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“Balochistan Case Study”

Michael Brown, Mohammad Dawod, Arash Irantalab, and Mahmud Naqi

INAF 5493-S: Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences and Management

Dr. David Carment

June 21, 2012

as well as the fractious ethnic nature of Pakistani politics.27 .25 Smuggling. 17 The Baloch are underrepresented politically and their nationalist political parties have at times been banned.4 There are approximately 6.13 The Pakistani government.6 Balochistan remains the most economically disadvantaged province in Pakistan.23 Canadian mining company Barrick Gold invested heavily in a copper mine in the province. and extortion from resource extraction companies provides much of the funding for the insurgency. The conflict has its origins in Baloch grievances.8 million ethnic Baloch in Pakistan. Progress is limited by the poor relations between western governments and the Pakistani military.” a group of Taliban leaders and fighters.18 Brahamdagh Bugti. Baloch autonomy is limited.11 are partially motivated by the desire for a greater share of the province’s resource wealth. and Naqi 1   Executive Summary: Pakistan’s Balochistan province has seen escalating ethnic conflict. Background: Balochistan.Brown. but fell afoul of the provincial government. a wealthy Baloch diaspora in the Gulf States.5 Their ethnic identity is largely rooted in tribal loyalty. 20 The Baloch are spread between Afghanistan. and finally cooperating with the Pakistani state to improve Baloch-federal relations. and most of the bureaucracy.10 Baloch militants. are based out of the provincial Capital of Balochistan. is the site of an armed insurgency by ethnic Baloch demanding autonomy or independence. Although rich in national resources.24 Balochistan is the second biggest supply route for NATO troops in Afghanistan. Nawab Akbar Bugti and 35 of his colleagues. 1958 and 19731. as the main nationalist Baloch parties boycotted the 2008 election. and risks spilling over into neighboring states of in Iran and Afghanistan. The conflict dates back to the founding of Pakistan and unsuccessful armed revolts were launched by Baloch in 1948. demilitarization and dialogue the conflict risks further destabilizing Pakistan and the region. Without greater capacity building for the provincial government.7 Balochistan has the highest unemployment rate in the country (33%) and the lowest literacy rate (25%).21 The Baloch have had long standing tensions with the Taliban. and still others are simply demanding greater autonomy.3 The Baloch comprise 55% of Balochistan province’s 8 million inhabitants (Pashto comprise 30%). remains opposed to Baloch independence. Pakistan and Iran with several militants groups claiming to be fighting for a ‘greater Balochistan’ uniting the community living in all three countries. which revoked Barrick gold’s permit and gave the project to a joint Chinese-Pakistani venture. a leading opposition figure and grandson of Nawab Akbar Bugti.14 The central Pakistani government is hesitant to offer significant concessions that may raise the specter of separatism amongst other minorities (the Minorities at Risk Project lists six at risk groups in Pakistan).2 The most recent uptick in violence stems from the Pakistani military’s killing of Baloch leader.26 Insurgents have ready access to arms due to regional instability and the province’s long border with Afghanistan.12 Although Pakistan is a federal state. which returned to civilian rule following the election of current President Asif Ali Zadari. sectarian violence and state repressions since 2006. with over 3.19 Of interest to Canada. Irantalab. There are three options available for Canadian policymakers: encouraging Baloch economic empowerment. was forced into exile after his grandfather was killed. encouraging inter-Baloch dialogue by strengthening Baloch moderates. the largest province in Pakistan. Dawood. two thirds of whom live in rural areas.22 The “Quetta Shura.000 NATO trucks passing through the province monthly (up to 12 of which are burned).8 The Baloch community is politically fragmented.16 The Punjabi ethnic group dominates the institutions of state and comprises 45% of the population. divided into a number of decentralized armed groups.9 The relative power of each faction within the Baloch is unclear. 90% of the military. some are satisfied with the status quo while others demand full independence. Pashto and Afghan refugees. Balochistan is strategically located at the center of the major drug and gun smuggling corridor between Afghanistan and Iran.15 The military still retains considerable political power in the country and the ruling coalition is weak and dependent on the support of ethnic parties. irredentism and significant cross border smuggling operations. Escalation of the violence has intensified the ongoing civil-military struggle for control in the nuclear armed nation. in 2006.

despite these signs of improvement and conciliatory actions. announcing judicial inquiries into the killing of Baloch leaders.000 to over 2 million. a radical Sunni Baloch group fighting for independence for the Baloch in Iran. Increased funding in the past has not translated into more projects or infrastructure on the ground.52 The Baloch in the past have responded positively to Pakistani government overtures. remained in Balochistan.”53 However. there were 621 conflict related deaths. to be largely staffed by non-Baloch workers. the presence of Baloch militants in Afghanistan has been an important part of the relationship between Pakistan and its neighbors.41 The Afghan government has recently started dismantling Baloch militant camps in Southern Afghanistan and forced exiled Baloch leader Brahamdagh Bugti to seek asylum in Switzerland.35 Demographic trends are an increasing source of tension.55 Despite the announcement . overall the trend in Balochistan remains more negative than positive. with Baloch nationalist largely rejecting mild reforms offered by Islamabad. over 400. Irantalab. and Naqi 2   Trends: The level of violence in Balochistan has been increasing. mostly ethnic Pashto. with Human Rights Watch noting that around 300 corpses of disappeared individuals were discovered in 2011.37 Consequently there have been increased tensions between Baloch and the Pashto. the most in a single year since 2006. along with an increasing number of economic migrants.31 as have demands by ethnic Pashto for the separation of majority Pashto areas from the rest of Balochistan. In 2010 Balochistan “had the highest number of militant. The Pakistani military has been accused of facilitating sectarian violence within the Baloch community by sponsoring religious fundamental groups as a way of further splintering the Baloch community.30 Sectarian violence has been growing.48 However.44 other killings have been attributed to hardline Baloch factions targeting moderate Baloch leaders who are seen as too accommodating.38 A major development in the province is the construction of a deep-water port in the Baloch town of Gwadar by the Chinese. which increased the delegation of authority to the Balochistan government. Separatist militant groups and the Pakistani government have been unable to successfully negotiate.32 Finally. doubled the provincial budget. The Pakistani military is suspected of being behind the murder of prominent Baloch politicians in 2009.29 Government repression of Baloch groups has been increasing. and called for the release of all Baloch detained without charge. the political outlook remains largely negative. 46 However. which allegedly is receiving support and training from Israel and possibly the United States. insurgent and sectarian attacks of any province in Pakistan.000 Afghan refugees. the level of violence by Baloch separatists towards Punjabi and other non-ethnic Baloch within the province has become more common (between 2008 and 2010 at least 22 Punjabi teachers were killed). Dawood. with one study finding “that any conciliatory move by the government results in a decline in militant attacks. increased the provincial share of resource revenues. both the United States and India seem hesitant to openly support a separatist movement in Balochistan given the danger of setting a precedent.34 or outside the province entirely. has been operating out of Pakistan. are often not fully implemented by authorities in Balochistan. more than 200 teachers have moved to the safety of Quetta.42 This has been interpreted as an attempt to get Pakistan to help broker a deal with the Taliban. It is expected to increase the population of that city from 70.47 Iran has expressed concern that Jondullah.54 Reforms passed by the central government. due to a highly polarized environment and a lack of human capital.”28 In 2011.36 They.39 Only 2% of the proceeds of the new port will go to the Balochistan government.33 As a result.49 In 2009 the Pakistani government passed the “Beginning of Right in Balochistan” package of reforms. gave the Baloch authority over law and order operations. threaten the demographic majority of the Baloch.40 Finally.45 An independent Balochistan does not appear to be in the interest of any regional or international power. and it is an increasing source of tension. Baloch leaders have actively sought US and Indian support for their movement and received a major boost when a bill was tabled in the US congress expressing support for the groups right to self-determination.43 The killing or ‘disappearance’ of prominent Baloch political leaders has occurred frequently since 2006. As of 2010.50 prioritized increased Baloch employment in the civil service. weakening Balochistan's education system.Brown.51 The Pakistani Supreme Court has also taken action.

regional actors (Iran and Afghanistan. Furthermore. should increase funding for education programs in Balochistan.56 Theoretical Framework: Rabia Aslam argues that the ethnic Baloch elite. The policy options for the Canadian government are as follows: Policy Recommendation #1 – Baloch Economic Empowerment: Canada.58 The conflict itself is made worse by an ongoing struggle between ethnic groups in the Centre and Periphery in the Pakistani state.Brown.63 This can be shown in the current situation in Balochistan where devolution of authority and increased funding to weak institutions has led to an increase in violence. Thus. The Baloch national movement itself exhibits what Horrowitz describes as a ‘convertibility of claims’ as they have moved between a posture of secession and irredentism based on which is most likely to be internationally successful.60 This provides an explanation of the alliance between fundamentalist groups and Pashto living in Balochistan. attempts to address the conflict without understanding this diversity will not be effective at resolving the conflict. this would make the Baloch more employable in the army and bureaucracy. with their own Baloch populations would be opposed).62 An empirical study helps explain the failure of the government’s devolution of authority. would similarly be opposed). The focus should be on vocational training. construction. the creation of safe havens for regional terrorist groups (including the Taliban). and its continued operations in the area. CIDA’s response to Pakistan’s flooding in 2010. Policy Recommendations: Balochistan is important to Canada because of the regional and international dangers that could result from the further destabilization of Pakistan. fearful of separatism amongst other minorities. Therefore. 57 Consequently. Irantalab. Canada should consider offering assistance to the Pakistani federal and provincial authorities with the aim of increasing adult literacy levels by providing a basic level of education to as many people as possible. This also underscores the importance of shoring up civilian institutions. as further deterioration in Balochistan could lead to the return of military rule. It is emphasized by all those involved in the crisis in Baluchistan that it is one which could only be resolved through political dialogue‚ negotiations and through building confidence between the people of Balochistan and the Federal Government.59 The ethnic diversity of the Pakistani state and the unstable alliances of ethnic parties have led to shifting alliances between ethnic and sectarian groups and the Punjabi dominated military. through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) alongside the Balochistan and Pakistan governments. in situations where there is high inequality between regions. any policy options must focus on increasing Baloch satisfaction within a united Pakistani state. and Naqi 3   of the reform package. and the possible spread of instability to other areas of Pakistan and the region. Dawood. and transportation sectors to allow the Baloch to more fully benefit from their province’s natural resources. Recently however the irredentist tendency has become more prevalent with increasing demand from a ‘Greater Balochistan’ uniting kin from Afghanistan and Iran into a single state. as well as the ongoing struggle between a weak civilian government dependent on ethnic party support and the military. To not act risks Balochistan’s further deterioration. The Canadian government must work towards stabilizing Balochistan within a united Pakistan. However. the conflict is simultaneously a greed. deteriorating American-Pakistan relations and ongoing tensions between the United States and Iran. The separation of Balochistan cannot be advocated due to demographic factors (the Baloch form a slim majority in the province). it was recently revealed that since 2008 only one new development project has been started in the province by the federal government. particularly in the mining. and political considerations (the Pakistani government. grievance and ethnically motivated conflict. ethnic Baloch teachers should be . the “Sardars” use legitimate grievance and the significant financial flows from extortion and smuggling to redistribute wealth to members of their tribe and the broader Baloch ethnic group. To avoid attacks on personnel. fiscal decentralization may have an impact in increasing conflict.64 can provide a basis for its liaison with the local Baloch community. Bakke and Wibbel’s study on federalism and civil conflict found that high interregional inequality and ethnic concentration increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict. This irredentist tendency has coincided with greater international attention paid to the situation.61 Previously the movement claimed autonomy from Pakistan.

Autonomy should be based on the 1973 Pakistan Constitution and the implementation of reforms outlined in the “Beginning of Rights in Balochistan”. Baloch leaders need to compromise between their traditional political structures and the process or idea of nationalism. along with hiring quotas.5%66 of the “Secretariat Group. and more incentive to cooperate with developers offering employment and training. and not offer funding to any groups or organizations that offer any tacit or explicit support to Baloch militant groups. In order to bring all Baloch leaders to the table. The Shahi Jirga. Irantalab. and greater devolution of power to provinces. establishment of an all Baloch security force. Increasing the Baloch stake in projects will reduce their incentive to attack mines or transportation. Brahanmdagh Bugti and Harbiyar Marri.Mediation. and thus increase the profitability of Canadian firms while similarly increasing employment opportunities for Baloch. they must as a precondition respect equally the social and economic rights of all residents of Balochistan. The Canadian government. A more economically empowered Baloch community will have a greater opportunity cost of conflict. as well as provide the Pakistani government with a group of leaders with whom they can negotiate. Officials in private should offer advice to their Pakistani counterparts and stress that significant restructuring of Pakistan’s federal system is needed to grant autonomy. civil society groups.65 Prominent nationalist Baloch tribal leader. to increase the employment of local Baloch. Greater inclusion of Baloch is needed in the public bureaucratic structure. encouraging them to peacefully negotiate with other ethnic groups. The government of Canada should unequivocally condemn the killing of non-ethnic Baloch civilians. as Baloch only compromise 3. and improve their political and economic situation. under direct supervision of Pakistani Army in conflict areas can act as a confidence building measure. Advice from NGOs such as the Forum of Federations will provide policy advice to further facilitate this process. Canadian resource extraction firms wishing to operate in the province should be encouraged to provide local vocational programs. and members of the civil service. The killing of non-Baloch citizens must be stopped immediately. with the consent of the Pakistan. which may help to stress the common religious bonds that the Baloch share with all Pakistanis.Brown. can provide the expertise in order to train the local civilian police force in the province via the RCMP International Police Operations Branch. Any development project in the province should take into consideration the ongoing tensions between the different ethnic communities in Balochistan to avoid making the conflict worse. Canada should encourage the intervention of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (a group dedicated to promoting inter-Muslim dialogue and reducing conflict). should meet with their fellow tribal leaders of pro-Pakistani Baloch tribes. In addition to cadet schools in Quetta. This should temper the positions of more hardline nationalist leaders.”67Tax revenues collected by the federal government should be distributed equally among the provinces and the revenue should go to the development projects designed to create employment opportunities and infrastructure projects. ethnicity or religion. Control and the security of the province is a needed pre-requisite to end the hostilities in the region. Additionally. All Canadian firms should be encouraged to give a small fixed percentage of earnings to the local community in which they operate. special programmers to target Baloch recruits will contribute to the army’s image. The Pakistani Army needs to undertake efforts in order to increase the number of Baloch in its organization and restore its reputation with Baloch population. which comprises leaders of the Baloch tribes should be convened and used as a forum to provide unified Baloch political voice. Negotiations and Compromise for Peace-Building in Baluchistan: The Canadian government should increase funding to local non-governmental organization in Balochistan dedicated to intra-Baloch dialogue. For the Baloch to win legitimacy for their grievances. . Policy Recommendation #2 . irrespective of their language. and Naqi 4   used. including inter-tribal dialogues between Baloch tribal leaders. Dawood. as well as the Baloch diaspora (including those located within Canada). Policy Recommendation #3 –Pakistani Government: Canadian should engage in quiet diplomacy with the Pakistani government.

Brown. and Naqi 5   Annex I – Map of Pakistani Ethnic Groups: Source: “The Four Major Ethnic Groups of Pakistan in 1980. http://www. Irantalab.” The University of Texas.utexas. accessed June 16. 2012. Dawood.

000 irregular tribal fighters. Calls upon the international community to intervene to halt a ‘genocide’78 Banned militant organization81 Relatively new. Founded in the wake of the Iranian revolution as an anti-Shia Muslim movement. it has mostly focused on attacks against Pakistan’s Shia minority. .Brown.85 Sharp upsurge in its attacks in the last six months in Balochistan against Baloch Shia and ethnic Hazaras. 76 Pakistan claims he travels on an Indian passport. Leaders have free movement and been setting up autonomous cells throughout Balochistan since 2009 and members have killed Shia and Baloch Nationalist leaders. Presumed to be the militant wing of the Baloch Republican Party82 Associated with the Bugti tribe. or the United States. The party leadership refused to return due to the ongoingtargeted killings of Baloch.70 Afghan Baloch) Recently After the killing of Akbar Khan Bugti and Balach Marri. Targets gas pipelines83 and attacks on military convoys84 and recently has been able to pull off more sophisticated attacks on paramilitary checkpoints. Pakistan After the death of its leader it has continued to be active. Alleged to receive funding from Saudi Arabia. increasing suspicion of complicity. it takes a hardline and is opposed to any sort of political dialogue. Has Nationalist Militant claimed responsibility for bombings in Quetta and the Goals: Irredentism. the group has kept its leadership secret.88 Jundallah Abdolmalek Rigi (executed 2010 in Iran) Base: Balochistan. but the charges were dropped.72 Conducted its first suicide attack in December 201173 Estimated to have 3. The son of Balach Marri is accused of heading the organization.86 Aims to create an Islamic state in Pakistan founded on sharia law.71 Hyrbyair was accused of inciting terrorism by the UK in 2009. grandson of Akbar Khan Bugti who lived in Afghanistan after the killing of his grandfather.69 Active Independence of a since the 1970s when it was ‘greater’ Balochistan allegedly backed by the (including Iran & Soviet Union. Dawood.79 Baloch Republican Party (BRP) Baloch Republican Army (BRA) Brahamagh Bugti75. but is Banned in Pakistan68 considered a terrorist Orientation: organization in the UK. Alleged to be close to elements in the Pakistani military and security services although it is ostensibly banned. killing of settlers. Reports that it Sipah-i-Sahaba (SSP) & Lashker-iJhangvi (LeJ) Maulana Luhianvi and Malik Ishaq Sunni extremist militant groups that are alleged to work together. Irantalab. the government of Pakistan withdrew outstanding cases against the leaders of the Baloch Republican Party.74 In February 2012.77 Widely assumed to be Brahamagh Bugti80 Orientation: Nationalist political party Goals: Independence of ‘greater’ Balochistan One of the largest and most powerful political parties in Balochistan. Not banned in Canada.87 Small extremist Iranian Baloch group. and Naqi 6   Annex II – Baloch Groups and Structure: Organization Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) Leader Akbar Khan Bugti (Allegedly-Killed in Pakistan in 2006) Balach Marri (Killed in Action in Afghanistan in 2007) Currently leader (suspected): Harbayar Marri Key Facts Influence Militant Groups: Associated with the Marri Base: Afghanistan tribe. which has no extradition treaty with Pakistan. Two of the group’s militants escaped from prison under mysterious circumstances. His presence caused tensions between the two governments and he is now seeking asylum in Switzerland.

95 Usually contests provincial polls. non-violent Independence of Balochistan (Iranian and Pakistani parts)100 advocates for an international intervention but at a lesser level and is estimated to have only about 100 militants at this time. The leader of this Ghulam Mohammed Pakistan organization was found dead Baloch soon after he helped form the (Died after being Nationalist Political umbrella group ‘Baloch detained in 2009)93 party refused to National Front’ which united participate in political several nationalist groups. Considered moderate. Calls for increased but boycotted the polls in resource sharing within 2008.89 Political Parties and Civil Society Groups Divided between Base: Balochistan. Both members of the BNP and NP have been assassinated. Dawood. BLA aligned BSO-Azad faction appears to be the pre-eminent movement at this time.91 Base: Balochistan. 92 Baloch National Front/Movement (BNM) Movement splinted after his death.96 Family party of the powerful Mengel tribe. for attempting to participate in the political process. the Pakistani federal system Current leader: Muhammad Zahi Baloch Wants a referendum on the future of Balochistan. Met with US Vice President Biden in 2010. Has about 100 members. NP and nationalist leaders.104 .94 ‘Greater’ Balochistan Abdul Malik Baloch Base: Balochistan. Middle class entry point into nationalist movement.103 Criticized by the Pakistani government as representing the exiled tribal elite. Unknown assailants have assassinated several leaders of the party. Student organization that has factions that support the Pakistan long been a source of Balochi BLA.Brown. either by Baloch separatists or by the government. Contains the BNP several different factions. States that it is not fighting for a Israel. civilians. 99 Balochistan National Party (BNP)97 Baloch Society of North America (BSO-NA) Dr. Receives funding from the Khan of Kalat. others pulled away and joined the insurgency.90 Baloch Students Organization (BSO) The hardline. Centre Left nationalist Pakistan political party. Attaullah Mengal Base: Balochistan. who is a descendent of the ruler of the princely state that preceded Balochistan’s annexation into Pakistan. and Naqi 7   Islamic militant has been receiving support from the United States and organization. Irantalab.101 Trying to gain bipartisan support. Wahid Baloch Primary Baloch lobby in the United States.98 Base: Washington DC Advocacy. it has ‘Greater Balochistan’ been able to conduct several only rights of the Iranian suicide operations against Baloch and Sunni Iranian military and population. previously controlled the provincial government. National Party (NP) A relatively moderate political party. Started in 2003.102 Important part of the lobbying behind the Balochistan bill introduced by Republican Congressman Dana Rohrbacher. Some factions joined the government. process Many suspect the Pakistani military for his death which Calls for the drew condemnation from the independence of United Nations. but boycotted 2008 polls. Represents the Baloch Middle Class. Major nationalist political Pakistan party. the BNM.

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