Research Note 82-21

CREW PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGING ARMOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS: STUDIES OF CREW SIZE AND METHODS OF FORECASTING HUMAN FACTORS

Roy C. Campbell, Elaine N. Taylor, and Charlotte H. Campbell SHuman Resources Research Organization

ARI FIELD UNIT AT FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY

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Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
January 1982 3

Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.

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3.

Research Note 82-21
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TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

CREW PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGING AROoEPNSSES STUDIES OF CREW SIZE AND "
7.

Final Report
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METHODS OF FORECASTING HUMAN FACTORS A E STFR-MTRD(KY)
AUTHOR(*)

-82-2
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(*)

*
9.

Roy C. Campbell, Elaine N. Taylor, and Charlotte H. Campbell Human Resources Research Organization 300 North Washington Street Alexandria, Virginia 22314
CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10.

Contract No. MDA 903-80-C-0529
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2Q263743A794
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U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333
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January 1982
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58
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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Research performed by HumRRO, Fort Knox Office, P.O. Box 293, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121, and monitored technically by Robert W. Bauer of the ARI Field Unit at Fort Knox.
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on revere. aide if necessary and identify by block number)

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Armor Tanks Crew size
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Manpower forecasting Human factors forecasting

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and identify by block number)

* The purpose of this research was to examine (a) the effects of operating a lightweight armor combat vehicle with crews of varying size, and (b) the effectiveness of two methods of forecasting human factors and training requirements for the same weapon system.- These objectives were pursued in separate studies though both dealt with a conceptually new, lightweight, highly mobile, armor combat vehicle. The lack of good criterion performance data weakened the research and led to a reliance on questionnaire data. (n

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In Study 1, experienced armor crewmen responded to questions about the impact on system performance of reductions in number of crewmen from four to three or two. The opinion data together with results of a literature review suggest that, if a combat vehicle design employs automation and control-anddisplay redundancy well, three men in a crew may not only be ample but perhaps superior to a four-man crew; a reduction to two men would, in the judgment of the experts, be too extreme, producing some degradation in system effectiveness and crewman confidence. In Study II, estimates of personnel requirements for the experimental weapon system were made by armor experts who were provided documents descriptive of the system but who had no first-hand experience with it. Their estimates, regardless of the kinds of descriptive materials used, did not differ significantly from judgments of the same requirements made by crewmen experienced with the weapon system. In task areas where estimates of time to perform were compared with observed performance time, the armor experts tended to overestimate time to perform; the shorter the actual time, the greater the overestimate.

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Jr. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 5001 Eisenhower Avenue. Director TRAINING RESEARCH LABORATORY U. Campbell Human Resources Research Organization Submitted by. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Department of the Army January 1982 Army Project Number 2Q263743A794 Manned Systems Integration Approved for public Moms. Elaine N. Campbell. Virginia 22333 Office. Haggard.. "ii . and Charlotte H. Chief ARI FIELD UNIT AT FORT KNOX.S. distribution unlimited. Taylor. O'Neil. Donald F. Alexandria.'%7: -77%* - Research Note 82-21 CREW PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGING ARMOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS: STUDIES OF CREW SIZE AND METHODS OF FORECASTING HUMAN FACTORS Roy C. KENTUCKY Approved by: Harold F.

O'Brien. William C. v . and advised on matters of practical and scientific concern. The specific objectives were to design. MDA 903-80-C-0529. Robert W. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). reviewed all plans and procedures. Taylor. Schmidt. and Campbell. Richard E. He monitored all phases of the work.S. Army and Marine. and pilot test moving platform gunnery techniques.. secured the participation of armor experts who provided the per- formance estimates. whose cooperation and support were consistent despite other demands on time and energies. an Interim Report" (Taylor. "Armor Weapon Employment Parameters: Human Factors Methodologies Applied to Small Crew Performance Estimates. 1982).7- Dr. the cooperation of the five test crews. Much of the planning and development work on Part I preceding that reported here is covered in an earlier report. The principal results of Part II are reported in "Development and Evaluation of a Stabilized Gunnery Training Program" (Harris et al. Harris. other than the authors.PREFACE This is the final report on Part I of a two part project: Research on Armor Weapon System Employment Parameters: Small Crew Performance Estimates and Moving Platform Stabilized Gunnery Training Techniques. HumRRO staff. who contributed to this part of the project were James H. The Project Director was Dr. Part II of the project was concerned with training techniques for moving platform stabilized gunnery. particularly LTC David Anstice (UK) and SFC Michael Ganoung. 1981). develop. Osborn and Susan N. . Special acknowledgement is due the HSTV(L) Test Group. Elaine N. is what made the project possible. This work was performed at the Fort Knox Office of the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) under Contract No. arranged support from the Armor Combat Vehicle Technology (ACVT) Test Group. ARI Contract No. And finally. Bauer of the ARI Field Unit at Fort Knox was the Contracting Officer's Representative. MDA 903-80-C-0529 with the U. Harris.

....... ..... . .. Results .............. ............ ..... .... ............ 39 .... 1 1 STUDY I.................. -.......................... .. Opinion Data ........ ......... ....... ...... ... STUDY II.... .......................... .......... .... .... ........ METHODS OF ESTIMATING CREW PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS .....TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ..... APPENDIX A lo .. .......... . .. 19 22 22 Purpose ................. 33 33 Subject Matter Questionnaire. Validity of Estimates ............... ........ ............. .......................... .... Empirical Data.... 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 10 12 17 Purpose....... Empirical Data ........................... 22 23 25 26 26 32 ...... REFERENCES ........ Method ............ .... .. Reactions to the Estimation Methodologies....... . ............... Opinion Data...... ............... ........ Comparison of Estimation Groups .............. Method ..... CREW SIZE REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATING LIGHTWEIGHT ARMOR COMBAT VEHICLES ......... ...... . ................... .. Estimation Methods....... Discussion .. Results...... - Data Collection ........................................... ............. ................... Discussion ........ ................ Literature Review........... Background. ... .. ........ ... Literature Review........VERSION 36 SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE--TEST CREW .......... ..

.. ...... . .............. .................. ........... ESTIMATED COMMAND AND CONTROL DIFFICULTY DURING HSTV(L) GUNNERY WITH A TWO-MAN CREW AS COMPARED TO A THREEMAN CREW . ESTIMATED PROBLEMS IN TARGET HAND-OFF BETWEEN HSTV(L)S AS COMPARED TO CONVENTIONAL VEHICLES . ........ ... EXPECTATION OF PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HSTV(L)S WITH THREE-MAN VERSUS TWO-MAN CREWS .... 16 TABLE 12 JUDGED FEASIBILITY OF MAINTAINING VEHICLE SYSTEMS AND SECURITY IN A STATIC LOCATION FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD (8 HOURS) WITH ONE CREWMAN DISMOUNTED .. ........... .......... MEAN ELAPSED DRIVING TIMES (MIN:SEC) FOR TWO-MAN AND THREE-MAN HSTV(L) CREWS IN OPEN AND CLOSED HATCH OPERATIONS . ENVIRONMENT ... ESTIMATED COMMAND AND CONTROL DIFFICULTY ON CONVENTIONAL TANKS AS COMPARED TO HSTV(L) WITH A THREE-MAN CREW .......... .....- .. ............... ..... . ESTIMATED TRAINING TIME REQUIRED TO FAMILIARIZE EXPERIENCED TANKERS ......... 14 TABLE 8 14 TABLE 9 15 TABLE 10 15 TABLE 11 ........................TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) LIST OF TABLES Page TABLE 1 VEHICLES WITH DESIGN FEATURES IDENTIFIED AS ADVANTAGES TO HUMAN OPERATORS .......... ....... NUMBER AND TYPE OF QUESTIONS MAKING UP THE SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE ........ .... BEFORE-OPERATIONS PMCS AND CREW SIZE .. ESTIMATED PROBLEMS IN TARGET HAND-OFF BETWEEN HSTV(L)S WITH THREE-MAN VERSUS TWO-MAN CREWS ...... . 13 TABLE 6 ............ 7 TABLE 2 8 TABLE 3 TABLE 4 TABLE 5 . ........ MEAN RANKINGS OF CREW COMBINATIONS FOR A COMBAT .. 27 ....... OF DESIGN . 13 TABLE 7 ESTIMATED COMMAND AND CONTROL DIFFICULTY ON THE HSTV(L) WITH A TWO-MAN CREW AS COMPARED WITH A THREE-MAN CREW........... .... ...... LOCATION OF CREW MEMBERS ON THREE-MAN VEHICLES BY YEAR . JUDGED EFFECT OF REDUCTION IN CREW SIZE ON CONFIDENCE IN WEAPON SYSTEM ...... ................ ... .............................. 16 TABLE 13 17 TABLE 14 24 TABLE 15 . ....... .....

... ........ . .U o TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) LIST OF TABLES Page TABLE 16 ESTIMATED TRAINING TIME REQUIRED FOR EXPERIENCED TANKERS TO LEARN BASIC OPERATION ... 32 34 TABLE 23 -a a:......... .... TANKERS TO BECOME PROFICIENT ..... ESTIMATED TRAINING TIME REQUIRED FOR EXPERIENCED ....... ........... ..... .. .... ... 30 31 28 TABLE 17 28 TABLE 18 29 TABLE 19 TABLE 20 29 ....... ESTIMATED TRAINING TIME REQUIRED FOR INEXPERIENCED TRAINEES TO LEARN BASIC OPERATION .. DIFFICULTY OF PERFORMING SELECTED DRIVING OPERATIONS ON DIRT ROADS AS COMPARED WITH OTHER TANKS .......... CONTENT AREA .. ESTIMATED TRAINING TIME REQUIRED FOR INEXPERIENCED TRAINEES TO BECOME PROFICIENT ..... ..... PERCENT OVERESTIMATION OF PERFORMANCE TIMES .............. TABLE 21 ....'-•TABLE 22 TIME TO PERFORM SELECTED TASKS ..... . |~ I......... COMPARISON OF OSD AND SMEE RESPONSES BY QUESTIONNAIRE ...... ..

many questions arise concerning the potential effectiveness of a vehicle manned with fewer than four crew members. Designing a vehicle for fewer crew members can result in a number of other advantages: * A smaller vehicle with a lower silhouette and less target exposure area. a program of tank development was initiated in the early 1970s to determine what technological advances should be incorporated into a design of the next generation of tanks. a formal understanding was reached by the Army. * Lower fuel consumption. which position should be omitted? Once omitted. In consequence. Current U. and driver. * Less weight. an automatic loader? How can the resultant workload on individual crew members be assessed? This last is a vital question. the ACVT program has devoted much effort to concepts of high mobility and agility. and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency committing them to a joint program of research and development. or even longer. One way to achieve high mobility and agility. modernization. * Lower training costs. loader. the Marine Corps. tanks are manned by a tank commander.. in 1976. how will the tasks performed by that crew member be allocated among the three remaining crew members? Is reduction beyond three crew members feasible? Can some of the tasks be performed by introduction of new equipment. The Armored Combat Vehicle Technology (ACVT) Program was established in 1972 to conduct studies aimed at exploring and exploiting the latest technology. It is anticipated that combat of the future may require continuous operations for 24 or 48 hours.S. * Lower production cost. * Fewer crew members at risk. and sustainability.CREW PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGING ARMOR WEAPON SYSTEMS: OF CREW SIZE AND METHODS OF FORECASTING HUMAN FACTORS STUDIES INTRODUCTION Background The Army has set three major goals for the 1980s: readiness. The advance in anti-armor capability has generated considerable interest in the development of tanks that are highly mobile and agile. e. If the crew is reduced to three members.g. In recognition of these goals. -testing While reduction in number of crewmen is an attractive opinion. * Simplification of air transport and increased strategic deployability. gunner. is to design a small vehicle that requires fewer personnel than the conventional four-man crew of current tanks. presumably. * Potential increase in total number of systems fielded. How effectively will fewer crewmen be able to sustain prolonged periods of operation? . More recently.

Obtaining such data requires a methodology for estimating human performance requirements in emerging man-machine systems. During the course of this project. Since the HSTV(L) can be operated by either a two. one of the vehicles being studied in the ACVT program was the HSTV(L) [High Survivability Test Vehicle (Lightweight)]. 4 2 .or three-man crew. or generally agreed upon methodology is available for making such estimates. information obtained from the vehicle operators could be used to validate methodologies for estimating manning and training requirements by subject matter experts who were familiar only with written and graphic descrip- tions of the vehicle. validated. These estimates will aid in assuring that the man can operate the equipment efficiently and effectively and that the equipment has the least adverse effect upon the man. In addition. during the development of Mission Element Need Statements. the other pertaining to methods of forecasting performance requirements for emerging armor systems.Answers to such questions cannot wait until equipment is in production. Thus. planned and conducted to serve separate purposes and are therefore reported separately here. Unfortunately. and at the time a concept is approved for experimental development. Preliminary estimates for manpower. reported here are the results of two studies: one pertaining to the number of crewmen needed to operate effectively lightweight armor combat vehicles. a 19-ton vehicle equipped with a 75mm gun and an automatic loader. Studies need to be performed throughout the development cycle of new equipment to provide program managers and design engineers with data that will help in making optimum decisions from among alternative design concepts. Such studies can help to avoid costly omissions and mistakes. the testing of this vehicle provided an opportunity to study selected aspects of crew performance for two different crew sizes. they were conceived. no single. training and continuing deployment costs of new systems are required at the first stage of the development cycle. Baker (1980) points out that 70% of the life-cycle decisions on a new equipment item will have been made by the time a concept is approved for experimental development. Despite empirical data shared between the two studies.

The second area of focus was on literature pertaining to crew size. (b) required no more than a crew of three to operate. Purpose The purpose of this study was to examine the advantages and disadvantages of operating a lightweight armor combat vehicle like the HSTV(L) with crews of varying size and configurations. Literature Review The literature search was concentrated on the period 1970 to present. the literature was reviewed on small." . . CREW SIZE REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATING LIGHTWEIGHT ARMOR COMBAT VEHICLES The conceptually new weapon systems being developed by the ACVT program have reduced armor protection in order to increase mobility and reduce size. crewserved. . 3 ". while this debate is unlikely to be resolved in the near term. the opinions of armor experts and experienced HSTV(L) crewmen were obtained.or three-man operation--that provided a useful opportunity to evaluate empirically the operational capabilities of the vehicle when operated by crews of different sizes.. the HSTV(L) offered a ready test bed for its controlled exploration. The ideal number of men in a tank crew has long been a matter of debate within the armor community and. The first was type standard vehicles. Method A three-part approach was taken in studying the effects of crew size and configuration. empirical data was collected comparing the performance of crews of varying size and configurations and third.STUDY I. The vehicle can be operated by either a two.. second. Special emphasis was to be placed on comparing two. in addition to the relatively lightweight 75mm gun and automatic loader.versus three-man operation and different combinations of two-man crew positions. It is precisely this feature of the HSTV(L)--two. a hunter-killer sight which will enable a commander to transfer his sighting of a target to the gunner or driver who will take the target under fire while the commander searches for another target. lightweight armor systems. and keyed to two areas. First. as well as developmental and test vehicles meeting three criteria: (a) weighed between 15 and 25 tons. The HSTV(L) has. . and (c) possessed an anti-tank capability.or threeman crew. . ..

once with the hatch open and once with the hatch closed. and two crew members. Driving. * . three. gunner. because of the commitment of the HSTV(L) to other priority tests. 1981). and correctness of deficiencies recorded. The four-man crew consisted of a tank commander. and driver. though inactive. 2 3 4 . 2 again once in each hatch position.versus three-man crews on the ability to drive and maneuver the HSTV(L). however. three three-man. each crew ran the course twice with a full (three-man) crew. very little performance testing was done.Empirical Data An extensive set of field comparisons of two-man versus three-man crew performance on the HSTV(L) was planned (see Taylor et al. and the two-man crew of a tank commander and driver. loader. The vehicle commander. and twice with a two-man crew. At two designated points on the course the crews were to stop the vehicle and move it into defilade. The M60AI was used because of the limited availability of the HSTV(L). was present in the "two-man" configuration to act only in case of emergency.. cross-country terrain with a 30-50 meter visibility. one of each size. 1 These crew performance tests were planned with the expectation that the HSTV(L) would be made available on a dedicated basis for conduct of the tests. otherwise they were instructed to run the course as quickly as possible without violating safety restrictions. Two crews made four runs of a one-mile course. PMCS. The runs were timed and the crews were debriefed after all runs were completed. These data were not collected. moderately vegetated. The effects of crew size on Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) were explored using M60A1 tanks3 and crew sizes of four. The crews were instructed to perform the first 37 steps of before-operations PMCS following the TM and to record (but not correct) any deficiencies on a DA Form 2404 (Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet). the three-man crew of a tank commander. Opinion Data A third source of data on crew performance as a function of crew size was the opinions of experienced armor crewmen. Records were kept of the time required to perform. An attempt was made to evaluate the effects of two. Nine crews (three four-man. were assigned to each tank. gunner. and since collection of such data had to be scheduled around other priority ACVT tests. one on driving and one on preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). and driver. The approximately oval course was about one-fourth hard surfaced dirt road with the remainder rolling. Three crews. completeness of number of entries on the 2404. three two-man--a total of 27 crewmen) performed PMCS on three M60Al tanks. Following a familiarization run. Later changes in ACVT program plans preempted this commitment of the vehicle to crew performance testing.1 Two crew performance tests were run.

again. of the questions asked are: "Place an x at the point on the scale that indicates how difficult command and control will be for two-man crews on the HSTV(L) during gunnery. and Seyfert. The 1979-1980 Annual Jane's Armor and Artillery provided the most up to date documentation on combat vehicles for countries of the world. only responses to 18 questions (number 21-30 and 35-42.Upurposes . what was available described hardware capabilities rather than performance of man and machine as a system. four for two-man. and crew confidence. almost all of it was of a technical or engineering nature. For of this study. Jane's Armor and Artillery. crew size. One group consisted of 40 E-6 and E-7 gunners and tank commanders with an average of about eight years experience on tanks who had been exposed to descriptions.t-a A- aA %: . six (two crews) of whom were Army and nine (three crews) of whom were Marines. Very little information was found on the methodology of vehicle development and. five concept vehicles described in the "Armored Combat Vehicle Technology Study" (Puuri. and crewmen opinions third. was included in the review. empirical data second. Results Research findings on crew size and performance in lightweight armor combat vehicles are presented in three parts. Literature Review While much information was available on vehicles. of the HSTV(L). Seventeen of the vehicles are for three-man crews. the Swedish S-tank. 1980) and selected by the HSTV(L) test group were reviewed. All HSTV(L) crewmen responded to the questionnaire on completion of their HSTV(L) service. Appendix A) were considered. 4J - 5 . A twenty-second vehicle." Or "Given a two-man crew for the HSTV(L). The other group comprised the 15 tankers (five three-man crews) assigned to the HSTV(L) test program. and anti-armor capability. how would you combine the operators?" Respondents.Examples Questionnaire. Performance data. extended operation.a. communications. In addition to data on the 22 vehicles extracted from Armor and Artillery. These questions covered such issues as the anticipated effect of reducing crew size from three to two on command and control. Responses to the questionnaire were obtained from two groups of experienced armor crewmen. concentrated on hardware capability and design rather than crew use or performance. Questions pertaining to crew size and expected impact on various areas of crew performance were included in a questionnaire (Appendix A) designed for use in Study II of this report (see pages 23-25) for a description of questionnaire development and administration. elimination of the loader position from the conventional fourman tank crew appears to have come about because of technological advancements in the state-of-the-art of automatic loaders rather than an analysis of four. For example. From this document. where available. though outside the guidelines on weight. and one for one-man. 21 vehicles were identified that met the criteria outlined earlier on weight.versus three-man crew functions. in one form or another. Results of the literature search are presented first. Mottin.

1 Protection from engine or operator compartment fires is provided on seven vehicles and automatic fire warning systems are present on three of these. In the event that an NBC environment is encountered. seven vehicle descriptions had no information on fording capability. Armor Magazine. The location of crew members for three-man vehicles was reported with sufficient consistency to do a simple analysis by time. the drivers have been located in the hull. K C. Armor and Artillery does not provide exactly the same information for each vehicle. both crew members are located in the turret. Duplication of displays and controls for driving operations are present on two vehicles. For crews of less than four men they may have particular impact. For example. For example. Although an official publication of the U.S. that before 1975 the designs for armored personnel carriers did not typically include turrets. while duplication of displays and controls for target engagement is a design feature on eight. Twenty-one articles from Armor Magazine were reviewed. five descriptions provided no information on the presence or absence of an NBC protective system. Army Armor Center. that the location of commanders and gunners has changed in recent years. Many listed vehicles have appeared in different versions or have been equipped with kits or modifications not reflected in the table. Regardless of year of design or type of vehicle. The clearest indication of this is found on armored personnel carriers. The duplication of displays and controls has implications for rest-work cycles and for backup of one crew member by another. and five can ford to a depth of at least one meter. Because armored personnel carriers. Thirteen vehicles can swim (some of them require a kit and advance preparation). automatic systems reduce the number of details that operators must otherwise monitor.! The summaries on the 22 vehicles and five concepts were reviewed in terms of five design aspects that could be viewed as advantages to the crew members. ten vehicles have a protective system against such conditions and three are equipped with automatic detectors. 6 . Each of the features included in Table 1 should improve the overall effectiveness of a combat vehicle and a number enhance the environment in which crew members are expected to operate. A summary of known advantages by design aspect by vehicles is given in Table 1. However. The original plan was to tabulate selected design features according to a division by year of initial development. In quite a number of instances the presence or absence of a particular feature is not mentioned.. There is some suggestion. The data on these vehicles were arbitrarily divided to provide nine vehicles designed prior to 1975 and eight designed after that date. have been considerd a means of transportation for troops intended to dismount for combat. a further division was made to compare these vehicles to "other" vehicles (see Table 2). for the five vehicles designed most recently. however. It should be noted. in spite of the very small number of vehicles considered. IThe data in Table 1 focus on basic design features. historically.

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8 .C aGunner location not given for one vehicle in the Pre-1975 group. Includes a Loader rather than a Gunner.TABLE 2 LOCATION OF CREW MEMBERS ON THREE-MAN VEHICLES BY YEAR OF DESIGN Crew CeP Position tnHull APC D Vehicle and Pre-1975 Turret 1975 and After Hull Turret 3 - 5 - - Ga C 1 3 1 -- 5 5 Other Vehicles D 6 - 3 - Ga C 2 b2 4 1 2 ~Combined APC and Other D G 9 2 5 - 8 2 1 - 5 4 6 7 . ]i bRadio Operator rather than a Gunner.

The principal criticism of the S-tank concerns its fixed gun which requires that the vehicle be stationary and pointed directly toward a target for target engagement. While Riggs (Mar-Apr 70) defines speciality tanks in terms of terrain. Berge (Mar-Apr 73). Perhaps the best known light tank incorporating a three-man crew is the Swedish STRV 103S commonly referred to as the S-tank. whether they are pro S-tank or not. most writers consider the speciality tank to be defined by function and the primary function put forth is that of a tank destroyer or infantry support vehicle. touches on the background of the design. The following provides a synopsis and conclusions of the review of pertinent armor articles relating to crew size from January 1970 through June 1980. One thing is clear. It is in actuality a two-man tank with the capability of emergency one-man operation (Ogorkiewicz. the design was a result of Sweden's reliance upon conscript service for self defense. This situation dictated that training time from mobilization to deployment be kept to a minimum.Armor Magazine does not necessarily reflect official position or endorsement of the articles by the Armor Center. states that four men are the minimum that can effectively operate an MBT. a reduction in crew size as well as training time was needed. Jul-Aug 75). while maintaining that MBT weight must be reduced. however. It is unclear whether the number of people in a crew is determined by state-of-the-art design technology or whether crew size considerations are used to influence design. Ritgen (Nov-Dec 72) sees the greatest problems in tank design being centered around weight and the future MBT as a 40-ton vehicle with a two-man crew. to develop lightweight tank destroyer vehicles with emphasis on evolutionary development. It does. Shioritz (Nov-Dec 70). describe the S-tank as innovative (Williams. To accomplish this. Ogorkiewicz. May-June 75). Elimination of the loader on the S-tank accomplished both. in those articles in which a smaller number of crew members is discussed: A debate on light versus heavy tanks (and the ramifications on tank speed and agility attendant to this debate) inevitably follows. . provide a forum for the exchange of ideas relating to armor and to the thinking on tank design within the armor community. Ogorkiewicz (Jul-Aug 75) is a particular booster of the vehicle because the adoption of a three-man crew allows a reduction in weight and silhouette.and three-man crews are often considered for such speciality applications. however. Some writers propose specialty tanks. that it is technically possible to have heavy tanks with superior mobility and that the main argument for a light tank lies in the cheaper cost. The S-tank has been operational since the early 1970s. in a discussion of the technical characteristics of the tank. Two.S. considers that this problem has been exaggerated. In part. however. Almost all who have discussed this vehicle. Hunt (Sep-Oct 75) states that weight is not the decisive factor that others imply. Turner (Sep-Oct 75) and Ogorkiewicz (Jul-Aug 75) see a requirement for the U. Ogorkiewicz (Jan-Feb 73) maintains that reducing the number of crew members increases tank agility by reducing reaction time. An examination of articles in Armor Magazine over the past ten years failed to provide explicit information on the role that crew size plays in tank development.

05 The HSTV(L) has provisions for a rear-mounted television monitor which was not installed on the test vehicle. agility.7. The mean of the four runs by the three-man crews was 4:30 as compared to 4:00 for the two-man crews. if designed specifically for reliability and ease of maintenance. He suggests that a vehicle. Soviet. The British experience with small. on the average a tank's weight increases by 15% and its size by 13% during development. by way of reputation. This difference of nearly half a minute is not statistically reliable. The times ranged from 3 minutes 33 seconds to 4 minutes 45 seconds. Foreign armor developments are of interest because most current lightweight and three-man tanks are foreign. during the two-man runs. growth allowances for weight and size at the concept stage are unrealistically low. -7 C7 . 1 even if it were it could not be unequivocally attributed to crew size since all two-man runs came after those involving the three-man crews (counterbalancing the order of crew size was precluded by other testing considerations). low silhouette. and in some cases simplicity in French. and British designs which have been achieved by small and lightweight configurations.W. Luttwak (Jul-Aug 72) cites the Israelis' unfavorable experience with light tanks (AMX 13) in the 1967 war as evidence against further development of such vehicles. could be maintained by two crewmen. Helton (Jul-Aug 73) observes that early problems with the M551 stayed with the vehicle. However. For example. A frequent criticism of tank concepts with fewer than four-man crews is that they will not be maintained properly. Bowen (Jan-Feb 80) disputes this. even after the problems were corrected. Crews in neither configuration experienced any particular problems with maneuver except in one situation where. Starry (Sep 75-Feb 76) and Ogorkiewicz (Jul-Aug 75) both cite the speed. p < . Jan-Feb 70 and May-Jun 72) though the design is not without criticism (McArthur 1972). Starry (Jul 75-Feb 76) suggests that a nation's tank development tends to follow established trends and practices. 2 * I= 2 2. including components.165. changes in PM procedures and inspection and replacement philosophy. lightweight armored vehicles is considerable--they developed a whole family of such vehicles (Ogorkiewicz. rWilliams (Mar-Apr 74) discusses some valuable "lessons learned" from his review on tank development. Mean elapsed times for the eight runs of the driving course are shown in Table 3.- . the vehicle had to be backed out of a hull defilade position. outside assistance was needed in backing up because the HSTV(L) driver is completely blind to the rear. In the two-man runs. 10 . these vehicles are not without their detractors. He proposes that maintenance come to the tank. Ritgen (Nov-Dec 72) recommends a transfer of servicing and maintenance requirements to organizational maintenance to the extent that such requirements cannot be reduced through improved design. rather than the tank going to a maintenance shop. Empirical Data Driving.

Preference for a three-man crew predominated. PMCS.00 3.33 3.67 1. This was expressed even by one driver whose commander did not normally interact extensively with him.00 i!11 .67 12. TABLE 4 BEFORE-OPERATIONS PMCS AND CREW SIZE Crew Size Four-Man Three-Man Two-Man Measure Mean Time to Complete PMCS (minutes) (N=3) 22 (N=3) 38 (N=3) 38 Mean Number of 2404 Entries Mean Number of Deficiencies Omitted 4. Drivers felt restricted without the f"eyes" and guidance capability of the commander.00 3. There was no reported interaction between the driver and the gunner during the run of the course even though the HSTV(L) driver has restricted vision on the right (gunner) side. Time and quality of preventive maintenance checks and services as performed by crews of different size are summarized in Table 4.TABLE 3 MEAN ELAPSED DRIVING TIMES (MIN:SEC) FOR TWO-MAN AND THREE-MAN HSTV(L) CREWS IN OPEN AND CLOSED HATCH OPERATIONS L Crew Size Three-Man Crew Crew 1 Crew 2 Total Open Hatch 4:40 4:15 4:28 4:20 3:33 3:56 4:12 Closed Hatch 4:18 4:45 4:32 3:57 4:15 4:06 4:18 Total 4:29 4:30 4:30 4:05 3:54 4:01 4:15 Two-Man Crew 1 Crew 2 Total Total After all runs were completed the crews were debriefed.

response overwhelmingly favored the three-man crew (Table 5). "false-negative" errors are few. both groups of respondents indicated that command and control would be easier on the three-man HSTV(L) than on conventional tanks (Table 6).05 F (2. It is generally true.60. which crew combination they would select for a combat environment. for instance. the difference in mean defi2 ciencies omitted was not statistically significant.or four-men. And while two of the three-man crews located all the defects in this category. Reducing the HSTV(L) crew from three to two was seen as complicating the command and control process (Table 7). Both groups seemed to agree also that among the two-man combinations the Commander-Driver pair was the most preferred. The total possible DA Form 2404 entries was not determined since many inspection items are so judgmental. In nearly every regard a three-man crew was preferred to a two-man crew. Two of the three-man crews reported many more deficiencies than any of the other crews. To evaluate the accuracy of the PMCS checks. p > . both with 4 x2 p < . 2 3 IF (2. though only the EAC group mean was reliably different from the neutral or "no-difference-in-difficulty" point on the rating scale. the number of serious deficiencies (defects in the "Not Ready/Available" category) omitted were determined. differences in preference for the various two-man crew combinations were not evaluated for statistical reliability however. which resulted in a larger (but not statistically so) 3 mean number of 2404 entries for threeman crews than for crews of two. nor did any of the two-man crews.The four-man crews completed PMCS in an average of 58% of the time it took the three-man or two-man. four for another.6) = 8. and six for the third. Opinion Data The 40 experienced armor crewmen (EAC) and 15 HSTV(L) crewmen responded to several items in the questionnaire pertaining to crew size.05 F (2.6.96. Three such defects were determined for one tank. however. HSTV(L) crewmen as well as armor experts with only descriptive 4 information on the HSTV(L) ranked the three-man crew significantly higher (preferred) than any two-man crew combination. a statistically reliable difference 1 in performance time.05 38. When asked. p < .6) = 1. that the greater the number of entries the more thorough the inspection.05 4 '1 -- 12 . p > . When asked about the estimated difficulty of command and control on conventional tanks as compared to the three-man (HSTV(L). None of the four-man crews found all the known "Not Ready/Available" defects.9 for HSTV(L) group.6) (4) = f 4.8 for EAC group and 17.

05 1. !| 13 . TABLE 6 ESTIMATED COMMAND AND CONTROL DIFFICULTY ON CONVENTIONAL TANKS AS COMPARED TO HSTV(L) WITH A THREE-MAN CREW Group EAC HSTV(L) n 40 14 Meana 8. the neutral point on the 13-point difficulty scale.23* -4.15 37 13 al = most preferred. asterisk indicates a significant difference at the .05* + 2.2 SD 2.22 3. 4 = leaqr preferred bThe smaller ns are a result of some respondents failing to answer this question.04 tb -4.6 9.16 aScale of 1-13.23 Gunner Driver 3.97 3.0 Commander Driver 2.05 level using a two-tailed test.TABLE 5 MEAN RANKINGS a OF CREW COMBINATIONS FOR A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT Commander Group EAC HSTV(L) n b Gunner Driver 1. where: 1 = more difficult on HSTV(L) 13 = less difficult on HSTV(L) b~b Observed mean tested for difference from 7.39 2.02 + 2.62 Commander Gunner 2.53 2.

0 5.70 2. Command and control during HSTV(L) gunnery (Table 8) was judged to be slightly more difficult for a two-man crew than a three..41* -1.9 6.66 -2.54 2.12 3. 975 + 2.25 -3.05 level using a two-tailed test. 14 . the neutral point on the 13-point difficulty scale.73 + 2. where: 1 = more difficult on HSTV(L) 13 = less difficult on HSTV(L) Observed mean tested for difference from 7. TABLE 8 ESTIMATED COMMAND AND CONTROL DIFFICULTY DURING HSTV(L) GUNNERY WITH A TWO-MAN CREW AS COMPARED TO A TFREE-MAN CREW Two-Man Crew Driver-Gunner Group EAC HSTV(L) n 40 14 40 14 39 14 Mean a 4.05 level using a two-tailed test.34* -1.02 + 2.04* .74 t -4.TABLE 7 ESTIMATED COMMAND AND CONTROL DIFFICULTY ON THE WITH A TWO-MAN CREW AS COMPARED WITH A THREE-MAN CREW HSTV(L) Group n Meana SD t t. the neutral point 7.82 2. asterisk indicates a significant difference at the .6 SD 3.16 + 2.16 ascale of 1-13.02 + 2.5 5. though not reliably so by the group of HSTV(L) crewmen.16 Driver-Commander Gunner-Commander EAC HSTV(L) EAC HSTV(L) aa aScale of 1-13.94 2.02 + 2.02 + 2.16 + 2. where: more difficult on HSTV(L) bObserved mean tested for difference from 7.01 2. on the 13-point difficulty scale.7 6.975 EAC HSTV(L) 40 14 1 = 5.17 5. asterisk indicates a significant difference at the .47 -3.50 3.71* -1.9 5.91 t. This view was consistent regardless of the two-man combination being considered.

03 1. 24 11 More Prob. 9 1 Less Prob.33 *P < .33* 2 n 33 12 More Prob. Similar response was given to a question about problems expected in communicating between HSTV(L)s with three-man crews as opposed to two-man crews (Table 11).78* 11. 17 8 Less Prob.05 *15 . as a group respondents foresaw no problems in communicating between three-man crews but were of mixed opinion when it came to two-man crews." Both groups of respondents believed there would be fewer problems in handing-off targets between HSTV(L)s with three-man crews than between conventional vehicles but tended as groups to be less decisive on this question in comparing two-man HSTV(L)s with conventional vehicles (Table 9). 16 4 X2 (I) .05 TABLE 10 ESTIMATED PROBLEMS IN TARGET HAND-OFF BETWEEN HSTV(L)S WITH THREE-MAN VERSUS TWO-MAN CREWS Group EAC HSTV(L) n 36 11 More Problems With Three-Man 4 0 More Problems With Two-Man 32 11 X2 (j) 21.* : . that is. Target hand-off between HSTV(L)s was seen as more likely to be problematic with two-man crews than with three-man crews (Table 10).82* 8.0* •p < . TABLE 9 ESTIMATED PROBLEMS IN TARGET HAND-OFF BETWEEN HSTV(L)S AS COMPARED TO CONVENTIONAL VEHICLES Three-Man HSTV(L) Group EAC HSTV(L) Two-Man HSTV(L) X (I) 6.

TABLE 11 EXPECTATION OF PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HSTV(L)S WITH THREE-MAN VERSUS TWO-MAN CREWS

Prob. With Three-Man Group EAC HSTV(L) *p < .05 n 40 13 Yes 3 1 No 37 12 x2(1) 28.9* 9.31*

Prob. With Two-Man Yes 14 5 No 26 8 x2(1) 3.6 .69

When asked if they thought it would be possible to put a crew member off the vehicle on an outpost and maintain communications and weapon operations at a distance for up to eight hours, respondents indicated it would be possible with a three-man crew but may not be with a two-man (Table 12).

TABLE

12

JUDGED FEASIBILITY OF MAINTAINING VEHICLE SYSTEMS AND SECURITY IN A STATIC LOCATION FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD (8 HOURS) WITH ONE CREWMAN DISMOUNTED

Feasible With Three-Man Group EAC HSTV(L)

Feasible With Two-Man Yes 11 1 No 29 12 X2(1) 8.1* 9.31*

n
40 13

Yes 37 12

No 3 1

X2(1) 28.9* 9.31*

< .05

Finally, while respondents tended to believe that a reduction in crew size from four to three would not adversely affect confidence in the weapon system, they were divided in their judgments of the effect of a further reduction to two-men (Table 13).

16

TABLE 13 JUDGED EFFECT OF REDUCTION IN CREW SIZE ON CONFIDENCE IN WEAPON SYSTEM

From Four-Man to Three-Man Affect Confidence?

From Three-Man to Two-Man Affect Confidence?

Group EAC HSTV(L)

n
40 13

Yes 5 1

No 35 12

x2 (1)
22.5* 9.31*

n
39 13

Yes 21 7

No 18 6

2 X (1)

.23 .08

*P < .05

Discussion

Opinions of crewmen, especially in their written comments, revealed
strong preferences for crew sizes. The reduction of a tank crew from four to three men is seen by some as causing problems in target acquisition, maintenance and sustainability, and these problems are perceived to be

exacerbated when further reduction to a two-man crew is considered. Additional concern with two-man crews was evidenced in the areas of command and control and reaction to casualties. On the other hand, however,
several of the SMEE believed that with fewer crew members target engagement time would be less. Other perceived benefits in going to smaller crews were few; the majority of comments were negative. Yet it should be noted that in most functional areas these opinions were not based on actual experience

with the smaller crews.
Comments also indicated that respondents are distrustful of technology. Many expressed concerns about systems reliability and durability. This is important because reduced crew size is most likely achieved by technological advances. Backup systems and, in particular, manual redundancies for systems were prime concerns. It appears that the more sophisticated the technology the more distrustful many are of its working properly. This reaction should hardly be surprising. Most NCO field experience has included experience with automotive, gunnery and mobility system failures brought on by the hard use, even misuse, given tanks, and they have experienced first hand the inadequacies of the maintenance system. This skepticism is a legitimate area for study or training in the fielding of new high technology systems. At least one recent system, the

*

M551 Sheridan, "failed" because of the common perception that the vehicle
was "no good" when actual data were to the contrary. Hilton (1973) observed

17

that tankers' previous experiences did not adequately prepare them for the M551; initial problems stayed with the vehicle by word of mouth even after they had been corrected. Such experience must be remembered. As one respondent commented on the questionnaire, "A three- or two-man tank will not work because people don't expect it to work." These subjective reactions notwithstanding, there is little by way of hard data to shed light on the issue of optimal crew size for an armored fighting vehicle. That a vehicle like the HSTV(L) can be effectively manned by a crew of three is reasonably certain. Armor experts familiar with the HSTV(L) through either system descriptions or first-hand experience agreed that the vehicle with a three-man crew was probably more effective--at least from a command and control standpoint--than conventional vehicles with the traditional four-man crew. Preventive maintenance can probably be done as well but not as rapidly with fewer crewmen, but in the critical areas of target detection and target engagement no data--either analytic or empirical--were obtained on crew size. One interpretation of the opinion data is that the armor experts prefer a three-man crew to either a four-man or a two-man crew: that somehow four are too many, complicating perhaps the coordination required among crewmen, and two are too few, a matter of not enough eyes and hands to handle the work load. This interpretation is plausible if one bears in mind that it is relative to the HSTV(L), a vehicle designed for three-man operation. This is an important point: Judgments of optimal crew size cannot be made absolutely but must be made relative to the design, engineering and mission of a given armor vehicle. As the literature suggests, by automating some human functions and duplicating the displays and controls for others, crewman operations may at once be reduced in number and increased in flexibility. How far systems engineers can go in eliminating the human function depends of course on the nature of a system's requirements. A vehicle like the HSTV(L), which was designed for experimental operation by a crew of either three or two, offered a unique opportunity to evaluate with some precision the need for the third crewman (or, viewed another way, the cost of deleting the third crewman). But, because controlled of three- versus two-man crew operations on critical gunnery and tactical tasks were not made, valid conclusions about the relative effectiveness of alternative manning levels cannot be drawn. We are left with experienced judgment which indicates rather reliably that an HSTV(L) with a three-man crew is superior to one with a two-man crew in areas such as command and control, communications, target hand-off, and crewman confidence. As accurate as these judgments may be, in the final analysis the question is not whether a three-man crew is better than a two-man, but whether it is enough better to justify the price one pays for the extra man. A vehicle like the HSTV(L) apparently can be operated by a crew of two, and assuming manpower to be the premium resource more two-man than three-man weapon systems may be fielded (the ratio, in fact, is three to two) per unit cost. Thus, if an HSTV(L) operated by two men cannot detect, engage, or hit targets as well as one operated by three men, then one needs to demonstrate that the disparity is substantial and not easily offset by the savings in manpower. This issue cannot be resolved by expert opinion. It requires empirical test, an approach intended but not realized in this work.

-comparisons *

.

K

I,

18

based upon differences in contact to strike time and large advantages in concurrent observation. the Operational Sequence Diagram (OSD). Miller.STUDY II. Comparisons of the OSD provided a sound basis for recommending the two-man turret concept. . Rupe cites a number of others who have worked on this problem (Folley. reconnaissance and communication time. derived from engineering techniques such as operational process charts. how much training will be required . Rupe (1963) quotes the Commanding General. They prepared OSD for three mission segments for two and one man concepts of the turret. the methods for determining desirable function allocations and operator/crew workloads . provides a task analyst with information on discriminations. US Continental Army Command from a 1961 issue "When a new piece of equipment is of the "Army Information Digest": developed. His presentation of the method illustrates its usefulness in making decisions on allocation of functional requirements to a human operator or to a hardware component. Obermayer. the user is concerned with how many men will be needed to operate it. . In his report on predicting training requirements for future weapon systems. Finley. Finley and Muckler (1976) observe: "The problem is that very little research provides data on both operator/crew and system performance. actions. . leaves much to be desired. As a result of this extensive review they conclude that methods for precise prediction of human performance in man-machine system tasks is a continuing and fundamental problem." Kurke (1961) provided a method. decisions. Shapero. The method is useful for establishing sequence of operational requirements. and information exchange necessary to operate a mechanism. and Knowles). Meister and Muckler (1970) reviewed well over four hundred documents spanning more than three decades of research and development to evaluate methods and tests that could predict human performance in man-machine systems. They found the literature dealing with this problem to be unstructured and conceptually fragmented. and input-output rate load imposed upon operators. Bauer and Walkush (1976) employed the OSD method of analysis to determine how many crewmen would be needed to perform weapons and leadership functions within a turret of an armored reconnaissance vehicle. Variants for each concept were also developed to reflect firing of a main gun or a missile." Also: ". This method of analysis. for mapping behavioral requirements in task performance. elapsed time in task performance. Powe. . His method required the identification of basic functional performance requirements for each of the system 19 . Carrier and Skandera. Bertone. METHODS OF ESTIMATING CREW PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS Methodological problems in estimating personnel and training requirements have been recognized for some time. More recently. Hughes (1979) investigated a method for predicting personnel requirements for two different tank systems by comparing their common and unique job characteristics. .

and operational requirements and other human factors aspects for lightweight armor vehicles were selected for modification and validation in this study. criterion data could be obtained for comparison with the estimates. Because other navigation equipment selected for this study was in the Air Force inventory. maintenance and training requirements for new equipment. and validate a methodology for forecasting minimum crew and training requirements during early design phases of lightweight. The equipment description was limited to information that would be available at an early phase in design of the system. the authors concluded that experienced Air Force technicians can estimate the following with a satisfactory degree of accuracy: maintenance man-hours. crew size. Research is needed to develop. Comparisons of task profiles were then made by plotting the total percentage of tasks containing a particular descriptor.g. training equipment and facilities and recognition of design features that might have adverse impact on maintenance capabilities were inconclusive. and overt responses) tasks were analyzed to obtain task characteristic profiles.. tasks as opposed to their surface characteristics commonly specified in descriptive task analysis. These were: (1) the Operational Sequence Diagram (OSD) method originally described and illustrated by Kurke (1961). Estimates regarding requirements for training. However. Two candidate methods for assessing and projecting manpower. Sauer and Askren (1978) describe a method that relies upon subject matter experts to obtain predictions about manpower. The Operational Sequence diagram (or OSD) method of analysis is best summarized by Kurke (1961): q 20 . Based upon the comparisons. mediating processes. improve. The two methodologies are described below. tools. and later modified by Bauer and Walkush (1976) to the solution of an armored vehicle manpower problem: and (2) the Subject Matter Expert Estimation (SMEE) method described by Sauer and Askren (1978). driving and gunnery capabilities) of the weapon systems to preclude costly modifications during vehicle production phase. a task by descriptor matrix was analyzed using a method of cluster analysis to produce prediction tables that reflected the basic structure of job performance for each tank system.i. Operational Sequence Analysis. Each of the methods described above relies heavily on specialists such as psychologists or training experts. they observed that the technicians seriously overestimated training time requirements. controls. In their study. Hughes makes a number of suggestions for improving the methodology and concludes that it can be useful to determine optimum job structure and to address selection and assignment policies for emerging weapon systems. Using a set of descriptors (stimuli. and task difficulty. Finally. and for providing early estimates of characteristics (e. sixty technicians from two Air Force maintenance specialties were asked to provide estimates based upon an engineering description of a radar navigation system. skill level. trnining. instruments. career field. highly mobile armor weapon systems.

The third step is to select the appropriate kinds and quantities of technicians to serve as expert estimators. Through development of OSD and especially through analysis on the vehicle. Each task can be described in terms of the number (or percent) of task steps representing requirements for action. in analyzing communications requirements between groups of men and machines. but who were not particularly knowledgeable of or trained in the OSD method. Briefly. The fifth step is to analyze the data. The SMEE method has been investigated in considerable detail by Sauer and Askern (1978). An important variation on the OSD method was introduced in the present study.- 4engineering * * 21 ." * -* *o. Second. training experts or others in specialized disciplines to apply the OSD.- . and fine visual discrimination. the need for perceptual-motor skills. This description is based on the engineering data and specifications available during early phases of system design. receiving information. " . Additional data can be derived from such analysis. and decision making. the OSD method relied on the use of psychologists. finger dexterity. recording." Kurke's description can be extended to derive quantitative information from OSD of task performance. an description package is compiled for the equipment or system under study. the approach: S. In its various forms the OSD can be used in several stages of system development. OSD provides a basis for allocating system functions between man and machine and for further subdividing the human functions among crew members. An OSD also is useful in depicting the extent to which time-sharing enters performance. can be identified. The technique consists of five basic steps. monitoring. and in coordinating information-decision-action sequences between interfacing subsystems. the interplay between machine and crewmen or among crewmen--whether at the level of function. As applied by Kurke and later as applied by Bauer and Walkush. for example. During this study it was decided that the effort would focus on determining if the OSD method could be employed by individuals who possessed some related subject matter expertise in armor. . transmitting information. "The OSD is a type of process chart modified for the peculiar needs of human factors work. human factors problems and limitations become apparent. The fourth step is . and in providing estimates of task performance time. task or subtask--may be studied in some detail. a questionnaire is designed to collect the specific human resource estimates desired. OSD can provide a method for comparing the effect of different crew sizes on task performance responsibilities and task time. Moreover. requires relatively little in terms of external support and therefore represents a relatively low cost method for producing human resource estimates. Finally. First. . Its primary use has been in determining man-machine interaction sequences. to collect the desired estimates. Such data provide means for comparing the human performance demands of different tasks. Subject Matter Expert Estimation.

The procedures for data collection included four activities: 1. Prepare subject matter questionnaire. comparisons were to be between methods. 4. Estimation Methods Engineering Description. training. Prepare engineering description.The expert estimation of manpower. The third group from which data were collected was the HSTV(L) crews. Detailed descriptions of these activities and the collection of estimation data from two groups using the engineering description and operational sequence diagrams are contained in Armor Weapon System Employment Parameters: Human Factors Methodologies Applied to Small Crew Performance Estimates (Taylor. the other consisting of the tables and figures referred to in the first. and Campbell. highly mobile armor weapon system. L The first three activities were performed concurrently. only a brief summary of methodology used with these two groups is presented here. of the HSTV(L). Specifically. the intent was to compare estimates made by armor experts using the two methods. and where feasible between the methods and actual system performance data. The engineering description was modeled after one used by Sauer and Askren (1978) and was prepared in two volumes: one being an engineering description. between each method and comparable estimates made by experienced HSTV(L) crewmen. Prepare operational sequence diagrams. supplied with data on but no experienced with the HSTV(L). 3. the HSTV(L). Collect data. estimates of crew performance requirements for that weapon system. 1981). Purpose The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of two methods of forecasting human factors and training requirements for a light. Harris. 2. The material was separated to enable subjects to refer to tables and figures without leaving the text. and operational requirements of equipment systems does not depend on the availability of prototype or actual equipment. and then validate those estimates against criterion data derived from observed HSTV(L) performance or reports from experienced crewmen. The method requires only an engineering description of the proposed system. The engineering description was prepared from three sources: 22 . * [] rg Method The general approach taken in this research was to obtain from armor experts. The impact of alternative designs on human resources can be assessed using the SMEE approach. predominantly textual.

3. The tasks were analyzed for the three-man crew to reflect accessibility of subsystem components. A breakdown of the questions by area. fire control system. and a general system description. and operational aspects of interest and formatting questions to elicit the types of estimates required. ER-10298A. The engineering description contained sections on descriptions and data. taking into account readiness of access to parts of equipment and distribution of the workload of the missing crew member between the remaining crew members. communication system. When the OSD for the three-man crew were completed. Conferences with Armored Combat Vehicle Technology (ACVT) test personnel and AAI technical representa- tives. Subject Matter Questionnaire The questionnaire was prepared by selecting the manpower. primary gunner's functions. the variants for two-man crews of driver-gunner. driver-commander and gunner-commander were developed. AAI. April 1980. Tasks were analyzed for each two-man crew combination according to the guidelines used above. Preliminary OSD were prepared for each task depicting step-by-step performance by and interactions among crew members. Operational Sequence Diagrams. 1 AAI is the firm that built the HSTV(L). These analyses were required to approximate an equally shared workload within the restrictions of the system and to maintain vehicle command and control functions traditional to the tank commander. and distribution of workload among the three crew members. I1 and III. Parts I. The questionnaire (see Appendix A) comprises 42 questions in seven functional areas. September 1980. 2. 23 . primary commander's functions. Preliminary Operation and Maintenance Manual for High Survivability Test Vehicle (Lightweight) HSTV(L).1. These were reviewed by the HSTV(L) test group or the AAI technical representatives and revised on the basis of their comments. training. HSTV(L) Fire Control System Training Manual. 1 February 1980 with Change 1. including sample questions is presented in Table 14. that is. controls and displays available to each crew member. preventive maintenance checks and services. The OSD were prepared to provide the OSD group of subject matter experts with a detailed understanding of crew performance of 16 driving and gunnery tasks. primary driver's functions.

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one being objective HSTV(L) performance data. So. The questionnaire only was administered to a third group consisting of the 15 crewmen (two Army and three Marine crews) participating in the HSTV(L) testing ongoing at Fort Knox. The participants were asked to review materials pertaining to the HSTV(L) and then to complete the questionnaire. the first called the SMEE group and the second called the OSD group. With the exception of performance times for five tasks. The quality of the data can be enhanced by selecting judges experienced precisely in the content area being explored. The reasons for this included the following: * The activities of the test crews (CRIT group) in the vehicle were very restricted.Data Collection Data were collected from 40 highly experienced gunners and tank commanders (E-6 and E-7 Sergeants) over a ten day period. objective HSTV(L) performance data in areas relevant to the questionnaire were not obtained for reasons already mentioned (see page 4 ). Thus the balance of the validation effort rested with the subjective criterion data. Subjective data in the form of observations and judgments of those experienced in system operation is a weaker but more feasible criterion. 1 Estimates made by experts using the OSD or SMEE methods were to be validated against two kinds of criteria. The OSD group received the same materials plus a description of the step-by-step performance and crew interactions for selected driving and gunnery tasks. the other being comparable subjective data obtained from HSTV(L) crewmen with first-hand experience in the functional areas covered on the questionnaire. These crewmen served from six to ten months with the HSTV(L) program. Firing was done under rigidly controlled conditions following a set procedure. They were advised to read all the materials before making their estimates. not all crewmen were qualified to provide criterion data on all items. The questionnaire administrator briefed the participants on the purpose of the research project prior to giving verbal instructions for the questionnaire and evaluation. The SMEE group received the engineering description for the HSTV(L) and a supporting document of tables. all completing the questionnaire at the end of their HSTV(L) service. although the CRIT group completed the entire questionnaire. This group was to serve as the initial criterion group (CRIT) against which SMEE and OSD group estimates were compared. They were also encouraged to refer to the materials as often as they wanted to during the session. down a predetermined 1 One crew member departed early and did not return the questionnaire. The 40 subjects were divided into two groups. drawings and photographs. Sauer and Askren (1978) used this type of source extensively. 25 . They established the credentoils of groups of judges in different categories and then used the groups separately or in combination depending on their established credentials ralative to a particular category.

only a limited number of the tasks or situations included in the questionnaire were actually performed by the crew during the test period. the CRIT group questionnaire results were limited primarily to areas of training and performance times and driving difficulties. * The crews always performed as full crews. driving difficulty. and time to perform selected tasks. C Questionnaire Data. Finally. participant reaction to the estimation methods are presented.course.00 and estimates greater than the CRIT group yield accuracy values greater than 1. No tactical exercises with the vehicle were attempted. Validity of Estimates Validities of performance requirement estimates was examined by comparing the SMEE and OSD groups' questionnaire results with those of the GRIT group and with actual performance data. at known targets. and (b) that obtained from respondents who actually served in the duty position referenced in a given question. In short. Twoman or one-man crews were not tried in situations where three-man crews would normally perform. This is followed by an analysis of the comparative accuracy of the two estimation groups. and commanders commanded. drivers drove. for example. The most complete set of comparative data was in the area of training time. the driver responses to questions about TC activities. driving on snow or through wooded terrain. nor were.00. that is. " *the Results Results bearing on the overall validity of crew performance estimates are presented for the areas of training time. There was little if any cross training between duty positions. gunners gunned. responses for items pertaining to two-man crew operation. " Crew members generally performed only in their designated roles. and handing off targets to another vehicle were not analyzed. For these reasons it was necessary to use data from the test crews selectively. firing at moving targets. Accuracy values (Sauer and Askren. As a result. Estimates that perfectly predicted the CRIT group training time have an accuracy value of 1. *' 4 26 . Crew maintenance was not conducted.00. Data to be analyzed were limited to (a) that pertaining to activities or tasks in the questionnaire that the crew was known to have performed or experienced during the test period. Estimates below the CRIT group training time yield accuracy values below 1. Thus. 1978) were calculated as time estimated by the OSD or SMEE group divided by the time established by the CRIT group.

53 3.00 .1 4.8 4.50 1.3 4.2 GUNNER Range (Hours) 1-720 1-80 1-2 (4) (n) OSD SMEE CRIT (19) (19) Accuracy Value 1.3 1. These values are presented for each of five levels of proficiency in Tables 15 through 19. Medians were used because of the many skewed distributions of estimated time.4 7.57 -- Median (Hours) 7. TABLE 15 ESTIMATED TRAINING TIME REQUIRED TO FAMILIARIZE EXPERIENCED TANKERS DRIVER (n) OSD SMEE CRIT (19) (19) Accuracy Value 3.8 Range (Hours) 1-720 1-40 2-80 Median Estimated Familiarization Time Median Criterion Familiarization Time 27 .0 COMMANDER Range (Hours) 1-720 1-60 1-336 (5) (n) OSD SMEE CRIT (19) (19) ( 5) Accuracy Value 1.70 -- Median (Hours) 4.- Accuracy values were computed for estimates of time-to-train in a total of 13 task categories for each of the three duty positions.06 -- Median (Hours) 7.8 4.

4 4.0 Range (Hours) .5 8.06 -Median (Hours) 12.8 4.5-29 .88 2.25 -Median (Hours) 7.0 8.5 8.7 Range (Hours) 1-72 1-34 1-80 (5) = Accuracy Value Median Estimated Time for Proficiency Median Criterion Time for Proficienc% 4 28 .3 4.5-40 Accuracy Value Median Estimated Time for Basic Operation Median Criterion Time for Basic Operation TABLE 17 ESTIMATED TRAINING TIME REQUIRED FOR EXPERIENCED TANKERS TO BECOME PROFICIENT DRIVER (n) (20) (19) Accuracy Value 3.23 .7 4.50 .11 Median (Hours) 18.78 2.5 Range (Hours) .5-200 0-24 1-336 (5) COMMANDER OSD SMEE CRIT (n) (20) (19) ( 5) Accuracy Value 3.2 4.67 -- (4) Median (Hours) 4.0 Range (Hours) .6 40.6 79.TABLE 16 ESTIMATED TRAINING TIME REQUIRED FOR EXPERIENCED TANKERS TO LEARN BASIC OPERATION DRIVER OSD SMEE CRIT (n) (20) (19) Accuracy Value 2.5 2.0 GUNNER OSD SMEE CRIT (n) (20) (19) Accuracy Value .0 1.93 1.0 Range (Hours) 1-72 1-72 12-672 Range (Hours) 1-40 1-48 2-5 OSD SMEE CRIT (3) a (5) COMMANDER OSD SMEE GRIT G (n) (20) (19) Accuracy Value .22 Median (Hours) 20.5-200 .13 2.10 -Median (Hours) 7.5-200 1-20 1-4 GUNNER OSD SMEE CRIT (n) (20) (19) Accuracy Value 1.

1 8.5 25.5 12.2 1.0 Range (Hours) 1-280 1-40 1-20 (4) (n) OSD SMEE CRIT (20) (20) Accuracy Value .46 .97 .45 -Median (Hours) 8.5 16. TABLE 19 ESTIMATED TRAINING TIME REQUIRED FOR INEXPERIENCED TRAINEES TO BECOME PROFICIENT DRIVER OSD SMEE CRIT (n) (20) (20) Accuracy Value 10.40 5.5 GUNNER Median (Hours) 15.0 Range (Hours) 1-272 2-140 24-672 Accuracy Value = Median tstimated Time for Proficiency Median Criterion Time for Proficiency Note: Commander position not evaluated.32 -- Median (Hours) 36.TABLE 18 ESTIMATED TRAINING TIME REQUIRED FOR INEXPERIENCED TRAINEES TO LEARN BASIC OPERATION DRIVER OSD SMEE CRIT (n) (20) (20) Accuracy Value 5.78 -=Median Range (Hours) (5) 1-280 1-40 1. 29 .0 28.50 -Median (Hours) 32.0 GUNNER Range (Hours) 1-272 2-140 1.5-25 (3) (n) OSD SMEE CRIT (20) (20) ( 5) Accuracy Value .5 3.67 9.5-960 Accuracy Value Estimated Time for Basic Operation Median Criterion Time for Basic Operation Note: Commander position not evaluated.5 80.

93 .96 1.51 1. the experience of thearea CRIT in group was limited to driving dirt roads.77 and the SMEE group 2. the OSD group overestimated the time required in eight of the 13 categories. and 4. Brake Maintain Steady Speed Turn * Accelerate Drive in Daylight Mean Normal 5. but only slightly so.88 1.91 1.37 1.2 5.8 4.Overall.00) while overestimate percentages are theoretically infinite.1 4.4 4. so these data were accordingly restricted.3 5. ~But Driving was another which usable criterion data on was available.07 . OSD and SMEE groups respectively. Similarly.55 .8 4.0 4. The on underestimates is 100% (accuracy value of 0. 4. Overall. 30 .18 1.67 (967% error).11 (89% error). OSD overestimates ranged in accuracy from 1. 5.02) across the driving tasks than were OSD responses (1. the OSD group had an average accuracy value of 2. the SMEE group overestimated in eight of the situations and underestimated in five.8 Median Rating OSD SMEE (n=20) (n=20) 5.50 (850% error) and underestimates ranged from . A comparison of the three groups is shown in Table 20.0 4.5 5.78 (22% error) to . underestimated in four and had perfect agreement in one.2. Overall.8 for CRIT.97 (3% error) to .2 4.06 (6% error) to 9. The SMEE group estimates were more accurate (1.8 4.02 aRated on a scale of 1 = Extremely Difficult to 6 = Extremely Easy 'Ilimit 'It should be noted that the use of accuracy values as a measure of discrepancies will tend to favor underestimates as appearing more accurate. for the listed driving tasks the groups rated the HSTV(L) at the high (Extremely Easy) end of the scale as compared with other tanks.23 (77% error).5 4. the discrepancies of both groups were large.5 5.4 5.and underestimated.8 Accuracy Values OSD SMEE .5 3.04 1.8 5.16).8 4.5 5.2 5.8.0 5.98 .16 . 1 Discrepancies were computed as the average of the absolute values of the amounts of over.3 5.50 (50% error) to 10.8 4.29.87 1.07 . SMEE overestimates ranged from 1.96 1. TABLE 20 DIFFICULTY a OF PERFORMING SELECTED DRIVING OPERATIONS ON DIRT ROADS AS COMPARED WITH OTHER TANKS Driving Operations CRIT (n=4) Shift Gears SSteer. So while the SMEE group was slightly more accurate in estimating training times. underestimates ranged from .

*time Task Performance Times.50 2.14 Accuracy Value - Median OSD Estimate Time Actual Time *Times rounded 431 . Five of these tasks were later performed by the crew under test conditions and actual performance times were obtained.00 5. This is offset somewhat by the fact that the absolute error is relatively small on short tasks.00 for perfect agreement). Although the sample of tasks is too small for conclusive interpretation.00 9.50 6 21 2. the size of the discrepancy decreases. the OSD group grossly overestimates the times--up to 1400% in one case. time to perform the longer tasks is more accurately estimated than is time to perform the short tasks. TABLE 21 TIME TO PERFORM SELECTED TASKS Task Zero Muzzle Reference Sensor Calibrate Vertical Reference Sensor Boresight Fire Control System Unload Ammunition 5 rounds 26 rounds Actual Time* (Minutes) 1 3 4 OSD Accuracy Value 15. While the discrepancies are still large.4. As shown in Table 21. the indication is that very short tasks are likely to be overestimated by a greater degree than longer tasks. The OSD group was asked to estimate the required to perform 13 tasks using the task descriptions contained in the sequence diagrams. Examination of the times shows that as the actual time to perform increases. Accuracy values were then computed (again using 1.

some were school instructors. the SMEE group was not. Results of the analyses are summarized in Table 22 by the major content areas of the questionnaire Igroup TABLE 22 COMPARISON OF OSD AND SMEE RESPONSES BY QUESTIONNAIRE CONTENT AREA Content Area Training Driving Number of Items Analyzed five items five items Results of Analyses No significant differences between groups No significant differences between groups No significant differences between groups No significant differences between groups Significant difference between groups on two of the seven items Significant difference between groups on one of the seven items No significant differences between groups Maintenance Gunnery Command and Control four items one item (11 activities) seven items Crew Requirements Design seven items three items 32 . Questionnaire responses were compared for the two groups: analysis of variance F tests and t tests were used to analyze items requiring time estimates and ratings. Other materials were identical. Thus it was assumed that any difference between the groups in their estimates of crew performance requirements would result from access to the sequence diagrams. The groups were homogenous in experience and background. it is of interest to examine how the two estimation groups compared to one another. the OSD group was given the between the groups was one of methodology: sequence diagrams. Both were All were assigned made up of armor experienced NCO in grade E-6 or E-7. and others were assigned to operational units. some OSUT instructors. chi-square for items requiring the selection of options.Comparison of Estimation Groups While available criterion data for assessing the accuracy or validity of responses made by the two estimation groups were sparse. to the Armor Center. Fort Knox. The OSD had somewhat more armor experience than the SMEE group (mean of The basic difference 98 months experience versus a mean of 90 months).

Likewise. Of these. the questions were of the free-response type. When the OSD group was asked whether they used the Engineering Description or the Sequence Diagrams more in completing the questionnaire. Ninety percent of the two groups asked for more diagrams. Discussion Estimates of training times from the OSD and SMEE groups. and 70% reported using both equally. the median ranking on the amount of detail in the OSD package (7. illustrations. Second. Reactions to the Estimation Methodologies The 40 respondents in the OSD and SMEE groups were asked to evaluate the materials they used to provide the estimates. The Engineering Description was rated only midway between Not Very Useful and Very Useful (6. The OSD group was asked specifically about the Sequence Diagrams. Over the three cases the SMEE groups tended to prefer the commander-driver team whereas the OSD group was divided in its preference between the commander-driver and commander-gunner. 65% said about right and 33% said it was too short." and "proficiency. The three items for which differences were found pertained to preferred two-man crew combinations. The poor quality of these data may in part be due to the difficulty of estimating anything as person. the amount of detail in the Engineering Description was rated as "Sufficient. 5% the Sequence Diagrams more. about right or too short. When asked whether the Engineering Description was too long. However. As mentioned previously.14 Approximately 80% of the items in the questionnaire were analyzed for group differences.or situation-specific as training time but it may also be due to weaknesses in question format. Ratings indicated that they thought it was more useful than the Engineering Description (8. 25% reported using the Engineering Description more." "basic operation. less than 10% revealed significant differences between the two groups. varied too widely for any comparison to be madr between estimated and criterion times. the questions required interpretation of terms such as "familiarization. respondents could write in anything from minutes to months. and photographs. This kind of latitude in interpretation and response may have aggravated the range of responses.8 on a 13-point scale).5 on a 13-point scale) indicated that some respondents felt too much detail was included. the SMEE group was given only the former and the OSD group was given both.2 on a 13-point scale from Not Very Useful to Very Useful). Materials consisted of two types: an Engineering Description Volume and the Operational Sequence Diagrams Volume." terms that are imprecise at best. 6i 33 . First. as well as from the CRIT group." also the midpoint.

All three groups described the driving activities on the HSTV(L) as easy. In comparing the two methods of estimation. substantially more than the longest t1. as compared to those for training time may be merely the result of type of questionnaire items. the indication being that time was overestimated more for short tasks than for long. 2s task in this study. TABLE 23 PERCENT OVERESTIMATION OF PERFORMANCE TIMES Actual Time Task Zero Muzzle Reference Sensor Calibrate Vertical Reference Sensor Boresight Fire Control System Upload Ammo 5 rounds Discrepancy (% of Overestimation) 1400% 400% 850% 150% (Minutes)* 1 3 4 6 Upload Ammo . few significant differences were found. ratings of driving difficulty from the estimation groups were much closer to those from the CRIT group (see Table 20).'74 In contrast to the training time data. These errors of time estimation can probably be offset by (a) training judges to compensate for them. It should be noted that the driving difficulty items restricted responses to one of six Thus the apparent accuracy of these responses difficulty values (1 to 6). The diagrams have the potential for giving the reviewer an insight into the effects of * 34 L .26 rounds *Times rounded 21 114% It is interesting to note that Sauer and Askren (1978) reported a tendency for judges to underestimate performance times. It is not clear from a review of the Sequence Diagrams how they may have influenced estimates if indeed they did. compared to driving on other tanks. Tasks in that study took several hours to complete. Observed times to perform five tasks (Table 21) were grossly overestimated by the OSD group. Table 23 shows a comparison of actual task time with the percent of the overestimation. (b) restricting response options to a range of times nearer to that expected for actual task performance. Taken together these data suggest that judges tend to make greater errors of estimation at the extremes of the time-toperform scale--overestimating at the low end and underestimating at the high--than in the middle where they are reasonably accurate. or (c) both. This phenomenon is not inconsistent with the typical ogival response curve found in psychophysical work.

differing crew combinations. There was no indication that OSD participants typically conducted the review in that detail. Whether the diagrams were superfluous to the Engineering Descriptions or whether for reasons of format or technical complexity they were unusable by the NCOs in the OSD group is known. But in most cases variations in task performance are so subtle that they can be detected only after very careful comparison between the various crew compositions. Since the differences between the OSD and SMEE responses were relatively minor. little can be said about the effectiveness of Operational Sequence Diagrams. These possibilities should be examined in a more controlled way in any further evaluation of the OSD methodology. *not I 3 4 35 .

Defense Logistics Agency. 1982. Furlong." Army Research Development. 1979.L.E. Development and Evaluation of a Stabilized Gunnery Training Program. R.S.M. Alexandria.L. Virginia: Defense Technical Information Center.REFERENCES Baker.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.D. Hunt. R. Meister. September- :4 Kurke. "Evolution and Revolution in Tanks. 1976.G. Fitzmorris. 1980. Obermayer. Virginia: Human Resources Research Organization. E. M." Armor Magazine. 1970.I. T." International Defense Review. Crew Station and Skill Level Assessments for the MICV/ARSV Turret..H. Finley. D.T. Man to Machine. Berge." Armor Magazine. Hughes. A Comparison of the Human Performance Requirements for the M6OAl and M60A3 Tanks (Research Memorandum)." October 1975. January-February * . March- "Smaller Crews. J." Human Armor Magazine." April 1973. Human Performance Prediction in Man-Machine Systems. & Walkush. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. "The Tank Is Alive and Well. & Goldberg.L. NASA CR-1614. D. A. Hilton. J. & Muckler. January 1979. F.H.. Human Factors Research and the Development of a Manned Systems Applications Science: The Systems Sampling and a Solution (U). Volume I Technical Review.D.S. "Experimenting for Tomorrow's Combat Vehicles. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. R. Alexandria. Morrison. July-August 4 36 .J. R. Washington..T.. Army's Armored Combat Vehicle Technology Program: Blueprint for a Lightweight Main Battle Tank. "The U. "Operational Sequence Diagrams in System Design.A. S.M. Melching. W.. W." Factors.B. 1972." Defense Journal. USecond "The Army's Match Game: Quarter. (COL). (LTC).. C. "The Sheridan: Airborne Cavalryman's Big Punch. March 1961. A. Armor Magazine. & Muckler. Virginia: U. and Acquisition Magazine. 1976. Luttwak. D. 1980. Harris. (CPT). Bauer. July-August 1973.A.E. Virginia: U. L. Bertone.S. F. "The Turbine and the Swedish S-Tank. J. Bowen. Alexandria.C.W. R. Armor Magazine..W. NovemberDecember 1979. D.Problem Finley. Alexandria.

JanuaryFebruary. R. N. R. R. Striker. Scimitar. Armor Magazine." Armor Magazine. "Turretless Tanks. "The Commander's Hatch: Tank Design: Ours and Theirs. May 1979. *•1970. Ogorkiewicz. Turner. (CPT) "The Assault Gun Tank Destroyer. (LTC). T. W. 1963. Part I and Part II. Armor Magazine. R. & Campbell. & Askren.M. Thompson. The Prediction of Training Requirements for Future Weapon Systems. "Tanks for Non-Tank Country.D.W." Armor Magazine." Armed Forces Journal International.M." Armor Magazine.S. (COL). March-April 1976.B. Armor Weapon Employment Parameters: Human Factors Methodologies Applied to Small Crew Performance Estimates..C. "Future Tank Design. Ogorkiewicz. 1981. Harris. Ogorkiewicz.. Virginia: Human Resources Research Organization. "Lightweight Combat Vehicles: Can They Make It On the Modern Battlefield. June 1980.L." Armor Magazine. "A New Lightweight MBT. "Scorpion.. J. S. and Training Requirements for Proposed Air Force System .H.H. Sauer. July-August 1975.C. November- December 1972." January-February 1970. E." Armor Magazine. January- Armor Magazine. Virginia: Human Resources Research Organization. (CPT). Maintenance. H. D. Alexandria.McArthur. Brooks Air Force Base.Appendix A. R.N. D." September-October 1975. (COL). C. Texas: Air Force Systems Command." May-June 1972. Starry. J. Ritgen.M. September-October. Shiritz. November-December 4 37 . 1978. Alexandria. A Personnel Support System Research and Development Process Technical Report 83." February 1973. Jr. R. November-December 1975. Armor Magazine." Armor Magazine. Spartan. R. January-February 1970 and March-April 1970. "Scorpion Reconnaissance Tank.M.M. Taylor.A.S." International Defense Review. Rupe. Armored Combat Vehicle Technology Program A Closer Look. "The Future Main Battle Tank.N. "The U. "Letter to the Editor. p Ogorkiewicz. November-December 1972. Ogorkiewicz. Riggs. Validation of an Expert Estimate Technique for Predicting Manpower.

March-April 1974. Tracking and Hitting Performance. Aberdeen Proving Ground. "Tank Innovations. "Tank Analysis. Army Test and Evaluation Command.Stationary Target.S. Moving Gun Mount . 1970." *." Armor Magazine. U. Final Report on Material Test Procedure (AD-719 086). J. Maryland.Williams. J. Armor Magazine. May-June 1975. Williams. 3 *0 * 38 .

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