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Whv does one commander succeed


Contindm d THE CAVALRY K X l W

where another one

Si Sgt. J. W i l h n Joscph



A Soldier's Story
Out of thia book emergea a detailed picture of how the armed fomr o m a seriea of lcponr which mlyont eormrned

The United States A w Association

Continuatim o f

Volume Lx

MAY-Jt-NE. 1951

No. 3

The u n i t e dstates Cavahy Association

(EnrMirbed 1885)
Houoruy P r e d m t MAJ. GEN. GUY V. HENRY. Ret.

~ m e n ro s m mmu

. . . . .
...... 4


OP BOSOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cc1) G E T S

apply. H e r ei sam e a l thoroogh briedng by t h e y s msn of the Jomt Chi& of ble Proridis0 m t into t h c e led to success or failure on the pur of m y eommacding o6cer.

E N -











BY -0

C A m . WILLIAM GARDNER BELL a d i d Conrnl Mmbm M q . GLN. HOCIAIT R. &Y MAJ. G e s . ALBERT SIDNIYJmsos. N.G. B M . GEN. THOWAs L .W O L D o u B m . GEN. JOHNT. C b. GEN.JOHNC. ~ ~ ~ N A L O Cor. WILLIAM J. BUDLEY Cor. Cn~ues V. Baonm, Jn. Cor. R. J. B m r u Cor. H m r E. GAIDMLI, USM Cor. HAMILTONH.H o m

w . r ( S . B . J a h R. E . Gwrr P. T i l u . Lurr I L.t Jr- T b m m W. c . l l . r . bhrt L BrmW. l . & u n d W D. ' l i l o r

DOST nnp ra TAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . By -t C O W W w i u R. Khmer SOWBTBISC TO STOP A TANK ~v C-A w. . u s


Cor. L. IC. LAWr


DELIBEUA~ONS O S ABNOU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .



c . ( . r lPrnk

P. C u r




r e e BOOK

.N. . . .



A SOLDIKWS S'110.T ......... A micr h bhrt S . Alh


3ubliatioo 06ces: 1406 East Franklin Strccr, Rirhmmd. V i r Editord A c e s : 1719 K Street. N.W., WobingDa 6. D .C :9SI, br Tbe U.s. Armor Associatioa. Entered as YcDod drrr maacrat IcIQmoad Vkghh, tmdp +ActdbIuch 3 , '"9. f= * it rpecinl mtc of poruge in Scctioo 412, Act of oaokr 3, 1917. Tams: Domatic sutucripiooS lodrridd ad. (.pdatsry oc .ivilian) i a d u d i a g A P o ' s . W . 7 ~ p e r ~ Pa . 0 . ~ 0 p e r p c r .C M d r r a d P m ~ a , $ ~ . ~ O , A l l r P b r a r p a o t n p q a b k m d . . o o c . %ile copies, 8%. ARMOR does UOI cy paid=nixmaus.




the author has missed the real d~ffexence. ,4lmored infanay muSt be uained LO FIGHT mounted. Op &tier to do so will wt be & e n K mined to Cght mounted and capable of theywillbedecirice. 1 f O u n d t h e m : o 6ghcinp~dismounred. be suprkhgly a t in Europe ard .-L long as warfare is conducted on found the trmpo the entire operaticn the eanh-s surface it is safe to predict aepeaded upon the skill and spirit u i : h chat there ~ i l i be a need for t h a two w h i c h tbe small infan- unit anacktd basic dements. Itlmatters not w h e t h e r mounted, 6ring from the hip, and tf e either M both reach the banlefield by alacrity with w h i c h all or pan o f tt e water. air or land. M b t does rnatte~ amaed infanay could switch fT07 mounted t o dismounted to mounted a . is how- thev fight. .+mod arppon. chidy in the form cion. This inherent ability coupled wi- 1 of tanks. is an essential element of the the fact chat in annor it is the tan. .. &=a)division. -4s such it s u not the infanpman, which sets tIe the infanay a c t i o n . it may and s d pace. is what&eremMtes h e e n t! e the infantrps mobility, but in two basic cumbat elements. M c u l t 1 the end it is and must remain infanpv. put in words and impossible to uncic-The armored division on &e ocher hand stand unless developed by long mal I ing is tbe Maelm. M a conditions being equal tt.e army with the bener balance betrvefn infantry and annoral divisions will w - 1 . U & present conditions in Euro? not less than onehalf of the diridos s h d be armored. The U. S. is beg oble DD furnish (and certainly second :o none in ability t o anploy) the a n n o d divkion component of any combintd fara. The current emphasis on small 2: d unia which VOUT editorial very ly found so dhurbing is doubr.

The Working lord


ikar Sit: +eve =OR is an ouopading p u b ..;ation. I a . thefrahaessofia .Ipuana and3zzhJe of the axwrit. However.andI~t&kwillbe :miliar to you. I would like to see more l.-ricles down oil the ~nnpony-banalion \el. Afm all. the ady way f o r .. unger oGcers (O learn from the e .
c L X or knowledge ,,les is to read

May I

along the cunment that I

o r hear of than. And ice their rrcicena is well established. :only hope lies w i t h AILNOR.
4th Reconnaissance Banalion


& ?

older. wisn


:O 174 \\-el2 put our mtst in this very issue : c a out ~ the wishes of Lieutemant . : 3 r . May we add one thought. . : artrck si ned by a senior offrur is ble t o be c k x k full of a w e e r of ex* -ience gained in all the grades, :c. that supplies some good grmcnd;


-k for

.junior p e r ~ ~ ~ n e l . - - E ~ .

More On Russian Tanks L ar Sir:

condirions Of be h the 0 c - hd ea ln Y $ i rims in Europe m not fogarrn and thptthebelaaceoftheafm is&ciendy weighted with, d d i v i s i o n s to k u r e the anny caaunanda mobdin. and fTeedom of InaBeuver in cambat. Major Gemad 9. W .G m . There is 00 SU~SI~NW far badeiield h i c h the Qrmmaoder can psdrcates its tactics oil the mobitv of mobilhy. by w e t a i n the initiative and ovmome tbe tank which hac is the basic*& r but kss mobile enemv. Conmcllt a d all other elanens are arganis no means s o &&\-e ioal.equippdandminedto~ m o u n d action. .4nnaed infanay ar- to counter a highly mob& enany. Modern weaptmspad p e n t both dic*andenginecrsrequireiroahasa r p r i o Y L n o e dto infana&e of modan battle6eld maneuver- me a hi+ ability. Parellthetically: I agree with try divisions than World War II. MAJ.GEN. R. W. GROW che caption UnQ tbe title .Gmarrd A m y Attnchi lnfauay i s DiEemlt on page 40 of the January-Februaq h e but I fear Manow, Russia
t IS to

r z t o t h e the K a e a ~ war.

X t b ,

beCm than rbc Mark v and the X14A3E8 iderior to it. how would things go in Korat? I think weve been lucky to have out kndid rankmen in blpcyc ua ;J- in-: $ 1 were the supreme camrrmder Russian equipmmt was verv good. t mdrr MM46r in k. I have no eTen Theirin T34 1941, r l aith in any Orber rank. ROBERT GRAHAM F. IM. VOUKleia MJdaown, s e w Yolk The Russians maintained their adMIZSIZT Robm G r b . 1 2 - y ~ & \ dnrage in rank design: the Stalind , M ofm Annor R-e offioer, has adN hich appeared in 1944. was the bat 4M cm u d comment. Uhat * unk that w a s seen in bade, anywhere. tbe * said ow OYI tair losvs was m fonb un to the end of the war. by Cd.Withers, Armor OfFrr. Gghth Gen. Von htonreuffel. Army, in his J e w ad article of last C m . c. L PROuDFOor issue. We recall his remark h t the Editor .U4A3E8 h a s not faded to dnnonmote I n d i a Armonred Corps Journal .If4A3E8 its ouprriority crews011l i b their the T-34. ta& 4hrnednagar. India

Referrin to Generalmajor H. B. 1 ueUer-Hil&ebransletter in your JanF b 51 issue on The U a of Soviet 7 inks by the Germam, and the poor q dip onof .Ur. Gant UnderhII w h i r his-letter. the t , llowing German inions on Russian Lnks w d 0 t h side of : ;s H a by Liddell Han am o f particu-

??. S(IA3EB at

d An

work i .Korea.

W ~ S

inferiot to &e Mark V a d it took a good 114 tanltmvl to put a Slack \



If the T-34




a y of the leaexpoaena o f mobile warfare have deaied the fact thot we have never lcczined mobility i n the

uue seose i n our annored d i v i s i a ~ ~ Poincin to the tremendous uccu with the which large number division of is budmed, w h e e l 4 vehicles and to


which keep it -mdbound, they advocate a paring down and a swiccb to full cracks throughout The TlSE2 armored personnel d e r i s a m p toward the gmnr mobility that has been advocated.




The -+nny has just announced the alemng of the Second .&mod Bvision at Forr H o o d .Texas, for shipment o v to become the 12th division of General Eiisenhaw.eis budding forces for the defense of u-eacm Europe.

Award of the Medal of Honor

President Truman, in a special cerer my at the W h i t e Hou~e Armed t :fees Day. May 19. pinned the \ &l of Honor, the nation's highest a on three Army veterans o the h ,rean campaign. The citation ac, npanying each award bh5:
I 'First uccnant). Lieutenant bpan Dodd y E,(then Stfi Infantry secold

Tbe famous-Hell rn Wheels" division pins tbe U. S. Gnstaktlary (considered roughly equiwlent Frances Fifth Armored Division, d Britain's Seve~~tband Eleventh h d Di\-idoIlr in plaiding armor backbone and mobiir). which draw additional strength f m n a separate Britirh d brigade and the organic tank units of the infantry &\isions abich are a pan of the
to a UmORd divirion),

o f the defenders an final objective.

perb leadership a d ism inspired his m

strong enemv
rary senlrc." * e

had v c u d the nt Dodd's su.

to overcome this

XATO forces. Thus tbe Wcstern World prepares the strength to meet any -ion. It is gratifying to see the prop& dcvwd to the major mobile UniL the armored division: and particularlp 50 when considered aspinst& a of war on the Continent.

It seems rbat aaothr step in the right direction might well be the reorganization of the Constabubq into a m e vmorrd &ision. Its beclrgrrmnd of crganization, in which figurrd the First and Fourth
e &
. + m o d D i k i o n andirshe ~ d i n f o m g n d c e under such distinguished commanders as GenHvmosr and UThirc, p"n-ide an appFopriate backdrop for its reconsatution as, f o r example. the

gallaauy and intrepidity above xii beyond the all of duty in acdon aL.;Inst the enemy near Subuk. Korea. 0' 30and 31 January. 1951. Lieuten6 7 : Dodd. given the responsibility of sprarheading an attack to capture H i l l
s~ Luaus

siment. diningushed h i m s e l fby con*

Founh . k d Dirisioa. Th annarrd divimon is a combined arms team requiring considerable time t o oqanize, main and equp. For tht reason, an acceptable proporth of operational-tp divisions must be in readiness to
m cbe immediate rrq*mElts
to f &e Second =tmOred Division to the S A T 0 foms: the reactivation of the First The .Gmrrd t k p w p o d u l d program: thc fast action on the T41: the development of the new persod & , all o f these thmgs pin i n pointing up the recognition of the requirement for mbilit)in modern war, a 9 t that has its ultimate and timely con6rmation on the 6eld in Korea.


o an? emergency.

Tbe major inspument o f mobile warfare today. the tank. has been widely discusred, by experts and orhen. l i d of the criticism goes to such great lengths to l i s t rbe many measures of defense against the tank that. in rum, it s e w - to atablish a strong case on behalf of the weapon that is&ective enough t o require 2u o f thcst cocmtexme~~res. -4nd few of the critics come forward with proposals as to what will * d erbe p k of tbc tank in p i d i n g tactical and smegical mobil+ on the battletield. Sand and man-made obstacles. mines. antitank weapons and airplanes have not stopped armor any r e tban the rifltandanilkqhave stopped the foot soldier. In &e hght of t kv t , ground warfare requires a team. That team consists of armor, artillery, &n). and rrticalair. ..\rmor's job i n that team is to provide it with mobility. fire power and shock. .-Lmds major tods far aKpmplishing that job are the armored division and the medium tank. .UL\IOR as the focal point of professional interest in. mobile warfare. would cd attention to the basic fact that tbc point of overriding importance is not a H*eapon,but a role..

Il-arm;d, crafty foe who had ,yithj t od several pmious a ~ ~ u l k fd t Bis p!>toonforward over ha2udout terrain ur.der hostile small-arms. momr, and arniiery fire from well CXP~C~~CIIC which S, ICX W h inrtnsiry that his men faltered. With utter di. rd for his own safety, Lieutenant D ~ ~ among m his d men, reo ucsd and encowaged them, and ringkhandedly charged the first h d e m.rchine-gun n e , killing o r wounding d l / its occupants I ired by his inccdibk cowage, t i s ~ ~ Rzponded m43nificmtly and, 6xil.l bayone0 and c d on the memy hostik position as Pitman threw it moved rekntlaay onward to its initial objective. securing the 6 - series of enemy positions, Lieucemant Dodd again rwrganiztd his platoon d . l e d them across a narrow n and onto Hill 256. Finn his ri& *throwin grena&. hc rdtanced at the head of platoon drspiae tbe intmse, concewlfed h o s r j k fin which was brought to bear 011 their n m n v avenue o f apprarh. When his platooa was still 200 yards from the ob itctive he moved ahead and with his last grenade desuoyed an arsny mortar. U i n the CRW. Darkness then halced the a&-ance bur at davbreak Lieutenant Wd. boldly advancing ahead o f h F unit%thepLtooa h g h a d e n a fc*4 against the remainin boscik poriu

1:5. a kev

amain feature deFrnded by a


% % e '615

r i m s

cfntinued t o w the wisrithout l e P:rd for the danger to om l i f e . until h.: and hisaoops haf3cl;mirradthe iast

with bpyoa~rJgmmies.

c ?




Same S W s
!!'orking with tanks-infun-


p o d observation and fidds o f fire-tanks lead 100 to 200 yards.

no *ation 100 yards.

or fields of hire-infmtn

leads bv XI IO

{*orkingwith tunfic-injanm mounted:


p o r observation and fields of fire-tanks and infant? move together.

tanks dwai s k3d.

Armored Infantry Platoon Leader

Sore Forrrtiors
' vo

On tbe training FQld-tbe f r a m w o r k for

good standard fotmafions for a reinforced infant? pb:

1. Infantl). in carriers (preferred:.

actlnp as leading element In mount4 approach march

FIRE M R - y o u

tank-infantry teamwork at p k o o n lerei

have it . . . usit! Your attached tank platoon shouk: liberally hose down evey likely clurni.
2. Infantry on tanks (sometimes necessary:

of bushes w i t h bow and coaxial rnJ chine guns. The personnel carrier. should do the same with their weap ons. Against such fire. vey few enern.. doughs are going to t3; to fire a r o c k : launcher.
MOBIUTY-you have it . . . use it' can ride. and should ride where it is possible. Keep movinpl This deaases the time o f exposure to enemy fire and makes you a difficult target for enemy guns. It also assists you in attaining tactical surprise.
vou apply your fire power and mob;ility will have sbock. Beat the enemy over the head with everything you can bring to


what do

I do now? . . . This silent prayer is d e r e d u p times during every platoon leader's senice. For the begm-

rhe p e d and t o those who have worked out sdutions to similar p d k m s card have lived to t e l l about them;. Here are a few of the tips and rules of thumb. wme borrowed from the Field Manuals. some not, and a l l OE which have proved useful t o platoon leaders who have gone


OC an answer he must go to &e Field Manuals. which give 'Evqone

I-:&ZdtanL:noriders 3ti tank: infanny squad leader & rifle squad

5th tank: ri& squad

6th tank: L1 light machine gun squad

'th tank: L2 light machine gun squad & infant? platoon

.i:h tank: r i b squad

..\ good formation for an infant? platoon reinforced with a


: a :=. :

To begm. vouf acmoted infan- riee platoon consists of three r i k squads and o & light machine gun quad {nwo Ml919A6s), and your plarooa Sergeant and you. Each squad has an armored personnel carrier ;FOU ride im ne d the and the p l a m * v t ~ l l rides V i n another. Your attached d platoon consists o f five tanks: two sections OE m o tanks each, and the platoon 1eader.s tank. The platoon leader usuall~ oarrmazds the first section (givin it in &ea three tanks), and &e toclosage?ntannmaadsthe d U c d 0 ; l . dinfantry platoon leader whose mission reinfarces him with a latoon o f tanks should be g d e d by two eneral principles. He SbCuldLve read the manuals. which give h i m e h e w r k of basic knowledge on his special sub:-, and he Should use SOPS. The latter minimiae confuhn in combet. Thep save time when time reallv counts. They give impetus PO d u b o f unusual p&lems. T h e Bhtish. for exampk, have had great wocess w i t h their battle drill; it shows every man where he fts. what be is t od o . when he is to do it.



bear-guns. small arms, artillery. air -and i n the attack of counterattach. memm h i m before he can recover Hit fast and hard. The manuals are right.

0 t h .

latoon of w k s and acting as leading element





3" 9 2

: . : :


go. Dismount and send out it ad and not e n g a a , coil your platoon. Form your per- local m r i ? (not more than 50 to 100 yards:. Keep well
meter me11 off the mad. Your tanks m e r the most likely
f approach, your n a c h the LLenws o

\Vhen vou are halted during a march. are not in the

priori? as far as they will

dispersed and use available conceahent to tbe maximum.

'Sc\er mount mfantn. on first two tanks. use ( . ; o

in order of

ranks for pnnc nd mount rhc Infantry p l r r m on m t n m g h e unks


Tbe next

formation is offered with some reservation. since any tactical m e ment across country-contact imminent-should Bow through the low groud. making maximum use of available cover and concealment. and several forn Jtiom may be used. It is. however. one much used by a r e i n f o r d platoon ! ir mounted attack in open count? :

0E l


(2" SOD]



.bd here is a pod formation for a reinforced platrmn i n the assault with . \ K s :intantq- dismounted: :

The Tank-Infantrv Team at Work

S o w for some action SOPS. From an approach march ionnation. when ~ontac?is made:

all your weapons carefully. and clear your held, ot' fire. .\lalie range car& for all guns and automatic weaponi.

P b -A. Point forms base. main

to right.

e of platoon flanks

L y mines-as won and as many

your defensedefend the clock.


possible. Preplm

IKE any team, the tank-infanu). combination, for best mults, requiw mutual CD yeration, confidence, training and hard work. This article covers an eightday per i o d of combat in Korea and l think cuempli6a tbe b e s t use o f tbe tanki n f a n a y team in terrain such as that in Korea.

in Korea a junior leader describes an operation

teamuork; more of tbe momentsf-

B. Point forms base. main body Banks


C. Hold at position ot :point; :main body:. leading squad left. next right. 3rd left; light
machine gun squad initially in reserve.'

.4ny time. use your .WC's. They may be used in sc'stions to form or supplement your base of fire or to protea your Banks and rear. Put the tracks in hull defilade. Leave a gunner far tbe 5 0 cal. (as well as a driver:. Put your platoon sergeant in charge.
You be with the decisive element (not necesurily the Iaqest:. T h e tank platoon leader is your e.xpen in the use ot wnks-use him as p u r second in command.

belpfnl in o w training program

received earlier: available. the infantry and rank leadershadnotmetbeforestartingtS. A f a v o a k factor was the lack of a m n y contact. It d l c d the team w gcz

D. Hold at position of :point: : w i n body:. leading squad right. next left. etc.
Your pla-oon is essentially a jabbing unit. be 'Jnlrin~ mor-eaena Of Your force ~mfined to shon books we 1 within supporting distance 'u3c) ' vards:. . -

Our tank company was alerted to

move to the support of the Infantry Rattalion in a series o f limited objecrive attacks. We moved out with 13 r m k s (M4A3E8's) and contacted tbe infantry at the assembly area (see ma ) at 1100, and were ordered to t;nB a route to pitions to support Item h p a n v r g up on Hill 339. The mad had cntered in five
Lt. lhn&n 8. Rckert, h., o Finance corps Ofi:w on o ho-)w koop duty row wth Armor. *-nod mth the M a r m C a p 6 r m g World W a 01 o p ~ b in VMB U 3 In ( ( I . k&. He pinod *-e R d Tonk b n o l m m l y In 1950 ond h a * r v d wth ~t a n b o o os o c a b a t tonk pbmom

.+ word here.

caught with your fire power down. Our enemies specialize in the use of massed infantrv. Y ~ M I must d and w q sthen be readp tracks, destroyto uop it. whatever appears. dead in ts


boun. The

.cu- a q t m i n d '

been netted with

That evening maps :15o.o.ooa:

u e

cammamlerand were brought up and, at tbe s


-+ fm la+t r r c o ~ t i o n s I,, . the approach mrch it k pays t o put a man on the tanks .50 cal. machine expa firr p o cwnfs ~ ~ in that first fight for

fire arperiorirv. i b h y~ do hit something. pet :he mad. bring tbe enemy under fire. and REPORT. In the attack n& your infantxy as far as ~ o can. u but
r i w a y s dismount

. 4 final word. This k just the beginning. These .ire su'ggestions b a d on experience. There will be those u 50 disaqee. You are ping to have to learn thgeneril rules-read the Field Manuals-and then decide on spec-tk solutions to your probkms. When you find 9 good one. if appropriate. make it SOP. -- ".\I1 right. you know the situation. LVell t? Plan .A o n my order. usinn that wooded draw there on the right. i k

tion o f this p t t m n lea&. targets were d e a p t c d by number (iz.,hiM


your infanv for rhe assault.




designation). The tankcompany QI) manderhadanscR508rdiod maintaiwd c o ~ ~ t a c with t the infanmy banalion canmuda. and tarps were cleared through o r &f o r the tank company cumman&. The d g o f t b e scropd day t k jump d f time was s e t up one hour ID 0700. -4s a result. the t a n k missed

bered. 1 through 80 faquick target

AIMOI--May-June, 1951



down the %.alley.with the infanq fobwing. . harti+ and mortar non g o t under way at 0700 a d 2 OQF at os00.

we were trying t o su the t w r infamy batr?lioos a J E e Was m:

p Z The tilnkr
s o -

nicely, silendng

nesuand5ecured b d w r A * j . FwtanLs Weredama&d by mines even though

f2Ommmk. who

tbepopenod0tTthed onetank failed to fdloar his

latoonMsnaclracrosaroad, git a miw (ewn a h be had been

enough p"+gwith the righ: BanL t m t d i m : initiative by the tan4 platom l a Qproduced coatact with the right 0auk infanay battalion. an,! asistcd tbe bettalion to thir o b j j tivesbydosc direcr fire. T h e l e f tinfanay r battali0.l

found wakatrarhd enenly 01 Hills 3 and 4, and requested one pl,

toan o f tanks to suppat their attacl section tanks went intb thecut between H i l l s 1 and 3, whil*

t o l d t o f o ~ t b e a a d r s ) .The& taPLhit mines when tbepaosedth d Everyattanptismadem~y &theroadreveothaughthe~ ismugb. Thatroughridewiukeep more tanks and tankers r o l l i n g . After securing the road juncth, one platoon took blacluug podtioas to the n o d , O M to tbe nodWesGand ope to the w e s t . along the three mads 4 tt h i s rime a phoon of the regim e n d tank c o m p y pulled in, and we had 1 i p n k s a d the road junction. too man). fa adequao~ COLId. and the fact that they wem from different organizations made conpol that much more ditEcult. T o make the situation a little more fouled up,


o c m

the ocha two tanks went up the mall wrth t o oudank tbc enemy. Th..

platoon leada mnained at the j w tion for proper am& of his platoor and t o insuIc that radio a t a c t W d> maintained. The infanay compan ammader dirrcted the tank fire VII radio and un&x its barragstarted u p a a H a $ , but the enem* hit them with u i t e a bit of fire, and

d. Artillerywasthen

ranks then had quite a 6eld day with approximately an memy platoon

routed and killed (either going up

. ., er 4 or coming off the reverse side).

!'he infantry then secured the hill .iiid the attack halted i t 1730. The :inks were perimeted behind Hills I dnd 2 (south) for the night. The fifth day was a slight repetition. as the infantry battalion was qain ordered to secure Hill 495. \\lth one company as a base o fire on [iill 6. and with the tank section of two tanks again in the draw behind i till 3 where the): could see Hill 495, and the other section i d tank ph:oon up along the road to the right fldnk of Hill 495, the attack started ttith very close tank suppp and proresse sed rapidly. One p toon leader did insist on fighting his own tank for J while (tbe platoon kader should hring the maxirnum amount of fire power to bear by using the whole pla:wn rather than trying to do it all himself). As soon as the lead Lompany reached the peak the reserve Lompany jumped through them to Lontinue the attack. The infantry Lompany commander o f the lead com:any at this t i m e turned the tanks 'wer t o the reserve company comnander (via the 300-AiY-VRC3 -adios) for his s u R. It worked 'en smoothly ani% conjunction **.ith the mortars ma+ to send . hat enemy w e r e alive scurrying OfF


U'e fired quite bit of ammunition andIlmr#consl ntly had two tanks at the river bed 1 ing re-ammoed: we shuttled them sc IS to have constant fire power again theenenly. This could not be d o n by platoons. as we

to the north. -% t w a s 1630 we dug net-. in and held $9 The seventh day a patrol was sen1 The t a n k withdrew to the pori DLls beld prwiously to Hill 228 to contact the .\larines; behind HI& 1 a 1 2 m the river bed and a tank platoon. an i n f a n q CMDto bivouac for thi light (Always pick . pan? a d a squad from the regimental positions back fa enough. if possible. A and P platoon took this patrol. N o where you can the infantq. enemy c o n w was made. but the by fire. Rearral range cards are demojitionsteamfound~-tnpped ofcourseanem ity and one of the mines (with 3 to 6 hand grenades; fim things we dc x h evening before and double mines <one. and then andark is to make c e fot each rank.: other under the Evst with a light din covering By tbe benveen eighth day the another two:. patrd of on t h i s work. b l ahmboug


three t a n k an infanq cumpan! the A and P squad went t o Ford



" E '

easily had onl. have v nine beem n k but it could kmeby lat0onSif more tanks had '11 availa le. The sixth mc ling our o b j j i v e was to secure 1 c Somchon River ford and this w taken with little The tank platoon K top of the passand 241. couM see g in on the hills H e immediately ry battalion cornVRC3 and. giving and the &utd and mortars in on sequendy must use made corrections as pessiwl?.'

contact the Marines again. There were only three operational t a n k this time. due to CONtant usage with little maintenam. T h e link t i m e after C h o w was used to re-ammo and refuel and do some fim ecbelon m a i n . but eight days is a little long for fhe best opera tion o f the tank company. With on+ six hours of maintenance we had nine operational m k s once again. In tanLinfanq-operations rhe paae of t h e anack is set b. the tankers and tanks. The weapons and equipment must be used to full advantage. Tankers must remember that thq have tbe aggressive weupon and conthat weapon ag-






miliraly f a a s

in other ways. Herrtotorr.

of di&rrrrt

Languages i n Preparedness: Link or Obstacle?

In snpptwthg Americds role of world kadersbip tbe r e s p b i l i t i e s of o w Armed Forces knge insreasingly n w langnages. A k d n g educator discusses our langnage problems and oflers some solutions.
by L. E . DOSEW
coordirrated military action m:s
besicpuy on

united i n a caamm objaxive. \<em only c4elitions of indeprndmt ~ n dSdfCOntaiaed Nkld Cpnth,en& A liaison at tbe top level n W o r l dW a r I was rally &e oa+ n e ~ofl integntion ~ rhiwd-ud ten then d y two bn WecC n v o l d : English urd Y S h . In \tbrld War 11. the only m e inte -ratian achieved at the staff and 6eId vels was h e e n th Amerianr and IC Britisb-with no language prob
m. except perhaps now and then in eculiar semantic idiosyncrasies a i ~ f level. f The forces that were lam laced undera singkanumand in the

the accurate fOtmulptjo11,

re~eption of

,meritan. British, French, Polish. u+v, Italian, South African. Pd.tinian-but except for the Americans nd British. they wefic not military ,mS of re!cognized and Co-equal so\reign govcmmen~-hcy were

ideas. aDdknguageisthenormalvehide fnr

the communication o f ideas. Unlels timely measures are taken to insure that languagedoes remain an effect]\e means for the communication o f ideas -a link rather than a barrier-then many a phase of the activities of the Atlantic Pact forces will labor under serious handicar. Sor is it an answer to point to the act that s o far. during tbe d y planning phases. there have k e n no serious language difficulties. Tk tasks ahead, in this area as in
many others. are much more arduous

tnnsmission and


P o r r ~ ~ c b Iccludic. I y
C U M X ~ V ~ ~ t~

It i s

ilvaged and have fighting legions of nmtries under the p k e of the enmy. The Brazilian torccs did not 111 into this pactem. and the lanage problem they created was a . urce of complicationo This t i m e we are not dealing with *le forues of a w p i e d died or friend1. countries, but rather with the freely Bntributed contingents of rlvereign g o v e m m ~ P . ,uages so far. are English, French. Ihtch. Danish. Sorwegian. Italian.

T ~ t k hk . k , Gdl-

rather arbiway o f attempting to &e &e problem of muItiiingualinn in an in. t e p t e d intematiod force: it is to decree purely and simpl? that Englub and French are IO b e , *workinglanguages for a I pupo5es. as the Let evenone prepared to use these international m g u e s . So far

laterkddedtot&k There docs exist are



these two languages have been the

than the encouraging but still inchoate accomplishments o f the early months. It is probably unfortunate that hnpa.@, like religion and politics. is a s u b w t about which nearly everyone considers himself endowed with certain innate wisdom and competence. It would be belaboring the point ro i n s i s t that as a le we Americans have been Large y unaware of the im and value of skill in foreign Even in those areas, both military and civilian, where languav proficiency is important. our record is n o t parricularly brilliant. A ti^ really skilled in the use o fa foreign idiom is still a.rarity. This in&attitude probably accounts for the casualness with which the compkx problem of language in the . NATO has so far been regarded. But the heavy hand of the pla

r .

working languages of S.4TO. This simple, though arbitrary. solution has been med before and found wanting. if only in the case of the o l d League o f Sations. and during the ea+ pp. r i d of the United Sations. In e&. this solution in regard to S.\TO amounts t o relegating the non-French or non-English speaking counzries ~b the status of linguistic satellites. Even if the deep psycholoqcal disa d v a n m e Bowing fran such an arbieary procedure are overlooked there is srill a graver d i f k d q . Tbe me languageelution would in &em s u b
O d i M t C WChIlkd



skill. .Assume.

ample. that ameeting is caUed htmeen the Surgeons General of the integrated forces to examine a common probkm. If French and English
are imposed as the only languaga d the meeting. it might well mean that subordinates would he dewgnated as nqnesemtatives a d referendum for sew13

A R M O R ~ O ~ J 1951 U ~ ,

cise objeahes sbould be h i t u t e d and carried OUt cwrpcuntly. k u s bok fot a mOmmt at the negbinrrspctrospdGcnlanqulge. on Mo Qlcahiom in tbt recent past a similar pmblan was solved in a relatively simple and practiCa w v . Ukn. in Lepingwitharr prodiumed wat aims. tbe N a z i War a i m i d s were to be pied in h ' + the knguagequatiopaMtup. Thedirrctitlcs ODtCd plainly tbat tbe pkls must be condrrod apcditiadyiand at thumctimethat a l l parties to the p m c a z h s is., the Bench and the Pro#utioa :English. French. Rus14

ldvaatagcrareobviarr ti s IKcd41is in Fact very little: -tohp%-m mpectto~Jpdvn o r t o a nudy of the anticipated language thedocummtation.To amduct a trial requirements, the planning o f a txairas c o m p k and hkoaicaht sigdlant ing prognm designed to meet the in f a u languages did anrrcitute a needsfoforal c h a k l g e A a ~ a o s r o r m d , a n d at meetings o r ocher evels, is thesvDcmcthodwiulptcrtobeused well as the pcocessingof documents i i in the U n i t e d Nations and many in- various languages the recruiting c f tsxmukd conferences: that is rimul- quaifid military and civilian persorintaprctation. ELcwhm in ne1 for specialized training f r o m the t h e page^ the wocds of JuniceJdvarious member countries (and let I !I son's report t o Resident Truman are shibboleth o f p r o p o r t i ~ ~~ lt i 0 n . I quoted in regard w the &ectivaless represemtation take presedmce o v t r o f tbe sdution. 'good resu~ts);the creation ot a trair . T h e same routine-like approach ing center adequately szaEed-and tbe now p r e v a h g i n mpect tothe mili- language problem is on the way to 1 tan- language problem w a s an o b d e solution. to even the experime"d use d the system at the United Satiom. T o d a y it i s not an exaggeration to state that "The immense volume of work the United Sanons' business, indewhich seems likely to face the pendently of an:- other considerations, General Asembly year by year would be greatlv handicapped were it renders it w &der to return to the system used in 19)fcarefully p % % ? m e a s u r e s by $6. and which is precisely that which which that work may be accomoouzly as poaiis now in use I n the S-+TO. Here again it is perhaps best to refer the reader t o tbe opinions of the users of the system rather than to the \ i w of its advocate in respect to its efectiveness The reader w i l l find on these pages the text of a recommendation by the Secretarp-General of the United Sations for speeding up the work of the organization. and also the words of one of the former presidents of the United Sations General Assembly. Belgian ex-Premier Paul H e n r i Spaak. Many ocher references could be cited concemmg the effectiveness of these modern techniques in solving the pmbkm ot multilingualism in inSot should the importance o f J temationaklife. both in respect to the simple language program at the troop spoken form o f the language and to level be overlooked. There is no bardocuments. The cases referred to are rier 50 great among men as that ol sulhcientlp eloquent to dqense with siknce. There is no handicap so great thk. to effective effort as misconception It is quite conceivable chat with and mirundentanding. There is no energetic and imaginative action. boan 50 strong for morale as ability 111 taken in time. the problem o lan- communicate. T h i s applies not only 1 1 ) guage in an integrated force using d and field operations. It a e> eight. ten. or twelve langwqes, far ab0 t o troops of various nationa 'tiefromrcmainm abaniercouldmfact located in a iven rector, as well as become a l i n . It takes no p a t the rela& of troops speakin?: imagination to conceive a situation in one idiom witg6the population of : which ten languages are used on a frk+ area + g another lac basis of complete equality. and in which the deliberations would be In this kld,as in many others. ad1 conducted with the ease and effective quate steps taken in time can we ' ness of a monolingual conference. transfonn a handicap into an asset.

CGrrmn), H wele to have complecc equality of a-

h ) , and the

wt k

i d psych<-


Tank Number 1 Phillips, C .D . Sehauz, R. A. Allen. R . C. Brown, N . J. Dorton, J. J. Tank Number 1 Irving,F. F.
Ashley. F .L .

T a d Number 8

Ritta, f. J.

B Haw. P .R . Winner, F. L

MeIslm. R. P. Roiwpoa. B . H. Shendan, S R. P W p . .H Vctort. J. . J. H.


LB .

H a n m e m . J. P. Clarke. J. W. Duke, I. E . Fleming, J. V.

Tank Number 5 Jall..en B P . Check, f. A. Chnrney. T. J. B o e k s d . J. W. Taaseh, E . D.

K ~ p pH ..J.

e J. S. Fader, T.C. T a p e . D. R.

West Point: Class of 1951 Armor Graduates


1 . 9

Of t h e 475 Cadets who will be graduated from ently conducting a ial course for those Cdets the Military Academy in June. 36 have selected who have selected is branch for their d>.Armor as their basic branch. Department of the sionedsemice. Thefdlowing~sabrealidowndthr ' I Army policy this year has prescribed that the p d u - branches which the Cadas have chosen and the ates who select the field forces be commissioned number being commissioned in each case: 1 initially in a c o m b a t arms branch. 119 Engineers 5 0 ,


armor presented


the Cadets. t le is pres-

for the Cadets to choose.

A R M J u I H ,

195 1



A patud &stratkm of tbe mgkeer assistance madtable

to tbe combat command commander in catrying out bis


Thn thpv each.. ."

to e a &

V M C *attacking baarlioa. doubk his cdumn, espccd, the rod is l r y r o p p d m a &k"


"Beggln ywpydm,sir,"clale

n - J -autIbeIieueitwarldbe ktta topLatborepkacmsindode

CCB Gets Engineer Support

nem: he's the combat command s t a f f

enginee, too. U d y we ge!t only o m armooed engineer company and


panies attached." "Whae k Captain Castle now?"

b0tal;m.S bridge campany. That bly

a b n d g e p h h c n n t h e c n g k e z company


h i m right away, sir. H i s

just doted in its assem-

commandareallp "smd for h i m . And tell him tc, hashis bands ~ H e * s p b o t h d WearhiSdhaL" "Yes, sir." Major Three saluted and and command responsibilities.* left. Cdonel Baker reviewed he plans that Three Bd prepad. The combat command would initially attack with battaliom abreast, using the L e e s h E&etown road as the line of departure. Boundaries for the attack would be the line Leesboro-Ednieville, both inclusive, on the north, and E&etownswamp on the south. Boundary between battalions would be the south fringe of the fomt between Leestlor0 and Ednieville. IOlst Armored Infantry Batdioo (reinfmed)to attack t h h the forest toward RJ W. 1I t h b e d u im ~ a n k Battalion (reinforced) to anack east on the m e tawn-Ednkville roed. Upon seizure of RJ 468, the attack to c k g e to column of battabms, 1Ith Medium T a n k Battalion (reinforced) leading. Not the mort ideal tarain for armor, Colonel Baker thou ht. What beautiful sites for enmy &tacles . . . s i r .&p&ll castk Rpons aS OTd e d . " colonel B a k a looked up to s e e the hnginen captain standing at the entrance to the tent. "Gbd to see you, Castle. I was just " t h a t happens when we have wonyin abutobstades. h y o u a c more engineers attached?' q-tJ with the p h for our next "Well. sir. the d engineer opa?tion?" 7% sir. Major Three went over battalion sends I s one of tbeirmapn, either the exec or the 5-3, to be our it for me on the way here." staff engineer. That leaves the engi"Good. Now,kt me see. You hare neer Lpmpany COrmDandert fm to three platoons in your compan) supervise all the engineer work we a bridge platoon from battalion. txed done. We don't get a major, Right?" bough, unless thae's an awful btd "Right,sir. And each of my plaenginWOrL anticipated, or d e s toons has threc squads." we get two or more engineer com"Well, Castle, suppose we attach a
AIMOI--M~-J~IW, 1951

-NJrden on the baa?lion armm?ader. I can easily control and suppat those ilamcms, and they'll do the same job +hether they're attached or in s u p wt. We believe it's best to a d nginees to supparted units miv ,hen the situation is such that the p i n the 11th medium tank corn jrent engineer unit omnoc < W v e operational control and l e hasrwoofthan. rSurerbe)..11all be able to take csre d-&g dis,Istical support'' "Good enough. But I'm relying on abled enemy vehicles Rom the road. " . * X I for adequate en support for under fire, if n WeM, ~ ' r n glad to bear each engin y attacking how. be:ween here and Ednievilk we have neer platoon has a tank dozer. That uite a de6k to attack through. makes a total ot twelve in the axmored c'hances are there1 be a mine &Id engineer battalion. I transferred to n ' 4 7 , Gstle, but I c two, and I don't expect W e l l L d afmoc beck i near RJ 468 in v~ good haven't been with uoops since. when .hape. :he like a b t of engineer I had my regiment, there was a nark. Think I should ask for one d change in the mill to give the infantry :he ocher three com 'es in the ar- dit+sion's engineer battalion five d those tank dozar They were all to be moral engineer batta 'OD?" "So, sir. Each of my latoom can pooled in one platoon in the engineer u p the mine fields for i le battalion H&S Company. While we're on the there ~ I I V0th- m M difI t supports. I'll sill have enough engi- subject, neers left to widen the gaps to permit ferences between the armored engimore rapid passage for the remainder neer battalion and the battalion with the infanny dilfision?" s f the combat d. 'Yes, sir. The bridge company of **.b far as the bcid is concerned. I t leading elanents 11th can't the armored engineer banalion has hnd a ford, my engineer platoon s u p two bridge platoons. In the infantry prting it will be abk t o put a c r o ~ a ~ division there is only one of these bridge without too much m b k . You U P , sir, I l l srnd a b e d bridge section, of which thee are two in the bridge platoon,alon withthatengineer laroon. m e bridge section [as rhree b r i T trucks and a bolster truck. Eac bridge truck carries 24 teet of bridge, and the bolster truck carries two intermediate supporo. If :he crossing is wider than 34 feec, uhich is the longest span of bridge :hat will support the medium t a n k :hey11 use one or two intermediate \upports to.coc1st~cta 6xed bridge up ' 0 72 feet in kngth. "If you have a chanoe, sir, perhaps 'ou can advise Lieutenant cobnd Tank of the 11th to have his supporting engineas near the head o f his zol~mn, I M + W i n d his reinforced company. If he finds :he bridge out, he won't want to waste :1me waiting for the btiage tntclis to

.uppart- Attrhinganeaginca lamoon t o a rrinfomd is 've llg an UMmSsillp

* . . pL-

'RighrClak.TbanktQtbehint. ThactakesusuptoRJ468. Sow.' cobpel &La cartinud, -our air force psople have beQ sboarng up enemymQpdru cdumnsbetween RJ 468 and&. That m h OC d will P & I+ k duttend u p w i t b ~ p c b i d ewhat s have yar ga 00 in+ tbc 11th out wben it auatoleadthecanbntcommand in cdumn bcpood RJ 46s" * M y supporting engines platoon has a tank doeer, Gdanel, and each


T h e

ARMOI--M~-JU~H, 1951

&n.t baitarc to use the aadway =Pip=--'

pbitingcdumn. Tbeydoa'tKemto

q e n t tasks for it to do."

mgbs sir." "OMe we get on to Tm&ability Pike, we should have dat sailing until we to the Weit River. With luck the 11th rmght caplure that bridgeintaa. ButwC'vep8)bepre paredforthenorst. Ifwcb6ethat bidge, Cask, wtvtcmyou doabout
i t ! "

by tbekadd tbe colulw and that it's mooey in the bank to have the cngina% dore at band to OVmamr
engineer vehicles,

caak. If tbc g o i n g g e t s on ~ that

"One thing you didn't marrim,

thobstrkr.MortcaMllndashinl, apcd?lly bridge trucks, are mo slow and c u d e m m e

But QI a rood they have no difbculn keeping up with tdu" ' B y the way, Castle, how man. trucks are there in the bridge ph

"I have one bridge

bridge, less whatever rmds we use up on the way. Well need more bridging fmm my banalion if we're to put across a baring kidge. I undastvld the riva i s nearly 250 feet wide at !%eelearn. CGlldym ucstthe whokbljdge company k % operat i o n ? Thatdgiveustwokidge platoms and we're likel!7 to need them, espgiallp if we bsc any e q u i p ment in the cmsing." T U put in a reques for it, Castle. But if we get totbe W e s t River beforethe remainder of the bridge company cvcher up to us, what can we do about it?' "We can't do much at alI ainst a daamined enemy. &el. 3 u t if our d g is l u q p o s d we should get a bridgehead on the orba s i & withour too much aouble. I t 1 be touch and ga and until wegec some tanks m#s to mppUCt tbe i n f M v . we'll be erpecLllvVUlnenMe to Q)cI11tenttack. With link o r no enemy ap porition to the crossing, we can gct armolcd infantry ac10g in the 21 assault boats organic to the bridge platoon. it soon as possible, w e 1 start ferqing t a n k rroo an the treadwap

'Twenty-6~ sir. ~ One jeep, one kton,


thrrc 24S-coos, 18 bridge trucks andtwobdsrertnrw "And bow about your platoons? ' E a & pkooon has a jeep, a tank doze^, two 2%0ms, and three armor= pamnel CuTiefL" T h a t doesn't sound very cumber 50And if the enemy b h s tha: bridge, we're ping to need engineer e q u . i . r fa t h e Qossing as soon as porn l e . During the initial crossinc phases, before we can build up in smngth on t l k far bonk, I 1 mas all the b e 1 can get 011 the near bank to give tbe infantry and engineers maximum ptection. ' A s 5oon as we seize that high ground west of Hewimburg, Castle. we21 have to take up che mobile defemse u n t i l we p e n m pcople and sapplies to lauuch an al -out attack on Hewimburg. Any ideas on organizing that hill for defense!" W e & Cobnel, from the map it lookslikethatsgwr roedacross the fop OC the hill h 2 d hare some likely spots for road craters and abatis. We can also. . ." "Hold your fire, Castle. What's an rafts. TheserafrscanbeusedlaIer abatis!" 011 as pan of the bridp i d . " "Oh, sorry, sir. An abatis is an obotrle made by felling across a ' h e r figure on a hast)- acarin then. castle. I doubt if the enemy# road. The most eliective abatis is one show much opposition. Bp the time with a n t i d and antipersonnel we get to-the West River. well have mines stmm through it. Makes it a .4gpsoronthenm. Assamaswe mcss~l operation for the enemy to deu Ednim-ik, have two of your ph- breach it." tams and the Imdge platoon march "Roga. Now what e k can you do in cdumn immediatelv behind the up the!re oI1 that hill? 11th Medium T a n k Bkalion. The W e can la? a mine field or two 11th will still have its engineer pla- across the rmin Hewim toon in dose suppers s o all the engi- toll rood, Doesa't bok like ere are null obstrks to tie them ~ ~ e p y w h e o d q u a r t c r s P e rmany wnrnel will be w d l forward in the i n - hut as bng as they are c m - d column." well by fire, the mine fields w i l l be "I'm glad you brought that up, sir. pretty e&ctive a S r 1 e s to enemy Usua&, I have a rough time aping admcr!.AndOfcauu,Ill tosdlcommrndasonhavingtheir mgkduus busy digging h u l l 3 2 all h d in their CX- poaitionsfortzoLs,if there uCn't more

hll. I'll probably call Qo par to per.\HUI inhnny. Y ~ u m k uc : - k e d for tb?t, aren't * ? won't use ' Y e s . sir. But I hope us as infvltq unlesd there's no 0 t h UJV out. You see, sir. engineen arc - - A d s p d i s t s and a~ very hard replace It takes m y months : train an en* unit, and it's . most always mocc econamr?l inthe I ngruntod~only~gineausk t the engineers s u e pou. HOWL er, if you hope to use y a u engincer~ infantry, Colonel Baker, it would t- well to remember t h t they can't be . I signed frontages as wide as those Jsignedinfantry units campafable in Le. The en 'neer company m g a n I td for com t at as infanay has far t wver personnel and ka 6re p o w e r ;Ian the infantry company." **I'llremember that, Castle." Cole re1 Baker thought a moatent. "well, :u t about covers everything. You've relieved my worries about overcoming 3.1 the obstacles I'm expecting the enemy to throw in our way. I didn't realize that an armored engineer mmpmy and a bridge p h w n had 50 many capabilities. Doern't laok like vel1 need any extra enginem from !our battalion, except that other bridge platoon. Guess well be k p ing you pretty busy, won't we? "Yes. sir. And we'll be doing a c uple o f other things for you as we y o along. I have a water supply section artached t o me f r o m our HBS Company, and well be supplying all !our people with wata during the entire operation. Also, we'll be conducting engineer reconnaissance. That's a continuing function with all en 'neer troops. We're always on the I A u t far engineer mataial, and \\e report all items of engineer intmst back through our own channels. "-4san example. I h e n d to send 1party into that quarry west o fS d e ton to see if thari anything we can use. We may find some rock stockpiled there that might a n e in handy for building appaches to a Boating bridge aver the West River. "All fn a& cdanel. well be discharging d aur mfansibibties i n this

~~peration:strrvnaoprin&roodaparing,&tacle rexnova1,defensive work, engineer inbclligezrce, and engineer






The has j u s t vuwrunced chat the famous 2d .\rmored Hell On UTbeCk Dh-isian has been alerted for o v movement t o Euxupe. where they d become a pan of Gen. Liscpbawers Sod Atlantic P a c t forces. join hands with the U. 5. ConmbuIa?. which &e rough equiraknt of an a n n o d division: r c h 5th . b n o d Di\ision: and &e Sriash 7th and 11th =\rmOrd Di\isiaK plus one armorrd brigade. this w d lend backbone to the regional defense forces in \Vest. e m Europe.


In addition to the replacement tracks for Shermar.. Pershing and Patton tanks, the company is producin: cdd rubber tracks f o r high speed cargo camen am! motorized gun carriages
8 8 +

Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crinenberger, Commanding Gen. eml of First . h v and President of the U. S. Armor =LsOciation, spcah;ng at a luncheon in S e w York Cin recently, had this to say: Since war is a national &on. we .hericans m u s t capitalize on our industrial advantage in the fields o f manufacturing, assembly lina and produc. aon capacity. Since it is in this technological sphere that 8 . 8 we stand unchallenged, it is oa this level that we should Cold rubber. which has high resistance to abrasion. wdl meet the enemy-a l a d where the advantages are ours. That is why we are so intent in training our American be used m the p d & of a S9.ooO,ooO order of reo his responsibilities in the utilization of these pLcement uacks for U. s. Army tanks, it was recentlv soldja u t &cal advantap which are his. a n n d b\. the B. F. Goodrkh Gnnpany. Its a p p 6 of which is another way of saying that the Ameridonisexpcoedtoincrrasethelimitedlifeoftankaacks. This tough .he&an rubber. which Goodrich dis- can . h p is just as gwd as the indiridual man who makes m-exed car+- m 1941, now is used in all passenger tire it u p n o better and no worse. * + 8 treads w x b a resulmnt 15 to 25 percent iocrrase in m i l e aqc- Cold rubber also is used in the manufaawe o f some The British have announced that production o f the C o P V ~ o kla. r Centurion tank is being rapidly increased. Production of


4 new and even more lormidable tank is also being infrom this event today. . .fim . . we do have an excellent s the fact that our m a \ . has g e of new anti- new 1 ht tank.. . Second i -reased. In addition, a annprehensive m .mk wea ns is being developed. including recoilless been &e to get these intopmluction in such a short time. Third and most impatant istbe fact that both the m : u n s , wh e other weapons are being m o d i f i e d . lution to have this new tank and the abiliry to produce it 8 8 + indicate the frame of m i d of this counp. The T 4 1 Walker Bulldog is the first completely new 8 B S :ank to be built by the A m y since World \tar 11. said iecretaq of the .4rmy Frank Pace recently. marking the On Slay 4th the 6th . r e d Cavahy Regunent celercasion of the first production model to r o l l Oe the assem- brated its 90th bkthdap as it car&d abng its years of senily line at the Cleveland T a n k Plant of Cadillac. It is a ice with its current [ asa pan of our occupation Tast, maneuverable vehicle, classed as light because of io forces in Gennany. Formed i n 1861. the 6 t h boass a ?&ton over-all weight, and its cavalry and reconnaissance record of thirtp-m-0 major campaigns and & in a mission. Its punch k in a new high muzzle velocity i6mm daen foreign countries Lun. On the basis of present knowledge we think it will ->utiight,outgun and outmaneuver anything of its class .bother unit cekbrating io birtMa\- is th famous 3d in the world, and its annor provides maximum crew proCa\**, IKlw dtsignatcd the 3d .Gmorrd &\dry Fkgl:mion for vehicles of this class. ment. It i s 105 pearssince theongiual unis a regiment d 8 8 Afountcd Ritkmcn, was f o m d t o open and pmtcct a .hd Under Secre of the h v Archibald .Alex- route t o the P d c SdTbe Third is DoI* samder. &g at the%-eland plan; at the CeRmOnies b e d at Fort George G.Meade in 12laryland, wbcrc m i marking the delivery of the first tank three months ahad carries on its long senice as one o f our m i l i ~ * s top #)fschedule: there are certain conclusions to be drawn mobile u n i a

TOO k m the tank platoon is 1 ; signed the job of taking the infan? regimental 0 b e b - c with only such aocompan+g infanay as can ride t kt a n k and miirhout mhing Wswers t o such questions as "what will the res of the regiment be doing? w i aaillerp fire be coordinated to hit likely areas of enemy defend How uill organi: weapons assist the tanks in accomplishing their mission?'

sum &

.one tquld" was

the reply.

The. tank company commander

should pankipate as a Iplf member


in order that

the engineers can clear

the mines,and all will moveinto the town at a sail's pace. Meantime, the
infantry commander will be jumping up and down xreaming, "Why den't the tanks get moving?'' You arc possibly wondering what ed to the tank platoon have often wondered the leader. has same thing. You may ask, W h y doesn't the tanker advise the regimental commander on the proper emplo!ment of his tanks? He never has the OPT?. .\ tank platoon leader wor g with the second squad o f Item Company is nwer aware of an impending operaaon until some frantic PFC arrives gasping out his s'on. of how he has been looking for you e v q place except at the tanks and that the battalion commander s a y for you to get yourself down there as fast as you can. You have been summoned to receive odes. not t~ qicestion them. You have one altemaave. the easiest, to attempt to e e the plan as presented to you.
Quite recently, for example during


:i 1

Such oebnad Georgie Patton acdondoem'tdin K o r e a andat this operating level, for v e q good reasons. At the 6rst burst of 6re f r o m a welhuenched enemy, the infant ' p will be campdleed to dkmount -fm the tanks and ssek caver, the &-bus a p p a c h will k the moa heavily defended. Tbe mod will be mined ever)- ten y a n k In d a r e - hdbrmfilledandtheanbankment cudon the plan d be samewhv was approximately 6 feet higher than less bold than envisaged. The ar- the valley. The atecutive a&er pointed down mto the ruinsot a parmbnd~tothered~wil l b e l e s p ~ t b a n t h b r o o d tially deraoped YillpBemd said T h e sweeping arrows in the 6 e L 3 manuals bsnalaa commands said f ay w t o mav bave led one t o expaz "he! put yaur tanks down there amight" i&uy, tank fire, wiUbe I vted how much infpaay the CO oomplkd to occupy the high ground, intended to assign for bcal oscuricp.

the defense of Wonju. I was atcached to a battalion of the 187th RCT whichhadthemissionofguydin a wide d e y leading stnight mto Le am. Tbe badion Commander had ~ C b o d a r ~ f O r m C p r i o r to my a m i d . He sent his executive otEcerdown t o sbaw mewbere to go. Wewalkeddoumthedpasthe hlLR and 400 yards in front of the OPLR In thisparticular area the mad

ARMOI--M~-JUIW, 1951

erandexplainedthata ~ k d o c s n o t anpbpmcntofumain h v e to occu ground b u m m l it. caning Becaw of of thek wesp any apecity. ~ t h e y c a n d o m i n a o t m a r e a b y Sirre ordinvily thc objecks assgnedtoinf?ntrydemerrParehill fiEpowerIlaK.1 enemyordimdy wcat dmt t a cthe k a masses o&ring a vQticll target, it is rank unit, but will manatva vound logxal to as5umc &at OveLhed tank the tanks and hit the position from 6re would constitute a routiae phase inthccoordirutcd6repIan. Butthis d direction which resmkls tbe uscof -ank f i r e . "If I go into position down i s n o r t h e a x . Tbeinfantrycomthere the rod m t will c ~ m - manders will not agree to the use of plurly-mask my BOG and will rcn- Overhead a u l t fire by anL .an i t i a l prcparaton. [ler my coaxial machine gun and tank thou h during the i ;amon in&eccive at rannearer f i r r . ! have dcmollsatcd to rhan 800 yards. If we arc attacked, them the acfllfacp and devaspting :he Qtuationwill be &e!ndy con- & e a of the coaxial machine guns :used without adding th additional used in conjunction with the rank .mise and psychological &ect of tanks cannon, onhr om one oiryion have I :epoSitioning tbemxlvtian opera- been permit& tooemploy tank h e in :ion which will mean thsr during the thismanner. Irrcommcadthatthis early phases of the action, just when type assault fire be emplayed during vou need fire the most desperately, training o f all infanmy units. the tanks will not be able to s u The difficult problan yet to \ou. We need a tion f r o m w 'ch, be solved in infantry s u p is the if the need &rise, we can send developwnt of a sta an of i n d i v i d u a l 4 shell &ring down this valley lo00 targecdesiption. wehavcfouad cards before it h a t e r and cove that the involved mahod of dczignathe intermedtte area with our rna- tionbpradjoisbothhccuntemd g . on m OcQSjoLI, chine guns-a position from which, time c when operating with a platoon o f I f you are chased & of a hill, we, \\ithout moviag, can deny the area infanay, we CoIbCtcd all tbe pra e : o the enemy and at ck same time ammunition in the platoon and r cover your withdrawal." The colonel, served it aclusively for usc of tbe in a voice rumbling with canvictioT1. said: "Lieut-t, if are not willing to t a b the same risks my men arc The writer of the fohwiug i sa :akin& I don't think you should be 1950 smavptl of the UJtUi states in my battalion." That answ& epite . U wAcudemy. Fdlollring a brief mires our greatest problem in Korea. nssigrrment ps I recommmd that when a tank l c o d c r i n k 3 d A t r n a c d ~ Lmpany is attached to an infanay Regiwwnt at F m Mea&. &+nul, regiment the entire corhpany be at- hetwstrsufmcdtoKorcoforan tached to the infantry battalion op i n i t i a l c r r c i ~ a s c o m b o t p l o t o o n erating in the temb most favorable lrodrr in the 8th G n d y Reghart. for tank emploJfmmt. The tank com- In recent months he his kcn acoml . t . . .leader with the 70th p a y organic totheinfanay regiment bar umk p should as0 be attached to a battalion Heory Tank Botrolion. a n d u t i l i s e d i o d m i n i o o J . Far obtc again the war in Korea has too frequently the regimental tank company is at the mercy of infantry proven the value of the tankinfanq &ers and receives assignmeno such team. Just as the tanks provide essmas d g engineers 20 d e 5 f r o m cial, accurate. direct fire support for t k front. The infantry relies on the doughbays. so docs the infanq a t h f o r the tankstoperformmiaions Which thy provide c u i p themsdva could pe&m more satis- tanks. Our field manuals arc sound un factdy. I have in mind road bkick Quite often a plataoon o f tanks is this daniae. but it has taken the derailed t o s e t up a mad block to hard bite of e x p e r h e t o hprus scrren refugees, a pbwhichcuuld be these facts on commanden m the handled quite adequately by one ma- kld. T o o many of our tanks wem o v e m by enmy night attacks beChiwgUndtWOguaodr ARMOI--MU~JUI~O, 1951



p e&ccive at night whm anclliki machine gun on a skate swivel d mount foruse bvtbetankcamrmadcr p b y d in a planned defensive situaorbederagaiBstgmurdandairtar- tirm. Infantry poyida early warning p i . ALO. a .SO caliber coaxial uta- ofttrattackinaasesfircpawa. kecpr olf taak-tluntaq prveno inchine gun w d give& longran filtacion, and prata7s the trrurate he which b v. fmmaaukingmmemprrr~~ . 3 0caliber trrcr bums out at 80@= yards. making aaxrate coarkl lire at unit a a p d l y proccct i d Cre and maneuver, but the assiuvlce greaternnge~ impossible. i t a l in d e r to hold a I n cunclusion, OUT tankers and of infanay is v d.u&boys have learned in combat temin feature or to p m e n t in6ltra. the tactics that should have been Cion. learned in t r a i n i n g , the principles I n opentions at pight constant stated in the .Amy5 Field hlanuals. viigilaoce m u s t be maintained. Enem! attacks in Korea generally m e sc, I s r LT.Jom R. HEXDRY *swiftly and with so little warning that positions not properly outposted or Rltticiently alert may be overrun I1 that the tank platoon is most ef- before firepower can be brought tc fective when employed as a mutually bear 011 tbe enemy. Early warning d supportingunit: in Korea, it has been attrks is pmkularly vital to the tank s b m that this method of empby- unib due to the fact that a certain to allow all m a t is doubly essential at Nght ame interval is n o g e t in their p e when the unit is positioned on the crew members t MLR Despite &e fact that the ene- sitioas, establish communication. and be prepared to exen maximum fire power on the target. A r t i f i d illumination has roved to be invaluable in night d! e ensive operalionr A n t i a i d t seafihlight, and artillery Barn have been used ex. tensively to illuminate critical terrain Trip Bares, which may be carried and sei out by the tank unit itself. pmvide in addition an excellent warn. ing system. Houses and haystacks. o r cans of gasoline placed in front of the lines, may be s e t on fire by tracer or by white phosphorus shells to provide additional illumination. The use of one or a combination o f these methods vastly improves the effective ness of tank f i r e , and also takes advantage of the marked enemy disinclination to silhouette himself m y ' s offensive antitank weapons. par- against a lighted area. ticularly since the Chinese CommuThe principles of the use of armor nist intervention. have collsisted al- haw remained changed in Korea. mort entireIy o f weapons which re- and it m w be emphasized that the quire the use~to move in close and techniques of tank warfare in Korea thmfore expare h h d to f i r e . ex- do not have u n i v m l a pIication. paience has sbcmp that a single tank HOW-. the m e t h ~ bJutilizing is unabk to protect itself saridac- tanks in defensive operations at night tocily against mass aaacks. On the and against a massed, fanatical asother h a n d , in insfanccswhere a tank sault deserve close attention. The platoon was empbyed as a u n i t ,mer- situation we face now in Korea we whelming numbers of the enemy will undoubtedly face again in g u a have been repulsed with heas? cas- rilla-infested areas, and well may face ual& even though individual ene- again in battle against an enemy who my soldiers penetrated benveen the makes unstinted use of great supplie ranlis o f manpower. The tank-infan- team. as in all IST LT.GSORCE P.Tusos. operations involving armor. b ex-

With more and more anphasis beng placed on tank-infantry operations n our Ann\-, some attention must be undm m k prorooll l e & with the >laced on such operations with TOIL HTank &nrrdiorr. -ri+ foreign uoop5. A 6ne Current .xample is the aperation of .bexican Tbe w o f t a n l i n Iiaa b a s h ank units with elements of the ROK talkcd and written about man\- times. b y in K o r e a . Itrmkesa~~goodsubjsctbecausc. -4s may be expected, tbe language it was said the!. couldn't be used m wrrier is the greatest singk bar to K;cmr. Tbq aren't ah-!% used the .ffective coodimtioh In March. way the book s a ! % but nil1 th\. are 1951, the First Platoon, G m p y being used sumdid)?.. C," 6)rb H e a v y Tank Battalion, w a s I bcliew the bcn way to dcscrik . lperating with tbe 15th ROK Regitbeir use. and the poMcms enCoun. x n t in the area north of Seoul. On med. is ID&be one day uih a :his pl& mission tbe tank phtank platoon in action. 100(1. with one company of ROK inlt was in mid-.~ugus in the Pusan t a n q and a platam of. ROK engiwe were waiting and exneers, supported by artiller)., was aspecting a breakout. but not sure -1gned to anack a hill just to the right wbich way it would be. Sorth o r , d the hISR, held 111 estimated South. The infantry were short of . o m y of Xorth Korean troops. pasormel. \Ve were able to ash company commander bo& hisrering morale and acunderstood a little English, but to be counting f a a number of enemy. the safe side an ROK interpreter My plroon had bear assigned an canying an SCR 300 was assiped to area and we had been working in it go with the i n f a n v in order to mainfor three or four &;s. U'e were to : i n better contact with the tanks. help the i n f a n q take and bold a bill. The Task Force CrOJsed the LD It was just a small bill sumundd with infantry mounted, the ROK onthrctddesbplargeraKsTbe company commander and interpreter L i t a t US^ of t a m k was b i b d b p &owith the tank platoon leader on the lead tank. The engiwas bad gone forward. 'the tank platoon leader rain. Only on an side 6rls there any o manem-cr. W e hd out several hours earlier to double- called the interpreter on the SCR- place for them t check &e clearing of mines fma~ the 300. No answer; the interpreter's our cboie on this ddc-eitber in a MSR. The column advaned rapidly radio was damaged and out of action. stream bed or on a narrow trail rnss for about 4,000 yards until it caught He tried for radio contact with the rice paddies. We had not used &e r a i l for fear of filling 0 6 into tbe up with tbe engineers. The ROK ROK company commander. with no t Regimental I & R Platosn had set up luck. Finally, tbe tanker med pass- rice paddies when we backed out, for dn outpost linebn the l a s t hills before ing written notes to the interpreter thae was no t u m d Tbe dav before we had assisted an contact w i t h tbe enemy was expected through a near-by ROK soldier. Still .ind according to the inaerpraer had no results. About t h i s time radio or- infantry company in getting tbe bill. located p e r a l l ? mOSt of the enemy ders were received to disengage the Today we were to cover thcm and i l l positions cask force and retum to bivou? areas drrw 6rewhik they gave up the h for the third time. Tbe enemx h e The infantry were dismounted:two with the mission unaccomplished. platoons were to assault the hill from This operation s h how lack of fromthemmamc#n ghilkwassoinrhe front, with the weapans platoon as etfectivecoordination and communi. tense dxzy were not able td bold it. J base of he. One infamy platoon IbdplaMedtouadthrret?nL cation can cause the failure of an and the engineers would continue othcmire well-planned operation. up tbe stream bed and two the i t h tbe t a n k 00 h e on the forward w trail thnugh the rice paddies This u d give us h e r firing positicms IST LT. LAURIS 11. Eu.JR. hill from cbeBnnL. Th e m i n at this

paritionrriuictedtbe~totbe rodand tk a r a just olftbe dto tbe right. NO m t OII t b ~ rnemyposith Wrsobsm.ed and no 6n? was being reccjved at &is timc. Tbe ranks mor.eed out with the infanay rmLl on tbe &Its and the SngineeTS in fmnt Soawmy he was received for appmximdy two bundrcd yards after tbe Column was exposed. . b t h t pome. small-anns. automatic weapons. and momr fire fell about the thm leading ranks. Four enginem wcle OISUZltiCS m the firu f e w s s c o n b Tbeenemypopdons revealed k y tbeir fire were immediately taken under bca\~tank. ma& the ctumgUn and mortar &. . enemy fire did not slacken at once. artilk? was called down on tbc crest and reverse slope of tbe objective. In a few minutes, enemy fire had dropped to d d d e sbas.Sow. b>. p r e a r m p m t . was tbe amc for the assault. w h e n no infanay md

T k prita of t k fdloloirg .joked


a d assigned to tkc 7dl corpb? BrigprL rkn, it kanrc 8 t . " of I s Diridm. He bork SUkdirrsmwPrra7-khd Force School and dso umd m r k 5th. 8 t h a d aoIk Anracd Dipiswrrr. He wens OPCrSCU ritli t k Wth lnDivisk as a pktoow T t . irr F r a ~ r sld ~p CVU. l missitnwd in * I i 19.15. swcessfrUv corrr?lctirg e conpetitire tow in 1949, k r p c r r t on t o h a in Awgnst of J 9 5 0 d m L brrr u


ARMOR~O~JUW 1951 ,

A R M O R ~ O ~ J 195) U ~ ,


'1 t

could move out d

m a l l arms

-4s500 as we w m c l e a r I had tlnLspDppat I d h d n o a n n m u n i with any of the othr PnLS and I was tbe last one out As soon as the d m front saw I wassroppsd hecame back and pulled mcin.

have trouble Jading ltta bring scv7 drormdrThercarOafarthirWU lpse aakes d lmburoed powda


Tk gnrurd is hirly d F lad tbe pod& are capable OC carrying tanks if with it abcr roManr more to overcame. i'n ahsost ?U opemiom a littk care is taken in chooring a the crews were working under ~UIDcrcaStbem.
Mtedthpoddy ha?&, but brought

aftcr~~nrundwouldwip out the breech. We've n m had mutoaurpnLOnetaukbadkcahit bledncctbcp. The cqnmunicption d v~ twentyeven times by .51 c?libcr antitank roLmds Noae paKatalthe well except when my antennas were 8nt A .50 Carib machine gun hd shot OB. Of course we were never kcn hit in the d v a d had to mom than a tbouJand yards from the be xeplaced. One am cable was cut infanag. Since that day tanks have been AtdQcapc washit by srmll armshe just as we WerCpullingbadL sevaal used many Merent ways and for tision k k s i n the tad command- many things. We have kea used to c i s cupola had to be rqdacd. Au transpon men and equipment when equipmalt stowed on dle oufside of trucks were not available, haul the tad was shot full of b o k wounded to the aid sutions, escon (wanp a d b k w &arc suipped supply trucks, and pull vehicles and gunsout o f the mud. A l l of theseare bdae any aceion.) n o t in a bok, but tanks have been Our big guns caused no nouMe used in Karea. char day. We had found PrrpiOuJIy l s r LT. THOMAS W ' . I~ELLEY. that when firing the 76 ur d d

movement, ot riding in their in the next six or eight w e e k will sbeping bpgs when porribk, Eepc be the begmning of the d qck down otscs of h b i t e to a mini- of adVCCSe coDditioasforumoropmmum.Theiceandaorpoan?rmw nons. Tbechangewillrrakmeidmountain roods ?Lo c a d nanctlr- pted with pleasure; war is never a b k mubk; it was f d that stmw p b t , but it mill k mcL with conma& which mo6t tallkolrried,o&rrd M e n c e b y t u r l r s . w b o k m w ~ excellent tractioLl when placed on a have overcome all obarla o&rrd b. PvriCuLtly sllppmy mountain road tk enemv. wather, and M . i p , 90 where one slip could m a n tbe ba of far with sumos ad are capable of a tank with its crew. doing any job r e p i d to bcing the The comingofwarwr W e a k has c o d k t to a succcdd anqhion. brought with it the most favorable weather for tanks in the entire year. Irr LT.W L Bnowm
The writer of the f o h w i n g is a


of West

Point, Chss

of tbm.

neuverabilir). and sbock action is still

.. c u m m s m d i r r ~ R e g m & r A n n y by moving through the water rapidly u p gr(ihY0tMI m 1950. Since the emugh to give a tidal wave e&ct in causing a reductioa in chedeprh - F dofther- k hos d p c ~ m -~ front, bat tank platoon leader in t k 70th around the exhausts and the engine comparrment. Fording of close to Hcrrqv T d Bandion. four and onehalf feet in depth have Th m ~ d n the 70th T d B a d - been made surressfully in this manioa along with antas i n & ar- ner. duniacomrma . e d intheKaEean The muddy rice paddies.ofFmd (2uapgq have. through the u x of one obetade that was hard to surtbeir naave intcUigence and imagina- m o u n ~ in moa cases only extmsi\.e tion, p v e n that the only things that engineer work would have made tankscan't do are By and float. possible. The tankers had to At the b e p n i n g of the con8ict. find a & q means of getting armor was considered to be out 04 its through. The answer was found in element in the rugged mountains, soft the regimental S 2 section. in the carerice poddies and poor mds of Korea. ful study of the maps of the area, and These obstadeh along with the ad- in some casts a personal reconnaisv m weather conditioas. were con- sance into "Indian Territory." The sidered a, be o great magnitude it route found around the paddy aced was thought that the role of axmor in was often a winding path along the the campaign would be one of long- 6ngers leading down from the main range support, or of sutian?ry road lines, or up the r o c k scream bbcks-the only excepth would be sametimes going miles out of the in ch morc favorable regioas in the way to bring the tauks into the ared m a d WeOL c e n d SeQDCs, where when thy were needed for s u p armod units would be abk to give T h m t r g has found that tbe tank. direct ~ p p o cto t the infanay in o&n- will be there when needed; if the Sve action. and then exploit the sue- t e r r a i n is impossible t oF t through i: cess of the attack with patrols deep will take just a little longer. behind the enemy's lines. The coming of cold weather elimi-

T i w and tankers have changed all Tlu writer of t k fobwing serred c a r m e n h t t ? d m a n i r r t h e ~ this; tanks have been used to fCapo from 1943 to 1946. Upon re- soaps and badly needed sup lies rivers which were over the ordlcpscfrascrpicLkortrrcdcdNath acros~ DRacr Agicvltwol cdtrgr, to bc ing clepth limits;this was done simply

thmJclves frozen. MIKwcr?bl 'lity was limited by thc extensive s)mem of Battalh. irrigation ditches cornmoll to Korean agriculture. which were cleccive anti' 4 . 5 a combat tank platoon l e a d e r rank ditches and by high paddy dikes >ou are appallingly aware of. how which the tanks =*ereUMMC to climb. small a segment of the w h o l e war you The Korean hills are a h and mggeti. so that t a n k are l i m SQ. YOU wonder-ponder-hw a n k routes. thing on the left? the right? You ited to the lower ground. T curse your lack of i n k t i o n of the tben. are generally roads and r i v a "big picture" and then thank God you beds. are not a gunner with only a sight F~rnrnatelp,in most Korean \-aue>.s and perirope to look &mu&. of appreciabk sire, t h e usually But you l e a r n 4 d t y at an exisrs a creek or river. the bed o f accelerated c a e not always the school which affords the optimum of 'tanksolution, but a dution, just the same. able country" by Korean sundards. In Inevitably any diruJrion of Korea such a location, a platoon m a y occaleadstoterrain. A t h e s t a r c o f t h e sionally be used in a 'spread" formai o n as a "wedge" or "echelon": but action, it was &en said that tanks t could not be succe8hsy used Over usually tertzin restricts the formation h i l e the unit is moving. e r r a i n , and when first I to a column w the Korean t saw the Korean hills fnrm a ship in Of course, within an area. the platoon Pusan H a r b o r ,I was about to add a leadercauusuallymaneuverhist?nl;s V o c i f uamen.'' ~ This misconcep into aaother fcnmation. tion has long ken dspelled-by the The versatility o f a m r has never exploits o armor in Korea, and daily been more clearly demonstrated. battle accounts t e s t i f y to the p r & Tanks have added speed and tipor to nentlv succudd useofarmotagainsc United N a t i o n s am& and have bolthe cammunist f o m s over all fypes stered the defense when initiati\-ehas of t e r r a i n and, I might add, in all ppssedonoccasiontotbeenemy. o f types of weather. necessity we've hauled bedding rolls. r e I r a i n has greatly influenced the and in sorrow, evacuated the woundedwhcn used. We've noothermeanscould often played "fire mannef in which tanks are utilized. be but Mtainly has not made their use impnctical. That f i r e power, ma- man.* too. and many times have ex-

1950. A brief tour at Fon Rilev, Kanby tmnsfer to the Far East Command, where he was $rst assigned t o the 8th Cad? Regiment. One month later he moped to his present post of combat tank p b toon leodcr of the 70th.Heory Tank
sas, IWS fobwed

Except during the cold winter months when they are hzen, the Korean rice paddies are in vircuallv all innurns impuoble. Furt h e n k c , even with the




Lhtemaat W i k

able to off tkraeci. for our infantq-,riding on our rear decks. had taken co~er in tbe ditches. Tbe ~ e c ond d o n , plus the entire third pht ~ m (1st Lt. Bernard D. Fahey. ammading) were able to get in hull de&debehind a rise of ground to our right Bank. One section of the first

platoon, under M/Sgt clarnwx Allison ocmpkd a reserve position. t o the rear. SgL Lightcap's second sbor deaoped OLY T 3 4 . The m p ' s arteagewaspafcaadmytnnk 6red three rouods at a m w z k Bash befacthat enemy tank was danoped. hlp gunner spotted a d e r Bash in his sight and made a ancsha kill. Sgt. Lightcap nailed tbe fourth tank on chat bdc. In tbe mantime, two mom were desoyed by tanks commanded by Sfc Jvaes Hoback and Leonard Baker. Two more and one SP were hit, but wbo Qstm).ed thcm haslit been dezcrmined. The enemy's initial v o l k knocked o f my mu&. broke Sgt. Lightcap's track and set a fire on his tank. M y bow gunner, Pfc Elmet Witch. uithout rrgard for his safety. ran forward and extinguished the blaze. On his r e t u r n , his jacket sleeve was twice nppd by nnall-anns fire. Th battle ended as suddenly as it started. Our doughbays mopped up the enemy infantry i n short order and we t d anmt of losses. The enemy loses coDsistcd of eight tanks,one SP and an unknown number of men. lsr


Logistics and Trains i n the Armored Division

LT. ROEERTD. \Vrtoos

The & L C - lubricant, developed b. the . h n y ordnvlae Corps, is expected to simplifv-the s . pLoMcm by replacing at least six different greases It is the d t of extensive tests, cunducred over the past three years which started with "opa?doll GrraseboU" The operation invdved a a m s w of d e 2k-u~ .+my ~ crucks which left Aterdm~Roping Ground. hlaryland. m -4Ugun 1948 and arvaed m 3 l o miles of driving in%-arPingdimaas Prrvious QpedQlQ had shown the . b y that orchary l u k i c y l t s aritabk f o r use af lugh tempem rurcr soldifg 01 OS vkous for use at exU U + ba sempe~lhlm.-tlV. w h lu-

=\ new grease which performs equally as well in q i c heat or .+raic c o l d has kcn adopted for use mall . - v e & andartillery pieces. the Deparrlnent of the .-Lmy anoaured tecentb.

bricants must be removed from both automotive and artillery items and Arctic lubricants applied prior to shipment from one temperacure tone to another. Appmximady M man-hours were required to convert t o d dimate operation a vehicle that had been lubricated with ordinvy warm weather greases. This included disasJemMy of transmissions, differentialr wheel bearings and other lubrication points, followed by a complete washing out, and then reassembly with d d weather grease. T'he .4rmydevebped all-umpeature grease eliminates such involved operatiam. Equipped with this grease. tbe vehicle is mack readily available for shipment to Arctic weather regions after engine oils and gear lubricants are drained and refilled. The new lubricant is suitable over the temperature ran@ of minus 65 degrees Fahrenheit to plus 125 degrees Fahrenheit.

HIS amcle was prepared t o present a bid pad concise picturedbgisacsandtrains ithin the armored diviboa. We are rone to regard bgst~cs as a subject t' minor iqpomnce and are inclined take the matter for granted. It is jnceded h - t there is very little cdor r glamour attacbed to Iogmks. Tacti.11 and intelligence activities o t k far lore opportunities for glory and exi ression of daring and caubat ability. i: is further conceded that log~stics is ,cared to sqpport combet but it is mphatically denied that I.9isti.J is a .ubject of minor importaace or a mat-cr to be taken for granted. It is an i , b v i and ~~~ fund?mentd truth that n1thout l q p c a l ! s u m c w i oc a & quacy there will be no tactical success. Logsacs embraces many fields of ~ctivity but in t h i s diruoion only the most important essentials w i l l be a)p*id&. Those essentials are the pro\ision of supplies, madriel maintenance and evacuation, and personnel isualty evacuation for the aTmoted division. The units, e h t s , vehicles and personnd who perform these functions constitute the trains of the units and of the armasd division. Every field of military activity is hased upon logic and sound estab lished principks. Logistics is no exception. The Lnt principle of logistia, me that should never be forgoncn, is that THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR

be pushal forward aad made conven iently available t o combat ooops. IAptdagencks have only one reason Iw exkwnce and that is to support tbe combat soldier. The third . ciple, ;UIV.%"CE PLtuSISC!% ESSESTJAL is rather otn-ious md basic, yet extremely imponant. Plans m w be formulated well in advance to insure that supplies and a r e provided when neeckd and where needed. The k priacipk. PRE-



IN . U L ECHELOiiS, p&de~ inThere will be inevitabk delays and interruptions in the deliver). of supplies. I supply rcsen-cs such as spare partsand rations are rmintained in a u n i s y delive-y delays w i l l not vaktttie unit.Alcglstd basedonthe atme p r i n a t a assist T any unit i 6 a . in acaxnp To ckadp undartvld dK +cs of the armored division it is n to have some idea ofthe use and composition of trains i n the & * . F i g w e s J and 2 illusbate the organhation and disporition of ains when the d i v i s i o n is engaged in dfensive combat. T ~ K di&rrnt trains e s t a b lish the chain of bglstical suppart within the divisian. The most forward trains are those logstical vehicles and personnel with the COmpBDies. Companv trains conTHE PROVISION OF SUPPLIES, sistofthecom ymaintenawxsec\I.UNTENANCE, AND EVAC tions and a d medical personnel UATION RESTS WITH THE and vehick. In combat canpany UNIT COMMANDER Command- kitchen and supply or baggage aucks erS are provided aJSistaD0 to acCOm- usually remain fanha to the rear with plish t h e hrnctiopJbut it is theunit batrdion bgistica elemcnrs. C O U U M I & who will to h+ BatcaioD trains Q)IIsist d the batdelm fa my bgisticol i n a d e q ~ talion SU~PIV, m a i a m and &n the unit Anabapiodpk, one for tal elements plus company kitchen I+ pasoand to ams&andv m mind, b that THE IMPETU OF SUPPLY AND SERVICE I S FROM THE REAR TO THE


FRONT. Suppliesandsa-viasmun


J i

C l a s s I supply point in the corps area. The rations are then broken down into battalion and seperate companv lots at the division Class I dismbuting point and prepared for distribution to uaitr U n i t rocion trucks pick up their rations on a preamnged schedule. Battalion ration trucks then return to .Ammunition OGce ( D . 4 0 ;willcoin- their rrspective field trains and the prise the Division Supply G m m l ratians arebroken down into companv Point Group. This group is situated lots for distribution to company kitchut^ -*+a . m m n a m. I P DD + m u ns m a 1 - 2 I I

riops is immediately available. . U su Ip uafk from the forward units requimi to repon to the DSCP * far &tion bd . Fre-quene the annored dirision will be aurharhcd t o oarrp ammuaition in excess of the division basic bed. WhenNchistheasc,divisionquartermaster truck plaaoon transportatia will be utilized to mDbiliue a division class V (ammunition> supply point. This mobile clvj V supply point w i l l locate near r h quuramaster's Class I disrributing point and Class I11 sup pointintbevicinitpoFtheDSCP. e~ installatiom and the Division

well faward on the divisioo hlSR i n Orderm~tetheBaWofgdine, ammunition and rations to the frwnt. The logisid picture within thedivisim is completed but tbac renuin, the qwstioo of the soufies o f suppl! fachedividoaasawbde. Armysup ports the divisions of theby p m .viding supply points and senjces f o r each corps in the amy. These suppl. pointSandstrvice~tiansiUeOp erated by army troops but are locate' inthecorpsarea Tothedivision the most important of the army supph points i n the corps area are the ann! Class I sup& point, the army ClasIll upp ply point a d the m y C k . . v supplyJoulc It is here that rh' divisions the corps draw their rat i o n s , fuels and lubricants, and an; munition. Knowing the log~stical ocganizatior and c o m h t i o n of trains within t h c annored &vision it is possible to tracc the Bow of supplies to the front. Tht. h w of Class I supply (rations> i\ reasonably automatic and is systematitedon a daily basis. Rations for the divisionarcdrawndailybythedivision quvramvtcr from the army

en trucks. If "C ntiarr oc 'Sin-1" rations are drawn tlwy must be discriibuud to t & individuals vchicle.reu'coarumas. Pnnvemcnr and distribution d c l l u s 111 supplies (fuel and lutxiLmts: do w pose any panicuktly cnsolaefacomlvailable and on call in the b a &

c t e m p ddivery t o ea& individual mk or otba vehicle in the canpen?. \ffa COmpMy refueling the oanany.thetnrkorpUdowillcdlect t m p v dnrms and rrn~n to b e t t a b eld wains. I nt & meantime, tbe bat! 3 will have maintained the eve1 a4 g a d b e in the battalion ann- then valid requisi* for ammunimt trams by directing that a gadiiie ti00 md beperartbd ~t chedivi:uckortruckscomefoMardftomthe sian mobile CLSS V supply point, if ieldtrainsmdjoincheoombotnains. the division has betn autborited amifter puck loaded with empty grJ0- munition in extxss d the basic bad, line drums have been asembled i n o r the army CLSJ V supply point i n :he battalion 6dd trains they aredis- the corps area for reptd ,mcbed to the Dscp. Pasonml 04 ammunition. Rehlled unit ammuni,he DSCP will direct the amvoy to t i o n auctstharraun totbeirrrspsc:he division Class III supply point if tive field trains and bdc are adjusted is available, other- and p& "arding to tbe -tic!rise to army cia% I11 N ly ipated rrquirrwats of the ambat

pint in the corps arep. At ei 3upplp poinb gasoline will be pnr tided on an emptydrum for fulldrum d l a n g e besir Re6lled aucks thm :emm to their battalion field trains md await call to pin the baalion mnbat trains. This completes the .\de, a simple and expedrtious pnr

'-rntc L

Class II (prescribed albwance equipwnt such as T;aE) and

fortification mntaiak) supplies are not s o readdy availabk as are Class I, 111. and V supptier ' I hp ~ - m ofClassIImdIV liesaamatter requisitioning m % p aoch~lging uoraviccable items *over the count^" for -bk items. Unit requirements f o r rhesc supplies will be satided when the technical mices o f the division obtain the applies and make them available. T h e divkion engineers prosick water with engineer water point detachments for the ma* cammylds. When a combat cumnand is coaunitted. a water point derachment w i l l accompany combat corrrmand trains. w a t e r trailers towed by company kitchen trucks and the water cans carried by a banalion supply tnrk may be filled there. Water is usuallpdistributed with rations supply actmities within an acmoted division are only a plrc o f the bgisticaI&invdved.Maintenanced q u i p e m and evacuation of dam-


~ t


The p"edure for the procurrmrnt Jnd disuibub d Class V supply ammunitioa)paralleLscloselychatof l a s s III supply. h u n i t i o a will be ' c e n t forward from the baalion combat uains to the companies when called for, usually in conjunction with refueling activities. Briefly, the p m a s is as follows: Empty ammunition :rucks are assembled in the battalion held tnins; the battalion m u n i t i o n s prrparrs a T 'on orda (request for d n a = dispatches the conoag t o the DSCP Ifter clearance is obtained han the :ombat command SS a the anubat command control point. The DSCP direas the ctmoag to the DAO w b m unit T ' Orde~ arc ~ aut h m M T u n i t Ttanspacl-

tion Orders are authenticated they are





Have Armoured .Forces A Future?

the original production o f the tanA h World W U hd dmloped into a static w a r of trenches. rrpasd, and lls & &ted by ax- Dapite all th tank bad cr>n&ibuted. the deadpcriepa. B y a c i n thescquenaof aadochieved,in war, he "ups-anddowns" t rough the past lock in the last yaE%e t h i r t y ?ears we can gx a bcncr light could see no furdxr prospect for it. on therecurrrotit-gument andoathe In his survey of futurc warfare he reasons why it has carried more- dkmisxd it in three s e n t e n t x s - ~ weigh than evens have j d e d , tankpropawasahrat IIhearcumTbatwill?Irohelptosboarhow far stances which called it into exhence o we are from having reached the limit were eracepMaal and arc not likely t of what is opaamndy POsjiMe for recur. If, they can be dealt armwcdforoer UPtilwehavCaied with by other means." Hir&ath sentence on the tank was to fdm requiiw h i c h were apparent t o clear4ghtal t h i n k applauded by moa of the generak chiq years ago it is foolish t o con- whowacprrscnt Onlyasmallband dude that the tank has %ad io day." of b e h mainly younger men. I rcmembQ hearing such a amclu- took a ditrerrnt view-and had a new a n k . sion exprraed in November, 1919. by v-isionofthepotencialitiesofthet soon~thclirsttypeof a diaingusbedsddier in a lecture on fa tbe "Possibilities of the Next War." fast tank, capable o Of Over His*erdict d the more weighty 20 m.p.h., was succedu 1,- produced because he had been coaarnedwith in England-camying the practical
rfta tbe F



tanks with much higrsped and radius than the 1918 type, I b e d the hurber idea that hn armowed forces could carry out a deep MtegiCpeaeation-anindependmt longrange drive to cut tbc enemy's communications far back. where his main arteries 04 supply could be vvered. I i l l u s t x a d i t b y a a e a t i v o n the lightning campaigns o f Gen+ Khan. drawing the conclusion that fully mechanized h should be :ies of mobile armoured warfare was capabk o f a perfumancc comparable followed by a +raging reactian. to that of the all-mobile forcesof the The great pioneer, General Swin- Mongols This idea particularly a p ton, who in 1914 had seem the "artOLindsay,WbobeoameChkf moured caterpillar" vehicle as a mrucmr of the Central Scbods on ~ 0 1 ~ 1 for t h the trrnch-&adlock, c ~ n - the formation of the Royal T a n k cluded his story o f the muchrrsined Cocps in 1923 asapennanent arm d development o f the tank m W o r l d the Army. The previous pear. with War I by phtlosophically quoting the the British armoured cars m Iraq, be Persian proverb: "the dogs bark, but had initiated the tint aiak o f an athe caravan passes on." Once again bn-o mechanized force. he rovedameprophet Eair in spited m u c doubt ~ a ~ ob d muNctioll, the tank and thecanception In 1927 the British Genenl S t a f f of its use continued to p r o p s in decided to create an Mechanized Fara 011 Englsllldduringtbeyea~~immediate~ fdlowin that war. 'Ibat wasdue for practical tcst of the new tL?orks a b e cdonel Fulkr, who had It comprised one bntt?lion o f tanks ban chief d O & e r O t tbe pll?rtime onebatplianofarmwcdourand TankCorps. He theideaof "tankead (the.forerunnerof the "5ea warhre 011 coaductedby light tank), one battalion of machine completely mechanized forces-an gunners mounted in six-whukd a mcnt) of tractLu4rawn vthicles, a bri& 6dd veillerp (reg& idea which lnorhr mcmber of i o haf-track 4 , M a @ bad dgi=lly s u m as far back s November, (with one sclfpoplkd bfaaap),a d 1916, in a papa entided "A Tank a - w of engi.hy"--lad by his vivid predenmtion ot tbezxYo4 the atof tbe are brought it into ~ I C realm p a i m a w w a s b s t b m u o t o f ~ of practicll discussioa. Moreover, in wayinwhich h i sl p r o p e Gd "Plan i 1919 a t d poscwar w thefacewas c b y &e infantry-

: d e ! d tk hope ad faith that the i e i p of the horse would amtinue. urnart every time I met one of their ablest leadm, who then (in t k mid19205)heldthechiefcommandinthe British Amy, he gleefully assured me :hat the tank w a s doomed because of impending i m rovemenrs in antitank weapons. Suclg aview,andattitude, persisted in high quaxters throughout the twenty years betwen the w a r s . Every demonstration of the potentiali-

That was pamcukrly Eommon i m m e d i a t c r e a r o f h i s h Tben. imon ardent cavalrvmen, who s t i l l i n considering tk 'bilitics of

fulfilling the new vision. writings, F u l l e r evolved the idea of a , many roldiers who deep tactical penetrationdriving hped IO revive m o b i l i t y and "open" right thmugh to tk c n e m ~ ' 5 &iWarfvC W e anta@& to the LKW ~ c o r p s , - l a d ~ ~ h e a d q u u c a s . neans that might make such a revival P - b % ~ - v ' s - z y s +bk. = i = d s p r a Q i n g h. in the
p m i s e of

Yer. d


f o r

J t o

? *




Tbe5e t d . 5 hdpedtocoafumods eariiertbeoreacal . expodonofitspe . .. tennll,au. Butmortofthesauor gmapls Were by no means amvinced

bytbedamasmtb.Tbeymmained d i d of the possibiIity of such b3--F-P=f=iw3to* theanwuredfarcaaedmmdoeciy t o the main body of the Army. and to what thy called -the main battle." As a d t Hobart's appormnitier to continue such practice of tank strotegv were amailed during the next mreaJons'aainillg. The d u t i o n a r y possibilities of the new idea weremcnehrup gnspad in Gennauy-epecidy by Guderian, who was paining the tank units which Hider had just begun to build. For over ten years Guderian, as he has related, bad been following British

loose fnnn thcir cautious m a i n & . ThtCam in Polad &mollanlsdkZdtk ruwideapnd . . . dlrmdmdthe~Cllmrmnd's 80 impore checks upon it.



-his UnChsLrrlgallop from Sedan to the sco cut oE the whole left wing o t
the apporing armier The Belgivls

to~tbcmis&lu#~betoreitcobpes. Ine&cs&thocric.d ond smtegicuz avprioc are r B a h u d fnm start to6nish. It is a high,Wsd "iodirrct approach" t o the ene my's rear PrtlL-WbQT his v i d but t UlneraMt acgans of canad and sup FiV are load.'

coUapsed, the by sea,and a

p Lidden Han-mv KC er in tank o c d f ~and saatm."

rnanvs annoured forces, who d Che b d at5dan and led the & v e % +Channel in 1940.:


was one of captain LiddeIl Hart's dipcipls in tank &k*"

Anny w1s m o d forces were then quid& suirchd south and east for a f m h stroke. AfterthemwFrenchfnmtm theAisnebadbun ierced,Guder ian's w e e p CdStwaLBto the s w i s s f r o n t i e r cut off the nght wing o f the French Army, and led to che fall ot France. I n each case the breakthrough itself only opened the wa! for a solution of the problem; the rapid and deep exploitation was the decidvepart.
-w.thod Guderian has epitomized the bZitz&g metbod as "Mobilitv, Velocity. Indirect Appmach." In a fuller de6nition of it-with which Guderian expressed emphatic agreement-I set it forth thus: The SeQCt lies paltly in the Lac-

British barely escap + part of the French put in the hag. The ar



tiCa bina at ion of tanks and aircraft, pady in the unarpectcdnessof the StrOLe indirection and time, but above On i n the fobw-through-the exploitation of a break-thmu h (the tactic?l petration of a front? into a deep strategic p?naration,oairhd out by anmnued forcesradngon aheafi o f the main amy, and operating i d P & + .

of such foreespromiseJ a
~ s o h g u s
It is kept up by a

The piPo of chis &nition are k q h g in mind when d1 r 1 3 the cours~ of operations through01t & ~ar-thae which bmght c~ickly decisive resalts and thosc rhich did na These points, too. form a pde ix t . e futum-shving the conditions t . a t will have to be fumed if arIToured fUe to Phy8 part in t& f t n u e comparable to what they did l i the immediate pa~r. 7h imprenu of counter-methodsand COULItcr-means are bound to makc the omd.tioas harder to fidfil, as they did in the last war after 1 9 4 0 ,but this blitzk-teg method may again pmve &tile if the means for it aze developed oil the lines that reasan long aga suggested. Theannouredfacesthat triumphed in 1940 were o f primitive ct tmposition-as Guderianhimself and his fellow tanlanm quite d i d . They were limitedby the means them atailable and their mode1 was far short o f the design that the @ Bntish exponenu of a r m a u d warf m had sct forth in the 1920s But it sutficed to disbcate the anniesbecruvthew4r: mies had DOC d l y begun to &stmd the new method of warfare. The stanling success o f the German anmured forces in -ing Fance a m u d Britain's leaders to the practica valueofthe new theory that hadbun barn there butneglestedbp

oorrenc-lilrc pmcess o f advance, eitber



the aTmoufcd falces carries simultaneY * thrUr0,while


g round +edctaNv of piercing it at a WePLertcd spot-in w h r h c a s e tbe Pnt-rarrcat contfaco in pouring through a narrow brrach, and then expands again to irs origmaI breadth. It is the pmistent pocr, coupled with rhe srrairzbilit). of tbe thrusttt that panlyzes &? oppownt. after t k original b r e a k % Baribk drive of


thehatthatrtuallydevebpsinu, a thruntokcsplace too quickly f o r the


This amd of opinion had developed. curiauly,k Mmtgamav's tictorp at E l ALmtin. Tk fact that the infrnly divisians were there employed to bna into the enan)-'s posk tiap, and open the way for the arI

mancdd%ions,wasscizedonasa text t o "boog* th infanay, and as a to drspu?gc the tanks. n . e c i o s s e s which the tanks arffard i n rbggingtactics fdlowing the frontal . and the subsequent fad-

z3zLoud &~ OB the remaants of Rommel's a m ,



Mpointedout1o;;gktorc the war that dto throw away arh a pOcent piece as a tank force in fighting the e n a y tank force is as foolish as f a t a chssplayer to begin by swapping

provided & @ a 1 arguments for & e

Durin t h e m a n t h s t h a t f o L d . -9 m9;cucrMimwmngninhPrd ayingthatthe dayofthetankwzs paqmdbtit dediaedfzoma primary to a secomhy instrummt r f warfare. Few paused to consider the quation whether the armourcd forces had been used to the best advantage. R a n w l ' s owll d i a r y Comment on his good luck in esaping is more to the point: "As always the British High

commvld showed its cwoman- caution a d l i t t l e facehrl decision. For

t h y attacked again and again with separate bodies of tank and did not, as mi ht be expected. thrcrw into the b r C a the 900 tank which they could. without risk to

themselves, have employed in the nortbern parr of the front. thereb using their vast superiority to gain a rapid decidon with the minimum casualties"

Tlm&u-m&charrv The "anti-tank" chorus was momenta+ silenced by the h t i c collapse of Geiman-Italian resiffance in Tunisia following d~ bd-through of tbe 6th and 7th Armoured Divisions, and the decisive d e of the formcrincuttingthrough the d o f the a p e Ban thus cutting off the ene!mys last bolt-hde. In that drive, ri&men were carried on the topoftbe tanks, 50 that they could come into action q u a y in clearing obrtadcs.It was an improvisation that saved much time in brin g up lorriedinfanay,wbowauld vehadto dismount several miles beck-but it was a lceectioa on the conMued omiosion to provide a d QDSScouoty vehicles for the infantry el^ mmtiuanvmwcddivision-ansed -uurgedfar-tvpearr TbcJbw,~gadvancethrough

tk dc\rbp mountainous S i and the funoel- It d to me that like length of Italy r r v i s d tbc cbauz marrandexpbitvloaotarhsba\lissed appormniticswhn the goiag ~ n ~ o o a g r c 4 o a I c l k . i t \\.as favounk forfeimd rrplod d b e p o s s i b l e t o r e a c h t h e a K rear and unhinge hi6 poritioa-as Lhanfxs of q u i c k progres4 but were "'S w% tlken into wbcn the t h e c n r m n S h d a ~ d a w i n ,hame came to deay the hmre of 1940. Thisvgumcntsemned toappeal to l n n o u r e d mobility. Motewer, too m y believm in it ba faith by the him-it fitted in with his own mobik ! ' l m that the i n & d rvowvdp inaincpbertcrthandidtbearguquartas to which bc as l a d . churchill himwlf uh- mmtr in hi* rrrded. .At my tienvent one of his paiodud r c ~ - had molnen* a t e . w-hen I visited him again in :ons, and in February dsckrsd: W e r >ave too much ~rmw-tanks ace 6n- June.juabcfcuehisannywmtcn-er .M." His doubts were decpaKd by to Socmandv, k no longer uued about 1918 met&ds, but on bddcr >is militay advim liner Afvrtbebreakoutfrantbe T l a o ~ ~ a l m p h a bndgcbed. his my hfran NOCOnatouroftheAwrionfomesin mandv to the German h t i a in Lngland early in 1944, one of the few s u p e r - S h m qk. Wd.with tk ,:dent believers in anmured mobility 4th Armarrrd Division. w a the sparhead o that drive; on reaching the 1 met was Genrral w o o d , d seine hewrocctotellmc~arccsn g the 4th Annoured Division. But I f,und him vcry disturbed-afta a fully such methods had worked. But b Igh-level confmnce which hd been Jddressedby F i e l d - h l a A S i r Alan B d e . Chid of the Im staff. A-ofit \sarfare was "back to 1918," ad that liqhtningdrivcsofthe 1990kindwa~ o o d felt that no longer papdble. W the ..\mericm HI@ ranmand had heen infecad by this sbw-motion ilew. while pinning his hopes to won after that the momentum o the drive was checked-pady through Patton, who had j u s t arxived in En I d to rake canmand of b U . E excess of top-level gdPurl\a & Third ' h y , w o o d fe?rrd that even fnwdefideacv supply due to l n t i o n ' t h a t was due. in m. he might be l e d to swallow the major- a4 to vision b e f o n h d . Later. I"' conclusioa. o o d mote: "I feel that we auld t desire I went to see w Patton. the lam's obvious have &ne the job more quk& if our dynamism was most refreshing, I was High comm?od had posses4 an equal appreciation o f the ibdirst a p rather dkc0ncerted I O 6nd him sa* :hat when the ~ u i e d armies i n v d pmach.* Refming to tbe .4vrancbes France they would not be able to r e bd-through. he ranadd: There f far-rraching dipeat a d drives& that of 1940. was no conceptbn o d o n s for armaur in the minds of but would have " t o p back to 1918 f suppbmq such methods." While qwstioning this, I our people . . . nor o felt it best to put the antracy argu- thrusts." Here we may fittingly conclude the ments in the fonn of an "indirect 3pproech." He had t o l d me that be- Surpeyd the past that hasbecn made fore the war he had w t a long to obtain a projection into the future. d \acation studying shaman's cam- What it conveys is that a o r c e s have not "had their &v"-be paigns on &e ground in Georgm and f :he Cadinas, with t k aid of my cause, in the real sense, t k h e not book. So I talked of the possibilities vet been tried n t m a p s e a n s t r a n inviewof )f applying "Shmnan methods" in dern&movingrtnppedof the way that a d o f G r n n a n anzer divisions overran Poland, mpedimenta to quicken the pace. -utting loose fmn ranmunications if rance and much of R u s s i a . But the =ce=q, and =eying put appofi- Germanpaarcrdivisionswerenot :ion. i n s t e a d of v g hung up 10 annowcrifomes. N o r w e r e t h e :+ng to overcame it by direct attack. called "armatrcd divisions' which the

l q

C b e c n




ARMOI--May- JYM, 195 1

A R M O R J U M ,


drawing up tbe menu at a lux- old-ocrp lines. ury bael-imtcad of trying to design T b a c ~ rrrmin. e Anniesand t h i r a#tbPtdberdopaMcm&aling VmGmd faces have got into the rut with bostik inhpay, tank, oc aircnft W e a d d ~ t o p n r r c c r anekmentthatis*OQlP, andaretbmkdon toddsapcthing

m o u d forces if tby a r e t D k a n n y
Guderiultyp, intbeoeenzive r in the The possibility dcpemis pnahr 00 :+e of tank --and rxtlyon o~rioaoldesignof ,mouredforc& Itwouldbewiscto r c r o g n i z e that the Y t d of necbanical design @ bigger ::nlrs,andthusfewerofthcm,isunf vourable to t h e fuMment of tbe Fnnciple. We might gain much bp a t-esh effort t o develop a lighter and C l e a p e r type of tank, p& that :le importance of obstodecromn ' g cpaci~is kept in mind. That reL Jires length of chassis, bat not necesrily bulk or weight in ).lch tanlrr might r.rher than a h g e d i b r e gun-the (mmans were going to concentrate L 7 the production of rocketvnks 1 1 cighing under 20 tons if the war had c tntinued.

li ht of their w a r a-pcrkce as a
w %ole, that manmn-rahili~is even

more important-for quickness in L-d-Trt-dtbt changing bucporicims and sbamring the nngc, for mocc dicctive f i r e Speed k anscntial elemart in mamrU8TabiliCy. bUt Ollly CkUheXlt. c r o s c o u a q mobilit); InattCrs mocc than @ , o n tbe rood; it might be

e L e t o p r o c s c r t h e ~ ~ ~ srcp multiplping anrpan, numbas.

arpplpneeds=d~transpart could IcosoMMy be "pecfgi. A r m i e s agzinmust get aut of this rut if they are ti, have any imponant inaucnce in the Seady thiq years ago I wrote a f u d m w k e they are likely to br t r r a t i w o n f i l t u r cw ~ a k both paralyzed and supplanted bv airand the " h l o p m e n t of a New pow-. Model Amy," which suggeasd baw In order to give ''armour* a fa.: thismightbeadrierrdinnvo hascs chance we have to sdve two problem.. -the 6rst "educianarp'' and sec- -the brrak-through and tbe fob\\end mmlutiormy."In the 6rst hase. through. The first is intrinsically the t h e n e w m ~ d e l d i v i d o n s w t x J b e a harder. The d&ulties of the second blend of taalrJ with mo~orized infan- are largely due to faulty organization h e ineuence of convention,' pp and adlexy. In the secand. the under t tank would swallow the older arms. thinking.

f :



I b . R h r i p l . aeroplane. The mobile divisions. d b c c o m e ~ w i t h t h e Them are various p i b l e wa\, a d e r y on self-propelled armaued Still to us for renewing the mountings and a smalls numba of W Z g h power of tanks. .Apart mole skilled idantry carried as "tank- fmm new technical means of paralyzmarines" in a n n o d vehides. The ing anti-tank defence which it is unueatise aroused much interest and desirable to discuss publicly, we hale discusion abroad. pamcdarly in the by no means exhausted the tactical Gennan .+my, which was then in the means. Since annoured forces were meltin pot after defeat in World first introduced into war their more G and othas have convinced exponents have always inborne wimess to its in3uence. But sisted that their value essentially detberr ismore signi6cance in what was pended on their being employed "in left uodone than in What was done. swarms-to swamp the defence." It IS conFor it can b z seen that even the the principle of ~aturatim-~f Gam?ns never went further than the fronting the defence w i t h e y more 6rstphaseofthatdesgn. Tbatsuf- separate aoaibnts tban he can cope u l u e d in ficedfortbcdefeatofFrance. Itdid with. That principle was f not arf6ce f o r the Meat of Russia. the German break-through at sedan =\ad as the war W e n t on, "armwed'. in 1940, where Guderw's corps of forces of tbe existkg type became 900 tanks cancentrated on a frontage ioaeodn& checked by farcesof simi- of Im than five miles in smashing lar mobiiq, while w i n g fewer op hmu t b e s u c c e s s i v e k h p o s i tbe Meuse. Ster a p e w portunities of making rings m d Iions f I5 miles in two days against unprotected foot-marching forces tration o w h t h they d hmoblh. That conderable resistance,it was through wat M d and f a lesS IcmarLabk intoopm cormtry and the advance bethap the fact that the "evdutiaraTv" came a gallop. S i r saturation tacticswerea IiedontheAisneinthe phaseoftbenewmodelbad& . the folsuakialt to re!volutio11ize warfare to seamd ~ - b g hwhere the extcnt it did in the earlia period of &e war. Yet the A o * u l f i l l e d in tank armies of the lam p " d , W h e n the priaciple was rarely f tide N d made no SaiOuJ d o n to attacks later in the war-although its dcvelap a newer modd-despite much value was fresldy attested in air a? superior ipduspial rcsDuLces lhep tacks, beginning with the "thousandwere CanMt to battcr their w q to bomber aids" The principle should * \ , b . sheer weighs l b n g the be m+ed in designing future ar-


apparatus with a crew of no m m thanthrre..4Dea.kindof aunit w d also bclp to d i m i n r c e s i \ r bulk in tbe chossk defined= .hother poq'bilif). is th drrrbp ante of the tank itself, but on the tac- ment o f rrmaccoaad t a n k f o r rbc t i c a l groundsenreof the crew and the sparbed. U'itfi C r r W t I m tanks rbac wider tactica skill o f tank unit com- would be Do rpmdrng dcrcrrmt etmanders. When tbose who have tanks fect from havy brrcs m swarm atof superior speed and a&dwell an tacks. I t d n a m a t t e r t h u a h i g h their inEcriority in gunpower. the pcOpOction urn knocked out if an dtendenqredkthe &:'itisthe f&\-e fraction p a ~ a r t e d the whok his rods." depth of tbe ddence-tben, t poor workman who k UThe complaint may be justified on+- ploitation of tbe break-through could \\*hm the ~ e a p ~ n - i n f e r i o r isi ~ CX%t going. and might better be carried treme or the terrain \-eq unsuitable out by manned tank. f o r finer mafor manceuvre. rwru\-ring, until another barrier-posiA su ' riv in gunpower. though tion was reached. d e s i r a b r a be putbased at too 1 T d heay a price where it results in a loss When such barriers are bved on a of marmeuwability ad a reduced Superior hitting power counts for number of tanks. Both t k handi- river. mobik ishntry are needed to rruch in the design of a tank, and caps are d & d t to a\-oid with the achieve the crossing. But the 4 of s apt to e\ en for self-protectionis relatively o f growing size o f &which m turn. foot6ghten actually required i nore value than thick armour, but the is apt to be favoured those who be O ~ * m r t i m a t e d .and can often be d u c d w h and a-hne skilful mapjwer of a body o f tanks shrinks r a p find it easier to f d h a &tanthrough casualties (battle or style of warfare. The v~ name of noeuvring cream a favourabk 0pc"breakdown). and the d e r the the post-war British *Centurion"tank in8 That was demmstnted in GUnumber o f tanks the more severe rela- i s Rminirent of rhe pede&an and denan's forcing of the Aleuse at Sedan. tively the shrinkage besunes. More- over-ladell Raman legwnam rather u k two mobile infan? regiments mer, a superior gun can t o a surpris- than of the rebarn Xlongd ca\-alry s u f h d to gain a crossing adequate of the wtmk ing extent be discounted by superior idea that gave rise to the lightning for the p a s a ~ manoeuvrability, especially in a 6ght style of operations ten years ago. It is corps-although most of the iqbcr between tank formations. A most time for a reversal of the elephantine c o m m a d m had argued that it would mking example was the defeat of the trend in tank design, and a move t e have to wait until the bachg-up Russian drive for the P l d oil6elds wards the revival of t a n k - t o m t tac- infantry divisions amved. But the in May, 1944, when the Stalin tanks t i c s . The development o f a new form Medcouldbefurtherdimkrisbai bv f motive power for t a n k as well as the development of new forms c4 made their 6rst appearase in battle o and gave the Gexmans an initial shock a new and lighter form of hard- tank-bridging and tank &cation. -4 i d difkrence could be made the hitting weapon. would increase the r bt opening fuc at over 3,000 yards advent of a nonspcclalized amphibirmge with their 122mm. guns. Y e t . Prospects. ous d . capable of sa-ilnming mers nhen this bade of Targul Frumos IddthoFuhum witbout sacrifice at its m a l tactial ended, hianteufkli division of 160 unks (of which only 40 were T i p The tank of the future will have to value: and this problem calk for a nith as much as an 88mm.gun) had be fitted with nightdriving vision and fresh &ort in research. destroyed 350 of the attacker's tanks probebly with radar. as well as with It can thus be s e n that. in the \\ hile losing only ten of its own. Even wireless. It should bc able to pass sphere of tank design. there are many the small Panzer IVs managed to safely through a d o a c t i v e belt of possibilities still Undeveloped by knock out a number of the oppasing countxy. If we ay to iwwbine all these which tbe powers of a tank break~Goliaths," by marmuwing swiftly requirements with a powerful weapon through may be renew-ed. Beyond under cover of ground t o reach t h e i r und provide over-all a d p " these are the latea potentialitk in rear. and closing the range-to 1,OOO tenion of adequate thickness. &e tank the sphere o f organiutioo. . . L pointed 1 I&. i s bound to beoome an iacreasindy out earlier, tbe chances of sffvnping . U h h it was the Grmin Anny clums). monster. The design must be opposition are much handicapped be1 1 hich the lead in maunting y - simplified. to produce a mechnial cause the exce5h-e size o present a m p e r sa n s t e a d of a Goliath. That may "annaud" &isions h erful guns in tanks. its moa expen- David i of r e ? E cnced tank leaden emphnsize. in the be achieved by external mounting of and ample-1"

--t d

the main anmment-a rock-luncher oc lCCOilleOC 9 J B c of p-uhich ShaJd k +mi. f i d red fed u-itb unmunitial-. Tbe ax-

mGlrai*carldtbc;rkquite snull-a cabin t o barsc the dusccing






pmspcus of an early break-through and the door." In his re&crionsm the kswns o the war he laas ochmptcd that lirbame mops

' a


t k fdbw-rhmugh-whkh is, amporiraa, simpkr than tbe problem @t' the W-througb. The buic m d -

famstiarr This brings us to the problem oi




tjoas o a solution were epitomized in the dehition of bliftkirg s e t fort? e a r k in tbe chapter. Pace with vm i s the secret of nobiiiq, a d
nrsppkud mwmentum, in the


threugh. But much depends on the devtbpmcnt of technicll means and the elimination of supexfluities.
rnthosbamau~ Anaourrd forces must move light. be abk t o aperate selfcontained. and develop more capecit)l to CUt loose f r o m comm~nications-in the Sherman spirit-if they are to attain the degree of OtFenSive mobility required for a decisive follow-through. The Germans went a good way towards this strategic ideal in 1940, but were greatly helped by the fact that the rulied d e s were easily paralrzed as well as too ~ h r a i l - h n d .It is no h m possl ~ r us at any rate. To m t in future u p having o p ncnts 50 susceptible to paralysis. And if we cannot cripple them in this way we shall run the risk of bwking o u r a m s in striking-unkss we can kick OCT w clogs and sli round their J e r s one means gultdtowardsgreater

JRING the fint c r i t i c a l sum- m o d attack. Tlme were &ious de large degncdependon W h O M fira mer days o f th SGnean war, fickncies in training and equipment. It ddependm the tactical saux o n e of the elements of an &e- don as well. A UnL on the ddcnr m markedbgthebngretreat b c k to the Pusan bndgehcad, the tile antitank weapons system was ini- a dugin positioa. for uampk.has an 5 viet-made T 3 4 tanks used by the tiall,: present and the rolling hills of adrantage over an onad;ing tank that J o r t h Koreans were a formidable central Korea became tank highways must sillrouccrc i d against tbe sky
maace. The impressive d e r than tank traps. b : the N o r t h Korean tan l n s p i d crnsiderabk ciitidan of OUT Army's d-XllOK. N O W ' that this @ C U h "tank The article presented kcre . I reomtee crisis' has passed wc are i n danger of from the Combo, Forces Jwrnol W T m me m t weighing these enemy successes hnd permiasion d the Editor. H ith baland judgment a d d u d inq that thiscountrg's security quires unks-tanks out of all propian t o their value to us. We like a simple ansuer to our militaqr probkms, and we know that industry can turn out a lot of tanks. But let's not jump to simple coacluJions or too many tank. The f i r s t waves d Red tanks H hich nunbkd a m tbe 38th parallel had a heyday. None d a m ' s archenemies was availabk t o the defense at the t i m e these Red t a n k chalked up their big gaim. But once
i n. * a headlines. Thenatural enemies of t k tank fam an .. air-



d muyNvrr. c r a s r c . o u n n \ -t r a m port d e nanother.Th dnstic reduction of impedmenta i s a third. All

these potentialities should be morr fully explored and exploited. The " d division" today is too much like an invertcd turtle-with a d prmour-clad head popping out of a huge roftsLinned body. T h i s is so unwieldy and such an inviting target for air attack that its mobility is too easily turned into immobilized ntlnaobility. The unarmoured elements should be wt down to a mmimum. So should the roed vehicle. The maximum possible ~ r c i o of n tbe infanay shouldbe airborne. What is morrrd 011 the ground should be t T a c k h nt&rthan wheel-bome. Supply to arh mobile faces should be as far as porsiMe by air transporr

the invading tanks lost t h e ? ! ! ? ! ! nrSSon thebottle6eld and their space

ground weapons system the land mine, t h e w =


A R M k ,

shaped-charge warhead), artillerp. the mket-6ring aircraft, and engker units equipped to neutnlirt OT datrog p a c k suitable for tank travel. This syrIn the resentment a sweepkgan~eaanpaifinft rem developed with surpising speed peatedbrscsthesign canceofour driven from Our re had b e 0 a l m o S ~ t i d V in Korea and oace it beame e&ctive, pn)rless forces in the field struck the t b e J L i e S a F d e n e n l y ~ . ~ the T 3 4l o s t most of its potarp. Amerkan psople and a hue and cry opadapatwormssirrfrrrnawas Exploiting auprise, the Narth I b arose for tarib and more m k s . Many c o p s a n t t p u p d a l m c L ~ a n T h u p rean Reds muted the pooc1y a d of the Army's armor advocates k d the d e r b o l t f i g h ~ T h e ~ RepublicofKaahras Thecbra swing w i t h the axiomatic sPOmcnt opened nut Q)DditioQs p a anddiJogulh?tionofrrcmtkfttm that tbe best antitank weapon is a mincdnotimeforGennanmininga n r n e t o a r w m i n d i d & demdirh t a n k Ewniftheawterm~relimited d e m o k m s hrrtba,tbemrrind . S . totheisueofstoppinga sin k tank, lloRbem France w1s tank anIlltr!i?in bndges or devise tank t q m . U units h a d y thrown into rtiarr were ~ a - h i g h l p q u e a i m a L ~ f a a it thebirdlpkof dle PnL notfunypreptad towithrtvd theat- outcome of a tank duel d d to a TbespinningWbcdofwrtnwper-

lineasitocksoutitsagpoaent.This smld advantage accrues to the more mobik and kss expepd\.e b k a . utilizing m e r and cimdment to balance its lack of armor. N'e are less concerned. however. with the \.a+ of means available to stop a single enemy tank than with the place of armor in the .4merican militaqi machine How much of OUT defense appropriations should be earmarked for ammr j n 1 - k of ~ Cur strat e g i c commitmmts abroad? What is the future of armor in the yeam imm e d i a t e l y ahead? .+re tanks the new cureall for .Gnerican recurit?. that th.r; might have first appeared as we lodred mer our shouMer at Korea? Before rraching a conclusion, k t us exam ine tank warfare in World W a r II and then anal~oursaategicpositioD in the present unstableworldoftodav. In France, Gannl Papon's taaLs u l o t e same pages i n the histo~ofmobikwarf?rr Theirmag ni6cent dashes ekcui6d the whdc WOrM. but these d n m s d i d not take placeuntilaftertbeGrnnvr fronthd been huered. In July 1944, Patcon's




& n n .

pensive and simple to'empbce. Tbey when d in open anInLly to JW earjly and can protsa rkmvlves hOm tk d e p d . ThrrefacoJtardoutin 'kstocltpiled n c a r w b m they arelike tioasofthebezcdu,enemytanks wlll the aium hs of tanks n i War II. gcnedy wen?superior ~ p c e y t o ~ b k ~ c o n c c n n A - ' \ tobeused. in con arc tot he^ \-polls s h 1 s that, i f a p t u d by in dility&amaolbutinE.crior m tioor and trigbts ot heavily armored . . n enemy ov - ourporition, rocket-6ringlircraft. Ifthebaalete-German p n k in ?nmr plate and - ,d not be into a Ove rain makes tbem med-bound rhtr guol.srmpdlp,ourtanlt~~ .Aged sword and uscd emxtiveb always mark uada tbe p"wbipg ullt willbestoppsdby demolitions, mine.. , a h us while we arc on th &enbrelLofdedsive nrpaiocity in tdctical andr?nLapr . \e. T h e m m e W i l l this combination of weapors air. which oft^ overwhelmed enemy . s t e m such as se -pmpcUcd artilkry boldauoor at bay? It lookd for a t i n e taakdefenss Finally, -e highly mobile and a n be kept in tbe T 3 4 type unlrs of tke fylagmendidMtposse% . sen-e to meet major t b m t s as tbev were impervious .3 weapons filing sllapedcharge shek Nath ,.~elop. Because of tbeir high mobittk boaoola, but the 3.5-inch mod-1 Sa were those weapons featured in ...unvmorrdutiller). iarsarekss the ckfensc of France in 1940 or in ujckly exploaa this fallacy. Tke lsceptiik to apture. are the these weapons to t t e tk seesaw- tank battksof the dam. L t i c : pe of ground defensive w e a p o n s The rde the)- might have played in field cmly emphaslzer the fact that v e : ,atweneedmmandsbouldconcencannot belax in forging more &ecti* e thscbettksandagairrn US in o ~ r v i c : ite on okaining in quantities aDlious march acms France a d i n t o WeapoQS for tbe system needed 0 keepymacchained. Gemanyolnnotkd. TaellwlAf The shape!d-&ell is a nightThe nature of Americl'sarmor p m =w@4bIld. rmur to the world's gners of a m r . am must be considcd in conjunc.+gunst let us measure It can be delimed not only by ba: m with our over-all requirements in Amaica's s r for tanks at rodra, but by artaery d rocket: c t i c a l a i r . Ifweareevertomeetthe thepresent. Uerenotanatioadedi- firingaircnft as well. This effectite r dssed manpower of the Gmmunist rrfinemcntinthdesi o f t h e p & m a b g aggression, but acnpire on anythin ccunay dedicated toa d - w i d e d e d e CDQcQluatcs the orce of the ey. 'qual basis we wil nesd to develop an pbrion in the desired direction. rather fmseagaiust it. We are not phnninga ~.~ctical air power far in excess of that rurpriseatrrtofbostilelinesthrough than having it expended in all dimaiailable to our forces in Korea. For which to release bodes o f rampagh tiarr equally. It represents a threat to h e initial defensive phase of any futank% If t D r a l war replaces l i m i 4 annor whichcan only be met by much ture c o d k t the Amy's weapons must heovia armor plate than any now ernwar, w h t we will need on land is a br. designed to contain tbe emmv's armeans of stopping tbe tide, tbe huge pbye!d. while tbe effect of even ttuJ mor tide on the ground whik tactical pmjectile can be lessened by inclining Red tideof armor and infantrp which Air delivers the Sunday punch from may move a u s . We must hdd the surface of the armor to effect a the sky. glancing impact, such inclined surthistidefromen gn%anypoples Command of the air is still an esalloverthewor who are not^ faces cannot be presented to all pra wntial prerequisite of victor)- for our jenihs 6red frontally, from a Bank or our friendsbut anerrenttrl ?nits a l l ff~fces. (It should be obvious by now o of rbem needed if we arc to win the fnml the air. Improved resistance t rhat the r a t i o of our divisions to those great smuggle. This calls for weapons the penetration of these projecales ot the enemy must also be greatly imwhicb can meet the re!quixemems of might be made by expensive processes proved.) Without a guaranteed comh i c h harden the steel surfaies, but at an inicial defense agaiust the vas w mand of the air, our entire military f technical development, infaatrp-canl; forces o f the enemy. this stage o psition will crumble. Yet we cannot the race between explosives and armor Thousands of relatively kxpensivc smultaneously support a large tank and highly mobile weapons will be SeQllsoPcdded. Themethodsofde program and a vast tactical air &-ellivering the explosive forces that man needed to this vast world-& oprnent p'ograa At this critical demand. Mhteva their individual has created have already far su+ moment. we should accelerate the design, kmust colkdvelv com- the pmcechn that can easily be afproduction of r o c k e t - a d aircraft prise an dccave antitank weapons forded by armor plate. upable both of fighting for mastery of 7IheFawaabbFptw the skies and of blasting enemy tank La us look at how such a weapons c ~ l u m n before s they reach the line of From t h i s we must conclude that system might aperate. Larger b contact. Asigning a relatively low in the forrseeable future, tanks will ks using the latest priority to armor is the other side of loclteo with shaped charger-ace IC eitber be uctrewly heavy, expenshe, :he tactical air coin. tfialatsborcranges Inthelnndsof rood-bound. and slow or not reallv The' expensive tank (in terms of tanks at all but cirtually personnele x p i e n d soMicrs with th ability I d b o r and m a M ) must wait until e a p'oviding pre and dving to dose the mge, thw and w our operations are more nearly ready bazoolus will m& it unpdtabk for tection only against smallarms h e . 1,UVtbem. Tbenthpcanbeoftbe tinliotofa?gcllane Where they can- ' Fommady. the weapons system n e hest qk, lea vulnenbk to the fits the global r # t b e p d bgaass-6reo thir have bcidy -bed \'capons that ace lying in wait for requirements imposed by a m a w brotbcrrank,orthroughopagmprrll I'lem, and specihcal)y deslgxd for n i t i a ldefense. Land mincJ and CQuptlJwherethe~Canlurlr i lode w h e r e they are to k used. lition equipment are relatively inexbehmd trees, hedgeraws or hillock.

L us.

1Ve do. of coufy. need tanks rubv for infantry dhisiom and lllllQcch unitsalrrdpinaismnxorproposed f o r e a h mobiliutiaa.Thevunmut dcsgnehtourctankswhichgive tbrm

7 -

8exibilitymtkdefense. Butthevast n u m b of tanks we amy 6nd 1 ~ ~ sary for a p a t hnd o&nsiwz should llof be bought today. . h p k time to manufacture thw &a not exist. Timecan befarnd f a t h e pmuacted build-up (a narmur)- prerequisite to the lauaching of such an h i v e : only if we 6nd means to stabilize the initial defensive l i n e . To build vast n u m b of taak mow w d d be to ckny our alba the &fensi ve weapons t b q so m l y need. and to perpnute our present cricial rbarageJ of trtc
s -

OElziL: "%



L tbe caplbi~ lor of anrra. but the manufactureof a large number of

h r i c l n induzry
ity of turning out a

tanks. particuldy with industry not geared f a f u k a k war production, WaCLM deprive us a more urgently needed munitions. F o r every u m sa? tank and irs crew we should s u b stitute a rocket-6ring aimraft and pilot. To match th 40,000odd tanks

manhalledbycommunistswould~ quire hundreds of tbwvdso f men to man thm and more to support


the tanks and recruit tbe rankers we would not be able t o use tbem with-


out u t t i n g a l o t m o r e d o n t h e h c . Tang are not h v n acmrs oceans as are tactical a i d tap are not loaded as easily as artiIlccy and banm kas. They have to be deck-loadedon most vessels. which can carry onb a feu-. Their large-le emplo?mem u-ould step up our bridging requirements. It would require a p a t effort to place them where they could be used. They would also necessitate a I-? sizable effort to resupply them f o r they expend great quantities of POL and ammunition. -A.mllIfi.=-ah In a possible war. we uill be competing with an enemy who i s fighting on interior lines of communication, using relatively short lard hauls for resupply instead of transpadng it acroo omnrAlargcscaleannodpmpm would result in our pliying the memy's game with the cards & against u s . It would be an endeavor



A R M O R ~ - J u n o , 19S1


get not king visible fppm the fast

NDeuvaing ship.

if possible Iongbdae &q rachcbre Withaainfauty. Thisis


During that lad the suQ.ccding b y .MVd Vesoek koLa U p fout moTr


by C O M M o o o # W O W W. K N O X
n a y w I s were that beyond 1,ooo yards
the "tiger" variety.

:ant attacks011 out trosp in tbcGeb

krhhod. Tbeyrrnracmlitcdwith daPaping12canksindL Tbeauisa f b i s e h~ " t @ a s " with h a

1 -

tanl;swerereldam@targetsfor artillery, and that at that dirtaocc o r lea, the point-blank range mde 6re con& unnecessary. Jly adventure in tank warfare dto be at an

naval gunfirr played the decisive role Naval h e control first proved it.

In repelling these



yards. The destroyer ShubriJr hau y t the hours of darkness i n firinl; agarnst shore batteries and the:: searchlights, while doughboys poured ashore. At dawn, with other vessels she came under the fire of shore bat teries and was a h subjected to a lonj series of air attacks. Defensive measures, as Usus; included maneuvering at high speed; that is, makingfrequent radical changes of course, 3uch as circling and moving in figureofeight patterns. in additid, naturally, the ship w a s rolling and pitching. It w a s while subjected to such violent and irregular motion in several planes that the firing was done against rapidlv moving tanks. How fanaken would the shore artillerist fee4 if the gun he was firing was so tossed about! U'hat could he hit at a range of 1 0 , O O O yards, with the target also in rapid don:: Soon after daylight, the Shubrick s shore kcontrol party reporred a con.
centration 06 25 tanks moving toward

tank Y ? z

on 1 0July,and a:

1 0 , O O O d o w n to 5.00(~

Geh, and called for indirect fire

against tbest tarinvisible h he ship. Inirially the M e was close

to 1 0 , O O O yards. After a fear ranging shoa, h e destroyer opened with fourgun sllvor horn h a fiveinch guns.

minutcr; then pause for reports of


anrrfromtheshorespoaas:then 4 marc minutes of rapiddre tben another uv for cor~ a n d s o a a &wasthere. suit? Sixor S e v a tanksran the gaunt-


hits,the&15were o r tooscared to continue in rtioa. Thus abaut 70 cent were pu aut action. A r k i s Jt ranges from 1 0 , O O O yards down to 5.o o o 6 , O O O udng indirea h e , thc tar-


AIMOI4ay-Jum, 1951

F ~ C e n t U I i e s & ~ h a s b e a r J. F. C. Fuller. He too maintains b i d with the d m p k problem of that "The best a n t i d wea adds"Audtankshavetoksu But,lparkwe that ported he firing from a stationary position at a orbertanlt* pcacfically stltionay t w i w The tire canpol sdution i s with Self-pmpelled guns." expem have given emphaos to tbe need simple. Naval h e a #conduy mato:ha hand, from necessity has had to of artiller);supportas be very complicated. Two ships steam- ter, but all scem to be unlnimnur in their &-ocacy of *another tank" as the main reliance against hostile tanks. fixthisand N'hen the concept o f stopping a tank with " & tank" is Yul?zed. it boils down to a matter of . rm?llatarget%theirspeedinbratcle The idea is that tbe "stopper" must rarely exceeds 25 miks an hour. It have a powerful enough gun to peneshould not be too diffrolt for a sa- trate horcile armor at aboat LOO0 aonvgshore gun tomakeagoodrcorc y a n k and kill the enemy with gunonawroingtankat 10~060yards,and basic f i r e . That ekment is a is cudin?l tank desip prrdicw; around the mure, g i ma h e control system that will aim it accurately. Catainly a whicbewrythh elsemustbebuilt. CoMvntration o f tanlcs could be hit S i potent& hostile often. carry a heat? front p l a t e ? = nearly I 1 inches thick, we m u s t opnMoam8dbo mount at least a 76mm gun to pierce i l la l v S o Other antitank weapon can ann- that pLte.Ourown tank w pare with the gun in potential &- have heat? h t annor. But neitber tiveness. Aircnfr, udng bombr oc the enemy nor oursek can &d to all the way around: rockets hit a small t only w i t h put h a v y ' a r m ~ r a c k and top can have but light great difiiculty, even T at u ?altitudes. sides b annor, atberwise the monster would .4t moving Landminesare be too heal? to m and about 35 miles ipeed under favorabk 4rionsisneeded. AUthisfarthe25&~aDdsimikr&for employment by foot sddiap are of tann-peoftank. such &at nngc os to be usclas exIn general fahlrcs th reSUlt i s cept as a last resort whea tanks have merely a gun summded by arcnor. alrrdybrokenintofrarrlina. The mounted 011 a Self-propdkd Mip8c sddier is tben at a aiticpl dirodvpn- alsoprmacd. Pe&manceinthewav ' d e sirwr be must hgbt against th of boding md sringrapidlv m a be uithaing mrhincgun fire fmm be- h?ndic?pped by mtriaed mtetnal hind th pmtecti0x1 d armor. Tank spaces. Although th gun itrelf is forrmtioassbouldofcouaebestappsd capable of great rtuncp at ranges of A R M O I - - M ~ - J U R O , 19Sl

writer i s aware thu tbe fa^ going is aut of hrmDa)t w i t h the cur,m-inch gunr. H a i d k c t h e at rent carepr of Amaican d Briria rmga up to 18,ooO yards was re- tankcrpem.AladaauKmgtbcm. by the shore 6re conad p a q Gn. Dcvas, exphins tbc YDCptcd 1 , being vay accurate and &d= ticor: in a recent intavievrr in U. S . $thenh i t , a tank was "ripped aparr.," N e w s d WaLl Rcpon (J+ 21 tney said. 1950 isSue>. 7h basic assumpfion Now, a naval gun u r n mare ac- therein is that "another rank* is the capin curate than an amy gun. Equally, best and \imully the b,th of thcm are ilmrummts d mar- mansdstoppingbortiktmks. The lous us precisian that can be counted August 25, 1% issue of the same Gn to hit what they are well aimed at, magazine d e s an intaview with u ithin incredibly srnall limits of arer. the celebrated British authority. Gen.




ting from airplanes, and the M V ~ conad. That b the Sat? and Marine a s similarly mined, but in the Caps way ?ad no Otba will work ensuingboctle the small ships planes etsciently. Siare VtiUay and t d , had no fighter proteaion and were are both a pact of the Amy, the estabsoondrivendown. Theyrrpanedthe Iichmmt of singk amtrol over t b of the tam sh0U)cl be SimpL tanks but coukl not keep the air bag e eiscntial in tion o f the A i r ewugh to spot gun6re against them. . haccellent article, r e Sup F o r ~ e c ~ m p o n m t , e = , ~ s e m s t ~ p m LasorrJ Learned in w o r l dw a r pose a special dillkulty because of th: II, Comdr. McMillian, appears in tbe recently won independence of the .A r Nmd zrrrtiurtr Pmceeding for Au- Force from the A m y . The writer gust, 1948. The high imp0""C of not pepked to suggest a method i thoroughly well a?ined graundqn~- overcoming this organizational hand ten is d e clear. U p o n many occa- cap. sion* bosreva; the shore h e conad parties Were unable to direct 6re b e But he i s thoroughly convinced th r . cause of targets bang aut of thar u s t be overcome if we are to t e sight. It was then neceQarp to use air- it m borne s p o m Therefore "a trained made d y to stop the overwhelmin? p l d aviaarn qualified to control horde of Russian tanks. Self opelkci the guns of fire support hips" was gunscan be d e indqensa le in daregularly maintained. McMillian ing this if all the personnel connectd points out that "These naval gunhe with their use are integrated into on? air spotters pilots) must be trained to team, under single command both f. I appreiate t h e - p u n d forces' prob training and operations. It seem, lem and to recognize front l i n e s and- futile to consider the alternative tt p d t a b l e targets. Thq must also be relying primarily upon our own tanks trained to appreciate the problems of to stem the Russian ride. How can $8 e fire support ships, to be familiar wi& expect to get enough tanks in the their ordnance and ammunition, and fieM in time, even if the nationdl ecoaomy could bear the burden? to understand and use the proper Saturally. the self-propelled gun. ring procedure and method of even when fully integrated with of fires." The foregoing blazes the trail for ground and air spotting, should not the &ective w e of the Safptopelled be relied u p alone. It will need to gun against tanks in land warfare. In be supported by and coordinated with w n tank. Y esence that trail is primarily one of antitank effom by our o integration of all the elements in the well as by and with our own combat problem. The participating artillery- planes. The galaxy of all these must men. tankmen. and ainnen must be again be well integrated for the maximuch more than merely *un&ed"; mum results. "Unification" is not they must be integrated under a single enough.



cr ical eye

once E Korean again. focused campaign tbe eyes has.

of the military world on that

er p a of the battkfield, the tank. T e tank has beem l i f t e d from the m :hballs. its plastic removed, dI ! it is now being examined with a

.ompanMc numbers that tbe h tie pan to sobilizl. Thus. tbe ob\-ious ~onclusion call b c h thu the t a n k pmed t o be deckive, in the & of the Korean bade. only b;cause one d e passcsd a supmon~ of wnks while the ahcr side had m etTective meam 04 countering this SUperiorin. T o folkw this reasoning to it5 logical conclusion. then. would not :he same have been true if the South Korean .Army hxi had plenty of tank but little or no infanm;. or if t h q had had an abundance o f infantn a d cane but little or no artillery? The answer should br obvious. T a n k infantr);. and a m l k n . then. are all decisive on the W e l d and must work as a m-odiruted team :o achieve victory. In any given eneasement. however, usually them will e.&[ cenain specializad conditions which will permit o r quire t k dominance o f one of these a m m a r the others to ensure the defeat o f the enemy. T h u s in the dcsera o f .Mricb or on the plains of S o n h German); the tank may predominate: whik in t h e mountaim of Italy. mfanm; and artillery mill have the dominant d e . But no matter what the conditions m i y be. oc which pla>r the kading role. the other fw-o have witally important supporting rdes which are IKC-ti for the surressdtheumpaign or S bank. o w that we have p b c d the tank in its paper pmFctive with r e h to the & major k t s of gnuad cumbat. it might be well to digrrss for a moment toconsidQ titi+ t5e futuredrhetant Ibmircmanydo considerthutbelatcstdePrbpncna inscienti6cmcafibareoamdingthe death knell of tbe tank in mucb the samefashiImaswasdoncfortbe h. T o date. bowever. no such d e vekpmmts have been reveakd. P e d safe ing their to assume development, tht as bag it as k probobhtbac a& requiremrnts for mobility. maneui-cr49


by both the layman and rh professional. Fortunately. such Y Jtiny is not new in the life of this



Jupe25th uiR mark the 75th -4nnivmary of the Custer Massaae on the Littk Big Horn during the camplip of 1876. The day w i l l be marked by appapriate ceremonies on the battl&eld. General o f rbe .-.George C. 3 l d a l l . secreur). of Defense, and Lt. Gen.

.ukn C. W e e r . Cammanding General of Sixth .Gm)-. are scheduled t o be speaken at the obsm-ance on the historical site near
the presentday town of Hardin, 3lontana. =L Linle Big Horn. General Custer and 225 ofKcers and men


the Seventh United Stam Cavalry were annihilated


b\- some 5.OOO

cUaaEaak6dd Sarional hlonument on the s i t e of the b a a k a daPrenmikssauhofHardinwillbetksceneofa tognmontbe mQpimg at ~ u n c 25. w w e r win th major a d r h e a k Gnarl1Ckrrb?llwiUspakatabenquctirrH& tbatnigbt


ipon and s o it will, undoubtedly, ive uithout too much embarrassr n ,ir. The *'Billy Mitchells" of the arm, red force are now trumpeting that th tank is the decisive ground ut ipon of the banle6eld; that the 3 :h dominates the bankfield: and th t without it the infantry can nt :her advance nor defend itself r g inst an enemy who psseses and 1 ~ 9 3 this u*eapon. As an example, thrv point to Korea and say. "We w t r e dominant on the sea; we had complete sup""'ty in the air. terrain $ \ . I \ favorab e for defense and delay; bu; still the enemy advanced. Why? &'du= he porsessed and made use of hi. tanks to such an extent that the Lpless South Korean and United Kttions' forces could not stand dgJlnst him." Ifow much truth is there in these >taremenu? What is the role of the tank in the ground f m team? iVith the tremendous increase in thc number of tanks organic to the prtent infantry division as compared u Irh the World W a r I1 division, and thc comeqxmding increase in the number o f tanks found in the type corps and field ann?. it is vital that commanders and staE C&XK have an understanding of the capabilities and limitations o ft h i s w e a p and how it s bd d be e~++ How vulnerable n rhe tank to enemy gunfire? Haw mc bile is the tank? Should it be emplc ved in mass? Is the tank. as the earlv stages of the Korean campaign se: med to indicate, the decisive
)L i

ground weapon of the battlefield? These and many other questions are being asked by dlicer~ mith and uithout annaed experience. who sincerely wish to know what to expect from their tanks. The puxpcse of this article. then. is to consider M y those areas wheRin t h e p a t e s t amount of confusion seems to&, to dirun a few of the capabilities and limitations of the tank: and to examine xnne asputs o f its employnent in the i n f a n e &xiSion.

In Korea. the tank. skillfully used by the North Korrans did prove to be the decisive weapon on the b a n k field for the greater pan d the campaign. It was not until the United Sations' farces obtained tanks in






;r ,,

., ,1.

target. and because o f the low expb


er of the w e a p ' s pro+ whic is not great maugh to injure the crew o r seriously damage the cank even when a dirrct hit is obtained. Fire from light a d q should not cause a medium tank to change its general position nor should it slow its ' cotheabove advance. The are: a direct h i x m a p Nrret will rendex tbe crew incapable o f t k h e r action; a dirrct hit on the outsi& of the rank when a member o f its crew has his head out w i l l eliminate that penon: and a direct hit on the suspension system map damage it enough U) compel thc d 00 withdraw. All of the foregoii h i 6 however. are r a r e and exnawly diikult

likely to stop a detemuned effort b\ tanks in mass. . 4 Tpn.-The A T gun received aemendous amount of publicity dur o r l d W a r II, with pamculaing W emphasis on the German 88-rnm dual This weapon attain& ! t s Z =.result ot i o employmen. by Rommel's r\frika Korps on two s q arate occasions. First, in the Libyai, nthe British. and seconc Z X L n a i c a n s at s i & - b - s i i in North Africa. On both occasions the Germans achieved complete tact cal surpke. They led the .Allied tanforas into a trap, and then sprung : from three sides. surprise. then, 1 one condition necessary for the &e rive w ot the AT gun and, in thta abovementioned instances. mass alsb to achieve. .ktikq of 155-mm caliber and was present. U n d e r n o d battle conditions. the above will, if a direct hit is obtained. knockout t b e c r e ~ and Jeriously dam- foregoing can be avoided by, first. dt age a medium tank o f the 3446 p . failed and accurate resonnaissanct Here again, hm, we are con- second, prevdmg Bank rotectiorr fronted with the difficult task of ob-- third, the echelonment o the tank taining a direct hit when indirect fire force to one or both Banks: fourth. 3 medmds arr em b e d U n l e s s the reconnaisjance by fire of likely .+r tanks are r 0 a d - L at a hait, gun emplacements; and fifth. close caught in a o r bogged down in coyetin 6re by follow-up echelons of d t ground normal forward move- the t a l i force. The sixth, and most ment or & evasive action sbould impoaant method of reducing the efsufFreinpreventingadirrcthit This fectiveness of AT fire results from the does not, however. rake into account dost axmiination of the tank force the &ctiveness OC masing an exm- with its supporting artillery to provide for heaw d q preparations pnor sive number of battalions of axtill? on a small area, but is besed on the to the attack, the use of smoke to t s Banks during the attack. h e of the n o d number of b a d - protect i ions likely to be encounted on the and the use of forward observers to &ect quick adjustments once the enraverage front. .4it.-The em loyment of air power my's AT guns have fired. .The .AT against tanks, aprhough p d u c t i w of gun is the least to be feared of all AT outlined abote effective d t s in both W d W a r weapons, if the 11 and Korea, bas v v d e h i t e l i m i t a - areadheredtoS y . %ringbatis 6 d ,its position t i o n s . Firn t k r e must be a fair tle, when the isexposed. I& its position exposed. degree of i i r superior'?. b n d , there must be fambIe weather t o machine gun and high explosive fire pmide n v ~Sbilitp.Third,as- from covering tanks and artillen. suming that the above two conditions should dspase quickly of the pun exist. the plane m u s t 6nd the tatget crew since they do not have the benef armored protedon. On the while moving at d u s r a t s of fit o speed at gRat heights. descend on the otber hand, give these same AT guns d pnxection of a tank and target which can take evasive action, the a ignore antiairtraft a d e r p in the area, they could. if properly employed hold i x a considerable perid. and obtain adosehit with bombsor a up an attack f The bamo&a.-Gmtinued research direct hit with rackets. Once again, if our t a n k are road-bound. caught in a anddevelopmenthaveincreasedmateh i s weapun d&lC bogged in soft d. OT othet- rially the etkctivenesr of t 1 . The new 3.5wise immobilized. an 0 t h favorable since World War 1 conditions exist for the use of air. then inch bezoola, which was given 13 first battle tests in Korea, can knock air is capable of rendering i&ve tank s o caught. When the above con- out any known rank. When first uxd ditions do not e d air attacks are not in Korea against the Russian-built



MMOI-M~-June, 1951

day rank at ranps of 1.000 t o Loo0 t a m d !%moans a p a s arw T i p , yud* Ifthishppens,tbefunued bbaplcrPntroaathetank is liLcly tokcome luxmuin. mswatorhknol veaptm which ClLl @J any plre an It is m l l to bear ia mind houmer. queaionpobeblyLicsinrbtnnc n f a a P y m a n can go. d i t only re- that thissvnt m a r c h may also de m a h n " Wemust ..ires a CICW d two t o aperate it. velopanewtypedarmor latewhich & h " O & or Uamtradhr :?le natural uestion then is: "Is noc will mia e&cti\.dy tK shapd faaniaGellrgentt8dancebcnraentlK * tis weapon 3 K answer to the tank?' Charge. t w o .E t c c p f o r i a 8 t x m s ~ 1 n a a y . i'he a-gwer. u d o m m d y , i s no. the hi46 (Puson>tank, whkb is rbt \Me it is of exueme value to infanBaabm?alNd-rank organic t o tbe infantry dirisian. . \ and airborne tmops, once again T o link together mobility and a r ppbabiy may be tbe answer. .aialized conditions are required for mor protection is not as illogical as it If we a c k m w ~ k . chat . use. These specialized CoIldiOons might seem at Lra glance. . U t h h bility as wdl as 4 procsaioa . e a result primarily of o~hnical lim- it is true that one c a n & f l%e and grot h e power is &simbk. o . itions in the weapon itself, namely ocher. at the same time t+ also camwhat use is thrs mob&?; M* : nge and arrura~y. plement each other. decrease in permits the rapd CanCentratioD o f Although the range of the 3.5-inch armored protection. with its c o n e great f i r e puwer at the decirirr point : .zooka is more than 100 yards. any- quent reduction in the weight of the on the bartk6eld T a n k s provide tbe : in over that distance reduces ma- tank. also means an increase in tacti- infan? disisioa with speed. fire : ria Iy the accuracy of the weapon. cal speed. Speed, in itself, then he- power. and m a s which. tnnrbd I 1 be suroof an &ecti\r hit. the op comes a form-ofprotection which wdl from the potential. me?N terrific t itors must wait until a tank Is well com nsate. to a limited extent. for shock action. Shock action ensures the I ithin this 1OO-yard range. Then. in the of armOted prorecrion. c ~ n -nrpturr of the enemy p - c i o n and der to f i r e at a tank, the weapon venely. an increase in armored pro- mobdin. ensures rapid exphtarion ew m u s t expose themselves and. in tection is a "must"when speed k no and pursuit. That. brieily, is armored -. doing, they become vulnerable to longer a factor. However. this w-ill a h . Thistypeofactionisnotlunil e fire o f supporting infantry. other increase the weight of the tank and ited t o tbe armored division abne. for :.nks. and artillery, particularly a d - results in a loss o f speed and mobility. it is available to the presentday iniLrv employing the variable t i m e The resolving of the conaict beus& * . However, it must be \ T Ifuze. All this presupposes that ween the demand for greater ar- b undc;stoodand uscd pmpdy. .I comr r:me same crews have survived the mored protestion and that for in- mander wbo fails to use this potential initial artillery preparation laid down creased mobility is a problem which speed and power. or abo uses it imbs the enemy. The ultimate in m r - has occupied the minds of the ar- properly. is fa% in his responsibilid : e and intestinal fortirude is going mored experts ever since the close of ties to b s cummad be required of men who will sit in World U a r 11. We mention it here heir foxholes and wait for tanks to since the requirements o f the field rumble into range. forces become the basis.of drawingWe have already diruned some o f Here again the bazooka. like the board designs. Infantry commanden tbe technical aspects of mobdip-. and \T gun, finds its greatest limitation must realize that their demands for the ordnance expert can give you in r h e \dnerab&ty of its unprotected greater a m r e d protfftion. if satis- Inore information i n terms of hirew. In addition, its doubtful accu- fied. will reduce the m0bilir)- o f the and borrepower-*weight r q . except at minimum ranges. is tankandlimititsem loyent. ut what about the pcacaal another handicap t o its effective use. should weigh car&.&, therefore, the aspects:: where can a tank go? m'bat Before leaving the bazooka. it advantages which will accrue from in- are i o limitarions as regards t e r r a i n ' .hould be mentioned that the shaped creased protection. In making such The answers to these impomant qua~hargeprinciple, used m projectiles an estimate, tbey must also guard tions CMIlOt, unfatunately. be p b c d hred by that weapon. is as0 employed against too rapid an acceptance of the on paper. Judgment m the use of in the projectiles of 0 t h weapons opposite theory which fanatically tanks comes, the same as with other cqanic to the infantry division, such advocates p a t e mobility and fire from . TU CX4' the 57-mm and 75-nun recoilless powerwithminimumarmored r e field. H e n c Therefore.commudrnwho& e is gained o + on tbt h & r : k . and the 105-mmart'liery piece. tmion. HO= cavalry be~ame \Ithough these latter weapons are lete because of the vulaerabiliy of not have this experience must utilize upable of bringing a taok under fire horse and rida to modern weapons. appomniry. m pmcimc t r a i n 4: a much greater range than the baThe towed A T gun.. except in air- ing, to deterrmn . tbe capabilities and z ( & . they do not possca the sax- borne units, has also been discarded limitations of their tank. I that is r . q OC the obsokcent A T gun and, because of the vulnerability of the d0ne:there will be ks teDdencv to in addition, the projectiles have m h - crew manning i t The rank. t o o . may expect too much as in the bsr war. deficiencies which are king kcome a r n piece if the p m or not t o demand enough. rc medied. It is possible that continued p o m t s of greater mobility and kss h i s no quesrioa that tbe Cm%re search Gill ultimately Meet a port- armorgouDcurbed Toonewhohas movementottankS is l i m i t e d aile one-man w e a p which d l use fought the famous German Ti@ lxnmcry b y e types OC tern&. -4s a reSui~ t h p e d charge projemk and which with the mobile Sherman tank and all too fTequen*. since the last w. !I1 be efkctive against the present- achieved.~iaorp, on the basis o f a pla- t h e expression T h a t is ~ ogood t tank

achieved fonnjdable d o rounds seven tanks held out. H m we have an A T

T34, it


. 1




i z A r





The intelligent use of tanks de- unda what conditions to employ a a n * dtrmin pnrdcul?r arganizl60n. This applies y ~ tanks in and its W i t y . with- W b a h r ~ e +got
out h i 5 Uadawlading, commandcn will waste thir a m o r or fail to use it to the maximum.

therrgimcndtankcom y , o r n the dioision md a~cps tan battalhj. The only tanlcorganiiations whoThe employmemt of tanks with in- Iola are 6xed are in reconnaissan.e fantq or infantry with tanks is a s u b units and. in an emergency, they m y ject worthy of much study. Of neces- be empbyed in other than norm11 sity. therefore. this discussion will be roler limited to a coverage of those aspecf~ TlmTaaM& wherein the greatest amount of confusion seems to e * .. The tankinfantry t e a m grew up n Reference to available militaq text- the hedgerows of Normandy wht-e books will reveal that tanks should: neitber tanks nor infantry could c.1erate without the closely c0ordinac.d 1. Provide anatank defense for the assistance of the other. Because f infant?. 2 . Provide the infant? with direct the tenain. and the defenses prepar d bv the Germans, the infantry squ .d firesu port. platoon with two tanks attachtd 3. a p r e and hold ground for was tbe nmst efEcient way to solve t;.e the infantF. tactical problem presented. Wh7;c 4. Execute counterattacks against such conditions will be found in enemy penetrations. future war, care must be taken The foregoing fundamentals p v - this role (for the rank) is not eraernmg the general employment of tinued beyond the point for which it t a n k with infantry are sound but, is&. like any other listing of fundunentals, The small tank-infantry team is .IT the\ cannot all be executed simul- pmpriate under certain specializvd meolsly, nor can o w or two of than conditions. These are the breaching ')f be stressed c o n d n u d y to the exdu- a f d e d line. the attack of strongly 'tions covered by decp sion of the others. Earlv in World LYar 11. the tendamong infanny p z ? d r or attacks in wooded divison commandas was to suess, 3 areas and towns. When we are fightmost entirely, the first two d these ing in open countq and over wod fundamentals. Later on, as this con- terrain, such a combination should be cept developed weaknesses, there was avoided. If thisis not done. then the a trend towad the adoption of t h mobility and speed of the tank are Imt. third fundamental in which the tanks for it is slowed to the pace of the inwere expected to do everything with- fantry and becomes extremely vulner. able to the fire of eneiny tanks and out any infantry support. self-propelledguns. For this reason. it d is weU for a division commander to ..\t the present time, some 5 yean anacipate such engapients, such Y after the yar. there still seems to be a the attack of a fortified line. and 35k general lack o f agreement as t o how for the attachment of a tank battalion ranks and infanflp should be em- from the m p tank group. These JR ployed. U'ben the new infantry divi- heavy tanks which can withstand t pu"ishment and deal more cfsion was organized, &rs assumed g v e l y with enemy pillboxes and immediately that the tank o*tion within the division had sdved armor. The infantry division tank rheit problem. The d i v i s i o n tank battalion then can be employed r n o ~ battalion was to k used to capture appropriately after the line has becn and hold ground, and the tanks or- bnached, instead of being forced to ganic to the regiment were to work in dissipate its etFom in a role for whish the small tank-infantry team. Such it is not best suited. U n d e r conditions other than t h t e an assumpaon is sound and logical, but it does not the compkte dirussed in tbe preceding paragrayh answer. .%iherence to a rule which armor should be used to lead the JP phces the tank in the same continu- tack and, because of its speed. uke e ous role means that the capabilities of objectives before the enemy can r the weapon are not bcing used to the act, or by shock action if the ene3y u s t know has already reacted. S w h an acti-bn. maximum. .\ commander m


employment of tanks with infantry "punch" of the counterattacking must be the -ding that &e forre. vl'hilc tbc inha-. gene+. tank is a powerful weapon that was cannot move fast enough to launch a made t o fight aSpite the fact chat c u u o t c n d at regimental Inrl. the its empiqvmcnt m a y be limited by tanks can. ditches. AT mines. d If ranks are used in f m a r d posiother t a n k mobt of t k t i m e it can tions, IM6mum uy of c d g be used where the infan? cannot go should be empbyd. If this is na : j t to r e h e the tanks on the ob&without suffering prohibitive casual- k. they w i l l be detected eadv a d \-e s o the armor.can continue the ties. .it An&, the 1st . b r e d D i - countenryasurcs w i l l be taken bv tbe :rack. At tbe same rime, infantry vision broke out of the. berhhead attacking force. Either hut? ardlcr? :mot follow the armor too closely o r successfully with only minimum casu- will be brought to b a r on h e posirev w i l l COW under tbe a r t i h f i e alties as compared with the h e a \ ~ tions, or the enemy may shift the hlch tanks always seem to draw. casualties sustained by adjacent in- point o f his thiust t o a m c b e ~area .either can they be too far back or fantry divisions. Therefore, whether where the tanks are not in midence. !ev will have to fight bypassed and YOU use the tanks in the first wave of T o aroid this poaibili?. the h * a d .rkun enemy infantry. in assault or use them as parr of the positions for each tank should be The danger in the separation of tank-infantry team. be sure you use pared. using dozers if availabk. The nks and infantry is n o t . as many them whenever possible. The\. will poution.shouki be well Camouaaged. f reduce your infan- casualiies.. ticen believe, the vulnerability o but notoacupie$ The tlnE toorrup?. : nks without infantry but the vulit should stay well back under m e r . A P m 2rability of infantry without tanks. concealed from observation. ready to i relatively open country (not jungle Tanks are a powerful reserve and move up into finng position at the a p woods), ranks can defend rhem- lend securi~ to any attack. but t h ~ dara-nrchmoment. p'opriate as range cardnbould s e c e ! s s a l ? . filing be. h e s with little di86culty as long as are of little value to anyone if the ..~ylight h h p&m for the commander always keeps them in re- prepared ahead of time. When the ifantry element, therefore, is to stay serve or holds them back for AT enemy amor approaches within l.Oo0 close to the annor as is "ecesrary defense. S o matter the source of yards o f the position. that is the time . )r their own protection and no closer. tanks under your command b o k to take it under fixe. Earlier than that ! et the tanks do the hghting while upon tbem whenever possible as a will produce no &estive results and :!leinfantry relieves on the objedve weapon to be supported. not a s u p will m e a l the posicioa of your tanks nd provides a harbor at night. The port weapon. If conditions do not to the enemy. If the enemy is em. !tter is necessary, if tanks are to op justify tanks as the prima? assault plo).ing heavy t a n k this range should .rJte efficiently the next day. weapon, then use them in support o f be reduced to 500 T a d . - i t night. the assault. Return them. however. tanks should OCCIIP); their prepared DdBd.1to the role of he weapon to be s u p positions in the event h a t the enemy Commanders of infantry regimenu ported as quickIy as possible. launches a tank-supponed night atx s t remember that it is not always Finally, this subject cannot be con- tack. Once again. bowever. rompkte .xcessary to assign a platoon of tanks cluded without c0"ddering bridh the firing data m u be prepared in adeach infantry batdion. hlany use of the .tanks of the infantry divi- vance. if effective hits are to be ob ::mes, more decisive d t s can be sion on the defense. Here. again. tained. hained by employing the tank com- arises a conaict between thosc who p n y , in mass, as the main &on. wish to stress the close-suppon r o ko f Sur. in s o doing, it must be realized the tank (a mobile pillbox;, and It is hoped that the foregoing dis :hat tanks, to work in a purely tank those who believe that tanks should cussion will contribute to a h e r :cam. must be trained for that role. be used more in the counterattack. understanding of the capabilities and irmored troops who have been The present organization of the in- limicawns of armor. If armor is OT. r i n d to work in company and bat- fantry division lends itself nicelv to ganic t o your rommand. use its mold:.tlion tank formations can, with mini- the accomplishment of both of these it). and f i r e power rhene~rrd:num training, revert quickly to the roles. The tanks organic to the infan- t i a s pcmit. It is a powaful weapon -,)le of s u p w n g the infanas try regiment might be used to deepen that can hand out and take punish:wt of the small tank-infantry team. the A T defenses of the banle posi- ment better than infantry. Do not rhose troops. however, which have tion. and the division rank battalion exput miracles, but do not hdd it 'wen trained to work in the small employed in a counterattack role. It back where it will IUS from lack of . ink-infantry team cannot, without must be realized, however. that if the use. Whenever posibk. place the inlmsiderable training, operate with tanks are employed in the forward fan- in support o f the tanks. How.ny degree of assurance in pure tank defense-areas to provide .\T defense, mer. when neesary, & not hesitate ',)rmations.Training docaine should. full advantage is nac being taken of to use your tanks to support the ine s For a l l the their mobility. Whenever possible. fantry elements of your comnnd :herefore, srress both d 'wqn assigned to tank units in the even at the regimental level. mine Finally. to achieve the maximum iivision since, in the hnal analysis, fields and obstacles should be used t o from your armor. empbv it with inach has its own peculiar techniques. provide A T protection and the tanks telligence and undernanding. = Y W Underlying any discussion on the should be held back to provide the would your infantry and arnllen-.
' '

however, as an infantry maJr. must 7e plonaed d arordi0.d in Cktd. \nillery, air, engineer, and i"hnay ,~tions must be fitted into the piaurc. \nil@ and air provide the @miration, the support during -dd i:e'aLTanti while the f i a d z e r - When u p


A R M O R - - M ~ ~ - J U ~1951 H,



t k fu bonk of an obrtade. This

WFOuId place the

Self-Propelled Bridges
! t.

~ t h r i v e r , b u ~ w n u l i

trould have t o be aimed a t a suitable kwinton the distant sbac. It should nxe &at speed yrd a to a43ieit t om b e Ed wipd


it !

to hre, if JATO' devices are

employed. With k l o p e n t and experiment, self-propelled or nrketlairpched bridges may well kcome
Two means of launching bridges

a & suggested. For light b+es





principle would be to fire a speaal anchor. trailing light cables into the Ear bad, and, on the suspension system s o created. complete a light bridge. Tbe anchor w d be ppopelled by a JATOlike device. and would vary in size with the y e of the bndge. Far p t o m bridges, a special J.%TG-llJ poptoon. would be6red into or onto the far shore, and subsequent pontoons similarly p jated would lock into the lead one which would be trailing a cable to the others. The bridge would be e b c avriesofpinedpontam. This w d d be far armored vehicles. These spans d d not result in idea bridges, but their components d d be prefabricated Y) as t o permit b a l assembly of the bridge to be made with the utmost spced. Both types of bridges d d be consuucted almost mechanically, with the en neem workin on the near shore on y. Infanm an armor would cross a 6nishd bndge to fonn and expand a bridgehead. T a c t i c a l l y it would be n v to protect the bridge anchors on the far bank from enemy infantry and armor, but this is net an insurmountable difKcult?-. For a mcket-launched footbridge, a "T"shaped ancbor connected to hght cables could be J.4T0-6rd and dropped in a morrar-like tmjectory on


w0uIdbe.i t e n the cables and'p asten them > on the near bank. To provicc. phnhng, notched aluminum secrior could be fittedonto the cables one : a time and, poweredby a small roclie-. each OIM would be projected -3 stream. The minimum requiremer.: for a footbridge would be achieve! by t h i s proces~. See Figure I. For a larger tocket bridge, a lar-e bridgeanchor of several tons could te mleced across a river on the s a m principle that a weigh? airplane vat 7 JATO can rise at an angle appr0ac:h g the v&d. This anchor would d necessity have to be heaw m order :a force it well into the earth to protlde a suitable base for a heavier suspension structutu~c.The anchor would a l a contain heaw pulley arrangemen:s. With these, stconger cables could he worked across and tightened, all work being performed From the near shore of the river. The next step would be to hook on the special prefabricated bridge sections to the cables. These might be mototed across the suspenson, o r shot across by rockets. Obriously the approaches at the far end cf such a bridge would require some human labor later, but the primarv pur pose of this span would be to vaul: combat troops over the obstacle JC rapidly as possible. See Figure 2. A pontoon bridge might be consmcted along h e s similar to thosr: j u s t described, but special rocket-propelled pontoons not unlike speed boats would be employed and the span would be able to carr). heatier loaQ than the suspension p . The initial pontoon would drag a light cable after it, and the pontoon

itlan&d. Thenextst


61~t baat. It should k-dhave seff--anchmgdevices that ,.ddbespnutg~sbotaut~~imr :t with the shore. Orre this ponI I n is in place, its trailing cable xlld & made taut with the near b nk, and addiaollpl JATosrrd pontl m s would be launcbed to ram and I& ,k into each other. Jhcb o f these p n m n s would be a complete bridge u it with su of saingen J d p I a n k i n g e m 3 , At the expm5e of seeming on the 1, ie O Rube cddbalpsm, it is p m : 11 to state rbu these JATOSred pntoonssCbouIdbeampbibiuusinordc- co s i m p h the task Ot bcindq r i -m up to the near shod for launchag. PFoPaly design4 the a m p n-nts o f this type could b r-mmed acms a riva in a ~p short tine, and the & S I tank ova would L i d down the a p p r o d u e & on the ancbor pontoon and make shore.

Id wata current. It might even be r IO guided, krt Q q - t the ..icess of the bridge WCuId bmge txtly on the adoring qualities of


r I

miolve the readez in the oechnical de:ah o f equipment which at the moment is nonexistent. The inventive o r critical minds will see many &mltit3 in the way of p e r f m g these unor:hodox military bridges, ,yet I beh i e the same minds can solve the pr)blems related to their perfection. U'e as users of military equipment A r c too often prone to a c ~ p the matenel at hand, or & content t o modify anJ i m p v e it slightly. There bas &cn too little inveativeocss in miliu r t circles, and the future demands thdt the army apply &e i rnd experiment that p d u missiles and similar weapum Ground dare i s a slow process at best, and i t dsslowed by t e r r a i n obstacles The military can pwide not only the specihtians d what it will require, bur a h some constructjvc and ima midve ideas as we& The sciend c u!mt and industrial know-how of the

N O eeort

has bem


here to

figure 1 .

U7ited States would not be hard pmsecl to perfect these bridges in CI ?junction with the m i l i e . Let us modernize ground combat.


SITUATION 1. The initial fire command was GUNNER, HE DELAY (tank commander points gun using vane sight and his power traverse control handle), TROOPS, 1200, FIRE. The effectiveness of massed tank action depends on the way the individual tonk moves and fires. In combat, coch tank normally performs as part of a section, platoon, or larger unit. At the same time, it is up t o the tank commander to decide about positions, targets to engage if not specified by the section leader, and ammunition or weapons to be used. Once tanks are committed to action, unit commanders must rely on h initiative, resourcefulness, and judgment of the individual tank crewespecially on the capability of the tonk commander. In this case, the tank commander decided to use high explosive ammunition with fuze de-

... ... . . ... ........





k y ogainst the dug-in enemy personnel. Not only would this ammuni-

tion give ricochet air burst on the position, but it would provide sensing indication: the range to the target was in excess of the burn-out time of machine gun ammunition (700-900 yards). the tracer element in caliber -30 SlTUATlON 2. a. The initial fire command is GUNNER, SHOT (tank common& points gun using vane sight and his power traverse control han-



dle), TANK, 800 ONE LEAD, FIRE. Targets moving across the field of vision require a lead. The initial fire command calls for one lead (5 mils).


6yG.nh o .
a class

b. On the M46 tank, the gunner's sight is a T152 telescope with e t i c k as shown below. The reticle has two movable index lines: a sight r
horizontal for range, vertical for deflection or bod. These reticbs are moved by knobs found just &low the front mounting bracket o f the sight mount. The 1152 sight reticle incorprates an aiming dota chart t o facilitote the gunner's compenrotion for ammunition o f different muzzle velocit i e s . In his e&, the gunner s e t s the horizontal index at 800 yards, un-

em1 dlheAnnyOI#r N. bm6

l e y . h r y H d t & Co., ''Ode. 64opp. $500.

Reviewed by RObERt S.

N . w


der the APC column, and s e t s the vertical index 5 mils t o the Id? of tent e r . On h 1152 sight t t e gunner sets his lead in the dirqction opposite t o that of the moving target, and then nt-kys on the center o f the t o + .

.I Soldier's S q adds another notaachievement to the many that .Iready emblaton the distinquished ccocd of Gelled Omrr Bradley. This book is outsmndinglv the best nemoir s o far published by a top :nilita~commander of,Worid War 11. It is a superb literary and history
1 l r


In readability, organbtion of ma:erial, range and authoritativeness o f :onteng both for the I a w n and the ;xof&nal, i n candoc and, above all.
Tho - A

all came out for the best. . \ h e all. comparable t o it by a bank com- he doesn't professto have done all rbr mander in this or any orher cumay. maneminding himself and to hare . GWorld War 11 hismy, it i s sur- won the war practically singlehanded. pasvd only by the masterful volumes S o t only in liteqUaliF. but in of that peer o f them all in any field tone and \*-paint A sddirrs ston -Winston Churchill. is a hr different-and much betrer There will be some who will fret -book than several otberr in the YIY and sputter over Bradley's blunt state- category published a fru years back. ments. Panis?ns o f this and that ou&t Bradley telk all about the blunders: and perrmality are sure t o be mitTed. pleny o f them. from .lfrica to r k to put it mildly. This reviewer. for Elbe: bitter and tragic. He teils w-bo example, an impawIoned z d o t of wai responsible for them. h c m thq General George Patmni illustrious happened. and the @n cust.-He Third . h y . is firmly c o n b i n c a d a spares no names and nodetaik. v~ good case can be made on &e T h i s is one o f the w& contention that on occasion. General of this volume. Bradky +lays an undue pmteztive Such fortbrighmess is sirmally unq First .+my, linown partialicy w a r d H among the milit+ hierartb. which he commvlded in the SOP It seems to be an unwritten law mandy invasion. But no one can question his honesty 01accuse him o f malice or unhirn e % . Although be was o b h s l y irked by Third Army's boiaerour ackiaes

this after-action report is in by itself. There is mthing

that no nutakes were nude snd that

and stxident aggmsiveneJs Bradley warmly lauds its great fighting

tiesandhktory-makingmum hr H e acclaims as "brilliant the L b u b u ~ work of Patton's StafE i n the Bank o f the Bulge, and in recounting Third A r m y ' s subrequat equally m d in drive t o the Rhine. remarl, A i r d . h y viewed defensive warfare as something to be shunned at all


Bradley is similarly frank and fair about all others throughout the book. H e gives generw paise where he considers it merited. and blunt criticina w b m he considers that due. And he does the same thing about plans and operations. Bradley-doesn't claim that ewrything worked out according to prior concept and schedule:


MMOR-May-June, 1951

modatlydBMSllneoRpPpenh. be had saved the Auled Irmier-an utterly unflnlndai ckim,as the d
pove~.N a O &

did Eiun-

bower not repudiate &is thoroughly

dishonest declamation. but he did nothing to put tbc quictusm an even

mom mirhiemus situation-Xlontys long Conspt o make himself cornmanderofall Allied p n d fofies. Following is Bradleys remarkable accOUnt o f this extraordinary affair: While we labored t o tepieve the command. the pre that Monty be named t


able and conscientlou~ ;Lwrican &and rcleiban. and his ma&cent boo 1s equally fine and sausfying. I i s an exhilarating experience; makes you proud to be an American. This counp is mly in safe hands 50 long as it has kaders of the quality, co~uage and integrity of Omar Brad-

IF. Those who may be irked o r offended bv what he has t o 5ay win f i n d it &t to deny that B d e y beJes hisopinkmontherrcord. Therewill be disagreement with his opinion -same of it probably vcp- violent d& agreement-but the record will be di&ult to deny. Thais the great strength of BradWs book and his

Chaaaer. He lays it on the l i n e without malice o r pettines and lets the record speak for itself. -4 graphic Illustration of this i n grainel howsry is his attitude toward General Dwight D. Eisenhower. who not only was his su cdker, but who. fiteralb, gare cban~e te win fame and d e d rank. Repeatedly. Bradlq does not hesitate t o let the record speak in a highly critical manner of his friend and~commander. The mou dramatic insane of t h i s b Bradleys account of his blunt showdown with Eisenhower after the &mans back had been broken in t h e Bulge. J l o n m had staged one of hismore odious anria, in the farm of a p r a ~conference in which be

gnwndcammandermowballedwi the assistvlce of a pan of the British press. And even though General Marshall had once rraJsured me that we would never be sanhvrhed under British commaml,I felt it necessaq to state my position unmmpromisingly t o lke. Wbm I raised the issue. Ekenhowa fended it oll impatiently with a reassuring reply. Nevmhelesyou m u s t know, I said, after what has happened I cannot &Montgomery. If he is to be put i n command of all p n d fofia you must send me home. for if M m r goes in over me. I will have tbe con6dence of my comd. %e flushed. He stiffened in his chair and eyed me M y . Well - he said, 3 thou ht you were the one PrSaDI count on for doing anything I asked you to. You can, Ike, I said. Ive enjoyed every bit of my service with you. But this is one thing 1 cannot t a k e . 3evcraI days previody I had indicated t o Patton that I would feel


a top botde ctYmKdx. dtspln Bnta h s l m u d u c c khlni?. in nmpr a d hisom xmaaylimi* PUDICI~~blubdcrrandpNn.oatirp anti-.* bhs a d arropmx. The two .herkan commzndm who were able to n o m r h Shtgomcry with any dcgrsc of tdcnm w r r r Eisrnbamr and the late LL C u d William H. Simpson. who c ~ m m?ndcd Xinth Ann!. ..U1 throclgh his book. & B RcQds ulstiurc after irrsuna o f h t o n ~ S inFuriating S C d highbmddnas-indudiag oumght ailront, to Eisenhower. <2> The PrOQwtad nnrgp;k with clearing the Scheldt. with the mul: bliged t o ask for relief rather than in that w e e h were lost More .hrwerp. Jbmit 12th . h y G o u p to Alont- the British over basic an-aging this war. This con8ict l a s t e d almdv captured. could k used a5 a > r n q scommand. George clasped me by the arm. If from the planning stage of O\TR- desperately rneakd arppb bse: a1S-l. & o f the Bulp quit, Brad, he said, then I11 be LORD until after the Bulge. The whv the t r a p h British w r r e abressed with one con- OtCUITed. uitting w i t h you. This astounding war wathm a w a r By t h i s time I could not have tem- cept-to ckar the Channel G n s t . i eramentally subordinated myself to That alone ruled all tbcir thoughts is forcefulb summed up in Bradlcr and aims. Everything eLe w a ss u b dramatic rcOunt of the 6nal collapse hl~nrg~mem v~ d . N o t f the Hehrmacht. a s foUmr: \.ere we as fully competent as the ordinated to it. B d k v m a k e it o .& Third . h y mde to b d t but DOW tbe U.S. had c ~ m - abundantly ckar that E i s e n h e r M a s nined 50 divisions in the ET0 in under constant and rrmendous pres- south from its bridgeheads b e h the W 3loselk and crasb down on the Rhhe L mntra5t to the 15 o f Britain. So over- sure to give in to this demand. . whelming a superiority. I argued, he did give in. unfarmnately. Thats at l l a m a Eirenbower at Ln came wmgly supported our insistence that why the war was prd0nge.d six face to tace with the bngdrsplted isL1.S. troops be fought under a U.S. momhs: why Third .4my was sat sue of P single vefsus a double envelf the Rubr w i t h a second down when it had nothing aut in opment o field command. f it but a routed and dkorgan- thrust from the south. The question On this question of a super ground front o commander. Eisenhower stood f i r m Ked enemy and could have speared to had been simmering for almost s a addition fo tbe Canadian and the British press relented. But the Wine bv November. 1944: why months. .h during the p e d that this campaign Jlonty S U f F e r e d his bitter defeat at First. the Bridsh sgwd. and the i n t h .-tmies already alr+. hlontganerp did nothing t o Sijmegen. and why he dallied a b u t .Lnerian S turb it. Yet he d d easilv have v d e d it out with a iimpk pres rtatement disavowing any need for the over-all command that had been proposed for ground forces.


b p e c t s the best account 50 far available of the virtually forgotten Sicilian cam-

s w

i s i n rnanv r e

pa@. w h y this O P e I a h has bem overlooked by military and other historians is a m y s t e r y . It included e\.er).thing; amphibious, airborne!. allied forces,and was completed in 38 days Its a perfect example o f a comprrhenwe and conclusive operation, yet practicaly nothinp has been written .*bout it. Bradleps account is excellent. but the campaign is wurth a

R m d i n g the ETO, which mJeerstandably a ~ ~ p i e the s bulk of Bradleps story, two acts d out .ibove all othm. !11 The previously noted conspir JE\ Alontgomeq-to s e t himself up
A R M O I ~ O Y - J W W 19S1 ,

. .

.. .




Dwight D. Eiscnhowcr
In previous issues of the magazine we have made known our d a r e to assemble at the Headquarters of the U. S. .+mor . h i a t i o n a librarv on mobile warfare that will rate as second to none. We hare set up a longrange procurement plan which visualizes the addition of every book that comes along on our special subjert.
.\t the present time. we are somewhat ashamed of the library. T? as we will. we cant undauand what succwim s d s aC our 66!ear.old .haciation and 63year-old publication did for essential reference material. The existing library is nothing more than a hare start. It is completely deficient in background on caval?. It contains j u s a stan on armor. and we have vowed that we will not allow the situation as regards cavalv background to happen to the annor end. In mentioning our thoughts in the magazine we have had several offers from branch personnel to contribute books to our library. Coming for the most part from retired o&cers who wish to see valuable material put to good and active use. have o&ed their personal libraries. s o far as militan. books go. for donation to our shelves Their kindness has prompted us to set forth some thoughts for other intererred personnel.

You should r

Sormandy to the Baltic

Field Marshal Montgomery

north. Montgomery had insisted that up the Ninth Army and share the SH.%EF sef -up a follow-up force in northern thrust with an .herican reserve of cen divisions to be bor- Group command, he preferred to go rowed from Fim Army. It was in at it with what he had and d i m it r o m 21st + .D I? Goup. As a result anticipation .cf this request that f our six months suuggle was hnally SR.IEF had originally limited me 0 four dicisioos in the Remagen bridge- won by forfeit and Eisenhower was a d those ten been transferred able to resolve this most contentious head. H to Monty as he asked. I would have tactical dispute of the war. First and . been left w i t h only the Third ..\nn)-. Third Armies were directed by And as a consequence Pawn and I SHAEF to encircle the R u b from the would probably have sat out the r e south. Despite Bulls gloomy objec&der of the war in a holding p i - tions, Remagen was to form the springboard for First .\mys advance tion on the west bank of the Rhine. Fortunately Eisenhower called to the Elbe. A Sddiers Stor>. is fascinating readStonrgamerpsblutf. If tbase ten di&ions o f First .Lmy went nath, ing. It would be p d t a b l e reading at Eisenhawer told him. 12th . b y any time. It is nicularly SO in these G m p was aL0 to go north i n corn- cbaotic and m&orn days. when it is mand of bo& &e Firn and Ninth profoundly inspiring to have reaf. I U.S. .emies. Just as soon as Monty firmed the fact that able. sincere. l e a d of Eisenhowerscondition on plain-talkin and honorable men .\RE n canman2 4 our armed forces. those ten divisions. he PTOmptl~ i


lotted him for his majot &on on the dropped the request. Rather than give

El Alomein to the

R i m Sangro
Field Marshal Montgomery


Global Mission
Henry H. Hap Amold

e . m

The Association will be most happ?: to accept Eoambutjons of books for the Headquarters library. We would like the items to be limited to military subjects, and we are particularly interested in the technical and general books on Gzvnlry and Armor. Bodrs covering campaigns in any war i n histor). are most desirable. Our big emphasis goes on mobile warfare. Those who feel they may wisb to contribuk books are requested t o use the following procedure: Send us a list of the books you care to offer, i n order that we may check it agaiust OUT present file. We wiU then notify you which items we &-not have and would appreciate haring. A l l +ing charges will be paid by the Seneray of the .bxiarion. The books will be in the library. and i n addition to p e ~ n d acknowled t tter, a l i s t of dorms will be carried in the pages of the of the magazine. In later izaKs we will publish a list o f titles o f i m rtant books on our acdvity which are not in our co~~ection. ~ndouCec~ some y o f the more v a l u a b w items will later be transferred to the Mounted Seivice Museum library when it is established. with the usable reference items being retained in the Headquarters for editoripl use in ~ o ~ e c f i o with n the magazine: for member use: and for historical rrsearch.

Brigadier Dcsmond Young


F &


The Guthering Storm Their Finest Hour The Grand Alliunce The Hinge of Fclte
Winston S. Churchill

On Active Service

Eoeh $6.00


. b y and all arsistance in establishing our mobile warfare libraq ail1

be sincerely,appreciated.
United States Armor .sssotiation 1719 K S a m . N.W., Washington 6. D. C.

fltet Admiral W i l l i m D. k h y






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