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High transient overvoltages caused by single pole line tripping


by Anita Oomen, Eskom Transmission Tapping power transformers off overhead power lines is a cost-effective solution for the supply of growing energy demand. Costs are reduced due to the absence of terminal equipment at the tee-off point. These solutions are commonly used on distribution networks, but less frequently on the transmission network. Such a configuration was needed as a temporar y solution on Eskoms EHV network due to terminal equipment rating limits at Alpha substation. The critical location of Alpha substation in the secure supply of the Cape corridor made it necessary to consider non-standard protection philosophy. The occurrence of a single phase to ground fault on a transformers HV breaker and the resulting single pole trip on the EHV line supplying the transformer resulted in high transient overvoltages in the network. Changes were subsequently made to protection operation. Background Fig.1 shows the network supplying the Cape prior to January 2005. The loading on the two Tutuka-Alpha 400 kV lines was such that the line terminal equipment was being operated very close to rated limits. A loss of one of the two Koeberg units or tripping one of the Tutuka-Alpha lines would result in loading the remaining line beyond the continuous current rating of the terminal equipment. It became necessary to provide a solution to ensure firm supply to the Cape under these network conditions. A proposal was made to provide two new bays at Alpha substation and turn the Tutuka Majuba 1 line into Alpha, thus creating an Alpha - Tutuka 3 line and an Alpha-Majuba line as shown in Fig. 2. The proposal was accepted for implementation in late 2005. A potential risk for the operation of the network existed until this proposal could be implemented. The scheduled maintenance outages of the Koeberg units, the first of which was due end January 2005, as well as the winter loading would put added strain on this network. An interim solution needed to be provided in the configuration of the network in order to reduce these potential risks. Fig. 3 shows the interim solution that was proposed. The Tutuka - Majuba 1 line runs very close to the 400 kV yard at Alpha. It would therefore require relatively little effort to tee-off this line directly onto the 400 kV busbar at Alpha as shown in Fig. 3. This would provide the additional network support required at Alpha under contingency conditions. Protection considerations Analysis of the network as it would be configured with the proposed interim solution indicated several risks from a protection perspective. The tee-off to Alpha on the Tutuka-Majuba line is located approximately 3 km from the first tower at Tutuka substation. The length of the tee-off to Alpha is approximately 200 m. The tee-off arrangement introduced potential insecurity of telecommunication channels and therefore maximum Zone 1 coverage of the line was essential in order to provide instantaneous tripping. The standard Zone 1 setting of 80% at both Tutuka and Majuba would detect a fault on the Alpha 765 kV busbar. It was therefore necessary that, for any breaker operation on the Tutuka - Majuba 1 line, a DTT (direct transfer trip) signal be issued to Transformer 3 MV breaker. This would ensure that, for any fault energize - August 2006 - Page 32
Fig. 3: Interim network configuration

that the line protection would detect, all three breakers in the tee arrangement would trip. The line would ARC (auto-reclose) and restore supply, provided the fault was not sustained. However, the transformer breaker would have to be manually closed after ensuring that it was safe to do so. A transformer fault would result in lockout of the transformer while the line would return to service. A 765 kV busbar fault would trip both the line and the transformer. The line would ARC, but the transformer breaker would be manually closed. It was also established that Tutuka would become unstable after a sustained line fault of 400 ms duration. Again, due to the potential insecurity of communication channels that the tee-off introduced, there was the possibility of faults at either end of the line only being cleared in Zone 2 time, conventionally set to 400 ms. Zone 2 times were therefore reduced to 250 ms at both the Tutuka and Majuba ends.

Fig.1: Network to the Cape, January 2005

Fig. 2: Proposed change to the network

Fig. 4: Damage to blue insulating chamber

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The time frames for the commissioning of this configuration did not cater for the changes that were necessary for DTT to be effected in this set-up. It was therefore decided to use a non-directional overcurrent element of the transformer protection relay to provide tripping of the Transformer 3 400 kV breaker. It was set with a pick-up ensuring that faults beyond the Tutuka and Majuba breakers would not be detected, and a definite time operation of 200 ms, ensuring co-ordination for faults on the Alpha 765 kV busbar. Fault records from the 765 kV network showed a very low incidence of fault occurrence. It was therefore decided to accept the risk of implementing the configuration without DTT. The line was left on 1 &3 pole Trip and ARC. Alpha incident of 29 January 2005 At 06h28 on 29 January 2005, the HV breaker of Transformer 3 experienced a phase to ground flashover on the blue phase, requiring its removal from service. The 765 kV bus-zone protection operated, tripping Transformer 3 HV breaker (faulted of up to 400 kV are observed. These overvoltages disappear as soon as the breaker poles closes. In a few cycles of the appearance of the overvoltage there are distortions in the voltage and neutral current waveforms typical of the presence of higher order harmonics. This can be seen in Fig. 7. The distortions disappear in about 400 ms. The overvoltage however continues until the blue phase breaker poles close on the line, as seen in Fig. 6. Resonance at a much lower frequency is also observed in the waveforms. Analysis of the composition of the voltage waveform indicates the presence of harmonics. There is a significant percentage of 3rd harmonics as well as smaller percentages of other harmonics as shown in Fig. 8. Fig. 9 shows the harmonic analysis of the current waveforms. Again, the wave comprises the fundamental component as well as percentages of 2nd and 3rd harmonics, noticeably in the neutral current trace. Overvoltage phenomenon Considering the nominal pi model of a transmission line, the network can be drawn as shown in Fig. 10. Due to normal load flow in the healthy phases of the line there is unbalanced current flowing in the earthed neutral of the transformer. A path exists for these currents to flow in the open phase of the line due to capacitive coupling of the line to ground as well as the magnetic coupling introduced by the externally connected delta connection of Transformer 3. Due to the very high capacitive reactance of the line, ver y high voltages develop during the period of the open phase. This explains the high overvoltages observed in the open phase as soon as the line breaker poles open. In a few cycles the voltage waveform appears distorted. The flux density inside the transformer core is given by:

Fig. 8: Harmonic analysis of voltage Fig. 5: Fault clearance by protection

breaker), Reactor 4, Bus Coupler B and the Number 1 Busbar 2 Section breakers, effectively clearing Zone 5 as shown in Fig. 5. At the same time, protection at both the Tutuka and Majuba ends of the line detected the fault in Zone 1 and tripped the blue pole breaker. After single pole dead time of 1 second the breaker pole was closed returning the line to service. Analysis of disturbance records indicates high transient overvoltages in the open phase during the single pole ARC dead time. This is shown in Fig. 6 which shows the currents and voltages seen on the disturbance record taken from Tutuka. As soon as the blue phase breaker opens current disappears in that phase. At the same time phase voltages

Fig. 6: Disturbance record

Fig. 7: Distortions in V and I waveforms

Fig. 9: Harmonic analysis of current

Fig. 10: Model of network

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Where

Bm = maximum flux density E = applied voltage Kf = form factor of the emf wave A = cross-sectional area of the core [mm2] f = frequency [Hz] N = number of turns in the winding

Fig. 11: Typical transformer B-H curve

The flux density and magnetising force are related by :

When high voltages are applied to a transformer core the flux density in the core begins to increase. As the core begins to saturate the transformer is being operated in the non-linear portion C of the B-H curve as seen in Fig. 11. The core permeability varies as the transformer is operated in this portion of the B-H curve. The varying permeability of the core results in the generation of third harmonics. There is a higher probability of this phenomenon occurring in single-phase transformers with the neutral point earthed. The third harmonic currents together with the fundamental component of current magnetise the core. During this time the permeability of the core (r) reduces until it finally becomes zero, at which point the flux density is at its maximum. At this point, any variation in the magnetising force will have no effect in changing the flux density of the core as it has now reached saturation. Once the core is saturated and r becomes zero, the third harmonics disappear. The appearance and disappearance of these harmonics is observed both in the neutral current and the phase voltage in the disturbance record, Fig. 6. This incident was simulated in Digsilent and Matlab and similar results were obtained. The high overvoltages thus generated are detrimental to all equipment insulation, and therefore it is necessary to prevent their occurrence. Conclusions The tee-configuration utilised as a solution to the problem discussed in this paper serves its purpose as a temporary solution. Protection performance is however compromised. Single pole tripping of the line is not advisable for the reasons discussed in this paper. Protection settings on the line have subsequently been changed to effect three-pole tripping only. Direct Transfer Trip of the Transformer MV breaker is essential in order to isolate the transformer for any line fault, in addition to the Definite Time Overcurrent tripping already employed. Acknowledgments PG Keller for assistance with fault record analysis, and A Perera for assistance with simulation of the above incident on Digsilent and Matlab References
[1] [2] [3] [4] Carolin, T., Summary of operational philosophy for T-off of Majuba Tutuka 1 400 kV line onto Alpha 400 kV bus Govindasamy, G., Alpha Substation, Transformer 3 765 kV Breaker Fail Incident of 29 Jan 2005, Investigation Report Franklin, A. C., Franklin, D. P ., The J&P Transformer Book, 11th Edition 1983 Havunen, I., Korpinen, L., Khr, K., Toivonen, E., Hager, T., The Transformer Book

Contact Anita Oommen, Eskom, Tel (011) 871-3506, anita.oommen@eskom.co.za energize - August 2006 - Page 36