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INDEX TO YOLUI : 111. 1891.







T Y r r m a r , ............................... CAVALRY RA1PS.- 1.leulcnsnt W . H HAY ......... CAVALRY OUTPOST DUTS.- By General F. DE BRA FIRISG AT BREAST-\\'ORES OF FSOW WITH T H FURTHER REMARKS O S THE CAVALRY F I G H I TSSBURG.- Lleutenant4%lonel 5Y.Y BE( QREGG'S CAVALRY FIGHT Ai GElTYSBURG J BR00KB.RAWW . . LFITEHS OS CAVALRY.-Rince K M P I ZC HOUI Colonel R .P Ht'GHm FEVLWIKENTH L.ErIEB.- T h e Cavalry D I v ~ ~ O I E 1 0 m r e . m LL-rrse.-Ths Canrlry I n Comb1 SINREE L E S I T E E ~ . Fighting on Foot of ti YlCEIGAN CAVALRY AT GETT\*SBURG.-Oeqer MOUNTAIN CASS0N.- Lieutenant ALVEI H SIDE NEW DRILL REGULATIOSS FOR CAVALRY 0. ON T H E SABER A S D SABER EXERCISE-Lleute PROFESSIOSAL SOT=.- A Conrenlent Method of An Epally Coiistrncted Canvu Boat Cavalry T a c t l a Description o f ..Field Sketching Board ...... Experiments In Xlght Firing by R u s s h n TK Honea In Danger Memorandum of t h e V l e m of the Dlvlrion In the Field against H a t l l a ..........., Redarkason Rime Hohenlohe'a Sixteenth I some of t h e EITecm of Gchml Training Up01 T h e Britlsh Cavalry at Aldenhot September T h e Erect o f SrnallCollber Bul+U The Indian Yemiah T h e Modern Cavalry Destroyer A&n T h e R o d Gnards o f Xexlco The Vlginia Milit~ry InsUtute, Lexington. The Wound8 (kuwd by Small-Calibfir B d e Umpiring the Cavalry Out ofExbtenee Bo= FOREIGN CRITICIBY O F TEE AMERICAS A SeUXI

............... ................................... ....................................



T . YclvrnaD 19: BrigsdbrCeneral TROMAII



.......................... . .

Translated by N 4 o r C. C.C.CARR. ERDAS RIFLE.-A. H Kovtt101b 161 TIIE RIGHT FLANK A T GETFRAI I X . . 1b7 S 1863.- LleutennntColonel WM

. by Peaee............................ 179 D n with lufantry .................. Xcd a d - ......1...................... 413 H.KIDD ..................... U .* .................................. 64
~ B B . ~ S C W I S Q L W Translated


. ..........................



RYY .............................. ;PnER E T R A ~ B

.......... ...............................


.......................... .................................... .....................................





.................................... .................................... ....................................



i m a n d e r In

314 4 m ( u O p e ~ ~ l o ~

.......................... .......

. ..........




....................... 89 .......................... 4 a D .................................. 85 .................................. 518 .................................... 427 ................*................... 419 .................. ........... 816 .................................... 816 ................................... 208 .................................... ais KIL WAR.- U e u l e n a n t WILLIAM .................................... !a8
r on Cavalry 5 Indlans

1863.-Ucut.-Col. W. OKELPaS AND NOIS

............ a a
E W A N C E . . 107



3 POWDER b y Lieuton-

............ I37

............ SPI

]ant ALES.

CAVALRS ;worncar. z i

............ a7 ............ 114

............ 381 ............ lea ............ 2!B ........... s



uus.. ..............

. -

Ha 14, September,
eabatitnte 6







. C



W V K D .




MARCH, 1891.

NO. 14.





beginning of the year 1866 found tl of the Cavalry Corps in camp, in the the t roop were directed to make their CI

t and Tbird Divieione

eible, with a view t o their occupancy The- -verity of the weathe degree of comfort. Ten horees were entirely without of eevsral incbee, aud the me
The railroad bad been

euppliea were hauled from t

well -ked commieegry for for the b o ; a condition cornpeneating for the

; thprr providing a d abundant forage went far towarde

elemeat whicb had

WITH T E E RESERVE gainst t h e had been las! t h e m mate fellowr; I f the statf m a d e the I indicated it still reb u t thore 5ns would )nfed eracy to march
a cheerful

pleaeurea were not for t b were on th e ground and,

an q r n e e s to be up
mained. It wae not t h

by his jost coufidence in their strength, a subordinate and humiliating poeitio

d rescued them from whose indomitable

hrow of the

and collapse of the came,although u n a

e long colValley. The desolate land

ed u p t h e i r n t bnild3, together u t a cheer-

horses had been carried down by t h e river, t h e pontoons were brought up,

rront of the swollen iously laid, and t h e

by the jokee and h u g i n 'bappy M o r n from a A magnificent force of

>WBB, howee cheered rode along

M. Ten thonr od gallant y, fighting

courageasoned by
)uragep a d

fight, t h e First Cavalry throu



rld. Free to t h e test r i n d with reatility of r eaciency m i c e . In trior to t h e arged eucChting dieP t h e beet

being assigned to their positions ae faat ae Cavalry wee ordered to support the Eighth charge, in column, down t h e r o d and t b general aeRsult ebould tak


md, by t h e eented t h e

t o the assault, we broke into colnmn at down t h e road &r t h e Eighth New

p s a d went epleebing The rain bad been


bred with t h e -red

t h e wagons, which, with infinite toil,

. mrambled oot of the

. .

trooperaof the leadin

the red clay of the nearly bottomless came u p on the 5 t h ; and on the m hospitable friends good-bye, wit forth, be spared all harsher erperien that they felt that their cause was fessed unbounded faith in the ability

ing dragged through roads. They finally the 6tb, we bade our

ss, although theF pro-

ral LEEand the coured the canal with t h e

EARLY and rose^^. w

tention to its destruction, while DEVIN pame object. On the 7th we reached river, and on the night of the 8t to seize the bridge a t Duguidsv

The Confederates w

i t wae, oar loseea

while the moral ing the road only with the gr I t was afterwards rcporte

verely upon the horses, be upon the m e n ; and there- a

uopleuunt sobjecta; stil clean and Redoctioe bed relieved of 'their load of


column and the trains; but it soon its narrownetw was snch t

frightfully cut up, and





o f t h i s expedition had rendered had severely teated t h e powem of

leee mnddy, afforded
veteran8 though t h e y were. Nearly o abandoned on t h e march or rendered w o r n a n d jaded condition of those whic timonj- to t h e aeverity of the'wor to perforin. Although t h e cominuad W'BR t h t h e r e wacl no diwcoursgcment or felt t h a t t h e r e d t a achieved fully com sacrifices. The I s s t r e m n a n t of EARL sufferings of war, which had RO I of enppliee a n d war material had been

f the bohad been serviceable. while t h e ined gave s t r i ki u g teebeen called upon

Union armiea, many

ed a n d weakened,
spirit, a n d i t wae d for all loeees a n d

tion, and yet, w i characteristic of could have been

doah, t h a t highm t h e burden8 a n d

BBOWI, of t h e F i R h tion among these co of tbeir eervicee in

thin destroying column w a s no unimpo T h o w a r m sun a n d k i n d l y bwccee a n d mud-covered clothing and equi dietributed, home8 wbod, uc'cou ical w o r k brought up, a n d every t h e r w o r k which all k n e w was be On t h e 26th of March we mar

It may aim bo unoppoeed march of or in the final reeult.

ed our soaked packn

ionR a n d forage were

a n d horses d through. Ion the apiwtructed ' com pel led ization, b u t '08888of t h e !ir pereons1 e r t y whereee liet; t h e n g in great

Jarnee river, which w e

t h e Dutob Gap canal, g in'iwview b e f o r e h e

great Commander-in-Chief, t h e

a atopping place

abundanr- the wanta On tbe 1 3 t h w e m

ith reached

c o m m a n d to crow the

t h e meanera1 SHBRImabled t h 6 I, at Mount I the W h i t e rited us, on h e progrees

t h e little milit t h e g r o u n d almoet w i t h o u t gradin front of Petereburg. Here we w e u n d e r ite npw commander, G

Hancock'e Statiqn, laid on t h e wurface of P o i n t to o u r lines in t h e Second Division,

w h o had heen absent from varioun c'a in t h i s wise, with regret, ita g a l l a n t co

pa, a n d wme ofacere e F i r s t Cavalry loet

BAKEB, (otherwise Txx BA

from a protracted absence a n d W u m i rank. T h e regiment here alao rejoi

Reeerve Brigade, a



able d u t y at tion in t h e h e honom to w y was t h a t
IS, had j u s t Sigadier-gen turn made i t

headqoartere m i g h t knowlodge that w e s

i I

ing o u t of sight. However, we pl fair progrese, and towards eveni

of t b e cavalry of t h e
Its commander, received his well ea
Reom like g e t t i n g

back blloas :

The Reaewe Brigade

fastened together a n d s t r e n g t made, o v e r which tho comma From this point w e h u r r i t h e advance g u a r d captured some of t h t h e remainder in sllort o r d e r o u t of t h e Cavalry, by r i r t u e of its h g o i n g on picket, with outposts well o u t T h e rain which poured down all n i g h t t h e picket line, b u t a recon oped t h e fact t h a t FITZ H t n L ~ de front. W e were, however, eatistied

i s ' s pickets a i d d r o v e

T h o brigade pushed

Second Maesach

ection of Fire Forks.

iould reniaiii while

bat its e e w i c e was su


of the oasmp'u g u n s ; a impending - w e d to k respond with p r o m p t n e w Upon the order for t h

t h a t faithfd and u n t i r i n g

right, informing u s t h a t iritreiicliments in front winter, was a t laet on t movement came, and t h e brigade moved t h e S i x t h Pennwylrania a n d t b e Second ndrance. T h e enemy'# b u t t h e a t t a c k was pre e n e m y w a s driven t o c o u n t r y in t h i s region brush, while t h e r a i n s of t h c soil t h a t moun greateet diflculty. "hie affair of t h e b

t h e Fire Forke road, chusette h a v i n g t h e

more neverely t r y i n g t h
on the Weldon Rsilroad an intfaite variety o up i n t o a t h i c k and

principal weapon use developed t h e fact t h Forks, t h e outposts


1 I.


-I. - I

ground it obligingly
ut little reeietance o y

in our ftpnt, and 88

but all preasing eagerly forward, in

easy. They must h a r o eup for they were totally indiffere our men were close upon them that th acter. A large portinn of the nearest

hers did not reach the

towards Dinwiddie; the aro of our char-

ieion wae engaged unmistakably comflict, in which our

fire, AOOU made the brigade atten ti on.

the morning from F i v e rested on Chaniberlain made about ten A.

DARB staff ( t h e only mounted otacer in si by t h e troops compoeiag the left of o u r li

attempt wan made upy it. But, a h o n

nee Bring! T h e

within a few yards of the crest, voices troops were heard. The command, IH

re which wan now

ce of protection from nn. T h e staff o6ibr disappeared; and d the dieordered line confueion and retreat. For-

t h e infantry linoa of the Brigade T h e -rve

Court Houee.

ate line eaept past, t h e

doable tihe, plunging an soon in the midet of t h e

of the yictorione Confederrriedly diemounted and, in rough t h e thick brneh, was in rear of PICKETTS diwae required to induce J to throw down their the Court House, a largo

effect of thie combined attack w w to ca puranit of DEVIR and DAW=. that b e

of a shot.

eition at Dinwiddie Court House. Fortunately hie Brat fierce assault u rear wm not followed u p with vigor, he hie attention to t h e force etill threatening lain Creek ; and the heavy 5ring in tb wan yet plenty of fight left in CPOOICI Colonel SMITEcommanding, etill kept Creek,and ita determined fighting at thie ju

noying foe in hie expedient to t u r n over on ChamberHie third brigade,

ion on Chamberlain C t U r e W M of the gmateet


laying the i



~ a w la u Advantage wae t a

i r e quiet in our front to get

u r front, and ae the long

mud-bedraggled troopera a c m the open fieldsin ened by the eight of our

of that portion of the enemy's 1 and the cavalry wae Boon in the the familiar ground towards Fivo F At the crow-road near the old A ~ a e s ' edivieion of the Fifth Corpe qualitim, and t u we rode paet, tbe A little fnrther on we came up wi

ordered beetilp forward

the brigade, we found had marched nearly all soldierly and bueineeence in their fighting d friendly peetinge. IPPIN, with hie divie-

,preeentinpt euch a tempting d not wait for their front to be

opportunity wae offered m o ekirmiehers of t h e enemy from their c


necesesrily B ~ O W ,
progrew cbeoked
b, on tbe fbrtber

preeeed eoldiem, w o n
meatbe over the 5eld.

/Finally, about noon, the First by a particularly vicioue neet o behind a line of fallen l o p
to occupy aome out-buildings within a annoying poeition, wbon the partiee

it would be a good opportunity for ua force wbich w m a maki w m a good one, but for charging we the horses were brought forward a fe
the day waa coneumed,

assault. we dash forward and are m n works, seeking a place over which i t m

f t l h formidable ible to force o u r

of t h e hoetile marks in a straggling and w e were upon them. T h e cbsrge was wbll without abeck WBE) o

very face of the well conn position. Here his artilte, thus effectually clearing portiorr of the field. T h e

our brave infantrymen r a n be Been a line crushing all reeietance. After seekin opening, we at last make a rash and himuelf, and are m n in the midst of

ain for u convenient over, every one for

As we preee forward in pursuit the athwart a war picture of surpaeain are still vivid. Broad fields rrtretch b which t h e dieordered remnant of t h e i n g ; some q u a d r o n e of hie caval t a n t open ground, ae though resolved on eo o u r conquering forcea, cavalry a n

on the farther aide of

io act of devotion:

beeau~ it w m not t h e fbrmed, congratulatory o

shad- of evening. Effective parsuit in the darkneea of nig region, is impoeeible, a n d t h e cavalry ie e 80 our facee are turned towards saddle8 from t h e &eke of our tir be poeeible in t h e midet of tbe confusion w pet calls in every possible combination of battle, and his anxiety
t wbich waa in progreee

h a n unknown

rounds us. Tromdivision calls, bri-

fbr his destruction, waa

the movement of t h e Fittb

to lie inactive before a

nw, and the delay u

cheers of o w dismount

hours seemed an eterdown i n t o an spatbetic

to find their miming men; sho between the captured Jobnnies dashing about regardlees of incipient cam ~ ~ f f ~ - acontributed ll to p length the excitement weam itself o u t ; pire ; sleep cornea to the tired eoldier wit reigns, except at headqnarters, where wor laid out, and at the hospitals rowful occupation.

Yanks; staff oflicere

, and

hearing t h e as they meh to t h e

cavalry, the whole force bei victory for the Union troops coald bardly ha

n more complete.

, . A i




imme~iiately proceeded t o rally to the rear teririg timber. The reserve squadron ( t h o 1 but two) had k e p t its placo in t h e woods ground, a n d as it wa# found t h a t t h e fire o harmlessly above amidst t h e branches of 1 prudent to k e e p it quietly in ita place until blc neighbors across t h e field shoiild have 8 k e p t u p a g r e a t racket for half a n hour c round-ehot calling forth a u a t h e m a s from gndes in rear, w h o were disturbed in t h e i r el Tbing~ finally quietiiig down, c a m p wa well satisfied to postpone tile settlement o f t This WBS one of those little affairn which t h e repnrts, in which no glory ia won, hut iiig t o t h e lot of t h e c.ara1t-y a M B p a r t of which add continually t o t h e aggregate o affair t h e First Cavalry lost ita adjutiiiit, 1 severely wourided. and several men a n d Iio W e were in t h e saddle bright.nnd early I and found e v e r y t h i n g dear in our front. . on t h e road t h e jogful news was p m w d aloi full retreat, a n d t h n t Richmond was oure road also proclaimed, unmistakably, t h a t w of n retreating a r m y . Stragglers in butter all stages of dilapidation were picked u p iii literally f u l l of them. T h e w a y w a s lit1 wagons, muskets, c a m p utensils, a n d disc sorts. Fires had been started in t h e brnsh abundanceof artillery ammunition being eca unexpected explos.ion added t o t h e intere occasion. T h r e e piecea of artillery were woods, soinc diatance from t h e road, a n d f t h e caisaons a n d limbers which !ad furnist Ccsreaa division had t h e advance, a n d was soon heard as h e d r o v e before him FIT exhilarating news of t h e m o r n i n g had rem tient of a n y delay, a n d as t h e rear-guard 4


nseqnent snrrender of t h e



end of t h e line fell waR sent t o victory nt Fire F o r k s

, which

the junction of t h e CI

. promptly,drove

him o w a s found abandoned ; t h e east, puphed t h e retreatal s h a r p skirmish, i n t h c m the routed divisions of lost faith in t h e ConfederIS at SFotts Corners n e a r z LEES cavalry,reenforced e a d v a n c i n g shades of night,

PICK^ a n d JOHNSON, w
acy, w e b gathered in.

e Brigade was diatirely unexplored dutermined a n d

to t h e right, t h r o u g h t h e

indicating t h a t our close i n g eqoadron wae noieele

e d t w o or t h r e e a n g r y ahota, w a s n o t deaired. T h e lead-

with a yell. The s waa given, a n d t h e ward; but how m a n y

t h e command ,Charge) d. A t lcaet it started fore o p w s i t e side will never

d e r corer of t h e slicl. ;iment at this tinic had t h e e d g e o f t h o open h e e n e m y w a s paaeiiig trees, i t w a s t h o u g h t . ie alarm of o u r excitnaided. T h e y , however, inore, t h e i r shells a n d I men of the o t h e r britts to mako t h e i r coffee. nadc. everybody b e i n g dispute Rntil daylight. e hardly mentioned in ich n r e constantly fall4 legitimate work, a n d ta casualties. I n t h i s utenarit A . S. CLARKE, a. t h e morning of t h e 3 4 t h e w l u n i n moved o u t t h a t LEES army waa i n T h e condition of t h e were close in t h e w n k e t a n d grey uniforms i n Iuada-the woods w e r e zd with broken d o w n ded equipmenta of ell y t h e rotrd-side, a n d an rod about,an occasional a n d excitement of t h e untl conceded i n t h e her o n w e came acrow8 t h c loose ammunition. r a t t l e of biw carbines EES ekirmishem. T h e d CUSTERS men impaI

lowed by t h e rapid d i our m e n t h a t t h e y w

piecee of artillery, convinced carry t h e poeition, a n d t h e y



disappoi t b e front, attacked pro driving the boeti Darkness, however, pre country,and t h e troop b

WILB, however,

of tbe Danville road.

ion of



place, first atrikiog the eneral YEREITT with the

owards &inelis Court

rnfion for which, General MERRITT,with CI'JTCR.wae eent over to the right

of DIWIN and

centrated a t Jetterarille. t h e Si General SEIEEIDAN, marcb when we trottad forward April) accompaiiicd ifth Corps until afternoon, Here we took possession ut pickets prepared army, feeling cone should be able to do so number of stragglers in e advance of their a r m y K'B divieion from
of FITZ LEE'S' enterprisfore night, and intrench-

Howe, and during the night had put hi Station on thc Lynchburg o r South Side clivisiori. was off bef'orc drgliglit headed for

nsville, and having

and look for a more

meot t o take a hand in ingcavalry. T h e Fift mente having been t h While we were reeti

1 MEBBITT, were making

Church.-?Chey came up

left of the Fifth ; DEVIN'a

g out to t h e left of t h e in-

federate columns, with wagona and artiller intervening valley and through openinge i higher grouud on the appodte i n g unmcceasful attempts to g for the two divisions in rear to pa- on

d be wen across t h e iinber, marcbing on

During the forenoon eent on o reconnaieeance

milee north of Jetterevill

CROOK, and dashing charge into the midst of the


ooking for a ford,

completed whe

?/E BRIGADE. t o Cover t h e withdags a n d prisoners.


tleep ravine to o u r right, and a line was

ricades, acroo88 t h e reflection t h a t we i g h t a n d front has

t h e troops of t h e division which were for the timber f u r t h e r to tho rear. They qui while, b u t a n o t h e r a t t e m p t to advance

any attempt t o dialod That trooblesom qoiet a n d w a i t to be

t h i n g i n ita front and ANDERSONS corps ae h

force iu o u r front was MAHONES diviaion of not h a v i n g been engaged d u r i n g t h e d a a n d did not propose to be driven o u t t r a m p without remonstrance. Thew n i g h t atLackR were generally

which for eeverity a n d dom been sorpaeeed.

ures of t h e Sixth Corps

On the m o r n i n g of t h e 7th, the loose, s t r i k i n g o u t tbr Prince E d w a r to Appomattox Station t h a n t h a t of n e diviaion w a s t r e a t i n g army. CBOOKU naissance to Earmville Station.

bed o n a recon-

D u r i n g t h e day t h e Second GOEDOWH corps, o n a road

this place on a reconoailulance, A r m y of t h e J a m e s being to t h e le

Brigade leading, a n d ance o n t h e road, j u s t van- guard received a and an investigation b y

h o n t h e opposite bank,

pect Station, on tlie L y n c h b u r g railroad a rille, to which p o i n t MACIKBNZIB~ dirieion p night wben we unsaddled. p r o although i t waa not visible. Ou had been tbrougli a country n arms, a n d H-au n R peaceful a n d existed. W e were again in t h e mdd advance followed by DEVIN; CROOK, who bringing u p t h e rear. M A C K E N Z I B h a d Appomattox C o u r t House i s of Appomattox Station, on the Cumberla main thoroughfare to Richmond, a n d o LEEE army was marching. General SEE


It was after

d u r i n g t h e night, to hi# o w n army.

d informed General t ho would march




u t learning through t h euppliee for LEES army arrival, he 6ret directed twenty-five milea distant
ae Virginia roads go, h a pleaeant country war. The freellly nd whole, were in pleusne of Virginia o w r

There is an anxious waiting for the expected, and for the intantry which ward to o u r aeaiatance. The men are of conflict ie heard away over to t h e along the line in our direction, and the selres behind their slight barricad familiar zip,zip, of the flying b our old friends of t h e Fifth Corpe. T h cloee at hand, and although they have tinuonsly for the paat forty-eight wearineee in every movement, we know the gravity of t h e eituation and can be position against a n y poeeible aeea Aguin in t h e eaddle, t h e caval to the right a n d front, and CUE ters, with its forest of captured batt ing RPOWIR and emothered impreca Divieion, who fwl t h a t they are Away off to the leA, acmm an expanse of a confoeed mase of wagone, gunm, and tr men begin to cheer, not doubting t h a t them. B u t there ie a Rudden h a l t ; t h e louder; a knot of horsemen can something which looke like a white flag, from the fmnt- Lrr has surrendered.


eure ie haetening forto make their c d e e at

re are eettling them-

ahead at a trot, and ae w-e

of t h e Jamee is also arching almost cwn-

homes forward,we were

t h e railroud

few hundred

e out into eome open fielda

ded upon to hold t h e

While we were groping had now fallen, the artildiecovered that the force ance of Ems army, set-

the men of the First

e e n round, can be B ight o f which oor m n be amonget

. .

e captured locomotivee, with themeelvee on t h e railroad.

ekirmieh line. S o t trooper knew t h a t
our line waa squarely wan being vigorously

t h a t a flag of truce

be arooeed to momentary f carbine fire when enterA t laet the grey dawn dusky, misty morning, giv which waa, thenceforth, to
f that glorioae event

memorable in t h e Na-

realize t h a t t h e long chase ie ended, t h a t t ceived ite death blow, and that our work i The military leeeoce of o u r civil war wlight eignificance for other nat which the operatione of our ar to thoee which prevail on the continent of conclnded t h a t no ueefnl leeeone could be 1 cltruggle waR regarded with I been bestow,& upon a w a r between savage dependence and e@ciency of iiient in fire-weapoue, wae displayed ue an

rebellion ban re-

o have had but

,i t w u , apparently,
and o u r four years

T h e i n c r d in-

leeeon which ehould



not have been diflicult

tione,it h a s been etigm it repeatedly charged etedioesly iRnored.
.etticieocy than t h a t di

; and yet, becaiiae tho

J , and

the fact that

example of cavalry
day's operationA from mined Bgbting on t h e again& vastly superior thwarted the efforta o mot strategic point, decisive victory won tbe following day. retreating army, by vi of tho enemy's retrea
cnoirlry i n the twelve I 9th, 1865. By ita deterN'B

t Dinwiddic Court House,

rce8 to occupy that impor-


e rear guard of the t placed iteelf on the path n the 4th of April. Our



[ Prepred expreply for the JOVRXAL OITHE 1.

I~ ' A P A L B Y AK-~ATIOX.]

ing columns of the in g the capture of

when t h e powera last limit of endurancw, the

tbe evening of April 8tb, aeiit to the rolief advance back to

been taxed to almost the ed Appomattox Station on Supplies which Iiud been

HE following rules npply to encountc b between the vanguard and the enemy, to observation of thc ers of the advanced guard, and to attack As eOon ae the leading patrol diacovei from eight, reports immediately, and nati lead& of the patrol informs his men by si patrol, as a rule, never join him i n hie obeervations. The lead fireR, and never ettlrckm t h e enemy, iinlesc which is never done if' the vanguard cn the enemy's approach.

it with tenacity until the

are strictly observed. Tho lcador o o f the enemy's being near goes to guard in a concealed position on the

cavalry and i t s imptooue 1 i t was made pssible only

1 1 :

rt upon the report nd leaves tho vanThe leading patrol e reserve. eontinoes

MOSES HARRIS, Captain, Fint Cuwlry.

Tile leader of the support, ao 800 noiten and decides upon any furtht cee arid hia orderu. If the chief o

information, the ntinue reconnoitering.

enemy for the purpose of capturi the ground to determine the beet flank and, if poes3ble, by nurprise




a n attack, t h e otEcer of t b e bush for t h e a d v a n c i n g e n e m ~npport of t h e t w p e in bie troops following must, i o su t h e m m m a n d e r of t h e a n d him own plan, i n

to prepare on a m d r a w him beyond of t h e

rt, t h e otllcer of t h e ade g a r d to t h e strength of by a t t a c k i n g himself, eo of t h e danger, m a y 1 rules for immediate acbe laid down, a n d e v e r y ; b u t i n no case must h e axim, t h a t t h e cav-

o delay t h e eneriiy, or to

long .contiauoua tlre, a n d coneiderable a m o u n

k e e p two of hie men w b trrncea, nesr him, in o r d e r

Reconnoitering and w tinued by.moanted patrole

rt i n eetimating discate t b e distances to

on t h e flanke, is conht, on foot. If t i m e ie mobility of t h e troops, trated on favorable points,

a t fnvorable times. X concealed a n d sate is important. Safety from a s u r p r i w , nnd coyer agai led-boreee are placed on the flanke of t h e if placed in rear of t h e line, even if she1 still more or leee expoeed to fire. I f t h e j tection, t h e boreen m u s t be t a k e n firrther m e n t with c a v p l r y r a mounted reserve ie a n d t h a t of t h e horse-holders, ie dietribu The reconnnissnnce of the ground by tht is quickly made, to avoid delaying t h e m ing, and because h e baa no time for at( minutely. A previous etudy of t h e m a eance, which i s intended to discover t h e t h e accidenta of t h e g r o u n d , which are i i t b e engagement. T h e commander of t b e vangunrd euri tione d u r i n g t b e marcb, collecta hie men a d v a n t a g e of a short halt to write t b e m which b e eende to t b e commander of tl! latter wisbee special inforniation about CI t h e ground, h e points this o u t specisllp ti g u a r d , when g i v i n g bim hie ordere; t h e upon it. I n e v e r y o t h e r caee h e e n d s ba i m p o r t a n t to t h e troope following, in reg miseariat, or a poeaible engagement. T h r e e chief points are carefully cot of t b e vanguard, uhen judging of the grot ing o f the marching troops, and the tncticc T o this belonge t h e reconnaieeanee of ' bridgee, dykee, forde, country roads, def covery of any obstacles; a i m , a timely t h e m e a n s at bnnd to remove them, an1 which he hae a l r e a d y t a k e n for tbie p u r b p e c i a l activity ie neceesary in pu commander of whose rear guard t a k e s a adapted to dinturb or delay t b e boetile c01 obetaclee. Bridgea will be found d e e t r o p by b u r n i n g t h e m or breaking t b e m dow through, woods m a d e impamable by fe cad-, fords by t h r o w i n g harrowa i n t o 1 s i n k i n g veeeele. For m a k i n g repaire, r

losition for t h e led-horses

t fire are obligatorr; t b e

of skirmishere. because red by low hills, t b e y are mind does not afford prot h e rear. I n a n engage:airable; ite ammunition, i among t h e skirmiehere. peer qf the advanced guard ch of t h e column8 followp i n g l o n g to reconnoiter racilitates tbie reconnaiaointe o f obeervation, and bortant for t h e march and

re t h e g r o u n d in all direcrandn at a trot, a n d takeo )wn in a few legible lines, advanced @ a d . I f t h e .ain placee a n d eectione of h e commander of t h e van;ter makee a special report o n l y such messages aa are .d to t b e i r m a r c h , t h e com-

:be preliminary meaeuree


l i n g a beaten e n e m y , t h e thoee measurea which n r e me, by artificial or natural , e i t h e r partially or wliolly, Dykee will be found d u g m g treee, atreeta by barrim , ferries by removing or loving such obetaclee, etc.,



patrols, however, m u s t n a t u r e of such o b s t i d e s .


C A v-'IL R Y.


ole first examine the

pioneers. T h e c o m m a n d s make timely r e p o m on t h e tho- which are of anced guard. giving, xaminos t h e authoris

if required, receipts. Besides those ofaci ties a u d clergymen. If t h e village i s supposed to LH: occ

by t h e enemy, t h o ap-

s to evade t h e obstacle, h e provisioning of t h e uard g a t h e r s intiorma-

steps to collect provi-ions

men to watch t h e execue advanced guard m u u t

f t h e vanguard to report r eections of t h e ground,

D u r i n g t h e examinstion of a u t h o thicl side, whilst t h e point watches o n For the reconnoitering of wooda nnd the support, t h e following i s t h e r u l e :

h i s position, h e must d e -

trol reaches t h e o t h e r side of t h e wood

c h for a suitable bivouac between t h e leading patrol and i n t i m e s of.peace, t h e ac proper j n d g m e n t of uuc m r y knowledge a n d a deemed indispeneably
to t h e r i g h t a n d left of t h e high-road

With regard to t h e passing a n d rec

streets, railways,

a few bnndred paces. n g of de6lee, t h e s a m e

ykes, woods, hills a n d inmnce by t h e leading patrol

whether the defile is

t h r o u g h a n d round. t h e

t h e enemy, i t is paeeed by t h possible. T h e s o p p o r t follows at a trot.


* '








rear guard, the following i The ordere of the rear

ferent arm8 to one anot the rear guard, and on

and to veil the retreat

ground, the formation of' behavior of tho enemy. ided into a main body ose of the advanced guard h horse artillery is generin touch with the enemy


The cavalry of the r

al-o try to discover the object of the eneni fore c'tluses bridgea to bo blvken down, i ni passable. streets to the requisite workmen, or deta ,%metinlea an unexpected is advanttlgeoulr; it oblige8 the enemy

venienta. He thereand fnrtla to be made

the h a d e of hie columns, f o 1 i n either case loeing time.

eploy or to make detoure, an obstinate resistance is their being turned.

i n order not to be outflanked by tile enemy

guard must neither allow

It must not fight Id fast in front and outhnked. J t retreab from one ing reeiehnce, ae a role, on1 When'paaeing throa marehy p o u n d , etc., th in a good poeition on a

rial available for military p my,but brings it away, aAe the nearest villages or towns, or destroys it.

their profrection. The t h e defile to relieve the dry retreat h t , whilet

e artillery and carhe edges of the woods ;

up a position as much con the enemy may be obeerv if he presses on. The commander of' th


the d i s c u l t operations of the rear on the pgrt of ita commander, tena-

similar orders and his'duties are very sim mander of the vanguard. The same rulea Ae to the eubdirieion the following are the rules : The rear eubdivision rear patrol. If the ene

the immediate neighbor ing patrole muet be executed with cover any flanking mov

duty of the h n k use they are to die-



They must protect the flanks from atta i n g by the enemy and keep up the coniiectioi march on parallel roads. There a r e three methods of covering patrols. which are dispatched from t h e aul protect tbe flanks of the column ; by flanki nne-lialf to two equadrons strong and are c for the same purpose as the flanking patrole iiients. which a r e dispatched by.ttie main protect the flanks of the main body. Tlrc duties and the methods of the flanl been mentioned above, when npeaking of i The flanking troops and thc flanking d ently, and must proride for their own Ral 4 v e s i n front and rear by putrols, on thc :ind take care to keep up their connectir I t depends on circumstances, whethcr t flunk nrovc as rapidly a8 t h e advanced gi whethcr they allow the main body to marc :i suitable position, i n order to follow i t u] ing patrols move rapidly fmni one point reniiiining a t each point only long enough tlt~tuchiiientu, which are dehipnetl to keep u columns marching on paralld roiids. sericl fiir enough to be i n touch with one nnothe For f h e condrict of those troops which prc tlie following is tliu r u l e : When tlic marching colunin Iiidtw. tlir tlie outpost duty. Letrtling and otlicr pa good points of observation. The clirisions, iii close order, take UI connect with one another. The eommai the rear guard, if necemarj-, distributes 1 on the flanks. If he is already in touch ground in front can be partly observed, pa keep liini Atill niore in touch with t h e ground in front. If those protecting troops are to be niarch by others, detailed for outpost du? all tbat ie known of the enemy, and do 1 duly relieved. From all that has been mid about t h



purenit may be to fa
ing columns.

opponent with outflank-

e, prgvent retonnoiterwtweeri columns which nu flank: By flanking o r t on parallel roads to ;troops, wbicb are from patched by ttiu support a n d by 0anking detach~ d on y parallel roads to

patrols at speed t o the v to which they are aent

ervation. T h e distances the mime considerations

the pursuing enemy. This

ig patrols have already

? advanced guard. mchrnenta act indcpendy. They protect tbemilks by fluriking patrol#, with t h e main colunin. troops pn)tec.ting tlie rd or tlie main body, or past theni. remaining in ifterwardw. The flankobnervation to another: reconnoiter. Flail ki n g voiinretion between two eir flanking Iiatrols out

taking advantage of the g d u n d and bd preparing obstacles. Bridges!; d beams, which a r e are broken down b ed tbem; narrow streets

ee which the enemy my cause him to lose e enemy make a detour Previous to t h e orously, t h e rear g

ct cohimns during a halt,

wtccting troops perform ,la and rcar p u a d s seek covering position, and er of the support, or of Its in front, in rear, and ith the enemy, or if t h e 01s a r e dispatched, wbictr emy, or reconnoiter t h e

other bodies to pass the r e s&%division quickly-

the enemy be repulsed, the and reassemblea beyond it,


t h a t the rear guard ehould

!placed at the end of a they inform t h e latter of t leave their places until maxims and rules of t h e

ank during the marcb, t h e

ut whether the liigli clainin mail A u 1 r y . on tlie b:iain

of lung and aeknowle ideal degree in war, ai con t i noal hards h i pa an diminished, we would German Cavalry, like
in war.

events in war will iiot be coiisideral)ly a n open, question. 1 1 1 any c:r~eit' tlie ier. tried to reach tlic ideal of pertbriiiapprowli it most i i e : i i . I ~ -



n performing anj- otlicr

Sorernber 19th. 1 ~ 9 0three , troops I F?"''1 " and I'K ") of t h e S i n t h Cavalry left Fort Robinson, XIJraska. and on the following driy reuched Pine Ridge Agency. Snut 1)trkota. a h c r e they were joined on the Ztith by Troop"D" of the sa le regiment. and the wliole W V Boipanized ~ into t l i r Battalion of the ? ntli Cavalry, commanded by Major GUY V. IIESRY, S i n t l i Cavtrlry. our duties i n c:in~lirrt tlic .\geticy w e inore like those i n garri4011 than tliosc of' a lite in tlic field agaii it atti actire foe. altlioiigh our tirile mi* liikcii iip i n preparing our attalion t i w a n y duty that i t i i i i g l i t br c.rrllctl on to I)erfnrni. The tirst iniportciiit stel) wais the orpii ization of our pack train, l ii iiney. \Vyotning. tinder t l l c . iiiicleus of clinic f'roni Fort .\I cli:rrpe PER RE EYER. tlic c h i d packer a t t l i : p o q Petail* of five nien niucle at oticc. t i i i c l , 11 I i oit gli t Ii ere w e rr (ow i n g t'roni each troop \v\-e~*e to tlic svrircity o f iiiu1t.s) only f i r c pirck n Ics to each t r w p , the nien wcre drilled dailj., often after d a r k , in ord to faniiliarize the packera w i t h their tlutics. Our packera hat1 reach( such II Rtate of proficiency t l i nt when, about tlie 10th of December. w e :ere given tire niore miilea t o each troop, we found o u r w l w s equiplie with a wuficient numlier a)f packs to carry ciglit clays rations for tl command. Our wlieeled transportation waR in a creellent ronclitioii, an4 tltere wtw plenty nf i t , etrcli trnop having lirec six-mulo wagon@. I n the meantime our coinmanding o f f i ?r did not let the troopers Iw idle, nor was he satistied with a perfunc nry liorne exercise. There


! i


preconcerted system latter being daily sho cember 29th, a b o u t 9:30, Colonel HENRY detacbmcnt of t w o Horchkiee g u n s left ( explored t b e so-called impregnable fortrer Lands. O n e troop scouted Porcopine Cre a dietance of twenty-one milee each w a y or C a m p wae reached about 4 o'clock, when tl


sunehine, w a r m or c t h e Agency until D notice; we were ordere

ith h i s battalion a n d t h e mp on White River and of t h e I n d i a n s in t h e Bad k a n d returned, covering 1rt-y-two milee altogether. I ueoal dutiee of t h e camp

were reeuoed.

W e w e r e joined by a tillew consisting of a d

iglit Battery "E," F i m t .lr-

with OR throughout t h e We left t h e Agency a t r a i n until a b o u t 6:30 P a n d t b e r e took s u p p e r

11ad keen our obj

about 2 A. Y. T h e n , reek whero w e found re until daylight. T h i s d neither wood, nor water est m o r n i n g w e cliaiiged

milee i n all, or lifts be

u t 3 3 0 A. Y., t h e niornonetantly a t a trot a n d man a n d beast. 8.1 t h e r e


O u r d u t y for tho

daily scouting.


inNtructiona from Gen -

below t h e Agency.

h'ewa had reached U R t h a t Major WHIT DE, Seventh Cavalry, had corralled Bio FOOT. a n d t h a t t h e campaign ould probably be brooght to a n early close. We bad finished s u p p e r a i bad been s i t t i n g a r o u n d talking, a n d bad j u s t dispersed to seek 01 " d o w n y couches" w h e n our a d j u t a n t suddenly announced : <'BIG F ) T has attempted to break been killed, and GARa w a y ; t h e y have had a 5 g b t a n d WALLACI~ a e LIXOTON a n d HAWTHOBXE been wounded ; a n d then g a v e us orders to break camp at once. T h i s wae a b o u t 30 P. Y. Our c a m p wae struck, t h e magona loaded, a n d t h e com a n d wan e n rvute to t b e Agency at 9:30. We were in a h u r r y , a n ( our g a i t wae a rapid trot. W e m a d e t b r e e halts a n d reached tho A e n c y juet ae reveille WM sounding, 5:30 A. Y. O n e troop ("D") had been left behind 1 t h t h e wagon-traio,whicli had dropped back a b o u t a n h o u r a n d a ha 'behind us. O n a r r i v i n g a t t h e Agency w e w e n t to o u r old cam g r o u n d a n d had waited about t w o hours for o u r wagons w h e n a c irier reached us, b r i n g i n g the news t h a t our t r a i n had been attacked nd was then p a r k e d abouL t w o milee from o u r camp. .&Boots mnd saddles" was imrneditrtel: sounded, a n d we were off to t h e relief of o u r wagona. T h e affair ai ountcd t o t h e exchange of a few%hot.a w i t h t h e I n d i a n s a n d t h e lot31 >f o n e poor trooper, who wae shot, in t h e 5ret volley, b? a n India1 dreeeed in t h e uniform of f hie overcoat boldly dina cavalry eoldier, with t h o yellow lining I played o v e r his back. We proceeded to c np, a n d bad h a r d l y nosaddled, w h e n we were a g a i n ordered o u t w h t h e Seventh Cavalry to obt h e Mission which was reported to be in i Imes. Colonel HENRY tained permieeion for ue to remain behin a n d allow t h e h o m e time for their m o r n i n g feed. About noon a m u r i e r from Colonel F c DYTH arrived i n o u r c a m p saying t h a t t h e y ( t h e Seventh Cavalry: uere h a r d preeseE1,and t o come at once. .Boots and saddles" was gain sounded, a n d t h e battalion proceeded to t h e Mimion aa rapid1 aa our w e a r y horeeu could travel. O n a r r i v i n g a short distance be w t h e Mieeioo w e m e t t h o S e r e i t b , a n d with t h e deployment of o u troops, a n d u n d e r cover of t h e H o t c h k i m g u m , tlie troops of the Seventh were withdrawn,


\ '
. a



and w e all returned t? ou

on this occasion w a s about Thia m u c h for the man o n t h e 29tt, a n d 4 P. m. ot o n e h u n d r e d a n d two mil4

nnd a half hours, inclucl-

ing the eeveral hours rest 1

skirmishes with t h e I n d i a the trot. T h e a d v a n t a g e of t h i s lounging i n t h e mddlc ie h e a v y load, consiating of dred a n d t w e n t y roundw volver ammunition, weigh usual pack. I n t h e battalion t h e r e case of lameness t h a t cam which I bad had shod for Oar casualties a m o n g 1 o u r r e t u r n from t h o Missi haubtion.

nien are kept awake. nncl

twenty-fbur rounds of re-

A L E S . \V. PERRY,
Lirufnicrirt, AVininlh Cavulry.

I. 1889.


duty of writing a sketch of *'The 0 Cavalry Brigade' i n the &ttysburg Cii writer aoiild fain liare shirked, bad the filii \vhicIi he felt at liberty to diaobey. It WI work liatl already been cloiie. and well clon to add to i t unything of positive and pern It is now nearly tive years niiice the de skitit,* erected through the liberality of' I those who fought here twenty-six years u the csact spot where tlic tierce Iiaiid-to-ha the Iisrdy Wolverines and the flower of Sou Un that occasioii : I tlistiiiguinlied son of'thl a trooper of' G R E G t i ' S comiiiiiiid, &livered ('arulry Fight oii the It orution u1)oii -*The It n-asadmirably clone, evidently IL labor by a spirit of fairneaa, a moderation, ancl 2 mendable. To peruse its glowiug prioc scenes. To the writer it in niore. I t brii it' it were but yesterday, the events of tlii

rations oi' tlie Michigan paigii," is one which the iioiie collie froiii n source tl sceiii, iiidwcl, that t h o s < that ~ i t w i l l lie difficult


xition of yonder grniiite number of survivors nf ). ancl intended t o niirrk I saber contest betwcen ' e r n cirv;iliers took place. Geystoiic Stntc,t Iiiiuaelt' fininlieti and exhaustive i t Flaiik a t Gettynhurg." love, ant1 characterized uclicial tone highly voiiiis to visit agaiii t l i e N t 3 I back w i t h full force. as bright July duy i n 1863,' \\-lien GREUG ancl CVYTER c-rossecl swords \i ti STCART, HAXITON iriid FITZHUOII LEE; wheii tlie fate of thin nnl n hung niispeiided by a thread on tlie plains nod lieiglits of Gett, burg. H e i n oiic'e more seated on his horse, i i i front of his nquadi I ot' the Sixth Michigan Cavalry, to the lett of PENXINUTON'S batt J-, watcbing the tumult that is going on below. H e hears the rui de and roar. as the earth quakes under the terrible artillery duel 01 >elnetmyIIill ; the A p t ter of the carbines as ALCIER'I diemounted I irmieherw drive back the

Erected by (be survlvon of G-'8 (Beoond) QV. @so) brlmde. tVolooe1 BRWRK-RAWLE. of Wiladelpbla.

dlVi.loQ and Of C V ~ C E '(SYlehl-








Coofederrite line ; the

ns; the jells of tile entire plan ie spread

to Colonel BROOKEbrilliant orator, i t must dent partiality for Penn-

here, and our friend would

n ideal bero, and not upon

and General GREQU

o-once at tiettogburg, miiid does not dare con-

1863, wae, 811 KILR

a moet lortunate

tbe battle which

iarly unfortunate in this

e of their commanding

accellsible data and my

I 1

I inally,of t ree

ion of the north and

all organized in 1862, and, a t the tim were, in tbe language of another, 'Ifre The commanding officer was Brigadier Michigan man, promoted from the colone talion commanders were, respectively GEOROE ( ; R A Y and W i L L l r m D. MANN. the SeCoiiil Micbigan as captain and GRANOER and P. H. S H e a i D A a ; the Itrat BRODEEAD and TOWN.Colonel GRA atid wae having hi# first experience A t two o'rlock on Thursday mor with ite diriaion, under STAHEL. lett it Virginia, where it had been maintaining the Department of Wauhington, an ward EdwardR' Ferry, on the Po acting as rear guard. T h e march with wagons, artillcry, ambularicc of a column of troop# in active ~e the rear guurd reached the for was no moon. The river was nearly, water deep and the current etrong. course wae to follow those i t 1 adrerice; they wcre gradually borno fa away from the ford into dee rcnchecl the river tbe water Xorcbing tliue throuKb the ink of wplashing hoofs in front, the away, and Sew, exce distance had been steep and alippery bank II But, Rarely acroee the food, but pubhed 011 into Maryland. drizzling rain set in. T h i n tbe morniiig when the piece of wood%,near P to t h o marrow, a:, thc men. But there was was reaumed. That day (26th) 38 commanded by the lamented HltrNo Frederick ae the eun waa s e t t i w and a more enclrantin
*Wonel B~UJOK~RAWLE'~ onatloo.

J. T . COPELAND, A he Fitth. The batret bad eeeu eeroice in

in Fairfax county,
n of videttee around

, the Sixth


IJ- guide to the propt horw succeeded born,

dd to the diecomfort, a

reached tho village of

de had cleared away,

and Seventh. They were


, .,



clover. arid i t made t h e poor firmislie riigtit a squadron %-a#writ out about t verging road. I t \vas illy d u t y , with a town pike, arid H very ririd reinenibrai~ lorry" of tliat J u l y n i g h t , d u r i n g which tlle. d i v i d i n g the time between t h e dettes. S o eneniy appeared. howe l l ictriga n rrgi incnte ret u r ned to En1 mitt v i h u con~inKup to t;tke their place iri c'anic to pws t h a t heroic. JOHNI31-v llicliigan, had tlie honor of niet-tit1g J u l y l*t. .it Einniittnburg i t was leurnetl

s tbirly laugh. That to picket on each di-

overlaokod t b e valley. i n g a n d fertilo c o u n t g r a i n were w a v i n g a

which reflected t h e sun' s o m m e r coJoringa of t h e along t h e column as picture of nnture'e t h e erideocea of loy tered t b e village. The ings, while from porch festations of welcome. with stqiles a n d w a mitted to go i n t o c a n d a m o n g friunde.

nlight. T h e rain of t h e a mellow haze of vapor t softly blended with t h e clamation of eurprhe ran r came i i i eight of t h i s re pleriaing A t i l l . were n cwry hand a8 w e enatcd n b o r e ninny Iiuildand young, came maiiit night w e \\-ere perI the I l l i l l s t o f plellty


leave the sadt h e l i i w of riMonday ( m l i ) t h e , tho First C'nvulry Diburg. I n t h i s way it ot'the Fifth aiid Sixth

t and

iaiigm had occurred.


~ 1 I . P A T R l C K NllCL'Ct'

a n d C'CSTEH

W ~ L B


. with
valley by a n o t h e r road.

Iior-eq well t i d f t h nritl Pistl, Illoren Iiroiigli t lie C'titcwt i n

place of COPELAXD.TIie Jliclriga ucltling t h e First llic.liipun Ca seeii iiiucii service in tile Sliennnd srcoiiti 13011 Run cumpaigli with

11 bcuii 8 t re iigt ti en nd II regiment tliat had r BANKS, rind in tile organizctl i 11 1861

rnier It*:idi ng.i ~ i o r e d

by w a r of t h e Emniittrbii General R. A. ALUERhad t iiito t h e place tliat w'oe NO

('hurubuaco, wliile serving as I State8 Infantry. IIe was mort

Fifteentli r n i t e d g u s t 30, 1861, a t

o one of t h e great e, L i g h t B a t t e r y "M," six rifled pieces, a n d

Linea of nwit *tom1 on

conimantled b y Lieutenant A. Tlie Tbird Division n-m now ordered of Litvestown, to head off STCART, who, t b e rear of the A r m y of t h e Potonisc,

e n t r a t e i n t h e vicinity macle a d e t o u r w o u n d t h e river below Edd with t h r e e brigadea

for the A r m y of NorthMEADE'E e n t i r e army. Union Mille a n d Weetboot equi-dietant RICK at Littloetown waa t h e latter's marcb indiw n , wbich place ie on a

intervnls of a few feot np booquets a n d wrea

tured wagons, was moving n o r t h w a r ern Virginia, between wbich a n d

aud the


w h o did not

minster, on t h e Einmittabu from E m m i t t s b u r g a n d Gettyeburg. directly nuroee STUART'S patb, t b e d i r catiog t h a t he, too, wae m a k i n g for

MICHIGAN C'ri V-4 L 2 Y d T BE



s command, which had

t a n d southeast of Get-


north of Raiiorer; iles southwest of Han-

consumed in acouring t h e soon came i n to t b e effec T b h b e r FAENSWORTE, wit town a b o u t 9 or 10 A. Y. t h e vicinity of Abbottatow a n d SirthoMichigan were I of t b e Sixth, a n d e r Captain ward Westminster, and Col mad i n a similar direction.

headed for Hancirer.

indicated. Several citizens, w i t b s h o t g u n s ir going on foot on t h e flank o f t h e column trj the cavalry. a n d a p p a r e n t l y eager t o particip tle. When within a mile of Hanover, t h e rei wheat field, a n d , mounting a crest beyond. cam hrigade, with a section of artillery in positic the head of t h e regiment (tben m o r i n g in shell, woundinyseveral men a n d bornes. Liei pany 'IC," had his horae shot u n d e r him. Cc the force in front of him was p r e p a r i n g to c h a raw regiment would be n o match for a brigade I \ detour to t h e left, a n d s o u g h t by a rapid r t h e command in H a n o v e r ; Major WEBER,w twtrusted with t h e i m p o r t a n t d u t y of Iioldi while t h e o t h e r companiua effected t h e i r retrei this d u t y performed. T h r c e charges upon often repulsed by t h e heroic WEBER,a n d , w dit1 he hold t o t h e work, t h a t he was c u t off rejoining t h e regimcmt until about 3 o'clock Colqnel ALGER. with t h e Fifth a n d Compai I i i d 11 Rmart encounter with t h e m n i e force, iniich superior numbers, b y t h e use of tlic
bines, w i t h w h i c h hia r e g i m e n t w a s armrd.

heir hands. were seeti ig to keep pace w i t h e in t h e expected batn e n t t u r n e d off into a upon FITZHUGH LEE'S , which opened.upon lunin of fours), with m a n t POTTER, ofComne1 G R A Y6eeiiig . that e, a n d aware t h a t o n e r e t e r a n troops, macle vement to u n i t e with i one q u a d r o n . being t h e e n e m y in check Right gallantly wae le little band were as n such deteriniliation id did not suecoed in x t morning. -A" of t h c Sixth, nlao Iding hin own a g a i m t 3enc.w repeating car-

er first. STUART niarctled he t r a i n s sandwiched be-

FAENSWORTH marched t

ter charge, repulsed the f u r t b e r pmgrees for t b a t In the meantime, w b

sounded, and Colonel oad towards t h e p o i n t

Soon attci noon, t h e e n t i r e division unite over,and a r i g o r o u s skirmishing was kept up riicn, who had retired t o a commanding posii the town. It was here t h a t t h e Michigan Brigade fi nl'peared mounted o n hio horse, r i d i n g cloe iiiisbers, w h o had been dismounted to fight oi tone t h a t was resolute a n d , to us, reaesuring U n d e r his skillful h a n d s t h e four regime gether as a coherent unit, acting so like one one i s a p t t o be t h e history of t h e other, n draw t h e line w h e r e t h e credit t h a t is d u e tr which should be given to a n o t h e r begins. T h e result of t h e d a y at H a n o v e r was tha farther away from a junction with LBB. H t h e east, m n k i n g a wide detour by way of .le PATRICK meanwhile maintaining hie threa inside of t h e circle which t h e redoubtable Coi forcing t h e l a t t e r to s w i n g clear a r o u n d to t h

in t h e rillage of H a n t i l d a r k with STUART'S n o n t h e hills south of

; eaw CUSTER, wheii h e u p to t h e line of akir-

bot, g i v i n g o r d e w in a

s were soon welded to) a n t h a t t h e history bf i t is oAen difficalt to m e leaves o f f and that

w a s driven &ill was obliged to t u r n to reOn a n d Dover; RILn i n g attitude on t h e ,derate was traversing, noMh aa far as Carliele,

having been decided that tb


' .

reaerre artillev.

afternoon when the Thi hulted temporarily, awa went, &&LITTLE MAC is in eo
was a futile uttempt to evo

whipping them." It conjure victory with

Sixth Ywhigan in advance. town, on a road flanked by fe fences on eitber side. The Captain H. E. TEOYPBOJ, bo same time two equadrons we

e encountered e beavy anted line wa'formed

qf the Sixth, led by She d, and at the

The mooqted churge vas a'

tering an overwhelmingly


encounand exjmmd to a Confederatea be-

mpted a charge in por-




1 "



report, says :


thirty-two. The conduct of the Sixth Mich NISC~TON'S battery is deserving of the hipliest


I '

h a p daylight) when C'CsTER'rj brigade went

bivouac a t Two t h i n p i n Colonel CSTER, "after his Rioii at

Taverns. One of the niost aingulur. not to MIS am BROOKE-~W oration, L E * S is the statement


July 2d in bivouac with the rcat of th

ems." Having tiad the honor to command

Two Tav-

the night of Ju l y 2,1863. From the time wh regimenta left Emmittsburg on t b hardly been given a moment for rest, and had Fifth and Sixth


: I







the First and Third Brig posted on the right of th nearer the Baltimore nncl tlie Second Brigade (C'cs h i s position of the day b

and I R V I S ( i t t E G i i ) were tliree-fi>iirtIis of' :i mile

. ,

. .

<',It 11 ~ . u . ( J u I y 2 d )recei -ed orders I to Two Taverns. which poin me reach ( J u l y 3d) received orders fro hcatlquar to the let\ of our line and tltt ck tlic ene =hole commmtd, and the reser .e brig:icle. CUBTER'Ibripade waa ordere I' to report (CC'STER) did not joiti nit' ilu ing-the tlii:
out doubt the true explan "At a n early hour on through n staff oBcer of

T h u s i t is made pla GBEQO'S prencieoce. right flank with only With him, to see waa to act.

takc" iiboiit it. I t waq cmptiiig to guard the i bi lity of intercepting it off the Balti-

eritably must have happened had GRECW, v brigades of MCINTOSH and IRVIN GREUG and to cope single-handed with the four brigades II prisiny the very flower of the Confederate c a r IIaurro~ nnc those brave knightei-STUART, ninrslialing i n person o n Cress's ridge. If C ticlcl w a s opportune, and, as lias often been 81 Geiic~ral1). McM. GREGG to wlioni, under Pr, bringing liiin Iirrc is due. GREGG was a grc.: let 11s piuse :I nionieiit bcfiwc we c n t r r upt coming battle. tn pay to Iiini tliu tribute of' ( light of 1111 the official rcports, put tngctlic.1 rnrike nne coiiiirctccl c1i:iiii of evidenre. we c n i r n t wliicli took 1iI:ice 1iei.e :iltiii)st twciity-s i i ~ ~ l in wliicli I tirst to 1:ist. :I well ~ ~ 1 : i i i huttle, wcre nianeiiverd 1in4l plaicecl with the ~ n i i i c skillfill cliess 1il:iyer i t i moving thc picccs I which every tlctriil w:is tlic fruit of tho Ijraii t h c time \\-licii I i c t i i r t i t - ~ lCWTER to the n the First J1icIiiy:in tliiiiiqlcring ng:iiiist tile 1) FIT%lll.CiH I A E E . l l l ~ l t I l l~ O t 21 Sill#lc fUlW I l l O V e ; not less for h i s intiiitivc tbresiplit t l i i i i i thr 1 c.ritic:il nionicliits. Tlirit niiiii \vas { h i e r t i l 1)avin M c M . G R E This coricl tirioii lias bern rc.;iclieci by ii 1 1 -predisposed i n tli;it direction: after a care v i e w of' id1 the itifortiiatioti w-itliiii reach beii (lay. If' tlic .M icliigan I3rigmle woti Iioiiors 11 i t \\-ai8 to GREGGtlrirt i t owetl t h e opportiinit: it was that niade it* blo\vs effcwtire. We sh, day, lie again boldly took responsibility at lieltl CIUSTER to his work on tlie right, even a orderetl by higher aiitliority tliaii lie ( ~ G R E Q O anti after CKSTER had begun the iiiovenicnt. Xow, having adniitted, and, I think, der (lid the planning, let u s briefly show how Ccs the greater part, at least, did the fighting.

th only the two little .ANDOL'S battery, tried d three batteries, comry and artillery, which FrTzaccia LEE-Were ~TER'S presence on this .I, proritlential, i t is to .idencc, the credit for and n iiiodust soldier ; I a description of t h e r diiiirtition. In the link by link, s o 11s to i scc that the engageyr:irr ;igo,


e Iliffcrtwt c.oiniiiaiitln igwity ilisplayecl by ab ion :i clicbss Imirtl ; i t i Jf OIW ni:in, w-lio, from *tliw:ird u n t i l l i e sent
ClIdeS O f 1IAJIPTO.Y R I l c l

rrlin was clistingiiisliwt


quick Iwrccptions




I recent atuciy tind r e - {

ng iipon that eretitfiil

re tlint will not perihli,

ancl h i s guiding haatl 1 see lioiv, later in tlio critical moment a n d er the lattcr l i d bccn to rejoin BILPATRICK,

mstrated, how GREciO VI and hi4 brigade, for

It makes us tremble to thi

Follom-ing the example of niy predecesso in this field, I propose to halt and let CCSTERtell his own story up I H certain point, when the narrative will be resumed : "Upon arriving a t the point designated, I mniediately placed m y command in position, facing towards Giettysl irg. A t the same time

. .


iy front, right and rear, but
of the enemy.



iemy appetlrcd on my riglit

- of six guns.

Leaving two

mition a n d c o r e r the road aining portion of m y coni;ht angles to m y former porange of my new position. o m y corninand with g w n t

r'*Ji," .Second Regulrrr AI=

lence the enemy's battery. r i t y o f t h e cneiny'n position. M y line, as it then exi-trcl, -ter branch, tbrnied of oiie orted by four nquadrons ot' is Gettysburg. c o r e r i n g tlie t w o remaining scctiori? ot' h e Sixth Michigan Cav:iIry Iry on t h e right-with tlic o t h e r i g h t a n d in adruiice ttnck on t h e Oxforcl (I,o\v dismounted arid ordrretl to Thc First J l i c h i g m WBH ie movenients of t h e enenij-. a n d a Iinlt' on tlie Oxford* of equal size on t h e Tork under comninnd of t h e gal?, k e p t nie so irell informed 'as enabled to make niy distw-elre o'cIocK, ha rcceired by a brigade of t h e Second junction with K i L P A T R l C i i ; 1's brigade he prepared t o language : *' Before I lind IO, comnianding t h e Second d. L e a r n i n g t h c true conthat t h e e n e m y was m a k i n g ig our position, Brigadier e position I then occupied." e quotations because t h e y Iairned, a n d Genoral GREW UETBB w a s withdrawn, a n d ce, opened t h e fight, a f t e r iinforce MCINTOSE. So far
the Emover -the" York" rocrd.~rd

from t h i s being true, i t i s j u s t t h e reverse of ie truth. ('I.YTER did not leave his position. T h e battle operre before t h e propoattd change had tnken place, a n d MCINTORH was urried i n o n t h e r i g h t of CCSTER. The fact is, t h e latter wa8 reluc a t to leave his poet knew h e ought not to leave it. He had alrei y been attacked b y a fire from tlie artillery i n position beyond e RUXXEL buildings. Major WEBER. who wns o u t o n t h e cross road Pding northwest from the Low Dutch r o d . had obnerved t b e mol ment of STVART'S collimn. Iieatlecl by ( 'I I A M B L I W and JENKINS, pa t h e STALLSXITH farm to t h e wooded crest behind I h ' m i E L ' s , a n d hac -eported i t to C u e T e a . , C'L-YTER did indeed begin tlie movement. , portion of t h e S i x t h Michigan, and pc)ssibly of' t h e Seventh, had : e n u-ithdrawn. w h e n Iic met GREG^ coining on t h e field a n d exp ined to him t h e eituation-tlint t h e e n e m y w a s "nll around." a preparing to " p u ~ h tlriiisp." GREOG told him to remain w h e r e h wan, a n d t h a t portion of tlie brigade which waq nioving away hrrltc countermarched, a n d rwwiipied ita former pnsition. T h c Fifth chignn h a d not bcen wiclidr~iwnfrom tlic rkirmisli line. and PESSIITON'S p u n s liad iierer ccn-ccl to tliuntlw their re*ponqes to the Con h a t e rliallengc. Colonel HROOKE-RAWLEunwittingly encl 'sea this view of t h e en-e; for, afler h a r i n g said i n one part of I i i m i t i o n tlint "as soon :I* ('L-STER, with hia brignde. h a t 1 iiiorucl off i * t h e purpose of joini n g BiI.PATRIPK near Round Top," Iic. h t e r . i PB on t o 'ny t h a t t h e ('oiifeclerntc battery n o w t>penetl firo. :rnd E S S I N G T I I N , W110 wns .\tt// in positim near t h e S P A S ~ ~ lioune. L E R rep (1 with proinptnwu." I t i* itbsurd to suppow t h a t Cr STER. *.with 11 hrignde." could be on t h e wriy t o join K i L r A T R l r K , while P E S N I S ( : IN w a A6Rtill ~ in p s i IIOII,'' replgitig to t h e C'onfedernte artillery. Buttery '. JI" \vu1 8 8 iniich a part of' t h e Second Brigade, T h i r d Di $ion, 11s wna t h e Sixth Nichigan Cavalry, a n d CCYTER cnuld not hav bcen ninrching awny, Ieirving PESNINGTON 'bstill i n position." No le claims t h a t h e was twdcrcd t o go with his c n r n l r y only. Gcnt 1 GREW does not so -t:tte. T h e r e in then n o room for a n y o t h e c o n c l u h n thnn t h a t ( ' I STER was t o go, with hie e n t i r e command, cl u d i n g t h e art i I lery . I'Exsixmox did not go-Colonel RAWLE say lie did not. S o more aliil Colonel ALGERor Colonel TOWN.The Si: 3 a n d Seventh moved :I tkw rods a w a y , but inimediately returned b >ret h e i r position h a d h i m occupied b y o t h e r troops. Y c I $ ~ T o ~ AHR not in position o n tlie r i g h t when t h e battle o p e n e d ; for, Record g to t h e rmme authority still, after PENNIXOTON'B reply to t h e Con lerate battery, YcINT ( W A had to send back for RrNDoCe g u n s , bich w e r e not yet up. Hy Colonel R A ~ L E 'account, S PENNIN~TON w p l a y i n g a queer part

6 '




-holding his position w i t h o u t support, while Top. CUSTEB, too, mue

CUETEE sags t h a t t h o e11 s i x guns at 10 A. m. STU

him with a battery of ry, claims to have left

S i x t h Xirliiyan, w a s s e n t

tion BOOD after tire brigad


it was not earlier tlinn 2

crvalry a n d GRIFFIN'S ]low; al80,BREATktED's

letter rmm Geow nl D MrM. G1:?.6n ' T h r e b uo cviiRic1 betneen your

mcult~ h u enme IO m) mind. It is and thal 111 C0p)lOg his reporl m e

GBIFPIN'S battery, on t h e commanding C r is' ridge, beyond RUMXEL'S, und more t h a n a mile from the posit s n occupied by CIXTEB. T h i s movement w a s noticed by Major WEB L, wbo, with his detachruent of t h e Sixth Michigan Cavalry, wae stationed in t h e woods whore b e could look ut upon t h e open counnortheast of RIJHMEL'S, try beyond, a n d h e p r o m p t l y reported t h e c t to CUSTER. r t h e edgo of t h e woods T h e first s h o t t h a t was fired came from n L beyond RvsrmEL'S. According to Major 1 CLELLAN, wbo WIIB Assistant Adjutant General on STUART'S staff, lis WPE from a section of himself, he GRIFFIN'S battery, a n d was aimed at raiidor b y STUART not k n o w i n g wbetlier t h e r e w a s a n y t h i n g I his front or not. Severa1 etiote wero fired in t h i s way. Major MCCLELLANis doubtlesa r i g h t i n t e, t b a t t h e w s h o t s were should fired as feelers; b u t i t ie to m e inconceivr )le t h a t STUART h a r e been totally unaware of t h e presence o m y Federal force in his immediate front: t h a t h e sbould not havl known tlint t h e r e w a s stationed on t h o opposite ridge a brigade o cavalry a n d a battery. C;BEOO had been t h e t e t h e d a y beforo, a n d 5 CART muRt at least have mepected, if h e did not know. t b a t h e wou I find him there again. It is probable t h a t h e fired t b e s h o t s in t h e ope of d r a w i n g o u t a n d developing tbe force t h a t he k n e w was tho !, to ascertain how formidable i t iniglit be a n d bow great t h e 01 tacle in t h e w a y of his further progress towards t h e rear of t b e un In lines. T h e information h e sought wan proinptl furnished. It w a s then t h a t CL'STEB p u t P E I N I NN'S ~ I b a t t e r y in position ; and t h e t h r e e Rections of rifled cannon openc with a fire sn rapid a n d ,. accurate t h a t GRIFFIN wan speedily Milcucet rnd compeliod to leave t h e field. T h e n t h e r e w a s a l u l l . I c a n n o t s a y b o w l a g it lasted, but d u r i n g ita continuant-e General GREOO arrived a n d t )k command in person. a n d FITZHCW Alioiit t h i s timo, also, i t is safe to wy, that IAMPTON LEEcarno up a n d took position on the left o ?HAMBLISS and JENKINS. T h e Confederate line then extended clear aci SR t h e Federal frgnt, a n d and was screened by t h e t w o patches of woode between RUBIBIEL'S farm. the STALLSVITH A battalion of t h e Sixth Michigan Cav Iry, of which mine w a ~ t h e leading squadron, was placed in suppoi a n d on t h e left of PENXINOTON'S battery. T h i s fbrmed, at first, t 3 ahort line of t h e L re-, ferred to in CUSTEB'Sr e p o r t ; b u t i t wae su s q u e n t l y moved farther to t h e r i g h t a n d faced in t h e eume general rection as t h e rest of t h e line, where i t remained until t b e battle en ed. I t s d u t y thoro WBR to rope1 a n y a t t e m p t t h a t m i g h t be m a d e t c a p t u r e t h e battery.

ns were stationed over-




The loll of which I ha the a t o m . T h e troopers i n f r o n t of t h e i r homes, w

T h e earth quaked.

k e t h e calm t h a t precedes ,s t a n d i n g "in place rest


T h e ti

e of sound volleyed and erberrrting t h u n d e r in R


CUSTER directed Colonel

T h e Fifth Michigan, its

which t h e e n e m y wae k n t h e r i g h t of regiment wa

I n thi8 movement d, tlie left Roniewliat

.a line of gray came out

filled t h e a i r with s h o t a n d

t h e Fifth Michigan ad-

While t h e B g h t wan in. H i s two co etatioaed on t h e left of PEN

WIIB driven

pmmoted to Major but a


OILAT fo 8 1 1 8 9 3 1 3 8 corninand

rhe countq- over t h e m rebels o v e r yondcr," pointing to t h e f r o n t ; is full of them." He bad observed all of 5 ,ABT'S movementa, a n d i t w~ulb e w h o g a v e Ccmru t b e firet i m p a n t information aa to w h a t the e n e m y was doiug; which inform o n waa transmitted to Gumlo, a n d p w i b l y had a determining infl nce in keeping CCSTES on t h e field. i t twenty-two yearn of' WEBER was a born soldier. Although age, he bad men mucb service. A private t h e T h i r d Michigan inf i n t r y in 1861, h e was n e x t battalion adjul t of t h e Second MichiLIOTT in t h e mutliwest, g a n Cavalry, nerved o n t b e staff of General n t h e Sixth C a v a l r y i n a n d came liomc with ALOEUto t a k e a troo iini a t Ciettysbiirg w a s 1862. T h e valuable Rervice performed b f i t l y recognized by CI-RTER in h i s ot3cial n Prt. He w a s killed t e n days later at Falling Waters, while leading s squadron of t h e Sixth by KILPATRICK as the. A Michigaii i n a charge which W ~ dwcribc Rpirited fight, h e wns most gallant ever made." Anticipating enger to have a p a r t in it. "BOB," he *ai( I) m e a feu- ( l a p before, while m a r c h i n g through Y a r y l a n d , I w: ii cliiince to malic o n e saber charge." He t h o u g h t t h e time Iiaci c'( e. l i i w eye fltwhetl a n d his face flushed as he watched t h e progrew * t h e tight, fretting a n d chafing to b e hcld in reserve while t h e h i p \VBR summoning o t h e r s t o t h e charge. But t h e Fifth Michigan. holding t h e mc adraiicetl po"ition, Rufhaving reinforccd t Confederate line, Major fwed greatly, 11.4nPTo~ being a m o n g t h e killed. Itel bting rifles are not 0111s S . H. FERRY effective b u t wnsteful weapons as well, a n nt last, Colonel ALUER, felt compelled to retire finding t h a t liis aniniunition had given 01 his regiment and seck hiw horses. Seeir t l i i R , t h e eneniy'e line WHR w e n to yield. The s p r a n g forward with a yell. The union li pnWs of s m o k e from t h e muzzles o f - t h e i r i n s Iind almost ceased. It was plain ttiirt t h e y were o u t of nmniun m a n d , for t h a t r e a w n , from field to field, tlie i ~ ~ i i r b lte o maintain tlie canteat longer. LEATHED a n d MCG?REQOU line of gruy followed in e x u l t a n t pursuit. opened with redoubled violence. Sheila (Ira ed rrnd exploded a m o n 6 y fell arouiid t h e posit h e nkirmishers, m-hile thicker a n d fa*ter tion o f t h e reserves o n t h e ridge. PENNI ron replied with aetoniehing effect, for e v e r y shot hit t h e m a r k , a t the opposing artillerista were unable to silence a single U n i o n gun. But Rtill,tliey carno, unYen, :torious career. t i l i t seemed t b a t nothirlgcould stop t h e i r be ready," said WEBER;"we will have t c h a r g e t h a t line." Bot the course of t h e purauit took i t towards t h might, in t h e direction o? ~go u t canister with t h e RANDOL'S b a t t e r y , w h e r e CHEETER W M Iwri


these he started to the rear, baving I reach f place of safety the rush of ch side had intercepted his retreat. I n the his men ran away; the other under

that followed, t w o of

r u n away, lived to


i t to rhsrge. As it hifa esber, placi

There wae no check to

tu+tteries, when, by nome er the head of column wae de

tbua abruptly ckecked,

onrcet of the Seventh llect in 6warms upon om their saddles and and Captain H. N.

MOOBE. The taek waa a

rails baing

firmly uni

Wbile tbie was going

fight again on many another dag. In the meantime, tliroiigh the pa merit moved forwnrd, the center eq charge. Tho Confcderates once rn was continiiod acrossa plowed fie1 to n point within past RUMMEL'B, battery. There another fence way of reaching the battery, tli tcr iiita the charging column ae fast as th of Captain PrirateR Powem and INGLEDE, this fence and passed several rods boyond. oiit a scratch, hut INGELEDE wa wero certainly within 200 Far But seeing that the enem fences, snd were forming a col Serenth fell back through the i n whose company sixteen ho lrParoring to cover the retre the m-rong direction. came to opening, just a8 the enemy's over hie shoulder, he caught the gleam arm of a sturdy Confederate. He ducked ceived the point on the back of his head. biill crashed through his ch NOORE'S leg under him. A n instant let with the last shot i n his revolver, and h i s i d e . Some diamountcd men of the took MOOREpriwner and es tery, from which porcition, made his escape. who, But now ALOER. to his horsen, had succeed , . S. TBOWBEI by Xajor 1 Virginia struck the dan

d tire. Two men, '8 company, leaped.

r thrust from the the blow. but re-

nf'ederatc fell dead at

himeelf on foot, with three






p u t to bight. Paet t h e Ru t o the fence w h e r e Yooplr

ate cannon, which did n o t detachment of the Union


k e p t o n ; but he, ctiori upon e v e r y

retiring, i t also w a s assail Virginia Cavalry, which T h e n , ae i t seemed, t h e eecond breath. Up to th

When his battalion w a s nted c h a r g e of t h e FirRt back by t h e o t h e r bat-

wily C o n f d e r a t e

left m~t b o y debouched i n regimoqt after regiment,

ted men, but t h o rente s h o t away, bot others

Y e n anti Iiornea were

colom. It w a s t h e battl Ltm, wae leading t h e

, w h o , with FIIZHWH



w a r could cow.

H e a n t i m e ALOER. with hie Fiflh, had d w n aside a little to t h o left, m a k i n g r e a d y to spring. MCINTOEH' squadrons were in t h e edge of the opposite woods. T h e t s v e n t h I e eullenly retiring, with faces to t h e foe. O n a n d o n , nearer a n d ne 'er, c a m e t h e assaulting y . T h e storm of caniebat1 b column, c h a r g i n g s t r a i g h t for RANDOL'S ter caused thein to w a v e r a little, b u t t h a t is all. A few momenta would bring them a m o n g theguris of CHEST1 , who, like PENNINOTON'S lieutcnantu, WM still tiring with frightful e g d a r i t y IW f a w t ae he could load. T h e n GREW rode over to t h e m t Michigan a n d directo charge. CWTERclsahod u p 7 th similar inutructions, ted TOWN a n d , as TOWN ordered sabers to be drawn, 1 iced hiniself by his eide, in front of t h e leading squndron. W i f h r a n k s well closed, with guidons fl n g a n d bugles sounding, moved t h e g r a n d old regiment of veterans. led b y W N a n d CUSTER, three to o n e ; first nc a forward to meet t h a t host, outiiiinibering trot. then tlie command t o chnrge r a n g out, lid, with gleaming -bur and flashing pistol, TOWN a n d his heroes H -e hurled r i g h t iiito the teeth of HAMPTON a n d FITZHWII LEE. > UEB, wlio with t h e Fitth had been waiting for tlie r i g h t moment, liarged i n o n tlie r i g h t squadrorie flank of t h e column ns i t puacred, HH uome i XCINTOSE'S under Lieutenttiit D A N did on i t a l e h . O n e company of t h e Seven LITTLEFIELD, also joined in t h e charge. T h e n i t was steel to steel a n d Greek m Greek. For minuter? gray column stood a n d a n d for minutes t h a t seemeti like years-1 and YcINstaggered before t h e blow; then yivlded 8 1 fled. ALOER petuo& charge in front TOEH had pierced i t s flanks: b u t Tomx's i w e n t t h r o u g h i t like a wedge, splitting i t i iwain a n d scattering t h e c k to tho woodu whence Confederate horeemen in disorderly r o u t they came. , tlie cannon were dumb. D u t i n g thie last melee t h e brazen lipa It wae a fierce hand to hand encounter be Teen t h e Xichigari men a n d the flower of t h e Southern cavaliers, d by t h e i r favorite cummanders, i n which t h e latter were worstec ~ Union tbrces in STUART retreated to his atronghold, le i n tlie poeseesion of t h e field. T h e rally sounded, t h e lines --ere refc ned, tlie wounded cared fur, a n d e v e r y t h i n g made ready for a rent a 1 of t h e conflict. B u t the charge of t h e F i r s t Michigan ended t I cavalry fighting on t h e r i g h t at Gettysburg. Military critics ha- pronoanced i t t h e fincet charge mede d u r i n g t h e war. CU~TER'S brigade loet It waa a famous tight and a bloody 01 o n e ot8cx1ra n d twenty-eight men killed, e Fen olcere a n d 112 men
- - f







I find from the oflcial daye, J u l y let, 2d and 3d thirteen officers and 13-1 tatal, 25i. It is difficult,

The above compilation give

ing-a manifest absurdity,
tlioat?, only, wbo could bc ac

greater than i t appears fr The operations of t h r burg campaign, prpperly at Falling Waters July I n


But, to pursue

ptain C. J.



Firet Michigan -Captain D.W.CLEMVER Captain A . W. D U G Q A N . Captain H. E. 1 HEAZLETT. ('aptain C i . R. MAxwELL. Lieuter R. A. A LOEI Fifth .\Iichigan-Colonel GOI'LD, Lieutenant T. J. DEAX. Lieutenant ' Sisth aiicliigari-I,ieutentriit G. W. C T H o l l P s o s . Cirptnin J . 1. K i m , Licutcwnnt Stiiru.ts-5. Scwiith Jliclii#iIn-I,icirten~rii~ J. C i . C'ARPESTER. 1.ieutennnt E. GRAY. Licutcw A LE S . 1V.i1. K ER -5. I t has riot bceri possible for rile to ol)t;ii ;inel woirncltvl fi,r tli:it Iwrticcilar period. TI tlint tlie fiwr regiments during their en twenty-three officer.* sncl 3% meii killed ; tlieil of \roiiiids: nine otticera and !IO1 mrii tot:il of 1.4iO men, who gare up tlieir live \-v:ir*. T h i s does not include those a l i o from tlie effects of wounds nnd sickness, tioris incurred while in the liue of tloty. C'olonel Fox's history of tlic cesualtiw i were ?ti0 cnrirlry regiments i i i the Uiiiori ttic ItrbeIIina. Of :ill tliew, tlir First JIicIi 1)c.r of men killed in nction, w i t h one csc In percentcige of killed? i n proportion t o tlii the Fifth iind Sixth Yichigan rank all tl t w o firet named ; arid it m u ~ t be remcni Sisth went out in IHC;?, and did their firfit which w e have now been conwidoring. ' I fourth rcwpectively. in the number of killc spect by the First M a i n e and First Michis Comrade#: T h i n is a record to be prc blush to o w n t h a t he wae one of CCSTER'S record ia written in history, where i t will aa an honorable place. 4 w we stand here of the beautiful monument erected to com patriotisni of the men whowe fortitude h e l p let us renew our fealty to t h e cause for v solve t h a t in t h e years that are left to us 91 true to the manbood that was here p u t 1 those noble dead who gave tbeir lives for

ieuteiiant E.F. B I C K E R , CALL, Captain W. 31. t R. N.\'AN;\TTER-i. Lieutennllt Colonel E. S. D ~ t ~ t i E 1 t - 4 . WYORI), Cnptairi IT. E. POTTER. 1.icutrntrnt S.

l i l t of tlic



rcvord. however. wliows


time of eerricc. lost tit ofticers uiid 11 1 inen

eel of' tlisc*:iscs; n griiiid

iiriiig those fbur aiwt*irI \-e clictl aiiicc tlic war piwonmerit arrid IwivaI C \ V a l * w l l o a s that tlivrc! rice during tlie War of , n lost the IargeRt nuni. ion-the Firfit Maine. irnitwr of men engaged, rest, not escepting the .ed that the Fifth antl :hting in the campaign y also stood third antl )eing ranked i n t h a t renlonc. of. S o man will e r w rhigan troopere. Their re a perinanent as well day, witbin the shadow morato the courage and to m v e the Union right, ch they fought, and rerill be loyal to ourselves, aa were be proof-true Union.

. /


guns not infrequently deyenda upon tl


igea the form of the be great in propor-

name "mountain

d of the column ; tliere-

powder used.

Tho weight of' the g u n is I

by the conaideration



Theory alone i s uofr both anite to produce direct means.

i s 1 but the means, harled into the i
t of destructive energy in

secon d . T h e figure of the piece, i

hell. Were the destructive

tmneportetion of cann it ie the energy of the tive distribution whic



Iocmaaing the rn Iocreeeing tbe e l

rior of the shell that tlie



sieting the straine a gun of given fig

reater can be the charge used i n er tbe initial velocity attained. being stable, with reapcct to that line.

Since tho number of

to a few, it ie neeewurry
pint. Therefore a higb accuqac.9 is iiecessar\-. a i d
to -e-

The trajectory

timtrtion of distance.
with the pole. The shaft is attached to horse led i n the column at the side ot'a more space laterally than were he let1

air of sliafle iw auftlinii two nniinale

t h u s overcome errore in

of the trail, and the

marl, consuming no e gun. -The ammuthe column. Thiie ,a consideration not

riition is carried on pack aniinals at the the gun is ready for action at ib monicnt's unfrequently of the highest importaiirw.

whicb should combine o used to suit the eye of th be distinct and eeparate mme accurate meam of leveling and rigjdly held i n a vertical pohi-

tind to the velocity of travel. A principle o f ' h i g h importance is interc

i t is applied. Thus broken or dnma

on qnickly p i n g into act is lost or not at band.

a tangent screw in t

use wqen the detachable rear sight and tbe front sight, being perma-

Htructed to perform but a single function, cffect i n the simplest manner the object of tion of tlic latent energy of the the projectile.

should be united IO n -the transforma-

by plwing

in this pouition it

possible. X hollow cam mad der-ogival pattern enclosing, w number of priwmatic sections of cast iron with respect to the axis, and so abaped ae number of fmgm6nts under the preseum of pattern possessing many excellent featuree. w t least two inches, as within

de into a definite


)re than a moral effect. and esmry to a l a r n i a fierco 01which makes a gun-aliell 1 poasible. ~wfurnished, is too light :I )eases many of tlie tlgsinin found essential i n moiiii]any. I t was desigiied IO n serrice, and is tlierefnrc at any single part iiiay l)t* ther by draught, by pack. That is to render the gun try occupntion. :tiles i n order to permit tile int of' ammunition with a i
in ninss of projectile by 1111 density in proportion to i t * tual power at all fighting

The two-pounder Hot weapon for use with the b k festuree uamed abov




r.6. A R M Y .

acceeclible t o all


mise and care o f the piecc y detachments or volunteer .ithout requiring the aid of

By iwreasing the culi

sand the weight of the ~ M J inds, and by correcting the gun, the cavalry might bc rould be invaluable to it i i i enough to engage.

lo9.i. Escort8 of honor arc detailed for th and escorting persoiir of high rank, civil or for this purpose are selected for their soldier perior diecipline. . The escort fiirins i n line opposite the plnc prercnts Iiinirelf. thc bald on the flank of' thi i t will march. 0 1 1 tlie appearance of the p w i t h the honors due to h i s rank. Thc eacort o f troops, platoonP: or f o l l i ~iind , takes up 1114 and h i s strift' or retinue taking position i n re: leaving the ercort, line is formed. m t l the pa before. Wren the position of the escort is at n coil tlic poiut where tlie person is to be received, : i court-yard or wharf intervenes. a double lin from thnt point t n the escort, fiwing inward .sirely salute as he prwes, and are then relier A n otecer is appointed to attend him, to bes HI) he may have to mnke to the commander o

purpose of receiving Qilitary. Tho troops : nppearance end euwhere the pereonape escort towards which ionage, lie is received R forincd into colunin march, the personage of the column. On c honom arc paid a n derable distance froiir k r iiiahnce, wnere of sentinels in post4 the sentinels Riiccesd and join the escort. ruth commnnicutions the escort.

.LVIN H. SYI)ESH.4Y, id Lieutenant. Eighth Cavalry.


1098. The composition and atrengtb of' ti escort are preacribcd Para. 1i1,475, and 1 i 6 , A. R. 1889. The escort is mounted or dinmounted at tli dieeretioii ot the coninianding ofllcer.

The escort is formed opposite the !nt or quarters of the deceased; the band on that flank of the escoi toward which it in to march. Vpon the appearance of the cofBn. the c' nmander commands : I . Carry, 2. ARMS, 3 . Present, 1. ARMS;the ' rnd plays appropriate

When the cavalry are to fire the s a l u dinrnounted, as prescribed to fight on foot, to tlie grave, where the ceremonies are c dismounted.



led and marched

The w o r t is next form If the ewort be sm


Cofin and ptrll-berirers; 5. qf the drcensed; 7. Other o

troops,.platoons or fours. i n line. The procession 2. E.wort; 3. Clcrgy; 4. er.r of the former comntnttd


Cavalry officerw should ma

iir front.

u p o n Ibis system nnd p n e r e of endurance.

At tlie funeral of a n mourning caparison, foll

Tlioy Should have a faniiliar kn methods of treatment of the diseases

iciiiea supplied to the troop. It is the duty of the commandin structed i n tlie tiwegoing requireme such racitations and practical instru 1102. Horses when received a troops uccording to color, un(ler dir They are branded on the near hip

If a comniieaionod
aioited offitera; if a

in forming column, g light arcillory and i named. from front to re

ommarids for tlie cardry,

ppropriatr mu&. \\-bcii of b h c artillerj- and c:iv.

a horse has beon eo assigned, his low liini to be used by riny other

the band. crocomprrnyi n g the escort ti II is halted at the e n t r a n c ~lo , hearse, wlieii the cdumrt .ie artillery, wheri unable to en column and Ralntu tbe reniai W h o n necessary to escort deceased t a n ~ church, befcre upon receiving the remains borne into tliu cIiui*cl~. The roniiiinndei- of

captain. Troop comnianderw, the adjuta ter will keep a dewcriptire book of the showing the nanie, sex, age, size been i n the mrvict', rnd h i s fitn which lie is applied and the name of h i s of the death or tmnet'er of every animal 1103. Taking the useful cffe H horse can carry a load o n a ho . \ homo carrying a soldier a ant1 twenty-five pounds, travel hours, including ordinary rceti t w o hundred to two hundred a Ice of from 4.5 to 6.5 inch co.uinn of troopers or two

brands, and Rpeaial how long each ha8 he date and cause
be recorded.

line facing i h v

to t h e

fiinc-ral. g i v w


eccortlirig to t h . while niounted




I .



Horeee req

backs are generally occasion

of the aaddles; sore the nicn must never

Alterdives; agents that bring about a h e a h y atate of the system : f potmh. Aloew. calomel, cod-livcr oil, sulphur, nitrate D Cardiacs; agents that inrigorato the eyn'em by stimulating t h e wtomuch : Cayenne pepper, ginger, gentian, camway seeds. Demrtlcvnts; agents that lubricate or shea :he surfaces: Glgceriiie, g u m arabic, IinReed and starch. Antidotes; agents that counteract the effec'.s of poisoria: Depending upon tlie kind of poison. Medicines that act upon tlie brain, ricrves :tnd nerve centern : Eicitnnts; agents that stimulate tho brair , nerves and nerve centers and thus increase their energy: . \ l c d i o ~ , amnioiiicr. arnica, I try c b ilia. se action is followed ATurcotics; agents that ace excitants, but 1 1 Iiy depression of' cnergy : Camphor, henbanc dladonna, opium. Fer or lower vircuSedatiues; agents that depress nervous antimoii~and clilolation : Digitalis, hydrocyanic acid, tartarat roform. Antisjmmnodics; agents that prevent or a i cramps: Alcoliol,

strllctures : generally : Caloiiiel,

give any evidence of

No born



of urine: Col~:ti~a.
f the womb:


Ilydrochloric wid,
: Colcliicum, tartar ther.

coatenta :

nanetitlj- improve diof iron, wpper and

of niuecular fiber:


. i

' I

foot, ne i s frequently done. Care niuet be too small and the outer surface of tho wnl that tbe shoe be not

d down to make

cetate of lead.

I n gawison. nt the tliwrc-tinn ot' t h ver, the lioraes niny I j c IcR iiiisliod. ready to I ) c put on tlie 1iorst.s.

Foul air and

to healthy action : Aceta of copper, ointment of ch

with large ventilators through tlie roof. ail ture i n each stall, which should be 1iIacwl w If possible, the building Double stalls d i o ~ l d not be lrss t l i ~ l lfo fect to eacli Iiorsc, nnd not lees tliuii 1200 c'u to each Iiorse in the stable. cient, n n d tlierr i n i i a t the draught will pass be c.losed, escept on the windward sidc. t If the stable i n partitioned off into ri be at least tive feet i n difticiilty. \ 2 pickct linc is crtablirlied i n the troop stable, the liorse parsed through the pi IJcllind the Iiorsea to having just slope en

dow or sitlc a p r e the horse'H eyes.

allollld lm ullo\vecl

suliphate of zinc, acetate of I

alls. each stall


diate vicinity of e ~ c l i

11108.. In proparing the ever with the knife is perm clip. I n removing earplus, tlie seat qf the shoe, ueo tho

e shoe, no cutting w h i t necessary to fit the toe


of'the foot which ir;

line i n good order.


may require. 16

I' I



I .


inside, nor near the doors washed from time to time, picket line ie ewept daily, ruxmni alates. protocted with Rheet i thin coal tar to preveat i t s ' may be followed with regar Rhould ho painted with The same precautioo cket post8 and picket tting horses near it. vicinity. - in prohibited. able to burn daring


I n ordinary climatcw, cavalry stablee mu sible. If the horsed do not stand directly in the Rtable the less will they suffer if called 8 For the same r e a ~ o n horaee , shoald never be except daring very cold weather.

Pock Truins.
iiig from 800 to 1000 pounds. ar I'nder fuvorable conditione each a n i thirty per cent. of Ilia own weight; t h excess of 200 p u n c h , when long or hard i f t y packe there should be twel\ With f Each troop should have four nieas ber, dovetailed 11 x l 8 x 2 t i inches, an without lidn.

Cd V A L 2 Y .


be koyt as cool HH 1'0sthe draught, tlio colder denly to take the field. lanketed in the atable,

a r e to be made.

One or more lam

el or Randy earth i a not g e r to the heel p o R t akiiig him stand in han the hind ones. ill paw a hollow for his j- backiiig out of

h a v i n g the weight it i s intended the hand for drill purpoRes. Facti pack should be providcd wi rope, eighteen to twenty-eight feet I Tho pack saddle consists of tile s corona ; manta or pack corer ; two piecee stitched together on the Ion

t h e etall.
windows of their etalls are to be kept open, unlecls n mid dmnghta effect the ani
e rain or snow, or when

e or oppoaite etulla. e, except to keep out horses. If the doors rway; if divided into e n t to OJJW the apper ould be secured i n such

When circamatan harge of a guard.

lnah rope,five-eighth inch wlial be ono blind for every fivo packs. The size of rope is given by t A 1' full-rigged" eadcllo has sli and lash ropee are then dispensed with. While raddling, loading or should be blinded. The males quiet whilu the blind m i o n ; tli move without first removing the blind.

trnp; cnni'nd cincha. hand laid nianilla lenther cinchr, with t long. There nhould

To Fit the Saddle.

1113. The pack eaddle ie fi lar to that of t h e riding eaddle placed one and one-half inches

I I '

r a n d are leRe con-





If t h e pads are not eqna t b e ekirte, then aqaare and fi vaa cincha immediately am touching t h e breaut bone (
till t b e adjustment i s m a d e ; padu. . Adjust tfie canvas ci a r o u n d t h e girth of t h e m

sh o u Iders.
1115. :ind 3.

Tlic packem ah

Ire i* opposite tho mule's ehoukier?l. T h e mule is placed ne 11- So. 2, who then putn on t h e blind. So. 1 on t h e near sid

1113. Place t i e c w o n one-half iiiches in front of rent; place t h e folded saddle dle b y both yokes a n d place i

htyariited by a i s to t w e l

So. : i pissea to t h e

cha over the saddle from

ltrtigo through t b e r i n g a

r t h e b e l l y ; puw t h e
W h e n cinched, t h e

k a n d plaec~ it, flat

he upper t?dgc~ well 1, with lriri back to

r i n g e n d of t h e cincha eho

edge of t h e near piid.

down with t h e r i g h t

T h e rations shoal

rope with t h e left h a

Salt; eugar, coffee a n d hundred pound packagee. is packed i n from five t o ei sacked a n d lashed firmly. The yeast powder caeca eloeoly a r o u n d t h e boxos to

a n d lashed in one
tlie cargo by t b r lower corners, lifts upward

, with o t h e r articluN,
d match in size, ehnye

h a y or wtraw stuffed


upper edges well to tob low t h e y muat tied too high t h e y be IifLed nnd placed as in t h e firet trial. cargo,No.3 takee IThile Sos. 1 a n d 2 are t y i n g and pla of t h e mule, cont h e laah ropc, t h r o w s t h e free end to t h e n t of Xo.1. No. 1 r e n i e n t to 90.2, a n d placee t h e cincba en g w p e t h e rope wi pawee t h e hook e n t h e hook (H, Fig. t h e rope t h r e e fee tween t h e aide-pa until a l o n g enou ten i n t h e c i n e h a b o o k (H, Fig. 1 ) . T h e r i g h t a n d , back down, bolda


Fig. 2 ) ; No. 2 pasees the end of the rope till t h e hoo tbe hook nhall be n e a r the grasp the rope a t der the part A A, Fig. Fig. 4 ) ; NO. 2p 6 8 @ 4 3 8t

the packs; KO.1 now hen lets the part i n the m i n g another loop ( A. hook, pulh tho ciricha o that, when tightsncd, f f pad; S o . 1 now the o p, from rear to front, U I I -

t h e rear end of ont and steadies

of tho mule's neck ; So.

aud at E (Fig. 4), with and lower edge of off pa


f the prscka art) properly

The object of the final saddle; pdlitrg all t h e pa
from t h e free end and carry the rlnck by re tigh teni og. When the pack-corer is uscrd it is pl:wed putting on the lusli-rope. When the side packs are of unequal bulk heavier should be placed on the near Bide; the off side-pack until the packs balance. Top pocks, i. e., small packages plnced i n side packs, sliould be avoided. When the sling-rope is half hitchedt intc Ioacl is made more secure, but there is greet 111ule.8 back. On the full-rigged saddle the canra8 cinchr dle by the ('spider;" the side-packs are laid held by the ding-straps and secured by the ( and sling-rope are then dispensed with; but i ropes gives greater security to thQ cargo and mule.

n-er the cargo before weight, tho larger or should then Inp m e r

0.1 takes tip the slack OY ing is done i n such mau-

niiddle between the


the saddle-yokes, the inger of injury to the

is attached to the wdII

i I

peak to steady it; he t paUe and, withqut lettin t h e slack to No. 1, who
over the ffont

tightens by steady ugh the hook, give* p u h When No. 2

the saddle aa before, 'rgo cinchn. T h e lash le o f the sling and lash greater comfort to the


edge of





Boots nntl sirddles ia the signal for m a iiioiiiitecl guard mounting or nioiinted drillr the signal guard mortnting or drill. The trumpeters assemble at j r s t cnll. yr ctnd sntldles. When full dress or overcoats are to be w miit c . a ~ l I inimetliately follows -first cull, !/titri .wddlep. Forniatiott Cirlls. drsembly ; the signnl for the troops or troop pnrtidc groiincls. Adjutant's c d l ; tlie signal !br thcb tron1)P or garrison paniile groii1iil; i t follows the a! :is may tie Iweswiheil by tlic coinnittnclinp I)
Alitrm Cti)ls.

Only two men, when loading. T h e mule is placed wit goea are piled. So. 1 pn

ited formations ; fbr t immediately tbllowe

d mounting, ant1 boots


No. 2 unfastens the free

ken the rope; S o . 2 with
a with the riglit h:ind:

tbe left hand removes the pads on' t h e off--aide,atid u

No. 1 removes t h e part un t h e near side, gathers the

the full dress or o c w monntircg or loot.' nnd

tails to fi>rnio n t h e i r

asuciiible on the camp

liibly7a t siicli interval

:I~IIIC to c s t i i i .

loop exposed, for conveniersc The second load is plac.

tying the mule when reload

of pads.

1130. M a g , church and f c r t i p e , clase?d as sercice c d l s , iiiay also be used 8 ~ warning i calls.

First call is t h e tint signal for formati'm for roll call on foot. Guard mounting is the first signal for ,yard mounting.

Fire t o l l ; tlie .ii,gnril for tlie ineii 11) f:ill guish fire. To rtrttt8: the sigiinl tipr tlie iiicii to fiill i n oii their truop p:ir:i~lcgroiiiids na quickly n: To Itijrst-; the sigriril for t h e n i c i i t o prt) l l o r s ~ ~saldtllc.. s. 11101111t : i I I ~ I : l s s < ~ n l ~ i :It l t * :I Ill.* :I* poshil,lc.. .~t'c.rc.iw Ctrtlz. l ' ~ t p ,/tjr'.s.*. r i 4 . cl~iirclr. rt,c*nlI.i z s i c t . . n-fityt fiitLIirr. sclrovl ai111 I IIC !Itwmt/. T h v p/rrr,tl is t l l c signal for striking te 1) r e p rti tory to inarc Iii ng. Ret*ei/lr :inti ttittoo Iwtwvle the asseniMj follow* the tt.sset1tbly. t l i r interrail being o i i l ~ tion :intl roll ciill, csccpt when tlicre i* Iiuri d s s r m b l y . rereillc, retrrcct, trdjittlrnt's cwll, ishes i i i i i l tlie mnrcltes arc sounilctl by a l l tli, other caills, as :I rule. tire sounilctl by tlie 11 orilcrly trumpeter ; Iio niay also sound tlie ; peters tire iiot uiiiteel. Tlie niorning gun is tired at the first note lire plnycd Iwfore i*ereillc. i t is fired tit t l first niarch. Tlie evening gun is fired at the last not The drill eignals include both the p r e p commands of execution ; t h e last note is t b

)r roll call : the rt?rctitr ):it reqiiirivl fbr forniatfhe stnndrrrd, tlie /lorrrriitnpetcrr united ; the npetrr of tlie guard o r cmbly wlien the truili-

ry comniands and tho

When a.&omniand i give the proper comm the chiefs of Niii)-divisinti*

e facilitated by obserring
ascending chord, that tlie -responding signals on tlie r i t are all upon the sanie note.
roop coniinander's) call is



the first two bars of ofier's

mtion added. Tlie signals rht turn and troop left tunc atoon left, troop right and h added instead of t h o sig-

the same; at thid signal, ?rR, move individually by sions in close order wheel
by fours to the right.
The same applies to, t h e T o the rear corresponde ward, march, instead of t h e

T H E BRITISH CAVALRY AT ALDER 'HOT, SEPT., 1890. The following extracts from letters by R tisb officer~, published
i n the London Times o f January 14 and 27, IS91, will furnish material for profitable thought and comparison in connection with the niiccceding letter i n regard to the actual fielc experience, in a rough and broken country, of the S i n t l r Cavalry There inay be many p a i p of December, 1890, and Jnnuary, 18!1: reawlis for the crippling of the British cava' through the medium of sore backe, but until aAer the rrtufling has panels of the saddles i n use, it is hardly nece ry to inquire further into the cause of the trouble, an it is erident w i l l continue to perforni its destructive wor

yr, but

and by the left dank. has the signal for-

tlirir minds a


e so a8 to e n -

ear t o be no



and with his carbine slung o n his back. Rncing nien k n o w t h t ;I eingle pound of dead weight makes tlie .iifferc*nceI)et\recii winiling and losiiig a race. . Yay not a stone of le4iCf w-eiglit i n our c a r a l r y horees m d x the difference 1)e:irec.n winn,ng niid loainp:~ c;rnipnign?"


The absence of a sound system of

ore tlian hnlf of' e* bclow tlic low-

The pemnality of your UR, and well jnst any longer to strictures, and cavalry.

It is, nlas. notorious that t l i t w i s : iI:IC dinnte officers o f ' tlie cavalry generailly,
is we:l

most of


it is


lifele9. the real disease and loet, and t!le public place our earalry i n which i t ahoultl liold Your correslwmtle compensate i n rnidtllu asion of nrnis, of tho
-is regards 2, I c from doing *o-thL tiisicussioii which fol

do not sliriiik ofliticer n t tho

vice system.


correspondent for

Times we may not only nee the tarried out, bot that we may



ntluce the best officers I I be necessary to bring * the great majority ot'
) Thnt government o remounts, suitable r shouIii receive S P ~ y lwo yearn; ( c ) t inter- regimen tal io in India); ( e )

4 P.M . and 10

P. Y.


. "

, .


re I C ~ Rnot ( I sore-bachrtl turn from the MiNsiiiii, e rested, and on Jaiiiies i n good conditiori. at tlie picket line tlic


, s l i d prcHluciiig exb

Is. one officer had to be ned i r r i d niadc' our other our cavalry offlcei-9 arc' s ; w i w , wbeli pucli nrv tlie athlete. is gi*aduaIIy His power and eiidurn l g hy that of tiis rider. cotidition and training. c a i g w i n bad condition 21s to h a r e once or twice :I k antl trot. This woultl Jaratles. This hardening rches. s l i o u l i l l ~ e required

i I I R ntl t lie in ii iiageiiwn t . A coiiipletc p i c k tr:riii v fiwce. Mules siioiil~lIIC

;1 mirelics rcquirril. s o m e the successfu I t r o q s

at the moment. I i u t t h c nthu. ' march i np. t h o w wit lioii t : 01- balling. Tliosc with ped. the latter even with r for horses irt the picket e ironclnti. Some discared. n sight. its w r n t of nilaptrts O f tile IIOTCHKISS gl1Il. oucliing on grounds I I O I I y written 1iiit.s ma1 t:tke


tent. We coiiiinenccd by traciiig on the grou I tlie outline of a h a t eleven feet long iuid four feet wide, wliarp a t loth eiido; ut each eiiil a ntrut stake \vas d r i w n ; d o n g each wide s( en stakes were driven opposite to each otlicr. I then cut a nuiiibe of limber cottonwood poles and branchca ; two of tlic largchat were l:i led firmly to the stake* :it the bow and stern. and werr then bent 01 r nnd lashed together i n the middle forming the keel. Smaller r les were lashed to the stakes driven along the sides, antl tlien cadi lair wii8 bent over and lashed together, nncl also Ilcalietl to the keel, ,assing lielow tlrc keel. These foimed the i*ilis.of the h a t . The g riwale w a s formed liy branches which wcre bound to each ril) and o tlie ends of tlic keel, tlie gunwale pcissiiig itlong tiit* side of tlie bo just nlwve the t o p of thc. stakes. Thug tlir framework of a boat lying Im oni up Iiiid Iceii construeted. To ntrciipthcn it willows were CI which were woveii i i i trnd out anioiig the ribs antl keel. The lrrslii gs that held tlie boat to the stakes were c u t ; the Iwsket work h a t v ~s found to be rrmarkiibly stiff except that tlic ends of tlie keel a d of the Iirjncipal ribs were incliiicd to spring outward*. This W ~ Nffcctually remrclied by tying then) down to the ceutcr of the keel bj lariat ropes. The protruiling eiids of tlie kccl crntl ribs were tlieii ?I wed off' and thr bnaket h a t corcrctl with caiivas. This Iwiit. eleven feet long and four fe t nitle. wcigliwl nbout c.iglity poiiniIs. \Vith six men o n h a r d it d r c a but three or fniir iriclies of wtitcr and Iiad but littlt. tendelicy to upset. It wirs built by four inen i n froni two to tlirw hours. It -IIN eirrily niniiiiged ailid leaked liut little. J A M M I"\HKEH,
: I

. .

Cojittiin, Fotiwli C a r d r y .

' I ' V. HESKY,

!dry. Brwtt-i'dtmrl 1.. S. d r i n y .


,.. . .., ; .


rbines and revolvers, but





proper condition to arches over broken sportation, pack transscotits with their paek ent heavy clothing for wagons, shelter tenta e provided. or canvass for animals.


Yienns The following translatioil of the introc will show the scope of the work :

391. Price,60 kr. tion and list o f suGjccts

liances, etc., should be

T h e drill regulation8 for the Hop1 anc tlllbt erery means be taken to arouRe a prc nlry in the course of instriic.tion,and define of uprightness, l o r e of tbe horse, courage, e This last quality Iias. whenever highly great successes, which are nercr obtaint lacking. The cavalryman, whether of hi animated by the desire for action ; he niui vincible impulse to action ; inactirity mi should awaken in liini the tear that he me tunity for glorious fents. But circumstances or military subordi inactivity; i n such case he can a t least p o i such contingencies as may one day atford h for action ; he must be accustomed to be i tireless niental activity. Only the cavalryman who is animated can perforni what is dellired of h i m , while too easily fqrced from one enibtrrrascinient the power of unfettered decision, not even to ward off his impelding fate. Thiu tireless niental industry. thia api ress is to be awakened and errengthened ; vice gireR the best opportunity for it. taught with indomitable industry and rr monotony trnd a precise and uniform man1 to nerioualy compromise all good results. Success will not be infallihly attained ceseive exercises or by the accomplishmei by the kind of exercisee and the manner To arouw interest in the eubject, to p may be styled ita intellectual part, indust will be requieite; but as soon as i t becc

npcrial Caralry require r apirit among tlie cavle ideaw desired as those rulianee and retwlutiori. eloped, led earulry into when this incentive ia or low degree, must be )ear i n his breast an i n bo hateful to him, and b e neglecting the opporion may compel him to r a n d weigh in his mind the desired opportunity state of continuous and

h this spirit of induRtry

the other hand, inonly another and deprived of !roic courabw will Wuftice of enterprise and progI instruction in field sert field ecrvice must be : be a labor of love, if of perfbrming it are not
a great n u m b e r of SUC,f a Ret programme? but performing them. iota instruction i n wliat skill and raet pationw :e a question of certain

d X GE S .




ribute, to the iiieniory of' officer who merited i i n d


the battle of the Alma, Inkerman. Balaklav Seraatopol ; was several times wounded, un( tenaiit Fifth Hussar regiment. At the do 1856, he returned to France arid served wit war n-itli Aiiatria &gain cdled him itrto ~c ennipelled Iiini to leavc the field f i w tlie IM I d borne h i s part i n the bttttles of Palestrc h i r i n g his service i n Africa n n d Europe, Dill :ind four clcrorutiotis: the Crossof the Legio vountry ; ttir Sirtliniaii Cross from the Kin& :itwI h i m w i t h his o w i i hantl us Ire lay W O U I froin the Sultiin; and the English Cross fro I'poii the reconinientlation of Geiierul 1 :I I)rip:idier-general of volunteers, June 23, v:ilua\ile serricex i n the campaign o f tlitlt OT Diiffit;'~ battles with the peculiarities :ind his uiisiicwssfiil iittcnipts to niqter t h t hi* \\ islies iind o rt l t w coiiii)relientled tii id 01 c~suiiiples :ire gireii i n this little book, wliich lby :iny nile iiitcrwtetl i n ciivalry literature. -T ~ H T L E T T ' S JIILIT.4RY 11USIC-41,E. Thv JOL-RSAX. is i n receipt of a coniiiiii lhrtlett, C1iic.f Bugler at General Shericlun'r; w:ii-. cont:iining iiii ticcount of. serertil entl w s t . introducing 1)iigIc mlls i i i connrctiori t i o i i i s t + . -1 1meiii of a i s stanzas, entitlcvl vlocwtionist. unci :at tlifwent plticeri i n t h ..'I':ips'' were ~ountlt~tl by the h g l t ~ r N , r . n! t'roin tlie :iutlience. By :in trrtihtic tiniiiid t i w bugle call to :ippropri:itt. p1ncc.s i n tti c4Swt is pi.otliiced. To give the effect of dist i*. usell i n tlic buglv. This sounding of th rloqueiit delivery of a finished elocutionist :irtistic an(l enjoy:ihle nuniber in the coiic( Aiiotlier nunil)cr at the twine coiiccrt I :in elocutionist) o f tlic C:irrilrytnnn's Daj ~losc of a succwnful charge." -\t appropr the corresponding calls were sounded o n t followed i n their Iwnper order. by "stabl~ .( t o horse," forwiircl." and '6 wuter call," B :ipproacli to the erieniy, tlie 'g trot," '.gal *.oiindc.d. The description, with the accom heen very realistic. A n adaptation of the also enclowd by Mr. Rartlett, as rendered of colors to C. 8. Grant Post, So. 3 2 i , D G . -4. R. The thanks of the Association a his kind remembrance of his cavalry comn concise description of the way thew iiiterer cntertainnietit should be arranged i n order

Cher II t

r p .

Ga n gel nnd

m u promoted firut lieu-

of the Russian w a r in h i s regiment u n t i l the in and H severe aolind Iital; biit not until he dagenta and Snlferino. received eight wounds of Hoiior from I i i w own if Sardiniti, who decored ; tlic Turkish G ~ W H Victoria." . nlker, Dufflch w i i e made #(is,as ai rewvnni for his lr. ' tlie English laiiguege, so a s to iilwnys make Ted. soliita very striking well worthy of' perusal

A0.A 6.c #.

c:itioii froin Mr. 11. T. c.iiclquurterri duriug tlie ririniiieiita given iri tlie t l i rccitiitioiis l)y eloc.u. IPS," W I ~ S recited by a n rccitution, pwtioiis of Ivtt. who wus concealed it' t h r diffcrcnt burs of pocih, 21 w r y beautifiil ice to tlic call u " m i i t r " ::ill, conibined with tlie must hare furnished nn at which it was given. 5 the account (read by from reveille until tihe v plnccs i n the reading bugle by lfr. Bnrtlett, " 1' boots and saddles," at tlic niipponed near I.'' and 'Lcharge" were lnying calls. niwt hare slut0 to the Color" was 7 him at a presentation artment of S e w Tork, clue to Mr. Bartlett for '8, and for the clear and ig featuren in a mueicul I be succcr:aful. H.

P .


T' '




illiam D. Dietz. CapS e w Tork. John

treats of the first aid


Translated by direction of Colonel E Infantry, Commandsrit of the U. S. School. By Lieutenant R. H. Wilson, would bo the nienn* lives. This is j u s t all connected with ct in airnilar cmer-

cient gunrnntce for the faithfulness, a t which the translation has been mado.

and clcarneea witb

cmual reading will

committed to better

.b. 6 6 .G h - .



. . . .

I ~ E V C ' EDI: CERCLEM I L I T A I R E .Serieu of 189

ne of tile Inod IIorsee in Anstm-Hu ntlic

Infantry Soldier (continued Elsewliere (conclirtlotl ). So. 3 :


Enlistment of Iritliarln in the Occupation of Tokar. Firiri wricludccl). Throwing an Slwed of Vclrsels and tire Slic Germany i n East Africa.









1 ' 0 1 . XVI, So. 5, 1890: Introduction. Test. Report of tlic Hoard on t h e Comp Plates, with T h i r t y - t w o F u l l Page Plate8 fi t r a t i n g Target8 a n d Etfcct of Projcctilee upon 1891 : Prize EaHay f i r 1891. T h e Enlintmcni zatioii of Crena for Our ?Sew Ships. N o t e c nition Cart, C o n s t i w t e d for t h e Ordnance Rallistic Equationn on t h e Angle of Elevatioi jecbry in Air Shall Pttss T h r o u g h a Given 1 with Dincuaaion. Electrical Counter a n d Slia tion Indkrrtor. Appcndix, vel. XVI,1891. ( bers, Conntitution and B y - h w s , Etc.

'he Aiiiinpolis A r m o r itivc Trial of Arnior n Photograplin, Illus~cih.Vol. XVlL, Xa. 1, Truiiiiiig a n d OrganiEkperiiiiental A m m u Department. Seacci'n in Order t h a t t h e Traint. Target Practiw, Ilcvolution arid Direciittliriing List of MemI

OUTING. J a n u a r y , F e b r u a r y a n d March, 18 H o w England T r a i n s IIer RedcoatR. Cycling i i i Mid Atlantic. Fish Spearing Sporte of' a n Irish Fair. Winter in N o r t h C Acroes the G r e a t Divide. Outing hnn addl range of' interentiirg ai*ti&n, Military k5 plrynieal development. 11;aomc of t h e rcc the ~ibSoutlierii C a r d r y Tilts." & & T hkei t l i t * . T h eSoldier Cyc.lintp." Oitting for March tel Her Redcoats," a paper as indispennuble t o 1 an l i i n book on tcwtiw. 'l'lie articlo in riel) Outing artinto nent to E i i g h i d , a n d by tl maater of' pencil and brush, Scymoor.

lie St. nuriiard


t h e Otonabee. T h e olina. T h e P i n k Sun. to i t a ever widening -vises" BR bowing on t i a n u m we liave had IIR a Marksnian" atnil *'!low England T r a i n s * National Gunrdatnan intlwtratctl by spciaI well kiiown Rnglinh

XIr. April, 1891. ' T h e Life a n d Times of J o h n l)irkinson, 1 Major-Genernl Charlos Lee, from MSS. of I liehed Lettera of Benjamin F r a n k l i n . Itiner ton from J u n e 15,1775 to December 23,1783. sylvlroia in ita Relations to t h e State of I from t h e J o u r n a l of William Jcnninon, jr., I t h e Continental Navy. Pznnsylvania Weat




2-1808. E x c h a n g e of aa Bondiiiot. U n p u b y of General Waahing'he Universityof P e n n nnsylvania. E x t r a c t @ mutenant of Marinea in 'r Rocords; lG44-1835.



No. 49. March,

Our Expericnce i n Artillery Adminiotra m. T h o P o w e r of t h e senate. Musketry. Military GymnaRticR. On t h o Increnrw of tho N u m b e r of Cadeta T h e !'Oath of Enlistm i t " in Germany. T h e Funeral Ceremonies of Washington. Rei nLe a n d Traiialatione. Military Noten. Historical Sketches of tli Vnited States A r m y : T h e Eleventh Infantry.




J O U B N ~OF L THE UNITED AT^ Organizatioii
05cers. Targets and
meat of Infantry. T h
'TI1 W A L E S .


NO. 81.

79 Boooltg,

1890. VOI. I f . Aairhor Dcfciiw by Girard

DECEMBER 29, 1890



JANUARV7, 1891.

N o r i o n d Typnorilr

tbinga that are great limited. Again, it i khole month's pay.

oaeily trannported, two tranqmrtntion is 60.00) that it abaorbn a for your promptness, I
n d Lirutmccnf,Eighth Cavalry.







a dinner of tbe .%ns of the Revoluti p a t winter, JAMES E. TUCKER who,

of the Second Yirginia C'aralry.n reginieii ; d e , nricl Colonel FLOYD CLARKSOX. who Sisth S e w Pork Cavalry, had tlie pleamri On the 30th of April, 1863, the latter reg brigade, but, thOUgh outnun General LEE'S OWII, the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel YCVI of the S i s t h Sew York. odered a charge number of those witb him reached the mai leaving only dead and wounded behind ; a UCVICAR, who, hntl his life been u p r e d , w high aniong the dashing leaders of the I' Colonel CLARKSON was not with the I 'hxcm, wboae hortw was shot under hi1 :ciixious to meet tbow? who had participate ma invited those who could be reached, Iiouse, to talk over tbie and other engage regiments had met each other, for tbe "(: to all the Confederate cavalry sttrriog in

pirtw at Sew York ?lie 1863, wns color b w w r I F I T Z ~ ~LEE'S ~ O Bbrigd been n major i n the ' ineetiny one another. mt ww surrounded by red by treble I t i s 1 , who wns io command whore. and tbe grenter m y at Chaneelloreville, ng the former tho brare 1 hare nrade his record


meiit at the time.




the engagement, w a s it, nnd Colonel CLARKeet Nr. TCCKBE at h i s t8 i n which them two ixth " was well known iriir; each having the




I I '

be with tlieni." .liici t h i j \vas tlie easa :tt i)orta of tliut enyitgeinenc written r) tiori to the work illme by tlie cava


The re-

the brigarlr coniiiiantletl by Geiwrul P *.omi n niid of ( ;ciicrul S T ~ EM S A S to IJf c-4 )in ni ti i iicutinb. T Ii is coni niun

and sent tliein under on tlie enemy's line ecl not$ing. There , Eighth :tntl Sereu-


leaving u* beliiiid, we &It liow uiiju

been the detnil tliut bring so m iicli glory


Wctlnesday nioroing ubout two h


Y w k , under coniniaiitl of Lieutenant-Colo

cavalry regiment, driving tliein and them a captain, wliose lieutenant co

were o r d e r d

prisoners, aniong guard that n few


took posseesioii of HU old 4 o t e w ith t h e n i until khc infantry came

1 ,

., 8.



' Z L LE. THE C-4 J'ALR I' 4 T C'HA. 'ELLORY 1

some pri! R e reach been eng, of three I irted our a J/rders we Colonel m e we hn superior 1 atLended *e were c :
lot to uiake ot to reas0
' of the ei dark. nftei ; the or( IS thrown ;nt towar1 1 0 1 1 s duty orses' brit

the brave X C ~ I C fell. A R and the rest of'the w i t h the Confederater ns we rode through


11 1

took the adrance, capturirr moils Black H o w Caralrx T h n r d a y atteriioon,'havinI since we started, with a 10s men wonndd. Having re] was about three miles bnck Spotsylrania Court House prisonem captured that the ing Kelly's Ford was rastl, 80 far f r o m support, would 1 the ofscem with him what bugler to .*outid "Forward. '' His t His

iers nnd bnggnge of the titt h e Chancel loiaril Ir Houst. ?cl more or less all tlit. tiiiiv 1 killed, one officer n i i d t i r e irnl to General SLOCI'M, nlii~ i-ecciced from I i i m to go t o 'VICAR knew full srell from ikirniishetl w i t h since crmsmrs. and tlitit our nilvniiee. t l i arent risk, b u t n u lie tolil wtrd to do, Iir oi.clcrril tile


His ,ut to do an

AA we marched on n fe back as we advanced ; abou we reached a nmall cleari; given; a mounted guard F BELL, with a few men, wne bad been on almost cooti tbey mated, holdiog tbeir asleep by t h e roadside. C t h a t them was a heary forci t h e rear goard wae fired ul to tbeir feet, and mounting It wca now very dark, and

and drii

volley. As the enemy enough for a mlumo o them and checked their ordered the cammalid to qnt our way through. t e atme momeot mun ot clear and full in de6 +here they waited for us. sheet of 6re belched farth


lie." ng were seen. but they f t l l iarcliirrg tliiuugh t lie wroodr, to halt and dismount w i s i t to the rear, and Captain the Conrt Honse. The men r forty-eight Iioum, tint1 na 8, most of them were I!-irig m n returned and reported House; about the mnie tinit. I in. The eomniand nprnng med i n line i n the open field. le fear that nome of our own d fired upon the rear guard. back to ascertain the true :tion of the roads to Todd's , he was challengcd, and on ulry," was tired u1mii nntl t CARROLL was killed by the road, which was only wide formed i n line, fired upon te. Then Colonel 3 l c Y l c a ~ -ak byfours to the riglit.ttiid unded the charge.,it WIR tit Virginia, and the notes rang other, ne m e rode down t o mesa it seemed 11s though a mrrrbines, nntl n t t h i n firet tire

immand were mixed up Item. Besides Coloriel MCVICAR, who was killed, tlirro officere n 'e wonnded and almut twarity men killed and wounded. These v re lett behind. and the -urvivoiw drove the enemy unbil the cro8s-r ds were readied. where the Confederate* took the ono to T o d d ' ~ T ern, and our meu went on to our own lines at Chancellornrille. I : 3 wounded w e w taketi few days w e w e l i t to to a howr near where they fell, and aRcr Libby Prison. r Blirckmod's -Vtrgn:ine, I copy oxtractcc from an nrticle written who ptibliehed i n 1866: at Edinbnrgh, hy Major EROI) YON BORCKE. at the t i n i e at' the enwas chief of Ataff to &nerd J. E. B. H T r r hat and had his horse gugement, and received a biillet through I e enemy'* ra!iik*. 'Plie s h o t through the head as we rode through extract comniences at the time of Cnptaio ( I.EB'w being dinllenged : "General STUART dispatched Captain I V TE of our ataft', to FI&s regiment6 n r r mir0as HLWH LBEw i t b orders to send on one of poseible and to follow slowly with the rest ' his brigade. tienerul STCABT arid his ~ltaffw e s trotting along a he hend of the coluiiin, w h e n , u t the nionient of emerging out of ie dark forest, we ruddenly discovered i n the open field before U I md at a distance of not more than one hundred and sixty yards a li I of hoetile curslry. who rewived u s with u wrere fire which m c e n f ited on the oarrow road. Fully conscious of oor critical position, ST BT drew hie sword und with his clew ringing voice, gave the order attack, taking the lead himself. For o w e our horsemen refused t c llow their gallant commanclcr; the? wavered under the thick s ni of bullee; WII all discipline ceased, arid i n a few minutes the I ater part of this splcndiQ rogiment, which had distinguislied itsel II 80 many battle-field@, broke to the rear i n utter confusion. At 1 moment the eneniy'w bugle sounded the charge, and a few sew 8 after we brurited the shock of the attack which broke upon us :e n thunder cloud, and horb our little bald along with itR rehemen r u s h , a w if driven bg a iiriglity wave. sweeping US along with it. n the darknew of the forest .*' I

lioo. Major KEENAN with his regiment to

advancing column, while

enemy. The Secenteent engtged in trying to arrest

e demoralized Eleventh n i n g over tho batterier

s stopped and, with tlic

becanie known the world over.

the danger,told General rntil h e could put his T

A R M Ynp



no: only able to throw h uellorsville House, but fro entire army.

e headquarters a t the Chiinr no eotiladiiig tire upon tile

eunsylvunia with KEENAN rncing corps of STONEWALL i d , and scores of his gallant checked until PLEASANTON that \vu* 0 turn back ttiat k would hnve continued on army back to the Rapidan. wteru skim.


still ; will.
f them rrhrnnk, Ik on raiik Qnth,

of the Sd inst., bare exciied the highest ad These noble feats of arms recall the glor Boonsboro,Antietam. Msrtinbburg, r p p r ville where the First Brigade shared w i t h u a i d they will now? while exulting in t h i s s the briire who hare fallen. Tho gyllaut K E E N A N , with one hundred and fifty killed small numbers, actteat to the terrible earnei niitltiight conflict of the 2d of Yay.



-on tbe ereii i i g Ira t ion. us d a p of Middletown. . le, Barhern and Amislie triumphs of victory, :cess, join i i t sorrow tiw [CVICAR, the gcneroul,

and wounded from p u r

ness tlint aniniated t h e



:tsar, tall
kiting his fall, her, rryunp
luoiiiious Iiung. er. y shall u e w r c e w


the lkbt o f pentee.

onding still, Ilorsville.

gave the order to death and destruction i n t o harged, but tboy could not





account o f ' its organi,zatioii irr tlcenird standing of its pooasible uws.

citizen. whilnt the Ist-

ilized gorernnients,

dotibtodl? be formed. Our drill regulatioiis yrewritn! t The bettalion normally consists of four

sixty each. A detailed account of the o

i s BO oppressive to tbe i tbo nation we must kee




of interio instruction in tbe lat there should be a t leaet one organization of tbia armf a BR modele for the volu capable of indetinite of tbe cavalry, infantry a adaptable to tbe cbancter nnteer may not be h a m p ecrrry for the cohes
~ e %

fur For pa

at volunteer

But for the security of srnq- to serve as a nucltwi r e depend i n tinit. of war. ip military traditions and of wnr among our people, y 2,000 inhabitants. Tbe tions governing it should The staff corps should be Friction ; the organization luld be of a nature moet ie8, in order that the r o l idnalitr more than is rtec'be eavnlry, infantry and

immediate contact with the enemy. and the troopn could be used. hut they lark that co

and completenew



.i L


onable area, to s

that hare to Iw

tioii of the battalion in our c for t h e eqoedron, is an i n

not be efficieritlr executed.

In the

brings forward llir laat reaerw iw

yerience, and can be expla

of tbo Civil War, a maniu

placed i n the firrrt or fighting lino

ctlry fbr the combat.

ganization, and to w m e ex

einplaynieiit i n wiir.

capalry hae performed bat many of ita feats w at the time, and hence coo

us of its coinmnndei.

fills thane conditions.

filsiori of the pursuit are 80 grciit that Qtill fore the leader can cause tlie inen to feel

tiiiie mncit elupsc be. ntrolling power. It

dedaetione therefrom, were 1870-.71. The new conditi

meot of tbe three branches change of organization. 1 ! h e cavalry retained the t

uatlrcm wliicli generally n h u t 130 inen ia t h e

merits niav be retained by t

II niiaiial

forniatioii. Generally. the cavalry

I 1
cavalry grew aloiig onomy,aa they have

into this diaeussiori. would not be coinplcte


lie6 tiir gcnersl oBcera, and aucli eacorta B time. The employnient of this diviaional c.aral (luring pursuits niicl retreuta will becolne a cussion.

the battle-tield, cliiring this die-

ffindvep i t i o n , could de qsact eacriliceefrom di *valry not be in con

nt body of c-rrvulry,or of proportion. wbould t by a !kw sbells. .in


army. Its service is rendered in advan

21s n ricreeo,

preventing the enemy fro1

I -.

nnitahk fiw cavalry mor t h e Bro of artillery. o the maoently attached t the spcial nature of t h e


t l i c i l i to

t h e diviaion.

Its ordi-

nary duties often reqoire t

thia abonld be aecmrnpzrni one battery with the othe should be rw) attacbed Tbew moet b e a

ilie arniy voiiiiiiiiiidur. 13ctiorc starting o i i his niihsiori iii a Itwlcr. tiliould be given all the iuforn t l i i i t is i n tlic poswssion of the latter. re<sidiii crimiy, hie pouible pwitioti, Ilia probable irate I i i i i i l i v a t i o i i a , etc. It' pool.rible. lie should be turn tlicviter of opertitious. The armiy :tbout when nncl i n n l i t i t dircction i t i s yrc He should he informed of the w i l l IIHJW.

,Ilia line ot


that hir, own army

intentione of h h c e latter in the ruort


enty or' tbem t o

haul three
der is iiifirnied where he is to rend hia tint rely upon getting support from other W i e This iufornintioii w i l l pidmblx is very iniyortant at the beginning; plticrs liiiiiself i n pnsitiori to furni the eiienily.

Thu cavalry corumniider now

tiuy atrategical r \ ? c n ~ r ~ i a i s ~a nee

merit uf operations, before co ahseuce of kriowledge of bis s the bulk of the cavnlry to kee





be allowed great independence of action, ciee, a special liue of retreat muet be indi



i n certcriu coiitingenLarge detncliments


be patrolled and t h o r t be rent far t o t h e froiit. dirision coreririg tiir

circumstances will permit. T h e cavalry having been deployed their work of finding t h e e n e m y a n d o usdrone in t h e first T h e chief of squadron pusbes forward, trols, PI circumatancee m a y require to ree ties. E a c h patrol w n t out is given a e each chief o f platoon receives specific or T h e eqoadron cornhi* squadron-in reserte to support may need it. T h e chiefs of platoon m heiitling patrols of a nou-comuiimioned fewer t b e better, wo t b r object be acc country, find traces of or e i j b t tile en c*rally gat all posaiblt, information of inquiries of t h e inliabitsnte, partieul

lwigadew of t h e diriritrii mcnt in first line. Tlir9e t w e n t y to t h i r t y mile?: a r m y corereti, tlie p o x he is adranc4ng or rvnt or iw aimply n retreat h iintarnlly prescribe inilea. keeping t w o or Ilow as near tlie center 3s ie number of squadI1 depend upoli tlic. i rciiiiiwtan res I\-h icli ndirig officer on t h e a m o n g tbemselvee, w regiment i n t h e rear. ith the remainder of t h e

a n d a few men-the to examine the ed

ne, as u reserve, nt n dis-

y of horse artillery witli

ce Iwtweeri tliew

posseeei6n of t h e enemy, can be reacbed, t iiecesaary, niust tako it a n d confiecute t b e pers t h a t are likely to give information. offices arid capture t h e mails, e n t e r tillaqea

le, reinforced if
ust e n t e r the post n t h e inhabitants.


tanee will be t w e n t y t o t h i The less resistance t h o firat line may be, a n d t h e be made. T h e m a i n body toward t b e point w h e r e t h e words, i t eboold be moved est force i s located. If, in shoald be placed i n rear of

n1n.r t lie recon n ni SOH n ct* whollld nlanys be moretl

brigbt children who k n o w n o cspecially if t h e latter be pr c o u n t r y must be flooded with i n y questions, g e t t i n g inform a n d if checked, aimply halting whilst tboee rhatever halts tbem. checked, contact must neve given by proper authority. T h e cavalry sucb a way t h a t t h e point8 keep u p an u n b have a m p l e opportunitiee portant information is obt

r i g h t or left t u r n hae been once



transmitted by t h e moet When t h e enemy has bee in nod ouly such parallel of t h e caw am likely to
to oppose in force aaisesnce or to ma

us partiea shonld be drawir eobwrved, as i n the nature . The cavalrr niiint

ry when covering its ariiiy :

urn to be0 and not to be

ie the only may to ucconimes to hesitate is to waste on is as niucti out

rnoiint. becnwe the eiieinys cuvalry WIIS i niisttikeii tor tlic lierid of niinieroug eolu u n t i l we reached 1,uiierille their scouts Linke.1 to their ririiiy by Iioraenien, they ; our paitions, of our halts, of our inoremc un tioni some little distance, incesmntly ap tliry *pisetid uneasiness. This \van the I riiiliwad junction ut S R I nntl I ~ prevelltec ~, from receiving its reserve :irtillery, utiilnill corps, II few days later, detentled St. Irivr the battle ot Gravelme. and niuch of the nttrihutril>le t o tlir fact that this corps WI: Aiio:liero~c.ei,an-*: * * W e r)li\v o n n h i l l of on our len, three snirrll groups, one i i i o t i tliwniouiited ; o n the slopes of tbt, little \-HI D single horseii~an entirely expoAed. nlon Irt, the iiiliahitailts o f w h i c h stared nt hi not deceive ourselver. i t mas the enemy ptrrtien mooiitetl and tli.sapibeared follometl hoi%elllrrr~, utter carefully watching UN, r a Tliese contact acoiitn had pasaetl twen twob divisions of infirntry, the reserve artil cloqgiiig the flank* of the leading infantry


hOll1e SCdJlltS

. Froin that moinent tchecl 11s iiiweaaingly.

- an

cxnc.1 account of ; ancl :IS they watched

r i n g a i d diarippuuring,

his front. Their RUCquickness, coolness. inconducting them.

Iry tlitit clestroyetl the e Sixth French Corps II and engineern. This 11 tlic French right a t inaster at that place ia etictil Iy i ncoiii pletc. or two ttiociaand yards I. the otliers i n advance hat divided 118, wc mw the tirldn near a ham? surprise. Wc could ne of the disniountd lie otheiw. Tho Mingle ed al*o. nur French squadrons, aiicl baggage nntl were ision of thtit retreating

The eontact equadm of anr of tbe tactica Lopon t i tbia duty, i

edge and ability most
hi6 power of acting aa

dron is liable to be called i t thoroughly the cavalry

,and at the mme time

must be kept i n vien.


marcb, h a

alarms. Tbe aon t a of the daring and enter-

General Visov says of his retreat fro111 nient we bectriiio the object of continual li the etieniys woutr. They kept gallopin range, s e e k i n g to see the head of our eo force ancl report to their aupp,rta. Actual fighting is only u means to 01 H h O U l d resort to i t only when maneuvering sos9cieutly intimidate the enemy to allow naiwuiice i n a eatisfaetory manner. Ifa portion of the line should became it will be supported from the rear by the mole time the other troops will be notif resolutely to support the engaged line by ai if pnwible. If the onempe cavalry be PI similar concentration of h i s forces and a The formation for this action mill be gc down i n the tncticw for this arm, but ther

icres : .* From that morapid iiwpection from I our flank, just out of 11 ancl so calculate ita

an end, and caralry demoiytration caonot I accomplish the recon:aged with the enemy, ,rest t r o o p , and at tho mod they will lrdvlroco aek on the flank or mar rly led, there will be a alrp action will enme. ned by principles laid e certain general prin.




tailed execution.
to the river, which i n t 80 tlie charge io the life

point t o i t a s thegrand

61 its rulue

as cnvalry. ing stirrup to stirrup to one hundred and fi

ne-s i n

Iitiritl, r i i i i l t i t tlir their houllc to Go11 n 1 1 ~ 1

It' the clitwgc rrhould be ~ l ) i i l s e d thc t i l i t I reserves must bo so dispose(l tlirit t b r j - CILII tnkc the pursuing enei iy i n the flank, to corer tlir rriIIy of' the det'tatrd Iiorsenieii r i i i t l to checak t h impetuosity of tile pursuit. cire torcell to ail): ncioii t l i c tieltl, iirforin:ilt' t i l t h tlefeaitcvl c a v i ~ l r y t i a i i r a>t' the state ot' :itYilir* niurrt br ininiei irrtely sent to the arniy voiiiiiiiiiicler. Tile <lirectioii ot' t l i r retrcat .Iionlcl be auch as to niisletit1 tlie eiicniy :iiiiI IIr:rw l r i n i CJA; it' possibl:. so us t o give favorable wiitlitioiis t o i t s I ~ W I ur1ii.v. ()lily gniding principles can be Kircii i i i this eiiililoTiiieiit of ctirrilry. n* ril)solut i. rule* tire out of p1nc.c.. Tlic victorious c:rv:iIry s l i ~ ~ i i l t iint l i*rleri?re IS 111i111 t)t. the i i t l ~ e r s q u i i t i l Iir is clrireii brliillll Ibis iiithi1tr.v liw 1) *otectioii,:tiid it niuit rl.wort to every i i i r i ~ r ~ ~ i i v to t ~k r c r p t l i c it1)liib:iiig cnv;rIry intirnitliitccl, t l i u s iwiilwiiig i t iist*lc%sa * :I recoiiiioitcriii: tiwce.

ellarge home." Previous to the char (he ground which is to order to give warning wide ditches, auiiken ma

rertciiing t h e eiieiny.


sable obstacles, aucli :is

'f iie iiicrcarsetl range. :iwiirucy t i n 1 1 r:ipia ity of tire of the intitlitry rriicl tielcl :irtillery litire inotlitietl t h e nietlio~la ot'einployiiic.nt, but they

tlirec*tlj-buck to the liriw. During the elinrge itbelt' aolutely free. tlic scouts ew detached parties m selves upon the enemy's tlie attacking line. Car

pursuit muat be carrie others following BN u

engiryed i n the nit7ce. the niust be kept u p ii* loiig

i n his squadron and rank dread? stated it is not &*S. B.-His Majesty will learn to rally rapidly."


hare by iio nieiiiis clwtroyecl tlic iisetiilnen~ ot' cnr:ilry on the tit411 bnttle. The proper eniployniclit ot'c;tr:t ry t t t tlic riglit nioii1ellt. liiis nI\rri~-a beeii one of tlie (litiicnlt ~)i.oblei i s ot' w i r ; inotlrrn arnis Iirire increased t h i s clifficulty,liut tlitay I i t r v r not cliiiiiiiatetl the proli- , leni. :in11 its a o l i i t i t ) i i s t i l l tries tlic s k i l l a r c 1 nliility of tiit. ccrvnlry otticer. The ctise uiiist iiitleed be vxciyti mnl ~ I I V Ithe I ttetioii oi; iii1)iIerii c:rv~iIry w i l l I i i r rt- i i decitletl r t k c . t t i )on the i)pposii)g ti)rces,* : i i i c l be tlic sole caiiist. ot' t h i r clcti-nt. t i s lina h e i i the c ' i t s ~i n maiiy 1i:ittles ot' the I w t . Ot' the twenty-two gren Imttles t'oaght by FREIIERICK. titteeii were woii by h i s carnlry. Jlc~lerii nrniit*snre so hirp :iricl the front is so esteritled. t l i r i t succtc's H oiie lmiirt aloes not iiee.tlie wliole line, urilesa t . a y i l y Iin\-e 11 predoiiiiliatiiig iiiduciice nlo tliat sticcess I)e tlie sc.iziirc r i i i t l retention ot' the ki*y t o the position; tlie tiisk of doing this would not naturally t l ~ o l v e upon thtb cavalry. This rirni pcrfhrni* tiit. purl ot'screeiiirig tlii iiifiiiitry u n t i l the latter conics i n coiituct w i t h tlie eiitwiy, wlieii i naturiilly I'HSS~Y t o tlie tliinks a i d p:irticuhirly to tliiit Haink which h w n t r r the bmt ground tbr the eiiiploynient of its peculiar powers. rhere it iiiunt protect tlie tlank of its own iiifiintry at all times. y o a -niy can be surprisotl by t i flank attaek it' its cavrilry is properly postcd r r i i t l does its full cliity. Csralry cannot I i o p tbr aiiccess HgAiiist the ttoiit of unRhak.en iufantry, unless the grodncl IN sucli tlint i t ct II tippear unexpectedly against the extended line; this formation ruiiclers infantry peculiarlj liable to confusion if siiddeuly attacked by sinall hdies of cavalry

, '. ?


nierita y i t b trus.ceu of hay which they had arried with them, pasaml a~ h nuch iiupetuoxitj- PB to over the wnrkB. a i d cliurged the F r e i ~ c dolay their mo\ements for a aiiffieient lea tb of time for the allied infantry to arrive and effect a uecure l a nient. Tbis obliged the French urmy to precipitately abandon the nee which had been conijtructed with great labor aiid esyeiiue, ant was regarded ns the bulwark of France as a defenm agaiiiat tlie a iee. Sotwitlintantling the great range a i d a uracy of the mwlerii rifle arid field piece, the auccesaf'ul use of eavi ry to delay t h e attack of aii unaliaken enemy iii superior force, a I BBcicnt leiigth of' tiins to enablo its own infaiitry to maintain a ke position until reinforced sufflcientlg to attaiii a dec1ai.d auperiori , line been. deionnatrated in n brillinrit manner. BAZAILUE wae retreating from Met2 ti the westward, along the etruck t h i s road Uetz-Verdun road. The Tbird German A uy Corp~) from the soutb,at a point in advance of the wincipal Frencli c d n m n s , rbe fighting commenced thus cutting the main line of retreat. bout 1 P. m. the Prusaians about 9 A. m. and was extremely severe. were exliausted nnd getting out of anin inition. It1 was obren-ed that the French were being reinforcod a I, unless eheckod in their advance, the Germnos would be hurled fic 1 their poaition before re infowenients could arrive, aud the line c rotreat would be opeti to the Frencli. BREDOW'U cavalry brigade v R the only available force that could he employed to avert the imm cnt danger. There were but 4% squadrons of bia brigade present. The good of tlie army deiiiaiitled their sacrifice, and most nobly ( i t l i q respond to the deiuantl made of them. Of w u r w it was B prehe5deri that a cnvalry attack undertaken against intact infaiitr and powerful linw of artillerj- would prore Y failure, and it' suet spful, the losses i n either c y would be fearf'ul. There wae no til 3 or means to preynre tbr artillery. The brigade this carvalr. attack by an overwhelming fi of' accidentally eiitered u p n the cbarge in t tielons, but after tlie artillery liad been reached and the gunners c down at their pieces, tbe whole brigade, in one line, aitbout rwei cs or flanking squadrons, charged the infantry supports witb SUI I vebamence as to break tbrough their lines, deRpite a terrific fim pleted beyoid all oxpectationa, but the e ward, regardlesa of tbe effort8 of their o f darted at a line of mitrailleuses tbst was t h e artillerymen, when infuntry and were cutting and etabbieg they were sudden1 attacked by t h e ea pelled to retreat, f o r c d The hitherto rieto u s quadrone, now

1 The flank of in part of the line, an vees to strike this

ad of his c t d u i i i i i ; ns they t to II fiaoiit, their frolit is

s iiiid iiiore if' iiecess:iq-, for

tli of the psition



two coiinecutire lilies, i i i i n as riipid wiiccesrioii :is


t .

h i a s i n n Guard utter i t s

time tlinposetl. but it could ave rendered the retreat of

Cavalry Iias a t all enemy i ti order to deln

ed to an unali:rkeii n g to enable its own iiifnii-

, is an cxnmplc..


be fbrded t h e Glieet, his ca




hen the survivorsw a d toward

G i


' I




victory of Gravelot he eveotaally eurreo

inforcementa enabled 8 line of retreat. The IWE u p i n Met2 where approach by n i i ascending infantry always fires high. approach of cavalry, if tlie


grade t h e condition and nndwr the wxeit

ck, if tbe proper force

t h a t of t h e old tletd piwe.

alry s l ~ o u l d owrate

3 enemy's twins. but to Ripe's Station. The carairy Mx)n struck rssion could bo made they were RO well guarded that n o serious i :, whcre it found an lipon them until after crossirig Sailor's C and capturcd wixteen opening nnd destrnyed several hundred wag N the enemy's line of g i i i i ~ The cavalry tirmly planted itself ace GORDON'S corps. It retreat to Danville, i n advance of EWELL'S n tierc*elyassailed the head of EWELL'S column, inging i t to 8 halt and battle formation. A brigade and battery pe tratocl the line i n rear tit' EWELL'X corpe and in udvance ot' GORM forcing tbe latter to take nnotlier road to the northward. EWELLns completely imlnted me up. when his coina i d detaincd u n t i l the Sixth Infantry Corps niand was tlestropd. The next day. April I l t h , the *me plaii as pursued, the main I,o~ly of the carnlry Iiiing upon the eiieii1y.t milk. wliilat one diriai ~ niatle ~ i I\ clash np>uhis trains near Farn Ile. OII the Hth. the c:ivdry got aheiid o f LEE'S arniy! captorin provisinti traiits, rtv., ilrore i n bia outpoqts. and took p i t i n n aboi the ricinit?. of .\ppniaittox Court Hou.w. The next mor ig, ( & ) R D ~ ) N hat1 coininenred his niovemeiit to attempt the forc ; of the cavalry lilies, . 'x march. tit the sight nlmn O m ' s intiintry arrived after an t i l l nil I I which ~ GORDOS'S lines recoiled without er Iqing. the mirtrin fell. : t i i t 1 the four g e a m t r a p i l y was over.


and neeleas altacks


THE C A V A L R Y R d l l ) .

A n enterprising cavalry


pon tbe tlanke of a wtre nd ineeeurity; it ca

this use of cav-nlry. After

The raid, i n a niilitary sense. niay be de irrnption of mounted troops into the the I W under the control nf tlie enemy. The object of the raid is to ravage the t ~iiiy'i prnperty, supplies and stores of all kin hi* communications. create confusion i n hi his cavalry away from wme point where its infirmation of the strength a i d distqbutioi

e d t o be an incursion

'r of war occupied hy

intry, destroy tlic vi)-

,take primnem. break ,Ian of campaign. call wseiice is inimical, get It' his forces. cauw him



T OF C A V d LR Y.
to divide bia forces, if toilding

9 C-4 VALRY.


to mrke detacbm

approaicli Yicksburg from tlie

r iind force its a h n :YBERM)S


is another of its duties

he morale of the forcea en-

dotiment. or destroy PEXBERTOW'L army. t r i t d at Grenada. too weak to riuk 1111 uc1
c a v a l r y tinder \'AS DORN nnd FORREST to I tioiia i n Tennessee and nortliern Missis-ipF sippi, wil. GHAST'S secondary d e 1 ~ ot' ~ 1 -11p1

, but ha employed hie

GRANT s communieaHollj- Spring, NiaeieI : \'AS I h B X YlIptUrad rrrilrnnd. Thiu forced cnmiiirnce opnrtiotie

tlie earliest times, but tbe result of11coinbraced i n the plan of The raid iabot e n

skill of the odacere and self-rqliance und the ind

t h e iiion, developitig tlir to a very high degree.

to be passed orer. the tinie the forces i n hand

muniuatioo, tbe cha


titig the Federal urniy.

wherelit sboold bave

unperceived ; but io the m a l t at Chaw* T b i r i s an esamp not have detached him ai111 inly have b e e n different. ill-timed WUPBC: of action, have ptodueed important


the place. tlwtroyetl the supplies :riid broke GRANT to retire to Jlrnipliis o n tlir r i v e r . t o t i entirely new lines. A raid niny be able to collect iitfornist that a reconnaieeaiice bc w i t id iictcd. ciitinot, no matter how wgstetnaticiillg it ni H r n l l l l l l YrC'LELLAN'?! STI.ART btarting troiii Tayloravillc. mi ts r i d suppliw on the entiro army i n lS64. He destroyed trans m, broke tile railivud, Pumuiiky, enpturcd borec.a. rnulrn ant1 p i c und learned the dirrpitioii of' MCCLCI.LAN' my. The iotorniatioii K ~ N from = the Talky, t h u r obtained determined LEE to reed1 k nttack and tlie sereii which was tlie prelude to that iuagiiificr~nt :lidrand o f the Ciiion daya' hattlcw. which finally resulted i n the tmopa from the P en i ns ul a . mr of POPE'* aritiy ant1 Again i i i Augu*t, 1862, STI-ART milled i Alexandria Rnilrorrd. *truck Citlett's Station on the Oraiige I H e destroyed t C i i t * . wagonr. myplies and 1turt.d ~i&a end prisciner?c--leariied tlir atreiiptli and d i a p s i t i >f POPE'S army : which iutormatioii enabled LEEto plnti the t u i g moretiient tlirough I i n tlie Pubsequent tleThorou~lifiare Gap by JACKSOX, which reru teat of POPE'S army. .era1 different routes, u I t an eiietiiy is receiving supplies orer IC. n t then), t h u s liniitctiralry raid cziti be eniployed to destroy e inaupuratiirg of wriiriy hid poszible linea of retreat just betiprt oudy.ofenniw operations againrt him. SHERIDAS started fir001 Winchester Febi ' ~ - 2 51865, . with IO,IWH) iibuletice*. nixteen anic a r u l r p e n , fimr pieces of artillery. eigh i v m b t a , uod P sinal1 inutiition \vapons, II pontoon train ot eight -e, a u p r at111milt. H e supply train w i t h fitteen d a p ' mtitinn of I 're he turned southeset, iiioved through Wnodstnck and Stiiuntnii. EARLY'S tbrcea i o the and a t \\'aynesbroiiph tlestroycd the last kstroying t h e railroad \-alley. A t Cliarlottwrille he tnrtied mu ?. Failing to crnua the r r A4tuLemtCourt Hi to Lyncliburg HY fir a e down that eirenm 811 Janiea River at Duguidnrille, tie took n cv mea RirerCanal to t h a t fir aa Oooehland, t horoughly destroying t 111 -ginin Centnil Railroad point. Then nioring north he struck tho ly crippled, by the dcat Louisa Court Hooee. nhicli he perinan



etraction of tmck Beaver Dam Station.



stock. arr fair down as he threw the forces froni House ria King Williani und his much iiectletl r r u p

OF C-4 l'ALR I-.


battle was fought July 3t1, and three learned that the Austrians had retreat the greater pert of the earalry had Corps was started July l l t h , bur tb the Yarch. Even a(r late as the 15th the by H detrrchmrnt of ca\-tlli-j- only o infantry, arid tliia forceti the Aucltriaiis to the vrillcy 01' tlie Waag. The cavulry of both thebe arini relied entirely upon the shock of intantry, and conaequcntly iinnc. that wide sphere of action i n n-l SO diatinpuiblied theni4rclr.

the battle it was

the army did not

army. During tbie f i r tbe n i n e rende iiently crippled two tenc-e ntorea of inca other raids were m


inipnnsablc countryIiatl periiuiornless-he

ad was cut at GodiiiK n advance of tlie

s liarti presrei1 tirniy.


1' fire tnctics, und

raid fature army command feaeional education if


fully tleiiinristratril

h e Civil War. and t l i r

The roenits obtained i


confronted by infantry. sn 1'0s etieniy niountetl, and the tlefe plishruent of his inis-ion. It does not with an eiirniy Ikbliind it. to ~i and if cavalry Iiopeb for surc


heen in command of was parallel end closet

's cavalry, that line, which ier, would have becw twoken. o,ght the Ixittlr with

11 tlic nioveiiieiitri ot' to enablo the Austrian

2&h, HAXCOCK an fantry. niost of thcni directed agairint th

Iry. PEEBIDAN dia-




, the cavalry opened xiicli


thut human cndiiraiice \VIM ntry broke and the curulry two dags. ThiN atoliped infantry mere w d l drilled. c l to battle for nearly three

- brigatley nriir Diiiwiddir

t h e i r fire until

iecl hi* cnvnlry. tliaiiiuiin-


iiibcretl,hut they iwerveil cnnie within close ~ J I I I ~ ch t i withering firt*11. t o ' S position lit 1)iiiwiiIditb
ES' divi&)ii

~ ,

wan alwowd. iiltitiitry

line in front, charging o

the entmy'a work. I I ~

s curalrj brigadry die-

The ~1c-14tk-e of BREDOW'U brigade n t ioiirille WIW niow than wnipenwtrd lbr by the r c r u h .in equ iiumber of SRERlD.4N'tJ rc-umatnrices. Tlir reiI1eii could Iiare done a8 well iiiicler ainiilar infantry tit Dinwiddie (7 e t Houw not oiily prepube of PKKETT'S rented a clinnuter to tlie I'ninn left, biit it 11 red the occupation of Five Forks the next day, and we do not t itrte to a w r t that an t h u c iire and lighting q n n l nicinbrr o t ' European ciivulrj-, rirmed ed the mnie rrriilt. 11.1 they ure tiruglit. cnulcl not hare accwnpli I'C iictinii. will uaually IS wphere of action will 'ord so expenrive a toy, civilized nations is so e. Of coiime rnitln 11d9 1 surmuiid the cnrrlry ent. TIiu invention of ~ed the cn'ectireiicrla of i froiit of unnhuken i n tI\vap attack icifiiitry 9 a t the right tinit* ant1
[owithdraw u clet'entetl

F c r l vat r.H Y.


rnoanted, which ente


meo, and witb the 0 t h sesailerl W.H. F.Lm6.s q e c t a c l e of a divieion th, the cavalry placed ttieniatroying many wagoris, etc. The latter formed up A more the rent of his

cape, but CROOK diNmountect


diriaion assailed

ntire force until the and charged on the left of conipletely envelop

rarj-. iralry doroted itself to eii the fortunes of t h e needle gun its eacriflcw operly underatand a n d . :beir tark oPprotectiiig . and cau be made thorwer can reiidor t h e de- , tual as that of the beet. to attain a ttrreatening ke time for all the f i r which the cavalry need
wnr we heard much of later period, when t h e nced operatione among I waa regulated by t h e t h i n g of flre action and -olumn8 were rendered
: miaaile,

It is ahaolutely necemary

the arm ie t h e

, I . !

a u r i iary, and if tbe me tbei alignment and etrih true avalrymen and are be d r e a d o f t b e flsr uncu tivated mind, bena *io4 efect upon Europo hae [D enlightened the N mate, at its true value, th and abey can take him a cove4 uoleee h e bo an ad An e89cient cavalry ( mnet;cbangetosuit the.c OUR ioventiona, imyroven theirainfluencee, and the by ubiliring t h e material

horses at speed, preservt. itbout benitstiou, t tier ure true cavalry spirit.

ur ngateni of free who&

e at

r e r of 1)recedcnt. but the time. The ra1.i-




Coptabi. FuuHh Cnr.iilry.

discwaaing tlie operations of cariilry clrawn into t h e atiiniated qlebste wliicl mtic minds hare tlvvoted to the solution whether or not the days of cavalry cliargt A n d yet, i n spite of this indubitable fac arc, at t h i s ver: n i o n i e n t . tiring exercise

is diAicult to ukoid being

raid ~~ialrseww of cavalry

tories is bought? And where is the spectator who asni and a pleasurable feeling of ad

a profound enthurri-

of a deluge?

groqnd, producea an impreaeion tbut caused by a u earthquake. Soon, in t

compared only to that of the advancing mass,

paet like a burricane. each man

g a8 one. If the B+Cidable fire of artillery
which bm covered the point of at

eatitled" Lea Orsoda Q O C S ~ ~ do M Jour."oool.loed lo d a . r & ~ M U U a i m Milllotre -~ Fmworr.publbbd Dampbloe. P.N.

BYl.ournber o f the J m a l
Is&Cds.,'XI RuecC puoS







dead and wounded m

be presented in all ita

is arranged i n adva every combat be int powder remove the aim of lime of infantr cavalry charge on t The only reliable from these maneuoera

m t l of compacc battalions like the anc after the wars of tlie Empire the i i

prevent tlie acc urate oeing features of tlie

compelled to truat to hie bayonet h a p . fewer chances of Ruccese than who undoubtedly lind a weapon w r y On the contrnry, it i A the r e r y iinniut Imed of the mnn rind horze, that constit :is oppowetl to the constantly augmented infaintry. This can be proved be)-ontl

nx of Greece? L o n g n! after sighting tlio tbe clumsy flint-lock y wa~ upon hiin; Iio ditions affording perthe ancient, pikenieri, the nioment ofshock. - of the element; conieaknese of cavalry erance of the Aro of o w of a doubt. To

i t is another matter to
neuvers and t h e poeei
e tlie fire of inhtiie8 and tlie vririiui-

reinote time*. ha-

primordial and invaria fluences. On this imm tiou of the uhock actio meuts in ballistics h a r e and NAPOLEOX employ

enta, wliicb froin

," say t h e y ; ' . F R E D E R I ~ K cisely a8 did ALEXASDEK

f tlir hostile infan-

try, nntl


bc fired

determined by a n g queNtion or' charges tern, the Cbaeeepot a body of infantry

may kill either the shock results. This t h e other. FBEDEBICK and Sa the use of cavalry in 80

for example, whicb was much Ruperior

epocbe r n d e rntacicnt t h e battle tactics of

TI--l 1




large a degree the th cuIati+ne. It wae for ville t a e able to reau

hits as to riullify dl




caralry. to regain its


agallop. w i t h a IOSN iiidewl. tactical succm~.


~ i * i i i the x


accident8 of ground, vaet battle-tielde of t a r g u m e n t 8 if we are

te fornintioriw, ttricJ :in >o*itiori in war of t l i r

tlw writer ever set foot upou a rifle runge. w h t h e beenis to be ignorant of, r i z : t t i

course, rsk w h e t h e r bud he would know markamen arc n o t e thc distances; by

firing straight to t h e front with their sig

00 nietem they will all tbia into a dan-

trative p w e r such t h t w o m e n ; then t h e Germans are justly m a n of t h e brigade If,to t h e murc~ o

from perfection of firearm. unforeseen nature.


DQ d o u b t t h a t maor emall @ of ae little will t and qeakened by t h e

a r e n t from a remarkable


Revue des Deux Mondes i n ow far t h e spirit of partibtened minds:


t h e trials of the rifle of t h e model of

enables iia t o fnrm u n

" 1




have been long adv

an abeolste prepondersn ecieoce bm pmduced thi tbemeelves inforln I n proof of this a m by mitrailleoeo dre. A will, at one discbarge, co and with such precision, ider tlie results acliieveal it h o u t being orerlierrted. killed

depends on his cnolnesn ant1 the fikill with w icli

i t s use, that i t

would mow down two o

latter cannot be dedo but at all events it ie element etill coati

feele both in the arm whi Up to the present ti

from the view of tbe i

e which the infirntryninli h e power of its fire. wns such that, atter the
er, being unseen. was curtain niiglit be rent

Iic fires, a n d a8 tlie target is risible lrnd increasing i n apparent diniension ~ L Bit comen d l pap n o attention :.e. Then it will IN seen wlietlier the results indicated in the t n l k f th6 Sormal School of Musketry (I'I?cole'uormalo de t i r ) itre i n cordit ncc wit Ii those ot'the battle-field. on t h i s day the nliock act of cavalry will have I w n rban~lonednever to be r e w n d . The adrocate- of the charge a r e not igri ant of all this; and . they h a r e been compelled, in order to avoid tl nbundoninent of t h i s . . n i :t n e h e r w b i c Ii t Ii cy coi isider t lie gra d e s nost noble, nntl moat heroic of tlie profession of ami$, to look for -ececIent s other than those of the wnrs of recent yearn, which the 1 rific power of infantry fire has rendered unRatiRfactory; they harq me back eightj-year8 tactics of nmclses and a n d hare borrowed from the Xapnleonie era t wcceesive attacks. Certuiulg if brilliant vi11 self-sacrificing devoa lr brutal eupriority, mrint is \Tell capable 10 the field o f battle. such prepon(lcrating necessary. Only by ' to coiitiaue the COIIwlieu the energy of


face of the ground. It often completely cove

s set forth hy many service, is calculatecl i s on this important. qmae that the infunlired by a long and charges it is i n the oditioiis atre suitable mergy which are tlie like sitcccs.*. T h e l.aet several reniarknble exno longer concenls liir utes exposed to his tire. ntage of liia position. The moment proper for o a..ulunie the dnta of iri lege of subjecti n g II admit that cavalry liae been weakened But that cavalry can r.11 as to enable thein

British campaign in the amplee. With the new

tiideocq will quickly ret

a rifle, capable, in a fe




6 L h o l e Lncperieure d followe :

need ie not meant a

and iricreaee the

beyond a peradventure,
mated with courage and

If a aeeond echelon nhelterd by the line in

I I.

- 7




iea will be atfforclecl

bilities ot i t s mrcene? If the attacks in

Ii ' I

CAVALRY reached. Siiriilarly a t Third Lancrm nnd tbe a half regimental front.




will find i n tlie efficacy of i t s firo w i n , t neceseary for tbo successful resistance of 011 its front, flanks or rear. This ndiniaaion of iteelf, ia enough t

The folloaiugare 8ome of the result .at the trial* hold at the camp of C ii1nn.c: dred yards. with the rifle of tlie mod

ecl by C'oloiiel L E B I L tier* of tlie O n e Hun-

provemelit eaiie'es liulf the bulleta suc'cese will crown its en and inherent sentiment. ita defeoeive power sa o

perform i n war." Tea. but the be impoesible. We will admit the rea*onrrble *atisfactorill)-proved that truhcity We hare atriven to pla faithful picture, drawn -rce. haa t o a certain


iow will enable a cuv-

not stir. W e will attack it oii all Nidesat charge lO.OOt# strong. and c.o:itii it will be comprlled to yield."

wc will return to the

have diecunaed t h i s much

Moreover. do you not admit t h h when y



would bave been tbe rea t h e cavalry, as impaeeable bits to tKe hundred shotw, ters diataoce, sixty-two sixty-four shots. We

i n battle formation h n a

beed attacked by cava able to join the firing is composed of half t miehere. and tbat The line of cuvalry w eqaal tbe infantry in t h i in battle formation ; tbe

and reserves hare been pow that the firing linu e battalion, or 300 skir-

n t is that of a battalioii

advance with 800 men

shot ie Bred while the e a metere. We will then I r e

over each space of 100 The two last diacharges

troopere wbo map a t to l i e o f f throagh o

o u r bullets to paline will etill be in

u clniin that the second

moremcnt of tlie cavalry. if it isu regiment is charged. the Iwttalion placeti on tlic flail pans. which, with the otlier reserves. will 1 to defy any attempt on its rear. In tliis ti riaait your attack without fear: you may tho French tactics preswilw. or. folloa-in~ y m r main attnck may be tiinde by the 61.r tochnients from tlir two cltliers. iind i f y u persist i n charging. regardless of rehiiltr. wlieterer muy Iw you strength. your losees will be t w vast. tliat he will lw 11 1)olcl iiian ind tl. who. i n any mcceeding war. will attempt to prove n theory by r peating your experience. And. are you quite sure tlirrt you will I able to'concentrate your mass of cavalry at the opportune nininen at a dchipnated p i l i t : ' We will take tlie caw of's reginicnt 01 nfantry posted n t the extreniity of the line as the most probable e. It will have t w o battalions i n line and one in rcwrve. Two attalioii8 i u line tuke up COO meters of' front. The renerre brrtta 111 may he put in double rank to receive c-avaky or may form coin my nquares. We will assume that i n either of these formations will occupy 300 nietcrs. The complete deployment of tlie regime :. to the f out and flunk, will then occupy one kilometer. The c irge h i l i niadc k t to boot,one file to the meter. therewill bereq red 2,OOo troopers merely for the first line, and for all three, 6.000. ,dd to this four quadronrc on the front and twoon the flank aa re rvee, we reach a total of seventy squadron*. This force though I ge, is not extraordinarily soland during the S&oleonic epoch. muc* inore considerable nineeeR were employed. Our Organization provides for no more ian two independent car-

small degreo of hesitancy


C'nlese the reeulte to be o

ng. we shall have only than a regiment for o f such a nature ae to will it be expedient 10

of war? We will auppose that all t




mow than twenty Iri the Praminnu was ni

. Prirat

t h o front of

far from the point

moving Rach an immens

tbe forlllatioo for tho att ndruntageous employm

cavalry antl, at the w:mc artillery, now u o rfficient

without p a t risk of t h e other arms. On A


g the nioreiiietit- ot' Division of the Pru+

not take up a position of the German staff pletely obstructed by

that their artillcry vould the Yance. The w c o u r i t * was, for a long tiiiw, coin-

We have, hitherto, i tics Itave undergone no protectiun from c m w , is concluded before n will not hold good in that these condition* Owing to the o w r -

of the battle, invariablj

lahorious efforts, and by works, will the attac

The armies will be, aa

saved the army fro

fire of artillery and

i nfnn try being amokelelro. t h e coni maritlrr cavalry B distinct and unmistakable point ot it w-ilI surge a b u t bere and tiiere anti 16s the seeret of its force. The combat of caralr? rgriinst infantr clifficult both i n inception and control, anc i n the direction of the axi* of tlic chargtb, i certain ruin. fir if the rhiet' attempts to c move i t to ttie rear, its own inertia w i l l ciir tart with its entsgonistp. B u t , will the capabilities of cavalry I .M i t a inability t o charge infantry? Certainlj other arms can cavalry expect to escape tl tion which science has caused i n all branct only by retiouticing its uricient methods, I h o e cnntributecl to the eetabliehnient of it hy entering boldly and without chitnerica utiieti the i n t u r i t q - and artillery nre IJOW t tci YW its niis*ion enlarged and a new horii Cavalry alone. by the rnpidity of i t s N cvlomn in march, and overwhelm it with C;cmll-~ p:rtn>ls alone, for the Man ithCbIf :it full s p ~ upon d the enemy's outposts, ar aliicli hitlierto, onlF the smoke and report rcvealcil to the eye and ear. The charge c ot the pit. and i n ita stead, is .wbstituted rlcmcwts of which, by taking advantage 01 arid the swiftneea of the horn, may succee iiieshea of the protecting net wliicli thei around himself, and, i n many cases, may infantrc w i t h its o w n arms. Far in advan m- i n connection with the other armR, i t wil defilee, bridges, fords, etc.; i t may, thank arms, acquit iteelf well in the most obhtins retmci the advanm of the enemy and prt u n c e guwcl from m m i n g into battery. In the protracted and soverely contestec dry will otitain results of the greatest i m p rnasseR on tlic flanks or rear of the enern!foot. Its mobility and rapidity of rnorerner cnncerted attacks on different pointe, and line af retreat. and this, with the most fay

n no loriper #ire to hiu. irection, without which

i te cohesion .- which i a .

will. therefore, be very he maw once laundieil

vi11 be wubject to alinoat

8 c . k its mad chnrge rind' i t on to a ruiuoun con-.

*mtric-tetln~ a result of ,ot. S o ninre than the process of transformaI of the art of wnr. H u t , wevcr much they may glorious traditiona, anti rvgretfl upon t h e rands \ rcling, can cavalry Iiopc 1 open hefore i t . eriieiite, van Aurrountl a i I fire, without showing, -ene011, nre ab14 to rush c-nllect the inforination the fire-arms wed Iiavt. p n d masees ia R t h i n g I indiviilunl chnrge, the ho accitlenta. of grounll in prrRsing through r h e adrerear- ha@ thrown irnount antl engage his of i t own nrniy, alone, )ut in a state of defenne, to tlic efliciency of ita comhat8; o h n it may snt the guns of his adrttles of the future, ctivB ~ C B by moving i n great nd oRen by fighting on will enable it to attempt o threaten the enemg'e able. e&&. Whonever

I .I.-






1 1 2 3

t h e pmeentu, of infan be reached without R etituted with great cwlerity and will crea

Dragoons, a few engi of the lioe. The he

Pruaaian division coming


From this bud to use ita artill

to dislodge t h i q weak he major part. Bein2


one1 DULAC, though mount,and, favored b e m g and dinengaged

twenty-five men.

ruabed upon each

a lose of four oficere ani1

able to utilize ita 6 when i t s object had

.quadrone. which, nt t h e utrnoet s p e d o

were retreat-

A few ucattered squads of the Seco had taken part in the action, h a r i n g
splendid a n d mwt nob Soch a n eoconnter valley of the farm of GBOrtar did like d r y which had just sustained a violen hrigadee, wtm compelled t o dieeontinne ut to burnt, for the carp

re dAfriqae, which , threw themselres

cavalry duel at Eeeli pire, gives tho follo

Upon o u r center

the victorious cavwith t h r w hostile i t and return t o its

v a n e d towarde i t in a

become aware of t h e
Mamba1 warned t h e di NOT and t h e cavalry to

combat. Them same troop, without in the lea the problem which, a t this very moment

ng eo many emi-


dictates of souttcl juclgnderniiee of tire-arnw i*

n e n t minds, a n d it i

law wbicb bes long between tbe bullet arme remained s t a t sumed their march, a stage some one of t h of antiquities. All o which -me are end i n the near futnre,

not date from to-tluv.



but t h e y have nt last. rcwith g i a n t @trick.% .It each

learned t o use tbeir m This at 5rst s i g h t

ir arm.
\\-e respcct tltc.+c* light slred bF tlie p i s t ;

illtleiatrs; t h e y a bot at t h e same tim

I of

refuse t h e duel witb

ious Itistory cvt' t h i s artit, 1, to clisniount aiid attack i t s

rival with i t s fire-ar A division o f cavn for holding homes. ment of infuntry, a alrx, n o niatter wh with reanonable p Aa for tiring f m demned whgn attoiq

formerly i n use. it irow the c;irbiiie o r t l i r

trnitiing for
bat mealb m q be o of cavalry coming up on ite advoreary and


horw. O t '

aiii at the same Iiaee. will





tbongh they may obetr

it entirely.

the pathw

of progress, can never close

der of things, equilibriutli Ilatione. The watere of II rising tide. For s0111em a t the rising wave triutnplis thing i n its front. The sight a drill, awkwardly holding necessary to mako a good ROCK and his soils C H R I S -

I n the physical as
takee place only after

rnajeetic.rioer strive to



their lances-for y lancer--call to mind t TIAN and KABPBB. The heroic smith, that he will stop the nay just constructed UAXIEL HOCK and his aeen adrancing from tive came on like the ovor their bodies a
brows contra
t 4 n with an air of detil It was impomible to ti!

0 THE EDITOR:-When the last nun )er ( March. -1891) of j o u r 3 JOURNAL reacbeci nie t i Jhort tinie2go, \\-as very much pleaeetl to find i n it the admirable addrew delivered y General KIDD,upon the

tiemy to progress, hss sworii mpts to I ~ R S over the m i l . As the train approached, old itli an iiiinicnre pike, w e w


The old smith StCJOll


his great aquiline

zed on t h e npproaclii1ig , You lih:tll n o t p s s . " to ~ a yi-

proud attitude.


and KASPBR, one on es(

tiunlesn as statuea. Su buts of their pikee on multitude began to trei The engineer, fearful t t that mea above the thr motive wae imniediite into the tunnel with a W h e n it had vanis epot ;where a few BBCO The 'three emithe and f8r i o the dietance the 1

hestr bare. stood ss innbeut for*-ard and rested the e points furward. Thc

eels : 6' Let lirr go." The locoa cloud of Rteam, and rualiwl
ea were directed to the

nndiminished speed.

occanion of the dedication of the monuni p t erected by the State of Michigan i n recognition of theserrire ade during tlie battle of Gettywbiirg. pages should conttlin the account gi truth-eeeking hiatoririi,o!'one of tho rn liant cavalry piicountere which occurred during the War of the work ehould not remain buried i n th has only a limited circulation. It m that previous to your publishing the ai your readers knew or had heard any liirnt passage-at-artiis, whicli, as some of riot hesitated to claim, mvcd the bottle sbwg to the Union cause-or at any rnte did much i n that I beg hewby to tender to General K heartfelt thaiikn for the kind and courteous manner i n wliic towards me and ni :igree with me, an me. This in all the more Rtriking from the fact that was first given to the public, in Se entitled, "The Right Flank at Gett delphin Times, i n ita wries of "C the Annals of tho War," nod sub form, there was n work upon. The and entirely ignored lry every author who had purported to istory of the battle of Gettyeburg. The publication of t h records of the ReIbellion had not even bogun. S o ad been printed but the report of Geaeral C'L-STBR of t h e Gettyaburg campaign, which Record," Vol. 7, payo 397-a re phal tbat it has not even been limes of the Official Records of



o f tho earliest publicat J. E. B. STUART'S offlci Historical Soc.iety's all &.her ninttelr tli po-1, in manuscrip was no sniall tusk, t ing &av1ilryfiglit til

qwnt the n i g h t of July 2d y lirive btwn late w h e n the I i t iit t 4 :I Ibed -frequently
aiy IIU\-Cw e n a few etiuakn iiirt.jority irevert heless did us w h o iiiiglit be wturnIII

w t ~ i i l i lrlc.knnwleclge



nt t h e saiw hour that

g r a t that i t CVBS iio easy given to tlir piiblic?iii the full. but as yet i i

o f ' Otfic*iaIIkcoi

aliglit correctitma ant

alm Uajoi.

H. B. McC ticiusly inipartial ( f m ~ Stiiart'n C'tivalry;" Gt.


I tiin the t o differ froiii me.

appeured i n wh Geeeral KIDDt r

the figlit


clitfi~rt~rit c y

e u;iiiie battle w r i t t e l l It? l ~ r glit side 1))- d e - Iiuve ever


erinenta do not csist. at I *tat* i n hut tire instairws :

d r y Brigudc took are bid thnt 1 wliould let knowledgo that that
ita loasea show that.

iiccouiit o f ever? encounter upon the 5. But the only p i n t ill which I f r i e d Genei-nl K I D Dita, that he tias the account us piibliwhed i n your

i i i poaitiori hat1 mort-tl off.* This ia iiut4i nr 1 h a r e ricknowlor lrft the tirlcl when the HS iilways Iwen the recolrignalr. tlirit tlie t i g h t PraN viaiiciiig o n the RCYMEL i i i i t t i i i i s tlint oiie of Crs-

cry Iwing still

t h i s n1.w will liare tn hc.

intr which bristle u p in

. -

one otlicer anti





ey would acklio\\l-



t l ?



on-conimittal in t h e atateibility i n quoting t h e esti-

INH. I. H.,



than thoee of the

era1 XIDD, t h e Becon perneeded myself t h Among o t h e r tbinge who will acknowled
ofticia1 report was a romance.

ot long aftor which t i m e t h e i n c-pying nia report the 1 ''

IO," reconciled tho ciiffirer, I g a v e an extract of that be w o r t h , thongh I niumt ear i n g some of t h e event8 which t h a t w e were reeponeiblo for

t h a t I thought that we of MCINTOSH'S b

k at G e t t p b n r g , " you will

t h e months of J a n u a r r a n d Febriiar G r a n d D u k e PBTEB, w e n t 01 i n g g r o u n d ) to test 6 r i n g at anow brec dutn from which to determine t h e t h i c k reeiat bullete. I n p b u u a n c e of. this, i t wae n e c e w I of different thickneseee; they aleo d i 5 e n which was either in a melting,a dry nr irig conditions. T h e firing distance r a r i e ( o n e step twenty-eight inches). The limt test, t h a t took place on the b y a detachment of twenty-five eappem sapper shovels: constructed, at a t e m p e n w o r k s of d r y , looee enow t h r o w n from down ; t h e y were elrcli nix s t e p in leng T h e first b r e a s t w o r k waq four feet t t waa five feet t h i c k ; t h o t h i r d breaet-w fourth breast-work was seven feet thicl eight feet thick. T h e height i n rear m front four feet; t h e base of t h e exterior t h e i'nterior elope one a n d one-half feet. Behind t h e worke, along t h e foot of t h e i black were placed. T h e w served ae ta slope of each work w a s a wand paate-b bulle-eye. T h e teete were made with t Y:16 A. r., at a temperature of s i x d e g r e e T h e firet teat took p l a c e a t a d i s t a n mere fired i n t o each work. T h e wind from t h e left aide. The result of t h e f i i F o u r of t h e bullete, e t r i k i n g t h o fc through i t , reached the target, b u t not

be Grenadier Battalion o f
o t h e Ochta polygon (fir-

worke, in o r d e r to obtuin J of snow breaet-worke to

:oconstruct breast-works
n t h e qualit? of t h e snow, i o z e n state, d u e to varyetween 150 sod 600 steps,

Id of January, WLLS made io, at 8 A. Y., with einiple re o f freezing, 690 brea*te shovel a n d not beaten

(Fig. 1).
:; t h e w o a d b r e b t - w o r k

: was six feet t h i c k ; t h e t h e 6Ah breast-work was four a n d one-liulf fect, in )pe w a s four fect, thtit of 'lie w o r k ended at 9 A. n. r i o r slope, b a d e painted ?te, while on t h e exterior ti circle repreeenting t h e ritlea, a n d were bcguti at mve freezing, (&aamnrj. of 150 etepe; five bullets e r a t h e r a t w n g and blew 5 in ebown in Fig. 2. foot brewt-work, paeeocl netrating, fell at t h e f o o b


of it.


. '



taiice o f tivc

Tliree of the bullets,

a distance of tour and c

Fi\c bullets. pnetratiiip tlre fire foot feet. I n tlic six, sewn
mine cliatuii
siriiir iw

t-\voi*k. stcq'prtl at



Three bullets, striki tanco of four to five fec Four bullets, stri ki 112 at B distance of tire fee After this the firiiii fmln 200 hteps. R e , r t r h : Fi ve 1)11IIc struck tlic target aiid fc Of foiir bulleta, atrik tame of fnur siid one-ha at the f i t of the turgr Four lullets,ntrikin; o f ' tire f k t . Three biillrtu, wtriki liniita of fiiur-to five fibt Tlre eiglit foot one v rr distance of five feet. This ciiclecl tlie firht f'ullowa: The tour ani unnntistbctory, as the f o u r foot one) striking of the rliot eould be set Sir, acreii a i d eight f rent the penetrntioii o of snow, (soh, but not h'one of the bulletw fii perpepdicular to tlirir.

tiirir I i i i l l c ~ t sstoltpeil :it the

eiplit foot breast-works i n tlir five fwt emlmnk-

L)i..ctrctrct~. ?w/ Step.s.-Tlie Di.*tuw,~. - t t ~Steps.-Tlir /

saiiiv rchii

iiwr : i i i i I

c l i s t n n w . tlir

iii:i**to :I

I t w clc-ptlr.



firstly 1"'


OF 5.4


k ' c k t h i s trdt t h e bi*caat-wnrkn

A t 8 A. Y. tlie same

time, fire breast-works

t l i r temperature fell to - 7 O R . : the t frnzeii, forming n crust six inclics tliic reinciiiied unclitriiped. The test Iwgan

the breast-works were he profile of the worka A . a temperature

th to three rid one-half

Distance, $m 8lep8.-Into




fmt breast-work, stopped at
stopped at a dis-

rk, etopped at a dint foot breaet-works

e i r e foot embank-

t r n w of b u r tu fire feet: Four hullet3,rtrikiug !lie at a distance of tire feet; After i h i 7 the firing;

frmi 200 > t e p . ! Rrs!tlk:- Five I;dletk. p:i~riripttjroirgh the four foot Lrettrt-wort.

ti.t* t.
ot t i r e

only the four and eight ere fired at each. Sercii


The genedl result of this Bring

Hrearrt-no+s macle of melting

sidered us follows: t mddeq. showelI t liut

uIIet at n distance of common compuct niaM. nti all were found lrirlg

tid one-fourth tci tliree



i OF~

trncted two days earlier ted

iii otic. hours

tbe brerrst-works were h e pm6le of tbe aorke le and tbe position of the The name rifles and the

breaot-work, foor bulleh h to three and one-half

f r e bullets, pa.sshg tbrougb

.. .




rough t h e four and ietance of three-fourths

f 6 v e bnl to m e a n d one-half feet. O

t w o m a k i n g a ricochet a l o n g t h e

third, also ricocheting, passed t h r o u g i n g t h r o u g h t b e crust, fell at t h e fire ended.


With thin t h e lestn

from the shovel) can be considered am t h e breant-work be made of t h e same with t h e feet and shovels, then such a thicknew can be coneidored eatisfa

i n g d l requirements. If of onow, b u t preseetl n k m e n t of a fire feet

thick, (watered from t h e top) w

t t h e top. nt leart

ferent distancoa.

.%moof t h e bu

others, however, pawing throu

.and t h r e e cartridge# were employed.


4, 1891.

w n i e crixiq of' tlie battle. had no place i noldier ot the Ciiion armies. He tinder
ie niintl of the viirdry



in to the I ceesity of g i v i n g pi*otcc.tioii I eivilizati 1. Its derelopmeiit lirix 1)cc~ii. d by the 1 cnliar conditicms incitleiit t o regions, w h savage tribes, skillet1 i n :ill stagem; I id the qualities ot' iiitlrpt*ii~lbemn, t h r c gli these agencies, iii~lelibly . The Jd xiean War \\-ax 1111 c.piwtlt. stage i n it derelopnient, while t l i r tiBttr I demonet ited the raltie of its p v v i o t i x ynfirmed iiid established fnr all tiittire acteristics Its progress sitice tlit. \ v i ~ r m prorcmc t of its armiinient ai111 cqiizirig rernai rd the same, except t l i r $itt v , whict iae thus far proved to bc* i t i i t i IUS.

UR cavalry owe6 itn or

t o tbe pioneers of weste generally speaking, contra warfare in wild und demlat t h e artq of treachery and B 'ence a d wlf-reliance h a r etamP J upon i k charact which parks an importan yerrre o f t h e Rebellion pen education and training, a0 agee ite dietingoiebing chl .bar c-onaisted chiefly i u th ment ; the organization h tempted aseimilation to i n rious rather than advanta The armament of the 1 character of its early eervicl tione wndered thu beat fit dare of percumion cap8 an ewiated with reference to t t o be relied upon. The e the &et that neither the a dry weapon, but that they The joat renown of the c11 upon itn many victorious ei OAN, FOBBW, and WEEEL splendid dismonutd 5ghti1 other bloody belde. By t h memories of Cold Harbor, 1 no lese proudly than thoee

requiretiieiita of war deiiianded that lie s the enetiic with courage and effect i n w l t i t i t i no iletkcts i n tactics or equiptileiit wei from his snldierly purpose. His intnlen hciitimentul i n equipment was eoiiicctl i i i greeted the appi-ariince of the lance. Tt veiiturecl to curry t h i n weapoii i n the et hooted rid gobbled at till they were glt lance, w i t h its glariiig red pennon, for t pretentious w k r . The fact was appreeial lance iiiiglit possess as a cliarginy \reap0 horse, niid t Ii us i ni plri red that i nclepeiitlei
h i s efficteiicy. The rquipinent of oiir curalry, to-clq by that o t any otlier iiation in the aoi*ltl beeii iiiaclc.. or iniprovenieiita adopte0, b t terri 01' actunl work i n tlie field, aiicl the -istolit buttering against tlic walls of cot the department of mactiufncture antl sup1 seltl4)iii kept pace w i t h the onward niurc by unwearied and ronstant thought lrii(lH :rlry ot3cera that we can Iiope to reup tiw

d thoroiiglily tlittt the Id be pri*pared to meet


a h u p eiic*otiiitcretl,

rrmitted to s w r v e him
of the unpractical or ritlieulc w i t h wliicli 110 w o r p II izn t io Iis \v 11 iclr clayn o f tlie w a r were > cscliuiiyc the ritylish iioi*e priictical :ind lerur that wliutever rcilue tlie tied the trooprr to Ilia )f action so esriciitial to probably tiot crcvlled . !Iiangcs liare not otteii ! being aiibjectecl to tlie iIy after I O I I i~ i t i d per. r at isni \v b ic Ii Y iirro 11 nd O u r advance has tliits ' tho age, a i d i t is only itiori on the part o f ' c ~ v arm the beiieflts which and itiiprovetl iiietlimln nical arts. Ian to correct tlieiii : to e tlian to tleriae ~)raic?i1 a s i n well aware that iiiy n than they are likely to he Aawciatioii I liarr no xrer. i mpst4ble w i t h u t iiitlevelo~md ideas wliicli :hey will not have k e n
rlwwe, atid we

try was detet*niiiied by the independencuof ita oi~ernle a necesqitj-, arid i i i tlir rs no difference of opiiiioii value of t ie saber BY a weapon al\va.verience of the Civil War deinonstmtwl w nor the carbine is the diTtinctirca cnve both equally nccessary IO its eficiericy. d r y of the Western nrniies is basccl iiot ouiiters wit 3 tlie bold horsemen of J L m .'alone, but in an equal degree upon its at Sashvil e, West Point. Macon, and nil troopers wfo fought with SHERIDAS, tlie ep Bottom, and Five Forks are cheriahcil '.Yellow Tas;ern, Winchester, and Toni'*

Brodr. The idea that hie na9 a by the infantry, und rescri

prior arm to be escorted antl protected for-special and dietinguiehed cerrice at

rendered possiblc by the increaswl t! which are ercry year apparent i n the i n e IC is nlways eusier t o p i n t out tlefec iiidicate \ v I i a t iniprorcments may be desi CUI nir.tlioilJ by whicli they may be attaine c)pinions liiire niore value i n nigown estini hare elwwlieru; and i n placing them befc deaire to be 01)trusire. Iiiiprorwient is, I interest ant1 cliacuarion. arid if the crude II fidlow contribute i n an?- degree to tliia e rccoidcd i i i rain. The Springfield carbine Iiiu wwrecl i t r to \wit with patience for tlie result of tlr Board tiow i n aeaaion. feeliiig miifideiit t effective weapon which tlie progrcsire SI The target practice work of the last few s . pitred u* to accept cheerfully an increii? the leiiytli ot' the barrel, if thereby :iddit


lmiw of t h e S m d l r\i*iiis it w i l l give u s tlie most of' the age can prodwe. 5, ham, it is believed, Ire' two or thrce inches i n tI range and penetratioii


t h e battle line. a magazinegun of reduced

wparated fi*oin the person

t h e old eontroveray of wonld Beem that tboee that it ehonld take t h e

to hold t h e

r occasion for a renewal of the saber; nevertheless, i t

waist-belt, rvliich is a powerful reason for cessive niicl burdensonic weight. -\ holster s while protecting the barrel anti breecli niec pi*tol sc.cui*ely. \roultl leave the stock U I ~ C hand. This could be effected by steel sprii the leather, and no great auiioniit of niecli be IiectwmrJ- fbr the lmducliori of s shou~d Tile mber is fnr froni beingn perfect wca cnl change i n its c1i:tracter appears possible. ciiing sdrocated. I t has ercn been suggested :rr*senaln i n such condition tliiit a sheet of 1x1 its edge would bc cut in two. Thh. with t scnbbartl, it is clniriietl. would render i t a inu( Certainly siicii a n c i l p o i i \\-oulcl Le verytlang~ considering tlie niodrrnte degree of skill i n they IIQW posse~s. It \vould hr folly to plact of any but skilled sworilstiierr ; anal with t rouiiil our troopers, WCLmuat be content \ r i t l i ficiency in each of the iiiaiiifiild acquircnie their gcnerrrl efscieiicy. The four or !ice tliousand crrrulry o f 01 would be u totnllg iiiadequtrte force to rely I With a three yearn' erilistnient (no reitnlisti cept in the case of non-coiiiniiwioned oftleers of iiistructed men could be formed, which, e v doubtless, i n tho event of war. be found av i n t h e ranks of tbe regular regiments or aa period of enlistment is, practically, for t h n m e n who fail to attain the grade of non-cc ing this period of service, a r e seldom fittec much additional skill in the use of a r m . C to make the instruction of this three yea possible, without giring especial importanc lucing ita present exultl Le provided, which, ,tiisin, nnd holding the ered and ready to the i in conibination with ical s k i l l 01' ingenuity Ii a holster. 11. unci :et no very rntlii e oflen heur i t s s h a r p iat it be ishiietl froni the 'r liglitl?- struck acroaddition of a w-oodrii iiioi-e effective ~venpon. J I I Y to our o w n t rooperr. ie saber exercise which i c ~a i L \ w r ;ii ttie \innti* liniitatiotir which burnoder:ite degree of proz wliicli go to nirike u p regular establishment on i n the event of war. n t being permitted exnd artificers), a reRcrve Z f unorganized. wouId, lable for service, either dunteere. The present

place whicb

tary arm,aemiceable for

might, with advaot W h e n we consider t


and handier weapon. attained after months

tion can tb0 a00

randomand uncertain i n rds, and that for firing

being preserved t o inill be a far more effee-

roaching witbin fifty dietance at wbicb t b e The increased etlec-

yeam only, end t b r w

miasioned oacera dur-

br the acquirement of r object abould then be

c o u m ae complete as
to a n y one branch.


fencing exerciee of the

awaken an interest

ution.1 is well calculated to

possible; the ordinaq-

effectual protectiori :tg:ii t i - t & witii vigor :igitiiist the blade ever so cliill Tliiq

the inatractions t h e

wbeneoer pnrcticabl
-not to the keenir tent with the URB of to and during the w that the rh:trpening s l i o i ~ l i l hc nd blni1r.i retriiricil i r t tliu U J I I -

done a~ the amenel dition as issued.

liich ilhoulil \iecnmc fully ap-

parent if-the fencing wceires serious stten

hard knocks to which e

must be whon tho troo all times in order that
dle in a proper manue

fight, and nJ it whonki be lit rfect freedom of action. The

wan called to arms i n -1

nunibers of a d d l e s , in

yenciea of war calling f o r . I a r p econoiuy tlie ortiunie1it:il part

or appearnnca. The

which pound the flu1 walk is tnken. The faults, but" it liad the t b e wddle, iiiatcad and rear, and left to

read with earc. the firs

inore thaii once sought tis


correct poeitioo of t that the cincha

.very tight, in order to d d l e upon the back."

' +


ace as mu b as posuible the slipping of tiit. Captain H LL s a p that lie Iiae 4 d l e d I i i -


i *



'I I $ 1

t%H TS



according to the co
change in the shape

moa to we u

i n u number oiie nadtllr.:iii~I

rad4Ila the c.urS-c4 4 the c:Ill.

prenenting a aerioun obstacle to the i n the caralry uriii. M y o ~ esperiericr n of Major CAXR'S. a i d I uni certain 111i1t I rendered uselem for cavulry rirrvice tli t i n g them w i t h proper bits frim those pnrtruent. I am contidtwt tliut otlier (

n t and emciency of r o r y airllilar to that sv:n iii:iny g o o d - I t o m .iiiipn&bility of fit-


tlral of pwitire stiff

Soldiers aelJoni or

as necesmq- and, unaro

diem, however. tanglit

tliouplit or iiiquiry. Olcl solwill ~isudly seck ai large s:uI-

jcct. Iti this inlitter of hits and bit prson:il opiilion. Tlie priiiciples I uccwriitc deiiioiistrartioii. i i i i c l Iiy their :I tlcteriiiiiirtl 11-liethcror not our present The niilitnry synteni \vIiieh uttiwtls no iii riicli ini~iort:trtc.e UIII rwriw : i t t w t i o r i w n11 d c rfu 1. In ettilsitleriiig the rwuiiniiig :ir Iw rcmeiiihred tliut i n tlirsr tlaiys o

t i o i i i t can Itc reticlily pro perly eo II st riict ed.

publiahed i n the Yurc endurunee of the lior by that of his rider."

groutrtls of pt'ofessio

JOL-RSAI., titiit tlie

po\vci* i i i i i l

rly trtiiiiwl. are liiiiitcil

Putting aside


British oftierr, wlio in d i n tlie JOCRSAL for

b j r c t wnrtliy ofcittciitioii

appoaratiee of tlie '-

lie clunisy :inti uiiattrwtivv tloes tint recorninend it t t i shapely 6 . JlcC'lellaa :* ' IJUI


the tronpers may reducing the weight

mats of t h e ridem,

the horse'a bucks and t l i v struction and grace of'outs not possessed by any form

The addle-blao
pad, and elioultl be

and tlie defects of tlic Iwesetir y eet forth io the Jot-RsaL f i l l .

eavalryofficers, who, Ibecause they traveling-bags of t h o western fro under certain oortditioiie. were in d r y equipme:it would be improved by apparently 80 useful and practical. A

to i t

au appendage

i n the work of the

wldom practicable, they forgot

d unmunaycable, tliu.

I /

I _

1i 7

and battle. W e bar some twelve years. of the packed valie their full capacity th mule. They are, ho

den: but all horses ciin be uccurto

of the rurddlo and ha pounding motion whe wiee than distressing powers of endurance.
fire or six wide, fittin being attached to, or

by purchnw w i t h i n a few niilrs of to trtrmport it for wry long dista (luring the boom of tlayliglit. niid night. When hay is wanting, ea to inake gout1 the dthficiency. Cr tional conditions whi~'1iwurrouiid western fiwiitier. can grazing to a notwithstanding the Piiie Ridge the time tias come when t h e equipniei c a r d r y nlioultl no loiiger be hasetl II conditions, but upon the require being ronaideretl n part of the

ia seldom ittace*sqt lilie ;lilt1

:\rp usnrlly Iitartlr(l tbci h:iy a t

ziiig is resorted to niily i i i tlie excel,u p carlilrr on the ncleil i i p n ; anti, le uaserted that ell HA tlie tntining of the lese c*xct*ptiotidfrontier

might be nttacbed 10 tb taclee for the rations, t

saddle oii either side a3 rccepof the Iicirei-sttck. All thew

part of wisdom then to relieve the ho lens burdens. a i i t l the troopers from the their care rcqiiirce? If a lariat is aometimes iieeti t t w akirniish line: by permitting hini to wliile he creeps forward to II PI firing. t h e present heary cincl c he weight of thew wei d r e s p i s i bi Ii ty w Ii i 1.11

the cavalry had the t h e advent of t h e sq luxuriant p s a e s of t

its scouting grwriiil. Betiirc le herds of the r:iiichitiniI t h e utforcled abu iidiin t subiqt c n re


and the buffitlo. rcritlcrcd

eooditions bave cban to admit of being rtrappetl t should he furnislied. The most iiiiportant prrrt be mentioncd. Tile cawdry :dl that can be desired. If lioraew! A s the go by iiiducctl to gire attention to firiiiter. Impectorn, nppnren tions 1)eyorid those relating

scanty herbage of the o tbeir chances running

dated. The usefulness the same L ~ U W Swhich supertluaue. I t ie a bo hobbleg to compete wit

side-line hobble was intro,Iiowerer. been affected by e lariat atit1 the picket-pin


" " ':





educating proceua existence. and he wo into i t perfect realiz

HY l i i h






I l I ~ l S t ~I S ~ S PEACE ~

IP p u

drirw the c.ooc.lusioti finin in\C O I ~ I I I ~ ~ I I of ~ ~ l iP ii~ S

Inu*t 1 ) ~ .p i r c n the

t Irttcr t lint opportunity o leaail their lines i n tliviw-

jwte wliicli diet iirb tbe dream of the cavalryni airy Iiohe of America I no less i-eoiarkable tlia

a heavier burden tiinn ai

equipped an no otber to leiid i n all wbicli pertai

ion coiiil)iiiritions as oftcii as possil)lc. y Ytpu w i l l 61id the proof t h n t I full! t h i i t I p r r esi)rrssion to i n ti i)rrrions , of tlio cii\-iiIry might serve i i i i t i l the Is\ t i i i i c . could l i t * f o i r l i t l during the tn o n th the c.iivdry i i i divisinii orgsiiiz:itioiis uftc \-el's. I f you h \ - e drawri a still fiirtllcr co ioii that it is necessary to I r a ~ e the ca t i m e of pence exnctlj. a # they tire to be o nn riietny ill cnw of war, then various obj althoiigli niiich can be .wid in favor of eqiially stroiip reamiia against such an Each infantry diriaion still requires to be attaclietl to it,and after detacliiiig o intiiiitry diriaian, if the cavalry is to be operate i n war, then all the rcmniningca into divisions of six rogimcntw each. later i n creariiig two kinds of'cava1i.y a i d the divinional cavalry. Tlie firat, nation of similar elements, would. i n e( patronizing euycrioritly upon the i d a t e the i to infantry dirieions, and finr~lly army that there were two grader -of' would not be advantageous io any way

ire quitch i-iglit. :rev w i t h yvu i n the w i n t i :r, to-wit : Tliiit tile nien

Soreniber. i n order thatOctober for nianeuvrri iig it' gwat autullllid I I I l l I I e u isinn, and are of tlir opinry dirisioiis organized i n iiized i n operating against 1011s beconie appareot, atid
I IL cburse, still, tlicrr ure engern en t . sertain aiiiount of cavalry megiinciit of cavalry to each canized i n peace ~ L N i t ie tu -y would Iicrve to be tbriiied ia would result sooiler or. , t of' the carnlrp dirieionm lisiating of a large combi4 of time, look down m-itli aralry regiments attacbed would be created i n the alry; a difference which that arm of the eervice an



of tlie e n t i r e army can sereen cavalry divisions w i d . The regiments art. t'reer. T h i s would be simply Pparatcd in peace a n d were

peace. we hear, i n cavalry circles,

caralrj- divisions froiii tlie organized

pcpratioll of tllr d of ullitilig tlierrl

for inspections. which could be und

e that all tire cavalry alioultl year, a n d i t should receive of diriaionnl cavalry. If.
isted in time of penee. untl Iry, t h i s double instruction of divisional cavalry would ralry organizntione, a n d o n gdiviaione w*ould never parnds. I n o r d e r t o form t h e :ogether all t h e cnralr>- of uard arid Twelfth a n d Fifrps t h i s coume would intert h e fnrming of t h e cnrnlry mation into lrarniotiy with I hastening t h e transforniucannot form as ninny d i r i s a r m y corps unlesa we form e n t s ; for moat of t h e army imenta of cavalrj- each, a n d f a n t r y division. 1011 t h a t o n l y t w o dirisioii* t i m e of peace? Because w e cavalry reginrents in t h e i r o n e regiment of cavalrj- t o t h e field with tlie o t h c r six ieion, which i s t h e i r normal

j u s t at titi8 time when tlir a r t i l l e r y e x j i n t o closer relations with t h c a r m y L gives gond cause for doubting t h e 1 uncl t h e deaire of t h e artillery for t h e o t h e r arnlr). in time ofpeace, estab \ins ita dirurdrantapeb. I t itlust be tlia't w e tiare historical examples o peace of Hubertsbiirg, FREDERICK inspections. He W ~ N liiiiieelf t h e

fern with t h e main obje 'divieiops, viz : Ia bringln

cavalry of 1806 did iiot fully deserv henlwd upon it, y e t t h e conviction c feel itwelt' in sufficient luwinony with

ere reproaclica hitherto avoided t h a t it dit1 riot r nrmR to stnnd alwnya

t hi npn.

of them one muat be a

T h i s woold n o t do.

How iiiry t h i s Iiappen? In I nrany chtii*ncterirtica must be uni leader of u cavrlry brigade or div

normd organization. ebch diviaion of infaot

v e r y rarely see all these require j e t , t h e y are even more necessary for U n d e r a n inspector w h o has Ibecir a good oficer in t h e routine duties of

teirt cavalry itispwtor. aimply ~ C J I U W lie was , t h e cavalry will ccr-

taioly receive an incompetent a

-haps, desira that more cava r m y corps. R u t t h e y w-ill Jim the pet idea of Iiaving.ime of pence. T h e numerifantry depend8 on o t h e r a d rtion of independent carally

long peace will finally let wide a Trifling nbjecte, such au fat horses. fin would became of chief importauco an

t h e chief objects. in the riding ball, ve a very dutrimental airy. With W B A N ~ E L fresh wind. N e h a r e

cavalry division6 in t i m e of

had experience i n t h e p a t with old a n d glorioue recordd, who, i n t h regiments confided to them, all


' I


unimportant tbi

t h e Scventli a n d Eighth Corps a n d pro would bc too weak ( e i g h t regimeiits.) ioiial ceralry would h a r e only four mgim

clietl to t h r Eiglitli, etacliing t l i e divisith wliicli t o take tlie the coat of sacli 8

cbaoged a command. T poeoible t b s t o n e of t b e r

it seemed quite imshould Iisrc str:iw he reprenentatioiis o n d r y . Randy m i l . nn(1 it unhenlthy, wliicli ( l i t 1 " uniforniitj-." Everytliia work. would be greatly injured.

trritigcn'ent between t h e troops of t h e di

t nrnia of rei-viw would

u n iuthntry reginlent, when I tirst cnterec

aerrice. wliose offleers wliollltl haire excuaetl

t h e command of o n e of t h e c a c d c formed from two ar

T h e n n ilivisioii of ot' nt lenet ten regi-

wiiiiilar n-ould occur ngain. S o w wu come to u p i n t of

ber ot' coinnianderr) who posseur, t h c necesua edge of t h e uervic'c for Ruch u post. a n d t h e viz: eye. y o u t h , endurance in riding. etc.

experience and knowlcesacirg vhnrncteriwtiL?r,

teentb Corps, of tbe -me tbe divirioa of tbe Gosrd,

\\'lint \vould be tlie result8 of introdur diriPions tlirouKhout t h e whole n r m y ? T be infuntr- clirisinng anal comninncled by infl alry tlirisions b y carulrynien. A eavnlry poseesaed t h e requieite youth, endunince. r for a c r r r l r y divieion muat quit t h e servicc capable nitin would thue be thrown nut ot' 1 edge of hir profenaim a n d experience in c fitted to'render i m p o r t a n t serricea to t h e *I fantry tliriJion or even a n a r m y corpr. I n c m n p r i w n . t h e p r e w n t condition M C

: independent


a r m y dioiclione woulcl trynien o n l y ; t h e C'IIV,enera1 w h o n o longer 1 quieknesa of decision ntid m a n y a dewrving. ? nrmy, w h o in knowlnmand, wa.9 emincntIy e at t h e head of a n inB m o r h preferable.


Iry dirimons when eriodicnlly for the road transportation dould not be turn conducted by the Hailway Coinmi-ion could not bo communicated to biru be be macle according to the clranges iir were correctly scheduled and &mn as fail to lreppen to niaily of our c'omtna footing to a w i r tboting i n our Isst war. der of tlie Guards Corps was billed Palatinate*. During the two days' selves suddenly passing stafioii:, that


1 S6
IlinI, but must t Genelgl Statf; it

sud from those

tried and failed?


i n tlit. nii*al tinier thr exaiiiple. n o'clock


the ni


The 6ret is the ne

pomsible any dit&ult io mobilization. That gnnizatione i s urgent17

bare tlih cavalry reginlenta ererciaed


accomplished. But th ing peace, I cannot gra

exercises take place i mixed arms, we can h

i n JInnnheini. W l i c w the t r w p They were Iiuiitecl u p b>-telqntpll. C I L I I ~ ~and ?. we rirrired i n lirriserrlao We fouiicl tlreGurwd CarnIry Divisic i t Iiad quitted Berlin litter w r did u 11 loading our rim ni u n i t i o t i t rni n n n d m u s t Iinppcn wlitw t l w iiie1wi dispositions ncecsaary. That did i ng 1)race. cnvn I ry t 1i r isi o ns d ti I* Bedidea. iiiany ot' the Iiiplier cnnin niornent of niobilizcrtion and tire strang I remember a-ell that ttt tbr. niobil both infairtry divisions \vet*e given n e w army corps nlm. ID the 1iiylir.r coinii that they remain i n the 8atiie p n i t i o n
rcginients ean easily be i n t r d u c organizations. Tbat otten trap1 insurmountable dittieultiea.

arc clrunpt~d (it the tids. ~ heir new e o t t i n r ~

ers rrnd rriost ot' the u not so important ization. The iiiain y and qiiiekl- tmno-

Io the transformati our laut great mobilizat

muoh trouble, and muc

menta and eccrrooly

the discouragement

in w a r by these larger commandr.

If, therefore, all cavalry r

But he eearchee for the

nuirdiing ant1 in t h e rryetem

l i e n it w i l l be much Icw ilif-

at the heginning of
u n t i l , t h a t time a rer t h r o u g h anp'evoln -411 discurnions t ha
petice Iirive oril? t h e introduction ot' suc*li 11 extcniletl throughout t h e

q u t i d r a n s are iiet4eil 11% be such R per crntuin 11 are base11simply upon emI I ~



portnnce whicb n ca

niass has. in t h e incalcul;rt)lc. ~ ~ l v n n t n ~ ~ c *

sight, since it confin hie tianda while we N cavalry, nnd t h e a

.bnd sc'cw*esus tiecdonl of w t i o n : bintI* im heavy blows, we ceiitiat Iiarc too 1iiiii.11

o o n t .Corn- lisaion of t h e \Vnr Ikpnrtiiieiit

we would certainly try c!f o u r couutry imal remounts for m


wero otherwise,

ralry. i ani fully convinced, if t h i s 2111o u r govarninent long eince. eitlier tittcr

nticipsted that if LEE ertake to move through

grcitly protract the struggle. though

the iiidepencit~iwrof the Confi.lIcrac> 'I'n prevcnt such a possibility, a s well :iriiiy fi.oin the i.icli ~ i i p l i l y fields of T~IWIA was S clirected to WCIIII n force t o lio4hlc- ta)wards L~-iieliburg. thus putti of t l w morc.nicnt auplwstvl to be po

I,opelesr of seturcut off Gcrleral


vi rpi n j u :

Ge neml

saying that no t - i i t ~ r Civil W;tr attrwtt*il- I )

v the railroads aa far as rent ohatscle i n the wnp

ntrniplated by C'ineral

*, iteeigiied. not

fiw IIW

throw of the Ariiiy ad' petlition, :tiid ctercrwe the aver:tge A i i i w i -

LEE. The rxpeclitioa. c o n h t i n g of thrcr wais c commrnil of General STONEMAS. Teiiiie*see. March 22. 18ti5. I t morecl
could retard a rapid nirrcli w a ~ left wagon rrnd four guiis with their criasn coin pa I iy i n g the cx ped i I io I I . There force of Coiiiederatc c:avalry opeivt fret which should bo borne i n mitic the strategy of this movement. T I kept prot'oiinci wc'ret. If any one the knowleclpe was not allowed to

of cavalr? under the red at Mowy Creek,

can citizerr is a b o u t , a s


w i t l i Iii-

dowii tlrroupli .I I;I~I:IIII:~.

cles of valor. ciirryiiig 11y arniral atnd stri)iigl)-

. capturing prisoners 111ii1


Krom. of Gen-

k i n g at the grrtes o f Mol)ile. iplial mardl tan t h e

( .

g h t h e Carolinw :

while GUANT. with ing hie hold upon which were to ehiv

a aniall dirision of cavalry ined to accomplicih II der\-ici..


PALMER'S brigade. mor Gap. while the other two brigrd wmt. point by the Flnt Gap roud. A i l incident octnrrett here, w h niiry lie of interest. as showinx t came to a11 ofscer through the


T H E S TO..VEJf;l S IiA I D OF 1865.

more o n a side road, to bo-, with orders to IC tions for me as to t h o said, you will receive W e turned out ear with our horses eacldl anited a n hour, and, whether the other reg reported all quiet i n t W e waited and wuited. no orders. I then s e n t there were any orders


re nidving. IFP soon ret uriicti r i n r ~ cainpb, with 1 1 0 signa of i i i o v c i i i r i i t . o'clocb, 8 o'clock, 9 o'clock calllie. I,Ut r to heylqiiarters, to ciscertrriii whetlicr . He canic buck niiai repc,rtc*It l m t soldier was to be seen anywhere. \\'liere i g d e Lati tukeu, was not k i i o w i i .



ot' obtctiiiiihp

,o'cluck we came up00 it was fordable, or wbe

e resolved to try it. lIaviii,g ntl, although the river w a s table ford. J u a t then c:iiiie
opposite bank. w e fi)uiid had taken anotlicr rt):bll, d it was m-itli great dirtion tlie Ride of the ro:d with tlie rain. l l i e

rear battalion: not u and went into cam floundering d o n g ,

again cross the ntreani. which was rising rapidly with the violent rain, and go into canip. Wtvtry. wt-t :1ii11 liuiigry, tliia waa not the most agree-rible iiews. but like p?04I si)ltlic 8 s we i n o r ~ t l 011. and at 2 o'clock i n tbe iiitwiiing w e ngaiii fi)rdrd 111 : river. were conducted to a piece of wood*, a n d told that we w)ulcl ii-uke ouruelrcrr comforhble for the remt:intler of the night. anal that inder tho c.ireumstnncee, we riecd not put out pickets, as t l i r i t duty had been attended tobp our comrades wlio had gone betbre. After diaposiiig of the iiiw aa besf I coilti. I at cion-ii on the root of a Inrge tree, leaned m? Iiead agaiiiat the trre,and i i i less tbaii two miiiuteo by the watch was tiwt asleep. Tlicb rlriri coiitiiiiied all iiigbt, and i n tlie niorniiig I was awakelied by tlic water trickling down m y nuck inside my rubber cloth coat.. It. yo1 would l i r r v r a picture of wine of the niiiior dircoiiiforts ot' a cavalry raid, iniagiiie the writer dittiiig on a log i n tlic ~ o o d s near , u s p i t wing tire. with 8 tin plate on tiis knee*. a t i i i c u p w i t h wffee iii i t I : I I a n t u i n l ) near by, ninkiiig a brcakfart of fried 1)acoii and corn pone. while the brrrkfaet was fant being coolei1 anal the coffee mpitl y diluted I,>the inceuwrnt raiii. I-p rides an officer, wlio exclaiiiia: \Vhy. Ca)lonel. what are _vou tloiiig bere? Tbeg h a r e a good Hair u breakfirat fbr you down at that farin Iiouse. There Bise about thir y of the fellowa there, and they arc keeping a place t i w you." It 0 1 1 1 , ; needed nornu appearance of wings to make nie quite sure that that mnn was nn angel. At t h i n point tlie conininrid halted fiw a day. partly for rest, and partly because a sutltleii rise iii the Yadl in Hirer Iiud inade fording difficult anti tlangcroua; h i t niore, I unc'y. to give full effect to the sudden uppearniice ot'oo large II baily of cavalry i n that portion of SortIi Caroliiia, tlircateiiiiig bili (;rw isbc~ro and .Salishiiry. The strategy wns well planlied a i d ctftwtive. Hat1 we moved directly i n t o southwestern Virgiiiia, t h e forces t h e w coiild hare M I hindered sod del:tyed our niovenientn RS to nerioual imperil the great object i n view. By this nioveineiit awow the nimiitaintt, those forces had been avoided, and were so far away as to >tFer no nerinua obwtacle to the nccornplishineiit ot' our mi*-ion. \V u t that niisAion was, was still R profound mystery to all not i n t h e Reeret confidence of the Comniaiiding General. The enemy was Iwtirelg deceived as to our pint o f attack. By a rapid nioveiiient to the north, General STOSEY A N found the railway r u n n i n g from Lyi diburg to &st Tennenwe, entirely at his mercy. At Hilisville, Col el ~ [ ~ L L L B with , five h l l l l drod picked men, was scut to Wytheville where tie had a sharp t!n6.

I _ .





Jackeonville, Major WAON with u emall force,was dis of destruction, and crrrri The remainder of the corn i t arrived about midnight, The Tenth Michigan bridges over t h e Rocrook west to deetroy the great b

S e m - . T h e next mornAbout twenty mileu

tirnee in aa many miles, beautiful bridgett, five have hean avoided con foreseen. It was wbil that I obtained a Lyn count of the a 1 1 of Richm ceded ue, the teain which br t h e station where we were Chrietian&urg, and mation tbat he had of the The main object of the tanco of one hund

ext ten ciaye have beeti olition of these bridges tie no farther than t tbn pnper b - the e n e r d STONEHAY nt v i n g hiin the first inforcomplisbed. For a di*railroad, so ini-

e%, t h a t

roins. Nenrly every brid

dietmeg, had been totally

General THOMAS
The main object of t h railroad waa in ruins, a would be General LXE'S

t. b 6 - 1 milroad wae n e v e r


aceomplishctl. Tlie

heir combined forcer Whatever his plane,

oigilancs a n d the untiri

empted junction of LEE'^ 8ome more effeetioe work through weotern North C

was well employed i n pickiiig u p fresh brigade was that direction. PALMER'S tiotwille or H e n y Court House, as it is \vas then in the beautiful valley of the seventy-fire mites from Henry Court I be u t the lntter plare by await the Arrival of the r 0 1 1 time, we inadc the distance i n twen Henry Court l i o u e e ~ b o u t 6 o'clock in by I\ Auperior force of the eriemy'a ea I do not know that I ever found pleasant to come unexpectedly u p o n a but if there i s n n r time which is more in the enrly morning a f i w a continu when men and boner, are thorough! but clecidedly sharp, and w e remaii not without serious Ions. having o n four men killed. and another officer. seriously wounded. The enemy's killr I and niortall>-wountfetl. Tbia had II nieaniily and a significance ciute. nq we afterwrrdR tealwed. liew that Greensboro W ~ Lour I ohje weiv wittidru\vn from Saliubury, 1wiiit . Ttie enemy ~ a n their r mistake Y A Y itppearetl before Salisbury i The brigade being reunited at Henry 1)ant)ury and Germantown, fro gatle was sent to Salem to neetroy mme t t i r manilfacture of clothing for the Con to o p r a t e on the railroad running from while STONEHAY. with the 0th Ris-er n t Sliallow Ford, and 8 :wi*iviiig at .L;alem,General PA C'rvatry uiider Lieutenant-Colo (;reeiirrboro and Daiiville, and sonir bridges over Abbott'e Cr sending one battalion t , o Hig rectio:t, while b e rem-ned

comlnand niored in conrentmte s t Mar. h e Tonth Michigan u near !%]ern, aboiit We were ordered to

houra, and reschcd

fowe of t h e enemy,
t than another,$

House, we niorecl to


Tho Fifteenth Pennsylv




Thi* force was FERIXSOW'S brigade and outnumbered us about four to one. not lraivo been difficult to make a eudde superior numbers, with t h e chances o But with horse* worn by a continuou without rest. i t scemcd extremely ha larpcly oniiinii\Lwring o w n , and that night'* rest i n camp. Theu again. should enemy. i t would be directly toward Saliab merit the forces w i t h which STOWEY gaged. On the other Iiand, could 11 crease the clianccs of STOSEMAY'I~ su most desirable. T b e a e conziderations decided t withdraw. S o w n c r W ~ the S mo attacked with great fury. I think I niay that there then followed one of the most ~1 in my jndgment, one of the best m e r . The Tenth fnlling back 1, presenting an unbroken front to the enemy; into line. and steadily delirering carbines u n t i l they coulcl see an0 shock of t h e enemy; t h o n wheel a new position-officcra ancl me age, coolness and discipline t r u l The movements were all co the plncc had been but the par sham fighting of the drill. The enemy a t t by each 8:rnk. while the attacks in the rear ancl courage worthy of a better cause. The fighting was constant riiptioii for nearly three houm six mi1c.s. when the enemy bc round t h e handful of rnen, an Hie loss i n the engageme been about serenty-tire i n kil hail in Geneiwl STOSEMAN He mct the enemy a few mi had very h i g h and precipito only way to cross it was by a bridge. manded by the e n e m ~ ' a artillery. ARer to dislodge then1 by Iris artillery, he call

pedition. It broke the direeted,and on it6 ro

cavalry, making prieon ber of t h e men. The battalion of t h t h e command of Capt road tHUil-16 loaded wi plies, and eeveral th emte government. The m tachment eutim bondred men, proceeded t after accomp~isbiog which to cdperate with General before us. It w a sent to Higli Point. uiitler ded io c a p t u r i w t W - 0 railmismry and medical sui'beloiiging to the Coiifed-




*crrtl i n driring the bore h c might aug-

numbering not iuwe tlian tliror the bridges over Abbott's Creek,

oved All our ioformat

enemy in that vicinity.

011 l110l.e

a t lei*urc.

rdoned for saying and exciting, and,


ter of form, a emull advance

on in 8dvance.

as sent forward, altliin@

it was

ling out of columa

panien w l i i v b had p i e ompaiiy B" c:tmc up pickets of tilo enoiny. that lie lind miHtrrkcn

at t h e bridge, for those o

to pawn B colunin

oflibes,Captain DCUN, ri
d on and orerhauled dcrate officers. TIICY d r y was e n c a n i p d t heed to this, us I ,and I could riot escape the notice of the t w o coni-

t h e vipgoa which was fou ioforrned me t h a t a large

the cause of the

for some time in'rain m a statT officer, I k u -




meii, c


SMITH took his twenty

demur etriek
was 0 WYB a primr men.

est confusion.



for 110

day's that t

@.PPI the C oone

from west or south of

A the p

me weeks afterwards in

ment atant

80 directed n s to conn t of attack, its quick

and imml

coiiie a iiieniber of tlie V.S . Cuvalry Assnciati 1 . C'ordial ly entlorri iig i t s objects ani1 the sentiiiic*itta exyresrretl. I cel~trcltlio Iionor U I ai coiiipliment to an old Confederate eavrilry c ccr \rho Itad wr\-ed i n the Army of Sortlierli Virginia duriiig tire itirr period of its esintence. I h u w eiijoyecl tlie JOVRSAL as R s ( reiiir, t i n d i n g niucli i i i it to intereat 811 ..old sol~lier." I Iiave not itirticipatetl i n the (liscussions up to t h i s t i n i r . preferring to e fig the ciitertaiiiincnt ntfiirdrd by proftssionul writers. to tlintiirb :tlieir equanimity. I tiiid. I i o w e v ~ t ~ h,r t t silerice may be constrii I iiito acqaiwc.rncc i n atatriiientR that I clo not concur i n . riiial. b evinp t h r i t tile diatiuguihhed yeiitlenieli wlio tlitfcr with me. w n p I mtiourly 110 doubt, will be c-quitlly williug to give aud ttikr: to corret erroneoil* inipressiclili, if coiiviuced of their errors, I will trike is.* w i t Ii the well writ teii article by Lieutenant-Colonel E. Y. S ~ - MR. ! Eiglitli C11wiry, on '.-\nic.ricaii I'ritcticr aiitl Foreign Theory."+ I concur fully with hila i n regurcl to the ractice. which lie illurtrntc-n by esniiiplt~sfurnished by the Cniw ;tindry, but I f e w he forgets that we w h o were o n tlie otlier sidc did the Iicavieit of the work, and yet hsve received little o r 110 ( d i t for it. Both WCPB Americans. All that we h a v e Ief\. was writ n i n blond and carnage by brothers' hands; all that we hope o r care ' y r e w m s ia ita aublinie and nielancholy history; its truth, its valor s patriotic devotiou to principles we --ere educated to helievo werc tight. I am an old Confederate trooper. but I knl . the flugofour country will never lack for men; under a proper i l l , the es-Confederate soldiers and t h e i r descendanb would tahow I ! saine readiiiew to-dry t h a t their ancestor@h a r e ever shown ; aii tlie lcssoiis tauglit by
*JW~SAL o f June, 1890.


o f tlw J w n s A L \vas kintllj wilt to m e



ago tlie prosprutw invitation to be-





s or

Ire glory to which aiiy Iiat I know and. it I

or i n burning bridgcsand destroying nrili

i n slipplying themaelves when tliere \VIIS cheerfully going without when tlior cootiterpart is unkuown. This is only one aide of the picture; T h i n k of the Confederate Roltiier enri

riiiining tmiiin, ogrrphe and rannlr,


niitkes liir tletluc\\-e


turn to thc other.

utnetances and opportiio

than Icariiiiip.

reat o0icers, Gen

ce and in coverin rbs of tlie crude

All of tlicni \\ere d r y . When the c a r be seen on tlic wall, lights not only i n behind in1 prompt u rate cavalry tiever

ance of a few blockade-running \-e* on one-half. then on one-fourth ratione, tli n i t l i o u t medicines nnd otter1 almost wi other tiioneg than what was mntiufacturc tlieF had won tliei ahle only *af\cr being paid eleven dollars per m o n t h , i n years. tor the use of the cavalry horse m-

sotten without uhws, lothiny, without nny per and tbat rcdeenirate money. for fnur I private noltlicr furthe war ended a cnvo three thouaaticl tlol-

alry horae sold for from one hundred nritl larr. untl, although the goremment tried tlie aascxsetl valuatioir of horses m

killed. for the prices of homea co t h e demand for them incrcared. care of the horae which he hired stuff) who wan dirabled by 1863, and returned to his ille, Virginia. J i i n c IS, he no sooner reacliwl. only slightly wounded or disabled, it bad involved tlie riders leading his sorry jad reginlent might be stationed to h i s home dred milee or more, at hie mortgaged their land to pay war, General M E m s said : The Confe customers; they are either stealing or randr, for tbey are uot accounted for. saw that their only cliance of supplyin i n gctting them from the other aide,an

Confederate cavalry, tli of r u n k , and tLey bad a bad Been and learned. t h a t used by tlie German Prusaian War of 18t1, as 1 hia rethrn to Virginia a fe

ed hia cavalry officers

e point where hiu freqiieirt Iy a h u n -

nally informed me, upon

our liorees by tbouatter of fact, our men

stray picket or strag-


out and in yoor condition generully." the Potoniac niinibered about 12.OUO Northern Virginia about 8.000 inen. ( Campaigns '' ). I n General STUART'S efforts to inte Ricbrnond. he had divided Ilia conman took it i n detail with I and SAEBIDAN death of General STI-ART was by no I would hare done ju8t as p o d Bgliting I doing when lie fell. His untin~ely were lesa valuable than tiis head and cbommand could hare done all tlie w life i n a will effort to keep back tli contending against. This w a ~ he SHEBIDAN. wliost. prestige S o w turn back to

20 1

tbegcrme did not prove to w*will not admit of the Union cavalry were the Confderate eerriee.

red to those suflered i n ted the most poivrrful d ; the other w i t h I i o t l l -

Many a p o d cava four b o & during t h all h i m monoy gone, h to death on a macadam
m fell at the tiends of

ward, who bad given up borne, to m w e in the rank the war ended, there was


valrynian i n oiir service stol, carbine tbnd 1 i o i . w at we ahoulil lirc off tlir
CHAPMAS anal JICISTOSH miiirnm 11dy of Iioryemeti WIY never defea of thi* galnry o f cli*tingoi~liedo their blows. but let u s w e : Geiierti


mgs, that hiaown head

auld the Americxtn enemy if we could.

what is wauted. Colonel S c x N l r R m the Union carnlry while u e were cond

sent b? General GRAST to was nioriiig u p tlie Plienandoah \'alley. W l i g did he iiot join h i m ? Because of tl General LEE.wlio sent General lfAMmos, DAN'S numbem, to attack and detnin him.

corps. Colonel ScYMrB ing itself together after

relief of the Union caval come to assist us, until t b

rind our diririon ( FITZL

hi* path ut TreSA E R I DA 1 ' 1 front , ourt House reed.

took %reand smoked us out the next dab.

& n e d SElrBIDAM troops having been mount campaign, while our b hie report on the mx

I n his report General S H E R I D - 4 S were FITZLEE'Sdismounted ea Gordonsrille. and t h o want of iin to the army on the James Hiscr. having ac It may not be pleasant to acknowledge SEEUIDAN .been able to carry out his ordere have muintained his position at Y and SHERIDAX holding Lgnchbu it u d a intended by C; strayed,

the direction of

ut had General 1 LEEcould not

*Yr. Lmcour I.ld : 'The bo r t t b ths dd d s p m . but-

o xec ut ed from


told, yet he did not enpture over one-hnlf. hough tilt. C'olifeticnites R conimnmlcr on the field u n after the bilttle. Having now given my view*, I an1 fre, D sal- that I believe the .iinerican caralry?equipptl with a ruagazio arbine, revolver a n d saber, and aasistecl by good home artillery, I capable of performing a n y duty, of niarclling any where uncl pmt i n g ttieiiiwelves againat troops of any kind whatsoever, of one-tllirt reater nrimbem, it mattrrs not where they a r e from, {f the o p p n e n ure dismounted. I estimate t h e value of the good cavnlry hotwe at le-third more than t h a t of men, when the nicn tire Iioraemen nnd custoiilecl to the use of fire-nmm TH( AS T . YUNFORD,
were without
Lynchburg, li'rginio.



failed to capture

EARLY'~ army, tboagb

in5otry, find one bend

cavalry, three corps of

on the field. General

which o u g h t . by d l

wyith some n l i g h t

we had retreated from passed o n unmolested.

TON, and

the record3

~ E R in


the Shenancloiili there did mort-

that tliaariter; a - i n t e r

d our ups and down*.



day's fighting

SUBBIDAN an they b s SEBB~DAN cared less

our badner. WABBEN

thirteen tboescrnd caval

I .

. .


P r TI







over the center of

tbe box. A slight altcratiotl of tbe board w now better effected by nioviog the arm tliun by revolving the boa ,d o n tbe wrist. *&Should the m a d chtriige its geiierwl direc tion at nny point RO a6 to r u n of of the board. a litie alioulcl k d r a w W I ' O ~ St'ie paper a t tbie point, and the sketch reconitnericed. The rieridiaii line in compaee box is now altered. as on minniencinp the R :etch. to suit t h e new direction, and ia drawn on tliia portion o t the sketch. .*The new starting p i n t is taken in tiit center of the slitaet atid two or three inches a b o w the line. These nlteration* of nieridirrnn may h a r e to he made sercrttl tinies. Wher the Rketch is Aiiiaiied it is removed from the rketchiiig bonrd, cut YWOSS the line where the iiieridian was changed, t h e point8 where the sketch was discontinued iiad recomrnenccd are made to coincide by u ,in driven tbrougIi theni into A table. the pieces w e then turiied RO as to hriiig their nit~ricliaii lines parallel and firmly pinned i n this posit on both are cut through nt one cut of a dmrp knife. The pieces ai*(! then joined hj- a strip of paper pa*ted on the birck." sketchiiig Iwotlrd over tlie unirer-


the ruler, rollers and pnper, as proved * t y l e ~ a t prcwiit i r i use. Extract from RICHARDS.. "The compass box h a s a meridian line bp wbieh it is tion of the needle, in order pond with the geiieral to the front. Rerolvc.

use other Sketching cnses or Imtrds

are hcd

tlifficultg i n such work has been cnrefitllg co the purpose of devising some means of ore lievctl that this sketching board doer RO to a field work, and with a n accuraq- ae great view of the great importaiice attached to t rspitl field sketchos and reconnaiswnce m H popitiona, anti i n r i m of the influence that will have u p o n future military operations a n of A suitable eketching board to be used in !

intc-red wIien trying io niet. Every p i n t o f iitlrretl and rtudied. for :onling i t , and it is Iw&ter extent than any to be desired for rupid ran be expected. I n facilities for making )s of mad@, rivers and icli inaps and nketcliea hattles, the providing icli work is Iiecerraary.

-9. Il!fnntry. Find Lirutnaant KindutaUi lo.

E . A. ROOT.

' I

*piinters and t'raKnionta of lead, Fhich, by t l e i r presence i n tliv partn of the h d v . induced long and ob lute suppurations, tieciuc*r;tly rendering lleconttary operations nt nary. Woundu of the h l c d reawls were naturally niore freqnen 8 they were more exp?sccl to riak of lacerntion, and hemorrha -the greatest daiiger ot all on the battle-tield-was always gra Rilles were likewiw otleii ntrnck and, if the contact was direct, y were diattercd, nn& IO t h o wound. Such niimeroii* splinters added new cumpiicatic wero the cause^ ot' the horrible ~ Y O I I I wliic. ) ~ ~ wording to Dr. B u r m

mntle such LL profhiid inilwcvwiriii



cluriiig t h o Criniean


I)ullet of the Cliassepot

Every one is familiar wi t I, t h v g m v e prog hy the fire-arms of thnt period, and the kir ous effects i q the principal cause of the Pent tutle whicli ha@ greeted the advent of ariii8 not u n t i l 18th; t h a t these iiew nrnis made atloptiori by France of the (:liasnepot rid bnllct, 385 grains. I t wau diwplncecl h?; calibei- .43, weight of bullet 385 grains. ant e n t rifle, the Lebel, the caliber of which i hullct 231 grains. I n Anatria the h n n l while the German# u s e the Mau*er, c d i b e r land and Belgium hare also taken atepa i indicated their predilection for arms mor described. The principle chractr?rivs of 1 duced caliber and its great p w e r . I t a UEX inent of a special slow burning powder; compratirelp light weight, the Bullet of hard metal. Iced and antinioq-.covered wit nickel. T h i s envelope is closely united t aiicl only i n exreptioiial canes, do the twc weight, as Ira8 been mid, id 231 grains. aiiC of' PO67 feet. Its trajectory i s very flat, an( to H diatance ot' from 3280 to 3500 g a d s . relocity bnth of rotation and translation, it1 great. ' Fallowing are some exninples of i siitwtances and at various diatancee: A t 218 ranls the penetration i n onk m a . i t 118 yards the penetration in pine wn A t 118 yards the penetration in slieet in
. i t M 7 yards the pt-netmtion in

is o f t he wounclrcaiincd edge of their murder-

n t of relief lint1 Krati. *mall crlibrr. It \cni air aplwaiairce. i i r the .:tliber .W) aeiKlit ot' G r w , model of 1874. i n i n tiirn by t h e prea15, aiicl the weight of

er lrav been adopted, 1 . Portugnl, Switserlis directioir end huve * lcsn sinilnr to thoae Lebel ritle are ita receaeitates t h e em pinyI a magqine rifle of ich is composed of' a protecting enrolopt! of re M y of the h i i l k t . ecome neparnted. I t s hne an initial velocity , zoiie nf'ctfert osteiid* virtue ot' i t u iiiinieil*e netratire tiwce ia very >enetrution i II rariour,

........-?4. invhes.

........ 10.



At . A Tyarcln the pnetretion i n s h e e t in

A t .ili

yumla the penetmtion in pine


...... 24 inches. 6. iiichcs. .........20. inc-hcw. ras.-... . I 6 inches.

.. ......
rming an idea of tlio on the Iiumnn hody. )iiitA of the trajectory, hree diwtinct cones of o f p h c t r n t i o n ; tilid,

Tbese few exnniples g i v u the means o effects of bullets of uuch perletratire p~ These effect* must be considered at differen ant1 for this reason, aiitbow have recognize action : First, a zone of explosion ; wcontl, a LC a rono of vontueion.


21 I

I t ia evident tb arms of small c

old models. The

t.ncountored at present. The new condition niiiiishing the serious features of injuries to will be less frequent. They will rather rece corisqnentlg the comminution wili be din splinters will always rosult from a bone beii will be Rmaller and not carried BO far. Yore be pierced through arid through and fewer f nay iiito tlle medullary cavity. P m p r t i o diameter of the bullets. blood ve.wls apt1 ne m u c k , atid. io LIIU event of ruch occyrren tietinite. precise antl without the former sei hility of heiiiorrhago will be tliminisht*~, and niuch the more able to ;wait the arribal n j u s t h e n sail1 applies to wounds .produced b froin 855 to 1.300 yards; at ranges g r e a t e r I tance it would seeirr that tlie 3 1 5 bullet is effects. According to certain investipatoir thrin thosc of the A3 caliber. but no witisfac fact has an yet been offered. The sanie nbserrtitionn are applicable to tiori of wliicli by tlie aiiirill mliber biillet i s I tlinn that ot'the .43 bullet.and is attended \I also to flat boncst wliicli are almost alwtty~ p antl niost sliarply cletinecl manner. . h i inter l w t in that they IIIY iriort. sensible to tibe effe t h a i i loiig I w n c r . Tliia i n i t d f is of littlo when 11 flat b i i c ia perforntcd. its iiijury is I tiirc, that of tlic nubjiwerit organs almost 1
Hciic.c. t t i c K e n c r a l

will alw result i i i dinea, and direct shock8 ? tangential blown and iiehed. Finaura and hit, but the splinters er, tbo bone will ohen gmentn will lird their Ily to the diminished ea w i l l be more rarely s, the injuriea will be uu features. T h e lialie wouiided will be so rmistatice. \That has bullets fired at ranges pn t h i s last nanicd tlislore destructive i n its hey are eveii greater ry explatlation of thin
0i-t t m w , the prforriicli Ieso funnel U l l M ) W d

leas eplinteririg. arid

iiig property of these of Iiyd niulic prcatwre

ayr cleterririninfi tlie eatiretl by t h e 3 1 5 bullet w e much less serious than thc !of the forlow d i b t v . This holds true of rliotn fired a t equal raiigl and is even nrorc appareiit if t h e effects of bullctR of equal relo y are coniparod. Tliia fact rerriilts directly from t h e e x p ments of SIXIEII and ( ' H A V E L . as Iwblislicd i n tlre drchit.c.8 de :He( .ine e r h a m a r i e .Mitit a i r n . The ndrtrntage i* entircly with the 15 ri e, and tliereforo it wnnot be llerried that it fortns a step iii t ranee. sinco it perniitn II Iiopo of saving limbs aliiclr formerly woul hare been neces.qrily aacrificccl. The siniplo nature of wonnds, t1i rertainty that tlie bullet Iius pnsscd tlirnugli, the abreiice of conti on of the eilgci of the wountl. will preclude unnecessary probing n Lexamination, and dli also facilitate the application of a nimple ai Aeptic dressing which will permit the wounded to be transported i central point where they can receive the necessary irirdiccllattent The w h n d s which will be encountered i n the zone of contiisil will be oitber simple coirtusionsor contused wounds. I n t h i n zone he wounds mentioned i n speaking of bullets remaining i n the tise ea, will be met witb. These wounds have nothiiig very remarkable n their nature. It in evident that their grhvity will diminish i n pr portion as t h e bullet has approached the end of.the trajectory, an h a s tberefore loat ita foreo. Ckcasionally, h6wever, a bone being s uck, indammaticin of
result is tlia
tlit, wouiitls







the ptwinsteiim will reaul thew will be the moat se reault merely utltravlraet. a n be raclilj- cured wit

olirtioes. But

tdeil that the

tillets of which. e allowect to re-

lw inferior

nbarrratina nn
new fact*: thuy

which i s coated

i n d e l of 1811-84 it i s Rix

from $45 to 545 ysnla.



w -

miination. &What has been, will be again, a n d t h e r e re me recommend to t b e y o u n g oflicere who, for w a n t of experienc in t h e rough ecl~aol of t h e frontier, are beginning to find fault wit t h e conditione of life ne found in o u r l a r g e garrisons, a careful e n d horough s t u d y o f t h e *ketcheu entitled reepectirely The A d j u t a n t a n d &The Ordnance Otficer; for 80 surely aa we b a v e a n o t h e r gre t w a r or insurrection on o u r hands, the d r u d g e r y of ieeuing*toresanc t h e exasperating syutern of acconntability far gooernnient pmprt , w i l l be again t h r o a t


General Ordera No.

ne of Heligolaad. sArmg. No. 1 7 :




The SimeThe Railroads of

Eoree Races in Fmn






April, 1891 (Extra Nu b y Captain Rogers Birnie d r y in Virginia Uuring t of Rifled Projectiles. A The Recent Indian Craze.


April, 1891 :. Compoeite Pbotograpby. Guard, by Cnptain Charles King, V. S. Ancient Greece. With Rod and G u n in Writers. May: Photographic Dark Roo tional Gnard (concluded). Athletics at A
Modern Practical
on the March.


TEEIOWA HImaxcAL R m s D . April, 1891.

I ' I.

tice &muel F. Miller.


I '

1 .

Irr, :





ectionn i n the'l'hroat.

QUARTEBLY REPORT OF TEE IC March 31, 1891. H. Monthly report of Sam



, Topeka. KtinwaN.




- _.-

H m n ' e Aamr




THE INVENTIVE h a ~ . W'eekty. \t-aahington, D.c. PRINTEB'I) INK. Weekly. Ne7 York.

Y O L . 1v.



S the nymtem IiropAetl F o r traiiiiiig the 4 instructioii is iniprirted : First, tlwoirtica I n the theoretical inwtriic~iona fairly ncci ration and surrounding country, drawn on )i a Inrge scale, sliould bo IIWII. T h e groiind I n all explanations thc fhriiintioii of the trc the ground. . S o called '-Iw-'n picturea" an should he studiously ai-oided. They i n r a r aibject and principleR of t h e general foriiiatit t o make the recruit tielicvc that w h a t ho t h H i S e r e r teach a iiiaii anything that hc Iiiuet I may not he M g ~HX ~ the tirwt. l ~'Ttre trut cal formationn do not reprewiil (tiw i l l e v e r w c u r on the battle-field." [ I reniark u firtal tendency iii 'I'acticn."] dace every nystem of wiir to absolute formi niould a l l the tactical foriiirtions a general I ing into consideration localities, moral circi nctcrietica or the abilities of commanders." Theoretical imfmction.- The iilbject of the formation and tho tused. On the board the dispoeition o f

tiw ticld tliity. tho y ; mound, practivnlly. t t e iiiap of the cowrInckboard i n colom on

known to the trooper.

> nhould be adapted to

norinal format ionn *'

/ ) ~ tonit y to caum the

* * *

hat haw crer m*r.rrred YSE. -Infantry Fire dearest ~iiiiidn to re-

ill then explain the ciplea on which it i s troop ie made for the


I .rh.


I '

"I ,I
the ground Varies, so



palrola of the outpoet line are gorer

d bo clearly stated.

ask qneations, thei w e e cvrrwted. I

gtlittiiecl n!id erroneouR

made to think tior tlreriley are to do, arid Iiow

they am to do it will be

Roctical instruction. -

e titken

ita ia nece'a-

not enougb. Practice i R developed inetinct.

pair! intiormation of the enemy. So the 1 back or captured. Various wcll defined the route as rendezroux i n c'awe of diaper 0 1 1 approaching the eiiemy. the

en i n niakiiig corwlici*ein tlic error to tile intellig!encc ed and therefore indivitluality nnd k Iiimaelf, - W h a t This is beat ne-

premed tbe poet will

eared by awakening a

i o g the pbssee of tbe crout will work tlierii out for himself Tbe system of Rquade pro

confldenw, quick d never will become

be lacking in Rome reeeded, but for the larger

lwnt, nnd ehould be made to imitate a bir I t eeeme moet adviwrble i

r the Indian faebion.

of t b e troop m o t a . S I seen. They avoid big woode, rnvinee and aero

rootea. Sncceae depeo

Aeible m o w without bciiip places and ride througtl

for they are too weak t o n i n without eucceediny

iicr i n which guard dnty is performed i a command in a garrieon,"BO i t ie belie

eaid 1 6 that the manf the discipline of manner i n whicb

Theoretied instruct


. ' I




be entirely concealed, their prewnce unau would :irriving, a few well directed vollcy~ fusion, a n d ruin would be cwmpletcrl by infantry could easily surpriec ravalry o n t clevelopiiiunt of ainokelesn powder will rt such eiirprines all t h e more necesscrry. Thc following tliapuitioii of the v a n g g i v i n g i m m u n i t y from surprise; secondly, soon enough to bo t u r n e d to advantage ag, ns forniing a screen agrrinHt hostile patrols



plaining all precauti a n d retnrne. T b e n Similarly t h e niovemo explained. Radical instrudion . murid o v e r wbieh ita
the troop following i

ected. T h e main body Irow t h e r a n k e into cone flank charge. Even march. T h e probable ler precautione against
n l is proposed. first an information let t h e e n e m y ; thirdly,
4 ............... .............. ............... ........ ..: 1
IV.C.Qr 1 ...............
R i W a b .

r obtaining

supervised a n d obsorvetl. i o time u n d r r tlie gencial w watching iiarrowly all

made. I Diepositions are

I R i i n t ........................................... I 4 hirwurcl U I h d N .......................... Vangnanl.. I FlnnkinK 8lw .............................. 1 Connwtirip tiltw t Van coiiiiiiantIer'* party ................




eketch is prepared.

gain such early inform

iee a n d g i v e the main body

and dieposition of t h e The general rulee

or rear of t h e column T h e Englieb, w h o

h n k i n g p r t i e a of ei

dyance OFeverything." slrch 8 fOI708tiOn Will

nt eurpriaa n o r g a i n infornia-

disposed with tlie point ;iloiig ttie l i n e of niaircti. the loading files 01 3ach Ride nenr t h o m u t e , covering front a n d 9 a n k s t o fifty y a r d s , tl. leader about fifty yadn in rear of either filc. T h e i n n e r forward r role are echeloned h n i t h e point to both flanks, a n d cover 450 y [Is of frnnt. T h e o u t e r forwnrcl p:strols are echeloned from thvir inks, also covering 450 j-urds of ti'otit. Eacli file is t h u s extended pproximatelg 150 ynrde ftoni ti irr neigh Imon, observ i iig wu1yo n tg-five arch on each mide. Tlie leatlern direct tlieir patrols from a r iitioit i n rear of t h o center, but niny gu o n t h e l i n e wlienerer tlieir tenonce iu neceueary. I n tliia tiiatiner 900 yards froin t h e flaiiks are wtaiiily covered, untl i n favorable c o u n t r y probably more will be n de nocure. T h e van-cornmarider iiiovce with hie par ' a l o n g t h o line of march about 5UO or ti00 y a r d s in rear of tbo poi I where h e can quickly receive r e p r t e a n d go forward to verify h a t Iiau been observed. Hie p a r t y acta as n wupport agaittet aoy hoe le patrol, or ae orderlitw. ae t h e case m a y require. Connecting 6l1 communicate with t h e forward patrols arid t h e support in rear. A n y eeriouu attack forcing t h e line of p role would require mom tho11 tlie third or fourth of'n troop usually tailed ae t b e lleupport" to repel it. So that tliis body niuet be large nough to hold t b e k i f :tiit* i i t check till t h e reserve (or main boc , i n forces emrrller t h a n the regiment) can form up. A half t m p i the minimum body t h a t can perform t h i s duty. T h i s eiipport of h f a troop ehould m a r c h i n tffo l i n m from BQO t o 300 y a r d s apart h e 6ret line about 500 yards in rear of t h e van-commandor's par . If cavalry attacka, it i s in readineee to meet it, a d v a n c i n g in t w o nee. T h e rear line actu 11s a support t o the Brat line in all cusee.

Tlie vaiigut\rcl i n a close country would




It may be urged t h a t th e eyetcm

ceptionally rough coo t h e dnsty march of t h e In an open country, may march entire, or t h e ground aa effecto well ae twenty." As i t conntry from t h e high g shonld be examined for

I 1 be hard on t h e Iiorses. So




on the horses than

one man can Fee as

gain contact a t once, relieving the firin w i l l m a k e every attempt to gain the rea bj- rapid moreinenta. and cunistauc-ea dictate. I u tlii9 manner the rear guar

being frequently latoone move out and T h e flanking troop n k s of the rear guard, o r 011 foot au the cir. drivpn in on ib

A battalion on t h e m troop- balf a troop ae

guard with one troop ~ E I 80 much larger, admits at groator dietancee wh

manding, six non-commissioned remainder of troop i n nupport ; t h e main position8 art) Bhown on map. (V Theoretical instruction.- 1. T h

is the reserve; tlrree

tratc the

principle8 on which t h

are made on the innp conforming

t flanking partiew.

on coming in sight
of the enemy hang on, if position and intentione

theatre. reconnoiters a u d sends sending report to t h e tho eopport dismonnts,

The positions of the patr

ecl in t h e eelected neniy is firat wen

advances in force, beet cover at hand,

wpport and reserve will be traced i n centration of the patrola for flank ncti

ogether with the con-

have, in t h e battalion c eenter along t h e .main platmne. T h e dismon advantqe of all cover 08108r8, a n d the h o r n is made to t h e mar.
t o meet it.

guard, a position in the ,or in reserve. If the orsee in rear of other

poued o r when a movement

are traced on the niep. Poeitione corn pointed o u t for prompt eeizure, c a w i n g the rear guard. Detrrila for tioi-ses are g i r e n au recommended. Rudical instruction.-1. The march. tho eelocted route. The detaih for the wouta and ridem. The diu up, t h e parta conforming to the ground a n huprvieion of the ot3cers. Villagee on t

n g line of retreat are retreat or cnttiog off

troop is marched to

A rapid
the other two.

By tlrur

8, under the carefal o and to the flankr

are reconnoitered by the pntrolr.





iiform. T h e oi-clers of encli, llie otlier. T h e petrols on


1 . For t h e defeneo of a defile t h e cliam to t h e lawt iiioiiieiit, nnsiired tlirit ii s l i o i

2 3 3 1

theatre, oiie in brow

insuring collieion, e aigbting t h e e n e m y sen forward, obwrven a n d re t h e j u d g m e n t of t for conceiitratinn of t h e aa t h e CircumRtances requir 3 . Fursuing rear qua

intod troopem c a n h a n g rt.trcut will b r i n g them

General remarks. --The

check pursuit a n d allow t retar p a r d m u s t bold t h e

of tlib rear g u a r d i n retreat is to II bod&-to niove uiinioleated. The

their lionwe lirlil near by i l l rear. T h e ohjrct Iieiiig to c41eck or clt4ay the iieiiiy, as iiiany men will be eniplaiyetl aa are aruilaldc i n t h e fig1 ing line. protc-cting t h e flanks by Ntrong lmlien, patrol* i t 1 gellei?L iot wutlicing. A gonerd reuerve ia a l w a p held rericly for a n y enie uiicy. T h e e l i n p i c i o n s will depend upon tlie tiattire of tlic count a n d tlic c ' n i r i ~ ~ ~ s i t iof ori t h e hostile forces. A very broken g r o u n d i ~ t r itlo rapid m a i i c u v e ~ , 80, in tmcli country, or if the e n e m y I i a s tle or i i o cavalry, a few patrols o n the fltrnka will suflicc. B u t i i )rdiiiary rolling g r o u n d with liilla anel miall atreania, the Iwat fori tioii fiwtho battnlion as LL rear g u a r d is oiic troop o n t h e niniii ro 2, m e 011 each flank a n d one in rewrve. The diatnnces tlepcnd on tl cliuractcr of tlic country and nianeuvers of the eneiiiy. If t h e country is eiiclowd, t h e troop ult fi the main route bliould be divided into t w o parts. a firing section 1141 P uipport. For only a limited n u m b e r of carbines c a n bo broug to twar o n t h e r c a t r i c t d front, and both nien a u d b o r w s will be k frcnlier. Tile troop i n

reuerve niust furnish informatioi, t o the fi of direction, obstaclew, etc., 80 a x t n eiirrbl

8 t i r i g line of all c h a n g e s

required of tlie ofiicers of t h e m e n in t h e su The coolest j u d g m o n t

1. W i t h i n effective

work is a p p r o t i m h t e l y t
cising j u d g m e n t i o t h e


rear, with siee and d i s t o meet t b e movement.

it to conforiii ita nioretc with the cwitc-r fighti n g troop to keep tlic inen :iirtl nioiintw t i 11, a n d h t l i ~ I i o n l dIn? in line together when cxceptionrilly good op1 rtiiiiitiw c u r for bring. i n g a large nuniber of ciirbiiics t o bear oi lie puraiii g columncl, no at a defile or bridge. T h e fighting line does not dispute tho Ivancc inch by in&, for that would inevitably rcault in ita being 1 (1 to tlic spot. But t h e y hold auccessirely strong positions a m t h e y c u r , and tbny will occur, for a niere fold in t h e qround is a great pr( mction, a n d hedgea, buildings, ctc., will afford cover for t h e horses, t affording s t r o n g pointe for t e m p o r a r y defense. T h e rear g u a r d muat figlit and fight rd, but without compromieing ita retreat. S o check can be inade 1 m a k i n g a show a n d then r u n n i n g away. T h e essenco of t h e tiand 16ia 80 to tight as to get away and fight again. Each poeition m u be rapidly b u t carefully B chosen a n d t h e n with known range, tire i leys into t h e colunins . tboy appear. I n t h e choice of poeitions p r i n i s r y consideration ie ehelter for t h e boreee. After inflicting low on t h e e n e m y and r u n i n g deploymunt, just before being committed to a compntmiai 3 action, t h e poeition ie given u p a n d a rapid move to t h e n e x t p lion in rear ie made. A

The troop i r i reserve aliould alter









I 1




I n aelecting p t s the primary eonsi

I f sur11 poets cannot should be posted aird the whole work sh
v i e w in pained.

is that a n cxtensire

be made.
ed bend i n the road muet ed a prompt advance strike the rear or flank at all times be kept

of the defenders. ap between the parte.

Theoretical in&nmtion.the parte for itn defenm. plain how they are met. and t h e movements to t h theatre eelocted. R a d i c a l inattruetion.ground. The o i c e r i n eom

which he could peep, being iirrisibl

ugh &e mosllcr, of p, 80 that he could

era of tbe enemy and exer defense would be fatal, made, and so on over the troop is inarched to the ions i n succession, ehow-

authorities. For. any one noting the redettm, and HpplyiiIg @ e rille wouh

t o do it. In the atwon poeed t o each other, in been made familiar

es troops should be ope, and the men having

Anything like regularity i n posting intervals n o good p e t s will i n general picture" where even B rough kno

i*wrong, for a t each

ing an extended outlook.

Patrol.-.-The main work of The pntrolR must move reconnoitering all places mher attack. rnmbling of wheels. They corn
port,and a third linein for foreee emaller than line will be ntrengthe

the reserve posed situations tho first

J- coosti t u tea

The p i c k d - T h e

picket Rh

only where e n extensive o in pairs for them among oue remaine in obeervatio Thie will obviate the nece

the flnnks. Nice judgment must b

2 . 3 4





ommanding t l i e j m b a bo iadicated by t h e con the support must, how be ready t o move proaebee.

i n GINC of' attuck the figlititig priiic.iyle in llllt of the dcfcllwt of a powition, the Nupprtu and piekrts vonntituti tlie first or firing line ; tho iwRc'rre tlie xworid or line of "upport!; lie niaiii I d y the tliir& or line of rescrvrx : it requires no grcatrr n nbcr of nien for outpost

the fight, being the t h W h e n a command

nerd reserves.

Extrmplt. i t , pnstitrg Otttpl&, ( bo0 l h y NO William~burglieiglits. Force. onu Iwigac mentrl, i n cwnp n t \V. Dctnil for outpostR, ione, Fimt Regiment, Liculcornt-Colonel S First Battalion, Major P., north and tw
I I'ivket

!).-Locution of camp. of cavalry, three regi' i r n t nnct ,%cond


c'oiiiin and i ng. fronts.

.f 2 I'atrols. ....................

era1 direction of tho li flank attack or an attac

complete; the full ci met on obtueles, or focws, ofcouree. thi

T m p A...

................. 1:) ( I ~ i i i aI ~ Bi w t ................. ................... 4 I

1 Vedette Post.

SI?. ...... 3x2~4. .......:..



P l l c d e ~ . N. c. n'h

-.............. .................. 28 2s
.................. ai

4 1

p u r d e d . Where the flaiikw by t h e Iweweriw or superior

Troop I1.... .I

*robis. ...............
2 Vrtlrttr I'ucits ...............



I Siiinll I'crst cu oii field duty, wcinietliing



................ .................. 4 -34

................ ................... f;}



more ie needod. tbe line of m i e t a n action. No de6nite rules They muet be determ

reduced, for it is ponsible for

...................................... .................. 'n Totals ................... ................ ! x

ailel w



Troops - 4 C " :iiiel 1)'' ' i n ruwcrve. Second Ihttrilioii, Major %., south

Troop E . . .

I 1'ickt.t.

( I sinal1 Past...................

I'oeioste... .......... i V'edette t'atmin ......................

j s11pprt ......................................
Totals. .................
1 V r c l v t t e Post (outlook ( 1 1 ' 1'aitml ..................... I Pic.kt.1. I ! lkt:tc*twd PoRt.............

................ J2 ............... 1 x 1 4 .................. 1 -34 5 .................. 5 3 5 - ................... M)


field duty, the pri obtain. Tho only

enues of approach, will ere is no special reserve

Troop F....{



I;upp)rt ........................................


.................. !3 1 ................. 18 ( ' m i i w t i n g File........... .................. 3


('allege) ..... ti \

3 ".E

harder on the men and harder on the horeeu

i n all direction*;

IO 11" i n rewcrrc'. (The lettem on tlie map corronpond to 'le dehila almve given. Tlie approxiniete routus of the patrols are 8 3w-n by arrows.) Theoretical in&ruction.-The regiment i camp would hare one battalion on olltpnt duty. tlio main body nstitoti n g the general


................. -m T o b l ................ ~ .............. ...- 511



-_ ,

Troops - * G "and


hil&kdd&",k,dikl.. ,ill,







With this end i n view, i nor Rtop them if t h e r accidentally do
i n 70 e n d 71, and a* the E n g l i s h r e m

miwoe. Tbe lineof oat

yards fkvm thw csmp, th p r d in ~ circumference.
cate the general line crt

dette poets, two ptitrols of I post. Detail for tlie troop:

(Vide Cavalry Instruction. p. l i l ) i n sfforordn the opportunit? for the hostile muet he continiioiia and held close to the Unless we traveiwe the densest underb t h e hornemrrne r i e w may be safely t errch wide, a n d utile- in s u c h buili a

moet broken proiind


will bc indicntetl, the post

The formation for the squad. (Vi Troop for Screening Duty i n a Close m follows: A scout long rollte c i f patrol. corerii
twenty-fire yard*. In rcar of the scout, patrol ride the leader nnd t w n files

yards on enrh Rich; k twenty-fire yanla;

e detailed for *upport a ~ l inwtruction. The troop is

lects h i s line of resistanw, re approximately Relwtctl. ound to r l w front of the 1 i i . c

exteneion whould be made. for th would be too great for the size of the for case of attack. The troop furniahw f o u r remniningfour being held i n pup from 1000 to 2000 yarde. accordi All euspicioua places Mhould who march with the leader, in o mttnt. As the country gets open t h o fla Jquad marching entire, but stil

fnr the firet line, the

may be called in, t h e


110 large

Inovernents can examine harnleta, etc., to t h e danke. whole line of equada. The tla i n the general movement in advance.

enemy; then by nieanm ot

Tliue, each pair of equade




rve. Eacli of tlie fornier



Theoretical instruction.-The tnwp : i line. T h e area to be worked u p is ebown the troop is the11 made a n d t h e advanw the support conforming. T h e advance mental reaerven in also traced in o r d e r principles may be given. Practicnl instruction.- Four squads H Each in t u r n i s d i s p e e d and directed bjof t h e troop following i n observation. a t a time, t h e remainder of the troop in o wonest be gained. T h e n t h e four q u r;epyort conforming. T h e detail6 are ult I f it ia found afler long practice t h a t and scouting duties these men should L>rperfecting themselves.

men excel in patrol

er to bent him in detail I f in t h i s m a n n e r succcsre beaten a n d driven in, it

old back t h o victors, who pereion of t h e hostile forcer. outpost line, Rpecial recon, immediately, a n d i n force

Genernl remark- h e to i(n leng dimcult to defend. T h e o n l y meann from early information of' t h e enem 11amrdw by t h e patrols. -4 battalion as cwort for a conv rnuced-guard, o n e for r e a r p a r d , h body rnarchee i n t w o lines or m l u tion of t h e convoy, t h r o w i n g o u t flanker*. be divided into t w o parte., half t iiloog t h e main r o u t e ; tlie o t h e r mcb under a subaltern. Fdch pa of from t h r e e to five men, constituting t putrole rewpcctively. A smnll p a r t y rides ing files keeping u p communicati T h e forward patmlrc reconnoi 10 t h e flanks. All placee where m u s t be eubjected to t h e most ~8 w r k is required when i t is con delay even a few well directed

advanceti -Riinrd will


and let1 torward acb officw, rounect-

o r k i n g t h e horae@. T h e flanking partiee keep vidual fire, while t h e rem gu timely warning of attack from tbut directio I n yarning a defile t h e a d v

P o r k a n d Ctiickahomi~iy own. ( V i d e Map KO. 2.)



hile t h e main body po*h dismounting a n d seiiding it ia k n o w n that a flank a t t a c k iat to be made, t h e T h e column is closed up, t nd. If t h e attack t a k w uare should be fbrine~l. n o r apace will permit t b

Prncticnl in&wtion.--Jn

t h e Brat e x e


will m n d out

patrols t o work up t h e g r o u n d a n d -in

reportn. I n subsequent exercieee bodie fenw. t h e o t h e r i n attnck of t h e convoy.

e, m a k i n g proper p p d , one in de-

h e tilain body must n i o w t o e position beyond rffcv-

where along t h o line of operntione for trols should report t h e i r preeencr? a n maneuver against t h e line. This pract ing rrccuratu field firing. T h e r a n g e will terniitied by volley firing. using t w o si tw utidertaken by nquadn a n d plat conditions r i l l present what will w

mated a n d then devolley practice will

SPICIAL 1 N S T B L ' ~ I O N .

Ail non-commission4 ofticem a Those who show s cnurRc in topography, a n d be ta itiy cncr, or o t h e r methods of sin A l l non commissioned ofl3ce mukc reports. T h e requisites If n watch is in t h e party, t h e t Ihit it will generally be fou iiiatructor will indicate p i Le sent embodying informat rneniy, a n d of t h e ground. frequent report8 should be r e q o i d . The beat wonts should a n d generally m e n showin
read n mnp.

a1 incltnetion.

po&ions in which t h e y nieo m a y be foulid who d certain dutiee are i m p o t:rkr t h e m , failure muet 10 do, but instead be g i \\-hich t h e y cau well perform.

No time limit ie placed 04 thew exe$ises.

Tbey must be kept

hool of practical horseand to make the man a pe e!roald be one individual,

ertaken in vie

benetite to bc derived. ht" and &'rightfront i n t o shown to be a means t o That all these matters
to the use of arnis and ty i~ proverbial ; which a\-alry aoldicr. T h e eniue of our people. r iii the proud position be cavalry soldier in modern



d Lieufrnaiif, P'vfh Cardry.






.. .-*..

. \


,.. -


CIVIL W A R ie more surprising to a n campaigns of o u r Civil War a n d t h e dewribed in term8 applicable only to tbc autonished to find o u r moRt familiar oarnee a n d d i l l more to be aseured o v e r the eig t h a t what lie bns been r e a d i n g i s a n ai War ! O n e of t h e principal cxpoiiente of t h is General Lord WOLBELEY, w h o niay bt Britieb troop@ in Egypt, Thie dieting published a n article entitledGenera1 Shc t h e carecr of our former Commanding therein UN SAT. K. SHERMAN.* This i error; b u t all his mistakes cannot be so T h e opinionw o f t h e gentleinan refer) War, would require n o Rpecial notice dic o n e h a v h i g authority. a n d did lie not a n c e with thoee entertained i n t b i s COUI the great majority of such foreigiicrs a form any. But, however diaBciilt i t ma, ously, it ie manifest tlmt t h e y are M) i regards himeulf as t h e critic par ercelfe a n d for all theme reatwns, hie fitnem tor cwines a pr,oper eubject for inquiry. J u s t criticiam of a w r i e s of military o f t b e critic: murid j u d g m e n t ; a comp priociplea of w a r ; freedom from bias ; tlie hietory of t h e operations in queetioi fact, particular a n d circumemvce affecting Aasuming t b a t these conditione areeeee be denied t b a t t h e y are-let ue eee wbeth

&can then to Bod t h e bods of 6 g h t i n g thernio the dark agee. Ee is i c b medieval company ; -e of eome noted w r i t e r on t h e Amorican Civil


.le of military romance lembcred aa a leader of

Id a u t h o r h a s recently n,in.which he diecuswa sral, who ie mentioned r h a p s n typographicail ,itably diemiseed. 3 in regard to our Civil not assume to aepeak as nee views quite at varia n d with thoee held b y r e taken t h e trouble t o to t a k e hi8 articlos eeriled ; t h a t their a u t h o r if t h e subject i o h a n d ; :aek he haa chosen beLtions certainly require8 meive knowledge of t h e orough familiarity w i t h d a i t h every i m p o r t a n t ie earno. ial-and i t can ecarcely t h e critic i n q o w t i o n ie

Wetted T .W. SII~UNAX w u . M I s well known. a fine .ubject of Qeneld Wou3eLrYs anicie.

Idler, bot not M a n t l d rltb tba


' I,






cli the loma row

ghts. At Fredurst 96.3 inen i n the . The Confederfire till the attack


I written

of an army onths old, compowd

went. were uneduThis statement i s ceror, the p r e e n tage of 11it8 ding campaigns. Tl~ere


" T a c t i n riid O m n i z a t i o n . p. . S I .



n r -

I .

ears. They had fonght eels Blnff, Chickassw , Champion Hills, and upon the linea before




sful. and HOXE aays

peace, to convert a n two years. And

$There is a disposition to regard the troops they led, 1~ altogether inferic prejudice was born of t h e blundem and by undisciplined volunbem ut the outset,the atubborii eouragc diaplayed on both the struggle; while, i f a inann chinie t a r e to bc measured by the aniourit of I through, the most veaymed soldiers of 1 compared with the survivor* of that cwn on i~ gmnd scale were illiietruted to the i n America, as i n those more recently Y all that relates to the supplying and feel tho Americatis displayed quite as qnucl p o r e r : while if the organization and di troop* were inferior, tlie actual fighting for no European forces h a w experience( combat which Sortti and South opposed the freqnently intlecirrivc result o f thc grq any proof that they formed exceptioiia I tar\- science Thoae actions were 80 iiicoi in Eavalry, and next beca,use the benten

American geiierrtle, and to regular eoldiern. T h i s nt of coherence exhibited bulte amply atoned for by les throughout the reat of be regardud as a rcteraii ual f i g h t i n g he hae p n e rope are but BR conscripts t. Tlie coiiditionw of w a r 111 a8 much i n the contest

npo\vder! K h a t l u u ? Can there

lie ordinaG riiIea of rniiisire, fimt from defirieucty would not hrc-ak up.

quality. hat when he heard of

In order to pursue,

WOLSELEY: .$The military studerit is also

izcd at about the mnie
rial. It had fought at ga, and Chattanooga.


inrich struck by the honent serioiisitew i n which American writers zapply the term reternns to troops whom European military writers would describc 1w very raw levies. I t is strange to hear tliie term applied to men r h o hare iiever gone throuKli any coulyo of military training. although they had, perhaps, been prevent during some month8 of tierce, but very loose f i g h t i n g against levies aa utidiecipliried as tlieniaelrcs.

. If ai

ecl an a I by t h e ; he has neasnne but as < the Bur!

ins claitnw to he reeard., rran are to I w memiired

o u n t o f a c t u a l fiKliting

ne through. the nitwt wldiera of Europe are acripta, compared with om of t l q t cotiflict.

I .


FOREIGS CHITICIS.V OF T. CIVIL WAR. tlie ~ m w IevieNof France did not run however, we find the regular, highly ( every nation i n Europe doing the ruritiing draw their own concluaione. The ab& remarks upon the tIWq)R a of accuracy to w1iir.h we art nccuatonird are correct i n reganl to one or more n r w I experience; and iricorrect i n rchwrd to LI The astonishing character of the N niiirksman*hip becomes ap)iarent \vlic.ii i wwre conipwed almost entirely of natirt contained but f e w i i i e i i wtio had riot bean 1 rifle from childhoocl. It would seem t l i n story of the new regiments who receireci on the *-ay to Sliiloli, aiitl were taught to battle waa actunllx bvgiiining: und that of tliing,ra a8 perrailirig all the t r o o p on I It map be a proper coniiiient on the the reader that Sliiloh was not decided u of armctl citizens dressed a s wldiers. 118 of its fighting strength tliati was i i e c e s ~ veterans at S e w Orleaii*. This fact is of liigli iiiipartaricc, becai ii(entioti thew soldiern,assure IIY that tlit &rope; *. twcausc rlicy \vc*rr s n p r i o r i n abii y c t invsriaLIy ilHd the worst of i t ; L tlieni, benides being greatly inferior in n i p)orIy drilled and discipliried that the A m i n t o the field-pitnilar in antecedent8 to but with far less training and erpcrienc sew Orleans, the decisive action of the ca tained a cruehing defeat at the liands of numbers of t h e raw levy above deecril Lossrno eaya : N o lew than 2600 w~ terrible battle, of whonl i o 0 were killed, 1 were made prisoners. The Ainericans wounded! The hietory of hiiman warfi ttiis disparity i n loee. Armies constituted almost exactly l i b Shilcih havetat least twice iu our history,
*FIeld.Rook of the War of 1812. p. la(%



m y . Consultinx hietory, Siylined, etc., armies of Students of hi8tory may

hiloh ponse*s the degreo works of tsctioti. the^ imetits, w-ithout previous he remainder. :merit concerning their reflect that both rrniies 8nierican*,and jwoliablp istonled to the use ot the u r author bad heard the ieir arms on tlie eteamer car cartridgo wlieti tlie irssumea tlie wttiie state
) r e quotation ( 0 remind I each of those *.crowds

are fought o i t by regiilur

a greater percentaKe to break WEI.LINOTONY

pet and the snnie was true i n 1870.

all Englidr writers who were the bent troops in I tiibcrs i t i every combat, iuw t h e force O p p O ~ d to )erst was one of the nioat :a11Government ever put se who fought at Shiloh, iii war; and becuuw nt aign. theee veterans suetle more than half their

lost to tlie eneiiiy i n that

0 were wounded and 500

only 8 killed aotl 13 preeents no parallel to


luring the French

h e that really wen, a t ight and defuatud nearly




4 1




A rior to ever ; ecod


and for some time, suyedoes not romnin so fornciplined, sucb a force ha8


0 1

elligen t educated, excel-

lcnt SI princi reaeon

the . e srience of several we co not k inperior to any r tione, ecaum it WUE com

he raw lerg has l i d

undcr ordinary condi-

and b



ither aa a general prin-

tions of our. forces from

the discipline is 8 8 but it h a s riot t h e

nte became equal to tnctiw i n greater part of the field \vas


t 1 !

no p e n t tactical ninneuvern reeorted to by the comman-

i, I:




: :, -. . .



C'I 17tL WLIR.


drilled and undincipli ned .'*

EN I : Y I '' s m u STRY . LIVERMORE : I.AltliouKIi cities wcre rc edly taken both by siege niid naa r u l t asat Fredcric.kat)urg, Peters-

Y OP T l l E l R ALLIES.

cribca his own

case *o ac-

en ae about on an equality of education, ignorant ot'

nee of most of our people,

quent energ. and earnat-

We quote once mnre: WOLSELEY: e r which h e labbrs, is i t n conflict with those of in moat of the histories of these Anierican




to win. But those ar, jukt a9 Salisbury the irrliiy wiiicli i n -

FOREIGN CRI TIClS *Iravl:Loru : +~.Soir mark the rendineas S of:iriy goocl opportunity of cliargi h 4 y ulle!gctl w ~ a i n s fthe Frdernl h disittclittccl thcni for this morr 8pec.i tbII h i c k gradually, i n pursuunee DAS. l i i n left was retired while iiic*fiii* tieing the Confederates). Iw c:ilIrtl a quarter circle, left t h lo\recl by a corresponding forward I i i i so doing, incautiously exposet l i i i t . of four brigades druwn up i~.So sooner did the happy e StlERIn.4S ordered ai1 inirneclia W l i e n their line

et1 to tiike advantage t hn.9 o f t m ; k e n grotitid-

trrritiing with j i r z - n r n ~ s

certainly reada like


upon this wl)ject

others of a n * * i n -

fo1Io ni n g e It racts


those coninlanded by their actio11 having the war. This torce . The battle of Wineciried the fate dthe BERIDANS cavalry. as followfi: &The , and ~ u e c e swas ~


infantry line of the Ar

reldued Fifth Corprr.)

To n w n y pemons o f intell

it ha* appeared that ou

:iny iiioclern armies of equal I :ilrno~t tire only oiic that our

JItiiiy duly qualified experts believe to-du :hat our arralry, in I w t p a r s of the war, \van the rnmt gener r etilcient mounted N organizecl-an opinion lbr ?ich we may be parfiwe that W ~ ever ~IOIILII l y those who will note that n r w l y rrery 7calrymnn in Europe h i s ropied OW $re-nnns and fhnt some of them ha practiced movements fn inrrtntion o f the Amrricnn m i d . Our critic g r rely informs os that t h y were .lwo-rallcd caralry ; that mountec chargee could only t:tke pluco L h w n a road on n front of four or ire troopers, armed w i t h rcvolverr and not with swords; that ere wan no country where cavalry could act, etc., etc. \\tiat a revelation it will be to l i i r n to lrni that every man of the 130,000 Fedoral cavalr3- was arnied with a sl er as well as a pistol arid carbine; that the Coiifederc~tecarslry w t ~ armed in tlic a n i u nianuer aa far a8 possible; that the $so-called r v a l r y * repeatedly

I ;I





this manner, infantry, c . What are we compel

raphy? It ie certain1

is knowledge of onr topoghim that between Ciettys-

g since tlistipiwarwt i n thereof were I)rokcii


The critic E rough, broken and What mnet we t Can it be possible t

SALLE'S cavalry at


at Mars-In-Tour, to



have fallen into sue topography or our dietinguiahed critic

It would, therefore

. that .this eminent writ

wirranted in the eoiieliisioil lation to the American (.'ivil he utmost caution. bwniiw. hemeelves; because tiis iniiirntirelg erroneous; because lit*

is not familiar wi

WILLIAM A. SHUSK, First Lieutatant, Eighth Camlr!r.



inscription tolls us that-THIS SHAFT


3, i m x


What menioriee do them einiple wo

Tliu objects bad in view by the Confederat the battle of Chancellorerille, the- inrawion of in the wpring of the year 18tX3, are well kn
aHbtorlal d d r e r , delivered October 13. IRM. upon
t f b e mxount here given h ~ u b . t ~ t i * l lthe y uame Y t zlr I W l d ~ IV 4 7 X m of Ycpmmber 14, In?s. In the HWOry I n tho AOML of (be Wu." under the U t k of " Tb r w M with the aid of addlUoo.1 information and o&bl

rarirfer the mat

n of t h e &dlerllon OK em1 011 t h e rlgbl ihnk


af July, and about nnoii, afler a tedio poeitioii on the Iiatiorer ( o r Honnuglit
town-3alcI.uroaii's left. austiiig mar&, took lleilp ita intereeetion

of war, permanently, if

c x m n t j north of t h

brigade on the r

federate Cause by the h to play. NO time waa I

June. t b e Army of S o r t The cavalry of the Arm

Europe, w i s u bold p ~ i i i e it. I n the early d a p o f

Tlio First Brignde, corumantletl b

t h e Third Peiinsylraiiia Ctlralry. con

jaded from STONE


tliviaionx, coreririg tlie Edward's Ferry during tlie ical conditioii wan f u r short

division, coiiwisting o

Licutenant-Coloiiel EDWABD S..Jos uiicler Major MYROS 11. BEALYONT, u ii1 1er L i e u t o iia n t - Colone I J A Y ES 31 DnL's Light Buttery 6 1 E-G." First three-inch rifled gum. It w a s tein strength by tile loss of tlic First Pcnnay sc'ttn Caralry regimentr which liud been with tlie reserve iirtillery aiid the Sixth tioii of' i i light battery ( - J I * ' ) belo .lrtillery, u n t l e ~ * coiiiiiiancl of Cup l'oriicll Troop ot' JItrrylaid Curuli V A L L , were ulso ncryilig teniporari oii tlic ewriirrg ot' J u l i e ztltli, whi Jhltiniore, bee11 cut otf by the C'c
Peii rixy Ivau in ('uva I ry , consisted tenniit-Colont.1 Joiix K. I~OHISSOS. ti 11 der Lic u te ii:i n 1 - Colo11 e I W I I .I .I A

and First Yawachued tor a p w i u l serrice



alrJ;, wbicli, a s tlic Third

pointed to eomrnniid the In t h o iiiovenlonta of

which it wan composed. Putoiiinc. atter crossing rrito brce divisions, operiited i n with the First I h - i s h n h t h e Third Division the Division the riglit flank. e cliivct aiid shorter rout1

13rigrtcle of tlic diri-ion u i d e r ( ' 0 1 b w k trcm Iiaiiorer Junctic rear of the m i i y , atid protcctiilp nt ITestniini~ter. After crotwir1g the I'otoiiiuc tli aiid night. and, Iiaviny becri tor the t w o brigades arrivwl with

uriendurablo, tho dusi

witb EILPATBICK in elow

almost impenetrable. Horaes tion H I Othe O~ road. OBicers

could Iiavc been seen trnmpin Jrorirea to save their strength,





I,' I


talions of the First Sea- J

it. Thoee whom

end Captain

ft of the road

It-built etone wall ran Ae haa been stat of the Hanover an

u p near the intersection noon of July Id. Two

i t angles. about t w o nt, there was a con-

H o'clock the Cnion

of IRVIN Gnroa's brigade and loaded in the middle

tall ahent j u s t ripe for c wall was the keg of the at once perceived. and by the time oiir federate infantry was HANK'S guns had dela of time to enable IIR tc with our breech-locldi more thnn twenty ftaet oft' fimm the ivall After \-rinlF attempting to h i r e our to a more slieltered position. u l o n g the B

we rravhed it. k, the enemy retired piece of wood8 some

firing. Later i n the even in^ t tire darknean. turtied our right

aking adrantnge o f dislodged I I portion after some trouble.

During t h e afternoon tb

irmieh firing between the

Our rdrerwries pro era1 WALKER'S celebrated '.Stonewall wupprting it, claee at hand. acting a8 n
T h e threuteiiing pos

party of JOHNSON'S tuck of Culp's Hill.


Suddenly a party o

t h e party, caueing the Con of the ridge. "To horse

which came PO tiear noultl hare rendered the Iiei A b o u t 11) o'clock i n t h e rlie two hrigndee morrd o r e crosae* White Run, new the

It o f P u I p ' ~ Hill* ~ hnd i t Rucceeded,

rc. Tnriipike, where i t

reserve artillery, and order8 from Caralry

'orps haidquarter

intervals as skirmishera on

directed to re1

pxwrwion of the Second Brigade of the


tietremla Junrsor's and WAUU'I


S X W . part ii. pp. 5ua md SIR


tbe Rebellloo.Vol.




This brigade, known

diet-General G!ZOUOB A. waa c o m p o 4 of the F i alrp regimeote, cornman A. Ammt, GBOUOS GUY, Light B8t.tery L( M," A. c. M.PBNWIXOTON, with t h e brigade had bee o n the 30th i t had been ac airy at Haoorer, and

had obtained correct range of my n solid shot and ~ l i e l l into n i g comman Second t a n sections of Battery '*M,*' I ordered them to silence the enemy' standing the superiority of the eiie
rtillery, under Lieirtentrlut fled g u n s . On J u n e 28tli, he Arniy ofthe Potoiiiac.; ith the Confederate carn o n J u l y ?(I. I t was a filled than those af the r e a t e r , p a r t of it was fresh from CollfL.tlerate
Cil rill ry R t

, and were pouring

accuracy. Placing rtillery, i n position, ich order, nota*itl:.

paetoree green.

IIuntemtcwn, had eyent t h rmt of tbe I h i d Division'

own words:

t* o f

JCIy 2d i n biroiiiw with the


one aection of Battery '*MI," suppor Micliigan Cavalry. faced towurcl Gr Pike; the long branch coinposed Battery "Y," +SecondArtillery, R U Michigan Cavalry o n tlie left. and rigtit, with t h e Starenth Michigan iind i n advance. was Iicld i n rerrdii might m a k e cwnting on the O t f o center and left. The First .Vie <quriclrons to observe the in01 inen to be sent oiic niilc aiid

ot'(icttyuburg. H i s best described i n liiu




ill h i R

11 n stuff officer of the to more my command

at once a n d follow tho Fimt

bore iiistructions, 1 1 1 ~ d designatetl, when a nianding Srcoiid Dilate it i n position on iich position formed ay. Ppon srriviog conillland i n poziie I c a u ~ e t ireccBii, btit failed to tli*-

risioii, ordered me to take

tlie pike leading from Yor t h e e x t w m e right of our li

tiou, facing toward G e t t p naieeance to bo made on ni

ing two g u n s


ing from Gettyriburg to Yo command of the g a ~ l l n n tMtij me w wcll iiifornied of the tibled to niake my cli*position* with w n i General G R E p1acc.d ~ t C'CSTER'S line, taking position between tl, the Hanorur Road. Tlic Si I;REOO'S brigade, was clisrnounted n~itl. i n the tlirecti iiiored through the WMXIS riot proceeded far when a e t r \('a* found. After d r i r i n g c'ti vrilrFnien succecclecl, i n t lieliing t h e i r line coriiirctiir Ilill, and extending to t h had w a r w been clone, a HOWARD, tlie commander ivuw Idawed i n General G R ot the erlerny's cavalry
d i recti n g C UST E E'S bri ga extreme left of the ari

the lctt o f iirrrc~ral

iiinrr Turiipikc and

ving ae skirmisllers, Cicttyslwrg. I t had

e? Bad the Sork Tornplke.rnd the




... . .



odored to relieve Crm~u's, u

-1'. 9


G R E G G ' S C A V A L R Y FlGIfT


official report, the whole country for other hand, the ground occupied by h i ing, and niorc expowd to Ilia v i t w .

ay at hie feet. On tho ents wau lese command. OW Dutch Rorid crowes

It it3 needlesR here to

having encoontored vicinity of GZettysburg

in# on about two niilea tjirtliri i n tlie Baltiniore Turnpike about one
i n g as he Iiad heen l i n g had. of coiirse,

rly climctioll, strike@ fourt hs youth -east

a mile nearer GettyaRoad from tile Bnnf cmes'

bobad, like ou through a n enemy'

left and in advance o the elevated ground ing t h e left of Lad8 army

burg, runs nearly parnllel with tile Low over ltond at the I<EEVEB Ii~uscail strikes the Baltiniore Turnpike by the



rpose of occupying hich, while protectn view of the routee

ver White Riin about k , cloac to wliicli, by niu nit ion trninu wepturllpike and tllu our main line of brttlo lis of a mile north-enwt

assault which tvaa to division of LONOSTUEET'E division8 and Wrmx's bri

etationed. This, k i n g tlic nliortw u by our troops i n obernting betw Hanover Road. By the+ roads the wuu Jirectly acccsaiblr. . \ h u t tllr from the iiitersection of tlw I m v


That t h i s was Iris

Low Dutch Road and the erns position, extending about equ loatling down to J o R s Rvu north, to the LOIThouse on or 1mx-v. One aide of tbin piece of w the enemy's powition. %tween the house stand#, and along whi

which the HOWARD Road rune, and that

divided south of the cram-

from the spring-houee at R

The force under GUBOO numbered a not more than three tliouRantl were about to be described. It comieted o TOBE'@ brigade, IRVIN Cia

large open space on the


farm, where the Confedcrate

by h i m opponents.

.I .







two o'clock h e ordered Major BEAUMONT to mort




d, Fourth, and F i f t h Virginia


Enfield muskets, though Fourteenth, Sixteenth, a

amniunition, and consisting ofthe teenth Virginia Cavalry regiment$,

Maryland, and GXIPFI f o r b bas been eetima tween six thousand an

' with

yland batteries. Tliia entire Confederate authority ut he-

hia brigade upon

of relievinet him, he
a t tbe time.

line, and the position CU~TEX re around, sad that First New Jereeg ~1~' pickets, s taki

however, that the enemy wae all t 48 expected at any mompnt. The rdered out, mounted, to relieve Ccs-

he Firrrt Sew Jersey finward towtird the wooded crest about fivevig hw of R niilu i n front of him a i d a short distance beyond RL-HYELexpecting there to find the envniy. Thin morriiient wae II sign for the depltrymeiit of n skirnri*h line froin R~-MSIEL'S harn. where strong jlicket fowu of the enemy hud been coneealed, and which r mcv owppied a line of fences R short dirtence in front. The Firat :cw Jt-rRey was ditcmounted and took ponition behind a fence runi ig perallel w i t h that occiipied by the enemy, the right of the line u icr Major J A N E W A Y and the letl under Cirptain BOYD, and inimedir 4y became hotly engaged. Two squadrons of the Third Pennayl nia, undcr Captains ROOEMand TREICHEL, and the PUXSISLL Truo were deployed diwmounted to the left i n tlieopen fieldqand the 'o* other squadrons of the Third Pennsylvania under Captains M LER and WALSH,dcployod mounted to the extreme rikht of the wl le line, in thc w d s covering the croes-road above mentioned r u n n i ; toward the enemy's position, MILLEUon the left of the road and W ,SA on the right. To meet this movement the Confederate skirmish ne was etrongly reinforced by dismounted men, and a battery w placed i n position bouue. i n front of the wooded crest back of the Rcvr The Confederate battery now opened fire, a PBNNINOTON, whom battery was still i n position on the Hanover Rc near the SPANOLEB 1 house, replied with promptness. MCINTOSM once sent back for RANDOL and h i s guns, a t tbe same time reporl to General GREW that he wan engaged with agreatlp superior for and requenting that I~vra GBECW'S brigade bo sent up a t a trot rt him. That





weat of the L o n hobse tion, and a few minutes

lopments. While i n thia poaitbe tremendoue artillery firing

off? for the purpoee of joining EILPATXICICRound Top, MCINTOSH, who had
m in bie front withoat wait



be attacked.

Accordingly. about

AdJmuMbaeml u p

QTbm mqludmM nnder Captdw MILLER, W

Am d ~Ham



k 4


' I

e. H a v i n g t h u s pierced
eniy iu flank, n1iic.h b i i c KINS' brigade in fiwrit of' left of the eneniy'o l i i i r . nPTos'6 nnd FIT% LEE'S center a n d leA of our line were p i t i o n diemounted alou t h e lef? YO as to cover tlir JIanorzr , ' s i me n 1 mi p por t i iig t 11eiii . R A SDO 1 , a n officer of ( i a n a l . d ith t h e Imttery. liaiviiig 'IIEBTER'Y section. 1 % ~ t h e t n o batteritas soon of HLMMEL' a h

c h a r g e upon our r i g h t center. As i rode o v e r quickly to t h e L m house Maryland prepared for such a n emu coming: ou t h e field, had moved t h cover the Low Dutch a n d Eanooer i n g more effectually t h a t importnot which was to t a k e i t s place, was j from t h e direction of t h e REEVEB h o u w in w h o w a s near, also saw t h e emergency, squsdroiia t o be formed at t h e gall
the attack.

be had left tbe Firet



As t b e F i r s t S e w Jer
parallel with the line of t h e c h a T h e Seventh Michigan a d r a n bot o n coming u p to a stone a n d it, began firing with their carbi s p i t e of t h e h e n r y fire, until i t Both regiments then fought face to face carbines a n d revolvers,

f tbe FiRh Michigan

a t once drioeii back, with tillery.

of oiir liire, b o t it was loss, by t h e effective fire of o u r :ir-

e fence with t h e i r

came u p and aaclixted t h e Firs

cer repeating carbine*, t h e Seventh Michigan g a v e suit. T h e First Yirginia, beco h Michigan, who had amiet could

e tliaii a dirriiionnteil brigade advanced to tlie support t>f' m a d e a terrific onnlaught upon the mmunition fimom t lie e op to relieve, held a d slackened, t h e Fimt S e w sqoadrons, which had been

encceeded in mounting, advanced u n d e r t h e Seoentb. It was inore than even t h e s t a n d , and it wae eompelle faet a d r u n c i n g to ita ausietance.*

T B o W B B l w l to t Firet Virginia

witbdraw. T h e enemy, &st on tbe r i g h t a n d then iaoiane came back upon attack, rod *io aod agai Tbe rigbt of the Fimt w i n e d at tbeir part of t $be laat pistol emptied,

T h e Jereeymen a n d Penneyld sesisted in t h e wpulet, of the

fell back, b u t not ontil t h e y had

being tbe g a l l a n t Major FERRY of

d v a n t a g e of by t h e d e w a s ordered to

nce, e m e r g i n g from b e h i n d e STALLOYITH farm, a large f HAXP'~ON a n d FITZ LEE.* E v e r y 8 , t h e grandest a t t a c k of all, were Id be decided against t h e A r m y of 'e last reserves, a n d hia last resource. reached, a n d havoc created in o u r


Though ordered to retire his g u n s towanln sanlting c.olumn \vas directed, CHESTER e n e m y WBR within fifty yards, a n d th had come into t h c line of hie tire. Stn tion of t h e t w o batteries, t h e nien i n column d r e w in t h e i r horses a n d w u r column fanned out to t h e right ant1 le ing on. ('USTEB seeing t h e nien in th tatc, waved his eaber atid shouted, with a fearful yell t h e Firat Michigan r i l l ead. HCINTOSH. as h e saw t h e Confed S.S r adjutant-general, Captain WALTEE a n d TREICEIEL to rally t h e i r nien for a ch But eixteen men could get t h e i r h made for t h e battle-flag. SEWHA moment, ruahed in by t h e side of ROGERS Whose squad of t h e little band. MILLER, vania wals already mounted, fired a roll r i g h t as t h e Confederate eolumn pawed then with sabers d r a w p . charged t h e enemy. T h e small detarbrnent of tbo a n d TRErCHEL s t r u c k t h e e n e m y NEWEALL wae a b o u t seizing tbe at hia head, a n d h e was cornpelle t h e color-bearer lowered hie s face, knocking him senselese a n d mun in t h e little band w mme moment, MILLER with his squadron of s t r u c k tho left flank about two-thirds of t h Going throogh a n d through, up to t h e Confederat back past RCXMKLL'S t h e h e n r y losees which he bad suffered a n d prevented hie g o i n g f a r t h e r a n d t a k i n g it, . Meanwhile t h e heads ,of t h e t w o colnm by HAYPTON a n d FITZLEK, fighting h a n d to hand. McI such scattered men from th could get together, charged i aeemed like hours, amid t h e small armB, t h e frenzied i m

the head of the


n firing until t h e

t h e Confederate

turned and the

as if in rt*riew, with

d i d t h e eame.

of admiration. It was, indeed a earewt, opened fire a t ENNINOTOS a n d KINster a n d shell were poured into tho na could fire. T h e

with orders to R o o l r ~ s t h e flank a8 i t paeeed.

t Michigan, which,

as i t had come haid formed close colunin of squad-

t h e head t h e T h i r d Pennsylt b e woods on t h e el with bie line, a n d


, sod placod himself

at i t s head. Tlie nearer, t h e Confederates outnumhering creased -first t h e in t h e van of Ibis

ow, in spite of the lessons of t h e

own t h e column.

a l i g n m e n t was maintained. CHESouble canister i n t o t b e i r midet, hie y t h e armful. T h e execution w a s



o n e led

drew nearer and ne

I '
Third Pennsylvnnia a by t h e time t h e Tbirci



of t h e staff, seeing t h a t a little , cut his way over to t h e woods on mho had remounted d find HABT,

d not be withdrawn.

CURTIS. had come u p 0 of nrtillcrj-, had con

past RUYYEL'B, a n d t h e eneniy


d r a w n rip i n column Road \vest of t h c Lo Six tecn t h Pen nsylva tlrr night, upon the changing at frequen eapcwially a h i t t h htrarpslrooters, a n d line, t h u s etliciently maintaining t h e a n d cardry, sild p r e v e n t i n g a flank field. T h e moral e of t h e field of t h e position, w e n t far t

between o u r infnntry rn t h a t q u a r t e r of t h e

o n e hundred atid forty enlisted men wo one hundred and t h r e e enlisted men m

and 004 omcer a n d tal, t w o hundred to be ed hie l o s w ~

part cpueed by the

woun+d, who w e r e
e w to t h e Tork T u r n p i k e , prepara-

aiid t w o hundred and m v e n enlisted men

hit iiclred a n d forty-t H-0.1

I ) .

Tbr wrlter * v u

a t , and in the morn

r e c o n i n show tbe loow (0 bave b e n u lollorr: brigatla. four enlinted men killed. t w r l w enltrted
rder m c m n t e ~ p a ~In ~lc the battltflrld.

ne omcer and t b m

elghtern olllren and one

and P m Lm'the dghting. be

Ins the ktIle.and the


the ~ p u r01 t



l i t at Gettynburg


o n e of the

birrow the language of CCSTER e annals of m-arfartb to procliice of c.u\-alry t h a n ttic one j u s t r r COUOt5d."

iae. T h a t we. on thc contrary.

G~lcoo and


struck the Army of the Pot0 eimultmeouely with PICKETT'B front, when our intuntry had Cemetery Ridge and but littl a success-the merest tyro io t result woold b a r e been. For Army of the Potomac; fortu buman liberty, he failed. Tbank GOD His Divine atmistance, the good fight
o u r arm8 !

to make the aeerrult readily tell what tbo

ere brougbt victory to

CU~TICB reporta. I n d e n j i comrades, will also

moat critical momen

a n d t h e turning poi hue not been the cas

almoet nunoticed ; J t h e three arms of t b time, each within su a n d each in ita pro campaign allowed u

that we saved the day ut tlir ettyaburg-the greeteat battle War of the Rebellion. I know that i t g historians to give us credit for having i r e uu credit for having done sgement, of which tho infanfighting on the part of the cayalry pnsartl w m the o d y battle of the w a r t in which combination nnd a t the wnir diatance and within sight of the otber T h e turmoil incident to a n active

Comrades, j o u r work be beautiful in ita simplicity, io silence, from far and n on which you fought 80 well. Before w e part, never

who h e r e poured forth the full the cauee they loved. And wha vive? That you, my co fight will alwaye be t o you a pleaeing mem drea and your children's children hear and

cpay a reverent tribcompaniooe-io-arme, ir lives' devotion for

ok at Gettyeburg.
"Ob! ~lorione fie1

cords of the campaign, both brooght together. nnd for the first e oBcial niap of this field has been
~ ~ a 8 V O S T k X ~ ~


11 his Inrge force of cnvrlrjTiilon a v e l r y at one time. when the two l'onledents nearly driven from the field of the malo Byhl. but llmred our cnnntrr h b r u r b l a v e a n in.


the following payer it




uma of eavalrp, proinul war,it may provoke the pertiape excite t h e indigna
now in that e e w

m y endeavor to state facts i n my liberty, incidentally, as I shall do, f the crude theories regarding the distinguished oftleers i n the late of some of the old veterans. and, some of the yoooger oftkern who been better instructed, wllo
62,we were glad to get a douhleder at that-and n saber resenlleather scabbard. euch were the of the scabbard ran over the shoulhe Peat or trousers' pockets, small hareracks of cloth. tbe etirrnpleather by the side of Oar saddles were generally of tbe al r i o p were Btitched tu a t Thus equipped we started to the

poataem the finaat w

Wing a ~IWJS scythe blad ably a m issued to us.

duties are the hardeat and moat preca is by far t h e most oxpen and eecondly, to record whom I had t h e pleasure to know pe in the army, where I waa enabled by rect estimate of their abilitiea, and pro aa oBcere. The following exbibit, intraluc liet of the plecoe whero affairs, ski were fought by my old reFiment, t federate A r m y , Sorther thoee i n which some of i n nianp other battles they perfo reserves or supports to battcriei, p against attacka of the enemy :


od intimately, while ationw to form a corir akill nnd jndgment






tacb the coat or blanket et army in May, 1861.

mrvanta, who follow

f the privates lied their hodr

their mastem, and generally weal and woe. I should like to svhich would L'ON only the t i m e the preeent, will content myself worthy of iuvestigation, as it bas ae its g h m y eide and admits of maeter and servant. It haa been R a higher and purer part of a little to the strength of states, nnd in the cnstoms, habits and noble , will never acbievo anything om d-ndanta" ;J : Firet, to vindicate the en-

istered to tbe wanta and

cooearned in 8x8 with the remark tbat it in ita beantiee, and ita p t b e t a coneiderrtion creditable

that "a people which acbiewemente of re wortby of being re M y immediate object damace, pertinaci

....................... '1 2 Q 8 I r I a ' c m r......... ~ ........... Hutwmod Church.. H I @ Wdge_.... ............ gaw4wo&i ............... ................ .......... Si~o~rTow .............. n 1 ............ Toul.............#.." .................. ............. - 1U
F v r r l l l a . ........................ cett*m.. ................
.YuuNwn orbem algbUr rounded.

................ ..... ..... BrL- 8I.UOIl.. ............ 6 8 ..... Bcrr7pllle.".................. 5 4 ..... Buckc(Osrl1k Yd ........... I z ..... Yd ....... ...... s s I Buckhod Va.. .................. 2 ..... Brldgmmicr.. ..................... 5 ..... Berer Ford ............. I ...... 2 1 ik-aV,';"a, ................. ..... I 5 ..... CUnnfogh.m'B Ford.. ...... .!. 1 ..... cmm co0'.O.p - ............ 1 ..... 1 Cold &arbor................. 8 lr ..... Cb.nallomlLla ............. 2 ...... 2 ccdu Creek...................... I ..... C r r r K e m ...................... 1 2 Domlrtcr.................... 1 1 2 Dralnemllb............... 1 ...... x PUnt H I 1 1................... 2 ...... 5 Port Ksnnon ................ R 8 ...... Frederickmbug ............ 2 ........ 19 PlreFortr .................. 4 3 ..... Funkuorn. Yd.. ............ FmOt ROY8l. . ............... z 1 FmllbCburch ................ 1 ; ...! .

t 1 1 ............. 4 10 11 .............I ..... .... 1 ............. 2 7 .... ............ 1 ........ 0 ....... 4 7 .... luua~.... a w6 ... ............. 1 2 .... ............. a 10 .... ............. 5 8 3 L ............ 1 ......... .................. 1 .... .................. 2 .... B ............. ........... 5 1 1 .... .... ............. 1 u 1 .... t - ........... 1 ......... ............. 8 6 .... ................. 1 .... .................. 1 .... ............. 1 1 .... ............. 5 1 ............. : 10 1 ............. 2 7 .... ............. 15 S I Yd .............. 1 .... .................. .... .................. 4 1 .... tb0 ......... 6 11 ... ............ 5 a, .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . l a 9 la ............. 1 I7 .... Id,. .............. .... Id.......... 1 5 .... ............. 1 1 .... .................. ..... 8 .................. 7 .... ............. a D B

nsramd).; 2

. era


I\. ~4



n a large degree, its hponaor; if h e t h e r t h e m is a mutual dependence. of love for a n d pride in m y old regipart," i t will ever bent the m m e ; ita




iiotliing b u t the t r u t h , for t h e glory o f tlie o of t h e other. I must beg indulgence for digression

m w r i t i n g for sola brare inan cat11 Y as they did t h e i r

r off mountains,


surge back n i t h their mellowe~l

On each w a r e of sound there i s

bed o n memory's pago, '.arid their rom m y h e a r t I t h a n k GOD. most

u p tlie paper herctoforc shown with tlie i

.tliffic.u Itiee t h a t t h e Coo fedcrn te cavalry had !keep mounted. Credit it with t h a t rhowing

ouut in orrlci. to aggregate niimustrntion of tlre

.ai J hained.

*Otherreginiente irirry linre a better I show our lnte adrerwaries their I bave named, t h o l i n t of wlricli pagee of t h e JOURNAL. . If we re-

I i

General STL-AE~T for deeignating his (STL-ABT' g i u i a Cavalry, a n d RADPOUD'A t h e Second.

Ieaveu, leaving bodies w r i t h i n g i n

niand First 1%-

n. -4nd t h i s wae d o n e a n d known

e v e r eaw; agood disciplinnriaii,a 6

monnmenb a

r a n o t h e r point: M a n y gritrid t h e p o n d w h e r e h e m e MI,

stood in line of battle; thiw i s

as u b r a r e olflcer, pinion of tlie r e g

ular nervice, and undereetimatetl the r a l u e o hirii rerF unpopular with hie corninand.

tcers, which m a d e

be epot w h e r e


loyal spirits" sped

iee around it dowers a n d gram

t b e y blow, "Here Coofedemtee



ulations that it became the equal compoeed of the beet material in mountain section of the State, Xany of them cou!d cut s of the bighest trees, or kill a been accustomed to homes from



uniform obedience to all of any m&ar regiment. the land; all the me

running deer witb a rifle, early isfancy, and could yet h e regarded them si learned to submit willi because they knew too I can hardly give a by describing what hsppe

olotions,and could never be trti8tad letration of his temperament than e were retiring from Yanrssas t with a part of the rogiment on R Gonerah GEART and A B E R c R O M B l E small squad of Aoine thirteen men town of Paris. I dashed in them back to the colonel with

were operating, and dincar

of the First Michi

and as these men were w When the p a r d retu adjutant), which r a n keee are received ; th next hears from you,

ment ou account of m y rough wrappings The General mid : You hare aurely had a rough day; I insist U F n you throwing off yonr wraps and eating a piece of turkey. P *hapsa little brandy will remore the cbill and numbneus; I was j u ; about to take some mpself, and will be glad to hare you join me wfore dinner. Thew wus no time loRt i n joining him was whnt I imagine that of the old Fa1 himself, must hbre been. I w1(c18c) h u n ~ roast turkey, wcll garnhhed, niacle rny front of it. Tlic toddy gave zest to iny a a6 it that turkey fairly flew; * * but as I appeared i n the right direction. Th pal, uelially req- formal, was, on that day, siniply chr 1 of life and graces, C-ridinga h i g h Iiorw. but still an el tlemnii. Aa I left. full o t admirat harirlg for. tile firat t i m e seen the inner man, lie said thank you for yonr prompt and satisfactory report. It hat you wctlt as yell did, on auch a daj- 8s thin; these p t of U R are like the

follows: CgYour report and tlie Y8llbids me aay he is fearful lest when he and your command will be in the Old n g too uear the regnlars, d 1 0 Xanasean General B E A ~ R E G A R D e senior cavalry otficer, the com. E.JOEINSTON promoted Genbat upon the reorganization ad well as his marlters. I desire to make here a reeorc e r d J. E. JOHNSTON hurled hia t

e. the importance

Jnet before the battle

had promised to Colonel mand of all the caval era1 STCART,which he determined to le
of 1861-2, I had four corn

ar Cedarville, in the winter

1. While riding out one rery rough I J. E.JOENSTON, who issued an order for a 6old avalry pickets, and mid as I headed his beadqoarters. The next morn,and I went by for m y ordera very before me. Late in to make m j report; Iic reat once relieved of all emhrrrracla-

day t o ioepect the cavalry

the list he wished me ing it WM enowing a

t u r n doubled up by Gener
After that battle chan am filled with expronmost affectionate- cer-


of confiden

wived me


cordially tha

at Manaswae a8 it was re

.. 1

I. I t
been w o r k i n g q n i e t l y b



t h a t g r a n d old m a n , i would bnre resulted

tly in a n o t h e r direction, at Harpers NS a r m y . H a v i n g by his celerity hiepered a b o u t t h a t i t wasnt BEAUuabble in t h e papers followed. EWELL. d , had fniled to execute orders nhicli truction of t h e Vnion a r m y .

coinniancl of General LEE, h ployirig his time in g e t t i n g liis leaders plans. , W e had
*bow. Our eainpaign waw al)otrt

home for safe kee EEOABD again forgot it. was replied to i n a witb

fame, for Genernl BEACmade a similar statement. w l i ~ c h

dlen sounded w i t b a wild cwnpaign had FITZ Lm. A t Gaiueevi

saddle up a n d bmte nricl Radt will be long remembered. Our n. I left Centerrille with Coloriel

the m m e time t h e A r m y of i n euch a plight. It m a y h i t a a e uritlergoing a r e o r p i orderod rtn election of reg$ tlie a r m y . Very fcw regini a n d t h e a r m y would have g o n e t o pieces had not this s t e p been anticipnted. T enlistment of men a t this timo made burning8 a n d their conconi t h e be*t a n d most conwientioue omcers w e t o t h e r a n k s ; untried men, sometimes pol were placed in command of regiments, whic ttie old order of t h e i r workinga; but, upor

iration of enlistmet,tw, ion of officers nnd 1yt e n t ? dinorder. heartetired or bad to r e t u r n miana a n d demagogues kmpletely dieorganized e whole, t h e r e i i g a n i inticipated. T h e new I dough leavened a n d n t o t h e butterfly, but ded a n d gone, a n d the oat a n d t h e necessary IT delighted t o wear. o be t h e beut cavalry pith it t h n n ever. nd relierod JACEBONN dry io front of BANKS ipped back via StaunJOHNSTOXS command ick t o Franklin, tbeu on Harrillonburg a n d , rurtain of his forces ed back to join EWBLL, ,in with t h e speed ofa I part left a t h i n cnrttor W ~ +o N constantly I not comprehend t h e im his home artillery w to s h o w t h a t h e W I L ~ ntil now picketing on

t h e meat packing eRtablisliment t h e r e as long as I could. T h e n ia W h i t e Plains a n d Or-

On April l A t , Generals White Plains in Fanquier artillery. T h e y were 800 10,859 men. I n t h e S h e n a eluding 3,652 cavalry. G e m o n d forwhich t h e bblk of

, witb

a n d ABERCRONBIE had arrived a t 7780 men a n d 14 pieces of

JOHNSTONmoved towardn RicbN8army was marching, leaving ONTS Mouatain A r m y ,

General EWILL, with liia divisionetationed at Laniont Point, five miles west of Gurd
BIX and M C ~ W E Lat L Frebe

r C. H. to Madison P,u n d e r JACKSON, t being under t h e




leaving the valley to join Generd ve on Richmond via Fredrickn-


look aRer General J6cDowILL, now

moved back to Mediaon

e r i n g BANKS' commancl, w h i c h ian we could bring oti. Next we rksrille, Martinsburg, to within a

left more plonder and were m o t from Winc

WheiGenoral JMKW borg, General ASHES, of

rper's Ferry to move back to Strlrhshall speak further hereafter, i n had been driven from Bolivar arper's Ferry, niust be Bent to

to which h6 w

ton, and was ordered to puah o n road, which we knew could era1 HANKSwas reinforced

fernal wogon train move as tboagh a

, and glanced at that into us to be d a w n by snails or to 1 proceeaion. Yet t h e flaming dis-

before they get away." SEIRLDS replied "-Yo force of the enemy worth speaking troope) ran a t the sight of 'rabble csvalr: tary to us a t that tinic). I will retake I)OWLLL, hiit you must Bend me meo to take i t if you don't," and he called for W I to stampede JACKSOX to Richmond. (st S I I , Part iii. Reb. RecordR.) General M c the Secretary of War, at U'ashington : as a condition of being able to atarnpede some cavalry of n kind I am uuable to givt are ae good a i I hare. and as to hie preve .minehow' I fear it will be like h i s intenti' tloah rivcr, *somehow' ( t h e bridge harir 'rabble cavalry') his command is not i n c he names. It has occurred to me that p' effected hie purpose here, may now go to burg without being strmpedcd to do it." Perhaps if t h i s wnrning by an officer had been heeded, things might have h e r mond. SCDOWELL Iind the instinct@of properly appreciated. Tlie Federal reports show one continue tion of the cavalry liorsea; but think of 01 green graas, without salt-which could n( santly day and night, and bringing up tlic McDowmL's adranco was now at Fro0 proaching Strasburg and we near Harper's a t Strasburg, after a march of thirty-six hostile army on the left of us, and in bur as our own. Wo halted facing h t b wayi to give bis men a breathing spell, aa they spur 80 long i n order to make the desired COI noble ASHBY, tbe Dxousm of JACKSON'S ar bridges on the Sbenandoah River, and the ue, 88 we bad rains to cool and refresh our tbe etreame 80 aa to delay the enemy w 1 borned.
t i

,m Manassas Junction:

they (General G B A B Y ' ~ -(not very complimen-. valley and rejoin I c BP it. The women will :ing cavalry, promising is letter, page 326. Vol. )WEL+ niiively repliee 10 nerd SUIELDS asks for, ie enemy to Richmond, ini. The Rliode Island ng the eaomy's escape, of crossing the Sbenanbeen dentroyed by the dition to go to the place ibly the enemy, having iclirnoncl or Fredericksf acknowledged ability little different a t Richd d i s r , but ho wau not complaint of the condi011 tlie pike, feeding on ~e hnd-moving inceacar of everything. loyal, FREYONT wae apirry. Upon oar arrival iles, we actually had a mt, either one as lurge determined nd JACKSON d been under whip and actions. A s a s r , e l l a n t , 7, had destroyed all the emeote seemed to favor wd troopa, and keep u p the bridgee had been ity of numbers, b u t be sckenedcand his t m p e pported by the Rackand h a d us incee-

JACKSON made up in speed for the dial

had wrched t h e point when epee3 mue( be

General YCDoWrtL

IWM. Gooeral BAYABD with hie b r i d e

taile, a rifle battalion, w a a very enterpriei

It ie a matter




mntly day and nigbt,

between the two we h artillery which had ammunition, stood by US hand whenever the occ8

a lieutenant of artill

Jdexiesn War. Our had performed feata of

\vas eqUally bold. *o that tumble" time. Our rplelitlicl anrl plied with c a p i r e ' l g i t l l ~ attered ita projectilea with ii Iavhli J offered, in a way that ~ v o i i l t l IIHVC t, or JACKSON Iliii1self; wheii a i c h brilliant servicu tturiii:: t i l e N'S foot cavalry," poor ti~llow-. unparalleled i n wiir. Gener:rl


hard times," be W U stil

''Old JacK"did not liirve a -01nstructed, but IIM went tip ant1 W h e n the numbers \\-erereiliictd by to meet the enemy. At tiriius, w a r l y behind them on their horees. valrj-, openetl on tlieni w i t h

their long range guns.

ctician, arid I liiive :iIw:ty* the end of the wirr he \vouI~I adder of fume trs 11 cavtilry rceptioii i n fathoming t h c t a r m of LEE, AsIiH1' w i i ~ H e never grew w a r y o r h e was a6 neiirl>- ubiquisoldier ever sat ii Iiorrtb his steed, and he kne w those he rode scenied to wishes. He wa* fearlea*, and ;LN his men, they seemed to be inaytrying circuiwtnnces by e would lead just whcrc no one elw his men were placed they hlievutl s killed while undertakhad always farored hini e to t h e well once too oRen," and e day before the battle witb a n infantry regiment an arna masked battery" ben account of its expoeed heel right and lett, lot the battery rce wbile the infantry

everything to be kno know and anticipate modest am chivalrous;




Port Republio while pr

p i i r e d their vollc~-s iiito ttic r x l w s e ~ l pons of the encm?. After ; \ s i i B Y ' s death. (ionend BH .\[arylund, wpecially diatinguislwd 11 while thcre WBR yet anine confiision re tinguirlicd P Icader. l i e clrairgecl, ilro 1,ieiiten;int-Colonel KAIN: coninland ~t-oun~letl. nnd held possession of the c o badly s v o u ~ ~ ~ ltc htalt they coiilcl II That night big-hearted. grand o l nietrt cwnrteti h i m to the field. where \vouiitletl. who were atrried off behind t o others who were necessarily left. h a r d h i m saying to hiinself: ;*The tlie great inil)etlinient on t h e road t like 11 drag." W e were I I O W off of *-loblolly," because of the rains a train more captured horsw than only with great clifficiilty t l ~ a r tma The time tbr action had now a almost reuclietl IL plriee of wnfety, FREMOIIP'J mettle. Leaving Ewr 80s piwhet1 nn to Port Republic to look hiR dispositioils on the rout11 side of the that point runs almost east anti west. Cross Kepr. but before we arrived there, :dry had Iwen severely tasecl, as t prewetl 11sclosely. Many poor, b who had endured alriiost to the the weight of armu, amnrunitio marches of thirty milew n day. Hundrec nfterwards strayed away to the to die there to being seen exliau o f JACKSON'S "foot cavalry" loyal and royal atfthe beet t YGRAT or SEY.Although they wore no perhap#, the mlidity ot trained regular ligeoceand dash, uo that RonietimeR 8 me would pull off his hat and give a yell with him, pell-mell, a whole hrignrie, all to do, no matter where tho order came

the cllarging
~ y s ~ n of y , tII1.


ansllming c,-,lnmynd 11, tile Ionn of (lie1311cktai Is, nrecl




many men

him cheer snme of the valry, and give money returning with him I

SHIELDS and to make ndoali River, which a t L fought the battleof calreaclywaid,the cav-

uniformw, a n d lacrkod, , they possoeeud intelwith a bmrdlese face, would carry forward
that it wae the thing





ot of young fellow i n ir duty, they Iiad not d at WincheHter niatry unition for them that we could bring connected with the infantrj- loyally r nllowed the Lead of nt once sending thetn ter, as the case inight leased with their s w eady ant1 willing to

t h e service and ever r

superior guns and all t


tind tlre pririlege o f witt w o regiments of c a v a l v - , ns. and also a regiment of
e irnpreseiooe received are eadem of tbe JOURNAL. I situated i n the ootekirte If miles from thoir barand from the drill keop their infanground from the arrimno, it impreeeed me

IIILE i n Dhseldorf i n May, 1891.

be tbe cavalry had

the arms tbey wanted,

n r a a i n g the drill a n d inmpeetion c

to be dragnone, and before two years r w e had an abundance of' carbine

and YCD~WELL. With b

ita plunder, commnnded

D IX .L 9HIELDY to thoee of BANKS, es pumuing ours, laden do\\.n wi!h

and beautifullyless. Day afterday g went on, and the artillery duels

and hour &r

h a d been wou

meantime JACKSON
L=B had prepared

t to him to enable h i m to clear

n MCCLELLAN'I right flank be-

movement which h
nceived and arranged in 11 executed by his truetod

the Eleventh Huerrars end the Fifth U h infantry stationed a t the same place. 1 herewith recorded for the benefit of t h e The drill ground of these regiments of the town, from three to three and a racks. The Germans utilize the daily m, ground to settle their boraoR i n t o regula, trymeir i n condition for route marching. While, of course, this remotenew of barracks i n onevoidable i n moet Germal as being productive of the inoat exccllent to protlur*o equally good reaults if gsrrisoirs. If. for instance, onr infantry clcr their full kit, march four an hour o r two and then wot1ld n o t be necessary as ambulances for men and comptiriy chnnged station. In the cavalry, not only cnn horses




;Briqp+ocnerd, snad Btisadc, Lesa Lharron, A m y of Northern Vi+nrCl.


, I



All this occupied froni ubout cj A. rona were Iii:ircltcd txick to their bti



h d just takeii place. I n t l i e afternoon. tlit-e IIIIIIC t w o R mounted and gynina~stic. exercises. a 1 ilrill very siniilnr toourn, then i n run iiinn clenrecl n Lair nboiit tlirre feet I i i t!ie wootlen horse i r i sewnil tliffere cuerciwa oil ttic 1ioi.izontal b a r ; tli Iiome* i n vlirioiir wnys. such as b huddle with stirrups, but no girth. etci T W O days Iuter. when the otlie I ~ e n inupected i n n manner bimilnr to nien ln each squadron who had lw irig arid destroying telegraph line This completed tliu inspection of the eee it. Whetlier o r riot the General went letters bent nrid letters received b o o b n
After the completion of aqua cornnicnced. A n them drills were nat oiily differihg i n detail, I will d rnent: A t ti A 31. the regiment colunin ot threea. I atatiorietl watched it file p u t . Tlierc we counted only three that were walk wtra very slo\v, but on fa soon found i t was close on to moved along I w ~ careful s cloaing u p at the rear of the c guit or changes of direction due to tlic e town, but tliere waa not. T h 113 I ever aaw the bead move with us.

and inapccted tlio quadroil. and caaw

be any dtecking and

rooked streets of the

slight unatesdineae at the r down and mooed as steadily I then moved out to t h e aide of t b e colomn

galloping or fretting, but I

if any borsew were

1 .


ad train, and this,

Appeorancee are very eitber at the walk, trot, or and eseily that it is d i l c u l one ridea with the column. movea at exactly

too, at a t r o t

of t h r e e m e n were dismounted ; t h e n

alternate cbeckin with un.

watching Gernian c a v a l v RO a m m t h l y ice t b e rapidity of each g a i t until r great beanty is t h a t e v e r y horse , BO t h a t there is none of t h e eo common in a long coluinu

ing a n d still slower in remounting. By tbie time t h e U h l a n regiment

rived on t h e field the other. Starting at eent t o t h e f r o n t and anted toward8 each r r i v i n g at nbout 600 or undHl; when about

Every horse moves

700 y a r d a a p a r t , line was formed a n

250 y a r d # a p a r t tho charge wae 80

front into line was 809 plabmne at a gallop;

at t h e drill g r o u n d , it was ve of pi ne timber ; t h e n first formed coluion of i n t o line at a gallop, two of the wo to t b e left of t h e leading squad-

a p a r t t h e halt, t h e t w o line# pulli other. After t h i s t h e Husnar regimen column of squadrons over t h e h

ereral times mnrched in

,and t h e n

contiuued on

lese than t w o minutes.

ment had whoeled enBc the gallup; the reKiment

across t h e plain. T h e u beautiful manner, t h e e otbern increaairig t h e h moved nt a gallop. When t h e rrgit b e forward was sounded, and then forward for nearly a thousand yarda. t t h e least crowding or a n d nien dismoiintcd.

throe feet high a n d from 100 to tervals o v e r t h e drill ground so will have to t a k e t h a n durin three to six feet wide ar After t h i s each captain d Hhort timo, when t h e regime barracks; on a r r i v i n g at ba drilled in t h e lance a n d

p are placed at inart of a command


In t h e afternoon g y m n a s t i c Once or twice per week in tilo a h

taken o u t on a reconnoitering ride b y 'rho German c a v a l r y ta conimon Ben88 movements, no m o w those which would bo of use before n tho leader a n d g u i d e of his


at Cternw n bat t a I i t )it g thenwelvea hoarbe th assembling t h e i r

i n g practiced except Each lieutenant. i s

their c\iticisrne in qbout,dve minutee t Qf p\rrMons and m O V

hulf mile or more, tbe fore, when i t WOIB whee

t o n e of voico.

After t h e lapse of
u k e p t up for probg direction sererul

was remounted, wheeled i n t o colunin

geant-major a n d t w o princi to tlo i t ; in fact, t h e r e ia rr acljuhntcl. sergeant-majom our drills. Line is formcd t h e moet convenient a n d rapid m a n n e r , order of squadrons. The adjutant is staff of8cer. It is o n l y RAer obaervi tions like thorre of t h e G

uite B n u m b e r of hen t h e regiment

wae diomoaotod to fight on

purely and siiiiply aa a



can one imagine a



forming front into

han a battalion or regiment routc, with tlre adjutant uiiil

tlic corps commander o n clowii to the Joiily look atrony, but daily denionstriitr


lieu tenant. tliey not ability to Iwrfoi*ni the

physical work required of thcni i n wtr. In piace of our cereiiionial guard 1110 simple one. Tlic sergeant of tliv gurrrc a r e reported to I i i r i i , inspects them ai) ,411 officer. cowwpoirdiiig to our otticw

clettiila wlien tliey hein to their pii*t. goes on for 11 w\.cck


drills in postiiig guides ' t i i i d ooniit not assume a want of'cornrnon st hi8 troop in line witliout sergeants? C a ~ i: ~ n y OIIC'

imagine why

;ill the formality of our guard mouiiti

p i a i d i n g a hay *tack or rick of wood


of waf; then wby tlrink they have ao

in timu of peace? Tho Gerinsnr b to sutlleiently practicae even tho

many even niore than our o w n country. being iatroduced into their cavnlry-all thc troopers now ride tlrem. F where a nian IIHRriotliiny io do horae, or for 8tecl)lc eIia.-ing and crow liorvc is liable a t any time to fall, the be one, for the reason that it in a good mddl

at Engliah saddle is

cerw and about half

e11 wcldlu in a good out t!f, and beaidc i s a n d children, BU atc,,and their men am

em parades, guard niountingN, bled except for inutruction or

ever had a n y doubts about ou seat with long stirrup# being the best of a German c a v a l r j conimand t
tfic-era get apathetic and coated with bew formations t o take place. Hut e Gerniane h a r e

valry, one observation

tbe eight of their inwecurebeat, do .so. I think that our caval

oon8tant drill and i n d r o tbeir men and otlicere i andl

' 1 0

much carrier.



i r



clotbing, b i d e s reqni o r inspection polish up f a saddle would meruly well if not better than



.p e a t deal of time to re-blacken and With the leather of the natural color to be tpaehed, and it certainly looks as leather. The -me remarkn would all-

lly what is known i n America


type. They also we i n addition

of t h e pommel as with us. T1ii.r our officers to carry tlie saber, b u t e aaddle would interfere with our



would be a convenient I think oar method of troopers carrying it in

Dismoaated, the BP
ber worn booked up ( front au with as) OD a the rear instead of to the

of t h e blouse. This is certainly a n g the saber-belt outside tlie

bloam, where it tho blouse in a

be saber-belt worn under the blouse, and epum, is t h e neatest and full drem is a caricature, and n favor of abolishing it nltogetber.

The German cavalry how p a r c b d & tbree and four-y yeare by y selected men befo squadron. Then for t h e next eoldiers 80 that their docilit, With t h e different conditione cable to train oar horses to p e a t improvement if the tra or a year, were made compuli

Bre magnificently trained. They arc r-olde, and handled and ridden for two they are put to general use i n tbe rear or two they are ridden by the old and handinem seem almost perfcct. f our wryice I regard it as inipractile eame extent, but it would effect a ling of remounts, say for sir months ry tu our recruit drill now is.
WILLIASI H. SMITH. F i d LLulouant, Trnth Cainlrg.

it a possibility to improve the tacticr nabrr exercise? Is i t a possibility to de\-iae a better plan than iat preeented in our eavalry tactics, for t h e instruction of our c, alrymen. to make them more proficient i n the use of this iinpor nt weapon? I t h i n k eo. and coneequently submit the following:. I n order to understand what follows, : is deemed advisable to give the following resume mncerning the rber and i t n urn. The saber belongs to wliat are known a hand weapons." Tbere are two ways i n which theae h a n d weapo act ; to deliver a cnt or to deliver a thrust; and. according to ti different ueea, riugly or combined, to which thebe weapons may b t, we arrive a t the different grades of hand wcapoiis, the princip, which are, the straight erg Baber. sword, lance, bayonet. cavalry and light I Sow, the object of d l theen hand we i s is to pcnetrate the 3 of the aunailnnt, tbe body of an nclrervary while s t i l l i n t h e weapon remailling i n the letter'w p t u p aheri le cut or blow has been delirered. T h e linnd weapon w i t h which w( hall concern ourseh-ee; i M the cavalry saber. This curved steel hand weapon in e u p ~ ied to be usud both for cutting and thrusting a t an adveraury, coni luently it ellauld cornbine tbe qualities both of a cutter and t h r u B r . The requisites of a thrusting weapon are iat i t be straight, taper to a p o i n t and have the center of gravity in ie band; tlie requieitee of a cutting weapon are, that i t be curved o as to preRent as few pointa as poaeible to a n oppoeing surface, tt t the center of gravity shall coincide with the point of contact or hall be as near coincidenee tu poesible. From a string attached to a stone, the f mer held in the band, the latter whirled around the hand, we have case where the center of gravity is as far au possible from t h e ha I, giving 08 great force at the stone but little control over ita dim1 ; tbe usme would be true, in a leee marked degree, in a saber arb L) the center of gravity lay too far from t h e haudle.


I n

much curvature. n o r is t h lioridlu to prevent ita effec Now that it liaa these tbruuting weapon?

center of gr;rrity aboiit his thirty-ais inches long, tiipc1.s o eiiable i t to be uuecl, wtieil w\-capon; ~ i r i t lit Ilas riot tor, r of gravity too fiir :iw:iy froni tllce an II thruster. ~tloubted quaiitierr, t h e qiicatioii lintY a cutting slid w l ~ e nas i i

l(;rcmoat, wlie~i ~ o k un o w that i t iant

CI ) iisiderw

I b u t t lit. succes

tlir shock tliiit must be oirrt wliicli, it i t rc.aclten

Our presetit suber is very cffec



iiivhcs for arin extcbiiaion

u thirty-six iricli blade, ti at t h e ti

the two layere of akin, to

rat d t d of elanticity tn iuscular farccio. to the walln of tlit. i e bone. I n H I I ohliquc

ni:rriy rt~scsmore, froin sacldlu the trooper to reach libout three

getber; 80 that, in order t ble deliver an oblique cut ae a cutting weppori uwcl ia very effective.

le your adrermry, wherever pmhil i n g r u t ; in other words. tlie saber

tlirust i n H caralry charge tlia after tlie sliock atid wlien the arwtilnnt

thrusting weapon, its efficacy dei t s point, arid this power depeude

tilitg of the saber as n thrust. I n a cavalry directed ; the .motion e h u m a n a r m is capae saber should be use41

lry Taetip, we find thut *the prompt, Rure and deit is made imperntirc. take the position ot cat is to be employed. 1) past traditions, or sed to be produced raised on high; but

cigainat caval ry or infantry-by all mea well forward i n tlie arrddle. During the against infantry and the tbruwt or cut demands. Iu all caees where I tray ledgo up, and tbe reanon is according to the Tactice, it posite the right aboulder, whereaa i point is a little to tbe left of the i g made, becaum WQ are auppoeed to f saber i n the left hand and
leA hand being up) tlie point would be shoulder; and i n the present Btierce pa

lie cut should be aeed cavalry, as occllsioii

ed. If we held the

which would then become

; I






the blade iota the adversary' nsber around t h e hand ; whe

the other tending to revolve the th, i n a true s a k r thruRt, Rhorild

atunrlly, the point will be to the

be a reeolution and the saber tend

to revolve toward the a d r

alryninii. The forloer w e are getti likewiuc t l i c proper method o f niak

tbe $ 6 tierce p i n t " is of the third motion

reginiuntn tliere aru vary fcw officem irnd 1' men wlio underatarid t h e thorough URO of t offensive and defensive weapon. Tile enlistet but otliceru, who are rebpon*ible for their i n s t iiicioos system of our Tactics concerning t h e the eause of the decline i n the attention p i d tf

tiem p i n t to the h o t . Now then, aa regards tha of tbe two ways of executing
f a eucceeefol saber thrust in the ae the eaber is withdrawn the ly, thereby causing

very few enlisted cavalry saber as an ion are not to blume, ttion, are. The purber exercise must t e he proper instruction 'e barn from tlieni? irres, not wholly useriut supple, and get $8. We ehould folject that troop comen these erercisos ~MJ anner beforo the i n I application; and aa smplify the different

the trooper's disablement,

to make each troop to prepare ow to defend himself uld be adepta i n the

UR(? 80 1u)



able to impart tbeir knom-Iion more tban the manual of arme, losing sight of the priniery Not 80, however, with the eaber ; the past two decades. Tbe men ber of different c.oinm:inds to



W i t h the exception of two pointe,

not i n Tactics), there isnt n single o be used by one dismounted man agai
one that ever would be made froin a

rciaem that would

are not more than t w o parries that ever require. Why, then, teach the inen all regnids efticiency i n conflict? Why not method of offense and defense? H
de according to thc crienigs position,

made m the Tactice rilieted men a mne


I n like maiincr, the

tiurce and

of distinction


once ninkee ita appears

i n war, tbe 5ret thing with i t entirely, and in nd mounted ; and if the

If, therefore, the object of the

hand i n the position of the must be had to ite applicatiori are not to lean to one side, k, nor direct the blade
t h a t be must imagine himself r intorvala he should j u m p u p , and then sway back

to wliaterer will find practical appli as regards the saber exercise is to do ita place teach the fencing exercise on wen have been properly t a n g h t d trol over their homes, very little

ized ; a proper hall, with aproperly san and each troop drilled at leaet twice a with an adversary, never any man goin Wooden eahre, weighted by le saber, center of gravity in curve, andeven improved a8 thick buckskin glooee and p

should be set aside, d always each man h the motions alone.

exerciee and substitute therefor

whole mt,and he should

i l


I ; .

winter months, and the dril instance, for a post of nix tr

r that i i i t a t i s l t o c i l t l be exercised with t h e s ay i n tlir right. Thrrc w i l l coilit. n tinic when porn( asai-t i i i getting iip the 'hetic*; them tliei ~ ~ i ~ l ~ l l tlic ~ ~ iiriiiy l l ~ l iiicii l ~ will be worb right -hi iitlctl.


twice each wec4i diiriiig the Id be ono hour i i i duratioii. For uch as Custer, drills would be arand barrack nlioes: o n days

?r i n the left hand as w e l l

rinbidestroun offlcer will w i l l be 21 few disciples, and ~g left-liaiicletl l i e well as

from 1O:YO to 11:30 will be a n d Sundays? .

rills every day escept Suturtlaye


3" Troop. 2:(1tIto :<.oc~.


E Troop, I c ) : Y I ~to 1 1 :30 ;


Troop. 2:OO to 3:OO.

Thai coloiirl aft' the Viiitctl Staltos :II y will li:ivt* 111c- reginleiit par t,.lcrl/encr wlinsc incn will be able to I ; tlic s t i l i t ~ i n such II inniln w . tliiit w h e t l i ~tbeg ~ arc oii font 0 r . c wl~tlier they have t l i c , *alter i i i tlie right or lcft h n d wbami tlwy come iir Iiostilecontrict. be I i r ~ 17nti)rtiiiiaitcslFwe itre g i v e n too n i u c et 11s *tart a reform, and nf' ttiiiig3 witlioiit yielding to the tapirit. good must cnine of it. Fortorlately it a i l : L good ilenl of useless drill nut of the lifi

during t h e winter.


nowe it is the biggest fiircc that

ineficirncy, 1i:i.c-e come near sounding the d of our corps." desire herc to esprem my thanks to n tain 1'. S. Roucs, F i r s t Caralry, for the e s mitted me, to pursue my itleas, with hiR troo development of the recruit (of which I eha fencing exercises.

t h knell of the "emblem

troop commander, Capisire opportunities perconcerning the p h p i c n l say more later) and the

Lieuhant, F i d Camlry.
d if their work ie to be taken atwo winters' practico will make :I

w e a p o n h t b offeenaiveand d will be brought to lifi, and

e; the dead arid now useleas saber

take ita proper place as tho arnre

- 4


weapon (saber) mnet be ber band or arm ehould

be right hand.

Suppose the sained o r punctured, what then'!



pect a n d d e m a n d of it.

I n war, t h

a s e of t h e cavalry under t b e i r corn

JernandB, expect a n d call for i m p UhlnnR to lie down in o r d e r to secure infantry f i r e ) . Tbia i s a v e r y woigbty

er fail t o m a k e full uin i t by exceeeive e w h o ordered t h e

ion from t h e eoemya for t h e most i n t i m a t e e, a n d speaks volumee visions. For t h i s

reason t h e r e exists a necessity t h a


ZC H O H E S -

in c a v d r y division orgsnizatio same ycar iu t h e maneuvers of t h e o t h e r a

I t h i n k t h a t isagwat in a n earlier letter, w)

yeara. T h o opinion hns become w

up with how it is to conducat

s t r o n g l y maintained, t h a t , moet valuable service for field, t h e n our cavslry can ority which iLobtained i n r m of t h c service. It can I W ing, t h e caralry perfornis t l w
if a division of froni twelve to thirteen

ions be accompaniod not correspond to t h e

our army t h a t strntegical superid e m a n d s arc macle upon i complied with d u r i n g war. It cannot be denied tlitrt at t h e

and t h a t i t should be enemys cavalry. It

t h e m a n n e r of meeting t h r . ten t h a t t h e overcoming of

in peace t h e carnlry y appliud in a m a n n e r

ceived idea t h a t it in t h e r e eo

t h e infantry-that it is ai1 auxnow t h e characteristics, c a p ry a n d must be exercised in . T h i s intimate acqiiaintaiice

earlier lettem. B u t does n o t that o a t t a c k s m u s t not t h e same troops m such importance t h a t a e i n those troop incapable of t h e few d a y e allotted to fie greateat a m o u n t of experience and i tactics. Bosidea, i t is entirely with of t h e maneuver to limit w i t h t h e infantry. A n a

arms? H o w many m e d a y ? Attacks of

in field work or battle er of t h e commander

L- 1.1.
A & *








*N can -sign four e n t of four squadrons arid four


intiintry is n l w a p intnct :), then, t h e

alry division of four regiments i n hand and may be assignccl

portance that all the c a r d r y slioultl with the infantry, a8 niuch for the

be bluiiiud for losing all desire to act hitiiself and h i u command a source of a
an(I to nllnw tlie feelings and pride of tii sidcs, twiiig pl:iced Iiors-de-conil)iitis nio t r o o p , and touc!lies their lionnr inore.tiirii a n evidiAiice of'their misfortune, tlic m o u n t . r i i i t l I)eing c l i s r n o u t i t t ~ d iriridu t h e coirsiiIcri4 a piinixIimcnt. True! the ditticultj- ~weseiitriitself to

rnlry commander cannot t l i the infantry, to make

iwnient to the witnesses roopa to he injured. Bemore piiiriful to mounted IIII of !bot t r w p . I~caupe, Inlli,tetl rmoiin niust (lit+ 811,. of action is ponrrrilly

iirnpire that if lie slioi~l~l

iiicreasi n g cry a hoiit t h v dest r w -

he c.aralrynian n i w t seriously
canuhler how he can avoid It must not be expected tect u s from this. An tho ti in war, a t least a t t great effect that the former times it wau withdraw when it found it of withdrawing before tlie that once during t h that i t was under in

no one w i l l dispute tl1c ttle o f 8 war escrts. 111 to ortler tlip tirtillcry ( 4 1 he infantry. Tliis way irifantry became so Iinbituul. tlidrew with the esplunntioii a sheep that tliey had not illtheir bivouac for tlie night.

ing away from t h i s old

r cavalry nucceeded i n brealii n g according to routinc, arid

t the hands of tlic If each and every attack of caruccensful; if it ia d w a p went to shot is beard. before dotermin-

ompire bowever superior i dry opon infantry i s dec

fir aa poeuible from the infan inactive, until finally the en

diecooraged and neglected, leee cavalry actions. If cava after tbe boldeet and bout rid

Idr iteelf' alinost detached,

ry, which bas been likewise

portunity for small porpose-

bedgee aod ditch-, bae come enemy in compact order, simply becaoae it has fallen opo i .tact infantry (and a t -maneuvers

1 I:

clwlare tlic cavalry tittrick succcwsful. t i ( ii1ioii w1iic.h this a t t a c k t d l , dcetroyed,ai cusc. cnoiiot. : I I I ~ ~Iioul~l not give birth t h n t i t is poanible to ovc.rthrow it by :in ~'CJlliptlct r i i i d w ~ l i.sccutetl. l if tlir riicn 1 ni'ss anti stand firm. Hy sn doing tic n t h r c i f the cuvalry which would 1 wliivli iniglit litire tlic niost disastrous c I Iiave foutid a *.vtry by which it is pc \\.itlitbut injuring the self:confideiicc of t iiiiipire, irAer tlic cavalry lian execiitea ripinat infantry, which haN niaintainec c q ~ c l iof tliv partien would have w o n n v bellmged to the same army. a%;d then c l back according t n the clcniarids of the distinctly uiiclerstood that thin i N done troops, and is voluntary, and t h e r e in tioii interrid is ugrrin ertablishcd. A will maintain its confidence and t h such a deciaion inany dieagreeable e ot'tcn arise between the ler~de oiie hue caused the other to be I t is mainly the b e i n g place which is done eometimee with m tlie desire to tako part i n them; cisce, and stifles independent i commandem. If a body of t combat by falling into an unfortunate made an nnaucceaclful attack. then the co run tlie rink of losing their calling a t a the cotitrsry, become Rkillful i o avoidin torncd to tinding pleasure in r

l l u r t tlevlnre the infiiiitry he, ii~)onthat vi1-w- of' tlio

(in idcn i n tlie infailtry, tack of cavalry, tinataver I oiilr preserve their cool~ l t create l i n the infantry witliout foundation. and :t during wnr. blc to eucnpc this dilenima ier of the arm@. Let t h e correct and fine attack self' properly, grant that

or t h r o u g h baring will not willingly , but they will, on


. .

airy i n a greatcr d

-combat becauee i t

attaoked i n t a c t in


DOW be made? I n war evidence of the

ap of t h e cohesion of'the onemy's

to be seen lying ermined with certainty, a i d if tion t h e supreme moment may

within w h a t time he can a n d must e x k n o w s b y a eort of intuitive feeling. It is only b y aucb maneavere in divisions t h a t t h e cavalry will learn them in actual war. It is t r u e t h a maneuvers. are very different from t nearer t h e t r u t h t h a n mere tbooretical concerning which we were unable to co i n g which t h e r e existed different

at t b i s or t h a t place, one

deci*ion. a n d concern-

t h a t the umpire declares w Beeidea t h e regulations t

fantry i s to be attacked
firing upon it; i n peace t artillery ia firing at i t or

m a n n e r in which unbroken in. If t h e cavalry does so it is nerved it, a n d is remaine in doubt w h e t h e r t h e her object, in which latter caxe,


Thi s meseare is a very considered i s true, a n d ecribe it. B a t it ie a p u n i s by t h e troop. A body of mounted CO-R whioh ia die

of maneuvern d o not so de-

which stncks i t s a r m s , or a d must reniain for a n hour incondemned /before t h e o t h e r uch more interest a n d lore for e l y placed hors-de-combat, and applied as a punishment for

instructive, a n d t h a t t h e tr them, w h e n t b e corps we when aucb a course of

cavrrlry allowed itself to be h n t r y or artillery should be opened lire upon it, ete.

confidently of t h e opinion th with t h e i n f a n t r y if h e firwt led t h e through t h e intervals of o u r e n o u r o w n infantry. brought t h e m 1 furnished $im t h e opportuli a n d s e n t him word to a t t a c k wrh had reached its height. The brigade engaged infantry line a n d wiali ttic awful uproar of tlie rapid fi f a n t r y upon t h e e n e m y , t h e y lie in t h e i r ivar, arid t h e cavalry r i d i n g o v e r some of our ow11 i pita, before t h e y c*ould have gotton t b wheel off a n d grrllop around o n e flank poaei bili t y of breaki rip t Iiraug more a p p a r e n t when i t is considered t h a f a n t r y is constantly swept by t h e pami buwinells in re-supplying ammunition, r e a r , fiold hospitals, etc.. all of which m I f t h e cavalry learned nothing else in t of t h e year of which I h a r e

d e in squadron columna

T h e y Iiad tier attacked. The im-

i n f a n t r y a constant wounded to t h e
innul maneuver

enemy. Something ca during war Ohere is n o

in estimating numbers. H u t ationa. After o n e has repeat-

flank*,and t h a t t h e y muat let t h e infant felt betore t h e y make thcir a t t n e k ; a n d t i o o fully rewarded t h e ca t h a t year. But t h e i n f a n t r y must learn i are to conduct themselrew in cases w h e r e m a w s of cavalry iii thei

e time to

make i t s 6re ngle piece of informaexercises how t b e y are made by l a r g e r

. .-

Wlio haa aot obaervud at ni ae the uaynlry uttnckecl t

though another had taken the moment i n whieli our in which the clitirge home enemy upon it. the tavor Yarch, March! Hurrah! aibk to the front for thc 1) the ground gained? How presenting this idea, hare infantry and given this co practical representation of unity of action mirat he pr if it ie to be idopted in war. T h e divisional cavalry i s daring an action; no compa place without b e i n g awom
already mentioned the w e

erw. and cveii i n war. that. :IR sonn try became passire spectators as role and they m i g h t rest. Is n o t ia inarked, and cannot shoot, i i r i i l cavalry has clrrtwii the fire of tlic tunity for the coniiniind * l \ c i f to gain as milch groiintl ~ E ~I O C aiding tile cHrnIry. n i i c ~t o neciirt at innneiirera. fiw tlie piirport~of personidly into the nirik.; of the myself i n order to give tlicm :I a1 action o f the two nrnir. Siicli c i n c l nmle to bcconie tlie cri-toni inclislwnaiiblc to the itif:intry R iwoiiniiisaaiice of a i *mall one or two ctivalr.vnitw for thc






loeating the pcritions of tli nonierous examples, eren at

is made of the cavalry i n qiiickly iy i n battle. I coiil~lintroduce rmiiig of ai village ( Roiirgct) of

, -

not by tbe enemy, arid of h and artillery was eecurod aernss t h e opon field w h i r b and infantry. Bat t h i s is cur nowhere dinputed that the in i h entirety must be @re of oar adopting the organ

krted actioii between the iiifiintry na of mounted inen boldly riding 1 byaviolent fireof both artillery coals to Ne\s-ceatle. With us it is

111 practice. in order to a v watch alroiild be inclined so sniall lainirio~icpoint project But. xlpprwiitly. tlie sun i i i twenty-four lioiir* t~ circlc iridicatcvl upon n watch fbcr stead of only twelve, which

- ot tixing tlie s u n , the

urt o v e r t h

4igIit osc.illiition.*. the


: i t *etviis t(J describe

sista that a c a r d r y rcgiment rieion, and there i s no danger a t the French had i n 1870, in ision u n d e r the iiiimediiite tlirec-

united i n a brign

tion of t h e corps command


All my considerations notbing i n the hcretofore poa coneider it extremely deeirab take part, not only in (field maneuvers and dioiaianal maneurem of cavalry

he same reault. I would ehange nization of our cavalry. I only

all the cavalry Rhould tinnually io combination with other arms f mixed commands ) but dno i n


will be properly oriented, t h e line

to orientatiori by nieaila o f t h e btcllite aiitl t h e hun are d l (listuation of t h e Nun a n d moon I , clitfurn by twelve hours: the r niidiiiglit where t h e N U I I was

on fro1n tllc. I;1*t,

nliilj)c~tl ti1111 i n the


iiwrcl a s :I

c.orn~i:isrr,c o this

W e k n o w that t h e s u n i

eaat tit 6 A. W .

T h e Niin i n in

Nombore from S. to W.;S . Numbers from 8. to E.;S .

, 2 , 3 , 4 , b , t i , (W).

tire. T h e n t h e e n t i r e chain h a v i n g 8 red at t h e waist targcts. Finally,

d b y r u n n i u g 300 ste-p, r u n to the last position, mned individual fire at e reeervee, -hen a e n 10 following shows the

h e hour hand and S I I . polnt the blwctthe l l n e S I I - V I helng.%utb-Sorth

Number of t % a w n .



a c b m e n t of tbs Eighty-fifitr h n ita ~ Cliawaeur detachment

Zd. X uHib. duroJ Mo

P JRUI. a w .


Night Bring of the C h a w

I6 32

I ? k 2



3 ! 2 I 6 32

fixed fixed fixed fixed

8 fired x4

weiut wdst




-__ sigbt,smearing it with a8ubetrruce er yet is alwayu to bold t h e bead




9 14 11 10 6 6 4


3 . 1

l b


I 2

6 4

9t 9


* T n m u Ilgbted by 5m.

thrrntr p h a d on the creat of the entraoebmc..aC

A t t h e time of t h e firing, thirly-two me fired without any appliances, airteen men a i t n n i g h t eigbte.


_ i

re coniniendril l ~ y tht. pc ri e rnls. t Ii irt br ign olo~icls.thirty ii1:ijoi.N o Iiuiidred licotrtitirit*.

The most wonderful part of the parade, of the army known IU) the Runties or the These are the Prcsidcnt'R favorite troops fine6t soldiem of the world. I have e w n



CABPENTOE, tho OTOYB, and rendered memorable for all








R. I. P.-Broad

drrolc of August 3 .1891.

in B u f i ~ l o Express of July 4,18.31.

?E EFFECT A t t* moment of writ ng which eorred at Chatha , mente T b were being i w incident im nothing to d o it bot mimp y with the stop i


we hear of rather a startling incident bie week, in connection witb experii t h Mark 11, ( t h e new rille). T h e the merita or demerite of the weapon, powere of tbe diminutive bullet;
der more brilliant Rer i n f m t r y otficem admit every mans head that the e w c e s e of Baroow it actually was. The fi

he fixed idea in shaken infintry, fold greater than 8s w t u a l l y made








brought about. Even repeating ritlee w I1 not change thin. If ange cavalry. With every thing, they w i l l make the task easier f mal ctrll ie made on the increme in the rauiditv of the firc, r o P inaiis mind to re.& thk temptation to 6 will never be orercome i n youug soldier these, or the utterly uneducated, half-di t h a t the German army will have to end practical data. and not on theoretical scli performances of ideal troops, that t h e GI -18 far as concerns our own army, let an! the Sikh campaign8 and ask himself wt ned cnemy t h e n the old meet a braver, better-drilled or more dete a t Britinh cavalry ever K l i a l ~ ainfantry; yet it is not on recorc r even behind entrenchfailed against them. either i n line, squar pi. 19, 1891. menta.-Army und .A*(ti:y Gazette, London





oel Theodore Ayrault Dodge,
a coneiderable literature
m o d important part
u o n the very ground

an w i t b

A W O ~ ,


accounts. arid of fillthat Colonel Dodge ern conreniences of

cellent, nuinerou'c. : r i d litrrry operations. -11-

cat study of the great rrtruggle, b u t

q h the klndoea of the author. hare heen






in& o n Board of Men-of-war. Obligate f Russian A r m y . A F r e n c h Opinion o Moltke. So. i o : Imprresions Regarc F r e n c h East, West and K o r t h Arniiee Maneuvera i n France. Two X e w Caualr< 71 : Portable lloepital Barrack. T h e Toure. So. 72 : Establishment of an I Rnseian Maiieuvcra Between Saroa and

Racing of Ofscers of the Geld Mnrehal Count Von g t h e Operations of t h e January 1871. Autuinn Zegiments i n France. So. igade Wedell i t Mare La n t r y Regiment i n Franc*. raunoe Selo 1890. G r a n d i\utunin -3fuiieuvcrs i n Switzerland. ?5 i 3 : P l a n for the Y a n e u 75: Horees vere of the Vnited F o u r A r m y Corps i France. KO. for t h e Cavalry S c h o o l a t Saumur, F m ?. No. i 6 : The Cavalry Saber as Tsed by t h e Field Artillcry. teductione i n t h e Freiich W a r Departnieut. S o . 77 : Fatabliehr n t of a New (Fifteenth) Cavalry Division in Rnmia. K n a p mc of t b e Aostro-Hungarian A r m y . No. i 8 : A r m e d S t r e n k t h of thc :ongo States. Combining of C a v a l r y Skirniisbem with Tagdcamr ndere io Rueeia. Experimeuta at t h e . i u t a m n Yaneurercr i n Frai e. Reserve Troops at t h e Introducing Velocipedm Imperial Haneuvere in AuRtria-Hungar: ne by Artillery in Rnwia. in t h e RusRian Arruy. Shooling at B.11 KO. 79 : EstrrbliRhment of Mixed Regim itR by t h e F r e n c h Cavalry. A Runuinn Opinion o n Reorganization of t h e Kloglieh Artiller Cavnlry Mounted Firing. Military R a ray Service i n Italy. No. 80 : T r a i n i n g Syetem of t b e German F i 1 Artillery. Target Pnctice for French Cuiraeeier OfBcers. ho 1: A Practice of t b e Germ a n Horee Guarde iu August, 1891. Aer p m e n t of the F r e n c h Cavalry Ofscers to Squadrons. Remount for t h e Soudnn Dirrtrict. Spanish Foot Artillery. No. 8 2 : Fre b OtBcem in Parliament. Seniority of Captaina a n d L i e u t s n a n b of le F r e n c h A r m y .


No.22: T h e A r m a m e n t of Cavalry A r m y . I n f a n t r y March Formation. 5 t h e Italian A r m y , 1891. No. 23: Infai tinned). O n a Velocipede from Borde Saber Question. I n f a n t r y March Fhm Contagion8 Diseases i n t h e A r m y , (con and March o f the Cnvalry. Organizati erland. KO. 26: T r i a l of II S e w Boot.

Contagioue D i m in t b e e Campe of Instruction i n 7 Marcb Formation, (conx t o Paris. No. 24: The ion, (continued). No. 26 : . iued). A R i g h t Amtnbly I nf A r m y Corps i n S w i t r Contagious D i s e a a e e in the



I . . , .

*. I ,

... I





Septeniber : H o w the Next War to Get to the Sorth Pole, by D Wolaelc~y. Let Germany Seize A Down w i t h t h e State, by Oiiida How Calvin Burnt Serretu

ry of the Armada.

enienl Method of Orientation. For-


Modern Cavalry .4rtiilery, SVI. Decirive Sortlrcrii Yoluntetw. Fi

a Mixed, Isolated Briga

ern ,\pproaicli t o S e w Tork 13riticli .\rniy i n IkR1.

Carbine Firing.





April, lS!bl : The Madras Army. TII Deacribed by an Eye Witnesw. July, 18 Our Recruiting Grounds of t h e Future f pending ALterationn in the New 6 1 Cavalry

Storm of Geok-Tepe, a8 : Prize h y , Snbject: the Indian Army. Imegulationfl."

July, 1891 : The 3fawichusetta Vc inteer Jfilitia, Part 11. American Polo. Part I, Illustrated. Aug e t : The Yaaeachneetta 010, Part 11, Illuatrated. r Militia, (concluded),
July, 1891. lune 15,1725, to Decemi n America, l i 7 6 - l i R 3 .

. u .1

r .

I -

i l



Sb& at Gettpburg.

N. T. June, 1891. ACADEMY, \VWT POIBT,

1891. TEEIOWA ~ I w T o a I c a LR ~ C O R DJuly, .
Henry Dodge, Colonel E irat Dragoons.

of a Flag.

The Histc






so. I S .

or, 1891.




W ' O


Wastiingtou, D. C. August, 1891.






I wYork. I

origin, ae far as it ie known. hie develo of to-day, a description of t h e variou8 by thie dovelopment; and a deacript tute a perfect cavalry h o w , adapted requiremonte of t h e service. than the horse. H i s phpical con

into the perfect animal xcellence ae attained point8 which consti-

, I

Some parte of hie anatomy are ana of hie diseaees are Rimilar.

it does many others of great im rnce.




years before CEBIST.

of the horse, ie in
that tbe p a t pia he would natnral

Central Africa; and it is conjectured rk Continent produced him, and that way into Egypt and tl ence tlirougli
apon philological groiinds that lie wiis
:is a iiieann of conveyance acrom t h This con*tarit companionellip and roli

pori tlic horse. create a

The first home was r 1800 B . C.,or 200 year8 We know the Greek


king of the dewrt.

death of JACOB. it# detailed and tho-ough descripequent y seen i n our

inferior to t h a t of all the

a nomadic people RO fondly cheriwhea. Arabs of the Ased tribe went up to J e

upon his marriage with the Queen pliahed their mieeiari. they told h i m t

legend reletee that eome 1 to corigratulate Sotoba, and, having accomey weru fur from their

of the Israelites who sent to later SOLOMON

in the country.

r ; the qame ie not mentioned by any that country. Eight hundred year*

sufscient suppliee to laat them on their to bring from liia etable8 arid give to t blood, the breed of m-hicli hac

S ~ L O Vgave O N orden, tallioii of the Ishinrrel

In acconnting for t h the Arabs divide his his

ior excellence of the r/lodern horse, o four different epochs 1

place their beet rider. armed that hardly would they have gathered


him to foal-getting, and by obtained the breed whose

pastoral people. T no qnick surprises,

hie urufulness i n t h e war



p o d npon the Arab IW a said, Wboeo maintaineth a magnilcent loan where tbere ie a tborough i n order to train a b o w next world aa a martyr. Paradise h o w of whithersoever their many of t h e Propbete ut roeult of hie teaching is, t
As m n as the foal. i arme, and walks around

THE HOBS6 will show that he is good or bad. If g o a they invariably get rid of him. The Arabs water tbeir horeee bat or a b u t 3 oclock i n the afternoon i n s u m t h e winter seamn. Ther feed bark& bu When barley ia not to be had, or after a I esertion. they feed h i m camels milk, wI tlic brniu and tendons, and doea awuy u :1iit1 which is the great enemy of the wnI their horwes, but wipe them down with nose-bag, which is made of hair. I n wii clay and night; and i n sunimer i t ia ke nflernoon, when it is removed : but is pu cli*ink. the diet and the exercise, are all to age, place. and season, w i t h the great The .\rabian thoroughbred is yrobi upon thet*arth.if uped a s * nieans of ariir of endurance excite the ndniiration if nc not accustomed to the liabits of the deM w niocli barley as his nton limb, that eats a miles a thy, fnr four nionthe, without 1,


:hey keep im, and if bad



ted suckling makee a

ion and hardens the

i n twenty-four houmr, and about 1 oclock in nee a day-about 8unset. we haa undergone a great ti they claim strengthens t i fat, wliicli relaxes tbem orae. They never groom wlen cloths, or with the r, the corering is kept on o n u n t i l 3 oclock i n the n again at 8 oclock. The aduated and proportioned care. the moet perfect home locomotion. His powore io incredulity, of a pooplo A home .sound in every I will contain, can go 6Ay by a einglo day. If in

the reins are p a d over age of three yeare he is e

wheel around quickly, to le

etc. let. A ehort gallo Zd. A etrong and

race, to calacol, to

life. This i s not too free1 They unmercifully fat but spare him from t h r e e

till death.

They MY that hie constitution ebould be d

without giving out for want of food, water, or re&. I n judging a horse they niea~ure from the niiddlo of the withern to the end of t h e dock ; and agaih they mensure from the m ddle of the withers along tho neck between the ears, to the end of t le Rkin on tbe npper lip. If these measurements be equal, tbe pome R only gcmd and of ordinary speed; if the distance to the dwk be Freater than the diataoeu to the end of the skin on the upper lip, t e h a m is of no valuehe ha8 no I[> in him; but, if the distance t ) the end of tbe skin ?n d by rest and care, and nn abundand after this new Rtagc: of life. he







It is claimed with muc draught horse-the g down tlie Ganges, Rtoriiic

aim t h a n either parent,

development wliicli it

cs Iic

learned of the re:

delivered t h e Turkish Sultriri into his son. was diapatcliecl from A i i g o n ~ to

JIIRZA.h i s eltleRt granda w i t h 30,000 Iiowenien,

ordee of the tletwrt, ant1 the

YoIiinrclietl to Sice. Europe was

obstacle#. The coni.

iviiig tliu sovereign

o f China.

the Oxus and J e had detached

when dratli put an of the deaceiidanta of these horsemen territories conquered by Z i w i i s and T day hare about the wnie qualities a* t


Their hamerr of tobore their nncestore

the Tnrkmari and the Bashkir.

The Ai

rganir k. the K i rgh ir, breed ie rr-mmetrical

f donpment, hiit is o
g r o w t h iind attaiiie i t n form slowly. not before i t is peren years o f age. It is ge

leading the life o







TME HORS from every q u a r t e r from which t b e fh Of t h o r e s u l t r e are quite uncertain,


return, a diatance of abou j o u r n e y waa accomplished i T b e best s t r a i n of t h e K

iilea. Tho t a d a y a n d a half b o w , is known as t h t Ldef. T h i s iklin which ?dfor rapid are distinguished f tlieir good eed a n d endurance o t h e Atlef liiz or T u r e Ktrrabair. tie s t r e n g t h wtlier rare, !iy caii pos1c.tuoue and k i r nor tho
IiniiJ*, coni. ck ot'a cnrlirilf
i t liiir

mounu were procured.

w n to the r*lo-c c i f t l i n

T b e horses of t h e Siberia eire, but yield to a superiori a n d Tahiklio. T b e crowing of a n A

partially conquered by t h e Soeri. th f i f l t i c e n t u r y t h c Goths, ai1 e n t e r p in most remote tinies had circled the E provinces of Asia Jlinor. inratled a
o f tlie S~uanish b r w d in rabic blood, introduced

sew them.

the couiitry.

But undoubtedly tho esc time WM o w i n g to t h e stmi

isist geiier-

le ltusaians.
The above are ttre p r i t e r r i t o r y east of t h e Ural southern frontiers of w w t e
b u t ita excellence i s nttri ian blood. In t h e vast territorie duced by t h o s t u d s of t h upon imported A r a b e a n d of t h e m o o t r y t h e Eng 1 s e n f h i e o t t i m e h a s not 0 cibat nunibere to have, native breeda T h e C h i n e , Siamese, B smell, eeldoni higher t b s n t b e d of ~ horses in t


c brniictic$

t h e northern province*, lor s e w n huirc interniirigletl with the n a t i r e breeds, elerrirth c e n t u r y ita liigli reputation; K i n g JOHN imported o n e hund p r o r e m e n t of tlie horse for agricultural 111. impoi*ted Spanish Iiotws EDWARD of liorses f'wm hia k i m d o m . HENRYV I I . continued the en forrnity of effort d u r i n g a l l t h e re but t h e reign of WILLIAM 111. is t traced to o n e of t h e great liorscs: 1. T h e Byerly T u r k , ridden I A Y ' S Irish wars. 8. T h e Darley Arabian.


Tliu Arabic ntrnin

e Spaiiish horse of t h e

de t h e e x p r t n t i o n

reeds is t h e lihornysan, Btrong adiiiixture o ' t h e Arabe only superior horsts were proices who were mainly dcpcndent an#. Since t h e Englidi occupation ibred has been intrclduced, b u t n o r hap h e beon introdiic-ed in sumked influeiiee upon .he various

a n d Jrrraneae horsca are t-ory British Idlands, is not o w h e n C ' X S ~ R iiivaded the country ' ~ y t h e Rowith t h e nalire m a r e s

T h e rn stride which characterizo t h e Eogliab of endurance a n d elegant s h a p c are no

modern thoroughbred.

rse, whilst tlie p w e m inherited from eastern

the ieland, 55 B. C. m r o q t h e borees of t


men of which may

average Rtraiti of the high fail i n the training stables

hemirphere at the t i m e of it

l i v i n g nninirl from tho cont

of .tho New Worlil.

nessee and Kentucky becaiiie settled tbei people iiianifested auch a foiicliiess for tlir sport that they were pla d among the most prominent patrons of tbe turf. The Kentuckc arm# hare produced mme of tlie finest specimens of the American t oroilgllbi.etl. Sew York did riot @how much love for c turf until the b e g i n n i n g of the prewiit century. and puritanical S e England haw never whown niucli fondness for i t , even to the prewnt ne. Since the Civil War the lore of racing ha@greatly iiicrccraetl tnd the tlioroughbred ie renred i n nearly every State i n the r'nion The trot is n &it dereloped i n this coun r to an extent unequaled i n n n v other part of the world; i n dwt R u ia is nbout the only other rountrg that ryatemutirall~ cultivates t h e , .it. The first timea tiom y, was i n 1818, arid that P bet W M that no liorue three minutes. The bet 1, iron grey gelding, eix-


aucceaa of the chaw for s

Before the Civil W a r m thmogh and mld in the S and Wisconsin, Minnesota

born. The difference ie encb local eorroondings. Prior to

land. The colonists for noiog, which sp

by the climnto

niilies, w i t h a few excep He \\-a* foaled i n 1780, count of his racing qualiids three irichtu h i g h , of )w- i n tlie withers, with a His loins and quarters ant1 iiostrils were unueuizc. but flat and clean. )se days, and nom of bia Ilmrtetl iii 1788. and mnie ! day. It was tlie second iat attracted attention by ?r, to which nearly all the to, Engineer, Commander, :Ianibletonian. Abdallab a daugbtor of YeeReiiger, allah was closely inbred. ares bred fine trotters; i n 'om Mesaenger, that huve ,r trotters, are few in numt i n g quality Beeme to r u n not crossed with the Mee-


tters, not m much for its at distribution throu-gb'i



of a home whom
ntbe Middle Statea an Morgan home was a ha for their honesty, pluck

echml-master, became the owner wattwed all over New England,

al. Hie descend

and weighing about

H e was a dark

hardy constitution.

for ita speed. From

cended Black Ham

hands in etetnre and o his average weiRbt ie

2,000 pounds in w to 1,700 pounde.

have been the great prod the Civil War, but the i n

o m for onr cavn

mre 8 heavy draug

afford it, be ream a

ve to the inark

rked that all th

r u n with cold blooded etock. Of late ye attention to the selection of tbe dam and E ing the beet type of animal for the work i UMR, he want8 the heavy necked, broad ch cltraight nhouldered draught home, and il to pay for the services of the pure Clydesd be doe8 the beat he can, and croasee her w cornea up to h i s ideal as nearly as hc car pense. The farmers who are higber up i i a tenm to drive to i a road wagon o r buggy type. They patronize a pedigreed stallio the services of such etallione are held at them cannot bear the cxpenee, and the ex1 stallion is repeated. Thecareand expense neceerrary to the I bred, are a considerable tax upon tho p they are ranked among the liixurien of m I n former times, before the constructic people of the Vnited Statee rode u p o n hc they do at the present time, and i n propor dle horses were more numeroua. The intn and buggy hae almofit eupplaii tion becomes morc dense becoriie more rare. The county fair-a which are held among other things, for the best trottin Thie encrourages tho production of a will hare to obtain our cava us to a consideration of the p him to the requirements of our service. gree of excellence required of the horn but the points powesaed by certain particolar usee have experience, and are now fixed and iova ebort, thick-necked. heavy-limbed, big classed ae a draught horse. not as a gallo Beginning with the bead of tbe anima s b o w wide between the eyes ie row, although the rule ie not wit not breathe through hie mouth, pamagee whereby he receiv to purify the blood, they e

the farmer p a p niore with the view of Becurband. Fsr hie ordinary ted, etout, hoavy limbed, le is not well enough o f f 3 with hie common mare, I an itinerant ecrub that ret it with the leaat exbe ecale of wealth, want ind they eeek a trotting if they can afford i t ; but high rates that moat o f iment with the itinerant

duction of' the thoroughtlucer, and consequently lern times. f eo many railroads. the e-back much more than n to the population, eadction of the light wagon

rewed i n the ricirbity. home from wliich we

one regarding the der eervice, are varioud,

ted horse ie u t once rience teachee that an one more narThe h o w can-



frec of meat, accompanied by large s u

b o n y nostril should be a n d t h o b o w hae b u t T h e y should be verr better. T h i e enable8 h e bridle hand.

free back einews make a faultlean leg.

large a n d free from meat and t h e paste forming a n angle with t h e ground of be tlegrees. T h e foot of t h e saddle horse

uld E& into t b e foot, forty-6vo a n d sixty proportional t o his

here t h e h a i r and t h e t h e front line of t h e

rnzor without niuscle on them.

attached to t h e blade b

:iction of the shotildcr'i and a r m s as t t iicirrly always fatal t o *peed. Tbe dwst capacity by d e p t h r a t h e r t h a n
fore be l o n g and well round
the g i r t h . which, i n saddle horses. sliou irppearance of t h e forehand is increas wliicb clothe the bottom of t h e chest et

tbe ribs must tlicre11.

Thie matwire


/ '

saddle horse. T h e

est and withem, gives


A abort back is t h e ideal of t h e h o r from t h e point of t h e shoulder to tbe greater t h a n t h e heigbt at t h e withers a n d t h o q u a r t e r will inte

t h e quarter must be tion will be con6ned,


- 1


especially in t h e gal little behind the wit with t h e loios which per line of the back &ould s i n k a n swell out slightly B the junction e and ruuscular. A I ightly arclied loina, or hog waiit of elus-

back, give u n m y actio

which unite to form t

re plenty of length i n he two bones

joint, otherwise his str le will be too I of the thigh ice at the root t h e hip bone or haunc . A third of prominence at the ttli will give the femur. The other en is quite well stitle joint. All horr 's of the mime g t h of npper or true high, but the J horse stririds ;a make but a e saddle horse sliou i more ne:rrly race horae. The L ick ahould be oiiit shudilig e point where IU enlargement. Th thigh should hock well down anc t h u 8 secure a tho paaterns and fec , should he as mld look muhat below the , the prerence of whic tella of a bad should hace four poi ts broad-the d the legs; four pa ntu long-the , the belly and the aoochen; four I tail. and the more

of t h e tail t o the p
hip joint OR upper en

the pulse nd the respiration, but still-thi toinetl. A iiinrked clep:rrtuw finni this l p example as 81 breathing rate of fifteen to I the Iiorne IY quiet, indicates disease. The expalid freelx ant1 equally when the hors i t indicates that one l u n g is unsound ant1 1 major part of the work, and of course the m i 11 ish ecl. , A horse is at his best at from seven tcl the horbe9 suitnble for caralry i n this w u r earlier pericul of their lives, and if they I muscles nre deceloped that me not reqnirc he is liable to attain a gewrnl set of frai ciivdrr purposes. For these reasons we d r y horses w i t h the inaximanl age fixed at inantler can a l w n ~ save s hi* piing homes one year's trnining before putting them i i

atio will be irly mainof one to four, such for ulsr rate of forty, when ibs on each side nhould breathes; if they do not other one hse to do the reathing capacity is climire years of age, bnt y, are worked at a mnch broken to the barnew, hy the saddle horae, a n d Clint is not adaptod to 'or the purchawa of carc yenm. The tmop comw-u-tlaya. and give them the rrllkY.
A . E. WOOD, ncrth Carnlry. L'. S . Army.

alight angle. The 1

spavin occurs ehoul

deecribed above. Vie cular and of great TO

forebead, tlie chest, neck, the upper par

nearly will the animal The b o w s in our c a
between fifteen bande a hands in height. By wind we undera horae such M has been

service should be beta !en fifteen and fund gonerally 3en and a half
f a horse. A breathing capacity N , when in good heall I and standiog

beart will beat I increase both




G y-uIv.rls TI

This ideal (phy-sical perfection) i cate i n the minds of our wtdiern, n n titin to it, we should endearor to elin to obtain pleasure and sport. The Greeks were the originators elriborated them ; the system of hand nations, and those of Asia. tended to tic rports-the Homaiia 1 figliting amongst these

HERE is 11 perceptibl
military posts; this ripp that is now passing, nio

t of the enlisted iiirn :it :ill f the w a r e of ritliletic c.i*:ize the 1-nited !;t:itrs.

amtion ; they understood the use liood and theF practiced thein to the g Ctiiralry this state of affairs continuwl necessary for a feud:il c h i d to call I forth. Then wnie a clisnpe; t h e Fe and standing armies eanie i n rogue who tilled the soil and engaged

throughout tho Age of r less. and i t was only s together and -stilly tern WRC orcrthrown recruited from c l a w s

an impetus from witho

t h e former; here, the after a number of yea

icle us, uuc i t wn* oiily the preser t systciii w:i-

evolved. With the ;itlilctic by the vast experiene cltruction. imparted a W e e t Point.

had beeii every mail's buainvss. Thus arose the necessity for etructioii. n n t l , i n i t . Iit)ltling the

, and the niportaiiit


e J1ilitar:- -4cntteiii.v :it

Tile whole tendrric

4 extremely rapid niorementn, with the *)fenergy nntl the maintenance t l i e hunian body. In fnct, it i Iuiiching bag lina given way

therapeutics, wherein the shall consider the former o

sible condition.

development; the other perfection; t h e former w

The obstacles that hare st gymritisiiinis at all our post8 of conipeteiit teacliers. A n y Foung officer by stuc come a good instructor. B scientific principles and th prore aniple ; the objection the immenPe amount of ap

that a multiplicity of appliances

is i n devclopiap; and

, .



nation ; in t h e t w o latter, if we area w h e t w c o u g h t to b t . . Concerning the nothin;, b u t will liniit o u r s e l r e a to t h e ns then, w e will m y Iiysicul development

r e t a i n i n g t h e interest of t h p

importance. S o m e n he i s pitted againat a excel makes itself fel hie rival, b r i n g s with it a m u s t be of i n c ciaes, founded o n a scientific. basis a n d t
by practice, form t h e
to fully develop a l l

~ 8 8 8 which ,

increasing with man'e u n d e r o r d i n a r y circum

the miiscles of t h e body. For t h e great d

cover miles a n d milea w w e mnet develop i n eve

between them a n d rnier the only meane

Btructor, w h o should, k i n d of w o r k ; a n d to well lighted a n d w a r m e

work t h a n o r d i n a r i l y ; e. g., rowing, c l i M u s c u l a r development is directly p

cordance therewith. 3d. Th tbese t w o t h i n g s broadly, w i

w h a t w e w a n t ie

greateat good possible ; t h e reverse causing overwork of t h e muwlee, t e

Violent ,eser('iyB, uce n degeneration

rheumatic one c a n n o t be made to e n d

s a m e exerciaoe t h a t a
e o n l y mldiere i n t h e

T h e Plobe at Weet P o i n t are, I bel service, wbo are properly t a u g h t a n d w h tary exercitwer; a n d t h e y coneoqoently being made broad shouldered, erect an aomewhat p o n j lot of candidatee. The d o r m thebmili-

To a t t a i n t b e aacemdant





etruetian/s, benee the effect

ot for complete mu

lent foundation for

destroyed. S o w t h i n uncoiiscioiis coordinat

s for the tluek'e waddle

door on ita hi

of the left; uticl

Hiiicc tlic

hpiiie i- a

t l l a t t the iiiieqiiatl niuwiilar t u g g i n g

oluniii, we might expect rodwe wmt. effect ; tllia

tion of the center executiog ; there ie

account6 for th i t ehould not a face, t lie move 111en

'crncl saber in his left-litrntl


to Ilia left Rhoulder ant1 tire well, would Bt wise be niigbt p r o w worw than uselescr.

ralualde, whon otlier-

I. 1

rnetlns of the setting-up exercises.

place, might atill be an ac mea would be much imp thing 86 being inten

nothing cscels the Indian club. exercises cannot be overes thing else, and when im foundations. Xext we come to t h e equal duvelopment of primary factor. T h e arally and materially

ceiling. 2. To dcvelnp the lower ex

By t h e term extremity1 appendages of the body, cd are connected with the tru rest of t h e i r extent.
is, graeping t h i n g s and

n as arms ILII

indiriilunl development; i n other w n i n g and jumping under different c

xercise in walking, r u n rdinatc derelopnient of oint, the eye, errry to outdo t h e adrerrestling and fencing

warding off and deliver e home, there i a n a anyIdior who has mastered

their dorelopment ehon iog the M y in every different cimomstances.

' L ' omore tlioroughl>- understand t nient of the estremitiee, it will perhap to tlrc consideration of

ation tor the derelopto demtc a little time

A 1 1 thew, but especial

new exercises. The ep tween t h e vertebrm, tog tutioii ant1 cnnstructi

calling attention to the shoulder and hip jointe,

stand much more of be Acten i n the clrrefu The bonea indicate by their sire and for; t h e long ones, as in arm and leg,

what they are intended levem !or prehension

: ,







and locomotion ; tbe s b alight motion, as i n t h e as in tho skull, to prot ottacbment. T b e leg of an aiiimul meat. in which run the moil, voluntary muscle o first eight it appeara a8 a a clouer inepection we fin muscles, iii fact of all th ment to bone or carti Tbere is some attached to the s

mucb longer and expendit ever, is very obvious. A muscle terminates, iiL ing, inelaetic cords. called to produce varioua motion muwle OF elastic part and point. In youth, the mua and gives eupplenese; yond the adult stage, upon by tho inelastic o age. It is, accordi twenty-th rea can readi IJhie muecleeam gradually little portauce tliat w b a ~ powiblo. In some old me exercise, we have somet etep and appearance. Xuscular development

rce rio much l e * * , t l i c -ensoii. liowt every instance. i n w iitc. glihtcn-

ic tendon ; t h i a ia 811 important enient is greatly i n prepoiidereiice, son matiirew aiid fiiial y passes beelement is gradually eiicroacliecl


regular teiiaio I arid relaxn-

epecific motion, that muscl I n other wordp, a

This is so true. that in fracturm a i cles act on the brokcn o r displaced bone, tl wliat bas happened and to what extent, injury, though the skin be unbroken; a ciple of muscular action for a fonndatior I n accordance with t h e tliffercnt mol portion* of the body. they have been c k A bending of the arni or leg i s callec ( l o this are cnlletl flexor niusclex. A *traightening of' tlie arm or leg i s iiiuscles are called estenwors. Iii t h e upper cstreniitiea. the flexors hehirid ; in the lower extremities, flcxoi front. Atlductoiv lire niuwlew thict bring t h rind fingers or toes near thc niiildle one. Abcluctor.r do tlie reverse. Adductor$ leg, fingem, ~ r r i c l toes, Abductors oubidc There :ire otliers also, hut these are t Every niusclc ia irttached lit b o t h en c w d as fisrd. a i d . wlieii the niusclc cont iiiq toward the fixetl end. or r i c e vei*a; of escrcising the cwtirctly tliffweiit n-t~ys there are crrtaiii miiuclcs wliicli bring tht I ~ i elcv;itt~~l i ~al)ductr.d ) ; thcwe sanie I)? bringing the side to the ariii. (whit cliinhing trecs. The Panic niny be said t lie tmly. Hence i i i a gymnasium, a mu1 iiip i i i II different way to develop the mur the t r t l i u n i and rxcite that peculiar ne] tcrect i n recreation," which i w mesaentia Last and most iiiiportant come the jo would be possible; with them we becc locomotive nnimal. It is from t h e stud thup permit, and a thorough understand these motions, that a q-stem of scientific developed. As has been remarked, the upper ai tached to the trunk through t h e interve respectively. The Rhoulder consiets of two bonee collar bone. The former receives the u

dislocations, a h e r e muamrgeon can tell precisely )rn the appearance of an he depende on t h e p i n f h i s diagnosis. ns that muwlee exert on
Sed :



muscles that

Jled oxteneion. and such

e i n front, and extenwrn Iwhintl ant1 extensors i n

irin o r lcg near the body.

c on the inside of tlic nrm,

priiicipiil o n w . \re iiiay c.onniiler either * t N . t h e other e n d tiw nior!nee wr.~ iiiay h a r e wereral rne muscle. For iiiwtance, rni to the side after i t has iacles would be est-rciaed i n supposed fixed) as i n n l n i m t all tho niurcles of dicity of appliancee, teiid?a. will \--erF much relieve stiniulus known a8 "inall physical derclopnwtit. e ; without them, nothing e the higliept prehensile, >1' the jointa, the motiorie ;of what muecles produce ymnaetic exercises can be lower extremities are a t ion of ahoulder and pelvie

he shonlder blade and the er end of the arm bone or







inner end of the co

d therefore to the breast bone b i the ich l e the center about which it retb the l y e e n e s ~ of the slioulder joint

tho ,mobility and variety o of Coarse hae beem attaine I n animals encb . B the

In tbew aoimale it i accompliebed principal1

the hind legs are con-

rse and dog are so much

swifter than man on acco

we see their structure has however; for instance, in them portione are uni and we bave the hip,

motions; hence we can will be fully developed an same principle that we UP TON'^ tactics and tbe n

The old UPTOV tactice recognized the r shoulder joiiit, but quite neglected tbe k to some extent the hip, tho spine nn? tli qiiently they did not thoroughly develol motion i n thaee joints. In the sereatre regulatione all these jointe except the detail and then i n combinstion ne far as I sionu i n the eetting-up exercises of c'r n i l by means of' exercising in the double I n a joint. mechanical friction ie reduc of a closed synovial sac, secreting a eyno' thin sac' is placed between the ends of tt nhicb ends are enlarged fw better appr tachment. Tho muscles, i n combinatio bones in place. .le I hare before mid we have to con! shoulder and hip being almost perlect ty the elbow, knee, a n k h and wriet being I We can compare the relative mobilit t h e following eummary : The shoulder joint admita of motio w a d , bnckward, abduction (elevation c*ircumtluction (circular motion about E rotation (about axia of humerus). The hip joint admits of the eame ni but thej- itre very much more limited i n more care i n its construction owinK to I danger of the hip getting oat of joint. ' of the hip bone and is connected with it cavity, whereas, i n the ehoulder, the loose, thereby permitting greater rnotio I n other wonls, coneidering these t a cular developrnent should include thee full extent of the limb, and thon their c The elbow joint admits of flexion controle tbe prone nnd eupine positioi dorelopment could not be obtained tbi will impart in the exerciee: 1. Farea . Rear. Front, 4 The knee joint admits of flexion ant tion ; this joint ie thoroughly develope

cesnity for developing tho ankle, wriet, elbow, and inger joints ; and coneele muscles that produce ?sercises of the new drill ist. are duly erercieed in nible. Some of the omie1'8 tactics mere rendered i d balance step. to a m i n i m u m , by nienne I liquid which lubricates; bones that form the joint, imation and muscalar atw i t h ligaments, keep t h e

er merely eix jointa-the I of ball aiid aocket jointe, inly hinge jointa. if the different joints from

n e\-ery direction: Foradduction (depression), uldere as n Bxed center), Ion3 as the shoulder joint. tent, and nature hae taken B uee, MO t h a t there is leae ! thigh bone fit^ the crvity vctly by a liganient i n t h e bole arrangement ie w r y

joints, the couree for mueiix motione, singly, to the ibination. d exteneion, and likewiee )f the hand, and a better the new drill regalatione a horizontal, 2. Raiw, 3 . tennion, with elight rotathe leg exercisee.




T h e wrist joint adm exercise t h a t might pro o f t h e wrist.





for work. thau to be full of lethargy. iiitloc muscular 8:-stem. A medical officer at every post rhou achetlule of ineammements of the cxtirniiti a t the beginning of Iiis winter's work n furnish data nlicreby the worth of ttic s~ bc tlemoristrated. A n hour day should be clcrotccl to tbc include. t n s u n i u p : 1st. The scttingiip e Indinti club :tiid punching bag. 3d., Esei iincl jumping. 4th. The co6rdiuate tlerelr body in bosing. wrestling, r i n e l wltentrer niing and YO forth. The fencing ac8tlem: the saiiiic building w i t h the gyniiiasiuni nitd tioii during tlic winter nioutils s1to41c1 bc nnsiurn; 3 1 . The fencingacadeniy: 3 1 1 .( gallery practice; 4th. I n carnlry. tlte ric Ererytbing tlependa on the \\-a? Del' source from which officers nncl elllisted mc mental nncl physical energy; without its 1 will drag a l o n g as heretofore : by ita orde be started rolling and it can trust the Lwther no moss. FORTJIYER,VA.,Sot-. P, 1 8 1 1 .
I by
IL pulpy,


in all these join-, as extremities. By a study of the ab0 of the numerous mnsclee t h a t they are t h e motore From this diseusaion

hc required to keep R and trunk of every nian 1 at tlie end; these will eni of tlerclopnicnt niay

tyninasiu in wliic h ehould ?rci?;cs. 5 1 . Esercises i n isea i n walking. running n i e n t of the whole human ossible. i i i twwing, ewimaliauld. if Imsilile, be in
lie wlclier's entire inntrucirnitecl to. 1st. The gym-

cisoa; t h e principles, accommodate the exe clia ice or carprice.

ear the elid of the w a m n ) 1 g school. *titlent. I t should be t h e tlerire their incentive to k i n g the initiatire, things ng a board, the stone will BCCM that the atone will

A t t h e close of each tions, a n d auecesa ehou

PETER E. THAVB, Scef ; I Limtmint, Fira Caraly.

special pririlcges g r a n
beet teame at different has had aufecient time ita taking place as for itutcd \\-lien the r4ptcni

i n g scheme. time. a good

instructor, a properly w
ditlerent weighted In

bags, are all t h a t are

common eenne muecol

t o formulate 80 -th8 exercises must It will be more of a enlieted men come out


tainel i n all the pitched battles portant of these operation8 may burg by a partisan corpa under T of Cassel, tho capital of Westph \-ear. In this latter operation C d r y and four light gunw, and i ni portail t resu Its. After the close of the S a p of' importance are mentioned, till

363 mongst the most inrthe capture of Ham1813, and t h e capture w c t i E P P , in the eame d 8,000 Coseack ca1's attended by most


OME authorities beIi

fire-arms has mad great extent, i n large traction in one directio

received but little atten new wee ie that of mak

enemp'e country and of the mast iniporta T h i s uee of ctivalrj-,

t h a t VIUCINQETOBEX, beaten i n a pitched ba

,rocluction of brcec.11 -loii<l i lip r cavalry to bc uscd. to any ?Id of battle. nut this coni f action, of the cncilry :ir111. of its sphere i n othc*r tlirecf caralry aIiicIi before 11ad he riioat importiitit of thew there can be n o cloill)t. t h t ty on either side i.i nomerorie the making of r:iitlr into t l l r communications, will I)c one fall to the lot of t h t iiriii. keived its gruntert ~lcrc.IopAmcricaii CilviI l\-:ir, date. THE GREAT, i n hi3 w i r s with iintan t l y i ii mzrki n g i n rcyiilc line of inarcli, t h u s sccurin,rr ntion. CAEY.+.R :ilso tell- 11'; uls, tiriding hiniwlf : ~ I w I I ~ . ;Inn of uning his ctrralry twlies, cut off foraging partic.. . into wurrc.iitieritig; been carried oiit century. we 6nd ploy caralry to any grcnt
e operations of thc Russian

raiding operations to the Amoriean Civil the history of cavalry; ble t h a n i n their spplin and Confedcrate cut und iinporttriit ion of the tlieatre

cation to the subject under discuwion. lluitls were freely prwticed curalry, aiid the results p i n e influence upon the course of wlirre tlicse operations took placc. Such operations us those esccutioii by nicn like M O R sos, SIIERIDAS, nnd niany otliera of less develop t h t spirit of bold11 hOU1 of tho cavalry arm. The war of 1Rcid adds not great atrugglc ; tho cnralry rble. That arni had not y the traditions of the Revolution.

out to succewsful


well k n o w n ; but, i n spite of the brilli d r y iirutlo for itaelf; the res iiiiglit justly hare been expected of i t ;

r sliort indeed of what

Coming down to the


ie b ' k -

light cavalry, and not to

the Rerere cold,

tbat were due t h e diem tbat famous retreat. M

ances. Even the successes which tb undoubtedly due, to a g r cavalry. The Ruwiane alone, if their cavalry i n 18377-78 did not a of and hoped for from abeence of capable le
le in thie country; and lish what wae expected a great degree, to t h e

cat o f f the foraging the French, did

U B K C ~first


raid across the

were handled and al

shot, and CHEBXICHEFP iniiiiediately



campaign in

head of hia Comacks. amidst the ple, and proclaimed the dissolution Symptoms of insurrection against t

ntry into tlie city at applaueu nf the peo-

render of t h e ga till the arrival of had gained; and, after remaining i n t ita1 a week, he was

a u k s expected to be operations, gad last1

of meii required for such d be armed and equipped,

bank of that river, however. as he 11 losing tr man, taking with him i n t r

ed his advance, witliout he Atores of tlie arsenal,

I n the first place,

ban quote TREYCE 011 tlic alry raid niay be described blow far exceeded the actual pbpical ?SAPOLEOX had been forced fly from

and bridges, magazi bepsion in the mind nece%ssry to do so.

ght unless it becornea

which moo ended bejond the Hhine.

elemeuta of succetm.

te the general principles

and telegraph lines, taking prisonera,di ing false intelligence, and carryinp: di

g Home Guards, spreadaiid apprehenaion into

L .

operations of the R been mentioned as campaign. Perhaps t tion of that period w phalia, by CHLBNI I'Detached with t h this indefetigable with great celerity ac

made into Kentucky i n July, 1862, h e ndependent cavalry opera-


I left Knoxville on tlie


T h i s raid is an e in all of them he util

of gaining informat enemy; catting railro

iieral MORQAN made and zed by him, it is claimed, and trained to fight on infantry and cavalry. marily for the purpose f damage was done the all kinda, snd spread-

captured 2,500 men of his enemy'a fo with Colurnbusand Ws&ington were of December. and tho transportation




coni m u n i catio tis the 19th to tho 30th was interrupted for

of the Federal army, I n June, 1862, he was

on their left flank,and rejo in his paseae;e destroyed together with qoantitien o and above all, obtained The mrne oillcer, a few re& at Catlett'e Station things, $500,000.00 in with all of General Po

turning by the other. CLELLAN'S army. H e

&&The two simultaneous raids of inoat decisive effect upon t h e issue destroycd the wcumulated supplies a line by which tlicy could bc brougl esliausted by t h e support of two iirn sererat niontlln, : t nt t tlicrc \ v w nn 21 hack on JIeniphis." 1 . 1 )to the spring of 1Mi3. the C



rtll Ilundrcit tt'ntR, large captured, (tltnong other 00 i n dold, togetller a n d o h i a 1 paper*,

w i t h their owti ~vc~tpot~s. which adversaries ho\r to ube.

the objecta with which t h e raid,thst "STOABT'S the moral efYect eecured,

raids are celebrated.


ceesful. Perhaps t h e
quences waa tbat underta

had very iniportaot results. GRANT'S operations rigtiinat Y

GMNT'S communications

miles; and with a loeeof

movement.*." (Corie DE PARIS, Yo]. III, I Thin raid accomplished conipletely the

with which i t





was Irent out, vir: It de trating the forces aoailab The raid entrusted to as GRIEWN'Swas a RUCC and captured by -FORR~ noticed later. STONBYAN'S raid aro when taken by itself, par was done to the enemy, operations of the main I contributed i n no small Chancel lorari I le. H ~ K I of the meam of cmceal says of this: "STONEMA and ill-timed adoption < employod, might pmduc diecussing the campnigr same thing. In the latter part of were almoat exhausted, 8 bead against that af thl strength and e6ieiency I the strength of the boc ateadily increaaing, till T h u s WXLJWN'S mid t h r with a force of over country able to check hi minor importance, WILE poeitioo of Selma, took foundries, arsenals. armm found there. Selma was aitd ita lose was a great ' of WILSON'S raid wna n c bausted state of the coon very reaeon it was most Bat the crowning wo that done by t h e force u and though SEEBIDAN'S t h o s e ordinarily known msulte obtained, were thc be well, before paming o SEXBIDAN'S expedi tioas.


power of concenattack on T'ick-burg.

xarnple of an ill-:idrisd, on, which i f judiciousl-

came too weak to niiike

plieR of every k i n d i n the south-nmt.

15,000 men, and some light artillery. G R ~T. who bad been south of the James since J u n e , ISM,fincling t h a t I hie efforts to drire LEE cavfrom Iticlimontl were without ayail, decic 1 to uee SEERIDAN'S alry to cut LEE'Slines of communication ith the rest of the Confederacy. These lines were the Janicr Ri 'r canal on the north side ilroad to the wutli. and of the river. the Richmond 8 Danrille still further south a road called the Sol I Side Railroad. These lilies being deatroyed, LEEwould bo ~ O Iwlled either l o eracuate Richnioncl oreubniit to being cooped up i n . when hie capture would be certain. SHERIDAN, who was i n the Shenancloah alley, north of the Janics, e s s back EARLY. demtrog and opposed by EARLY, was ordered to m tlie canal, then. cros*ing the JameR, mal a raid tp'the south and cut the two railroads, and finally join SI R Y A X i n Xorth Carolina. BEERIDANaccompliahed the first part of im task a-itbout ditficulty, for he drove back EARLY, and, prewing c , completely destroyed the canal, but was unable to cross tlie river 1 account of ita being SO swollen. Ife therefore niored along th north bank, passed Richmontl to the north, and tinally assembled H force i n rear of GRANT'S lines. The latter. having a great SUI ioritg of men, detached aerie8 of operatione which SHERIDAN 011 the 29th Jlarch. 1865. on t h finally ended with the Rurrender at App mttox. The Ruswo-Turkish War of 18?5-?8, fi niehes us. as alrcndy noted with but a single brilliant example of tht se of caralry in raids, rir : i n hie well known i n GOVRKO'S first passage of the Balkans. GREEN, hintory, Bunis u p the results of this raid a follows: "This expeditioii of GOL'RRO'B was more than a mere c a d i raid ; it was an admirably conducted movemPnt of an advanced g rd composed of all arms. W i t h 8(100 infantry, 4000 caralry, and t t ty-two guns, i t had, i n no lesa than a month, gained pnwession of ie of the principal pnnaes of' the Balkans, from which the RuePiar t h o u g h terribly attacked, never let go their hold, and which they nally used in January for the passage of ti large portion their ari -. I t had carried a panic throughout tho whole of Turkey betweel he Balkansand Constantinoplv. and its scouting partie8 had peneti eci to within seventy miles of Adrilrnople, the second city of the em re, and had destroyed the railroad and telegraph on the two prin pal lines. Finally, it had gathered accurate information conccrnir the strength and poritions of the large Turkieh force advancing 1 wardR the Balkans." The Ruarrians neglected many good opportu ties of using their cavalry effectively, especially during the inveetr nt of Plevna. The Turkish

cavalpr, also, was bot little.
GOODBICE'S " Repor Egypt, 1882," t h e a alry. T h e cavalry



el-Eebir, a n d following t ~peed,keeping up a r u reached Belbeir t h a t nig uext morning (Septemb

ith all practicable ABABI'Srear guard. It . M a k i n g a n early start g t h e cultiratetl g r o u n d a sert iiitwveni ng,

iiito two ports; one, o t h e r , o f from 3000 to

of t h e F o u r t h h a t h e s u r r e n d e r of t h e llion ( A R A H IPASHA) a n d liad gone to C'airo,


* * *

of t h e Alexandria outGeneral DRCRY LOWE

inentimable value. A sbved from ruin, a n d wero linrrying to t h e i r vi r e t u r n to peaceful a n d eon H u n d r e d s of o t h e r exa trste t h i s eubject, b u t tho6 present purpoee. We wil! now consider mnking a raid. T b i e n u task. Some r a i d s will de w n t , a n d , since t h e ema ita march, t h e detachme as ie coneistent with t h e

ttended b y results of an defeated, a n d Cairo

le directions, glad of a

T h e n u m b e r of nien is

forces were used almost all t h e raids of im] rtance varied in s t r e n g t h I raid into Kentucky, i n I from 1,000 t o 3,500 men. T h u s Y O R ~ A renerally took with hint 1862, w m made with 900 men. S T U A R ~ 1,500 to 2,500 men. FOBBEST used sboui he same n u m b e r of men as STUART, while VAN DORN'U famouR raid IW made with 3,530 men. T h e t w o simultaneous raids of GRIBUSO? ind HTREIOHT were each made with a b o u t 1,800 men. T h e expetlit n u n d e r Colonel TOLAND, in July, 1863,to c u t t h e Virginia a n d Em rennesnee R t d r o n d , upon which BRAOO depended for his reint'orren nta. fniled becniiw it was rcgirni t of cavalry a n d o n e of undertaken with too few men-a raid I Norenibcr, 18ti3, a g a i n s t mounted infantry-while AYERCLL'E t h e aame line, was brilliantly e u c c e d u l :he t r a f s c o n o n e of t h e main railroads of t h e Confederacy being terriiptud for t w o week& great depota of supplies t h t r o p d and pees four timer, his o w n AVERCLL had four regis t r e n g t h k e p t on t h e move to intercept hi1 menta of c a v r l r y and t w o of infantry wit a few punrr. D u r i n g t h e latter part of t h e w a r t h e Federal cavalry L d bccome very numerous large wale. It i* not and t h e i r operations were on a correaponc ,gIy probable t h a t auch s t r o n g forces will e v e M? used in a n y futuro war for strictly raiding purposes -they lac4 1 3 mobility which is eeeential t o auccess. operations aero- t h e Be ane hie cavalry forcr was I n GOCRKO'S a b o u t 4,000 strong, a n d aAer g a i n i n g Shil a Pam, July 19, 1870, t h e . was town of Enki-Zagra, a p i n t of immcnse i p r t a n c e t o GOURHO, , seized hy aboot ti50 Cosaacka. From #hi ;a a n d K a ~ a n I y kGot-nKo s e n t out raiding parties of from 700 t o 8! nien t o d e s u o y milroadst telegraph linecr, stations. bridges, etc., ant D gain all tho information t h e Turk#. T h e c a p t u r e possible aa to t h o position, s t r e n g t h , eto., of Cairo was made with about 1.500 mer Before deciding upon t h e n u m b e r of r n to be employed w e niurt we t h u t i t fulfills t w o conditions; it mue 3e strong enough to brush to bar ita propem a n d i t n \ w y a n y small detachments t h a t attem m w t poseess great mobility BO 118 to be tl e to march long dist(LriccW in very s h o r t periods of time. H a v i n g suttled as to w h a t we are to D a n d Iibv m a n y men we will necd f o r t h e parpoaes. t h e r e still r e i line for ua t o censider, t h e question o f a r m s a n d equipnients, suppli , t h e trainiiig of t h e men, etc. I n o t h e r words t h e question a r b which t h e suceese o f a n y military opem a i n be necervlarg t o m n o u t ? To anewer t h e w questions i t w i l suit t h e iwnctice o f t;inious leadem. N n R U A J made tlie I I I W ~ careft11 p1.e

I- 1


the greatest care. He liad get the most daring and fifteen or twenty days be-

eelected - ~ l his ho companiee of wont

possilde. I n deatroring milroada, fires

these were then bent no as to be uselem. for 100 nien to deetroy one mile of rail STCAHT, in his operatione. had a meti were furninhed with tents. A t firs eaber and rerolrer, but experience

-uilt 011 the railn, and an hour was autlicioiit

the country and obtai

of uae to their cornman

rivers, tbe lea& known

intended to trawrse. d theniaelrea through possible that would be tb of the etiemy, his poforces and bridges on u m n s could march. etc. rrirul of the main body

were armed only with em tbe neceenity

STCART'S men were expert i n fighting o The nien whom GRIEBBON took wit

on his raid througb

'The eeouta remained in

his arms, eaddle, brid bivouacked in tbe o
mounted. The usua and sixty to wrentp wcauione, a great de
to bu obtitiimd. Y o

had made tlieni veterans i n Rerrice. GR dnni of movement. GEAXT'Sinatructioris and deetro?-the depots i n PEMBEETO of April, 1863, from the vicinity o open country of the enemy; and i n tions thproughly, he sought the ene any serious engagement. Every m enemy. he dirided his force into diepatched i n several directions, mid to have originated day's marcb or 80 ahead spirit, PO ae

ae giren great freecut u p the railmada

to carry out hi8 itintruc-

produce a

great impremion, but a . 9 MOBQAN'Smen did almo

He generally took some



the mme manner advance. H e ge

vinions, and t h e too t a c h d to t h e sadirty to forty miles , was the alternate ions of advanced guard, i s main dependentQ WIW ch or BO ahead. FORREST

Hie march was so skillfully m eerioun fighting. Colonel STBEI~ET'E raid which connection with G a c I B B O N ' s , failed preparations. He was ordered enemy's country, and the i m bie force should be well mounted and He WMBent out, however, with men or care of homcs, and they were moan
wi&hthe exceptions of aboat capt ored. Ke have alreadyacren b STOXEMAXbad been detached just ville. STOXCSAX mado mattera wo waging a eort of guerilla wa 80 as to act effectively again

y been referred to in y for want of carefal

he use of t h e horae. notbing of the uae

roken down horeee

i I

and dankersstoguard in his companiesofBCO trained hie men to tlgh

ie battle of Cbanoolloremattering his force, and



Paesing on to
of all kinds that

find that goneral keep-

o f t h e leader i n case of a d . T h e success of t h e t h e auddennees of t h e

attained. O n e of t h e principal facto lie8 undoubtedly in :he physical end and it is just liere thwt previous trainin

lly proportionate to of movemeot con-

menta and

cess iii m a k i n g raida f the incn a n d horses, ell molct conspicuously.


of advanced g u a r d s and
Tbe pace a t whicb the

dags' rations, two days' a n d the wagon train ca bud nt firet a coueide

were taken, by meuii?r w i n g t a k e n by surprise. t h e walk, a n d seveiitevii though much longer :arried o n his horse tour '-tent, cloak and blnnkct. ammunition. S r i E R i D a s but finding it Iiaruperetl carded it all except O I I C

in the lntc S i n u s c.uiiipuigii. t w o ac'cnu a n d horees were to live

wliich will IX fouiicl in

rerolver or Ianco ; a n d in

on foot a g a i n s t both infan pelled t o retreat tbe caval 1877 have adopted 88 a practice of making raids t h e time comes to act, the
best pack trains, not raised a t a mom drill a n d m a r c h i n g for months." W h a

own ware and the warn

ies to I n d i a n warfare

able to brash away any s to2,SOOmen. .



for t h i s purtictrlar all that can be desired. all it would probably bc cannon. rad to sliow, b r nioana of how cavalry raids should It is a Rubject worthy of at if these operations iirr sults can be acconiplishrd ot the least important of nring and enterprise t h t



eramplea taken

successful.' t h e cloeest study; for,the no doubt tl ekillfnlly eondncted, the m e important r with a comparatively emal I l r c e . And all, i t foete& and develops)tdat spirit of ehould ever characterize g cavalry.

be conducted, in order to

i Extract fromanaddream b y C a p t a l n G w R o E F . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ U.8. ~.T 1nfantry.before ~ tbe Voion le WILLIAM H .J o s a . r h o b d Veteran Legion.o f Columbw. Ohlo. on the death o f C e r v e d twentytbyean In the rank8 of the regular hod WM d l r h u g c d rlth chu)

acwr certlnate 01 'a good man and an excellent 1 4 subrquently to bin discharge su~trlned t h e repuutla good CltlreO.]

and who fnr trenty.flre y& n upright bndnce man and a

*' *


' m b a n t , Third Carcllry.

: rorka:


OJLHADE JONES first enlisted at t h and received his final dimcharge i n niay m y that NO far as t$e pioulding of was raised in the army, and whatever mi rouodings from the tender age of thirteei h a r e impressed themselves on his cliara fluences and those surroundings * For they arc of a public naturi citizens, should be more interested than i n of any mere indiridual. And as a eort a d l o w me to read a paragraph from the t Republic of recent date : "At present only the lowest and most white people of the coqptry offers recruits discipline mill do aomething to elevate. on the lowest class of negroen and Indi that the army is b e i n g ueed as a s c h o o l d DO one who is lit for citirenship, who c such despotic discipline as must be enforc enter the standing army in time o f peace Were thie the utterance of an individa good purpose to bring i t to notice ; bet I m thie cruel and falee language of one of our tion in general belief. That i t is wrong n of u a may know, yet I fear tbat moet of tl regular army, think as thie editor writt h i s editor given the subject intelligent I would not have written aa he did.

* * *

e of thirteen. i n 1843, . I n otlier words we actcr i R concerned. he )od or bad i n his surmature manhood muet , and it is of thoee in* that I ehall epeak. J. i n them we, as good worth or morthleeeneea rt for what I sball eay i n s of the h i n t Louis thleee clam among the ie ranks. These, a r m y ill hare the eamee5ect and i t is,woll enough rection for them. But overn himeolf without n an army, should ever

Drely, it would eerve no reluctantly admit tbat T papre baa ita foundamay believe, and eome who think at all of the hope to ehow you, had y and inveetiptioa, he

The enlisted men a M a n y forget, what all g a t h e r i n g for t h e sto w h e n all was doubt a n d
core, were h u r r y i n g to t h e t h a t in t h a t hoiir of trial,

together long before you were 01

when no o n e k n e w in stood a~ one man, firm1

an oath to defend the

t h e t r a i t o r TWIWS b entrusted to him an
to t h e e n e m y t h e forces r, a n d when whole coni-

metit lie beat t h e druni to a fife t h e t w o l q - s formed n friends ot1ir.r boy served ten yeor8 i r i t Iielcl Itiph commund in t h e r o l u \-our Stnte i i i C o n g i w s i i i i t l as THo>i.+sI,. Torsc..

with iinportaiit public o f i w under t h e S amidst hardsbips a n d

nre inembers of this encnnipnirnt of t

citr. and both of whom on Veteran Legion by

for duty. A n d from t h a

lesaenod t h e i r numbers position. Gentlemen. *. the' lowent a n d mo for citizenship." lioltl not in t h e i r r a n k s so a n d the hundreds of others t h e baneful influerkes of ou thirteen. a n d hold them for yenra a to society tit for eongressnien a n d is honorable, nnd honorable thlear," tliosc not '&fit n as I h r r e described,

B u t l e t us k e e p to t h e

of the enlieted men of the

to investigate t h e eubje

much information at Je
gations by the command

h e could h a r e gained in cannon Hound of his

T h e t r a d e of soldier

admiration a t a n y time kind, courteous a n d sen-

a n d t o t h e world LIXCOLX.*

, ,

been k n o w n all over the had helped win battles fo

the other. After t h a t t h e that thia officer bed s e w 8 drat commission. I have i

d bravery, a n d that he


could be a menace to lib which ia father to t h e pre T h e n are t h e people wise in withhol a r m y - , by holding up t h e occupation regular a r m y of tbe United Stat- i s

couragement from t b e ier to contempt? T h e nservator of t h e art of



paat may benefit t h e future. We t h a t when we marched out i n 1

tUeuWnmtWoe1 lorn 0

realimd it, comradee, p put down a mighty



rebellion by force of a our daily life and dnt which the experiences proved to be the beet. t o battle and to victory 11 and captains of these BB who went to make up t robellion were the wooer enc8B ofour dead cornrad to veterans this evening; battles-for of such only of being m i s o n d e w t d t h e war approached the lin more nearly w e attained to t we were, until finally, wh our work, and had done it could go home under the conntry,wewlio bad been m i n all but name--ae regular interest a n d dependence be "0, but there will be n tnry of our national existen o eay nothing of: Iodic war, t since w e last eheathed the e' continoone peace period wt h m the past hold no warn A fool can say, (1 today w t o answer for to-morrow. amped nd regulated ns) after the manner of the regular army had

this way comrades, we sts which crushed tliu




ered i n as c k,in the ti 3en the reg1 .ore war," t re devotes ( troubles. I&, and thit

ve e r o r 4 for the fui

we peace,'

tteers, were dinebarged of need tb.ere is a tiiiitual rs and the rolunteere. act say. I n the first cenI year in six to organized ia now twenty-eis years -one years is the longest oyed. Do these figures se? u t no man is wise enough


f r o m cast t o west the bro nent. stretching north n n d s o u t h fron fertile *oil. hound le** foreatw, possesei Rourcen, and peopled by a race unexcellec for energy atid irirentiw genius, t h e United Stntes ha* no r i r d . war i n Imikud Separated a*t h q nre f r n n i (111 other gr it c*oiititrien. upon as almost beyolit1 the range of p s s ility. While all Europe proniis w i t h the hi Icn of immeiine ntaritling ariiiice. which, e v e n i n tlicsc piping t i m e ,t* IJC'HCC. shake tlie contiiicnt w i t h their niurti:il trend, the United btates rests Rewire. Hut i w thir security r e d or appartwl? Csnacfri is fast becoming a country, which. if a fne. would be wortliy o our ateel ; 3lexico keeps a larger ataridinq army than our o w n : q estions of great moniont remairi unsolved; t h e tleiiion of orirest is 1 broad iri the latltl, atid a feverish nncertaitit? exiats. \\-tin ctin tell what niornt'nt a s t o r m niny burwt which w i l l call into play the whole ntrerigth of our great ntion. who Ansuming then that the possibility of Far does exist-and after cnrcfiil thought will deny it--it becon es the duty of the United States to be ready i n the hour of trial. A failure to be t h u s rrady can r e y l t orly i n untold expetiditure of blood and treawure. Experience shows that time is nucessarj- for the organieatioii of an army, and that i n a n y nionths munt elrpw before a raw recruit can be traneforrned intq an e l c i e n t soldier. Organization must,therefore,at all timer, exist; and ita form should be such as to provide the Kreatest porvlible security conuistent with wise economy. The United States has an organization n which all the neceaeary branches are represented. The internal orgrmiurtion of some of them ia susceptible of grent improvement; as,for exarnplv, tho Rubetitation


a system adniitting


g battalions of conr t h e internal orpniiizntioo of tbe variou

v a l r y and artillery; tit dutie*, ttie niagnot conring within t h e mope of t b i s paper.

of t b e i r charaoterietics a
with t h e long-bow, gai c r e d i n importance

e u i t nod M the infant

rations is baaed.

tory or arrest pursuit. T b is a n y a r m of t h e service c

h a t in no tactical actiou

bare become widely e t a u g h t to rely largely


d u a l muet therefore be eame time be rrble to

destrmctioo t h e question s an srmy have.

power of reeistanco t h a t i by greatly superior forces,

i t a mora& destroyed.

T h e cliief function of artillery on way for tlie a t t a c k , a n d in o r d e r thtrt n e c e e s a r j for i t t o come into action main in action longer, a n d t o move a requirements being made necessary bjg u n s now in use. Troops a c t i n g on t h e defensive w s h e l t e r as can be found or readily eo walls and intrenchments. It beco d r i r e t h e e n e m y from such shelter, t h a t t h e infantry can advance. A heavy croae-fire of artillery pr upon t h e enemy, a n d would ahake W e have m a n y instances on r and COINCY at t h e battl e n t i r e l y from his positi orilj- to advance a n d occupy it. It h a s now become a m a t t e r o t h e front, a n d modern battlee are t h e object being to ditwover t h e enemy'# t h e e n e m y aa much loa^ 88 p s i b m e n t of t h e infantry, a n d to d r a T b e artillery of t h e defense advanced popition, to corer t h e force a n d intention@of t h e enel i n g columnn come within rang to force a n early deployment. L a t e r t b e artillery of t h e -me objecte, a n d for t h e eam enemy'cl artillery, when t h e latter 6re wo D u r i n g t h e remainder of t h e engagen rect ita fire u p o n t h a t a r m T h i c h ie for t h e in t h e attack. YAPOLBON eaye t h a t a army, b u t if it has to Atruggle for an auperior artillery, i t gets demoralized. a T h e necessity for infa tho introduction of rapid duced a popular impremion t h a t caval anc'e, and ie of little value i n modern A n examination o f t b e a delueion. a n d t h a t


h of time against a

lost rnucb of i t s import-

i I


cavalry have been
being largely retained



veloped i n our late war. The Germ taught, and although they failed to


to heart the leeeone

of them to any great

of thc two previoue wars. arid the

A t the breaking o upon the then preva

both sides acted largely wan of little use against ted out their error, and until at the close of the

to keep it; watching hia rnovemenb and ing to pressure but never losing touch.'tht

n its organization as a things thoy did was to wing their belief i n its

Linked to their army by horsemen, our positions, of our Iialth, of our ni us from some little distance, incesnan they tapread uneasiness. I n our cavalry i n maswi diffic

exrrct account of :IN they watched earing and disappearing,



i s no arm from t h e c

which the army can reap prominence, is that of raiding. "A mid is defined a~ 811 telegraph lines, stations, R diwrder and excite appr

ual battle-field i8 shown on August ltith, where two lines of French i n t and then fougbt tbeir alf their whole numher, the whole campaign.


Althougli raiding was Napoleonic warn, it was I MOBGAN, FoaR6m and ST the cavalry arm i n that direction. STUART'S raids in 18 bfd=LrLLnn's army i n J and two pieces of artill

tbe movements of t h e t

era1 perforinirnce ot'o

i l


. _ .

w h e r e h e m a y at poeeible, t h e mobilization

n s of t h e enemys army,

t h a n e v e r before for thes While no attempt h w each of t h e t h r e e arnis of

a r m y in t h e field.

pass to t h e deterniinaT h i s qneetion doee not ad

challenge t h e adrnira-

tion of t h e whole world alry should he one-fourt

be taken as unity, cav-

proportions i n t h e i r army airy one-sixth and artille

sa unity, cavalry ehould This rule, however, is not under normal conditions.

In. a hilly, dimcult eount diminished, while i n an open

desirable during a etste of war rmal condition is peace n which these propor-

g e n g preeerve peace within i

1 t h e respect of o t h e r

But as DO country could s t a n t l y at war s t r e n g t h d u r i n g peace, t duced. H o w t h i s reduction shall be. m a great importance, but t h e a n l w e r is a those brnrrchrs which can be most quickly As European nations are more liabl war t h a n ourselves, they naturally etu rary questtons, a n d we may therefoi action t o be t h e result of m a t u r e deli rnl Ptudy. AII exalninatioo of t h e German a are maintained d u r i n g time of p t h e difference b e t n e e n their pea much lesa t h a n i n t h e o t h e r branc Kot only iR the cavalry k e p t u ures have been tnkeii so t h a t t h e half t h e time required tor t h e o t h e tnkc t h e field a n d c o r e r t h e conc The AuMtrian cavalry can al than t h e o t h e r branches of th depot cadre, being, a l w a g s nlai nations also h a r e complete a equipment of t h e reserve cav We naturally ask t h e q u e t h e ~ e r v i r e which , in well k maintained a t a n y t h i n g like the less expensive branches the cnc,nlry is #rst needed an its creation t h m uould the othpt branches. So diffivult i s i t to t r a i n quire, t h a t t h e G e r m a n s o e x t e n d t h e i r length of PC S o t only must t h e c including t h e m a n n e r o also trail1 his horse a n d l e a r n to care for It is only by month rider c a n gain t h e po almost inechanicallp, upon t h e UM of hie woaponlc. It i s also t r u e t h a b u t the s a m e excell a r t i l l e r y uRually fig

army - kept . coni s of necewitS

gmeteJ --cut



R TIONS. brancboe of the service u Furthermore tbeir tigh while mounted they can ment of their horses. TBBNCE says: &'Itia arms cavalry is the one sturally exifits i n the otbcr DEB contact with the enemy. nounted. and consequently, )le attention to the managethat of' all to be iii the most constant generally a matter of rital t at OIICC. or i n our own case trong force lit tlie very be. ition ot'tliis neceswitywhicti the endurance of thc hcary 7 at their full Rtrengtti dirridg for instant action on tlic %lie desirability of trlways kininte n n r strengtll, nppty in the Vnited Stnttbs whiclt lip the general rule for t l i u branches of the service to qto exnniine into the-caial re separated from all otiier re under the necemity of



r ncknowledged

maintaining thd cavalry to all nations, certain co wrve to emphasize them. proper relatire proportio the United Staten ar

b i .

maintaiaing as large a stan World. 30 country or co space of time oppose to do to eacb other. But with the large subject to England's dnd our country inva ent condition, we wo tion had b n wrougbt. The treaty of 18 kept on tbe Great Lakes i as England baa control not m o q J h a n fourteen

the mercy of the enemy unless we coul force to wize and tleetroy the canals befot ships. Our standing army is emall, scattored I therefore look elsewliere for aaeistlrltce w-1 The only orgaliized force outeide of militia of t h e ditt'erent Statee;which agg m e n , nod i& increasing from gear to gear. equipped a n d drilled to a certain degree 1 tiniea reiiirrrkcd that militia would be o f ; this is most certainly an erroneous idea. "lie militia has greatlr i m its proficiency i n certain State on the Pennsylvania militia, Muunt Gretna. President HARRIEO?~ pid : lion we had poseesscd a force to t h i s Pennmylrania Sntion would not have occurred; B which such a force would All suffered and many died, sylvaiiia Guardemen hare acquired i n camp and on t b e march. 'l'he Pe only accompliabed i n t h i s dence of b e i n g well drilled General %HoFIELD, on the EJ-IV811itl Guard is LL splendid new about it either i n could harc seen it totroops. I would not hesi emergency." Secretary PROCTOB said: IlAll tbst division for actual eervic days' rations." Still more recently General BOW the h'ew Tork militia. Although P i n the lead, that of certain other S t @ &

advance with sufscient the paesage of such wer

d insufficient. We must
n an emergency arisen.

e Rtanding army is the gates more than 1U9,OOO heee men are unifornied, proficiency. It is somele use in actual war. b u t

the urente of the war.

take care of themselves nia Guardnmen are not give unmicrtakable eri-

There is DO fnncy busid any military man who

to be needed

by that

similar viewe of ilitia ie doubtless mates to it in escel-


to tbe lakes. As En

ority bemmee at o I n case of war dofenceJew. bot tb


The following facb gleaned fro erale of the vsrious State6 may be Be regards numbere, men of all arms; follow

of the adjutant gen-





Ohio. 5,627; Mnseacbu down t o Arkaneee; from The greater part of of the aewice in the a

ry ; the other branches

Artillery Force. n ......393 artillerymen. ..........._ 3 batterim.

............ 8 batteries. ............. 3 batteries. ..........._ 3 battrtiths. ............ 2 batteries. .......... - batteries.
1 II
proximately sixty

2 light batterirs. Iierry txattcbrirs.

found i n the southerti among a l l the States.

oring to enpply all the m or the lateet model 3.2-inc

aa soon as tbe X W R U I ~ ~ the militia inhrntry is

the 3-incb rifled guns

of steel. Batteries of

supplied. Thus we see I armed as the regular

general rale for tbe proper

of the service would show
in botb cavalry and arorganized and mainable to organize and
test benefit may be

States to maintain a cavalry force auffic itlj- large to supplement the militia organization, and thus make a ,mpIete working force of the whole. Viewed i n this light it would undoubtc Iy be a measure of cconomy to the government, inasmncb as i t w Id tend to rendcr a large force complete and arnilable at a compari relc small cost. The necewity for maintaining a relE rely large cavalry force becomes more apparent when the materia from which an army can be recruited is taken into coneidemtion. long a time h a s elapsed since thi -lopeof the late war that few men educated i n that school of exper lice are available. Fortunately, however, militarr school lisve sprung u p on every military spirit is being band, and through their instrument.litJ which will be of great fostered and a military knowledge inpa benefit to the United States i n C ~ R Bof wa mattered about through Of uuch schools there are more than 1 -tb its quota of young the States, each of which annually aenc more or less perfectly, m e n , conversant w i t h military t c r m R , dri r. and educated to Rome extent, i n the art ( It may be interesting to know thdt ere( high wchool i n !h.#naachuaetta is also a militarF school, military R 'iwe being a portion of the prewribod course of study. The etudei are trained in infnntrp drill, and different schmls are combined a ually for battalion and brigade drilla. Other States encourage military cduca n i n various ways; for out 180 cadets to the example. Jdiesouri does so by appointing ierwise favored a t tbe State University who are uniformed and expense of the State. Yirginia alone has thirteen militrry s( @Is,with from 1,200 to 1,500 student.% Xany military scbmls tb Ighont the country are set Point. of a high order, being closely modeled on All of the 150 schools mentioned give p ctical instruction in inillery drill, wbile only fantry drill, to which inany of them add one or two give any instruction i n cavalrr rill. The three bronebea of the eervice are I resented in the regular army by twenty-5re regimen- of infantq lumbering about 12,000 and five regimenta of men ; ten regirnenta of cavalry, 6,008 me artillery, 3,000 men. These odmbera are 4 y approximate, dependeecursd. ing upon the facility witb wbicb recraita Our otficera are sufficientl~numeroas to mmand double tbe above 80 iocwamd, providinR force, and in a few woeke tbe army might recruit8 could be secnred.

1 , .

'. ,




greater attractions) t h e
infantry, 12,000 c a v a l r y

hen number about 25,000 hue m a k i n g o u r available 123,000 infantry, 15,800

cavalry, a n d 11,500 artill B u t according to t h e force ehould be onre-sixth men. while the artillery s
t h e addition of at least

m a n d t h a t E n g l a n d may makc., or of g o i n g rassiirg circumstances. T h e building of a tions, iR a work of years-a work fortunatc I n t h e megnwhile the army should be su any emergency in which i t mnp be called such increase t h e militia should be t a k e n now has u real value. und will render grec called upon. T h e militia, for t h e most part, is as w troops, rind to look upon i t IM a mob is to past fcw years. Combined with t h e r e p

w a r under most embarunder present condiy already begun. ciently iiicrensed to meet 11)onto net. I n innking iito c o n ~ i d c r a t i o n , for it and eillciont wrvico if


in modern war, a n d t h e largely composed of r o l u

t h a t o u r armies murt be

I armed as t h e regular rget t h e progresn of t h o r army, it should be a re its deficiency in cavregular army. Ik, s i ~ c lthe powder we 3 to fu1611 t h e d e m a n d s is conipooaed, nre cornCinrLmant. V. A . HOLBROOK, Fir# C a d y .

mended. T h i s would ale0 corres

c o u n t r y for t h e r a p i d o long months m u s t elap

forcible m a n n e r t h e disad would be placed in case of

conditione unfavorable to t h e y m u s t create a n x i e t y

standing army hoe been Every American must he coneidere the neceaeity

of humiliation when e acceding to any de-








m K E author of this book

1 o i c e m of the E C O L B I B TPAJOL, , ~ ~ he

of hi* youth, his tastes,

pecta of a brilliant mili to ita progreee and labors. sheathed his sword. offerer, no stranger

I .

t h e new r6gulatione had tion, and DE BUCK, who

ory over practice,I


!roes, SEIDLITZ. LAGALLE, his recollections of the great cavalry NL-RAT and BEJJIPRES, and from memor; vpeated the practical leee o n s giren by the oolonels and captnins Iio had raised t h o rcputatioa of the caralrp to so high a pitch. d active. with a glowing Written with an intelligence vast :. with a rare love for the beart, i n nn observing and delicate Bpi eoldier, this book, almost improvised, i B charming little mawterpiece. A t once witty and profound, the thor, laying aeide all prejnin partp, without ceasing udice. shown hiinself . s o original that .Iiariiis thc military reader. to be true, hare u perfuiue of poetry wbic k of tlw soldier : he apeake DEBRACK never loses Right of t h e mo of honor, of courage, of devotion. arid ti languagc pinken one thrill. The style inores on at a cavalry p a c e , ' ~ ich is well rulnpted to the subject. ? id : *' War is above a11 an 1 niodern philosopher, Jf. C ' O C ~ I Nhr , combined wi:h art which requires for its practice the gi this thought, which indoniitable courage." DE BRACK had an c m i g h t well serve as a motto for his book. Yore than thirty yeam have passed a ay sinco the first publication of this work, and during those thir years the French a r m y has made war in Africa. i n Relgium, in the rimea, i n China, in Italy; the flag j-vt flies i n Cochin China and i n 3 exico. DER R . 4 C S . S book is ns true, ns good n <I as useful nn on the day of ita first yublicatioli. The late tvarq hiire been enriched b scientific Siacoveries nnd the bullet and bayonet much material progress. The cannon b qtely. Some new proetrike at a greater distance ai?d more ac cesses have t a k e n rise i n the particular c racter of such or euch a strategy, hnre remained mar, but the general principles of tactics, TUREXNE, unaltered. They trill a l m q - s be thaw w ch FREDERIC,


and S A P O L E O N niade them.

It WIW believed tb
wished t o prepare hie

Ucthodical warfare. for which the book

to preparo the reader, will forever be the

DE BRACK is intended ly one employed by in-


So this work wae regiment were almad be enid that tbie book

structcd generals and disciplined armies. We had intended to modify the form of I haste, as though the

h e author not having 8 , simply reproduced

BUCK'Swork by fusing voting a new chapter to 9 addition of tho modern proved the work? W e Ipearance, itu eeal of iming t h i n g s i n such a sub-

I j

campaign ; system which niight hare beconi work, that woulci thus have filled the gap seeks, in t h i s the day of need, to fill as beat While awaiting this work, so ardently war which seems to be advancing with tbe as a baais that which sou hare learned i n ti ring to my memoranda, which LA ROCHE shows m e how to classify, I shall collect 112 form ant1 simplest to retain i n tile manor: but rather of a conversation), the results premed before you at the time of our The very small iiumber among you who will judge me while recalling your espcrieii learn that of which they are now iguorunt this knowledge as a reminder whicli will, on that which they may hare forgotten a i d wil dittlcultics from tbeir path. The spirit of order which has governed done you all the good possible; i t han prepar tlie seed which must now be R O W I I . The H t l of the duties which it lien iniyoaed npon y rather than reflection. In war, reflection t to go hand i n hand with action. Pure mr they may be, may become uselee8 as soon )I movement becomes deranged. The occurrt seen arreste at once their action. 111 war I foreseen; i n light cavalry where the sold upon himself, every action ought to be the 1 Tho fault of tlieories is their drynew; t not to belong to them, yet the ..wliy is t h is of thia .why that we ahall talk to-day, ples which action will prewnt to us m a p n or future. In peace you have ueen hotr things are to learn why they aro done. \Tar alone teaches war. The school e have just freed ourselves are only a theor: which an application will be wanting u n t i l paign. War multiplies eituations, and almoet a11 in an unexpoctd manner; especially for ligl same eventa under P thousand different wi

T Y.


wars are always meth

Jena, Friedland, W great FBBDEBIC, fro

leasons came from tliv ni CHARLES XI1 ; Sa-

d mmed under

remely cigllaut

he UM au ideal

gui - 2 a i d a i standard ich each commander can. sired, pressed by the ide of a giant, taking of peace. then referIYONS manual often ily, and i i i the carkst not that of an esmy, the principles I exn instruction. ve Reen active ncrrice 3 ; the reniainder will intl will niake use of tcrrsion, rrcall to tlieni believe, reinow mnie u for fifteen yeam Iiae the ground to receive : W N N and multiplicity h:ire produced action moet sustained ought linea, however perfect he regularity of their e of anything unforeioat everything in unhas often to depend d t of caiwful thought. why would appear goul of our action. It order that the exambe lost for the present


and h h -

of fifteen yearu, to c

ce after an abseiiw of tliu acrrice witli

tions concerning details, tten, but only to make the war; have recallcll

books. TbeF have unfol it to general oilicers; but datiea baa been but little hrra very materially added pity tbat tbis general o l c judicious observations upon plete elementary eyetem pre

ne, now you are Foing

rcises from which we iiore or less perfect. to ! sliall enter on a cam-

works; among others. light cavalryman, a110 s of FUEDEEIC. It irr n

p instantaneously and Pavalry, it preeenta t b e ta. It ia not BO much


. Cd VA L R S 0L'TPOS T 1 'T T
n such or such a g e n e r o u s enough to acknowledge his a b i l i t j until a colonel, H man of a n a t u r e similar to him a n d removed t h c barriers which obstrc tion. H i a rapid advancement wae only a n i t wae solely t h e fault of o t h e r s t h a t i t h s d I f I dwell upon this fact i t i s for a h t S o w h e r e , more t h a n in t h e a r m y , o u g h t one hie a n b o d i n a t e s , a n d a r a i l himself of thei Nor a n y w h e r e should t h e justice rendered Fh devoid of t h e p e t t y jealousies born of eelf4o' heart-which m a y become a serious, a n d I w h e n t h e y basely trammel t r u e genius anc services which m i g h t h a r e benefited it. ' SC doubtless a v e r y respectable one-but bo1 T h e armies i n which i t h a s been given too been defeated, while those w b e r e merit line jected to it8 unreasonable demands, b a r e Merit being equal, seniority should t u r n t h withdrew Y from t h e arm I n 1815 C O R ~ L of those t h a t k n o w how to s u b m i t ; i t w a s y o hi8 life a n d took i t s flight a few years ago his noble brothers in a r m s who died upon tl pire, or upon tho scaffolds of t h e Reatoratiolr t h e spot w h e r e hie body reeta in t h e cem w h i c h h e bad quitted thirty year6 before BB I W h y could not death delay a while? H e W I from t h e flag concealed u n d e r his h u m b l e b o n t h e d a y of victory, with a standlrrd take have found t h e o n l y t o m b a n d winding s h e CGUBLYwas m y ideal of a l i g h t a v d y fought by hie side, a n d his counsels a n d ex upon m y memory a n d i n m y h e a r t foretei t h a t I h a r e learned to k n o w w h a t qnalitiec distinguished otilcer of light c a v a l r y ; ahd myself, I h a v e had m n i e slight, fortunate t h e m to t h e a t u d y a n d remembrance of t h e to me. To be a good officer o f t h e advanced gu brave a n d to command well u n d e r fire; 01 of action t h e greateet n u m b e r of meo a n 4 L dition for exerting t h e greateet power. instruction. indispeneable a8 it is. though



One m a s t be born a light so m u c h natural aptitude, s

o o t h e r position requires u s for war as t h a t of an a k e t h e superior man. in-

me in 1807 ; Le became a g
leaguecl in advance of o u r

i n 1806 while t w e n t y a d of t w e n t y men of

Seventh Cbaeseure and N i n penetrated 88 far ae t h e he in-ChieE I n 1812, at Pnltnak, wit1 t h e General-in-Chief of t h e

prompt, RO careful i n h manded a detachment, at

the G r a n d Army. W b e n e v c o m m a n d were fresher a n d

action t h e men of his for fighting t h a n those a s u r e by t h e common mediocrities or aupe-

w o r t h y of him. an. For t h r e e yeare I ple will remain graven It io i n s t u d y i n g them re neceseary to m a k e P f at a.later date, left to hire, I h a v e often owed structions which h e left

standard a n d keep


it ie not euongh t o be uat b r i n g t o t h e place e t h e m in t h e best coni s eecond part of our t the mout brilliant, is

undoubtedly the most im of things, and cannot be 1 A babit of judging the with the ready remedies scropnloue inspection of t spendent upon,a uumber

d horees, an acquaintance r t a i n cases, a daily and nowledge of t h e repairs ipments, and the repairs 3 uneful to man and beast 11 understood, regularity position of the bivouacs, ty affect the health of the wily dispensing with the be instrumenta contained eeping seasonably, study 3m, the maintenance of a arguing when they have a conutant superintend. If the horses etrength, to -all the more carefully a8 diflcult,-to inspire the 1 enthusiasm,-those are eful times do not teach; r y coup d a i l , to promyt:e the truly distinguished

rons, etc., proven The great quantity of ueelese articles regulation panta mounted; thone of duck for summer; which is oiily good to make him carelees

continoous watchfulnees io horaea, indication farrier, instructions for the e i n the surgical cane, tho a r t of the character of the men discipline which will prev nb longer the guard honee en08 which will prevent the set a pereonal example in ev

sound of the cannon. To-day,the equipment of a chaeeeur or only to serve in a general movement from

seem8 conceived

what t h e theoretical i n - thobe are what, joined to

new ofjudgment on the



P e a c e haa taught y which i t baa nubjected

>our minds and bodies, in handling pour arms a
nsoful, and we sh ocoopied with many de engage it excloeively. 1 W a r is, eaid Gem not yet been beyond the

the varioua exercises to upon you because they ill retain, above all, from ve brought under control of dimipline and individual address the very foundation of all tactics.

of boota. i s not

attention, to-day cipal objects which should one day, to him who h a s what the world is to the young that is, what practice is t o theory. man some habits which The ewe, the obliga-

home nor the arme of the trooper are his


Id army I have oRan

ald follow tba -meat
et tbe time of l e cb.nglng aatlon. In wblch could be allowed to mnaport. Tho tmnrpnrtmtlo wold the doable n-ltp nf injorl forcingpareels IDLU cmea a n r l n l ~ uns



known troopere to refuse

im other persona io moun

be lest their absence should authorhorse6 and uee their arms.

attack it. Tbe trooper i to bim OD his departure a part of himself; only
pnnishment a n deprive their possomion. If I had had the

good fortune to mmm would bave religiouely consideration, and the I

vslnrrble odcer of the It i s to prepare yo that I have recorded formiug, in a manne During the nine

t, had he lost hisown.

practical knowledge of outpost duty them reeollecdons-tbin species of

ve had the honor of commanding

of our family, our common efforts tbe transfer of t h e o

be furninbed to each on avoid that labor. Be to i

u; I ehall hare it printed i n order to eition, that ie left open to criticiem. I

promptitude of composition would and I have thrown haetily on paper


is better t o say too much than not enoug tbe application of it before reaching a final yon will reproach me for the contrary fat Study is the areenal from which you day of action. To study carefully assists us m d to do this is the secret of 6uccmB as a so mach a8 i n the light cavalry ( l a 6 0 1 1 plication of this tmying of a distinguiehe n e s of decision and action) is genius." Theoretical instrtiction ie given coupled mreree the action of war. The cold met crampe and confines the brilliant drea inepired with enthusiaRm for our pr from afar only an action upon the young man who, later will be the h h i s entrance under the henry rod of which doe6 not consider the why o gunted because he finde no echo of hie fier only n formula, where any other would m Let him alwaye learn patiently whn find it@ application. A t the firet e full swing; he will shake off the dust of t mesa, hie chest will fully expand, his sight by a horizon. R u t tho theories learned wi made possible only by their precel h i m to-day; let him recall the lea the Roman recruit. In the matter of instruction o only when lie ha6 an exreee of rived i t ie too late to learu; i t i the useless. Yoreq-er, war pre becomes EO complicated by di our knowledge may alao find application can be made onlp labor. \Then the nieii of m y tim and our etudiea at the m i l i t a we made our exit from it a sad lot of troo received amidat eaber bl and awkward ranks. 0 us. At every step we we were wanting in that w




how sou can await ion; tben,perhap,

k and

net quickly, oi8cer. Sowhere

i t h trammcle which iich it nererjeitates,

i g nchml and the no longer limited n the movement8





hard ---.or w e k a m e bet


lrymen t h a n you are now, but perW e bad over y o u t h e advantage dland, W.Tagram, E y l a u a n d Moee a n d trained o u r judgments. re in the most sublime of d r a m m , i e reasons for \-ictory or Quickness of decision a n d action. T h e dash which carries e v e r y t h i n g T h e firmneea which tleepain, of n most desperate eituations. 7. T h e calmness which neve his eubordinates to we o n l y wit t h e courage which set8 the exam


h a p not better than you of t h e glorione daye

jaisk,, which harden

5. ti.

a n d retrieves t h e

Soldiem of t h e Great
we have been able to


Some great day8 will will s t u d y t h e m o n l y in t

wn for you. Let u s hope t h a t you

ns n single man. wius or enatcbcs victory, *he were a mistress. T h i s combination of

L U n t - C h l , Commanding hkginunt.

ties is called first,


be rend.


To clear t h e way
H o w doea it

Thus at t h e time of an ex secret, if i t is necessarr that the men sh

until t h e a r r i v a l of t h e p r o p e r time, should provent a n y feeling of uneasiness e Q. W h e r e is t h e positio A. A l w a p at t h e place of command. Q. But suppose t h e r e a A. There c a n be but example, when t h e chief squadrona in eclielou, wlii
fird, except u n d e r peculia timt and t a k e t h e liend of

iucover this secret eea of t h e i r chief'

e n e m y step by etep, ha deeigne, exhaunting h i s

Q. What ie t h e meaning A. Head. Example.

required in a comrnadder of light atbematical estim tion of his
2. T h e eure and rapid t h e f h m e of m i n d of t h e of t h e one he attacke.

t the bead of t b e t e r to lauucb t h e


h recoguizes a n d c o m p r e h e n d s , bich h e commands. as well as t h a t whatever sido h e approaches d i n i b minuteet detailn a8 t o niposaibilitiee for attack, de:

prehend at a plancc t h e which Iio c a n readilF o i n t h e e v e n t of a repulse. If, u n d e r certain ci t h e bead of t h e leadin

hand all hi# force,

be impossible for a n y doubt to arise

m a y happen, a n d a11 s rOne be bas loft. I n a retreat. on t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e cbief t h e rear g n a r d , being careful to p u t t h e ad ofecera i ? whom h e has the greateet con his march t h a t t h e p
Iways accompany

3 . The glance with t h e field, he takea it i n


MI, ./,( - , , ,


There i s one case i n whi to t h e attack, t h a t i s , when in column; then he leads p i t i o n being taken. be re11 that of manenverer.

ef should precede his comnianti has rallied, whether i n linc or

d, u n d e r fire andl

h m r i g h t to left at a di epeak P few worde to t b e

them, make an opportun

inapection of his regiment, riding1 four pacas from t h e liue; s h o u l d ! ad soldiers to cheer and encourage I lling t h e men by t h e i r namea, and

promptly demoralizing t h e corps. m a n d e r no greater niiufortune can o n e whose ignorance a n d laziness ar a n d improper influences. T h e c t h e knowledge of h i s weaknetw soldier understands him b e t t e r th his time then in correcting h i s Egotism i n a chief is not o d y most s h i n i n g qualities, and tak power orel* his subordiuntes. Tliu chief w h o does not pe and who, i o t h e day of privati orily his own interests, will demoed.

eirt t h a n to hare nrourage intrigues ee t b a t h e screens

Undor dre, equality t b r o n g h of the brave, by the brave, m m a n d pride. The chief eboold

cockade; justice, s condemned who i e can never re

eboold be so ~1088, entire, in every eitustion, I L E eis

battle-deld ia reaped tbat wh better t flrmnese, inrtfnct, courage, i more perfectly can he upon will8 of all, to bind t h e m into
PT~W ~O M service, the


In bivouac, i n t b e face o only one-half as much as allowing him more homes t h tiorr to exercise g r e a t e r vi fatigue. D u r i n g tho contiiiu to h i m , a n d h e should nev quires his nien to deep, for hie honor is at s After a n engagement, if t h e wounded b birouace. t h e chief should p a watchful oye upon tbe at l i e d straw to g i r e t h e m his own. A s soon us prisoners a especial protection, a n d endeavor to amel redssuring a Q r d s a n d thoughtful attention ; to hare t h e m attended t o at the same time If a detachmen: of a n o t h e r regiment, his, t h e chief should go some paces i o fro presence of his own corn ample will be q u i c k l r foll a p a r t of t h e family. D u r i n g t h e campaig I n f a n t r y was onlereci on to which I belonged; t our hussars. T h e t w o regiments

n carried to the

w n wounded men. or infantry, joins a n d g i v e i t in t h e



t h a t &nvarde, eayioa; sev responded to t h e challenge HQIWUW, and t b e infantry

scieotiousnew. He phould show them in which t h e y will e a r n , a n d wbich h e will to obtain for them. T h e n teach them t h e general scale o forewarn t h e m t h a t he will denland o f ea of hie obligations. T h e o n e who, either t h m u g b n e g l w to t h e full height of his paition-sinc honor of t h e regiment a r e at stake--sh of his command a n d placed in t h e r a n rear Thia h a v i n g been done, be wi m a k i n g t h e greateMt efforts to obtain t playing t h e iaflexibilitg of iron in th I n presence of t h e ciieniy no otR battle even t o move onl- a slight di is impoeed upon him b y t obiigatio~ be dictated to him by t h a t instinct, by t h soldier alwaj-* possesses. 1 have k n o w n n Iiy cannon bnlls while t h e y w r e lioving been ten y e a m retired. arri been i i i m y proper place. thie would not t h e y l i r e 8R- years longer t h i s idea will the- will a t t r i b u t e to-thia fault th The practices of p a c e h a r e cers; t b e y h a r e been led to be arrest for delay in a t t e n d i n g call platoons, mmetimee well a n d 80 that t h e time of which t h e y w performing t h e duties of a cor consume, and spend entirely a t to this b y t h e exorbitant p r i r i l By r i r t u e of this law, whi eire of improvement, t h e most o r d i n a r y man withoot m a k i n g t h e least effort. So,in t b great t h i n g for a n odcer is reeulte o f t h e inepcctione, bu will rudely correct t h i s evil, t h e ootgro One man i s burn a general, a n o t h e both must be accomplish t h e cooacience of both w m a y be a eub-lieutenant an should paes into t h e c a i r


make fourteen,.the bussars

ertire t h e rewards

o goes t h e r e ? IiTbe Fourteenth

th L i g h t Infantry. enduhip w a s soon found, for leagais from Ratisbon by n n obliged t o yield h a d i t riot devof.ion wbicb it inspired. e d t h e o r d e r to go into birounc bile t b e y t h u s needlessly consunie m a , o t h e r regiments dismount, i n ge a n d provinions; t h i s is n h e regiment deprived of its

place for hie divieion, hie b ment or detachment will

ouac which his regi-

To install himself quickly or

d e p e n d t h e etacienc

of wbom one shall

except by a few broken do Ohen i n a d v a n c i n g i n

paces t o t h e r i g h t or left, near to d above all from a village, i4 choice, i n t h e end, will ent. M e r i t being equal, t w o chiefs vouacs a n d t h e otber poor oues, a t will 5 n d u n d e r his orders a s t r o n g o n d will be followed n o longer

lism whieh every severely wounded

thein constantly; t u n e of t h e i r lives.

i o s t t b e e o e m r two regiment3 ; this is almost always t h e e t h e advance, let him g o along some column parallel own, and if b e is obliged to cut it. let bim send to forewarn at he commandant of t h a t column or better still, let himgo himeel to tell him. All will t h e n be done replarly, a n d one avoid8 excit g between regiments, hatreds wbich prod~c sad ~ and e n d u r i n g effec s. The reeponeibility of a chie of a light corps is a h e a r y burden for one who a p p m i a t e e at ita jam value t h e importauco of hie duties. Ohen the d e t y of t h e e n t i r e a ppie confided to him, a n d u n d e r all cimumehncee, the lives of hie en, t h e honor of bis standard, are in hL bande. I A colonel of l i g h t cavalry, II entering on a campaign, should arremble 6 r o t hie ofacere, t h e hie oon-cotnmiesiooed ofeccrs, a n d remind them o f their duties, a of t h e confidence h e h a s t h a t t h e y will perlbrm them with rigor, i telligence, a t t i v i t y a n d perfect con-

excel t h e b e R t

41 1

j e c t t o t h e o r d e r s of a skilled a n d

today, ehoald skip the head of a regiment. B

grades, a n d stop o n l p at t h e

of justice, t h e r e muat he a preif h e desires to

thus happily eitnated not seek to pa t h i n g is a study, a n d a fruitful one


If t h a t h e k n o w s how to grooni

instruct himself thoroughly ; later h e will hia time, for n o m a t t e r where hie fortone a conduct him, he will find everythi decided a n influence upon o u r career. U n d e r a n y circumntancee never censure for h e is responsible for e v e r y t h i n g ; to act

se would be to

i m t r n c t o r ; if h e is i g n o r a n t of poet, punish t h e chief of t h a t

tinpiebed men, with aold incladed i n the g a m e o n w h shop of t h e msnter workme

take a hand i n t b e work hi

bo have really seen war a n d a r c bedongs; examine carefully, in t h e

s t o p t h e performance of all d mand, and b r i n g b i r n d f int know how to perform t h e d Oflicers are not equally on t h e field of battle, t h e o t b e r i regiment; from t h e latter nothing terior a r r a n g e m e n t and orgnnizat T h e really superior o a n o a e r is v e r y rur pressing useful a n d active of merited promotion, a n d n o practical knowledge of specialiste. Sometimcs a body of o destitute of energy, of uct fault of t h e commandant depend o n t w o or t h r e e leadere of differ lished themeelvea a8 t b e chiefs of cljquee

tad with t h e ine n t can eecape. both ; b o t 110 such

If he enjoys the advan

d e s who have estabheir comrades recog-

d l d u t y , a n d later, of a
ia a power, and that in v i t a o f

ng, power always ttiumplrs.

fortune which a n otllcer shoultl d u t y well; a n d to find himself subwhich t h e d i g n i t y of t b e position oppoees riiate friendehip for his inferiors, t h a t k i n d n exhibition of intiich would make i t

One of the greateet pideeire to meet witb at the

of a regiment which perfor





pleaeent, w h e n t h e i r merit t h e i r proper p i t i o n e , to estai plete a n d brotherly equality, 1 t o require t h e distinction o f r Sometimes a good mu1 wbo eelf to yield to t h i s weaknees able,for it io baeed upon esteem especially i f t b e inferiom w h o tbemeelvee, a n d often witbout t h e i r friend i n hie position t familiarly with his inferiors t not t o be d r a w n , in a n y caBe, si0118 which would produce a I He ought, eo to speak, to by t b a t of hie moral euperioi knowledge of life poeseseed b b r o t h e r l y confidence. The cb v i r t a o of hia r a n k i a n d w h o m o a g b t to avoid similar ihtimac a n d t h a t of hie position will 81

ad bem discovered, to place them in s h between t b e m a n d himself a com3 i n s t a n t t h e relief from d u t y ceased

uffern from his isolation permits him1 pleasant, and at bottom, so honort h e h e a r t is right, t h e chief is wrong. h e honors with t h i s affection, forget t e n d i n g it, t h u s b r i n g into dirreputc chief. Whoever coinportrl himself g b t to be, above all, etrorig enough t h i s intimacy into m a k i n g conees:kof respect for himself p l a t e t h e degree of his familiarity. a n d above all, by the minds and t h e inferinre to whom lie accords :I f w h o feels himself superior only 1~y iind ie narrow a n d charakter feeble. I ; if b e do- not, bin persdnal dignity BIS be promptly compromised.





mn o n e point of t h e cavalry field of action, which, however has called forth t h e most varied views a n d opposite opiniona in t h t .anks of t h e cavalry, a n d concerning whicb I h a r e h i t h e r t o encount red only tho vaguest ideas. I refer to figtiting on foot. T h e d e m a n d haa been m a d e of t h e CaVall that, even in action against cavalry, a reserve of a few squadrons bould be dismounted in o r d e r to hold a defile in rear. I n t h e last Far we have eeen t h e dismounted cavalry take rillages (although o ,v wben held by Mobile G u a r d s or Franctireurn), a n d a n oil pait np: exists of such a n f activity to a prinincident. T h e r e is a tendency to raise t b i s 80 ciple, a n d i t is often h e a r d from cnralryrn tliority, We m u s t be independent; W e dependenco upon t b e infantry. Yes, t h e p o w to drill t h e cavalry in t h r o w i n g independent of t h e pontoniere. T h e r e time a regulation t h a t waa propoeed for alry in fighting on foot, according to whic instruction, i n all i t s details a n d in field cavalry, a p r o p i t i o n which, fortuoatel According to t h e newspaper? o n e of t h e neighboring States bas not onlyreintroduced t i n f a n t r y b u t h a s made it the r u l i n g element inspections I found eqoadron chiefs w rent, had practicod fighting on foot lowed t h e course of t h e i n f a n t r y re

WHERTO I h a r e scarcely m i d a word

. I





mounted m a c r v a l r y would h a v e to be left mounted for t h u s eighteen equadrone at the highest WOP i n g on foot, or 1,440 men. Imagine t h e w
carry 88 far, or ahoot 88 well, 88 a n much t i m e c a n n o t be devoted to t b e inet sltooting as in t h e infantry. T h e l a t t e r will better. It can certainly be safely asserted t


Tbe half squadron produced

ere held back

ecarcely t h i r t y car

and each rush was



Any result from such a n

pposition to thie zeal for tile foot ely d i u p p r o v e d of it, never

of t h e cavalry i n eboot f a r t h e r and


dice i n tbie dieinclination. mvere blaw if i t i r once a d can go i n 9 action w i t h o between b o w a n d r i d e r i s

m e t h i n g more t h a n mere prcjuv q l r y spirit will receive a rsible t b a t a cavalryman horse. The intimate mnnection n ; t h e love of t h e man for his horse
of t h e cavalrye fighting

ie weakened.

t o defend i w l f against a n attack o f t e n t i r e cavalry division. Yet tbem carbi m a k e a rush forward according to p a w H o w do t h e y t b u e p w to t h e action alry commander begged m e for a n explanati execute tbie, I wae placed i n adilemms; the hold hie carbine i n hie r i g b t h a n d in o r d e r to hi8 saber bookod up. Should he now aliqg h d o would be to t u r n the carbine 8n t h e b u t t aa a clab. B u t t h a t c a n n o t diemoonted cavalryman muet p l a y a n with hie saber a g s i n e t infuntry ar Let ae aleo calculate t h e higheet t h a n t w e n t y cartridgee per ma the regalatione eet forth care of t h e s u p p l y of ammunition. silent. Can t h e ammunition mrts follow line? The problem of re-eupplying the lory only by t h e greateet ditflcn eighty cartridgee witb him, a n d y e t the exercised at tbe opening of a t t a c k s i n through want of ammunition. of t h e c a v a l r y m a n be fired? more cartridgee? X o ! T h e n how and whe get t h e m ? When a l l these tbinge are t a k e n a t t a c k s of t h e diemounted weaker, a n d I certainly d o i n f a n t r y c a n offer eucceeefal of a n e n t i r e c a v a l r y divieion. If a cavalry division en o f t h e enemyn i n f a n t r y i

t b e cavalry eboald of t b e r e p l a t i o n e .

againet man, using

t h e forme, a n d say but few The etepmotber-lik indicates t b a t they do


content1 tbemeelvee witb g i v i n g i n r e g a r d to attack a n d defense. t of t b e subject of fighting on foot m a c h d o e a p o n thie exceptional ilence, in regard to t h e eceive application, t b e

d r y in s u c h a n action
n to form with m o r e appear with s leas i x t y full files; e v e r y a n d at t b e higbest, t. G r a n t i n g t h a t
rona) baa o n e cailaseier reg mounted a e a maewe. E v e

b ammunition


ed i n t h e artileconomy maet be t o enffer a check


i m e n t c a n be k e p t d the coirrreRier regiment, be a r m e d

neidemtion t h e

boob a n d hie uuiraea, would that it woold general1 eervicee in d g h t i n g

c~88 rendered

it wise

carbines availablo. In addition


ich ie secured to i t when mounted, ision occupiee t h e disorganized detachmenta of t h e enemy's i nized nrmed citizens, or againnt inhabitants enemy. In t h e dofeneive t h e cavalry can, t h r o u g h deception, a n d u n d e r certain portant masses of t h e e n e m y t h a t t h e point too l a t e ; or by being pushed for

re can be jnetified only in caeea

ry detacbmont ( a r m e d citizens, and a t t e m p t s to p r e v e n t a f u r t h e r

iebee most i n tbie by deception,. g e n e m y t h a t is opened upon by

mn etope, bie march i s interrupted. eider it advimble to push forward

abandon t h e attack entirely. of i m p o r t a n t pointa. It in


limited, as a rule, to t h e nie and t o target practice. To expect dangeroue. I f more were demanded of i t infantry w o r k in garrison d a t y . i t of its t i m e to these exercises and i known t h a t t h e cavalry h a s no n squadron chief r e v carefully d i o f instruction, a n d each d a y a n aonably if h e expecte to eucc exicrting requirementrr. He nI is n t t h o e n d of his day'e w o r k d u r i n now m a d e upon him, a n d t h a t an i n c r e cal forces in o r d e r t o inetruct him i o t h e s other exercises of t h e iofantr demanded of t h e cavalry, tl ciaes to t h e background, a n d saffor a corresponding eacridee. It is o n t cavalry ofecem are opposed to fighting on heard t h e m denominato i t as "noneense, dan

nd upon hie phyeia t t a c k on foot, a n d

ed men moet

nfantry, a n d t h e y returned by t h e h t thbm up, w i t h o n t having made


n tan be more
or d e m a n d a n y t h i n g more


will fnll i n d a n g e r of using this oxpeneive a r m . Let u of I) cavalry divieion are required to etorm a by a determined, well-instructed battalion o neere. If this battalion d t h e cavalry baa en s t r e n g t h of a brigade, i not able to fome t h e bat a t t a c k i s auceeeeful. i t a i l i n tho attnck with t h e M

diemounted m e n t h a t ie well beld 500 to 800 carbi-

rmation t h a t i t ie


I more dan&roue than ie i n accord

more of t h e cavalry in fightt h e i r nature. Combinntione


THE MODERN CAVALRY DESTR( 'ER AGAIN. nted with an o 5 c i a l H e r e w i t h t h e readere of t h e JOURNAL are p
should be for thie. It m a y my directly u n d e r t h e comreport of a seriee of care which will afford food for reflection to
o have been led to


lication Qf the cavalry, t h a t i t is u p neede t h e n e a r e r or more r rehiforcement of t h e i n f a n t r y in without parpoee, a n d t b a t t b e l y of i t s most i n p o r t a n t services

i n g question, whether eharpehooters a n d device&, are a8 formidab1 controlled in tbeir firing bp o l c e r e of eki

ractice b e a r i n g no actual war. tbst hat nothing can s u p t h e intereat,'lett to tbeir own xperience :


ven t h e greater part of t h e i r cavnew creation, like all encb hybrid n d will 6 1 1 far s h o r t of t h e most

T h e g r o u n d on which t h e firing took flat on t h e b a n k of t h e Mieeouri River, by slight accidente of eurface, suBcient geta o n occasion.

an exteneive eandlevel, bat m a r k e d ly conceal t h e tar-

The fire waa uncontrolled, t h e men beiq

A teaeonable estimate a v e r a g e oetimate of t h e 5 great, which t h e very e m a T h e weuther wae faro

on tbe f o u r t h




the same g r o u n d , a n d in ta fired at each halt. For



placed in groups of front being t h e same.

at equal intervale of o n e


ca8e8, a n d the extended o r d e r in two. It i ever, that in o m o f t h e former cases the li e i g h t more target8 than the extendat line, an m a n hit,.while t h e n u m b e r of hita w a act ~ tended line, eo t b a t tbie case s t a n d s : Extend

to be remarked, bo*of groupe contained showed only one more illy greater on the es1 order, eleven meu h i t

f fifty. o u t of forty-two; groups. twelve mon h i 8 ou o The greatest contrlrut is found i n the E :ord experiment: tended order, t w e n t y men h i t ; groupe, 8 .



d e when t h e fire was



vulnerability of lines a n d in small groups.



The influence of an erroneous e u t i d t e f distance ie indicated by t h e contraet between t h e fourth a n d 6f experiments. I n t h e mado a u a v e r a g e of former a c o m p a n r of t h e best instructed m n t h e latter a company 1.35 per cent., with t w e n t y - t h r e e nien hit. of thirteen marksmen, fifteen first-clam mer rrid twenty-one unclaeeified men mado a n average of 3.5 per cent., pith f m t y - o n e men hit, aimply b y being compelled to use eloratians taaoriublp well gueuwd. 'l'heee experiment8 are too few a n d inc niplete to w a r r a n t a n y conclusive deduction. but t h e y indicate: First-Tbat t h e renults now obtained ' our skirmish practice would riot be obtained i n war. Second-That poor uliot~,using t h e ri t elevation, are more valuable t h a n sbarpsbootc-ra using the wron roue; a n d Third-That between 1:OOO a n d 600 %*a

nL marhorn.

F l r e nncontr0lled. Tagers

Flm uncontrolled. Tatgew obcured

tained u p to abort n n g e e , at which, in r a r i o u s lines n i l \ have reduced t h e inte nd experiment:


k t number o f ' men h i t i n t h r e e



' I









B be h a d been at echool f o r S e a keep clean. of w h a t to them w a s 80 important, and yet el upon tbose w h o considered tbemeelvee bie EU spised a n d t h e n shunned h i m ; t b e maideqs als him. \T.\.'hhtcould h e do t o w a r d s s u p p o r l i n g h a t a n d shoes gradually wore out; h a v i n g no be took t h e blanket a n d s h i r t furnished bp t b e made h i s own moccasins a n d breech clout, a 1 tribe, the love denied him in hie own. He a p p a r e n t l y felt v e r y bitterly towards tl had tried to treat him eo kindly, as be s d d , t a child, from poverty a n d filth, g a v e him an e him w e r e a t Aret luxuries b u t afterward6 nece him back to his people better able to apprecia ditioa, b u t w i t h no means of bettering it. B t h e whites, he would have been of a lower cae a n outcaat; h e became desperate; in order to I good graces of bicl people b e m u s t do mmett admire. Io a #tote of pace tbie w w impose thirsted for war-for w a r w i t h the white opinion, through mistaken kindneee t h e y had d a n d w e r e t h e cause of all h i s suffering@. In to ehow his ability a n d t a k e a few ecalpe fron i n a n d near t h e reeervation, and who, h e mid, w the world would be botter off without them. some horses, blanketa and houeebold utenei o w b u t WM goi G o r e r n m e n t would w a k e u p t reinforcements to t b e few regular eoldiem w b against h i s tribe, b u t could easily be avaide settled country for awhile, a n d when i t finall! people would sue for pence a n d become got tional rations. By starting such a w a r he M a n d at ite close he would be a rich m a n a n d I Xanj times since then have I t h o u g h t o f1 h a r e I heard t b e remark : "1don't underetanc ate6 of ecreteru echoole c a n take up arms sga a n d eepecially 80 since PLENTY Horn-, a sylvania, on J a n u a r y 7 , 1891, near P i n e L i e u t e n a n t CASPY, o n e of the beet friends the PLCXTP HOUSES b a s been tried for thiu murdc To some of my frienda t h e above h m seen Bome p i n t a of t b e ' & I n d i a n problem," a n d othere I forward i t to t h e JOCBNAL.


rnd learned n o t b i n g l e n t l r looked sriorn, they t l n dto w den

-3 in t b i
tbe D areal

looked scornfully u t
wife? H i s clotbee, o n e y to b u y otbem, nterior Department, I Rought i o a n o t h e r Government w h i c h him w h e n ucatiou, and w h a t to itiee; and then eent I t h e i r degraded cond he remained w i t h ; i u hie tribe he WOB instate himeelf i o the n g wliicb t h e y m u l d dc, a n d b e tberefore mple because, i n hi8 ne him a cruol wrong, b e boped to be able lhe whites w h o lived re such wretcliee t h a t re also hoped to e t a 1 . By t h a t t i m e tbe g on and would eend would at 6ret be eent in such a large unbecame neceeerrry, hie Indians" with addiold benefit h i s tribe, D i g brave. I conversation. Often row t h e I n d i a n gratinret t h e government," mte of Carlisle, Penne, 80 foully murdered

for tt


whid war, I

,t i t took

In warm



about Ic m


mrning tbat a d a mile above w, I w e n t

O P P twent


gave 1




b tobe ing u Peon. and t





Carlirle, Penn., w b qh e learned to be a tinamitb. On ig tiom there, be b to hie tribe dreesed in a good otbee, and filled suit u n for his own advancement and tbat of his tribe.




u u c a


ole m o o

ana w n t to


adisos have ever had.

a n d acquitted. d to t h r o w l i g h t upon r the information of

bad even diratinguisbed them From their atandpoint he







omparison of the
to the conclusion

Dismounted action ie, and remaioa, 8

te in fire-arms hare do e

ciution of it8 nature in i 8 and magazino rifle8 Cn


view. In ita NOR. i6, 7 entire training of men a i 1 The rider muRt get a re 1 each body of cavalry mu t of which a m i n s t infantr .




1 " '


tenance of eommani


snaciently protected

qoently numerous 80

were not alwaye enillcient, and co occnrred. The artillery was not air

e' S

3 8


A magazine carbine has been intmduc Anatria.


l e

d P ieto


h t exeroieee bae not been eetimat




cavalry witb the lance is by no meane t h e h o t raaka of the dragoon re&

, December 6,1890, FORT BIDWELL, CALIPOBNI. T h e recent development of t h e Melvriah cr ze, which hae 80 much demoralized t h e Indians all over the Wwt, has produced a great many articles on the eubject; all of them ~fire or leae correct., but none en$irely eatiefactory, eo far ae regards t b origin and originators of the creed to which the aboridnal inhabita ta of our country have given eucb belief ae to bring ue to t h e verge tf a great Indian war, afier tbe Indian quention had come to be ?gurded as practically settled. ore or lees All of t h e articlee mentioned hare p i n definitenees, to Xevada ae being tbe regior from w cb thie now wide-epread doctrine baa been promulgates T h e writer, having rocently been placed in a position which her offered eingular h i l i filly into t h e tiea for a n inveetigation of thie matter, baa, details of i t ; has questioned many of the . PeDFB.cYLdiaoe on the subject, and ie now able to give B very come t accaunt of tbe teneta of the faith.
*Prom tbe ArcrbDI A-

'ed witb it. Bat in Rueaia t h e feeling

lor April, 1801.


that the doctrine iv'(~8
lived i n Mason's Val-

will return to their 'former rangee, and

more abundant than it ever

before t h e



of all kinds will be

Indians by this marl's preaclieems to have ceaued from t h e September, 1887, when a new

KOIT-TS~W claims that lie receive8 th trances, during which h e goes to ttie spirit

relatione whilo in lid coiivorrwe freely

all pieces, arid that and w i l l fall to the


be Indiaoeof

ne s$all return to their old htrLi&

f twelve different

him, in which he figures ae people. SIDES is in truth a old coffee-cooler,who chime t

the and occupancy.

with LEEWINNIYCCCA, who locree original WINNEYUCCA, coneider a most pernicious d

. ..hl




hae been much perverted a n d d i d Cheyennes, Arapahoes, a n pmmiees will s h a k e t h e i r fuith


N+T. P. PHISTER. Erai Lvutrnad Firat Injmiry.

w o r n . KANIM. January 9,1lW2. port made by thqruthar In Soseqon of toe Pscitlc. Since the articb me 10 bellere that Kurr.rs6a l a an
at h r a m l d Lake reservation. from re6u w u sUIl p m c h l n g M late 4)


THE MILITARY HISTORY. By an A r m y School Chatham. The Englieh are not a humoroos people, an to hold t h e opinion t h a t a j o k e would ecarcel of t h e Queene Anglo-Saxon eubjecu nnleee revolver. A n Englishman ie never eo diemal to be f u n n y ; b u t he is eometimee erquieitely sober earneet. . A n exemplitication of tbe.latter fact ie 1 History, by a n A r m y Schoolmaster, publis T b i e little manual ie evidently intended aa an t h e military examitlatione. It baa all t h e pa1 by 8 red cover, a n d conveye briefly certain h n ( l o p e of inaccuracy q u i t e ae Englieh ae tl Hintory must be to a n Englishmans taete; i prime requisite-nccuracy ie a eecondary co to Englieh historians in general,a n Irishman t h a n h e doee t h e Queen, a n d a n I n d i a n chie pendence to t h e rule of a n English viceroy a1 w h e r e the Britieh repulaed the F r e n c h a n d t t and Niagara, where t h e Americans defeated w a r d s withdrew, are alike British victoriesnot affect t h e English mind. Wellington is tl a n d goodneee, wliile Napoleon i s a cbarlutan I wig-Holstein b u r g l a r y waa a crime, while thc a n d r i a and the occupation of Egypt were all worthy of a Roper-religious people who cann to countenance the slighteet violation of t h e lieh eabbath. T h e 44Army Scboolmaster wn&s hie lil Qneene taste, at leaet to t h e taete Q f h e r lo, of chief battlee. we find BnnkereHill. wit1

Cberennea wbo were nil their war




LteU(m0rf. Finl


mer. Gale & Polden,

i t might be jaetifiable enter t h e head of o n e were fired in with a s when h e undertakes musing when h e ie in
ind in @&The Military d b y Gale & Polden. id in ( c r a m m i n g for otic virtues expreeeed orical information of color of the binding. nuet be agreeable aa a ideration. According ho lovce hie iele more bin wbo prefers indealike rebels. CorGna, I abandoned t h e field, he Britieh a n d after.he inconsistency dnes incarnation of Renins d acamp. The Scbleew n b a r d m e n t of Alere t h e r chrietiauly acta band i t i n their liearts bcity of a diemal E n g -

book, if n o t to tbe eubjecta. In t h e list

ie remark.American

!&I .i.








Governor of Ohio.


ueen Victoria ie given BR 1848. As d, this statement muat be eornewLat

rical menu ie, pertated that "in the government, eubneeds no other
hat in 1871 the

, u. 9.
A U T , t0 tbe

1 1

almost every subject read i t to form an

A. L . R*

are required t o



a t Chiilons. The 1J
the Organiz8tion of Officere. Edocatio Wooden Scabbard0



with Stuart'e which ended in t monument on a


our wounded were



KO.37 : The Problem of the Attack by a Mixed Brigade (map 1. No. 38 :

General Staff in Campaign. No. 40: e coltiee. The Souvenirs of Private T

k of a Defile (bridges) the Duties of the the Chineee DitlL

Army, [continued). No. 43: Deetruc-

the C h i o w Army.






Tbe Effect of

October: The Mississippi Sational Guard tenant R. E.Evans, Twelflh U. S. Infantry. November: The Sational Guard of Californ tenant W.R. pamilton, U. S. Armr. Sadd t i n ued ).



Mounted Infantry. Post S Serrice i n the \Tar of the Rebel Field Sketching and Keconnrriesance. Ei (IIohenlohe). Two Brigades. (Hoenig).



nary-Surgeon, (firat-class), F. Smith, nary School. A pamphlet of forty pa plates. Price, sixperice.

UNITED SERVICE INYTITCTIOI Stw Lecture 1 1 : The Organization a

Lectore 12 : Ambulance Organiz for the Mounted ,%rviccs.

THE IOWA HISTORICAL RECORD. Ralph P. Lowe, with Portrait. Mra. Clara of Iowa. Iowa Pioneer Trails to California.

M g e . Tbe Making

ne1 Von Lobells Annual Report8

No. 60. sited Surtee Ssvy.


September, 1891.

Man ufactnre. General

Ils, etc., of the Saxon Rumian h n e u v e r a in

aine Cavalry.
1. Portland,Oregon.

Francisco, Cal.