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SYMPOSIUM REPORT

“STABILITY OPERATIONS: WHERE WE ARE AND THE ROAD AHEAD”

13-14 DECEMBER 2004

SPONSORED BY

THE UNITED STATES ARMY PEACEKEEPING AND


STABILITY OPERATIONS INSTITUTE

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

AT

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Executive Summary Page 3

2. Symposium Overview Page 5

3. Keynote Address Page 7

4. Panel Presentations and Discussions Page 11

5. Lunchtime Address Page 28

6. Dinner Address Page 30

7. Symposium Findings Page 31


.
Annex A – Potential Future Themes Page 34

Annex B – Symposium Attendee List Page 36

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Section 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On December 13-14, 2004 the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute (USAPKSOI), the State Department’s Office of Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) hosted a stability
operations symposium designed to enable collective solutions to the challenges
confronting the United States Government’s in stability operations. The event was held
at the Center for Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference’s theme was “Where We Are and the Road
Ahead” and provided a meaningful opportunity for agencies and organizations involved
in stability operations to share experiences and lessons learned, and to inform other
conference participants of their capabilities and current and planned activities.
Conference deliberations concentrated on the following focus areas:
• policy and concept development and integration;
• ongoing or planned research;
• education, and training development; and
• operational lessons learned with emphasis on improving civil-military planning
and execution, and identifying civilian and military capability gaps.
The central purpose of the symposium was not to resolve specific operational
issues, but rather to inform the stability operations community about what participants
are doing, where the community is heading, what the impediments to success are, and
how to overcome potential obstacles through partnerships or collaboration. The
conference assembled over sixty experts from the U.S. Government, both civilian and
military; international organizations; research centers; non-governmental organizations;
and academia. Attendees, representing more than thirty organizations, heard from
panels of participants who discussed the above focus areas in terms of their own
agencies’ efforts in stability operations. Panel presentations and the discussions that
followed provided a means to enhance planning and coordination, and to identify
resources and expertise that the stability operations community can tap to optimize
investment in policy-making, planning, concept and doctrine development, operations,
coordination, training, education, and research and lessons learned.
Two days of deliberations produced a range of relevant findings and
recommendations intended to advance the core competencies of the large and diverse
collection of organizations that comprise the stability operations community. Findings
and recommendations included the following:
• A glossary of common key terms is essential for successful understanding,
collaboration and information sharing among members of the stability
operations community.
• Interagency participation in the military’s stability operations planning is
required and a useful template and cooperative mechanism that would
improve interagency planning should be developed.

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• Additionally, increased interagency and IO / NGO participation must become
standard in the combatant commands’ training and exercises.
• The Department of Defense is taking major steps to educate and train its
personnel on all aspects of stabilization and reconstruction. In particular, the
U.S. Army is attempting to increase its capacity to provide security in post-
conflict operations by modularizing its force.
• The S/CRS organization needs time to prepare for the execution of its
mandate to lead U.S. government agencies in fulfilling their stability
operations missions. Once fully operational, S/CRS will enhance the
capacities of the international community involved in stability operations with
a particular emphasis on improving the partnership with the United Nations.
• It was emphasized throughout the symposium that ownership of and local
participation in the crisis response strategy must be a part of any stabilization
and reconstruction solution.
• There was a strong consensus among attendees that more fruitful, informed
communication and trust between the civilian and military components of
government and non-government organizations are a vital element for
success in ongoing and future stability operations. Non-government
organizations believe they must remain neutral in the stability operations area
in order to retain access the vulnerable populations that are the target of their
humanitarian mission. Dealing with transnational threats, who target civilian
relief personnel, is a new, significant problem that must be addressed, if
reasonable prospects for success are to be expected.
• More attention must be devoted to measuring success in stability operations
and a need exists for a system of metrics to assist in the evaluation and
validation of reconstruction and stabilization missions.
• A central venue for collection, integration, and dissemination of policy,
planning, and operational lessons learned related to post-conflict operations
should be created.
This inaugural meeting was intended to launch a series of follow-on sessions,
which will allow all within the stability operations community to build relationships,
explore opportunities for collaboration, and further develop strategies that address
specific issues and challenges that are highlighted above.

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Section 2
OVERVIEW
The core of the symposium consisted of a series of plenary session panel
presentations followed by question and answer periods. Panels represented eight
categories of organizations participating in the symposium:
Department of State
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Joint Staff and other joint organizations
Army Staff and other Army organizations
United Nations
International organizations
Non-government organizations
Research and study organizations.
Panelists focused their presentations on opportunities for collaboration,
challenges in the field, and suggestions for leveraging resources and expertise to
benefit the stability operations community. In addition to the panel remarks, three other
presentations were delivered. A keynote address by Ambassador Carlos Pascual, the
Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; a lunchtime
address by Colonel John Agoglia, Director of PKSOI; and a dinner presentation by Ms.
Nancy Lindborg, Executive Vice President of Mercy Corps, provided insights into the
interests and concerns of the civilian relief community engaged in stability operations.
In order to ensure a productive and substantive conference and to avoid
organizational information briefings, panelists focused their presentations on
collaboration opportunities, challenges in the field, and suggestions for leveraging
resources and expertise throughout the stability operations community. Moreover,
panelists provided appropriate read-ahead material to complement the presentations as
well as to inform other participants on the background, details and objectives of their
organization’s stability operations efforts. At its core, the purpose of the panel
presentations was to identify possible opportunities for collaboration with other
organizations represented at the conference. Examples of read ahead material that
was provided included:
• analytical reports, in draft or final form;
• assessments or other planning documents;
• strategy or doctrine papers;
• guidance, training outlines or instructional programs.
At its inception, the sponsors designed the symposium to inaugurate a series of
follow-on sessions that will provide opportunities for the entire stability operations
community to build relationships, explore opportunities for collaboration, and further
develop strategies that address specific issues and challenges. With this in mind, the

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conference accomplished its purpose by identifying several recommendations and
potential focus areas, including public security initiatives in stability operations,
cooperative planning, enhancing information sharing, integrating U.S. and international
stability operations capabilities, and increasing interagency training. These and other
findings are described in the following report, as well as recommendations for the
substance of future meetings.

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Section 3
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
“Status of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization”
Ambassador Carlos E. Pascual
The keynote address focused on the status of the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The Ambassador opened his remarks by
outlining U.S. stability operations related policy interests. He observed that over the
past 15 years, the U.S. has been involved in seven major post-conflict reconstruction
and stabilization operations and contributed significant resources to more than 10
others. Additionally, he pointed out that failed and failing states provide breeding
grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking, humanitarian catastrophes and other threats to
U.S. interests. Continuing with his review of U.S. policy interests, Ambassador Pascual
also noted that Post–Cold War experience teaches that ad hoc responses are not
enough. Indeed, in this regard, the U.S. Government (USG) must work with the world
community to anticipate state failure, avert it when possible, and help post-conflict
states lay a foundation for lasting peace, good governance and sustainable
development. The Ambassador tied U.S. policy to the symposium’s theme by
concluding that successful stabilization and reconstruction are essential to an
achievable and sustainable exit strategy for military and peacekeeping forces.
Key to the conference’s deliberations, Ambassador Pascual stated that
stabilization and reconstruction operations are not a passing phenomenon. He further
elaborated that these missions are made even more difficult when they occur in internal
conflicts in which nations such as Russia and China tend to refrain from providing
assistance because they wish to avoid criticism of their own domestic policies and
conditions. In his commentary on the importance of successful post-conflict plans and
operations, Ambassador Pascual noted that in past stability and reconstruction
operations, the State Department has not participated in the planning nor has it been on
the ground during initial phases of the operational response. It is imperative, he noted,
that the State Department participates in the initial planning, has the capability to
deploy, and has a presence on the ground. To this end, the Secretary of State
established S/CRS in July 2004 and gave it the mission to “Lead, coordinate, and
institutionalize U.S. Government capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict
situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or
civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market
economy.”
Ambassador Pascual emphasized that S/CRS is interagency in character and
function and has a staff of 35 personnel from the Department of State, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Army Corps of Engineers, Joint Forces Command, and the Department of
the Treasury. The Secretary of State gave S/CRS a broad mandate to manage
resources, planning, and development of policy options to respond to failing, failed, and
post-conflict states. In an effort to anticipate the scope of responsibilities it has acquired,
S/CRS is acting under the assumptions that the U.S. government will address 2-3
stabilization and reconstruction (S & R) operations concurrently, and that S&R
operations will last up to 10 years, with half of these operations lapsing into conflict

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during the first 5 years. Two significant implications arise from these assumptions: first,
institutionalizing a stabilization and reconstruction capacity requires building the
capacity of U.S. government partners, and establishing strong relationships with
external partners; and second, management systems must be developed that can
transition to “normal” structural mechanisms.
In approaching the roles and tasks that evolve from the charter that it has been
given, S/CRS has developed an operational model with five functions to fulfill its
responsibilities. Specifically, these functions are:
Prepare Skills and Resources: S/CRS must establish and manage an interagency
capability to deploy personnel and resources in an immediate surge response that has
the capacity to sustain assistance until traditional support mechanisms can operate
effectively. In this regard, a civilian response corps with appropriate standby civilian
capabilities will be developed.
Mobilize and Deploy: S/CRS will coordinate the deployment of U.S. resources and the
implementation of response programs in cooperation with international and local
partners to accelerate the transition from conflict to peace.
Monitor and Plan: S/CRS will identify and prioritize states and regions of greatest risk
and importance, and lead U.S. planning focused on these priorities to avert crises; and,
when possible, to prepare a coordinated, integrated response to them as necessary,
coordinating preparatory planning and exercises with the military.
Coordinate International Resources: S/CRS will work with international organizations,
international financial institutions, individual states and non-government organizations to
harmonize approaches, coordinate planning, accelerate deployment of assets, and
increase the interoperability of personnel and equipment that participate in multilateral
stability operations.
Learn from Experience: S/CRS will incorporate best practices and lessons learned into
functional changes in training, exercises, planning, and operational capabilities that
support improved performance of the coalition of organizations that join together in
response to complex emergencies.
In order to successfully perform these functions, S/CRS has developed an
operational strategy to execute this operational model. In its essence, the strategy will:
• create maximum capacity immediately,
• use existing authorities and mechanisms to tap interagency strengths (skills,
programs, etc.),
• establish an interagency database which identifies appropriate skills and
relevant contracts,
• assess and fill skill gaps through these contracts and rosters,
• build stronger capacities with additional authorities and mechanisms,
• complete a feasibility study for a Civilian Response Corps, and
• address other legislative and regulatory constraints as required.

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Ambassador Pascual stressed that relevant skills and resources are vital to the
success of the S/CRS mandate. To meet the requirements to implement this strategy
and deliver on its responsibilities, required by the “prepare skills and resources”
function, S/CRS plans on creating a Global Skills Network which would contain rosters
and contracts with firms, individuals, non-government organizations and other
appropriate U.S. Government specialists. Additionally, S/CRS will conduct a feasibility
study on the creation of a Civilian Response Corps that will, among other features,
assess how the government can quickly access relevant people and skills in the private
sector in areas such as constabulary, police, judiciary, and city planning. Finally, under
the “prepare skills and resources” function, a new funding requirement will be
established. Elements of this funding initiative would include: the prepositioning of
global funding mechanisms, an immediate response funding program (conflict response
fund), and mission launch funds that would finance logistics, communications, security,
etc.
In the second functional area, “mobilize and deploy;” there are additional U.S.
Government requirements to “lead, coordinate, design and manage” the U.S.
contribution to post-conflict operations. S/CRS’s organization has identified additional
positions needed for the State Department to lead and coordinate the U.S. Government
civilian response, to mobilize international responses, and to coordinate with the
military. In the Department’s diplomatic operations there are additional positions
needed to create a corps of specialists to deploy rapidly to participate in peace
negotiations and to develop close relations with transitional governments that emerge in
the aftermath of hostilities. As an adjunct to this specialists corps, there is also a need
for a technical corps with design and management skills to address transitional security
and governance in order to devise and oversee programs and deliver quality advice and
assistance to transitional governing organs. Of significant value to enhancing U.S.
interagency cooperation, S/CRS will develop Advance Civilian Teams to deploy with the
military at the brigade and division level to be the foundation for Provisional
Reconstruction Teams or similar interagency field organizations. To provide informed
policy guidance to missions in the field, a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization
Group will be formed in Washington that will be co-chaired by S/CRS, a State Regional
Assistant Secretary, and a National Security Council staff designee. This group will be
the foundation for making policy recommendations for the Deputies and Principals.
In support of the “monitor and plan” function, the following actions are being
taken. The National Intelligence Council has initiated a process to establish a list of
countries at risk of instability that will be updated every 6 months. Moreover, the State
Department will undertake additional planning and exercises with the military, especially
with the Regional Combatant Commands. S/CRS will also partner with the Foreign
Service Institute and the National Defense University to enrich its capacity to generate
policy recommendations, test them, and apply them.
In the “coordinate international resources” functional area, S/CRS will design,
plan, coordinate, and conduct many initiatives aimed at increasing global capacity for
peacekeeping and peace support activities. A central purpose of these initiatives will be
the increased competency to manage relations on the ground in the crisis mission.
S/CRS will strive for rapid deployment of a qualified civilian presence capable of quickly

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establishing an effective field-based coordination mechanism to optimize civil-military
operations.
In the last functional area, “Learn from Experience”; S/CRS will stress the
following:
• participation in gaming and exercises with the U.S. military,
• development of a dynamic database of studies, reports, and associated
information to support decision-making,
• creation of real-time information feedback loops for policy makers,
• design of lessons-learned “tool-kits”, and
• identification of gaps and deficiencies in U.S. capabilities to carry out
successful stability and reconstruction operations.

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Section 5
PANEL PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
PANEL I - DEPARTMENT OF STATE / USAID
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
U.S. Agency for International Development
The first presentation by this panel addressed the “Problem Areas in Transitional
Security and Rule of Law.” The remarks highlighted that Interagency Working Groups
(IWG) have been created for three major issue categories in stability operations -
Transitional Security, Rule of Law, and Governance. The IWGs have responded to their
mandates by developing a list of essential tasks for stabilization and reconstruction
operations, assembling an operational database of current U.S. capabilities, and
comparing essential tasks to actual capabilities. A comparative analysis of the tasks
and capabilities that were identified revealed a series of gaps and deficiencies
described as “Problem Areas” in U.S. capabilities associated with post-conflict missions.
The first “problem area” deals with strategic communications. Panelists noted
that there is no developed capability or doctrine that assists U.S. personnel participating
in stability operations in explaining or justifying themselves to the indigenous population.
Ignoring this shortcoming can undercut everything that the mission attempts to
accomplish in its response to the crisis.
The second Problem Area relates to constabulary forces. In almost all
contingency planning there is a clear requirement for constabulary forces, yet the U.S.
has none. Absent a capacity to provide these forces, the question remains whether the
U.S. should develop such capacity elsewhere, perhaps through the Global Peace
Operations Initiative, or whether the U.S. should develop its own capability. Moreover, if
the latter is recommended, additional issues must be addressed:
• Which agency owns the force?
• Would it be under military or civilian control?
• What are the force’s legal authority and status?
The third Problem Area centers on protection. More specifically, responsibility
needs to be designated for the protection of key figures in the indigenous population,
the civilian stabilization and reconstruction staff, and key infrastructure and facilities.
Participants observed that the host country has obligations in this area, but usually does
not have the capacity to effectively undertake these responsibilities. How then, do the
intervening military and civilian police forces assume the critical public security tasks?
The fourth Problem Area addresses the disposition of the host nation’s armed
forces. Panelists acknowledged that the challenges associated with the transformation
of the indigenous defense establishment, which has proven to be elusive in previous
crisis responses, are a high priority for successful stability operations.
The fifth Problem Area concerns training for the indigenous public security
community – police, judiciary, and penal administrators. Presently, there are multiple
actors and agencies, a slow response time to implement corrective measures, and a
separation of funding and financial resources for the response community involved in

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public safety matters. Other issues highlighted included civilian police, interim criminal
justice, and organized crime in the post-conflict stage of failed states. Participants also
made the important distinction that these “Problem Areas” were in some cases
resource-related, in other instances jurisdictional problems, while others needed more
conceptual work before plans could be reasonably implemented.
The second presentation of the Department of State panel concentrated on
“Governance and Participation: Opportunities for Collaboration.” Panelists stressed that
when considering governance it is important to focus on the effectiveness of the delivery
of services and the legitimacy of how those services are provided. The panelists noted
that the first issue relating to collaboration involves transitional administrations. Some
headquarters (including the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, the Office
of the High Representative in Bosnia, the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, and the
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) had taken on a quasi-
governing role, and that useful best practices could be gleaned from an examination of
how these missions collaborated with the host nation to provide acceptable governance
assistance programs. Another area ripe for analysis of lessons learned related to
collaboration with indigenous governing institutions is the national constituting
processes. A third area that could be cultivated for collaborative opportunities is vetting
procedures and the incorporation of the local community’s participation. Participants
emphasized that who gets to the policy-making table, and who decides who gets to the
table, are important factors in the country’s future. Additional elements of the
collaborative governance calculus are mapping of local capacity, community power
dynamics and the compressed time frame for announcing the results of governing
processes.
Another possible policy integration area is improving the indigenous
government’s delivery of goods and services. The panel also highlighted Formulating
crisis response policy and strategy across relief sectors in a holistic approach for
restoring the host country to normalcy.
Additionally, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Army Civil
Affairs units, and other implementing partners all have after-mission analyses and
reviews that feed into a compilation of best practices. However, notwithstanding the
existing lessons learned programs, a more integrated approach and expanded capacity
are still needed. As an adjunct to this point, the importance of linkages between the
different functional sectors was also noted; for example, restoring utilities is an equally
important task in both the Economic Development and Humanitarian Assistance
sectors.
The final segment of the panel’s presentations focused on the changing role of
USAID and how the Agency was going to support the State Department’s Coordinator
for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS). In essence, USAID is reforming the
organization to be more strategic in its approach to its work. Two key means of
accomplishing this new approach are: first, USAID is working with the interagency to
develop a methodology to forecast early indicators of possible instability; and second,
USAID is working with its field missions to assist them in determining the root causes of
instability.

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At the conclusion of the panel’s formal remarks, the attendees discussed the
process necessary to address the challenges to improve the U.S. Government’s
stabilization and reconstruction capacities. The group noted that modeling concepts,
flexibility studies and Interagency Working Groups are some of the components of the
processes that would lead to better prospects for success in stability operations.
Participants also discussed the problem created by the influx of large amounts of initial
funding for operations that was then followed by smaller amounts of funding at recovery
stages, when those initial investments and initiatives required continued resources or
risked collapsing and shattering expectations. The audience’s response to the panel’s
commentary also highlighted mandates for operations and political will, with recent
events in Liberia used as an example of the negative implications attached to the lack of
an appropriate mandate. A discussion followed on the concept of Advanced Civilian
Teams (ACT) that would deploy with the military down to the brigade level, and that
would form the basis for Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT). A key question was
how the ACT should be embedded with the military forces. Many symposium attendees
acknowledged that a need existed to establish an interagency glossary to define key
terms associated with stabilization and reconstruction missions.
During a discussion on the need for more effective pre-mission training and
instruction, conferees raised the question about responsibility for building the capacity of
practitioners with the skill sets for stabilization and reconstruction operations. A
consensus emerged that joint, cooperative training programs were most desired and
useful. Regarding obstacles to the success of assistance programs, a discussion
ensued on “spoilers” and what measures could be taken that would cause those in
opposition to the mission to voice their grievances in a non-violent manner.
The discussions following the State Department panel presentation closed with
the idea that, while difficult conceptually, problems related to stabilization and
reconstruction must be considered and resolved on a regional basis rather than
exclusively on a country-specific plane. These thoughts led to a point raised repeatedly
over the two-day assembly about the importance of local investment in and ownership
of response policies and strategies for a successful transition to stability and recovery.
PANEL II – OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Office of Force Transformation
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations
The first area of discussion for this panel concerned Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) for transformation and stability and reconstruction operations. It was
observed that Americans, and in particular the nation’s military, are not very comfortable
undertaking stability and reconstruction operations.
However, there is a growing number of U.S. military personnel who now have
experience in, and more understanding of post-conflict operations. OSD believes that
the creation of the Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization
(S/CRS) was a very important step in furthering the management of these missions.
OSD can assist S/CRS with its training and planning responsibilities and initiatives.
Moreover, panelists observed that to be a viable player in S&R missions, S/CRS must

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get expertise in contingency planning, and that civilian agencies and NGO teams must
be on the ground quickly during the response to a crisis to “jump start” the local
economy.
Regarding military activities in these operations, the presenters acknowledged a
need for more Civil Affairs forces and for more Civil Affairs training directed at the active
component forces. In support of deployed forces, the DoD Acquisition Corps must be
able to harness appropriate technology and quickly get it into the field. Additionally, to
get a better comprehension of the operational environment, DoD also needs to increase
the military’s linguistic and cultural expertise. The panel also identified additional,
related needs to seek out more effective partnerships with non-government
organizations, establish metrics for S&R operations that assist in measuring operational
effectiveness, and establish a better-tiered communications system.
The remarks on force transformation led to the second area of discussion for the
panel that focused on transforming national security. The panelist indicated that U.S.
military responses to crises from 1990-2002 occurred in countries which were not
successfully integrating into an ever more interconnected world. As the world evolves
toward increased interdependence, the term security will also evolve into a broader
more comprehensive set of definitions and required skill sets.
Major points of the presentation on transforming national security were:
• DoD needs to transform its stability & reconstruction capability to bridge the
mission gap between a short conventional war, such as the initial invasion of
Iraq, and the extended stabilization operation that quickly follows;
• the concept that an acceptable policy outcome equals the judicious exercise
of power backed by strong moral principles;
• the importance of recognizing and preparing the “strategic corporal;”
• the U.S. security environment now consists of four challenges: traditional,
irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive;
• It is imperative that the U.S. harnesses education to create:
− a new national security culture,
− more effective inter-departmental / Interagency relationships,
− more enlightened training and education for the most critical component
of America’s security capacity - its people and its future senior leaders,
− a more cohesive and effective national security team for the future.
Keeping the focus on transformation, the final presentation by the OSD panel
addressed training in the context of the evolving transformation of joint forces. The
objective of training transformation is to propel DoD training to a more joint, live, virtual,
constructive training environment with a seamless continuum of planning, education,
training, rehearsal and execution. The panel noted three capabilities as critical in
facilitating achievement of this objective: a joint national training capability, a joint
knowledge development distribution capability, and a joint assessment capability.

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The Department of Defense Training Transformation Vision states: “Provide
dynamic, capabilities-based training for the Department of Defense in support of
national security requirements across the full spectrum of service, joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational operations.” To help secure this vision, an
initiative known as TIM2 (Training Transformation Interagency, Intergovernmental, and
Multinational Mission Essential Tasks) has been undertaken.
U.S. Joint Forces Command desires an effects-based, collaborative, network
centric capability that is a coherently joint capabilities-based force. Training
transformation provides a construct for training the Joint Force. Towards this end, TIM2
is a multi-year, multi-task endeavor that has the following phases: build the task force
and determine requirements, determine education and training needs, conduct
individual education, conduct training and exercises, and continue to improve and
prepare for future challenges through experimentation and expanded collaboration.
Both interagency integration and stability operations are included in the Tier 1
Joint Capability Areas. From these areas will follow enabling capabilities, subordinate
enabling capabilities, and tasks. From the tasks for units and individuals will follow
conditions and standards for training.
The discussion after the OSD panel remarks began with a question on what to do
in the short term to help the stand-up of S/CRS. Several ideas emerged from the
ensuing panel-audience exchange. Among the responses offered were making more
relevant the curriculum in the military education system, e.g., the SAMS and SAW
programs of instruction, and providing military planners to S/CRS. One participant
mentioned that senior American leadership is often not as knowledgeable when
compared to other countries’ senior leaders in the area of understanding the political
aspects of stability & reconstruction operations.
Attendees made a call for meaningful measures of effectiveness following the
remarks about improving education. Specifically, the group entered into a discussion
about what metrics were used in the evaluation of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams
that were deployed in Afghanistan, since the teams’ effectiveness had been called into
question. Another discussion focused on the type of scenario in which the military
would work for a civilian structure – especially if an international structure had the lead.
Another participant raised the question about how lessons learned by captains and
majors already doing interagency work on the ground are being captured and recycled
to the field. The notion of capturing best practices led to the comment that the
interagency culture must be improved to the point in which different departments work
with each other more productively; otherwise, U.S. decision-makers and the policy
community will in all likelihood not be as effective. Regarding the idea of changing
practices in general, conferees observed that there must be an audit of changes
created, otherwise there will not be as much accomplished as there should or could be.
Returning to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, an attendee commented that the
PRTs must be trained in both security and economic development, since the two areas
are closely intertwined in the field.

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The OSD panel discussion then shifted to the issue that military construction
projects in an area of operations are usually rudimentary due to Congressional
guidelines.
Finally, panel and audience exchanges concluded with several comments on
training. Upon discussion that the military often gets little or no input from NGOs during
post-conflict planning regarding conditions on the ground, participants recommended
that regional combatant commands should use their war games to simulate stability
&reconstruction operations, and should include NGO participation. Others then
remarked that a training environment must be created that encourages and incorporates
participation by and coordination with international organizations and NGOs. The
training tools must bring in the post-conflict challenges that accompany the
reconstruction environment.
PANEL III – JOINT MILITARY
Joint Staff
Joint Forces Command
National Defense University
The Joint Staff panel began with a discussion of the Joint Staff J5’s relationship
to S/CRS. The J5 will have overall lead for assisting in coordination with S/CRS, OSD,
the rest of the Joint Staff, and the regional combatant commanders. The panel noted
that the S/CRS has already visited many of the regional combatant commands, and in
every case, the visits have been well received. One critical requirement emerged from
these visits - a key challenge for S/CRS is to develop strategic planners. Additionally,
the panel noted the requirement for common terms of reference as crucial for agencies
to work more efficiently together.
The second part of the Joint Staff presentation dealt with the DoD concept for
stability operations. Joint Forces Command has developed four cases that deal with
stability operations. These cases are: 1) a failing state that requires assistance in
protecting itself from subversion, lawlessness, or insurgency (Haiti 2003-4); 2)
operations before, during, and after major combat operations (Iraq 2003-4); 3)
intervention in a region that has collapsed politically and is under control of militias,
warlords, or other illegitimate and unacceptable governance (Somalia 1993); and, 4) an
area occupied by an external, transnational force promoting an ideology through force
and threats to destabilize legitimate governments of neighboring states (Taliban-al
Qaeda and Afghanistan 2001).
The stability operations concept development work at Joint Forces Command
has begun with Case 2 – operations before, during, and after major combat. The
central premise in Case 2 is that stability may not be an “end state” in the classical
sense. Additionally, stability may be a long-term mission for the international
community in order to achieve and sustain an acceptable set of conditions. Stability
cannot be achieved solely through military action, and only when the underlying
conditions of instability are changed will stability be successful. As has been the case in
the past, restoration of the status quo may be insufficient for long-term success. The
acceptable set of conditions for stability include: security, governance, rule of law,
sufficient infrastructure, economic sufficiency, and acceptable social perspectives and

16
behaviors. Those organizations responding to the crisis must understand the desired
sustainable end state conditions before any major operation is launched to correct the
situation and to restore stability. Achieving success requires integrated interagency,
multinational, and non-governmental action. All of these actions will require endurance.
Military actions within an integrated stability operation include: protect the
stabilization force; develop and share intelligence; eliminate, neutralize, co-opt, or
induce spoilers to cooperate; protect emerging government leaders; protect critical
infrastructure; support reconstruction operations; and contribute to winning the
information battle. Joint Forces Command is working with interagency and multinational
partners to transform the U.S. Armed Forces through joint concept development and
experimentation initiatives, including developing concepts and prototypes, co-
sponsoring stability operations conferences and related events, and providing
actionable recommendations.
The final presentation by the Joint Staff panel described the National Defense
University’s (NDU) contribution to illuminating and resolving stability operations issues.
Key players at NDU include the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the Center for
Technology and National Security Policy, the DoD Regional Centers at NDU, and
NDU’s colleges and schools.
Recent and ongoing priorities related to stability operations at NDU include the
University’s contingency support for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM. This support comprises situational awareness programs, assistance
to concept planning, and after-action assessment and lesson-learned reports. Other
programs deal with capabilities-focused assessments, education and training
assistance, and other special projects related to post-conflict missions.
Other initiatives in progress at NDU involve strengthening the interagency crisis-
action planning processes, improving support for operational level civilian-military
integration, refining diagnostic information requirements, and building a collaborative
information sharing environment.
The discussion following the Joint Staff panel remarks began with a question on
how ideas for stability & reconstruction fit into the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
Panelists observed that different scenarios are being developed to highlight stability
operations in the QDR. The next question focused on the type of capacity DoD provides
to the interagency that can accomplish the tasks in Case 2. Participants noted that an
interagency perspective and input is being added to combatant commands planning. In
this vein, an attendee suggested the need to have some type of Goldwater-Nichols
legislation to encourage the military to work in the interagency arena. As in other panel
discussions, further exchanges focused on lessons learned. Panelists remarked that
the military services are trying very hard to capture lessons learned from forces still
deployed and recently returned from the field. Finally, considerable discussion ensued
about the utility of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) that supports the
regional combatant commanders. A consensus emerged from the discussion that the
JIACG is useful for information sharing, but has limited utility in planning operations.
PANEL IV - U.S. ARMY
HQ Department of the Army

17
Training and Doctrine Command
Center for Army Lessons Learned
The first presentation from this panel addressed the U.S. Army in stability
operations. The panel noted that the Army has a variety of initiatives going on in the
areas of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and
facilities (DOTMLPF) to deal with S&R operations. Moreover, the Army believes that
the key to victory is unity of effort in a national campaign plan.
Strategic Planning Guidance 06-11 Directive states “…the Army and the Marine
Corps will either create standing units focused on stability operations or develop the
capability to rapidly assemble, within their respective Services, modular force elements
that achieve the same effect as standing units.” In accordance with this directive, the
Army is modularizing its force. Related to this effort, the Army is transitioning from an
Army based around large, powerful, fixed organizations to an Army designed around
smaller, more self-contained organizations. The modularized Army will have Units of
Action (brigade-size combat teams) that have increased capabilities. With
modularization, the Army will gain more flexible battle commands, and tailoring the force
will be easier.
Participants also discussed US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) operations
and how USACE will support the combatant commands during stability operations. A
division of USACE would be aligned with a combatant command and would undertake
integrated Army engineering planning. Modular teams would deploy to conduct field
operations, and reach-back teams would also be deployed to support forward elements.
Some areas where the Army can assist in stability operations include:
• recognize the importance of cultural changes in stability operations
• provide more flexible DoD resourcing processes
• assign an Army officer to DOS/HLS
• provide deliberate planning training
• assist with exercise development
• assist in the development of Advance Civilian Teams.
Panelists commented that some of the areas where the interagency community
can help are:
• develop a unifying stability operations framework; assign clear roles, missions
and authorities;
• create an interagency expeditionary planning and execution capability;
• provide responsive support for stability operations;
• increase interagency participation in stability & reconstruction training and
exercises;
• participate in combatant command sponsored planning,

18
• develop sound pre-crisis and transitional plans;
• collect and share regional and country information;
• provide additional cultural and regional expertise;
• provide interagency manning in key organizations.
The panel also identified a number of possible venues for further collaboration
between the Army and the interagency. Examples included: Unified Quest; Mission
Rehearsal Exercises (MRE); Combined Training Center (CTC) training rotations;
Department of State Fellowships; Institute for Strategic Studies and Senior Service
School attendance; planning opportunities; S/CRS Advanced Civilian Teams Concept;
Department of State sponsored training; and a Department of State / U.S. Agency for
International Development (DOS/USAID) “101” brief (covering, for example, missions,
organizations, and capabilities).
The second portion of the Army panel dealt with Training and Doctrine
Command’s (TRADOC) role in stability operations. The presentation described the joint
operational environment and highlighted the implications of traditional, irregular,
catastrophic, and disruptive challenges to that environment. TRADOC has numerous
stability operations venues that address the challenges of these missions. These
programs include: the Stability Operations Task Force (Combined Arms Center), the
Irregular Warfare Task Force (Army War College), the Iraq Virtual Staff Ride (Command
& General Staff College), the Combat Training Center Scenarios (Combined Arms
Center), and the Joint Forces Land Component Commander General Officer Course
(Army War College).
The panel noted that “concurrent and subsequent stability operations” are one of
the key operational ideas for TRADOC capabilities development. Concurrent and
subsequent stability operations are seen as securing and perpetuating the
achievements of decisive maneuver during the campaign, and will “Win the Peace”
once enemy military forces are defeated. Further, concurrent and subsequent stability
operations are critical to ensuring long-term resolution of the sources of the conflict.
The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) delivered the Army panel’s final
presentation. CALL’s presentation highlighted what has been extracted from the
experiences of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The briefing was divided into a discussion
of the strategic environment and a joint operating summary.
CALL made the following points regarding lessons learned relating to the
strategic environment. In the area of civil-military operations the overarching problems
are:
• the shortage of trained personnel with specialized skills;
• the magnitude of sewage, water, electricity, and trash projects to complete;
• projects frequently not in concert with what local Iraqis want or need;
• the lack of tracking systems for projects; and
• the lack of appropriate measures of effectiveness.

19
The remedies to fix these problems include allocating civil affairs troops to advise
brigade staffs on more effective execution of civil military operations, including:
• coordination of local Iraqi community requirements, and
• encouragement of Coalition personnel, local Iraqi governmental officials, and
religious leaders to meet regularly in neighborhood advisory and district
advisory councils.
Regarding integration between the military, the coalition civilian sector, and the
Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), the overarching problems include the lack of security in
certain areas of Iraq, and the challenges to progress confronting the newly established
IIG. The solution to these problems is a more concerted effort to empower the IIG and
Iraqi security forces with U.S. and Coalition support and training.
The panel identified the “Four Pillars of Transition” to stability in Iraq as security,
government, essential services, and the economy. Long-term success depends on the
Coalition’s ability to train, equip, and integrate Iraqi security forces, continuing Iraqi
ownership of the Interim Iraqi Government, and setting the conditions for upcoming free,
democratic elections in Iraq.
In the joint operating area summary, the panel presented several major points:
• the “strategic corporal”- individual soldier actions can have international
impact;
• cultural awareness is an operational requirement;
• training, equipping, and integrating Iraqi security forces are priorities of effort;
• supplemental funding is necessary for nation-building;
• extensive infrastructure rebuilding is necessary and civilian contracting is key;
• information operations are often decisive;
• security for reconstruction and upcoming elections is critical to success;
• brigades are functioning effectively and are fully integrated into the joint,
interagency, and multinational environments.
In its initial response to the panel remarks, the audience asked about Army
metrics for stabilization operations. Panelists noted that new field manuals and modular
training doctrine would address this. Panelists also remarked that 100,000 Army slots
have been changed by moving to a modular Army. A discussion followed concerning
the need for constabulary troops. In this exchange, participants observed that the
modular Army will increase its capabilities by 10-15 brigades by going to a modularized
force. These units will have some capability to be used in a public safety role until
civilian capacity is restored.
As in previous panel discussions, there were several remarks concerning the
need to capture integrated lessons learned and data from Provincial Reconstruction
Teams. Finally, participants again highlighted the importance of including NGOs in the
planning process.

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PANEL V- UNITED NATIONS
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
World Food Programme
The first part of the United Nations panel highlighted United Nations logistics
operations during post-conflict missions. The United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
(UNJLC) is based at the World Food Programme (WFP) headquarters in Rome. The
Centre is staffed by UN agencies and NGOs, and participates in large, complex
emergencies. The panelist used WFP participation in the humanitarian crises in Darfur
and Afghanistan to give insight into the magnitude of the Joint Logistics Centre
operations.
The WFP presentation posed the question, “How much impact does military
logistics support actually have on humanitarian actions?” In answering the question,
WFP noted that military logistics support tends to be high cost, accompanied by an
inordinate amount of administrative procedures, and that many issues must be resolved
before the support is provided.
By way of an illustration of the breadth and depth of the logistic challenges
associated with complex emergencies, the WFP presenter used logistic challenges in
Darfur to show how difficult and long lasting humanitarian operations can be, and to
highlight that there are no easy solutions. In terms of sustainable remedies to
international crises, the panel noted that sometimes causal factors related to the crises
are removed, as in Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia. However, more often, the
problems that caused the initial response are not resolved in an enduring fashion, as is
the case in Somalia, Congo, and Sudan. The panel also commented that when
attempting to integrate the response to a crisis, intentions and vocabulary count, and
there will often be disagreement between humanitarian organizations and their military
partners in the response. Panelists also noted that for humanitarians, humanitarian
assistance is the end, not a means to an end. Because there are fundamental
differences between the civilian relief community and the military in approaching the
solution to the crisis, for many international and non-government organizations the
military, and particularly the American military, is not part of the solution, but rather, part
of the problem.
The next presentation by the United Nations panel focused on UN peacekeeping
operations. The UN is currently deployed in 17 peacekeeping operations involving
approximately 60,000 troops. In addition, there are over 7,000 police in the UN civilian
police operations, and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(UNDPKO) in New York has 680 staff members, including 60 military personnel. The
primary shift in the challenges that has emerged from the current peacekeeping
operational environment is the introduction of non-state actors. The operational
environment is seen as multi-dimensional, where there are regional, hybrid approaches
to problem solving in which the UN does most tasks, but contracts out security.
The peacekeeping operations commentary highlighted several UN initiatives that
have been implemented:

21
• multidimensional planning capacity in New York;
• integrated staffs at the mission operational level, mission implementation
plans;
• clear relationships between the Special Representative of the Secretary
Genera and the UN-Force Commander.
Other efforts include seeking to resolve issues at the operational level using
regional and hybrid capabilities outside UN command and control, with robust
collaboration including “civilian crisis management” techniques.
The last segment of the United Nations panel concerned the humanitarian
system and its interface with the military. The presentation highlighted several key
points about the present humanitarian relief environment. These points included that in
today’s environment:
• 90% of casualties are civilians,
• humanitarian aid has become an object of war,
• approximately $10 billion a year is allocated for humanitarian assistance,
• humanitarian personnel have frequently been targeted in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Liberia, East Timor, and Chechnya.
Participants suggested several concepts regarding military support to civilian
relief operations that are conducted primarily by the United Nations, NGOs, and the
International Red Cross. Key considerations for improving civil-military relations are:
• improved access to vulnerable populations,
• a clearer perception of humanitarian relief actions,
• greater operational independence for the humanitarian operations,
• enhanced security of humanitarian personnel.
Panelists described several potential measures to increase meaningful
interaction between humanitarian and military actors that join in a response to a
humanitarian crisis, including:
• better liaison arrangements,
• more comprehensive information sharing,
• a more informed use of military assets in humanitarian operations,
• increased military or armed escorts,
• more attention to joint civil-military operations for humanitarian relief.
Recent experience in humanitarian crisis management and response has
identified several lessons learned concerning the interface of humanitarian
organizations and the military:
• time and effort must be expended by both parties to understand each other;

22
• investment towards establishing effective communications;
• ensure clarity of roles, responsibilities and expectations;
• a greater effort in cooperative training.
The discussion after the UN panel began with an enquiry regarding the nature of
operational reflection being conducted by the humanitarian organizations as they find
themselves being targeted by insurgents. The panel responded that humanitarian
organizations will seek security only as a last resort, and that their ability to remain
neutral in spite of a changing operational environment is critical to their mission. A
discussion followed about how the humanitarian community can maintain impartiality
and yet have access to all vulnerable groups. The panel and audience exchange then
turned to the military and non-government organization relationship, with an emphasis
on what seems to be a growing rift between the military and the civilian relief
community. Not everyone agreed that there was a “growing rift,” but some coalition
actions in Afghanistan were seen as problematic by many NGOs. Attendees urged that,
more communication was needed between humanitarian organizations and the military
and civilian components of government.
PANEL VI – INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
International Committee of the Red Cross
International Organization for Migration
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) opened this panel. The IOM
conducts an array of special programs, and occasionally interacts with the military. The
panel remarked that IOM works for the UN in the operational mission. As a matter of
policy and management, IOM’s structure is highly decentralized and service-oriented.
The organization is currently supporting 19 missions.
The panel noted four key areas of migration management in IOM tasks and
responsibilities. These areas include migration development (the return of qualified
nationals, the exchange of expertise, and remittance of income); facilitated migration
(workers and professionals, family reunification, Consular services, and recruitment);
migration control (capacity building, border management, and policy harmonization);
and forced migration (asylum seekers and refugees resettlement). The IOM is
experiencing growth, with a membership increased from 67 states in 1998 to 109 states
in 2004. During this time period, the operational budget increased from $218 million
dollars to $639 million.
The presentation concluded with several lessons learned from the IOM
experience. First, the indigenous population should be included in the plans, policies
and operations of the response community. Moreover, if possible, the local government
should be included. Second, if possible the crisis response should have a light
bureaucratic footprint when doing stabilization operations.
In the second part of the International Organization panel remarks, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that its mandate is established
in international law. The panel observed that the integration of political, military, and
humanitarian efforts into a common plan is essential for sustained success in
humanitarian missions. However, panelists also noted that problems that might arise

23
include rejection by the targeted population combined with security issues. The ICRC
sees that its ability to function is directly related to its acceptance at the local level. The
presenter indicated that there is a new transnational threat that sees the ICRC as part of
the military coalition intervening in the crisis. The panel emphasized that ICRC still
believes that the way it has operated in the past by maintaining neutrality is still
relevant. The panel also remarked that ICRC was able to work in Afghanistan before
the Coalition invaded. The ICRC believes there is a need to have an agency that has
more access than others, and that the ICRC sees itself as this agency. The ICRC
maintains that it can exchange information with the military, but cannot be a part of the
military’s planning process.
In response to the panel’s commentary, the audience asked if the terms
belligerent and neutral are still relevant, given the perception that Al Qaeda considers
everyone a belligerent. The panel responded that the “War on Terrorism” is not the only
“game in town,” and that impartiality is still viable. Notwithstanding the global war on
terrorism, the ICRC will remain neutral. An attendee commented that the challenge is
how to look at the world through other than a military lens. Another attendee remarked
noted that non-government organizations must be honest with themselves, and that
there is a blurring of lines between these organizations and the belligerents.
Participants also noted that many international relief workers were not killed by
insurgents but by criminals.
A final comment concerned the example of CARE, which has moved to a “Rights
Based Approach” in providing aid. This has made the organization more political in
nature. Regarding this, participants stressed that many humanitarian organizations
have not remained static, but have taken long-term, more politically relevant strategies
in fulfilling their missions.
PANEL VII – NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
Refugees International
International Medical Corps
U.S. Institute of Peace
The non-government organizations (NGO) panel discussion began with a
commentary on documenting health and human rights by International Medical Corps
(IMC). The panel noted that the methodology to document health and human rights has
several components. These components include qualitative data collection, qualitative
interviews, facility or capacity assessments, and key informant interviews. To illustrate
these components, the panel presented examples from work in Sierra Leone and
Afghanistan to demonstrate the qualitative data collected by IMC. For example, in
Afghanistan 70% of women were found to be depressed, 16% attempted suicide, while
90% of men and women supported women’s rights. The panel also showed data from
Herat, Afghanistan to highlight IMC’s efforts in conducting facility/capacity assessments.
The data collected by International Medical Corps is used for advocacy. IMC
believes that the essence of successful direct advocacy is that numbers talk. The
Pentagon, Senate and Congress, USAID, United Nations agencies, and local authorities
are all petitioned by International Medical Corps. The data collected is also used for

24
public awareness, and is unique within the humanitarian aid community in that it is
derived from scientific measurement to focus on women’s health and basic needs.
Following IMC, Refugees International reinforced earlier comments in the
symposium by discussing the pervading perception that the dialogue between NGO’s
and the military has become strained. This strain began with military airdrops in
Afghanistan, and the NGO’s belief that humanitarian aid was being inappropriately used
by the military.
Panelists noted that NGOs and the military share similar characteristics. They
work in chaotic conditions, their jobs are necessary, both want the tragedy to end, and
both strive to achieve stable conditions. Of interest, participants allowed that the
dialogue between NGOs and the military is often better in the field than it is at their
respective headquarters. Attendess suggested that the NGOs and the military need to
have regular exchanges of ideas, and that mistrust is only compounded when there is
lack of communication.
The third element of the NGO panel was a presentation by the United States
Institute of Peace (USIP) on reconstruction and stabilization programs. USIP aims to
develop an integrated approach to assist societies emerging from conflict or
transitioning to secure stable conditions. The Institute confronts the challenge of
promoting stabilization, reconstruction, and reconciliation through four key activities:
first, preparing and supporting policymakers and professionals; second, providing policy
relevant analysis and support for implementation; third, disseminating lessons learned;
and, fourth, conducting operations on the ground.
USIP is also helping S/CRS establish itself, especially in the area of governance.
Additionally, the Institute is assisting with civil-police programs, and has brought
together stakeholders to design requirements for stability police units. USIP continued
the growing consensus on capturing best operational practices by stating that there is a
great need to establish civilian lessons learned that are derived from the experiences in
Afghanistan. USIP is working on turning “lessons learned” into “lessons applied” by
developing a database similar to that created by the Center for Army Lessons Learned
(CALL).
The discussion that followed the NGO panel presentations emphasized that the civilian
relief community is not monolithic. The group also noted that open discussion can be
beneficial for both NGOs and the military. The audience observed that many different
NGOs can provide information that could tend to suppress the military’s appetite for
doing some humanitarian work in which the civilian relief community has a distinct
comparative advantage. During an exchange on the size of the civilian humanitarian
community, participants noted that approximately twenty NGOs do approximately 80%
of the humanitarian work.
PANEL VIII - RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS
International Crisis Group
Institute for Defense Analysis
Henry L. Stimson Center

25
The International Crisis Group (ICG) led the research organizations panel. The
ICG is a research arm for NGOs, and attempts to help prevent or resolve conflict
through data collection and analysis. The ICG was formed because the international
community was failing in its humanitarian efforts. ICG brings analyzed data to decision
makers. The ICG helps define what the elements of prevention are in a particular crisis.
Recent work includes policy papers on Afghanistan and work done on the Darfur crisis.
The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) delivered the second presentation for
the panel. IDA’s briefing focused on the Institute’s comparative analysis of “Two
Proposed Multinational, Multilateral and Interagency Experimentation (M2IG) Cases.”
IDA argued that the two cases developed should be described as “cooperative
intervention” and “forcible intervention.” Further, IDA believes that these cases should
become part of a multinational experimentation effort, and should involve both the
United States Government interagency community and selected multinational and
multilateral partners. The S/CRS and JFCOM / J9 staffs should work together to
develop, with its multinational, multilateral, and wider interagency partners, both the
concept of operations and the organizational arrangements within the USG and beyond.
The outcome of this collaborative analytical work by USG agencies and multinational
and multilateral organizations should:
• identify the utility of the experimentation concept,
• lead to senior management “buy-in” by the U.S. government and other
partners,
• lead to development of agreed doctrine, training, and information sharing
architectures.
The Stimson Center presented the final remarks by the research organizations
panel, with a briefing on “The Future of the UN Peace Operations Program.” The
presentation highlighted the “Research on Reestablishing Post-Conflict Rule of Law.”
Specific topics of the research include building international capacity to extend and
support the rule of law in states at risk; securing post-conflict borders while disrupting
spoiler networks; and building transparency and accountability within peace operations
and local government.
The panel also presented preliminary reactions to the United Nations High Panel
findings. Global threats and challenges identified included: existing and emergent
diseases, a deteriorated global health system, war between and within states, the
proliferation of Nuclear Biological and Chemical weapons and materials, terrorism
(defined as deliberate violence against civilians for political ends, always wrong), and
organized crime and corruption.
The High Panel recommendations to nations were:
• developed states should transform their militaries into units suitable for
deployment to peace operations,
• regional organizations should place peacekeeping and prevention capabilities
into the United Nations standby arrangements system

26
• sign the Geneva Conventions, Genocide Convention, and Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court,
• abolish the United Nations Trusteeship Council and Military Staff Committee,
• expand the Human Rights Commission into a committee serving the entire
United Nations System
• create a small, new advisory panel for the High Commissioner for Human
Rights.
Finally, the High Panel’s recommended changes for the Security Council were:
• enlarge the Security Council to 24 members,
• any use of force beyond Article 51’s provision for self defense should be
authorized by the Council,
• the Security Council should be more proactive when authorizing preventive
military action where needed,
• create a subsidiary organ, a Peace-building Commission, to oversee all
United Nations peace-building activities,
• routinely set up monitoring mechanisms for sanctions regimes with
appropriate authority,
• budget for investigations.
In addition, the panel presented recommended changes to the Secretariat.
These recommended changes include:
• adding a Deputy Secretary General for Peace and Security,
• adding a peace building support office of approximately twenty personnel,
• expanding and restructuring the Department of Political Affairs,
• formalizing United Nations collaboration with regional organizations for
information exchange and cooperative training.
A general discussion of the United Nations High Panel’s preliminary findings
followed the panel’s presentations.

27
Section 5
Lunchtime Address
“Status of PKSOI and the Stability Operations Systems of Systems”
Colonel John Agoglia, Director of PKSOI

Colonel Agoglia addressed the symposium participants concerning the status of


the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and its vision of the stability and
reconstruction community. PKSOI has a much wider focus than did its predecessor, the
Peacekeeping Institute. It looks beyond peace operations to the much broader field of
stability and reconstruction operations of which peace operations are a subset. It has
increased both its resources in terms of people and budget. In keeping with its
expanded role, the Institute’s network of contacts has expanded as well. Of special
note is its assistance to Ambassador Pascual’s office as evidenced by this symposium.
The focus of the presentation then shifted to the Institute’s vision for the stability
and reconstruction operations community. He laid out a series of desired endstates
toward which the community should work:
• Integrate the research of the military, interagency, NGOs, and IOs into a multi-
disciplinary effort focused on key issues identified from ongoing operations which
will inform policy and concept development
• Participate in an integrated policy and concept development process that
facilitates multi-disciplinary concept development and identifies critical policy
issues to be discussed by the principals and deputies of the USG policy process
• Establish a process to integrate new multi-disciplinary concepts and policies into
existing doctrine and operational techniques. Use experimentation and simulation
to test the new concepts and policies and identify the second and third order
effects of implementation
• Combine, where possible, IO, NGO, interagency, and military training and
education opportunities. Establish formal procedures to enable IO, NGO, military,
and interagency organizations participation as desired in each others’ training
and education systems
• Develop a collaborative interagency, NGO, IO, and military lessons learned
process that identifies requirements for future research, informs policy reform
and concept development and supports training and education refinement or
restructuring
• Develop a cadre of military and civilian personnel who can man a multi-
disciplinary headquarters in time of crisis
Colonel Agoglia then showed the Institute’s vision of how the community could
shape these operations through a “systems of systems” approach. He postulated that
each of the agencies and organizations involved in the community participated in one of
the following areas:
• Policy and Concept Development

28
• Policy and Operational Integration
• Training / Education
• Implementation / Execution
• Lessons Learned
• Research / Publication
• Strategic Communications.
The participation could be further defined both by when in the lifecycle of an operation
an organization became involved (prehostilities, during a conflict, and post hostilities)
and at what level it was engaged (tactical, operational, and strategic).
To promote a better understanding of the roles and functions of each agency at
the symposium, Colonel Agoglia closed by asking each participant to provide as part of
the follow on to the symposium where in this spectrum it worked and the upcoming
events the organization was sponsoring.

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Section 6
DINNER ADDRESS
A Perspective on Civil-Military Relations in Stability Operations
Ms. Nancy Lindborg, Executive Vice President, Mercy Corps

Ms. Nancy Lindborg addressed the symposium participants with several


observations about current relations between the U.S. military and the civilian
humanitarian relief community involved in stability and reconstruction operations.
Notwithstanding ever increasing experience in working together in responding to
complex emergencies, Ms. Lindborg observed that the military and non-government
organizations (NGO) must make concerted efforts to increase confidence and diminish
distrust of each other in the two communities’ humanitarian efforts. Having said this,
Ms. Lindborg hastened to add that despite concerns and angst regarding the civil-
military relationship in headquarters and corporate offices, much progress and
corrective action regarding joint operations occurs in the field. She pointed out that this
is due in no small part because the two communities share a fundamental concern with
accomplishing the humanitarian mission. Regarding the notion of mission
accomplishment, Ms. Lindborg remarked that the NGOs are a vital part of any solution
to post-conflict reconstruction problems, adding that longer term development issues
are complicated and beyond any single organization’s capacity. The NGO input into
resolution of stability operations challenges is necessary and needs to be encouraged.
Switching her focus, Ms. Lindborg emphasized a recurring theme in the
symposium, that local ownership of reconstruction policies, plans, and operations was
an essential ingredient for success and for a sustainable end-state. Herein, according
to Ms. Lindborg, lies a unique opportunity for the NGO to bridge the gap between the
local population and the diverse array of organizations responding to the crisis.
Ms. Lindborg concluded her comments by acknowledging the changes occurring
in the operational environment in more recent crises in which the civilian relief
community is quite often the target of attacks aimed at disrupting or ending
humanitarian operations. One consequence of this rising threat is that protection of
NGOs has become an urgent problem that must be dealt with. Importantly, the
resolution to this problem should not bind the civilian aid workers too tightly to the
military forces responding to the crisis, and therefore compromise the impartiality of the
civilians in providing assistance.

30
Section 7
CONCLUSION AND SYMPOSIUM FINDINGS
The symposium is viewed as an initial step to improving cooperation among all
players in the stability operations and reconstruction community. Future conferences
will explore in greater depth the myriad of issues that stand as impediments to
conducting successful operations. Additional themes and focus areas for possible
future assemblies that emerged from the symposium’s deliberations can be found in
Annex A. Key to this effort will be continued information sharing among the participants
as to each organization’s roles and upcoming events of importance to the community at
large.
The key findings of the symposium were the following:
• All agreed that a glossary of agreed, key terms was essential for successful
understanding, collaboration and information sharing among members of the stability
operations community. Where such a glossary is to come from remains the issue.
The military has generally useful terminology, which is not as subject to change as
that within the civilian community. Even such quasi-glossaries that exist are not
universally accepted across military-civilian boundaries or even universally within
various elements of the various civilian communities themselves.
• The Department of Defense recognizes the importance of stability operations and
is taking major steps to educate and train its personnel on all aspects of stabilization
and reconstruction. These efforts include the addition of stability operations themes
and actors at the combat training centers, mandatory and elective stability
operations education at all levels of military education, and the refocusing of both
operational and training doctrine to include a significant stability and reconstruction
emphasis.
• A requirement was identified for a useful template and cooperative mechanism
that would improve interagency planning for stability operations. Going beyond the
USG interagency to include other nations, international organizations, and non-
governmental organizations, especially in areas of intelligence and operational
intent, must be examined in the light of operational necessity and security.
Conversely, governments and militaries, and especially the US government and
military, are extremely well suited to give NGOs and IOs certain kinds of information
not available from other sources.
• The U.S. Army is attempting to increase its capacity to provide security in post-
conflict operations by modularizing its force. The core of this increase is the creation,
by reorganizing and reallocating assets within the Army, of additional brigade size
elements containing more of the non-combat arms branches and capabilities.
Additionally, more and different types of training on stability operations will lead to
increased capability for these modular units.
• Interagency and IO / NGO participation should be a key component of combatant
commands’ training and exercises. Questions of funding remain, as do
considerations for resourcing manpower and training non-military personnel in
advance.

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• In a similar vein, interagency and IO / NGO input into combatant command
stability operations planning should become commonplace.
• It was acknowledged that it would take time for the S/CRS organization to
prepare to execute its mandate of leading U.S. government agencies in fulfilling their
stability operations missions. It was further acknowledged that once fully
operational, S/CRS will enhance the capacities of the international community
involved in stability operations with a particular emphasis on improving the
partnership with the United Nations. This partnership should prove particularly fruitful
as IOs and NGOs do not normally have the same problems with supporting United
Nations operations as they do with other unilateral or multilateral efforts not
sanctioned by the UN. Moreover, the UN brings particular expertise and insight into
the stability mission. There still remains the possibility that there will be some
missions upon which the UN and United States and other national governments will
simply disagree.
• A central venue for collection, integration, and dissemination of policy, planning,
and operational lessons learned related to post-conflict operations should be
created. Many agencies already collect lessons learned from both completed and
ongoing operations. However, a method to share these must be developed to allow
both increased cooperation and better understanding in future missions.
• It was concluded that more attention must be devoted to measuring success in
these operations and that a need existed for a system of metrics to assist in the
evaluation and validation of reconstruction and stabilization missions. These metrics
are key to successful and smooth transitions as operations move from one phase to
another and eventually to termination itself. Metrics must be planned for and
mechanisms to measure their accomplishment put in place. The system for
determining metrics and their mechanisms must evolve as the operations
themselves evolve.
• There was a strong consensus among attendees that more fruitful, informed
communication and trust between the military and non-government organizations
were vital elements for success in on-going and future stability operations. NGOs
are beginning to realize that some missions that they are undertaking should more
appropriately be considered "stabilization" or "development" missions rather than
"humanitarian.” Some could then view these NGOs as not being neutral. It remains
to be seen whether these NGOs would be able to compartmentalize their operations
into a neutral, humanitarian component separate from other development /
reconstruction components. In the latter case, closer cooperation between
themselves and the military and governments with which they work may lead to
greater harmonization of efforts.
• Transnational threats, who target civilian relief personnel, are a new, significant
problem that must be addressed, if reasonable prospects for success are to be
expected. As mentioned above, when NGOs and IOs become involved in the
reconstruction and stabilization mission they are acting against the interests of those
parties and people who wish that mission to fail, whatever the humanitarian
consequences, and therefore become targets. Closer cooperation and coordination

32
with the military to obtain the security they need to accomplish their tasks may be
required.
• Non-government organizations must remain neutral in the stability operations
area to retain access to the vulnerable populations that are the target of their
humanitarian mission. This viewpoint is widely held within the NGO community, at
least as it pertains to certain functions. It may, however, become an increasing
untenable viewpoint as the NGO function comes increasingly into conflict with
spoilers, bandits, and terrorists who profit in some way from disrupting the IO / NGO
operations.
• It was emphasized throughout the proceedings that ownership of and local
participation in the crisis response strategy must be a part of any stabilization and
reconstruction solution. Although a unity of command may never be achieved, the
harmonization gained by unity of effort can increase effectiveness several fold. Also
key to an effective strategy is the involvement of the host nation government. The
eventual ownership and coordination of the strategy must be transferred to a
functioning and capable host nation government as soon as practicable.

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ANNEX A
POTENTIAL FUTURE THEMES
As was described in the invitation to the symposium, the December session was
intended to be an inauguration of a series of meetings to continue the momentum
generated by the opening session to improve the capacities of all agencies involved in
stabilization and reconstruction operations. To this end, when symposium participants
were asked to identify potential themes for follow-on meetings, a number of responses
were offered. The following list of themes and focus areas reflects the consensus of the
conferees’ suggestions for themes upon which to concentrate future sessions.
• Public security – civilians, NGOs, local nationals
− Constabulary force
− Rule of law
− Protection of civilians
− Organized crime
• Planning process
− Common planning template
− Framework
• Information sharing – transparency (OSD lead)
• Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
• Funding concepts
• Integrating US & international capabilities
• Strategic communications
• Increasing the size & capacity of S/CRS
• Civilian – military cooperation / coordination
− Rules of the road
− Principles for coordination
• “Mission migration” in stability and reconstruction operations
− How many missions (e.g. provide food, water; provide lift, SAR) defaulted to
the military five years ago?
− How many of these missions have migrated to civilian agencies? Why?
− How?
− Based on the foregoing, what group of missions can be migrated?
• Train and equip lessons learned
− How well has the US performed in building a stabilization and reconstruction
capability in foreign partners?
− What are the key metrics?
− Are we training/equipping in areas that do not promote or impede
interoperability with non-US units?

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• The USG’s plan for interagency transformation is to integrate independent
department and agency initiatives and transform national security institutions to
meet challenges and opportunities of the 21st century (objectives of National
Security Strategy, supplemental 02)
• Civilian-military roles (competencies and limitations) during transitional security
phases and how to hand off effectively and efficiently the responsibilities from
military to international civilian and national civilian authorities
• Military command and control relationships (hierarchical) with civilian authorities
(United Nations SRSG, High commissioner, etc) and the U.S. horizontal
collaboration and coordination architecture during complex contingencies
• Core competencies of US military that could (should) support integrating
multinational, multilateral organizations during peacetime, crisis management,
and reconstruction and stabilization operations
• Interagency focused training as an alternative to DOD training
• Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)
− Models of decentralized interventions - PRTs and beyond (PRTs, UNTACT,
district administrators, etc.)
− A rigorous, objective assessment of PRTs’ performance and whether the
model should be duplicated elsewhere
• Importance of terminology / acronyms to bridging the civilian - military divide.

35
ANNEX B
SYMPOSIUM CONTACT LIST

SPEAKERS

AMB Carlos Pascual


Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
U.S. Department of State

Ms. Nancy Lindborg


Executive Vice President
Mercy Corps

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Training Transformation

COL Patrick Kelly

SOLIC

Dr. Jeb Nadaner


Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict

Mr. Thomas H. Harvey


Director for Humanitarian Affairs
Stability Operations

Mr. Quentin Hodgson


Stability Operations Coordinator
Stability Operations

Transformation Office

Mr. Terry Pudas


Deputy Director – Force Transformation

DEPARTMENT OF STATE / U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stability

Ms. Melanie Anderton


Public Affairs Officer

36
Ms. Holly Benner
Lessons-Learned

Mr. Matthew A. Cordova


Director for Transitional Security and Rule of Law

Ms. Leslie B. Curtin


Senior Foreign Service Officer (FE-OC)

Mr. Grey Frandsen

Mr. Ford Hart


Director for Monitoring and Planning

Ms. Kara C. McDonald

Dr. Jerry McGinn


Special Assistant to PDUSD(P)

Ms. Susan Reichle


Deputy for Humanitarian, Reconstruction, and Economic Stabilization Programs

Mr. John Schmidt


Deputy for Security and Governance

International Organizations

Mr. Gerald C. Anderson


Director
Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations (IO/PHO)

Intelligence & Research

Reid Daugherity
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Foreign Service Institute

Mr. Michael Harwood

Political-Military Affairs

Ms. Elena Kim-Mitchell


Director of Policy Analysis

37
Office of Policy Planning

Stewart Patrick

Mr. James Kunder


Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East

Ms. Elizabeth Kvitashvili


Director, Conflict Management and Mitigation Office, USAID

JOINT STAFF

BG Select Donald Lustig


DDPMA

COL Douglas Morrison


J5

Lt Col Philip Smith


Multilateral Affairs Division, J-5

JOINT FORCES COMMAND

Col Christopher C. Conlin, USMC


Multinational/Interagency Experimentation

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Dr. Michael Baranick


Center for Technology and National Security Policy

James A. Schear, Ph.D.


Director of Research
Institute for National Strategic Studies

CENTER FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Mr. Matthew Vaccaro


Program Director, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies

38
ARMY STAFF

Mr. Thomas A. Lynch


Political Advisor to the Chief of Staff, Army

COL James E. Moentmann


Division Chief Strategy, Concepts and Doctrine

U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

LTC Paul L. Cal


Chief, Joint Concepts Branch

Mr. Thomas J. Daze


Instructor, Joint and Multinational Operations Directorate,
Command and General Staff College

Mr. Marvin Decker


Center for Army Lessons Learned

Mr. Terrance G. Moran


Senior Policy Analyst – Combined Arms Center (CAC) Ft. Leavenworth
Strategies Group, Force Analysis Division

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Ms. Brenda Wyler


Assistant Director Warfighting Support

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Colonel Roy R. Byrd


Director, Security Cooperation Education and Training Center

RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS

Dr. Elizabeth Cousens


Director, Crisis, Peace, and Prevention Forum

Dr. William J. Durch, Senior Associate


The Henry L. Stimson Center

39
Col John Ewers, USMC
Military Fellow, CSIS

Ms. Michele Flournoy


Senior Advisor, International Security Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Terrence K. Kelly, Ph.D.


Senior Operations Researcher
Rand Corporation

Mr. Martin A. Lidy


Institute for Defense Analyses

Mr. Mark L. Schneider


Senior Vice President, Special Adviser on Latin America
International Crisis Group

UNITED NATIONS

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Mr. Manuel Bessler


Policy Development and Studies Branch

World Food Programme

Mr. Douglas W. Osmond


Senior Logistics Officer
UN Joint Logistics Centre
UN World Food Programme

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Mr. Tony Craig


Military Division

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. Andres Kruesi


International Committee of the Red Cross

Mr. Stephen Lennon


International Organization for Migration

40
NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Dr. Lynn Lieberman Amowitz MD, MSPH, MSc


International Medical Corps

Mr. Ken Bacon, President


Refugees International

Mr. H. Roy Williams


Center for Humanitarian Cooperation

U.S. ARMY PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS INSTITUTE

COL John F. Agoglia


Director

LTC James C. Brown


Director, Joint Operations

COL Tim R. Cornett


Director, Stability Operations Logistics

Prof William J. Flavin


Professor, Multinational Stability Operations

LTC Susan Gough


Director, Civil Affairs & Civil-Military Operations

LTC Thomas P. Kratman


Director, Rule o f Law

Prof James S. McCallum


Professor, Stability Operations

Prof James H. Nichols


Professor, Rule of Law

COL Christine A. Stark


Director, Law Enforcement

COL David E. Stark


Director, Special Operations

41
Mr. Mark Walsh
Director, Civil-Military Relations
MPRI Contractor

Mr. Michael H. Esper


Doctrine Analyst

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Beth C. DeGrasse, Program Officer


Peace and Stability Operations

Mr. Michael J. Dziedzic

Mr. Robert M. Perito, Senior Fellow


Coordinator, Iraq/Afghanistan Experience Program

OTHER ATTENDEES

Ms. Christine Coleiro

Mr. William O’Neill

Ms. Christine Shelly

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Ambassador Margaret K. McMillion


Deputy Commandant for International Affairs

Dr. Kent H. Butts


Director, National Security Issues Branch
Center for Strategic Leadership

Dr. Conrad Crane


Director, U.S. Army Military History Institute
The Army Heritage & Education Center

COL Thomas A. Dempsey


Director, African Studies, DNSS

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson


Professor, National Security Affairs

42
Strategic Studies Institute

Prof Michael R. Matheny


Professor, Military Strategy and Operations, DMSPO

COL Eugene Smith


Author, MOOTW & Conflict Termination, DDE

Prof. Bert Tussing


Professor, National Security Affairs
Center for Strategic Leadership

COL Peter J. Zielinski


Director, Military Requirements & Capabilities Management, DCLM

43