Continental Philosophy Review 32: 143–168, 1999. © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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On the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research
DIMITRI GINEV
Center for Culturology, Department of Philosophy, University of Sophia, Ruski 15 Str., Sophia 1000, Bulgaria

Abstract. The paper provides an overview of the hermeneutic and phenomenological context from which the idea of a “constitutional analysis” of science originated. It analyzes why the approach to “hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research” requires to transcend the distinction between the context of justification and the context of discovery. By incorporating this approach into an integral “postmetaphysical philosophy of science”, I argue that one can avoid the radical empiricism of recent science studies, while also preventing the analysis of science’s discursive practices from collapsing into the frames of radical anti-epistemological critique mandated by some hermeneutic philosophers.

In what follows, I want to suggest a hermeneutico-phenomenological conception of natural-scientific research with the aim of showing how a philosophical interpretation of rationality of science beyond epistemological foundationalism is possible. I should make clear at the start that I will not be dealing with a large class of (rather technical) questions concerning the relationships between philosophical hermeneutics and (what one might call) “post-foundational epistemology”. My concern in this paper is only with delineating a context of studying natural-scientific research, in which a specific hermeneutic fore-structure of doing such a research can be revealed. Following the phenomenological concept of “constitutional analysis”, I will call this a “context of constitution”, opposing it to the “context of justification” and the “context of discovery”.

1. On the very idea of the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research An important consequence of reformulating the transcendental phenomenology of consciousness’ intentionality in a hermeneutic phenomenology of “facticity” is the rise of a new paradigm of constitutional analysis.

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Transcendental ego no longer plays the role of a privileged site of meaning constitution. It is rather the totality where this constitution takes place. On the new paradigm of constitutional analysis, there is a kind of interpretation which is an intrinsic moment of all human activities. This kind should not be confused with the concept of interpretation as a specific epistemic procedure. From the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology, interpretation must be comprehended in the sense of a primordial existential act. The “primordial interpretation” brings to light the meanings constituted contextually within a particular activity. There is no meaningful Being-in-the world without interpretation. In the course of clarifying in what sense the projecting of understanding has its own possibility, Heidegger (1962, pp. 188–189) writes: “In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding.” In rejecting the idea of an ultimate transcendental grounding provided by ego’s time-consciousness, one focuses on the temporal-interpretative self-constitution of human activities. In this perspective, the “existential structure of the primordial interpretation” (i.e., the structure revealed through Daseinsanalytik) involves three moments which Heidegger calls fore-having (Vorhabe), fore-sight (Vorsicht), and fore-conception (Vorgriff). Fore-having is the background of familiar practices in which an “average understanding” of the situations of everyday concernful dealing is embedded; fore-sight provides the orientation of the everyday involvement in concernful practices; and fore-conception is the anticipatory grasp of what is supposed to be an outcome of the concernful practices. Thus considered, the existential structure of interpretation is a “hermeneutic fore-structure” of the modes of being-in-the-world. Accordingly, each human activity is predicated on a characteristic hermeneutic fore-structure. Heidegger’s elaborations on the nexus “understanding-interpretation” provoke an interesting ambiguity in the way of construing the notion of hermeneutic fore-structure. On the one hand, this notion denotes “everydayness” as a mode of being-in-the-world that has a pre-epistemological status. Speaking in terms of Sein und Zeit, everydayness is the primordial mode of existence characterized by the concernful “upon-which” of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something that is ready-to-hand. This pre-epistemological constitution of meaning (as the upon-which of a projection) gets its structure from a fore-having,

In this perspective. In particular. In transforming the readiness-to-hand into a thematically objectified presence-at-hand. but to the intrinsic organization of the modes of being-in-the-world-through-thematizingthe-world-theoretically as well. each epistemological specification of existence as characterized by a theoretical attitude of thematization presupposes a “modification” of everydayness. everydayness is opposed to all “epistemologically specified modes of existence” (represented typically by the different kinds of scientific research). The main theme of his early philosophy is the hermeneutic fore-structure of everydayness as “average existence” (durchschnittliche Existenz). the hermeneutic fore-structure can be construed in terms of the contradistinction between primordial being-in-the-world and epistemologically distinguished modes of existence. since only the analysis of this fore-structure provides an access to Being. there is no being-in-the-world led by epistemological principles and methodological norms of a given theoretical attitude that is free from discursive-practical everydayness. (To be sure. the distinction between the “pre-predicative as-structure of seeing of the ready-to-hand” and the “thematic-predicative as-structure of seeing of the present-at-hand” is applicable to the epistemologically specified modes of existence. it is a notion of a hermeneutico-phenomenological theory of everydayness. Thus. On this reading. and a fore-conception. because it threatens to dissolve “fundamental ontology” in a plurality of . This is why many important distinctions of Daseinsanalytik are to be applied not only to stressing the “existential primordiality” of non-thematizing behavior.HERMENEUTIC FORE-STRUCTURE 145 a fore-sight. the search for a hermeneutic fore-structure of a totality of (epistemologically distinguished) discursive practices is completely reasonable enterprise. The latter becomes “concealed” in the cognitive structure of the former. In this regard. Heidegger does not pay much attention to the “intrinsic everydayness” of these modes. The theoretical attitude of thematization “modifies” but does not eliminate everydayness’ hermeneutic fore-structure of meaning constitution. By this expression I mean a mode of being-in-the-world characterized by epistemic procedures of thematizing the world. On the other hand. an extension of hermeneutic phenomenology to secondary modes of existence would not be acceptable for the author of Being and Time. By implication. A regime of “everyday concernful dealing with the intramundane things” (illustrated typically by a scientific community’s everyday life) is to be attributed to each “secondary” (epistemologically specified) mode of existence. every epistemologically specified mode of existence remains based upon the concernful constitution of meaning.

heterogeneous electrochemical systems. Suppose that the process is carried out by a community engaged in studying chemical reaction networks. this extension would transform hermeneutic phenomenology into a kind of “interpretative anthropology” of the diversity of cultural forms corresponding to the secondary modes of existence). dissociation reactions. My efforts in this paper are concentrated entirely on the hermeneutic fore-structure of the normal-scientific everydayness (which I will call research everydayness). In trying to address this question. complex oscillations. (This is the guiding idea of Heidegger’s “existential conception of science” in Being and Time). scientific research is to be studied with respect to both meanings that a Heideggerian approach would ascribe to the notion of hermeneutic fore-structure. and therefore. it has an “existential genesis” from the ontologically primordial everydayness. Scientific research is an epistemologically specified mode of being-in-the-world. (iv) searching for formal techniques for a .146 DIMITRI GINEV existential analytics of the specified modes of being-in-the-world. the community’s members employ a wide range of discursive practices: (i) preparing reports of various kinds of chemical reactions (e. called by Kuhn a “normal science”. In particular.g. Consequently. Related to this everydayness. reactions at metal surfaces. From a hermeneutico-phenomenological point of view. etc. creating laser-illuminated systems. and so on). nonequilibrium steady states. In their research work. enzyme-catalyzed reactions. let me take as an example a particular situation of a hypothetical research process in chemistry. (iii) establishing specific patterns of dynamical behavior of reacting systems (in particular. and chaos). (ii) elaborating on experimental designs that can bring to light new data (e. there is always a hermeneutic fore-structure projected onto totality of discursive practices that build up the normal science’s kind of research of a given scientific community within a given scientific domain.g. Yet scientific research is characterized by its own everydayness.. This claim raises the question of how to distinguish between hermeneutic fore-structure and cognitive structure of scientific research. hermeneutic fore-structure is the notion of horizon of scientific research (carried out by the “collective Dasein” of a scientific community) as this notion is understood within the paradigm of constitutional analysis suggested by hermeneutic phenomenology. transient chemical oscillations in closed systems. The hermeneutic fore-structure is always projected onto the wholeness of practices involved in a certain kind of human activity. continuously stirred flow tank reactors. birhythmicity. bifurcations of limit cycles..). patterns of nonlinear behavior like bistability.

g... inclinations. Then. (vi) looking for new mathematical formalisms for reacting systems far from equilibrium. methodological codes of how to expand the domain through conceptualizing new empirical data (e.. ways of intersubjective experiencing. The interrelatedness of all these discursive practices informs the integrity of the scientific community’s research everydayness. thermodynamics). (Later I shall try to demonstrate that there are several ways of thematizing and analyzing this interplay as a repetitive hermeneutic cycling. one finds theoretical models of empirical data (e. Looking at this everydayness. and how to avoid ad hoc hypotheses (i.. and a fore-conception of doing research. explaining the “strange behavior” of chemical reactions in terms of nonequilibrium. (vii) repeating experiments with the intention of checking whether the experimental data confirm the existence of a specific pattern of dynamical behavior. data from biochemistry and geochemistry) and constructing new theoretical models. At this stage. which on their part presume a reading of the totality). hypotheses that restrict the domain’s empirical content in order to save the validity of certain theoretical models).g.HERMENEUTIC FORE-STRUCTURE 147 graphical description of dynamical behavior (like dynamical phase diagrams and crossshaped diagrams). models of nonlinear chemical reaction networks as dissipative structures). In the cognitive structure of such a domain. There are common meanings. They are recognizable only in the processuality of scientific research. and orientations which are inextricable from the self-constituting totality of discursive practices. they can only be thematized by reflecting upon the interplay between the totality of discursive practices and the structure of a scientific domain (following the example.e. a fore-sight.g. and for this one appeals to readings of particular practices. the hermeneutic cycling can be put in terms of part-whole relations: one is trying to establish a reading of the totality of discursive practices. anticipations. Yet one is unable to isolate these three moments as a static structure per se. What is constituted in the totality of discursive practices becomes (cognitively and socially) “institutionalized knowledge” of a scientific domain. (v) adjusting the new experimental data to theoretical models of the background knowledge. this would be the nonlinear dynamics of chemical reactions far from equilibrium) constituted gradually by accomplishing the practices. Furthermore. one can recognize within the interwovenness of practices a fore-having. These components of the . explanatory scenarios (e. implicit norms. I should like to point out that the totality of discursive practices is to be conceived as a text-analogue. (viii) checking up the formal consistency of the theoretical models.

The second direction is towards the “negativity” of this totality. Clearly. “Fore” refers rather to the pre-cognitive. however. the structure of knowledge in a conceptually. This distinction precisely defines the demarcational line between the hermeneutic fore-structure and the cognitive structure of scientific research. However. “Fore” here stands not for the presuppositional character of all cognition (in the sense of pre-understanding that accompanies each cognitive procedure. the interwovenness of discursive practices bears the character of a hermeneutic fore-structure. mathematically. with respect to the established cognitive structure of a scientific domain.148 DIMITRI GINEV cognitive structure (and the very structure as a whole) are complete and closed from epistemological and semantic points of view. Since these forgotten practices have a “negative presence” in the research process and can be (under circumstances) “reactivated”. a complete methodological code is that one which excludes the possibility of being enriched with new normative principles. The first direction is towards the “actual totality” of practices that gradually constitute a scientific domain. an aspect that is of prime importance for M. i. and “forgotten” in the research everydayness’ processuality. “sedimented”. ontological conditions of having a cognitive structure of experience within a given mode of existence. In this regard. one may draw the conclusion that the research everydayness both . Polanyi’s ideas). (In other words. To sum up. The point. in which components of the cognitive structure come into being. the processual totality of discursive practices. 1 (The thesis that research everydayness’ interwovenness of discursive practices is a hermeneutic fore-structure pulls the further analysis in opposite directions. a complete theory is that one which can no longer be improved by minor alterations. for instance. and fore-conception. and so on). for each component one can formulate epistemological and semantic criteria for completeness. one must not confuse the processuality of constituting the structure of scientific knowledge with the very structure. theoretically and methodologically articulated scientific domain supervenes on the horizon informed by a scientific community’s fore-having. Of course.e. fore-sight. The hermeneutic fore-structure does not chronologically precede the cognitive structure. By contrast. the cognitive structure of each scientific domain is liable to further modifications and revisions. the practices that become gradually pushed out. remains always “open for further readings”. Thus. they build up “scientific community’s unconscious”. is that at any stage of the domain’s development one can get a reconstruction (in epistemological and semantic terms) of its structure as a complete and closed structure.

I think it would be useful to set out more clearly what is the significance of this study for the attempts of universalizing hermeneutics as alternative to the “epistemological project” of modern philosophy. Later I shall return to this critique of the cognitive sociology). A genuine universalizing of hermeneutics would require a commitment to the view that there is no human activity which is not primordially predicated on a dialogical constitution of meaning. Eger 1995. The programs of studying the discursive-practical constitution of scientific knowledge guided by the tenets of radical empiricism [like those of the cognitive sociology of science] pay attention exclusively on the research everydayness as “actual totality”. The latter is to be provided by the constitutional analysis of hermeneutic phenomenology. In other words. fore-structure is not “before”. As a consequence. To be sure. To put it in other words. This claim contradicts the central tenets of the analytical philosophy of science. but it is the very dynamics of the cognitive structure. Nevertheless. and can only be thematized by following the methodological standards. Before going on to see how the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research can be thematized and analyzed. Ginev 1997a. or enzyme-catalyzed reactions) cannot be regarded as “partners in a dialogue”.HERMENEUTIC FORE-STRUCTURE 149 reveals [as “actual totality”] and conceals [as “negative presence”] the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research. genetic drifts. . In opposing naturalism. the studies into the hermeneutic fore-structure of natural-scientific research are contributing to the genuine universalizing of hermeneutics. Hermeneutic fore-structure does not also mean a “hidden essence” behind the cognitive structure. Crease 1995. This fore-structure is rather the discursive-practical processuality of “structuring the cognitive structure”. they miss important aspects of the formation of scientific domains. the enquiry of the totality of discursive practices as a hermeneutic fore-structure demands a completely other type of reflection. epistemological representationalism and foundationalism. an important “dialogical dimension” of natural-scientific research is stressed by several authors (Bevilacqua and Giannetto 1995. Both realists and antirealists make the case that scientific research is an activity predicated basically on a monological representation of the mind and external reality. While the cognitive structure is to be rationally reconstructed. one has to demonstrate that there is no human activity which is not hermeneutically fore-structured. and criteria of an “objectivistmonological epistemology”. norms. the objects of natural-scientific research (like electromagnetic fields.

Darwin’s theory of evolution. On this approach. Ways of analyzing the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research Let me start with some technical remarks. In the perspective of the hermeneutic study of natural-scientific research. Yet the hermeneutico-dialogical approach to natural-scientific research helps also in surmounting the neopragmatic deconstruction of science’s cognitive specificity. raised on the basis of specific considerations. and classi- . 2. the instruments of the laboratory milieu are sui generis “interpreters” between researcher and nature. In the preceding section. who pay more attention to the instrumental context of this research. natural-scientific research can be interpreted as a “completion-of-meaning process of reading”. It is nature that “inscribes a meaningful text” on the instruments which the researcher has to read in a dialogical process. The reason why science has a cognitive differentia specifica is to be found by scrutinizing the specificity of scientific research’s hermeneutic fore-structure. A scientific domain is a body of related information about which there is a problem. As I already pointed out. Lavoisier’s chemistry. science gains its autonomous cognitive organization not because of having a “normative code of epistemological rationality” or because there are “transcendental conditions of constructing specifically designed knowledge”. Thus. 51).150 DIMITRI GINEV Heelan 1997b). one succeeds in overcoming the image of science based upon epistemological foundationalism. I admitted tacitly that the structural unit of scientific research used for making a distinction between hermeneutic fore-structure and cognitive structure is the scientific domain. p. Examples of domains in earlier stages of science are Mendeleev’s periodic table of chemical elements. it is precisely scientific research’s hermeneutic fore-structure that makes science a distinctive mode of being-in-the-world. In this perspective. Mendel’s genetics. (Gadamer 1997. On another definition (Shapere 1984). To draw the implications of this thesis amounts to developing an alternative to the neopragmatic rejection of a significant science/nonscience cut within the “whole of culture”. the whole “research everydayness” in natural sciences is informed by dialogical patterns of reading a meaningful text. In stressing this dimension of natural-scientific research. like any other human activity. domain is each body of information constituted by items for which an answer to an important problem is expected.

From a semantic point of view. In avoiding all technical details. this treatment reveals a wide range of issues that demand a reflection upon the hermeneutic fore-structure. As a rule. masses. I am going to specify the notion of scientific domain in a manner that combines constructivist aspects (related to the way scientific research becomes objectified as a body of knowledge) and structuralist aspects (related to the semantic contents of this knowledge). relevant to the structuralist aspects is the so called “semantic conception” of scientific theory. quantum mechanics. or structural aspects of empirical systems. The formal-semantic treatment of scientific domains cognitive structure does not contradict the search for a fore-structuring of scientific research. molecular biology. these domains are closely related to domains in which systems’ dynamical behavior is investigated). however. a state of a system studied in classical mechanics is a configuration of the instantaneous positions. Each state is a simultaneous configuration of values of behavior’s basic parameters. In view of the task of deepening the analysis of the nexus “hermeneutic fore-structure – cognitive structure”. It is not my aim in this paper to dwell on the complementarity between the semantic reconstruction of domain’s cognitive structure and the hermeneutics of scientific research. While the constructivist aspects are to be elucidated from the viewpoint of a hermeneutics of scientific research. (a) The first way to get to grips with the hermeneutic fore-structure is by studying the interplay between the stream of discursive practices (charac- . Examples of domains in contemporary stages are special relativity. The theoretical models are intended applications of domain’s theory. (Only a small number of scientific domains are constituted by theoretical models that are not dealing with systems’ dynamical behavior but with taxonomical. synthetic theory of evolution.2 A central notion of this conception is that of “theoretical model” – a model of the dynamical behavior of a certain class of empirical systems. and velocities of the bodies included in the system. the whole models-interpretation of domain’s theory) provides the semantic scope of scientific domain. By contrast. and biochemistry. The following description of the three main ways of analyzing this fore-structure represents a selection of issues. The selection of issues I will offer should provide a rationale for delineating the “context of constitution”. morphological. one is to state that the totality of possible models of domain’s theory (or. For instance.HERMENEUTIC FORE-STRUCTURE 151 cal mechanics. a theoretical model represents the dynamical behavior as a set of states and a sequence defined over that set.

The new group proves to be engaged in a discursive prac- . the focus should be placed on particular forms of “fusion of discursive practices” that contribute to articulating a domain through promoting the creation of new theoretical models. instead of looking for a hermeneutic cycling between the discursive practices and the arising (from these practices) theoretical structures. and technical complexity of the equations. However. the situation changes.4 In this regard.152 DIMITRI GINEV terizing the “research everydayness” of a scientific community) and the gradual constitution of theoretical models that build a scientific domain. on the other. to “pure theorizing”. Because of high diversity of the empirical data. instead of step-by-step methodical order one has to search for a characteristic hermeneutic circle between practical instrumentation and models constructing theorizing. the discursive practices of the two groups have remained separated. On this principle. using instruments of experimenting. reading experimental data.3 Members of this school proposed different scenarios of illuminating how the conceptually articulated scientific domains are developed from the everyday practices of scientific research by a process of Hochstilisierung (based upon applying procedures of idealization and formalization). through dealing with scientific instruments in which geometrical forms are technically realized. the complexity of discursive practices taking place in scientific research must be algorithmically reconstructed as a step-by-step order that leads from the elementary practices of the prescientific experience to the axioms and postulates of the scientific theories. What methodical constructivists forget to take into consideration is the fact that all elementary practices (of doing measurements. A historical priority in studying this aspect of scientific research’s fore-structuring is to be attributed to the school of methodical constructivism. “a life-world of a scientific community”). since a third group comes on the scene. Hence. Suppose that for a long time members of the scientific community have studied experimentally chemical reaction systems that exhibit nonequilibrium steady states. other members of this community have been preoccupied with finding equations that describe the time evolution of chemical systems far from equilibrium. and so on) are embedded into a horizon of a certain “research everydayness” (or. Following this principle. and this horizon is not to be separated from the cognitive structure of scientific domain. the constructivists admit a strong unidirectionality of scientific research – from “pure prescientific instrumentation”. on the one hand. suggested the so-called principle of “methodical order”. let me return to my previous example. Now. (In order to illustrate this claim. the constructivists. Parallel to this research work.

restricted to the vicinity of nonequilibrium of steady states). Following this line of reasoning. when the reductionist standards of epistemological objectivism have only a restricted application (because of the complexity of system’s dynamical behavior). I would not say that this increase implies necessary a calling into question community’s “normal science” type of research. or a specification of commutation relations for such coordinates). Generally speaking. the predominance of self-reflective behavior has nothing to do with a revolutionary behavior. I should like to call such fusions of discursive practices “crucial situations” of the research process. In most “crucial situations”.HERMENEUTIC FORE-STRUCTURE 153 tice that may bridge the gap between experimental data and mathematical speculations. fore-sight. in which the thermodynamic entropy is generalized to a new function. “forgotten understandings”) regarding the specific nature of what is under study. In this actualization. More specifically. An important aspect of the “crucial situation” is the conspicuous increase of scientific community’s self-reflectivity. a “crucial situation” is the site where a creation of new theoretical models of empirical systems’ dynamical behavior takes place. The function of these preunderstandings is to open the door for applying non-reductionistic devices in scientific research. In the final reckoning. which in this case is the thermodynamic of equilibrium fluctuations and its statistic methods. preunderstandings become integrated into the process of constructing theoretical models. different kinds of . Self-reflectivity is rather a way of bringing into light preunderstandings (or. To stress again. one might also say that the fore-having. Such a self-reflectivity demands an “actualization” of the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research. Examples of such devices are: the principle of complementarity (when the system’s complexity does not allow a joint specification of each pair of canonical coordinates. the more complex is an empirical system’s dynamical behavior. this discursive practice consists in a series of attempts to adjust mathematical descriptions of phenomena far from equilibrium and stochastic analyses of nonequilibrium systems to the “background knowledge”. These are the fluctuation-dissipation models. the more hermeneutic preunderstandings are involved in the theoretical model. the quasiergodic theorem stipulating that the trajectory of a system’s dynamics may pass arbitrarily close to every point on the energy surface (when the system’s complexity demands a probabilist approach). and fore-conception of a research everydayness remain preserved in the theoretical models as integrated hermeneutic preunderstandings. there is a “fusion” of the three discursive practices that leads to creation of theoretical models of the chemical systems with multiple steady states.

5 Roughly speaking. A crucial situation is to be treated as a structural unit of the research process carried out by a certain scientific community. Yet these two groups of discursive practices are mutually reinforcing in the process of constituting theoretical models. I mean not simply the normativity (embedded in community’s totality of discursive practices) that precedes the articulation of methodological norms. since the discussion of this aspect requires entering into the complexity of “science-technology” relations. and the latter to the “objective knowledge”. A special aspect of this problematics provides the reflection upon the role of technology and engineering in scientific research. and criteria. theory-laden meaning is informed by procedures like idealization and mathematization.154 DIMITRI GINEV coupled. . In using this hyphenated expression. nonlinear differential equations and methods of differential topology (when the system exhibits complexity typical of dynamical behavior far from equilibrium). Protonormativity does not denote inexact and vague formulations of these norms. However. Furthermore. standards. This is why these models are an amalgam of praxis-laden and theory-laden semantic components. I will call it proto-normativity. standards. I have in mind prescriptions that can be cast in terms of categorical imperatives (the case of traditional normative epistemology) or hypothetical imperatives (the case of Laudan’s “normative naturalism”). In such a situation (because of the “fusion of discursive practices”) the inseparability of a theory-laden meaning and a praxis-laden meaning comes to the fore. where the former correspond to the integrated hermeneutic preunderstandings. whilst praxis-laden meaning comes from procedures like experimental instrumentation and measurement. Actualizing scientific research’s fore-having. proto-normativity does not only mean a prearticulated form of the explicit norms of “rational scientific behavior”. and criteria that later on (by means of logical analysis and rational reconstruction of scientific language) will be transformed into particular prescriptions. I will leave it aside. (b) The second way of reflecting upon the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research leads us to focusing on the normativity that is to be attributed to the process of constituting domains of scientific research. referring to all normative aspects of community’s research everydayness that cannot be reduced to (and formulated as) a “codex of scientific honesty” (in the sense of Lakatos). fore-sight and fore-conception through integrating preunderstandings in theoretical models is a particular illustration of the interplay between hermeneutic fore-structure and cognitive structure.

7 Thus. 6 On another definition. The very articulation takes the form of a “spiraling alternation” between the projected whole of fore-having. fore-sight. methodological normativity is to be restricted to the epistemological reconstruction of research process’ cognitive structure and dynamics. the . and fore-conception determine the way the discursive practices (involved in scientific research) should be arranged and accomplished. By contrast. its “rationalizing” cannot be carried out by empirical thematization or normative reconstruction. because the hermeneutico-circular being-the-world is predicated on protonormativity. and foreconception. It is inherent in community’s fore-having. in which the “fusion of discursive practices” takes place. proto-normativity is not to be isolated from the particular situations of the research everydayness. and anticipations of what is coming when a discursive practice is accomplished. there is an unarticulated web of prescriptions for making use of background experience. In contradistinction to the methodological norms (which are presumably invariant and decontextualized). this interplay constitutes gradually a specific domain of scientific research. By taking place in the totality of community’s research everydayness. In other words. Reflecting upon proto-normativity makes the constitutional analysis (in the paradigm of hermeneutic phenomenology) irreducible to both empirical thematizing and normative reconstructing. proto-normativity is a notion denoting the hidden normative arrangement of a scientific community’s research everydayness. fore-sight. and fore-conception on the research everydayness and the specified norms of the particular discursive practices. preferences. an ongoing articulation of the proto-normative web in explicit epistemological and methodological norms. inclinations. standards. In the course of the research process. This web is incorporated in the totality of scientific research a manner that prevents any specification of particular norms or “normative codes” of scientific rationality. and orientations attached to each discursive practice. In other words. Proto-normativity refers to the implicit requirements that the projected hermeneutic fore-structure imposes upon scientific research.HERMENEUTIC FORE-STRUCTURE 155 The essential difference between proto-normativity and methodological normativity is to be derived from the difference between constitution and reconstruction. fore-sight. Proto-normativity follows from the part-whole interplay as informed by the hermeneutic circle. Thus considered. Fore-having. proto-normativity is an ontological characteristic of scientific community’s being-in-theworld. and criteria takes place.

In so doing. he goes on to insist that the knowledge-guiding interests are a “topic of a transcendental reflection” which has to disclose (in Apel’s idiom) the apriori -structures of the validity claims raised in the argumentative discourses of natural. On this conception. social-. By claiming that the interests guiding the three types of scientific-argumentative discourse must be (transcendentally) presupposed in the systematic account of the possibility of the constitution of natural-. From the viewpoint of philosophical hermeneutics. the three basic interests (the interest in controlling an objectified world. . there is no reason to hold that the basic knowledge-guiding interests are not intrinsic to scientific research. This view opposes Apel’s (1968.156 DIMITRI GINEV more advanced is the research process the more proto-normativity of the hermeneutic fore-structure turns into explicit methodology and regulative epistemology of this process. calls) critical-emancipatory sciences.” (Apel 1977.8 Apel also rejects the view that the knowledge-guiding interests may be equated with the external historical interests which promote and institute different types of scientific research. A special issue in discussing proto-normativity of scientific research is the issue of the knowledge-guiding interests. And this implies the further claim that all conceivable internal. 1977) conception of the interests. Apel actually hypostatizes the basic norms of validity associated with these interests. there are no knowledgeguiding interests that are not constituted within the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research. Vis-a-vis the fact that the proto-normative hermeneutic fore-structure provides scientific research with a “primordial orientation”. however. p. meaning-constitutive interests of knowledge may be derived. and critical-emancipatory sciences. An illustration in this respect is provided by the following programmatic declaration: “Concerning the three fundamental interests of knowledge I would claim that they can be systematically grounded as normative conditions of the possibility of meaningful experience within the frame of a transcendental pragmatics of language games. and the interest in critically emancipatory self-reflection) are to be considered as normative conditions of the possibility of constituting objects of specified scientific experience. In so doing. 431). social. guiding the generation of knowledge in natural. which is the “source” of all secondary cognitive interests and orientations. he refuses to reflect upon their “hermeneutico-practical genesis”. from the three fundamental knowledge interests or from possible typical combinations or dialectical mediations of them. social. and (what he. the interest in communicative understanding. and critical-scientific objects of study. in a sense. after Habermas.

the hermeneutic openness in scientific research’s historical dynamics is absolute. On this dialectic. the conditions of intersubjective validity) are on a “deeper” (foundational) level than the hermeneutic fore-structure of producing such a discourse. (The development of modern physics provides many examples of “absorption” of supposedly “theoretically finished” scientific domains that become later recast in the discursive practices of new-arising domains). while the epistemological/semantic closedness is always contextual and relative. There is always a possibility to “absorb” and “dissolve” such an established structure in an ongoing process of discursive practices of an arising domain. Yet this claim simply expresses an old-fashioned transcendental illusion. Yet this abstract possibility can never become an actuality. The point. The research process always remains predicated on an interpretative openness. after each new “crucial situation”) the hermeneutic fore-structure becomes more and more “effaced” by scientific domain’s cognitive structure. Indeed. It seems reasonable then to assume that there will come a final moment. theories. It seems reasonable then to assume that there will come a final moment. The interpretative openness characterizes not only the research process but scientific domain’s cognitive structure as well. In the historical dynamics of scientific development the “ef- .HERMENEUTIC FORE-STRUCTURE 157 In suggesting these elaborations. and its hermeneutic fore-structure is in each moment a “fore-structure of completion” (in Gadamer’s sense). at which the research process will reach an ultimate (finished) cognitive structure. there is a dialectic between closure and openness in the processuality of constituting scientific domain. Apel is led by the conviction that the conditions of the possibility of argumentative discourse (or. the hermeneutics of discursive phronesis has to be replaced by a transcendental hermeneutics of the argumentative discourse. There are no meta-scientific (or transcendental) conditions of the validity-claims of scientific argumentation that lie behind (the situativeness and contextuality of) the discursive practices of scientific research. domains. and consequently. etc. fields. the hermeneutic fore-structure will be totally “objectified”. at which the research process will reach an ultimate (finished) cognitive structure. is that this completeness (however it might be formulated) is relative to the never-ending interpretative openness of scientific research.8 (c) The third way is to be described as an “effective-historical” interpretation of the dynamics of scientific research. In other words. In each new moment of the research process (or. however. Consequently. one can introduce cogent epistemological (and semantic) criteria for a completeness of models.

158 DIMITRI GINEV facement” of domains’ hermeneutic fore-structures and the “absorption” of finished cognitive structure go hand in hand. All objects of human-scientific research are formed exclusively by cultural traditions. Most of the natural-scientific research traditions are completely independent of cultural traditions. one has to have recourse again to the notion of “crucial situation”. because of the interplay between hermeneutic fore-structure and cognitive structure. what is formed as “objective knowledge” in a given “crucial situation” is not to be separated from what is handed down by the stream of fusing discursive practices. the fusion of discursive practices and the objectifying thematization of what is under study form an effective unity which can only be analyzed as a hermeneutico-historical process. i.e. leading to a certain “crucial situation” in which the discursive practices are materialized . Notwithstanding. Each “crucial situation” in the research process is a specific configuration of discursive practices that makes possible the constitution of a theoretical model. Gadamer’s attack on Dilthey’s methodologism stresses the inseparability of human-scientific experience’s cognitive dynamics from the cultural traditions’ “effective history” in which this experience is embedded. would be unacceptable to Gadamer). From a hermeneutic point of view. Against the background of the foregoing considerations concerning the interpretative openness one can figure out how Gadamer’s conception of “effective history” is to be applied to natural-scientific research. which makes the demarcation between “internal” and “external” history reasonable. Of course. Gadamer’s conception of “effective history” seems most relevant to the internal dynamics of natural-scientific research traditions. scientific research is “situated”. this view is not without qualification tenable for the natural-scientific experience. In trying to apply the conception of the “effective history” to natural-scientific research. There is no human-scientific research tradition disentangled from a multiplicity of cultural traditions. 9 In this regard. thereby providing an illustration of the interplay between hermeneutic fore-structure and cognitive structure. Notoriously. At each particular moment. The priority of the interpretative openness of scientific research over the epistemic (and semantic) closedness of scientific knowledge’s structure is a specification of the priority of the practical rationality of “prudence” (phronesis) over the epistemologically justified rationality. I think. (An idea which. His conception of the “effective history” refers to the immanent history of the self-interpreting cultural traditions. Gadamer is not interested in the hermeneutic dimensions of scientific experience’s cognitive dynamics.

The hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research is not to be cast in terms of the context of discovery. Yet the fore-structure does not belong to the context of justification either. the three ways of analyzing the hermeneutic fore-structure address three different (but closely interrelated) hermeneutic cycles characterizing the processuality of scientific research. because it is not “located” in the “finished structure” of scientific knowledge that is the theme of all programs of rational reconstruction in the philosophy of science. If one generalizes the idea of scientific research as a hermeneutico-historical process with respect to the whole dynamics of changing “crucial situations” in the development of scientific domains. the ongoing articulation of normative methodology of scientific research is the outcome of a repetitive cycling between the proto-normative hermeneutic fore-structure and the articulation of particular normative structures.HERMENEUTIC FORE-STRUCTURE 159 and finalized as a constituted theoretical model. Third.10 Actually. articulated. First. Yet at each moment scientific research (and this makes it a hermeneutico-historical process) transcends its situatedness by opening new possibilities for a fusion of discursive practices. then one can gain a picture of what would be an “effective history” of natural science. Second. My aim in this section is to show that the integral framework they provide defines a specific philosophical context of reflecting upon science. since the hermeneutic circles it involves are intrinsic to the cognitive dynamics of scientific research. All three cycles refer to particular aspects of articulating the cognitive structure of scientific research. moment scientific research (like any other cultural activity) is predicated on a “situated transcendence”. at each. there is a repetitive cycling between the hermeneutic fore-structure and the particular “crucial situations” in which theoretical models are. In other words. 3. The interpretative openness of the hermeneutic fore-structure shifts the focus from what is complete (in epis- . which I should like to call the “context of constitution”. Beyond the traditional context-distinction The three ways of analyzing the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research are closely interconnected. there is a repetitive cycling that takes the form of “effective history” (Wirkungsgeschichte) and informs the cognitive dynamics of scientific research. The delineation of an independent context of studying scientific research raises the important question about the validity of the traditional distinction between the “context of discovery” and the “context of justification”.

For many years the traditional context-distinction is under attack from different perspectives. there is no normative justification that can be detached from the justifying psychological and social attitudes. a necessary condition for defending the context-distinction is to claim the irreducibility of normative epistemology to empirical disciplines. One should pay special attention to this attempt. An attempt at a naturalist overcoming of the context-distinction deserves closer attention. normative epistemology presupposes empirical studies for delineating the context of justification. But if this claim fails. as the champions of naturalized epistemology assert. then there is no room for separating the normative from the factual in scientific research. Both enterprises aim at interpreting the relationship between the local settings in which scientific knowledge is produced and the cognitive and social “standardization” and institutionalization of this knowledge in units (like domains. what remains to be completed). “there is no reason to conclude that the entire process of discovering must be completed before the process of justification can begin. Furthermore. they suggest in an important respect antipodal pictures of scientific . Neither discovery nor justification can be extracted as “pure” processes. Despite the parallels. discovery and justification are not only intimately intertwined.160 DIMITRI GINEV temological and semantic terms) to what is in status nascendi (or. On the one hand. But nevertheless. however. and cultural history (the main disciplines that must constitute the context of discovery) contain significant logical and normative aspects. sociology. 37). psychology. and disciplines) that are relatively stable (with regard to the established cognitive structure) and socially reproducible. p.11 It has been criticized for the impossibility of drawing a clear-cut temporal differentiation between discovery and justification. the constant interplay between discovery and justification prevents the drawing of a clear demarcational line between studying scientific research (exclusively) in terms of a certain empirical discipline and judging the rationality of this research (exclusively) in terms of normative epistemology. Of course. and on the other. the disciplines that are supposed to constitute the two contexts are not so clearly divided as the context-distinction admits. I am referring to the attempt at getting rid of this distinction in the cognitive sociology of science.” (Sahnon 1970. In fact. for in many respects there are significant parallels between the studies in sociology of scientific knowledge and the studies in hermeneutic philosophy of science. (Moreover. Finally. specialties. Empirical processes are always shaping the normativity of justification). but their inseparability is an essential feature of scientific work.

since “all beliefs are on a par with one another with respect to the causes of their credibility. one has to take a “critical distance” from science itself. they are. There is no cognitive specificity of science that is immune to empirical interpretation and sociological explanation. and methodological norms of objectivity have a transcendental status. The representatives of the “strong programme” (especially David Bloor) are inspired by Wittgenstein’s rejection of the traditional epistemological notions in favor of the discursive practices (“linguistic games”) expressing particular “forms of life”. Hence. “method” and “rationality” are no longer trans-empirical entities. As a result. however. A possible way of gaining critical distance is by assuming that the truth. cognitive sociology does not suggest a theory of how the social networks . in order to avoid such a circularity. it becomes evident that the cognitive sociology fails to defeat the argument of vicious circularity: By claiming that the study of science’s cognitive specificity must be relegated to science itself (in this case. there is no need of delineation a normative-epistemological context of justification. “produced” in local settings of scientific research. p. Accordingly. Like any other component of scientific knowledge. In other words. from the very outset this way is precluded by the cognitive sociologists of science. Of course.” (Barnes and Bloor 1982. “truth”. At this point. A basic goal of the cognitive sociology is to reduce (without remainder) this context to the empirical study of collective processes of constructing scientific knowledge. the whole enterprise of sociology of scientific knowledge bears upon the truth and rationality that are taken over from the cognitive structure of science which is supposed to be the object of study. 23) Consequently. the sociologists of scientific knowledge reject!: not only the transcendentaland/or normative-epistemological account of science’s cognitive specificity. According to the representatives of this programme. First. In fact. Each transcendental assumption would tacitly justify the context of justification. a basic tenet of the “strong programme” in sociology of scientific knowledge places emphasis on the necessity to consider both true and false scientific knowledge generation equally amenable to explanation in terms of empirical sociology. rationality. scientific research is construed as such a form of life. there is no rationale for privileging an epistemological context of “rational reconstruction”. empirical sociology). All of them are social artifacts. 12 Two remarks are in place here. but the very demand of achieving a “critical distance”. one needs such a distance in order to thematize the cognitive specificity of science without falling into vicious circularity.HERMENEUTIC FORE-STRUCTURE 161 research. Notoriously.

e.13 The reduction of normative epistemology and the context of justification to empirical sociology does not succeed in bridging the Cartesian gulf. There is an opportunity to take a “critical distance” from science and to avoid falling into vicious circularity. Naturalizing the context of justification is not the only way to overcome the context-distinction. It deserves to be mentioned that in his interesting critique of the sociology of scientific knowledge Michael Friedman (1998) stresses also the need of transcending the traditional context-distinction. On his view. What sociology of scientific knowledge fails to develop is a theory of the discursive practices through which science’s cognitive content comes into being. then (as the case of cognitive sociology indicates) the vicious circularity is unavoidable. He develops his view from the standpoint of the latter Wittgenstein. Friedman displays discontent with Barnes’ and Bloor’s attempt to replace the problematics of the context of justification (i. since by taking for granted the naturalist position it hypostatizes “cognitive entities” whose generation it has to thematize. Yet is this thematization possible at all? If it is accomplished in the framework of an empirical theory. The author of . in raising this claim I come to my second remark. But it is impossible in the framework of normative epistemology as well. the traditional epistemological problems) with the problematics arising out of the sociological case studies of the “local production” of scientific knowledge. Cognitive sociology of science does not succeed in explaining the social production of scientific knowledge. since the latter has only to do with the “finished structure” of scientific domain and not with the processuality of the discursive practices. there is no single example that shows how a cognitive sociology’s theory works in explaining the generation of knowledge’s specific cognitive structure in particular social networks.14 This failure is intimately related to the lack of “critical distance”. a third alternative remains still possible: a theoretical thematization of scientific research’ processuality in the framework of a theory that is beyond the traditional context-distinction. Despite the huge number of excellent case studies illuminating different social aspects of scientific research. without succumbing to transcendentalism and/or epistemological normativism. this replacement is due to a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s ideas. Now. By implication. The traditional epistemological dualism remains preserved in the cognitive sociology of science. Now.162 DIMITRI GINEV produce the conceptual theoretical and methodological “content” of science. this would be also a thematization of the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research.

to the extent that I accept the validity of social constructivist accounts of natural scientific practices. In reflecting upon this predicament of cognitive sociology of science. Accordingly. I am an antirealist about the discourse of the natural sciences. XIV]).HERMENEUTIC FORE-STRUCTURE 163 Philosophical Investigations defends by no means a kind of socio-cultural relativism. It is the latter view that creates the main trouble in the practice of sociology of scientific knowledge. The two groups of facts (the facts about reality constructed by scientific research and the facts about the social-institutional networks in which this research takes place) should have equal status. an asymmetrical treatment of natural and social reality would be a crucial testimony against the consistency of the social-constructivist approach. does Friedman’s critique help in figuring out a third (Wittgensteinian) way (beyond the naturalism-normativism dilemma) of . while the practitioners of cognitive sociology of science are committed to a relativist reductionism. if I am correctly understanding Friedman’s suggestion. The following confession summarizes succinctly the asymmetry in question: “I am a scientific realist with regard to the discourse of the social sciences. Wittgenstein holds with respect to the philosophy-science relationship a non-relativist antireductionisrn. he is not reducing philosophy (and the traditional epistemological notions) to the natural sciences. because the cognitive sociology of science is itself a scientific enterprise. Furthermore. Yet. the whole enterprise of cognitive sociology of science should be transformed from an empirical (naturalistic) treatment of scientific practices into a kind of self-reflexive dialogue between two “forms of life” (social constructivism and natural science) which are on a par with one another. Friedman suggests that the practitioner of this enterprise should scrutinize the historical contexts of formation of her/his own philosophical agenda that legitimizes the realism about the facts invoked by the social-constructivist approach. However. (This is why the authors supporting this approach are obliged to defend a kind of “second-order realism” with respect to the sociological theories that have to explain the social construction of the natural-scientific facts. By that I mean that the best explanation for the history of all of our knowledge enterprises is provided by the best social scientific theories. p.” [Fuller 1993. A social-constructivist approach to scientific research is groundlessly asymmetrical in its treatment of the facts of this research and the facts invoked by the very approach. Does this suggestion eliminate the problem of reflexivity that is the Achilles’ heel of cognitive sociology of science? In other words. Doing empirical studies in sociology of scientific knowledge is also a multiplicity of “linguistic games” belonging to a certain “form of life”.

the thematization can neither be designed as a traditional empirical study (like the studies in the context of discovery). Like philosophical hermeneutics offers a perspective beyond the objectivism-relativism dilemma.15 This “double hermeneutics” assures the “critical distance” from scientific research as an object of theoretical thematization.164 DIMITRI GINEV thematizing scientific research as a multiplicity of discursive practices? My inclination towards a negative answer is determined by the fact that Friedman’s critique does not resolve the problem of the “critical distance” I mentioned above. since the task is to thematize the discursive practices as a self-constituting processuality of scientific research. As a consequence. It is this “context of constitution” in which one thematizes the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research. that the basic characteristics of the studies carried out in the context of constitution correspond to the three hermeneutic circles on which scientific research is predicated: . Studying scientific research’s self-constituting processuality is a sort of “double hermeneutics”: one has to “enter” into an investigatory hermeneutic circle in thematizing the discursive-practical texture of scientific research. The solution of the problem to the “critical distance” hinges on the way of thematizing the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research. Thus considered. (The studies into the self-constituting processuality of scientific research are not guided by the epistemological standards of scientific research itself) In achieving this distance one succeeds to avoid vicious circularity by transforming it into a hermeneutic circularity. Let me finally point out. the (studies into the) context of constitution offers a kind of reflecting upon science beyond normative-epistemological objectivism of the context of justification and relativism that follows from narrowing the perspective on science exclusively to the context of discovery. nor can it follow the patterns of a normative rational reconstruction (designed in the context of justification). The focus is on the three hermeneutic circles and their interrelatedness. Friedman is not able to develop his approach as alternative to both epistemological normativism and second-order realism/naturalism. which on its part involves constitutive hermeneutic circles. Indeed. the theory of the discursive practices taking place in scientific research forms an independent context of studying science. His Wittgensteinian approach does not specify the “dialogical relations” between the discursive practices of the theory of science’s linguistic games and the discursive practices of scientific research.

the semantic-practical ladenness that is generated from the lifeworld experience plays the role of a hermeneutic fore-structure of all theory-laden activities in the research process. 4. the problem of scientific rationality. In this regard. • The studies are neither empirical nor normative.g. 280). Herfel and Hooker (1997. Notes 1. For a full discussion of development and variants of methodical constructivism. experimental observations should not be called semantically theory-laden but semantically praxis-laden like all cultural objects of lifeworld-experience. 148–153) conceive it as a circulative-regulatory mechanism that operates at many levels of constructing sciences cognitive content. but interpreting the proto-normativity of hermeneutic circles that are constitutive for scientific research. the problem of demarcating the internal from external history of science. the context of constitution invites discourses (hitherto ignored or prohibited by the analytical philosophy) to dwell on various non-standard problems in elucidating the nature of scientific research. . To be sure.. 3. Delineating the context of constitution and thematizing the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research serves in achieving two aims. see Janich 1997. The distinction between hermeneutic fore-structure of doing research within a scientific domain and cognitive structure of this domain is akin to Heelan’s recently suggested distinction between a “praxis-laden context where the sentence refers to something that is in actual use or designated for use in construction” and a “theory-laden context where the sentence refers to the physical structure” of something that is under study (Heelan 1997a. • The studies are scrutinizing scientific research in its “effective-historical” interpretative openness. it opens up a horizon of new problematizing. Thus.HERMENEUTIC FORE-STRUCTURE 165 • Starting assumption of these studies is the ontological priority of the “practical horizon” of being involved in a research process over the theoretical attitude. Ginev (1992) suggests a kind of “autopoietic episte- 2. The notion of theoretical model I am employing in this paper draws basically on Suppe’s (1988) version of the semantic conception of scientific theory. Second. Thus. for example. and so on) posed by the standard (analytical) philosophy of science in an entirely new framework. On Heelan’s view. First. it allows to reformulate many important problems (e. p. this hermeneutic circle can be reconstructed and recast in terms of different kinds of (non-representational and post-foundational) epistemology. pp. the problem of incommensurability.

To be sure. On this formulation of the idea of “double hermeneutics”. But this seems to be only possible within the framework of a theory of the discursive practices. 8. 9. Even the “classical” theoretical models are embedded in the effective-historical dynamics of discursive practices. To reiterate once again. The effective history of scientific research bridges all kinds of semantic incommensurability in the development of scientific knowledge. On this argument against cognitive sociology of science. 11. pp. Proto-normativity can also be characterized as interwovenness of descriptive and prescriptive aspects in constituting theoretical models. a model in Newtonian theory of gravity and a model in general relativity) can be filled by studying the continuity of revisionist interpretations of the first model that leads finally to constructing the second model. pp. 10. the semantic-epistemic gap between a pair of allegedly incommensurable models (say. In addition. see Ginev 1998. one can make the case that bearing upon the truth and rationality of science is taken from traditional philosophical approaches to science that sociology of scientific knowledge strongly criticized. 5. 12. A special issue in discussing the interpretative openness of natural-scientific research is the critique of incommensurability thesis. 14. see Heuningen-Huene 1987.) There is no theoretical model that is beyond the “fusion of horizons” (in this case. Scrutinizing this interwovenness will show how the articulation of a normative methodology is related to the semantic articulation of a scientific domain. 61– 73. (On this argument. is an explanation of the generation of methodological norms in terms of practices that precedes (somehow) the technical organization of scientific knowledge. 111–121. 15. . 6. whereby they are not immune to interpretative modifications and revisions. On this kind of critique of transcendental pragmatics. 7. see Ginev 1997a. see Shapin 1995). what is handed down remains partially preserved as hermeneutic preunderstandings in the constituted theoretical models. the “fusion of discursive practices”). see Ginev 1997b. In view of this “revisionist plasticity”. What the cognitive sociologists are looking for. there is always a potential for “revisionist plasticity” in the research process that opens up the models for further interpretations and reinterpretations.166 DIMITRI GINEV mology” in trying to bring to light science’s cognitive self-constitution. For a discussion of the different lines of critique of context-distinction. see Brown 1989). most of the representatives of cognitive sociology of science are not satisfied with the Kuhnian view of the normative structure of scientific research. see Cole 1992. This is another topics related to Heelan’s (1997a) distinction between theory-laden aspect and praxis-laden aspect of scientific research. pp. pp. 61–75. 80– 85. Regardless of how semantically complete the theoretical models are. On this view. the norms that guide the decision making in the research process are made of the same stuff as the technical knowledge produced in this process. which is hard to be found in sociology of scientific knowledge. 13. (See Ginev 1997a. (On this point. On this view.

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