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Nuclear or not? The complex and uncertain politics of Japans post-Fukushima energy policy
Masa Takubo
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67(5) 1926 ! The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0096340211421475 http://thebulletin.sagepub.com
Abstract
In the wake of the Fukushima disaster, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced that Japan should meet its energy needs without nuclear power plants. But his statement may have little relevance in the next administration. There is a complex power struggle underway over the future of nuclear energy in Japan involving political, governmental, industry, and union groups. Despite the seriousness of the Fukushima crisis, Japans historical commitment to nuclear powerand a fuel cycle that includes reprocessing and breeder reactorsstill has powerful supporters. Even with a scale-down of nuclear power, there is a possibility that the policy of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel will continue as a matter of political inertia.
Keywords
fast breeder reactor, Fukushima, Monju, Naoto Kan, nuclear fuel cycle, Rokkasho, spent fuel reprocessing
he wisdom of Japans long-standing plans to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and develop fast breeder reactors has begun to be questioned inside the country in the post-Fukushima context. In a televised statement in July, Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced a radically new goal for his country: a Japan that meets its energy needs without nuclear power plants.1 But the prime ministers precarious political situation makes it difficult to predict whether his professed interest in phasing out nuclear power is anything like the course the nation will eventually
follow. Ever since Kan suggested in June that he would step down once reconstruction from the March 11 disaster is on a stable track, a major focus of political discussion in Japan has been how long he will stay in office. As a result, whatever Kan says about nuclear power is often interpreted as an attempt to remain prime minister for as long as possible. And even if Kan is sincere in his desire to set Japan on a new energy path, there are reasons to believe that his statement may not have much relevance in the next administration. There is a complex
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power struggle underway over the future of nuclear energy in Japan. It involves political, governmental, industry, and union groups, and despite the seriousness of the Fukushima crisis, Japans historical commitment to nuclear powerand a fuel cycle that includes reprocessing and breeder reactorsstill has powerful supporters. Although it is being discussed in Japan and taken as a given in some Western press accounts, a non-nuclear Japanese future is anything but a sure bet. Furthermore, even with a scaledown of nuclear power, there is a possibility that the policy of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel will continue as a matter of political inertia.
the others because of seismic upgrades required after a pair of major earthquakes in 2007, other safety issues, and previously planned inspections (Mainichi Shimbun, 2011). Subsequently, in response to Prime Minister Kans request, Chubu Electric Power Company shut down Hamaoka Units 4 and 5 for earthquake- and tsunamirelated upgrades.3 Ten more power reactors were scheduled to go into periodic inspection by the end of 2011 (Mainichi Shimbun, 2011). If no startup is allowed, there will be no reactors operating by May 2012. The governors of several prefectures have said they will not allow power reactors that are out of operation to restart until clear guidance on revised safety requirements is provided by the central government. The guidance has been anything but clear. On July 10, the government announced a two-stage safety review. The first stage applies to the plants waiting to be restarted and the second to all plants, including those that have remained in operation. On July 21, the test procedures developed by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, which is part of METI, were approved by the Nuclear Safety Commission, which is part of the Cabinet Office. But confusion regarding these testscreated by the difference between the positions of Kan, who is cautious about restarting reactors, and the METI minister Banri Kaieda, who wants to restart them as soon as possibleis far from over. Its not clear when these tests will begin and whether they will be considered trustworthy by local governments. And thats not to mention the even more confusing situation
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surrounding Japans plans for reprocessing nuclear fuel and building fast breeder reactors.
The nine regional monopoly power companies and the Japan Atomic Power Company, in which the power companies have a controlling interest, own most of JNFL. These power companies are, therefore, both owners and customers of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. They cannot, however, decide not to reprocess spent fuel without a change of national policy. Originally, Japan intended to use separated plutonium to fuel fast breeder reactors, which produce more plutonium than they consume. Japans fast breeder reactor program stalled following a serious sodium leak and fire at the Monju prototype breeder in December 1995. Monju was finally restarted in May 2010, only to undergo another accident in August of that year, when a three-ton fuelloading device dropped into the reactor, leaving no hope for an early restart. It was not until June that the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, the operator of the plant, managed to retrieve the device. Under current plans, the fast breeder reactor commercialization is not expected to occur until around 2050. In the meantime, Japan has already accumulated about 46 tons of separated plutonium, the bulk of which is stored at reprocessing plants in Europe. With breeder reactors decades away, the current plan for disposing of Japans plutonium stockpile and the additional plutonium to be separated at Rokkasho involves mixing it with depleted uranium to make what is called MOX, or mixed-oxide fuel, which can be used in light water reactors. This plan, too, has experienced a series of delays. In 1997, Japans Federation of Electric Power Companies and the government
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announced plans for using MOX fuel in 1618 reactors by 2010 (Federation of Electric Power Companies, 1997).5 In June 2009, the federation pushed back this goal to 2015. Nevertheless, plans for full-scale reprocessing at Rokkasho are going forward. The major reason appears to involve the need to find a destination for spent fuel accumulating in nuclear power plant cooling pools around the country. The pools are becoming full. In the past, the reprocessing plants in the United Kingdom and France functioned effectively as virtual interim storage facilities for Japan, but this storage method is no longer available because Japans contracts with the European reprocessors have been completed.6 Now the principal options for dealing with the problem are to send the spent fuel to the cooling pool at Rokkasho or to send it to interim storage facilities yet to be built, either on site or elsewhere in Japan. But only one off-site intermediate storage facility is under construction. So to make room for spent fuel now at the countrys reactors in the Rokkasho cooling poolnow itself almost fullthe reprocessing plant must operate. This has nothing to do with demand for plutonium; its a matter of creating storage space for spent fuel. It should be natural to have a debate about these fuel-cycle programs in the process of reviewing Japanese nuclear power policy post-Fukushima. If the country were to eschew nuclear power, after all, there would be little need for a reprocessing plant or for continued development of breeder reactors. There has not been much of this kind of discussion, however.
The lack of focus on this issue is partly a matter of the urgency of Fukushima: The most attention has been paid to stabilizing the damaged Fukushima reactors and then to compensation payments for damages caused by the disaster. Thereafter, public discussion has centered on power shortages in general, with a particular focus on the timing of a restart of reactors shut down for periodic inspections. The political atmosphere of the country, mentioned above, has also loomed large on the public stage, leaving little space for a more overarching nuclear discussion. The discussion that has occurred has been contradictory and confused, to say the least.
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continue for forty years) of the reprocessing facility in Aomori Prefecture would make it possible to use a portion of the 12 trillion. . . to be reserved by the electric power industry as reserves for reprocessing. This would be possible merely by overhauling the existing nuclear policy structure (JCER, 2011). The compensation discussion has been necessary because insurance coverage required by law is far too small to begin paying for the consequences of the Fukushima events. The Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, modeled partly after the US PriceAnderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act and enacted originally in 1961, requires operators of nuclear facilities to buy private liability insurance that covers 120 billion yen (about $1.5 billion) per operating site. It also mandates that operators must have a contract with the government to cover the same amount should the kind of natural disaster not generally covered by private insurersan earthquake or a volcano, for examplecause nuclear damage. Since the Fukushima Daiichi case was caused by an earthquake, the government, not the private insurance policy, will provide 120 billion yen. But the compensation payments for the Fukushima disaster are expected to reach at least several trillion yen, hence the call, by some, for use of funds originally intended for reprocessing. There also is talk about going through court-led bankruptcy to dismantle Tepco. But since mid-summer, the discussion of changes in Japans approach to nuclear energy has gone far beyond the mere payment of compensation to the victims of Fukushima.
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himself denied that he mentioned cancellation at all. Several days later, on July 20, these flip-flops flipped and flopped again when Kan told the House of Representatives Budget Committee that in an energy policy review process, the government will discuss, without prejudgment, whether it should proceed with the nuclear fuel cycle project in accordance with past plans. The same day, METI minister Kaieda expressed his opposition to this idea in a different committee. So will there be a serious review of the nuclear fuel cycle policy? Clearly, a complex political battle on this point is underway. The energy policy review Kan mentioned is to be conducted by the Energy and Environment Council. This council, chaired by Koichiro Genba, the minister in charge of national policy, was established in June as a working group of the Council on the Realization of the New Growth Strategy, which is chaired by Prime Minister Kan. Discussion at the Energy and Environment Councils first meeting, held late in June, was based on reports from the National Policy Unit (NPU) of the Cabinet Office. It has been reported that there is a power struggle going on between two groups of NPU staffers: Team A includes about 30 people, mostly bureaucrats from METI, the Ministry of Finance, and other government agencies; Team B consists of about 20 people from the private sector, many working at think tanks. Kan is said to be favoring Team B. There is a separate team under Goshi Hosono, the minister in charge of nuclear accidents (a position created within the Cabinet Office in
June), consisting of some 30 people. Hosono and his team work closely with Kan (Oshika, 2011; Nikkei Shimbun, 2011). The Energy and Environment Councils interim report, released late in July, says the government should lead a nationwide dialogue under the theme of concretization of a scenario of reducing the level of reliance on nuclear power. The theme suggests a compromise between a force supporting Kans idea for a nuclear phase-out and a force supporting continued use of nuclear power. The report marks the first time the cabinet has showed clear support for scaling down nuclear power. The report also recommended a review of the possibility of separating the generation and the transmission of electricity. The nine regional electric power companies operating nuclear reactors now have a monopoly over electricity distribution in each region.7 A separation would foster competition, allowing other providers of electric power, including renewable energy sources, easier access to consumers. And that is why attempts to force the power companies to divest themselves of the transmission lines they own would no doubt face strong resistance. Such drastic changes in energy policy, however, are far from certain. The Energy and Environment Councils interim report is to be the basis for deliberations involving two more entities: a subcommittee of the Resources and Energy Advisory Committee of the METI and the Council for Planning a New Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy, which has been arranged by the Atomic Energy Commission.8 In the past, these entities and many of the people connected to them have been highly
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supportive of expanding the Japanese nuclear program and a fuel cycle that includes reprocessing and fast breeder reactors. One has to wonder whether a truly innovative energy and environmental strategy could be formed through such a complex process, which is complicated even further by the possibility that Kan will resign before this process ends, leading to a reshuffling of the whole cabinet.
Democratic Party came to power, NKP is expected to finish its new energy policy by the end of August. A call by Japans third-largest political party for fundamental change in the countrys nuclear policy will not be ignored. But change is always difficult to make, even after a catastrophe. The crisis over the spent fuel pools at Fukushima Daiichi has dramatized the need to tackle the task of storing spent fuel safely. Fukushima Daiichi has one of the two on-site dry-cask storage facilities in the country. The facility has nine casks containing 408 assemblies in all.9 Although internal sources say the structure of the dry-cask storage facility was damaged, there have been no reports of any safety concern with regard to the spent fuel stored in the casks. In a rational world, the apparent success of the casks might lead to more interest in a sufficient dry-cask storage program. After all, even if a decision is made today to shut down all the nuclear power plants, the question of where to store the spent fuel for a long period of time will remain. The trauma from the Fukushima Daiichi accident might, however, lead to opposition to building anything new related to nuclear power in Japanincluding interim storage facilities for dry caskswithout a clear and sincere explanation about a policy change by the central government and power companies. If new storage facilities are not built, something would have to be done with the spent fuel accumulating at power stations across Japan. Even if only a small number of nuclear reactors are allowed to operate, they will still intensify the pool storage capacity problem. It would be ironic if the
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Fukushima events simply reinforced the status quo and led to a continuation of Japans reprocessing policy.
Acknowledgments
This research was made possible by the support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. This article is part of a special issue on the disaster that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in March 2011. Additional editorial and translation services for this issue were made possible by a grant from Rockefeller Financial Services.
Notes
1. Titles for politicians and references to the political situation in Japan were current at the time of writing, i.e., early August. 2. One reactor (Tsuruga Unit 1) is scheduled to be shut down in 2016. An English summary of the Basic Energy Plan and its background information are available at http://www.meti. go.jp/english/press/data/20100618_08.html. 3. Hamaoka Units 1 and 2 already had been shut down for decommissioning and Unit 3 for periodic inspection. The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency said it would take a couple of years for Hamaoka to complete upgrades to protect against earthquake and tsunami risks. 4. The Citizens Nuclear Information Center reports in English on the status of Rokkasho at www.cnic.jp/english/cnic/index.html. 5. The White Paper on Nuclear Energy 1998 explaining the MOX-use plan is available in Japanese at http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/ about/hakusho/hakusho10/siryo2082.htm. 6. A total of 7,100 tons of Japanese spent fuel was sent to the United Kingdom and France under reprocessing contracts that began in 1969 and 1978, respectively. See p. 107 in http://www.nsc.go.jp/anzen/shidai/ genan2008/genan063/siryo4.pdf. 7. The tenth regional electric power company, the Okinawa Electric Power Company, is the smallest and does not have nuclear power plants. 8. The JAEC has published long-term plans for nuclear energy every five years or so since
References
Asahi Shimbun (2011) Kan comes out for a society with no nuclear power plants. July 14. Available at: http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/ fukushima/AJ201107134461. Federation of Electric Power Companies (1997) Purusaamaru no Genjo (The present situation of plans to use MOX in LWRs). Available at: http:// www.fepc.or.jp/present/cycle/pluthermal/genjou/ index.html. Japan Center for Economic Research (2011) Impact To Last Decade or More if Existing Nuclear Plants Shut Down. Available at: http://www.jcer. or.jp/eng/research/pdf/pe(iwata20110425)e.pdf. Mainichi Shimbun (2011) Hamaoka Genpatsu: Teishi Yosei (Hamaoka nuclear power plant: Request for halting of operation). May 8. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (2011) Minister Yoshiaki Takakis press conference record. Available at: http://www. mext.go.jp/b_menu/daijin/detail/1308386.htm. Nikkei Shimbun (2011) Datsu GenpatsuFutatsu no Chiebukuro (Nuclear phase outtwo brains). July 18. Oshika Y (2011) Keisansho no Genpatsu Kudeta ga Hajimaru (Nuclear coup of METI begins). AERA, July 11.
Author biography
Masa Takubo is an independent analyst on nuclear issues and the operator of the nuclear information website Kakujoho.net. He is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). This article is based in part on a chapter in an IPFM report on spent-fuel management to be published this year.
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