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Salta vs.

De Veyra

Facts: Petitioner was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos branch. As such, his duty was to grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the amount of the loan applied for. In the performance of this duty, he is supposed to exercise care and prudence, and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and regulations of the bank. In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank, petitioner indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in a manner characterized by negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. This is how the respondent bank found petitioner to have discharged his duties as branch manager of the bank, and so it filed a civil action in the CFI of Manila on April 22, 1970 to recover losses the bank suffered and another case on September 23, 1972 . At the same time the bank caused to be filed, based on the same acts, a criminal case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. (Bale 2 Civil Case at isang criminal case) In the criminal case, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence). With his acquittal in the criminal case, petitioner filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases, based on Section 3(c), Rule I I I of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: (c) extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. ... Judge de Veyra opposed the MTD while Judge Purisima granted it. Judge de Veyra ruled that the MTD must be denied for the reason that acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly the accused would not be liable-there is no such a finding. Apart from this, Plaintiff in this present civil case bases its case either on fraud or negligence-evidence that only requires a preponderance, unlike beyond reasonable doubt which is the requisite in criminal cases. Issue: WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case. Held: No. The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the NCC. The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main

whether acquittal or conviction. the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. 33. It is but just that when. l(d) does not apply. Alvendia is not only enlightening. but authoritative. it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter. one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. as in the present instance. any mistake or mishanding of the case committed by the latter should not work to the prejudice of the offended party whose interest would thus be protected by the measure contemplated by Article 33 and Article 2177 12 of the New Civil Code. may proceed similarly regardless of the result of the criminal case." It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions mentioned in Article 33. . particularly as to the sufficiency of the allegation of fraud in the civil complaints. Definitely. I think Rule 107 Sec.element of which is fraud. the result of the criminal case. would be entirety irrelevant to the civil action. Reyes in Dionisio vs. which petitioner disputes. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make these actions 'entirely separate and distinct' from the criminal action (Articles 22. in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code.L. Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed. Hence in these cases. . the prosecution of the criminal case is left to the government prosecutor to undertake. It needs hardly any showing to demonstrate this fact. " Under Article 31 of the New Civil Code. Thus — ". . We hold that the following allegation in the complaints unmistakably shows that the complaints do contain sufficient averment of fraud The opinion of former Justice J. the criminal case is prosecuted by the prosecuting officer alone without intervention from a private counsel representing the interest of the offended party. permitted in the same manner to be filed separately from the criminal case.B. The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code is to be found in the fact that when the civil action is reserved to be filed separately. 34 and 2177).

(1) that the action had already prescribed." The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Pampanga. wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. On October 1. including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2. judgment was rendered only on April 15. however." For P290. the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Issue: . 1953 Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga.Capuno vs.623. The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be well taken were.623. and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action. On January 5. while the criminal case was pending. Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned. Prior thereto. The court disallowed the intervention. herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. which sum. The Court a quo in its order of February 29. At that time. 1958.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages. In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of Buan were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors. was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. Pepsi Cola Facts: A vehicular collision occurred on January 3. The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers. in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi (Civil Case No. Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2. they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent. the criminal case was still pending. or on September 26. 1953. On June 11. the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise. 838 entered into a "Compromise and Settlement.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 1959. 1958 the parties in Civil Case No. 1960. dismissed the case. and (2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno.000. 838). in turn.623. also for damages. 1953 in Apalit.

The information therein. Held: No." which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed. which action must be instituted within four 4 years (Article 1146. . without having made it they could file a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case. 1958 would still prosper. and consequently the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict. showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code. was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. that is. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26. when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon Elordi. The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal. And when they commenced the civil action on September 26. or after the lapse of more than five years. Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto. for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. that is. Such reservation was not then necessary. under the provisions of the Penal Code. 1958. There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict. and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. 1953 or thereabouts. 1958 the criminal case was still pending. "from the day (the action) may be brought. The civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent.WON the case filed by the appellants on September 26. Civil Code). The prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run. Cipriano Capuno. It is barred by prescription. on January 3. it may be recalled.