MichaelHesselholtClemmesen,BGen(DA,ret.),M.A.

(history) CentreofMilitaryHistoryattheRoyalDanishDefenceCollege

15.1.2010

Insurgency as an instrument for strategic offence: A century of Pashtun history. 1

Waziritribesmanthemid1930.(http://www.beikey.net)

DevelopedfromtheXXXVICIHMAmsterdamcongresspaper:TheDevelopmentandEmploymentofaCradleof Insurgency:FromacenturyofPashtunrebellions.

ThestudiespreparingforthewritingofthearticleledtotheclearconclusionthattheeffortsinAfghanistan from2001onwardshavebeenhamperedbystrategictunnelvisiondrivenbyacombinationof opportunism,expediencyandunrealistichopes.Ontheotherhandtheoppositiontotheinternational campaignisnourishedbybasicallyfaultyperceptionsoftherootsofthelocalresistance. Firstaquotationtohighlightthattherootproblemoftheborderlandwasforeseenandunderstood longtimeago.ABritish1932studyoftheIndoAfghanborderinsurgenciesquotedaletterfromtheAfghan EmirAbdurrahmanKhanfrom1892wherehewarnedthegovernmentofBritishIndiaofthelikelynegative influenceofthebordertheDurandLinethatwouldcomeintoplacethefollowingyear:Inyour cuttingawayfrommethesefrontiertribes,whoarepeopleofmynationalityandmyreligion,youwillinjure myprestigeintheeyesofmysubjects,andwillmakemeweakandmyweaknessisinjurioustoyour Government.2 In2006therealityhadstartedtodawnamongthemoreopenmindedobserversinWashington.Ina presentationon12thDecemberafteravisittotheregion,thewellinformedanalystAnthonyH.Cordesman noted: LittledoubtPakistanigovernmentnowtoleratesAlQaida,Taliban,andotherinsurgentoperations. PeaceagreementwithtriballeadersonSeptember5thinNorthWaziristanappearstobedefacto surrender. India,Kashmir,Baluchiseparatism,Pashtunquestion,supportofnativeIslamistshavehigherPakistani governmentprioritythanwaronterrorism. TalibanandotherfactionsactasdefactogovernmentsinpartsofEasternPakistan. SomeMadrassasareTalibanandAlQaidabases,somevirtuallyonborderwithAfghanistan. PartsofArmydoseemcommittedtoopposingAlQa'idaandTaliban. PakistaniISIisdividedbutsomeelementsappeartoaidinsurgents.3 ThenewObamaadministrationappointedthetoughspeakingdiplomatRichardHolbrookeofBalkans fameasitsSpecialRepresentativeforAfghanistanandPakistan,butotherwisetherealisationdidnot influencethenarrowAfghanistanstrategyfocusoftheU.S.andtheallies.Holbrookediedlate2010,only weeksbeforethedemonstrationinearly2011ofWesternfailuretostabiliseandusePakistan. Thearticlewillgiveaquickwalkthroughthehistoryofmorethanahundredyearsofinsurgenciesand counterinsurgencyeffortsintheIndoAfghan/PakistaniAfghanborderlandtoillustratewhythe insurgenciesinAfghanistanandPakistanshouldnotberegardedandtreatedasseparate.Instead,they mustbehandledasoneforevershiftingPashtunborderlanduprisingthathasbeenavailablefor employmentasaratherbluntandindependentlyactingstrategicinstrumentfromtheothersideofthe border.Thetroublefromtheareahasnearlyalwaysbeencatalysed,usedandsupportedbyinterested powersfrominsideandoutsideSouthCentralAsia. Tounderstandthisfactisessentialforanycounterinsurgencythatisnottoremainavaindriveto containsymptoms.However,thenecessarycombinationofmilitary,economicandpoliticalstepsrequired tosucceedisgoingtomeethardresistanceinaninternationalframeworkwherethebordersand
2

Op.Cit.C.CollinDavies:TheProblemoftheNorthWestFrontier18901908.Withasurveyofpolicysince1849. London1932,p.160f 3 IntheCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudiesbriefingWinninginAfghanistan:HowtoFacetheRisingThreat Slide35:PakistansDangerousRole.

sovereigntyofpresentstatesareconsideredsacrosanct.Thatisonemorereasonwhythepresent combinedeffortismostlikelytofail. Thisfocusalsoimpliesadeliberateshiftofthenarrativeawayfromwhatdirectlyorsubconsciously nourishestheoppositiontotheinternationalcampaignagainstthepresentPashtunledinsurgencyin Afghanistan.Toillustratethecommonunderstandingoftherootsoftheproblemoneonlyneedstopicka randomsampleofthelatestbooksabouttheconflictinanAmazonliteraturesearch: AnOrdinarySoldier:Afghanistan:AFerociousEnemy.ABloodyConflict.OneMan'sImpossibleMission.4 WarsInvolvingAfghanistan:AfghanCivilWar,AngloAfghanWars,SovietWarinAfghanistan, AfghanCivilWar,AngloAfghanWars.5 Afghanistan:LandofConflictandBeauty:AHistoryofConflict.6 Afghanistan:AMilitaryHistoryfromAlexandertheGreattotheWaragainsttheTaliban.7 IntheGraveyardofEmpires:America'sWarinAfghanistan.8 TheWarsofAfghanistan:MessianicTerrorism,TribalConflicts,andtheFailuresofGreatPowers.9 Theunderstandingoftheproblempresentedbythesetitlesnotnecessarilybythenarrativesand conclusionsofthelistedbooksisfirstlythealmostcompletefocusonAfghanistanwithinitsinternational bordersandsecondly,implicitly,thatanyattempttociviliseandpacifytheAfghansisdoomedtofailure. Pacificationhasbeentriedinvainbeforebysomanyempires. Withoutmakingthisclear,thereasonforfailureisunderstoodtobethecharacteroftheaverage Pashtunman.Heispresentedandrespectedasthesupreme,incorrigible,noblesavage:anunalterably wild,primitive,independentminded,automaticallyxenophobic,conservative,fanaticallyreligiouswarrior somebodyfundamentallydifferentfromus,analien.Thedifferencemakesanycivilisingprojectbothfutile andarrogant. TheonlyproblemwiththispictureisthatitcontradictsboththehistoricalevidencefromBritish administratorsinvolvedinthedevelopmentofthetribalareasintheInterwarPeriod,thecurrentevidence ofsoldiersandreconstructionsworkersontheground,andthescrutinyandconclusionsofthebest contemporaryanalysts:outsiderslikeDavidLoyn10andaswellasinsiderslikeAhmedRashid11andImtiaz Gul.12
4 5

DougBeattie,2009. 2010. 6 JohnC.Griffiths,2009. 7 StephenTanner,2009.

8
9

SethG.Jones,2009. PeterTomsen,2011. 10 DavidLoyn:Butcher&Bolt.TwoHundredYearsofForeignEngagementinAfghanistan.RioVista,Texas2009. 11 AhmedRashid:DescentintoChaos.TheWorldsmostUnstableRegionandtheThreattoGlobalSecurity.London 2008 12 ImtiazGul:TheMostDangerousPlace.PakistansLawlessFrontier.London2009.GulislesscriticalofPakistans presenteffortthanRashidandtriestojustifyhiscountryspresentdoublestrategy,whichhisdoesnotacknowledge, withgeostrategicarguments.However,inhisanalysisofthelocalsocialeconomicroots,heagreeswithRashid.

The border zone

ThemaininsurgencyzonecirclingeastpartofPashtunmajorityareas.(temi.repubblica.it)

Forclosetotwocenturieswarandinsurgencieshasbeenthefateofeverygenerationinthisborderarea, thefightingpulsingfrombeinglocalisedandsporadictoregionalandperiodicallyintensivewar.Mostthe troublehaditscentreinthetribalmountainareasonbothsidesofthepresentinternationalborderline. However,thefightinghasalsobeennourished,supportedandinspiredlocallyfromthemoresettled Pashtunareasonbothsidesofthisborderzone.Regionalpowersandtheoutsideworldwereinvolvedfor morethanhalfthattime,projectingideologies,ambitions,threatperceptionsandgeneralconflictsintothe areaofthePashtuns. Inordertobetterunderstandtherootsofthepresentsituationitisimportanttokeepinmindthatthis extendedborderzoneonlydiffersinonerespectfromothersimilarwild,multiethnictribalzonesbetween empiressuchastheCaucasus,theBalkans,CentralAsianorthofAfghanistanandnativeAmericantribal landbetweentheBritish,SpanishandFrenchpartsofNorthAmerica:ThelandsofthePashtunswasnever broughtunderfullcontrolbyanyoftheforwardmovinggreatpowers.WhentheoverextendedBritish EmpirehalfheartedlyexpandeditssecuritypresencenorthwestwardinIndiatoavoidaRussiancontrolled Afghanistan,ithadchosenacheaplayeredapproachadjustedtothelocalconditions:Theinner,eastern layerconsistedofthemoresettledPashtunmajorityareasintheplainbetweentheIndusRiverandthe hills.Theycouldbecontrolledbymobilemilitaryforcesandweretoremainadministereddirectly.The

NorthWestFrontierProvinceestablishedforthatpurposein1901withitscentreinPeshawarwasalsoto monitorandindirectcontrolofthenextlayer:thewildhillylikewisemainlyPashtunpopulatedareasupto theinternationalborder,namedafterSirMortimerDurand,whoforcedtheAfghanEmirtoagreetothe borderlinein1893.Thatlinewasnotguidedbyaconsistentmilitarygeographicallogic,itdividedseveral ofthedominatingbordertribes,andtheBritishtacitlyacceptedthattheEmirmaintainedsomerolein relationtothebordertribesontheeasternsideofthelinebyeconomicsponsorshipofhisfavouredtribal leaders. ThePashtunmajorityareasinthenorthernpartofBaluchistan,thethinlypopulatedareabetween BritishIndiaandPersia,wereleftoutofthetwolayeredNorthWestFrontierProvincearrangement. However,thePashtunsdominatedthedistrictwhereQuetta,thenewgarrisontown,wasbuilttocontrol themainwesternroutebetweenAfghanistanandBritishIndia. TheEmiralsomaintainedalevelofinfluenceintheautonomoustribalbelteastoftheLinebecausehe wastheleadingMuslimprinceofthearea.HehadbeenforcedtoacceptBritishcontrolovertheforeign policyofhiscountry,andheusedallhisremaininginfluenceoverthebordertribestoweakenthatcontrol wheneverpossible.HeencouragedfundamentalistMuslimleadersandclergytounderminetheauthority ofBritishsponsoredtribalheads. TheEmirsfirstsuchdiscreetefforttoinspireproblemsfollowedjustfouryearslater,in1897.Another effortcamein1908,whenthedevelopingcooperationbetweenthetwoborderingempiresundermined hispossibilitytousethethreatofRussiatoreinforcehishandinhisdealingswithBritishIndia.13 ItisimportanttonoticethatastrategicGreatGamehadcreatedopportunitiesandsourcesofincome forthePashtunsastheoutsiderscompetedinbuyinginfluence.Withoutastrategicmotiveinvestmentin infrastructureandtheeconomyofthetribalareashasconsistentlybeenverylow,andthroughoutthe20th Centurytheconstantpopulationgrowthcombinedwiththelackofdevelopmentcreatedaconstant migrationofPashtuntribesmentolargeregionalcitieslikeKarachi.Thediasporahasmaintainedclose contactstotheirfamiliesandtribesanddevelopmentsintheborderzone.14 Asearlyasinthe19thCenturythebadeconomicconditionshadledtoaPashtundiasporatocornersof theEmpireasfarawayasAustralia,andfromthe1970sonwardsthenowquicklygrowingpopulationin boththeNorthwestFrontierProvinceandtheTribalAreascreatedamassiveemigrationofmalePashtuns. MostfailedtofindworkinsidePakistan.Hundredsofthousandssoughtanincomeascontractworkers, especiallyintheGulfStates.LargegroupsofPashtunssettledinEuropeandNorthAmerica.Intheearly 1980sthousandsofrefugeesfromthewarinAfghanistanwereaddedtothePashtuncommunitiesinthe largePakistanicities.15 ThelargePashtuninternalemigranturbancommunitieslatermadeitimpossibleforthePakistani governmenttocontainthetroubleandterrorismintheborderareas.Ithaslocalsupportingexpatriate groupsinallsignificantpopulationcentresofthecountryandwillgetfinanceandcarryoutsupport

13

Forastillvaliddescriptionofthecomplexityofthesituationandmotivesbehindthedevelopment:C.CollinDavies: TheProblemoftheNorthWestFrontier18901908.Withasurveyofpolicysince1849.London1932. 14 SeethediscussioninFerozAhmedsdatedMarxistLeninistanalysisin:FocusontheBaluchistanandPushtoon Question.Lahore1975. 15 SeeRobertNichols:AHistoryofPashtunMigration17752006,Oxford2008,pp.111134,140172.

operationsboththereandelsewhereintheworld.TheroleofWahhabismaswellasSufismamongPashtun tribesunderminesthepotentialofmoderateMuslimauthorities,evenifthattoolweretobeemployed.16 UsingJohnMackinlaysacuteinsightabouttheInsurgentArchipelago17ofpopularrebellions employingauniversalistideologyinourglobalisedworld,itbecomesclearthatthearchipelagiccharacter ofthemigrationcoupledwiththecharacterandroleofIslamistrevivalmeansthatalltheworldisgoingto remaindirectlyinfluencedbythePashtunborderzoneinsurgency.TheWesterngovernmentswillhave seriousdifficultiesdevelopingandsustainingthenecessarycomplexarchitectureofthecounterinsurgency responses,giventhecombinationofsimplifyingroleofmediaandimpatienceofhomepublicopinion.The problemsbecomeacutebecausetheinsurgencynotonlymotivatesandinspirestheyoungfrustrated PashtunsandotherPakistaniexpatriatesintheWest.LargenumberofyoungMuslimsecondorthird generationimmigrantsfromotherpartsoftheworldsuchasIndonesia,China,formerSovietRepublics andtheMiddleEasthavebecomepassive,activeormilitantsupportersoftheborderinsurgency.

On19October2009PakistanipolicepresentsomeofweaponsfoundinacacheamongMashudPashtunTaliban supportersinKarachi.(islamizationwatch.blogspot.com)

WiththepresentfightingonbothsidesoftheDurandLine,itbecomesessentialtoconfronttheideathat thelocalconditionsandthecharacterofthePashtuntribesarereallysospecial,soconservativeand impossibletoinfluencewithcivilisationandanachronisticallywarriorlikethattraditionalcounter insurgencyeffortsaremeaningless.Ifthiswerereallythecaseandthemainroottoourcounterinsurgency problems,anyefforttopacifyanddeveloptheregionwouldfundamentallyfutile.Thenawithdrawalfrom

16

SanaHaroon:FrontierofFaith.IslamintheIndoAfghanBorderland.London2007,givesanexcellentmodern adjustmentbyaddinganindepthanalysisoftheimpactofIslamicrevivalismandSufismintribalbehaviourofthe NorthWestFrontierProvinceofBritishIndiaandearlyPakistan. 17 TheInsurgentArchipelago.FromMaotobinLaden,London2009.

theareawouldbesoundandlogical,especiallyifthetribescouldandwouldblockfurtheruseoftheirarea asabasefortheinternationalinsurgency. If,ontheotherhand,thestereotypeisasflawedandanachronisticasallothersuchattemptsof simplifications,wehaveotheroptions.IfitisthelackofdevelopmentinthePashtuntribalareasthat remainsthecoreoftheproblemthesituationthatdrovesomanytomigrationouractionsshouldbe differentandcouldachievepositiveresultforboththePashtunsandourselves.Thealreadymentioned 1932vintageanalysisofconflictsintheregionmustbereadassupportingthislatterview.Fromaclose studyofthetribesthatanalysisconcludedthattherewasnofundamentaldifferencebetweenthesetribes andtherestofhumanity:Perhapsthemostimportantlessonofall,andonethatshouldprofoundlyaffect ourfuturefrontierpolicy,isthatsavageandbloodthirstytribesbecomelessbarbarousandmorereconciled topeacefulpursuitsunderasettledadministration.18

OneofmanyschoolsdestroyedbytheTalibanintheSwatvalley.(www.bloggernews.net)

Insearchforadeeperunderstandingoftherootsofpresenteventsitisrelevanttofocusonfourperiodsof thelasthundredyears.Thefirstcoversfrom1919to1939andstartswiththeThirdAfghanwar.Thesecond isthe1970swiththecombinedpoliticalcrisesinPakistanandAfghanistanthatledtoradicalisationandthe openconflictsofthefollowingdecade.Thethirdisthe1980s.Thefinalperiodcoveredisthelasttwo decadesonbothsidesoftheDurandLinestartingwiththewithdrawaloftheSovietforcesfrom Afghanistan.ThereafterthecurrentdevelopmentofWesterncounterinsurgencydoctrinewillbeoutlined andusedasaprismforthediscussionofthepresentsituationonbothsidesoftheLine.

18

TheProblemoftheNorthWestFrontier18901908,Quotedfromp.70.Theargumentismadeinatotally convincingwaybyAhmedRashid:DescentintoChaos.

When Butcher and Bolt was still but only just acceptable to home public opinion

BritishIndiantroopsinWaziristan1935(http://www.beikey.net)

Asalreadyoutlined,theAfghanEmirhadchallengedtheDurandLineinboth1897and1908bybreeding rebellioninthetribalareas.AsaconsequencehehadbeenforcedtoacceptnotonlytheLine,buta humiliatinglimitationofAfghanisovereigntybycommittinghiscountrytofollowingBritishadviceinhis countrysforeignrelations.Inthewinterof1919anewEmir,whoaccededtothecrownafterthemurder ofhispredecessor,gambledthattheBritishpostWorldWarImilitaryweaknesswouldallowAfghanistanto gainadvantagesbywarthatincludedatleastfullindependenceandpossiblytheunderminingoftheBritish willtosupporttheDurandLineborder.InMaythatyeartheAfghanregulararmycrossedtheLinein offensivesagainstPeshawarfromthenorthwestandwest,intoWaziristanfromKhost,andagainstQuetta fromthenorth.19Theinvasionwastobecomereinforcedbyageneraluprisingofthediversetribesacross theLine.TheBritish,however,mobilised350.000menand158.000transportanimalstomeetthe combinedexternalandinternalthreat,andwithinacoupleofmonthsBritishIndianforceshadentered Afghanistaninseveralplacesincounteroffensives.Theeffectiveresponsealsoincludedasymbolic strategicairbombardmentofanundefendedKabulandledtoapeaceagreementinAugust. TheBritishhadbeenforcedtofocustheireffortsoncontainingtheuprisinginseveralborderdistricts andthereforeacceptedafullyindependentAfghanforeignpolicy.TheAfghansideformallyrepeatedits acceptanceoftheDurandLine,buttribalrebellionscontinuedfromnorthernBaluchistanallthewayto Chitralinthefarnorth.RegainingaminimumlevelofcontroloftheverydifficultmountainousWaziristan requiredtheemploymentduringthewinterandspringof1920of83.000troopsandsupportingcivilians, modernartilleryplusasignificantairforceoflightbomberaircraft.Morelimitedpunishmentoperationsin
19

FortheofficialBritishhistoryofthewarsee:GeneralStaffBranch,ArmyHeadquarters,India:TheThirdAfghanWar 1919.OfficialAccount.Calcutta1926.

Waziristan,mainlyusingaircraft,continueduntil1925.TheyoungRoyalAirForcewantedtosecureits continuedindependencefromtheBritishArmybyreplacing,substituting,slowandexpensivearmy operationswithpromptlyappliedandlesscostlyandriskyairbornefirepower.20Theconceptofdisciplining rebellioustribesbybutcheringtheircamels,cattle,sheepandgoatsanddestroyingtheircropsand villagesduringanarmyraidfollowedbytheunitsquickboltbacktosettledareasshouldbereplacedby thequick,safeandcheapoptionofdoingthesamewithaircraftinaircontrol.21Themirageofcounter insurgencybyairpowerunfortunatelysurvivedintothe21stCentury. Duringthenext10yearsuntilthemid1930spacificationoftherebellioustribaldistrictsonlysucceeded byabalancedcombinationofmilitary,economicandmilitarymeans.Themaincentreoftribaltrouble movednorthtotheareaclosertotheKhyberPass. Inthemeantimethelocalmilitiaswerethoroughlyreorganisedtomakeitpossibletowithdrawthe regularbrigadesdeployedduringthemaininsurgencyinWaziristantogarrisonsnowbuiltadjacenttonew roads.Thenewinfrastructuresupportedeconomicdevelopmentanditcouldfacilitateamilitary redeploymentifnecessary.TheBritishadministrationofthedistrictswasreinforcedandimprovedtoallow directedapplicationofjusticeratherthancollectivepunishmentofseriouscrime.Thenewsystem remainedbackedupbythethreatofairpower. However,thispoliticomilitarysystemstartedtocollapseinthemid1930s,whenitbecameevidentthat theBritishwerebeginningtotakestepstoleaveIndia.Theapproachingdepartureoftheforeignrulers encouragedlocalpoliticalpreparationsandmanoeuvringforthepowerstruggleahead.Thegrowing politicalresistanceagainstthewaningBritishruleintheareathereaftercentredonPeshawar:the administrativecapitalofthefrontierprovince.Atthesametimethethreatofpunishmentfromtheairwas losingcredibilityandtroublereturnedtoWaziristan.Thetribeswerelearningcountermeasuresagainstthe aircraftatthesametimewhenthetraditionalapplicationofcollectivepunishmentinsuppressionof rebellionsbybutcheringandburningbecameunacceptabletotheincreasinglywellinformed,liberaland pacificBritishhomepublicopinion.22

20

ForashortcleardescriptionoftheInterwarRAFlogicsee:JohnRobertFerris:TheEvolutionofBritishStrategic Policy,19191926.London1989,pp.88ff,169ff.JamesS.Corum&WrayR.Johnson:AirpowerinSmallWars.Fighting InsurgentsandTerrorists,Lawrence,Kansas,2003,pp.5166,8186,givesageneralevaluationoftheeffectivenessof theconcept. 21 FortheofficialBritishhistoryoftheWaziristanoperationssee:GeneralStaff,ArmyHeadquarters:Operationsin Waziristan19191920.SecondEdition,Delhi1923. 22 ThebestmodernaccountifthepostWW1warandinsurgencyis:BrianRobson:CrisisontheFrontier.TheThird AfghanWarandtheCampaigninWaziristan191920.StroudinGloucestershire2004.Thecollapseofthe1920system isdescribedbyC.E.Brucein:Waziristan19361937:theProblemsoftheNorthWestFrontiersofIndiaandTheir Solutions.Aldershot,probablyin1937.BruceunderlineinhisargumentthateventhemostwarriorlikePashto respondtogoodstronggovernment,justiceandeconomicopportunitiesinthesamewayaseverybodyelse.The ImperialWarMuseumhasrecentlyreprintedtheofficialhistoryfortheinterwaroperationsin:N.W.FrontierofIndia 192035.OfficialHistoryofOperations.PartI,IIandIII.London2004.

Trouble north and south of the border

PrsidentMohammedDaoudKhan(www.embassyofafghanistan.org)ogGeneralMuhammadZiaulHaq (obitmag.com)

InPakistanthebreakawayofBangladeshin1971ledtoautonomymovementsinbothSind,Baluchistan andamongthePashtuns,andalongperiodofseriouscivilunrestbroughtMohammedZiaulHaqsmilitary takeoverin1977.Thereafterthemilitaryandsecurityservicesconsolidatedtheircontroloverthestateby allyingthemselvestothefundamentalistIslamicforcesinthecountry,movingitfrombeingthehomeand sanctuaryforSouthAsiasMuslimsthatthefoundingfatherMuhammadAliJinnahhadcreatedto becomingasemiIslamicstate,ignoringthewishesofthepopularmajority.FromthenonwardstheMuslim leadersofthecountrywereallowedtoconductacampaignofhatredagainsttheWestandespeciallythe U.S.thathaspoisonedpublicopinionbothinPakistanitselfandamongPakistaniexpatriatecommunitiesin EuropeandNorthAmerica.Thisbecameoneofthesignificantsourcesofourpresenttroubles. InAfghanistanthedevelopmenthadmovedintheoppositedirection.TheKabulWesternorSoviet educatedintellectualelitepressedforacentralisationofpowertoacceleratesocialandeconomicreforms. ThefirststepwastheousteroftheslowlyreformingAfghankingMohammedZahirShahbyhiscousin MohammedDaoudKhanin1973.Thecoupremovedthelegitimaterulerofthecountry.Daoudsoughtto enhancehispopularitybyintensifyingAfghansupportforthePakistaniPashtunandBalochiindependence claims.23However,Daoudsinternalpositionremainedweak,andtoconsolidatepowerhesoughtthe supportofthetwoCommunistPartyfractions:theKhalg(Masses)andtheParcham(Banner).Withthe communistsbehindhimhemovedagainstthestillweakfundamentalistleaders,includingthelater MujahidinleadersGulbuddinHikmatyarandAhmadShahMassoud.Theyfledandwerereceivedwithopen armsbyboththeunstablePakistaniBhuttogovernmentthattaskedtheFrontierCorpstogivesupport.The refugeesalsofoundsympathyandhelpfromPakistansIslamicpoliticians.ThePakistanileadersrepaid
23

FrontierofFaith,pp.185194coversAfghanrejectioninprincipleoftheDurandLineduringthefirstfifteenyearsof Pakistani.FocusontheBaluchistanandPushtoonQuestionanalysisthequestionatthetimeofDaoudscampaign.

10

DaoudssupportfortheBalochiandPashtunseparatistsbygivingsupporttoanunsuccessfulrebellionin Afghanistan.24 Inspring1978DaoudwaskilledinacoupandreplacedbytheKhalgleaderNurMuhammedTarakiwho inhisplacewasmurderedinSeptember1979ontheinitiativeofhisrivalandPrimeMinister,Hafizullah Amin.ThelocalrebellionagainstDaoudinsummer1975hadbeensmashedquickly;howeverthefull communisttakeoverinspring1978provokedageneraluprisinginAfghanistanoutsideKabulinMay,the monthafterthecoup.Fromthebeginningtherebellionwascontrolledfromapoliticalandmilitary headquartersinPeshawarinPakistananditsmainbasebecamethecampsaroundthatcitywhere hundredsofthousandsofrefugeesfromthefightingweresettlingintocamps.Inearly1979theAfghan governmenthadlostcontrolandrepeatedlyaskedforadirectSovietmilitaryinterventionwithinthe frameworkofthecooperationtreatysignedinDecember1978.Sovietmilitaryadvisoryandmaterial assistancehadincreasedinstagessince1972,25andlimitedSovietforceswerealreadyinplace.Aftersome monthsofhesitationtheSovietPolitburodecidedtostabilisethesituationwithanoperationmodelledon the1968interventionintoCzechoslovakia.Theairlandingandoverlandoperationstookplacewithout problemsoveracoupleofdaysinlateDecember1979.AminwaskilledbyhisSovietSpecialForcesguards andreplacedbyBabrakKamal,theleaderofthelesshardlineParchamAfghanCommunistPartyfraction. EarlythatmonthZiaulHaqhadmadeapublicdeclarationoftheintentiontomovePakistantowards Islamisation.26 ThereafterthescenewassetforanewGreatGameovertheDurandLine,thistimewiththeRussians overextendedintoAfghanistanandwiththeactiveoperationsfromthemountainousanddesertcore PashtotribalareasinanorthwesterndirectionratherthanintotheIndusplain.

24

ImtiazGulgivesagoodsketchoftheinitialPakistaniresponseinthemid1970sinhis:TheMostDangerousPlace, Chapter1:PakistansDangerousGame. 25 WhentheauthorstayedinHotelKabulinmidMarch1976intransithomefromPakistan,hehadbeenoneofonly twoWesternguests.TherestwereSovietmilitaryinuniform. 26 ThedescriptionofthedevelopmentsinAfghanistanandPakistanistoahighextendbasedon:AhmedRashid: DescentintoChaos.FortheSovietoperationshereandlater:LesterW.Grau&MichaelA.Gress(eds):TheRussian GeneralStaff:TheSovietAfghanWar:HowaSuperpowerFoughtandLost.Lawrence(Kansas)2002,andGregory Feifer:TheGreatGamble:TheSovietWarinAfghanistan.NewYork2009.

11

Pashtun core areas as antiSoviet bases

SovietairbornesoldiersinAfghanistan(englishrussia.com)

Thekeyroleoftheborderarea,theunderdevelopedPashtundistrictsonbothsidesofthePakistani AfghanborderbecameclearshortlyaftertheSovietforcesthatenteredAfghanistaninlate1979.The invadingarmywasfundamentallyunsuitedtoconductanythingbutmassiveoffensivemechanised operationsinWesternEuropeorManchuria.Successfulcounterinsurgencyeitherrequiresacombination ofmassiveforceandtheextremebrutalityrequiredtocommitsemigenocideorthecombinationof extremepatience,selfdiscipline,politicalsensitivity,minimumuseofforce,lowlevelinitiative,alllevel flexibilityandabilitytosubordinatethemilitarytootheragencieswasdescribedabove.TheSovietArmy wastoothinonthegroundandtooweaklysupportedbytheSovietleadershipandpeopletodothe former,andtheydidnothavetheresources,leadershipandmoraletodothelatter.TheAfghanArmythat theycametosupporthadtoalargeextentdesertedduringtheTarakiandAminregimes,sotheSoviet unitshadtolearntodothejobthemselves.Withheavyuseofspecialforcesandothereliteunitsthey graduallydevelopedanabilitytocarryoutdeliberatetacticalcordonandsearch(calledblockand sweep),raiding,ambushandconvoyoperationscombinedwithpunishmentbydestructionofproperty andterrorattacksonciviliansactuallyBucheringandBoltingastheBritishIndianoperationsfrom1897 to1937,butatafarlargerscaleanddestructivelevelandfarlessaccuratelydirectedthantheBritish operationsthen.Thecombinationofverylimitedforcestrength,lowmoraleanddisciplineandbrutalin indiscriminateuseoffirepowermadearoundfivemillionAfghansfleetoPakistanandIranandturnedthe restofthepopulationawayfromtheCommunistgovernmentinKabul. TherefugeesinthePakistaniandIraniancampssuppliedrecruitsfortheinsurgentMujahidinforcesthat operatedasmobileunitsfromtrainingareasandbasesbeyondtheDurandLine,enteringAfghanistanto conductmajorattackstosupplementlocalresistanceforcesandthereafteragainseekingrefugeabroadto avoiddestructioninablockandsweepresponseoperation.TheunofficialSovietGeneralStaffanalysis developedtwodecadesafterthewithdrawaldoesnotseemtorecognisethatthedefactorecognitionofa safehaveninthePashtuncoreareasofPakistan(aswellasinIran)fortheforcesofcounterrevolution

12

probablydoomedtheirlimitedeffortfromthestart,inspiteoftherathernarrowpopularbaseofthe resistanceallowedbythePakistanileaders. ZiaulHaqsmilitarycoupandhispoliciesofdeliberateIslamisationtopropuphispoliticalpositionhad madehiscountryaninternationaloutcastwhentheSovietmoved.However,theSovietinvasionquickly temptedtheWesttomoveintoexploittheSovietoverextension,andtheSaudisarrivedtosupportand recruitanddevelopfellowIslamists.ZiawasevenallowedtoblockdirectWesternsponsorshipofanypart oftheAfghanresistancenotsuitablymotivatedbyradicalIslam.Supportwaschannelledthroughthenow vastlyexpandedPakistaniInterServiceIntelligenceAgency(ISI)thatdecidedwhotoassistwithwhat:seven Islamicresistancegroupingswereselectedasworthy;secularnationalisticanddemocraticwereleftout, themoreradicallyIslamic,thebetter.Averysignificantpartwenttotheorganisationofthebrutal extremistGulbuddinHikmatyar.TherebyZiaindirectlyconsolidatedthepowerofthefundamentalist Islamicforcesinhisowncountrythathehadchosentolegitimisehiscontinuedrule.Thesubstantial training,militaryandsubversivestructurerequiredtosupportPakistanswarbeyondtheDurandLineby selectedAfghaniproxieshadtobeestablishedinthePashtunmajoritycoreareasinFATAandnorthern Balochistantobecomeeffective. Afterasurgeinforceleveltoachieveaquickmilitaryvictoryin1986bythesametypeofineffective counterinsurgencyoperationsasthoseconductedpreviously,theSovietstrategychangedduringthenext twoyearstooneoftransferringoperationstotheAfghanforcesandnationalreconciliation,whereanew AfghangovernmentunderMohammedNajibullahdecentralisedthearmedforcesbygivingagreaterrole tostructuresdevelopedfromlocalmilitias,byopeningthepoliticalsystemtothemoderatepartofthe IslamicoppositionandbytryingtosavepartofthemodernisationreformswithinamoreIslamic constitution.Inwinter19881989theSovietforcesleft.27

27

Asnote12.

13

Pakistani geostrategic use of the Pashto core areas

KabulwhencapturedbytheTalibanwithPakistanisupportin1996(www.dailykos.com)

MuchwouldhavebeendifferentlaterhadtheU.S.ledandorchestratedfullinternationalsupporttothe UNsponsoredefforttocreateandmanageastabletransitiongovernmentinAfghanistanthatfollowedthe Sovietwithdrawal.ItwouldonlyhaverequiredsomethingsimilartotheeffortthatledtotheBonn AgreementinDecember2001.Insteadaseriouseffortwasdeemedfutileandbureaucraticinertialedtoa shortperiodofcontinuedAmericansupportviaISItoPakistansGreatGaming.Itwasanunfortunate mistakethatwouldberepeatedadecadelaterwhenanotherBushAdministrationshifteditsfocusfullyto SaddamHusseinandlostanyinterestinthepostwarreconstructionofAfghanistan. ISIuseditsspecialistsandbasesintheFATAsupportedbythePashtomannedparamilitaryFrontier CorpsinadoubleoffensivetoimprovePakistansgeostrategicpositioninitsconfrontationwithIndia. GuerrillastrainedhereinfiltratedintoKashmirtoinitiateandfueltheopeninsurgencythathadlastedfrom 1989uptotheopenlimitedwarin1999closetotheLehroadbetweenthethennucleararmedPakistan andIndia.TheoriginalPakistaniinvasionofKashmirinautumn1947hadalsobeenconductedbyPashtun tribalirregularmilitias. Thedirectoffensiveinspring1989toreplaceNajibullahsgovernmentwithaPakistanifriendlyand fundamentalistoneunderHikmatyarfailedinitially:EvenifPakistaniartilleryandcommunication specialistswereemployedindirectsupportoftheoffensiveviaJalalabadtowardsKabul,theattempt endedindefeat,andittookthreeyearsbeforethecollapseoftheSovietUnionandaworseningeconomic crisisledtoNajibullahsfall.TogetherwiththelackofAmericaninterestthecompetitionbetweenthe formergovernmentandresistancemilitaryleaders,nowdefactowarlords,meantthatnostable governmentcouldbecreated. InJanuary1993thefullscalecivilwarstartedwithHikmatyarsbombardmentofKabul.Nearlyall modernization,nationalcohesionandinfrastructuredevelopedduringthepreviouscenturywasdestroyed inthefightingthatfollowedandledtotheformationoftheyoungpuritanPashtunTalibanmovementin 14

therefugeereligiousschoolsintheQuettaareainnorthernBaluchistan.Withitssuccessinbattleand supportfromawarwearyAfghanpopulationithadachievedcontrolofnearlyallofthecountryfiveyears later.Attheendofthe1990sthePakistanmilitaryleadershipunderPervezMusharrafandISIhadshifted theirdirectsupportandcooperationfromHikmatyartotheTaliban.IndirectlytheISIsupportedthe sophisticatedleadersofAlQaidathathadmovedtoAfghanistanandincreasinglydefinedanddominated theforeignpolicyviewsandactionsofthenaveTaliban.WithcontactsandlocalknowledgefromtheFATA andborderingAfghanareasfromtheircooperationwiththeMujahidininthe1980s,AlQaidaquickly tookoverandrantheformerlydirectlyISImanagedfundamentalisttrainingfacilitiesforlocaland internationalMuslimmilitantsintheborderarea.ThesecondClintonadministrationsawthegrowing threat,butitcouldonlyreactinasymbolicwaywithlongrangeairweapons.Therewasnowillingnessto moveeventoairbutcherandboltstrikesuntilaftertheeventsof11September2001.28

28

Rashid,DescentintoChaos,andDavidLoyn:Butcher&Bolt.Forananalysisofthedevelopmenttowardswar lordism:AntonioGiustozzi:EmpiresofMud.WarsandwarlordsinAfghanistan.London2009.

15

To get the monster genie back into the bottle

USMarinesfrom24thMEUonpatrolinHelmandProvince(www.captainsjournal.com)

ThewarinIraqdrainedresourcesfromAfghanistanbeforethingswereundercontrol,andwenever recovered.Weneverlookedback.29 NeithertheBritishinthetwoinvasionsinthe19thCenturynortheSovietintheirinterventionintothe Afghancivilwarin1979hadexpectedtoendupindemandingandprotractedcounterinsurgency operations.HoweverOperationEnduringFreedom,theU.S.invasionthatstartedinNovember2001, differedfromboththeBritishandSovietinvasionsofcentralAfghanistanwentfurtherinitsnarrowmilitary navetybynotconsideringanysignificantpostinvasiondeploymentessentialorevenrelevantforthe regularAmericanmilitaryforces.Theverynameoftheoperationhighlightingtheshallowrootsanddepth ofthepreinvasionstrategicanalysis.Alightfootprintwouldbesufficient. ItwasseveralyearsbeforethecrisisinIraqbroughtthesuccessfulbureaucraticrebellionofsenior officersofthearmyandmarinelightinfantryagainsttherulingmilitaryparadigmandtheintroductionofa newcounterinsurgencydoctrine.AccordingtothethenPentagonunderstanding,itsarmedforcesshould smashtheenemymilitaryquicklywithoverwhelming,scientificallydistributed,accuratefirepowerand thereafterredeploytobasesreadyforthenextoperationleavinglesserqualifiedalliesandcivilianagencies topickupthepiecesandmaybeleavingsomespecialforceelementsforatimetotrainthelocals.30The economicallyattractivefootprintwasmadedependentonauseofairpowerverysimilarinconceptand motivetotheBritishRoyalAirForceaircontrolpolicyfortheborderzoneintheinterwarperiod.

29

RichardArmitage,U.S.DeputySecretaryofState20012005inOctober2007.SethG.Jones:IntheGraveyardof Empires.AmericasWarinAfghanistan.NewYork2009,p.127. 30 Ucko:TheNewCounterinsurgencyEra,andRichardDuncanDownie:LearningfromConflict.TheU.S.Militaryin Vietnam,ElSalvador,andtheDrugWar.Westport(Connecticut)1998.

16

DuetothefailuretocaptureOsamabinLadenandcontinuedlowlevelproblemsontheborder, especiallyoppositeFATA,alightarmydivisionsizeforceremained,howevermostofthelargecountrywas cynicallylefttothereemergingwarlordsandalliesnotcapableoftheAmericanWayofmodernwarfare. NoAmericanexampleorpressurewasappliedontheworldcommunitytoliveuptoandrealisethe Americanpresidentsspring2002promiseofaMarshallPlanforAfghanistantosupportreconstruction ofthedemolishedcountry. TheMusharrafchairedPakistanigeneralsusedtheU.S.dependenceonPakistanibasestoextricateand bringbothTalibanfightersandPakistanivolunteersandISIagentsbacktosafetyfollowedbyreorganisation andretraininginFATAandnorthernBaluchistan.ThenewAfghanpresident,HamidKarzais,returntothe oldEmirtraditionpayingstipendsforpeacetothelocaltriballeadersinFATAfailedtohaveeffect,31 probablybecausehiseffortswereunderminedpoliticallyfromIslamabad,becausehismoneywasmore thanbalancedbyotherdonations,andbecausetheU.S.hadshiftedtoIraq,whereshehadbecomefully committedinaratherclumsylearningprocessthatindirectlyinstructedIslamicmilitantseverywherehow theWestshouldberesisted.AllsawhowtofightmodernWesternforceswithminimumownrisks.Withno significantU.S.leadershipinAfghanistan,theinferiorWesternmilitariesonlycommittedverylimitedforces andotherassistancetoimprovesecurityandacceleratereconstruction. In2005,aftertheISIsupportedexpansionandretraining,thedifferentmainlyPashtunmilitants steppedupoperationsintosouthernandeasternAfghanistanfromtheirPakistanibases,however,the worseningsecuritysituationhadalreadyledtotheMdecinssansFrontiretowithdrawfromthecountry insummer2004.AcoupleoftheinsurgentorganisationsnowemployedtodestabiliseAfghanistanhad actuallybeencreatedintheearly1990stofightagainsttheIndiansinKashmir. TheU.S.respondedbysendingarmeddronesintoFATAairspaceoncadreassassinationmissions,a superiorsuccessortomorebluntaircontrolbutcherandboltoperations,butISIcontinuedits combinationofdirectsupporttotheTaliban,includingthebombingoftheIndianKabulembassyinJuly 2008,andtheratherlimitedsupportforU.S.andotherwesternoperations.Westernforcesnowexpanded intosouthernAfghanistantocontainandrollbackthesocallednewTalibanoffensive. Theincreasinglyandunderstandablyselfconfidentmilitantsintheborderprovinceswhocouldget supportfromtribalmembersinthelargePakistanicitiesnowstartedaterroroffensivetodestabilisethe politicalsysteminPakistanitselfaswellasthetrainingofdiscontentedmembersofthevastPakistaniand otherMuslimexpatriatecommunitiesintheWest.TheproblemhadworsenedbecausePunjabimilitants hadjoinedthePashtunsintheborderzoneandforoperationselsewhere.32Themurderoftheopposition leaderBenazirBhuttoinlate2007didnotchangethesituationandneitherdidtheterrorattacksin Mombaioneyearlater.AnadjustmentofpolicyonlycamewhenmilitantstargetedPakistanimilitaryand ISIinstallations,andafternewgovernmentshadtakenoverinbothIslamabadandWashingtonthe destabilisationcampaigndirectedagainstbothcountriesfromtheborderzonemayfinallybeseenasthe indivisibleproblemithasbeenformorethanacenturyafterthePashtunsweredividedbytheDurandLine andlefttotheirownsponsoredchiefsandpoverty.33
31 32

ImtiazGul:TheMostDangerousPlace.PakistansLawlessFrontier.London2009,pp.24f. Ibid.,pp.1820. 33 MainlybuiltonRashid,DescentintoChaos,which,however,issupportedbyCordesmansDecember2006 presentation(seenote2).TheperiodiswellcoveredfromaU.S.AfghaniperspectivebySethG.Jones:Inthe GraveyardofEmpires.AmericasWarinAfghanistan.NewYork2009.

17

SofarthelimitedPakistanicounterinsurgencyeffortshavebeenconcentratedagainstfirstSwatand thenWaziristan,andtheyhavebeengiventheformofoffensivesunlikelytohaveanylastingeffect.The sanctuariesinthewesthavebeenleftfullyoperational,makingNATOandAfghanioperationsinHelmand, KandaharandUruzganbothdifficultandveryrisky.TheonlychangehastakenplaceinSwatand Waziristan,wheretheAlQaidaleadersarehiding,thebaseareaforattacksagainsttheU.S.forcesacross theborder,becauseitwasfromherethattheinsurgentsstartedanoffensiveslidetowardsIslamabad. EventhefactthatU.S.hasnowtakentheleadingroleinthecounterinsurgencyinSouthAfghanistanhas stillnotledtoanyPakistaniefforttoclosetheTalibanbasesinnorthernBaluchistan.

Thestilluntouchedsanctuary.ProTalibanprotestinQuettaagainstthemilitaryoffensiveagainsttheTalibanin FATA.(www.guardian.co.uk)

OnereasonforthelackofaneffectiveeffortinWesternPakistancouldbethatthebestregularinfantry unitsofthePakistaniArmyaretheBalochiandFrontierForceRegimentswiththelatterrecruitedamong thePashto.Anothercausecouldbethelackofcounterinsurgencytrainingintheregulararmywhichis explainedandreinforcedbyafundamentalunwillingnessofthearmytotransfermoreforcesfromthe borderswithIndiaandpreparethemforanew,inmostgeneralsmind,secondarytask. Thereareonlyfew,ifany,indicationsthatcanchallengethesuspicionthatthemainmotivebehind crossborderoperationsagainstNATOandtheAfghangovernmentstructuresinSouthAfghanistanremains thewishofelementsinISIandthePakistaniarmedforcestodestabiliseAfghanistanandremovetheriskof anycontinuedWesternandpossiblyIndianinfluencehere.Thustheyhopetosucceedintheirgeostrategic GreatGamingbytheresilienceoftheirtrainees.Theinsurgentsretrainingandreequippingaround QuettaandthendispatchedintoAfghanistanaredifferentfromthosefurthernortheastbybeing overwhelminglylocalAfghansandPakistanis.TheyarenotAlQaidaforeigners.TheU.S.hassofarnot donemuchtoempowerthePakistanicivilianpoliticalleaderstoforcethePakistanisecurityforcesto throttlethewaragainstitselfanditsalliesinSouthernAfghanistan.34
Forarecent,balancedanalysis,aftertheleakofthePentagondocuments,see:Afghanistanwarlogs:whosesideis Pakistanon?WikileaksreportshavegalvanizedopinionsofsomeAmericanswhoviewthePakistanimilitarywith suspicion.guardian.co.uk,Monday26July2010.

34

18

NowthePakistanigovernmenthasbeenweakenedbythedisastrousMonsoonfloods.Asthe InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudiesobservedon20thSeptember2010:IfPakistanis' disappointmentwiththeirgoverninginstitutionsweretobecomeevenmoreactiveandwidespread,itis possiblethatrelationshipsbetweenPashtunsonbothsidesoftheDurandLinecoulddevelopevenfurther, leadingtotherevivalofamovementtowards'Pashtunistan'.35

35

IntheStrategicComments,Volume16,Comment29:Pakistan'sfloods:broaderimplications.

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The framework of current Western doctrine of counterinsurgency

DavidGalula1956(coincentral.wordpress.com)andDavidPetraeus2007(upload.wikimedia.org)

Thecounterinsurgentforcemustseparatetheinsurgentfromtherestofthepopulace.Thisisbest accomplishedthroughtheeffectiveuseofpopulaceandresourcescontrol.Caremustbetaken toensurethatciviliansarenotinjuredormistreatedasaresultofcounterinsurgentoperations36 Everycountryisdividedforadministrativeandmilitarypurposesintoprovinces,counties,districts,zones, etc.Theborderareasareapermanentsourceofweaknessforthecounterinsurgentwhateverhis administrativestructures,andthisadvantageisusuallyexploitedbytheinsurgent,especiallyintheinitial violentstagesoftheinsurgency.Bymovingfromonesideofthebordertotheother,theinsurgentisoften abletoescapepressureor,atleast,tocomplicateoperationsforhisopponent.37 Anarmy,beitSoviet,American,PakistaniorevencolonialBritish,willprimarilyorganise,equipandtrain forconventionaloperationsagainstotherregulararmies,andtheemphasisintacticalbehaviourwill normallybeondestroyingtheenemyforcesinacombinationofoffensivemanoeuvreanduseof overwhelmingfirepower.Whereairforcesareinvolved,theywillfocusontheabilitytodestroytheenemy command,forcesandsupportinginfrastructurebybombardmenthopefullyaccurate. WhenarmedforceshavebeenemployedincounterinsurgenciesduringthePostWorldWarIIperiod, thefocushasinvariablybeenonlargescaleoffensivesweepoperationswhereanyresistancewas overwhelmedbyartilleryandairbombardmentfollowedbymeasuringthenumberofkilledbythe
36

FM324.2(FM908,FM798)TACTICSINCOUNTERINSURGENCY,21.April2009,2118,Table21.Insurgent strengthsandcountermeasures. 37 DavidGalula:CounterinsurgencyWarfare.TheoryandPractice.Westport,Connecticut1964,Chapter2:The PrerequisitesforaSuccessfulInsurgency:TheBorderDoctrine.ContrarytoGalula,SirRobertThompson:Defeating CommunistInsurgency:ExperiencesinMalayaandVietnam.London1966,didnotconsiderearlybordercontrol essentialforthesuccessofthecounterinsurgencycampaign(seechapter13JungleandFrontiers).

20

explosivesorcaughtinthesweep.Thatthepositiveperceptionoftheresultofsuchoperationswas fundamentallyflawedbecameclearwhentheinsurgencyworsened.TheU.S.ArmyandMarineCorpsonly startedtorelearnthattheprofessionalgutfeelingwasnonsensewhenthesituationinIraqwentfrombad todesperatein20042005. ThereafterU.S.ArmyandU.S.MarineCorpsusedtheclassicalcounterinsurgencylearningdeveloped onthebasisofFrenchunderstandingoftheir1954Indochinadefeat38andBritishpromotionoftheir Malayasuccess.39Theycombinedthoseideaswithboththeirown,deliberatelysuppressedlessonsfrom thesecondpartoftheVietnamWarandtheactualpainfulexperiencefromIraq.40Thestudiesand discussionsofthetwolandcombatservicesquicklyledtoamodernCounterinsurgencyFieldManualand duetothecriticalsituationinIraqtheysucceededinhavingitapprovedinmidDecember2006inspiteof Pentagons,halfthearmys,theairforcesandnavyscontinuedfrustrationsandbureaucraticresistance.41 Thefundamentalchangeinoperationalparadigmthatthenewmanualmeantcanbestbeillustratedbya slidetextfromthepresentationbyDoctorConradC.CranefromtheU.S.ArmyWarCollegeStrategic StudiesInstitutefromOctober2006.CranedoesthisclearlybyhighlightingtheCOINParadoxes: Themoreyouprotectyourforce,thelesssecureyouare Themoreforceyouuse,thelesseffectiveyouare Themoresuccessfulyouare,thelessforceyoucanuseandthemoreriskyoumustaccept Sometimesdoingnothingisthebestreaction ThebestweaponsforCOINdonotshoot Thehostnationdoingsomethingtolerablyissometimesbetterthanusdoingitwell Ifatacticworksthisweek,itmightnotworknextweek.Ifitworksinthisprovince,itmightnotworkin thenext Tacticalsuccessguaranteesnothing Mostimportantdecisionsarenotmadebygenerals42 However,theIraqicontextofthenewmanualwasclearintheverysuperficialandhalfheartedwayit coveredtheborderproblemunderlinedbyGalulaasquotedabove.Itonlymentionedthataninsurgency couldbetransnational,butillustratedthisbytheexampleAlQaida,anditunderlinedoptimisticallythat theinsurgentsdependenceonsupportfromsanctuariesacrossaborderwasaweaknessthatcouldbe exploited,ashecouldnotcontroltheborderarea,andbecausemodernprecisionweaponsmadehim vulnerableevenacrosstheborder.43 However,whentheU.S.ArmyhadcompletedthedevelopmentofaFieldManualforCounterinsurgency Tacticsinspring2009,theborderproblemwastakenfarmoreseriously,probablybecauseoftherealityin Afghanistan.ItnotedthatEthnicorreligiouscommunitiesinotherstatesmayalsoprovideaformof externalsupportandsanctuary,particularlyfortransnationalinsurgencies.Accesstoexternalsupport influencestheeffectivenessofinsurgenciesandthatinsurgenttrainingcentrescouldbeinanother
38 39

Galula:CounterinsurgencyWarfare. Thompson:DefeatingCommunistInsurgency. 40 DouglasS.Blaufarb:TheCounterInsurgencyEra.U.S.DoctrineandPerformance1950tothePresent.NewYork 1977andDavidH.Ucko:TheNewCounterinsurgencyEra.TransformingtheU.S.MilitaryforModernWars. Washington(DC)2009 41 FM324/MCWP333.5COUNTERINSURGENCY,15.December2010 42 TheEvolutionofAmericanCounterinsurgencyDoctrine.Dr.ConradCrane.10October2006 43 FM324,177,187and199.

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country.44InthefirstparagraphofasectiondedicatedtoborderareaissuesthemanualunderlinedthatIn additiontothetypicalexternalsupport,usuallysuppliesthataninsurgentgroupmayreceivefromacrossa border,insurgentsmayalsoestablishsanctuarybasecampsandconductcrossborder operationsfromadjacentcountries.Thismeantthatthebordercontrolwasunlikelytotakeplaceinan effectivewaywithoutsignificantU.S.involvement.Physicallysealingthebordermaybeimpossible, sincedoingsocouldincreasetherequirementforforcesandmaterielbeyondavailableresources.Placing forcesorbarriersateverycrossingandentrysitemayalsobeimpossible.The2006optimismhad vanished.Bythesuggestion:Establishorconveneavillageortribalcouncilfrombothsidesoftheborderto identifyandsolveissuesthemanualactuallyrecognisedtherealityofcounterinsurgencydividedbythe DurandLine.45

FromtheKunarborderdistrictinlateautumn2009.Scoutsfrom2ndBattalion,503rdInfantryRegiment(Airborne) providessecurityduringasearchoperation(politifront.files.wordpress.com)

However,evenifthemanualhasnowbeenamendedtoincludeabetterunderstandingofthetransborder problems,thisdoesnotreallyimprovethesituationverymuch.Onecannotrealisticallyhopetoprevail witheventheidealtacticalmanualaslongasarealisticstrategythatcoversbothAfghanistanandPakistan ismissing,withinteragencyandinteralliedeffortsthatremainfundamentallyunbalancedand uncoordinated,andwithaPakistanieffortsouthofthebordercontrolledbyacontradictorystrategicand anachronistictacticallogic.

44 45

FM324.2,253and279 Ibid.,BorderAreas,369to383

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From optimism towards collapse.

Abelatedandlimitedeffortnowabouttoend:PakistanisoldiersincontinuingsanitizingoperationsinSouth Waziristanthissummer(2010).(southwaziristannews.newslib.com)

Timeaffectseverythingandinfluencesalldecisions.46Theborderisouralbatross.47Time.Thefinal dimensionissoobviousthisitinvitesneglectbytheoriststimeisundoubtedlytheleastforgivingof erroramongstrategysdimensions.48 CrucialtimehasbeenwastedbytheinternationalcommunityinbothAfghanistanandPakistan.Inthebest caseitstillremainsanopenquestioniftheinsurgencyinbothAfghanistanandthecentralpartsofPakistan linkedtothewildPashtunborderareacanstillbecontained.UsingGilMeromsanalysisinHow DemocraciesLoseSmallWars.State,Society,andtheFailuresofFranceinAlgeria,IsraelinLebanon,and theUnitedStatesinVietnam49asthebasis,thereisnotmuchhope.AccordingtoMerommodernliberal democraciesarenearlycertaintofailinprotracted,limitedwars.FirsttheSouthKoreansandnowthe DutchwithdrewfromAfghanistanafterthecollapseofpoliticalwill.Thedifficultiesofthegovernmentsof Germany,France,Australia,Canada,UnitedKingdomandtheU.Stosustainpublicsupportfortheir deploymentmeanthatonlyafewmoreyearsareavailabletomakeAfghanistanstableandstrongenough todefenditself. Theconstantlyused,buttotallyflawedargument,thatwehavetriedandfailedsince2001(ratherthan 2006)reinforcethepressureforearlywithdrawalasdoestheconstantuseofthewordvictoryasan

46
47 48

FM324.2(FM908,FM798)TACTICSINCOUNTERINSURGENCY,129.

SeniorofficerfromtheU.S.82ndAirborneDivisioninMarch2008:Seth:IntheGraveyardofEmpires,p.258. ColinGray:ModernStrategy.Oxford1999,pp.4243. 49 Cambridge2003

23

objective.However,theconstantintensificationofthefighting,especiallyinsouthwesternAfghanistan, withincreasedNATOlossesdrivestheperceptionthattheeffortishopeless.50 Late2010,therestillseemedtobeasmallwindowofopportunityleft.Firstly,asmentionedinitially, thereisnothingthatindicatesthatthetribalPashtuninAfghanistanandPakistanarefundamentally differentfromthemajorityofotherhumans.Theytooseekimprovedopportunitiesfortheirchildren, betterhealthcare,improvedinfrastructure,betteropportunitiesforemploymentandfairandjust treatmentfromthelocalrepresentativesoftherulersatthesametimeastheycombinetheiraspirations withasound,sceptical,conservativeattitudetochangeandwithanaturalwishtobeabletoinfluence localdevelopment.TheonlylikelydifferenceisthatPashtunexperiencewithlocalandcentralrulerswill tendtomakethembothjustlyextrascepticalandgratefulforevensmallconvincingandstable improvements.Thechallengeistobeabletosupplythatlittleextrabettergovernmentandthepeaceto achieveprogress.ItshouldnotbeimpossibletocompetewiththeTalibanandothergroupsthathave nothingmoretoofferthanastrictapplicationoftheSharialawandregressiontoautopianpast.Theinitial reactionsofthepeopleofWaziristanliberatedbythePakistaniArmydidconfirmagainthatPashtunsare likeeverybodyelse.51 TheotherpositivedevelopmentthenweretheindicationsoftheincreasingwillingnessoftheU.S.from 2008onwardstouseitsleveragetoconvinceallsidesandespeciallyPakistanisecurityagenciestostop GreatGamingandthereaftertoseeandtreattheinsurgencyaswellasthecounterinsurgencycampaign asone.Itwasnoteasy,becauseitwouldrequirethetotalterminationofmorethanthreedecadesofnave supportofthePakistaniarmedforcesthathadonlybeenendedgraduallysince2004.Akeyobstacleto progressevenifthishappened,however,wasthatthecoordinatedandcombinedeffortcouldnotbring realprogressifitremainedlimitedtoasecurity(military,intelligenceandpolice)effort.Tohavealasting effectitmustextendtopoliticalreforms,goodlocalgovernmentandsomeeconomicdevelopmentinthe Pashtuntribalareasonbothsidesoftheline.Thedailynewsfromsummer2010underlinedthatwewere stillfarfromthatstage,evenintheareawherethePakistanisecurityforcesthenmadeavisibleeffortdue totherebellionsproximitytoPeshawarandIslamabad.52 Now,inearly2011,thecontinuationofeffectivePakistanisecurityoperationsagainstradicalIslamistsin theBorderlandseemshighlyunlikely.TheassassinationofthePunjabiGovernorSalmanTaseerearly2011 andtheopenpublicsupportforhismurdererintheyoungerpartofthePakistanielitehascastratedthe PPPgovernmentanddemonstratedthattherebellionisgainingcontrolofthecorepartsofthecountry.It isadevelopmentthatevenanothermilitarytakeoverisunlikelytocontrol,consideringthe35yearslong alliancebetweenthearmyandtheradicalclergy.ThesourceofthemainsecurityproblemfortheWest andtheAfghangovernmentisnolongerthePashtunBorderland.ItisthechaosandlikelyMilitantIslamic controlofanucleararmedPakistanstillalliedtoChina.

50

CharlesA,Miller:EndgamefortheWestinAfghanistan?ExplainingtheDeclineinSupportfortheWarin AfghanistanintheUnitedStates,GreatBritain,Canada,Australia,FranceandGermany. 51 BriefingWaziristan:Thelastfrontier.TheEconomist,January2nd2010. 52 E.g.thenewsitemsaboutAmericandronestrikesandPakistanioffensivesbySyedShoaibHasaninBBCNews, Karachion24.6.2010,inNEWKERALA.COMon30.6.2010andDAWN.COMon11.7.2010.

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Final remarks

SalmanTaseersassassinMalikMumtazHussainQadriarrivestotheRawalpindicourthousewithrose petalsfromhissupporters(http://www.heraldsun.com.au/) Toconcludethearticlesshortsketch:formorethanahundredyearswehavewitnessedtheemployment oftribesfromtheIndoAfghanBorderlandasrebelauxiliaries,deliberatelykeepingtheareabackwardin thedevelopmentofgoodgovernmentandthelocaleconomy: 1) BytheEmiragainsttheBritish,employingreligiousactivismthenaslater. 2) BytheBritishasapotentialguerrillaagainstaRussianforwardmove. 3) BytheGermanswithoutsuccessinWorldWarI. 4) ThereafteragainbyfirsttheEmirandthereaftertheIndianCongressPartyagainstBritishcontrol. 5) ThenbythePakistanisinafailedcoupattempttogainfullcontrolofKashmir. 6) ThenagainbytheleaderofthenewrepublicanAfghanistanagainstaweakenedPakistan. 7) ThereafterbythePakistanimilitaryleaderswithmassiveU.S.andSaudisupportagainsttheSoviet invadersconsolidatingtheirdomesticholdonpowerbyadeliberatealliancewiththeradicalIslamic forcesinPakistanandamongthePashtunsonbothsidesoftheborder.

25

 8) AfterthewithdrawalofSovietsthePakistanisecurityeliteemployedthenowavailableresourcesto seekasubservientregimeinKabulfortheGreatGameagainstIndia,aneffortthatsucceededwith theTalibanvictoryof1996andtheuseofthetrainingbasesinthePashtunBorderlandinthe insurgencyinKashmirthatculminatedintheopenwarof1999. 9) ThispolicyofthePakistanisecurityelitecontinuedafter2001inparallelwiththeofficialsupportfor U.S.andotherWesternoperationstopacifyandrebuildAfghanistan,nowwithanadditional insurgencycentreintheTalibancoreareaaroundQuetta.Nothingreallychangeduntilacoupleof yearsbackwhentheIslamicinsurgencyturnedagainstitsPakistanielitesupportersandWestern interestsinthelargecities,whereterroristcellscouldoperatefromtheiremigrantlabourPashtun communities.WiththeassassinationofSalmanTaseerandtheclearandeffectivepublicsupportforhis assassin,theproblemisnolongerlimitedtotheborderland. Lookingbackonthepastcentury,theonlynoveltyistheregionalandevenglobalambitionsandreachas wellasthepoweroftheinsurgencyfromthecradlesinthePashtunareas.

26