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ARMOR

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ARMOR

D b u g b Southall Freeman's

~VOlunre~I. PlanmandPatridt ..

The United States

Volume LX

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER. 1911

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LETTERS to the EDITOR

EPICS OF ESPIOlYAGE

The
and

Turkey and
Iran
us.-7

Fon Koox, Ky.

insigne.

LT. Cor. G. I.

Eppmtso~
I

Birmingham. Ala.

I
THE COVER

I
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a

, .

T w15 b a tbt August day. Ahma 00 hat t o sit i 0 . a Pono~ t dd4 a tlpSbmeDany. B l w t h z e m c n a a e lankas and thy Lnew that what thy were codmeting d get a b t
except for the doep-mutkd "thump. thump" of otba l a n k firing their 90nun guns'an distant h k s . Now and them it was possible todistingush

by COloNH c.

v. m

thebonncchutaofa.30calibermachiw gun. As the number m e tank i n the plamm rounded a sli


maneuverwascovered

M-46'~ i n the p b . It took position i n de6bde t o cava the advance Cautiously th secand tank a proacbed an apQ spcwre. SLldCknK the tank commapder shouted:

"GUNNER. SHOT. TAXK-

ONE FIVE HUNDRED. ( I h t i -

fied) FIRE!. . : "ON THE WAY." WHOOhlPH! ( d later) WHOOMPH! "CEASEFIRE."


on any be&

This might hive been any valley, fmnt, except for h a p parent absence of trees and green vegetation. Yet the tenseness that acTraining i s given all tank units.

COmpanM CombQt was not evident amongthetankem. W h y ? T h e explanorion i s sirn l e . This

excepttboseinanannorrddivisioa. w a s a o t j u s t a n y v a ~ , t w a s a who have completed their basic a d particular v T t b e Garlic Springs ~ i n d i v i d u a l a a i n i n g p h ? l & firing range at new Armored Com- so 0exible is the poBnm that tbe bet T-g Arts, Camp Irwin;Cali- group camrmoder qxmising unit uaining amy modify it toconform to fornia. When the Army coacdved tbe idea for the new arwced training area, it had in mind a training program which could h g M y teach t a n k

tankers get tougher!

function"Pwand manma. All aaining be


to

Camp Irwin are trained UDda dmulwd combat COnditiDns using th lnidst combat rrticsandtdchniquer,inc~ inq tbotc k?mcd in Korean fighting. This cgnpebepdve fiveweek trainsigned to prepme bath mcll and d t s asskilkdfigtuin teamscapabkof meeting any corn t situation an any field o f bank. Special emphasis has ken placed on gunmrp, trticll training EombQt

As

there would secondq. a d, tank ucws at

3tbu m w A+nonl Codat Trairring Area in tbe Mojave Desert


0 8. Army P k u r

fiM exadraandmaintmanrvof
newt devcbpsdtanksandotberu1951

--Octobu,

rimilroactudrank F a t h e k objsai.e,Emlrr.rrbyilmmcaarrsiPghYkrk8sldcllnth
initiativead

'IbtgpnaewdEmLaammpDdas M s&ll&am hut tbac b QLe irrrtnrtarrit6eachtpnLrrbopdnpattthe objechsadthe -porit i o a s d ~ ~ e D m p b i m dthe6rs&ghaSaaitiqueishld OPdenmackarghtoutTbenthe +kYbnatOLarrafarthecumA

a situpticp rhich might d h i n

comb.tmmptanin.
\pk chat (for

AnaicMaboa d t h e p c 0 H e m ~
)LwoP?cDoLL

tankswill pocscddrram a w i d e d e y

ad take a hill axupid by infantry


sevenltbouvradyardsawa Tk tanks mOvealt incolumn J a s tbey
advancageof avaihbk cover d a m cealwnt. Takingpositioninturm &ladqthetlaLcolm=kr is infomltdbytheinstnrmrthatamobilc gun is in position two tbousond pards a w a y t o t h e l d t h t Tbeshldent commaaderpkbabeacr positim and m o the ~ tank hull &lade firing position, on advice o f the instructor. SNdent gu8ncs then choose their ammunition and if thdr chaia a new position, the d withdraws picking primaq and rseooduy paiis wrong they are cocrectcd by the in- a d f i r r i s m a a e d a g a i n . This-tioas. It t a c h e s v o f f i r e w , smlccor. FromtheaonthepuMllnr p a n t i d y simple maneuver requires essential to tankers and toughens king probkm i s m the hands of the the utmost coordination between thm to combv principles tbey mrp students as they sight and 6re the tanks. Theinsmrtorsgrudethenu- be called U p tollscin eitbao&ngun. This fint phax is repeated in dent aews by handin the Srst phase sive a defensive war." d i n s * m c e s , u the end o f which but in the seomd, the students have TbelargeaocticalproMan~iS a critique and orientation for the SCC- full respmsibility and insnucton act thebattalionin&. Asaclintax andplaaseisheld. bthesecond to battalion the cweand-aassafetyotktrs the insauaa snres as safety by the trainee One of the most intaesting prob half day d y and merely points out the c q p lans is the tank versus tank situation. battalion camrmrda. It begins as in the event the student tank ann- In thk action, uciliring h14 tanks, ~ g i v e t h e c a n r m p d a a n man& misses thrm in his obsavl- crem and vehicles arc pitted against orientation of the problans and the tion. each otha usin live . 3 0 caliber am- ObjjvesheistOtake. TbebattalAnotherillusmum istheBicvck munition. twoor three tanks ion then goes into bivouac and p m Lake night problem. In this p b k take defensive poritioas and are at- d w i t h c h c p r o b k m . Actingas a tank platoon is engagsd in a recr~ tacked by an equal number of &en- umpires, as in maneuvers, are rbt inglade movement. The tanks Inass dve tanks. The tanks are completely rtructa personwL The en& probtheir fire on an o b j j to COVCI a buttoned up. As the defensive tanks lem, invoh-illg sinyaght PnL, is h k Asonesectionoftheplatoon take position i n hull &lade, the of- completed before any nrggatiarrs Q mwes out. the otbei continua to h e fensivetanksmoveaut. Usin maxi- correctiansaremdc. AsinpLE#m at a simulated m h - g e ~ ~ m mum ~ rm e r ami& k e y at- and ~ompany pcobkms infantry is k. When thefiDstsectionhas taken tempt t of i r e and maneuver and knock used in supporrof the tanks throughout the defensive element T e n hits _out the &tire two and a half days Camp Invin has nine tank 6rmg on either an o k s i v e a defensive tank constitute a kn0cked-t \.e- ranges. Therearesixtactialpobhn hick. Thus far, there have been no ranges two gunnery nu- and a cvpalties d e e d among students o r spedalrangedevaedsddpto6liag t a n k s d i n d e f i l d c p o r i t i o n . In insNaxs One impressed soldier gave his addition there are two anciaixu& thought on rhis pa&ldar problem. artilk?? ran- which are d by *It gives us (the defcmse) a chance Satiod Guard and Rcrcrn units in to fire at mpreuvering tanks and a t summcrtnininganlp. H e r e is a be?Ldonn of the qn?s tbe same t i m e receive retuning he. what thkmans to me is srmplp, p?t ofnnges: I. T d H E l a m theoches gup W O I e be %Lf pou. rba Anabet,aninsmlaa advaavl !min;aam rmge). su-bu OFKaean fighhtiag,sAid: This (pmb andsub-calikmaniprLaoneaaciw km)reallyceache5checrewsto~ ' lo00 inch range). 2. Mln~arget-sub-calibermrrrrontheirtoesin-*and

rbt a u l m t ' S

hirtbarghto

phopc

FatherscadphprC,thefinal in the aientation O P d t a t tZ spaiamdtheop aptimrdthetont Tbccldrrinobjaxivc is

stnusxmcdyactsasasafetyo86ca inqulatingthedireaiondfire. He rmy,in==i--e%


+tPrgcbbutftK

armmorrdfrmrthnan. This tssppharc mining is important. First of all, it cmates initiative on the part o f each crew member by
givinghimachancetobeinstnrted in a trticzl problem, and then being cestedinasecadphase. Thatis,he is guides by hand through the lem and given a free t o r u n t b e d haseasheseesfit. ~n odditioa t h e d and platoon comnuaden and hadat are able to grasp the situations and then apply the instmaion immediately to a somewhat dmilv paMan using their own judgment. As one M 4 6 student driver said: "ForthefinttimeI'vebeenable to rmdastirad the proMemsof the entirecrew in runnings tactica prob lem. H ~ t h e s e p r o b l e m s w e r e exptipca to me i n training manuals and by insauaas but I think it takes hthand experience to really grasp what a tank crew is up against in a cambat sihlation." Illustrative o f this, the Garlic

S t u E Z E

E!!

"&

The ARIETE:
Italr's
J

Armored Brigade
pmpm i s to prepare each sddier

DO get tougher.

by UEWENAM C O l W E i R. GUERCIO

~.

.aChiisana~ Gijii Subscription t o


7

ARMOR

or a seledon o f gift b o o k available


T l R U l C l T I E BOOK BE.PARTMEHT
1 0

, -

1951

11

, .,

-bar-Ochbu,

1951

..

long nnge'antitank capabilities It gives him armor advice on his staff. hll of rherc are corsrultly and im-

a@nsttheChiacrcRbd+-T%eROK
regimaltalcanmvrdadtht

Regiment's Tank Company


mi6 but ntkr a Decd for mofe rtma tIaining for infantry com-

mediately available. This amstant av?ibrbilit;rp d u d e s ahlltims where t k infantry regiment might find k l f completely saippcd o f armor, and hence of its primary antitank masures since enemy armored astacks will be launched to take advanrage of surprise and wealnas, there would nor-

thoDc tanks s p e wt b e m ~ same tcll miles o f advance per day!


AnotberamsidNatiollinfavorof

the integsd tank company i s the OIploimion of a local surcess which

may not have been anricipated 2nd for which no rank attachments fmm division would o r i @ have bern quested; the regimental tank company would b 00 hand t o meet this d l y n a t k r i m e m c a l l f o r a t a n k unforrrecn dcompany from a dirisional tank batIn the qimental tank company. t a l i o n . A regimend cOmpOnY, in- we have a unit which is already inte -1 with rrgiwntdphns and grated in? the team. This sinration ations, d beon tbe scene.

v-

Intheucpvlsianofthesuccessful

rmnkrca4therrfac,inacased con6darc m tank unit commanders.

Iacban landing, my regiment enEountered d rrciavlce from an


enemy

istbeLyllaeforthe a succedd team. Only


ampaation i s attained will

tbe aplhilitiaof the -tal tank camp kfullyexpbitedandthe


-value!

unit whatarethe tKJ of the ampany and b T v e they been Immc out in Korea? * The current organization of an int

dta

provide the infantry

rect command. It supplia him with

~ t armor h under his di-

faroe well situated in a mount?inous stronghold sauth of Suwon. Initially, due 60 the nature o f terrain and the fact that enemy annor seemed to be opposing the Eighth + m y advance to tbe south, asmot Oppositioa t o the q b e n t was not coIlsidmd a scriou t h r e a t . Nonetheless, a tank c o m p y was employed with the regiment. On the d night in thc area, t h e n a n y attacked averts last minute co~rdinadondi&at midnight,downawinding, maun- d t i e s that invariably arise when tainats road, with h e tanks. Four o f & arc iswcd bytily. I know of t k were knocked out by tank f i r e . few insmces in Kara where attack RegardlesJ of its antitank mission plans allowed sdicient &ne for pria and numerms seccduy capabilities, 'planning in which to enable a IKW' the regimental rank company Will be membertobeproprlyio d W 2 employed primarilp in the rok ol in- the team. Frequently, Z o jump fanay support. The mere presence given late at night for attacks t of armor docs much to eliminate the off the following dawn. ;Mart units fear of a potential enemy tank at- involved in the.a d Lns would ensepo5itack and the t e a m feeling encour- b e d d i n n i g h t ages the foot soldier. For. in spite of tiom thus 6xodinatilm plans were % k d t t o makc. As a part of the b W Y d v a t i + d o f & my tanken knew the bati n d i d d antitank weapons, the doughbov abne is 1l0( psychobgdJy ta ion and company commanders quipped to soad up to an enemy thtoughout the regiment. M y awn dosely t k l in with regiarmored attack. He knows he can work w 1 ~ 2 and $3. This had great cape with enemy infantry, but he is mental s always amcemal8bout thk machine common advanrage. 'The rmdeguacy d maintenance gun emplacement a that tank p sition.AnrcompPPryin fncndlytank dispdstbacconcern; canseeit tsofthc with him, h haws it will move PrimarpCOnCCmOf oqpizatian. d e n be move& d he knows What divisional nMPba s duly justi6ed but tbe it can d o . The regimed tank corn- The concern i p a y provides this support always at propoSa that an a a r k d tank amsupport the dlspal of i n f a n t r y battalion pany with maincanmaadaimmtdiatelyuponrr- frQmt b e ~ b e a l i m w u u l d k m p o take inm aammt ~ o n t w o d i & r r n t a m s i o r y bate!r & hils t platoons of my cam y were at- allthehcpiptbearcproMansdo tached t o elemam o t % 7 t h ROK a r i s t i n t h e ~ t a r s f t u p b u t t b e y W o n during o&llhive opaatioos are nat iaaumountabk. Most d our

T-

:dm2p2&tbem3rz

v 1951 ,

A R M N C U L ',

1951

I d ,

tachments d such a urut should be requested unless such a &sioa is trouble arises in tbe i n & tank contempbted. There are actudly few OCCaSjON in canbat [in Korcll when LrnpanY. certainconddcratioamuabegiven aregimentaltank-isysaP [hedistiaccian b e t w m the intangible Med. and umwof tbcsc arc not usualfeeling of an infantry caamvrder tD ly warranted. ceaenlly. thc tank company will llKnr 'ogetber wben ward a tank unit which is h i s o u t 6 t a n d a t a n k u n i t w i c h i s accompanying the regiment 00 hog ~ r r a ~ k Thk d . M-e, +ugh ~ n -admiIlis&ative or te42hnL.ll marches. Intentional, may be de6ned as deep However, some delibaatho should concern over his own outfit and mere be given the matter of iatmpqsing t a l d i h interest f o r the -bed unit which tanks t h g h the * has its own "parents" T a n k o f the Iar column for protection; tbe ma+ iin war^ inregimental tank company have cbse is of no little s :ies o f friendship thmu hout the regi- \-olving "Bad" tactics G l u m n s are nent and are not simpy regarded as subject to ground attack whik oper-mangers who may be gone tomomow. ating a n y w k in the combat zone. For the redepbment of X Corps Normally, the regimental tank company will operate with two or three from the I n c h area to the East mast platoons attached through the regi- of Sorth Korea. my company was ment while the fourth platoon under- attached to the &\ision tank battalion p s a maintenance treatment. The and all tank units moved togdm mion at Cbosin Reservoir, previous- LST.SteanwhiIe, my regiment mcn-ed ly described, represeas the only occa- overland to Pusan by mom a m v v . sion in six months wherein my com- About midway on this march, deep pany fought as a unit. For this rea- in what was collsidercd friendly terrison,only a few days' training in com- tory, the co"Y0y was ambusbed, suspany t a c t i c s should be included in the taining casualties. The presence of schedule of a regimental tank cum- armor in this column wmld have pany. Compeny size missions should beaten OfF the enemy attacks and be the responsibility o f a company of might well have discauraged the atrhe division tank barnlion and no at- tack in the b t place. Armor acc~m-

po?, decorations rad

rd

If

FROM THE K O R E A N FROM

A SMALL.UNIT ACTION-

The author's coinbat experience i n support of his views on remining the regimental tank compvly
time, I was becoming increasingly concerned over

bridge

at

hold E and maintain fire on A whik attempted to evacuate two tanks from C with thrown tracks and to dislodge the two kn0cked-t tanks at the bend that blocked the me-way road. Due to the icy onditionsand the intense small a m he, bothof tbeselatter attempts failed; we sustained a number o f casualties in the recovery operations. W e knocked out the two disabled tanks and the companv withdrew to D . Though umwxsdd i n h e twoday action, we had crippled a C b regiment, thereby relieving the p sure on our own regiment. Marshes. icy roads m o ~ n t l i n s and 3 0 below zero temperatures merely handicapped our operations. Had my company not been in+ to the regiment, I doubt that armor w d have a c c a n m the regiment into this terrain; bowever, we karned thmugh n d t y &at th handicaps d be o ~ c o m e and we played an bportant part in this and l a t e r operwas ordered to

the E which had no by-paa. Tbe founh p b m

ations.

17

In America the Field Army is not a bed organization s mde up of a number o f corps and army mops. but i Neitber do the corps +e a 6xed organization. There am, bowever, three types o f divkion-infantry. armor, airborne-that may be included in variable proportions in corprapd6ddarmier Xiambining a nrpcriaitp m m o b i l i t y gives the essential frredom Of acriol,in o&nbve apratioIlJ and greatly enhvrccJ defensive clpobilities against superior fofies. The U n i t e d States i n b a y divisim i s a highly mobile fighting ' u n i t when QllllpMd to its facign counterpam. With addithid truck tnnspat?tion, it becomes a mechanized divirioo m fact and capabilities Our airbome divisions. ofcoursc, aremos~mobile though their awn element, the air. On the ground, du n i t s are provided with full tracked combat d k k s to give them croscountry mobility. T h e combination of these complementing divisicms, infantry, ahbome, and a d . with adequate kgistics arpportk the real key to tactical mobility in our l v g c r k AtanetimetheNinthAnnyinWestem Europe was cOmpOSed of ten infantry and four armored divkhs t k Third Army had tem infantry and five armated divisions the Fira Army had nine infancrv and t h r e e d d i v i d a n r ; a n d tbe Seventh Army had nine infantry and two ddivisions. In various situations airbome divkkms d k t i d y participated with this pup iugof infantry and annored units. If we are correct in aatingthatmobility isephvrced by incrrasing armor in the Field Amy, it would fdbw that the United States ofannorshouldbethemore hy4tha= mobilt.Tbe &of the Third h ~ w o u l tend d t o iuusatc t h k In Decaaber d 1944 when Von Rmdstedt sbud; from the =I with his highly mobile pvua amy, tbe mapt elements of the u n i t e d states Third Amy in a mpttaof two d a y s were swung b u g h a9Odegrre*ofdircction, fiomaposirion facing the Skgfrkd L i n et o a fulkcale attack against the southern fixe of the frmarr Bulge. T h i s same operation illustrates c&ctive mobiliq of combat forces m strategic defensive

011

The most mobile combat ckmeats of the Field Army the ground am the light armored cavalry regiments

the annored divisions and the separate t a n k battalions l s s i g a e d ~ e a c h t o t b c t p p e c ~ r pThoughwtiaherr en+ m o m i d , the infhh-ydivision can be quickly con-4ctobarFIILy

w r t a I t o a d division by th attachment o f d- iti'bcn our buildup tus reached tbc sa@ r h ,lent motor teap~poc~ to carry its dismounted ekmeap. can passover totho8enSirr. then must we b e ?t a ~ulnerabk spo t o hat N%h its organic tank^, d i n g two battalions. lad a to masour fomsqukkl~ r-compafv, %e motorized infanp), division through the hoaile forres before thr\ a n tmng up reinforcemen& once hating a c h e d the w . is we^ suited to pmv& continuing tlase cooperation in mobile columns with arnux capable of srriking darp into mobile armored combat is the enemy rear are vital to the expbitatiocl of thisb o t h e r vital factor i n the mobility of a Field Itypical example of such exploitation is the United :he &ectivenes of t k tactical air sup R given i t In . rllodern warfare, the pound forus that ve a close t a d - States Third .+my which M e clear d tbe C k r u u n a ! r lam .~lairsupportarefora~~tci.ndeed. Theextent towhich defenses at .\vrariches on I . \ u p 1944. and 12 d had c d the seine River to the erst. Uas investing -his tactical air not the &t ,tectivenes, but as0 the mobility of tbe ground forces B r s t ~ m i k s t o t h e \ ~ a t . a n d k l d t h e l i n c o f t b e ~ River on the wuth. .Jnnocbeminimited. Speed is d great imponance in pursuit and the .%my The airborne division, vansported by air and coordi1 . d with mechazllzBd ' gnwrdfofies,becomesamajor Commander shouM be prepad to push h a r d the f the .%my at tbe fim indication of an neans of haeasing the mobility potential of a Field mobile elements o \my. While in the air it adds a degree of mobility to the enemy cetfogfade movement. In this connection. bowr\-cr. u s t be remembered that pursuit of an e \my which may be considered p m m t e to the speed it m enemy is a hazardous undertaking. It is. thadore. of \ ith which the Army cammander can efFect a juncture of highest imponance that reconnaissance in the air and on l i s airborne and ground troops. The infantry diviion, which is now organically the ground be stepped up to tbc maximum in or& thu bol?ncc and quipped with tanks md antitank guns, is a basic major the pursuing forces may not be aught -1ghtin unit in the Field Army's role of assault or defense. surprised by the enemy. In t h u evens a competent indli;t is s t 8 tzue that all a h e r arms and services exist for and gence sewice should forewarn the canmvrder 50 b bi: dedicate their efforts 00 the mission of the infanu).. The cwld either stop the pursuit. or ccmcentrue quickly tbe ract that tanks and ccnmtermeasures against tanks are now n e c e s q npe of troops at a given point and timc for the x p i c to the infanty division, emphasizes the role of purpose of count&ng the enemy's Mians or break@! d o w n his'resistance. In this phase of apentiats tbe object in infantry COmbQt Built around the tank as the main striking weapon. the. should be to bring final ruin upon the aremy means ~rmored divkion comflements the infantry division. Ad- of continued and uninterrupted arcion througbart the day wbea and night. This last can bst be taming by deep penetration or by mobile troops are disposed in depth. envelop the enemy's b n k , armor r enables an arThe i m NS of mobility and fire The measure o f the mobility of a Field Army depends m~red L i o n to d e deep into e e n e m i s communi- not only on the mobility of the figbting faces rkmphes. cation zone. With its inherent mobility and shock action. but also on the capaci~ and kibilitl; of the suppb symnor paralps an enemy threat to a d v d infantry tem. Afm the St Lo breakout in &summerof 149). tbe formations. As a result, armor provides a b i b l e member Twelfth A m y Group had ba)ancebforces of mobile infanof the F i e l d Army's 6ghting team. cry and armorsu6cient t o m e to the Rhi9e. tack o fs u p Armor aids the inhntry committed to a defensive mis- ply capacity in a newly invaded cuuntq with damaged sion by providing a mobile force for counterattack. In railroads and long lims o f c u m m u n i c a ~hawever. addition, it is the c o u n t e r b c e to the threat of enemy f o d there armies to sit befre tbe SKgfried Line until armor. Together tbey can provide an economical unit s a v e m b e r , when &&Ve operations 0 more became equipped with the implements of war to accomplish the feasible with a guaranteed supply of fuel and ammuniwide variety of missiaaJ required of the Field h y . tion. Tbusit issam that mobilit). is not mere+ a matter best mobile of such equipment equipwnt Unha can b iteis a adequately millscone tied supplied. to a camthe Although the Anny Commander is nut responsible for of organization or weapoly he certainly q n have an influence on both. The Field Army, to carry out the mission mander's feet Mobility, tbereforc. also includes tbe means large nockpihs of supplies and assign4 should 6e arganired and equipped 50 as to have to support mobi the greatest h e power and mobility possible in that part the means of getting them to the rapidly m i n g troop5. But @.en all cbese means. ibe equipaent and the sup of the theater o f operations in which it is committed. Some individuals have questioned the need for strong plies. witbout m e n d mobili? in command aDd d the r be atrained fTan the mobility in the Field mob& forces in a defensive periodof w a r . Because of the m o ~ cannot vast frontages involved and the d o u s o&nsive b y . is a OurconclusioD is that mobili~in a F i e l d pqwer o f modem p o n s , a situation such as existed in W o r l d War I involving a continuous l i n e of d e f m with nesessq'aset that must be baLnced against logktxs Banksrestin oasccueobrtacksiswtapttorexr. W e capacity, communicatiam, wather. and terrain obarles. must fight t%e phases d any futurr war on the Superior mobility is an essential in a c h i n g rrtic?l susyrtcm of mob^ ckfense," a line h g a natural (or periority. Insaivingforiacnandmobilit)-oftheField artificial) obrtacle, lightly held and becked by strategrallp A m y , that military priaclple of geaing tbcrr "hwest with located lughly mobilt forces quickly to reinforce a thxcat- the mortat- is even mocc imporrant mday than abm ened point a d imndiately counterattack a penetration. U t m e d many years 180. Great mobility and amored saiking power are essential if LT. GEN.W n u s D .C such adefene is to succeed.

&.

"fe""8

1951

ARMOR-LII.'IL---Odobar,

1951

19

. -

armnr;lpdm?nd lcoders llwst lcam to w a d think f a rha than tbt tboupnd y d of slugging to their next objective The expbitation o f an m e x p e c d o r unforesuccess i s tbe mast to be desired maneuver in war-

impmmmcncin this diftaion. Frwn the regiment down,

fare

to combat. Our troops have beanne too road bound; allof them too anxious tori& into battk. W e m u s t =instill in the infantry tbe a n and capability of covering ground rapidly by on foa and i n being in fighting condition at r a v e must ruthkssly eliminate equipment from the pman of the soldier that does not contribute directIy

As& emmds to wider fnmts, c w a i q g r a t e r ~mobilitybaxmvJmoredmrmimporuntorigimobility WAS o m 6 d primarily to the indivj&al rddier. But as the degree of complexity of war I d , tbe suppoltiag&ts i n 4a d foo, had to in<rcase chcir mobility to match that ofthe tiont line s o & . If this were not done, the iocceased mobility of combrat mops w d be wasted, as the s u p ply and support ecbdons would not be able to keep up with the front. History is lete with examples where the mobility of fire pomr m & w i t h adequate m o b i l i t y of logtstral sapport has given professional success on the httle6eld. Perhaps aae of the hest was the s w i f t swing \f the German annks though Belgium and-northern Fraace in World War I. It i s believed by most students d military hiSt0r)r thPt only the blunder of OM s t & oficer prevented 8 d and early victory by our enemy in -hat war. A study of the first months of world War I , h o w that the pmfesshal German army o f that t i m e had mastered the combined movement of uoops. weapons and loglsbc s u p
pori.

+. cal
gib-

PPQ, and future wars may flnd unia fighugcn w a y vpylocd fnrpf?ges with hagc g a p or Ildimq-1 in between. Panic&+ could this happen oo t k Lrgcr ODlltiDCDg the& armor?ndaba%rhidah\.e

on

thecomrmDder a mans o f iDcrcasingbah his psiand sfllfegral moblily thus. &a& an be d . noap &re q q concentrated, fire power shifted at a p a c e. 4 a number of yean ago. .\IotaLed transports. bo& track and u betled have contributed to theability o f the suppl\ echelons t o keep up with and adequarely support this incrr?sed ground m e bility. But rhere is a definite technique in k t i n g and haadling tbese res~urcesm-hirh must be masted

commandandd.
.A receht addition to the field of na -has increased. and in the future. to the mobility of mops and Su*

In zumrmrioa, the mobility of units i s the cambination of eikient bading and utilizatioa of available panopo~, mend mobility and individual mobility. As we improve in tbac hkb, we will achieve better unit mobility. In addition, unit mobility can improve with eEectiVmas of signal awmunic?tioa. We are making satisfactory technlcal p r o p s in this kkl, but muss carry on further and indodnarion i n the use of all means available.

tobatth-.

LT.Cue. JOHN R. HODCE.


4 4 4 9

nnn the earliest times, the greatest captains of history have been those who have been able to inatast the m e bilityof.chirPooprabavetbatoftheiradvenaries.This irrreaad mobilitg has usually resulted in more efective f i r e power. It maMes thearmmaader t o b e e r and easier shift his h e pasrrr as llecumq, quickly and surely to d e rkckive point, w o r e the aKmy can react.

O u r own American campaigns in . % c a and France In World War I1 showed our professional recopition of these princ i p k a l o . Hmever. his-tory is replete with examks of military operations ited at the crucial m e mentor d t i ngin defeat when combat units too rapidly outstrip their l o u . em. b a s gistical support.Two wellknown examples d in World War II. The British which ~m be apd airin Noah Africaat a~ timewere in h o t pursuit of Fbm- quarttitics of itme1 w i t h evezy hopeof clinching a uick victory west of nansponed must amtinue. Hand in hDd witb this &Cairo,.whn nrddeoly they found had ouwripped veiapment and ccse?fch must p hldia to incrczrc the theirpline,andmotmm?iotenancesupporr. Them- mobility of troops adwcingon the@ Etrectively em loyak this incrr?lcd mobilitp win encial moment passal-Rommel escaped. Again. we rememuse OC availabk troaps and ber when Patton with %Third Army felt that he could able tbe most a&ntathis rn pu~theGermanfolceson his front beyond the Rhine fire pmer. However, to most dcquatelp - t o a d u s t be de\.elopsd andcrushordarronlae ~ o n l y t o f i n d t h a t b e h a d bility, means m outstrippedhis~supportand that further advance to the mobility of thesupporting troop5. Tbekmarscdmobilitp nassavailabkintk Ficld Anny wasnotpracticable ?haaodaberkaofisrhouldbe bome in mindby amlbrat commanders t o h U I e that Bexi- is primarily proyided by machine%saps have been aLea arr being depekpsd t o enabk bility 1M1 mobility of fire power can be s u r d by xnm and othrr irnpxma~ts bilekgkticllsuppoztPhosu&iendy%b toinsurethe the logistical support to mainpin the p r e a bp tbecosp movement a d mainoffire power of the cunbat bat troop. However. all thk inncpscd mobility slrill bt tothe~bbwofvictory. Thisrrquifes of tittle avail unkss a great percent?gc of tbe mrhincs planlungandtbem0aPainst;l~ and fighting vehicles are srvicabk and avaiIabk at the i m e and place needed. Inmead d l i c i a q and attentian supervisionof opcrahn. Tbe CannUDder must provide 11- t cemate IanstoinsllrBaribilityandmusthaverrscnns tomaintenanazmustbeanziped Basidy.sinccannm s pliady f m m ~ o f a l l ~ i t of mob& bgisdcal support capable of sudden and direct bility i withthedrivaandcmwand movement to thecritical aleas at the critical time. If he . Na olllp his fails to do this. he may 6nd his bgkticll support dir- continues tbrougll the C h a i n of d sipated or tied u m u n p d t a b k ways at the vcry dmc maintenancehecomeavid frnrrmsmocgicand trh he it t n ldvantage the moment oppor- cal d t v . hut the cost of mobilitp in Qlknhrrrrocbed ~ W t yh NOCarnmaDdcI wou)c1 W g l y out- sucb s t a d kigbts that maincmmrc bas b c a a beavp *-in W Mtion?l eCmaanp. striphisbgiaicalsopport Proprty anpbped. propatp maiat?iaed, an mobibty Fnmtpgcs in war have been pdually exttn&d i n tbc

Em

Thc speed and rangc of the mod& airplane m u s t be fully -bid in order to gain maximum results This m w be doDe in botb the transponation of combat elements and the aerial supply and Rsu* of canbat tToops.. % r t l a n s p t has p'ogressed to a point where it is now feasible tocusider the t r a m p o m t i o n of most major items of equipwnt w i t h which cambat troops are equlppd. Thk ympl? means that airborne and air-di~isioasw i l l be a& to e n g a s in combat o a sustained nature. being resup plied Kith all c b o f itemsby air *or air W g s . The combination of air-transported troops. airbnne and air-landed and air-supphed. with hi&b mobik ground troops advancing t o a j u c t u c on thc ground. will give commanders in future caneia a mdst e&ctive combination to outmanewer future enemies and will m-

%v

m.

tase

U--Oc+r,

1951

A , I

1951

21

was mobility.

have obraped that General EiscnbosDcr held out substan* no reserve i n Wa~emEurope during W d War

same

&* htkckfawdWamaEurope~.aad mmcstocberareasofto tbe fieewald,idaiority i n strength can bat be o&et bp


this k achieved On the continent o f Europe, mobor rail, and air transport \\ill figw l a r g ein tbemobilitp of k l d vmier Spread over a piece of Gemany samezoOby 3OOmik rheSeMlth A m y obviously must be mobile man e 2 d extent if we am? t o be notice. And we aim o excel in

worse y* seat-bound The E i @ Army rrpated this a r t o f d i l k u l eadymtbeKaanwar*dwbalit

amecced, &thg &CklXJl naC Norhingcouldbe moredangnousthan far thehlerican Army to e=+ depeadam on its feet for an Zngine. Much b a s h said on the s u b j j but ~ l o w l ~ :ban eva we must raist the easy course of d o m g c ~ r ) . thing sitting down! Tbis thought may d marc phib sophical than the partial vim tobeexpected from rh commander of an active Feld .&my, but I am certain it hitsthe heanofthe matter. The free world will survive only if it is defen&d bp s o b whose mind0 are able to direct their fect to morrt t d and kill the enemy. Defensive warfare, as much as any OtheT kind, d o n l y wben ddias will madaf

o ~

. -

2s

kid-.,.

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a .

.-

Amphibious Tank Experiment

A NEW SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


a
D

Robath Lavat,tbeww senaaryof Defense, e


n t d

GovammmtravicemDsemba,1940,whnhansIp

p o i n t e d s p c r ? l l s s i s t m t t o t b e ~ o f W a r .InApd 1941, hewasnamedAssis*urt seacrary of w a r fa Air, in which capacity he s 6 k d until t b e d of w o r l dw a r II. He was UDdarcactvy of State under the Hononbk G e o r g e c .Mvshau ncently appointed Semeraq of Dc fenrc, from July, 1917 to Januuy, 1949, after which be m e d to th N.Y. investment bonLin%ad 6nn of Browo BtorhmHarrimonPadCo~ofwhichbe heenapartnerfaserrenl~ Mr. Lowtt was born i n Huntsville, Texas, on September 14, 1895, the o o ~ lof Ju -and Mn. Roben Stoa he n. . He was educated at Y U n i d v (BA. class of 1918). took p o s t p h a t e caunes at H d Law School (1919-lw), and Hvvard Graduate School o f Businep ..

A d m m s m h (19arrZl). In 1916 he pined the Aerial Coast P a d Unit No. 1, organized by F. T m k Davison (the fint Assistaat Secretary of W a r fa Air) as a naval reserve p p , and learned to8yat Pat Washington, L. I. This m t was a b sorbed by the Navy at the o u t W of Wald War I. As a naval ensign pilot Mr. Lovat went to France in August1917. ThathewonhisknchWings~gland be planes, at Tours, in the autumn o f 1917. established a U . S . Naval A i r service T r a n s i t i o nw g School in the hll t d 1917. Fnwr November, 1917, to Jaw 1918 he was arsiped to the Ragal Navy Aid savice at F e w England

boets OD the N o r t h Sea submatine and pan0 andcaoypatrol. He then saved with the RNAS, 0 night barnbas i n hanceagainsc &German salbasa of BruZeebruggeandosrendlodmanh?llm -gmrds=Jshaps in occupied Belgiumand France. H e became a strong advacated bombing d o n the barit d rrfao prrpared at that time the Navy Depvtsrmt fonaed the U A orthem

A R M ,-

1931

1 I

MEDITERRANEAN

5E

TURKEY BUILDS SI IRMOR BACKBONE

w 1951 w

A MESSAGE FROM TEE COMMmDIlV >ENERAL OF TEE ARMORED CENTER

Ir
iog

bagreatpkasureformc mletumtQtheHomeof AnnambeGlamtandillg

rrnmldTbeAllmredCenta.& oac ab0 bas km associated with


Annyitkadkrinctivcprivlhgetobe in a porition which enables me to

~ s i p c c i t r ~ i n t h e

to that our &TadUtes are prop crly noorifiea to tbcir roles in

meCtingtbc---demands
During pod r u t

- -

suproiettbc~dfuactioa-

d Tbe Amrard s c b l and

fatrpiocd~spciplisg
to

world

W a r II, Amra bas grown in S i q empbpawnt, d Colllpladtv. Examples of d i v a r i d methods ofanpbyment


ofannrMmyriodandwellb d I shallnot dwell upon them here. The Armmd school will, however. continue t o k tkkader in the neveradingaudyoftbermnyapplications of Arms to the doctrines of warfare. chanp M cansrplltly king made in equipmat, logistia, d tactics for tbe more sumodul employment of OUT ann. The Annored schod has always been in the faefIont in the deemhwh andapplicationof these changcr and will cauy on m that role. Th sandads of the School have, since its founding, been high; the
calikrofipstruawm bas

the maprityof t h c x m o n -h oqn e s batllesballeverbebstbecruocArmor k aba mcmbea d tbc tam. We will present-as we h - y s have failed t he-iasPucooa - annewoechniqws The interat of D e Armored equipment, aad e h .HOW- school doa noc lie entirely in tnipever, we will n o t s&ay fmn current ing~.9naorpanmbclwearellso n tbe forgiog of raw Itlaorganiz?tion andapntion so far that interested i what tbe scbool tearhes can have no t e r i a l i n t o A r m a ~ ? a d J d d i m T o accomplish this, we have estab p d applicatioa. e d tbe oaim GDdidate spanI dowtamtanpLtcthat OUT nain- w ing shall imbue prsonnl with the ment andmandfiedtbcwortd the idea that Armor, a m y Othr branch, 3dArmaedDivisiolr.Tk0860 is tlite. We must d l remember that Candidate Dcpvrmcntd notmver wearepartofarmm, tksucccsof entirely clvswm wotk, but will also which is deprnderrt oL1 the succes- i n c l d much physical training and in addition to that i n ful manipllation of all its pans We field stm&.ln m t k persod moral code shall include i n all w training tbe idea o teamwork to the end that no needed to start t h e young O&CK

been excel-

lent. I do not intend that there shall be any change m thk policy but shall insist that OUT efForts remain at the same admirable level. One frequently hears that the scbod mrha only theory which does not mincidc with theexperience of a l l o f h r s . A c t d y , the School teaches a compilation of the experiiencesof rmnp 086Car By using what is larnrA at the school in oonjunction with What he haskprned from -m&dbeequipped t o any ordinary situatian and

!-

I .=

ddito Iir l I

F R O M KOREA
A TANK COMBAT BRIEF

b.: :
,j'

_ . .

-OR

.............. . ............
capitalize to the fullest 011

NOTES

annmand car, 90 tie movie crew borrowed a jeep ad amw!rtal it into a olrrrm vehicle by building

adsbdlYouadit It isaqrcaed that the 6lm will be released this f a l l . Titkbasyettokdeddedupon.

tborc Amcricla chaetai s t i c r - i u d L a c r w - h , ecc.-whncin we kd theworld.... k the begmmngof the Korean War we rad in &e headlines drat 'AI\lERIC.US TASK$ NO
MATCH FOR T 3 4 . Ofcoume that referred t o w light t a n k You alI know that our first voops went to Kortl with only li ht tank, whicfr b what t h y equip+ w i $ i n j a F , tor -pltio~ PlrpOEcr And aur bght tank3 were knocked out by t k RussianT-34r Butwesam bad medium t a n k shipped from the States, in actionout there-ad it is reponed that in e v q single exrounter to date ouc d u m r have lrnoclcd aut thc R & T-34~. we think ou guns arc kna,our fileumtrd

*,

. ThrfoUowi~gisorr~fronarecentspeech by Lt. Gm.WiUis D.C-ger, Commmding Geneml of First Anm and President of the U. S .
AmKwAzcociptia. *Ib& hi

New Y d City.

. By way of explaining why armor is so important apartofourAmerican any, it is only neceaary to remember that war k a n a d &m. Accodingly. w y should . capitalize those Ameri. andonachievements can acpibutcs,

m i d r p w

The Congress Dunces!


his ?&bility, i s the Ausniul Empcla. the rrpcsenptiveof t h e most paternal desp0asmth;lteVaariacd. " H e is hbimili?n. King of Baagainst Napdeon Bonnplnc in 1 8 1 3 . varia. in wborc frank countenance to 1 In capture 8 1 4 ,it invaded Paris. France next and year belped it you can read the arpeaion of his . L h )'ou Sec that ph q u i l i n e nose, near saved the day at Waterloo and in 'nk rrrm with an a *t c h a d the b h far to the King of B a v h l That is the mto nlght. OId Bluecber wanted King of Dtnmark, wbose cheerful t o bbw up the Jam Bcidge across humor, and lively q a t e e s enh-en the seine because o f its nunc, but the royal paftiu-thq call him the they disntaded h i ml y changing the merriest of the brigade of m-dgns. . . That cdoss?l figure. levring "obnoxious title." He thaught they aught to Hang the Cordurn, and Db- against the column, w b bulk is not member France i n the"pdisb" man- kssened by the folds of his ample ner. But he was w d by saner domhro, is the King d W U l t e m b and next t o &him is his sm,the C r o w n minds. In t k fall of 1 8 1 4 . with Bonaparte PMce, wbosca&aion forthe Grand Mt OCF to the bLnd of Elb?; the DudKss of Oldenburg has brought ratherthanthe great ones of Eumpe met at Vienna h i m t o t h e b settlementofpu licbusinesrthatwill forapcstward+math.k weremany weigh pobkmJtobe sxmbehisown. Allthis~nmdof discussed, f m & e L h h a d shifted PeMnaga, who arc buzzing around s ale e i k reigning princes a d .the boundab o f all of Europe, made u and unmade! Kin* and introduced dukes, or great dignitaries fnm variwidely their Bourgpaif anti-feudal re- OUJ countries. With the excepjon of forms A l l the d d , in the eyes of a few Englishmen (easily distinthe richness of their the oldschool d i p b t ~ W?S , ' ~ p s y - guished ~ ~ e and y amcual. , Their watchword clothes) I do not see anyone witbout i s name." was "kgitimoey"-as opposed to m e a title to h And again, accudiq to a modan lutionary ways and means. The now fauutus C o n p of commentator: "Dividin the spoils at by SULIIp Vienna was descxibed as fdlowJ by a Vienna, was d e Nous festivities military Bdgian+mer:Yotfhavecoaeat the right moment. If you lite fetes balls, fireworks, hunting and eighing and balls, you will have enough of parties a tbopsand diversionr Emthem; the Congress does not go, it peror.Franz. ashost, felt morally justidances. There is, literally,a royal mob fied m draining the already sknder It . i s crying out: Peace! r e w w r c e S o f h i s ~ t r y ' S ~ ofPowed Indemnity! was his bounden duty to see that his timeAsforme,Iamalookeru.i. Allthe guests had the best +Me 6 million @indemnity I shall arL for, isa new hat, That the sum ran to 1 I have!worn mineout in taking it OE den, never seemed to irk the imperial to sowreigns whom I meet at the cor-l-lle(=tarAlexaaderofRus;iaWaS ner of every rtreet,. T a k e notice of -that &l martial figure, walking generally considered the big gun of with Eugene de Beaubarnair; that is the Congress. It was his wife that theCzarAlexulder. Andthattall, tipped Be!ethwen! AkklDda was dignified man with the lively Neapdi- s p s d i d l y a liberal, with idas of tan onhis ann, i s &e Kingd Prussia. rrfonn. H e w a n t e d t o s c c P d d r e And thm i n that Veaetinn suit. s u n c d u n d e r a p m g = s k e ~ thestiffnessdwhichscvcdycoacak tion, and Germany pmpedy united

*g=

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PM$I

s"d"

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1951

T l E F8RRESTAL DIARIES

With the American Tankes i n Germany


In WesternEnrope tbc pepmatioss for defense go forward

H u e is a story of ane p k e of NATO 1 Y t i d y

* * *

There is probably nothing like it in any arba anny. . . Captain NielsErikk& fran the Garderhusareme (The Royal Hu~saa) in Naestved who tells about this is the commamk of 15 Danish cavalry 086Cas * ~ g tanks with tbe63dTankBanaiaa at Kipin-, 18 W from Krrwcm. Wlidurg. The Danish 08;Cers "Mostao~cuwsisthehighde havebeentrainin f o f o n e ~ t h . - &talyAd*v p e of prepamhsof the Ameri- The Amencan cans. I n les than half an hour Group in Denmark arr;lllgcd the for the Danish ofeverything can be ready fora turn- training cou~sc C a r s with the First Inout The visible n Gennany. cpagthingisonwhee andin- that fantry Division i 'The bacLgnwd of our studair. All repairs are done in d i n g workskp-even the repair of in- ies" says captain rrprhlv. 'is that struments. The most unusual or- we shall now have armored CM + . W e have had both der in the barracks makes a turn- for the a out possible on a moment's notice. tactical and technjcal insuuction "he soldim' qaipment is placed and we have taten pan in two so that they can jump into it like maneuvers in regiment combat the firemen who jump L t o their p p size similar to tbe combat bocus on their wai to the fire en- p p s which will be atablisbed as prescribed in the new Danish a m y law. W e speat tbe whole @oft&atffcisc in theapen. Day and night fm faut days two d T b t A m e r r a* n S krrgimmtsweletertcduodertbe m Germany arelitelally ready to annmaadd General Samuel conturn aut all 24 b r s of the day. ky. The 63d Tank Baaalion has 'On of the things which in- 69 tanks. The Dvla worked with

."

T=

tbae tiuh"

WhathvetheDmQleamed?
rirst~foccmo&todrivethe troaps llow qad K)75 Qa cent of tbe year in theopaairudadther big PerJhing tank adsboot with o&ers norenked mcn leave the its weapons-gun and machine
bivouacarea.

Thecammrodad g u n r ~ w e h a v e l c v n e d t h e - ?rmasdartccbthe boaalion's Company A had lateStAmmc?n


nique and have becanc f a d i a r with the very adclune Qlllllil\mjlcdet t CltimDsgaCmwhichtiamthe o a dgrcc t h t we how

spent 189 Clays last yeax under opmairwitbatusiDgtarra& In mum the fad o f tbt Amaicalx5 i n

th field bun+

good-

..

HOW WOULD YOU DO IT?

4
The readwadion of'tbe Fwst A m w e d Division a t Fort H o o d , T&, brougbt 13poO j5U.e~from nine reception centers across tk W a t tbe rae of 900 a &y. Herds tbc story of w k took p k e as tbc trains rdkd in fro= Forts Devens, Sberidan, Lewis, Me&, Sam Houston, Cnster, SiU, Jackson and Dix

Filling a Newly Activated Armored Division

- .

'.

v1951 ,

~rirhtbtcdorwkl.arr~
t h c n d ~ 8 t r h e e x i t o f

acB+~MmrbaedQud placed mrrtas DQd to the Qu to conapoPdrriththtnumba.Tk militargpaliocdn?!nsoabsdrhebus c'onvoy a l q p i r k the trdn and rhe b e f a m d a t F a c H o o d d + . . -pnrxtdsd cuImdtkTbeintarricraat8u noncomrmsrawd timaamduceedI.imowina.lanm toarnsfaeochgmupfmmtheto put thesddiaaterotppdOm=k'e 10 the btoqcomplec with h i m feel that he beiag trcpocd Theamvoyhpllkdoutfor 'eccpiop area wbere it was met by DII an individd besk ntber than :he2dAnune!dDnirionBaDdd "justonematina Each i n :martial music. Whik en route the

U W S c a w the d. form Which A t t h c m X p t i m - ~ "nd baggage were UnLVvlrrl and 0x1-

thenumbcrd

.luctcd

to bonacL which had been .>dgnedtoachgpatp.Th~ 'were then allowed a short restpenod ~being~baltothedining d f o r a hotmeal,orasadrinevent :he).had lffientlyeamamealaboard ofhtypcofpersarodarmporing -he aain. PUPU P lbccipt AEsignmenoweremdetod Meanwhile, the Claclrification and M e r e n t L y p of Units the in=kgnment section was at work p~ had pcv'paring to process the newly arrived viewer. Each inI i l b Recolds arranged by auslybeengivenaqwtldfmm thrrc n i t s wbich were ,qwps arrording to d~ master rosrer to five di&rcnt type u tobe filkd. F o f a g m p l e , b e d be P + by ttoap t-epresentative. W D AGO Forms 20 assgnedv-toabadqunrtnsd were separated and placed w i t h a rec- senrice unit,acombot d headn i t a d an engineer check sheet upder L p of quamn, a line u :he cords jacket for the c o n d unit, e t c Thus k could marsh qualin making of the inonriewer. hrtavkwek had kation with pdkence i previody been designated tohandle aoignllEllL TbeDivkionTninrUNt~consinJ certain numbered group, therefose g of records ing of the 124th Armasd 5lainte simplif?ring the d nance Battalion, la md a l l i d papers. Approximately 0- hour after de- Battalion, 47th Armored Medical training, the 400 fillm were de- Battalion and the 501st Military t livered, still divided into p u p s of Police Company, 8 1s 3 5 , t o t h c l a n i f i C a t i o n a n d ~ Banalion and the 141n Annored Sig ment section, which was set up in a nal Compeny as attached unio,were the hst units to receive the fillas. large field house. General C l a r k e delivered a wel- This enabled these units to begin come addms in wbich he explained trainingadasaRsUlsrbepwere o furnish trained 6 k s to sup theminionof the 1aArmOredDivi- able t sion and tbe part the new men would port Division activities. Normally 25 men b e a c h train play m itsoperati. U n completion of General C a lr g saddres, p a p s 9 through 16 were eJcoeted to the P o s t ESC and a h & d an oppommity t o purbascs. while c;roupS 1 thrargh 8 and an equal albanent of Vaxyiq remaiwd seated andwereoriented as skills. This dze p u p was earia for to t h p d g pocedurrs. Thg the rrceiving unit Q)mpL2Lyler to oricnt, with each i n d i v i d u a l were told why thy W being F- &y essedinthisprticrkrmannerand receiving p ~ o r cattention. At the end d an iuterview a man haw they would be selected or 1swasassigned,andthe * was signmalt to various u n i t s . * ab . l. ~ Each group of 25 h t e r - o l t n a d 0 n a p ~ V i e W e d b g t h i n t a v i e w a W h O h a d Tbe assignment was then recorded

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The Peron Era

Dance of Death

Closir the Ring


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