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The Constitutional Commissions 1. THELMA P. GAMINDE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAULC.

FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, respondents. FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s c o n f i r m e d t h e appointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998 opined that petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in Leon, wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,1 9 9 9 , C h a i r m a n C o r a z o n A l m a G . d e t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n A u d i t r e q u e s t i n g o p i n i o n o n w h e t h e r o r n o t Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.” Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit en banc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner’s term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her. HELD: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde asCommissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered.

Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus staff. RATIO: Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n m u s t s t a r t on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the d a t e s o f appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter. In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between “term” and “tenure.” “[T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.” Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution under their existing appointments at the discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1) their removal from office for cause; (2) their becoming incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or (3) their appointment to a new term there under, all of which events may occur before the end of the one year period after the effectively of the Constitution. However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX, providing for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the first appointees under this Constitution. 2. BRILLANTES vs. YORAC 192 SCRA 358, 1990 Facts: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision that “(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that

should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of “administrative expediency,” to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC. Issue: Whether or not the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the absence of the regular Chairman. Held: NO. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning. In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make. 3. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT 482 SCRA 233 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) FACTS: The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of their ―no report, no release‖ policy. Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. ISSUE: Whether or not DBM‘s policy, ―no report, no release‖ is constitutional HELD: DBM‘s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional.

the CHR promulgated Resolution No. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION (CHREA) vs. ―automatic release‖ of approved annual appropriations to petitioner. 8522. By virtue of Resolution No. no release‖ policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. No. Congress passed Republic Act No. A98-062 the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. This conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a ―no report.R. To support the implementation of such scheme. By parity of construction. Being ―automatic. Article X of the Constitution is defined as ―an automatic manner.The no report. The Court held in the case of. the CSC-National Capital Region Office. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. ―automatic release‖ in Section 6. 4. Romulo. a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy. and one Accounting Clerk II. Indeed. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III. authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services. the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the ―just share‖ accruing to them from the national coffers. thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution. FACTS: On 14 February 1998. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G. the CHR. Section 5 of the Constitution. in the same resolution. four Attorney IV. In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme. place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy. through a memorandum recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla . of which petitioner is one. spontaneous and perfunctory. otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. Furthermore. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval. without thought or conscious intention. the Constitutional Commissions. November 25. but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request. should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. which provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. and the Ombudsman. connotes something mechanical. 2004. On the strength of these special provisions. To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would.‖ thus. to that extent. one Chemist III. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. 155336. Batangas v. one Clerk III. such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A). three Special Investigator I. no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed.

as the law’s designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system. Petitioners aver that the resolutions w e r e i s s u e d w i t h g r a v e a b u s e o f discretion because the COMELEC took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of its Divisions. The CHR. which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat. In the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.reclassification. particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of positions therein. Meanwhile. is beyond cavil. and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management? HELD: CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning the CHR’s alleged blanket authority to upgrade.proclamation controversies. as well as the composition of a Municipal Board of Canvassers. reclassification. and all such cases must first be heard by and d e c i d e d b y a D i v i s i o n o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n . d o e s n o t h a v e t h e authority to hear and decide the same at first instance. E l e c t i o n c a s e s i n c l u d e p r e . reclassify. Sarmiento vs Comelec Facts: COMELEC resolved a number of cases en banc regarding the appeals for inclusion and exclusion of certain election returns and certificates of canvass. the 2 Divisions of the . In Energy Regulatory Board v. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading. Petitioner bewails that the CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial matters are concerned. and create positions inasmuch as the approval of the DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable. Issue: W/N the COMELEC should have heard the appeals en banc Ruling: N O . sitting en banc. i n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e Constitution. T h e C o m m i s s i o n . 5. as well as creation of positions. the officers of petitioner CHREA. nonetheless. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading. in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR.we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. although admittedly a constitutional creation is. requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. creation. pre-proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases a n d . Court of Appeals. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. The interpretation of an administrative government agency.

and must be dismissed w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e f i l i n g o f p e t i t i o n e r s o f r e g u l a r e l e c t i o n protests. All such election cases s h a l l b e h e a r d a n d d e c i d e d i n division. Said resolutions are. Subdivision C.R. Y. Commissioner X retired and was replaced. and said that the aggrieved party could then challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or through a certiorari case before the SC. Indisputably. the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction. 1998 elections. H o w e v e r . therefore. when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. then. S e c t i o n 1 6 o f R A 7 1 6 6 provides that all pre-proclamation c a s e s p e n d i n g b e f o r e i t s h a l l b e deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. these cases have been rendered moot and academic. 6.p r o c l a m a t i o n controversies. or with grave abuse of discretion. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected Governor. and s h a l l p r o m u l g a t e i t s r u l e s o f procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases. 2000) FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Governor. On 2/24/00. Eastern Samar during the May 11. The petitioner filed this case to annul the order for the promulgation of the resolution and to direct the First Division to deliberate anew on the case. On 2/15/00. provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. while Commissioner Z wanted to see both positions first before giving her decision. null a n d v o i d a n d m u s t b e s e t a s i d e . i n c l u d i n g p r e . Private respondent filed an election protest with the COMELEC. petitioner and respondent received a purported resolution in favor of private respondent promulgated on 2/14/00 and signed by Commissioners X. Commissioner Y dissented. Ambil v. which was assigned to the First Division. No. Commissioner X prepared and signed a proposed resolution in the case.C o m m i s s i o n a r e v e s t e d w i t h t h e authority to hear and decide these Special Cases. . Doctrine: Section 3. 143398 (October 25. The Division later set a date for promulgation of a resolution of the case. and Z. COMELEC G. Article IX of the 1987 Constitution:“The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two Divisions. The First Division later declared that the parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. Since the terms of office involved in t h e S p e c i a l C a s e s s u b j e c t o f t h e petitions have already commenced.

the exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en banc. In 1995. It ruled that it has no power to review via certiorari. since on the same date an order was issued where she said that she still wanted to see both positions before making her decision. HELD: The SC dismissed the case for prematurity. First. whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court. First Division. 98-29) acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Civil Service Commission 1. Lastly. unable to restitute said missing amount. He filed the case with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. He averred that he was forced to retire because of the erroneous audit. He later filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PNRC. Third. Baltazar Camporedondo vs National Labor Relations Commission 312 SCRA 47 – Business Organization – Corporation Law – Government Owned and Controlled Corporation vs Private Corporation Facts : Baltazar Camporedondo was the administrator of the Surigao del Norte chapter of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). Commissioner Z could not have affixed her signature on the resolution.00.000. The SC declared the resolution signed by Commissioner X as void for various reasons. “The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth. Baltazar. in scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. a PNRC auditor found out that Baltazar had unremitted collections amounting to P109. then filed for early retirement. Second. the Clerk of the 1st Division denied the release or promulgation of the resolution on 2/14/00 resolution. the 1st Division even later said that the parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. affirmed by the NLRC.ISSUE: Whether Comelec. . The Labor Arbiter.

alleging that on June 9. that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor Management Council. etc. the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building. the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues.00. and payment of the children's allowance of P30. that the strikers refused to return to work. PNRC has its own charter (R. which ordered the strikers to return to work. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands. 1987. preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS. No. As a GOCC. that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work. and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. and that the strike be declared illegal. Its subsequent amendment did not convert it into a private corporation. 1987. 85279 July 28. HELD: No. 2. allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS. and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. payment of accrued overtime pay. Baltazar however argues that PNRC impliedly became a private corporation when its charter was amended to give it authority to secure loans.R. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine National Red Cross is a private corporation. 1989 Facts: On June 11. 95).ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case because PNRC is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC). it is subject to its own charter and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right . The simple test is to find out whether or not a corporation is public or private is to determine if it has its own charter for the exercise of a public function or was it incorporated under the general corporation law. SSS Employees Association v Court of Appeals G. conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries. night differential pay and holiday pay.A. and are compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System.

O. XIII. Swiss-based organization. and agencies of the Government. an administratiave docket of dishonesty was also opened against Baluyot. IX(B). petitioner Baluyot. collective bargaining and negotiations. She gives as evidence of its private character 1) it does not receive budgetary support from the government and all money given to it by the latter and its instrumentalities become private funds of the organization. its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. Sec.1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. November 24. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches.R. filed a complaint with the Ofc. provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization. 31]. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. 1 of E. Issue: Whether or not PNRC is a government owned or controlled corporation or a private corporation. 3. the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only. without including the right to strike. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter. The chapter administrator. Francisca Baluyot vs. subdivisions. . Upon recommendation of respondent Militante. NLRC. in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights. PNRC. 2) funds for the payment of personnel’s salaries and other emoluments come from yearly fund campaigns. the auditors from the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) headquarters discovered a case shortage in the funds of its Bohol chapter. was held accountable and thereafter. . No. No. private contributions and rentals from its properties. Nos. petitioner claims falls under the International Federation of Red Cross. Paul Holganza Facts: During a spot audit in 1977. Held: The 1987 Constitution. and peaceful concerted activities. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to strike. Sec. 1161. Baluyot raised the defense that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction as he had authority only over government owned or controlled corporations which the PNRC was not. of the Ombudsman for malversation. including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. 69870 & 70295.2(l) see also Sec. respondent Holganza as member of the board Bohol chapter. G. This being the case. instrumentalities. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.A. 3) it is not audited by COA. having been created under R. the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

parC of the Rules of Court – once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid judgment of a competent court. Macaraig is not applicable to the case of private respondent because there was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution or at the time of appointment of petitioner. 1986. Applying the case of Achacoso v. vs. Alunan III. Hon.Held: The Court cited the case of Camporedondo vs. Hon. as Ministry Legal Counsel –CESO IV of the Ministry of Local Government was temporary. 47. and are compulsory members of the GSIS. Private respondent contends that the nature of his appointment can no longer be passed upon and controverted in the present case considering that said issue had already been settled in the foregoing Minute Resolution of the Court. he cannot be removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and due process. 47. 4. public respondent has jurisdiction over the matter. respondent. on donations for its disaster relief work and other services and in its benefits and fund raising drives…” Clearly then. Civil Service Commission. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function. and Secretary Rafael M. Thelma P. De Leon Chairman. Alma G. 95. fees and other charges of all kinds on all importations and purchases for its exclusive use. March 19. Rule 39. CA Hon. Department of Interior and Local Government. his appointment did not attain permanency because he did not possess the required CES eligibility for the CES position to which he was appointed to. as amended. thus he can be transferred or resigned without violating his right to security of tenure. parC of the Rules of Court. DE LEON vs. NLRC. with an original charter under RA No. The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled or private in nature is simple. be exempted from payment of all duties. Gaminde Commissioner. petitioners. it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to rest. Court of Appeals and Jacob F. Therefore. or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions. it was held that since the private respondent was not a Career Executive Service eligible. The PNRC was not “impliedly converted to a private corporation” simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans. Macaraig. the court ruled that private respondent’s appointment on August 28. as stated in Rule 39. 1992 – Court issued a Minute Resolution holding that Achacoso v. . and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Sec. FACTS: In the decision sought to be reconsidered. taxes. “Resolving the issue set out…we rule that the PNRC is a government owned and controlled corporation. having met all the requirements for the position to which he was appointed. Sec. Montesa.

It must be stressed that this is not the first time that the principle of res judicata has been set aside in favor of substantial justice. Abella. CSC (2004) The Facts: “Petitioner Francisco A. 1999. when said appointment was submitted to respondent Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his appointment. retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). now the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). III.ISSUE: WON the Court possess any rights to re-examine the case despite what was stated in the Rules of Court? YES RULING/HELD: The Court is not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. which allow transfer or reassignment of CES personnel to other CES position without violating his right to security of tenure. it was disapproved on the ground that petitioner’s eligibility was not appropriate. while the . Issue: Who may file reconsideration or appeal Ruling: Approval Required for Permanent Appointment A permanent appointment in the career service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with the provisions of law. petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department Manager III. SBMA on July 9. pursuant to CSC Resolution No. in view of all the foregoing. ABELLA V. which is afterall the avowed purpose of all law and jurisprudence. Labor and Employment Center. 850 dated April 16. It implies the civil service eligibility of the appointee. On January 1. 1979. Two years after his retirement. WHEREFORE. on July 1. However. Thus. which was then the required eligibility for said position. a lawyer. having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy. 1996 as Department Manager of the Legal Services Department. Labor and Employment Center. the instant motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY. the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of personnel in CES. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Department Manager. 5. petitioner was issued a temporary appointment as Department Manager III. With regards to the issue of the private respondent’s designation : A CES eligibility is not a requirement in the case of private respondent. Jr. petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a contractual basis. 1999. the rules and the standards promulgated pursuant thereto.. In view thereof.

an appointment to a civil service position must comply with all legal requirements. otherwise. O n A p r i l 3 . Darangina Facts: Engr. the CSC 2001 sustained the termination o f Darangina’s temporary appointment but ordering the payment of his salaries from the time he was appointed on September 25. Plans and Policy Services. The applicable provision of the Civil Service Law reads: “SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.Darangina filed a motion for reconsideration. 2000 until September 24. in the main. if this should take place. 2000. Tomawis then appointed Alongan Sani as director III. On appeal. the choice is subject to the caveat that the appointee possesses the required qualifications. and jail guards. and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. 2001. stating that respondent could only b e r e p l a c e d b y a n eligible. 2 0 0 2 . An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission. the Civil Service Commission approved this temporary appointment effective for 1year from the date of its issuance unless sooner terminated.2000. That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. CSC granted the same with modification in the sense that Darangina should be paid his back wages from the time his employment was terminated on October 11. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided. the CSC disapproved his appointment.” 6. Thus.appointing authority has the discretion to choose whom to appoint. Darangina was a development management officer V in the Office of M u s l i m A f f a i r s . Thus. On October 31. 2000. without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided. — The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions: “(h) Approve all appointments. h e w a s e x t e n d e d a t e m p o r a r y p r o m o t i o n a l appointment as director III. O n S e p t e m b e r 2 5 . On October 11. in the same office. finally. police forces. whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether the rules pertinent to the process of appointment were observed. the law requires the appointment to be submitted to the CSC which will ascertain. CSC v. Ali P. But he is not also a career executive service eligible. shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance. firemen. 2 0 0 0 . except those of presidential appointees. to positions in the civil service. the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter. To make it fully effective. 2000 until his separation on October 31. newly appointed OMA Executive Director Acmad Tomawis terminated Darangina’s temporary appointment on the ground that he is not a career executive service eligible. the expiration of his one year temporary appointment. D a r a n g i n a f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r p a r t i a l . whether original or promotional.

a complaint against Pedro O.reconsideration. Darangina filed a motion for reconsideration. including appropriate eligibility prescribed. 7. PETITIONER. [PARDO] Facts: On November 29. Rito and Ped Dacoycoy. Darangina then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed for his failure to implead the OMA Executive Director and the incumbent of the disputed position. George P. found a prima facie case against respondent. the CSC found respondent Pedro O. Suan. Allen Chapter. With the expiration of his term upon his replacement. In the absence of eligible persons and itbecomes necess ary in the public interest to fill a vacancy. 1996. No reinstatement & back wages. On appeal to the Court of Appeals. the CSC promulgated its resolution on January 28. a Citizens Crime Watch VicePresident. as driver and utility worker. that such temporary appointment shall not exceed 12 mos. in accordance with the provisions of law. APRIL 29. and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. PEDRO O. Quezon City. hence. 1999 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. After the fact-finding investigation. (2)Temporary Appointmen. misconduct and nepotism. on March 5. After a conduct of a formal investigation. However. the Civil Service Regional Office No. CA reconsidered its previous ruling and ordered his reinstatement as well as payment of back wages. . Administrative Code of 1987 Book V Title I Subtitle A Chapter 5Section 27. 8. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed. only salary from appointment until termination. Employment Status. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons. – Appointment in the career service shall be permanent or temporary. respectively. VS. Northern Samar. CSC’s MR was denied. Petition GRANTED. RESPONDENT.(1)Permanent Status. a tempappointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided. for habitual drunkenness. respondent was not guilty of nepotism. 1997 finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. Dacoycoy. but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. DACOYCOY. 135805. praying for his reinstatement as director III and p a y m e n t o f back wages up to the time he shall be reinstated but the CSC denied the same for being a second motion for reconsideration which is prohibited. NO. G. issued the corresponding formal charge against him. and..R. rules and standards promulgated in pursuancethereof. there is no longer any remaining term to be served. 1995. Issue: Whether Darangina should be reinstated HELD: CA REVERSED. the CSC’s resolution was reversed ruling that the respondent did not appoint his two sons. filed with the Civil Service Commission(CSC). Tacloban City.

Both positions are career positions. Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. Ruling: The law defines nepotism as all appointments to the national. However. BANGALISAN v.” Further. The word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. If not within the exceptions. it was Mr. Mr. In fact. The court ruled that it is true that the respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them under respondent's immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT. It was also the respondent who certified that “funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito. city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof. 8. but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law. it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. Clearly he is guilty of nepotism. 1998 and September 30. Jaime Daclag. listed him in his job description as his “next higher supervisor. Mr. CA. including government owned or controlled corporations. Daclag’s authority to appoint first level positions. who recommended to DECS Region VIII the appointment of Rito Dacoycoy as driver and appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority. who was the school administrator. The Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated January 28. 1990 to dramatize their grievances against the alleged failure of the government to implement measures intended for their . The court stressed in the Debulgado case that the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. it was the respondent who recommended Mr. Ped.Issue/s: Whether the appointment of the two sons of respondent is within the scope of the ban on nepotism. 276 SCRA 619 FACTS: Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged “mass actions” on September 17 to 19. 1998. or of the chief of the bureau or office. What is needed is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the `outstanding' civil servants.” Unquestionably. provincial. Dacoycoy from the service. dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him.

No. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DETORRES VS. Alfredo B. he was advised to re-apply with UPLB. Alfredo de Torres from the civil service due to his prolonged absence without official leave is valid HELD: The CSC predicated its ruling on Section 33. his failure to assume duty as ordered caused his automatic separation from the service. Dr. De Torres' absence from work was not duly authorized by UPLB. 1989. 953045 stating that De Torres was already on AWOL beginning September 1. CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave. The provision states: . ISSUE: WON the automatic separation of Dr. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FACTS: Dr. ACCI-UPLB. De Torres wrote the Chancellor of UPLB that he was reporting back to duty. employees in the public service may not engage in strike. he served as the Philippine Government official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific(CIRDAP). Dr. 1989. Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and notified De Torres that since records at UPLB did not show that he had been officially dropped from the rolls he may report for duty. recognizing their right to do so. even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memo Circ. However De Torres was informed that in the absence of any approved application for leave of absence. or regulating the exercise of the right. To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefore. which was in effect at the time. The CA upheld the decision of the CSC. walk-outs and temporary work stoppage like workers in the private sector. He was advised to report for duty and that if he failed to report within 30 days he would be dropped from the rolls of personnel. De Torres is a Professor of the UPLB who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September1. De Torres did not report to work. 9. The Education Secretary issued a Return-to-Work Order but the petitioners failed to comply. ISSUE: WON government employees can engage in a strike HELD: No. requested the Civil Service Commission regarding the employment status of Dr. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages public employees was clearly recognized at common law. but was denied. Thus. Dr. As a general rule. De Torres then sought for reconsideration with regard to said decision. After almost five years of absence without leave.When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire. Thus.6 public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in work stoppage against a public employer. he was considered to be on AWOL. De Torres. 1986 to August 30. During this period. Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules. Members of Academic Personnel Committee. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him that he should report for duty on or before September 5. De Torres failed to do so.material benefit. 1989since his request for extension of leave of absence for one year was denied. In the absence of any express legislation allowing government employees to strike. The Commission issued CSC Resolution No. Hence they were charged by the Secretary with several administrative cases leading to their dismissal from service.

the CSC-NCR rendered its decision upholding the protest of Calamba and recalling the approval of respondent’s appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer. if he failed to return and report for duty. He also denied ATO Director Gilo’s request. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the ATO formally filed with the DOTC her protest against the promotional appointment of respondent as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer. UPLB records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. even after he had been warned of the possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period. however. On January 5. he was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation Office (ATO). On November 18. duly attested by the Civil Service Commission. Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. On the contrary. 2004 Facts: Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office. claiming among others that respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory requirement for said position. he was promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board of Regents. is whether petitioner was indeed dropped from the service by the University.R. 1998. This action constituted sufficient notice. that he shall. he shall be considered automatically separated from the service." UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner of the possibility of being dropped from the service. Dela Cruz G. 1994. Strangely. presently holding the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division. Provided. UPLB records show Private petitioner was not only retained in the roll of personnel. 10. He was promotionally appointed to the said position on November 28. The pivotal issue herein. in a letter dated January 13. be notified in writing of the expiration thereof with a warning that if he fails to report for duty on said date. 1995. 158737 August 31. he will be dropped from the service. DOTC. for lack of merit. however. No."Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than one year. 1997. But prior thereto. CSC-NCR Director Acebedo ruled that there is no cogent reason to disturb earlier rulings on the matter. then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. In the case at bar. Annabella A. Moreover. If an employee who is on leave without pay for any reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of one year from the effective date of such leave. the highest governing body of UP. 1998. All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the University has chosen not to exercise its prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employment. de Torres from the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. within a reasonable time before the expiration of his one year leave of absence without pay. CSC v. In a letter dated February 9. CSC-NCR . his salary was even increased three times. He remained in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel. Garcia rendered a decision finding the protest without merit. On July 20. Calamba appealed the decision of the DOTC Secretary to the CSC-NCR. 1995.

the appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment. Sufficient if not plenary discretion should be granted to those entrusted with the responsibility of administering the offices concerned. In Salles vs. Dela Cruz filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals assailing the CSC Resolution. organizing. was the uncontested choice of the appointing authority. Dela Cruz has sufficiently complied with the required experience standards.The CSC treated Calamba’s request as an appeal. deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. 1998 ruling is unofficial and inexistent. directing. On November 13. education.. In a letter dated January 26. coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws. Consequently. the power to appoint rests on the head of the department. However. the CSC rendered its Resolution granting Calamba’s appeal recalling Dela Cruz’s appointment. Acting on the request for reconsideration filed by Dela Cruz. agency examinations and seniority. . CSC-NCR Director Acebedo explained that the January 5. in the appointment or promotion of employees. Planning. 1994 as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer. Respondent would indeed lack the required years of work experience to qualify for the contested position if the managerial standards in the first clause above were to be strictly followed. Dela Cruz. respondent had a little over one year of managerial experience from his designation as Acting Chief of the Aviation Safety Division during the latter part of 1993. the appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but also their performance. In the appointment of division chiefs. Issue: Whether the CA erred in approving respondent’s appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer despite his failure to meet the minimum four-year managerial and supervisory qualification for the position Held: No.When asked by the CSC to clarify the conflicting rulings. They are in a position to determine who can best fulfill the functions of the office vacated. At the time of his permanent appointment on November 28. CSC MR was denied. rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools were part of the work performed by respondent for more than 13 years prior to his ap It is elementary in the law of public officers that the power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper authority. rules and regulations pertaining to licensing. CA granted the petition by setting aside CSC Resolution Nos. 1998. 1998 ruling of the CSC-NCR. the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his appointment was well within the supervisory standard in the second clause. Calamba requested the CSC to implement the January 5. Garcia dismissed the protest against respondent’s appointment. work experience. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority. Then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. 1998. The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed. he is also in the best position to determine who among the prospective appointees can efficiently discharge the functions of the position. et al. as in this case. the CSC denied it. 98-2970 and 99-1451 and approving respondent’s appointment as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office.Director Acebedo granted Director Gilo’s request and affirmed the approval of respondent’s appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer. Francisco. Not only is the appointing authority the office primarily responsible for the administration of the office. trainings and seminars attended. we had occasion to rule that.

seminars attended. prospects for the future and best interest of the service. etc. who can do it best should be left to the head of the office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied.” The reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an appointee is the date of issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC or the date of resolution of the protest against it. we sustain the latter. courtesy. We need not rule on petitioner’s assertion that respondent’s subsequent compliance with the experience standards during the pendency of the case should not be counted in his favor since respondent was anyway qualified for the position at the time of his appointment. 1991.. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been .ATO Executive Director Gilo also noted respondent’s full compliance with the qualifications for the position. There is no reason to disapprove the appointment of respondent as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office considering that he is fully qualified and evidently the choice of the appointing authority. may be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness. Given the demands of a certain job. Commission on Elections 1. Cayetano V. Between the Commission and the appointing authority. initiative. Formal qualifications such as age. later affirmed it after a re-evaluation of the case and declared his previous ruling unofficial and inexistent. “Every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. who previously recalled respondent’s appointment. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 (1991) FACTS: Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25. CSC-NCR Director Acebedo. team spirit. number of academic units in a certain course. loyalty. ambition.

Bautista vs. . engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination. Election Officer Jareño referred the matter of Bautista's inclusion in the certified list of candidates with the COMELEC L a w D e p a r t m e n t o n 5 J u l y 2 0 0 2 . 2002 barangay elections. In compliance with the t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r . commissioner. body. and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years. for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person. Atty. . is engaged in the practice of law. At the same time. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: “. HELD: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist. E l e c t i o n O f f i c e r J a r e ñ o i n c l u d e d B a u t i s t a i n t h e c e r t i f i e d l i s t o f candidates for Punong Barangay. board. Otherwise stated. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. in a representative capacity. referee. a lawyer-negotiator of contracts.” Atty. 2002.R. Election Officer Jareño refused to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. 2002. Bautista filed an action for mandamus against Election O f f i c e r J a r e ñ o with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas. committee. The trial court o r d e r e d Election Officer Jareño to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry. a lawyer-manager. firms. associations or corporations as to their rights under the law. . COMELEC [G. or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose. or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar. Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the July 15. 154796-97 October 23. one who. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.55%. T h e r e a f t e r . On June 11. or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. before any court. 2003] FACTS: On June 10. 2. Nos.

The proceeding on the cancellation of a certificate of c a n d i d a c y d o e s n o t m e r e l y pertain to the administrative f u n c t i o n s o f t h e C O M E L E C . the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of Bautista's certificate of candidacy without first referring the case to a division for summary hearing. The COMELEC en banc can only act on the case if there is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division. Thus. 2. In Resolution No. There is due process when a party is able t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e i n t h e form of pleadings. the COMELEC did not give B a u t i s t a s u c h opportunity to explain his side. ISSUES: 1. 5404 and 5584 3. The COMELEC en banc i s s u e d Resolution Nos. T h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e h e a r d d o e s n o t o n l y r e f e r t o t h e r i g h t t o p r e s e n t v e r b a l arguments in court during a formal hearing. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing .A summary proceeding does not mean that the COMELEC could do a w a y w i t h t h e requirements of notice and hearing. 2. Whether Bautista was a registered voter of Barangay L u m b a n g a n w h e n h e filed his certificate of candidacy.During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections.t h e C O M E L E C L a w D e p a r t m e n t recommended the cancellation of Bautista's certificate of candidacy since he was not r e g i s t e r e d a s a voter in Lumbangan. Hence. Whether or not the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due p r o c e s s w h e n t h e COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on t h e COMELEC Law Department's recommendation before the barangay elections on 15July 2002. Bautista and private respondent Alcoreza. and 4. 5 5 8 4 o n 1 0 A u g u s t 2 0 0 2 ( " C O M E L E C Resolutions"). COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404o n 2 3 J u l y 2 0 0 2 a n d R e s o l u t i o n N o . t h e C O M E L E C e n b a n c r e s o l v e d t o c a n c e l Bautista's certificate of candidacy. ere candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. HELD: 1. The COMELEC should . 5404and 5584. or a margin of 197 votes. Whether or not it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as P u n o n g B a r a n g a y i n view of the alleged disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista. Meanwhile. Whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it issued Resolution Nos. 5 4 0 4 . However. the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay. A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. On the other hand. Bautista obtained the highest number of votes (719) while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes. 5584 expressed COMELEC's policy regarding proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place of their election. C a n c e l l a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s involve the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions. Resolution No.

Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. and (2) the electorate is fully aware in factand in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor o f t h e i n e l i g i b l e candidate.have at least given notice t o B a u t i s t a t o g i v e h i m t h e c h a n c e t o a d d u c e e v i d e n c e t o e x p l a i n h i s s i d e i n t h e cancellation proceeding. The importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process. An elective office is a public trust. Commission on Elections which h e l d t h a t t h e e x c e p t i o n i s predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions. from serving. Malasiqui. Zarate further . or in the case of his permanent disability. He therefore made a misrepresentation of a material fact when he made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan. Jr. I t i s a w e l l . He who aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself. 4. Jr. false representation of a material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. 4 4 o f t h e L o c a l Government Code provides for the rule regarding permanent vacancy in the Office of the Punong Barangay. or (2) if elected. A c a n d i d a t e guilty of misrepresentation may be (1) prevented from running. 3. the second highest ranking sangguniang member. the highest r a n k i n g sangguniang barangay member. won the 1996 SK Elections of Brgy Ican.s e t t l e d d o c t r i n e t h a t t h e C O M E L E C c a n n o t proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified.that of being a registered voter in the barangay where he ran for office. 3. Zarate filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that three or more votes that read “JL” should not have been credited in favor of Lallave. namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified. Unsatisfied with the proclamation by the Barangay Board of Canvassers. or (3) prosecuted for violation of the election laws. v. Zarate vs COMELEC FACTS: Julian Lallave. F o l l o w i n g S e c . Pangasinan. Thus. the proclamation of the second placer Divina Alcoreza as winner in lieu of Bautista is void. garnering a total of 46 votes over Marivic Zarate who garnered 45 votes. B a u t i s t a w a s a w a r e w h e n h e f i l e d h i s c e r t i f i c a t e o f c a n d i d a c y f o r t h e o f f i c e o f Punong Barangay that he lacked one of the qualifications . The material misrepresentation c o n t e m p l a t e d b y S e c t i o n 7 8 r e f e r s t o q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r e l e c t i v e o f f i c e . shall become the Punong Barangay. The COMELEC en banc deprived Bautista of procedural due process of law when it approved the report and r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f t h e L a w Department without notice and hearing. The exception to this well-settled r u l e w a s mentioned in Labo.

which.election cases shall be heard and decided in division. S u b s e q u e n t l y . in Barangay 18. was denied by COMELEC en banc. 2003 FACTS: Petitioners.” 4. for e v a l u a t i o n . The Municipal Trial Court rendered it decision in favor of petitioner Zarate. this petition. . Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain. Zone II of Cavite City. Lallave appealed to the Commission on Elections theorizing that the votes reading “JL” should be credited in his favour considering that such initials sufficiently identify him as the candidate and that the votes bearing “Julian. subsequently. submitted to the Commission en banc. recommended filing an information for double registration against petitioners. Ravanzo. “Notno Lallave”. 153945 February 4.The COMELEC en banc annulled the decision of the Municipal Trial Court and declared Lallave as the elected SK chairman.U p o n r e a l i z i n g t h a t t h e i r r e s i d e n c e i s s i t u a t e d w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f Barangay 28 not Barangay 18. declaring 8 of the original 46 votes invalid. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. Reynato Baytan.. respectively. The petition for annulling the COMELEC’s decision was granted and was set aside. p e t i t i o n e r s s e n t a l e t t e r t o f o r m e r C O M E L E C A s s i s t a n t Executive Director Jose Pio O. instead. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction without first referring the case to any of its division. Baytan vs. The Commission was ordered to assign the case to a division. The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a division of the Commission but was. Petitioners’ Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the Provincial Election Supervisor. petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered a new. Atty. 83-A of Barangay 18. and “Nono de Real” should have been credited as well being his nickname and middlename. provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.stated that the votes bearing “JL” were stray votes and that there was no candidate with the name or nickname of “JL”.. Jr de Real”. COMELEC G. No.R. Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction? Held: Yes. w h o . Hence. The COMELEC affirmed Ravanzo’s resolution. Roberto Ignacio. who led them to register in Precinct No. Ratio: The recourse of respondent Lallave transgressed Section 3 Article IX of the Constitution which provides that “. Joson requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous registration. Juanito V.

g r o u n d e d b e l i e f t h a t a n o f f e n s e h a s b e e n committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. T h e e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e i s t h a t a preliminary investigation is not the o c c a s i o n f o r t h e f u l l a n d e x h a u s t i v e display of the parties’ evidence. Since "double registration" is malum prohibitum. election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor. Chavez. Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means this Court’s Resolution dated May 5. 1992 to all regional election directors. No. This letter was sent after their second registration was accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of double registration to a higher official. . Moreover. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 211 SCRA 315 Facts: On May 5. petitioners’ claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. HELD: No. 1992. petitioners’ claims of honest mistake. Chavez in favor of Francisco I. this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. 1992 elections. boards of election inspectors. 5. However. provincial election supervisors. from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11. city and municipal election registrars. It is for the presentation of such evidence o n l y a s m a y e n g e n d e r a w e l l . it failed to order the crediting of all “Chavez” votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez’ name in the list of qualified candidates. 104704. and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets. CHAVEZ vs.ISSUE: Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it recommended the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous registration. On May 8. the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public. disqualifying Melchor Chavez. private respondent therein. FRANCISCO I. the Comelec issued Res. There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in different precincts without canceling their previous registration. good faith and substantial compliance with the Election Code’s requirement of cancellation of previous registration are matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather t h a n a t t h e p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Neither is the letter to Joson an application to cancel their previous registration. 1992.

ISLETA. this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it. vs. which provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of “unofficial” count. 163193 June 15. BRILLANTES. JR. Sec. JOSE CONCEPCION. pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: “For purposes of the elections for President. Petitioners-in-Intervention. NORBERTO M. DR. JR. No. G. the controversy presented being one in the nature of a preproclamation. JOSE DE VENECIA.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.. 242. VicePresident. 6. receipt. Omnibus Election Code). Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free. Vice-President.Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the members of the Senate. honest. orderly. Resolution 6712. Facts: Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution. FRANKLIN M. to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. EDGARDO J.. Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. ANGARA. peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court. BERNAS. GUTIERREZ. FRISCO SAN JUAN. JAIME Z. Ruling: The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. . GONZALES.R. petitioner. DRILON. AND JOSE A. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL. However. respondent. Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass. GALVEZ-TAN. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. Issue: Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified. 2004 SIXTO S. as the case may be. transmission. HONESTO M. as the citizens’ accredited arm. no preproclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation. nevertheless. Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action.

the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against petitioner. The quick count under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL. The following information. Act No. Ananias Hibo. The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices. 1983 Facts: After the local elections of January 18. In its opposition. and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. to wit: (1)consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates." It being “unofficial”. 7. Act No. Issue: Whether or not the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan have the power to investigate. contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate. Act No. and consequently. with violation of the 1978 Election Code. the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. further bolstered by RA 8436. solely authorize NAMFREL. which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act. A prima facie case against petitioner for violation of section 89 and sub-sections [x] and [mm] of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978 was found to exist. . prosecute. 1980. the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayan’s exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office. vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information. in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors. Section 4 of the Constitution. and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office. 8436. Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus. 7166. but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. 8173. then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog. Asst. was filed before the Sandiganbayan. prosecute and try the offense. defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran. Moreover. Section 27 of Rep. conducted an investigation. DE JESUS vs. Act No. the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The aforementioned conditions were found to have not been substantially met. Resolution 6712 was null and void. as amended by Rep. any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 120 SCRA 760.Article VII. 9206.

Jose Tolentino. 1998. They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184. as a consequence of which. TUPAY T. orderly and honest conduct of elections. Jr. We perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm.Held: The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC is to insure the free. of the authority to investigate. Local ballots in five (5) .R. Tolentino. On May 12. Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Jr. Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor. the Tanodbayan. failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. the automated machines failed to read them correctly. 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Some recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri). some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. The error was in the printing of the local ballots. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections.) The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. LOONG vs. There was lack of agreement. From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan. the experts told him that the problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. No. Jr. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUSAKUR TAN G. prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office. 133676 April 14. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. of the Election Code of 1978. Tolentino. Atty. he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine. 8. respectively. After the consultations. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count. 1999 FACTS: Automated elections systems was used for the May 11. Atty.

The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong sequence code. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1). a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate In enacting R. COMELEC started the manual count on May 18. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous count. honest. the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free. 1998. The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary. Jr.. initiative. No. COMELEC issued Resolution No. (The main issue in the case at bar) HELD: the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata. Jr. Before midnight of May 12. and credible elections. 8436. Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. ISSUE: whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. orderly. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office.municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. 98-1750 approving. COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. These municipalities were Talipao. On May 15. No. Tolentino. 1998 is lifted. the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 1998. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC. We hold. however. Siasi. Our status quo order of June 23. plebiscite. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated machines.A. Atty. 98-1796 and 981798. 98-1748. The next day. 1998. Atty. Tudanan. Tapul and Jolo. May 13. urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from . was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. peaceful. there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. Tolentino. 6 On the same day. capricious or whimsical. referendum and recall." Undoubtedly. A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R. 1998. 98-1750.A. Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election .'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation.

R.A. .A. 8436. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work.levitating above the problem. We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R. Commission on Audit 1. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Sambeli v Province of Isabela 210 SCRA 80 . It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.

the petitioner. Pursuant to NPC policy as reflected in the Board Resolution No. this instant petition. it is allegedly incumbent upon COA to authorize the payment of the balance because to act otherwise will constitute an impairment of contract. the Provincial Auditor advised the P r o v i n c i a l T r e a s u r e r t h a t a n o v e r p r i c e d i n t h e t o t a l a m o u n t o f P 6 1 9 . unnecessary. No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COA shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination.10.893. establish the techniques and methods required therefore. it behooves the Commission on Audit to put a stop thereto. ECS appealed the decision but was denied for lack of merit. t h e p e t i t i o n e r r e c e i v e d an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable dated April 17. 837 pieces of shovels.. for being highly irregular or unnecessary. the Commission on Audit adheres to the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved and that irregular. Sec. and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. in addition to the use of government vehicle. 1990 from respondent Regional Auditor Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing . Provincial Auditor formally forwarded the matter with the Regional Director who formally endorsed the stand. extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or use of government funds and properties. 81-95 authorizing the monthly disbursement of transportation allowance. unnecessary excessive.20 offered by ECS Enterprises or an overpayment of P195. Based on the finding of the Price Evaluation Division – COA Technical Services Office.FACTS: An agreement was entered into by and between the City of Isabela and ECS Enterprise for the purchase of 300 units of wheelbarrows. 2 0 e x i s t s o u t o f t h e t o t a l p r i c e o f P761. excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. Hence. 0 4 2 . offends the sovereign people's will. including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular. and 1 set of radio communication equipment. IX D. . On the proposition that improper or wasteful spending of public funds or immoral use of government property. Thus. Bustamante v COA 216 SCRA 134 FACTS: Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of National Power Corporation (NPC). claimed his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. It contends that the contract of sale has not only been perfected between the Province of Isabela and petitioner but delivery has been made by it with the corresponding partial payment by the Province of Isabela.1 9 9 0 . It recommended that the future claim of ECS Enterprises be withheld. Petitioner assails the ruling of the COA as not valid. (Art. or scandalously excessive or extravagant.077. ISSUE: Whether the ruling of COA is invalid so far as it will constitute impairment of contracts? HELD: In the exercises of the regulatory power vested upon it by the Constitution. As such he was issued a government vehicle with plate number SCC 387. 2 (2) 1987 Constitution of the Philippines) 2. On May 31. .

the NPC. NO. . We will be rendering inutile this Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's. in the exercise of its power granted by the Constitution. can put to naught a constitutional provision which has been ratified by the majority of the Filipino people. and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is very patent that the circular is addressed. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. owned or held in trust by this government-owned and controlled corporation. the people's property. The petitioner takes exception from the coverage of said circular contending that such circular did not mention the NPC as one of the corporations/offices covered by it ( COA Circular No. The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the disallowance of the c l a i m f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n allowance which was denied. and ultimately.P1. among others. Petitioner appealed this denial to the Commission on Audit which denied do due course. by issuing are solution. If We will not sustain the Commission's power and duty to examine. 75-6) ISSUE: Whether such denial to give due course to the appeal of herein petitioner constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? Whether NPC takes an exception from such coverage of the said circular contending that such circular did not mention NPC as one of the corporations/offices covered by it.250. Hence this petition. to managing heads of Government-owned or Controlled Corporations. We likewise c a n n o t sustain petitioner's contention that the Commission. usurped the statutory functions of the NPC Board of Directors for its leads to t h e a b s u r d conclusion that a mere Board of Directors of a governmentowned and controlled corporation. audit and settle accounts pertaining to this particular expenditures or use of funds and property. HELD: NO.00 representing aforesaid transportation allowance. or in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. the NPC being held under such category of corporations.