F R A N C.

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ARMOR

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The United s t a t e s

Volume Lx

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1951

NO. 6

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LETTERS to the EDITOR
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ZACHARY TAYLOR

THE C O V E R

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Two Volume Set

$10.00

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1951

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SELF PROPELLED GUNS
Devebpments and Trends

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the much later 1

cluded nrh pomrful and mDbile Lcgirr hkeuuquc of 199 a d tbc d 1935. dl WeapOILsas 75mmguns011 hrtl-mrts. Panzer r)i\isioa c wa5tarucd. T b i strrcdtwofd~ 3 inch MI0 and 9anm SI36 on 314 lead, finding han their own experin a l b the tbe armored fcuuaafions during rbc ence the limitation of towed anti-*mk medium tank ch?sJk and L f the sapad W d i6mm h118. Tbe last. which w"?s f i l s two years o tornredanti-canlrguns aarlaimed as the best specifically designed as a tank de- wu; even in tbe German of 55 which at thu time oraskding in tbe means o f defeatiq t a n k a defense stroyer. had a maximum r d rvstem based on them lacked &xi- m.p.h. and wasoneof theatstanding technique d umoeed warfare. 3 in spice of requests from xane of tbe armored vehick designs. bility and being semistatic was inefdfWhile the desire to increase the m c ~ leading Panzer ComrmDdCrs fa fectual once.opaations assumed a pcopelhd utiikry. The I r k of inmobile charaaer. In fact its $Fg.tive- biLn of anti-tank guns was pard! ded largely on the chance responsible for the development d terest. if no( acxual OppositIOn. on tbc of bosti armor attacking just where self-propelled guns. Y) was the lacti part of tbt a r t i l k combined with a adequate numbers of anti-tank guns of tanks with effective armor piercing shortage of suitable chassis tfter meetother dcmvds p m t d a s had peviou~ly betn empla~ed.HOW- weapons. .atbough as early as 1916 ing thing bemg dme & u t this ftn wme General Swinton. the father of the ever, exactly the same guns mounted on mota carriager or in t a n k were tank. stated that the bes way of fight- time. But. a l b u g h the Genn;m three very much more &ective in eveq ing a tank is with annther tank. conrespect. Thus after the first few days tra" views. that "tanks are nor meant quarter tract aactors were the bcu a Dowing y e built. the uv of the 1940 campaign thk French ro- to fight tanks" have all too often \ehicleS f f towed mil+ in suppoR of tant duced an improvised. self-prope ed prevailed Jnce then. In consequence o 4 7 m m g u n o n a 6 ~ 6 c h a s s i rA d 1 insufficient attention was frequently units presented unque&nabk drfhGa result s e m i - i m p i d f tank arma- culeies. . number of these c h n de chars given to the question o self-propelled gun-howitzen a r h as ment and ahen the @hid fightwas made available to the French 2nd and 4th Annored Divisions and used ing enemy armor arose. improvisations the 105mm %'asp" and the 15omm r ~ i a vehides l had OJ be resected "Bumble Bee" began to appear in with considerable &ect. The follow- o ing year, 1941. saw the appearance of to. 'When, finally. the importance of I942 F u n b a devdopnent WZS. kurgent se c a rl e kl y fa l emobile s u i c d &-tank b. tbe more and B r i t i s h 2 p o u n k (SOmm guns: being able to combat hostile armor a=. mounted on light. four wheeled trucks was acfrnowkdgsd and d e q ~ a ~ l y and other, rather primitive forms of a d tanks were i n t m d d the need ckrerupportguns. Samoretban self-propelledanti-tank guns in Libya. for s p a d self-propelkd anti-tank one battalion in a Panzer & - i s h d l ? bt equipped . with them The United States Annv began guns a tank destroyers diminished. d and the abm still ursd cowed guns This was clearly h when after with similar impvisatiom such a tbe same time, with the i n & t h e d o f the second world wartbe the 37- Gun Motor Carriage M6 tiar of heavily armed tanks ouch as attached rank dearoyer battalion^ of on an adinary 4 x 4 Although the T i p s and Panthas. m a n y P a m the last to entef this field it developed U.S. infantry divisions were replaced comrmndm f a t that the need f a by organic tank battalions. the mobile, o k s v e role o f anti-tank The other e&ct of the appearance self-propelled guns was less u r p t a r t i l l e r y [arthest in creeting the Tank o of large numbers of tanks on all sider and there was already a tendenq t Desnoyer Cormnond. From the very go am t o rocket PfojeMCs for area beginning tank destroyer units were. or more d y , of the appannce of bolnbardment in the words of the Tank Desoyer Iargearmoredformakwasa partial Lrperiwntal work. bowevcr, coaField M a n u a l , aespeciallp dedgned mechanization of field artillery. In the tinued right up t o the end of the war first permanent mechanized formafor o&nsive action against hostile of tbe i o n s . such as the French Division and kd to the deve-t annond forces." Their equipment in- t Jagdtiger).

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Tanks in Korea:
1950 -1951

by UHmNANT COlOWL GKWOE 6. P U K m ,

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An a d y s i s of tank npemtiotrs in Korea 01'41 the toutse of the c a m p a i p . by an author who u s a s .4rwror O@er.of IS Corps for I4 nroptths

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degree. Also he does not need the s u support tank units up the degree of c k control required by a Chongcbon Valley 23-26 November battalion commander. 1950. It is believed that the drafting of a maintenance, recovery and evac- T L h P b Y - E t h g l l O l l O d Exm6Ocdd uation plan, based on use of a DMCA, mobile maintenance teams. Winter conditions imposed a great and axes of mainshould be strain on drivers, crew personnel, vethe assigned duty o f the Division Ordnance 086Cer prior to each opera- hicles and equipment generally. and tion. nK DMCA wchnique i s qd- the need for proper maintrmnce paamount. H o w e v e r , n o r m a l ~ ly as &&ve in defensive actions and prindpla still applied to operitions mmgrade movanents as in o&nsive in the snow and extreme cold of SO. combat. vember, December, January, Februarv. 19w1951. w vehicles m u i r e d v l . d m m W h lubricants and mainte;lance perfarm the armored infurmy rde. Ihrl. inspections had to bc frequent and Infantry units employed as a part of Light aircraft praided an exceIlent means o f detectingenemy ahead of an advancing armored unit and for immediately reporthg this information t o the unit. B e s t d t s w e r e ob tained when the plane was in radio contact with the unit commander. Some tank battalion commander^ commanded f r o m their light aircraft on occasion. H o w e v e r ,it is believed that a battalion commander should be on the ground and in hll conpol of the situation, using a qualified aerial observer in the plane. If he becomes an observtr, his activities as

The

system w a s employed
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commanderareresuictd. m a p plies primarily to a battalion collt. mander. It would not apply to the commander of a combat command task force, since use of a light plane would mocc ofenable the battle that commandcf personally t oand sct

make

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SONE I D U S FROM A IUNIOR LEADER
To the Editor:
Platoon Ldcr (GI. B. Havingspent ?Imat two -years as a 4thRcn. h . ) (Mos1204). I fed thottbac is 110 bcnaunit t o a d i n the Anmr Branch. It is a small cask face in i d . You have mobility. firepower, SbacLrti0a;and last but not kast, it is veryt o employ the principle OC maneuver, dwthr mounted ar dismounted. However, as the result of my e y i a x e , there arc certain c h a n ~ 1 would and Equipmcllt of tbe RsonnaissuKe make in the Table of Platoon. Herr am my

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by UWENANT H€NRY S. MAICAMONK)

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tapmust bescreened bydinmunted pasawl at night. 2 Fewa tanks are lost to tank hunta tevnr wben tank commanders fight with their hatches open than when "buttoned up." T h i s does not apply to the driver. 3. APakcammardais=e&ctive wbhr he fights his crew than when he spends a large part of the acoioD king the hlrret mounted cal .somachinegun. The.50calNrret When tanks are support to.advancing infantry, not when the attack is primvilv a tank action. 4. T a n k unit leden command by means of their radio net and movement of their tank A dismountad tank p k a n leader k relatively ineffective i n attempting t o run over the
beak6eld to direct his tanks.

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Equip the Suppat uad with a C0mmunications system. The two HaMTrack,inlicuof%e twome- SCR 3o(rs mounted in the tanks are quarter ton vehicks with traikrs un- & If w camp~'lywere.a tank tiltheprmotedpasonaelouriais company I couM see their use. But in

5.Mutual c x l ~ l f i k between P a k and infantry is essential to SUEc e s ~Each must feel that the other wiH remain a d fight when the situationissaioua 6. Tanks employed on the MLR are very &ectjve against enemy per-

owadintheopen. 7. Racket hriachers are relatively ioe&ctivc against pmperIy supported tank attacks% open Main. They
am dective against tanks operatin

izlcbdc~,defiks,woodsan buih up area$. whn operating i n

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arharmstlnlrssbouldbeadequacely
=pplctbabYinfulery8. Tbe Reds attack prGripelly at nigk Camcaamcks at daylight have had greater porsibility of achieving ~WitbRalforcesintherePr

OppramdYstiIlin hirattack formatiQLcaasedyareas

company. 1 noravailable. T h e ~ f o r t h i ~ i s t h a p o thetwoonchalfmatrlilerJuexK% d v dismount mineand giveone t large enough tocarry even the squad's the 'Scout Section when they work basic bed. In the event the vehicle dismounted,and the other stays in the w i t h the mortar is knocked out, the platoon h e a d q w a 1 strongly sugsquadisuseless. 'Ibaragain,inthe gest three SCR 536's-aK m phoon setting up of the mortar..chere are headquanm.anothafortheRi& a s t one in the Scout rimes when the squad will have to Squad. and the l pull o f f the road t o set u and give section. It is weu known that th Reronsupport to the plaoon. have bem many times +en one of my ve- nzisrvre Platooa at times may have hicle with traikr has hogged dawn to fight dismounted. There arc too on the way to their setup positioo, many-unitcommurdthat thus slowing dawn the arrival o f the mwboareundQthe' the only prformed way a m is by i staying r d r mounted. much-needed fire. A half ack fully can carry at leas four times the amount of ammunition that the two I have found, fram past arpqirnce, one-half ton eailer carry, and the that my platoon has =ked JUS as half track can o&r some potsction t o much on foot as mounted. i t ~ l l s to be th general poky f o r the Riee theaewhpmsmalarmstire. b Arm the five in the support and Scout S e c t i o n s t o o t their squadwith istols. Intbeeventofa SCR 510's and convert than to SCR vehicle t u e a L w h i l e tbe platoon W s DidvauevercvrymSCR509 f ~ t h e m O r t a r i s a n e whik working as a nuDcuvaing ekment? W e l l ,believe w, it is a hard tasL, aDd slaws down the squad conk ,it boils down to &in8 carry mortar and.ammunition for- siderably. ! ward. The shouMer weaptm would away with the two SCR 300's in the de6nidy be a hinckance, as the squad t w o t a n L , d d d i n g t h r r e s c R is normally in the base of f k and the 536's. 0 t h than chat. the communif only reasfm for individual weapons is c a t . i o n s ~ a n n o t b e b e a t . o for self-protection in the event of an cours. M w radio5 d b Iwould&minate~d~many infiltlation. b Promote one of the support squad items that are T0Br.E and which my phtoon has not used in ax pa5t op d v e s training in erations. as aosudoa problemand see to it that the use of the MI0 Pbtting Bovd maneuvers that covered all soctf of andtheAimingCirde. I w o u l d h Situations and. under morc of the make the M-10 and tbe Aiming Cik mathervari?tianr TO(LEt0thecam- Tbe fint item that would go is the p l y . T h e ~ t F i n t c l a S s m e n - telescope. Tberruethrreintheplat i o m e d d be in charge of the mar- toon; one in plaaxm beodqunrtm m d the 0 t h two in the Start Sectars W h n they fin in battery. AaotherchangcaraJdbeinthe tioa. I ha\* neva ured tbcm, and

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ATONIC BATTLEFIELD AND ARMOR
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OF EDITORS, AWARDS AWB ULCERS

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Because of the n 8 m d the. ter. and the fighting chancrcrrptrs of tbe enany io the easern d
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maCr a strang attempt ID see that his pexsmud are tbrnoughly oriented in tbc usc of iumot am& i n turn.

Korcl, the u s e d tlokinfantry teams has been limited. With vay few ex~umorbasbsgnrucdinonly one o f the five mabods of attack,

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empbgrhbarmOrpmPerly,willbe
poiddF~ytimcsover. bulkad far making a lor of noise, still draw he fmnn the enemy. Tanks d rip up the mpQ and cut wire lines. lines. However, tanks ace tremendously dfectipcbepltcompanionsforthe

inhntrg. The i n f a n a y wire teams must kam to put wir+ oE the roed so it wm't
becutandtoantid t e t b a t w h n armor apcrotes in tEu uca, cornmunications lines may be cut Lrhnap CanmaaderJ must learn that armor lKcd aot be empbyed m evay ttatrk Famurion-and that the lzulhuay be c o m m i t t e d several houri later. Tbac steps are helpful in reducing the amount of enemy mortar and artillery $re which the tanks draw
onto

that of supporting by h e alaae. Even tben, the teamwork between tbe adarea. However, by firing cncm. vancing i n f a n t r y d the supporting r . b y the infantry phtoon kadt a n k becomes of peramount impor- er, talking di+ to the tank platoon tance. leader, tank fire was brought to bear Prior to tbe actual attack, tanks and several enemy b u n k Were de are used to knock oat known enemy stmye!d w h i c h w e r e holding up the bunkers a d emplacements on th advance of the infantryman. The fog forward slopes of the objective. T a n k was so beaw that tbe tank htoon 6 r e is direned and d j d by direct leader w a s unable to pick up norradio control betwern the attacking mal 4-1 machine-gun fire. so sdid company commander, o r platoon belted tracer ammunition w a s used leader, and the tank CammaDder. and the t a w w a s readily identi6ed. b r i n g this phase, the supporting In using tanks to support by fire. artillery is a b brought i n a ~ the tank- it i s highly important to maintain acinfanq team by 6ring on the t o p curate, steady,and continuous fire on graphical crest and rrvme slope of the objective, as the jlightea lull in the objective. As the enmry is forced the firing ahrds the enemy an opporfmm his positions OLI the forward slope by the direct fire of the tank,

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ud-YtheopnW d W s l l with andamllery d s b e l t e n o n t h e r e
municationstrenc tohismortar-

the infantry.

Infanaycommandenmustremember also that, big ard powerfd as tbe t?nL . . is, . it can be destroyed by enemy nnbduab with the proper antitank weapons in their bands. In areas wooded and in desks, plans must be made for ppDcection of tanks. Cantinuaus training of infantry tmop in conjunction with tankers will pmduce!the techniquesand bases d m u d conbdence OD "ecessar)r i n
thetanbfantryteam, If these things ale arranplished. tbin the infantry commvlder will bave th shock and he power and can a c k surprise whenever the trtial situatiou itself. LT.Ca ROgar J. Ixasras.

The witcr of the following m e d oversem k the k Pacif;, verse +,Tie is t?~rnunder f ~ e 6th Infantry Divkkm in t by the artilkq, CriBgvT fuse. This 7hater, m i n i n g 011 with that orspbtion fa the Kortcrn occupltio#l. haspmvenefkaive o Kora owe a year As the a& jumps ofF. the tanks He r e t w n d t place a steady volume of fire from ago,inhispresentpostosChmuandboth the 76mm gun and .SO caliber ing Oficer o f tk 3d Rsrtnlinr, 65th machine guns on the o b j j e . When Imfantqv Regiment, 3d lnfrmtry DioiS i C m . t h infantry reacher the fire has to be lifted, cept the platoon k.der's shift their

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fire to the 0anks. The platoon leader's tank i s then uscd @engage and des&ov any bunkeno r anplacements

Tank-inf-

team-k,

needlm

to sav, is very essential to the

of&aperation.wbm,for still maMea by the enemy. b y tar- a tank banalion a d an inhnay gets to be engaged by tbe platoon talion am! noti6cd ChaI tap am! to n t o . leader's tank are then dirraed onto work togaher on a task face i thenew target by ddeniprion, encmy terricorv, it is essential thu useoftncer.usedcdorrdarole, therwocanm;ldasgecrogabaat or any caobmtian of the a h . the e ! a r k p o e l i i

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-dtbe% hInOeifytbe
hreslossty
mavewns

geadtbetaDk
towalktbeir

commandasandp~leadas~ ceive the word to move in on the enemy. This d l y results in brid hand-to-hand 6 hthg Mar the enemyeitherhas kilkdorhasre treated over the crest of the hill.

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theMLUp0atbk
infaBtrp company

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when +?en&y riaemen are seen t o leave their positions and head f o r the rear, the tank move out fast to prearranged pitions 011 the opposite
side of the hill and pusue the enemy with fire while the *try lays dawn a heaw volume of small arms fire from the cmt d the objective. If chis is a limited objective attack with a primary purpose o f killing the infantry Oan have arrangements to enemy and MY o f securing more &el and reload ammunition, ad uetrticsworkvetywel them having already StaRed to rout use dl the enemy is more or less the enemy, exploit their advantage by firefromdlangles. on continuing dawn the valley. the ocher ifaprnnancntpene Practically +g# the SCR 300 aadon L daired, the t a n k and in- is the basic means o f communication

cd

inMay. Hewyniarhadss*dlcnthe sapplrgRiveranditwasinBood At
a o e d ~ t o o s r v i f t a n d

forhavityLdenMpririatofad 3L the k q the menrmstoth&sidc Itwas
w e d
t a n k to

viol that we keep snapping at the

beck a4 the withdrawing enemy and
mPinMin c o n t a c t
sixcam
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w air could

Trucks md jeeps couldn't ford the and.there was no time for a btidging opntion. T a n k s p rhe Marines m. At present, on OUT positions west d Kursarg we are supporting the men in tk frost-line foxhoks by using Someofourtanks asartillery. Thy arc run up on bulldozerdug maundsofeaah t o give tbem a higher angle of he. They are particularly valuable in the artillery role because
ofthegreatran

inetbemastbeyfkd.

oftbe9omillimeter

caMfnlintbeE&

0Ur.inhntrywn are enthusiastic exponents d teamwork w i t h the tan& That i s evident from the numbaofrequestsweget for tank support from tbe infanay commurdm. The
nolwpmcmdprivatesarejustasen-

thudaair. TbemacsauuIofthetreadsathe aoht tbosc big 9Qr make when they

bcna when they p on patrol, o r atd a bunker complex, o r jua. when thepreeth tanksup thaeon tbe line

6rescemraomaketberi&marfd

withthm. Thydothepbforusandhelpus fight in the style wecouldn't use withqpttbQILTbeMnriaesaredto

fie

asataunwithourown

andbiggunsbedringtberiee-

TRAFFIC CONTROL
HEWN

mm. ' I b c t p n L S a r c p a l t d ~ t t a m . LT.Cor.JOHN T.R o o m .

w m n m MUEUH-WII~EIUAND

In tbir age of mecbnnized warfare, ha& control is a key to

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mesthernobilityand

initiative from the command and forcing the enemy to yield to one's . owll will. Pvticulvly in attacks they

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guarantee viamy, d i s i u p the unity of enemy combat o p a t i u n and thus S a v e l i P c I ~ m e n .T h e l o a o f ~ bility-eitba from the failure to reali z e its impataace oc the inability to applv it-hds to heavy casualtiesand t h e & r u t do f~one's forces. It i s worth while to study the German of he recent war from this

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2 3 e oolmnsadwithrrJpectroatbenurntbecomto amt a rapid and

o n tbebosirof theprecaiing f m tbe&ccmcrolsyscemEhOUldbe
canmeed with both the troops

a l the mavements
.dhtroopr

n==b~heodquartaJfrom dividopuprbarldhavetbeir~
ppllicamtmlogQIci& Thiswasthe in t k Gampn A m y , W h di"military palife Ikrhmmq- whik

COQ

~ S p d c a p s ~ h a d

thehigbahdquarcershad~dlituy and "military p e which inadentally llsoaariedoutpdicedutiessuch as papki king discipline outside o f the troopunits IbepenmneIofthese poke units were s e k c d with particul?ic a r e lad bebngsd to the older agedasaa, sochat a pasonal relationship d mutual familkicy and conf i b grew up b e e n them and the troopbat least on division level.

re"

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in quacia, 011 the typed PP

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aining and

M y r V U - - v

1951

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lnizedkigdccomporedof*+

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typadtonLaDdmcchonr?l v e hjcle!s' Ln essclyx this organisah was based upon the tdings s e t forth in FIllk!is Gold Medal priot Essay for 1910.'o Arlmiady, there

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numerouscrrhnt.lllinitatiarstothis p h , but Fulkr hopd that an ext e n s i v e campaign to acquaint p u b lic opinion with the rank would alk

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A-CASEIN PREPAREDNESS
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v i a e rome of'tbe deeprooted conservatism among tbt "die-hards" in the w a r c)$ce. First to take o t b x at the new trend was hrlkri own departmentthe War Oilice. As a d t of winning the 1919 Gold M a prize Essay* firlle;r

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by his superia, S i r H q Wilsoo," ChiefoftheIm Generals& {C.I.G.S.), w Genenl Bunt. Dcplty Chief o f rhe Frcnch General SCafF. and the Prcsidcntof tbe French RepuMic sborotrrd him w i t h aca-

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demicbonors'2Addemonartion o f p+dicc against Fulls's a d d s was the aeatment of the M e m o r a n d u m dealing with the formationofawchanrol bnga&.Alh g h the autboritils made a passive gesture in favor of cbe plan by farming a New M o d e l Brigade in the Aldmboc cammopd, theg underminedtbcenQeschtuEbycanstruaing the brigade on a summer cam footing, 10 that the continuity o f fortgsenthltorzarrrz+wassaerc 6ccd. Fuller was appalled! He madc numerous attempt5 t o prevent the mctigl of this fdsefrant, but it was toolate, for the seaetayo€ state for W a r hd already publicized the p j -

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Even the future exisace ofthe Tank Carps was a delicate matter among higher cckbns. Authorities felt that the tank bd d its purpose. Fulkri "egg crpEl[ersn were r e

gardedasll5efulwtiliariesforthe
infantry. not as bade-winhg weap ansintheirown withtbisattitu&, duced to fau decision upon the tatc of the o r p i -

tation was postpanaator the prrscot." c u r i o u s l y enough, it was the empby-

mentoftanksanddaain troubled arcas within the Empire that kept the tank kfore the pubk" F+m1922adirpltebetwecntbc

Air M i n i s t r y and t k War OIliCe ova tbe c o n d o f d unitsin Mesopotamia forad the authoritia to am
A R v r u , 1-1

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scrapped, and a samU numba of infnia grade hiark I l tanks were QIOauaed. As a substitute, the War OBiCe kudmcd the Tank Coqs with a number qf V k h Iight tanks fa use m a fighting d e ?ad not merely as scouts*s whik the Tank Corps fad rrspa 'o.eg* ment, it tnade rapid ad\llmes rn

cause. but it i s &uhtful wbaba

k hcarldhavc~tbcoumcnw h a * p inbmat in the composition of the Experimental

Fm.

rtapeasdtbeMncuV~inScp Pmberrepaeai~OfthemistaLa of 1921-22 ButdeDcd by unvmorrd o o o p ~antitank loalitk and mcal gmwth. e&Cti\.C lodmhip. the d S i the First World War t h F a struggled h g h the e=t~ little. HOWhad been no propam far the study ci- arr~mplshing o f llpmcd units under battle con- ever. one fundilmnd principle was a d units should annored not be andfuvd unditions.Bath Mileand Wonhington- determined-that Evans saw the need of such a pgram, and asa result, in March 1927, until otlkers and men w w morc fathe !kaetay of W a r notified the miliar with pint operations." In nation that an t a l Force other wo& reasmed the advocau~ was to be fonmd at Titiworth corn- of mechaniution. the canpasition of the Lrpmll~ntalFor~ewas i m p f e n not the ccwrep ot mechanization. on the h a d tbe critics of . other . wer e prompt i n pointThe Secretary went on to explain mschvuucKm that tbe force was t o be commanded ing t o the experiment as a failure. hy Colonel Fulkr. Leading +e pcOcersion was v i W. Germvns the most notable critic of Fuller. GermalM . wasoneoftbe Fuller was aware of the project as first to N h t e mecbvliution on the early as 1926. k* it was not until groundsthat the tank poscesd only beretumedhaninrpsctiartour negative tactid value.f* F a Gerin ladia that be was o&blly a p mains t h infantry was still the m o ~ effestive striking force. H e claimed pointCdbyMiLK-hiscommvdto& come e&ctive on May 1,1927. Wben that tbe inhnnym?n e!quqq%dWith in February he jaumeyd to Ti- the luxe%my antitank wortbtoinspccthisfuturecommaad, superior to the tank. H T S Z he found not a canpletcly wcbp 4 unlike uF the the SCnAkd n i d force but htead the 7 t h In- y l y mschiulicll army," can be expimkd fantry Brigade md the T i d w d m time of need &t saiouscpa-Tnonlyhial featule theentirecommaad sequmcs= Despite tbex aiririaa was the pavidaa that lnechanid of the tank one Mwt help but while reading Gcmraim unitsweretokdlotd to him from +te time to time whnevcr the 3rd Divi- WbetberhgelluiDely.disa~edof r sion saw f i t ! * ; hrllcr pratested to his the tank and mechanization, o superior and # thane fa whetber be berated than beausc incradng the mechand * compori- their dewuement, the "mechanical don of thc h , but Milm 'lepcgted- amy." was contrary to his c o ~ c c p ly ignored his quests. F * . after of the "ma%armyw= another f u & attempt to alter the AnkrraadFW C.1.G.S.L decirian, Fulkr wmte his Nevert&kPs the solipbvy Blain d p t i o o . ddading his rtioa up a s fdbwed by s u b 011 the +that it would be a experimart w The fraudulent act a his pact to 6ll an quentmshPnicolgrarpin anent which m no way resam 1 9 2 8 h a i n i o g ~ a n , & e f i o e d bythesec. by the triak of a newly formed ArRtary of war.aftadale! mored Fora. Tbe unic a brrproduct csm&kxatioa, he consend t o with- of the 1927 Experimmtll k c e . was u ,but draw his l v d p t h u p the cab- dirbnaded at thead of the p d i t i o D t h o t v l o t h a a u i c c P d b e not without rhicving QlQy appointed to d the E x p i - It arneibutcd to a bccmudastad mental Fara. Fuller'r brr was . .an ingdthecomporitionof&

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)2srl T & RUJJ. J o d , UUX (pcbrpy. 1924). lS2.

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FR6M THESE PAGES

p , 1951

GENERAL COLLINS' REMARKS BEFORE T€lE ANNUAL AUTUMN CONVOCATION AT TULANE UNIVERSITY I N NEW ORLEANS
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-.PkoE d that tbe Swkt rulaz were prepared to mtbemilitorg fmaof their puppas in an ~tomrl.nnabafrrenotiopr T k d u a r a r c d r b c h e c d s tootbe ~ attack wils prhopr even m m sigdicmt than the actual OCNTrcncc.P~macchauanytbingeke,this~e lay i n the fact that militay aggrdlm was not merely cademd, b u t , far dne 6rst time in histoq-, collective military face lmda an mcernaorgpnization was appkltooppotcsuch-. Theissueonwhich tbe Lepslle d Naths had fcumked-the issue which peacefd r&ons had d u d to face in Manchuria in 1931, in Ethiopia i n - 1935, at Munich in 1938-was rquvclp=dcarngawlYBut Kaea has lpoLbcr meaning in that it has thrown c o n light on that least undanood aspect of ouf nvimnlsccurity+mr need fa a rrsavoirof trained manpower. Noahreisthirhprarrmotcsbarplydrawnthan in the n a y d t h e r d + d i f 6 r u l t problemswe faced in pwiding enough trained manpower to stem the communist surge tbec In both Wald W a r s our allies staved oEthenemywhikweradiedaurselveJforrtion. In Karr?thacwasnosuchres@te TheRepublicofKorea facer.orgonizcdsdelyEain~pOliceplrporesW~ ?barnto be avawkhnrrl by a communist army which was deliberately a s p a i d and equipped f a aggression. Tomeet tbe aggresh we had to send suppart to the Republicof Kaar fansasquicklyaspoaible and had to use tbac regular forces which were available dose by. TbeAwncln * 2 4 t h and 25th Infanay Divisions and the 1st Gppiry Dividan ~ r m paforming e occu tion duties in Japan. ThvhadtobepicLcdupandcus&iintoKocea piecaDea\;ithclidadm * qiments,insteadofthe autbaized three, and with a l l units greatly undnstrengrh. -AdtkweaLzKssesdtkuuitsin JapanreaeCtedthe C O a d i t i o a o f A r m y u n i t s ~ h e r e .Justpriortothe opening of w opantioar in Korea in June 1950, the Reguhr Army was 38OOo men uoda the strength of autbocitcdby Congress for the fiscal pcu 1951. 630vh * e had bcen stn&ngfor months crying to LFlch and maintoin that Dcpgth through Vdqnteer reauitingIboe,dacemhadpomirsdotbeGnp that w e d n a a s k f a a u t b o r i z a t j d o to use Sekctive Service except as nemsary t oH I that gap between authorized oerrgtb and tbenumbaotmen we could obtain through mruiting abne But despite the fact thlt we w a e re q u i d by law 00 r c ~ A p t s for such short terms as one pru--which i s a terribly castly and ine86dmt way ddoingbusbKsbslnwere uno& to get a e n t voluntm5 an our acngtb bad dropped gradually to 59;5ooo against autbapptlan of 630,000.

created,

a i s p l t c h d t o k Th3dInfanayDivi&mwasre with aseatglvatiaollGuprd and snmg Ocganrd Re though we sinply were not able t o ger it to full v r v t G r p r m d e u p d b a h u n i a m d ~ ~ T b e s c
smcngthbefomithadtod. I n a r d . w e h a d t o & a regiment frore Pumo b a s the third regi'ment f a this division. At about c k same timc the 1lth AirbaDe Ditision was krimalnl .inadatopwidcGeneralMacArthur a fullstm@ lirbaw regimental combat tom. the 187th Airborne Infantry. k t b e n r r r m i n r r l in the Regular Army i n thiscclntry onlyaoedivision, the 8 2 d Airborne, in condition to fight. We d a d not d u c e w last division to impotency. even though the Eighth Army still was desperately in need of wrt.
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individuals must be uainai men a b o k a sbm re-

fmbecperrodof tniningcan e&cti\rly fill the d d our ditidons ana otba unio wbaba in QloIbDt or in training here in the United Srues. This sauggk against communinn may w d l be a bag one. and cequim a kagnnge We.must plan ahead f a the long pull a d not be cankd away with shat-cange crises and the resulting ktckmms which always seem to follow. If w'c ace to continue our tnditiard mi* policy of placing grat dcpmdcpa on OUT s a tional Guard a d Reserves. them wemust make it ponribk for them to acquire tbe degree of pcpvedness which
modernwucequirrs.

To meet further pressing needs for combet-type units
and for essential engineer, signal, ordnum. quanennaner, o order more than and other supportin units, we had t companp sizekationai ~ ~ aand r d % m e colrps units inm active service. But like thc R lac A m y units,they& were short of trained men. only sources of man er with which to fill them-since t h e ~egular ~rmy been aripped-were the Selective service system which had been quickly. re established by the Canafter the Nonh Korean attack, and the reservoir of trained men still remaining in our Ospized Reserve Grips and N a t i d G u a r d . Selective Savice had not been operative since January 1919 and would have required two a three months to call up selectees Tkse men would then have needed an absolute minimum of 14 weeks o f basic training before taking their plsces in units, plus additional unit training Morc the units were ready for combaL Tk only practicable mnaining soufie of relatively well

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warsandcanmwlffadkrgea;lodingh I t i s t k enemy wbo determines wbcn and whue we must e t . And such aconditiondmostcompdr us to be asprepad as were our early seakrs to mea a sudden aaact It 56emsto me rherr body anerolutiop to the probkm: it is one dictated by the lessonsofthe pas. If we cuntinue to rely upon auc citizensoldim we must be camin that they ace p r e p a d f a their rolesand must dop a pcognm thatwillpepvethem. l%ereisruchaprognmandit hasalrradybeenrecaMKadcdtotbeGmp I t i s a program of universal d t v y training dagned to pcD\ide a steady Bow oftrained young men i n t o w rcvnr componentsand toestablish an enduring base f ao u r mil+-

I calmat stress too arargly tbe fact that I3 1 must be &fended ~atitm-soldiarWe do not prcn&c

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mined men was in our Organized Reserve cocpd which has always had two cat es of -el: individuals not assigned to u n i a but

I am sure you ace asking, "What dDer n r h a pcognm mean to ~ 7 "HOW " will nudents aad ed-tors be affected?' " W h cau we do abaut it?"

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tnard(b.A&ndVu
Universal military aainingmanS somesrcrifres to all of us. We know f u l l well that bebideach 4 number
nvrdsaman;thubehiadeachmann?adaf~and friendswho will beaf)scted. we knw too that our cdlege5 will fdthe imprt. although~lcan rec no permanently disruptive &ects. And of course, univad military training d be + , but i o corts would be l i t t l e When compared to thecortsof the two a k e m a h s -huge pQmawnt standing forccs a g m ~ n u s But to all the plan &en an oppnunity to+ somechhg in renun fos the bkssings we enjoy uader a free government. Our students have a dual role. mW e d soon have three and oLK-h?lf millioa der arms and it seerus likely that world conditioDs will requirelvgeAnnedForcesfasaactimetocomc. The needsolnwt be met by \dunteers llopc and same of you willbecakdupontosave. Manyofyouarelkadytoo old to be a h e d by UMT, but you m a y be allcd throughseleccivesavicc Tboseofyouwboareinthe RereMs and t h e m ROTC may be called in your Rcvrwcapacities. But upon all of yw r e s t s a samg d o b l i g a t i o n toomhute what " u c a u to tbe socurit?. of our nation in tbac aiticll tima. And yau aher Ilspsibility is equll)). importam Wherbayousemein tbe Armed b a w t a s men and women you will havea great ineumccon the
41

skills. units had

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ThoPiPeadT h e n , hre at baoc.we bad to face the task of building

e n d So the only available source was t h e large group of Resmistsnotinunits. Formaately,theorganizedRcserve CorpswasaMemmeet the pressing demands,and by the end of August, 1 9 5 1 , 2 0 0 , ~ Rerervla * for active duty to fill vacancies in combat units and to pravideixEmlcm fornewrecnria - unformndy,intheinitialrurbofcryingtomeetthe' eme%ency,there wm not much time togive amsidgation to variations in individual cpse~; and bwas an immediate and t demand for skilled specialists which had to bemn~rrruheedinvrmcinspnca i n calling up f a h who had had service ov~seas during World W a r 11, while& Resewiawhohad never been ovmeas and had nochildren werenotcalled. The answer in most cases lay in the fact rhat the men had d i k t occupaaonal specialties. These inequities have been eliminated as t i m e and conditions have permitted. ThedreadfularpcrienceofruhingunderaTengthunits into action; of early anagency recaus for combat veterans with family respanJibilitia; o f long delays in training our cititenjddiers-all these stack d e f k k d a hold for us a solemn warning which we must not ignore. We must realize that o u r h y ' s Regulv forces m u s t be kepccbse t o authorized sbmgb, tbac we m u s t support those forces ARMOR--NO~--,
1951

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1961

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IN SEARCH OF A PROPHET
I n the A d v d Course at Fort b x . the Gerrmn invasion of fi?nce is mentioned ody brie8)-. o f that loo& sbifting raaiql StnrggL Orrr the wadand of Afria bemveen General Ranmel and the SUCCeSSiOn of British d r s , anhi the bade of E l ruamein is treated in detail, w & the tankbattlesbetwernthc;ermansandthe ussianson.the Earvm front are notccn-ersd at afl!

kdsustocunsidertbefasibili~d the rcgimend t a n k canpvlia as amtbu banalion. LWO battlbO U'ith p S of tth an e kregimrnts tbe inf- ot di8'iSbO i n f a c r y Corna d

-t2

Jc5sn6wdinthehrturt.

Eumpe. But

ItkwcUmshldyGcnaalPanoo'scam

kwarkftdF.Wecannotassumcthatdrcumstanceswill pennitduplidw of that campaign in E~lropea m Asia. We m u s t projest the tactical lcpsont of the last war i n texmsof the future-in aamrofncwand p w a p o a s d t h e P m b abkconditiom w willexistwhenwarcome~. It k obpiour that this country is unlikely to pre cipitate a war by an ottoct In spite of sane care lesr t & abaut a p v a u i v e war-we must accept the pdmb&ty that we will be on the defensive, sb.tcgicnyl plwt trticollg, at least in the initial p h s of m y war. In 1948, Gama Bndley, speakPapSsaa'ThL ernment can hove no L w i t b o u t voudvcs being t h e w . " In the light of this Prhnary amsidL * weshoulduramiwwdefensnc tbeay. our current a t c m , ""plait vidently" may be premature. It may be n fint to stop tbe horde before we have the oppor-

= CPllDot a h d to sap W E t b e

i n

r

manhr would d k have inme trticll &xibitip than be bas now. T E K w u n i t s w t b e a becumbimd into infinv-bea\? oc Ud-ba8T & teams to fit the mission. the temmand tbcsituation.

S t L z -i u
fix e!xpbitption.

tunity

Onc type of &kme now LDllsidefed p& for tanks k the secakl mobile defense. It contem. . of a sria of strong points, lamthe t y zwa~d cov~redby a screening faa which will dchy tbe enemy during our withdrawal. The stmngpointsshauld cause the attacker md+by forbpale and the force on the stnmgpomtmight rarnmattack ifcheoppormnity presents In this i s nothing more than a mecbodof mgSpBcefortiwandispractical o n l y w h w e "sfacetospare. We are mugbtthat the best defensive use for tanks k in a cl)uateratLldr role, but the conditions obrainipg at tbe start of a war may make even locot countcatrrks impramid fix sane timc. U n l e s sI have misinmprrtcd tbe repom from Korea, this is tbe situation whicb C0n)lontd ourfopces there. It would seem that w best chance would lie with a completely armored force, iaudiately available, which would he a ble not only of counterattack but of a coun At any rate, since we win not have unlimited space to swap for time in any theater in w k b we are likely to fight. the tbeary of mobile defense as it is now unckrstood

in Russia. Aside from trtical we could learn something of the metho4Jof a potential enemy. Since the war, our A m y has underpne some imporrant organiufional changes. some of these changes are now o f questionable value. Perhaps the most i n t e ~ ~ t Change hg fnw an Armor point of view is the addition of a tank company to each infantry regiment and a medium o r heavy tank battalion to tbe i n f a n t r y division. Presumably,t h i s was done to provide antitank pmtection for the infantry and may have been justified wben the antitank weapons of the individual soldier were so very inadequate. With the improvement of theie individual antitank weapons-improvements so great that some infannymen now consider the tank b lete-there i s ha+ t* need to justify tying up the equivalent of IWO tank b?n?lions in the antitank defense ofeach infantry division. The i m p m e ment of antitank weapons should release the tanks fran the obligatiaa of close support and antitank
protectionofthemfultry. Some infantry rrgislentd eommvdm with CL*Iin Kora am quite in agree ment that regimental tank company k a burden is tlbk baw their opini a n s o n t h e i l n tyoftheinfrntrytormint?ia tbe talks. n e lo&tial requiranara of tbe inhntry dividcrn have been too great for supply cknnts wbich were not dcsiped to support 50 haw a unit. Are the infvlny &SiOnS to continue b "makedo" with this o r g i l n b tion o r will we make the required organbtjonal

In other wordr if tbe I n f v Di\isial w e organized along the lines su-ed. &e power of tbe tank units would not be dissipad nor d tbe liqh+ equipped infantry units be saddled with the burden of Supphing thousands of gallapI of gawline and tons of ammunition. Thc tank bornlion w o u M.'hate\.er l d be logisacailv solution relf4ut6cient. to this proMan i s esmdy
adopted. it is
a p'oblem which must be sdred. Lye. in .%mor have things to d o . H'hik w e h a w made impmements in tbc armored pemmnel a r rier since Warid U'ar 11. we have mde liale p c ~ g r e s toward a compleul?. afmoFed force in which all vehicles will have the cmacamuy mfhclbik

ofwtanks. The trend of tbe present and tbe possibiliticsof the future have been pointed out with wgniSrrnt

cia+

&ea

swpp&

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G-qgcerrarc

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".%mod Forces have not 'had tbcir day' because. in the rral sense. r h o h a t . # yet b#* wiui.'tk points out t h a t . whde the combat ekmaus of our p t d di\-isioa QL1 kWC the I d and lrnnem-er to avoid obarles and mad bbeb. our "wheel-borne tail" cannot. He funba exmtedh, and anyone who hzs YQI an vmmd divkial a0 rbc
road would not deny

B. H. Liddell Hart.

who

caclcbdcs that.

2 c z ! L
Cbg€?5?

A.

mend tank corn* hnr UPdergaK 5ome interesting cbanga si.cc we entered the fighting in Kore& whn first @en some tanksof bisoyn. the men and commmkr infanny insisted a l sp 'tting bis tanLCom of y into tank-

n theory

of the empbywnt of tbev rcgi-

portion bccwdcn tbe number of rchidcs in tbe annbat echebnsand tbe rupplpoehida-wehave lmd six years to work out a amxe s '* a&miution. We d do not baw OIY. There are! ceminly impcmmcoachrtcm d sbould be made in tank daigp. These iarpoff men8 must be waked aat now in timc o f w u t b e p m s u n iramgrat a d forbeaelaworse. we arc likely to sgbt the lyxt w witb whatever tank is in podurtion at the timc tbe war
OCLUII.

wcdsmberrvisaf. the laa war, m tryins to find its real trerd In* meaning, too many of us are ready to accept tbeaaionsofa catpled American armored divkiarsin Europe in 1944 as tbe only tank actions
onagranddofibeentirrwar.
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bomeoperrtian sectionsandinsauinstvres single nnrnus. We in Armor are badly in need of a p'opha of dissipated. the individual tanks beorw dose s u p the stature of Cba* H b , rcrliripgour poremi4 p o r t am;lkry, and nothing more. With experience. 1 an case thinfvltrpcolrmander ~ b g i u a e c o n - 'and conf;dent d o u r future. ~ 1 prrmt 4 , u n t i l now the tan are more ohen 'em- in the counsels of the mighty. Such a popbet will need the paienrr of Job. the fcnrnt Eaitb of a ployed u a u n i t ,.tbe.integrity of platoons and corn-monastic saint. the s t e m im tVdGibrrlru. plies being wherever the ternin perBut the o b j j is w o r t h ~ & o r trrqumd. mits their employment at all. Tbe development of for in saving .4rmor he m a y be saving tbis cauna).. this tank sense in the infantry is gratifying and it

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facsthiSproMemsharldbc wecan& \rlop rirbome tank battalions to plrticipav m air-

We still have no pLncs capabk o f muspahg tanks.u'benan bscoawsa

""that tbere k r %tal dispm

E?

-ba-Duembap

1951

HOW-WOULDYOUDO IT?
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THE

BOOK
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Dk.docy

CLIMAX OF WAR-DOOM
UOQNG THE RlNG. By winston Qnrrdrill. V d 5.1 749 pp.
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FOR A TYRANNY

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A Foreign Policy
Fdr Americans
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One Moment With God
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Miniaa,Naliond p r d y t e.m C h d
Wasbgtoo,

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Legged into History

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By Bill Murldin

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, 1951

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A

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......................... 5 61 m H m Bprthrt ........ W - k L W ..............No.Lp.16 4 0 l O r t i a a k r . w Y ........... N a f p . 6 6 h a , M 4 . 6 r D r y G ..................... 2 14 ........................... 5 n u - w ........................s n PertkIcL.cdH.c kcd U B., .Jr....... No.4. p. 14 8 -umML ..................... 2 41 Pkke%UTbcodolhB.,Jr ................... s -.m.-V ............ ......... I 6 4 . Iamar HeFaddell .............. 6 - I & a L ......................... s 31) . LsIABmbEeL ......................... I 34 QuimbJaCpb M. ............................ ..............L ............ 8 30 R w m L n 4 c d . c b u l a r w , z d ................. 4 2 ta=,mmIrL.ILp ....................... s LL cd aobsrt B . ....................... S u I L .................... . . I 3 1 ) Bri..Gen.P. M . .................... 1 - L k h n J ............... 5 a pobinatt. I+.Cot Jobn T....................... 6 (THglL-G.,Jr ................ 4 n e k b W 6 a . J . N . ................... 1 . et m k c d E d r f n Y ..................... 6 S?CWiUi8mD.................... 4 M L k U C I L h. I .................. t - so W C . l . l i 6 r J . r ...................... '6 SB sL.r,Dr . Roger ................ No.2, p.48 4 No.5, p.39 6 Qufim4BdGthDLJ ..................... 4 6 steven&w.Guth ......................... 2 -,I*.brVIM.D. .............. 5 18 m. ~ G C a ~ a a.................... p h ~ 3 -uC.Lvuu,a .................. 2 3 .....:............... 6 % 20 TibasUGawCkP......................... r n I = ............................... s . 14 vmy.nteollcl,HuroEmrd ................ 1 R.b.olrr.E . . . . ................... . 5 14 -=01.r ........................... 2 w w8a ............................ 1 L L 0 1 k r L o m k T m ......... 1 24 Wwae, Jobn ................................ 1 watghll. porl ............................. 5 -.-*ma. .................... I 24 W'hh.Maj.Gum.LD ........................ 5 -UM.S,.Jr. ....................... s s W-LLBOkrtD ......................... 3 -. ~ % L L ~............................ BR 4 a4 W i c O L w D I i n n P...................... 2 --JaStmy ..........5 N a L p . 6 4 S ! a Wortbinllton.W . C a n P . E . ................. 1 l r r i L i c . L b h t 1 L ................... 2 14 Y.LcwbsPcR.nL ......................... 4 m = k m m I & c m L ~ P . J r ................. 2
-mmmbDli
(O

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.LX. 195i
.......................

Doay J

yiddlabs'Lic.dbu YooaMSs~EuiB.

.......................

NO. PYC
4 4 6

53
21

00 Annor. Cur 3 ~mp t o Tanks, gLttacr ................ S DooshbaJ m Tank, Fomm 2 D . p ............................. 2

................. ..................

. .
1 1 1 1 2
2 2

P . . .
0
4a

=piQri.l Peaare:

14
54

Air Blrp. ............................... 1 l k i t h h C I . O & T U L ................... 2 Arradp.rwrdcuriS.Tt8Et ........ 1

5 32
ST

EditmbL

25
6

4i

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9 44

46

New 1 m. . ................... Attemtkm Mmia Dimeton! ............... . . the NcptivC .................... T a a 1 k y i m k A h & 8 b 1 ................. lirvrLtha to Spoaaor Mounted Service M11.crrm .............................. Tbc l . t hrmorad Division .................

.ad M W - A

l2
13 18 13 18 18
20

In t h e -

d Troop

....... ......... Rl&mCoatcaporui.rSo#.Shr .......... 'propyrsd." Trat. Hadley .............
TprLcrBdld.8owAraOrBu!kbae Ymgoehv Anmy: b t i a w k t Porn

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5 5

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64

.

30
24
22
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49
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...........

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!26

.................... We%a 8 w8Y, we 8 bw Way to Go .................. No. 4. 18 To United Nations Po= ........: ........ InotkrYeam ........................... BCdArmarinKorea ...................... U.S. wu Death8 ........................ A t ~ d Weapons c m i o n ............... W . l t a r h U l A n n i r s s u p ................. Atomic & t t l e f I e d d Armor ............. The A n n d M e e t i ~ g ...................... Of~m,AAIvdr.ndUlcers ............ T.m-Wsj w w ...................
Abk,Not8 W ,

3
4

4
19 18 19

4 4 5 5
S

wht'r In 8 Name? ....................... Wld B i l l " ............................... ' A n A-" ............................. &port h m Korsr. W i .................. Scporr of A n n d Yeetiw (Year Eadioe
December 1 9 # ) ) &quirematt for Arapor, Ibc, H o w

AaalgtbeBUsba -,A ..............................

........................

1 2 4 5
6

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4

32 32
32

.

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1

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......................... ..........
L a m

ss
21
44

1
8 5 5
5 5

5
6
6

32
18 18 19 19 47
34 49 14

6 6

.............. . .......... Biq .................. s d t R o p c l h d G o l # o I o r h c r i c r ............. c . (BootIrdcr. . ..... ..
sarct.rJr d Defame, A New
SCli-Pmpdled
Sarrhof8Ropbc+kw

n

"Soldkr'r Story A"

&me Idar fipm 8fonior

Filling a N d y Mirrtsd Armored Division,

49 10 43 30
28
23

Ped Have A n n o d Forcb. Future? Eirvc ....... " H i of hte, "he" (Book &view) Watson .. H i t t i n g tba hachea, Huri.an ................

....................................

.

5
S

.

sOm&hbg to stop T I p t b X .............. Stcel Dngo. i s ....................... Sumey of Soviet Armor. A, Ikriron Symbol of Armor The, ...............

.

.

Rwiew) M e a

SI 6 65

yvantoaio

6

17
46

.

...........

2 2
2

56 54

41

........................ s en ...................... 6 21 ,y. With the, I h i . r . L k . O l . l r A . ...................... 1 14 w e ................................ Eama4w-L ................ s 1 6 harpbibioorT.alr ...~ B r L E E H .......................... . 34 M :, 1 8 -. .. = . I A -r .......................... s . 23 Annie8ofbrmoa, .......................... . -*.3rrw ........'....,.............2 6 l 15rmcrmtbelsirbaraeM.fdoa.prrrrLlin.Jr.. . . u L L e S 8 b E ...................... I 40 . m M m S V w D ...................... 6 21 No.8, p.20 4 m-=wcmL-E ..................... 1 27 ArmorNata ..................... No.% p.56 6 Amtmdc8rS.Tlleir p . . t f e b , C J . W J............................ 1 31 . . oprhmt+ ............................. 2 -lncmtrrbWe=mt,bburger,Jr .... 1 ....................................... 1 42 15lnaqd PhtOaD Ladcr Reinfo.,%% e tda.UW.rLS ......................... 4 12 -.Jr. ............................ s u-w ........................ s s AnnofsIatQinBridF.Buag .............. 4 m f r t c . L mp . .................. s 4a A=-lit=PdJem%&w .................... 4 I--w .................. s 46 . t P s s . r I , W . J r & ....N . t p.40 S .6 '%lbnTitorr &diu" (Book Ecrian). Al.ulk ................................. 4 u I . I L 6 r t . a ........................ 5 40 C a a e i n ~ S w l t l ............... a 6 -um-a ............. ........ 6 17 ~ t b 4 O a G o u d ........ . ~ 4 W M EL (bLa L ................... 1 23 CCB 4giEekesuppm%Buag .......... 3 =ucam c . ................... 6 et ~ t b . ~ ( ~ & v i e w ) , s ...... h . r 6 =-%rntb+....................... 4 2s ~ b u r c 3 T b % s h .................. r 5 ..
E=m%Lt-a
. . r e L u c L L k L . IL
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-=a

Grrd.,LLc.L . A 2

...........:.............. ............................... ..............................

.

24
20
22

Infantry Regiment's Trnk Company The D n k e 5 Integrated Annor. I e k ...................... 1 Integrated Trainkg for Armor. Eirrrrold 1

. .

1 1

.......

14 37 6 12 5s

24

5

11

1 4

32
69

. . . . . . . . . . .
zoamar,sgt.RobeRB.

.......................

4

Dosbrt s 4 L e t ' s Keep tbe Bow G-r. Miieton Let's Name Oru Cloee Combat Units, Raymond 2d 2 L e t ' s Tdk About Armor. Janus 1 Logidea u u i T r a h ir the Armored Division,

43

26
11 34 24 34

in Prepuduesa: Link or Obrwle? ................................... ......... ............... Forrytbc ................................ 3 Jd.oluiaaIbmdup ( S a v i c e J o d ) ......... 1 Medal of Haoor. A d of the ................ S JdenWhoprrttheArminArmy. Wayne ........ 1
Yesaage from the Commsndbg Geoend of The

Tank C o m b Briefs ......................... Tank Deferme Against Attack Steveas.. Tank Eamomy: AnJJdr of O p a a tm .d a d Combat Losses, Bobineu .................. T 8 n k I n i . n t r g Team at WOrtE, The, PitLCa,Jr... Tank.Tc~amrt .................... (Sum1 Shtance) Dcmcr4 Hodees. Buri..

.

4 2
1 5 6

so
23

w
0

57 42 29

& m y r r + i n BooDcjr , Tank kn't Born O.emight, A, C n d d Tank Pktoan Leder. Th, Kdler

.

m
6 14 34
66

Tank Pwoao Opcrrrtioar in Korea ............ 5 -1 H.rpa. E m TibDa (slim Eck, Jr. Kelley. Bmwn, Bopdstm, Wilcox

.

....... .............

4 4

.

M
5 10
l . 2 18 61
20

.

30
43

6 40 6
43

Armored Center: xaj.David C . h .................... Maj.Ctn.LD.White YobilitJr i n the Field Army .................... (Sum & Spb.t.aa). Crittenberger Hodgc. Ch.mkrli0. swilu€ Eddy . M r Liaeohr's Army" (Book Review). Henry ...

..................

2

.

NCO's

e6
6@

4 the A n n o d Cavalry Regiment (Sum &) S Yak.h, chw;Jr. Moore, zohna. Narlette Messer. Sehwvtr

.

. .

5 5

so

TIPtarGetTanglmr................ Tanka i n Defame: Kapyoctg pieLet+ Jr........ Tanka in Korea: U&H@l. PicLett, Jr......... "Thir i s War!" (Boot Btrirr) AmdmWs ...... -Tito ;sd G o W " (Book Bcricr) H.ndkr .... 'Th5~ M ~ ~ ~ c l k r - H i l k b r ............ ud Tdning Pmblhtioum .ad Aida. ckwnt ......

.

1

..

4 8 5 4
6 2 1

14 12 SI
58

~

25
50

TrcndrinArmW-

(Sam w & SPb.t.ac0). o m Von D e lu V i r m u d huri.

. . ................

.

26

2

.

.....

West Point:

CLrU of 1961 Annor C r d o r t a ...

N 1.p.34 a wh8t WORM You Do? (Pmbkm) ... No.1.p.W lN0,s.p.U

.

5

15
44

[

2 4
6

w

a

30
46

1
D .o c a m b a r , 1951

-8.

16

4s s 9

s4

LEADERSEIP

By William R
3 2 w

dW t e
$20.00

From 1944 until just before his suici& i n1 9 4 9 ,our
wartime Secretary o f the

Navy and our first Secntuy o f Defense set down as his private reminder a day-

wolm
Aullld

m

A 8 m w
17l9 K W,N.W., WerMng)on 6, D.

C .

highly confidential a M ~ U = has ever before been made

public'se soon after the f a c t . Aside h m the

extra-

ordinary material it reveals, it also provides an un-

paralleled picture of how the wheels of government
go round, * o w j r t L o f c L e M b m # b w r ~
EDITED, VIT?l CONNECTIVE BACKGROUND TEXT,BY WALTER WUB,
d b rL.

-

or&r jTom

q S SD v m a S

theBoolrDe-

-ssw0@

rrru+-G u a l a w d T h . ............ ~ ~ sur, oLinaro:TlrLo,&: ; 7 s cras amnnd Anadr i nu Londna carpoigr. lorn
mm-coIyuAfVIOUCYO)HMUWED.

1'
..., .............. ; ..:.... ...............= ....................
*-

.

1 .... 4 . 5 0 ClIiefdSlalrlkwlorPbarad~ 3 . 7 5 -Wdh@lOll~P@kTh.opm .h . Dn ,oirhion,, 3 . 2 5 ...

Theoloaprhoa ' d W ~ T r o a ..$ p 3 . 2 5 -_-c llKth#urrmtandT~dGfOUd

-

. .

......................-.

...

................................

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