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A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U . S.

Anny amMnd ard Generdl Staff College i n partial fulfillment of the requir-ts for the


JAMES J. m E P s u i ,

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Rxt L e a ,


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( L e d v e 0ldnkJ 1 2 . REPORT DATE 2 June 1995


Master's The is, 2 Aug 94

2 Jun 95



Military Police Operations in the Okinawa Campaign

Major James J. Emerson, USMC



U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900


Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.


. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 w o r m

During the World War I1 campaign to seize the island of Okinawa, Operation Iceberg, U.S. Tenth Army employed a significant U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps military police structure. However, the challenges posed to these units by military traffic, nearly 300,000 enemy civilians, and over 10,000 prisoners of war are issues largely neglected by historians. This study analyzes the overall effectiveness and value of the largest joint military police operation in the Pacific theater. It evaluates military police force structure and operations by assessing pre-campaign planning and results of operations with extant historical doctrine, operational setting, and historical information. Historical military police doctrine is discussed to identify standards which existed in 1945. Intelligence or other information about the operational environment is examined for relevance to doctrine. Finally, historical accounts or information about military police operations are contrasted with doctrine and operational setting. Historical information is assessed within five mission areas; traffic control operations, prisoner of war operations, civilian handling operations, security operations, and law and order operations. within these mission areas information is further organized by unit. time, and relation to the tactical situation. Detailed assessment and evaluation reveal Tenth Army military police overall effectiveness and value in Operation Iceberg.

World War 11, Joint Operations, Military Police Operations Amphibious Operations, Traffic Control, Prisoners of War, Civilian Handling, Security, Law and Order, Pacific Theater





Unclassified 1 754001-280-5500



Unlimited Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)

P ~ C X I I W 4 ANSI Std 239.18 298.102


Name of Candidate: Thesis Title:

Major James J. Emerson

Military Police Operations in the Okinawa Campaign

, Thesis Cannittee Chairman

, Member

LTC Robert G. Mang&, Ph.D.

Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 2nd day of June 1995 by:

Philip J. '~rookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U. S. Army Camnand and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)


mjor J s

~ C N IN S ?HE oxcmAnA C a M P A m I by J . ~wscll, USM3, 1 1 7 pages.

m i n g the World War I1 capaiw to seize the island of Okinawa, Operaticn Icekeg, U.S. ~ e n t h Army ' arplayed a significant U.S. Army and U.S. m i n e Ccaps military police structure. However, the &allposed to these units by military traffic, nearly 300,000 eraeny civilians, and over 10,000 prisoners of war are issues laqely neglected by historians. This s t * andlyzes the overall effectiveness and value of the largest h e Pacific theater. It evaluates joint military police operation in t military police force structure and operations by assessing pre-capaign planning and results of operations with e x t a n t historical doctrine, operatid setting, and historical infomation. Historical military police .&=trim is discussed to identify standards which existed in 1945. Intelligence or other informtion about the operatid euvirctment is Bgmined for relevance to doctrine. Fi~lly, n f t i o n about military police operations are historical acaxmts or i cantrasted with doctrine and o p e r a t i 1 setting. Historical i n f t i o n is assessed within five mission areas; traffic c a l t r d operations, priscner of w a r operations, civilian handling operations, security operations, and law and order operations. Within these mission areas information is further organized by unit, time, and s s e s and evaluaticn relation to the tactical situation. Detailed a reveal Tenth Army military police overall effectiveness and Value in @ention Iceberg.

To my wife, Sharyn, I cuuld r i o t have succeeded without enaauaganent, patience, support, and sacrifice. This thesis is yours


my son, J ,

and daughters, Stefany and Sammtha, thanks for

your mture sense of understanding and auxxlraganent.

To my amnittee; C o l Wood, Ln: Wyes, and Dr. Maqmm, y&

,per% advice and support were invaluable.

Finally, to those b i b l i ,

veterans of Okinawa ackmmledged i n the

you have my resped and gratitude for both your

accarplishnents in "Cperaticm Icebergn and your enthusiastic support for this thesis. This is your story; Setper Fi!




.......................... ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ACKNOWLEDQmNTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter ONE. INTRODUCTION Background rnrpose . . . . . . Assumptions Definition of Terns Limitations

i ii iii vi

................. ............... ................. ............... ................. .................. Review of Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Significance of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY General Logic Evaluation Framework Assessment of Planning Assessment of Operations Doctrine Structural Evaluation Structural Planning Assessment Structural Operations-based Assessment Operational Evaluation Criteria Operational Planning Assessment Operational Results Assessment Summary Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.. . . eli imitation .

. . . .

6 6 7 9

10 13 14


.............. ........... .......... ......... ................. .......... .... ..... .... .... .................

THREE. MILITARY POLICE FORCE STRUCTURE EWLUATION General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Structural Planning Assessment . . . . . .

.... ....

28 28

Doctrinal Support Relationships U.S. Axmy Ground Combat Forces U.S. Marine Corps Ground Combat Forces Landing Operations . . . . . . . . . . Garrison Forces/Island Command Tactical Air Forces Functional Doctrine and Setting . . . . Traffic Control Operations Prisoner of War Operations Civilian Handling Operations Security Operations Law and Order Operations Operations-based Assessment of Structure . Traffic Control Operations Prisoner of War Operations . . . . . . Civilian Handling Operations . . . . . Security Operations Law and Order Operations . . . . . . . Summary Endnotes

........ ........

........ .............. .... .......... .......... ......... .............. ........... .... .......... .... .... .............. .... ..................... ..................... .....................

.... ....

28 29 31 33 33 35 36 37 39 41 44 45 47 47 50 51 53 55 56 57


MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS E7JALUATION General Operational Planning Assessment . . . . . . . . . Traffic Control Operations Planning . . . . . . Prisoner of War Operations Planning . . . . . . Civilian Handling Operations Planning Security Operations Planning Law and Order Operations Planning Operational Results Assessment Traffic Control Operations . . . . . . . . . . Prisoner of War Operations Civilian Handling Operations . . . . . . . . . Security Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Law and Order Operations . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
61 61 61 63 65 66 67 68 68 76 80 87 89 92 93

..... ......... ....... .......... ..........


CONCLUSIONS Structural Appropriateness Operational Effectiveness

. . BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . .

.... .... .... ....

. . . .

...... ...... ...... ......

98 103 109 116



Page Tenth Army Structure

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .



Tenth Army Military Police Force Structure WaluationFramework

. 4.

. . . . . . . .

South and Central Okinawa Road Network


B a -

The last major World War I1 operation in the Pacific theater, the Ryukyus Oonpaign, focused on the island of Okinawa at the southern end of

the qrukyu chain between Fonmsa and Japan. The invasion of Okinawa,
Operation Iceberg, was one of the largest mphibious assaults of the w a r bringing the gnnmd forces of A&iral Chester A . N M t z and General Douglas Maarthur tcgether for the first time. U.S. ambat and logistical forces mmkered 172,000 and 115,000 respectively, slightly less than at Luzon. This force faced 100,000 Japanese defenders and a dense civilian population of 500.000.' The joint and d i n e d expeditionary force under the operational direction of the aarmander-in-Chief,Pacific Ocean Areas, was assigned the mission to capture, o c q , defend, and develop Okinawa island and establish ccoltrol of sea and air in the Nansei Shoto a r e a . The mission

sought to establish bases ran which U . S . forces a u l d attack the Japanese

main islands, support operatias contiguous to the East China Sea, and sever Japanese lines of cammication with Asia, Fonmsa, Malaya, and the East Indies. U.S. Anny and K x h e Corps ground and tactical air forces were task organized uuder U.S. Tenth Anny headquarters. The resulting

Tenth Anny canpign concept was to seize the island of Okinawa, rapidly

inprove and develop airfields and port facilities, and exploit this

pitian in the region.

I n addition to the necessary naval and air forces,

. S . Anny XXIV planners designed a large joint ground force canprised of U

l v r p l h i b i o u s Corps, Tenth Anny reserve mads up o Corps, I11 W i n e l b

W i n e and two Psny divisions, and a large army garrison force or island

The qrukyus C a p i g n provides a unique and m t c h e d

vie of

joint and ccmbined integratian of senrices and forces at both the operational and tactical levels? The Carmander, Fifth Fleet was the werall carmander of the opemtim, the amrander, l l v r p l h i b i o u s Forces Pacific was the oarmander of the e t i o n a r y force, and the Carroanding General, Tenth ?my was the cormander of expditicmary troops. The Cmmder-in-Chief,Pacific Ocean Areas issued the initial p l directive an 10 Cctober 1944 to initiate preparatias for Operatian . I

T e n t h ?my had developed basic amnmd and organizatian mcepts


for an operation of this size and scq?e previously on 16 August 1944. structure was ncdified by replac-

the Anny service area structure with

the f m t i m of an Island Carmand to better facilitate base developoent,

island defense, and military gomxment operatias. Canbat forces canprised the remhder of the Tenth W a s

i n figure 1 :

The regirerent for base developnent and military govermnent operatias in the Pacific theater had highlighted the inadequate mmker of military police orgamic to the divisions and carps. The P m t mrshal,
Far East Carmand, realized that as operatians pushed further into the

theater, it would not bepractical to evacuate prisoners of war to Australia. As a result, this would require a dramatic increase in the

mmker of military police units.

Additicmally, as the U.S. presence

l continued to "strkg out" d

haeasing exterior lines of operation

behind advancing ompaign fmts, the need for additimal military police
units to protect installatias in theater would also grow. Widering


F i -

1 . Tentki Anny Structure

this, the hravost 1 ,

Far East Carmand, requested a n additicmal 17,000

military police be prodded in theater. The War Department could not fully accamodate this request and f o m t i m of provisiaal military police units

hcam n e c e s s a r y . '
? @ r i m s t i were encountering increasing ~nmnbersof civiliansin their

as they pushed closer to Japan. Increasiq population density

and the extra reactions displayed by Japanese civilians to U.S. forces

qlicated tactical prablens, exposed canbat forces to increased risk, and created psychological d i l . '
W, the Ryukyus campaign challeqed

military police planners to provide classic suppoa to a joint field q , handle an estimated 500,000 eneny civilians, support base developlaent for at least eight airfields, and support dwelopnent of a Navy operating base at White Beach on Nakagusuku Bay. ' Acardhqly, w i t k i n the Tenth Army task organization existed an
Army and I % & n e Corps military police farce structure canprised of

appruxjnntely 3,500 soldiers and m b a t t a l i ,

. The Army aap1Oyea three

three separate anpnies,

and six separate platccas of military

police, while the Marine Corps enp1Oyea one battalion and five separate canpanies of military police. The foregoing force structure is depicted in figure 2 . Finally, the Tenth Amy PrOwst mrshal also aaployed a joint staff canprised of both Anrry and Marine Corps representatives.'
U . S . Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, military police planners

detennhsd the troop reqdreuents for the

ompaign. They

cansidered experience gained in past and q i n g operations, studied

Okinawa prabable needs,

and canpared then to military police unit


The P r c n r o s t Marshal, Tenth Amy, kegan p h m h q for the

a military

ompaign in Novanber 1944. Planners originally police structure that nas larger than that described above.

The creation

of provisimal military police units was utilized to aqwwate for military police deficiencies identified by planners. Additicmally, there

are mmerms 1 e s

of joint military police task organization i n the

amalgamated phases I and I1 of the ompaign.'O Lieutenant Generdl Victor H . Krulak, U.S. I%&ne Corps, Retired, was the G-3 for 6th I % & n e Division &riq Operation Iceberg. General

Krulak made the f o l 1 a v j . q

camrents r

military police support d ~ k g

the Okinawa czqxiign: You must realize that this was our first real exprience w i t h civilians. Military police wereused in the classic sense as part of the shore party to help organize the beach area, and as sam as we began to encxnmter civilians t h e y were givencharge of the civilian

. Tenth Army military police force structure Figure 2

I n spite of the rnrmeroussignificant characteristics of military police

support in Operatia Iceberg, there is no collective written history,


Infonmtion provided in after action reports by units

regarding the results of operatiens is factual and accurate.


Military policelogistical support was adequate. Definition of Terms

There are

~.nnwaus t -

and phrases in this d o c l n n e n t that require

a clear definition. W y terms camrm in 1945 or those diffdng f m

current dcctrinal mankg are included:

o v e r * Adininistrative Order. An order c

administrative details,

such as traffic, supply, and evacuation, when instructions are tco v 0 1 to be included in paragraph 4 of the field order, and at other

times when necessary ti publish administrative instructions to the carmand;

usually issued by divisiens and higher units.
Beach W t e ~ a n c ered

The beach maintenance area is that

poaion of the beachhead which cxmtains all the canbat senrice support units and activities necessary to sustain the 1


A dmq is the locaticm within the beachhead where an

individual unit's s h o r t tenn supply sustairnnent which t r a m s in its

organic trains is located. "

Civilians found or encamtered in a theater of

They may include

or in areas affected by operations other than war.

civilian internees, refugees, displaced civilians or detained civilians." s Garrisan/&%md CCormudder. l%e garrisan or island carmander i
the officer ordered to canrand the units of all services assigned as the

garrison of an atoll, island, or other

M i l i t a r y Gave-t.

That form of governnent which is established

and mintdined by a Mligerent by force of arms over occupied territory of

the eneny and over the inhabitants thereof. "
Prisoner of War. A persan captured or interned by a belligerent

p e r because of war."

of War C o l l e c t i r g


A locality designated in the

a r e of a frat-line divisian during ocmbat for the assenblage of priscmers

of war, pendhy ewminaticm and arrangenent for fuahez e~cuatian.~'
m i s a n e r of War IncZosure

installatian in the ccmbat or

axmumications zane with facilities for the processhg and tenpolary detentian of p r i m of w a r .

A soldier who has becane separatedfran his

organization without authority. A mtor vehicle that has fallen behind for

na n advance. >I any reason i

Straggler C o l l e c t i r g Paint:

A straggler post designated as a

collecting point in administrative orders at which stragglers are assenbled

pmdhq return to their proper organizations. Straggler collecting points

are located in straggler lines. "

Straggler Line. A line designated as such i n adninistrative

orders and usually following well-defined terrain features such as roads, railroads, or streams a l q or in rear of which military police patrol for
the purpose of a p p -

soldiers absent f m front-lineunits without

Straggler W t .

A post established by military police fron which

patrols operate for the purpose of a p p r -



The prablen ocolducthg this research results f m n limited sources

of i n f t i o n .
words addressSemndaq

sources which cover this caqaign spend very few

military police support directly. These sources do cwver

the topic indirectly wfien speakhg of emirta~nentalfactors: enmy p r i m , enmy civilians, or trafficability of main supply routes. This type of infmtion is scattered through these texts rquirhg detailed and time conslanirag examination. Fortunately, the available primary source dacumentation p d d e s much better detail n q a d i q task organization, p l d enployment and results of operations. This infonmtion c a n b i d
w i t h the fonner may not provide a caplete picture of the results of

enployment, pmblans, and lessans learned. Military p~lice battalion after action reports & s t about for the units involved; however, infop~tion

separate units below the battalion level is cxmtained within higher

headquarters reports. Professicmal associatias have rendered access to

veterans of the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet mine Force, Pacific

mrine Corps eyewitnesses were located and intenriared. No


participants were located in spite of strenuous efforts. Even thotgh difficulty &st4

i n collecting desired evidence, this research design

renders an accurate px&ct with sufficient evidence to w r t this

thesis. Delimitation This thesis will address the operations of other oanbat forces, canbat support forces, and canbat service support forces as required to

N l y answer the primary and secondary questions regardirag rkLlitary police


Review of Literature
There are a rnnnber of excellent extant works which address the
Okinawa Canpign.
Key works on this topic are mjor Charles S . Nichols,

Jr., W, and Henry I . Shaw, Jr.' s Okinawa: V i c t o z y in the P a c i f i c ; J a m H. and William M . Belote's

a f S t e e l : lk B a t t l e f o r Okinawa;

Burtcn Beecher Brigys' Logistic Stqoport o f the Okinawa C a p a i g n ; George C . Dyer's % 2


Anphibidus Cam2 to CanqUer War: lk S t o r y o f W r d R i W

I . T . M.

mmer; Benis M. FranktsOkinawa: C q ~ s t o n eto V i c t o r y ;

h ' s Okinawa, 345: Z F E Gateway to Japan; Frank 0. Rngh's Z X x ? Island

War; Thaws M. I l u b e r ' s Japan's B a t t l e f o r Okinawa; and irvirag Werstein's
Okinawa: xke Last Ordeal.

These accounts provide excellent historical infonmtion regardiq

the tactical and operatid chronology of the Canpaign.

They spend

n the little, if any, time addressing the military police support imralved i
operation. There is saxe indirect reference through discussion of the envirornnent. The attention devoted to enerry prisaners, circumstances on

the beach, eneny civilians, military govermnent, weather, and

trafficability on Okinawa provides indirect reference to the operatid
ernrircamwt of the military police.

Several other works serve to illustrate the persanal attributes of

this Canpign experienced by the individual mvine and Soldier. These

books are George Wt4illan; C . Peter Zurlinden, Jr.; Alvin M . Josephy, Jr. ;
navid Daqsey; Keyes Beech; and Heman Kogan's Mc~mnanVdor: mcine


in Action; William Manchester's GWdbye, WDarlolesS: A Enwir o f

!Chese texts make

the P a c i f i c War; and Emie Pyle's Last C h a p t e r .

occasicmal reference to the military police directly and are also laced with of the indirect notes described i n the first category of

N e , Mere are works d e a l *

with specific unit history.

These are found primarily at the Service and division level. These works
include Benis M . Fmuk and Henry I . Shaw, Jr.'s V i c t o r y and O c c u p a t i a n :
History o f U. S. &dne C o r p s qperatians in W o r l d War II; Ray E .

Zqplanan, James M . Burns, Russell A . Gugeler, and John Stevens' Ufrited



in W o r l d War

1 1 , The War

in the P a c i f i c , Okinaha: The Last

Battle; Geo2ge W l l a n t sThe O l d B r e e d : A H i s t o y o f the First m i n e

Division in W o r l d War




Johnston's E D l l c w M2: The Story o f

the Secand m i n e D i v i s i o n o f W o r l d War II; James R. StC&Muts 'Be Sixth

Mw5ne D i v i s i o n ;

The Sixth &Brine Division Association's S i x t h m i n e

Division: The Strikirtg Sixth; Edmud G. Love's The H o u r g l a s s : A History

o f the 7th

Infantzy D i v i s i o n in W o r l d War II; Edrrornd G. Love's The 27th

Infantry D i v i s i o n in W o r l d War II; 77th Mantry Divisicol, mited States Amy's Ows to hbld it High: The History o f the 77th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n in
W o r l d War II;

and Orlando R. Davidscmts 2 3 Deadeyes: ~ The St-

o f the

9 6 t h Infantry D i v i s i o n .

These v i u r k s collectively provide very good d t

histories cansidering the canbat invwlvenent at the divisicm and reghatal levels. These authors spend very little the and text addressing their organic military police support or attached military police support in a
given operation.

n these texts There is m e direct reference available i

t h a n found in other v i u r k s about the Canpig-. There is also additicolal

indirect reference made in these texts similar to that mentimed above.

The history of the Seccmd Marine Division prwides aparagraph of

amwntary of its organic Military Police s prisaners d m i q the Okinawa Canpaign. handling of eneny

The history of the 96th Infantry

. .

Division provides a tm-page history of its organic Military Police Platoon's imrolvemnt i n the Pacific, There are no references made about

the canpanies of the 519th Military Police Battalion which were attached to
the 7th, 77th, and 96th Infantry Divisias &ring the early phases of the Okinawa Gqaign. Similarly, there are no references made to the canpanies

of the 51st Military Police Battalion (Provisional) ~

c were h attached to

the I11 2nphibious Corps, First l 4 d z i . m Division, and Sixth l4dzine Divisim
during the early phases of the Okinawa Canpaign.'* Detailed exmination

of both of the foregoing categories-oflitezatme ensured discovery of 1 1 references to military police support spread thraughout larger

I & & the , m3st

anplete source of infomtion & s t s

i n the

p r -

source doclnnentation: operation plans, administrative orders,

field orders, daily staff reports, actim reports, and special action repoas f m n theater level down to battalias. Reports frcm units, wen separate units belm the battalion level were incorporated i n the reports of the next higher level amnands, if at all. This creates an obstacle in dealwith military police units due to the tendency to attach carpMnies

and p l a t -

to divisims and regiments

certain phases of an the


operation. I n these cases infmtion availability depends

reporting priorities of the supported unit, since separate capany and platoon reports thraugh parent mrmands appear to have been rare.

Nevertheless, there is a amsiderable antnmt of infmtion available in these documents for detailed review. Finally, mmenms relevant articles fran periodicals such as the c e s muine Ca2ps G3zette and Military Review, are available. These -

o t h directly and indirectly provide a range of infomation which is b

relevant. 'I%y ccmtain historical discussions r q a r d h g military police
support in several areas. Only cme of these articles deals directly with

the Okinawa Cmnpaign; however, they serve to support dcctrinal discussion

and canpariscm. There is a great deal written about military w

qerations, civil affairs, and military police handlw of enmy civilians. These articles serve to support discussion of military police handling of civilians. Collation of the many mall shreds of evidence available increased the u l t i r r a t e d u e of this literature.

No cme source makes significant

effort to address this topic; however, exWaction of infomation fran the

many sources provided a more caplete historical picture.

Significance of the'study

The significance of this study is twofold. First, this thesis

fills a historical void in a military era which is otherwise well documented. while this thesis does not provide a mnprehensive historical accounting of military police involvement in the Ryulryus campaign, it does e c c o a d , this thesis represent the only collective work on this topic. S provides the cmly analysis of military police operations in World War 11,

and specifically the Pacific theater.

'Dan, Van der Vat, ! R E P a c i f i c CiolpMign: !l%e U .S. -J s e War 1941-1945 (New York, NY: S i m and S b t e r , 1992) , 382.


9enth pnml, Action Report Rydqus, 26 m c h to 30 June 1945 (Okinawa: n.p., 3 sep 4 5 ) , 1-0-1.
G. Fix, Tenth A m y in the Okinawa CanpMign: An AnaZysis f a n the O p e r a t i d Pa-spective W A S Thesis, U. S . Army Caumnd and General Staff College, 1992), 1-2.



Action Report


1-0-2, 3-0-1, 3-0-2.

' ~ r m yForces, ~ a East r Cormand, ~eneal Headquarters,!l%e havost J&mhal'sHistozy, Cznpaigns of the Pacific, 1941-1947 (Australia: n.p., 23

Dec 47), 8, 30-33.

61stLt Lewis Meyers, m, ftJapanese Civilians in Canbat Zanes" mine coqs ~ e t t e (February 1.945), 1-3.

' J a m e s H . and William M . Mote, 7&2mm of Steel: ! T h e B a t t l e for Okinawa (New Yak: IEarper and Raw, 1970). 196-197. "Tenth Army, Action Report Rydqus, 1 1 - M I - 1 , 11-=I-2.


Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Participation in the Okinawa ( [ ? I : n.p., 15 m r 46). 99.
Rydqus, 11-MI-I,

''?renth Amy, Action R e 1994,

"LtGen Victor H . Krulak, m, (Ret) , interview by author, 19 C c t tape reandhg and transcript, telephmic interview at LtGen Krulak's hane i n San Diego.
"FM 19-5, M l i t a z y Folice [Obsolete1 (War Department: Govenmrent Printing Mfice, 14 Jun 441, 221.

' % n t h


1st Qlgineer special Brigade,Operations Plan

"Ice&zyn (Okinawa: n.p., 4 Feb 45). Armex No 1.

"Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Staff O f f i c e r s ' Field mnual for dqkibious Operations [Obsolete] (Hawaii: n.p., 10 Sep 44) , 55.

"EM 19-5, 223.

"Bid., 223. ' ' B i d . , "Bid., 223. 223, 224.

"Bid., 225. i d . , 225. i d . , 225.

" k yE . m l e m n , James M. Burns, Russell A. Weler, and John Stevens, Okinawa: Ihe Last Battle, Ihe War in the P a c i f i c , Lhlited States Army in World War II (Center o f Military History, United States Army,
Washiragtan, DC), 1993, 473-482.

General Lqic
The challerge in studying military police support in Opeation
Iceberg is meamrhg its effectiveness. In order to gaugenilitary police

effectiveness in this campaign, structural and operaticma1 evaluations are presented u s a symnetrical framework (fig. 3 ) .

Figure 3.

Ebaluation Framwork

o t h major parts of this framework, two processes facilitate Within b evaluaticm: a s s e s t of p l -

and assesswnt of operatias. Thus,

this chapter describes the framework for both evaluations and the mechanics of both processes within that framework. Finally, the military police doctrine and plaxmirq infonmtion available in 1945 is presented. While this chapter provides an overview of doctrine and infomation, detailed discussion by topic is found in chapters three and four. Evaluation Frammrk
Structural and operatianal evaluatims are d i n e d to create me

logical framework. This architecture fonns the basis for chapters three

and four: Military Police Structural Evaluation and Military Police

Operatid Evaluation. Within each chapter assesstents of both p l a r r n i n g and operations are used to facilitate evaluation. Additicmally, efficiency is emsidered by graupirq evidence according to major subordinate units, mission areas, and critical canpaign junctures. Task organization and opeatimal tenpois considered across this series of junctuces. Relative
eccmnty of force and mtual support are highlighted in both evaluatiow.

I n chapter three, force structure is evaluated to determine if it

was appropriate. This evaluation of military police force structure seeks to answer the f o l l c u i x i g question: Were sufficient personnel planned for,
n employed, and properly task organized to achieve operatianal success? I

chapter four, military police operations are assessed to determine if effective i n actual execution. Amlysis of military police operations

seeks to answer the follcuixig question: Given the available force

structure, were military police operatims effective and of value to the W g n ?

This research design does not attenpt to masure other areas, such as logistics, due to a lack of pertinent military police infonmtion. logistical cansiderations h a m a significant inpact on strudure or operations are discussed under each topic. Assessment of P l a r r n i n g

Each evaluation enplays World War I1 contemporary doctrine and

information regarding the operatid s e t t i r i y available to planners as a

gauge for a s s e s this a s s e s t

of preoperation military police planning. The goal of is to determine phmirq adequacy. Dxtrinal standards and plans to

operaticma1 s e t t i r a g are canpared to operation and * s t r a t i v e provide -1usions

about the appropriateness, ccmpleteness, and accuracy

of military police force strudure and operations p l a r r n i n g . Assessment of Operations


s e a assesmat process examims the appropriateness of the

force structure enployed and the effectiveness of the operations cmducted based q c m the results of military police operations. This operations-based assessnent process differs fran the operatid evaluation. whereas, the operatid evaluation measures effectiveness,

the operations-baseda s s e s -

is merely cme-of-two pmesses utilized to

judge structural appropriateness as well as operatid effectiveness. It

n special action reprts, after action canbines infomation provided i

reports, literature, and interviews of participants to provide a historical picture of military police operations. Canparisan of results with doctrinal Qliteria and p r g n assessp l a r r n i n g creates a second gauge for

k o t h military police structure and operations.


a s s e s t prccess.

principdl pieces of historical doctrine pruvide a basis for

of the accuracy of the military police force structure planning First, Field Mmual 19-5,Military Aolice,' provided the primary
& m y military police doctrine t h o . @ 1945.

source of

This field d

primarily addressed operatid tapics. There were, howwer, several sections dedicated to standard military police organizatias and doctrinal

support relationships with a field anny, a a q s , and a division.

O p e a t i d infomticm pruvided a basis for p1ami.q structure required to perform specific missions.

the capabilities and

19 -5

Field 1

included a separate section cm military police support for anphibious operations.

Second, Fleet M&ne

Force, Pacific Staff Officersr Field Mmm.2

far Anplhibia~sqperaticms; pruvided detailed m i n e Corps p l guidance for anprhibious operatias in the Pacific Ocean Area. This field manual mmtained a structural cmprisun of a Marine Divisicm and an Anny Wantry Division. Other infomtion regardirrg military police support* relationships w i t h canbat, and canbat support, and canbat service

support units was included. There was no specific military police

operatianal infoxxmticm in this source, however, infrequent references are m d e z q a d i q military police roles in anphibious operatias. Third, a series of trainkg docments, published by m i n e Corps Schools titled, Arpbibicus Gpratiom, included Mphibious (Phib) 19,
1 t of Militazy Aolice:

This d o c l r m e n t pruvided the same level of

19-5, but

dactrinal detail for operatianal tapics as Field 1

enphasized M&ne Corps anprhibious operatias. Whereas, Phib 19 was

published in 1 9 4 5 and m y not have beenavailable to t i o n


planners, it does represent the collective Marine Corps military police eqerieuce available to planners fran after action reports of previous operations. It can masaably be assured to represent m i n e Corps military police operatid standards in ~anuary1945.
Fourth, Field mnual 27-10, W e s o f Larad Warfare , provided very

detailed and directive policy r administration of military w prisoners of war. t s


of occupatianal forces,

, and the treatment and handlhg of

This d o c r a n e n t represented very definitive policy for all

these t o p i c s . ' p e r s c o l n e l ~rmcemirq Several periodicals exist which addressed military police lessans of & s

era. These articles focused primarily on three areas; i o u s

operations, handling of civilians, and traffic qerations. W h e n canbined

w i t h the four principal sources cited, the mterial provides a

canprehensive base fran which to derive historical standards. These standards provide a general gauge for assessnent of military police strurrure and operations p l for this Finally, the

doctrine addresshg force structure nonmlly discussed types of units, but

not their specific t e n t s .

necessary, U.S.


and M&ne Corps

f organization will be referred to for details of unit structure tables o

and organization.
Structural Evaluation Criteria

The first mjor measure of military police effectiveness is the

n this appropriateness of the military police force structure splayed i
d g n .

The follcwing questians arise:

1 .

Was the planned military police structure amsistent with

n the Pacific extant doctrinal standards and contgilporary eqerience i


Was the military police structure wfiich was anployed adequate

to handle the actual mission requirements?

The l @ c

utilized to evaluate appropriateness of military police of planning and operaticas

force structure anplays the two a s s e s t s

already discussed. M-tion

is presented by major subordinate unit and

s s e s t is amsidered relative to the tactical and operatid setting. A of military police planning and operations as they relate to force structure provides a gmd ruler for me%mxkg overall military police structural appropriateness for this v i g n . evaluation is contained in chapter three. Structural Planning Assesauent
. Anny Forces, Pacific Ocean Ewmination of Tenth Anny and U.S

Detailed discussion and

nrea, military police structd planning provides a basis for assessnent.

This i n f t i o n is assessed for planner adherence to minirmnn standards

established in dodrine. Did Tenth Anny anploy the dnhnn military police structure prescribed by doctrine ? Military police dodrine traditional r e l a t i & p s

between supporting and supported units based upm exprience at the service level. While these traditional relationships fail to account for specific mission-based requirements, they do infer minirmnn generic levels of support at various canmnd levels. Dob2:ine also provides a basis for deducing

dnhnn requirewrits for the successful acaqlishwnt of traditional


military police missions and unctions.

These requirerents serve as a

basis for calculating m i d n u n force structure required for specific types of missi-. Whilemission-based requiranents f a i l t o account for the

general needs of supported ~ t s the , two methods used in taudeiu provide a

canplete means to assess the planned military police force structure. Intelligence available t o military police planners forecastedthe probable o p e r a t i d setting.
Mnnerous factors r e g -

the e n ,

indigenous civilians, the euvircwnent, and the situation are cansidered due

t o their significant iqdct q m n doctrinal cansideratims.

Exh factor is

discussed in chapter three as it affects a particular facet of missim planning. Doctrinal criteria teqered w i t h infomatian pruvided the most military police support in 1945.

accurate basis for pl-

Today this

same process serves as a basis for assesanent of the military police

p 1 -

conducted. Historical military police planning is reviewed and evaluated

against the doctrinal criteria and o p e r a t i d setting t o determine

s t r u c t d planning a c y .

U . S . Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean Arsas, Tenth

Amy, and major subordinate carmand pl-

is assessed using this

criteria. S t r u c t d Operati--based Assesanent

Operations-based assesanent of the Tenth Amy military police force structure m i d e r s specific m i t s , specific o p e r a t i d results, and the relative tacticdl and o p e r a t i d setting i n w h i c h military police operations occurred. This process seeks t o assess the adequacy of military Did the Tenth Amy have

police structure based q c m o p e r a t i d results.

sufficient military police assets to handle thecirclnustances they encountered? This question is anmered by analysis of military police operatias they relate to structure. Assessnent depends


frun after action reports, special action reprts, recollecticms of participants, or well-ckumnted seandaq saurcematerials. Major abjectives expressed in p l a n n i r i g are canpared to the results of operatims. Operation plans define the required structure that planners identified for this caugnign. Operatid results damstrate

whether planned structure was adequate withtangible evidence.

Evidence is oqadzed by mission type or function, p e r o n n i ! = g

unit, and chronolcgically. Missicms, uucticms, and peromhg units are self-explanatory. Chrcau,lcgicdl placenent draws a relaticmsbip between the historical operation and cme or rr~re military police critical junctures in the canpign. There are five critical junctures for military police

suppoa in Operation Iceberg w h i c h are considered. First, there is the

support to operaticms in the beach maintenance area.'

there is

the rapid sweep of northern Okinawa by 6th M x c h Divisica6 Third, there is the shifting of I11 Marine ~ i o u Oorps s to southem Okinawa.'
Faurth, there is the perid of omstant msnsoons and diminished

trafficability in May and June, 1 9 4 5 . 8 Finally, there is the mssive i o n of p r i m and civilian internee pcqxrlaticms as the southemmxt Tkse five junctures are not -istent with

part of Okinawa is s e d ?

canpign phases; haever, they constitute periods of criticdl effort by

military police units. Inefficiency is captured and separated run inadequate structure.

Operational Evaluation criteria

The second major masme of military police overall effectiveness

is operational effectiveness The folludg questions lcgically arise:
1 .

W a s operational p l -

masistent w i t h extant doctrinal

n the Pacific theater? standards arad v i e n c e i


Were planned military police missions successfully


The lcgic and methadology used to determine effectiveness of

l military police operations enploy the same assessnents of p and

operations. The framewcok for evaluation is near-identical to that used for structure. Evidence is again organized by unit, function, and chnxmlcgical sequence. As in the structural evaluation, the factors of
ecanany of force and mtual support are discuss& where applicable. A

detailed discussion is cantained in chapter four.

The doctrindl aiteria used in the structural evaluation is

eqnndd qxm in the operational evaluation
W a s military police

operatiaal plambq effective? This question is answered again by c a n p a r i r a g dcctrinal criteria and operational s e t t i r a g with the historical plamliq conducted.
Even t b g h issessnent of operations planuixg relies qxm the same
dcctrjnal sources, chapter four examhes cmly operational catent.

It is

specific enough to facilitatediscussion of the key mission areas. The

same five mission areas described in the structural evaluation are

cansidered here again. Each area is defined in sufficient detail to evaluate the effectiveness of both planning andoperations ccoldubed.
External factors and circ~anstances abviously affected each unit's

ability to adhere to doctrinal standards Thus, the setting is urther defined f m n that base provided in chapter three. The expanded doctrinal criteria canbined with a redefined setting together provide a yardstick to measure operational plans. Planning is assessed for every unit possible; however, lack of infonmticm for scme units precludes q l e t e assessrent. Thus, the assesanent of planning in this operation focuses at the T e n t h Amy, X C J Corps, and 111 Aqhibious Corps levels due to availability of historical infonmtian. Unit plannhq at lmer levels is inwrporated into the Amy and Corps discussions. The planning assessrent d e w s the planning prcduct not the process. Operational Results Assesanent Assessrent of operational results represents the realsubstance of

the historical discussicm in this thesis. Wereoperaticms successful or

unsuccessful? This question is answered by the historical facts
wrmmdhq the various military police operations. Operations discussed

in chapter three cansidered structd inferences cmly, but chapter four

analyzes all aspeds of both successful and unsuccessful results achieved. Plans identify operational objectives. These objectives indicate what capabilities were desired by planners Military police plans, analyzed in the operational planning assessrent, provide a basis for analysis of operations actually executed. Discussion of doctrinal

criteria canbined with the operational setting and planned operations

provides an overall operaticmal criteria for each mission area. Ccmparisan

i t h this criteria pennits assessnent of the of historical operations w

quality of military police perf011~llce.A s s e s t

d i n e d with a s s e s -

of operations plarmiq

of actual o p e a t i d results provides an accurate

mans to assess the overall effectiveness of military police operatias.

The owmr&fq logic and methodology of this thesis seeks to

r i f i a r y and seccndary questions spelled out i n capletely answer the p chapter o n e . This is accaplished separate yet syrmretrical evaluaticm of military police structure and military police operations. These t w areas caprise the substance of the two follawirag chapters. Within each chapter, plarmirg and operatias are discussed to achieve logical and factual answers to the research questions of this thesis.

' E M 19-5, M l i t a z y mlice [Obsolete] (War Department, Washington, DC: Govenrment Print* Office, 14 Jun 44),1-250. 'Fleet m i n e Force, Pacific, S t a f f O f f i c e m f Field Nmud f o r Aphibicxzs Operations [Obsolete] (Hawaii: n.p., 10 Sep 44), 1-74.
' p m 19, Ehplopsnt o f M l i t a z y &lice [Obsolete] ( m i n e Corps Schools, NC: n.p., 1945), Series on Arrpjlibious Operations, 33vols, 1-48.

' E M 27-10, Rules o f Land W a z f m [Obsolete] (War Department, Washjlagton, DC: C m e m w n t F r i n t * Office, 19401, 18-21, 74-77, 82-85.
=TenthA q r , Action Repart Ryukyus, 26 Mrch t o 30 June 1945, 3 w l s . (Okinawa: n.p., 3 Sep 4 5 ) . P7-111-2, PII-IV-8/29, PII-=1-1/5; PTOVOGt B k x s b l , 1st Rgineer Special Brigade, M i l i t a z y mlice Activities Okinawa Beach *Nice m a (Okinawa: n.p., 17 ~ u l y 1945). 1-3
' 6 t h BBrhe Divisicm, Special Action Report, Okinawa Gperation, 2 wls., Phases I & 11, 30 A p r 45, Phase III (Okinawa: n.p., 30 Jun 45), VII-11/48. ' 1 1 1 BBrine Zqhibious Corps, Action Repart Ryukyus -ration, Phases I and I1 (Okinawa: n.p., 1 Jul 451, 44.
%XIV Corps, Action Report Ryukyus, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45(0kinawa: n.p., n.d.), 67-69, 87-90; I11 K&ne Zqhibious Corps, Action Report, 110-128.

%nth U m y , Action Report, P7-111-33/35.


World War I1 era military police operations depended heavily on

manpower and hmm interacticm to achieve success. %emfore, adequate

farce structure, effective task organizaticm, and econany of force were u i crucial principles g

the military police planning pmess. As

of planning and opeations are

s s e s t s described in chapter two, a

cmbined to evaluate structure, but dcctrinal criteria m t first be

S t r u c t dP

A s s e s t

Doctrinal Support Relatiaships

Doctrine affected force structure in two ways.

First, dcctrine

established traditimal support relatiaships for military police units and supported carmands. S d , dactrine created specificamditians for mission perommce based qxm service l e v e l e n c e

and lessons

l e a d . These ccmditians served to expand or diminish traditimal levels a i l of prescribed support t it for a given situaticm. Raditional

support relatiaships therefore required first amsideraticm. Cme questicm

e r e . Does the p arises h l &

military police force



m i n i r m a n dcctrinal support prescribed i n traditimal support relatiaships?

Field Mmml (EM) 19-5,Military Police, provided planners with a general description of the doctrinal levels of military police support for a U.S. Army division, corps, field army, and theater headquarters. Specific organization of these units was found in their respective tables of organization or tables of organization and equipnent. Additicmally, this reference provided description of military police prisoner of w a r processirag canpanies, military police escort guard canpanies, and specially fonned criminal investigation units for use at critical points within a theater. Finally, FM 19-5 describes a military police canpany, aviatim for use in support of air forces and associated installations.'
U.S. Amy Gxxm3 aanbat Porces

The division military police platoan, organic to all types of

divisions, was named in accordance with Tables of Organization
19-87 and 19-97, or Tables of Organization and Equipnent 19-7, 19-117, and 19-177T. It is inportant to note that the tenn platcon here must be

properly defined. A division military police platcon organized under Table of Organization 19-7 was authorized apprcodrrately 90 soldiers in the unit.

caqprisan, Amy military police canpanies were authorized between 130

and 150 soldiers dependirag upon the table of organization that the unit was
organized under. Fomd w i t h i n the division headquarters anpry, division military police p l a t were carmanded by thedivision p m t rcarshal?

The Amy corps was doctrinally assigned a military police platcon

organized under Table of Organization and Equipnent 19-77. The corps p m t1 -

s part supervised this platcon. When the Cmqs operated a

of a field army, doctrine considexed one platcon adequate. In situations

wfiere the corps was o p e r a t i r a g independently or required additid support,


doctrine provided for the assignment of a military police canpany,

organized under Table of Organization and Equipnent 19-37. This elastic

ccmpany expand&

with additional platccms to provide a m

. of cme

platoon per division. The 19-37 canpany had the same support relationship
with a corps as a military police battalion had with a field anny.

The field anny military police battalion doctrinally provided a

w i d e m t q e of support within the anny area of operation. It operated within

both the canbat zme and the annumication z m . This battalion was
organized under Table of Organization and Fquipnent 19-35. This battalion ccmsisted of a headquarters and headquaaers detachvat, four military
Each ccmpany within the police ccmpanies, and a medicdl detaclm~~L

battalion m i s t e d of ccmpany headquarters, scout car section, and three military police platcons.
Ebr an anny of mxe than three corps, a military

police ccmpany, Table of Organization and Equipent 19-37, attached to the battalion for each additicaal c o r p s . '

The task organizaticm for T e n t h Amy reflects that each Amy

division had an assigned military police platm, the XXnr Ccaps hacan assigned military police p l a t ,

and the 519th Military Police Battalim.

A s s i g n i r a g the 519th Military Police Battalion to the XXnr Corps vice Tenth
Amy, deviated ran doctrinal support relationshipsi n EM 19-5 to push

military police support forward to XXnr Corps. The Tenth Amy Headquarters had a platoon fran the 519th Military Police Battalion p r o v i d i r i g security

and military police support at the canmnd post. Additionally, the Corps
attached ccmpanies fran the 519th to their two assault divisicms, 7th Infantry Division and 96th Infantry Division. Ccmpany B, 724th Military Police Battalion attached to the 77th Mantry Division i nT e n t h Amy

r e s e r v e . '

The Tenth Amiy M a t e d fran basic


dadrinal support

relatimships, however, the total quantity of Anny military police units

m h r of Anny supported carmands clearly satisfies canpared to the total n

the basic quantitative support requirement for a field any established in

doctrine. Tenth Amiy did not lMintain centralized ccmtrol of the 519th
Military Police Battalian in order to provide additiaal support to X X N Corps for shore p a r t y operations. M d n u n military police support was task organized at the lowest possible levels. U.S. &Brine Corps G
d Canbat Forces

The & Corps Schools prduced a series of training documents

. Doclanent nmhr 19 in this series, titled ryphibicus Operations (Phib)

Phib 19, was t i t l e d ~ l q m n t of Mlitary Rdice
Phib 19 provided

planners with the sane service level experience and traditicmal support relatimships as FM19-5. Phib 19 provided a descriptian of two basic m i n e Corps military police organizations; the fleet Marine Force military police battalion and the m i n e division military police canpany.'

The military police canpany organic to the mrine division

possessed three p l a t o c n t s and a canpany headquarters. Table of Organizatian
F-90 provided the structure and organizatian of this canpany. An F Series

canpany rated apprcDdmately 100 mines.

The military police canpany

pmvided a full range of support to the Xwine division. The canpany

carmander also acted as the division provost mrshal. Doctrinal provision

existed for a divisian to request additional military police support fran

the next higher echelcm of wmrand when necessary.'

Fleet m i n e Force military police battalions, new organizatims at the end of 1944, possessed four military police cmpmies and a

headquaam and service

canpany. The first of these military police

battalions was activated 27 October 1944. These new battalions saw varying mmirq levels between 350 to 500

Doctrinally, cme or more of

these battalicms was t a s k organized into a force abnre the division lever.

The Marine ground mnbat forces of Tenth Army



a s k organization included a the I11 Marine IImphibious Corps. The Corps' t

corps military police assault divisions: and a canpany in each of its two principal

1st and 6th Marine Divisions. The 1st Military Police

Battalion, Fleet l 4 I ? 5 I E Force, Pacific also attached to and supported the 111 Marine Anqhibious Gzwqs. Additionally, the Tenth Army attached three military police cmpanies run the 1st Pravisid Military Police Battalion, Island amMnd to this corps. The I11 Marine Anqhibious Corps kept one of these mnpanies attached to the Corps Military Secticm, and attached the other two cmpanies to the 1st and 6th W i n e t t a t Divisicms. Tenth Army planned this joint a of military police to

assist I11 Marine Aqhibious Corps with cantrol of civilians and allow more

n assault shipping. The military police mits to flow into the target i
7th Field Depot possessed a guard ccmparry. Altlmgh not organized under a

military police table of organization, this canpany perfonaed nummus military police support functions. Finally, the 2d Marine Division also in

~enth ~rmy reserve had a canpany of military police organized under Table

9 failed to It is abvious that Marine Corps doctrine in PHIB 1

address two of the military police organizations enploy&d to support an military police canpany and the field depot AqXbious Corps: the m~ps
guard mnpany.

In spite of this, the plamed l 4 I ? 5 I E military police force

strudure exceeded doctrinal standards.

The three attached Army military

police canpanies gave the corps an apprcadmate 30% increase t o its military police structure. Ultimately, I 1 1 Marine Anphibious C o r p s possessed over

60% m e military police support than prescribed by doctrine.

Landing Operatiom

Prior t o leavkg the discussion of aqprt t o ground an'ht units,

it is important t o mention the specific nuances involved w i t h anphibious

operatiom of this time f .

In the 1 -

phase of this anphibious

operation, organic military police aqprt fran the divisiom decentralized

and attached t o the reghatal ambat team.

In sane cases this support

This process

further Suwivided attachjlag t o the battalicm landing t .

provided e x l y presence of military police aqprt t o the shore party.


the next higher headquarters flowed ashore and established ccmtrol; these
units ~ m ~ l consolidated l y again either re~ining cm the beach or pushiq forward w i t h the divisicm. These units required no a d d i t i d structure t o

provide this shore party aqprt. Division military police w s+ly detached plat-

and plat-

detached squads t o shift structure.

Capst and Army l w e l shore parties drew military police support ran

organic and attached assets:'

~arrisc~ ~1o r ~ e s / ~ s l aarma nd


FM 19-5 prescribed a s

d type of military police battalicm to

assist in maintaining security a t the service carmand, defense carmand, ports of embarkation, overseas department, or within a theater of operatiom. This type of unit, organized under Table of Organization and

Equipnent 19-55 or 19-56, possessed four military police canpanies, a

headquarters and heackparters d e t a t ,

and a medical detachent.

W l e of perfomirg a full range of military police functias, it represented a versatile organization well suitedfor support to garrison forces and island canrands. Emever, available doctrinal publications failed to specifically address a m p p r t relatimship for this type of

. S . Anny garriscm force or island carmand. battalion w i t h a specific size U

For that reascm, garriscm force p l a r n r i n g relied a l r r P s t exclusively on estimated mission r e q u i t s . It is noted here that two provisimal

military police battalions were formed ran the 102d Mantry Regiment
under Table of Organization 19-55. The 1st Provisid Military Police

battalion attached to the Island Trcops, Island Carmand, and the 2d Provisid Military Police battalion attached to the Military Govenmrent, Island Carmand.

The Army redesignated these two battalions prior to

canpaign closure as the51st and 52d Military Police battali-

respectively. ' l In addition to military police battalions, FM 19-5 lccsely desaibed crhinal investigation units. These were special organizations formed w i t h i n a theater of operations to amduct Q^iminalinvestigations for a field a m y , w i t h i n a cammications zone, or other carmands wfiich required this type support.

Here again, doctrine failed to establish a

quantitative s u p p r t relaticmship. It also fails to establish the general size of these units. U . S . Anny Forces, Pacific &em Provost s identified a r e q u i t

and ~enth ~nny

for tvm criminal investigation

sections, organized under Table of Organization 19-5005J. Subsequently, cmly one kcam? available: the 36th Criminal Investigation Detachent
w i t h apprcodmately eleven members.=

A third area of support to a garrison force where no exact support

relationship existed concerned prisoner of w a r processkg canpanies. These

n the Pacific. They mall special units operated at the platm level i
pravided a&.ninistration and record keepkg functions for the Prisoner of

War M m t i o n Bureau. Table of Organization and ?Zquipnent 19-237

outlined structure for these canpanies; howewc, their independent p l a t -

had an organic aWstrative capability and operated inaepenaent of the

canpany. The 1st Platm, 162d Military Police Prisoner of War Processkg

attached to the 1st Military Police Battalion, Island Troops,

Island amnand. The successhl eqerience of these unitsin the Pacific, forecasted the adequacy of this p l d ~tructure.~
FM 19-5 identified cme organizatian that had a prescribed support

relationship with garriscm forces; the military police escort guard


Organized under Table of Organization 19-47, this canpany

attached to the higher headquarters for a theater ofoperatiom, a service

carmand, a defense carmand, a field amy, or a separate corps. This canpany operated a prisoner o f w a r inclamre, or a canp, and ccmducted
evacuation of prismem. The Tenth Army did not request any of these canpanies for operation of the Island Connmd central priscmer of w a r i n c l e . Historical records provide no evidence of why this type

organization failed to participate in the campaign." Tactical Air Forces P 1 a n n h g for support of tactical air forces and installations presented issues similar to those faced in p1anrh-g for military police support for garrison forces. Develcpent of airfields an Okinawa

projected a cannensurate increase in the military police m q p r t for these installations. The base developnent plan depicted a total of eighteen airfields. EM 19-5presmibed use of a military police canparry, aviation for airfield support. It provided traffic amtrul and security with five

o p e r a t i r a g sections and a canpany headqw.rters according to Table of Organization 19-217. This oqanization eqanded as necessary to meet the

needs of a particular air base. The tmditicmal support relatiaship

e n t h Amy Tacticdl Air Force possessed assigned cme cxnpany per base. The T

the 1243d Military Police ,


Aviation and the 1388th Military Police

Aviation within the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrcm, 92d The plan to utilize cmly tvJo military police canpanies,

Air Depot Group.

aviation failed to recognize m h h n n doctrinal support relatiashipsfor

the support of eighteen airfields. Additionally, the two principal

airfields of Yontan and Kadena amtinually drew on the 1st Provisicmal Military Police Battalion and the 1st Military Police Battalim, Fleet Force, Pacific for additional support. to explain this p l Military police records fail

deficiency. Due to exhausted theater smrces of

replacmts and service units, the hwost Marshal, U . S . Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean Area received disappmval of a request for a fifth military police battalion This m y account indirectly for this and other

structural shortfall^.'^ Functional Dxtrine and S e t t i r a g Functicmal doctrine merely prescribed the characteristics of
p2oper perfonnmce of a prticular mission or function. This cnnbined with

relevant intelligence a l l &

planners to predict the e n v i m t and its

h p c t on structure. The same military police doctrine used todetermine

support relationships applied here also. Fmctional areas included traffic control operations, p r i m of viar apeations, enarry civilian ccmtml apeatians, security apeations, and law and order operations. These fmctional areas are andlyzed and anpared to the structure and capabilities of the various military police units. haffic Cmtrol Operations *doctrine in
E 'M

19-5 andmrine Corps Doctrine in


1 9

placed a large prenim on the kpxtmce of traffic contm1,avoidance of anqestion, and nobility for canbat effectiveness andoperatid success. Doctrinal respcasibility for traffic plaxming resided with the G-4. Doctrinal reqcasibility for road reamnaissance, input to the G-4, and route signkg fell q c m the

Doctrinal respcasibility for

execution of traffic plans resided with the military police under the supenrision of the p m t marshdl.'6 Specific prescribed duties fall into

two areas which h p c t qm required structure.

1 .

qwate control points at bottlenecks, intersections, and

cme-way defiles; and operate infonmtion booths, furnish infonmtion, report rmvenents, report required mintenance, and recannend iuprovanents. (Required fixed posts)
2 . Esoort colunms, patrol routes, handle accidents, and clear

jams. (Required foot and vehicle patrols) '" Intelligence available for the target emrirorrment provided fairly detailed infonmtion on beaches, inland terrain, and road networks The
Hagushi beaches backed up to a seawall and other obstacles, but, each

assault beach had rmerow exits leadkg tavard a mastal road nmnirq

between the beach and Kadena and Yontan airfields. The c e n M part of the island psessed a ccmplex inland mad network. Okinawan mads omtinued south via three principle routes. Substantial lateral routes existed

around mjor towns and villages, however, decreased in the open expnses in
TO the north, only o m principle routeran north and south.

Occasionally, lateral access rcads ranbetween the primary route and local

towns or villages. Undweloped and restrictive routes characterized the road network in the north
Apprmcimately 225 and 450 miles of primary and

seccwdary roads respectively would require a canplex systen of traffic omtrol posts and patrols. This is depicted in Figure

The m t

significant deficiency of the Qkinana road network centered on the poor qyality of surface and subsurface road mterials. Ctmsideriq the

anticipated volume of military traffic and pcDr weather, roads pranised to deteriorate quickly requiriq traffic omtrol in areas requiring mhtenance. Tqether, these factors indicated that traffic omtrol would h a n1 require a rrmch greater t f of mqzmsr.''

The Provost Marshal, U . S . Anny Forces Pacific Ocean Area analyzed

traffic operations of previous theater aqaigns i n detail to prcduce force

e n t h Anny Prmst mshaltsplans called requiranents. Subsequently, the T

for and requested an additiaal military police battalion which was disapproved. There is no evidence that corps or divisicm provost l r r a r s h a l s anticipated difficulty acanplisking this mission with the available support. Military police p l at the anny and theater levels reflected

thoxniyh analysis; however, subordinate military policeunits relied q m


sections for production of traffic plans necessary to calculate

traffic p t and patrol requirements. l'be timeliness of traffic p l 38

varied amrmg the nmtamw G-4 sections. Not all major subordinate carmands prduced traffic circulation plans prior to landirg. mis deprived military police units of theability to plan traffic related force reqwiranents in d e t a i l . ' 9 Priscmer of Xar Cpemticms

Doctrine i n both FM 19-5 and Phib 1 9 maintained -istent

for military police handling of prisaners of w a r .


Clear reference also

existed to Field Mmual (FM) 27-10,Rules of Land Warfare?

The primary

godl of doctrine soqht ccmpliance with the provisions of FM 27-10 in

handling prisoners at all levels. There existed three sub-fundions of these operations w h i c h directly affected military police force structure requirements:
1 . Operation of division collecting pints. (Division level

military police operated)


Evacuation of priscolers frun division collecting points

to prisoner of w a r inclosures in rear areas. (Corps/anny level military police evacuated)


Operation of p r i s m of war inclosu~es.(Operated by


corps/anny level military police/military police escort guard

Each of the functions listed a b e have a varying i n p c t on

structure d q e m l i q upm the ~nanberof enany prisaners iwolved and the duration of the operation. I n order to be useful, this dcctrinal infonmtion required an estimate of enany prisoners of vmr that would be captured. The Tenth Amy intelligence estimate in the ~ e n t a t i t i c m s Plan, Iceberg provided
M ,

i n t i o n

or estimate of enany prisoners that

Figure 4 .

South and C e n t r a l Okinawa Road Network


e n t h Army and U . S . would probably be captured during the campaign. Both T

Anuy Forces, Pacific Ocean ?+reas action reports anitthis issue in

discussians of p l -

1 , and intelligence. However, the Prwvst -

U . S . Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas states that the enemy prisoner of war

operations in the Philippines and other 1 1

island c a n & -

were studied

in plarming for Operation Iceberg. These records further indicate that large mxnb=rs of prisaners were anticipated in planning.

Plans placed

respansibility for prisoner of war operations with military police units o m c to canbat units and considered this structure adequate. Corps military police units were initially tasked with establishent and operation of i n c l e s . Operation plans provided detailed and consistent

guidance for handlirg of prisoners of war.

I n short, the traditicmal

support relatiowhips were viewed as adequate. Findlly, the military

police battalion assigned to garrison forces was tasked to run a central priscmer of w a r inclosure later in the campaign. The priscmer of war plans were consistent with doctrine, exploited the additid military police

suppoa at the corps level, and ultimately shifted the burden to garrison

'' forces.
Civilian &mcXLingOperatians
Both Army and Marine Corps doctrine pointed out the relatiaship

between military police in occupied territory and the aWstration of military gwenment. EM 27-10,Rules of Lmd Warfare, was at the heart of military police operatias in support of military w t . The basic

goals for this missicn area included enforcerent of military govenmtent ordinances, protection of lives and property, and restoration of law and

Specific duties prescribed fell into two areas affecting structure:

1 . Security functions; escort and guard internees, defend

civilian inclosures and rear areas f m n isolated resistance, guerrillas,

and hostile attacks, and seize and secure civil records, property, and

I a w and order functions; prevent pillage

and pilferage,

ccmduct energetic preventive polichg, and a M s t e r jails or priscm~.~'

Doctrinal i n f t i o n

considered military occupation in general

tenus, and presented canplex prablems to military police planners. Colrnterintelligence planws assessed the pmbable reaction of these
o Tenth Amy forces. Japanese propaganda would prabably result civilians t

in fear and possible hostility until U . S . intentions were deronstrated.

Thus, the Tenth Army ccmcept initially treated each enany civilian on
Okinawa as a p r i m of war until properly classified. A l t h q h

segregated f m n actual priscmers of war, each civilian would require all of

the same handling cansideratians. This added a seccmd requirement to

t i e s perfom all the same & necessary for prisaners of w a r . Civilian

functions a u l d not be consolidated w i t h prisoner of war handling since the

t m groups had to be segregated: separate collecting points, separate

inclosures, and separate evacuation processes.

am i n i n n r m , this would

require duplication of the military police support to ccmbat units cansidered adequate for handling priscmers of war. This mission area also required an estimate of the m m h r of civilians that would be interned in order to judge the inp.ct on structure.
In this case, military govennnent planners prepared a detailed estimate of

civilians to be interned, respective geogaphic lccatias, and relative time in the c~npaign. The plan envisioned a symnetricaluncwerirag of the

civilian population i n the north and south. The total population anticipated counted appKodmately three hundred thousand Okinaumn~.~~ Military gwensnent teams were attached to cantat units at t h e lowest levels; however, the 2d Provisicnal Military Police Battalion attached to the Military Governnent Secticn, Island OcmMnd was not scheduled to arrive at the target until seventeen days after the initial landing. Three anpanies f m the 1st Provisicnal Military Police Battalion were attached to the I11 l&rbe Zqhibious Carps: Ccmpany A attached to the Military Goverrnnent Section, I11 Mw5.m Zqhibious Corps,
t h l&rbe D i v i s i & o and aanpanies B and C attached to the, 1st and 6


with military goverrnnent teams. lhis joint task organization planned to

cover the shortfall created by the shippiq flow of the garrison forces,
and mved m e military police support forward to handle civilian^.'^ This mission area deMnded a m t a t i o n of military police structure based p the density of the civilian population on Okinawa.

Planners acmrmodated this need thraEgh shifts in t a s k Organization. Each

corps had a military police battalion attached, and the I11 Marine Zqhibious Corps had garrison force military police anpanies attached. Additicnally, the reminder of the 1st Provisial Military Police Battalion planned to land and attach to the 1st hgineer Special Brigade/Tenth Amy Shore Earty Group.
Tenth Amy planners shifted three

battalias of army level and garrison force military police support to canbat units early in the campaign. The plan later shifted garrim force units back under Island Carmand. Ttxxwgh plamiq by military govenment sectias allowed military police planners to be flexible in the gnplayment of a limited structure."

Security Operations Security operations doctrindlly overlapped the four other mission areas. In traffic operations, military police s e d
min supply routes,

key rcad junctions, and brim-.

police s e d civilian c c m t x 0 1

In p r i m of w a r operations, military

collecting points, i n c l e s ,

and prisoners i n transit. I n

operations, military police secured civil records,

populations, and facilities. Military police also cxmducted tactical security operations in

areas against


1 units or guerrillas.

As will be shown in law and order operations, security is inherent in the

act of policing. These functionsgenerally do not affect structural plambq, as mst are a b e t activities of another missicm area. As such, they require no additional prsmnel.
Eavever, security of critical

facilities such as supply W s , airfields, carmarad posts, or amstruction units generally required dedicated forces with this as their primary focus.

In these cases, military police forces required stmctuciq to accamodate

these planned missions?'
FM 19-5 and Phib 1 9 described all the duties listed above.

Additionally, these references provided g u i d a n c e cmemkg shore party security cancerns. Security of supply 6uqs cca~stituted a major amsideration in the n o d & u s i o n area durirag an E m p l h i b i o u s. 1 that characterized the ha& Security of supplies precluded service

pilferage and protected them against eneny units and civilians. Intelligence estkmtes described c~unterlandings and erployment of paratrccps within the hchhead as likely eneny cwurses of actian. This potential threat required that structurdl plans acmmt for it. Military fran division assets attached to the first subordinate police detadxm~ts

shore parties to land, and canpany size detachents ran corps' military
police units ultimately supported the Anny Shore Party Group."
Next, cansideration of airfield security requirements was a

critical plamiq factor. The size of Kadena and Yontan airfields and the prosped of developing sixteen additional airfields created a major structurdl consideration. Doctrine asserted that military police canpanies, aviation provided a proper suppcart relationship for a single tactical air forces installation. However, no infomtion on security r e q u i r t s for either of these airfields or any of the planned airfields

was present in the historical records available. Additionally, this

caganization provided eqandable structure, kut no i n f t i o n

on actual

size or structure was addressed in the doclaeents ewmined. The 1243d Military Police Capny,Aviation and the 1388th Military Police Capny, Aviation both existed under H e a w e r s and Headquarters S q a c k m , 92d Air Depot Group. These two units are menticoled in the action report of the
P ~ O ~O ,G ~

Tenth A m y , but only briefly.

It is unclear why

additional aviation canpanies were not plarmd to suppcart the two other existing airfields or the fourteen planned airfields. Plans fail address

any of these additional requir-t~?~

Law and Order Operatias

Doctrine ran FM 19-5 and Phib 1 9 specified law and order

operatienccnpssed within the scope of traffic ccmtrol o p e r a t i , and civilian ccmtrol o p e r a t i . or enfox-t These

prisoner of w a r o p e r a t i ,

uuctio.s, such as traffic enfox-t

of civil Kqxllatians,

were canpanents of the larger mission areas. These redundant functim

required no additional structure beycaul that required for the principal

r e a . " mission a
Ttm other independent functians of law and order operations

prescribed by doctrine existed in plans. The m3st significant function involved control of stragglers. Stragglers cansisted of unauthorized
perscumel in a given zone of action. These stragglers routinely included

sanrenir hunters or curiosity seekers. Their mwenent fran rear areas and
presmce i n forward areas clogged m a i n mp~~l routes y and interfered with

s t a b l i t canbat forces. Doctrine prescribed e points, and patrols as control measures.

of straggler lines,

These requirements sanetimes

coincided with other traffic, prisoner of war, civilian ccmtrol, or security posts; however, this was mt a l w a y ~the case. Given its relative priority by T e n t h Anny, this function required cansideration in f o 1 s structure. Stragyler were k p ~ l instituted l ~ imnediately to the

rear of division hdaries plackg principal respmsibility with the corps

military police. The scope of this problem typically grew as service and
garriscm forces flowed ashore later in the canpaign. However, as shown

earlier, the corps military police assets kcam less eqaged with prisoners and civilians as garrisan forces became operatianal. The result
was that corps military police battalions planned to shift enphasis fmn

other mission areas to this one."

Another t -

function of law and order operatians amern& First, military police attenpted to prevent of weapans, unauthorized possession of

general e n f 0 . t c t .

pilferage, praniscuous f i r *

sowenirs or ccmtraband, and desecration of tanbs. Violations were investigated, incidents reported, and restraint applied w i m ~ necessary.

?he Island ClcmMnd operated a U .S . priscmer central stockade. At lower

levels, tfmporary stockades were operated as necessary.

Plans placed the

reqcmsibility for law and order operatians with military police units at

each level due to anticipated infrequency of violations?

Operations-basedAssessment of Structure Traffic Cmtrol Operations Traffic operations planned in the beachhead anployed doctrinal relatiaships of military police units attached to shore party elenents as described in the planning assessment. At division and lower levels operations were executed i n accordance with plans. As the corps' shore parties landed, corps military police units were planned for support of these organizations. XxIV Corps a s s l a n e d ccmtrol of the southern half of

the Hagushi beaches cm Lt2 and I11 Marine Amphibious Corps a s &
of the mrthem half cm Lt6.


1st Platoon, &q?ay A and 1st Platoon

Canpany B, 519th Military Police Battalion detached ran their parent

mnpanies supporting the 7th and 96th Mantry Divisions. They remained on the beach as planned to support the XxIV Qxps Shore Party. Ccmpanies C and D of the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet m i n e Force, Pacific
were planned to support the I11 Marine Amphibious Corps Shore Farty.


units, originally, scheduled to land c m -3,

did not cane ashore until Lt11


leavirq the corps shore party without support for five days."

this period the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions left guides behind i n critical intersections to protect their lines of annumicatian to the beach.

The Tenth Anny Shore Party Group a s &

control of the beachhead

cm 9 April 1945?5 Tenth Anny Shore Party Group or 1st Bigheer Special Brigade relied upcm military police elenents of both corps' shore parties.

oanpany D of 1st Prwisicml Military Police Battalion was planned to

c h e d attach to the brigade for additional support. S this unit did not arrive until 1 6 .
5 . to land on -

Corpss' military police

respcmsibilities were divided north and south at yellow beach 3 at the mth of the Bisha Gavia.

The mrthem beaches were largely abafbmd after

Tfie Tenth Anny Prowst khrshal reported division military police

on duty on the beaches and lMin roads on

I+1 in accordance w i t h plans.


6th Mxine Division assessed their military police organization for shore party support as adequate and efficient. Both corps reported no ccolgestion on their beaches; hawever, I11 Sm@i.bious Corps noted that the shore

party military police landed too late to perfom efficiently, and sane beaches used to 1and'TenthAnny service units had hadequate traffic control."

As initial inland traffic control operations in central Okinawa

progressed, military police assisted eqimers p o s t * signs. This

additid duty diverted p?mamel planned for use at traffic posts. The

ergheem reccmnended greater rnmJws of military police to keep min

supply routes open. As operations in the north progressed rapidly and mre

roads uncowed, traffic control was hirmpered.

Due to the rnanber of

military police required to handle civilians, guard supply dmps, and still afloat, insufficient military police were available for traffic amtrol posts. The initial traffic problems were axrected as mre units such as

the 1st Military Police Battalion flowed ashore and established traffic
posts as planned. The 6th Mxine Division Bqheer reported that engineers

handled traffic control at canstruction sites until military police became available."

the end of April 1945 the 111 m i n e Zqhibiaus Corps executed

two separate division nwes south into the Tenth Amy lines. Additionally,
the 27th Mantry Division nwved to the north to a s tactical

mspmsibility for that areal9 All of these division rrwes succeeded

without any difficulty. This provided evidence of adequate military police

structure when division and corps mits supported each other." Traffic control became critical dur5.q the mmscxms between late

May and early June. U . S . Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Observer
reports indicated that there was a need for m e properly trained military police, especially in these later phases. It further inferred that

inadequate military police structure ampmded the problems i n the xxnr Corps z o n e created by weather. Subsequent to the loss of supply mutes 13

and 5, the structure s l p s p o r t e d twenty-four-hour-a-day operations between


and Lt65.

IIowever, XXrV Corps military police assisted I11 Wtrine


Zqhibious Corps military police with ccmtrol of route 1 while route 13 was closed."

Corps traffic on

haffic control operatiam supportkg Tenth Amy, as it uncovered the southern end of Okinawa and encountered dense pockets of miniq civilians, were characterized at all echelons as excellent. Many traffic posts south of the Island OcmMnd forward bmdary were jointly mnned. The I11 mine 2nphibious Corps characterized these operations a s requiring strenuous effort ran available mits." Traffic control in the outlyiq island operations is evidenced by operatiam of 3d Platoan, 2d m i n e Divisicm Military Police aanpany on

rneya Shim and Agud


This platcon's support for shore party

required augmentation by l&rines of a thirty five nun replacerent draft.



M c a t e d that the doctrinal ccnpliment of military police was

insufficient for handling both traffic operations and civilian handling operations ~imultaneously.'~

I n sumnwy, the results of traffic antrol operations prwided

mixed reviews on the supppting strudure.

First, it is difficult to draw

exact discriminating lines between prablms created by late arriviq units

and insufficient structure. Division level support was generally viewed as

adequate except w i t h i n the separate regimental 1adi.x~ force enplayed on
Iheya Shim. Hcwever, division operations received supplenentary support

ran corps military police units. Operations at corps or army levels

sametimes indicated a need for additid structure. This resulted primarily f m the late arrival of corps,

and garrison military

police units, and was corrected as these units became available. Garrison f -

o canbat units in this mission area; prwided minimdl augmentation t

harever, the two corps ulthtely supported each other late in the
9 .

Finally, the simultaneous requirenent to acccnplish other

missica~swas a significant distraction frun traffic operations throughout the =w=&m. Friscmer of W a r Operations Planned priscmer of w a r operations sinply included collection,

escorting, h o l m , and p~ocessing of Japanese military primers and other labor t q s .

n t o this mission area only as Canplexity entered i

respansibility for various tasks was assigned to a particular level of

military police support.

A s noted earlier in this chapter, planners

assmed that military police structure assigned t o canbat units would be adequate t o accanplish this functicm. Additimally, garrism forces were

tasked t o take over operation of corps inclosures and conduct pemanat processing of prisoners.
They were unable t o accanplish this and had to

opt for a single central incl-ef' Historical records reflect that the intenment and processing of

over 10,000 priscmers was accanplished without significant difficulty.

P l d tenporary inclosures were operated by both corps until the Island

Cmmmd tenporary central inclosure was opened cm 17 April 1945.


forces also proved inadequate t o run the central inclosure a t several points during the cmpaign.
The 1st Platcan, 162d Military Police capany,

P r i m of War Processing, had t o pmvi& or a m t security d u r k g these


In spite of this, the unit proved adequate for the task of

The clear inference

processirag 10,000 prisaners over the allotted period.

fran review of t h e s e operatias points t o the adequacy of the military police structure within oanbat forces as well as the inadequacy of military police structure within garrism forces!' Civilian Hadling


Civilian handlkg operations ran parallel to p r i m of war operations, but were thirty times the size and scope of the latter.

missicm area repssented the mt significant challeqe of the cmpign for

military police. Planners, as already noted i n this chapter, provided a

dedicated military police structure intended t o integrate into the Military &xenment Secticm of the Island Carmand. The 2d hwisicmal Military

Police Battalicm ultimately provided this support; hawever, the unit landed

in three principal echelcms on Lt17, Lt25, and -37.

This scheduled flow

into the target rendered this battalion unavailable until phase three of
g n the &
causirig other units to canpensate i n the interim period.

whereas, military police units assigned to ambat forces plarmed to collect

and escort civilians, garriscm forces were w

d to hold civilians, e of

achhister to twenty three plarmed caps, and provide a N 1 m

suppoa to the military govenrment teams?

m order to reinforce available military police units early in the

operation, Canpanies A, B, and C of the 1st hrovisid Military Police Battalion attached to the I11 Marine Amphibious Corps and landed on L day throqh 2 . These units dedicated their efforts exclusively to this

mission area. The 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet m i n e Force, Pacific as already mentimed landed eight days late. This factor also l deprived the I11 m i n e ?mpXbious Corps of p function during this initial phase. Civilian i n c l e s established by military teams in support for this

the beach service axea were initially mguax&d due to insufficient

military police once divisians rroved forward. Lack of interpreters again

hffnpered military police m p p n t .

Selected &server repcats recarmended

that military police tables of organization be expmdd to include e a d q u a r t e r s ! ' interpreters in each canpany and battalion h Ctnbt forces were required to ann%x=t civilian handlirig operatians beymd mere collection at least twice during the campaign. A shortage of military police bwdemd the ambat forces of

Mxbe This

Division w i t h civilians in northem Okinawa between W 2 0 and -30. issue W c t e d


m i n e Division tactical operatians significantly. As a

result, the decision was made to decline civilian operations where a potential adverse result to tactical operatimight occur. This pmblen in southern

occurred again for 6th m i n e Divisian late in the &gn

Okinawa. However, this time the 15th Marines formed a provisional military police unit of two officers and seventy five enlisted Marines to handle
n civilians. I

cases, the available military police structure prwed

irsdequte to acccmplish plarmed missicms?

The pmblans handling civilians resulted ran three basic

factors. First, the late arrival of canbat support and garrison forces limited ability to cope with initial rnanbers of civilians. S d , the return of all three &es of the 1st Pravisicmal Military Police

Battalian to Island OcmMnd cantrol while 6th Marine Divisian was quickly
m c m e r i q large rnanbers of civilians, put this division at M a t e

disadvantage. Third, the density of civilians uncovered in final stages of

the d
g n cxxnbined with 1

evacuation m t e s to caqs in the rear,

stressed the military police structure. This o c m e d at a time whm military police were providirg a full range of services a s
the entire

island. N o other operational exanples indicating insufficient military police structure existed. All other planned civilian operations were accanplished, and a total of 284,669 civilians were successfully i n t e r n e d . ' 9 Security Operations Security of supply W s , airfields, carmand p t s , or other critical sites represented four areas which required independent military police structure. Little evidence of advance detailed p l a r n r i r a g or

enumeration of sites left only general guidance addressirg the types of

e a r area activities requiriq protection. W l y duq security service or r
was the respmsibility of the respective shore party ammnder; howwer,

airfields, canmnd posts, or other sites received no attention in plans. Plans included supply dunp security pruvisicols and strict prohibition of p i l f e r .

The absence of sufficient military police

initially in the beach s d c e area resulted in amsiderable looting and pilferage of equipnent and supplies. As additional units landed this prublen came under amtrol. The equipnent of the 1st Military Police Battalion, fleet K d n e Force, Pacific landed on yellow beach three ahead of the Battalion.
was gcme.
W h e n

the unit came ashore on -11, virtually all of it

It took apprcodmately five days for the battalion to recwer the

majority of its vehicles, and by six days for the quarteamster to replace essential ~upplies.'~ Plans failed to address security for airfields. Very little infopnation exists regardirag the actual security of KadeM or Y a t a n airfields. The 1st Prwisional Military Police Battali=, the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet M 3 r i . w Force, Pacific, and the 519th Military Police Battalion all aupented security at one or koth of these airfields on rumexus cccasiom during the canpign.
I n the absence of specific

plans, these additicnal missions pulled planned structure run other mission area^.^' Plans also failed to address security of canmnd posts. Dxtrine prescribed military police for the field amty canmnd post;

b e e r , this support was oriented around perscumel protection of the a m m d h g general.

This fundion was not prescribed for corps and

l a t division units. The 519th Military Police Battalion provided a p


the Tenth & . m y C!anmnd post. This platcan provided security for the

headquarters and assisted the provost rrarshal operatirag a special G-2

interrogation a r e a . The General, Island CcmMnd also aloyed a
Canpany D, 1st Provisicmal

larye twenty ~ m n prscmal security detail.

Military Police Battalian provided this detail. Finally, sane division dtsa l s o used military police for security of the divisicm carmand p t .

Here again, unplanned missions pulled structure away f m n other potential

a1oP-t. Finally, miscellaneous security requirements such as protection of
navy canstruction battalion sites and @ p n e n t

drew q x m military police

a s k s were not planned. The 1st structure. These miscellaneous security t

Military Police Battalion, Fleet Wine Force, Pacific, provided this type of support dw5.q phase three of the cmpign. This security was not

n o t h e r principal mission area such as traffic operations. incident to a

Military police focused on security of assets at night when hqemhle.
Plarmed and unplanned security operations canstituted the largest

iqdhent to structural adequacy for other mission areas. Jnproperly cansidered, these requimwnts lacked sufficient dedicated structure to ensure successful mission accanplishment and mn-interference with other mission areas.

and Order Operations

Stragyler c a n t 1 0 1 topped the list of duties in this mission area.

This responsibility rested primarily with the corps military police units,

however, all levels of carmand bore a respmibility for enforcenent. The

T e n t h? 4 m y Provost Mzrshal reported this as the greatest enfor~etlent

problem, but apprmdmately seven hundred and ninety stragglers were


in the beach maintenance area alcme between




Conversely, the 519th Military Police Battalion apprehended cnly Fifty four stragglers in the


Corps zcme of action between L day and -84.


operaticas achieve3 planned results without significant difficulties idcatadequate support~tructure.~'

General e n f o r c t

and prevention of pilferage r+red


seamd greatest amo~lntof military police effort. Few arrests were made, but mch of the missmaterial was recwered by military police. Here,

military police structure provided adequate support for a planned and duable service. EufoIcement of weapns discipline in rear areas and prevention of desecration of tanbs were the subject of limited historical discussion in unit reports. It is clear that these missions were planned for and amkcted indicatthat the minimum necessary support-

structure was a~ailable.~ These law and order operaticas pointed to the adequacy of military police structure for this function.

limerow prablans existed with both the plarnred and actual

military police structure. While generally adequate to provide required.
support for this caqaign, plarmkg gaps, nunaganent of force arrival,


amtml of task organization at the target were sanetimes deficient. Chapter four discusses operations in detail.

'EM 19-5, M i l i t a z y Evlice [Obsoletel ( W a r Department, Washiragton, DC: Gavenrment P r i n t i n g Office, 14 Jun 44) ,204-220.

"Fleet Marine Force, P a c i f i c , S t a f f O f f i c e r s ' Field Mmual for duphibicus Operatiom [Obsoletel (Hawaii: n.p., 10 Sep 441, Chap. 1, 16; 6 t h Ma?5ne D i v i s i a n , Operation Plan hB 1-45 (Okinawa: n.p., 10 Feb 45), 3zmex Mike, 1-7; U. S. Imny Forces, P a c i f i c Ocean m s , P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the OkinarYa @eration, 2 vols. (n.p.: n.p., 15 46), 99-100.

' E M 19-5, M i l i t a r y Evlice, 216-217.

4 9 , 1-10; n.p., n.d.1,

Operation Plan 1-45 (Okinawa: n.p., 6 Jan Iwv Corps, Action Reprt Qukyus, 1 Fpr-30 Jun 45 (Okinawa:

~ n n y , '2Bntative

EM 27-10, M e s of Larad Warfare Dbsoletel ( W a r Department, washiragtan, DC: Goverrnnent Printing Office, 19401, 18-21, 74-77, 82-85.

' P H I B 19, ~ l of Military ~ E w l i at [Obsolete] (Marine Corps Schcols, NC: n.p., 1945) , Series m rrmphibiaus Operations, 33vols. 1-48.

"w. Victor Bdej, U . S. Atmy and Muirae Corps h e r of B a t t l e , P a c i f i c TBeater of G p r a t i o m , 1941-45 (Allentown, PA: Game Publishing Co,
1984). 170.

'phib 19, Part 1, S e c t i a n 1, 2-3.

' 1 s t Military P o l i c e B a t t a l i a n , fleet Marine Force, P a c i f i c , Action R e p r t of F i r s t M i l i t a r y Evlice Battalion, Fleet W 3 n e Farce, P a c i f i c f a r Phases 1 and 2 of Okinawa Gperation (Okinawa: n.p., n.d. ) , 2; m d e j , 161-165; Phib 19, Part 1, Section 1, 2.

' I I I Auphibiaus Corps, Action Reprt Qukyus Gperation, Phase I & 1 1 ( O k h a w a : n.p, 1 Jul 45). 3.8; Island Oarmand, U . S. Anny Forces, P a c i f i c Ocean Area, Gperation Plan m. 1, Legdims (n-p.: n.p., 1 5 Feb 1945), 13; Ora N t z , Former manber Guard aanpany, 7 t h F i e l d Depot, during Operation Iceberg, interview by author, 13 IXmnker 1994, tape recording and t r a n s c r i p t , telephonic intenriew at Ora N t z ' hate i n W e s t Lafayette, ; 2d Ma?5ne Divisim, Operation Plan AD 10 (Saipan: n.p., 15 Feb 45) , 1-2.

Tenth Anny,

Feb 45), 1-7; (Okinawa: n.p.,

Share P a r t y I n s t r u c t i o m ( d r a f t l (Okinawa: n.p., 10 1st Ergbeer Special Brigade, G p e r a t i Plan "Ia&erg*

4 Feb 45). ~ n n e v ~ 0 . 7 , I.

19-5, 179-191; USAETOA, 77;80,99-100; T e n t h Army, Tentative

Operations Plan 1-45, 1-10.

"FM 19-5, 204-212; USAFEOA, 689-700; LTC J. K. Daly, USA, *Thirty Zhasaud Prisoners of W a r Over the Beachn M l i t a r y Review (April 1945).

e n t h Army, Action Report 2 "FM 19-5, 202-203; T 30 June 1945 3 vols., (Okinawa: n.p., 3 S q 451, PII-XXI-1.


6 to

'5USAFEOA. 77-80, 99-100; FM 19-5, 219-220; 51st Military Police Battalian, Action Report, 10 Jan 1945-30 June 1945 (Okhawa: n.p., 30 June 1945), 1-8; 1st MPBn, EMFPac, Action Repmt, Phases I & II, l-8.

%SMTOA, Annex 3, 1-10.


77-80; Tenth Army, m t a t i v e O m a t i o n s Plan 1-45,

99-100, 708;

T e n t h Army, Action Reprt, PII-XI-1.

Manual 27-10, (FM 27-10), Rules of washiragtcm, DC: m t e d States Govemmnt

"%M 19-5, 161-162; Basic Field

Land wazfare, (war , t Printing Office, 1940), 18-21.

13-23, 99-100, 218-220, 547,548; 1-45, Annex 3 . Operations Plan

"-. "

T e n t h Army, Tentative

"FM 19-5, 66-68, 155-160; Phib 19, Part 2, Sectian 4, 34-38; FM 27-10, 74-85. 13-23, 99-100; Tenth Army, Tentative Operations Plan 1-45, Annex 4, 8-9; 6 t h ES?5ne Divisian, Special Action Report, Okinawa @ration, 2 vols., Phases I & 11, 30 Apr 45, Phase I11 (Okinawa: n.p., 30 Jrn 45), VII44-VII47.
' % n t h Army,

Tentative @rations Plan 1-45,Annex 15, 4.

, '
Action R e +

220; 51st MPBn, 1-7; 52d Military Police Battalian, (Okhawa: n . p . , 18 Oct 1945). 1-2.

"1st Special Brigade, 2; 51st MPBn, 1-7; 52d MPBn, 1-2; 1 , 1-8. 1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Report, Phases I & 1

" ' E M 19-5, 146-155, 157, 189, 216, 219-220; Phib 19, Part 2, 13-26, figure 1 & 2.
3, 11; "'Tenth my, Tentative G p e r a t i m plan, ~ n n e x 188-191.

EM 19-5,

% 19-5. 219-220; Tenth ?Amy, Tentative Gperatians Plan 1-45, AQnex 13. "FM 19-5, 32-41, 128-133, 155-159, 168-178; Phib 19, Fart 2, 13-26, 31-38. =FM 19-5, 33-38, 157; Phib 19, 27-30; Tenth ?Amy, Tentative operations Plan 1-45, 17-19, Annex 13, Pgpendix I, 3; 51st MPBn, 1-7.

FM 19-5, 11-19, 20-28, 31, 139-141; Tenth Amy, Tentative

& Annex

G p e r a t i w Plan 1-45, 15-19; Annex 13, Appendix H, 1

I, 1-3.

13, Pgpendix

'Tenth Amy, Action Report, P11-IV-8.

Amy, Action Report, Pll-XI-3,8; 6th m i n e Divisicm, Specid Action Report, VII-11.12; X X I V Corps, Action Report, 34; I11 1 , 125, 216. Mzine m i o w Corps, Action Report, Phases I & 1

'%nth Army, Action Report, Pll-XI-3,4; 1st Karine Divisicm, Special Action Report, E Z g h e e r E n g i n e e r e x , 6; 6th Mzine Divisicm, Special Action Report, VII-33.
. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Victory and Occupation: '%enis M Xistory o f U. S. Corps Gperatians i n Warld War 1 1 (Washingtan, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, H e a u e r s , U. S. m i n e Corps, 1968),
'?Yenth Amy, Action Report, P11-XXII-4.
'~IJSAF~A,708-709; Tenth Amy, Action Report, P11-XI-9; X X N Corps, Action Report, 67-69.

Urenth Army, Action Repart, Pll-IV-29;


I 1 1 Wine Z4tphibious

Action w r t , 197. Action &port

(okinawa: 25 ~ u n e 1945),

''Iheya-Ag~mi Landirag Force, V I I 2, 1-7, X 1 .

'yenth Army, Action


Report, P l l - X I - 6 , 7 .

Pll-XI-6,7. 218-220.


1 , 1st mgheer Special Brigade, Military Fwlict? "Provost Activities Okinawa Beach Service Area (okinawa: n-p., 17 J u l y 1945) , 1-3;

"6th Marine Division, S p e c i a l and Phase 1 1 1 , I 1 1 51.


Report, Phases IaI, VII 47


"6th &Brine D i v i s i o n , S p e c i a l Action Report, Phase 1 1 1 , VII 47-48, Tenth Army, Action Repart, P11-XXVII-4.
Special Brigade, 2-3; & 1 1 , 5.

t"" , 1st FMFPac, Action Repart, Phases I

1st MPW,

5151st MPW, 1-7; 1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Repart, Phases I & II, 1-8; 519th M i l i t a r y P o l i c e B a t t a l i a , Action Report (Okinawa: n.p., 1 J u l y 1945). 1 1 1 .

=EM 19-5, 216; Tenth Army, Action Report, P l l - X I - 2 - 7 ; 51st MPW, 1-7; a p t Edma7d G. ~ove, T h e 27th Infantzy D i v i s i o n in World War 1 1 (Washhgton, LC: Washington Infantry Journal Press: 19491, 551; 1st M i l i t a r y Police Battalion, F l e e t l&rhe Force, Pacific, S Q p p l e r w 2 t d Action Report o f F i r s t Military Fwlict? B a t t a l i o n , F l e e t l&dne Force, P a c i f i c f a r A3ricxi 22 April 1945 to 30 June 1945, Okinana @eration (Okinawa: n.p., 1 J u l y 1945), 2.
"hwost Mwx&al, 1st

Special Brigade, 2;

519th MPW,

1 1 1 .

"Crenth Army, Action Report, P 1 1 - X I - 5 ; 1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action m e s I & 11, 1-8; SQpplanental Action Report, 1-4; Provost Marshal, 1st Ecgineer Special Brigade, 1-3.

General The military police operations amducted during the Okinawa capaign proved

and diverse. As in chapter three, this chapter

considem five functional or mission areas: Traffic control operations, prisoner of w a r operations, civilian handling operations, security operations, and law and order operations. Doctrinal criteria for these five mission areas which was presented in chapter three and will not be reiterated. However, additional functional criteria is discussed. Planing amducted and operational results are assessed within the frammrk of these five mission areas. Operatid Planning Assessment ! c m t r o l Operations Planning Traffic C Field B&nual (EM) 19-5, Military Police, and IImphibious Operations (Phib) Volume 19, Brploymnt o f Military Police, both provided military police planners with detailed guidance for the planning of traffic control operations. These sources both pint out the dependent relatiaship of the military police traffic control plan upcm the approved traffic circulation plan prepared by the

The i

M c c o l t r o l plan resulted in proper

m t . r o l s to canpliment the placenent and ccadhation of traffic e circulation plan and consider contiqencies.'

Review of available operation plans and adninistrative plans revealed significant dwelopnent of traffic policy. System for mmkerhg and letterkg routes, posting of signs, area respmsibilities, and functid respmsibilities were presented in these d o c r m i e n t s . At each level a traffic circulation plan was discussed, however, only the 2d Marine Division Order included a traffic circulation diagram. U . S . Anny Forces, Pacific Ocean Azea Selected Wervers noted that numeraus traffic circulation plans were

prepared prior to landing n o r were they

available for M a t e i . n p l e n e n t a t i o n . 2 The inference exists that detailed amtrol planning was delayed by the absence of t i r c s e l y circulation plans. Hcmever, the Tenth Anny

reported that the Anny traffic circulation map required very few changes, indicating a plan existed at the start of the carrp3aign. Prmrost Nwshal spoke further to this issue n o t The Tenth ~ n n y

that original plans

proved satisfactcay. Finally, the ProMst BBmhal reported that military

n their possession which had been police ashore on Lcl had strip maps i
prepared akcmd ship frcm aerial photcgraphs.
I n ccmtrast, the 1st

Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific put together their traffic amtrol plans subsequent to a r r i v 4 . q carmand post at G m a Point. This o c e d at the I11 Mphibious Corps for two reasaus. First, the the

n chapter three, landed late on Lcll. , S battalim, as discussed i

6 t h Marine Division had made quick and sizable gains e x p a d k g the Corps

zone of action to the north. The planning amducted at



involved the battalion's follow-onplanning subsequent to the a s s a u l t . '

s Traffic circulatian planning at various levels was criticized a

untimely; howwer, timely military police traffic amtrol planning did


Such initial traffic amtxol plannirg attenpted to meet basic

doctrinal standards. The Provost Marshal, U.S . Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean

and the Provost Mm&al, T e n t h Amy studied potential differences in

traffic control requirements frun previous Pacific Ocean Areas operations. Finally, untimely traffic circulation planning by sane units failed to achieve doctrinal objectives: caplimentary traffic ccmtxol and circulation platming. Ultimately, these two processes occurred independent of each other or in reverse order at sane levels w i t h i n the Tenth Army? Prisaner of War Operatiom Plannirg noctrinal prisoner of w a r operations plannirg required amsideration of several basic clanponents: handling, collecting points, evacuation, and inclosures. EM 19-5 and Phib 1 9 both addressed each of these areas.
DependinEI q c m the given stage of an anphibious operation,

respansibilities for each of these areas varied. Within the beachhead the

shore party carmander was respansible; hawever, this was generally a

r e a . ' military police unction in the traditional rear a
Basic handling guidance was aimed at protection of the prisoners rights under Field khnual (FM) 27-10, Mes o f Land Warfare. Collection points provided a co3lrdinated location for tactical units to deliver priscmers. These were nomKily operated by the division military police

r i s c o l e r s platccm or a n p n y , the unit also respnsible for evacuation of p to inclosures.6 I n c l e s were doctrinally established by a corps or army in a Laxye i n c l e s , temed central

canbat or cammications zane.

inclosures, were established by theater or field army ccnmanders.

Priscmera were p s s e d

by a priscmer of war processing ccmpany at the

inclosure in accordance with War &parimat requirenents. The tenu, priscmer of w a r stockade, finds its way into the action reports of this
m g n .

This is not a dcctrinal tenn for describing a prisoner of war

facility. It generally refers to sanething between the collecting pint and the inclosure described here. This facility is used at the divisicm and corps level in addition to colleding pints. perm~ent processing described above."
As discussed in chapter three,the Tenth Anny plan did not provide

It does n o t provide the

an estimate of prisoners to be captured. Hcnvever, military police study of

prismem captured in the Philippinesand other small island m g n s resulted in anticipation of larger n*anbers of prisoners. Corps military police units were initially tasked to establish and operate three primer n c l e s of war i or stockades: cme by IMIV Corps arid two by I11 Phib

Corps. Subsequently, the 51st Military Police Battalion, Island amrand, planned to a s ccmtrol of the three corps i n c l e s . '

'Ihese plans provided detailed guidance for handling of priscmera, aperation of collecting pints, arhhistration of id-es, and

evacuation of priscmers within both the beachhead and the various zcmes of

e n t h Anny txacept for action. The 1st Military Police Battalion used the T
handling priscmera in both training and plamiq. The former &mradhg officer of Clnpany A, Colonel Kenneth J. Becker, indicated that both the aawpt and the tminiq were proper for what t h e y m t a e d . These o c t r i n e . ' priscmer of war plans were all consistent with basic d

Civilian Handling Operations P l -

The fonner G-3 of 6th W i n e Division, Lieutenant General Victor

H . Krulak, U . S . W u h e Corps, Retired, noted that Okinawa was the

divisicm's first real experience with civilians. They realized that the
Okinavians were not treated well by the Japanese. Even though they obeyed

the Japanese, under American amtml t h e y would be canpliant, helpless, and require care. The Tenth Anny planned to be ccmpassiomte, provide fccd,

and medical attention in the amtext of the tactical situaticm.1

FM 19-5 discussed the suprene authority of a military gwenmnent

over lands, property, and inhabitants of an ensrry territory. Phib 1 9

provided practical guidance c m the iqatace and tedmiques for handling

and controlling civilians. Military police missions again included both

security and law and order fuuctions previously depicted in chapter

Mnneraus articles on civil affairs, military gwenmnent, emmy

civilians, and related p l & prior c a q a i g n s . t &

provided additicmal l e s -

leamed in

The cansiderations of intematimal law, the impact on

and supporting operations i n the Marianas, the extr6ne behavior of

cansiderations for the mianas

Japanese civilians on Saipan, and p l were


the topics inc1uded.12 This operation planued to integrate

military police with military government relieving military police of all but security considerations. As such, military police planners primarily cansidered nmkers of civilians and their attitudes.l3 Finally, military police anticipation of r e q u i r t s for

amtrolling civilians is evidenced i n pre-opeation trahiq. Both mines

and soldiers csmducted 1 g e

trainhg designed to facilitate basic

annnmicaticm between military police and the Okinawans.

Classes and

lectures were designed to develop appropriate attitudes focusing cm relief

. . recognized that these units and protection of these civilians. Trarnrng

cmtabed ccmbat veterans with potentially hostile attitudes toward amy

civilians. 'l

The three battalions of military police support pushed forward

into the assault echelcm clearly reflected an appreciaticm for the scope of civilian handling operations anticipated. Policies cansidered security first by initially treating all civilians as prisoners. Semnd, policy addressed relief operatians and protecticm of civilians. Last, prohibitions of American ccmtact with Okinawau civilians enhanced both security for Tenth &my forces and the civilians r e s i d i r i g in military
gavenrment inclosures.

Civilian handling operatians are not renenbered

b s i q of primry hprtance by all veterans; hawarer, p l -


that they were the largest anticipated challenge. Plamiq satisfied most dactrinal standards incorporating significant detail. Hawever, there was m specific policy for the use of force w i t h civilians. Neither doclanentaticm or the recollection of veterans revealed any explanation. While not addressed in Phib 19, FM 1 9-5

provided specific guidance in this area. This was a significant p1amh-q

failure. E ~ ~ e p t i this q problem, civilian handling operatians p l doctrinal, W h , and adequate for the operational s e t t i r i y . " was

Security C)perationsP l Security planning failed to adequately cansider three specific

areas; airfield security, cam?aud p t security, and engheer and naval

construction battalion site security. There is no indication of plannkg

in any of these areas. First, airfield consideratians are entirely absent

in plans, yet military police action reports refer to significant r t provided at both Kadena and Yontan airfields thmghout the canpign.
Second, the cmly discussion of canmud post security found in plans

addresses a pmhibition on n w v i q or holdkg priscolers or civilians w i t h i n sight or hearing of any carmand post.

Here also, military police action

reports and recollectims of veterans indicate security operatians to protect carmand posts ran the Army level da;vn occurred. Specific detacinnents were f d in accordance w i t hE M 19-5 for protection of the

There is M evidence of this in pre-operationplannkg. Third, xwmnxs

military police units were attached to engineer and naval construction battalion units for security of equipnent, perscumel, and key sites such as briaes. This is also neglected in available plans. '' Finally, neither the Provost ,
U . S . Army Forces, Pacific


General, T e n t h Army and the Cmnm3.q General, Island CamwCi.

Ocean Areas or the Provost 1 ,

Tenth Army cansidered these issues in

plannkg as evidenced by respedive action reports. There is no evidence that the doctrinal standards identified in chapter three were m e t . ' '

Law and Order Operaticms Plannkg

principal areas of law and order doctrine were addressed in

chapter three; straggler ccmtrol and general enforcement. Plans addressed each of these areas r q a d k q policy and pmhibiticms. Military police rxmtrols and schenes for e n f o r c t were also generally addressed. There

is no indication of specific plans for straggler amtrol points, lines, or

patrols prior to landing. Nor is there any indication of specific plans for law e n f 0 2 c t patrols or posts. Neither of these functions were

expected to require significant attention until later in the canpaign. This m y account for the absence of this specific p1amiq.l' Operatid Results Assessment Traffic Ccmtrol Operations

The first point of focus for traffic operatias was the beachhead.
FM 19-5 clearly listed the first duty of military police i n the beachhead

as traffic ccmtrol. There are mixed reviews on military police

e n t h Army G-1 l a i n & effectiveness in this area. The T
of inadequate

traffic control on the beaches to guide debarking units to assably areas. It is noted that the T e n t h Army Headquarters cam ashore on Lc17. IMIV Corps reported no caqesticm on their beaches early in the operation. The 111 m i o u s Corps action report indicated no caqestian on their

beaches on -2;

however, it was noted that the shore party military police

landed too late to perfom efficiently. These military police were

pruvided by the 1st Military Police Battalion, fleet mine Farce, Pacific

which landed eight days late on 1 1 .

The former aanpany A carmanding catch-up

officer of this unit, Colcmel Becker, stated, "We were p 1 a y i . q

ball on the beach since we landed late. If we were to p r c n r i d e any real ccmtrol, we shaild have landed mch earlier."" ampanies A and B of the 1st Military Police Battalion established traffic posts, infomntion booths, and radio jeep patrols of

the roads.

Jeeps amducted camroy escort, cleared roads, reported road

conditions, reported on civilian cancentraticms, and enforced traffic regulations. Colanel Becker stated,
"My Ccmpany

handled traffic control up


to mtobu, but not any further."

Apprmdmately sixty percent of this

Becker noted, These

battalion was iwolved primarily in traffic m t r o l . operations w e r e very effective. kept supply lines open."

W e kept civilians off of supply lines.

W e


Canpanies C and D r a i n e d w i t h the Corps Service Group a t the

North Shore Farty Area.
Canparrl C established traffic posts, infomation

booths, and stragyler collection points r a n Bishagawa north t o Bolo point

inc1di.q Route 3 and all of the territory east t o the Ocean.

Oanpany D

performed the same funbions in a zone parallel t o C Conpany a l q the west coast mmiq north t o the road junction of Routes 1 and 6.
1 ,
The Provost

Service Group exercised operational m t r o l of these canpanies.

The fonner Executive Officer of Conpany C, C o l d Jams H. l&Crddin

U.S. Kxim Corps, Retired, recalled, " m f f i c was the mt i n p r t a n t

function w e M.

It was a function of xmbility.

Other than 1 -


the operations went well."

? A S


previously noted, 1 1 1 Aqhibious C o r p s divisions l e f t military

@ice behind a t key intersections as a result of the absence of the Qrps

Shore Party military police.

6th Kxim Division noted that their military This was

police organization for shore party was adequate and efficient.

damstrated by their ability t o expand their military police support ran the beachhead as they turned north?
The 519th Military Police Battalion was largely split up anrmg

their divisions.


A provided the 7 t h Infantry Division w i t h traffic

control in the Division zone of action.

C o r p s Shore Party u n t i l relieved on -18.

1st Plat-

was attached t o the

Canparrl B provided traffic

ccoltrol in nmemw areas; 1st Platcxm a t the Tenth Atmy Carmand Post, 2d

Platam in the vicinity of K u e and Chatan, and 3d Platam in the XXIV Corps

area east of mgushi beaches. ampany C also had 1st Platthe corps Shore Party until relieved on -18.

attached to

Additionally, on W14, 2d

Platcon, ampany A and the 3d Platam, Canpany C were attached to the Island Oamrand Slmre Farty for traffic control.
The 519th Military Police Battalion was fully engaged in traffic

control frun the nnnent it cam ashore.


noted above, the



and yellow reported no traffic problems on its beaches. Distinctive G~een infmtion bcoths were established by the 519th Military Police Battalion early i n the operation. These were inneased to cover inprtant traffic

centers as the tactical situation developed. These posts provided

immluable assistance to drivers, maintained current situation maps, and remuted traffic as required indicated by the PrOvOGt , 1st Engineer Special Brigade,

military police were initially sufficient in the beach maintenance area. All who were available were assigned to traffic ccmtrol and e~cuatim of civilians f m the rcads in this


Due to road d t i o n s , traffic

bwme q e s t e d but never stopped w. Extensive civilian handliq

requires m a &

it necessary to relieve military police run traffic

sugply roads were still posts and patrols to collect these civilians. &kin
behg developed throughout this period.

Ccnstruction of the Kadena traffic

circle aided greatly with the speed, flow, and handling of traffic. After construction of the circle, bottlenecks d y occurred on Route 1 crossiq . In spite of the late the Bishagawa and at other briaes along Route 1 arrival of the 1st Military Police Battalion and the 51st Military Police

Battalions traffic operations within the beachhead were generally successful.2S

The systan for m k i q routes proved very satisfactoq, however,

signs prepared in Oahu received unsatisfactory distribution delaykg the pmper m k i q of routes. Military police assisted posting signs; thus p e r s c a z n e l were diverted who had been plarmed for traffic posts.

I n spite

of this, traffic ccmtml at all levels was excellent. &Bst difficulties were due to rmd ccmditias. The origindl T e n t h Anny plans pmved 1 ' s satisfactory, as evidenced by the Prwost Lcl.

tour of the Island c m

Well informed Military Police armed with maps were on duty on the

heaches andaloqthemainroads."

N e x t it is apprcpriate to emmine traffic control as the

operations eqanded ashore. The 6th Marine Division made quick and sweeping progress in the north. M x h of this expausion occurred sinailtaneausly with developoent of the beachhead. Military police support

for the 6th Marine Division drive came ran Oanpanies A and B, 1st Military Police Battalion as discussed above. As the operation progressed rapidly, and traffic ccmtml was b e d . mre of the island was u~lcovered


lack of military police, the m m b r of civilians, the requiranent for dmp

guards, and significant elements of the military police force were still
afloat, precluded establishing all of the desired traffic posts. This prablen was corrected as m e military police becaw a v a i l a b l e . ' "

The entire I11 &phibious Corps displaced f m n the north and

central areas of Okinawa to Tenth Axmy lines in the south c l u r i n g the first
week of Nay. Emments of divisions in and out of Tenth Anny lines were

y the Tenth Wmy Prwost Marshal Secticm i n close coordination amtrolled b

with the 1 1 1 &phik&ousCorps and

Corps ProMst

Marshal Secticms.

The Tenth Army, hwost IBzxhal's report indicates the m s were a l l canpleted without any difficulty. The 6 t h m i n e Division used their

military police effectively for their divisicmal m t o southem Okinawa

between L+31 and L+35. A t

plan w i t h overlay, routes of rrarch,

and specific instructions to military police was rates of d, inoJrporated in Opeation Order m d x r 49-45 on L+29."

On -35,

the 1st Military Police Battalion began Supenrishg the

I 1 1

rmves south of 1st m i n e Division, 6 t h m i n e Division, and the

Aqhibious Corps Carmand F a t .

The Battalion displaced t o the new Corps

Carmand Pofit in the vicinity of FutArmy hwost I v B r s b l , these major

on W39.

A s noted by the Tenth

m s went withaut difficulty."

The roads

Dust and rain caused delays throughout the operation.

had pcor bttans, and heavy traffic grwnd rcads into clouds of dust and
Qleck points were established w i t h i n corps' boundaries then seas of d .

t o screen out unessential vehicle traffic.

began ccntml of traffic by camray cmly.

Qn L+59 I 1 1

&phibious Corps

Screenirag fomd several hundred

vehicles per day in forward areas h a * operati-.

no wnnection w i t h &t

In m y traffic posts south of

the Island Carmand h m d a q were


covered jointly by m i n e and Army military Police.

were established a t key intersectians.

These booths provided valuable

assistance which kept traffic moving m t h l y .

ROadS did not inprove u n t i l

In the south, the 1 1 1 Aqhibious C B q s rear


was divided

between two mnpanies of the 1st Military Police Battalion.

way traffic on the main supply rautes.

m e mere vvas c

The rcads would not s u s t a i n two way

traffic except around Naha. This system was not trouble free.


stated, "Scme perxnmel were insistent that they cane back the same way

t h e y went.

Nothirig would have gotten down that road.

So, we insisted that

they follow the cme-way circuit. It worked well.""

Trafic control became critical during the mnsams between mid-my and early June. By L A 0 rain and traffic rendered routes five and thirteen in the XXtV Corps zcme inpassable. All overland mxrenent of l i e s troops and for five divisicms had to be routed over Route 1

through I11 A n p 3 h i b i o u s Corps zone of action. A n average of twelve hundred

vehicles traveled in each direction daily.

Close liaison, constant traffic

control, and rigid traffic screening maintained the flow of annumition and e q u i m t to the f m t line troops. mjor General

S . Geiger,

Carmandirag General, of the I11 Anp3hibious Corps fomlly recognized 1st

Military Police Battalion's successful effort' The 519th Military Police Battalion shared traffic posts

w i t h Marines of the I11 A n p 3 h i b i o u s Corps durhg this period as efforts

intensified to limit traffic an deteriorating main supply routes. The 519th Military mlice Battalion and the

Corps Staff J m e P r h r o c a t e

established mbile traffic courts operated with military police patrols. One c m p n y was focused on traffic control for the Corps at any time.
Qnpny A was relieved on L A 5

by Canpany B.

These units m m m d posts, ran

Qnpny B

patrols, and comkcted road blocks a l q the Corps bolmdary.

shared a post at Chatan with military police ran the 1st m i n e

Division." C m t W deterioration and closure of roads in the



area intensified traffic control throughaut the

oanbat zone in early



Corps military police assisted I11 Marine Anphibious Corps


military police with control of l o s e d : ' 13 and 5 were c

Corps traffic on Route 1 while Routes

U . S . Army Forces Pacific Ocean &?=as Observer reports indicated


there was a need for more properly trained military police.

It suggested

that if traffic amtml had been prcnptly established, saw roads in the
XXIV Q r p s zcme

of adion would not have been lost.n3s

The Tenth A

reprted that subsequent to the loss of sqply Routes 13 and 5, Route 1 was only kept open between -51 and 6 5 t b m g h rigid traffic control and twenty four hour a day eqineer ~perations.'~ Traffic control d w 5 . q the final part of the ca&?aign was hmpered
by dense pockets of

civilians. The effects of lost w l y routes m l y operations anployed air and water
The I11 Marine

in the east were still evident.

lines of CamMlication to relieve the stress on roads.

Wphibious Corps evaluated traffic c c o l t r o l as satisfactory, but mcrvetwt of t s and sqplies required strenuous effort. It was noted that cxmtrol

could have been better?' The 51st Military Police Battalion also provided traffic cxmtrol at mmemus times in the campaign. W h e n

A reverted to battalion

n the vicinity mtro1, it provided traffic posts and patrols annmd Hiza i

of the Island Ccmmnd.

w a r stockade

Canpany C C to the Island Carmand prisoner of

near Kadeua also providing traffic control in that area.

aanpany D provided traffic control alcmg the Bishagam. On Lt60, Catlpany D

reverted back to Battalion mtrol. Traffic mtrol shifted ran south of

the Bishagawa river to n o r t h s i . d e and expnded northward.

antirrued to patrol the Island amMnd Area in early my.

Canpany A

aanpany B also

provided traffic c c o l t r o l at Kadena Airfield and a 16 square mile area at

S h i m h d a with traffic posts and patrols in May.

Canpany C continued to
The 51st Military

provide control of traffic in the area aruund Kadena.

Police Battalion provided traffic control throughout the Island CcmMnd

area. These operations were all cmpleted effectively without

difficulty.'' Traffic amtrol in autlyhig island operations is characterized by operations on Iheya Shims by the 3d Platom, 2d Marine Division Military Police Canpany. This platom's support for shore party was a m t e d by Marines of a 35 man r e p l a c t draft. Heavy rain and deep md forced

tanks and artillery vehicles to ramin in dmps d m i q unloading.

Avoidance of serious traffic cagestion was attributed to g a d traffic amtrol. The S-4 indicated that the doctrinal cmpliment of military police was insufficient for h i n d l i q both traffic opeations and civilians sMtaneOuSly.'9 Traffic amtrol operations were effective except in two areas. First, the late arrival of the 1st Military Police Battalian and e l t s of the 51st Military Police Battalion significantly hapxed Corps-level shore party operations in the

mgushi beachhead. This settack was

ampensated for by flexible military police run the Marine Divisions, and

the 1st Military Police Battalion's ability to quickly gain control once
.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Selected Qbsenrers ashore. Seccold, U

reported that better preventative traffic amtrols could have precluded the loss of m t e s 13 and 5 in the X X I V Corps zone. I n contrast the I11 ?4qEbious Corps inwrporated a rigid one-way traffic circuit prior to the
rains, and dedicated two ccmpanies to traffic control in the Corps a r e a .

A s a result, Route 1 was not 1-t.

This effort resulted i n cxmtinued

sustainnent of the Tenth Army f m t .

In spite of these problems, traf i c

cantrol operations were ultimately effective.

Friscmer of War Operations

The two corps and their division military police units were

reqmsible for priscmer of w a r operations.

According t o plan, three

stockades were established initially: one by XMV Corps and t v i u by I 1 1 Aqhibious Corps.

order Island amrand planned t o assme control of the

The G-1, Tenth Plmy noted that

three corps or division stockades.

ackhistrative considerations made it necessary t o vary frcm the basic plan.

T h e r e is no other specific reascm given for this change.

The Island

Canrend established a central Island

amrand inclosure instead on -16.

s i q l e inclosure was sufficient for the m m h m of prisoners captured."

Once established,

a l l prisoners were evacuated t o the central

The f i r s t prisoners of war received

inclosure directly frcm the divisions.

by Island Canrand arrived on Lc20.

Initially, they were guarded by the 1st

Platcm, 162d Military Police acmpany a t the central inclosure in the vicinity of Kadena airfield. el-ts Later, these prismers were handled by

of the 51st Military Police Battalion."

The tenporary central inclosure was s u n m d e d by a six cot four

strand barbed wire fence.

Salvaged shelter halves over slit trenches

provided the cmly shelter for prisoners. suppl-ted

Food included K and C rations

Water had t o be hauled and

with native food when possible.

transportation was scarce.

Sanitation had t o be t a m t t o the prisoners,

the mst difficult problem to address."

C c o l t r o l of prisoners was easy since 1 i s h

speaking prisoners

n one instance, tansmitted orders to the others, but pmblans did occur. I
a p r i m on a w m k i q party cut American phone lines. In another instance, six prisoners escaped f m the central inclosure. All of them
were recaptured or accounted for in several days. were

These type instances

the exception. The greatest percentage of the prisonera initially

were Korean or Okinawau labor troops. The first Japanese were mostly
vmded, a factor limiting resistance.

Segregation in the temporary ~sland

OcmMnd central inclosure was limited to ~fficers.'~

Counterintelligence Corps teams screened prisoners daily. Sane banefide civilians were found a n w q priscmers and turned over to military grrvernment. Those prisoners with established prisoner of war status were pennmently processed by the 1st Platoon of the 162d Military Police

This platoon processed prisoners t h l y

and efficiently. on

-90, 10,740 priscners had been interned. This included 120 p r i s m of

war f m outlying islands, 1,093 d e d prisoners, and labor troops. Mmy

soldiers were found i n civilian i n c l e s ,

others c c o l t i n u e d to be captured

after the island was secured, many were found h i d i r g in caves, and there
was a sizable guerrilla force in north Okinawa."

Castructicm of a n e w and larger ampolrnd at Yaka began in


Ccmpany A


Canparry B

(less the 1st Platccm) of the 51st Military eight thousand

Police Battalim operated the Yaka ampolrnd. By -81,

prisoners of w a r had been processed. The p m a n m t Island Cnrmand inclosure was opened on 8 3 at Yaka with a capacity to hold 15,000 prisoners. The temporary inclosure at Kadena transferred to the military govenrment for use as a civilian i n c l e . ' 5

hwost 1 -

Section, Tenth ~ n n y operated a special

intenqation center for the G-2 where reliable sources were inte?zqated.

The FYOICS~ Wshal utilized military police assigned to the Anny aarmand
post fzun the 519th Military police

att tali on."

Whereas XXlV Corps initially operated a prisoner of war stockade

for its divisions, the I11 w i o u s Corps did not maintain a regular p r i of w a r stockade. The 2 initial stockades referred to were

established and operated b y both of the Ku-ine Divisions. These 3 stockades were necessary prior to establishment of the Island aarmand central inclosure. 1st Marine Division noted that the prisoner evacuation process was satisfactory. Cm b43, the 1st Military Police Battalion

opened a Corps primer of w a r stcckade adjacent to a W i n e Brig. ?his

Corps inclosure handled an average of 11 prisoners each day. % Battalian also pruvided guards for m x d e d priwmrs at Corps hospitals." Early in the operation while supporting the I11 2qWbious Corps,

the ccmpanies of the 51st ~ilitary mlice Battalion operatedprimer of

war inclosures and collecting pints in close prcPdmity to civilian

i n c l e s

and collecting points. An estimated 2% of the civilians

Cm -60,
A operated the

collected were actually p r i m of w a r .

Island Carmand p r i m of war inclosure at Kadena.

Between 8 0 and -83,

capmy A operated the new Island aarmand central inclosure at Yaka

containing 12,000 priwmrs. This m m b r included M i d e civilians subsequently transferred to civilian inclcsures. Initially, the 1st Platcxm, 162d Military Police Canpany furnished interpreters, assisted in nmniq the i n c l e , 2 1 . primers. On and processed

C m p q C reverted back to battalion control and took


over operation of the Island Cnrmand inclosure at Kadena.


Lt30, the 1st

Platoon, 162d Military Police C ! c n p n y had processed 250 prisoners in addition to initially qerating the inclosure. 141ey mtinued until late

i n June when mmbrs dramatically increased. During the nrmth of B y , this

Platoon was required to a m t the inclosure guard fran 7 0 7 9 to Lt86. to U76 and

During these two periods processing tenporarily ceased. The platu r n s

Interrupticms limited precessing for this single p l a t .

forced to stop processing at least f a u times during the v i g n in order to a m t s e c u r i t y . " Within the lMnr Corps zcme of action, the problen of handlizg civilians urns also larger than prisoner of war considerations. As a

result, sane prisoner of w a r functicms were cmsolidated with civilian handling functicms. The Provisional Canpany, 519th Military Police Battalion established collecting points for the 27th Mantry Division. Ute in the operation, C h p n y A intensified prisoner of war operations

d Koza, Ycolabaru, and


The 519th Military Police Battalion

was cxmtinuously imrolved handling prisoners of w a r throughout the

operation. These opeations provided viable evacuation of prisaners, positive amtml of prisoners, support for intelligence and ~terintelligence operaticms, protection of prisoners, care of prisoners, and p e m m a t processizg of priscmers. Evidence that insufficient military police were available to cope with p r i s m of w a r operations simultaneously with other missicms clearly exists. In spite of that deduction, these operations achieved their desired results without any negative h p c t on the mnpaign

o r the forces imrolved.

Civilian Handlhg Operations These operations canstituted the largest and mxt canplex mission

area d r o n t h g military police. Dodrine proposed mtrol of the

populaticm, s a f records,

of the population, and protecticm of civil

currency, and prqerty to the greatest extent possible. P l a m

clearly recognized this challerge, as three battalions of military police plus corps and division organic assets were landed in the assault echelon to handle civilians. This mission area, like traffic mtrol, pranised to inpact the tacticdl situation directly if inproperly handled."

The principal military police unit planned to m & p x t military

govenrment operations was the 52d Military Police Battalicm. This

Battalion guarded civilians in 23 military governnent Caps.


it was necessary to use military police assets organic to canbat units to handle civilians at mmerous times during the cmpdign. kept natives inside inclosures at night and guarded gathering fccd durhg the day. The Okinaguarded

Military police in fields

mthmally attempted to

evade their guards to return to their fonner hanes for clotbiq or other 1 affects. Gthers sinply wanted to be free of the restraint

m the imposed. Wscorted civilians were not permitted to travel anywhere c

island. This prevented Japanese soldiers fran n-aving and poshg as civilians, it prevented civilians run f

ensny soldiers, and it

prevented civilians ran being mistakenly killed. Military police attempted to keep guerrillas away frun civilians.
where raidiq Japanese killed civilians w

instances existed

. .

d of cooperating with the

Americans. Military police also kept unautbrized Americans away frun

civilian inclcsures


Due to lqistical design, the 52d Military Police Battalian did not land early enotigh to handle civilians in the initial stages of the operatian. Military Folice assigned to the military government should have landed w i t h than. As a result, the 3 ccnpnies fmn the 51st Military Police Battalian which landed in the assault echelan w i t h the I11 Zqhibious Corps played a critical role as 6 t h M&ne Divisicm began to

Wckly push north. Additionally, divisicm military police were actively engaged w i t h significant lnanbers of civilians wen before military govennnent teams came ashore. This requirement imposed these units to perionn other planned missions.u
Mrmeraus civilians were encountered m v i q i n the beach

the ability of

maintenance area. A civilian inclosure was amstructed but went mmmmed initially. Civilians would leave the inclosure and return to their villages. Military police were ultimately w i t h d r a w n ran traffic posts to collect and control civilians. The Tenth Azmy Military Govenrment actian

report noted that difficulty was e n t e r e d

1 e

controlling the circulation of

gxnqs of civilians with limited lnanbers of military police. points were operated as far forward as possible by and mmterintelligence. 5'

Civilian collect*

military police, military g o v t ,

The Okinawans were generally cooperative and docile. A large percentage were

children, and the elderly. No Japanese fanaticism

was m e n c e d a m q those civilians successfully taken into American custcdy. No concrete cases of civilian espicnage or sahtage occurred.

The Okinawans did not fear the Americans as nu& as t h e y feared the ravages
of w a r .

tco few interpreters and military police hindered

military gavenmnent operatias. Furthenmre, too few interpreters

h a q e r d military police operaticol~.~

I n addition to security of inclosures, military police

&tails ran the Xxnr Corps collected livestock until the Island Cnrmand

units toak o v e r .

L+77, 2 & e s

were attached to Island Carmand to

handle large rnanbers of civilians and p r i m collected in the final days of Daily ccanrays run the I11 2nphibious Corps of

a p p r c a c i r r a t e l y 50 trucks peddled civilians to whatever Island Carmand caps would accept them. These cawoys had to travel l c o l g distances run the

south requiring precious transportation and limited military police escorts. Late in June, the Corps evacuated 21,967 civilians frun the ~sland Carmand area because Island Carmand did not have sufficient resources available. This was a 75 hour operation tyirq up trucks and troops."

I n each case above, assets organic to a n h t



overburdened garrison force ensuring mission accanplishmnt. The 1st Military Police Battalion worked closely with the I11 Aphibious Corps C-1, C-4, the Corps Military Police Cmpny, and the Military Gavennnent Section. The battalion evacuated 1602 civilians in the first 8 d a y s . They also provided guards at inclosures and chasers for civilian working parties.
73~0p l a t -

attached to 6th mrine Division, a reinforced p l a t o o o l Division, and 2 officers a t e d

attached to 1st

the Corps

Military Garemmnt Section. These &tadmats operated at Sobe, Jima,

China, Nakadamara, and the Ishigawa-Cbima r e a . They relieved much larger

Anny military police canpanies of the 51st Military Police Battalion, but

perfolmed the same scope missions satisfactorily. Dwing Phase I11 of the

ompaign, one platm was attached to 1st m

e Division, and a reinforced

platam was attached to 6th m i n e Division to handle civilians. The 1st Military Police Battalion pruvided substantial support to the m i n e Divisims, I11 m i o u s Corps, and Island aarmand."' Becker mrmnarized

the battalion's experience with civilians: S r r a l l grarps of military police run the ccmparry not invulved in traffic control would be sent out to pichq civilians ran collection points or find than. A dozen or so would ame aut of a cave, get on the narrow roads, interfere with traffic, and slow the advance of sup~1ie~.=~
Becker further recalled:

The use of force was applied at face value. There was no policy per se. W a n e n and children were no tmuble, and the mles were largely coaperative in the presence of w a n m and children. You just pointed which way that you wanted than to go and they waild go. The i r a l e s by themselves were always treated with sane caution.59
Periodically, these mines would experience significant quantities of civilians, but they were all extremely coopeative. Howwer, the first task of collectkg civilians was sanetimes difficult. Military Police would look into a cave and observe mwenent, but due to the language barrier receive no response to caoPands. B S r i n e s would m t i m e s open fire into the cave. Becker recalled, "Gne Sergeant he had killed two Okina-; to me once s a * that

he was really bothered by t h i s . ' @

The 519th Military Police Battalion provided this same type of

civilian handlkg support to the XXIV Corps and its divisims. Canpany A operated the 7th Infantry Division civilian stockade and controlled civilians at S h h ? h h .
Y w

I n June, the


handled civilians at
Canparry B

. M y a , m e , Koza, and Tamgusuku.


civilians in the XXIV Corps area at Chatan and l%amkoru between early in

the operation.


C handled civilians at Ginowan and Shimabuku in

2pril. I n June, Ctnpny C controlled civilians at Shinzato, Hyakona,

Yabiku, F u m h s h i , and Ycmabaru.

Gn b18, the Battalion folmed a

provisional acmpanY to attach to and support the 27th Infantry Division. This Ctnpny ran the civilian inclosure at l&nnbru, forward collectirq points, an intermediate inclosure, and a rear inclosure. This support

ccmtinued until b 3 3 when the canpany was disbaraded.61

?he 51st Military police Battalion engaged in extensive civilian

control aperaticols d u x -

the initial stages of this operation. Ctnpny A


established multiple tenporary anpmds at Saba, usa, J * ,


The acmpanY also established capmnds at Toy,~agdam, Nakami

and Ishikawa.
Ctnpny B

worked with civilians at Sabe, Chibna, Gushikawa, and

Ishimine-Kutoku. This Chpmy mJved 10,000 civilians and priscmers to


Their coways were strafed and attacked by snipers. Extensive

raanbers of civilians were pushed out on the Katchin Peninsula and fenced
off f m friendly forces as an imnediate tenporary control. This c a p n y established outposts to pickup civilians and amducted foot patrols w i t h military governnent teams forward of friendly lines to locate, capture, and protect civilians, records, and property. B Chpmy guarded Island CcmMnd civilian inclormres at , Koza, Takabaru, and M d i h r u .

They were

relieved of d u t y in early May at these anpmds by military police f m

the 52d Military police Battalion.

Chpmy C followed

the 6th M d n e Division north m k b g with the

military government team. This canpany established civilian collectirq points at W, Tbya,

Takeshi, Usa, Nsgahama, Ishikawa, Futsuki,

Nakadarrari, Yaka, Nago, G m a , and Taira. It also patrolled ahead

of a n h t units with military gaverrrment teams to locate and protect civil


and property. C


attached two p l a t -

to the Island

Camand Military Govwment Section to assist with large rnanbers of

civilians at the end of the campaign.62

Even though the 52d Military Police Battalion functioned

near exclusively handling civilians with the Military Gmernwnt Section,

there is negligible infonmtion about their operatias. The bulk of their responsibilities enccmpassed support to the various military w teams focused primarily on the operation of omps and inclosures.63 Late in the campaign in the south, the T e n t h Anny found large g m q s of civilians. I n one particular case the 6th Marine Division found a p p d t e l y five hmdzd in a quarry. control of this 1 division military police took
G-3 of 6th

and cared for then. The f 0 -

m i n e Division, Lieutenant General Victor H . Krulak, U. S . m i n e Corps, Retired, cannented: These operaticms took the load of handling civilians away run canbat units. The principal problems were those of magnitude. Our military police had never done this before. I believe they were quite well trained. We benefited early ran the Okinawan willingness to cooperate."
As noted by Krulak, the first significant problem was based upm

the periodic magnitude or y o l m of civilians requiring ccmtrol. In the

north, the 6th m i n e Division uncovered civilians much mre quickly than
anticipated. The late arrival of the 1st Military Police Battalion, the 52d Military Police Battalion, and e l t s of the 51st Military Police

Battalion canplicated this. In addition, the three canpanies of the 51st Military Police Battalion attached to I11 Aqhibious Corps returned to

Island Carmand cantrol while the 6th W i n e Divisicm was still wrestling with sizable groups of civilians i n the north."
Again, i n the south, the volume of civilians encountered

overwhelmed military police units. The 15th Wines formed a provisional

military police unit for this


I n spite of these prablens, civilian

handling operations were effective overall. Three thousand military police amtrolled three hund~edthousand civiliansP6
Secmd, it appeared that the use of force in these operatias was

l not properly regulated. As noted in the p

assesanat, there was no force

policy reflectirag doctrinal prescription, there were no =-lethal

options available, and mitigaticm of lethal force appeared to rely qxm

Okinawan cwperation and circmmtance. BeckerTsreoollectias cm this

mtter are t v e d by the recollections of former Private First Class Salvatore Cavallaro, of the 1st Military Folice Battalian. He stated,

Force in handling civilians was discussed, because we were going to take care of than. We had to clear caves and tunnels of the Japanese h e y tcok for cover. Accidents without killing the civilians that t happened sanetimes when Japanese soldiers hid in a crcwd of civilians and used a weapm or grenade on the troops. Sanetimes, t q s d d get trigger happy and open fire on the crowd. We would have to stop
this if we d d P 7
I n spite of the lack of plamed policy, use of force was covered i n

. t

Military police understccd that their job was to protect the This served to regulate the use o f force.6s Regardless of

deficiencies, these operations achieved overall success in the face of a large and canplex challage.

Security Operations Security operations, though largely u n p l d , required a great

deal of military police time and effort. Airfields, carmand posts, and
other critical sites were secured by military police. The XXIV Corps G-2 credited military police security w i t h denial of eneny tactical success in

rear areas.The 1st Military Police Battalion provided a wide q

e of

security support. Daily r o v i q patrols covering the Corps area encountered

and neutralized d

l eneny cancentrations. lt&s

in the Corps zcme were

inspected and closed. During the last eight days of phases 11, 1,290 tanbs were inspected. heny e n t e r s
were custa~lry: snipers, infiltrators in

bivouac areas, and attacks on vehicles passing at night. During phases I

and 11 menbers of this battalion killed 5 and wounded 4 Japanese soldiers.

During Phase 111, one platcan provided security for the I11 m i o u s Corps rest cap at m. One platm, attached to the 1st r i s , Separate %beer Battalion, secured b equipnent, and mtrolled attached to the 1st

traffic a?mmd canstruction sites. Amther p l a t ,

N a v a l Ccastruction Battalion, provided night security of equipnent and

installations. Finally, a squad of 16 mines was attached to various elements of the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Wea. Lhily security patrols c c o l t i n u e d in the Corps area and 1981 tanbs were inspected.

During the entire operation, menbers of this ~t

captured 1 3 Japanese soldiers. "

killed a total of 24 and

The 51st Military Police Battalion was also engaged in a wide

range of security functions. Canpany D, while attached to the 1st mgineer Special Brigade, provided 20 men as a special guard for the protection of

the Q m m d i q General, Island Carmand.

C b Lt22, this anpny dispatched

military police to intercept two coral trucks reported as driven by Japanese soldiers. Canpany D provided scout cars to Y m t a airfield and

the South Beach Provost Marshal as a precauticm against enemy paratrcqs.

I n m y this anpny operated guard posts at Kadena airfield, yellow beach, the 43d W i l e Cammmicaticm ~
t and , the Island Carmand Tank Farm.

Canpany A r e s p c o l d e d to Y m t a airfield after enemy planes crash landed.

The anpny guarded sites at Kadem and provided security patrols in the
Island Carmand area. acmparry B encwntered a d infiltrators at , l Japanese unit of Early

and killed 3 Japanese soldiers that n i g h t .

in m y , the anpny guarded supply duqs at Kadena airfield and respzmded to Ycmtan airfield when eneny aircraft aash landed. Canpany C while attached to 6th Marine Division, helped suppress a Banzai attack at Tancha.

They supported the 521st Quartemaster Group by g u a z d i q supplies and ran a patrol at Kadena airfield to protect persannel against sniper fire.
Finally, this anpny provided security for the 693d Ordnance Battalion duqs.

The 519th Military Police Battalicm was no excepticm in this

missicm area. It also provided the saw range of security operations as
Canpany A,

the other battalions.

attached to 7th Mantry Divisicm, had

its 1st Platcon providirig security for the shore party in the South Shore Paay Area. ! C h i s security included area and duq guards.

In m y the

anpny provided a guard &tail

to include guards for the e s

at the 74th Hospital. The detail eqxmded

quarters in June. Finally, A



provided a platcon to guard the Corps duq. Canpany B provided guards to

the 394 H a l d i r i g Canpany, and the 7lst Me3ical Battalion. The capany

provided guards to the aorps drrmp.

Canpany C,

attached to 9 6 t h Mantry

Division, had its 1st Platm provide security to the shore party in the
Sxth S h o r e Party Area.

This security included area and drrmp guards.n 1st JBigineer Special Brigade

Finally, the Fruvost Mw.-&al,

reported that the physical presence of sufficient Military Police hraught a significant looting and pilferage prablan on the beach under control through the use of walking patrols throughout the area." Military Police units of the Tenth Anny appear to have achieved pitive results w i t h these security operations. As the G-2 for xxlv Corps pointed out, military police security operations denied the Japanese tactical opportunity or advantage in the Tenth Anny rear area. Despite the lack of plannkg for these operations, effective and measured application of this mission area helped provide force protection for the Tenth Antry.

In amtrast to the value of these operatias, there exists the canpetitive

role w i t h other mission areas for limited military police r e s e s .

relative value or importance of gmrdhq nurses quarters or a rest canp could not be canpared to the need for additicmal traffic control or civilian handling capability. This is neither cansidered i n relation to other mission areas or the criticd military police junctures in the vign.

In retrosped, sane of the assets dedicated to specific security

operations at specific times could have possibly been used to better overall advantage.
Iaw and O r d e r qWations

Neither of the t w basic unctions of this mission area presented prablens w h a canpared to other missims. Stragglers and pilfering, while

clearly pmblms, were not serious. Rgnedial and a&inistrative measures

help& wntrol these problms."
M these pmblgns, the mst significant

was that of stragglers mnrirag fnm rear to f m t for the purpose of

souvenir hunting and looting. Military police recwered civilian property

and turned it over to military govwmnat. Military police check pints

had great effect; stragglers were sent forward to bury enemy dead.


end of the day they were returned to their units with a message for their
ammdbg officer.

Passes were issued to aid in the wntrol of

stragglers. Passes did not authorize travel forward of the corps rear

These measures reduced the rnrmber of stragglers cansiderably. weather.

There were also very few stragglers dmkg i n c l t

Pilfering in supply c h n r p J s ,c m beaches, vehicle theft, and unauthorized access to civilian canpolnads represented the next msat frequent offenses. Very few arrests were made for pilfering, but mch stolen property was recovered. Unattended vehicles were frequently taken

by stragglers or others and afterward abr&med.

Wmy vehicles were

inproperly marked, repainted, or the losing uuit was unable to identify the vehicle in detail. These factors greatly canplicated the recovery process. Despite this obstacle, a cansiderable rnrmber of vehicles were recovered
thrmgh the effective use of check pints.

Another area of general law and order was p m t i c m and response to crimes against the civilian population. There were a large rnrmber of native ,

and specific efforts were mxle to keep troops away f m n

civilian inclosures. I n spite of this there were a few cases of rape that were ultimately investigated. Additidly, military police investigated

the b m i q of native houses. These incidents were largely attributed to

stragglers. Violators were cmfined in the Island Carmand stockade, and on Lt90 there were 95 soldiers, 2 sailors, and 3 m i n e s in the Island Carmand stockade.75

The 1st Military Police Battalion investigated fires, accidents,

and missing persormel. mnbrs of this unit apprehended a deserter ran a

Navy Construction Battalion declared a deserter an the island of


He was apprehended in the 6th m i n e Division area.

Additionally, spot check teams were established to locate stolen vehicles.

The battalion recovered 50 stolen vehicles and retumed

rightful awners.


to their

Also, 14 a h m k m e d vehicles w e r e turned over to the

Provost mrshal, Tenth A m y , and 62 Japanese vehicles were imporrnded

between 25-30 June for delivery to the Island Carmand Provost mmhal.
Stragglers were detained at the Battalion Wig until an officer ran the individuals unit called for him. This was quite effective in cutting dawn

the rnrmber of sowenir hunters each day." The 51st Military Police Battalion had ane canparry primarily
ccmducting these operatiam. Canparry D provided detailed straggler amtrol
in the South Shore Party Area of the Hagushi beaches, and ran patrols a l c o l g

the south side of the Bishagawa. Additicmally, these military police enforced Tenth ?mny regulations rqardhg the praniscuaus firing of

The canparry issued reports of delinquency for each violation

identified. B y mid-Kay the canparry had issued a totdl of four hundred and sixty two r e p o r t s . "

The Provost 1 ,

1st Engineer Special Brigade reported that no

serious crimes were camLitted against civilians. Looting and pilferage

were most significant initially, but ultimately reduced and b q h t under

control. The aimindl Iwestigaticm section of the


Military Police

Battdlicm was left cm the beach to imrestigate these problens. Five

reposed cases of robbery and thirty six reported cases of larceny occurred

in the beach maintenance area. The largest problem was vehicle theft.
Pspreheusicm of stragglers rivaled the scope of the vehicle theft problem. mrcodrrately seven hundred and ninety stragglers were
appmhadd i n the beach maintenance

area between

L+8 and b60.

This was

primarily ammplished by the use of violations included resist-

and fat patrols. Miscellaneous

arrest, insubordinaticm, or uniform

violations; these made up the rerainder of 1,133 reports of delinquenq

l3udng this period.

Law and order operations achieved notable results amsiderpart time focus and priority that they received. Tenth ? m n y military


n police units were generally successful accanplishirag p l d abjectives i

this area. These operations were also consistent w i t h doctrinal criteria.

Military Police operations achieved p l d abjectives and were generally effective. Operaticma1 deficiencies resulted p r i l y ran

structurdl inadequacy and late force arrival, however, rnrmerous operational p l five. oversights occurred. Detailed conclusions are provided in chapter

%M 19-5, M i l i t a r y Fulice [Obsoletel (War Department, Washington, DC: Govermnent Print* Office, 14 J m 44),48-65; PHIB 19, h l p l o y n w t of M l i t a r y Police [Obsolete] (Marine Corps Schools, NC: n.p., 1945), Series on zmpbibious Opeaticas, 33~01s.13-20. ?&nth Amy, W t a t i v e G p r a t i o n Plan 1-45 (Okinawa: n.p., 6 Jan 45), Annex 13, AppendixH, l,ff, Pppendix I, 1; XXnrCcorps, AchMstrative Order 10 ( m e : n.p., 10 Feb 45), Annex K, 1-4; lMIV Corps, Action Repart RyukyUs, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45 (Okinawa: n.p., n.d.1, 67-69, 87-90; 111 &@ibious Corps, Operation Plan No 1-45 (Okinawa: n.p., 23 Feb 45), Annex IbJw, 1,ff; U . S. Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, participation i n the Okinawa Gpration, 2 vols. (n.p.: n.p., 15 Mar 46). 708-709. * t h Plmy, Action Repart Ryukyus, 26 6 to 30 June 1945, 3 wls. (Okinawa: n . p . , 3 Sep 451, PII-IV-27-29,PII-XXII-1-5.

' F M 19-5, 161-178; Phib 19, Section 3, 31-33.

%S?GPX, 13-23, 99-100, 218-220, 547,548; Tenth Amy, W t a t i v e Operations Plan 1-45, Amex 3, 1,ff; Tenth Amy,Actbn R e p r t ,

PII-1-40-41; 519th Military Police Battalion, Action Report n . p . , 1 July 1945). 1-11.


%AEFWi, 13-23, 99-100, 218-220, 547,548; Tenth Amy, m t a t i v e . Becker, qperatians Plan 1-45, Amex 3, 1,ff; Colonel Keflleth J (Ret), Interview by author, 28 Oct 1994, tape recording, telephonic interview at Colonel Becker's hane in L a Altos, Qlifomia; Provost Marshal, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, M i l i t a r y Police Activities Okinawa Bead Service Area (Okinawa: n.p., 17 July 1945). 1-3.
lo Lieutenant General Victor H . Krulak, n 3 C (Ret) , Interview by author, 19 Oct 1994, tape recordkg and transcript, telephonic interview at Lieutenant General Krulaktshane in San Diego.

"FM 19-5, 66-68, 155-160; Phib 19, Part 2, Section 4, 34-38; Basic Field Mama1 (FM 27-10),Rules o f Lurd W a r f m (War Department, Washington, DC.: &ted States Rwemmnt hrintirq Mfice, 1940), 74-85.

Lieutenant Colonel Lewis N. Civilians" M3rine Coqs Gazette (April 1945) ; Captain H. C. Prudthamre,U5.Z?lZ, "Civil Affairs" mine Corps Gazette (my 1944) ; S t a f f Sergeant B i l l Miller, USMC, ffBeachhead Gavezinmztm mvine CoIps Gazette (Nwauber 1944); First Lieutenant Lewis m , m, 57apanese Civilians in C & t Zanes" mine Coqs Gazette

samelsen, m, ~wandZirx~ Enarry

-EM 19-5, 154-160;

~hib 19, 33-37;

(February 1945). 1, f f . "Sarrmelsen, 1-4; Tenth Amy, Action Report, 1 - 1 - 5 ; USAFPQA, 99-100. PII-XXII-8/9,

"1st M i l i t a r y P o l i c e Battalion, F l e e t Marine Force, P a c i f i c , Action Repart of First Military FDliae Battdim, Fleet Xzine Force, Pacific far Phases 1 and 2 of Okinawa Gpxatim ( O k b a w a : n.p., n.d.1, 1-8 and Stpplemental Actim Report of First Military FDlice Battalion, Fleet xwine Force, Pacific far Period 22 qpril 1945 to 30 June 1945, Okinawa Operation ( O h m : n.p., 1 July 1945). 1-6; 5 1 s t M i l i t a r y P o l i c e B a t t a l i a n , Acticm Report, 10 Jan 1945-30 June 1945 (Okinawa: n.p., 30 June 19451, 1-8; 52d M i l i t a r y P o l i c e Battalion, Actim Report (Okinawa: n-p., 1 1 ; Becker, Interview; 18 Oct 19451, 1-2; 519th MPBn, Action Report, 1 Colonel James H. McCrocklin, USXR (Ret), Interview by author, 23 Oct 1994, tape reaxdbq, telephonic interview at C o l d MXxccklin1s hane in Wimberly, Texas; Fonner PriMte First Class Hans H. Wer, U S E , Interview by author, 12 Nwauber 1994, t r a n s c r i p t , telephconic interview at o F i r s t Lieutenant John P. Mr. W e r ' s hane i n Philadelphia, PA; F Sawyer 1 1 , USICR, Interview by author, 22 October 1994, telephcmic interview a t Mr. Sawyer's hane i n Vero Beach, FL; Fozmx Private F i r s t Class Salvatore Cavallam, uSW2, Interview by author, tape recording, telephconic interview at Mr. Cavallaro' s hdme i n -stead NY.
"EM, 1st Dqineer Special Brigade, 2; 5 1 s t MPBn, 1-7; 52d MPBn, 1st MPBn, FMFPac,Action Repart, Phases I & 1 1 , 1-8; Tenth Army, mtative qperaticm Plan 1-45, 15-19; Becker, Interview. 1-2;

EM 19-5, 158-160; MXxccklin, Interview.

phib 19, S e c t i o n 4, 33-37;

Becker, Interview;

Tenth Amy, Tentative Operation Plan 1-45, Tenth Amy,Action Repart, PII-XXII-1/9; 51st MPBn, 1-7; 52d MPBn, 1-2; 1st MPBn, FMFPac,Action Report, Phases I & 1 1 , 1-8; 519th MPBn, 1 1 1 ; Becker, Interview; McCrocklin, Interview.
Annex 13, Pppendix I, 1-3;

l?USnrrOn, 99-100;


Tenth Amy, Actim Report,


'*EM 19-5, 11-19, 20-28, 31, 139-141; Tenth Amy, 'Bntative qperatians Plan 1-45, 5-19 andAnnex 13, Pppendix H , 1 and~nnex 13,
Apped-k I, 1-3.


19 -5, 150; Tenth Army, Action Report, El-IV-8; Tenth ~ r m y , ActimReport, P6-0-2; XXnr Corps,ActionRepart, 34; I11 mine e i a u s Corps, Action ~epart, 125, 216; m e ,mterview.

"1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Report, Phases I and 1 1 , 1-8; Becker, Interview. =lst IGBn, EMFPac, Action l%Ckddin, Interview.

Phases I and 1 1 , 1-8;

c i d Action Report, Okinawa Operation, 2 " ' 6 t h b5dne Divisian, * wls., Phases I & 11, 30 Apr 45, Phase I11 (Okinawa: n.p., 30 Jim 4 9 , WI-11.12; EM. 1st Ekgineer ~ p e c i a i Brigade, 1-3.
"519th MPBn, 1-11; XXIV Corps, Action Report, 89-90.

a5m, 1st Engineer

Special Brigade, 1-3

'"Tenth Army, Action Report, PII-IV-27/29.


'"Tenth ~ r m y ,m i a n Report, P11-XXII-4; 6th b5dne ~ i v i s i a n ,

specid m i o n Report, OPnO No 49-45. 3-4.

% 3 t MPBn, Supple2pntd Action Report, Phase 1 1 1 , 1-6.

'Venth Army, Action Report,




"1st MPBn, Supple2pntal Actian Report, Phase 1 1 1 , 1-6; I11 Anphihiom Corps, Actian Report, 128. "519th MPBn, Action Report, 1-11. 67-69.

"XXIV Corps, Action Report,

' v e n t &

Army, Action Repart,

P11-XI-9. P11-XXII-4; I11 Anphihiow Corps,

"Tenth Anny, Action Report, Action Report, 197. ,

' % l s t
MPBn, Action Report,

1-11. 95

" a p - d m m i Action &part,

' W t h Anny, Action Report, "Tenth Anny, Action Repart, Yenth Army, Actian Repart,

VII 2, 1-7, x 1.
PII-1-40. PII-1-40; USAFPOA, 218-220, 530-532. PII-XXII-I/~;USAFpoA, 218-220,

530-532. "Ibid. "Ibid.

a r i n e "111 m i Corps, Action Report, 141-143; 1st M Divisian, Specid Action Report,Okinawa, Namei-Shot0 (Okinawa: 10 Jul 4 9 , 2; lst m, FMFP~C, mppl-td Action ~eport, P III, 1-15.

''Tenth Anny, Action Report, PII-XXII-8/9, PII-XXVII-3/5.

"Ibid., PII-XXII-8/9, PII-XXVII-3/5.

USAFPOA, 708,ff.

235-236; Tenth &my, Actian ~epart, PII-XXVII-~/~;

'5XXN Corps, Action Report,

89-96. 133-138.

"111 m i o u s Corps, Actian &port,

"1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Repart, Phases I Suppl-td Action Repart, Phase III, 1-6.

II, 1-8; and

'BBecker, Interview.


m, Action


1-11. 1-8.

"51st MPB~, Action Report,

"52d MPBn, Action Repart, 1-2; Island C Pacific Ocean Areas, Gpration Plan No. 1, 1945). 3, Annex I, Pppendiv A, 10.

, U. S. Wmy Forces, h . p . : n.p., 15 Feb

W a k , Interview.

'%thMarine Divisicm, S;oecial Action Report, 111 49-52.



"xxIV Corps, Action ~eport,114-115.

"1st MPBn FMFPac, Action Reports, Phases I

1-8, and 1-6.

& II

and Phase III,

" F M , 1st mgheer Special Brigade, 1-3.


Anoy, Action Report,


"1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Repart, Phases I & 11 and Phase 111, 1-8 and 1-6.

Si%ucturdl ?qprapriateness

Military police structure p l d to support the U . S . Tenth Imny quantitatively met or exceeded dcctrinal support relatiaships in all but

t w o areas: support for Tactical Air Forces and support for Garrison Forces.
Although structure provided military police assets for Kadena and Yontan

airfields, it made no provision for develqwnt and rehabilitation of additional airfields c m Okinawa. Additionally, doctrinal aplayment of a military police escort guard canparrywithin the Garriscm Force or Island

amMnd was not included or discussed in available plans.

Gther doctrinal support relatimships, while quantitatively

adequate, deviated significantly run traditional task oqanization to meet uncticoldl r e q u i r t s . Planners clearly denonstrated fldility and

insight as t h e y shifted oryanizatimal caphasis forward in support of ccmbat forces. Tenth Imny shifted the 519th Military Police Battalion dawn to the

Corps. The Fleet Marine Force, Pacific created the 1st

Military Police Battalion and attached it to the I11 Nazhe Anphibious


Finally, the T e n t h? u m y jointly attached three canpanies of the

51st Military mlice Battalion, Island amMnd to the I11 Anphibious Corps. Planners abvicusly appreciated the challaqe facing the assault echelon by

the scope of traditional military police functicms in

handling operations.



Curiously, the I11 2nphibious Corps received a large and disproportimate share of the military police support. This was due to the

T e n t h Amy's need to m e mxhnn nunkers of military police ashore in the

assault echelon d i n e d with I11 2nphibious Corps' ability to embark these forces. Coincidentally, these forces prarided an mintentional depth for 111 2nphibious Corps when the 1st Military Police Battalion c a m ashore eight days late. Further, these units were able to perfom civilian handling functions tasked to the 52d Military Police Battalion which was not schechrled to arrive at Okinawa mtil phase I11 of the aapaign. Civilian handling operations posed the m t significant requirement for military police in this campaign. The majority of the military police structure was plam-ed to handle civilians at sane point in the U g n .

The inability of these forces to support volminous

amstituted a weakness in

operatias at least twice during the & g n

this mission area. hragile plans to shift task organization ciuriq initial stages of the campaign sought to provide adequate support until garrison forces were established ashore. Houwer, e d rapid gains in the

north rendered plans inadequate in the face of increased poExilation density

prior to arrival of two military police battalias in the assault echelon:

the 1st Military Police Battalion and the 51st Military Police Battalion.

Also, a task olganization shift of elements of the 51st Military

Police Battalion run I11 mphibious Coqs back to Island Carmand control

goployment of wnbat forces of the 6th lmzine Division to handle

large nunkers of civilians. The 1st Military Police Battalion ultimately supported the 6th m i n e Division; hwever, it was spread out providixg a full m e of support ran the Haguski Beaches to the m t c h peninsula

In this case the overall force ashore was inadequate for the volume of
a s k civilians and aolcurrent missions. The poorly timed shift of t

organization was caused prjmrily by the absence of the 52d Military Police Battalion. Whereas Island aarmand military gme?mwnt structure ashore was
growing, t h e i r dedicated military police support, the 52d Military Police

Battalion, would not achieve closure for sane time. Ultimately, q t i n g

needs w i t h i n the Garrim Forces impacted adversely upcol ccmbat forces.

Ute in the campaign, the Tenth Amy military police structure was wholly inadequate as luiudnarm m m h r s of civilians were uncovered when other missions had reached maturity in scope and caql&ty.
The I11 Anq?hibious

Corps, faced w i t h significant population density in their zone of action,

tasked the 15th &Brims to fonn a provisional military police detachment of

anpany size. Additicoldlly, the 1st Military mlice Battalion and the



were required to support the Island amMnd in the handling of exceeded the capabilities of their

civilians since missian r e q u i r t s military police units.

I n the outlying island operations, doctrinal military police

support at lower levels proved inadequate to handle civilians and traffic

m t m l sinailtaneously. Addititma1 support for these ccmbat forces was l c o l g doctrinallines obviously required. These units apporticmed forces a and had no pool of additional suppcat as at the corps-level. Military police f r r n c t i t m a l doctrine was cansidered in 611 but two areas: support for Tactical Air ~orces and Island amMnd p r i m of w a r inclosures. m
Area plans,

e is no evidence in the U.S. Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean plans, or U .S . Tenth Amy Garrisan Forces or

u .S. Tenth Amy

Island aarmand plans that either of these issues was properly cansidered. 100

First, the requirement for Tacticdl Air Force andrespective airfield protection was obviously critical to the achievenent of operational abjectives stated in chapter one. Anticipated Japanese tactics discussed in chapter three should have further highlighted this requilrenent. Plarmers, as noted, prqmmm3 two aviation military police canpauies into the Tactical Air Force force structure. Havever, the absence of detailed airfield security plans, the mspxified size and strucXure of the two aviation military police ampanies enployed, and the failuxe to structure for further base developaent disregarded doctrine and provide3 substandard support for mission.
As a result, plarmers did notprcgram sufficient structure or

pxprly anticipate the impact of these issues on other mission areas.

Three of the four military police battalions provided essential support to

both Radena and Yontan airfields during the capign. This clearly pointed out the inadequacy of both security planning and the structure of the two aviation military police canpanies assigned to these installations.

each occasion, these qlaxmed security requirenents detracted ran other missions.

Next, the absence of a military police escort guard canparry also

reflected disparity between plans and dcctrinal prescripts. nS noted in s chapters three and four, the Island Carmand p l d to a
the three corps prisoner of war i n c l e s

aperation of

once established ashore. The

concept of Amy-level or Island Carmand support for this missicm area clearly inferred the doctrinal requirement for a military police escort
guard ccmpany. Havever, plarmers placed this responsibility with the

Island Carmand 51st Military Police Battalion by default.

The 51st Military Police Battalion, as discussed in chapters three

and four, was tasked to provide a full range of military police support to the Island Cormand. This left little assurance that prisoner of wa operations wauld not directly caupete with other missim assigned to this battalion. Even thngh planners anticipated large lnaobers of priscolers,

they failed to praperly m i d e r this estimate while develcping Island


structure. As a result, Island Cormand reduced prisoner inclosures

to one central inclosure w h i c h the 1st Platcon, 162d Military Police Canpany, Prisoner of War Processing, guarded exclusively in the initial stages of the operation. This unit a m t e d s i t y for this inclosure

twice m e durhg the onp3aign resulting each time in a tenporary halt to prisoner of wax processing.

Both of these deficiencies adversely hpcted on other areas of

military police opesations by unnecessarily ccmpeting for limited assets. This factor was either not recognized by planners or could not be addressed due to exhausticm of military police assets available in the theater. Available infonmticm was not specific enough to permit a determination of the rcot cause. Additid unplanned missions included security of carmand posts, carmanders, engineer sites, n a v a l ccmstruction sites, and hospitals.
Sane of these missions caqlimentedother mission areas.

of these,

such as the twenty m m security detail for the Island Connand

Generdl, were questionable uses of limited

~~npower. These


requirements detracted fran the priority required for traffic and civilian operations; mission areas with dire3 k p c t on the tacticai situation. Accepting this discussicm, military police structural p l still genemlly t h o miwas

the caqlex nature of mmerous missicm

areas and special organizaticms. It is absolutely crucial to note again that these plarmers identified the need for m e additional battalion which

could not be provided in the Pacific Theater. I n spite of inefficiencies

identified, a fifth battalion waild have provided Island Camtmd with sufficimt assets to effectively support the W t h Army ccmbat forces vice detracting run than at points. Operaticms pointed out that this structure

n ammplishkg the mission except for three junctures in the succeeded i

canpign: midway through the assault echelon , l

m s civilian

handling in the north, and mass civilian handling south. The first was attributable to the late arrival of d t s in the assault echelon. The
seam3 was due to the late arrival of garriscm forces and poorly timed

shifting of task organization within the assault echelon. Finally, the third was due to support requirements which exceedd military police capabilities at that point in the campaign. P l gaps failed to reveal

n p J a c t that security and prisoner of war operations wauld have on the the i overall structure, but especially the Tactical Air Forces and the Garrison
Forces. This last inadequacy points to the only real exmple where the

structure was incapable of accanplishing the mission. Operational Effectiveness

n chapter four, reveals Operational planning. as assessed i

dodrinal adherence in m t mission areas. Actual operations were generally successful except for several specific pmblens. The first and, possibly, m t important military police mission area was traffic control. Traffic a m t x 0 1 p l was x d u c t e d

by military police in spite of the

failwe of sane unit G-4 officers to produce traffic circulation plans

prior t o arrival ashore.

While credit-

the military police for pie,

these control plans did not anpliment t a f f i c circulatian plans produced later.
This issue was k e y a d the control of military police, but remined

a deficiency nevertheless. Traffic operatims were successful except durjunctwes in the d g n : run Lt3 t o -11

two critical

and during the l a s t week of m y

and the f i r s t week of June.

The first period covers the i n i t i a l asampticon

1 1 Aqb&ious Corps Shore Eaxty of the north half of the of control by the I

Hagushi beaches.

The Caopanies of the 1st Military Police Battalion

designated t o problems -ted

the Corps Service Group had not landed and traffic an the beach. Gnce ashore these Marines quickly gained

control of traffic and successNly expanded north run Hagushi a l l the w a y t o the t@tobu peninsula. Initially this problem was due t o the late

arrival of this unit.

Camrersely, this battalicon demplstrated high

canpetency as t h e y quickly gained positive ccmtrol of a large and e q a d i n g zone of acticon.

Next, ext-

weather dur-

the last week of m y and the f i r s t

However, U . S. Amy

week of Jime caused the loss of Routes 5 and 13.

Forces, B c i f i c C e a n Areas, Selected Werver r s traffic ccmtrol i n the X X I V Corps zone.

criticized reactive

The report stated that proactive In contrast, rigid,

control could have prevented the loss of these routes.

i f not relentless joint traffic control was credited with the maintenance of Route 1 and the ccmtinued sustainnent of both corps.
It is clear that

the I 1 1 Arclphibious Corps system of a one-way traffic circuit prior t o the

arrival of extxene weather ccmditims saved the principal w l y route i n


their zone.

Ultimately, this was critical to the Tenth Amy's ability t o

sustain their canbat forces. Cmsidering the p a r nature and conditions of

these roads, overall traffic control operations were successful and of operatima1 value to the Tenth Amy.
The next significant mission area involved the handling

of Okinawan civilians. This unction also had significant hipact qmn tactical forces. Military police operations relieved canbat forces of the

burden of civilian handliq, control, and ultimately a n y interference with

tactical operations or sustairrment. The m l m of civilians presented military police with a canplex challenge which they met successfully except

in several situations. Those operatianal pmblens relating to structure

have already been discussed, howwer, there was one additicolal operaticma1


The absence of a Tenth Amy policy for use of force with civilians

n FM 19-5. This plarmi~~~ failed to satisfy criteria established i failure

may have resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties. The tactical

s shields enviraranent was ccnplicated by the Japanese use of civilians a

during final attacks on American forces. It is not clear f m the

resources considered if a solution would have been drawn fron a well

defined policy on the use of force. It is clear that the a?zsence of such a
policy left soldiers and Marims to their own personal j m t s Military police involve~nt to stop trccps f m firing qmn civilians indicates that j u d E p r s e n t and resulting behavior was wstiCIMble to those present. It is certainly questionable today. The need for such a policy was further darnnstrated by exatples of military police accidentally killing civilians
in security operations. EVeu t h i g h training attgclpted to amid this



focusing on military police protection of civilians, legal and

articulate policy was certainly required as prescribed in doctrine.

This issue provides the only real negative note for this mission
a r e a . It sfaouldnot wershadav the accanplishwnt of appmxkately 3,000

military police who successfully collected, mxred, i n t d , and cared for a p p r c o c j l n a t e l y 300,000 civilian Okinawans.

The s l e

volume and associated

a s k dervnstrates the overall success achieved in this canplexity of such a t

mission area.

Prisoner of w a r operations presented military police w i t h fiarry of

the smne requirements as civilian handlirg, but w i t h only 3% of the volme.

spite of this lesser populatim, the organizatiaal structure w i t h i n the

Island amMnd proved inadquate. As a result, the Island Carmand central inclamre failed to carry o u t the T e n t h A m y policy for segregation of p r i m ; only officers were segregated. This was the only deficiency noted thm&xmt both operatianal assesawnts. These operations successfully collected, mnred, held, protected, and pmessed over 10,000 p r i m of war.

Ultimtely, this supportwas effective in spite of this

problem. Failure to conduct detailed plaminy for separate security

missions created a plaminy void. m, security missions were not i t h other unctiaal ccmsideratians prior to the properly coordinated w
canp?aign. This parallels those same security related deficiencies

identified in the structural evaluation. Urqlanned airfield security,

crmMnd post security, and other critical site security ccnpeted with other

mission areas for limited capabilities and focus.

h these


missions were generally successful, their unplanned nature inpcted qxm the quality of overall mission accanplislnnent. It is impossible to &tennine what other problems might have been avoided had plaminy and

coordination properly occurred. It is also impossible to detMRine how

rrmch better or expansive other types of support might have been had

planning cccurred. It is clear that military police security operations were credited with deterring and neutralizhq Japanese atteupts to disrupt operations in the Anny and both Corps1 rear areas. This prablen was m e of poor p1anni.q and not of operatianal execution. Finally, detailed planning for law and order operationssuch as straggler control, was also neglected. Although general policies, prahibitions, responsibilities, and mrrective actionswere prescribed, military police did not plan for posts and patrols prior to lading. This n y significant need for p1anni.q may have been deliberately anitte3 since a general enforcenent was not anticipated until later in the operation. In contrast, pilferkg was clearly eqxxted to manifest itself in the keachhead, yet specific military police plans were not available. ?+gain, a planning failure did not render negative operatianal results. Law and order operations as with security operations were successNly executed and achieved successful results. This raises the question of haw detailed planning should be prior to arrival i n the area of operations.

The results of the T e n t h Amy military police operations were

generally very successful, however, canpetition anrmg mission areas for limited military police assets occasicmally deprived areas of adequate support. The Tenth

inprtant mission

and specifically the Prmst

I-Br&al staff failed to continually prioritize these mission areas for

given t -

in the operation. The absence of prioritization led to

seemingly randan focus and reaction amn=g various units. Further, the
Tenth Amy never exercised operational control of these forces at the

Army-level i n order to focus the military police effort and achieve mutual

suppoa for critical mission areas. This would have provided a possible
solution for sane of the issues resultfrun inadequate or unavailable

structure. Even thcniyh operational results were successful overall, mre

thorn@ plarming

and focus of subrdinate military police support would


have resulted in better coordination, etxmany of force, and synergy of

capabilities tbroughaut the Tenth Army. These units indivitkally deserve

nu& credit for their accanplishments i n the face of inexperience and a

challexqicg enviruriment. T h e y provided many examples of the best and m t

8uccessful military police operatias of their e r a .

Applenan, Roy E., Okinawa: The Last Battle, U . S. Amy in World W a r 1 1 , The W a r in the Pacific. 1948. Reprint. W a s h k g t o n , DC: Historical D i v i s i o n , Department of the Army, 1993.
B e l o t e , J a m e s H. and W i l l i a m M., 25rphmn o f Steel: The B a t t l e f o r Okinawa. New York: Ha.rper and Row, 1970.
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Dyer, Geolge C.,



to Ccolquer

W a r : The S t o r y o f


Richard Kelly !ltzrner, Washirigton, DC: U. S. Gavenrment h-intiq

O f f i c e , 1969. Frank, Benis M., Okinawa: Capstme to Victory. New York: Ballantine, 1969. Frank, Benis M. and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., V i c t o r y and Occupation: History of U . S. m i n e Corps Opratians in WarldWar II. Washirigton, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 D i v i s i o n , Headquarters, U. S. W a r i n e Corps,


I . T . M., Okinawa, 1945: The Gateway Wleday, 1985.

to J .

Garden city, NY:

Griess, Thams E., A t l a s o f the Seamd World War: Asia and the Pacific. Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishiq Group, 1985.

HOugh, EYank O., The Island W a r . New York: Lippincott, 1947.

Huber, T h m s M., Japan's B a t t l e far Okinawa. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Cmht Studies Institute. 1990.

Johnston, Richard W.,

Follcw Ms: The S t o r y o f the Secand X~WineD i v i s i o n o f World W a r II. New York, NY: Randan House, 1948.
A History o f the 7 t h Infantry D i v i s i o n in World W a r II. Nashville, TN: B a t t e r y Press, 1988.

Love, Ek3mmd G., The Hceuglass:

27th iizantry D i v i s i o n in World W a r II.Washiragtan, DC: Infantry J d Press, 1949.

. Ihe

mdej, w. Victor, U. S. A & and Mzine Carps G n i e r of Battle, P a c i f i c Iheater of Gprations 1941-1945. V o l m I , Allentown, PA: Game Publishing Canpany, 1984. Manchester, William, Gzdbp, Dzhzess: A m i r o f the Pacific W a r . New York, NY: Dell, 1980. W l l a u , George, Ihe Old arced: A History of the First &C%rine Division in wodd war I I .nashingtan, DC: Infantry J d Press, 1949. W l l a u , George, et al., M m r m ~ nValor: Mwine Divisions i n Action. WaShhgtan, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946. Nichols, Jr., Olarles S., Major, lEM.2, and Henry I . Shaw, Jr.,Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific. 1955. Reprint. Rutland, VP: Charles E . Tuttle Cb. : Publishers, 1966. Pyle, Emie, Last Qmpter. ~ e ~ork, w N Y : H e n r y ~olt and chqxniy, 1946. Sixth &BrineDivisian Associatian, Sixth Mzine Divisiau: Ihe S t r i k h g
Sixth, Riducah, W : Tunrer, 1987.

StoclaMn, J~IIESR., Ihe S i x t h m i n e Division. WashiqLcm, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U . S. K&ne Cbrps, 1946. United States Army, Infantry Division, 77th. (Xlrs to IIold it High: 2 7 ~ History of the 77th Infantry Divisian in World W a r I I . P J a s h i r a g t o n , DC: Infantry J d Press, 1947. Vagts, Alfred, Dr.,Lmding qperations: Strategy, Psycholqy, Tactics, mlitics, Fran Antiquity to 1945. 1946. Reprint. mrcisbrag, PA: Military Senrice Publishkq aanparrY, 1952 Van der Vat, Dan, Ihe Pacific C@gn: Ihe U . S. - J q a w s e Ndm.2 1941-1945. New York, NY: Simm and Schuster, 1992.

Werstein, Imkg, Okinawa: Ihe Last Ordeal. New York, N Y : [n.p.l, 1968.

U . S . Army, Tenth Army, Action Reprt Ryukyus, 26 6 to 30 3 vols., Okinawa: 3 Sep 45.

June 1945.

. !&ntative
4 Feb 45.

Operations Plan 1-45. Okinawa: 23 Feb 45.

"Icebeq". Okinawa:

. 1st Erigineer Special Brigade, Operations Plan

. The Share Party Concept (Draftj. En.p.1: 29 Nov 44. . 1st Engineer Specid ~rigade,ProMst E ~ ~ h aBeach l,
and i n f o m a t i o n . Okinawa: 17 Jul 45.


Corps, Action Report Ryukyus, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45.Okinawa: n.d.

EO 45.

. Iceberg,

Leyte: 8 Feb 45.

Order 10. Leyte: 10 Feb 45.

. Administrative

. Administrative Orders 11-17. Okinawa: 8 wr-19 ~ u 45. n . Shore Party Instructions. Leyte: 10 Feb 45. . 7th Infantry ~ivision, Operation Report, Ryukyus Canpaign.
Okinawa: 30 Jul 45.

. Field Order 30. Leyte: 5 Mar

Okinawa: 10 Feb 45.


. Administrative Order-1. Leyte: 5 Mar 45. . 27t2-1Infantry Division, m t a t i v e Operation

Plans, Iebezy.

. 77th Mantry Division, Operation Plan,

18 Feb 45.



. 96th Infantry Division,Field

5 Mar 45.
June 1945.

Order AD 12, Iceberg. Leyte:

. 51st Military Police Battalion,Action

Okinawa: 30 June 1945.

Repart, 10 Jan 1945-30

52d Military Police Battalion,Action Report. Okinawa: 18 OCt 1945. 519th Military Police Battalion,Action Report. Okinawa: 1 July 1945.

. .

U . S . Army Forces, F;rr East Canmud, General Hea&uarters, The Pttmwt mmhal I s Kistq, C Z n p d g ~ o ~f s the P a c i f i c , 1941-1947.Australia: 23 Dec 47. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, P a r t i c i p a t i o n in the Okinawa Operation. 2 vols., [n.p.1 : 15 Mar 46.
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CamEmd, Operation Plan AD. 1, 15 Feb 1945.

. Office of . Island

the ,


U.S. Marine Corps, I11 Zqhibious aorps, Action Repart Ryukyus Operation,
Phases I and II. Okinawa: 1 Jul 45.

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. Action

. Operation Plan AD

1-45. Okinawa: 23 Feb 45.

1st Military Police B a t t a l i o n , Fleet Marine Force Facific,Ater Action Repcut f o r Phases I and 1 1 o f Okinawa Operation-Okinawa:
30 Apr 1945. Sqw~X-td Action Repart o f F i r s t Military IilZice Battalion, L m e 1945, F l e e t i%u9qe Farae, P a c i f i c f o r Fericd 22 April 1945 to 30 J O k i n a w a Operation. Okinawa: 1 July 1945.


. 1st Marine D i v i s i o n ,

W a l Action Repart, Okinawa,

Okinawa: 10 Jul 45.

. Operation Plan 1-45. Guadal-1: 10 Feb 45. . Adninistrative Plan 1-45. Guadalcmal: 10 Feb 45. . 2d Marine Division, Action Report, Phase I, N-i
Okinawa: 15 Apr 45.


. Operation Plan AD 10. Saipan: 15 Feb 45. . qperation Plan I W 12 ( ' t e r n a t e Plan). Saipan: 27 Feb 45. . 6 t h m i n e Division, special Action Repart, Qkinawa Operation.


Phases I & 11, 30 Apr 45, Phase 111, OkinawaSO Jun 45.

. Opration Plan dB 1-45. Guadal-1: 10 F e b . Operatian Plan 1-45 (Alternate). Guadal-1: . ADM Plan dB 1-45. Guadalcanal: 8 Feb 45.


3 t @ r 45.

U.S. Navy, Bnphibious Group Four, Action Report, Czpture Iheya Shims and Aguni Shims. Okinawa: 18 Iuig 45.

Doctrinal Publications fleet mine Force, Pacific,Staff Officers' Field Mmua.2 far Aphibiaus Gperatinns. (Obsolete) , Hawaii: 10 Sep 44. Field
19-5, Military Fulice. (Obsolete), War Department: 14 J m 44.
W~~fJzZ? (Obsolete), .

Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land h.d.1

War Department:

Bnphibious Cpxations (Phib), Volme 19, Bq~lop~smt of Military Blice. (Obsolete), mrhe Corps Schools: 1945. [?I, Cases

S t a m Area

MteriaZs on Mlitary Gmenment. Civil Affairs mldirg 6 Presidio of Xmterey, California: 15 September 1945.

M y , J. K., "Thirty ThDuSand P r i m of War Over the Beach.*nMilitazy Review: April 1945.

Jacobs, William H., "Military Gcmrmst at 0kinawa."November 1946.

Corps Gazette:

m s , Lewis, "Japanese Civilians i n acmbat Zcmes.nMdne Corps Gazette:

February 1945.

Miller, Bill, "Beachhead Govermnent. m i n e Corps Gazette: mvaber 1944. EYeSCOtt, Brainard E . , l*Organizatian of the Traffic Headquarters."Militazy Review: January 1945.
Prud'hamva, H . C . , "Civil Affairs.* m i n e Cozps Gazette: m y 1944.

Samuelsen, Lewis N., "Handlicq hany Civilians."mrine Corps Gazette: April 1945.

&amelsen, Lewis N . , 'W1s on the Bea~h.~I@tine Corps Gazette: August 1945. Vernan, E. H . , "Civil Affairs and Military Garenrment."Military Review: June 1946. Chqxlblished Material
Fix, Robert, G., BT, USA, lX?nth Anny in the Okinawa c%Wiign: An AMly~is fm the O p e r a t i d -ive. m, Thesis, U . S. Plmy Carmand

and General Staff College: 1992.

Chqxlblished Interviews by Author Becker, Kenneth J . , Col., E W R (Ret) , Former Cammdhg Officer, A Canparry, 1st Military Police Battalian, FMF Pacific, Duriq Operation Iceberg. Interview by author, 28 October 1994,Los Altos, Ca. Tape recording and transcript held by author. Qvallaru, Salvatore, Fo2mer PFC, USkC, menber D Canparry, 1st Military Operatian Iceberg. Interview by Police Battalion, FMF Pacific, Dura u * , 12 Novanber 1994, West Hanpstead, NY. Tape recording and transmipt held by author. N t z , Om, Former menber Militmy Police Canparry, 7th Service Reghat, Duriq Operatian Iceberg. Interview by author,13 Novenber 1994, West Lafayette, IN. Tape rearding and transcript held by author. . , Lt-Gen., USkC (Ret), Former G-3, 6th U e Division, Krulac, Victor, H 24 &arch 1945 to 30 June 1945. Interview by author.19 Octaber 1994, San Diego. Tape reoxdiq and transcript held by author.

James, H . , Col., U D C R (Ret), Former Executive Officer, C 1st Military Police Battalion, R4F Pacific, DurOperatian Iceberg. Interview by author, 22 October 1994, Wimberly, TX. Tape r e a d i n g and transcript held by author.

W e r , Hans, H., Former PFC, U S C , maker 1st Military Police Battalian, FMF Pacific, w i n g Operation Iceberg. Interview by author, 12 Novanber 1994, Philadelphia, PA. Transcript held by author.

Parks, Nelson, G., FoLmer PFC, USMC, manber 1st Military Police Battalian, FMF Pacific, Eurhg t i a n Iceberg. Interview by author, 23 October 1994, Sam City, FL. Tape recording and transcript held by author.

sawyer, J & ,

P . , 11, mnwr IstLt. U S C , PlatLeader, 1st P1atccm.C 1st Military Police ~attaliian,FMF Pacific, Durirq t i a n Iceberg. Interview by author, 22 October 1994, Vero Beach, F'L. Tape recording and transcript held by author.



Combined Arms Research Library U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 Marine Corps Staff College Breckenridge Library MCCDC Quantico, Vn 22134 Marine Corps Historical Center Personal Papers Section Building 58, Washington Navy Yard 9 0 1 Street ~ S.E. Washington, DC 20374-5040 Commandant of the Marine Corps Security Branch, (POS-101, Operations Division Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps 2 Navy ~ n n e x Washington, DC 20380-1775 U.S. Army Military Police Museum U.S. Army Military Police School Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5114 Colonel Anthony Wood Marine Section USACGSC Fort Leavenworth, KS


3 .





7 .

Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Mangnnn, Ph.D. 1724 Tulane Brownwood, TX 76801 Colonel K e ~ e t h J. Becker, USMCR (Ret) 1225 Monte Verde Court LOS Altos, CA 94024-6732



Colonel James H. McCrocklin, USMCR (Ret) P.O. BOX 2 Wimberley, TX 78676-0002

10. Master Sergeant F. "Ace" Arciaga, Jr., U S (Ret) 9881 Kings Canyon Drive Huntington Beach, CA 92646