personnel reduced the data for selected measures (e. 57 . V2. from a unit's failure to complete the test scenario due to Also. process resulted in a set of American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) files containing DataLogger-based data for all test weeks. To reduce the automated data. This lengthy were used to set up the DCA analysis routines.. da. and stage. attention was paid to voice reports which could also be supported by the CCD (e. Prior to analyzing manual and Missing data may have resulted contaminated data were applied. with two levels (CVCC and Baseline). test accuracies. reduced sample size across cells and across measures.0) was used for all data The (SPSS/PC+ is a registered trademark of SPSS Inc. battalion . with three levels. and company). The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences for the IBM Personal Computer (SPSS/PC+TM. recorded during execution of the scenarios to transcribe Test support personnel used playback o. independent variables guiding these analyses were condition. Contaminated occasionally skipped a question on a questionnaire. test support personnel listened to one radio net at a time while A complete. and standard The CROSSTABS procedure generated frequency deviations. To test performance effects. participants equipment failures or participant absences. two for all Baseline and CVCC test weeks. REPORT procedure computed means.) analyses. Transcription was accomplished individual voice transmissions. This strategy influenced by the unplanned event were omitted. accuracy) using manual data reduction forms. a CONTACT report) to determine their Once playback of radio traffic was complete. Working as a team. including percent response breakouts for Other procedures included MEANS and questionnaire items. procedures for accommodating missing and Descriptive analyses.. transcription was recorded..

and tactical map with POSNAV icons and overlays were expected to provide an overall advantage for a subset of Maneuver BOS tasks. Du Bois & Smith. 1992. fire support. (b) navigate. stated the CVCC units' performance on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units' regarding the (a) move on the surface. (d) engage direct fire targets. Du Bois & Smith. these operational issues provided the foundation for organizing hypotheses to describe the expected The differences between the CVCC and Baseline configurations. and usage of equipment. including the hypotheses and the structure organizing them.1 through 1.g. control of terrain. 1991. Issue 2: Does the CVCC system enhance the Fire Support BOS? Only a very limited subset of the Fire Support BOS was addressed The inputting of target location grids by in this evaluation. this current set of performance measures was built on preceding CVCC efforts. target acquisition and engagement. 58 . operational issues and hypotheses follow. 1991). Quinkert. respectively. has been documented by Leibrecht et al. Thus. and (e) control terrain. the research issues spanned command and control.5.Performance Measures This subsection explains the set of measures developed to quantify the performance impact of the CVCC system. tactical The maneuver. The current set of performance measures was derived from the In turn.. based on the results of data analysis and The process followed in developing the measures lessons learned. encompassed tactical movement and navigation. As discussed in the Design of the Evaluation section of this report. situational assessment. Organization of Measures The operational issues underpinning the evaluation have been presented in the Design of the Evaluation section of this report. measures used in the battalion TOC evaluation were based on measures from earlier CVCC efforts (e. Issue 1: Does the CVCC system enhance the Maneuver BOS? The CVCC system's CITV.. Leibrecht et al. 1989. Hypotheses 1. comprehensive a quantified evaluation this measures supporting The measurement categories cross-section of unit performance. Based on four BOSs from the Blueprint of the Battlefield (Department of the Army. gathering and processing of battlefield information (enemy and friendly). 1992). steer-to display. (in preparation). 1990).. the battalion TOC evaluation (O'Brien et al. digital messaging capability was expected to provide an advantage for fire support tasks under the CVCC condition. (c) process ability to: direct fire taraets. ano intelligence activities. lasing or touching the tactical map combined with the CCD's .

Navigate. including the tactical map with digital overlays and digital report capabilities.1 through 3. stated the CVCC units' performance on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units' regarding the (a) receive and transmit the mission.. A related hypothesis (SAl) stated that the CVCC unit leaders' performance on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline unit leaders' regarding the ability to assess the battlefield situation. Process Direct Fire Targets. 59 . operational measures are presented and organized by the hypotheses within each operational Hypotheses were stated in the preceding subsection. Engage Direct Fire Targets. respectively. (b) receive ability to: and transmit enemy information. The advantages provided by the CVCC system for gathering enemy information using the tactical map (e.g. Table 9 presents the operational measures for Issue 1 which were developed to address the following Maneuver BOS functions: Move on Surface. were expected to positively impact command and control performance.1: The CVCC unit leaders' ability to collect threat information on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units'. and (c) receive and transmit friendly troop information. Hypothesis 4.1: The CVCC units' ability to conduct surface attagk by indirect fire on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units.4 and 3. and (b) direct and lead subordinate forces.Hypothesis 2. . Hypotheses 3.5 stated the CVCC unit leaders' performance on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline unit leaders' regarding the ability to: (a) manage means of communicating information. Does the CVCC system enhance the Intelligence BOS? Issue 4. List of Measures In the paragraphs that follow. issue. Hypotheses 3. Issue 3: Does the CVCC system enhance the Command and Control BOS? The CVCC's enhanced features.3. and Control Terrain. inputting enemy locations by lasing or touch) and digital reporting via the CCD were expected to allow CVCC groups to outperform Baseline groups in collecting threat information.

3. Table 9 Operational Measures by Maneuver BOS Function MEASURE i 1. manned vehicles Kills/round ratio. 1.9 1.11 1.14 1.1 1.1 1.4.6 1.8 1.2.2. manned vehicles Kills/hit ratio.2.5 1.1..3.1 1.7 1.4.4 1. by echelon Number of OPFOR vehicles killed south of PL King Number of OPFOR vehicles killed south of PL Club Number of OPFOR vehicles killed south of PL Queen Number of OPFOR vehicles killed south of PL ACE (Table continues) 60 .4 1.3 1.6 1.4.2 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.4.3 1.10 1. manned vehicles Number of manned vehicles sustaining a killing hit Number of rounds fired by manned vehicles.2 1.1.3 1.3 Title MOVE ON SURFACE Distance between BLUFOR and OPFOR Center of Mass Time to reach Line of Departure Exposure Index Range to OPFOR at displacement Time for companies to reach objective (Stage 2) NAVIGATE Distance travelled Fuel used Mean time out of sector/axis Mean time misoriented Time to complete exercise PROCESS DIRECT FIRE TARGETS Time to acquire targets Time between lases to different targets Time from lase to first fire O 1.1 Maximum lase range Number of fratricide hits by manned vehicles Number of fratricide kills by manned vehicles ENGAGE DIRECT FIRE TARGETS Percent of OPFOR killed by end of stage Percent of BLUFOR killed by end of stage Losses/kill ratio Mean target hit range Mean target kill range Percent OPFOR vehicles killed by all manned vehicles Hits/round ratio.

4 CONTROL TERRAIN Number of OPFOR vehicles penetrating designated line (counterattack) Was the battalion bypassed by the OPFOR? Number of OPFOR vehicles penetrating designated line (delay) Number of OPFOR vehicles that crossed PL Queen Table 10 presents the operational measures for Issue 2 which were developed to address the Conduct Surface Attack function of the Fire Support BOS.1.5.5. 0 61 .3 1.. Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information.5. Manage Means of Communicating Information.5.1 2.1. Table 9 Operational Measures by Maneuver BOS Function (Cont'd) MEASURE 1. Receive and Transmit Enemy Information.2 1. and Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces. Assess Situation.2 CONDUCT SURFACE ATTACK Mean accuracy of CFF locations Percent of CFFs with correct type Table 11 presents the operational measures for Issue 3 which were developed to address the following functions of the Command and Control BOS: Receive and Transmit Mission. Table 10 Operational Measures by Fire Support BOS Function MEASURE 2.1 1.

5.3.3.I SA1.1 3.2 3.1.1 3.4 Did Task Force prevent decisive engagement? Did the battalion withdraw intact? Number of counterattacking companies engaging OPFOR To what extent did the battalion meet the brigade commander's intent? ASSESS SITUATION During the last stage.2.1 RECEIVE AND TRANSMIT MISSION Elapsed time from battalion transmission of FRAGO to receipt by company commander/XO Duration of request by company commander to clarify FRAGO/overlay Consistency of relayed FRAGO RECEIVE AND TRANSMIT ENEMY INFORMATION battalion Time to transmit INTEL report full net: 3.2 3. by echelon 3.5 TOC to lowest manned net Consistency of relayed INTEL RECEIVE AND TRANSMIT FRIENDLY TROOP INFORMATION Mean time to transmit SITREP full net: lowest net to battalion TOC Deviation of BLUFOR location reported in SITREP from actual location Delay between observed phase line/line of departure/FCL crossing and reported crossing Delay between observed battle position arrival and reporting SET at battle position Elapsed time from request for fuel and/or ammunition report until received by battalion TOC (Baseline only) MANAGE MEANS OF COMMUNICATING INFORMATION Average length of voice radio transmissions.2 3.4.3 3. how many (S 3) destroy? battalion company or (Table continues) 62 SA1.2 .3 3.4.3 3. excluding named reports DIRECT AND LEAD SUBORDINATE FORCES 3.1 3.1.1 3.4 3.3.2 Mean duration of voice transmissions between battalion TOC and battalion commander/S3.Table 11 Operational Measures by Command and Control BOS Function MEASURE how many OPFOR tanks did (Stage 3) your company or battalion destroy? BMPs did your During the last stage.

5 Accuracy of SPOT report locations Correctness of SPOT report number and type Accuracy of SHEL report locations Accuracy of CONTAC7 report locations with correct type Percent CONTACT -orts of sample measures and their operational definitions A list appears in Appendix B. .1.. This staff also administered manual data collection instruments. (1992). Table 12 Operational Measures by Intelligence BOS Function MEASURE COLLECT THREAT INFORMATION 4.1 4.5 MEASURE 2Title During the last stage.4 SA1. how many tanks in your (Stage 3) company or battalion were destroyed? During the last stage.3 4.3 SA1. can be found in O'Brien et al.1. operating the ECR stations.1. 63 . Table 13 summarizes the primary responsibilities assigned to each member of the support staff daring the training and testing scenarios. in preparation).1. how far was your initial battle position from your subsequent battle 'Stage 3) position? Table 12 presents the operational measures for Issue 4 which were developed to address the Collect Threat Information function of the Intelligence BOS.1. and operating the surrogate battalion TOC. where the emphasis is on measures whose definitions have changed since the report of preliminary data from the battalion evaluation (Leibrecht et al. A more complete list SuDDort Staff The test support staff was responsible for training exercise participants. controlling all scenarios and exercises.2 4.Table 11 Operational Measures by Command and Control BOS Function (Cont'd) £ SA1. did you company or battalion destroy any enemy vehicles after the (Stage 3) order to delay was given? During the last stage.4 4.

Floor Monitor. Battle Master. The Event Coordinator. adjacent unit commanders. and C Companies "*Implement battalion commander's orders/directives to D Company and scouts "• Coordinate BLUFOR activities with Battle Master * Coordinate radio messages with Radio Operator V 64 (Table continues) .The Exercise Director retained overall decision-making authority for all matters regarding the conduct of training and testing. B. and others assisted the Exercise Director in ensuring proper Table 13 Responsibilities of the Exercise Control Staff During Scenarios Exercise Director "*Oversee overall scenario execution "*Implement procedures for accommodating unplanned events "*Serve as Assistant Battle Master "* Monitor and operate CSS workstation (CVCC condition) "* Operate SEND program "• Administer questionnaires to gunners and drivers Event Coordinator "*Inform Exercise Director and ECR staff of simulator and TOC status "*Troubleshoot and coordinate site support in the event of equipment malfunctions "• Document equipment problems "*Oversee VCR operation "• Administer questionnaires to vehicle commanders " Coordinate automated data collection Battle Master "*Initialize MCC and CSS workstation "• Supervise scenario execution within control room "*Supervise control room staff "• Conduct brigade orders briefing for participants "*Maintain Battle Master log "* Assume roles of brigade commander. brigade staff "* Conduct post-scenario debriefings "• Maintain contact with TOC to coordinate scenario execution OPFOR Operator fSAFOR) "*Initialize OPFOR workstation prior to execution "• Control actions of OPFOR "*Coordinate OPFOR activities with Battle Master BLUFOR Operators (SAFOR) "• Initialize BLUFOR workstation prior to execution "• Implement company commanders' orders/directives to platoons in A.

role-played the brigade commander and staff. In addition. This permitted decentralized execution consistent with the research plan. The Event Coordinator primarily coordinated activities between the ECR. two BLUFOR operators.Table 13 Roles and Responsibilities of the Exercise Control Staff During Scenarios (Cont'd) Radio Operators "*Role-play platoon leaders. and XOs "*Coordinate radio communication between BLUFOR elements and Ml simulators PVDMonirto "* Record significant events using log and PVD flags "* Record breakdowns and other contingencies on PVD Log "* Maintain PVD Log Floor Monitor "*Supervise RAs during scenarios " Coordinate with RAs and simulator technicians to help resolve equipment problems Research Assistants (In simulators) "*Train crews and answer questions "* Record key performance events on log "* Notify Floor Monitor of system malfunctions and troop problems S Record equipment problems on maintenance log " Administer Situational Assessment questionnaire execution of events. and other tactical elements. the Exercise Director supervised the overall conduct of the scenarios and served as the Assistant Battle Master. At the conclusion of each scenario. and ensured the ECR was set up prior to the start of each exercise. the Battle Master conducted the debriefing. battalion TOC. Based in the ECR. The Battle Master. two radio operators. assisted by the ECR staff. and a PVD monitor also worked in the ECR. an OPFOR operator. and the vehicle simulators throughout the training and test scenarios. company commanders. The Battle Master maintained primary responsibility for scenario execution. 6 65 . he supervised the ECR staff during execution to ensure strict adherence to the operating procedures and to the scenario events list. He also presented the brigade OPORD (pre-mission briefing). adjacent and supporting unit personnel. The Battle Master.

The voice radio nets were identical in both conditions: company command and battalion command nets for company commanders. the fifth day of testing in this evaluation put the battalion through a series of Data Collection Exercises with crews reallocated to form a completely manned platoon (Lickteig. The Floor Monitor also assisted the Event Coordinator by notifying site support staff (technicians) during equipment malfunctions. from certain design choices. and other information to their SAFOR elements. these factors also may have affected the battalion's command and control dynamics. Thus. four vehicle monitors collected data on crew performance. the CVCC-equipped company XOs had the battalion command digital net instead of a digital O&I net. Further. Radio net differences between the Baseline and CVCC conditions complicate the interpretation of communication-based performance. as appropriate. These factors may have influenced the flow of information within the battalion. The working framework used by the company commanders and XOs to interpret SAFOR-generated reports may have varied across individuals. battlefield information from the wingman and platoon leader levels originated from SAFOR algorithms or from BLUFOR operators. Their responsibilities included training participant crews on the operation of the simulators (Baseline During the test and CVCC) and the CVCC equipment (CVCC only). scenario. and tracking the status and resolution of these problems. are discussed in this subsection. In combination with the lack of Fire Support Team (FIST) personnel within the companies. The Floor Monitor supervised the trainers/monitors. there was no strong incentive for company commanders and XOs to relay INTEL reports. When the CVCC TOC transmitted digital reports and FRAGOs on the battalion command net. in preparation). which may impact the evaluation's results and their interpretation. FRAGOs. the lowest echelon manned within the battalion was the company level (company XO). One practical consequence was the limited ability to study transmission of reports across echelons. the company commanders and company XOs received them at the same time. However. and occasionally from implementing procedures. company command and battalion O&I nets for company XOs. Because of this limitation. Methodoloaical Limitations A number of methodological limitations stemmed from the simulation technology itself. the company XOs did not receive them until the company commanders relayed them on the company command nets. These limitations. But when the Baseline TOC . Facility-based issues have been provided to the MWTB site manager for action.O Eight Research Assistants (RAs) served as vehicle trainers/monitors. In other words. Given the allocation of manned simulators. transmitted voice reports and FRAGOs on the battalion command net. This 66 . only SAFOR elements were operative at the platoon level.

circling around tree canopies. SAFOR vehicles never committed fratricide. Also. target engagement performance in this 67 . for example. The simulation algorithms modelling ballistic performance.g. such as time to transmit INTEL reports Due to limited processing capacity of each simulator's computer image generator. SAFOR responsiveness was sometimes slowed by keyboard command requirements. Several factors posed special challenges to the crewmembers as they strove to role play professionally. and probability of kills were based on outof-date 105 mm service round data. including actual combat. Altogether. OPFOR platoon vehicles did not disperse when artillery fell. the simulation implementation of target lead differed appreciably from the fielded tank. depriving the driver of important visual information. these azid similar limitations require caution when attempting to apply findings to other environments. In addition.methodological difference would be expected to impact selected aspects of communications. making it difficult for gunners to master firing at moving targets. Compounding this was the lack of a clear. Thus. especially since one SAFOR operator controlled the actions of several platoons. this limitation could somewhat compromise performance related to positioning and navigation. Occasional collisions resulted. if a vehicle commander found it necessary to verbally guide his driver. Combining manned and BLUFOR vehicles in the same unit meant crews could follow BLUFOR elements instead of navigating for themselves. and FRAGOs. so the crew may have discovered that ignoring them on the overlay carried no penalty. As with other DIS evaluations. The mid-week officers call addressing these issues was designed to ensure participants were clear about their role-playing responsibilities. and perhaps reduce overall attention to C3 activities. Constraints limiting SAFOR behavior compromised the realism of the simulated battlefield. Additionally. probability of hits. the driver's vision blocks occasionally failed to display surrounding vehicles properly. Vehicle images could flash intermittently or disappear for extended periods. Maneuver options for SAFOR units were limited. These problems degraded the driver's ability to maintain proper position within a tactical formation and to steer clear of neighboring vehicles." Crews occasionally appeared to be engaging in "Rambo" behavior. In addition. the commander's ability to fight his unit or his vehicle may have suffered. Unrealistic movement of SAFOR elements occurred (e. due to perfect IFF capabilities. scrambled patterns when two units intersect).. immediate signal telling the crewmembers their vehicle had taken a killing hit. mine fields and obstacles were not implemented on the terrain database. failure to follow cover and concealment principles. The use of kill suppress to protect manned simulators may have encouraged unnecessary risk-taking when crews discovered they were "invincible.

battalion evaluation cannot be considered representative of actual tank gunnery performance. 68 ..

Detailed profiles for each group appear in Meade et al. including Basic/Advanced NCO Course attendance. (1992) defined the basic set of measures. this report presents only part of the results from the battalion evaluation. (in preparation). Rank as well as active duty experience levels (both armor and non-armor) were comparable for unit and vehicle commanders. Appendix B presents the updated definitions for the modified measures. Meade et al. key data from the Biographical Questionnaire were examined. To assess how well the Baseline and CVCC participants were matched in terms of basic qualifications. possibly conferring a relative advantage on the Baseline battalions. O'Brien et al. This difference in favor of the Baseline NCOs and enlisted personnel extended to military schooling. Two Baseline battalions and one CVCC battalion completed only part of Stage 3 of the test scenario. (in preparation) discuss operational performance with special emphasis on the potential impact on armor tactics.Results and Discussion This section describes and discusses the results of the evaluation. The organization of data follows the evaluation's four operationallybased research issues: (a) command and control. the experience differences between the Baseline and CVCC gunners and drivers are not considered a major factor. along with selected measures chosen to provide an across-the-board sampling. The reader is encouraged to review all three reports for a complete account of the evaluation's findings and their implications. but several definitions have changed since the battalion TOC evaluation. crews were generally not used to working together. including target engagement. and (d) collection of intelligence information. with emphasis on the battalion's operational effectiveness as well as performance of unit commanders and company XOs. (c) attack by indirect fire. to some degree. with a focus on questionnaire-based data and equipment usage measures. Focusing on operational effectiveness. and procedures. including an examination of the comparability of the independent samples assigned to the Baseline and CVCC conditions. General considerations lead the presentation. Given the evaluation's focus on C3 processes and the central role of the unit and vehicle commanders. At the same time. The difference might have influenced target engagement and navigation performance. active duty experience was significantly greater for Baseline gunners and drivers than for their CVCC counterparts. Atwood et al. the training which they received during the test week should have been a levelling factor. making it 69 . The measures of performance supporting this evaluation have been listed in the earlier Performance Measures subsection of this report. (in preparation) document the results pertaining to training and SMI issues. techniques. However. (b) battlefield maneuver. Circumstances in executing the evaluation occasionally led to missing data.

Each subsection concludes with a summary of key findings distilling the noteworthy results. During the Baseline week when the S3 crew operated with no gunner. the time to 70 Does the CVCC system enhance the Command and Control . Certain measures automatically took on fixed values for the CVCC condition. M units. and (f) Assess the Battlefield Situation. The subsection concludes with a summary of findings. ANOVA summary tables (SPSS output) appear in Appendix V to provide more complete information. Consequently. occasional equipment difficulties led to dropping impacted measures from the database. (e) Manage Means of Communication. Other limitations resulted from the evaluation's design.. closed-hatch operations only) stemmed from the simulation technology constraints in effect during the inception of the evaluation. Some of these limitations (e. such as allocating crews to positions no lower than company XOs. the reader should keep in mind the evaluation's limitations. (d) Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces. unfeasible to compute some of the Stage 3 measures for those only seven of the eight planned crews. these constraints were outlined in the Background and Review of Key Literature section. The implications of the major methodological limitations have been discussed at the end of this report's Method section.. The outcomes of statistical analyses (ANOVAs) are presented strictly in summary form in this section. (c) Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information. (b) Receive and Transmit Enemy Information. target acquisition and engagement measures for that crew were excluded from the analyses. A probability level of . The presentation of performance measures which follows is organized by the research issues outlined in this report's Method section (Performance Measures subsection). In interpreting the results presented in this report. The CVCC battalion missing the S3 crew generated data for Appearing in Appendix C are supplemental tables more completely characterizing the distributions of data. sample sizes in data tables appearing in this section and in Appendix C vary modestly.g. Command and Control BOS Issue: BOS? This subsection is organized around the six command and control tasks identified earlier in this report: (a) Receive and Transmit the Mission.05 or less is required before an effect is considered statistically significant. the CCD instantaneously transmitted digital reports on the net(s) selected. In particular. Since all crewed vehicles in the CVCC condition were on the battalion net for routing of digital reports. The sequence within each issue's subsection follows the hypotheses supporting that research issue. due to design features of the CCD and the manned radio nets defined for this evaluation. In addition.

Elapsed time from battalion transmission of FRAGO to receipt bY company commander/XO. FRAGOs) as they were relayed was guaranteed. 71 . transmit a SITREP. perfect consistency of digital reports (e. including any transmissions clarifying the order. unit and vehicle commanders could not edit digital reports received. Consequently. The performance data are summarized in Table 14. Two measures are not presented. Mean transmission times in the Baseline condition (Table 14) were nearly 10 minutes or greater. for example. because the number of observations in the Baseline condition was too small to support meaningful analysis of data. Because of the fixed values for the CVCC condition. These data were collected only for Stages 2 and 3. the duration of transmissions clarifying the FRAGO. and the consistency of FRAGOs relayed on the company command nets. This measure was defined as the total elapsed time from the start of the TOC's transmission of a FRAGO to the point when the last company commander finished relaying the FRAGO to his XO. INTEL reports. when the battalion FRAGOs were issued and executed. values for this measure were set at zero. The time saved by the digital capabilities enabled the CVCC battalions to begin planning and executing the mission earlier. The deviation of the BLUFOR location reported in a SITREP from the actual BLUFOR location required two FLOT endpoints to enable computation.. so the act of relaying reports could not change their contents. Receive and Transmit tne Mission Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to receive and transmit the mission on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units'. The elapsed time for the companies to respond to a request for a fuel/ammunition report was captured only infrequently. no ANOVAs were computed for this measure. In the CVCC condition. the time to transmit a FRAGO from the TOC to a company XO was also zero.g. Further. from a vehicle to the TOC was zero. The measures supporting this task captured the duration of FRAGO transmisssions. due to the instantaneous digital burst transmission capability. and nearly all Baseline SITREPs reported own unit location as a single centerof-mass grid. As another example..

no ANOVAs were performed on these data.27 FRAGOs (percent) 1 0 0a a (12.41) n=17 (17. .58 n=0 Consistency of relayed (. Baseline participants issued twelve requests for clarification in Durations of the Stage 2 and fifteen requests in Stage 3. were no requests for clarification during Stage 2. the FRAGO's graphic overlay and embedded text were apparently so self-explanatory that unit and vehicle In contrast.60 (. commanders almost never requested clarification. the CVCC condition.46) n=7 18.. aInstantaneous.84) n=16 0a 9. in the CVCC condition there the FRAGOs.55) n=3 35. and only 2 By contrast. Table 14 Mean Performance Data for Receive and Transmit the Mission Hypothesis. Due to the infrequent dialogues averaged around one-half minute.07) n=5 .26 .43 . observations for the CVCC battalions. transmission time spent by company commanders and XOs clarifying As seen in Table 14. by Stage and Condition Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline CVCC Measure Elapsed time from Bn transmission of FRAGO to receipt by co cdr/XO (minutes) Duration of request to clarify FRAGO/overlay (minutes) Company commanders 0a 12.13) n=2 -- (.21) n=15 Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means. 72 . Duration of reguests by companv commanders/XOs to clarify This measure quantified the actual voice FRAGO/overlay. In The difference between the two conditions is dramatic.43 n=0 Company XOs -- (. No battalion FRAGO was published during Stage 1.05) n=15 .94 n=0 100 (.23) n=12 .36 (5. Note. requests in Stage 3 (averaging one-quarter minute).38 (5. complete transmission of FRAGOs occurred by virtue of CVCC system design.

quantified by comparing the contents of the FRAGO relayed by the company commander to a template of key information from the The process yielded a percentage score (0-100%). The measures used to evaluate this hypothesis quantified two speed of fully aspects of INTEL report transmissions: loss or information and reports. The measures analyzed under this Summary of key data. information. signalled by verbal acknowledgment in the Baseline condition. Scores for with higher values representing better consistency. CVCC system substantially enhanced the battalion's ability to disseminate mission information. indicating a substantial loss or distortion of information when using voice communications. hypothesis did not lend themselves to inferential analysis. the the FRAGO information to their subordinates. contrast. the CVCC condition were set at 100%. by the transmission event itself units. the statistical analysis was performed on these data. Receive and Transmit Enemy Information The CVCC units' ability to receive and transmit Hypothesis: enemy information on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units'. Baseline commanders frequently requested clarification of FRAGOs. this measure was defined as the elapsed time from the start of an INTEL transmission by the TOC until the Reception was message was received by the last manned vehicle. disseminating scripted Table 15 process. scripted FRAGO. For the Baseline condition. ensuring zero-delay dissemination In of orders containing complete. capabilities provided instantaneous FRAGO transmission and perfect consistency upon relay. no 3. consuming over six minutes on the radio during each stage. and they correctly relayed only one-third or less of In a nutshell. An index of transmission speed. Baseline commanders sacrificed 10 minutes or more of mission execution time relaying and clarifying mission . the INTEL was transmitted by TOC personnel on the 73 . contrast between the two conditions was dramatic. basic transmission values were set at zero because all manned elements were on a common digital net (battalion command . However.. the mean percentage of information relayed correctly (Table 14) was 19% in Stage 2 and 35% in Stage Because of the fixed values (100%) for the CVCC condition. Nevertheless. and For CVCC in the CVCC condition. because the company commander could only relay the FRAGO exactly as he received it. undistorted information. the data for this task convincingly documented The system's digital performance advantages of the CVCC system. this data supporting the performance summarizes Time to transmit INTEL reports full net. FRAGO consistency was Consistency of relayed FRAGO. net) and digital transmission was instantaneous. Baseline units. so all unit and For vehicle commanders received the INTEL at the same time. the dissemination from distortion resulting hypothesis.

Baseline transmission times averaged more Overall.5 minutes in Stages 1 and 2. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means. INTELs that did not bear on the immediate situation would not have been relayed. received all INTEL reports with no delay and with 100% Thus the CVCC digital capabilities saved valuable consistency. This measure was designed to Consi tencv of relayed INTEL. by Stage and Condition Stage I Measures CVCC Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline In both conditions. time consumed by STune to transmit INTEL reports full net (minutes) 0P 1. Table 15 Performance Data for Receive and Transmit Enemy Information Hypothesis. in included INTELS ultimately relayed at the company level were the analysis. O Comparing the contents of relayed INTEL reports to a template corresponding to the scripted report. complete transmission of FRAGOs occurred by virtue of CVCC system design. Company XOs/commanders might not have relayed INTEL relevance.95) . company was in contact.00 (percent) (39. Two possibilities could explain the low number of reports is a matter of The first relayed in the Baseline condition. gInstantaneous. with higher values 74 . When the subordinates.00 op .82 n=1 Consistency of relayed WINELs 10p 60. not lend themselves to statistical analysis. all unit and vehicle commanders scenario..n6 n=1 n=1 Note. relayed approximately 10% of the INTELs scripted for the In the CVCC condition. so there was no need to relay them.03) n=10 ff3 100. time and ensured maximum distribution of information at the echelons implemented in this evaluation.58 (1. consistency was defined as the percentage of elements accurately relayed. the advantages of Every CVCC commander the CVCC system were clear and dramatic. in deference to more critical tactical information. Only clarification queries was added to basic transmission time. Baseline commanders than 1. received INTEL reports simultaneously on the battalion's digital Although these data do net. reports that they did not consider relevant to their The second is a matter of priority.32 100a 100f 25. battalion O&I net and was then relayed by the company XO to the company commander.65 (.96) (f 1. As Table 15 shows. capture the distortion or loss of intelligence information resulting from the process of disseminating INTEL reports.

designed to quantify speed of throughput transmission of friendly It was defined as unit information as represented in the SITREP. transmission faster with were associated values for this measure and therefore represented better performance. Stage 1 did both conditions generate a sizable number of There was a noticeable trend in favor of CVCC throughput values. perfectly consistent nature of digitally transmitted INTEL reports afforded distinct advantages to unit These advantages and vehicle commanders using CVCC equipment. This measure was Mean time to transmit SITREP full net. Only in Table 16 summarizes mean data for this measure. Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information significantly better than the Baseline units'. Due to the small sample sizes for the CVCC condition. values for CVCC units ("perfect") fixed the and condition However. during that stage consistency scores These data were not subjected to inferential averaged 60%. of relayed information was perfect in the CVCC condition. statistical about statements precluded the instantaneous. the consistency constituting better performance. friendly troop information on the battlefield was expected to be Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to receive and transmit The measures supporting this task focused on the time spent communicating about the unit's activities and status. ensured maximum dissemination of intelligence information without On the other hand. Baseline degradation of quality or currency. Shorter platoon level and relayed to the TOC were analyzed. INTEL report available. units in Stage 1. and on the Table 16 provides timeliness of reporting key battle milestones. probabilities. with Among Baseline units. distortion of information occurs when INTEL reports are relayed by voice radio. the CVCC capabilities enhanced the battalion's distribution of up-to-date information about enemy activities. with Baseline participants taking more than . half again as long to transmit SITREPs full net. and those that were relayed Clearly suffered dangerous loss or distortion of information. a summary of data for this hypothesis. occurred by voice in the Baseline condition and by digital relay Only SITREPs which were originated at the in the CVCC condition. the elapsed time from a platoon leader's (role-playing support staff member) transmission of a SITREP on a company net until The reception of the company SITREP was acknowledged by the TOC. Only in Stage 1 was more than one INTEL reports were scorable. The limited observations indicate substantial loss or analysis. 75 . only eight relayed scores fixed at 100%. INTEL reports were seldom relayed.As with FRAGOs. no ANOVA was performed The small sample sizes indicate that the CVCC on these data. The small sample sizes in the Baseline Summary of key data. primary processing time involved was the platoon leader's Relaying transmission time and the company XO's relay time.

n-52 .46) n=12 3. the XO could easily generate a company SITREP using the information (location and status) displayed on his CCD. The obtained values for this measure were influenced by the difference in the way that SITREPs were compiled by participants in the two conditions.38 (.43) n-15 Duration of commo between TOC and Bn cdr/S3 (minutes) Delay between observed event and report to TOC (minutes) PL/LD crossing . In the CVCC condition. the XO usually would request the information from the platoon leaders. However.72) n=6 2.05 (2. then compile the aggregate information and transmit the report. the DCA routine could not establish a clear link between platoon and company SITREPs. by Stage and Condition Stage I Measure CVCC Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline Mean time to transmit SrrREP full net (minutes) 1. without having to query the platoons.57) _n=1 4 2 - n=-0 .47) n=20 2. When SITREPs were required in the Baseline condition.O system's automated logistics reporting reduced the need for participants to send SITREPs.24 (1. These events.26) n= 1 3 2.57 (3. and the linkage between platoon and company SITREPs.8) -211 (1.15) n=3 (. * Mean duration of voice radio transmissions between the battalion TOC and the battalion commander or S3.83) Vp=12 (1. In both conditions. the digital platoon SITREPs were not routinely relayed to the TOC.16) n=32 .75 (1.36 (1.28 . company XOs were responsible for compiling company SITREPs and submitting them to the TOC.73 .26 (3.58) n42 3.91 1. Rather.56 (. were easily identified in playbacks to support Baseline data reduction.93) n=5 (.61 (2.13 1.79 (.22 (4-56) n=2 .53) n-3 Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means." but they painted only a small part of the reporting picture for CVCC units.72) n=25 . The seven reported SITREPS in the CVCC condition represent platoon SITREPs that were relayed "as is.43) n5 .43 - (1359) n-lO BP arrival 1.51 (. Hence.90) n=4 n-0 2.52 (.40 (.29 (3.37) n=88 6.84) . the SAFOR automatically generated digital platoon SITREPs at computercontrolled times.30) n=4 5A3 (3. Table 16 Mean Performance Data for Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information Hypothesis.04) n=12 1.45 (. This measure 76 .

but the length of their individual voice exchanges On balance. Delay between obssrved arrival and regorting set at BP. outnumbering the CVCC The apparent volume participants at least three. The data for this delays) corresponded to better performance. The disappearance of the volume difference between conditions in Stage 3 can be attributed to two factors. Stage 1 being longest and Stage 3 being shortest. there was no brigade FRAGO in Stage 3.g. this measure was designed to index the timeliness with which the battalion's companies Elapsed time was reported crossing a designated control line. have substantially contributed to the volume of traffic in Stages 1 and 2. Linked to key tactical milestones. In short. reducing the number of vehicles involved. shorter transmission times playback information. and other general information-sharing activities The total elapsed between the commander. Smaller values (shorter report crossing the PL/LD were ignored. The mean durations (see Table 16) were quite comparable The effects of between the Baseline and CVCC conditions. First. this index quantified the timeliness of the battalion's reporting of its updated status at the end of a tactical movement phase. Similar to the preceding measure. analysis. voice radio. SITREP) were excluded. of voice radio traffic in this category by more than 8 minutes in Stage 1 and almost five minutes in Stage 2. was designed to characterize the typical time which members of Named reports (e. leaving "other" transmissions primarily including coordination. measure (see Table 16) did not yield any significant main effects However. The measure was computed as the elapsed time from a unit's observed arrival in a battle 77 .. were desirable. in contrast to Stages 1 The analysis and discussion of the brigade FRAGOs may and 2.to four-fold. Delay between observed PL/LD crossing and reported crossing. not essential for CVCC commanders to report crossing PLs and LDs because the POSNAV features gave the battalion commander and his staff the ability to monitor companies' locations in real time. CVCC unit and vehicle commanders coordinated by voice radio much less frequently than their Baseline counterparts. time required to complete each exchange was computed from In general.. S3. the CVCC system reduced the amount was comparable. it is important to note that it was or interactions. the battalion command group spent coordinating with each other by . and TOC personnel. calculated between the observed crossing and the company's Cases where a unit failed to corresponding report to the TOC. as was the However. these data were generated at the vehicle level and the two Baseline units failing to complete Stage 3 were excluded from Second. condition and stage were both nonsignificant. radio exchanges than CVCC voice more substantially engaged in participants in Stages 1 and 2. SPOT. this analysis. Baseline participants condition by stage interaction. differences between stages were most likely related to the scripted length of each stage.

Summary performance data are presented in Table 17. Durations of less than one second and greater than 30 seconds 78 . However.4 minutes old. the digital system provided the battalion commander and TOC staff with continuous information on the location and status of the entire force. Therefore. The latter measure was developed during data analysis to provide additional explanatory power. By contrast. at best. One of the most common CVCC participants' comments during debriefings was the observation that they had an excellent picture of the unit's status throughout the battle. The most noteworthy point is that the CVCC capabilities reduced the need for reporting a unit's status and location.position to the point when that company reported "set" in the BP on the battalion command net. In spite of the difficulties in testing statistical significance for this hypothesis. and was nearly 13 minutes old on occasion. practical consideration of the trends illustrates the advantage of the CVCC capabilities. Overall. those reports represented only periodic updates. Smaller values (shorter delays) indicated better performance. the CVCC system clearly enhanced the dissemination of friendly unit information. Baseline commanders frequently commented that they had difficulty keeping track of the friendly unit situation. Cases where a company failed to report being set were ignored. Baseline commanders received information indicating readiness to continue the mission that averaged up to 5. Moreover. In the counterattack stage. up-to-date profile. Also noteworthy was the reduced need for members of the CVCC command group to coordinate by voice radio. . In the CVCC condition. Averaae length of voice radio transmissions. the battalion commander relied on voice radio traffic to monitor the flow of the battle. This measure was designed to provide a convenient indicator of the average voice transmission duration. In the Baseline condition. Manaae Means of Communicating Information Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to manage means of communicating information on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units'. All in all. A transmission was defined as the uninterrupted keying of a microphone on a radio network. The data for this measure (Table 16) showed a sizable advantage for the CVCC condition in Stages 1 and 2. reporting being set in a new BP was marginally necessary. Data for this task derive from two measures: the average length and the number of voice transmissions. the data firmly illustrated the beneficial contributions of the CVCC system. Neither of the main effects nor the interaction was significant. The POSNAV features and the automated logistics reporting capabilities provided a readily-accessible. the objectives were treated as BPs. Summary of key data.

The data for this measure appear in Table 17.74. it was expected that CVCC participants would generate fewer voice transmissions.. than those for the Baseline condition. a significant stage 1(1. function of conditions. 1(2. for battalion command net. includes a complete account of ANOVA summaries. commanders all SOP provided Not planned as part of Total number of voice transmissions. A second transmissions required to pass complete messages. It was expected that voice . Soldiers are trained to use short voice transmissions in order to reduce the likelihood of being located by enemy When a longer message must be direction finding equipment. battalion for the was significant interaction condition by stage command. p < . frequency of voice radio transmissions became a parameter of interest as the data for As with the preceding length of voice transmission emerged. transmitted.g. In addition. 29) = 11. 2 < . measure. for Appendix C battalion command net. f(2. participating in the evaluation.g. Because a great deal of with a complete message or report. implemented in the availability of digital communications did not directly influence participants' behavior when they communicated by voice. show that soldiers maintained radio transmission discipline in accordance with Army SOP and training. 19) = 33.g. and C Company networks (e.52. the reduction factors ranged from 20% to 70%. with a significant effect of condition for every network (e. substantially reduced voice radio traffic at battalion and The digital communication capabilities of the CVCC system Across all networks company echelons (see Figures 14 and 15). the original set of evaluation measures.001).35. the duration of voice transmissions (Table 17) did not differ significantly as a Further. Generally averaging between 3 and 5 seconds. and "hot mike" malfunctions. for The battalion command net. battalion O&I.. given that much of their tactical information was communicated digitally. a transmission was defined by the keying of a microphone. nets radio various the across the patterns were very similar the that suggest findings These evaluation.. tactical information was communicated digitally in the CVCC condition.001). or their interaction. with the largest 79 . regardless of the This was consistent with the battalion experimental condition.. to eliminate both meaningless "clicking" events transmissions of CVCC unit and vehicle commanders would tend to be shorter. stages. reason to break up transmissions in this manner is to allow These data access to the network for higher priority traffic.049). were excluded. with events less than 1 second and greater than 30 By no means was a transmission synonymous seconds being ignored. radio operators break the message into shorter These data do not reflect the number of transmissions. organized by The means for the CVCC units were consistently lower radio net. p = . effect was found for all nets except C Company command (e. 29) = 3.

time required to disseminate combat information.33 (21.39) 89.63) 4.96) 158.64) 154. Table 17 Mean Performance Data for Manage Means of Communicating Information Hypothesis.17 (48.40) 178.19 (.20 (63.00 (50.00 (6687) 225.30 (54) 358 (.88) 3.19) 4.44) 113.77) 282.02 4.35) 3.90) 4.31) 169.05) 97.17 (38.41 (.59 (49) 3.60) 3.20) 4.78 (.06 (.17 (14.00 (120.03) 50.37) 133.92) 501. 80 .59 (.42 (.80 (.17 (65.00 (50. consistent pattern constitutes a considerable battlefield advantage.25 (.83 (35.64) 83.40 (.00 (66.09 (.50 (69.98 (.33 (34.This reductions appearing on the battalion O&I network.44) 3.92) 168.43) 161.65) 4.32) 4.00 (48.00 (35.00 (44. Condition.45) 3.21 (.61) 4.22) 169.80 (58.46) 3.20 (.82 (.33) 4.65 3.40 (61.53) 4.23 (55) 4.09 (.28 (.00 (44.27) 81.68) 3.40 (42-72) 168.40 (.19) 249.52) 354.61) 231.45) 3. by Stage.05 (. and susceptibility to electronic detection and electronic countermeasures.8) 152-50 (25.00 (33.58 (.99) 227.59) 89-50 (24.83 (58) 3. and Network Stare Measure Average voice transmission duration (seconds) Bn amd net Bn O&1 net A Co cmd net B Co cmd net C(n56)det7) C Co cmd net Number of voice tranmmissions Ba Cmd net Ba O&1 net A Co cmd net B Co cmd net C Co cmd net 281.19) 4.48) 74. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means.14 (.80) 77.30) 3.52) 4.80) 278.91) 132.41) 3.00 (23.08 (Al) 3.33 (38.20 (.62) 3.00 (97.37) 3.93 (.77) 116.00 (66.50 (57. favorably impacting network accessibility for critical C3 traffic.27) CVCC _n6 Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline = CVCC a_6 6 Stae 3 Baseline n=5 Note.83 (59.

80 150 132. Volume of voice radio transmissions on battalion (average per net).00 :• 250.10 185. ~ 87.25 152. Number 450 400 350 300 • i i261.Baseline 100 50 Stage 1 Stage 2 . Number 250 235.00 150..40 cvcc 101. Stage 3 nets Figure 14.06 100 ~.75 S: 200 150 " 208. Volume of voice radio transmissions on company nets (average per net).50 125. CVCC 389.28 ]Baseline so = 50 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Figure 15.17 200 171. 81 .17 L]h.


of factors,

The differences between stages can be explained by a variety

discussion in the Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information Actual mission execution subsection) and variable stage lengths. times varied between stages, being longest in Stage 1 and shortest in Stage 3. Taken together, these results document Summary of key data. the value of the CVCC's digital communications capabilities. When the data for number and average length of voice transmissions are combined, the operational impact becomes In Stage 1, for example, Baseline especially important. commanders used the battalion level radio nets for an average of 54.38 minutes, compared to 25.48 minutes of voice traffic in CVCC Besides enhanced operational security attributed to the units. reduced voice radio signature, the accessibility of command Frequently during scenario debriefings, networks was notable. Baseline unit commanders expressed frustration at being unable to enter the battalion command network to report critical events. By contrast, CVCC unit commanders often expressed wonder that the command net seemed so quiet, yet they didn't perceive any lack of tactical information. Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces

including the nature of the missions (see earlier


The CVCC units' ability to direct and lead Hypothesis: subordinate forces on the battlefield was expected to be

3ignificantly better than the Baseline units'.

The data for this task captured whether the battalion prevented decisive engagement in delay situations, whether it delay positions, whether it massed withdrew intact from initial fires on the OPFOR in the counterattack, and whether the Three of these measures battalion met the commander's intent. used criteria from applicable mission training plans to arrive at a binary (yes/no) determination, as explained in the discussion that follows. Did the task force prevent decisive enQaQement? This evaluative question was answered (yes or no) by the Battle Master The during the execution of both delay stages (Stages 1 and 3). Battle Master assessed the commanders' reaction time to the order to displace, the proportion of battalion vehicles successfully displacing, and the influence of friendly SAFOR controllers' He also considered the number of BLUFOR vehicles response time. lost. The data from this measure showed no consistent trends. In Stage 1, all CVCC battalions prevented decisive engagement, In Stage 3, four while four of six Baseline battalions did so. of four Baseline battalions prevented decisive engagement, but Chi-square tests only four of six CVCC battalions did likewise. revealed that the differences between conditions were not significant for either stage. the battalion withdraw intact? Near the end of each delay stage (Stages 1 and 3) the Battle Master answered this 82



considered intact if

question with a yes or no determination.

withdrawal. Performance trends for this measure slightly favored CVCC units. During Stage 1, five of six CVCC units and four of six Baseline units withdrew intact. In Stage 3, four of six CVCC units and two of four Baseline units met the criterion. The differences between conditions were not significant, as shown by chi-square tests. Number of counterattacking companies engaging OPFOR. This measure quantified the extent to which the battalion massed fires on the OPFOR in the counterattack stage (Stage 2). The Battle Master observed the number of BLUFOR companies that engaged (exchanged fire with) the OPFOR main body and recorded the number on his log. Five CVCC battalions engaged the OPFOR with two companies and one battalion engaged with three companies. In the Baseline condition, one battalion engaged the OPFOR with one company, four battalions engaged with two companies, and one battalion engaged with three companies. whereas all but one Baseline battalion successfully massed fires. The difference between conditions was not significant, as revealed by a chisquare test. To what extent did the battalion meet the brigade commander's intent? This measure used a percentage summed across component variables to express the overall performance of units in each stage, as compared to the brigade commander's intent (see

70% of the unit survived by the end of the

The battalion was


Meade et. al.,

standards (Department of the Army, 1988). In delay stages (Stages 1 and 3), component variables included the percentage of BLUFOR losses, the number of OPFOR vehicles killed on the enemy side of selected PLs, and the number of OPFOR vehicles penetrating a given line by the end of the stage. In the counterattack stage (Stage 2), the component variables included the percentage of BLUFOR and OPFOR losses and the number of OPFOR vehicles that penetrated a given line by the end of the stage. The means for this measure (see Table C-10) showed a trend in favor of Baseline units in Stages 1 and 3, but the condition effect was not significant. The degree to which this measure relied on OPFOR losses and terrain control reasures might explain the observed trends. Baseline battalions tended to fight longer from initial delay positions, and in so doing, inflicted heavier losses on the OPFOR early in the battle. At the same time, Baseline units took heavier losses in those initial positions, at least in Stage 1. By contrast, CVCC battalions tended to withdraw from initial positions earlier, in accordance with the concept of the operation. Since OPFOR losses contributed more heavily to the overall score, this measure appears to have favored Baseline units somewhat. Summary of key data. No significant differences between CVCC and Baseline conditions were found in any of the four measures supporting this task. Thus the data did not support the 83

in preparation) and mission training plan

hypothesis that CVCC-equipped units would direct and lead


subordinate forces more effectively than Baseline units. Assess the Battlefield Situation Hypothesis: The CVCC unit leaders' assessment of the battlefield situation was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units'. Vehicle and unit commanders completed a situational assessment questionnaire at the end of Stage 3, estimating enemy and friendly losses and rating their confidence in their responses. Each participant was asked to report only for his own unit (i.e., battalion commander and S3 reported for the battalion, company commanders and XOs reported only for their respective companies). Their estimation responses were compared with actual data from that stage to determine how accurately they interpreted the tactical situation. A copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. Table 18 summarizes situational assessment data. The Situational Assessment questionnaire was designed for administration immediately following the final stage of the test scenario. One Baseline battalion ended tactical execution with Stage 2, and a second Baseline scenario was terminated before OPFOR contact in Stage 3. Both of those units therefore reported on Stage 2, rather than Stage 3. The last two items reported in Table 18 were not appropriate for units that did not complete Stage 3, and therefore no data were collected from those two Baseline units for those items. Percentage of OPFOR tanks correctly identified. Participants were asked how many OPFOR tanks (T-72s) their unit destroyed during the stage. Their numerical responses were compared to the actual number of OPFOR tank losses obtained from the automated database. A value of 100% represented a perfect estimate. Estimated values greater or less than the actual number of kills were decremented (e.g., when responses of 9 or 11 kills were compared to an actual value of 10, both received a value of 90%). The performance scores were modest in both conditions (see Table 18). The effect of condition was not significant. CVCC battalion commanders and S3s more accurately assessed OPFOR tank losses than did Baseline battalion command groups, but at the company level, Baseline units were more accurate. Overall, Baseline participants reported significantly higher confidence in their responses than CVCC groups (E(1, 90) = 5.70,
R .019).



Table 18

Mean Performance Data for Assess Situation Hypothesis, by
Measure Number of vehicles destroyed (percent correct) OPFOR tanks Battalion 50.09 (32.55) n-ll 27.57 (23.19) n-35 48.09 (33.51) -ll 46.03 (29.64) n-35 38.09 (25.61) n-ll 48.20 (34.94) n-35 40.17 (26.52) n-12 44.17 (34.19) n-36 39.11 (33.10) CVCC Baseline


OPFOR BMPs Battalion



37.31 (30.91) n-36 27.83 (12.66) n-12 49.11 (43.31) n-36

Own tanks Battalion


Determination whether own unit destroyed any OPFOR during delay (percent correct) Battalion Company Distance from initial to subsequent BPs (deviation in k1m) Battalion 90.91 D-11 63.89 n-36 75.00 n- 8 69.57 D-23

1.02 (1.09) n-il 1.21 (1.52) D-35

2.64 (3.77) n-8 1.53 (1.51) &- 2 4




Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the



Confidence ratings reported in conjunction with this item were significantly higher among Baseline participants than CVCC (E(1. As can be seen in Table 18. company commanders their assessment of their own losses. Percentage of BMPs correctly identified. B.001). Neither However. Respondents were asked to estimate the distance between positions for their unit. CVCC participants were more frequently correct than Baseline participants. R = . CVCC participants estimated the distance more accurately than did Baseline participants. At both echelons.034). significant. Destruction of OPFOR vehicles after the order to delay. p < . Participants significant. and C Companies was used. OPFOR vehicle. was the echelon effect nor the condition by echelon interaction . condition Participants reported Percentaae of own vehicles destroyed. Scoring was accomplished in the same manner as with the two preceding items. 86 . and XOs in both conditions made notably more accurate estimates of their vehicle losses than did battalion command group members. 90) = 4. However. battalion echelon. The Stage 3 Deviation between true and reported distance. This item asked the respondents whether their unit destroyed any At the OPFOR vehicles after they were ordered to displace. Confidence ratings for these responses differed only Baseline participants registered slightly between conditions.. the average for A. Responses were compared with standard. the effect of condition was not significant. participants. significant difference between condition at either echelon. CVCC participants were slightly more accurate in Also.46. the number of tanks lost from their own unit during the stage. based on the master FRAGO. neither the condition nor the echelon effect was estimated how many BMPs their unit destroyed during the stage. but no significant effect of responses. 90) = 38. FRAGO specified initial and subsequent BPs for each company. CVCC unit and vehicle commanders assessed the number of OPFOR BMPs killed more accurately than did Baseline However. Overall. and significantly higher among company commanders and XOs than among battalion commanders and S3s (_(l. battalion echelon. This item differed from the preceding one only in the type of The scoring was accomplished in the same manner. measured For the values for each company. but the reverse was evident at the Chi-square tests showed there was no company echelon. the condition effect was not significant.62. more confidence in their was found.

with no Thus. this at peaked that awareness did not methodology assessment situational the Unfortunately. as their debriefing comments suggested. regardless point. unit leaders would have to relay FRAGOs But the and INTEL reports to accomplish complete dissemination. a dramatic improvement over the Baseline condition. The CVCC's digital transmission capabilities enabled more rapid dissemination of FRAGOs. enabled commanders to maintain a more accurate assessment throughout the scenario. tactical the of assessment ongoing participants' the capture Therefore. the latter driven The lack of by functional characteristics of the CVCC system. Summary of Findings The CVCC capabilities enhanced the performance of battalions in four of the six tasks under the Command and Control BOS. The analysis of data supporting the Summary of key data. and an estimate of its current strength. the "peaking" effect near the end of the exercise may have reduced the likelihood that such an affect would be demonstrated. if the CVCC system situation throughout the scenario. a benefit achieved without In a fully imposing additional task demands on the participants. empirical Baseline values to fixed CVCC values. Overall. 87 . of condition. the battalion typically had of the last stage. the realistically reflects situational awareness. Baseline participants should have had a fairly accurate snapshot of their own unit situation It is possible immediately preceding the end of the exercise. inferential tests in those cases by no means diminishes the operational importance of the advantages. instrument was only administered once per test group. ease of relaying digital items should speed the process of passing orders and reports down the command chain. developed a working concept of the OPFOR formation's size. It should be noted that the situational assessment instrument was based on the assumption that short term memory However. at the end By that point. Also.* Confidence ratings for this item did not differ significantly as a function of condition or echelon. CVCC-equipped battalion. Table 19 summarizes the major findings for this BOS. Assess Situation hypothesis yielded mixed trends. advantage for the CVCC condition was not demonstrated. the expected significant differences between conditions. . the data firmly exemplified the beneficial CVCC contributions to the accomplishment of C3 tasks in both defensive and offensive Several of the key findings resulted from comparing operations. resulting in substantial savings The same capabilities produced maximum dissemination of of time. The CVCC system's enhanced communications features ensured that all unit and vehicle commanders received combatcritical information at the same time. when compared . INTEL reports. by virtue of relatively recent SITREPs from subordinates. with conventional voice dissemination.

Maximum dissemination of INTEL info . trade-off between rigid consistency and the ability to modify transmissions generated elsewhere. signature.Perfect consistency of info relayed to subordinates . a finding At the same time.Much less time spent clarifying FRAGOs .Reduced need to report unit location and status .Table 19 Summary of Major Command and Control BOS Findings Task Receive and transmit mission CVCC Advantages . it lessened the unit's electronic operations perspective. The CVCC's digital capabilities.More rapid dissemination of FRAGOs . including no doubt the automated reporting of logistics status. the automated logistics reporting feature reduced the need for vehicle and unit commanders to report their location and This would appear to reduce task demands fuel/ammunition status. (1992).Better accessibility on command networks Receive and transmit enemy info Receive and transmit friendly troop info Manage means of communicating information The perfect completeness and consistency of the digital FRAGOs and INTEL reports were powerful features of the CVCC system. reduced the voice radio In coordination demands on members of the command group. a fruitful topic for future research on automated C3. addition. some also reported by Leibrecht et al. Undoubtedly these advantages contributed heavily to the dramatic reduction in time spent clarifying FRAGOs.Reduced voice radio signature . made the radio networks more accessible for critical command and 88 .Fewer voice transmissions among command group for coordination . and overlays to FRAGOs to edit ability the wanted participants This suggests a tailor them to subordinate unit requirements. while greatly increasing the volume and timeliness of information regarding the status of friendly forces. it enemy and to electronic countermeasure intervention. The reduction of voice radio traffic which occurred in the CVCC condition had two important benefits from a combat First. thereby decreasing susceptibility to detection by the Second.Fewer voice radio transmissions .Perfect consistency of info relayed to subordinates . on unit and vehicle commanders.

The next subsection addresses the results bearing on the contributions of the CVCC system to the execution of battlefield maneuver tasks.. (b) Navigate. (1992). (c) Process Direct tasks: Fire Targets. Move on Surface Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to move on the surface of the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units'. 89 then key data . and number of fratricide kills by manned vehicles. are summarized at the end of the subsection. Their comments indicated they were more aware of their It may subordinate units' status than Baseline unit commanders. quantitative trends is somewhat inconsistent with the CVCC participants' comments that they had a better picture of the battle. assessing the battlefield situation are likely to benefit from use of the CVCC system. (d) Engage Direct Fire Targets. results for each measure are discussed in sequence. according to the following BOS-based (a) Move on Surface. especially considering the instrument's reliance on participants' It is also possible that not all aspects of memory of events. mean time misoriented. Participants commented very The results showing no consistent impact of the CVCC capabilities on situational awareness are similar to findings However. and (e) Control Terrain. control voice transmissions. well be that the instrument used to quantify situational assessment was not sufficiently sensitive to detect CVCC effects. related to the Maneuver BOS. . The Performance Measures subsection of this report the measures used to quantify performance under these lists tasks. number of fratricide hits by manned vehicles. the lack of reported by Leibrecht et al. The results for several measures developed under the Maneuver BOS are not presented. favorably about the ease of access to voice networks. Maneuver BOS Issue: Does the CVCC system enhance the Maneuver BOS? the expected impacts on maneuvering and engaging the enemy on the Given the CVCC system's POSNAV and CITV capabilities. These measures include mean time out of sector/axis. The data for this BOS document relatively robust advantages of the CVCC capabilities in accomplishing command and control tasks. due to the fact that the measures produced nearly all zeros. Several hypotheses organize the data battlefield are extensive. Summary data (means and standard deviations) for the The measures supporting this hypothesis appear in Table 20.

56) n=6 (5.0 (659.9) 23492 (316. CoN was defined as the arithmetic mean of the company vehicles' x-y plots.10 (12.26 (65) . the ability to control the battalion's movement so as to maintain contact yet limit exposure to enemy Subsequently the measure was fire was seen as an advantage. The average of the three non-reserve companies' values was computed to yield a battalion-level measure.8) 30 n (10.0 (1090. within 500 meters.60 4. Designed for the defensive missions (Stages 1 and 3).-23 HNo: Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means. In other words.9) n-5 NA .12 ..8 (607.9.0-6 NA .43 24.11 (10. by Stage and Condition Stae I messe CVCC Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stge 3 Baseline Ditanc between BLUFOR and OPWOR COM (meters) 5207.2) .=-11 ..71) p.m.9 .p=35 (3. extended to the offensive mission (Stage 2).7) 6A1 (4. Akin to stand-off distance. Distance between BLUFOR and OPFOR center of mass (CoM).9) .3) 27685 (845A) a=6 Ramp to OPPOR at diplacemeat (meters) 2836.6) n0=5 NA .5) 10.84 (4.5 (564A) .0) _.57 9.=6 NA n=6 26072 (392.9) p.0 (451.3 (844.9) 3043.4) 2553. Table 20 Mean Performance Data for Move on Surface Hypothesis.=6 NA OW5 2369.2) 14.6) 6.3) 3234.n=4 NA Time to reach LD (main) 19.9) .60 (4.6 NA NA This to reach objectives (min) NA NA 29.lchelon 9. The distance between each BLUFOR nonreserve company's CoM and the CoM of its nearest OPFOR company was computed at the point when the last OPFOR firing occurred.79) p-6 36.35 (5. 90 Larger values signified .57 (11.34 (2-8) n-31 (10.9=8 Co Echelont 4.06 (11.8 (404.42 (4-53) n. NA .-36 (5.12 4.0) 15. including dead vehicles.02 4.17 8. since that mission ended with a defense of the newly occupied objectives.12 np-l n.9-4 2251. this measure was defined to quantify the battalion's success in preventing the enemy force from closing on them as they delayed back.Not applicable. the key to this measure was the separation between adjoining BLUFOR and OPFOR company-sized units upon completion of the mission.6 Eq-m Inex B.

perhaps indicating greater confidence in their abilities to navigate and "see" the battlefield. Differences between stages (greater distances in Stage 1 and smaller in Stage 2. 91 .012). Mean end-of-stage distance between BLUFOR and OPFOR center of mass.17 L 1500 5000 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 . three stages. better unit performance.19.002). with the CVCC capabilities expected to Meters 5500.(2. the average end-of-engagement distance separating BLUFOR and OPPOR companies was greater in the CVCC condition than The effect of condition was in the Baseline condition.00 CVCC Baseline 250 2349. 27) = 18.17. The condition by including the offensive nature of Stage 2. * 5000 5207. 27) = 5. 27) = 11. p = . R < . In all Means for this measure are displayed in Figure 16. R = .50 l 2553.33 3500 ________ _ 30002 82768. as was the effect of The condition by stage stage (.19. enable the battalion to better control its movement in relation to the enemy forces while delaying.001). stage interaction (due mainly to the more substantial difference between conditions in Stage 1) can be explained by the fact that the CVCC commanders generally chose to pull back further in completing their delay. compared to Stage 3) most likely resulted from the tactical differences built into the test scenario.. significant (E(l. interaction was also significant (E(2. Figure 16.

These results show that the CVCC-equipped battalions did a better job of controlling their movement while delaying, In the resulting in less risk of receiving hostile fire. force at a enemy the keep to counterattack mission they were able greater stand-off distance. During the Time to reach line of departure (Otaae 2 only). counterattack mission (Stage 2), the battalion was given a target time to arrive at the LD (15 minutes following issue of the To ensure synchronization of all BLUFOR companies, the FRAGO). ideal was to reach the LD precisely at the designated time. This measure was computed as the time elapsed from REDCON-I to the BLUFOR vehicle crossed the LD. point when the first The data show that CVCC battalions were more successful in For the CVCC condition, reaching the LD at the designated time. elapsed times ranged from 13.3 to 24.0 minutes with a mean of Among 19.43 minutes (standard deviation (SD) = 4.56 minutes). Baseline battalions, elapsed times ranged from 16.4 to 31.6 A t-test minutes, averaging 24.84 minutes (SD = 5.79 minutes). revealed the difference between conditions was not significant. However, an important aspect of these data is the fact that CVCC units, overall, were closer to the target time and more consistent in their performance, arriving between 1.7 minutes In contrast, Baseline units were early and 9 minutes late.

always late, ranging from 1.4 to 16.6 minutes later than the

designated time and showing greater variability of performance. The better performance of the CVCC units on this measure most likely relates to the ad hoc finding that those units reached REDCON-1 more quickly than their Baseline cohorts. Among CVCC battalions, time to report REDCON-l averaged 7.82 minutes In the Baseline condition, (SD = 5.28, range 3.1-12.5 minutes). the corresponding parameter averaged 17.28 minutes (SD = 9.61, The difference between conditions was range 13.5-23.9). The CVCC units' faster significant (_ = 2.36, df = 7, _ < .05). establishment of readiness to execute the mission was no doubt largely the result of the more rapid transmission of the FRAGO (discussed earlier in the Command and Control BOS subsection). Considering the nature of ideal performance for this measure, it might be preferable to redefine it as a difference or discrepancy score reflecting how close the unit comes to "hitting the bull's eye." Used Time for companies to reach objectives (Stage 2 only). for the offensive stage only, this measure captured the time taken to accomplish the primary portion of the battalion's In addition to transit time, the mission in the counterattack. measure included the time required to organize the unit on the objective and report "set." It was computed as an average across


the three non-reserve BLUFOR companies.
in executing the counterattack, performance.

As a reflection of speed

shorter times defined better


battalions completed the primary mission in 29.42 minutes (SD = 4.53, range 23.9-36.4 minutes), compared to an average of 36.35 minutes for the Baseline condition (SD = 5.71, range 29.8-45.1 The difference between conditions was significant (• = minutes). In addition, the smaller standard 2.12, af - 10, 2 < .05). deviation for the CVCC condition indicated greater consistency of The better performance of the CVCC units is performance. consistent with data for the preceding measure and is largely attributable to better maneuver control afforded by the POSNAV capabilities. The Ranae to OPFOR at displacement (Stages 1 and 3 onlvy. unit and vehicle commanders were given standard instructions to displace during delay missions when a company-sized OPFOR element approached within 2000 m of a BLUFOR company's position. The This reason for this was to avoid becoming decisively engaged. commanders the company well how quantify to designed measure was were able to apply this criterion in requesting/executing their The linear distance between each BLUFOR nonunit displacement. reserve company's CoM and its nearest OPFOR company's CoM was computed at the time the battalion displacement began, then was For the conditions of this averaged across companies. evaluation, longer distances generally corresponded to better performance. In both delay stages, the average displacement ranges were However, this trend was not greater for CVCC-equipped companies. The effect of stage was not significant, nor was significant. the condition by stage interaction. The lack of significant differences between conditions contrasts with the results of earlier research at the company In that study, the advantage of level (Leibrecht et al., 1992). the CVCC-equipped units was significant. As a vehicle is exposed to more enemy Exposure index. By using maneuver vehicles, the risk of being engaged rises. principles based on knowledge of enemy positions, a key to survival is to reduce the direct exposure (i.e., intervisibility) to enemy vehicles capable of delivering hostile fire. The exposure index was developed to quantify a vehicle's risk of Following initial intervisibility enemy-initiated engagement. with an enemy vehicle, a count of all intervisible enemy vehicles was obtained for each manned vehicle every 30 sec until the first All counts from the sample main gun firing by the company. period were averaged to yield a single value per manned vehicle. For this measure, smaller values were desirable.

shorter in the CVCC condition.

Mean time to reach the company objectives was modestly

On the average, CVCC-equipped


As Table 20 shows, there were no consistent differences The effect of between the CVCC and Baseline conditions.

condition was not significant.

The most striking feature of

these data was the consistently higher mean exposure index for The echelon battalion echelon vehicles, seen in both conditions.


effect was significant (E(I, 240) = 17.36, p < .001), as was the effect of stage (E(2, 2240) = 8.09, p < .001). None of the twoway interactions was significant, nor was the three-way interaction. The higher mean exposure index for battalion echelon vehicles was unexpected, because it was assumed the battalion commander and S3 would generally position themselves to the rear of the companies, exposing them to fewer enemy vehicles. However, the battalion commander and S3 were frequently seen in the midst of company formations, and were more inclined to move around the battlefield during delay missions. Further, they were more likely to be left behind when the companies displaced back from their battle positions, compared to company commanders and XOs, sometimes leaving them in closer contact with the enemy. Indeed, the exposure index was especially elevated for battalion echelon vehicles during delay missions. The exposure resulted of Stage significant effect of stage reflected largely a lower index in the counterattack mission. This most likely from the lower density of enemy vehicles during the bulk 2.


Summary of key data. The data provided limited support to the hypothesis that the CVCC capabilities would enhance the battalion's ability to move on the surface. CVCC-equipped units ended each stage at greater distances from the enemy, indicating they were better able to control their movement during delay operations and to keep the enemy at safer stand-off ranges. Greater control of movement among CVCC units was reflected in more consistent timing of key battle milestones, particularly the time taken to reach the LD and the objectives in Stage 2.

Hypothesis: The CVCC unit's ability to navigate on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units. Table 21 presents the summary data (means and standard deviations) associated with this hypothesis. Distance travelled. Because of the CVCC's POSNAV capabilities, it was anticipated that CVCC-equipped battalions would be able to navigate more accurately and avoid being lost or misoriented. Accordingly, crews in the CVCC condition were expected to travel less distance, overall, in accomplishing the mission. Table 21 displays the mean data for distance travelled. The reduction expected for CVCC units materialized only in Stage 2 (counterattack). The condition effect was not significant, nor was the echelon effect. At the same time, the effect of stage was significant (E(2, 255) = 32.31, p < .001), due apparently to scripted tactical differences between stages. Although the



patterns in Stages 1 and 3 (generally greater distances for CVCC battalions) differed from stage 2, the condition by stage interaction was not significant, nor were the other interactions. Table 21 Mean Performance Data for Navigate Hypothesis, by Stage and Condition
Stage I Measure CVCC Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline

Distace tranwlU (meters)
Bn Echelon 13517.8 (7352.1) n-1l 13378.9 (5083.2) n9=36 13512.3 (8171.9) n,,12 11270.2 (4062.7) _9u36 7455.6 (3341.9) n=1l 9597.2 (2521.8) .n=35 8509.5 (3114.2) .n=12 10044.0 (2823.8) n-3

8006.0 (2585.3) .=l10 9037.3 (3242.2) 30 g,

6550.5 (2394.8) _.8 75255 (2514.2) D,23

Co Echelon

FaWlused (gallons)
Ba Echelon 20.74 22.91 12.63 16.29 14.87 12.64

.D-11 Co Echelm 20.22

n=12 18.99

n-l1 17.53

_n=12 16.18

n-lO 15.04

a.& 12.29

Time to complete exercise (minutes) 67.52 (4.34) n-6

73.95 (7.11) .0-6

41.46 (3.95) n-6

52.40 (9.72) n=6

51.29 (1.71) .n5

48.24 (3.88) n-4


Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means.

Several factors are important in comparing the CVCC and Baseline conditions with respect to these data. CVCC-equipped battalions frequently chose to withdraw further back in executing both delay missions (Stages 1 and 3) than did their Baseline counterparts. This may have reflected greater confidence in their navigation abilities and in their information regarding the battle status. On a related count, CVCC commanders were often observed moving from one location to another for direct observation, presumably capitalizing on POSNAV's superior navigation capabilities. Such movement occurred much less frequently among Baseline units. Finally, the unit commanders and XOs participating in the Baseline condition may have relied substantially on unmanned BLUFOR vehicles to navigate, particularly in Stages 1 and 3. This would have artificially lowered their total distance travelled.


. R = . em In Stages 1 The means for this measure appear in Figure 17.Z4 D CVCC 301 20 10 Baseline SStage Figure 17. where proportionally greater distance was travelled because of the greater distances to None of the interactions subsequent battle positions scripted. The effect of condition was significant (F(1.. The time required to fully Time to complete exercise. 27) = 7. CVCC-equipped battalions were expected to perform each mission more quickly than Baseline battalions. it was anticipated that fuel consumption would also decline. the battalions using the CVCC system took less time for mission completion. p < . . effect of stage (F(2. Minutes 80s 73. and 2. execute each stage was defined as the elapsed time from the initial REDCON-1 to the completion of the last scripted event Given the CVCC's automated C3 (submission of a SITREP).46 501 48.08.52 50 •~i 52. 27) = 54. 2 < . and 3. was significant.001).96. Although fuel Fuel consumption data are found in Table 21. 255) = 25.As a result of the expectation that the CVCC capabilities would reduce overall distance travelled. The same factors discussed for distance travelled are relevant when interpreting the data for fuel used.95 70 67. capabilities. but the advantage disappeared in Stage 3. Mean time to complete Stages 1. the condition effect was not significant.40 41.013). 1 Stage 2 96 Stage 3 2.06. The significant Neither was the echelon effect significant. as was the effect of stage (E(2.001) reflected mainly the higher values in Stage 1.Ful use .249 140. consumption among CVCC units was modestly lower in Stage 2 (counterattack).

60. This trend replicates previous findings reported by Leibrecht et al. These two slower Baseline units were excluded from the analysis of Stage 3 completion times. even though there was a sufficient amount of the allotted time left for the battalion to complete the stage. Greater confidence resulting from the POSNAV capabilities apparently enabled CVCC units to move more expeditiously in executing the mission. Battle Master observations indicated that CVCC crews much more frequently moved to a new position on the battlefield. Summary of key data. including more rapid dissemination of orders and combat reports and shorter decision cycles. (1992) at the company level. in essence. apparently to secure a new or better vantage point.The condition by stage interaction was also significant (E(2. At the same time. The differences between stages were undoubtedly due to variations in tactical events built into the test scenario. O The measures addressing the processing of direct fire targets focused on crew lasing activities as indicators of target 97 the hypothesis that navigation in battalion operations would The results provided modest support of . Reinforcing this was the fact that CVCC participants. The apparent disappearance of the CVCC advantage in Stage 3 is misleading. This suggests that the CVCC equipment gave commanders greater freedom of tactical movement in executing their command and control duties. since their Stage 3 values were indeterminate. 27) 3. The significantly reduced time to complete Stages 1 and 2 reflected favorably on the navigation features of the CVCC system. especially drivers. the slower units were weeded out. • = . The two Baseline battalions failing to complete Stage 3 fell short because they ran out of the time allotted for completing all three stages of the scenario. The faster completion times for CVCC-equipped battalions are congruent with the data for time to reach LD and time to reach the objectives (discussed earlier under the Move on Surface hypothesis). One CVCC battalion commander observed that reduced fear of getting lost was a great psychological advantage. benefit from the CVCC system's POSNAV capabilities. Process Direct Fire Taraets Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to process direct fire targets on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units'. The net effect was a bias in favor of the Baseline units because.041). overwhelmingly commented that POSNAV was a great advantage. other factors most likely contributed to faster mission completion. the one CVCC battalion failing to complete Stage 3 was terminated for administrative reasons: a higher priority requirement necessitated relinquishing the network. In contrast.

52 (.acquisition behaviors.33 (..49 (.71 (.7 (245.49 (.34) .70) 34 _n= (.9 (4994) n-8 2341.7) -=10 2602.i=8 .89 (.58 (.1) 3 .77) .10 (.51 .68 .25) _= 3 2 (.0) -011 3010.20 (.60 .20 (.87 (.7 (907.=30 2848.0 (445.3 4 1.45) .86 (.43 (.2 (468.22) -6 2.35) n=34 (.18 (.71) V-.1 (575.67 . Table 22.43) .2) 035 ..1) n=27 (minutes) Bn Echelon 2.D1O 2.9w23 .6 (627.36 (1W2) -23 Co Echelon Time between lanes to different tuaet (minutes) Bo Echelon . Maximum lase range.0-o .0-8 .56) 09 .30) p.79) .61 (.88 .78 (1.57) n-030 1. It was defined as the maximum distance a manned vehicle 98 .1) -D=33 2516.02) D-033 2.2 (873.2 (652.48 (.88) n.5 .4) .27 (.83) .69 (1.30) .0=24 Time fhm first Ilae to frlt fire (minutes) Bn Echelon .21) .1 1 2.07) -n= 7 2.n=10 .13 (.58) P.30 .32) .94 (1.43 (1.0) D=35 2263.n= 1 2491.82) n-=25 . by Stage and Condition Star I Mealsure CVCC Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline Maidmum lw anmp (meters) BEn Echelon 2983.0) -011 2775.26) .91) n-=11 1.9 (611.64 (1.14) n-=7 1.9-5 38 (.63) -0=8 .28) V=35 (.6 (343.4) V-10 2599.69 (.34) _n-li .31 (.15) .56 (.6 (600.Oall Co Echelon .64) _n26 (. Table 22 Summary data for these measures appear in Mean Performance Data for Process Direct Fire Targets Hypothesis.33 (1.9=35 .84) -0=30 2.05) Dw7 .26 (.33) 23 g- CD Echelon Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means.39) .97 (.Time to acquire tqaets 3046.1) _nll Co Echelon 3130. This measure was designed to quantify the outer edge of the range envelope for detecting potential targets.-8 .pn=36 2.32) -=30 .

-.53.86 2317 . . as was the condition by stage interaction (E(2. 240) = 5..02). Given the CITV capabilities to enhance battlefield surveillance and target acquisition. p < .5 2599. the mean ranges for CVCC-equipped vehicles exceeded those for Baseline vehicles. -vC..87 2516. CVCC-equipped vehicles were expected to generate greater maximum lase ranges.-'-_ 3000. Bn Co Stage 2 Bn Co Stage 3 Maximum lase range means.60 . 3500 3. but it may be that Baseline vehicles were not as successful in selecting positions with good fields of fire in Stage 3. ] Baseline 15001500~ . most likely the result of longer line-of-sight conditions in the terrain setting for Stage 1.50.55 2602.001). p = . In the CVCC condition. The reason for this is not clear.17 _..031). the effect of stage was significant (f(2. '. 1000 500 Bn Co Stage 1 Figure 18. Time to acauire targets. 2500 2000 29010. excluding lasing to non-vehicles.lased to a potential target. The CVCC vehicles enjoyed a greater advantage in Stage 3 than in Stages 1 or 2. Target acquisition time was quantified by measuring..50 3046. Meters 4000.. The effect of echelon was not significant. The condition effect was significant (F(1. . 240) = 18. the elapsed time between initial visibility of an enemy vehicle and the first 99 . both GPS and CITV lase events were eligible. The significant stage effect reflected primarily the greater ranges occurring in Stage 1. In addition. 240) = 3.64 S 130. regardless of condition.. p = . Means for the maximum lase ranges appear in Figure 18.20 2491.56.09 2775. 2263. for each manned vehicle.66 2848. Overall.

84. 226) = 3.94 .43 2.0 O.CS N 2 ii•I[• i !~~.611!. Mean time to acquire targets.87 2.5 2. 9 2. 226) = 11. lases by Minutes 4. Baseline vehicles took more than half a minute potential target by lasing. I -- Bn Co Bn Co Bn Co Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Figure 19.001). 100 .5 4. crews were expected to acquire targets more quickly in the CVCC condition.5 . R . especially considering its tactical similA It is possible the terrain conditions in Stage 1 were less 1.0 ... 3.023). The variation in target acquisition time across stages The longer times in Stage 2 appears related to two factors..64 ) 1. - For CVCC-equipped vehicles. R = The echelon effect and the interaction effects were all .0 S2. The longer to respond to the first effect of condition was significant (E(1.9 2. the commander and the gunner were compared to select the shorter For each stage the average per vehicle was computed.36 S• CVCC Baseline 1.0 3. the shorter times in Stage 3 are more challenging to ity to Stage explain.13 1L]2c33 zo. undoubtedly stemmed from the on-the-move nature of the counterattack mission. with enemy vehicles stationary throughout the primary portion of the stage. expected advantage of the CVCC-equipped vehicles was confirmed: across the board. •.69 -. along with the effect of stage (E(2. nonsignificant. The Mean data for this measure are displayed in Figure 19.011..- 0. . interval..5 1. other hand..5 0.lase to the same vehicle.44. Because of the CVCC's independent thermal viewing capabilities for unit and vehicle commanders. These conditions made it more On the difficult for crewmembers to detect distant vehicles.4 2.

or echelons. so that early visual detection of moving As an index of Time between lases to different targets.g. the Likewise.. shorter lase-to-fire times were anticipated for CVCC-equipped vehicles. enemy vehicles was more likely. Enaaae Direct Fire Targets Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to engage direct fire targets on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units'. first sighting/lasing systems for both the commander and gunner (the "hunter-killer" capability) led to the expectation of sho -r values for this measure among CVCC-equipped vehicles. reflecting the longer times occurring in Stage 2. greater awareness of friendly and enemy positions). Conceptually the process In practice. stages. ranging generally from half a minute to nearly one minute. In be found in Table 22. echelon and stage were nonsignificant. Given the enhanced situational awareness expected to result from CVCC capabilities (e. this measure quantified the time interval separating successive lases to different enemy vehicles. time was computed from a manned vehicle's first lase at an enemy round directed at the same vehicle to the firing of the first vehicle. . undoubtedly due to the hunter-killer advantage of the CITV. 230) = 5. broken or cluttered. R = . Only the effect of stage was significant (E(2. This measure was Time from first designed to provide an index of a crew's speed in responding to enemy targets with direct fire. enabling the vehicle commander to search the battlefield in thermal mode simultaneously with the gunner.. The computational procedure measured the elapsed time from a manned vehicle's last lase at an OPFOR vehicle to its The advantage of lase at the next OPFOR vehicle. elapsed included application of IFF procedures. Summary data for this measure can spite of an apparent advantage for the condition effect was not significant.005). speed in acquiring sequential targets. contributions of the CVCC system to the acquisition of targets The maximum range at which lasing to for direct fire engagement. Baseline vehicles. target acquisition time condition for all stages.52. interactions. the effects of as were all of the Two measures clearly demonstrated the Summary of key data. This undoubtedly resulted from the on-the-move nature of the counterattack mission and the lower density of enemy vehicles during Stage 2. lase to first fire. 101 . values did not vary greatly across conditions. an enemy vehicle occurred was significantly greater in the CVCC In addition. These results were was significantly shorter for CVCC crews. The mean Table 22 summarizes the data for this measure.

include both catastrophic and firepower kills (as determined onKills line by the vehicle's computer). unless Finally. due to both direct and indirect fire are counted. engagement of the at the wingman or platoon leader level.. primary responsibilities centered on command and control. While the SAFOR enemy was largely executed by SAFOR vehicles. the opportunities to assess the direct influence of CVCC capabilities on engaging the enemy were somewhat limited by the design of the evaluation. include those resulting from friendly fire (i.This hypothesis must be tempered to account for the fact that crews participating in the evaluation were assigned roles at the company XO level and higher. friendly damages and casualties otherwise noted. Many of the measures under this hypothesis share certain Kills of vehicles (both enemy and friendly) common fundamentals. There were no crews operating Thus. unit commanders. fratricide). unless indicated differently. 102 . Table 23 contains summary data (means and standard deviations) for the measures supporting this hypothesis. the of control elements were under the direct were the same in engagement target determining SAFOR algorithms With CVCC equipment in the hands of crews whose both conditions. but not mobility kills.e.

0 (530.5) n-5 (10.0) .13) .o .1 (8.6) a.1 4.P3 2369A (695.82) .9o36 .20 2243.9-4 22.6 Percmn B .3) .5 (103S) gas 12.Table 23 * Mean Performance Data for Engage Direct Fire Targets Hypothesis.1 (365.) .1 (561.25 (119) .8) 03024 3.6 (7.2 (8.3 Penst OMOR Wed 7.9"3 1496.9) pM-1 8.2 (239.-4 Co Echdon 231.11 0 Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means.s (7..16 (.0 (6.-11 CO bhenISA 10.5) .9-5 14.6) g-3 1896.-S5 (8.2 (17.9-6 (6. by Stage and Condition Starel MMa CvCC Baseline CVCC s Baseline CYCC Stag 3 .S NA n-1 1402.12 (.6 26.1 (608.2) .p6 (10.9) 1770.=4 Peesant OPPOR vehides killed by manned vehicles Number rouns find by Owned Weid" Be Ekhelon 11.7) j-4 .4) j.7) Oa6 .3) .1 (100) _n-6 LM s/klatio .7) Ow23 1762.9-6 .4) 201.9) j.94) .2 (304.? Baeline 87.4) .4) 1970.1 (6. (76&.3 (1074.3 (1162.9.=24 Min tart W ramp Da 6elo08 2440.6) .9) .67 (.0 (6.8) 2214..9) D=6 (6.3) .18 (.D-12 15.98) .U=lS 1773.2 (6.0=6 (3.82) .) B-5 1649.p=6 (10o) %36 2.7) . (table continues) 103 .6) 2.9-6 88.0) .4 91.2) .4 (734.1-21 n=20 V-25 1%=17 2105.4) Jg2018.40 (1.D-36 Number mamed vele sustaining a kli bit 2. (504.33 (.0) .1 (5.4 (3.10) c=6 10.05 (.5) .LUPOR killed 22.4) p-6 9A 71.52) .6 (390.6) p=3 Co Becelon 228 (318.6 (2.9 (365.0-6 4.9=4 MmI a t hi aMP (me"es) Ba Ecbelo 24873 (357-5) BW7 2151.0 5.8) _n-12 &1 6.6 (9.8 (2-7) p.1 (515.V-6 .6) .02) .3) .1) j.0=7 2664.1) 188.0 (9253) g5 210&9 (731.0 (553.11) g-4 12.5) .3 (426.-36 .28 (.1) .1 (13.-6 .08) .09) n-6 3.9) O16 1910.7) .19 (.17 (1.1 (7.8) MS 26.83 (.6 (10.9 (21.0-28 .6 (9.1 (1.0-10 10.0 98.9-6 6.9 (528.n6 10.1) p-21 19163 (587.7) pa6 (2.

which were ..06 (.47 (Al) .20) JD28 (.0.pM . n.20 (08) .24) . j2 . (1992).008 .28 (36) M-21 (37) _.10) Dag .06) J)l 0 .31) n-9 .23) .05) O-28 (.35 (37) D-6 28 (.05) .9-25 (.S Table 23 Mean Performance Data for Engage Direct Fire Targets Hypothesis.11) . 28 .27 (. 104 frou the scripted OPFOR attack routes in Stage 3.12) .05 (..29) .-27 .13 . The effect of condition was not significant.08 (.23) .08 Co Echelon (.. This probably resulted slightly more likely to avoid contact with friendly elements during the later portion of the stage.09) .40) .s . 27) = 3.8 .19 (. nor was the condition by stage interaction.17 (.23 (25) j)..03 ..010 .0.24 Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means. This primary indicator of engagement outcome quantified the battalion's success in destroying the enemy forces.21 (.29 (.6 . The lack of significant differences between conditions is consistent with results reported by Leibrecht et al.00) ..08) Dul 0 .38) .06) .22 (.48 . Percent of OPFOR killed by end of stage.35 (.02 0 (.38) _p3 . manned Ban PbeoC .36 .24) ...16) .07 .20 (.02 (.0=24 (.22 .31 (32) n-28 CO Eckheo KWb ratio.40 (.19) n-5 .30) . A significant stage effect (f(2.05) V-27 (.09 .=-4 . (.17 S KikWo ratio.17 (.05) Mw-31 .26 (..84.11 (.24 (.7 Co Echew .31 0 (0) n-5 .p-3.17) .24 n-u5 . maned an Echelon .034) reflected largely a lower proportion of OPFOR killed in Stage 3 than in the other two stages.l 0 .S . manned Vwlidu Be Echelon . by Stage and Condition (continued) StaI MMna CVCC Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Sage 3 Baseline Hit/rouad arao.26) _.31 (.31 . Examination of the data (summarized in Table 23) revealed no consistent mean differences between CVCC-equipped and Baseline units.10 0 (0) .

The line with the lower ratios during Stage 2 which apparently reflected the numerical superiority of the BLUFOR in the offensively oriented counterattack. mean performance did not vary systematically between the Baseline and CVCC conditions. with the force ratio more in favor of the BLUFOR. . effect of stage was significant (E(2. Mean number of rounds fired (see Table 23) did not differ consistently between the CVCC and Baseline conditions.. the better the combat effectiveness of the battalion. This measure was designed to indicate the extent to which crewed tanks contributed to attritting the enemy. Summary data for this measure appear in Table 23. Similar to the. 28) . on the average about onequarter of the battalion was lost during delay missions (Stages 1 and 3) and less than one-tenth during the counterattack mission (Stage 2). nor was the condition by stage interaction. As a basic index of firing activity by crews in manned simulators. The data (summarized in Table 23) reveal equivalent mean performance by CVCC and Baseline units. The condition by stage interaction was not significant.8. Number of rounds fired by manned vehicles. but the effect of stage was significant (F(2. thereby killing proportionally fewer enemy vehicles. Losses/kill ratio.002) reflected mainly lower proportions in Stage 2. There was no significant effect of condition. it was possible that CVCC-equipped crews might participate less fully than Baseline crews.61. as shown by a nonsignificant effect of condition.001). The condition effect and the condition by stage interaction were both nonsignificant. this measure indicated how successfully the battalion conserved its own forces during the exchange with the enemy. The condition effect was not significant. this measure expressed the cost of kills inflicted on the enemy in terms of friendly vehicles lost in the exchange. The ratio was calculated by dividing the total number of BLUFOR losses (excluding fratricide) by the total number of OPFOR losses. A simple loss-exchange ratio. p < . Another primary index of engagement outcome. As can be seen. The lower the ratio. likely the result of unit and vehicle commanders trailing somewhat behind their companies during the on-the-move counterattack. As seen in Table 23. A significant stage effect (F(2.17. p - . The latter trend (fewer losses in the counterattack) was undoubtedly due to the lower density of OPFOR in Stage 2. The entire BLUFOR (manned and unmanned) was represented. 27) - 7. in Percent of OPFOR vehicles killed by all manned vehicles. this index provided a more general indicator of the extent to which crewed tanks participated in the actual fighting of the battle. 105 .002). immediately preceding measure.. 27) = 15. Percent of BLUFOR killed by end of-stage. p .78. Since the CCD might divert a unit/vehicle commander's attention from the immediate battle. this measure captured the cumulative number of SABOT and HEAT rounds fired by each crew during each stage.

the measure was computed as the distance (in meters) from a .001) resulted principally from more rounds being fired in stage 1 The lower numbers in Stage 2 compared to the other two stages. -. behavior among unit and vehicle commanders was equivalent across the CVCC and Baseline conditions. scored by a given crew were averaged to produce a single value 106 . the typical distance at which crews firing their main guns scored hits against enemy targets. the host computer classified hits in terms of damages sustained. R < .005) reflected principally lower means during Stage 2. This measure was designed to capture Mean taraet hit rance. with fratricide kills included. None of the interactions for this measure was significant. CITV) did not enhance vehicle On the other hand. this finding suggests that the CVCC capabilities (e. rounds than battalion echelon crews. the difference was modest and the effect of A significant stage effect (F(2. Overall. firing vehicle to the OPFOR vehicle hit by the round fired (i. The number of vehicles sustaining at least one killing hit was tallied during This measure each stage. consistently fewer manned tanks in the CVCC condition sustained killing hits. demands of the CCD might distract unit leaders from fighting the battle.72. The range values for all hits fratricide hits were excluded).. POSNAV.e.58. Although The data for this measure appear in Table 23.6. On one hand. were predictable. Applying to manned vehicles only. due to the lower OPFOR density scripted in the The modest difference between the two counterattack mission. Number of manned vehicles sustaining a killing hit. delay stages (means for Stage 1 being higher than for Stage 3) most likely reflect scripted differences in terrain line-of-sight conditions and OPFOR routes.85. as well as their general positioning somewhat to the rear. provided a rough indicator of exposure to lethal enemy fire. 250) = 15. these results show a logical pattern of participation in the battle that was not modified by the use of This further dispels the suspicion that the task CVCC equipment. This is understandable. nonsignificant.. Even though manned simulators were programmed to override the damaging effects of direct fire or indirect fire hits. condition was not significant. with company echelon crews firing substantially more 250) = 9. These data indicate that the CVCC equipment did not influence the proportion of manned vehicles taking lethal enemy fire. it suggests that risk-taking survivability. given the broader command and control responsibilities of the battalion commander and his S3. p = . consistent with the lower density of OPFOR in the The condition by stage interaction was counterattack mission..g. 27) . A significant stage effect (E(2. The effect of echelon was significant (E(l. 002).

for manned vehicles. to hit targets at greater ranges. The lack of a significant CVCC advantage for this measure appears inconsistent with the significant CVCC advantage for Although CVCC-equipped maximum lase range discussed earlier. lased to targets at greater ranges.022). 1 discussed stage in ranges lase maximum to the longer in conditions terrain line-of-sight longer the case. explanation for the significant condition by echelon interaction is readily apparent. while the effect of stage was significant The condition by echelon (Z(2. and implementation 107 . probabilities of hits and kills. 117) . on the average. similar Stage in hit ranges longer primarily reflected effect earlier. stage) was significant. apparently exercised comparable processes in deciding when to O fire at targets. though it is consistent with the trends seen Basically the same factors with mean target hit range data. in that As Stage 1 were presumably a key factor. but the effect of stage was significant (F(2. CVCC commander could not fire with his The CITV's firing process typically in the hands of the gunner. confirmed by the lack of a significant The echelon effect was also nonsignificant. generally leading crews to comment that they relied on conventional IFF Thus. were nonsignificant. firing accuracy (marksmanship).42. These findings indicate that the CVCC's capabilities did not impact main gun firing accuracy. R < . of the means reveals no systematic difference between the CVCC and Baseline conditions. nor was any of the interactions. R < The stage None of the interactions was significant. 117) = 5. condition effect. discussed earlier to explain the pattern of results for mean target hit range apply to the findings for mean target kill range. The data for this measure ratios indicate better performance. Inspection Table 23 summarizes the data for this measure. crews in both conditions means (GPS and vision blocks). their decisions crews first The to fire came at ranges comparable to the Baseline crews. Mean target kill computed very similarly to the preceding measure (mean target hit range). . The limitations of the distributed simulation environment in terms of ballistic algorithms. the leaving CITV active. the CVCC-equipped battalions were expected.* Given the hunter-killer advantage of the CITV.11. echelon. interaction was significant (f(1. are summarized in Table 23. As an index of basic Hits/round ratio.10. the proportion of rounds hitting Higher an OPFOR vehicle was computed for each crewed tank. IFF function had a substantial inherent error rate. The condition and echelon effects including the ANOVA outcomes. This measure was defined and range. including the IFF feature. None of the main effects (condition. 1.001).84. 156) = 9. . paralleled very closely those for mean target hit range. for each stage. p =. but the No plausible other interaction terms were nonsignificant. the only difference being the end-point (killing versus The data for the measure (see Table 23) hitting a target).001).

. . Stage 2 Stage 3 Mean kills per hit ratio for manned vehicles. Higher ratios represent better performance. 156) = 3. indicating that this measure was not a discriminator for any of the variables of interest in this evaluation.30 . this measure compared the number of enemy vehicles killed to the number of rounds fired by each crewed tank. Mean ratios appear in Figure 20. An indicator of the effectiveness of main gun firings.292 0. .47 MS- 030: . for manned vehicles. Kills/hit ratio.2 .36 1 i .049).. p = .qO.15 0. for manned vehicles. this measure calculated the proportion of hits scored by each crewed tank which resulted in destruction (mobility kills excluded) of the target. These limitations were Kills/round ratio..022 " [3] CVCC El CVCC Baseline 0-19 0.. while the effects of echelon and stage were nonsignificant.22 . 108 . Providing an index of the effectiveness of rounds that hit enemy targets.48_ O 0. discussed at the end of the Method section.94.L40 0.05 Bn Co .3.10 0.. None of the interaction terms was significant.55 0. significant (E(1.35 31 0. of target lead should be kept in mind. where an overall difference in favor of CVCC-equipped vehicles can be seen. Higher ratios indicate better performance.35 0. There were no significant main effects or interactions.:ii •] : Bn Co Bn Co Stage 1 Figure 20.20 0. The effect of condition was KUUl/hit 0. Table 23 presents summary data for this measure.

As discussed in a subsequent subsection on the Intelligence BOS. The data for the separate measures. however. are presented here for the sake of completeness. The factors that determine a kill. CVCC participants more accurately reported the type of OPFOR vehicles in their transmitted CONTACT and SPOT reports. The Baseline battalions consistently killed more of the enemy in the engagement areas in both delay stages. These measures were originally developed as input to a composite measure quantifying the extent to which the battalion met the brigade commander's intent. given a hit. the earlier the enemy is attritted the better. . other factors (such as friendly losses) being equal.primary The summary data for these measures appear in Table 24. lethality in the primary engagement areas was quantified. This pattern is consistent with the results discussed for the Control Terrain hypothesis in the following subsection. this was accomplished by determining the cumulative number of OPFOR vehicles killed by the battalion south of two successive PLs during the course of the stage. 0 109 . include the point of impact and angle of attack along with the type of munition. For each stage. In general.The advantage observed for crews using the CVCC equipment may be attributable to better round selection for the types of targets and ranges encountered within the simulation environment. For each of the two delay stages. Given improved target identification. Number of OPFOR vehicles killed south of designated PL (Stages 1 and 3 only. and probably relates to the greater stand-off distance which CVCC units tended to maintain (see earlier Move on Surface subsection). although the differences between conditions were not significant. CVCC crews would have been more likely to select the optimal round for the target.

5 (33.8) n=5 54. the overall lack of significant condition effects for the measures quantifying target engagement performance was not surprising. by Condition Measure Number OPFOR vehicles killed south of PL Jack (Stage 1) Number OPFOR vehicles killed south of PL Club (Stage 1) Number OPFOR vehicles killed south of PL Ace (Stage 3) Number OPFOR vehicles killed south of PL Queen (Stage 3) CVCC 64.8 (17.3) j2=6 D7=6 84.8 (9. No participating crews served below the level of company XO.6 (22. indicating greater effectiveness for those rounds hitting targets.2 (21.1) n=5 67.7) Baseline 81.7 (14.1) 38. The equivalence of firing activity between the CVCC and Baseline conditions indicated that.8 (11.8) D7=6 n7=6 89. the presence of the CVCC equipment did not by itself distract the crews from performing their normal combat tasks.. The kills/hit ratio was significantly higher for CVCC-equipped vehicles.2) n74 Summary of key data. A plausible explanation for this is to postulate better round selection among the CVCC crews.7 (22. Control Terrain Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to control terrain on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units'. In general. In effect. at the company and battalion echelons. CVCC crews had more time to make the decision to fire and to select the type of round most appropriate for the target type and range. Was the battalion bvyassed by the OPFOR? 110 The Battle Master determined on-line whether more than four OPFOR platoons . and company and battalion leaders typically focused on C3 responsibilities rather than directly engaging the enemy. Table 24 Mean Enemy Kills in Primary Engagement Areas. which may have been possible due to the earlier target acquisition performance discussed in the preceding subsection. Only one of the measures for this task supported the hypothesis that the CVCC capabilities would benefit the direct fire engagement of enemy targets.3) n=4 83.

from scripted information reaching resulted have may conditions the company commanders from the SAFOR operators (role-playing platoon leaders) in the Baseline condition. enabling the unit leaders to stay sufficiently abreast of the battle to avoid being bypassed. and the preceding subsection documented that CVCC and Baseline units . three stages. two delay stages was to maintain contact and continue to attrit the enemy. Virtually all of the Baseline and CVCC battalions completed Stage 1 without being bypassed by the enemy. performed similarly when engaging direct fire targets. battalion completed the mission with ten enemy vehicles penetrating the control line. No explanation for addressing the Move on Surface hypothesis.46) to In Stage 2. 6.'ith performance of the Baseline battalions.17 enemy vehicles (standard deviation. Because of the exclusive occurrence of zero values For the delay missions (Stages 1 and 3). and another CVCC In Stage 3. This left direct fire as the primary means for controlling terrain. for controlling terrain in the simulation environment of this Combat engineer evaluation may have constrained the outcome. in both conditions appeared to pursue preventing enemy In addition. the CVCC-equipped battalions allowed an penetration. supporting this task did not support the hypothesis that CVCC The mission in the equipment would enhance control of terrain. This contrasts i. none of which permitted any enemy vehicles to penetrate the designated control line in any of the for Baseline units. one CVCC battalion penetrate the control line. permitted two enemy vehicles to penetrate. defensive represented and plans were based on mission training boundaries which the battalion should have defended to deny enemy In Stage 1. the CVCC units' performance in Stage 2 is readily evident. The data for the primary measures Summary of key data. Number of OPFOR vehicles penetrating designated line. difference chi-square test confirmed there was no significant The maximum performance in both between the two conditions. For each stage. Sum-•ra of Findinas 111 . a control line was defined to determine undesirable These control lines enemy penetration by the end of the stage.penetrated to the rear of the front-line BLUFOR companies. one CVCC battalion allowed one enemy vehicle. average of 4. support was not modelled. no ANOVAs were performed on any of these measures. the curious performance of the CVCC battalions probably relates to their tendency to begin their displacement earlier and end their missions with greater stand-off distance than did the Baseline These trends were discussed in the subsection battalions. and all battalions A completing Stage 3 did so without the enemy bypassing them. and SAFOR vehicles/units did not alter their behavior in response to artillery fire. and this may have led commanders to try to inflict The battalions maximum losses on the enemy early in the battle. the means available penetration quite aggressively.

which apparently gave the crews more confidence in their navigation abilities. 1992) the CVCC units completed the combat missions more quickly than Base'ine units. in more consistent timing of key battle milestones. The faster target acquisition seen in the CVCC condition may have given the crews more time to make the decision to fire and to select the type of round most appropriate for the target type and range. of the measures in this BOS may be largely a result of the 112 There was clear evidence in four of the five 0 The comparability of CVCC and Baseline performance on many . In addition. However. tasks that CVCC capabilities enhanced the battalion's performance in the areas of tactical movement. * The CVCC-equipped crews were able to detect their first targets at a greater range than did crews using conventional equipment. (1992). and in better end-of-stage stand-off distances. target acquisition. but they appear to indicate better round selection. and target engagement. 1992). at the company and battalion echelons. The CVCC crews engaged in firing activity as frequently as Baseline crews. Greater control of movement among CVCC units was reflected in more rapid movement to objectives in the counterattack.. These findings reflect the hunterkiller advantages of the CITV and are consistent with results from company-level research (Leibrecht et al. This reinforces similar results reported by Leibrecht et al. These results are important because they indicate that. The ability to monitor the unit's position on the tactical map in real time apparently enabled CVCC units to move more expeditiously in executing the mission. 1989. The latter probably accounted for the greater apparent freedom of movement in evidence on the part of CVCC unit and vehicle commanders. the presence of the CVCC equipment did not by itself distract the crews from performing their normal combat tasks. 1991. This difference most likely relates to the assessment of battalion performance compared to the assessment of isolated crews. At the same time. The higher kills/hit ratios for CVCC-equipped crews have not been reported in earlier research.. and the two groups were equivalent in the proportion of the enemy which they killed. CVCC crews acquired targets more quickly once they became visible. These findings undoubtedly resulted from the POSNAV capabilities. As reported in previous research (Du Bois & Smith. including more rapid dissemination of orders and combat reports and shorter decision cycles. Leibrecht et al.The measures analyzed under this BOS yielded support for the expected beneficial impact of the CVCC system on battlefield maneuver tasks. other factors most likely contributed to faster mission completion. they differ from Quinkert's (1990) crew-level finding that the principal advantage of the CITV occurred after acquisition of the initial target.

Faster completion of mission in Stages 1 and 2 . Previous researchers have reported significant savings of distance and fuel among CVCC-equipped platoons and companies (Du The absence Bois & Smith.Faster movement to objectives in Stage 2 . 113 . the decision to displace). experimental platoon or wingman if appeared have might which differences Performance information from an leader vehicles had been manned.* With participants/crews allocated no lower experimental design. predominant inolvement of SAFOR elements in target acquisition and engagement may well have led crews in both conditions to In downplay their emphasis on acquiring and engaging targets.Faster target acquisition in all stages . SAFOR vehicles/units predominated in executing maneuver tasks. the messages which appeared on the control screen.. alternative allocation of crews. which included a fully manned platoon.Enhanced kills/hit ratios in all stages Process Direct Fire Targets Engage Direct Fire Targets . The SAFOR reporting procedures in the Baseline condition relied on the SAFOR operator relaying As a result. counterparts. the legitimate effects of the CVCC system. Leibrecht et al.g. of a comparable effect at the battalion level undoubtedly reflects the roles assigned to participating crews and the ease Vehicle commanders at the company of following SAFOR vehicles.Safer end-of-mission stand-off ranges in all stages .More consistent timing of movement- dependent milestones in Stage 2 Navigate . 1992).Greater apparent freedom of movement for unit and vehicle commanders . company Baseline volume and quality of information reaching reaching information the rivalled have may commanders and XOs follow could crews Baseline Further. than company XO duty positions. masking In addition. 1991. would have impacted positioning and navigation as well as certain decision processes (e.Greater maximum target detection range in all stages . is presented in Lickteig (in preparation). 1989. out levelled have may factors design-related short.. Table 25 Summary of Major Maneuver BOS Findings Task Move on Surface CVCC Advantages . their CVCC These factors SAFOR elements instead of navigating on their own.

Fire SupDort BOS Issue: Does the CVCC system enhance the Fire Support BOS? The CVCC's impact on the accuracy of designating enemy targets for engagement with indirect fire is discussed in this Organizing the presentation of data is a single subsection. distance measurements of the discrepancies between actual and The smaller the discrepancy. enemy vehicles (regardless of type) nearest the reported location defined the location of the nearest enemy unit. shown by a significant effect of condition (f(l. In practice. between Stages 1 and 3. R = . As seen Complete data for this measure appear in Table C-5.016). precise location information is more difficult during tactical movement. Conduct Surface Attack Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to conduct surface attack by indirect fire on the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units'. p < . issue is the accuracy of CFF reports. the CoM of the three grid locations were analyzed. 70) = 22. Curiously. suggesting perhaps a Considering the small sample size (n warm-up or practice effect.. XO level and higher are accustomed to following subordinate units and often admitted doing so in the test scenario. reflecting the precision with which battalion elements were able determine and communicate the locations of enemy targets selected to receive indirect fire. The effect of stage was also significant (E(2. Accuracy of requests for Mean accuracy of CFF locations. The poorer accuracy seen in Stage 2 for both 70). accuracy. in Figure 21. although the CVCC capabilities prevented Stage 2 The accuracy from degrading greatly when compared with Stage 1. 70) = 4. as by Baseline participants. 114 . the better the reported locations.001). p . based on the Conduct Surface Attack component of the The quantitative focus in addressing this Fire Support BOS. This circumstance would largely explain the rare misorientation and straying out-of-sector which occurred in this evaluation.001). as was the condition by stage interaction (F(2. indirect fire was quantified by comparing the enemy location specified in each CFF to the actual location of the nearest enemy Only CFFs with valid unit at the time the CFF was transmitted.41. conditions is most likely the result of contacting and engaging Obtaining the enemy while on the move during the counterattack..10. apparent trend in Stage 3 indicating Baseline accuracy better than CVCC is puzzling. hypothesis. during Stages 1 and 2 the CVCC participants submitted substantially more accurate CFFs than those submitted This was a reliable advantage. especially given the tactical similarity . the "best" accuracy scores for both conditions occurred in Stage 3. Only those unit and vehicle commanders transmitting scorable CFFs contributed This computational process yielded values for this measure.

as indicated by the cell sample sizes (see Table C-5). - 3) in interpreting Stage 3 differences between Baseline and CVCC conditions. These data show that the CVCC capabilities increased both * accuracy and consistency of performance in reporting enemy locations in CFF reports. This indicates more consistent performance when using CVCC equipment. highly fluid battlefield. was used. of which 34. The data further reveal h lthat substantially more usable information was transmitted by unit and 115 .54 5W F-7-7391. a distinct benefit on a fast-paced. many were not scorable because they lacked adequate information on location.3 (66 percent) were missing target locations.. Mean accuracy scores for enemy locations contained in CFF reports.17 E LiCVCC Baseline Stage 1 Stag e 2 Stage 3 Figure 21. The standard deviations for these data are smaller in Stages 1 and 2 for the CVCC-equipped battalions than for the Baseline battalions. Baseline unit and vehicle commanders submitted an average of 52 CFF reports per stage. Of the CFF requests transmitted by Baseline participants. a much greater quantity of usable targeting information reached the FSO when the CVCC equipment. caution is in order 30M 2500m 2000 1500 1000 708. Thus. Meters 4000' 3500) 3469. In each stage the CVCC commanders transmitted substantially more scorable CFF reports than their Baseline counterparts.79 1714.50 for the Baseline condition in Stage 3.

72) = 8. Scoring was accomplished by comparing the reported vehicle type with the actual types of enemy vehicles visible to the reporting vehicle at the time the CFF was transmitted.~- LiBaseline 30 20 10 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Figure 22..57 86. If one or more enemy vehicles of the type reported were visible. Mean percentage of CFF reports correctly identifying vehicle type. This measure quantified the accuracy of unit and vehicle commanders' identification of type of enemy vehicle in their requests for fire support. 116 * . Table C-5 presents complete descriptive data for this measure. Percent of CFFs with correct tyDe. of the CVCC significant Neither the interaction system was significant. the CFF was scored "correct. highlighting the value of the CVCC system's precise location reporting capabilities. Figure 22 displays the means. showing a consistently greater proportion of CFFs containing correct enemy vehicle types in the CVCC condition. the proportion scored "correct" was calculated. or personnel carrier) were scored.004). helicopter.67 91.S3 83. The performance advantage Percent lOO 90 90. 2 = .95. vehicle commanders in the CVCC condition. effect of stage nor the condition by stage was significant. as evidenced by the effect of condition (F(l." For each commander sending scorable CFFs. Only reports containing a valid grid location and valid type of enemy vehicle (tank.33 70 6&33 ~J .

the data suggest that location accuracy suffers during engagements where the friendly force is on the move.Paralleling the preceding measure.Greater volume of usable information in all stages * The superior location accuracy afforded by the CVCC system is undoubtedly due largely to the ability to input precise locations to CFFs by lasing or by touching the map screen. this can be expected to improve the accuracy of indirect fires delivered on enemy targets. Table 26 Summary of Major Fire Support BOS Findings Measure Accuracy of CFF locations 4 CFFs with correct type # CFFs with complete information CVCC Advantages . The CVCC's advantage in terms of target identification accuracy most likely results from the CITV's surveillance capabilities as well as the digital exchange of information about enemy elements. including display of report-based icons on the tactical map. the standard deviations for this measure are smaller for the CVCC condition in all three stages. At the same time. contributing to more effective massing of friendly fires. The data clearly document that the CVCC capabilities enhance both location and identification accuracy in the process of requesting fire missions from mortar and artillery elements. As a general principal. Although the differences are not dramatic. However. leading to less accurate CFF reports. the . the consistency of this trend suggests less variability of performance when using the CVCC equipment. These data establish that the CVCC capabilities increase the overall accuracy and consistency of reporting the type of enemy vehicle in CFF reports. offensive maneuvers may degrade certainty of position information and demand more attention for navigation and target acquisition than defensive maneuvers. 117 .CFF report vehicle identification accuracy better in all stages . Summarv of Findings Table 26 summarizes the findings pertaining to the conduct of surface attacks under the Fire Support BOS. This can be expected to contribute to enhanced battlefield effectiveness. In turn.CFF report location accuracy better in Stages 1 and 2 . CVCC capabilities clearly are effective in limiting the degradation during on-the-move engagements.

as reflected in participant-generated CONTACT.Fully two of every three Baseline CFFs were missing target locations. Table 27 summarizes the data for this hypothesis. This is a high rate of missing information and is an delivery of indirect fires. given the requirements for accurate This subsection examines the effect of CVCC capabilities on collecting intelligence information. particularly the CCD's prompts for location information and the ease of obtaining precise locations of enemy targets. One hypothesis. based on the Collect Threat Information component of the Intelligence BOS. organizes data presentation. are especially valuable in ensuring that complete and accurate locations are submitted with CFF reports. The measures supporting this analysis focused on the accuracy of obtaining and reporting enemy location information. 0 118 . The CVCC capabilities. Intelligence BOS Issue: Does the CVCC system enhance the Intelligence BOS? important shortcoming. and on the descriptive accuracy of the target identification process reflected in CONTACT and SPOT reports. The following section on the Intelligence BOS discusses the CVCC's impact on the accuracy of information reported about enemy activities. SPOT. The results presented in this section indicate how CVCC capabilities can help unit and vehicle commanders generate accurate fire support requests to increase the effectiveness of their surface attacks. Collect Threat Information Hypothesis: CVCC units' ability to collect threat information on the The battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the Baseline units'. and SHELL reports.

pa (10570.Table 27 Mean Performance Data for Collect Threat Information Hypothesis.Ju1 88.47 (30-32) . accuracy was significantly better among CVCC units than among The Baseline units (for condition. Neither the stage effect nor the condition by stage interaction was significant.37) ja7 reapou with Pecent CONTACJ tz e(29-20) cwfectam of SPOT nu e mand type Obsed eport Eu= f= _n= -9= -= flu . with Baseline units' deviations averaging more than six times those of CVCC units.0) j.3) . from the reported location to the nearest OPFOR vehicle at the time the report was sent.8 (578.n Mta: Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means.pots 2034. The mean Location deviations for this measure can be found in Table 27. in meters.0) 5 .7 390.14) B-14 1888.7) (2154.43 (30.HLL . F(1.9-6 SPOT apor -9a . by Stage and Condition Starl MsWWM CVCC Baseine CVCC Scap 2 Sta 3 Baseline CVCC Baseline Ladom asan -dvki 547.-. largest difference between conditions occurred in Stage 1 (see Figure 23).4) JuS (921.037).70 (26.2 (429.38 (31.19 (630. S.7 (751.01) V=16 1662.0.4) .71 (32.3 (1033.0. 119 .2 (645-2) 2-25 84.5) -9-15 59.a .0= Dan -9= .1 (595.3 623.2) p-5 50. 2 = . Only reports containing valid locations were scored. location accuracy determined how close the reported enemy location was to actual enemy locations.1 CONTACT mports (677.l9 1783.0 355. The measure was computed as the distance. 94) = 4.3) Ja7 46.9- .4 3752.8 1896. .72 p-=30 1648.- .48.9=22 84.25) 3--18 1333.7) jul8s Pl-12 (497-3) .0 -9- 2. CONTACT report Accuracy of CONTACT report locations.

. Given the automated reporting features inherent to the CVCC system.27 3500 3000 2500 20=00 1895. This procedure acknowledged that valuable intelligence information can be gained when precise enemy locations are specified as early as possible.83 355. such an event typically involves follow-up transmissions between the originator and other stations on the network to confirm the actual location of the enemy activity.778 meters off.Meters 4000 _______ 3752.7 per stage. "Tanks. participants in this evaluation were instructed to specify grid location(s) of enemy vehicles in their CONTACT reports. As discussed earlier in this report.] CVCC E Baseline 1500 1000 547.g.3 out of 133. analogous events are very unlikely. the standard deviations for the CVCC battalions were substantially smaller than those for the Baseline battalions.08 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 meters) of enemy vehicle locations . Although armor SOPs call for only cardinal direction in CONTACT reports. reporting a grid of 456123 as opposed to 123456). While such a mistake would eventually be discovered and corrected as message information was processed. .. Figure 23. south").36 623.g. This most likely occurred due to the transposition of grid numbers (e.67 390. Mean deviation (in reported in CONTACT reports. Twenty-nine percent of all Baseline CONTACT reports (38. the more consistent performance of the CVCC units is a distinct advantage. Inspection of the cell sample sizes for CONTACT report accuracy (Table 27) revealed that CVCC 120 . on the average) could not be scored for accuracy due to lack of valid locations (e. One data point that clearly influenced the data was a Baseline CONTACT report (Stage 1) that was 41. In all three stages.

also was interaction by stage Among the CVCC participants.3 This and were therefore excluded from the analysis of accuracy. In most cases the LRF will of the LRF to input report locations. values for this measure constitute better accuracy. . this measure quantified the deviation between The same procedures used to reported and actual enemy locations. nor was the effect of stage. in meters. the mean performance for Baseline units tended to be better than for CVCC units. between the For reported and actual locations of OPFOR artillery impacts. shows a large proportion -f flawed SPOT reports for the Baseline Overall. the CVCC's capabilities measure (see Table 27). an by Baseline unit and vehicle commanders.] An average of 124. or lased to a point on the ground near 121 .3 unique SPOT reports per stage were sent Of those reports. each report with a valid location. reflected in the larger sample sizes for this In other words. reported locations was computed for each type of information. the CVCC unit and vehicle commanders sent condition. compute accuracy of locations specified in CONTACT reports were Only reports containing used for locations in SPOT reports.2 percent) average of 36. substantially more scorable SPOT reports than did their Baseline counterparts. valid locations contain did not (29. were instructed All participants analyzed. were valid locations The accuracy of to report OPFOR vehicles observed and destroyed. The condition was not significant. the CVCC capabilities enabled participants to locations. As with CONTACT report Accuracy of SPOT report locations. however. resulted in a larger quantity of usable enemy information reaching the TOC. accuracy was quantified as the deviation. location accuracy.* commanders sent substantially more CONTACT reports containing Thus. obtain a reliable distance reading from a solid target. [Note: Data for these measures are to be reanalyzed following DCE data analysis. nonsignificant. SHELL report location Accuracy of SHELL revort locations. the condition effect difference occurring in Stage 1. yielding two submeasures. the reported location was compared to the actual location of the nearest OPFOR artillery Smaller distance impact at the time of report transmission. Supporting tables and discussion to be completed when analysis is complete. tactical reports. As seen in Table 27. and therefore provide relatively accurate input to the CCD for In the case of artillery impacts. accuracy scores for SHELL reports were substantially worse than they were for CONTACT and A possible explanation for this may lie in the use SPOT reports. provide a larger quantity of fully usable enemy information to the TOC staff. participants may either have input the attack location by hand using the CCD touchscreen. with the most notable However.

Across the three stages. this is a relatively high rate of missing information and would hamper the TOC in constructing a realistic picture of the battle. The effect of condition was significant (Z(i. Supporting tables. The accuracy of the identification process associated with generating SPOT reports was assessed by comparing the number of enemy vehicles reported to the number of same-type vehicles actually visible to the reporting vehicle at the time the report was sent. an average of 12 per stage (29. the report was scored as correct. CVCC participants sent substantially more SHELL reports than did their Baseline counterparts. but neither the stage effect nor the condition by stage interaction was significant. As with CONTACT and SPOT reports. For each vehicle sending CONTACT reports. Correctness of SPOT report number and tvye. Either of these options would have yielded An average of 41. relatively inaccurate locations. This measure was designed to quantify the accuracy with which unit and vehicle commanders identified the type of enemy vehicle in their CONTACT reports.) 122 . R < . the proportion of correct CONTACT reports among CVCC units averaged better than 84% (see Figure 24).1 percent) were not scorable due to missing locations. figures. with higher scores representing greater accuracy. while Baseline units' proportions averaged less than 60%.85. As can be seen from the cell sizes in Table 27. 98) = 27. the proportion of correct reports in each stage was computed. the higher volume of usable location information resulting from digital reporting was a definite advantage.. the artillery bursts. This measure was computed separately for the observed and destroyed components of the SPOT report. If there were enemy vehicles of the type reported actually visible to the reporting tank at the time of report transmission.3 SHELL reports per stage were transmitted by Baseline unit and vehicle commanders. Even though the accuracy of SHELL report locations did not benefit from the CVCC capabilities. larger percentages represented better performance. For this measure of descriptive accuracy. and discussion to be completed when analysis is complete. Of these. Percent CONTACT reports with correct type.001). The computations yielded percentage scores ranging from 0 to 100%. [Note: Date for these measures are to be reanalyzed following analysis of DCB data.

47 70 60. 90 88. accuracy was significantly better among CVCC units than among Baseline units. the CVCC system enhanced the Intelligence BOS. 123 .Percent 100. where similar procedures were used to quantify location accuracy.43 ] Baseline 40 30 20= 0 . to SHELL report location accuracy. in In terms of both enemy location and vehicle identification.I " Stage 1 Figure 24.38 5 c 46. 59. Stage 2 Stage 3 Mean percent of CONTACT reports with correct vehicle Summary of Findinas Table 28 summarizes the findings for the Intelligence BOS. the lack of differences between conditions echoed a finding from company-level research On balance.70 84. The finding that CVCC-equipped commanders sent substantially more reports (CONTACT. The data for the measures which were based on grid locations show that. type. significantly was battlefield In short. (1992) With respect reported only CONTACT reports being more accurate. and SHELL) containing valid Valuable locations has considerable operational significance. CVCC units rendered SPOT and CONTACT reports that were significantly more accurate than Baseline units' reports. 1992). in those cases where the digital system could capitalize on reliable range returns from the LRF. earlier research at the company level. the data clearly show that (Leibrecht et al. This finding is consistent with the CFF report accuracy data from the Fire Support BOS (discussed earlier in this section). SPOT.. Leibrecht et al. to collect threat information on the the CVCC units' ability better than the Baseline units'.

. addressing both operational and methodological implications. evaluation's findings. (in preparation). which forced the TOC staff to query the sender or to proceed without the information. the reader is encouraged to review the companion reports by Atwood et al. and SHELL reports Across the four BOSs.Better accuracy of enemy locations reported in all stages TBD . specified. ensuring responsiveness of combat support and combat service support elements. TOC to the (accuracy) assessing and controlling the battle.Greater volume of usable info for CONTACT. SPOT. the major findings of the battalion evaluation highlight the contributions of the CVCC capabilities For a full account of the to the conduct of mounted warfare. (in preparation) and Meade et The following section discusses major al. SPOT. lessons learned during the course of the evaluation. intelligence information is lost when enemy location is not frequently missing location information. and SHELL reports were . Table 28 Summary of Major Intelligence BOS Findings Measure Accuracy of CONTACT report locations Accuracy of SPOT report locations % CONTACT reports w/correct type Correctness of SPOT report number and type # reports with complete info CVCC Advantages . provide a larger to CVCC capabilities enabled participants higher quality overall with information enemy of quantity implications for important has This staff.Better identification of enemy vehicle type in all stages TBD Baseline CONTACT. The ease of obtaining locations by lasing or touching the touchscreen most likely accounted for the greater volume of On the bottom line. and coordinating with adjacent units. projecting and planning future operations. 124 . the complete reports in the CVCC condition.

Most of the voice-transmitted information is not appropriate for the report formats supported by the digital system. especially regarding design of automated C3 user interfaces. 125 * . integrated observations during execution of scenarios. Digital transmissions in the battalion evaluation could not be modified as they were relayed. In the current evaluation. although digital transmissions would somewhat offset the reduction of voice transmissions. Even with digital reporting available. By and large these observations stemmed from participant feedback. allowing them more timely access for verbal transmissions. (in preparation). both upward and downward. Participants accepted the lack of editing capability well. From a tactical perspective. and extrapolations from performance data. discussions among the research staff. many participants felt that it was preferable to transmit certain reports (especially CONTACT and NBC reports) by voice means rather than via the CCD. digital reporting helps free voice networks for critical C3 communications. Lessons learned in the context of armor TTPs are reported by Meade et al. Similar observations about SMI issues. Automated reporting of vehicle/unit logistics status is an excellent example of a totally automated function which was very well received by commanders and XOs in the battalion evaluation. This characteristic offered perfect completeness and consistency in the process of disseminating information. are presented in Atwood et al. etc. nor were they intended to.Lessons Learned During the course of this evaluation the research staff accumulated observations regarding lessons of value in planning and conducting future research. digital reports and voice messages complement one another. It reduced their burden in terms of requirements to transmit information about the status of their fuel. Unit leaders frequently desired the ability to modify FRAGOs and overlays so they could tailor them to the tactical level of their subordinate units. Investigators will likely find themselves confronting this issue in future research efforts. ammunition. Rather. except in the case of orders (FRAGOs) and the accompanying overlays. By reducing the overall volume of voice radio traffic. much important combat information is conveyed via voice radio exchanges. (in preparation). Commanders see this as a distinct advantage. Operational Effectiveness Command and Control Automated C3 systems such as the CVCC do not eliminate the need for voice radio communications. the reduced radio signature is important in decreasing the unit's vulnerability to electronic detection and electronic countermeasures. This section discusses the major lessons learned dealing with operational effectiveness aspects as well as methodological issues.

aggregation of same-type reports meeting certain criteria. evaluation. TOC workstations could aggregate reports of the same type which met specified timing and location criteria. and the ability to delete In addition. TOC reports individually and in blocks. the battalion level than at lower echelons.S This development raises the prospect that unit SOPs might need to redefine requirements for routine submission of SITREPs--either their format or frequency of submission might be altered. the individual reports remained electronic map. tends to produce greater freedom of movement. related reports were clustered together and a single icon represented them on the However. Consigning the integration of information to a machine separate. such as discrete addressing (discussed in the previous paragraph). reflected their belief that many messages are not needed by everyone on the network. a relatively simple form for users. etc. all vehicles on a given digital Many network received all transmissions sent on that network. out reports by type of report. 126 which can lead to This . addressing--the discrete for desire a firm participants expressed This ability to direct messages to a specific receiver. Automated navigation systems give the crew a substantial sense of confidence in their ability to avoid getting lost. such tools included automatic rejection of redundant reports (those received previously). Users' concerns about being deluged by a tidal wave of reports are nearly universal. that selectivity in disseminating information can be an advantage in combat. performance of navigation tasks may offer an established anchor for quantification in future research efforts. effects in comparison to conventional means are more subtle at Nevertheless. routing of reports was based on network-wide broadcast. icons on the electronic map signalling report location and type. and participants are The positive almost unanimous in praising their capabilities. Automated C3 systems can successfully integrate information In the current evaluation. Automated navigation systems such as POSNAV typically have dramatic effects on combat performance. to represent units instead of individual vehicles. but it can bring high payoff if the process facilitates the user's information This is a relatively new area in processing and decision making. Digital transmission capabilities can lead to individual users receiving large numbers of reports. As implemented in the CVCC system. is a challenging enterprise not without risks. and tools for managing the volume of In the current information take on considerable importance. or perhaps both. overlays. FRAGOs. POSNAV icons could be selected of integration was implemented: In addition. which much work remains to be done. Other workstations could filter tools could be developed for future research.

making gunnery difficult with moving targets. It is important to that the system is not working properly. Automated navigation systems can fail during combat. in order to tailor them to the needs of subordinate units. and it reduces the need for coordination between vehicle commander and driver. Destrovina the Enemy In terms of simulator capabilities. crews may choose to follow them rather than navigate This can mask advantages of automated navigation for themselves. is an important aspect of an automated navigation system. battalion the In advantage. This feature enables the driver to assume much greater responsibility for navigating. subject to errors. the simulators do not accommodate boresighting by Consequently. Techniques for ensuring realistic role-playing are discussed later in this section (Experimental Procedures subsection). The simulators use an automatic lead solution that does not accurately represent the actual M1 tank. becoming lost or disoriented if they become separated from SAFOR Procedures could be developed to make SAFOR navigation elements. the MWTB's M1 simulators were not designed to support gunnery training. . A crew must maintain proficiency in manual navigation Modelling equipment techniques in order cope with failure modes. failure contingencies in simulation evaluations is worth consideration. Vehicle commanders operating at higher echelons (company command. At the same time. explain to crewmembers that gunnery functions differ in the MWTB simulation environment. Thus. and the affected crew must be able to continue performing its warfighting tasks. especially in graphic form. it can leave crews susceptible to systems. thereby reducing participants' level of trust. When lower echelon vehicles within the unit are SAFOR vehicles. 127 . This illustrates the contribution of system features which provide relevant information to all members of the crew. battalion command) are primarily responsible for The attention they pay to engaging the enemy is therefore less than it would be When an investigator assigns crews no lower at lower echelons. gunners frequently complain individual gunners. is a major vehicles to TOC the from to transmit such overlays participants many evaluation. expressed a desire to be able to edit overlays received from the TOC before relaying them. rigid consistency of digital information may not always be appropriate. as is incorporating procedures to assess a crew's readiness to navigate without automated assistance. In addition. directing the combat activities of their units.travelling greater total distance while executing combat missions. Digital overlays displayed on an electronic tactical map are The ability an important feature in enhancing tactical movement. Providing automated information to the vehicle driver.

. future IFF implementations should model greater reliability. quantification of performance in this category focused on accuracy of reported enemy locations. However. participants in CVCC research often comment that the CCD is more useful in the O defense. especially if kill suppress is used to prevent loss of those vehicles. Intellia-ence Gathering especially sensitive to the effects of automated C3 capabilities. at least as they were implemented in the CVCC system. This highlights the importance of techniques for ensuring realistic role-playing. Thus this is an important area for assessment in future research efforts. Similarly. the CITV's autoscan mode is typically used substantially in defensive missions and rarely during offensive operations. For example. The type of tactical operation frequently influences the use of automated C3 capabilities. the volume of usable information (i. discussed later in this section (Experimental Procedures subsection). Accordingly. General Considerations Soldiers using new equipment for the first time often exhibit reluctance or resistance to accepting the new technology. In an evaluation.e. Participants in the current evaluation often reported they did not trust the IFF function. when they have more time to use it. Performance related to gathering intelligence information is In the battalion evaluation. The primary effects depended on inputting precise location information to reports calling for locations of enemy vehicles. The use of automated C3 equipment does not necessarily distract the crew from fighting the battle and engaging the enemy. Automated IFF functions tend to be ignored or discounted if they frequently produce erroneous determinations. engagement performance may be affected in a manner which appears to counter the advantages expected of advanced systems. In addition. Excessive risk-taking behavior ("Rambo" behavior) may as in the current evaluation. as they work with the equipment their attitude typically becomes more positive. inflate engagement-based measures for crewed vehicles. Differences 128 . Their initial reactions to the equipment will not usually match their final assessment.O than the company command echelon. This indicates that vehicle commanders can integrate experimental equipment into the performance of their jobs without modifying the basic parameters of the job itself. the investigators must explain and demonstrate how the new equipment can help the users do their jobs and increase the unit's combat effectivenevs. reports containing valid locations) emerged as a useful index of performance effects.

Qualified crewmembers utilizing experimental equipment sometimes discover unexpected ways to use the advanced capabilities. must be chosen carefully to meet the objectives of the evaluation. At the battalion level. Evaluation Methods Task Organization The task organization of the test unit can be effectively manipulated by a combination of crewed simulators. Given current Army doctrine's emphasis on combined arms operations. in the current evaluation occasional participants used the CITV to establish fields of fire and target reference points. Care should be taken to avoid overloading SAFOR operators with an excessive span of control. At the same time. This underscores the value of the soldier-inthe-loop approach in conducting simulation evaluations. Simple steps can be taken to control SAFOR operator workload. SAFOR elements. The penalty for violating this principle is reduced responsiveness and realism among the SAFOR components of the test unit. but their recall of details of the battle was not consistently better than that of their Baseline counterparts. and notional elements.such as this are to be expected. For example. Participants' perceptions of their own performance don't always match the objective reality of their performance.. the validity of the task organization can be influenced by the balance between the manned. scout section leaders). using SAFOR units or a combination of crewed and SAFOR vehicles. computer-generated. Comunications 129 . such as using radio operators to assist in handling voice communications. The more roles each operator is responsible for playing. platoon leaders. CVCC participants commonly reported having an especially good picture of the battle. * . the tank-pure battalion structure used in this evaluation can be modified to accommodate appropriate combined arms force structures.g. including the allocation of actual crews. The composition of the test unit. In the battalion evaluation. For example. and future research efforts would profitably probe for tactically-related trends and the reasons for them. the greater the workload. for example. This illustrates the importance of obtaining objective performance data in future research efforts. mechanized iriantry platoons could be cross-attached to form company teams. and MCC-controlled elements. practical implementation of the test unit configuration relies heavily on SAFOR operators role-playing key positions (e.

scenarios which both experimental and baseline units have a reasonable chance of completing in the time available. the impact on operational dynamics and user credibility should be carefully assessed. mission execution. can affect task load on selected networks. research efforts. the structure of communication networks should be In the comparable between baseline and experimental conditions. should have been required to provide those reports to company commanders and XOs. Realistic voice and digital communications between unit commanders and their subordinate SAFOR elements are also desirable. the battalion evaluation.* Communication networks supporting automated C3 evaluations should be realistic. in turn. where experimental design considerations lead to network differences between test conditions. Standardized OPORDs and overlays can be provided to reduce Construction of scenarios which are planning time requirements. operational checks in simulators. reports between the TOC and company XOs differed from the voice This led to differences in procedures for network structure. The absence of a downward digital link from the company echelon to the SAFOR operators limited realism in the Given a digital battalion FRAGO. and debriefing. digital a brigade-level of absence the current evaluation. Ideally. Army doctrine. no actual relay was necessary. digital routing for structure network the current evaluation. Realistic communications (both voice and digital) between In the the test unit and its parent headquarters are desirable. the impact on quantitative measures should be determined at the outset. 130 For . where a relay action on the battalion digital network. desirable The realism of the planning and preparation phase can sometimes be enhanced by using available simulation tools. mission planning and preparation. to provide the SAFOR operator more verbal company commander had information than he would have if the SAFOR operator had had the capability to receive digital FRAGOs and routes. with limited time available for each test A challenge for the scenario developer is to craft scenario. Limited simulation equipment will typically force trade-off decisions and compromises in configuring the working radio This. network led to brigade-level digital messages being transmitted Thus. Combat Scenarios Effective training and test scenarios require certain phases: operational briefing. execution time is a highly of feasible terms in realistic goal. The testing schedule for simulation evaluations is often constrained. in accordance with Army doctrine but tempered with future-oriented input from combat developers. In future computing certain report transmission measures. participants and constrain ready access to combat-critical Where network structure varies from established information.

. in the current evaluation SAFOR capabilities were used to conduct leaders reconnaissance at the Stealth station Such techniques can enhance following the operational briefing. To support future research. comparability of graphics between experimental and baseline conditions can be enhanced by In the current evaluation. When new missions involve basically the same sector. realism of SAFOR behavior. capitalizing on existing graphics. back-up vehicle simulators are desirable to avoid loss of crews and concomitant loss of data. the scenario's overall credibility and foster a sound roleplaying attitude on the part of the participants. Alternatively. Expanding the processing capacity of the CIGs to eliminate loss of vision block imagery would reduce frustration on the part of crews (especially drivers) and enhance the credibility of the Improved SAFOR capabilities are needed basic simulation model. new missions could be constructed in such a way that old graphics would be clearly inappropriate. Baseline participants frequently complained that new graphics were issued with FRAGOs.. Equipment failures occurring during training exercises and scenarios can degrade the quality and effectiveness of the training program. The planning of evaluations should ensure adequate preventive maintenance. This may lead to trade-off decisions in configuring BLUFOR and OPFOR forces. which in turn can hurt the quality of the data collected during testing. potentially impacting measures of performance and breaking up the flow of the battle for the participants. 131 . short of taking the entire simulator down. a number of improvements to distributed interactive simulation capabilities are highly desirable. ease of controlling SAFOR actions. Ensuring smooth execution uf training and testing events requires reliable operation of equipment. Scenarios requiring numbers of SAFOR vehicles exceeding the capacity of the SAFOR system risk interruptions during execution. with wholesale changes in operational control measures which were judged unnecessary. reliance on existing graphics may be preferable. When mission changes occur. example. In some cases (see following paragraph) hardware upgrades are required to reduce equipment failures. including protection of time blocks for maintenance and availability of sufficient spare parts. Such failures often interrupt test scenario execution. and system response speed. Vehicle simulators should be outfitted with the means to signal clearly to the crew that their simulator has sustained a killing hit. Overtaxing the SAFOR system results in slow responsiveness and It is important to more greater danger of system crashes. Simulation Capabilities Equipment failures are common in the distributed interactive simulation environment. understand the practical limitations of the SAFOR system and structure the scenarios accordingly. to upgrade processing capacity. Wherever possible.

Implementation of a thorough training program helps ensure a viable test of the conditions of interest and helps protect the quality of the database.. scenario materials and procedures. Obtaining crewmembers qualified for their intended test positions For most experimental applications. Enhanced technician- testing. and unit levels is an essential element. PVD) would improve operational reliability and reduce the time required to train control staff. equipment user interfaces (e. MCC terminal. For some applications it would be desirable to form a given test unit using crews which normally work together as a unit. Adequate training of participants at the individual. and scheduling which may require modifications.. two steps are critical to is a ensure readiness to begin actual testing. it is sometimes possible to crews. implement different crew allocations in separate phases of interaction among crews/echelons. and In preparing for an evaluation. (e. Expanded tools for monitoring the status of simulation components (e. SINCGARs simulators) and diagnosing equipment malfunctions Finally. Following both of these steps. Indeed. the impact on performance measures are all important considerations in determining duty assignments for participating As in the current evaluation. Kill suppress is a useful mechanism to maintain consistency of scenario execution and prevent loss of valuable opportunities 132 . crew with crewmembers who normally work together is preferred. MODSAF. the desired C3 environment. coordination should precede the conduct of functional testing. software. subjecting the complete set of functionalities to rigorous testing with a Careful planning. The first thorough functional test of the hardware and software. preparation.. human factors enhancements to the control are required. Experimental Procedures Of fundamental importance to an effective evaluation of automated C3 capabilities is the selection of participants. the evaluation's objectives. crew..g. and fully loaded network.g. The allocation of crews within the test unit configuration can strongly influence C3 dynamics as well as the measurement In designing evaluations.g. even when participants have SIMNET experience or when intact crews are involved. FSE terminal. training materials and procedures. adequate time should be scheduled to permit necessary corrections to be implemented. carefully weigh the feasible alternatives against the The credibility of the design. efforts are in progress to develop enhanced SAFOR systems level mechanisms to simplify and facilitate the process of initializing simulation components are highly desirable. investigators should process. configuring a is imperative. Computer Generated Forces). The second step is a full-scale pilot test with crews in all This determines if there are problems with vehicle simulators.

to participate in evaluations is difficult. it is helpful to program make-up time in the training and testing schedule. However. More detailed feedback could be provided if desired. measures of performance to account for ostensible attrition of vehicles protected by kill suppress. signal telling the crew that they have received a killing hit is It is difficult to adjust needed to discourage "Rambo" behavior. or more groups in each test condition. Determining reliable effects of automated C3 equipment relies on statistically significant findings. Data Collection and Analysis The Situational Assessment instrument used in this evaluation was based on the participant's ability to recall geographic and quantitative features from the just-completed mission. More aggressive means might include penalties for repeated incidents of unwanted behavior and asking the ranking participant to intervene. To help compensate for equipment failures. to collect data. the instrument did not prove very sensitive to contributions of the CVCC system. especially related to fratricide. this mechanism does * .. it would seem worthwhile to develop reliable techniques to assess this aspect of mounted warfighting. especially at the battalion level. Given the performance variability typically encountered in this research area. tardy participants. achieving acceptable statistical power may require a dozen this provision quite well. Feedback was provided in the post-scenario debriefing. obtaining groups . Investigators must often settle for smaller 133 However. These factors can be countered by providing timely guidance and feedback to participants (consistent with each participant's privacy rights) and by relying on peer pressure and the participants' typical desire to cooperate. but care should be exercised to avoid injecting experimenter bias or contaminating the current group's performance by comparing them to previous groups. It is also important to establish priorities for deleting scheduled events. Performance feedback can enhance the training benefit received by the participants as a result of their support of the evaluation. Factors such as kill suppress and the ability to follow SAFOR vehicles can threaten the realistic role-playing atmosphere desired. For this and perhaps other reasons. in case unavoidable loss of time is substantial. Given the importance of situational awareness in combat operations. Participants in CVCC research have accepted A clear compromise realism of the test conditions somewhat. without making evaluative comments ("good" versus "bad"). Participants routinely expressed a desire for feedback on their performance in the battalion evaluation. and related problems. but quantitative information about kills sustained can be obtained easily to help explain performance data.

(d) pooling observations to increase reliability of measures. Where data collection logs are necessary. In the long run. and the algorithms should be verified and validated at the earliest opportunity. can place heavy demands on support staff members. great advantage. and getting the most out of the available groups is Techniques for enhancing statistical power include: (a) using a within-subjects or matched groups design. As part of data collection and analysis planning. Involving the data analyst from the start is highly desirable. including the flagging and recording of events at a PVD terminal. it is critical to program sufficient calendar time and resources to accomplish QC requirements satisfactorily. it is important to identify data elements required to support measures of performance/effectiveness early. it may be possible to develop procedures for obtaining log-based data elements from DataLogger recordings. Manual collection of data during test scenarios. Alternatively. but it is particularly demanding for automated data because comprehensive QC checking must be conducted iteratively across multiple reduction phases. (c) designing test sessions to enable more data collection opportunities. they should be designed to facilitate on-line activities of the data collector. distractions. and (e) eliminating unwanted sources of variability by means of experimental control and standardization. It might be worthwhile to explore the use of an electronic clipboard using codes or keys designed to simplify recording. Quality control (QC) checking of the evaluation's database is indispensable. and completed logs should be checked daily. Implementation of measures in the form of computational algorithms should begin early. QC activities are performed largely by manual means. This is true for both automated and manual data.. There is a need for more effective techniques to verify and validate algorithms. development of automated routines and other means to facilitate QC checking would be a * . Measures to protect data collectors from distractions and competing demands would help. and efforts in this direction have been initiated at MWTB. and difficulty in interpreting on-line tactical events can result in lost and unusable data elements. Therefore. (b) obtaining the largest number of groups practical. preferably following pilot testing. 134 . Competing tasks. samples. A recently developed MWTB capability to record real clock time as part of the data stream during recording of test events should resolve this problem in future research efforts. imperative. Manual reduction of battalion evaluation data was complicated in some cases by the difficulty in converting DataLogger time to real time. This is especially true for those elements relying on instrumentation software which may have to be developed in parallel with basic system functionality.

This process proved to be very timeconsuming. such as those resulting from this evaluation's test scenario. This would greatly facilitate the reduction of automated data. System upgrades to facilitate the playback process and prevent frequent failures would significantly reduce the time required for transcription playbacks. perhaps voice recognition technology could be adapted to automate the process of converting spoken transmissions to a paper record. This means only one week can be processed at a time.S Many measures relating to communications effectiveness line exercise playbacks. and returning later to that same week requires reloading the tapes into memory. In the long run. Reduction of large DCA data sets. required transcription of voice radio transmissions during off- 135 . requires most of the computer's disk memory for a single scenario. The DCA hardware should be upgraded to permit storage of the complete database from all test weeks.

136 . SPOT) containing substantially more accurate information about location and type of enemy vehicles. CONTACT. CVCC unit and vehicle commanders to seek clarification only rarely.. Occasional nonsignificant trends were also considered when they This occurred where fixed values were operationally meaningful.Conclusions and Recommendations The major findings presented in the Results and Discussion section were based principally on statistically significant trends. voice radio the battalion's decreased reports.g. The perfect consistency (and completeness) of digital 2. 7. and they reached their counterattack objectives more quickly. CCD of transmission burst digital finding. together with the signature. CFF. CVCC unit and vehicle commanders generated a decidedly greater volume of usable information in their This was seen clearly for CFF. reporting activities. The CVCC's automated logistics reporting led to a much 3. movement-dependent milestones was more consistent than Baseline battalions' during the counterattack. as follows: 1. SHELL. for the CVCC condition (e. and SPOT reports. The combined major findings support definitive conclusions regarding the operational effectiveness of the CVCC system's advanced capabilities. Unit and vehicle commanders generated reports (CONTACT. instantaneous transmission times. FRAGOU and INTEL reports was a dramatic improvement over the poor by disseminated information of corresponding consistency led FRAGOs digital of clarity The apparent conventional means. reduced need for company commanders and XOs to report unit location and status. The CVCC's digital transmission capabilities enabled more rapid dissemination of orders and more complete dissemination of INTEL reports among the battalion's leaders. This was attributable to the communicating and acquiring in advantages system's CVCC information. greatly reduced the number of voice radio transmissions. The CVCC system's enhanced capabilities enabled battalions Their timing of to complete combat missions more quickly. The digital reporting capabilities of the CVCC system 4. Given the relative ease of preparing CCD reports with accurate location information. especially precise location information. Participants reported easier access to radio networks. including This those for coordination among the battalion's command group. 6. 5. perfect report consistency scores) made it unfeasible to perform inferential tests.

Crews using the CVCC system participated as fully in engaging the enemy as did Baseline crews. automated TOC workstations) form a high technology foundation for future research and development. Recommendations for Future Research The future of C3 on the combined arms battlefield must rely heavily on automation and digital technologies. the following issues loom as key questions to be answered development efforts.O 8. 12. 9. CITV. The CITV's hunter-killer advantages produced target acquisition among crews using the CVCC system. and force structure requirements. Major research initiatives directed at horizontal integration and combined arms command and control are poised to establish the technology and knowledge base required to support materiel. The experience and lessons learned from the CVCC research program furnish valuable pointers to research issues which will be important as the Army pushes automated C3 capabilities into the high technology future.g. enhanced SAFOR programs) are expanding the basic research potential of test beds such as the MWTB. The simulation building blocks used in the CVCC program (e.. training. Ross. 11. These improvements are being driven by the Army's burgeoning research initiatives as well as plans to integrate distributed simulation in large-scale training exercises such as Louisiana Maneuvers (e. steady improvements in distributed interactive simulation capabilities (e.. The reader should bear in mind these conclusions are based on the performance of tank battalions operating in the distributed interactive simulation environment. 10. suggested crews using the CITV were better able to select the Enhanced kills per hit ratios among CVCC-equipped units 13. CCD. POSNAV. faster unit and vehicle ammunition most appropriate for the target type and range. Based largely on the observations accumulated during the battalion evaluation.g.. in future research and 137 . doctrine. CVCC-equipped crews were able to detect enemy targets at greater maximum ranges than Baseline crews. At the same time. The collective capabilities of the CVCC system enabled battalions to maintain safer end-of-stage stand-off ranges. 1993). Inherent in the experimental design and methodology were a number of limitations (discussed earlier in this report) which form an important part of the context for the evaluation's conclusions. The POSNAV features afforded CVCC commanders greater apparent freedom of movement than was observed among Baseline participants.g.

What training approaches are required to support fielding of automated C3 systems among disparate elements of combined arms What is the forces.. transfer of training? 5. What user interface considerations (e. so as to optimize combat effectiveness? training? simulation and of live mix optimal 3. new research How will 11. Armed with new C3 tools carefully based on systematic research. simulation models of automated C3 systems. What task-based requirements should drive future training A thorough analysis of developments for automated C3 systems? tasks and skills from a component and system perspective is highly desirable. The resulting enhancement of horizontal integration will boost force effectiveness under a broad range of mission contingencies. How can allocation of attention be influenced to minimize information overload and optimize performance? 6. mounted warfighting environment? 1. and how can the validity be improved? The answers to these and related questions will have a fundamental influence on future directions for the digitized battlefield. soldier-in-the-loop foundation to guide the automation of C3 for the combined arms environment. training be conducted to maximize retention and 4. How do automated C3 tools impact operational effectiveness including staff What measures. the 138 . With an empirical. encountered when applying automated C3 tools in the combined arms. What steps will ensure that manual (back-up) maintaineL in case automated systems fail? skills are 7. design and format) are important to ensure smooth linkage both horizontally and vertically? especially capabilities. the difficult challenges in synchronizing combat activities can be met. enhance the research and development efforts directed at automating C3 processes in the combined arms environment? What is the validity of distributed interactive 12.. distributed simulation tools.g. How car. will optimize the impact? How does echelon influence the design and utilization of 8. of the combined arms force? capabilities. combined arms C3 systems? 9. What modifications to combined arms TTP will be necessary to optimize effectiveness of automated C3 systems? 10. What are the functional requirements and constraints 2.

139 .* ultimate payoff can be expected to be a dramatic improvement in the probability of success in future conflicts.

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Appendix A Sample Data Collection Instruments . Contents of Appendix A: A-A A-B A-C A-D Battle Master Log PVD Operator Log TOC Operator Log RA Log A-E Situational Assessment Questionnaire A-1 .

IO Formative Bn Evaluation Date:: File: BFED - BattleMaster: Assistant BattleMaster: Bn Cmdr 3B 2B Y06 Y03 .Ap•il 13. DCA Notified to Turn DataLogger ON: __:__:_ (Time) TURN VIDEO CixzRAB ON (Flag) 1 . S3 A Co Cmdr A Co XO B Co Cmdr B Co XO C Co Cmdr C Co XO 4A 4B 2D 2C 4C 3C A06 A05 B06 B05 C06 C05 Be sure to note changes in Six and Vehicle ID if there is a change in simulator(s) assignment. 1592 BATLZNABY!1 LOG DBFENSIXV BCENAR.

start and stop times).aie dbaate.. ES9756. 20. moving N. Did Task Force prevent a decisive engagement? NO lkw loing did It take Co Mirs to do. o az c to delay order? Send Flags and Reored: Breakdowns (who. Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary.Defmensive Scemas Stage 1: __Bn Cdr calls in RedCon Bale TOC requests SitRep _ 1: Time: _. all Bns delay to Phase II BPs._ _ Bn TOC sends SitRep to Bde . what. Now quickly did Blufor controller.__. ON1 EBde issues Intel: "All source INTEL reports sighting of 2nd Ech MRB/lst Ech Regt. Equipment Problems. Los . Halt in Exercise (why. start and stop times). If A Co has not requested to delay." AUIfLUM SARUM CM Zt 10. 30 On Bde Net: 1-92 Mech Cdr reports initiating delay to PL Club." DATA ELEMENT: YES 1. Bde sends to Bn: "To prevent 1-92 Mech from becoming decisively engaged.Lay after order to do so? 2. Did at least 502 of front iJae vehicles succesafully displace? 3. S 2 .

Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary. Breakdowns (who. what._ _Bn Bn Toc reports crossing of PL CLUB Toc reports SET in BPs 11. start and stop 3 . Bde issues Warning Order: Bde Cdr to Bn Cdr: "Suspected 2nd echelon of MRB of 144th moving NW in W sector of 1-10 AR AO. Equipment Problems. Halt in Exercise (why... 811 reports SET screen line 1 FRAGO issued to Bn TOC BDE requests FUEL report Bn Toc reports crossing of PL JACK . CATK in progress BDE requests AMMO report S11 reports SET screen line 2 ___ BDE requests SITREP Bn TOC sends SitRep to Ede TOC notifies BDE that FRAGO is complete OR BDE notifies TOC that prep time "is (Indicate which) Bond Flags and Record: up.. BDE: "DIVARTY Acquisition radar reports 144th RAG vic ES910725. ___ "Concerned about enemy's direction of attack. 34...... which is more westerly than expected. 24. . start and stop times)." ttdw.•r Los - efemlwv Saommio ____." times)..

DATA ELEMENT: (End of Stage: Participants out of sims) Measure distance between each company COM and scripted endpoint (use PVD ruler): A Co: B Co: C Co: D Co: Reason(s) for distance from endpoints: DO TEE VCRB AND DLTALOGGER NEED TO BE TURNED OFF? * ond Flags and Record: Breakdowns (who. start and stop times). Equipment Problems. what. Halt in Exercise (why.sattlelleater Los staee I - Defensiv 3 oario . DATA ELEMENT: YES Was Bn Bypassed by enemy? NO Did 13 or mwr* mew vehicles penetrate North of foaward Cos? . Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary. start and stop times). 4 .

start and stop times)." "1-10 AR and 1-92 Mech be prepared to resume defensive after 1-10 AR counterattack. start and stop times)." BDE requests FUEL report Bn TOC reports crossing LD: Bde issues FRAGO 2 to Bn TOC BDE requests AMMO report LEMD ILD4ZNTS OF 2ND ZC E ME3RNZAZI VrC 1S863815 (faxwe-d of OJ FOG) Time: 0PWOR ARTILLERY C1 A AND B COMAXIES 3W1 OO 2ND ZCLKWI MC+ REAC8J DATA ELEMENT: How many companies engaged the OPFOR main biody in the CATK? Bade requests SitRep Bn TOC sends SitRep to Bde Breakdowns (who. Bde issues Warning Order: moving North. what. Equipment Problems. Bend Flags and Record: 5 . Halt in Exercise (why. Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary.SattJ'daat LO .sma ve Seenalo stage 2: ____ Bn Cdr calls TOC directed Bn Cdr reports in to STARTEX: issue FRAGO RedCon 1: Time: Time: Time: Bde issues Intel: Division All source reports elements of 146th MRR vic ES9063.D.

Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary. start and stop times). Halt in Exercise (why. Equipment Problems. what. start and stop times)." (Indicate which) BREAX (End of Stage: Participants remain in sims) DATA ELEMENT: Measure distance between each company COM and scripted endpoint (use PVD ruler): A Co: B Co: C Co: D Co: Reason(s) for distance from endpoints: DO THE VCRS AND DATALOGGER NEED TO BE TURNED OFF? Send Flags and Record: Breakdowns (who. 0 6 ."attlator LOS - Detmalve Scmazlo TOC notifies BDE that FRAGO is complete OR BDE notifies TOC that prep time "is up.

.4100 CONTOLL E FOR A CO RZE1?S GAS TO A CO CUR FOR C CO MNTS GAS TO C CO CDR PLATO0ON CONTR 0 Bn TOC sends NBC warning (GAS) Bn TOC sends NBC report to Bde to Bde Bde issues Intel: "2nd echelon MRB+ sighted vicinity ES8673." Bde orders 1-10 AR to delay to PL Queen (if request has not yet been made) Breakdowns (who. 7 . start and stop times). Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary. PL. what. Halt in Exercise (why. 45. moving North. start and stop Send Flags and Record: times).Natax Los Defnsve Scenario stage 3: ____e E:Bn Cdr calls in STARTEX: to issue FRAGO Time: Time: TOC directed Bn Cdr reports RedCon 1: Time: Time: DATA ELEMENT: Time unit was told to be in BPs Send flag at time units SHOULD be in BPs (from above) _ _ Time Bn reports SET in BPs 0OfR MnIZMOSVENT Bn TOC sends SitRep to Bde OPIO s artilery barrage alomg ACE (an 3Ps 25. &35) On Bde Net: 1-92 Cdr reports facing elements of 79th GTR. Equipment Problems.lattj.

start anid stoD timesm) Halt in Exercise (Why. 8 . Bend Flaas and Record: Breakdowns (whc. Now quickly did l•ufor control•ler react to delay order? i__ BDE requests AMMO report BDE requests FUEL report Bn TOC reports all i___ de requests SitRep Bn TOC sends SitRep to Bde companies SET on BPs .BattlJdaster Lu4 . start and stop times). Did at least 502 of front line vehicles successfully displace? 3. EguiDment Problems: Anvthing Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary. DATA ELEMENT: YES 1. Now long did It Did Task Force prevent a decisive engagement? NO take Co Zdes to delay after order to do so? 2.Defensive Scenario Sta•e 3 . what.

what. CALL COMPUTER ROOM TO STOP-TAPE OSTOP VIDEO CAMERAS Send Flags and Record: Breakdowns (who. 9 . 3 DATA ELEMENT: YES Was Bn Bypassed by enemy? NO Did 13 or more enemy vehicLes penetrate North of forward Cos? END OF EXERCISE (Participants out of sims for SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT) DATA ELEMENT: Measure distance between each company COM and scripted endpoint (use PVD ruler): A Co: B Co: C Co: D Co: Reason(s) for distance from endpoints: . start and stop times). Halt in Exercise (why. sa4i. Equipment Problems.Defensive Scenario . start and stop times).Battle4aster Los . Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary.

M~atch 16. 1002 PVD OPERATOR LOG DEFENSIVE SCENARIO Formative Bn Evaluation Date: File: BFED . DCA Notified to Turn DataLogger ON: :_: there is a (Time) TURN VIDEO CAMERAS ON (Flag) o1 .- PVD Operator: SPosition Bn Cmdr zIDL 3B 2B 4A 4B 2D 2C 4C 3C Call S* Y06 Y03 A06 A05 B06 B05 C06 C05 Vehicle ID S3 A Co Cmdr S A Co XO B Co Cmdr B Co XO C Co Cmdr C Co XO Be sure to note changes in Sim and Vehicle ID if change in simulator(s) assignment.

start and stop). Halt in Exercise (why. MOVING OffM ARTn. 30 D Co controller reports elements of TF 1-2 (friendly) moving to the rear. POSSIBLY 2ND ECULODN OF MR. A Co requests permission to delay to BP 13 [Bn O&I net or Bn Cmd net] Bn Cdr orders Bn to delay back [Bn O&I net or Bn Cmd net] Out of Sector/Misoriented Vehicle(s): Vehiclo(s) out of sector or misoriented (Circle which) Vehicle(s) return in sector or correctly orients (Circle which) Wh~at caused vehicle to return in sector or to correcey orient (sel/aother vehicles/ECR)? Vehicle(s): Send Flags and Record: Breakdowns (who.UMY SARUM Of BPS 10.URCE TEL REPOTS SIGHTING OF RB. moving N. [in ECR] DDE ISSUES INTEL: '210 ACR REPRTS ONLY LIGHT CONTACT IN THEIR SECTOR. ES9756. Equipment Problems. what." SDo ISSUES INTEL: "All source IBTEL reports sishting of 2nd Ech HRB/lst Ech Rest."ID Log Stage 1: _ _ . 20. Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary. 2 .Defensive Scenario Bn Cdr calls in REDCON 1 TIME: Bn TOC requests SitRep from Companies [Bn O&I net) DUE ISSUES INTEL: "ALL ZSg'06S0. start and stop).

Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary. what. A Co at BP 13 A Co reports SET at BP 13 [Bn O&I net] B Co at BP 23 B Co reports SET at BP 24 [Bn O&I net] A Co requests permission to delay to BP 11 [Bn O&I net or Bn Cmd net] Bn Cdr grants permission for A Co to delay to BP 11 [Bn O&I net or Bn Cmd Out of Sector/Misoriented Vehicle(s): Vehicle(s) out of sector or gets misoriented (Circle which) VehiclesW) return in sector or correctly orients (Circle which) What caused vehicle to return in sector or to correcly orient (self/other vehicles/ECA)? Vehicle(s): Send Flags and Record: Breakdowns (who. start and stop). "ACo company crosses PL JACK "ACo reports crossing PL JACK (Bn O&I net] WDE ISSUES FRAWO 1. WHICH IS MORE WESTELY SElETDWM. 1-92 'ECH BE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH AL. Equipment Problems.MYD Los .Defensive Scenario Stage I-: IDZ ISSUES KAIING ORDER: "SUSPECTED 2ND ECU•EIO OF MB.01G n CLU.. 2-10 AR 33 PREPARED To COITERAITCK TO SW MOM VIC FL SPADE. start and stop).. Halt in Exercise (why.1• NAST'Y ovn DEENS:"CO CMTO IN CERED ABOUT EIMW'S DIRECTION OF ATTACK. ENSURE TNAT MU EASTERN FLANK COMPAIES DO NOT GET BYPASSED. 3 . OF 144TE MOVING MW IN W SECTOR OF 1-10 AR SBDE AO.

4 . what. start and stop). Halt in Exercise (why. C Co may C Co reports crossing PL JACK [Bn 0&I net] C Co at BP 34 C Co reports SET at BP 34 [Bn O&I net) Out of Sector/Misoriented Vehicle(s): VehicleOu)out of sector or gets aisoriented (Circle which) VehicleCs) return in sector or correctly orients (Circle which) What caused vehicle to return in sector or to correcLy orient (seo/othez vehicles/ICR)? Vehicle(s): Send Flags and Record: Breakdowns (who. start and stop). Equipment Problems.PVD Log Defensive Scenrio ___ C Co at BP 33 C Co reports SET at BP 34 [Bn O&I net] A Co company crosses PL CLUB A Co reports crossing PL CLUB [Bn O&I net) B Co company crosses PL JACK B Co reports crossing PL JACK [Bn O&I net) A Co at BP 11 BP 11 [Bn O&I net] A Co reports SET in B Co at BP 24 B Co reports SET at BP 24 [Bn 0&I net] C Co company crosses PL JACK not cross PL) t0nZ: the BP straddles the PL. Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary.

Halt in Exercise (why.PVD Log . 31•U "ACo company crosses PL SPADE "ACo reports crossing PL SPADE [Bn O&I net] "ACo at BP 12 "ACo reports SET in ___ BP 12 [Bn O&I net] [Bn O&I net] Bn TOC requests SitRep from Companies BREAK (End of Stage: Participants out of sims) Out of Sector/Xisoriented Vehicle(s): Vehicle(s) out of aector or sets uisoriented (Circle which) Vehicle~s): Vehicle(s) return in sector or correctly orients (Circle which) What caused vehicle to return in sector or to correcly orient (self/other vehicles/ZOm)? DO TEE VCR3 AND DITALOGGER NEED TO BE TURNED OFF? O Send Flags and Record: Breakdowns (who. Equipment Problems.Defensivei Uesaio 511 reports I7 WDE requeest seuem Une 2. 5 . start and stop). Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary. what. start and stop).

: DIVISION All SOURCZ REP=$ UDOT VIC ES9063.y." OF 14613 MMR DEFUSIVE AlTER 1-10 AR MDE IS5UES WARNING ORDZR: "I-10 AR AND 1-92 CE NE IZZPARED TO 12811 A Co company crosses PL QUEEN A CG reports crossing PL QUEEN [Bn O&I net) A Co crosses LD A Co reports crossing LD [Bn O&I net] B Co crosses LD B Co reports crossing LD [Bn O&I net] C Co crosses LD C Co reports crossing LD [Bn O&I net] Out of Sector/Kisoriented Vehicle(s): Vehilel(s) out of sector or gets aisoriented (Circle which) Vehicle(s): Vehicle(s) return Ln sector or correctly orients (Circle which) What caused vehicle to return Ln sector or to correcly orient (self/other vehiclaes/rE)? Breakdowns (who. what. Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary. start and stop). Equipment Problems. start and stop). Send Plags and Recorf: Halt in Exercise •!•. MOVING NORTH. 6 .DefueSive SCiODrLo Stage 2: O_ Bn Cdr calls in RDE DIR=ECTS TC TO 513M lAG STARTEX TIME: A Co crosses PL SPADE A Co reports crossing PL SPADE [Bn O&I net] BIDE ISS=E XNM.M LOf .

Defensive Scenario 8tase 2: ONf AIMTALLU! 05 AM *I5 5 €A1Z "ACompany at Objective RAIN "ACompany reports SET on Obj RAIN [Bn O&I net] WE1 1U: 18163 AM Z58071.b Log . ALL MUM YnW 5. what. 7 . Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary. T11 RUMW RAM VMOVD•T. VCLE h•TIMAZ DO RZGZSUMTAL Y1OW0S WXC B Company at Objective SNOW B Company reports SET on Obj SNOW [Bn O&I net] Company at Objective FOG C Company reports SET on Obj FOG [Bn O&I net] Bn TOC requests SitRep from Companies [Bn O&I net) _C B (End of Stage: Participants remain in sims) Out of Sector/Misoriented Vehicle(a): 0 Vehicle(s) out of sector or sets misoriented (Circle which) Vehicle(s): Vehicle(s) return in sector or correctly orients (Circle which) What caused vehicle to return In sector or to correcly orient (aelf/other vehicles/ZM)? DO THE VCRs AND DATALOGGZR NEED TO BE TURNED OFF? Send Flags and Record: Breakdowns (who. start and stop). Equipment Problems. Halt in Exercise (why. start and stop).

Out of Seotor/Miuoriented Vehicle(s): Vehicle(s) out of sector or Sets nisorisined (Circle which) sectos or correctly orienta (Circle which) In sectac or to cogrecly erient (selflother vehicles/ECR)? Vehicle(s): Vehicle(s) retun in What caused vehicle to ret•rn Send Flags and Record: Breakdowns (who.- MRIGADI ORDERS 1-10 AR TO DELAY TO FL QUEEN (if . 35. what. start and stop). Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary. 8 . start and stop). and 45) ON DDE NET: 1-92 CM 3EOWS FACIMG EUMTS Of 79M CT. Platoon controller for A Co reports GAS (in ECR] ___ Platoon controller for C Co reports GAS [in ECR] Permission to delay to BPs along PL Queen is requested (Bn O&I net or Bn Cmd net] Specify Requestor: Bn Cdr orders Bn to delay back (Bn O&I net or Bn Cmd net] DDE ISSUES INTEL: 210 ECMWU MRS+ SIGHTED VIC11ITY ES 6673. Halt in Exercise (why. Equipment Problems. tWVII necessary) NOTR.MID I Defensive IScauio Stage 3: __ Bn Cdr calls in STARTEX TIME: A Co reports SET at BP 25 (Bn O&I net] B Co reports SET at BP 45 [Bn 0&I net] C Co reports SET at OI•=R BP 35 [Bn O&I net] artillery barrase alma PL ACE (an We 25.

MYLos . Equipment Problems. start and stop). Halt in Exercise (why. 9 . to return in sector or to correcly orient Csellotkher vehicles/IE )? Vehicle(s): Send Flags and Reoord: Breakdowns (who.Degmsive kenario Stage 3: _ _ A Co crosses PL QUEEN A Co reports crossing PL QUEEN [Bn O&I net] A Co at BP 11 A Co reports SET on BP B Co crosses PL QUEEN B Co reports crossing PL QUEEN [Bn O&I net] B Co at BP 46 B Co reports SET on BP C Co at BP 36 C Co reports SET on BP END OF EXERCISE (Participants out of sims for Situational Assessment) Out of Sector/Misoriented Vehicle(s): Vehiole(s) out of sector or gets aisoziented (Circle which) Vehclae(s) return in sector or correctLy orients (Circle which) What caused vehicl. start and stop). what. Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary.

iIN TOC LOG DEFENSIVE SCERIUMO Date: Monitor: Stage 12 05 F First CONTACT report Specify sender: from simulators 06 F First SPOT Report from simulators Specify sender: 07 F First CFF from simulators Specify sender: A Co requests permission to delay to BP 13 08 F Bn Cdr orders Bn to delay to BPs 09 F Bn Cdr orders D Co to execute CATK 10 F TOC requests FUEL report 11 F TOC requests AMMO report 12 F BREAK (End of Stage 1: Additional Notes/Flags: Participants out of simulators) . ."tlGhe 11. = Help F = Flag C =Comment .

iBREAK (End of Stage 2: Participants remain in simulators) Additional Notes/Flags: x = Help F = Flag C = Comment ..Stage 2: ______LD reported First CONTACT report from simulators Specify sender: First SPOT Report from simulators Specify sender: First CFF from simulators Specify sender: TOC requests FUEL report 13 F 05 F ___ 06 F 07 F 11 F TOC requests AMMO report 12 F .

. Stage 3: First CONTACT report from simulators Specify sender: 05 F _ _ 06 F First SPOT Report from simulators Specify sender: ___ 07 F First CFF from simulators Specify sender: NBC warning sent to TOC 14 F I__ NBC report sent to TOC Permission to delay is requested 15 F 16 F 09__ Specify requester: Bn Cdr orders Bn to delay TOC requests AMMO report TOC requests FUEL report 09 F ______ F 11 F 12 F END OF EXERCISE (Participants out of simulators: SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT) Additional Notes/Flags: Administer H = Help P = Flag C = Comment .

The OPFOR in the 1-10 AR sector Is the 146th MRR which has 2 MRBs forming the 1st echelon of the regiment. The Bn Cdr sends a Warning Order. A. Each of the MRBs attack with 2 MRC+s In its 1st echelon and 1 MRC+ In its 2nd echelon. and are preparing to counterattack. SNOW. As the stage ends. the OPFOR turns to meet the BLUFOR attack. A. A Co attacks along AXIS BETTY on the right flank (W) to secure Obj RAIN. The OPFOR recon Pits establish contact with A and C Co's. Bde Issues FRAGO 2 to 1-10 AR. As this stage ends. After movement to subsequent BPs is initiated. the Bde Issues FRAGO I to 1-10 AR. D Co remains in defensive position in BP 11. and are prepared to continue the delay mission. the 1st echelon MRBs of the 144th MRR have either been eliminated or move out of the 1-10 AR sector to the NW. it makes contact with the 2nd echelon MRB of the 144th MRR. As this stage begins. Subsequently. the OPFOR attacks with 2 MRBs in the 1st echelon of the 144th MRR and 1 MRB In its 2nd echelon. the OPFOR has been eliminated and A. 24. the OPFOR deploys chemical munitions. The FRAGO 2 overlay establishes new BPs 25 (W sector). A Co continues In contact as it delays to BP 11. 34. FRAGO 2 is issued. Shortly thereafter. 2: Counterattack. As this stage ends. The OPFOR has element of the 2nd echelon of the 39th GMRD moving forward (N). The battle Is joined. B. and D Cos are set in BPs 12. respectively. 45. B Co reports contact with OPFOR Is broken and Indicates the direction of OPFOR movement is towards BP 11. respect'*7 ely. Bn FRAGO 1 is Issued. D Co moves to BP 46 and becomes the reserve. As the stage begins. As C Co delays back toward PL JACK. the Cos are set In position. D Co displaces to BP 42. 199? Sage 1: Delay. C. As this stage begins. FRAGO 2 also establishes BPs 46 (center sector) and 36 (E sector). As A Co Is reaching Obj RAIN. along new PL ACE.CVCC Date: RA: Sim Duty Position: LOG RA DEFENSIVE August 21. contact is broken with the OPFOR. The battle Is joined. 2 OPFOR recon Pits are advancing to establish the initial defensive positions. and BP 11. 1-10 AR delays to subsequent BPs along PL QUEEN. a counterattack to the SW to destroy the 2nd echelon of the 144th MRR as it passes through the A Co sector.Formative Bn Evaluation . and 35. The Bn Cdr sends a Warning Order. to resume delay after completion of the counterattack. C. and 35 (E sector). The BLUFOR along PL KING receive a 10 min OPFOR artillery barrage. and D Cos are in the vicinity of Obj RAIN. After a period of fighting. .D. and 11. Stage 3: Delay. As the battle progresses A Co is forced to delay due to OPFOR pressure and because the 1-92 Mech on the W (right) of 1-10 AR Is being forced to delay. A friendly tank company from the 1-52 Mech is continuing its movement rearward (N) past the D Co position. B. The Bn Cdr has the Bn delay to subsequent BPs. have submitted SitReps. respectively. along PL QUEEN. B. 45 (center sector). After the Cos cross the L. FOG. and C Cos move to establish defensive positions in BPs 25. Each MRB has 2 MRC+ in its 1st echelon and a 3rd MRC+ In its 2nd echelon. B Co attacks along AXIS PAM in the center to secure Obj SNOW: and C Co attacks along AXIS UZ on the left (E) flank to secure Obj FOG. .

C Co is STARTING SITUATION: The simulation is initiated by OPFOR movement. Bde issues Intel: "210 ACR reports only light contact in their sector. Bde sends to Sn." (if request to delay has not been made) DIVARTY reports 144thRAG vic ES. D Co is in reserve along PL CLUB in BP 40. C Co reports SFT at BP 34. 20.Stage 1 (Def): The Bn is set in BPs along FL KING. "To prevent 1-92 Mach from becoming decisively engaged. @ Report Adjust Fire Ammo Call for Fire Contact Shell SitRep Spot Intel FRAGO NBC OTHER Tally o1 . possibly 2nd echelon of MRR. D Co reports SET at BP 42 B Co reports SET at BP 24. 1-10 AR be prepared to establish hasty defense along PL CLUB." 1-92 Mech Cdr requests permission to delay to PL Club. "Suspected 2nd echelon of MRE of 144th moving NW in W sector of 1-10 AR Bde issues Warning Order: AO. all Bns delay to Phase II BPs. Bde Cdr to Bn Cdr: "Concerned about enemy's direction of attack. 30 Bde Net: 1-92 Mech Bn Cdr reports to Bde Cdr heavy contact along PL KING Sll reports consolidated at CP10.910725." OPFOR artillery barrage on BPs 10. @P 30. A Co is in BP 10. B Co is in BP 20. in moving ES940650. which is more westerly than Ensure that your eastern flank companies do not get bypassed expected." Bde ibsues Warning Order: "1-10 AR be prepared to counter attack to SW from vicinity PL Spade. A Co reports SET at BP 11. 3de Net: "All Source Intel reports sighting of MRB. moving to screen line 1. 1-91 Mach be prepared to establish hasty defense along PL Club.

Stage I (Def): Record: Coordination between TC and crew Problems with the Equipent Anything Noteworthy or Ot of te Ordinar. Novel uses of the Equipment Questions that the TC asked you BREAK (End of Stage 1: Participants cut of simulators) Did crewmember express dissatisfaction with the equipment? What was it? . What percentages of firings was done by TC? Use of Maps: Tactical Map (CCD) + Lap Map = 100% Use of Visual Devices: VBs + GPSE + CITV + CCD_= 100% Additional Notes: 2 .

SNOW. moving North." Rd* issues Warning Order: "1-10 AR and 1-92 Mach be prepared to resume defensive after 1-10 AR counterattack. C Co is in BP 34.Stage 2 (Def): A Co is in BP 12. Source reports elements of 146th MRR vic ES9063. and D Co is in SP 11. Call for Fire Contact Shell SitRep Spot Intel FRAGO NBC OTHER 0 3 ." Sil reports screening from CP5 to LD In TOC requests SitRep from Companies. respectively. Ide issues Intel: Division Al. B Co is in BP 24. AND FOG. B. is initiated when BattleMaster orders Bn Cdr to implement FRAGO 1. D Co STARTING SITUATION: Simulation stays in reserve and A. and C advance to take Objectives RAIN. All companies consolidate on Obj's Did TC transfer FRAGO to paper map (to what extent)? Report Adjust Fire AMMO Tally .

Novel uses of the Equipment Questions that the TC asked you BREAK (End of Stage 2: Participants remain in simulators) Did crewmember express dissatisfaction with the equipment? What was it? . O What percentages of firings was done by TC? Use of Maps: Tactical Map (CCD) + Lap Map = 100% Use of Visual Devices: VBs + GPSE_ + CITV_ + CCD_= 100% Additional Notes: 4 .Stage 2 (Def): Record: Coordination between TC and crew Problems with the Equipment AnythinS Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary.

moving North. D Co is at BP 11. A and C Cos report "GAS" Bde issues Intel: "2nd echelon IRB+ sighted vicinity ES8673. and C Co's move to establish defensive positions in BPs 25.? S tRep Spot Inteo FRAGO NBC OTHER 5 . Adjust Fire Ammo Call for Fire Contact Snel. and 35. respectively. D moves to BP 46.Stage 3 (Def): STARTING SITUATION: Simulation is A Co is on ObJ RAIN. 45. OPTOR artillery barrage along PL ACE On We net: 1-92 Cdr reports facing elements of 79th GTR." Bde orders 1-10 AR to delay to PL QUEEN (if request to delay has not been made) Did TC transfer FRAGO to paper map (to what extent)? Report Tally . A. initiated when Battlet4aster orders Bn Cdr to implement FRAGO 2 B. B Co is on ObJ SNOW: C Co is on Obj FOG.

Novel uses of the Equipment Questions that the TC asked you END OF EXERCISE (Participants out of simulators for SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT) Did crewmember express dissatisfaction with the equipment? What was it? What percentages of firings was done by TC? Use of Maps: Tactical Map (CCD) + Lap Map = 100% Use of Visual Devices: VBs + GPSE_ + CITV_ + CCD_ _ 100% Additional Notes: 6 .Stae 3 (Deo) Record: Coordination between TC and crew Problem with the Equipment Anything Noteworthy or Out of the Ordinary.

Driver requests clarification of waypoint(s). 7 . Driver requests next waypoint. Gunner tells target. TC forgets to switch to GPS mode so gunner can input grids to reports.EXAMPLES OF COORDINATION BETWEEN TC AND OTHER CREW MEMBERS Designate was NOT clearly signalled to gunner. TC to let go of palm switch--after designating a TC asks gunner to input grids to reports.

SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT OUESTIONNAIRE BN CDR & S3 RA CONDITION - Test Scenario SIM DUTY POS DATE WEEK Please answer each question and rate your confidence in your answer using the scale below. During the last stage. battalion destroy? During the last stage.----I Voey Canfidlant 5 coLately Canfidmt amahat Cntfidemt Confidence Rating i__ 1.last Yes stage.-. During the last stage. During the . how many BMPs did the battalion destroy? Number of BMPs destroyed: 3. how many enemy tanks did the Number of enemy tanks destroyed: 2. How far (in kcm) were the initial BPs from the subsequent BPs (as established in the last FRAGO)? Distance (kim): . did the battalion destroy any No enemy vehicles after the order to delay was given? 4. how many tanks in the battalion were destroyed? Number of battalion tanks destroyed: 5. 1 Not at all Conadent i 2 -I 3 Mdxately Cmnfidmt I---. Place the number from the scale in the space preceding each question.

how many tanks in your company were destroyed? Number of company tanks destroyed: 5.l Confidant Confidence Rating 1. how many BMPs did your company destroy? Number of BMPs destroyed: 3. During the last stage. 1 2 ---------3 S I-not at all Confident I ISomaewat Confident I hadeataely Confidant ---I .Test Scenario CO CDRS & XOS RA CONDITION SIM DUTY POS DATE WEEK Please answer each question and rate your confidence in your Place the number from the scale in answer using the scale below. how many enemy tanks did your company destroy? Number of enemy tanks destroyed: _____2. the -space preceding each question. How far (in km) was your initial BP from your subsequent BP (as established in the last FRAGO)? Distance (kz): . During the last Yes stage.O SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT OUESTIONNAIRE . During the last stage. did your company destroy any No enemy vehic~les after the order to delay was given? 4. During the last stage.----------Very Confident CompLete.

Appendix B Selected Performance Measure Definitions B-i .

AMMO STATUS. The entire enemy force. Which are: ADJUST (including overlays). Refers to all possible digital reports. Use of an LRF device to a target which returns a valid number not greater than 3500 m. a sampling for each hypothesis evaluated. NBC. SITUATION. measures which have changed since that report are included in In addition. Documentation for these routines can be obtained from the senior MWTB analyst. refers to firepower and catastrophic kills. All basic set of measures is defined by O'Brien et al.SELECTED PERFORMANCE MEASURE DEFINITIONS This appendix contains the definitions of selected measures The and includes collection. reduction and analysis summaries. Kill Unless otherwise stated. SPOT. CALL FOR FIRE. and OVERLAY The transmission of a report by the originator. 1992). Measures Terminology The following definitions provide a ready reference for terms which might be used uniquely in this appendix. The transmission of a report by someone other than the sender and on a net other than the net on which it was received. BLUFOR The entire friendly force. An asterisk (*) denotes definitions that have changed since the battalion TOC evaluation (O'Brien et al. (1992). SHELL. INTELLIGENCE. provide included to The term "Standard DCA Output" refers to measures for which DCA routines exist as part of the standard DCA library. occasional unchanged measures are this appendix. FIRE. FREE TEXT.. comprised of enemy SAFOR vehicles. Lase OPFOR Relay Report Type Send B-2 . or for which it might be helpful to have such reference. excludes mobility kills. comprised of friendly SAFOR vehicles and manned simulators. CONTACT.

Transmission B-3 . minus any periods of breakdown. For verbal reports The sending of a report. each analyzed separately.Stage The test scenario consists of three stages. pressing of the CCD SEND button. Stages are defined from REDCON1 to completion of the last scripted event. refers to "appearance" of the sender on the For digital reports refers to radio net.

the exposure period begins when period. excluding companies from 2nd battalion. displacement will be noted at a PVD during playback sessions.3 z Exposure Index Operational Definition: The number of non-dead OPFOR vehicles to which each BLUFOR vehicle is exposed during a defined exposure For each BLUFOR vehicle. Collection & Reduction Summary: DCA routine determines. for each manned vehicle. Bn to displace or (b) the first averaged across companies. ANOVA Summary: Condition X Echelon Bn echelon: Co echelon: 2/stage/week 6/stage/week Expected N (per cell): @ 1. displacemant occurs in the absence of an order. ANOVA Summary: Condition 1/stage/week Expected N (per Cell): B-4 . CoM may include dead vehicles (BLUFOR or OPFOR) but will not include vehicles greater than 500 m from computed CoM. order to displace. Operational Definition: between each non-reserve company's CoM and the nearest OPFOR company's CoM at the time that either (a) the Bn Cdr orders the BLUFOR vehicle moves out.4": Range to OPFOR at displacement (Stages 1 and 3) Staaes 1 & 3: The distance. in meters. Collecticn & fledv-tian Summary: Assistant S3 flags and records flag and flag time are entered into database. from that vehicle's company is recorded. initial intervisibility with a non-dead OPFOR fire The time from initial intervisibility to first vehicle.PURFORJANCE KMASURE SUMMARIES Move on Surface 1.1. initial intervisibility with a non-dead OPFOR vehicle is fire from that BLUFOR established and lasts until the first vehicle's company.. If DCA is provided with database and CoMs are computed.1.

based on vehicle odometer reading. 1.2.1: Distance travelled Operational Definitiont Cumulative distance (in meters) driven by each BLUFOR vehicle during a stage.2: Fuel used Operational Definition: Total amount of fuel (in gallons) consumed by manned vehicles in executing the mission. Collection & Reduction Summary: INOVA Summary: Standard DCA routine Condition X Echelon Bn echelon: Co echelon: 2/stage/week 6/stage/week Expected N (per cell): B-5 . Collection & Reduction Summary: ANOVA Summary: Standard DCA routine Condition X Echelon Bn echelon: Co echelon: 2/stage/week 6/stage/week xpoected N (per Coll): 1.2..

in minutes. . the third will be used for comparison with the Baseline condition.3. b) GPS laser. May include periods of intermittent intervisibility lasting 3 seconds or less. Compute average per vehicle. ANOVA Summary: Condition X echelon Expected N (per Cell): Bn echelon: Co echelon: 2/stage/week 6/stage/week B-6 . periods lasting more than 7 minutes will not be included. the first two provide diagnostic information. Process Direct Fire Targets 1. until that manned vehicle lases to the non-dead OPFOR vehicle.. shortest interval from either laser system Operational Definition: Average elapsed time. and c) shortest interval between intervisiblity and first lase from either CITV or GPS laser. CVCC data are provided in three sub-measure categories: a) CITV laser only.1*: and c) Time to acquire targets. b) GPS laser only. excluding periods lasting more than 7 minutes. Baseline data are provided for GPS laser only. computes interval between start of intervisibility period and first lase with a given laser system to a target. from when a non-dead OPFOR vehicle becomes visible (for at least 6 consecutive seconds) to a manned vehicle. Collection & Reduction Summary: DCA routine determines intervisibility as defined above. by a) CITV laser.

fires first vehicle Includes lases and firings from gunner (CVCC and Baseline conditions) and Veh Cdr (CVCC only).3. for GPS laser only. b) GPS laser only. from when a lases to an OPFOR vehicle until that manned manned vehicle first on that OPFOR vehicle. Intended target algorithm Collection & Reduction Summary: determines lases to OPFOR vehicles and time of lase. and c) shortest interval from either laser system Operational Definition: Average elapsed time. includes hits and misses. Excludes durations greater Excludes lases beyond 3500 meters. submeasure (both CITV and GPS laser) the interval may be computed gunner lase on between last CITV lase on OPFOR target and first are provided data Baseline different target (and vice versa).1. in minutes. the third will be used for Note that for the "c" comparison with the Baseline condition. in minutes. a) CVCC data are provided in three sub-measure categories: CITV laser only. zero values excludes and than 5 minutes Collection & Reduction Summary: Standard DCA routine. and c) shortest interval two between lases from either CITV or GPS laser. except times greater than 5 minutes and zero values are not included. vehicle. by a) CITV . average per vehicle. b) GPS laser. in calculation of means.3 : Time from lase to first fire Operational Definition: Elapsed time. computes lase on interval between last lase on one OPFOR vehicle to first greater lases between times excludes vehicle.2 laser. until the lase by the same manned vehicle on a different OPFOR first Durations exceeding 5 minutes will not be included. from the last lase on an OPFOR vehicle.3. the first provide diagnostic information. ANOVA Summary: Condition X echelon Bn echelon: Co echelon: 2/stage/week 6/stage/week Expectod N (per Cell): B-7 . than 5 minutes in duration. by a manned vehicle. OPFOR a different Compute average per vehicle. Time between lases to different targets. ANOV•R Summary: Condition X echelon (per Coll): xpected N Bn echelon: Co echelon: 2/stage/week 6/stage/week 1.

kills classified by the computer.4.3: Losses/kill ratio Operational Dofinition: Total number of OPFOR kills (firepower and catastrophic) by BLUFOR compared to total number of losses Includes direct (firepower and catastrophic) taken by BLUFOR. and indirect fire losses.4. by DCA routine. Enaaae Direct Fire Taraets 1. Collection & Reduction Summary: Standard DCA routine O aNOVm Summary: Condition X Echelon Bn echelon: Co echelon: 2/stage/week 6/stage/week Expected N (per cell): Control Terrain 1. IJOVA Summary: Condition i/stage/week Expectod N (per Cell): B-8 .5o1: Number of OPFOR vehicles penetrating designated line (Stage 2) Operational Definition: Cumulative number of OPFOR vehicles that crossed the designated line (line is based on MTP criteria for a successful counterattack).. Collection & Reduction Summary: Standard DCA routine lOVA Summary: Condition 1/stage/week Expected N (per cll): 1. the number of OPFOR vehicles that penetrate north of a line from ES82008300 to ES85008339 to ES85408570 to ES87008570 to ES91008400 by the end of the stage. average per vehicle.5: Mean target kill range Operational Definition: Distance (in meters) from a firing manned vehicle to the OPFOR vehicle killed (catastrophic and firepower) by the round fired. Collection & Reduction Summary: Determine.

Determine direct distance between reported location and the CoM of the three OPFOR vehicles closest to that reported location. Colleotion/Reduction Summary: Baseline: Record CFF sender.1.1.1: Elapsed time from Bn transmission of FRAGO to receipt by Co Cdr/XO (Stages 2 and 3) Operational Definition: The total elapsed time between the time the Bn TOC initiates transmission of a FRAGO to the time the last Co Cdr receives the FRAGO (reception completed includes time to last clarification. Conduct Surface Attack 2. enter into database for input to RS/l table. For CVCC condition. Operational Definition: The average length of the Co Cdr request(s) for clarification of FRAGO and/or the accompanying overlay.1. FRAGO consists of FREE TEXT message containing FRAGO and accompanying overlay. if any).1 Mean accuracy of CFF locations Operational Definition: Deviation. CVCC: Essential report elements are input directly to RS/l table via DCA. locations will be analyzed. INOVA Summary: Condition X Stage Expected N (per Cell): 1/stage/week 3. objectives. ..2: Duration of request by Co Cdr/XO to clarify FRAGO/overlay . For each report location. purposes a tally of the number of CFFs which could not be scored Only CFFs with grid (due to missing locations) will be kept. determine the OPFOR vehicles (of any type) intervisible for at least 6 seconds.Epected ANOVA Summary: Condition N (per Cell): Occurrence dependent Receive and Transmit Mission 3. of nearest three For descriptive OPFOR vehicles to reported OPFOR location. Determine the three closet OPFOR vehicles to the CFF sender. pre-planned fires. and final protective fires will not be included. send time. and contents from playback tapes. B-9 . Calculate the CoM of the three OPFOR vehicles. in meters.

in minutes. compute transmission times from SEND time until report arrives in last receiving queue of lowest manned net. of transmission to acknowledgement on the receiving net. cumulate For Baseline compute transmission times from start across nets. For each report.. send times (start of playback of Bn Cmd/Bn audio from contents and transmission). Collection/Reduction Summary: Baseline: Record INTEL sender. For CVCC including elapsed time for clarification (if any). O&I/Co/Plt CVCC: Essential report elements are input to RS/1 table via DCA. add elapsed time for clarification at lowest net. receive times (end of transmission). database into enter nets. compute elapsed time from initiation at TOC until received by last manned vehicle on lowest net. for input to RS/1 table. between the time the Bn TOC initiates transmission of the INTEL report to the time the last manned vehicle receives (reception completed includes time to last clarification.2. ANOVA Summary: Condition Occurrence dependent Expected X (per Cell): 01 B-I10 . if any) the INTEL. Receive and Transmit Enemy Information 3.1: Time to transmit INTEL reports full net: lowest manned net Bn TOC to Operational Definition: The elapsed time.

or repeated in recognizable form. multiply rating.2: Consistency of relayed INTEL Operational Definition: The consistency of INTEL report contents. No data are collected for CVCC condition. Colleotion/Reduction Summary: Baseline INTELs are recorded from all nets on playback tapes. 3. No . Divide scored. the item or N rating will total "Y" ratings by total number of items by 100 (If a scorer is unsure of the appropriate will be reviewed by an SME and the appropriate Y be assigned).. as original and relayed INTEL or FREE TEXT messages contain identical information. Contents are compared to original text. or it was repeated inaccurately.the item was not repeated.the item was included either verbatim. Ocg T-5:00 Tim Content What: BRDM #: 1 Where: ES839720 Activity: Recon (performing recon) Heading: Stationary Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y ait N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N T-2:00 What: BRDM #: 2 Where: ES806699 Activity: Recon (performing recon) Heading: Stationary What: 146th MRR Where: ES990400 Activity: Moving Heading: N What: MRB (2nd ech of MRR) Where: ES940650 Activity: Moving What: 1-92 Mech Where: PL KING Activity: in heavy contact T-0:00 T+5:00 T+9:00 B-11 . comparing relayed INTEL to scripted INTEL (expressed as a percentage).2. Elements from INTELs (listed below) are scored as follows: Y = N = Yes .

ES8763 What: Co(-) #: * T+51:00 Where: penetrated PL CLUB vic 1-10 bdry Activity: stopped T+53:00 What: 210 ACR Where: PL JACK Activity: Light contact Heading: Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N T+74:30 What: 146th MRR Where: ES9063 Activity: Moving Heading: N What: MRB(+) Where: ES8I10 Activity: Moving Heading: N B-12 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N T+86:00 . #: 2 Where: ES9668. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N T+16:00 T+23:00 T+26:00 T+30:00 T+30:30 T+38:00 establishing EA 140 MPRs) T+41:00 What: MRBs(+)(2nd ech of 144.T+10:15 What: 210 ACR Where: In sector Activity: Light contact What: MRB (of 1st Ech MRR) Where: ES9756 Activity: Moving Heading: N What: 1-92 Mech Where: to PL CLUB Activity: Delaying What: 144th RAG Where: ES910725 What: 1-92 Mech Where: PL JACK Activity: Crossing What: MRB (-) Where: PL JACK Activity: penetrated (attacking across) What: 1-92 Mech Where: PL CLUB Activity: crossing.

prepared to defend. Regtl formations #: 2 Where: ES8165.. T+90:15 What: 210 ACR Where: proposed bdry vic PL JACK Activity: Set Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N T+96:00 What: Heavy vehicle movement. resupply TOW ammo complete What: 79th GTR (elements of) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N T+118:00 T+119:00 T+130:30 Where: 1-92 sector T+133:00 What: Tank Bns (-) #: 2 Where: PL ACE Activity: penetrated (attacking across) Heading: Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N 0 B-13 . no enemy contact What: 1-92 Mech Where: PL ACE Activity: Set. ES9071 Activity: nioving Heading: N estimated T+97:00 What: MRB(+) @ about 30% strength Where: PL CLUB Activity: Establishing hasty defense Heading: Stage3 T+111:00 What: 146th MRR (lead echelon) Where: ES8774 Activity: Moving Heading: N What: 79th GTR (lead echelon) Where: ES7870 Activity: moving Heading: N T+114:00 What: 210 ACR Where: to PL ACE Activity: moving to establish What: 210 ACR Where: PL ACE Activity: set.

cumulate across nets. . enter into database for input to RS/I table. from the lowest net transmission of the SITUATION report to the time the Bn TOC receives the company SITREP. in minutes.L report arrives in receiving queue.3. and contents from audio playback of Bn Cmd/Bn O&I/Co/Plt nets. Collection/Reduction Summary: Baseline: Record SITREP sender. compute transmission time for each net: From initiation at lowest net until company report received by For Baseline compute transmission the TOC. CVCC: Essential report elements are input to RS/1 table via DCA.1: TOC Mean time to transmit SITREP full net: lowest net to Bn Operational Definition: The elapsed time.What: 1-92 Mech Where: to PL QUEEN Activity: delaying T+134:00 What: MRB(+) (2d ech of MRR) Where: ES8673 Activity: Moving Heading: N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N Analysis Summary: Descriptive summary for Baseline condition Receive and Transmit Friendly Troo2 Information 3. times from start of transmission to acknowledgement on the For CVCC compute transmission times from SEND receiving net. receive times (end of transmission). For each report. INOVA Summary: Condition Occurrence dependent Repeated N (per Cell): B-14 . send times (start of transmission). time unti.

3. by echelon Operational Definition: The average duration of voice radio transmissions. ANOVA Summary: Condition X echelon Bn Cmd echelon: 2/stage/week Co echelon: 6/stage/week Expected N (per Cell): B-15 . from actual FLOT (of reporting company).. Collection A Reduction Summary: Baseline: Record SITREP sender. Compute average per manned vehicle.2: Deviation of BLUFOR location reported in SITREP from of reported FLOT actual location Operational Definition: Deviation. 3. excludes transmissions shorter than 1 second or greater than 30 seconds. determine the actual FLOT of the reporting company by identifying the most forward vehicle on either edge of the company formation (DCA routine). Collection/Reduction Summary: DCA routine determines duration of radio transmissions between microphone key events. enter into database for input to RS/l table. Manage Means of Communicating Information 3. For each reported FLOT. in meters. ANOVA Summary: Condition 1/stage/week Expected N (per Cell): .1: Average length of voice radio transmissions. at report send time or AS OF time (whichever is applicable). send time and contents from playback tapes. Transmissions shorter than 1 second or greater than 30 seconds will be eliminated. as defined by keying the microphone. CVCC: Essential report elements are input directly to RS/1 table via DCA. The midpoint between the two locations so defined is compared to the midpoint between the two FLOT locations in the SITREP to yield a directline distance.4.

Collection & Reduction Summary: Battle Master monitors engagement.S Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces 3. records whether TF prevented a decisive engagement (YIN). the proportion of Bn vehicles successfully displacing. (b) proportion of Bn vehicles successfully displacing (more than 50% of front-line elements = acceptable). and a consideration of BLUFOR SAFOR controllers' response time. input to database.1: and 3) Did Task Force prevent decisive engagement? (Stages 1 operational Definition: Determination (yes/no) whether the TF prevented a decisive engagement. assessing (a) reaction time of Co Cdrs (requesting permission to displace) and Bn Cdr (ordering displacement). Analysis Summary: Condition (X2 for each stage) 1/stage/week Expected N (per Cell): B-16 . Based on Battle Master's assessment of reaction time of Co Cdrs and Bn Cdr. and (c) BLUFOR SAFOR controllers' response time.5. Applies to defensive stages 1 & 3.

SPOT.1. enter into database for CVCC: Essential report elements are input input to RS/1 table. the search backward extends to the start of the stage. the original reporting vehicle (do not score relays). "observed" and "destroyed" elements of the SPOT report will be For descriptive purposes a tally (%) will scored independently. determine distance from reported location to location of dead OPFOR vehicle closest to that reported location. to RS/l table via To score the "SPOT-Observed Report:" For each report location. whichever is applicable). determine the most recent intervisibility lasting at least 6 seconds with OPFOR vehicles SPOT report for If this is not the first (regardless of type). whichever is applicable). the search If this is the first backward extends to the previous SPOT. at report create time (or AS OF time. determine those which have suffered catastrophic kills. send time and contents from playback tapes. To score the "SPOT-Damaged Report:" For each report location. in meters. the original reporting vehicle (do not score relays).Collect Threat Information 4. determine the most recent intervisibility lasting at least 6 seconds with OPFOR vehicles SPOT report for If this is not the first (regardless of type). be kept of reports which could not be scored (due to missing locations). at report create time (or AS OF time. of nearest OPFOR Any report containing more vehicle to reported OPFOR location. ANOVA Summary (for each SPOT report type): Condition Expected N (per cell): Occurrence dependent B-17 . SPOT. Determine distance from reported location to location of the OPFOR vehicle closest to that reported location. the search If this is the first backward extends to the previous SPOT. The than one location will be treated as separate reports. the search backward extends to the start of the stage. Colleotion/Reduotion Summary: Baseline: Record SPOT sender. of those. From the candidate pool of OPFOR vehicles.1: Accuracy of SPOT report locations Operational Definition: Deviation. DCA.

Collection/Reduction Summary: Baseline: Record SPOT sender. the search backward extends to stage start. score the report 100%. compare only vehicles which have suffered a catastrophic kill). the search backward extends to the previous SPOT. ANOVA Summary (for each SPOT report type): Condition Expected N (per cell): Occurrence dependent B0 B-l8 . of O the reported type. The "observed" and "destroyed" elements of the SPOT report will be scored independently. enter into database for input to RS/1 table.O 4. CVCC: Essential report elements are input directly to RS/1 table via DCA. the percentage of reported vehicles. If this is the first SPOT. determine the number and type of OPFOR vehicles with which the original reporting vehicle (do not score relays) had intervisibility lasting at least 6 seconds. divide the number of intervisible.1. If there are at least as many vehicles as reported. If this is not the first SPOT for the reporting vehicle.2: Correctness of SPOT report number and type operational Definition: For each scorable SPOT report. which were found to be visible to the reporting vehicle. For each reported location. of the reported type. of the reported type. send time and contents from playback tapes. If there are fewer vehicles than reported. number. same-type vehicles by the number of reported vehicles. Any report containing more than one location will be treated as separate reports. and type. Compare the number of same-type visible vehicles (regardless of location) with the reported vehicles (for the SPOT-damaged report. Scorable reports are those which contain location.

kill Divide questionnaire response by table entry. correctly reported. ANOVA Summary: Condition X Echelon xpeocted N (per Cell): Bn echelon: Co echelon: 2/week 6/week 0 B-19 . enter into database. record.1s Situational Assessment Question 1: During the last stage. and C companies and by the Bn Score is expressed by the percentage of T72s as a whole.. how many OPFOR tanks did your company (Co Cdrs & XOs) (Stage 3) battalion (Bn Cdr & S3) destroy? or Operational Definition: Total number of T72s destroyed (catastrophic kills only) by A. Assess Situation 811a. B. convert to a percentage. Collection & Reduction Summary: DCA constructs a killer-victimtable by BLUFOR unit and victim type (include totals).

Appendix C Descriptive Data Tables for Performance Measures C-1 .

46) 0.35 (5.00 29.76) 0.00 41.00 n-4 NA 19.37 31.00 6 n- 2349.00 4120.00 5 _N4A 6.00 2678.83 (607.00 n-6 (5.11 (10.45 n-8 8.77 'R-9 9.33 18.00 n-6 Time to Reach LD (in minutes) NA 3234. Each data cell standard deviation (in parenthesis).41 (4. C-2 .00 29.12 _-11 4.38) 2243.00 28.06 (11.99) 0.00 (451.17 (316.00) 0.79) 16.6 Exposure Index Bn Echelon 9.00 (1090.12 (6.57 (2.82 45.00 (659.00 34.20 (392.00 n-56 2836.56) 0.00 29. N•j.43 (4.00 15.00 2898.83) 0.00 n-6 24.88) 1655.09 n-6 includes (from top to bottom) the mean.17) 2.00 4 nNA Company Echelon . appear in the table as NA.00 29.95) 1932.00 n-31 NA 14.50 (564.87) 0.60 (4.21) 0.00 n-5 NA 2768. Table C-1 Descriptive Data for Move on Surface Hypothesis (Maneuver BOS) Measure Distance Between BLUFOR and OPFOR Center-of-ftss (in meters) CVCC Stage 1 Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline 5207.00 6386.49) 0.42) 2377. minimum.71) 29.60 (5.42 (4.80 (404.00 3559.00 n-34 NA 6.50 (845.00 28.00 3609.17 (10.87 36.00 4027.64) 2273.53) 23.60 n.00 12.57 D-11 4.00 3150.76 n-12 4.00 _NA 15.57 (11. and of observations (jt). maximum.44 n-12 4.38 n-6 36.26 (10.00 n-23 2251.00 _n-5 NA 10.71 n-30 2369.45) 1999.00 n-6 NA 2553.53 35 _n2607.58) 13.26) 4400. and number Some measures were not applicable.30 24.34) 1857.10 (12.. Range to OPFOR at Displacement (in meters) Time for Companies to Reach Objective (in minutes) 29.88) 0.02 (2.00 11.00 3854.33 (844.90) 1812.00 2645.94) 1858.84 3043.74) 1.

88 -12 10043.64 (3.48 11310.18 72.09) 11.71 13381.71 n-30 46.68) 6.48 12732.87 n-23 48.80 n-12 16.87 (3.19 (4062.03 28.48 (3114.22 n.78 1S467.53 (8.92 n-li 13378.39 n-30 6550.23) 11.75 20350.64) 3330.09 19.47 22. minimum.74) 12.92) 1326.49 19.08 26.19 16127.29) 5477.98 (2823.37 30823.11) 66.81 31002.41 18.78 n-36 7455.71 (11. maximum.22 (6.88) 5961.77) 7.04 (5.28 12.29 (3.72) 41.85 (7352.88) 44.90) 13.24) 6013. C-3 .25) 3782.15 14.14 15093.22 13467.13) 5405.81 n-12 11270.04 n-36 67.65 21.29 (4.10 15.78) 9.62 53.95 (7.64 (3341.25) 6146.48 _n.84) 9.63 (3.63 38.58 n-8 7525.97 -10 9037.18 (4.38 75. and number of observations (n).80) 4721.50 (2514.98 (2565.68 16.92) 9.45 n-l11 9597.20) 3437.80 52.96 47.09) 8.52 Company Echelon O Time to Complete Stage (in minutes) n*6 n-6 n-6 A"-6 n-4 Note.72 87. Each data cell includes the mean.95 12.33 n-35 8509.89) 10.40 (9.31 n-I 1 20.76 n-36 13512.20 (2521.34 17470.74 (8.09 21889.74 33.94 (5083.66 n-1 1 17.51 a-23 CVCC Stage 1 Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline Company Echelon Fuel Used (in gallons) Bn Echelon 20.48 (2394.24 (3.99 (5.18 37.29 (3242.52 (4. Table C-2 Descriptive Data for Navigate Hypothesis (Maneuver BOS) Measure Distance Travelled (in meters) On Echelon 13517.36 _n-36 52.29 p-36 8005.51 n-8 12.69) 3150.81) 5678.81 48.32 (8171.33) 23.07 27.46 (3.91 (10.3 6 73. standard deviation (in parenthesis).32 n-35 41.97 67.95) 36.I-I .11) 9.34) 63.41 !1-12 18.

00 A.33 (0.00 2-10 2602.49 (0.69 (0. S Each data cell includes (from top to bottom) the mean.22 1.60 (600.S 0.86 (0.52 (0.09 (575.08) 352.04) 1S12.97 (0.71) 0.26 (0.67 0.48 (0. maximum.05 3.18) 2461.00 3.24 4.00 n-31 2491.53 n-24 0.55 (627. and number of observations (n).36 5.61 n-35 Nai. Lase Range (in meters) Sn Echelon 2963.00 -li 2775.17 (652.27 (0.23 1.01) 306.28) 0.12 2.00 n-35 2263.04 0.70) 0.65 5.81 n-30 1.00 l-.42 n-30 0.00 3472.64 n-6 2.00 3402.72) 1S37.S5 4.81 7 2.33 (1.63) 0.00 2953.05 0.25 4.02) 0.39) 0.69 (1.00 3-30 2848.88) 1.65 n-33 2.66 (245.77) 1.06) 1175.06) 2065.00 n-33 2516.31 (0.14) 1.10 (0.20 1.00 3480.00 _-11 3130.72 5.14 n--11 Company Echelon 0.53 n-1l 1.39 n-35 Time from Lase to First Fire (in minutes) Bn Echelon 0.87 (611.00 3469.87 (0.33) Company Echelon 0.07 0.00 n-23 CVCC Stage 1 Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline Company Echelon Tiem Between Lases to Different Targets (in minutes) Bn Echelon 0.06 0.50 r-34 (0.00 3352.20 (0.88 0.22 n-8 0.13 (0.21) 0.15) 0.00 3337.05 6.32) 0.91) 0.25 n-8 0.79) 0.05 1.64) 0.36 (1.00 3463.68 n-10 0.8 2341.04 4.06) 759. C-4 .03 n-10 2.60 n-30 0.2 6 (0.38 (0.38) 593.49 (0.04 1.70 (907.15 1.36 3.00 3393.37 n-34 (0.40 -11 0.23 n-32 (0.64 (1.05 1.2S) 0. standard deviation (in parenthesis).03 2.78 (1.91 n n1.56 n--S 0.9 0.26) 0.83 n-30 2.m.12 1.05) 0.09 0.58) 0.07) 0.26 l-10 0.34) O.30) 0.34) 0.96) 2400.61 n-34 1.00 3464.7S P-5 0.94 (1.89 (0.00 3436.56) 0.* Table C-3 Descriptive Data for Process Direct Fire Targets Hypothesis (Maneuver BOS) Measure Tim to Acquire Targets (in minutes) Bn Echelon 2.0S 2.00 a-27 Company Echelon N.00 (445.00 n-35 0.45) (0.61 (0.3S) 0.64 (342.38 n-36 2.20 (0.82) 0.29 3.88 (499.01 n.58 (0.32) 0.16 2.1S 1.00 R-11 3010.63) 0.43 (1.68 0.30) 0.26 4..56 (0.60 0.00 3493.06 1. minimum.42) 700.57) 1.43) 0.20 (873.15 (468.25 0.61 3.87 n-8 0.42) 0.22) 0.71 (0.00 n-11 2.87 3.84) 0.18 (0.13 1.45) 1519.43 (0.6S w-23 3046.20 -7 0.79 n-8 0.00 -10 2599.08 3.05 1.53 A-23 0.

10) 977.56 2812.77 n-5 1970.85 (S03.17 11n-20 10.30) 9.89 n-25 1649.53) 5.05 (925.03 -20 2106.50 34. and appear in the table as NA.10 (608.07 (515.11) 1562.00 7.54) 2040.88 97.64 1498.64 Company Echelon Percent OPFOR Vehicles Killed by Manned Vehicles .95) 26.12 (0.94) 767.81 23.-6 .27 2687.70 n-17 Company Echelon Mean Target Kill Range (In meters) Bn Echelon 2440.12 (1.13) 12.37) 1444.35 2104.92 n-4 Percent of BLUFOR Ki led by End of Stage 22.85 (5687.45 19.79 2687.13 (13.00 n-6 91.31 2785.92) 3.09 0.87) 1237.13 (6.43 (2.22 2751.63 n-6 0.55 2688.41 n-3 1910.40 (734.76) 46. standard deviation (in parenthesis).82 2956.50) 1601.54 (318.31 n-4 2151.85) 1458.80 3156.20 (239. C-5 .52 98.93) 60.48) 428.37 3064.13 (365.98 (500.56 15.02 0.56 7.09 (8.77 100.10 n-6 98.09) 14. maximum.51 2788.76 nl-28 2018.06 40.39) 726.29) 726.72) 1506.60 (7.50 (528.92 n-5 87.56 1977.39 (695.01) 26.06 40.-6 n-S n-4 (Table continues) .47 2664. and number of observations (n ).06) 378.36 (3.98) 1657.56 2753.71 3064. Each data cell includes (from top to bottom) the mean.38 37.24 2956.02) 1.64 n021 1896.63 n-5 0.14 16.39) 928.23 11.71) 7. Note.77) 1681. Some measures were not applicable.72) 4.38 n-6 0.03 fl-16 3.46) 1422.38 n-4 0.04 (6.54 n-3 1916.02 0.41) 984.18 n-3 1770.-6 -6 n.18 (0.38 (6.12 2729.64 n-IS 6.59) 96.70) 22.41 n-5 0.92 2668.55) 71.92) 1526.50 n-6 Losses/Kill Ratio 0.OS (553.11 n-4 2012.10 l-5 1889.10) 6.08 1-6 0.27 (1074.16 (0.51 96.70 1731.86 (731.31 (426.14 _l11 12.10 0.06 0.83 (357.11) 0.48 (768.70) 9.19 (0.40 A1-6 2288.14 (9.62 (2.24 (17.47 n-1 1762.24 2796. Table C-4 Descriptive Data for Engage Direct Fire Targets Hypothesis (Maneuver BOS) Measure Percent of OPFOR Killed by End of Stage CVCC Stage 1 Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline Stage 3 Baseline CVCC 87.91 n-24 0.S4) 5.36 n-7 2243.65) 1252.81 n-6 0.08 11-6 88.42 97.45) 557.S0 2369.7 2312.64 (390.56 (9.54 3156.25 n-6 0.59) 777.73) 0.32 (1162.27 (10..81 (2.41) 64.57 95.39 n-6 71.92 r3 1773.90 (365.10 0.24 (8.29 1-6 Mean Target Hit Range (in In Echelon meters) 2487. minimum.67) 74.89 n-21 14.73 2913.15 n-23 10.40 n.67 --- 2664.08) 14.10) 1.88 (21.31 2788.04 (10.36 n-7 2214.15 22.15 (304.29 1402.28 (0.14 (561.20) 428.63 n-6 0.19 3069.0S (0.72 2796.

12) 0.21 (0.67 n-8S 0.05) 0.SS n-8 0.10 0.40 (0.00 *20 0.11 (0. minimum.33 n-10 0.00 0.50 n-4 0.02 (0.00 0.00 0.10) 0.31 (0.29 (0.00 2.00 21 n-.00 0.67 _n-3 0.18) 0.31 (0.36 (0.37) 0.17) 0.15) 0.22 (0.00 0.00 n-17 1.18) 0.00) 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0. 1.22 -l10 Comany Echelon 0.00 1.33 (0. and of observations (U).26 (0.89) 2.00 (0.0s) 0.31) 0.35 (0.00 3.36) 0.09) 0.30) 0.33 n-24 3.12 1-5 0.14 n-27 0.00 0.83 (0. Manned Vehicles In Echelon 0.00 n-29 0.00 n-28 0.17 (0.17 (0.09 0.00 (0.00 4.08 (0.67 (0.00 1.41) 0.60 n-31 0.00 0.25 (1.38) 0.00 0.00 0. C-6 .-5 0.00 0.62) 1.24) 0.40 n_-S 0.00 n-27 0.00 0.37) 0.00 0.35 (0.00 0.23) 0.05) 0.20) 0.00 1.00 -s 0.96) 0.91 n-24 CVCC Stage 1 Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline Company Echelon Kilts/Hit Ratio.20 (0.00 (0.00 1. Manned Vehicles In Echelon 0. standard deviation (in parenthesis).00 R0..19) 0.19 (0.22 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 n-7 Comany Echelon 0.S0 B-3S 0.24) 0.28 (0.00 5.24 (0.94) 0.40 (1.20 (0.67 n-28 0.00) 0.16) 0.00 (0. appear in the table as NA.00 1.38) 0.08) 0.00 (0.28) 0.00 (0.41 n-35 Numer of Manned Vehicles Sustaining a Killing Hit 2.23 (0.52) 1.40 n=5 0.00 (0.00 0. Each data cell includes (from top to bottom) the mean.00 0.08 (0.00 0.32) 0.00 2.00 6.00 (0.00 1. maximum.17 (1.15) 0.23) 0.12 .00 1. and number Some measures were not applicable.11) 0.03 0.40 r-31 2.25) 0.00 n-6 0.55 n-28 2.47 (0.00 0.02 (0.13 0.00 1.00 0.00 n'6 0.00 n-25 ie Echelon 0.62 n=10 0.00 0.00 n-28 0.82) 0. Table C-4 Descriptive Data for Engage Direct Fire Targets Hypothesis (Maneuver BOS) (Cont'd) Measure Hits/Round Ratio.00 0.26) 0.00 -9 0.00 l-24 Kills/Round Ratio. Manned Vehicles 1.31 (0.47 n=10 0.00 0.00 0.40) 0.00 0.27 (0.00 -6 n-6 n-6 n6 n1-s n-4 (Table continues) Note.48 (0.

00 96.00 n-li 15.47) 0.00 4.29) 13.00 94.21) 58.09 (5.82) 0.20 (21.75 (17.00 31.25 (6. minimum.89) 0.17) 0.00 17.00 !-36 NA 5.00 n-ll 7.28) 56.00 1-lO 10.00 n.00 n-8 12.67 (22.00 93.00 30.60 63. C-7 .* Table C-4 Descriptive Data for Engage Direct Fire Targets Hypothesis (Maneuver BOS) (Cont'd) Measure Number of Rounds fired by Planned Vehicles on Echelon 11. Some measures were not applicable.NA 89.00 n-12 15.08 (8.00 21.00 4 A- Note. Each data cell includes (from top to bottom) the mean.00 23.00 n-12 8.00 (6. NA NA MA NA NA Number of OPFOR Vehicles Killed South of PL OEEN (Stage 3 only) NA NA 67.75 (10.63 (11.62) 0.60) 45.00 n-30 NA 8.51) 0.58) 0.00 31.26) 0. and appear in the table as NA.70) 31.00 23.07) 16. and number of observations (1a).00 97.00 6 ft.00 n-36 NA 6.00 36 p64.50 (7.53) 1.50 (22.00 P.00 93.11) 72.79) 1.97 (8.00 4 p- Number of OPFOR Vehicles Killed South of PL ACE (Stage 3 only) NA NA NA NA 54.00 10.00 20.53 (6.00 73.95) 0.00 p-S 38.83 (9.36 (7.00 29.00 n-24 NA CVCC Stage 1 Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline Comany Echelon Number of OPFOR Vehicles Killed South of PL JACK (Stage I only) n_6 _n-6 Number of OPFOR Vehicles Killed South of PL CLU (Stage I only) 64.00 94.64 (10.00 X's (33.06 (10.00 30.3 6 81.67 (14.00 94. standard deviation (in parenthesis).00 29.00 40.06 (8.80) 0. maximum.79) 64.

79 (501. maximum.00 n-3 100.54 (923.00 100.00 708.12) t-22 91.39) 36. Each data cell includes (from top to bottom) the mean.00 3469.83) n-14 86.33 (24.93) 0..87) 50.00 0.00 n-1S 100. standard deviation (in parenthesis).00 115.50 (1073.57 (473.00 22 100.00 g- 50.37) 77.00 2295.00 391.19) 1644.33 (32.15) n_-3 83.51) 20.00 n=25 Percent of CFF Reports with Correct Type (observed) 90.00 7934.32) 41. Table C-5 Descriptive Data for Conduct Surface Attack Hypothesis Support BOS) Measure Accuracy of CFF Report Locations (observed.70) n-6 68.53 (24.00 n-6 0.00 1846.68) R-6 58.00 100.00 100.57 (17. and number of observations (n).50 4378. in meters) CVCC Stage 1 Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC (Fire Stage 3 Baseline 532.00 175.00 1714.50 3050.00 n-8 0. minimum.00 Notl.33 (28.67 (29. C-8 .17 (3068.33 (52.00 n-25 50.

46) n-3 fn-0 --- n-O Percent of FRAGO Elements Correctly Relayed 100.07 (0.58 (O.47) 0.16) (0.15 0.95 n-12 n-0 Company XO --- 0.18 n-7 0.20 3.97 (12.25 0.60 (0.47 (0.00 5O0. C-9 .08 0.88 23.27 1.38 (5.25 n-I Company Cdr --- 0.50 n-5 0.05) 3. All CVCC FRAGOs (overlays and text) were transmitted instantaneously and with perfect (100%) consistency.82 n-I5 Duration of Request to Clarify FRAGO/Overlay (in minutes) Sn Cdr -- -- 1. standard deviation (in parenthesis). 0 n-17 Note.09 72.00 0.72 n-15 18.41) 0.O Table C-6 Descriptive Data for Receive and Transmit Mission Hypothesis (Command and Control BOS) Measure Elapsed Time from Bn Transmission of FRASO to Reception by Co Cdr/XO (in minutes) CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline 0. Each data cell includes (from top to bottom) the mean. 35.00 0.35) 2 n100.27 (17.16 0.50 (0.21) 9.98) -- -- 0.43 (0.32 0.43 (0.08 22.83 n-5 0.84) 1.57 n!-16 0.00 12. only.23) 0.17 1. maximum. minimum.22 3 -.07) 0.00 9.SS) 0. and number FRAGOs were transmitted in Stage 2 and 3 of observations (_n).35 n-2 --- 0.36 (5.

includes (from top to bottom) the mean.00 -- -0. minimum.95) 0.32 (39.00 n-6 0.03) 0.82 n-1 100.63 n-l0 60. standard deviation (in of observations parenthesis).00 1. and number consistency.00 100.73 3.00 100.65 (0. maximum.82 0. Table C-7 Descriptive Data from Receive and Transmit Enemy Information Hypothesis (Command and Control BOS) Peasure Tim to Transmit INTEL from Bn Cdr to Co Cdr (in minutes) Stage I CVCC Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline 0.00 -- Percent INTEL Elements Correctly Relayed 100. All CVCC INTELs were transmitted instantaneously and with perfect (100%) C-10 .00 n-1 25.58 (1.00 n-I -- Note..96) 0.63 n-3 -- 0.00 100.00 100.00 1.00 25.56 2. Each data cell (a).

26 (3.15) 0.80 n-4 --- n-0 Difference Between Observed BP Arrival and Reporting SET (in minutes) 1.05 9.30) 0. minimum.35 n=12 0.52 (0.82 _n-15 --- Deviation of BLUFOR Location Reported in SITREP (in meters) -- n-0 915..61 n-6 0.55 n-6 0.57) 0.91 2.13 (1.00 915.91 (1.29 (3.60 n-4 n-3 Note.38 (0.26 n-10 1.23 n-142 --- 0.05 12.17 2.45 (0.15 n-13 869.02 5.57 (3.80 n-88 0.45) 0.43 (3.01 4.60 n-11 3.37) 427. and number of observations (n).95 n-6 0.53) 0.03 1.67 1056.95 4.58 n-42 989.15) 1.43) 0.45 n-52 -- _n-0 2.38) 0.75 (1.45 n-2 2.65 1.04) 0.72) 0.93) 0. c-11 .05 (312.13 1.25 n-12 1.59) 0. Table C-8 Descriptive Data for Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information Hypothesis (Command and Control BOS) Measure Time to Transmit SITREP from Lowest Het to Sn TOC (in minutes) Stage I CVCC Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline 1.30 n-5 3.08 10.75 (1.83) 0.00 n-I n-0 Difference Between Observed and Reported PL/LD/FCL Crossings (in minutes) 0. Each data cell includes (from top to bottom) the mean. standard deviation (in parenthesis).03 1.45) 0.05 6.56 (0.88 n-12 "-.51 (0.28 (1.30 8.37 n-6 0.03 1.47) 0.96 (673.95 n-3 2.11 6.63 n-32 -- -3. maximum.26) 0.60) 459.40 (0.77 1503.00 9.72) 0.22) 652.67 0.79 n-25 Duration of Communication Between Bn TOC and Bn Cdr/S3 (in minutes) 0.26 (232.58) 0.58) 0.13 1.61 (2.79 (0.08 8.21 n-5 5.05 4.43 (0.61 2170.43) 0.73 (0.36 (1.08 4.18 3.67 n-20 802.05 (2.90) 0.

98 (0.20) 3.32) 3. Each data cell (from top to bottom) includes the mean.01) 2.97 4.26 3.59 (0.06 (0.20 (0.82 (0.94 4.56 3.54) 3.78 (0.61) 3.19 (0. and number of observations (n).88) 3.14 (0.19 4.34 5.84 3.87 4.48 4.25 (0.56) 3.42 6.64 3.41) 3.56 4.31 (0.06) 3.60 4.23 (0.40 (0.80 (0.27) 3.95 3. standard deviation (in parenthesis).58 4.16 4.38 3.14) 3.87) 3.20 (0.66 4.88 3.02 4.08 4.30) 3.99 4.91 3.09 (0.65 (0.41 (0.49) 3.61 5.47 3.35) 3.09 (0.57 Bn Command Net Bn 08 Net A Company Net B Company Net C Company Net (Table continues) Note.59 (0.15 3.28 4.08 5.21 (0.48 4.64 4.50 4.46 4.43 3.58 (0.65 3.71 4.93 (0.58 (0.30 (0.Table C-9 Descriptive Data for Manage Means of Communicating Information Hypothesis (Command and Control BOS) Stage 1 CVCC Baseline n-6 n-6 CVCC n-6 Stage 2 Baseline n-5 CVCC n-6 Stage 3 Baseline n-5 Measure Average Length of Voice Transmissions (in minutes) Ode Co mand Net 5.61 (1.07 342 (0.52) 2. maximum.95 4.17 4.68) 3.35 3.33) 2.71 (1.02 (0.21 (1.51 5.51 3.25 (0.28 (0.28 6.44 4.83 4.37) 3. minimum.13 3.46) 3.45) 3.65) 3.56 6.45) 3.60) 3.46 4.58) 3.22 3.14) 3.39 (1.74 4.36 4.55) 2.36 4.68 4.19) 3.53) 3.53 4.19) 2.15 3.05 3.10 3.63) 3.07 4.74 4.40 4.92 5.58 3.40 (0.83 (0.98 3.62) 3.41 5.93 4.41) 3.15 4.11) 3.46 4.05 (0.44) 3.66) 3. C-12 .29 4.52 4.08 (0.59 4.63 4.24 3.

91) 29.00 68.00 90.05) 30.17 (65.00 217.80 (11.00 (44.00 132.77) 65.00 127.00 83.20 (63. C-13 .44) 32.80) 131.00 81.00 354. and number of observations (n).00 113.72) 32.00 186.00 161.50 (57.90) 109.00 98.00 131.00 (27.44) 9.00 325.00 158.00 138.03) 133.17 (38.00 152.00 74.00 113.00 (66.00 173.00 (23.43) 40.00 (120.00 350.00 169.80 (58.27) 23.39) 247.92) 225.17 (48.61) 26. minimum.99) 91.50) 22.52) 56.00 239.40 (61.33 (21. Table C-9 Descriptive Data for Manage Means of Communicating Information Hypothesis (Command and Control BOS) (Cont'd) Stage 1 CVCC Baseline n-6 _n-6 CVCC n-6 Stage 2 Baseline n-5 CVCC n-6 Stage 3 Baseline n-5 Measure Number of Transmissions Bde Comand Net 58.00 76.00 195.96) Sn Command Net Sn 0&1 Net A Company Net B Company Net 107.00 240. maximum.22) 165.00 282.00 208.00 281.00 77.77) 34.00 481.00 (97.00 (66.50 (69.00 213.00 132.00 50.00 209.00 (66.87) 163.00 Note.33 (28.00 118.00 160. standard deviation (in parenthesis).88) 83.48) 19.00 C Company Net 89.00 225..83 (35.83 (59.00 133.00 129.00 249.00 266.00 178.00 40.00 227.00 (33.80) 339.00 97.00 82.00 168.00 378.19) 219.00 (48.00 (50.00 681.85) 44.33 (38.00 81.17 (14.64) 28.50 (25.64) 39.00 89.59) 135.00 272.00 171.00 178.40 (42.00 260.31) 110.00 363.00 99.33 (34.00 501.00 231.00 (44.40) 147. Each data cell (from top to bottom) includes the mean.50 (74.00) 11.00 283.37) 180.92) 53.40) 29.00 295.00 168.00 (50.00 58.00 278.00 154.00 328.00 169.00 177.00 (35.64) 16.50 (24.00 116.00 (10.50 (13.

78 98.55 77.21 (26.35 (9.29) 77.86 97.93 (19. C-14 i Ii II i l I I I II .21) 19.00 89.46 94.02 97.97 (6.63 99. maximum. and number of observations (n).90 66.35 (9.70) 80.11 (19. minimum.44 n-6 R-6 n-6 n-S n-6 n-4 Note. standard deviation (in parenthesis)..14) 53.90 94.13 100.70 99. Table C-10 Descriptive Data for Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces Hypothesis (Command and Control BOS) Measure Percent of Sn that Met Co wander's Intent Stage 1 CVCC Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline 81.46 84.89) 55. Each data cell includes (from top to bottom) the mean.

00 n-17 328.95) 747.88 (382.10 (595.70 (470.00 n-5 1895.00 100.47 (30.00 n_-34 1362.00 1648.80) 50.00 2793.43 (30.71) 7.74) 31.31) 2.14) 0. percentage) --- --- --- n-O.14) 0.33 41778.00 1724.00 Accuracy of CONTACT Report Locations (In meters) Percent CONTACT Reports with Correct Type n-30 n-16 n-18 n-14 n-19 n-7 Note.30) 38.00 100.00 A-15 59.00 1888.00 n-l5 3752.00 3037.71 (32.00 n-4 Correctness of SPOT Report Number and Type (observed.50 2476. in meters) CVCC Stage I Baseline CVCC Stage 2 Baseline CVCC Stage 3 Baseline 436.01) 0..51 (458.00 100.00 n-17 405.77 (2072.27 (1033. standard deviation (in parenthesis).00 907.00 3236.00 100.04) 0.36) 327.00 n-33 --- n-O 68.02) 3.61 (28.39) 1.50 n-21 1105.67 (751.00 n=17 409.68) 85.08 (630.00 n-19 73.00 n-20 94.00 2430.70 (26.05 100.00 2698.00 n-17 81.15) 41.08) 0. 0 C-15 . Each data cell includes (from top to bottom) the mean.67 (497.00 2068.00 4195.00 6880.00 n-15 623.00 n-20 --- n-O 65.00 1700.65 (532.20 (429.97 (2154.52) 740.00 100.00 1783.71) 19.67 1229. minimum.83 (921.00 n-18 --- n-O 56.36 (677.27 (10570.50 n_-16 375.00 1742.00 n-4 Accuracy of SPOT Report Locations (destroyed.00 100.41) 105.38 (31.00 1700.00 n-34 79.73) 52.43 (27.00 n-21 91.00 n-6 46.36) 37.94 (1406.61 (423.00 n-32 81.59) 0.26) 1.27 (33.00 n-19 84.00 100. maximum.56 (13.74 (588. and number of observations (n).37) 0.00 1333.23 (27.76) 50.00 100.78) 0.00 n-25 355. in meters) 394.28) 802.00 100.68) 0.25 (645.00 4469.72 (29.25) 0.00 100.00 100.83 (577.75 (29.00 n-30 84.00 n-18 88.00 100.00 2188.20) 0.00 100.00 _n-18 649.05) 1.52 (32.00 6502.00 n-7 390.00 100.00 n-12 50.66 (429.32) 0.23) 891. Table C11 Descriptive Data for Collect Threat Information Hypothesis (Intelligence BOS) Measure Accuracy of SPOT Report Locations (observed.00 n-22 547.22) 984.00 1662.45) 0.47 (30. percentage) Correctness of SPOT Report Number and Type (destroyed.00 1666. n-O n_-C Report Accuracy of SHELL Locations (in meters) 2034.23 (12.00 1735.19) 0.

19) 0.00 5.00 n-35 2.08) 1.01) 2.00 91.00 fp-36 .11 (33.00 5.61) 0.00 (1.00 n-36 CVCC Baseline CVCC Confidence Rating Baseline Company Echelon Number of OPFOR BIMPs Destroyed in Echelon 48.00 6.80 (1.13) 1.00 100.20) 0.55) 0.45 (1.00 n-1l 2.56 (0.57 (23.83 (12.00 n-ll 2.3 5 49.52) 0.17 (26. Table C-12 Descriptive Data for the Situational Assessment Hypotheses Percent Correctly Identified Measure Number of OPFOR Tanks Destroyed Bn Echelon 50.18) 1.89 (0.08) 1.00 3.00 n-12 44.64) 0.00 n-ul 50.97) 2. standard deviation (in parenthesis). maximum.00 5.00 5.91) 0.10) 0.65) 3. C-16 .00 5.20 (34.09 (25.25 (0.00 n-36 4.00 90.82 (1.00 5.31) 0.94) 0.00 n-36 2.00 100.00 5.00 n-12 3..66) 0.00 5. and number of observations (n).00 (1.09 (32.00 77.11 (43.00 5.00 n-12 4.96) 1.03 (29.00 3.00 5.17 (34.39 (1.33 (1.00 3.00 100. Each data cell includes (from top to bottom) the mean.00 100. minimum.17 (1.00 n 38.19) 0.00 n3 27.00 n-35 40.29) 1.00 n36 Company Echelon Number In Your Unit Were Destroyed On Echelon 83.31 (30.00 U-11 27.00 _n35 Company Echelon 48.79) 2.00 100.00 n=12 37.00 100.29) 1.00 39.00 n-12 _nll 4.09 (33.51) 0.00 n-12 3.00 n.00 n1146.00 n-35 308 (0.00 100.

and number of observations (n). standard deviation (in parenthesis).82) 2.00 n-8 3.90 n-35 5.00 3.50 (0.00 2.77) 0.00 n.57 (0. C-17 .77 !-11 1.95) 1.40 n-24 5. minimum.21 (1.09) 0.00 n-24 Note.45 (0.53 (1.00 n-35 5.54 (0. Each data cell includes (from top to bottom) the mean.64 (3.51) 0.23 3.77 A-$ 1.76) 2.23 11.Table 13 Descriptive Data for Situational Assessment Hypothesis Deviation Between Actual and Reported Distance (in meters) Measure Distance from Initial OP from Later BP Bn Echelon 1.52) 0.00 4.00 3. maximum.00 5.88) 1.02 (1.00 CVCC Baseline Confidence Rating CVCC Baseline Company Echelon 6.1 1 3.

Appendix D Analysis of Variance Summary Tables r D-l .

Table D-1

ANOVA Summaries for Measures Supporting Move on Surface Hypothesis (Maneuver BOS)

Distance Between BLUFOR and OPFOR Center-of-Mass (in
Source of Varlation
NMain Effects caow STAGE 2-way Interactions COwD STAGE Explained Residual Total


Sum of a
26123628.666 6198484.966 20199037.844 576S872.847 5765872.847 31889501.515 14968056.000 4W877557.515

3 1 2 2 2 5 27 32

Mean Su ara
8707876.223 6196484.96 10099518.922 2682936.423 2882936.423 6377900.303 555113.185 1464923.672

15.687 11.166 18.194 5.193 5.193 11.489

Signif of F
.000 .002 .000 .012 .012 .000

Exposure Index
Source of Variation itan Effects COwS ECHELON STAGE 2-way Interactions COwD ECHELON CONP STAGE STAGE 3-way Interactions COND ECHELON Explained Residual Sum of Save1s 1978.074 6.095 1034.949 964.910 429.983 7.897 130.755 283.171 166.820 168.820 2576.877 14311.137 DF 4 1 1 2 5 1 2 2 2 2 11 240 Mean 19sre 494.518 6.095 1034.949 482.455 85.997 7.897 65.377 141.586 84.410 84.410 234.262 59.630

8.293 .102 17.356 8.091 1.442 .132 1.096 2.374 1.416 1.416 3.929

Signif ofF .000 .749 .000 .000 .210 .716 .336 .095 .245 .245 .000

Tots 1





Range to OPFOR at Displacement (in
Source of Variation Main Effects COw STAGE 2-way Interactions COan STAGE Explained Residual Total Sum of Sl jam 1013442.373 159607.755 861025.006 14951.327 14961.327 1026393.700 3477743.100 4506136.800

Mean Sqaure F 2.331 .735 3.961 .069 .069 1.577 Signif of2F .129 .404 .064 .796 .796 .234

2 1 1 1 1 3 16 19

506721.187 159807.755 861025.008 14951.327 14951.327 342797.900 217358.944 237165.095


Table D-2 ANOVA Sunmaries for Measures Supporting Navigate Hypothesis (Maneuver BOS) Distance Travelled (in
Source of VUriation
Main Effects COND ECHELON STAGE 2-vay Interactions COan ECHELON CONO STAGE ECHELON STAGE 3-way Interactions COND ECHELON Explained Residual Total

4 1 1 2 5 1 2 2 2 2 11 255 266

1068242373.41 27231266.541 7006204.897 1051631208.77 146831295.955 7096431.591 59959502.660 81423590.419 15534581.908 15534581.906 1230608251.27 4149976231.67 5380584482.94

267060593.35 27231266.541 7006204.897 525615604.39 29366259.191 7096431.591 29979751.330 40711795.209 7767290.954 7767290.954 111873477.39 16274416.595 20227761.214

16.410 1.673 .431 32.309 1.804 .436 1.842 2.502 .477 .477 6.874

of F
.000 .197 .512 .000 .112

.161 .084 .621 .621 .000


Fuel Used (in
Source of VariLtion
Main Effects COND ECHELON STAGE 2-tay Interactions COND ECHELON COND STAGE ECHELON STAGE 3-wey Interactions COmE ECHELON Explained Residual Total

Sun of 2024.095 29.918 1.453 2019.217 315.125 99.471 29.827 192.101 60.502 60.502 2399.721 10272.070 12671.791 4 1 1 2 5 1 2 2 2 2 11 255 266 Mean Signif

506.024 29.918 1.453 1009.606 63.025 99.471 14.913 96.051 30.251 30.251 218.156 40.283 47.638

12.562 .743 .036 25.063 1.565 2.469 .370 2.384 .751 .751 5.416

of F
.000 .390 .850 .000 .171 .117 .691 .094 .473 .473 .000


Time to Complete Stage (in
SoJree of Variation Main Effects COND STAGE 2-way Interactions COlD STAGE Explained Residual Total Sum of Suem 4167.925 250.113 3881.669 254.014 254.014 4421.939 953.492 5375.431

F 3 1 2 2 2 5 27 32 Mean Se 1389.308 250.113 1940.765 127.007 127.007 884.388 35.315 167.982 f 39.341 7.062 54.957 3.596 3.596 25.043 Signif of F .000 .013 .000 .041 .041 .000


Appendix E List of Acronyms



AFATDS ANOVA ARI ATCCS ATHS BDM BLWFOR DOS BP C2 C3 CCD CFF CIG CITV CRT CSS CVCC DCA Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System Analysis of Variance U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Army Tactical Command and Control System Airborne Target Handover System BDM Federal, Inc. Blue (friendly) Forces Battlefield Operating System Battle Position Command and Control Command, Control, and Communications Command and Control Display Call for Fire Computer Image Generation Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer Cathode Ray Tube Combat Service Support Combat Vehicle Command and Control Data Collection & Analysis System



Directorate of Combat Developments


Distributed Interactive Simulation Exercise Control Room Fragmentary Order Fire Support Officer Gun Line of Sight Gunner's Primary Sight Gunner's Primary Sight Extension Intervehicular Information System Line of Departure Laser Range Finder Management, Command and Control System Maneuver Control System Military Occupational Specialty Mobile Subscriber Equipment Mounted Warfare Test Bed Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Non-Commissioned Officer National Training Center Operations and Intelligence Opposing Forces Operations Order Phase Line Position.Navigation Plan View Display


Quality Control
Research Assistant Readiness Condition E-2

LIST OF ACRONYMS (Cont'd) SAFOR SCC SIJNET SIoNET-D SIINET-T SINCGARS SITREP SHE SMI SOP SPSS STX TIS TOC TRP TTPs XO Semiautomated Forces SIMNET Control Console Simulation Network Simulation Network--Developmental Simulation Network--Training Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System Situation Report Subject Matter Expert Soldier-Machine Interface Standing Operating Procedure Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Situational Training Exercise Thermal Imaging System Tactical Operations Center Target Reference Point Tactics. and Procedures Executive Officer 0 0 E-3 . Techniques.

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