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Copyright Material IEEE Paper No. PCIC-2007-5 John A. Kay, CET

Engineering Manager Rockwell Automation Canada 135 Dundas St., Cambridge, ON Canada, N1R 5X1

Paul B. Sullivan, P.E.

Electrical Consultant DuPont Engineering, Camden SC Camden Regional Engineering Office P O Box 999, 719A US Hwy. 1 South, Lugoff , SC 29078

Michael Wactor, P.E.

Senior Design Engineer, R&D Powell Electrical Systems Houston, TX USA 8550 Mosley Drive Houston, Texas 77075

Abstract Improved medium voltage (MV) control equipment designs, including enhanced structural protection systems, have continued to evolve in support of improved personnel protection. Recent changes to some standards, such as the NFPA-70E; have emphasized the need to look for improved safety compliance to mitigating the risks associated with the operation and maintenance of electrical equipment. The requirements for employee safe work practices have all targeted reducing the risks of electrical arc hazards. However, arcs accompanied by explosions continue to occur in electrical systems. Factors such as inappropriate human interaction with the equipment, equipment malfunctions because of misuse or lack of regular maintenance or unforeseen events continue to contribute to the unexpected release of explosive electrical energy in the workplace. New arc resistant MV control equipment designs provide an additional level of protection if properly installed and applied. This paper will outline the added benefits of arc resistant equipment along with the details surrounding the appropriate installation and site application considerations when arc resistant MV control products are being considered. Also included is a case history where arc resistant medium voltage motor control equipment was installed at a production facility of a large North American chemical company. Index Terms - medium voltage, control equipment, arc resistant, NFPA-70E I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1970s, principally in Europe, interest in evaluating electrical equipment under conditions of internal arcing arose. As a result, a draft Annex AA to IEC 298 [1] A.C. MetalEnclosed Switchgear and Controlgear for Rated Voltages Above 1kV and Up to and Including 52kV was prepared in 1976 and approved by the IEC in 1981. The last edition of IEC 298 was approved in 1990. The document was renumbered as 62271200 [2] during its most recent revision cycle and was published in 2003. Knowledge of the arc resistance testing guide in IEC 298 spread to North America, and was used as the basis for EEMAC G14-1, 1987, Procedure for Testing the Resistance of Metal-Clad Switchgear Under Conditions of Arcing Due to an Internal Fault [3]. EEMAC G14-1 incorporated improvements in knowledge and understanding in over a decade of use of Annex AA of IEC 298 in Europe. The development of IEEE Guide C37.20.7 "Guide for Testing Medium-Voltage Metal-Enclosed Switchgear for Internal Arcing Faults" [4] rests heavily on Annex AA of IEC 298 - 1981 and Amendment 1 - 1994, and incorporates many of the refinements originated in EEMAC G14-1. Since its original publication in 2001, IEEE C37.20.7 has undergone numerous revisions to improve the consistency of the testing, add additional voltage ratings, and to incorporate test procedures for new technologies in arc fault protection. The latest revision of this guide, which should be published in 2007, has a new title "Guide for Testing Metal-Enclosed Switchgear Rated up to 38kV for Internal Arcing Faults". It is expected to specifically include information regarding testing of low voltage equipment. It should also be noted that the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) is adopting the words of IEEE C37.20.7 into their C22.2 series of standards [5]. II. EQUIPMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Failure within a piece of MV control equipment, whether from a defect, an unusual service condition, lack of maintenance, or mal-operation, may initiate an internal arc. Standards and guides have been developed over a period of many years, through the cooperative efforts of users, those who specify equipment, manufacturers, and other interested parties to evaluate the ability of a given design to withstand fault conditions. These test conditions were traditionally representative of "down-stream" events, referred to as bolted faults, that simulate a short-circuit condition outside the equipment under test.

A. Protection Levels of Arc Resistant Equipment

Each test guide or standard defines the safe approach areas and arc flash protection boundaries depending on the style or type of arc resistant protection level.

B. IEC Classifications
The IEC standard 62271-200 defines this as the Internal Arc Classification, (IAC). The IAC makes allowance for internal overpressure acting on covers, doors, inspection windows, ventilation openings, etc. It also takes into consideration the thermal effects of the arc on the enclosure and of ejected hot gases and glowing particles. It does not take into account any damage to the internal aspects of the equipment. The test procedure and ratings are provided in a normative annex. In standard 62271-200 a distinction is made between three types of accessibility to the metal-enclosed switchgear and controlgear that are possible in the site of installation:

or Type 2 indicates the instrument compartment is accessible without compromising the arc resistant protection. The application of suffix C to Accessibility Type 1 or Type 2 indicates that the equipment meets the additional requirements to reduce the collateral damage to adjacent compartments and equipment, and should not be interpreted to indicate any additional degree of protection for personnel. The application of suffix "D" to Accessibility Type 1 indicates a design tested in a manner similar to IEC 62271-200 where each protected surface is individually identified and rated.

D. EEMAC Classifications
The EEMAC G14-1 standard uses a similar accessibility definition system to the IEC and IEEE standards.

a) Accessibility Type A, b) Accessibility Type B,

Restricted to only authorized personnel. Unrestricted accessibility, including that of the general public. [2]


Accessibility Type A. Equipment with arc resistant designs or features at the front only. Equipment with arc resistant designs or features at the front, back and sides.

The metal-enclosed switchgear and motor control centers may have different types of accessibility on the various sides of the enclosure. The following code is used: F for Front side* L for Lateral side (left or right) R for Rear side * The Front side shall be clearly stated by the manufacturer A third accessibility type is provided for pole mounted equipment.

b) Accessibility Type B.


Accessibility Type C. Equipment with arc resistant designs or features at the front, back and sides and between compartments within the same or adjacent cells. The only exception is that a fault in a bus bar compartment of a feeder cell is allowed to break into the bus compartment of an adjacent feeder cell. III. SITE CONSIDERATIONS


Accessibility Type C, Restricted by installation out of reach. The minimum admissible height of installation shall be stated by the manufacturer.

A. Installation Considerations
The accessibility type rating of the equipments arc resistant capability will dictate some of the aspects or the installation. Consideration has to be made regarding the physical location of the equipment in relationship to the electrical room configuration and location of adjacent equipment. The following information addresses equipment qualified to IEEE C37.20.7. Similar evaluations can be made for any of the Accessibility Types defined in any of the testing guides previously mentioned.

C. IEEE Classifications
The IEEE C37.20.7 guide describes accessibility types in a slightly different manner. There are also two primary levels of protection described by IEEE C37.20.7. These levels correspond directly to the test indicator placement as described below. a) Accessibility Type 1, Equipment with arc resistant designs or features at the freely accessible front of the equipment only. Accessibility Type 2, Equipment with arc resistant designs or features at the freely accessible exterior (front, back, and both sides) of the equipment only.

B. General Considerations
Equipment designed to mitigate internal arcing faults does so by providing a mechanical barrier between the operator and the fault and by exhausting the arc fault by-products from the equipment to a location that is controlled and safe. This exhaust is typically from the top. To successfully pass the requirements of the testing guides, the mechanical integrity of the equipment is a must and generally remains unaffected by the site installation. The exhaust function, however, is greatly influenced by the installation. If the arc gases exhaust from the top, there must be clear space above the arc resistant equipment. This means a totally clear space: devoid of cables, conduits, cable trays, piping and such. The rationale being that the hot arc plasma released from the top of the structure needs adequate space to exhaust


These basic levels can be modified by additional requirements indicated by a letter suffix after the Type number. The application of suffix "B" to Accessibility Type 1

and cool prior to reaching a location where contact with an operator or any other flammable item could occur. The determination of accessibility type is made based on the accessibility of surfaces of the equipment. Where all surfaces are potentially accessible, type 2 equipment should be specified. Accessibility type 1 equipment is typically only applied when the sides and rear are inaccessible. Where type 2 equipment is not available at the required fault ratings, accessibility type 1 equipment may be installed. However, special considerations must be made regarding cable management and the appropriate labelling and identification of the flash boundary around the exposed sides and rear, since the sides and rear of the type 1 style of arc resistant enclosure provide limited or no arc resistant protection. The testing guides and standards specify that adequate clear space is located above the arc resistant control equipment to permit arc gas dissipation. This means total clear space devoid of cables, conduits, cable trays, piping and such. The rationale here is that the hot arc plasma released from the top of the structure needs adequate space to be displaced into. If items encroach into the clear space above the equipment they could cause two specific problems: 1. Equipment in the path of the approximately 16,000 to 35,000 degrees F arc gases [6] may instantly be vaporized or become ignited unless the arc gases have cooled sufficiently before contact is made. The hot arc gases could be re-directed and splash down on anyone in and around the control equipment.

c) What length does the plenum need to be to reach the

exhaust point? point?

d) How many turns will be required to reach the exhaust e) If the release point is external to the control room area, f) g) h) i)
is it an area that can be controlled, restricted or is inaccessible? If the release point is internal to the control room, is the release area large enough and can the area be controlled and restricted? Do I have attachment locations on the building structure to support the weight of the plenum? Where top entry is necessary, is there adequate space for top entry if plenum and exhaust ducts are used? Does the plenum affect the continuous current rating of the equipment?


It is common in arc resistant designs to address this issue by utilizing a plenum above the equipment to collect the gases and direct them to a designated location within the room or outside the building.

C. Use of Plenums
Many suppliers provide a plenum system on the top of their arc resistant enclosures. Top-mounted plenums allow for the ceiling height directly over the switchgear to be reduced slightly. (Refer to installation considerations.) The plenum facilitates channelling of the dangerous superheated air and arc contaminates to a safe and controlled location which is typically external to the electrical equipment room. The plenum release point could be external into a controlled, fenced off area. In locations where the external venting of hot flammable materials is not possible, containment rooms can be used to dump the arc waste into. The size of the containment area has to be determined based on the recommendations of the equipment supplier. The use of a plenum requires several additional installation considerations: a) Where will the arc gases be exhausted? b) Is there a clear path to the exhaust release point?

Fig. 1 Typical arc resistant controller with plenum Consideration also needs to be made in regards to the entire sub-station and control equipment configuration. Depending on the site configuration, a close coupling of the switchgear to the medium voltage control equipment may be necessary. In this case, consideration has to be made as to whether the individual functional sections, circuit breaker cabinets and motor controller cabinets have common or separate plenums. If the plenums are to be connected together, then the size of the plenum has to be reviewed to ensure compatibility. In cases where different vendors are selected for different aspects of the control, i.e. switchgear is purchased from one supplier - motor control centers from another, validation of a common plenum connection must be provided by the suppliers.

D. Cabling Considerations
Since arc resistant equipment is designed to withstand a certain amount of pressure related to the arc, special consideration has to be made for cable entry and exit points. If the equipment is designed to exhaust from the top, then power cable entry space may be limited. It is preferred that cable entry be made from the bottom. However, this may not be always possible. Some equipment configurations may need to be constructed with extra deep cable sections to allow both cable and exhaust openings. Some configurations may require additional width. Additionally, the cable trays must not compromise the area above the equipment in such a way that exhausting gases could be reflected or redirected into the qualified aisle ways as defined by the Accessibility Type Rating. Further, when routing the cable trays outside the perimeter of the equipment, lighting becomes an issue. Care must be taken to adequately illuminate the area so these trays do not create "dark spots" on the equipment that could lead to misreading meters or relay settings. Where control and power cable entry is made into compartments that are exposed to the arc by-products, these points must be sealed to insure that the pressure wave does not propagate into unintentional locations through rigid or flexible conduits. The pressure impact is a function of the conduit fill rate, length and number of bends. Knowledgeable engineering judgement should be used regarding this. There are different sealing systems available to assist in the prevention of arc gas propagation and pressure waves through conduits. One of the simplest systems is the use of sealing putty to fill in the gaps around the cables and the conduit. The sealing putty should be pushed tightly around the cables and into gaps at the end of the conduit (reference Fig 2). The putty should be placed at each end of the conduit to insure full protection. The putty is not adversely affected by the high temperature since the putty is exposed to the hot gases for a very short period of time and is primarily used only to block the pressure wave.

an arc blast. These types of sealants are not usually recommended for this type of application. Alternatively there are conduit/cable sealing systems available that provide an air tight seal. These systems use compression style sealing rings to seal tightly around each individual power conductor (reference Fig 3).

Fig. 3 Typical Conduit Conductor Sealing Bushing CFC-free polyurethane expanding foams, specifically designed for use with cables and conduits, can also be used to seal the end of the conduits. These typically come as a two part system. The two parts are mixed and, after a specific time, can expand up to approximately eight times in volume. All of the installation considerations for power cables also apply to a bus duct entry system. An appropriate system is required to limit egress of arc gases into a bus duct system.

E. Room layouts
Several decisions must be made concerning the room before the equipment can be specified. It should be noted that these considerations need to be addressed for any installation of power equipment, not just arc resistant equipment, as these conditions affect the safety of the operator in all cases. It is critical to address these concerns for arc resistant equipment, so that the expected increase in operator safety is not compromised by the conditions of the installation. Review the room/site for the following, 1. Will the fault gases be vented into the room or out of the building? 2. If the gas is to be vented into the room: a) Can the room physically withstand the expected overpressure? b) What collateral damage can be expected? c) Is adequate protection provided to the operator for potential exposure to gases and smoke?

Fig. 2 Conduit/Cable cross-section with sealing putty There are also intumescent/elastomeric sealing systems that expand under high temperatures to provide a tight seal around cables or an opening. These systems typically do not perform well under the rapid temperature rise associated with

d) 3.

Is there a designated place to vent the fault gases within the room?

to be affixed to the building warning of the need to keep the area above the control equipment clear of all items. Finally, the determination of Accessibility Type is made, based on the accessibility of surfaces of the equipment. Where all surfaces are potentially accessible, Type 2 equipment should be specified. If Type 2 equipment is not available at the required fault ratings, then the unprotected areas surrounding the equipment must be quarantined where possible and the areas clearly marked for flash hazard.

If the fault gases are vented external to the room: a) Is the vent area protected from personnel? b) Is the atmosphere in the vicinity of the exhaust point volatile? c) Is there equipment nearby that may be compromised? d) Are there any items in the vicinity of the exhaust point which are flammable?

Once these questions are answered, the basic effects to the site are identified and the general arrangement of the equipment may be established. The next step is to determine where the equipment will be placed in the room.

G. Checks during commissioning and before energization

Installation practices for this type of equipment are very important. Sloppy or incomplete equipment installation practices could result in mitigating the overall protection capabilities of the arc resistant equipment installation. Special care has to be taken to insure that the following items are taken care of and even double checked to insure integrity or compliance: a) The equipment must be installed per the suppliers installation instructions and recommendations. b) All internal and external cover/access plates must be completely installed and sealed per the manufacturers instructions. c) All mounting hardware for these plates must be reinstalled and specified torque properly applied to the retaining hardware. d) All removable cover plates may have a sealing strip or other sealant material attached to them (when present) it must not be damaged. e) Sealing of seams and gaps during installation, such as plenums joints or between adjacent cabinets, requires special attention. The sealant materials used should be only those supplied or recommended by the arc resistant controls manufacturer. f) Verify all plenum and exhaust ducts are tightened and sealed appropriately. g) Verify all conduits entering the arc resistant cabinets are sealed appropriately. h) Insure the appropriate warning labels been affixed per NFPA-70E [7]. IV. CASE STUDY A. Background

F. Other Installation Issues

Installation of arc resistant control equipment within an indoor room or outdoor enclosure requires special review of the room geometry in relationship to the equipments placement. This is especially true when the fault gases will be vented into the room through a plenum system and exhaust duct. The room or building which houses arc resistant equipment to which the gases will be exhausted into must be designed to withstand overpressures of up to 15-20 pounds per square inch (PSI), on a transient basis The plenum size, weight and exit point needs to be considered in the room layout. The plenum size is critical to proper pressure relief of the equipment. Restrictions in the venting area, numerous turns in the exhaust duct, and extreme lengths of exhaust duct can all contribute to reducing the effectiveness of the pressure relief. The exhaust duct arrangements can also create structural issues for the building due to its weight. The plenum discharge location has to be carefully considered since this point will need to be identified with an arc flash boundary and marked accordingly. Additionally, the plenum and duct concentrate the fault by-products into a specific opening and the resultant outflow of gases can produce significant risk of injury from the thermo-acoustic wave. Room geometry can increase the effect as the wave reflects and crosses itself, often multiplying the forces. When the plenum discharge is to the outside, suitable access restrictions to the exit point area may be necessary. If the location will not support an exterior exhaust of the arc gases, an interior containment system may be necessary. The containment room or building must be designed to withstand the overpressures associated with the rapid release of the arc gases. In the case of installations where no plenum is used, special care needs to be made regarding the ceiling materials used and proximity of other flammable items at or near the exhaust points. This should be reviewed even if the manufacturers recommended space is provided. Special warning signs need

A large chemical manufacturing company has a manufacturing facility in Delisle Mississippi. The site experienced significant flooding during hurricane Katrina in August 2005. The flooding caused significant damage to existing equipment, including MV motor control equipment. Figure 4 provides you a visual representation of the floods size and its impact on the facility. The following information describes the work involved and the considerations made for the replacement of the damaged medium voltage motor control equipment with new arc resistant motor control equipment.

improved protection for personnel as described in other parts of this paper. Arc resistant equipment was therefore preferred for this replacement work. However, the new equipment had to meet several requirements. D. Delivery The equipment had to meet the critical project schedule. The facility needed to have electrical service restored as soon as possible with a December 2006 start-up time for some of the systems. To facilitate the equipment design, a standard design for protection, metering, and motor control circuit was developed. The main bus of each line-up of motor controllers would have the same phase and ground relay protection. This protection was not in the existing equipment as the motor control equipment was supplied power from 13.8kV/2400V, 3750kVA transformers that had fused switches on the primary of the transformers. The new 15kV switchgear included circuit breakers. Therefore secondary relaying could be used in the control equipment to trip the primary breaker for a secondary bus fault. The main bus of each line-up of motor controllers would each have the same metering system installed. The existing equipment did not have a main bus metering system. The meters were supplied current from the same current transformers use for relay protection. Voltage transformer signals came from a set of open delta connected voltage transformers located in the incoming power cable compartment. Each controller used the same control circuit design. This standard design helped both the equipment manufacturer and the installation teams. The new design used a common microprocessor based motor protection relay that included motor differential protection even though some motors did not require differential protection. The standardizing on the protection, metering, and controller circuits enabled the controller equipment manufacturer to easily duplicate the equipment design. This standardization enabled the manufacturer to meet the rapid delivery needs of the project. E. Layout

Fig. 4 Flood Level B. Equipment Damage

The existing 2400 V MV motor controllers were flooded with at least 3 feet of dirty salt water. Many controllers were completely submerged. Figure 5 shows results of the flooding. The facility personnel initially investigated the possibility and expected success of reconditioning the equipment in place instead of replacing it. This option was quickly discarded. The work was then started to specify, purchase, and install new equipment.

The equipment had to fit in the footprint of the existing equipment. Some minor adjustments to field wiring could be made, but those adjustments were minimal. The scope of the replacement included reusing all of the existing cables. Fig. 5 Flooded Equipment C. Equipment Selection Most of the existing MV motor control equipment was not arc resistant and used air magnetic controllers. Equipment purchased for facility projects in the last several years used arc resistant equipment with vacuum contactors. The decision to use arc resistant equipment was based on The cables entered the equipment from the top of the enclosures. Each exposed end of the cable was thoroughly cleaned, tested, and checked for damage. The cable was reused only if it passed the inspection and testing. The equipment configurations were either back-to-back or side to side line ups. The arrangement requirements were communicated quickly to the new equipment manufacturer so

the equipment layout could be developed. Since the new equipment is modular in design, the layout of the equipment was not a critical factor at the beginning of the process. F. Arc Resistant Protection Level

The new equipment is installed such that personnel have access to all sides of the equipment. Type 2 accessibility level equipment, as defined in C37.20.7, was chosen to provide protection to personnel on all sides of the equipment. The equipment supplier met this requirement when the equipment plenum is installed. G. Current Rating

learned how the equipment needed to be connected. The installation of the other line-ups went very well. It is highly recommended to engage the services of the original equipment manufacturers to assist in the initial installation. This would help insure that the proper steps are taken which would reduce rework and insure the overall arc resistant capabilities of the installation. One of the items learned by the construction group was to be careful to not stand on or otherwise damage the equipment arc vent flaps located on the top of the equipment. This was not a problem once the construction group understood the purpose of the flaps. J. Conduits and Cables

The short circuit current rating of the equipment had to meet the minimum system requirements of the existing electrical system. Equipment rated at 60kA was selected to meet this need. H. Removal of Damaged Equipment The first work involved the removal of the flooded motor controllers. The work was done to minimize the damage to the existing wiring. Each conductor was labeled when it was removed. This allowed identification of the correct cable and conductor when the new equipment was installed. After each cable was pulled out of the equipment, the flooded equipment could then be removed. The result of this work is shown in Figure 6.

The existing control circuit cables were routed and installed in the new motor control equipment. New conduits were run for many of these circuits as the existing conduits did not meet the new equipment layout needs. The 2400V motor feeder cables were installed in the equipment through a cable hub in the top of the equipment. K. Plenums

The arc resistant motor control equipment was provided with plenums to direct the arcing fault gases away from the top of the equipment and personnel operating it. For these motor controllers, the decision was made not to install the plenums. This decision was made for the following reasons and was based on the project needs and with consultation with the equipment manufacturer. First, the existing conduit, cable tray, and cables interfered with the installation of the plenums. These obstructions prevented access to install and route the plenum exhaust duct to outside of the equipment room. For a new installation, these obstructions can be designed out of the system. In the case of this replacement project, these items could not be addressed without adding significant cost and time to the project. Second, this equipment is installed in rooms with high ceilings (15 or more). The project team responsible for this work felt that the high ceilings would give the opportunity for the exhaust gases to be vented directly through the top of the equipment into the room space. Although the gases enter the same room as the person who is operating the equipment, it was felt the person would not be exposed directly to the arc flash energy. Eliminating this direct exposure is a significant benefit of the arc resistant equipment. Personnel could still be exposed to some level of arc gases and direct particulate fallout materials resulting from an arc event. Additionally, there was no consideration made for the acoustic sound wave. These were compromises made for the installation. Since the plenums could not be installed, the equipment no longer officially met its type 2 accessibility rating. But it did meet type 1 accessibility rating. Because of the reduced accessibility type rating and the possibility for exposure to reflected gases and particulate, site personnel decided to require full arc flash protection while operating the equipment.

Fig. 6 Field Wiring with Equipment Removed I. New Equipment Assembly at Shipping Splits

The new equipment was delivered and unpackaged in its permanent location. Construction crews moved the equipment into position and began the assembly process. Many of the construction members working on the equipment had not installed arc resistant equipment and were not familiar with its installation requirements. The first few motor control line-ups were used as a learning opportunity by the crews. The equipment manufacturers were brought on site after some small installation concerns. No significant installation problems were encountered during their assembly. It just took more installation time as the construction crews


Arc Flash Energy and Personal Protective Equipment

The arc flash energy for this equipment was calculated using a computer software program. The analysis was performed for the existing system. This would be a basis to understand how the secondary relaying and the arc resistant equipment changed the arc flash energy hazard. The arc flash energy for the main bus of the existing motor 2 control equipment was calculated to be 7.5 calories/cm . The protective device that operated to clear the fault was a fuse on the primary of the substation transformer. The calculation used a 36 working distance. The arc flash energy for the main bus of the new equipment, not considering the benefits of the arc resistant design, was 2 calculated to be 21 calories/cm . This was a surprise to the project team. The increased incident energy was due to the limited available settings of the protective relay chosen for this application. In this design, the existing fuse provided faster clearing at the calculated arcing fault current level. If a different protective relay with more flexible settings had been chosen, arc flash energy could easily have been reduced to less than the existing installation. It is important to perform arc flash energy calculations as part of the facility design process. This way if relaying or equipment choices negatively affect arc flash energy, other solutions can be reviewed and chosen before equipment orders are placed. For this installation, there was not time for this review. The arc flash energy for the main bus of the new equipment was then performed considering the benefits of the arc resistant design. The arc resistant design ensured the integrity of the enclosure for the front of the equipment, where the equipment operator could be standing. The working distance to the arc could be significantly greater than 36 as the arc byproducts would not be coming from the front of the equipment. A conservative distance of 5 was used and the calculations were performed again. The arc flash energy was 2 then calculated to be 13 calories/cm . This was a significant reduction in arc flash energy from both cases previously modeled as compared to when the 36 working distance was chosen. The increases arc distance reduced the arc flash energy by approximately 38%. The facility personnel realized the risk that some energy could be reflected from cable trays, cables, and conduits, back towards a person standing near the equipment. 2 Therefore the site chose to require 25 calories/cm protective equipment to be worn when operating this equipment. This protection level was the lowest protection level equipment available at the site. The arc flash protection equipment includes a hood, arc flash suit, voltage rated gloves, safety glasses, and safety shoes. IV CONCLUSIONS The installation of arc resistant control equipment provides the best level of personnel protection from arc flash/blast hazards. The designed level of arc blast protection provided

by the equipment is only maintained if the equipment is properly installed and maintained. Failure to install or maintain the equipment per the suppliers recommendations will result in a false sense of protection and could expose those around the equipment to the same hazard level as non-arc resistant equipment. Special care and considerations have to be made during the installation of this type of equipment to insure that the entire system is not compromised by its improper installation. It is recommended that you directly engage the services of the equipment manufacturer in at least the initial phases of the equipments installation. When selecting your installation team, make sure you outline these requirements in your specifications and include a complete equipment inspection prior to energization. This will help insure the integrity of your arc flash protection system. Sometimes compromises may be required when performing the complete installation. These compromises should be done only with the involvement of the equipment manufacturer and only after a full safety and system analysis of incident energy levels. VII. REFERENCES

[1] IEC Standard 298-1994-11, High-voltage switchgear and controlgearPart 200: AC metal-enclosed switchgear and controlgear for rated voltages above 1 kV and up to and including 52 kV, International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva, Switzerland. [2] IEC Standard 62271-200-2003-1, High-voltage switchgear and controlgearPart 200: AC metal-enclosed switchgear and controlgear for rated voltages above 1 kV and up to and including 52 kV, International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva, Switzerland. [3] EEMAC G14-1-1987, Procedure for testing the resistance of Metalclad Switchgear under conditions of arcing due to an internal fault, Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers Association of Canada. (Electro Federation of Canada, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada). [4] IEEE Standard C37.20.7-2001, IEEE Guide for Testing Medium-Voltage Metal-Enclosed Switchgear for Internal Arcing Faults. [5] C22. (various), Canadian Electrical Codes Part I and Part II, Canadian Standards Association, 2006. [6] R. H. Lee, Pressures developed by arcs, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Applications, vol. IA-23, no. 4, July/August 1987, pp 760-764. [7] NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces, 2004 Ed. Quincy, Massachusetts National Fire Protection Association, 2004.