In Defense of Argument Culture: A Rhetorical Criticism of Asiacentric Bias in Intercultural Communication By Satoru Aonuma Department of International Communication Kanda

University of International Studies, Japan & Naoto Usui Department of English Kanda University of International Studies, Japan

Contact: Satoru Aonuma Department of International Communication, Kanda University of International Studies 1-4-1 Wakaba, Mihama Chiba 261-0013 Japan E-Mail: saonuma@kanda.kuis.ac.jp

A paper to be presented at 2nd International Conference on Argumentation, Rhetoric, Debate and the Pedagogy of Empowerment, Slovenia, April 2008.

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Introduction The purpose of this paper is to engage a critique of ethnocentrism in scholarly discourse and to reclaim the relevance of argumentation (both as an intellectual discipline and as a critical-rhetorical practice) in a multicultural world. Specifically, by way of critical analysis, the paper will discuss problems of so-called Asiacentric scholarship, a self-appointed academic crusade whose goal is to correct allegedly Western or Eurocentric bias (Miike; see also Kim), in the discipline of communication studies. We believe the emergence of this type of publication, namely work of scholars that place their own culture (Asia(n) in the present case) centric to their scholarly endeavor, should deserve critical attention of argument and rhetorical scholars, especially of those of us convening at this international, intercultural, and interdisciplinary occasion. First, in the guise of academic multiculturalism, Asiacentric scholarship is a discourse less scholarly than ideological. What Asiacetric scholars end up with is not criticizing but rather generalizing a culturally-specific logos and nomos of their own in the field of communication. Additionally, and perhaps more relevant to the present occasion, Asiacentric scholarship misrepresents the history of argumentation in Asia (and elsewhere). Erroneously and naively expressing an overt hatred and hostility against reason and rationality in public discourse, Asiacentric scholars virtually ignore the recent theoretical development (McKerrow; Perelman; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca; Farrell; Toulmin Cosmopolis; Toulmin Return to Reason; O'Keefe; Cox and Willard) as well as empirical/historical studies of non-Western discourse (e.g., Branham; Hazen; Jensen; Katsura; Usui) within the field of argumentation. We wish to proceed our discussion in the following fashion. First, by way of critical review of pieces recently published in the United States, we attempt to identify and explicate main arguments put forward by prominent cultural-centric scholars within the field of communication studies. We will then engage in a critical analysis of these arguments specifically, taking issues with these scholars (cultrual-centric scholarship in general and Asiacentric scholarship in particular) in relation to the study of argumentation. It is the conclusion of the paper that, rather than waging aggressive culture wars against one another, argumentation scholars in East and West should form a solidarity to defend an argument culture and celebrate our commonality in a multicultural world.

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Identifying the Argument June 2007 issue of Communication Monographs features a special forum titled Cultural Bias in Communication Theory. The fundamental question of this forum, writes the forum editor, is When viewed from standpoints in particular cultures, does mainstream communication theory appear to be culturally biased? (Craig 256) Mainstream here is tantamount to Western, i.e., Euro-American and four prominent cultural-centric scholars contributing to the forum (Allen; Covarrubias; Kim; Miike) all agree that mainstream communication theory is inherently Eurocentric. From an African American standpoint, Allen writes that mainstream theory reflects Eurocentric, white supremacist biases so that white people often seem to deem their racial identity as a nonissue, due greatly to invisible privileges of whiteness (260). Covarrubias speaks on behalf of Native Americans, criticizing Eurocentrism in communication theory that assumes silence as merely consumptive. According to Covarrubias, Eurocentric theory fails to account for what Native American culture regards generative silence, i.e., a positive illocutionary force by which people are seen as dynamic, affirmed, strengthened, connected, acknowledged, and ontologically empowered (268). Kim, a Korean scholar, blames mainstream communication researchers for either dismissing cross cultural issues or applying existing Eurocentric communication theories to explain differences in communication behavior across cultures. Calling such research ethnocentric, she suggests that we Asians free ourselves from Western tenets of theorizing (e.g., ones that emphasize personal creativity and individuality) and encourages the building, testing, and proliferating of communication theory informed by Asian values that appreciate human relationship and interdependency much more than Europeans do (283). Echoing other contributors, Miike, a Japanese scholar living and working in Hawaii, criticizes the Western worldview. By quoting such Asian philosophers as Confucius, Dogen (the founder of Soto Zen school), Daisetsu Suzuki (scholar of Zen Buddhism in 19~20th century Japan) and introducing various kinds of Asian concepts (e.g. ninjo or humanity), he posits that Asiacentric perspectives respect interdependence and interrelatedness of the universe, reduce ego-centeredness, encourage the listeners to be ego-decentered to sense and read the emotional dynamics of human interaction, discourage competitions for rights and independent liberty but

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seek for mutuality, reciprocity, morality and harmony of the universe. In his words, Eurocentric theories have unduly overstated the global significance of its own local knowledge so that the time is long overdue for the Western mind to lend an ear to unheard and silenced voices from elsewhere (277), and curiously enough, examples of these unheard and silenced voices include (his own?) Asiacentric scholarly discourse. Miike concludes that if Western scholars of communication become more sensitive to these unheard voices of Asiacentric tradition, Eurocentric traditions can be informed and enriched by Asiacentric visions (273). Among the contributors to the forum, Miikes cultural-centric scholarship is the most hostile to argumentation, which thus necessitates fuller explication for the present purpose. Specifically, he questions what he calls reason and rationality bias in Eurocentric communication studies, proclaiming the irrelevance and foreign-ness of reasoned discourse and critical thinking for the practicing of communication in Asia. According to him, traditional communication theory underscores reason and rationality coupled with the speakers clarity and credibility, for [t]he ability to speak clearly and convincingly with reason and rationality is cherished in Western societies (274). This Miike calls an Eurocentric bias, for in Asian societies the ability to treat a concrete person humanely is not the result of reasonable and rational choice, but of emotional sensitivity and sensibility. . . To be communicatively active in the Asian sense thus is to be perceptive, receptive, and introspective to feel together with fellow humans, nature, and spirits (275). In sum, advocates of cultural-centrism in communication scholarship seem to share the following assumptions in terms of the Eurocentric tenets within the field of communication: (1) Eurocentric view of humanity is originated and shaped by the Enlightenment, (2) Human beings under this view admire progress from the uncivilized to the civilized, rationality, individual freedom, and right consciousness, (3) Eurocentric view ignores or degrades the values that inhere in other cultures (Or it claims universal applicability), and (4) Ethnocentric challenge from other cultures or ethnicity is a vital counter strategy to enlighten Eurocentric scholars of communication theories or help to enrich their worldviews. The Critical Response Having outlined what cultural-centric scholars have to say about the current

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Eurocentric state of communication studies, we now turn to critical analysis of problems inherent in the very scholarship they themselves advocate. Quite apart from the problems of alleged Eurocentric bias within mainstream communication theory, as Starosta has written, scholars who place culture (mostly of their own) central to scholarship have their own problems: They tend to stress the nature of differences when, in retrospect, they should be busy accounting for the possibility of locating compatibilities (65). Specifically, we will pose a series of critical questions regarding methodology, ethics, and politics that Asiacentric critique of communication theory embraces and employs, with a particular focus on Miikes anti-argument polemic informed unfortunately by his own (unacknowledged) biases, cultural, personal, or political. 1. Our initial question is simple and straightforward: Is the centricity vs. counter-centricity debate productive in any way? We raise this very question, for, having listened to the voices of cultural-centric scholars rather carefully and sincerely, we are still not certain if their project is going to be any intellectually productive way of discussion regarding the relationship between culture and communication (rhetoric and argumentation). This is a methodological as well as ethical problem. In the first place, we feel it unfortunate to have found no clear definition of the term Asia in Asiacentric scholarship we just reviewed. There is no way of knowing what discourses of these scholars are centric to; whither the ends of Asia, as Ryuichi Sakamoto would say. For instance, Miike omits regions and communities that we normally consider Asia in his Asiacentric scholarship. He mostly speaks to Japanese, Chinese, and a little of Filipino philosophies and cultural values, ignoring such entities as East Siberia, Hindu communities in South East Asia, and Islamic communities that encompass Asias vast region as if they were non-existent or unimportant. There is perhaps no need of engaging an extensive review of literature within cultural studies and sociology (such as Saids and Andersons classics) to recognize diversity of values and philosophies within a single ethnic-, racial-, gender-, and political community. While an imaginary body emphasizes its uniqueness and justifies its tradition, however, it masks or trivializes the very diversity. As Nakamura warns, scholars of Asia, be they historians or anthropologists (or communication scholar if you will), cannot possibly treat their subject in singular terms: There always exist Asian peoples, cultures, communities, etc. that resist our essentialization and totalization. This

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is exactly where Miikes Asiacentricity perspective goes wrong: Unfortunately and necessarily it is an failed attempt to represent diverse cultures in Asia as if they were one single monolithic unity. Second, we are quite disturbed by the excess of a misleading binary opposition, i.e. Asia(centricity) vs. Euro(centricity), in Asiacentric scholarship. In rhetorical terms, we can safely call it a discourse of othering. In fact, this is a typical discursive strategy deployed by scholars who work in the area of intercultural communication, which students of rhetoric have already criticized (Kakita; Matsushima). Asiacentric scholars regard Eurocentric values as a priori and highly systematic existence and try to challenge them by promoting counter-centrism that they derive from their own cultural background. A closer look at their argument, however, reveals more complex power relations within the discourse. It is important to note that what is central to Asiacentric scholarship is not European but Asian cultures. Rhetorically juxtaposing Asia first (the superior) and then Europe (the inferior) in their discourse, these scholars attempt to kindly enlighten and enrich mainstream (Eurocentric) communication theory. Implicit in this rhetorical opposition, we suspect, is a cultural chauvinism on their part: Eurocentric theory is poor (not rich), incomplete, value-less, and violent, hence in need of help from (or to be replaced by) Asiacetric theory that is rich, complete, valuable, and peaceful. And we are not sure where this antagonism (or the waging of a culture war if you will) would lead us to. 2. Our next question concerns the current and present state of studying and theorizing communication: Is the presently existing mainstream communication theory actually and monolithically Eurocentric, as cultural-centric scholars want us to believe? It is of crucial importance to note that Eurocentric values depicted and criticized in the work of cultural-centric scholars we just reviewed replicate what Mofefi Kete Asante, an African American communication scholar, problematized more than twenty years ago. In his pioneering work The Afrocentric Idea published in 1987, Asante criticized that Eurocentric tradition seeks an ungrounded aggrandizement by claiming a universal hegemony (4). He lamented the lack of recognition of African cultural history and ideals by Eurocentric scholars and advocated what he called Afrocentricity, i.e., placing African ideals at the center of any analysis that involves African culture and behavior (6). We pose this very question, for what we have found in Asiacentric

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scholarship is mostly a mere reiteration of Asantes Afrocentricity in Asian terms. Does this mean that mainstream communication scholars (most of who supposedly reside in North America and Europe) have done nothing whatsoever to revise, refine, and enrich their theories for the past two decades? Is there any possibility or hint that Asiacentric scholars contributing to the forum printed in Communication Monographs intentionally or unintentionally ignored vital sets of critical discussions over problems of cultural-centrism in communication theory since Asante? To be fair with Miike, he did acknowledge the existence of theoretical diversity in mainstream/Eurocentric communication scholarship, pointing to the emergence of feminist theory, dialogical theory and empathic communication theory, etc. However, he still insists that their Western ideas on human communication have not directed thorough attention to non-Western perspectives (276). He even omits description of that diversity due to space limitation (276). Speaking frankly, we are curious about how Miike and other cultural-centric scholars perceive the current state of communication studies. While we do not want to pretend to be specialists in intercultural communication studies, we do know that, perhaps provoked by Asante and others, there has emerged a host of scholarship that takes problems of culture and communication (especially those of non-Euro-American societies and communities) seriously. A fact that Communication Monographs, a major journal in mainstream communication studies, prints this very forum (Cultural Bias in Communication Theory) is a good sign that outlets do exist for us to engage in various cultural issues within the field of communication. The National Communication Association (NCA), the premier professional organization in North American communication studies, also publishes an anthology on international/intercultural communication annually, and it is unreasonable (at least in our eyes) to assume that all of the essays published in the annuals apply existing communication theories to explain differences in communication behavior across cultures, in order to establish the universal applicability of North American theories about communication behavior (Kim 282). And if the listener/listening centeredness is one of the Asian virtues, why is it that the voices of Eurocentric scholars are unheard of in Asiacentric scholarship? Why is it that Asiacentric scholars have chosen not to listen to scholarship other than their own? Or might this simply be a case of one not doing enough homework? 3. Our next question is directed specifically to Miikes Asiacentric work,

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particularly his depiction and representation of argumentation in Asian cultures. In the first place, Miikes critique of what he calls the reason and rationality bias in mainstream communication theory is confusing and misdirected. His cultural-centric relativism does not allow for a complex understanding of social and cultural phenomena since the vagueness of its definition of rationality procludes a serious analysis of historical agency (Mohanty 1). He naively and erroneously equated reason and rationality in argumentation with mechanistic instrumental rationality; hence his critique does not account for a humanistic turn (Brockriede) in contemporary argument studies. Especially with the advent of New Rhetoric, argument theory had gone through revolutionary transformation (or should we better call it revivial/Renaissance?) in the past century (Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca; Perelman; Cox and Willard; Toulmin The Uses of Argument). Gone is formal validity based on geometric syllogism; we now have fields, warrants, and rhetorical validly in its place. The very idea of, and the relationship between, reason(ableness) and rationality in public discourse has also been substantially refined, as we began to recognize argument primarily as an audience-centered communicative act or phenomenon of persuasion (McKerrow; Perelman; Farrell; Toulmin Cosmopolis; Toulmin Return to Reason; O'Keefe; Cox and Willard). This is a disciplinary history that, we believe, is all familiar to students of rhetoric and argumentation. Namely, contemporary argument and rhetorical theory, however Eurocentric it may be, exhibits no reason and rationality bias at least in Miikes uses of the term. It places importance on audiences perception (or even rapport or Burkean identification between a speaker and her audience), not instrumental rationality, when it comes to assessing and evaluating the force of argument, unlike Miike wants us to believe otherwise. It is to be noted further that those who believe that [t]he primary locus of responsibility for the success of communication lies in the speaker (Miike 274) are very few, if any, in the context of Euro-American communication studies. As an introductory textbook on communication widely used in USAmerican colleges states, The power of the great speaker is an illusion. The speakers power is granted by audience. The audience is many. The speaker is one. The speaker is weak. The audience is strong. . . . The seduction model of persuasion is inappropriate for the Anglo-American audience (King 21). And we again wonder if such virtues as respect

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for interdependence, interrelatedness, ego-decenteredness, audience-centeredness are uniquely Asian. Why is it that Miikes Asiacentric scholarship chose not to discuss these facts and developments in argument and rhetorical theory in Euro-American contexts? Perhaps because they do not embrace his Asiacentric paradigm? Second, whether Asiacentric or not, there does exist a wave of international scholarly effort exploring such issues as types of reasoning, formats, evidence and styles of argumentation in Asian cultures. These scholars do not ignore and dismiss cultural issues as a nuisance factor (Kim 281); rather they have been investigating functions and forms of reasoned discourse in various rhetorical communities in Asia, while recognizing their historical contexts and cultural diversity. This is particularly true in case of Japan, a small island country in North East Asia. While Okabe is right in stating that such scholarly endeavors had not taken place before Yukichi Fukuzawa during the 19th century, it does not mean that the practice of reasoned discourse (debate, discussion, controversy, etc.) is not part of the traditional Japanese culture and history. By way of critical literature review, for instance, Hazen studied Japanese argument and explored the possibility for the universality of logical process across cultures. It is the conclusion of his study that a number of elements in Japanese logical argument have been presented as being different from other cultures; however, few of these elements have been specifically tested (232). Argument takes place in any society and takes many forms depending on situations, conditions and circumstances. The power imbalance in a social hierarchy creats dissents; dissents provoke arguments between parties involved. Debate may be cordial or fractious, written or oral, conducted in the university or in the home or fields, and may be joined by participants who are distant or proximate. When prohibited in open forums or plain language, debate may move underground or adapt the protective coloring of activities less susceptible to regulation (Branham 132). For instance, Branham investigates Kabuki and puppet theaters as alternative argument fora during Japans feudal period called Edo (1603~1867) and observes that the social order has not always produced deference to authority or subordination with a smile. It has often generated significant resistance and prompted, rather than neutralized, argument and debate (135). To attain equal civil rights between men and women as well as womens suffrage, feminist movements in 19th to early 20th century Japan were also actively engaging reasoned discourse. An essayist and social activist Raicho Hiratsuka

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(1886-1971) founded a first womens literary society Seito (Blue Stocking Society), whose journal was an argumentative forum to publicly discuss and denounce patriarchal notion of ryosaikenboshugi (good-wife wise-motherism) (Usui). Taken together, these studies do reveal the existence of reasoned discourse in Asia. Namely, to say that reason (and rationality) is irrelevant and foreign to the Asian way of communication is not only disrespectful of sincere and meticulous efforts made by international scholars of argumentation; it could end up misrepresenting the history of argumentation and promoting a certain form of revisionist history in the name of Asiacentricity, which we believe should be avoided at all cost. 4. Extending the question we just raised, our final point concerns another series of problematic rhetorical strategies deployed by Asiacentric scholars. In demonstrating unique cultural values that inform the practicing of communication, scholars who embrace cultural-centrism in general tend to look to texts of ancient philosophies and religions. In Miikes Asiacentricity, for instance, we find the teachings of Confucius, Dogen, and Daisetsu Suzuki, among others, all spread out absent any historical contexts or explanations in which they emerged. Doing so would make their scholarship exotic and interesting for sure; yet we find this way of scholarly practice problematic. First, we agree with Starosta when he states that, while [t]hese researchers comprehend that all knowledge is connected to history and that, without accurately locating ones history, one can hold no genuine cultural knowledge, . . [s]urprisingly few of these researchers distinguish past from present. . . They tend to leave open questions of the degree to which ancient. . . traditions continue to influence modern cultural communication (66). Does this imply that Asiacentric scholarship Miike and others advocate is non-empirical, informing little about communication as it is presently practiced in Asia? Or do they mean to suggest that, when it comes to the practicing of communication, there is an unbroken cultural, philosophical and socio-political lineage between past and present in Asian communities? And if so, where is evidence? Additionally to be noted is a problem of certain selectivity in Miikes practice of citing these historical texts as evidence for his Asiacentric project. Having ourselves check with Lun Yu () or The Analects of Confucius in Chinese, Japanese, and English, for instance, we have begun to wonder if his philosophical teaching fully fits Miikes Asiacentric perspective. Confucius did in fact speak of clarity and

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perspicuity as the chief virtue of linguistic communication, which Miike seems to reject as being Eurocentric: The ability to speak clearly and convincingly is cherished in Western society but not in Asia. In Chapter 15 of Lun Yu, however, Confucius is reported to have said, , which translates, "In language it is simply required that it convey the meaning (Lun Yu) or Words of officials are to be simple; they are to be communicated (our translation; saying this, Confucius criticized the bureaucratic and evasive discourse of Chinese officials that lacked clarity, directness, and accountability in communication). That Confucius acknowledged the value of communicating clearly and convincingly with reason is never a selective or imaginary reading on our own part. As Kubo, a scholar specializing in Japanese history, reported recently, one of the very first college debating societies in Japan was the one founded at Tokyos Chuo University in the late 19th century, and it was named after this very virtue taught by Confucius, i.e., Perspicuous Society or . If the teaching of Confucius constitutes important source of cultural and societal norms in Asia, therefore, those who want to embrace these Asian norms cannot be hostile to the practice of speaking with clarity and reason. Denouncing the value of clarity and perspicuousness in discourse simply betrays the Masters teaching hence is to be considered to be unAsia(centric). The bottom line is that, whether European, American, or Asian, we communication scholars have no good reason to be autistic to what our predecessor have to say about theory and practice of good communication. Conclusions At the risk of preaching to the already converted, we have attempted to reassert and reclaim the relevance of argumentation in a multicultural world. For the last several decades, international conferences held in Europe, North America, and Asia have drawn students of argumentation worldwide. There we have scholars as well as educators engage in argumentation, both as an intellectual discipline and as a critical-rhetorical practice, across national-cultural boundaries. We believe that these activities are intellectually and praxically valuable and that, rather than rejecting reasoned discourse as inherently Eurocentric, argumentation scholars in East and West should continue to enjoy an argument culture and celebrate our commonality in a multicultural world.

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In concluding this paper, words of qualification and apology on our part are in order. First, we by no means maintain that argument is the only form of Asian communication nor categorize ourselves to what Kim calls The Captain Cook researchers. Neither do we deny the existence of communication in which harmony or interdependence is more appreciated than critical reasoning and thinking. We simply mean to suggest that, with regard to argumentation, some claims made by Asiacentric scholarship are empirically counter-intuitive and theoretically groundless: An argument takes place when people perceive what is happening as an argument and, in this sense, argument is potentially everywhere (Brockriede 179). Second, we do recognize that our critique of Asiacentric scholarship may look excessively reactive and critical; we also admit that the tone of our language may sound overtly pointed. While we do not mean to trash their scholarship outright, we cannot not engage the critical analysis as we increasingly feel a certain fear for politics that cultural-centric scholars, intentionally or not, participate in. We live and work in a discursive community where [b]y virtue of being born in Japan, acquiring Japanese norms and looking Japanese, one is expected to show ones nation-ness. . . toward the state and its allied capitalist interests and participate in the economic progress of Japan (McVeigh 201). There a rhetoric of cultural-centric discourse serves, consciously or not, the politics of cultural nationalism [that] regards the nation as the product of its unique history and culture and a collective solidarity endowed with unique attributes (Yoshino 1). In McVeighs words, In Japan, when the going gets toughtoo much international scrutiny, failure to achieve domestic political goals, loss of confidence in political economic institutionsa common response is to bring up culture. Cultural nationalism, or a defensive particularlism is an excellent means of defense, shielding, diverting, or distracting attention (who, after all, wants to be called a philistine or worse, an anti-cultural relativist?). Culture, whatever it may mean, is a favorite distraction of committed nationalists. (198) We sincerely wish cultural-centric scholars be more self-reflexive about, and more accountable for, what they do as specific intellectuals in Foucaults sense of the term. In particular, those who practice Asiacentric scholarship should learn from, and never forget, histories and cultures of their own: Asia is one was, and still is, Imperialist Japans favorite slogan; Defend our unique culture! is a rhetoric that sugarcoated and

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justified Japans aggressive warring efforts and adventurism in Asia and the Pacific. In his keynote speech addressed at the first Tokyo International Conference on Argumentation, Katsura, a scholar specializing in history of Indian philosophy, documented the existence of a scholarly exchange between Milanda, a Greek philosopher-king settled in North India, and a local Indian philosopher-monk named Nagasena on debate and argument theory that took place in the 2nd century B.C. This is indeed a remarkable historical record, and at this particular occasion, we would like to share this intellectual exchange with you, part of which goes like this: Milanda: Revered sir, will you debate with me again? Nagasena: If your Majesty will debate as a scholar, yet, but if you will debate as a king, no. Milanda: How is it then that scholars debate? Nagasena: When scholars debate one with the other, your Majesty, there is summing up and unraveling, there is also defeat, and yet the scholars do not get angry at it. Thus do the scholars debate, your Majesty. Milanda: And how do kings debate? Nagasena: When kings debate, your Majesty, they state a proposition, and if anyone differs from them, they order his punishment saying Inflict punishment upon him. Thus, your Majesty, do kings debate. (4) Both as an intellectual discipline and as a critical-rhetorical practice, argumentation did exist before geopolitical boundaries of Europe, Asia or America (let alone of any nation-states) as we know them were formed. Since antiquity, what we scholars of argumentation, Asian or otherwise, do has no borders.

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