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VOLUME XLIV

Military
NUMBER 11
Review
NOVEMBER 1964
':
Myth of the Military Mind. . . itCol Gordon K. Fleischman, USA 3
Foreign Policy and Military Power . Rocco M. Paone 9
Korean Truce NegntiatiQns Walter G. Hermes 14
Required ROTC Lt Col Theodore Wyckoff, USA 24
Lions Under the Thrnne . Brian Bond 29
French Foreign Pnlicy . . . Howard C. Reese 37
Future nf the French Army. . . Gen L. J. Le Pu/och, French Army 41
Future nf the French Navy. RAdm M. Y. de Baze/aire, French Navy 50
Scientific Information . . Maj Ray M. Dowe, Jr., USA 55
Cybernetics . Lt Col V. Bokariev, Soviet Army 66
Getting to the Fight . Col Robert Bernstein, USA 71
Ambush Detectinn
Brig Gen Robert H. Williams, USMC, Ret 84
and Marcel Vigneras
Like Unto Water .
Maj E. H. Dar, Pakistan Army 94
Military Notes 97
Military Books
107
l
The Military Review, a pUblication of.the UNITED STATES ARMY, provides
a forum for the expression of military thoughtwith emp.hasis on doctrine concerning
the division and higher levels of command.
The' VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not neces-
sarilythose ofthe US Armyor the Command and General StaffCollege.
~
Editor'in Chief
LtCul Donald J. Delanell
Assistant Editor
Lt Col Albert N. Garland
Features Editor
Maj Robert L. Burke
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l.t Lt Robert K. Lindgren
SpanishAmerican Editor
Lt Col Juan R. Melendez
Brazilian Editor
Lt Col Jouo H. Faeo
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Lt Col Algin J. Hughes
Armll War College
Executive Officer
Maj Jame. N. Hale
Production Officer
Maj Norman C. Murrall
Staff Artist
Charles A. Moore
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Kansas 66027.
The Myth of theMilitary Mind
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon K. Fleischman, United States Army
I
N HIS farewell address, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower, a profes-
sional soldier himself, startled many
people by warning against the poten-
tial threat of an American military-
industrial complex. The warning, ap-
parently, was but another sign of a
growing concern in many quarters
over the place of a large standing mil-
itary force in our national life, an
intangible fear that, perhaps, we have
built a monster that may devour us.
Since the Eisenhower warning, a
large number of books and motion pic-
tures have focused the critical atten-
tion of the American people on the
US Military Establishment, and the
influence that establishment mayor
may not exert on American life and
Government. In one book, the Armed
Forces are pictured as only waiting
the right moment to take over the
Government. In another, they ire de-
picted as a huge, uncontrollable jug-
gernaut which, when triggered into
motion-accidentally or on purpose--
will rush us headlong and irretriev-
ably into nuclear oblivion.
This constant bombardment of crit-
icism aimed at the military forces is
certain to have some impact on public
opinion. Undoubtedly, many people
are beginning to wonder about the
true character of the men Who have
adopted the military service as a pro-
fession.
In the. course of tb.is public con-
templation, inevitably there seems to
emerge the of the military
mind. The military professional is
November 1964 3
MILITARY MIND
seen as a man set apart by a distinc-
tive uniform, a part of a complex and
incomprehensible organization, with a
day-after-day preoccupation wit h
mysterious projects labeled "Top Se-
cret." Perhaps the civilian believes
him to have a vested interest in war'
e c ~ u s e this is his business, his ave-
nue to promotion, to larger command,
and to increased prestige.
Certainly, tIM! civilian believes that
the professional military man thinks
differently from ordinary humans,
that he has thought patterns, atti-
tudes, and opinions conditioned pre-
dominantly by his military training.
Historian Herbert G. Wells, in his
famous Outline of History, expresses
this traditional civilian viewpoint
when he st!'tes:
... the professional military mind
is by necessity an inferior and un-
imaginative mind; no man of high
intellectual quality would willingly
imprison his gifts in such a calling.
Precise Definition
The term, of course, raises a num-
ber of questions. Is there such a
thing as the military mind? If there
is, is it necessarily inferior? Finally,
if it does not exist, why does the
fiction persist year after year?
Critics malign the term, but they
do not define it precisely. Instead,
they bring forth an assortment of ad-
Lieutenant Colon e I Gordon K.
Fleischman is with the Office of Per-
sopnel Operations, Department of the
Army. He received his Master's de-
gree in International Relations from
Georgetown University, and is a grad-
uate of the Fall 1962 Associate Course
of the U. S. Army Command and Gen-
eral Staff College. His most recent as-
signments include duty with the 8th
US Army in Korea, and as Assistant
Professor of Military Science at Tu-
lane University.
I
jectives,' asserting that these describe
it. According to them, the military
mind is dull, unimaginative, and pa
rochial; militant, autocratic, and dem
agogic. They say it resists change to
the bitter end and clings fanatically
to ancient traditions and outmoded
concepts; that it has little faith in the
effectiveness of democratic govern
ment under stress. By inference, the
critics define the military mind as one
that displays recurring manifesta
tions of these characteristics. .
If there is such a thing as a mili
tary mind, however, who possesses it?
An answer can be found only by ana
Iyzing the professionals of the officer
corps, for these are the men who
wield significant influence in military
affairs and whose individual philoso-
phies may be said to be the warp and
woof of military thought. These are
. the men who would possess a type
mind, if there is one. From where do
they come? What are their social and
educational backgrounds? What are
their politics? What is the true im
pact of the military environment on
their thin!dng?
Soldier and Citizen
In earlier periods of history, stand
ing armies were made up of mereen
aries who fought and died for a price.
To them, war and preparations for
war were merely jobs. They were lit-
tle moved by feelings of patriotism.
The officers were often second sons,
disinherited under the laws of pri-
mogeniture, who turned to the mili
tary service for glory, prestige, and
a livelihood. They usually were iso-
lated from the aristocratic society
from which they came.
American forces today are quite
different from those old military ()t'l
ganizations. Our officers come from
all walks of life, from all levels of
Military Review
4
society. The sons of tradesmen and
laborers serve beside, and on equal
terms with, officers who come from
professional military families, the
wealthy industrial class, and the so-
cial elite. They must be motivated by
higher ideals than personal gain, be
cause in our society military officers
are not in the upper economic brack-
ets.
Unlike the mercenary of the past,
the American officer is both a soldier
and a citizen. He is seldom insulated
from the civilian comll1unity, even
when he lives on a military reserva-
tion. He votes in national, state, and
local elections in his home state; his
children go to pu blie schools; his wife
shops in the local business houses. He
is often a homeowner, more r'requently
a home renter, living beside civilian
neighbors, paying the same taxes,
participating in the same community
projects, ann attending the same
church. Often, in these surroundings,
he finds himself in the small minority.
Is this the type of environment that
will produce and sustain the military
mind? It seems unlikely that the pro-
fessional officer can remain completely
immune to the various influences, the
crosscurrents of opinion, and the vari-
ous patterns of thinking of the numer-
ous individuals outside the military
profession with whom he comes into
daily contact.
Education
If a man is the product of his edu-
cation, the military officer cannot very
well be the single-minded, inferior
creature his critics claim he is. The
educational backgrounds of our offi-
cers are as varied as their social ori-
gins. Some come from the Ivy League,
some are graduates of leading engi-
neering schools, many studied in small
liberal arts colleges, and, perhaps, the
November 1964
largest rtumbers were educated in the
huge state universities. Only a small
number come from the service acade-
mies.
. This wide variety of educational
experiences in the formative years
produces a wide variety of intellects
trained in a broad range of academic
subjects, and taught to think with
open, inquiring minds. Military train-
ing and a military environment are
incapable of completely changing these
intel1ects, of transforming them into
a uniform mass mentality.
An individual enters the military
service with certain well-informed be-
liefs, prejudices, and mental habits
produced by his social stratum and
refined by his education. While these
may be refined further by military in-
fluences, they cannot be erased en-
tirely and replaced by a narrow, rigid
mental conformity.
Nonmilitary Courses
A gr.eat many officers on active ~ v
ice advance their educations by going
back to college, thfough private initia-
tive and financing or under military
sponsorship as a form of additional
training. Most of this work is done
at the graduate level in civilian col-
leges and universities around the
country. The courses pursued are not
special military courses, but standard
offerings, presented by the regular
faculties for all students, both mili-
tary and ci vilian.
Many officers already hold advanced
degrees from the Nation's leading
universities; a few have earned de-
grees from foreign universities. At
the present time, over 800 Army offi-
cers are enrol1ed at Government ex-
pense in ful1-time graduate study in
various . col1eges and universities,
while an additional uncounted number
are attending classes on their own.
5
MILITARY MIND
The Navy and the Air Force'have sim-
ilar graduate training programs.
The intellectual training these offi-
cers receive is no different from that
of their civilian contemporaries. How
can it produce a lack of imagination,
an inherent resistance to change, a
suspicion of new ideas, and the narrow
outlook that is said to mark the mili-
tary mind, without prodUcing the
same type of mentality in the civilian
students? Obviously, it doesn't.
Conservatism
Critics charge the military mind
with a predilection for conservatism
or ultraconservatism in politics. This
must be true, they reason, because
the military forces as instruments of
Government must support the status
quo. This. is specious reasoning. It is
unrealistic to assert that simply be-
cause officers are charged with carry-
ing out the mission of the Armed
Forces-to support the legitimate
Government in all circumstances-
they necessaril,Y are all ultraconserva-
tives.
The whole political climate within
the Armed Forces has changed since
the end of World War II. In the "old
service" of prewar days, there was
an almost impenetrable barrier be-
tween military and political affairs in-
sofar as the professional officer was
concerned. Then, he confined himself
exclusively to military matters; he did
not vote, he did not discuss politics
openly, and even in the higher eche-
lons of command, he seldom spoke out
publicly on subjects that bordered on
the realm of politics.
Today, military officers are active
members of the electorate. They par-
: ticipate freely in discussions of po-
litical issues, although by law they
cannot take an active part in political
campaigns. Our high military leaders
often speak before influential groups
and testify before Congress on mat-
ters which are both. military and po.
Iitical in nature. The former strict
separation of military and .politica'
considerations has given way to a
broad interchange of views among
members of the Military Establish.
ment and, informally, between mili-
tary men and their civilian neighbors.
Political Views
The political views held by profes
sional military people are not uni
formly conservative. A man's .politics
often are the result of his upbring-
ing. Raised in a Democratic family or
region, chances are he'll be a Demo-
crat. A man from a staunch Repub
Iican family will probably espouse the
Republican cause. The habits and
training of his early years will not
desert the professional officer, despite
tbe pressure that may be exerted on
, him by the forces of military life.
In the United States our military
forces are not one giant monolithic
structure. The separate services-
Army, Navy, and Air Force-differ
among themselves on many questions.
These differences are not simply pro
fessional jealousy-they are usually
honest differences based on divergent
thinking all)ong military leaders. The
fact that these controversies arise'and
are aired in public indicates that the
military thinking of professional offi-
cers is not one undifferentiated, color
less mass. Instead, there are numerous
individual evaluations and judgments
based on enlightened, perceptive think
ing, spiced with imagination and
guided by professional insight.
A military environment does have
an impact on the thinking of the serv-
ice professional. This is inevitable,
and necessary. Without it there would
be no military force, only an unruly
Military Review 6
mob. Military training teaches respon-
sibility, integrity, discipline, reliance
on experience, and leadership-quali-
ties which, while important to the ci-
vilian, are vital to the military man.
These qualities are not incompati-
ble with freedom of thought, a wide-
ranging imagination, and a penetrat-
ing mind. On the contrary, they form
a valuable . .framework for the exercise
of the mind. We hear frequently of
uacademic discipline," Hresponsible
thinking," and "int!illlectual integrity."
Far from insulating the mind of the
military thinker, military training
gives him sharpened tools for his in-
tellectual pursuits.
Estimate of Situation
We should recognize, too, that mili-
tary thinking as a decision-making
process has some distinctive and de-
sirable characteristics which are dic-
tated by the nature of the problems
the military professional must solve.
Given but a limited time, the general
or the admiral may be called upon to
make decisions that will affect the
lives of many individuals and, per-
haps, even the destiny of the Nation.
He needs, quickly, a thorough analy-
sis of the problem, including a develop-
ment of possible courses of action. The
advantages and disadvantages of these
possible cou rses of action must be con-
sidered from every angle, weighed
against what an opponent is likely to
do, and compared with one another.
This process we call the estimate
of the situation. It is not unique to
military thought, but because of its
importance it has been formulated in
staff manuals as a distinct step-by-
step process. Time is often the most
critical factor in military decision
making. A decision must be made, and
it must be made now; it cannot be put
November 1964
off until more facts are available, more
evidence secured, as is often the case
in scientific investigations or even in
business decisions.
General George H. Decker once
said:
The real test of the military decision
maker is to weed out the trivia, to go
to the heart of the matter, to decide,
and having decided, to execute.
Our civilian critics often interpret
this as blind, unthinking, irrational
action by wh'ich we hope to "muddle
through."
Best Posture
Is military thought 'conditioned by
a desire for self-perpetuation as an
end in itself, or by the philosophy of
military-industrial control? Not likely.
The majority of our military leaders
are concerned only with obtaining the
best possible defense posture. When
they propose more defense expendi-
tures, the procurement of more expen-
sive equipment, or an expansion of
the manpower of the Armed Forces,
it is not because they are seeking
more power for themselves or seeking
to perpetuate a large Military Estab-
lishment-it is because they believe
sincerely that such increases are es-
sential to the Nation's defense.
The thinking of our military pro-
fessionals has created the most e l b ~
orate defense force in the history of
mankind. At the same time, it has
produced Rhodes scholars, diplomats,
presidents, corporation executives, uni-
versity administrators, and college
professors. Each year numerous mili-
tary officers retire to accept executive
positions in industry, or teaching posi-
tions in colleges and universities. This
seems to indicate that thoughtful peo-
ple outside tlffJ military profession rec-
. ognize these men as leaders and schol-
ars, not narrow-minded militarists.
7
MILITARY MIND
In reality; then, there is almost no
basis for asserting the existence of a
monolithic military mind. Why, then,
has this myth persisted? Several fac-
tors may help to account for it.
Traditional Conflict
There has always been a traditional
conflict between the professional mili-
tary element and the civilian popula-
tion at large. Ours is the Nation of
the minuteman, the farmer who leaves
his plow and takes up his rifle long
enough to defend the land, then 're-
turns to his plow. The spirit of the
citizen-soldier engenders a suspicion
and distrust of the man who makes a
lifelong profession of military service.
The military-civilian conflict continues
today despite the much broader base
in society' of our standing military
forces. It is reflected in numerous
ways, from the problem of the civil
liabilities of servicemen to the ques-
tion of continuing the operation of
commissaries. f
Outspoken Members
Some outspoken members among
military leaders stand out so promi-
nently that in the public mind they
appear to represent the entire Mili-
tary Establishment, and their v i w ~
tend to be accepted as the views of aU
military professionals. In the furor
created by such men, people tend to
forget other military figures, past and
present, who have demonstrated the
breadth of knowledge and the depth
of understanding characteristic of all
great thinkers.
Misunder8tanding
There is a misunderstanding among
the critics as to the meaning and ef-
fect of military training and disci-
pline. Discipline provides the military
man with the proper reaction in times
of stress when there may not be time
for problem solving or when thought
processes may be slowed or immobi-
lized by strong emotion. It does not,
and is not meant to, replace thought. '
The military serviee requires as much
inteUectual talent as any other pro-
fession.
The era when all a military officer
had to have was a strong voice and
an elementary knowledge of tactics is
gone forever. Modern military forces
demand officers who can deal com-
petently with higher mathematics,
chemistry, physics, sociology, interna-
tional relations, history, and a host of
other fields. Discipline is still essen-
tial, but it does not rob the military
professional of his intellectual gifts;
these, too, are essential.
Cross Section
Is there, then, a military mind? All
the evidence is against it.
o A mental process or outlook which
is predominantly identified with the
military profession cannot be isolated
and tagged with a neat label any more
than can types of minds in the various
civilian professions. Military officers
represent a cross section of the Amer-
ican population. The numbers of them
who are Democrats, Republicans, 01'
Independents; who are conservative,
liberal. or neutral ~ r found in a'p-
proximately the same proportions in
the officer corps as they are found
among aU Americans.
We in the service need to demon-
strate continuaUy to ourselves and to
our civilian associates that we are not
aU cast in the same inteUectual mold.
We must prove to our detractors that
we are not human- automatons who
receive our thought impulses over a
closed circuit "party line." We should
make it crystal clear that the uniform
clothes the body. not the mind.
Military Review
8
Foreign d Military
Policy an Power
Rocco M. Paone
T
HE idea that foreign policy and
military power are closely inter-
related is not new \9 basic US doc-
trine, although the machinery for poli-
tical-military coordination in foreign
affairs is of relatively recent origin.
Actually, it Was not until the era of
World War II that the political lead-
ers of the United States fully compre-
hended the practical necessity for an
intimate relationship between military
and foreign affairs.
Today, the military leader has a
November 1964
much greater opportunity in peace-
time to influence the shaping of US
foreign policy. The Secretary of De-
fense today often seems most impor-
tant in foreign policy formulation.
Just recently, when Mr. Robert S. Mc-
Namara, the present Secretary of De-
fense, visited Vietnam for the fifth
time in a year,. the President, the Sec-
retary of State, and our allies anxious-
ly awaited his report.
What has motivated this new appre-
ciation of the military part in the for-
9
POLICY AND POWER
mulation of US foreign and national
security policies? One reason certain-
ly is involved in the confidence the
country bas acquired in the ability to
maintain its civilian control of the
armed forces. The military man, mOst
of us now agree, "can be trusted."
MilitarYCivilian Knowledge
The new concept of political-mili-
tary relations implies, and even re-
quires as well, a greater degree of
civilian expertise inmilitary, econom-
ic, and scientific affairs to enable polit-
ical leaders to make wise decisions.
The military man, too, must have a
much greater knowledge of political,
economic, and scientific endeavors.
There often is a trend, therefore, for
the civiJian. to become "militarized"
and the military man to become "ci-
vilianized."
The latter'has had to be brought in-
to the inner sanctum of official policy
planning, formulation, and execution
because, in f o r ~ g n policy planning.
military and nonmilitary factors are
now considered as being almost in-
separable. The realization that a na-
tion as powerful as we are has been
virtually paralyzed by the enormity of
its own weapons technology has forced
the civilian leader to depend more and
more on his military advisors. As a
result, military recommendations are
sought before the fact of US foreign
policy rather than from the ex post
facto view.
Rocco M. Paone, Associate Profes-
sor of International Relations at the
United States Naval Academy, holds
a Ph. D. de g r e e from Georgetown
University. He is the coauthor of the
book Geography and National Power,
and formerly was consultant to the
Department of the Army on foreign
military aid.
New Machinery
Following World War II, the Unit-
ed States established several agencies
to ensure civil-military cooperation in
foreign affairs. Chi e f among these
were the National Security CounCil,
the International Security Affairs Of-
fice in the Department of Defense,
and the Political-Military Staff orga-
nization in the Department of State.
These agencies do not make policy;
each, however, recommends it and does
so from high-level vantage points, al-
though the President is not bound to
use these machines nor need he accept
the recommendations emanating from
them.
National Security Council
Under President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower. the National Security Council
became a bona fide advisory body and
achieved a high level of importance in
executive planning. Through the work
of the Council, the President can know
the tenor of military thinking, even if
tbe recommendations mad e by the
armed forces are unacceptable.
Mr. John F. Kennedy did not uti-
lize the services of the Council as
profusely as had his predecessor until
the latter part of 1962, although he",
generally sought the advice of a num-
ber of its key individual members.
Actually, President Kennedy stream-
lined the Council by appointing its
key members to an executive council,
a type of ad hoc committee for sudden
emergencies. This committee played
a major role in dec i din g action
against Cuba in late 1962.
Intern(Jtional Security Affairs
Tqe Department of Defense has had
its ),nternational Security Affairs Of-
fice since 1950. Charged with, among
other duties, the development and con-
ditioning of Defense Department poli-
cies in the fields of international po- '
Iitical-military and foreign economic
Military Review 10
affairs-including the planning and
direction of the military assistance
programs-this office coordinates re-
lations between the Departments of
Defense and State in the political-
military area.
Often called the "little Department
of State," the International Security
Affairs staff offers military considera-
tions to a political policy as the Polit-
ical-Military Staff of the Department
of State scrutinizes the diplomatic
ramifications of a proposed military
policy.
Department of Defense policies in
regard to foreign affairs are submit-
ted to the President t h r o'u g h the
White House Staff on National Se-
curity Affairs. Here. of course, many
final decisions are reached. Composed
as it is of military and civilian spe-
cialists, it is asserted in some Wash-
ington circles that. despite all the le-
gal machinery for political-military
relations in foreign policy formula-
tion, this White H 0 use Staff often
"runs the country."
Political-Military Siaff
Although the creation of the Po-
litical-Military Affairs Staff of the
Department of State dates only from
1961, the Department of State had
been dealing wit h poItical-military
problems through its regional bureaus,
the Pol icy Planning Council, and
other groups within the Department.
The Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs had worked with
sen i 0 r Defense Department officials
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but on
a so-called "required" basis. It became
apparent, however, that this arrange-
ment was not adequate and that the
required a regular orga-
nization that could view political-mili-
tary problems on a worldwide basis
and, simultaneously, provide a focal
November 1964
point for the political-military activi-
ties of the Department's regional bu-
reaus.
There was also the rather obvious
necessity of having an agency in the
Department that could review, the to-
tal national de fen s e effort the
major lines of policy being executed
by the Department of D e fen s e in
terms of their over-all foreign policy
implications. 'And it was considered
, desirable to have one central point of
contact within the State Department
accessible to the Defense Department.
of Personnel
To promote further political-mili-
tary coordination between the Defense
and State Departments, an exchange
of officer personnel was inaugurated
in 1960. There are, therefore, mili-
tary men working in the Political-
MIlitary Staff of the Department of
State, and foreign service officers on
duty in the Department of Defense's
International Security Affairs Office.
The normal tours of duty are t\'.;o
years.
On a long-term basis, the Depart-
ment of State now assigns foreign
service 'officers to the war colleges and
othe,' military training institutions
as students, liaison officers, and fac-
ulty. Political advisors are assigned
to major US military commands. and
military officers attend the Foreign
Service Institute of the Department
of State.
Decision Making
Now the question arises, what about
the mechanism of decision making?
Certainly, this involves political and
military coordination of a most thor-
ough type.
Let us ,suppose that as the imple-
mentation of the Nassau Agreement
begins to take s hap e, our national
plans for Polaris forces are effected
11
POLICY AND POWER
and we require another Polaris sub-
marine base abroad. While this re-
'luirement seems I to be an uncompli-
cated military one, it is, in reality,
filled with political and economic rami-
fications. -In foreign affairs nothing is
devoid of complications. If some ele-
ment. or fa c tor seems simple, the
awareness, of complex ramifications
should be all the more intense.
Major Considerations
Thus, the decision of locating the
submarine base must be viewed from
va'rious directions. Will the ptoposed
site be in an area within the consist-
ency of over-all political-military
policy or national policy? How much
will it cost and whose labor forces
will construct it? Another and a most
significant factor to be considered is
the domestic political climate-the at-
titude of congressional leaders. Final-
ly, and these are at least as important
as the other elements, there are the
international security situations and
the Department 'of State viewpoints.
When the proposal is made, the De-
partments of D e fen s e and State,
through the International Security Af-
fairs Office and the Political-Military
Affairs Staff, concurrently would ex,
plore the diplomatic feasibility of con-
structing the proposed base in a par-
ticular country. Will that c 0 u n try
accept the submarine base? What
compensation will be required? What
would be the effect of the base on
our allies and the multilateral force
agreements question? What would be
the reaction of the S 0 vie t Union?
These, too, are among the major con-
siderations that bot h Defense and
State Departments must weigh.
. The pu rpose of this is to refine the
proposal with all of its problems and
implications into a Defense Depart-
ment memorandum to the President.
This memorandum must be approved
by the Department of State. If it is
not, then it is written in such a man-
ner as to indicate the views of both
Departments.
The refined proposal before him, the'
President has his own ovganization
for further refining the bases for the
ultimate decision. Views could be ob-
tai'led fro m the National Security
Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
va rio u s Cabinet members, and the
White House National Security Staff.
If he accepts the Defense Depart-
ment memorandum as presented or
recommended, the President w 0 u I d
then order action by a National Se-
curity Action memorandum, which is
a crisp summary of the President's
decision, coupled with an assignment
of duties and orders. The Department
of State would open negotiations with
the particular country, while repre-
sEmtatives of the Department of De-
fense, at the same time, would assist
in these negotiations with discussions
on a technical level. The Department
of State in this case would be regard-
ed as captain of the team.
Other Factors
There are other factors that might'"
or might not play a part in the deci-
sion-making process. One is the human
element.
All kinds of hindrances might de-
velop if the people concerned do not
cooperate. The a b iIi t y to persuade
without resultant aggravation is an
imponderable but essential ingredient
for the effective action of the machine.
Another consideration is the per-
sonal desire of the President. There
is no doubt but that there exists in
foreign policy formulation an elastic
flexibility. The President nee d not
utilize the pathways of political-mili-
tary efforts emphasized in this article.
Military Review 12
He may order that outside-of-Govern-
ment studies be made, as well as in-
dependent 0 n e s within Government
agencies. Today, hundreds of papers
are being prepared on various aspects
of US foreign affairs-many of these
at the direction of the White House.
A wide degree of flexibility in for-
eign policy formulation seems most
desirable, particularly when it becomes
necessary to solve quickly sudden and
critical problems. When such a crisis
occurs, the Departments of Defense
and State simply do not have the time
to study the problem from many and
diverse directions.
Executive Committee
The Cuban crisis of late 1962 viv-
idly illustrates this point. In this crit-
ical period, the President and his chief
advisors personally immersed them-
selves in the problem of Soviet mis-
-siles located 145 kilometers from our
shores. Mr. Kennedy quickly formed
an ex e cut i v e ad hoc committee of
the National Security Council com-
posed of the Secretaries of Defense
and State. the US Ambassador to the
United Nations. and General Maxwell
D. T a y lor (then Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff). and added sev-
eral other key men-Dean Acheson,
John McCone. Robert Kennedy, and
McGeorge Bundy.
The group met at least twice daily,
and for several days sat in virtually
continuous session. The discussions
were led by Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Bundy.
and, at times, by Mr. McNamara and
naturally centered on both defense and
diplomatic considerations. The State
Department was more heavily repre-
sented than the Department of De-
fense.
The President-there is no doubt
here-was in charge, and after all
the issues were identified and compre-
hemled,)1e made the decision. He did
not utilize the full spectrum of advis-
ory agencies available to him, but he
did make use of the principle of coor-
dination which is seeded into the Gov-
ernment's political-military machin-
ery. He did not have time to digest
advice except that which actually em-
anated from key high-level and per-
sonally trusted advisors. This certain-
ly was no time to become a prisoner
of staff reports.
ConclUsion
The fact does remain, however, even
with changes of administration and
within administrations, the structural
organization for political-military con-
siderations in foreign affairs does ex-
ist on working and executive levels
and is readily available to policymak-
ers. Perhaps what is even more sig-
nificant is that, whether the decision
to be reached must be quick or within
a reasonably aIIoted time, there is a
specific acknowledgment that the de-
cision can be made only after neces-
sary political-military fa c e t shave
been explored.
How the machinery of political-mili
tary cooperation in foreign policy for-
mulation is utilized by the President
is his prerogative. All of the groups
involved in this complex machine are
concerned with foreign policy. not one
office makes it. Certainly, the military
and foreign service officers do not, or
the civil servants, or outside advisors
and consultants.
The President and his appointees-
his Assistant Secretaries up-are the
actual policymakers. They all. however,
depend upon coordination and cohe-
sion. even across departmental lines.
for the refinements which must be
ultimately consolidated into a recom-
mendation to the President.
November 1964
r .
THE MILITARY ROLE
IN THE KOREAN TRUCE
NEGOTIATIONS
Walter G. Hermes
F
OR American military men, the
Korean War was an unusual ex-
perience. Not since the War of 1812
had US armed forces settJed for Jess
than military victory. In Korea, dur-
ing the Jast two years of the war, the
Nation did not try to settle the issue
decisively on the battlefield. As she
had in the War of 1812, the United
States carried on a limited war, while
she attempted to negotiate an end to
the fighting.
Yet, the military role in the Ko-
rean War differed markedly from the
one played in 1812. There had been
14
no military representatives at Ghent
in 1814 to help negotiate the peace
treaty. At Kaesong and Panmunjom
in 1951-53 there were no US political
representatives.
This is not to suggest that the mili-
tary representatives operated inde-
pendently; they did have a share in
determining the policy that was
adopted. And because of their daily
contacts with the Communists, they
had to learn to cope with their oppo-
nent over the conference table as well
as on the battlefield.
During the first whirlwind year of
Military Review
the Korean War, the United Nations
Command (UNC), headed by the
United States, battled the North Ko-
reans, and later the Chinese Commu-
nists, up and down the Korean Penin-
sula. By the-;;pring of 1951, the battle-
lines had stabilized in the general
vicinity of the 38th Parallel, where
the fighting had started.
Major Alternatives
With the status quo generally re-
stored, each side claimed some meas-
ure of military success, although
neither had been able to gain a com-
plete victory. The prospects for a mil-
itary settlement dissipated as the op-
ponents dug in and fortified their po-
sitions in depth. Continued stalemate
or a negotiated agreement became the
major alternatives.
Continued stalemate was most un-
attractive, particularly if it lasted for
an extended period of time-it could
prove costiy, both in lives and mate-
riel. A negotiated settlement did seem
to offer a solution whereby each side
could salvage at least some of its na-
tional prestige and reduce the drains
on its manpower and economy caused
by the war.
Thus, when Yakov Malik, the So-
viet delegate to the United Nations,
suggested on 23 June that the beJlig-
erents discuss the possibilities of a
cease-fire, both sides were amenable
to the initiation of discussions.
Walter G. Hermes has been a his-
torian with the Office, Chief of Mili-
tary History, Department of the
Army, since 1949. He received his
Master's degree from Boston Univer-
sity. This article is based on material
in the author's soon to be published
Truce Tent and Fighting Front, a vol-
ume in the series of the official history
of fhe UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE
KOREAN WAR.
November 1964
In June 1951 both Communist and
United States political leaders spoke
in terms of a strictly military settle-
ment. Yet, almost in the same breath,
the Communi, ts spoke of returning to
the 38th ParaJlel-a move with both
political and territorial consequences,
since both sides then held territory
formerly belonging to the other.
The relationships which existed be-
tween the political and military lead-
ers on both sides during the ensuing-'
negotiations made the prospects for
limiting the discussions solely to mili-
tary subjects extremely remote. The
close political control exercised by the
Communists over military operations
needs no explanation, since this was
standard procedure, For the Ameri-
cans, though, the close coordination
and consultation carried on between
the Departments of State and Defense
during the Korean War was in strik-
ing contrast to World War II experi-
ence. The development of policy was a
corporate State-Defense effort during
the Korean War with the President
usually approving the end results. The
Washington leaders exercised a tight
control over the negotiations from
start to finish.
Instructions
Thus, the instructions sent from
Washington on 30 June 1951 to Gen-
eral Matthew B. Ridgway, the UN
commander, took cognizance of both
the military and political implications
of a truce settlement. Since the Com-
munists might not be prepared to seek
a permanent political settlement in
Korea, Ridgway was advised that it
was essential to obtain a military
agreement that would be acceptable
to the United States over an extended
period of time. Ridgway was not to
discuss political matters-such as the
disposition of Taiwan, the seating of
15
mistice commission estal,lished to BU-
members of the
General Henry I. Hodes
KOREAN TRUCE 'NEGOTIATIONS
Communist China in the United Na- ,
tions, or the 38th Parallel,
As for specific details, the United
States wished to have a military ar-
,
To head the UNC. armistice team,
Ridgway selected. his capable naval
commander, Vice Admirjll C. Turner
Joy. Together, they c h o ~ e the other
m ~ ~
lINe and Communist liaison officers sign maps showing demilitarized zone
would have equal representation of
United Nations and Communist mem-
bers and free and unlimited access to
all Korea. Ridgway was also informed
that the United States desired:
A 20-mile - wid e demilitarized
zone, based on the line of contact.
No replacement of troops, equip-
ment, or materiel except on a one-for-
one basis.
Prisoners of war should be ex-
changed as qu ickly as possible on .1
one-far-one basis.
These were the essential parts of
the initial American position.
Major General Laurence C. Craigie of
the Air Force, Rear Admiral Arleigh
A. Burke of the Navy, and Major Gen-
eral Pail< Sun Yup of the Republic of
Korea Army. It is interesting to note
that these five men were all profes-
sional soldiers with little or no polit-
ical or diplomatic experience.
Shortly b e for e the negotiations
opened, Ridgway gave the team mem-
bers some personal instructions. He
warned them that they would be sub-
jected to lengthy propaganda speech-
es; these should be ignored. In deal-
- ing with Orientals, Ridgway went on,
Military Review 16
great care had to be taken not to
cause them to lose face; therefore, a
"golden bridge" of withdrawal from
a situation should always be provided.
RHlgway also pointed out that there
probably would be some difficulty with
semantics, since English, Chinese, and
Korean would be used. The UNC dele-
gation would have to be on its guard
against inaccuracies in translation
that might cause basic and sustained
misunderstandings.
First Contact
The first physical contact with the
Communists across the conference ta-
ble came on 8 July when the liaison
officers met at Kaesong to make ar-
rangements for the plenary sessions.
According to Oriental tradition in
negotiating peace, the conquering na-
tian faces the sauth. Before the Com-
munists could forestall them, the UNC
liaison officers walked in and assumed
the conqueror's positian, ca'using great
consternation among their counter-
parts. Needless to say, at subsequent
meetings the Communists made cer-
tain that this never happened again.
The Communist sensitivity to seem-
ingly small matters of tradition, pro-
tocol, and equality remained constant
throughout the negotiations. When the
C:-I'C delegation set up a small UN
flag in a brass stanp, the Communists
quickly brought in a larger Commu-
nist flag in a bigger stand. They ob-
served the establishment of sedate
UNC sanitation facilities at the truce
site and then built larger facilities
and painted them in gay colors. Since
Admiral Joy had a sedan to transport
him to the conference building, the
Communists imported a vehicle from
the Soviet Union so that General Nam
II, the senior Communist delegate,
could also arrive in style. The Com-
munist sensitivity was one of the in-
November t 964
tangible factors that contributed to
the length and bitterness of the nego-
tiations.
The tone for the meetings was es-
tablished at the first encounter. Cold
formality was the norm, with no cor-
diality or acceptance of small ameni-
ties such as wine, cigarettes, or food.
Admiral Joy wished to impress firmly
upon the Communists at the outset
that the meetings were not social mix-
ers, but were being held for one rea-
son only-to arrange a truce.
Across the tahle, the Communists
had assembled a formidable group of
negotiators. The chief delegate and
nominal leader was General Nam,
Chief of Staff of the North Korean
Army and Vice Premier of the Com-
munist regime. Assisting him were
Major General Lee Sang Cho, Chief of
the Reconnaissance Bureau of the
North Korean Army and a former
Vice Minister of Commerce, and
Major General Hsieh Fang, Chief of
Propaganda of the Northeast Military
District of China, who was reputed to
have played a major role in the 1936
kidnapping of Chiang Kai_shek. Ac-
cording to some observers, General
Hsieh directed the armistice opera-
tions at Kaesong. The other two Com-
munist delegates were of lesser im-
portance to the negotiations, but all
the enemy representatives had exten-
sive political as well as military ex-
perience. )"
Negotiations Begin
As negotiations began, the Com-
munists attempted unsuccessfully to
have written into the agenda two top-
ics with obvious political comiota-
tions: the 38th Parallel restored as
the boundary between North arid
South Korea, and the withdrawal of
all foreign troops from Korea. The
17
. KOREAN TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS
UNC delegation firmly opposed their'
inclusion.
Whell the Communists became con-
vinced that the UNC would not con-
cede, they finally agreed on a five-
sea and air around and over Korea,
Admiral Joy maintained that the en-
emy should compensate the UNC on
the ground for the latter's surrender-
ing its air and sea dominance under
Armll NIlt08 FeattJ.Tt!1l
At 1000 on 27 July 1953, Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr., chief UN delegate,
and General Nam II, Communist representative, signed the armistice at Panmunjom
point agenda. Four items were of
major importance:
Fixing a military demarcation
line and a demilitarized zone.
Arrangements for the establish-
ment of a supervisory organization to
make sure that the terms of the armi-
stice were carried out.
Disposition of prisoners of war.
Certain recommendations to the
governments of the countries con-
cerned on both sides.
In an effort to divert the Commu-
nists from the 38th Parallel, Admiral
Joy tried a novel approach to the set-
tlement of the military demarcation
line. Since UNC forces controlled the
the terms of an armistice agreement7
He proposed fixing ,the demarcation
line considerably to the north of the
positions then held by the UNC troops.
It was an interesting gamble-an at
tempt to break total military power
into component parts and give them
separate values for bargaining pur-
poses.
But the Communist reaction was a
swift and rude rejection. General Nam
calJed the proposal "ridiculous" arM
pointed out that the battlelines were
the concentrated expression of the
military effectiveness of the UNC land,
sea, and air forces. When Admiral Joy,
rebutted that Japan had e e ~ defeated
Military Review
18
without a single soldier setting foot
on the Home Islands, Nam derided the
claim. Everyone knew, Nam main-
tained, that the Korean, Chinese, and
Soviet peoples had defeated Japan.
Had not the United States fought
Japan for three years without victory
until the Soviet Army entered the war
and dealt Japan a crushing blow'?
"Can these historical facts be negated
lightly?" Nam concluded. Since both
sides obviously were using different
history books, Admiral Joy did not,
pursue this subject further.
Demarcation Line
The Communist rejection of UNC
offers to trade territory and the UNC
refusal to talk about the 38th Parallel
finally led the conferees on 27 N ovem-
ber to accept the battleline of contact
as the line of demarcation. Commu-
nist insistence, however, upon com-
pleting the work on the line of demar-
cation before taking up other agenda
items aroused Ridgway's and Joy's
suspicions, General Ridgway informed
Washington that agreement to the
Communist demand would amount to
a de facto cease-fire, since the enemy
apparentlY' intended to make the line
a permanent rather than a temporary
arrangement.
But the US leaders in Washington
decided that, because the Communists
had conceded on the 38th Parallel, the
UNC could accept the line of contact
which ran north and soutll of the par-
allel. This line of contact would be
valid for 30 days.
Almost immediately, military oper-
ations slowed down and the Commu-
nists showed no disposition to reach
swift agreement on the remaining
items on the agenda before the 30-day
time limit expired.
Debate on the establishment of a
supervisory organization to ensure
NDvember 1964
compliance with the armistice terms
began in December 1951. After pre-
liminary skirmishing, three basic is-
sues emerged: Who would carry out
the inspections behind the lines t" en-
sure that neither side built up its
forces and supplies during the truce?
How much inspection would be per-
mitted? Would the rehabilitation or
construction of airfields be allowed
during the armistice?
Exchange of Views
The Communists eventually sug-
gested that neutral nations be named
to do the inspecting, but wished to des-
ignate the Soviet Union as one of the
neutral nations. The United States re-
fused to consider the Soviet Union as
a neutral.
In regard to the question of how
much inspection should be permitted,
General Ridgway held that the Com-
munists would exploit the privilege of
unlimited inspection in the intelli-
gence field and that neutral joint
teams, based at selected ports of entry
and centers of communication, would
be adequate to observe the arrivals
and departures of men and materiel.
As for the airfield question, both
Ridgway and Joy strongly recom-
mended to their superiors that the
enemy not be permitted to strengthen
his air potential during a truce.
The Communists agreed to limited
inspection, but would have nothing
to do with the concept of restricting
airfield construction. Again, a com-
promise was proposed and accepted.
The UNC dropped its insistence on
airfield restrictions. and the Com-
munists stopped demanding that the
Soviet Union be one of the members
of the neutral nations' supervisory
organ.
The differences between the think-
ing of US leaders in Washington end
19
KOREAN TRUCE
the military leaders in the Far :Bast
in approaching the intricate task of
negotiating with the Communists were
sharply pointed up during the ex-
change of views on inspection and the
of airfields. Ridgway
and his staff argued that further con-
cessiohs would only indicate weakness
to the enemy. and that the best course
was one of strength and firmness. Only
when the Communists realized that
the UNC to cling steadfastly
to its principles and would yield no
more, Ridgway felt, would they set-
tle down seriously to the business of
an armistice.
Flexible Approach
The Washington leaders, on the
other hand. inclined toward a more
flexible approach based upon the prac-
tical necessities of providing for what
might become a long armistice period.
This meant avoiding fixed positions
that might precipitate a break in the
negotiations whiSh could be blamed on
the UNC. Besides, pressure in the
United States and from some of her
allies to end the fighting in Korea and
to reduce the US commitment there
was steadily mounting.
The American military chiefs alsd
knew that the United States had no
military capability to reach a favor-
able decision in Korea unless a far
greater mobilization was ordered. Un-
der the circumstances, since all-out
war was favored by few, and con-
tinued attrition was undesirable. the
best solution seemed to be an armi-
stice agreement under the most advan-
tageous terms available. In the mean-
time, the ,Republic of Korea Army
could be strengthened and trained to
defend South Korea 'against further
aggression.
By the end of April 1952, an armi-
stice agreement hinged on the disposi-
tion of prisoners of war. The original
US 'resolution' to exchange prisoners
on a one-for-one basis had long since
disappeared. In its stead, the United
States espoused the principle of no
forced repatriation. The shift had
been gradual and hesitant, in many
ways through default rather than by
intent.
Humanitarian Concept
Actually, the Army had first sug-
gested that there were many Red Chi-
nese and North Korean prisoners' who
would be severely punished for their
anti-Communist activities in UNe
prisoner-of-war camps if they were
sent back. The idea of offering the
prisoners a choice not only seemed
humanitarian, it also had considerable
psychological possibilities.
Throughout the fall of 1951, Wash-
ington leaders neither accepted nor
rejected the voluntary repatriation
concept. General Ridgway felt that it
had definite merit. but pointed out the
one great risk--once the United States
openly advocated the principle, it
would be difficult, perhaps impossible,
to discard it.
Ridgway's caveat proved to be valid,.
The concept appealed to humanitar-
ians all over the world and was eagerly
seized upon by the anti-Communist
prisoners. To the Communists. how-
ever, voluntary repatriation and its
concomitant, no forced repatriation,
were anathema.
The Communist attitude undoubted-
ly stemmed from the numbers of pris-
oners involved. The fact that close to
50,000 of the over 130,000 prisoners
-including better than one-half
the more than 20,000 Chinese-indi-
cated that they would forcibly resist
repatriation meant that Red China:
would suffer an enormous loss of face.
To acknowledge publicly that more
Military Review
20
than half of their captured soldiers did
not want to come home was 'unthink-
able. For over a year, then, the Com-
munists refused to consider the many
UNC proposals that sought to make
the principle of no forced repatriation
more palatable, but instigated riots in
the prisoner camps and did everything
possible to discredit the screening
process used by the UNC to determine
the non repatriates.
It was not until after Stalin died
in March 1953, and a period of con-
solidation and reorganization set in
within the Communist bloc, that the
enemy again indicated that he was
willing to reopen negotiations. Al-
though the question was finally settled,
the Communists insisted down to the
very end that there was no repatria-
tion problem. They maintained that
once they were given the opportunity
to talk to the prisoners, thereby coun-
teracting the poisonous propaganda
fed to them by tlie UNC, all the pris-
oners would want to go home.
The final agreement gave the Com-
munists this opportunity, but only
about 600 men changed their minds.
Behind Scenes
The military contributions to the
key issues that developed during the.
discussions were but one side of the
coin. Behind the scenes, the UNC staff
officers worked feverishly to discover
chinks in the enemy's negotiating ar-
mor.
The UNC delegate.s and staff officers
were subjected to the fuIl gamut of
Communist negotiating tactics during
the two-year period. After the first
month, Admiral Burke commented:
No amount of reading about Com-
munist tactics in conferences can ever
prepare a man completely for the rude
slwck he is bound to receive when he
is first exposed to those tactics.
November 1964
Overnight, the Communists could
shift from harsh, browbeating, name
calling attacks, which were designed
to harass or to secure further con-
cessions, to quiet, reasonable, and busi
nesslike approaches to problems they
were ready to settle. The flow of prop-
aganda could become a trickle if they
scented a {jNC concession, or it could
become a veritable flood if things were
going badly for their side.
Communist Techniques
The UNC team soon discovered that
the Communists were experienced and
strong on substantive affairs, but less
rigid about procedural matters. In the
latter field, the team learned that the
Communists would usually accept UNC
suggestions on procedures, although
never in toto. Interpreters finally
reached the point where they delib-
erately inserted an error into a pro-
posed agreement so that the Commu
nists would find it and, as a result,
might leave the rest of the text alone.
If the UNC delegation offered a con
cession-no matter how smaIl-with-
out demanding something in return,
the C!>mmunists became quite suspi
cious. Sharp, Yankee horse trading
they understood and respected; gift
horses were always looked in the
mouth.
One favorite Communist technique
'was to let the UNC make the first pro-
posal and then to tailor their counter-
proposal accordingly. By outwaiting
their opponents, the Communists could
accept the portions favorable to their
position and haggle for more. Eventu-
ally, when they saw that the UNC
would not yield further, they would
bring forth theIr counteroffer. The
UNC team found out that as long as
the enemy continued to argue a point.
the door was open to trading, but that
when the Communists refused to de-
21
KOREAN TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS
bate any more, they had arrived at
their minimum position.
Bluster, bombast,' profanity, and
rudeness were everyday weapons in
the Communists' negotiatory arsenal.
In Korea, however. the translation of
the screaming insults, the derisive
comments, and the blatant rudeness
into English robbed the rough words
of much of their impact. To be called
a "turtle egg" or a "running dog"
might be extremely offensive to a Red
Chinese, but the literal translation
had no meaning to an American.
The Communists did not object to
distorting facts or history to suit their
purposes, and their interpretation of
words like "reason" and "logic" meant
only reason and logic favorable to the
Communist position in the debate. Set-
tling an argument through reason and
logic proved to be impossible because
of the semantic and dialectical differ-
ences. Sooner or later, the matter un-
der consideration reached the horse
trading stage and both sides made
concessions without regard to reason
or logic.
Patience
If the Communists hoped through,
their use of loud and scurrilous lan-
guage to bait the UNC delegates into
angry or emotional outbursts, they
must have been disappointed. The pa-
tience displayed by a people famous
for their impatience and by a group
of men trained for action rather than
words was remarkable. Only on rare
occa;ions did the remarks of Admiral
Joy, Lieutenant General William K.
Harrison, Jr., his successor. or any of
the other delegation officers betray a
trace of impatience or emotion in the
official meetings.
Outside the truce tent was another
matter. In their recommendations to
General Ridgway and his successor,
General Mark W. Clark, Admiral Joy
and General Harrison constantly
urged more firmness in dealing with
the Communists. The theater com-
manders and the delegation leaders on
several occasions advocated breaking
off negotiations if the opponents re-
fused to accept the UNC proposals.
Their recommendations were tempered
by the long, frustrating sessions in
the truce tent and by their belief that
the Communists would never come to
terms until the UNC stopped haggling.
made a final offer, and then recessed
until the enemy accepted it.
The disinclination of the Washing-
ton leaders to present the Communists
with an ultimatum and risk the onus
for ending the negotiations argued
against the adoption of this course of
action.
Other Obstacles
It should be noted that the Commu-
nists were not the only obstacles to
an armistice agreement. During the
moments when agreement appeared
near, the military leaders in the Far
East had to cope with the bitter oppo-
sition put forward by Syngman Rhee
and the Republic of Korea
ment. The UNC failure to drive the
Chinese Communists out of Korea and
to unify the peninsula had sorely dis-
appointed the South Koreans. They
vowed to fight on alone, staged parades
and demonstrations, and even set free
thousands of Korean prisoners of war
on the eve of the armistice. .
Fortunately, by this time, the Com-
munists had decided to come to terms
and did not allow the threat of South
Korean action in the future to deter
them from signing the armistice on
27 July 1953. Nevertheless. the task
of placating Mr. Rhee and securing
his reluctant agreement not to inter-
fere with the truce called for high tact
Mmiary Review 22
Finally, and of overriding importance to any strategy, our course for the
future must be rooted in determination to defend our principles. We are a
Christian Nation. Let us remember and be guided by the words of Saint Paul
in his letter to the Galatians when he wrote, 'Stand fast therefore in the
liberty wherewith Christ has made us free:
General Earle G. Wheeler
and diplomacy, patience, and 'under-
standing, under very tense conditions.
In summary, the military role in
the Korean armistice negotiations was
both military and political in nature.
The military leaders in Washington
and in the Far East contributed to the
making of policy through their recom-
mendations and proposals. In the truce
tent, the UNC delegation labored to
achieve a cease-fire that would endure
until a political settlement could be
reached and that would protect the
UNC forces against a resumption of
the fighting.
The members of the armistice del-
egation who served in the frontline
skirmishes with their counterparts
across the table received valuable
training in Communist tactics in ne-
gotiating. Behind the scenes, they had
to contend with Syngman Rhee and
his followers, and to reassure them
that the United States would not de-
sert South Korea after the armistice
was signed.
Considering the initial inexperience
of the American commanders and dele-
gates in the problems they encount-
ered, the soldiers, sailors, and airmen
did exceptionrlly well and succeeded
in gaining most of the objectives set
out for them. That the political con-
ference conducted after the armistice
failed to agree on a Korean settle-
ment, that some of the truce terms
have since been abrogated, could not
be blamed on the military negotiators.
The peace in Korea today, uneasy
though it may seem, has lasted for
over 10 years. It is a tribute to their
efforts.
23
REQUIRED ROTC
THE NEW LOOK
Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Wyckoff, United States Army
"
T
HERE are
f
in the United States
today some 247 college-level
Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps
(ROTC) units, with a total enrollment
of about 160,000 cadets and a total
annual production of approximately
12,000 Army second lieutenants. Of
the 12,000 second lieutenants commis-
sioned through the ROTC program,
about 1,100 are commissioned as ca-
reer officers in the Regular Army; the
remainder are commissioned in the US
Army Reserve.
The 1,100 Regulars are more than
twice the number currently being pro-
duced at West Point, the only other
major sour.ce of Regular Army second
lieutenants. The 11,000 reservists com-
missioned through ROTC form a con-
tingent about seven times as large as
the total production of Reserve second
lieutenants at the Army's two Officer
24
Candidate Schools, Fort Benning and
Fort Sill, where the combined annual
production will run about 1,600 this
year.*
In addition to providing the largest.,
number of officers, the Army ROTC
program has proved, to be the mO$t
economical of the three principal pro-
grams which turn out commissioned
officers. Where the cost of producing
one second lieutenant at West Point
has averaged in recent years $44,000,
and at the Officer Candidate Schools
$6,500, the average cost for a commis-
sionee from a senior ROTC unit has
been only about $4,000.
Notwithstanding the undeniable im-
portance of the ROTC program in the
Nation's defense effort, several as-
Statisties pertain.ing to nationwide enroUme-nt
in the ROTC ha\>e been provided by tbe Office of
Reserve Components. Headquarters. Department
of the Army.
Military Review
pects of the program have come under
ure in recent years. "ROTC takes val-
uable college time which should be de-
voted to academic studies," runs one
line of criticism. "Enrolling 80,000
freshmen to produce 12,000 seniors is
a waste of effort," another line of ar-
gument states. Military science classes
are "unacademic" is still a third alle- '
gation. These and other arguments
have been advanced to support a move-
ment in many of the Nation's colleges
and universities to push "elective" or
"voluntary" rather than "required" or
"compulsory" basic ROTC, a decision
made not at the national level, but
within each institution for itself.
As a result of the voluntary ROTC
movement, in just three school years
-1961 through 1964-22 major uni-
versities and colleges changed from
required basic ROTC to voluntary
basic ROTC. At the beginning of the
1963-64 school year, while 144 schools
continued to require basic ROTC, 103
schools were operating on an elective
basis. Unfortunately, several of the
Xation's largest and strongest state
universities were included among the
103.
Difference Between Systems
The question r.rises as to whether
there is much difference between the
two systems. Is a required program
any more effective than a voluntary
program in accomplishing the objec-
tives of the ROTC program? How
well do the two contrasting systems
Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Wy-
ckoff. former Profes.or of Military
Science at Arizona State University,
served in the Caribbean theater dur-
ing World War II. He holds advanced
de g r e e s in International Relations
from Princeton University and is pres-
ently assigned as an artillery advisor,
Military Assistance Advisory Gruup,
West German Army, at Bonn.
November 1964
succeed in accomplishing the pro-
gram's primary objective-producing
commissioned officers for the Active
Army and for the Army's Reserve
components?
After three years as Professor of
Military Science at one large school
with a required program, I have ar-
rived unequivocally at the conclusiori
that required basic ROTC is the cor-
nerstone of SUCCeSS in producing ac-
ceptable numbers of good quality offi-
cers. This conclusion is based on my
experience at Arizona State Univer-
sity-experience supported by statis-
tics derived from that part of our
student body to which we have direct
access in our ROTC classes.
Equally True
While this conclusion is unquestion-
ably true at our type of school-a state
university with an undergraduate en- ,
rollment of over 15,000, where almost
any student who applies for admission
is accepted-I believe that the same
conclusion would be equally true in
other, perhaps different kinds of
schools.
Admittedly, many universities with
voluntary units produce significant
numbers of officers. But it appears
that those people who prefer a volun-
tary program may be failing to take
into consideration one factor which we
-at a large school with a required
program-have discovered to be highly
significant. This is that many of our
best juniors and seniors would not
have "gone advanced" unless they had
been required to take ROTC as fresh-
men and sophomores.
An actual poll taken in March 1964
showed that, of our 91 seniors and
juniors, 39 woulil not have taken
ROTC had the program been volun-
tary. Further, We discovered that of
the last two years' distinguished roili-
25
A SAMPLING OF CADET ATTITUDES AT ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
PERCENT
10 20 80- 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1. 91 SENIORS AND JUNIORS IN MARCH 1964
57 percent originally took ROTC voluntarily ::.::::,':::::,',':,'.w::::.,'.:::::,'.:::,':::::::::::::::::::::::f
43 percent took it only because it was compulsory
2. 382 FRESHMEN IN JANUARY 1964
30 percent took ROTC voluntarily ..,'..: ..::..:::..: ......:..:::......:::::::.
70 percent took itonly because it was compulsory
But 88 percent now hope togo advanced,more than half of
whom we would never have seen witbout requi..red ROTC
And 32 percent are undeeided,more tha.n half of whom we t... :...:.... :.:.: ........
would never have seen without required ROTC J-
8. 274 SOPHOMORES IN MARCH 1964
23 percent said they took ROTC voluntarily '
'17 percent said they took itonly because itwas compulsory ,
I
But 87 percent now hope to go advanced.more than half 1:=4:::]1
(21 percent) of whom were nonvolunteers .,.:::.:::.;.::.::.:.:.
4. 274 SOPHOMORES (CONTINUED)
89 they learned something worthwhile from t.;:: ..:;::: ..;::::;::: ..;.... . II
49 percent said they thought ROTC should be required for II
freshmen
10 percent (all volunteers) said they preferred an all-
'Volunteer corps

t ~ y ,students and graduates, at least
nine would never have been elCposed
to the advanced course had the basic
"course been voluntary. It is clear that
in this one university, the production
'ofacceptable numbers ofcommission-
ees could not have been maintained
on a voluntary basis without a serious
drop in quality.
Ouestionnaires
To obtain specific data, and to keep
abreast of the climate of opinion in
ollr cadet corps, we have for three
years U!{ed the technique of adminis-
tering atleast once a yearanonymous
\\fitten questionnaires to all fresh-
men and sophomores. To check outthe
validity and objectivity of our ques-
tionnaires and our polling procedures,
we have sought the assistance of peo-
ple familiar with public opinion sam-
pling methods, including members of
the university's psychology depart-
ment. Therefore, we have specific,
solid, current information based on
questionnaires completed by fresh-
men in January and by sophomores
in March.
In completing the question as to
why they had enrolled in the ROTC
program, 70 percent ofthe382 fresh-
men in class on the day of the poll
stated thatthey had taken ROTC only
because it was required; the remain-
ing 30 percent stated that they had
enrolled voluntarily. To test the ac-
ceptability ofour program at the end
of one freshman semester, we asked
the cadets to complete the statement:
"At the present time I am (consider-
ing going advanced) (undecided)
(not interested)." We therrcorrelated
these responses to the responses we
had received to the question of why
the cadets had enrolled in the pro-
gram.
Of the 70 percent who had stated
November 1964
they had enrolled in ROTC,only be-
cause it was a required course, more
than one-third were favorably enough
impressed withthe programthatthey
were hoping to "go advanced," while
still another third were undecided
about continuing beyond the second
year. Of the cadets who would have
taken ROTC regardlessofcompulsion,
almost one-half of the total number
stated thattheywanted togo intothe
advanced program, and another third
were undecided.
Of all 382 freshmen cadets, then,
38 percent were definite in their de-
sire to go advanced, 32 percent were
undecided, and only a bare 30 percent
indicated no desire to continue in the
program afterthey had completed the
basic eourse.
How many of those freshmen who
now want to go advanced will actually
qualify when they are sophomores is
quite another matter. But the sig-
nificant point is that we reached 267
freshmen whom we would not have
seen under a voluntary program, and
of whom 89 or more may end up as
advanced course cadets.
Sophomore Cadets
As with the freshmen, our sopho-
more cadets also were asked whether
theywould have taken the ROTC pro-
gram if it had not been required. In
theircase, 77 percentstated thatthey
would not have taken ROTC had it
not been required, while only 23 per-
cent answered that they would have
taken it voluntarily. Then, as with
freshmen, we asked how many were
planning to apply for the advanced
course.
This question has a completely dif-
ferent impact on sophomores than it
does on freshmen, since by a man's
fourth semester the handwriting on
the wall is prettyclear as to whether
27
ROTC
a man will or will not qualify for the
advanced course. In fact, there is al-
most a 1 to 1 correlation between the
men we want and the men who want
us. Nevertheless, we asked the ques-
,tion. The significant part of the an-
swer -was that of the 37 percent of the
class who stated that they did desire
to go into the advanced course, 21
percent came from the group which
would not have taken ROTC had it
not been required: Only 16 percent
came from the group which would
have taken RO',I'C regardless of com-
pulsion.
Acceptability of Program
The acceptability-and acceptance
-of compulsory ROTC is, and should
be, a major' continuing concern at any
university where the compulsory pro-
gram is conducted. Since sophomores
have had one more year of experience
on which to base an evaluation of the
ROTC program than do freshmen, a
few questions whe asked them which
were not put to freshmen. For exam-
ple, we asked them first whether they
felt that they had learned something
worthwhile from ROTC, and then
whether they thought ROTC should
or should not be required for all in-
coming freshmen.
Eighty-nine percent of all the re-
spondents stated that they felt that
the program was worthwhile; 49 per-
cent felt that ROTC should be re-
quired of all incoming freshmen; 10
percent-all volunteers-felt that the
cadet corps would be better if it were
composed exclusively of volunteers.
More than half of the sophomores who
thought ROTC should be required of
all freshmen were men who themselves
would not have taken it had it not
been required.
It is time that we take a new look
at the required basic ROTC program
and the advantages it offers, not only
to the individual cadet, but to the
country and its national defense pos-
ture.
A required basic ROTC program of
two years' duration builds self-conti-
dence and gives the essentials of basic
leadership training to all able-bodied
male students, not to just a few stu-
dents. Where civilians frequently ex-
press their confidence in the required
ROTC course by stating that it
"teaches discipline" or "produces bet-
ter citizens," what more immediately
impresses the students themselves is
that ROTC training can and does ef-
fectively build the individual cadet's
self-confidence and makes him better
able to deal with people. Military men
would say that ROTC training teaches
leadership.
If the Reserve forces of the US
Army have the very best officers this
country can produce, those forces can
be counted on to do their job effec-
tively when called upon to do so. It
was General George C. Marshal! who
pointed out in 1945 that the real v l u ~
of ROTC training was that it pro-
vided a great reservoir of competent
officers for the Armed Forces--civilian
soldier-leaders available in the event
of a national emergency.
General Marshal! went on to say that
World War II proved this point, and
he paid tribute to the 118,000 ROTC-
trained officers available in the United
States in 1941. He noted that without
those officers, the war would probably
have lasted at least one more year. '
As it was then, it is still true today
-in preparedness there is strength.
In the required ROTC course of in-
struction, we have the preparedness.
Military Review 28
lions under the throne
Brian Bond
"AN ARMED disciplined body,"
wrote Edmund Burke. "is in
its essence dangerous to liberty: un-
disciplined. it is ruinous to Society."
Burke's sentiments reflect a view of
mihtary power, in relation to the con-
stitution and to civil liberties, that
has been widely held from the 17th
century to the present day.
This argument for a constitutional
safeguard against military interfer-
ence in politics seems, in philosoph-
ical terminology, an inadequate ex-
planation. It oversimplifies the sub-
sequent ,political role of the officer
November 1964
corps; it obscures the real reasons
why the standing army has seldom
provided a direct threat to the con-
stitution; and it exaggerates the m ~
portance of a politically mature and
peace-loving national character.
To Britain's good fortune in solv-
ing the vital constitutional issue be-
fore the development of the Indus-
trial Revolution and the advent of
mass armies must be added the para-
mount factor of geography. Tile Chan-
nel never completely guaranteed im-
munity from invasion, but, in the
period of limited dynastic wars, it
29
LIONS UNDER THE THRONE
p 0 sed problems sufficient to make
Britain an extremely unattractive
prospect to aggressive European rul-
ers.. The same difficulties-of trans-
portation, conquest, and communica-
tions-helped to deter both Napoleon
and Hitler in the era of total war.
Political Climate
Reliance on superior sea power has
clearly affected the political climate
of Britain. Nevertheless, it would ,be
wrong to jump to the conclusion that
civil government will invariably flour-
ish in maritime states which are free
from the fear of invasion. Japan pro-
vides a striking exception to the rule.
Two further conditions would seem
to be necessary:
The government will seldom keep
the armed forces in proper subor-
dination in a society where violence
is frequent and goes unpunished by
the central authority. The activities
of the Freikorp,s, for example, and
the undisciplined character of polit-
ical meetings in the early years of
the Weimar Republic, enhanced the
self-importance of the Reichswehr as
the sole guardian of order and gave
impetus 'to the nascent Nazi PartY'.
Representative government rests
on the precarious foundations of eco-
nomic prosperity. A democratic con-
stitution, free from military inter-
This article was digested from
the 0 rig ina I, published in the
J.OURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED
S E R V ICE INSTITUTION (Great
Britain) August 1968, under the
title, "Military Power in Modern
British History." Copyrighted
1968 by the JOURNAL OF THE
ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITU-
TION.
Mr. Bond is a lecturer in mod-
ern history at the University of
Liverpool.
ference, is notoriouslY' difficult to im-
plant in countries where starvation
is common. In early 19th centurY
England, when discrepancies in ma-
terial wealth were extreme, the coun-
try was virtually under military oc-
cupation. That open dictatorship was
avoided may be attributed partly to
the successful suppression of politi
cal activity by Lord Liverpool's gov-
ernment and partly to the local power
of that substantial class who were
enjoying, or hoped to enjoy, the iruits
of the Industrial Revolution.
A favorable geographical situation
then, though extremely important,
provides only a negative condition for
the absence of militarism in Britain.
Even the political reliability of navies
should not be exaggerated. Charles
I's navy went over en masse to Par
liament and played a major part in
the King's defeat. In 1688 even the
sailor-king, James II, was unable to
count on the certain support of the
fleet which might have preserved his
throne.,
Outside Pressure
The 19th century historian Sir
John Seeley propounded the thesi;
that the amount of freedom in a
state is inversely proportional to the
pressure on it from outside. When
allowance is made for the looseness
of his terms, there is clearly much
truth behind this idea. Lacking well
defined and defensible frontiers, the
states of central Europe, for example,
are under constant pressure from
more powerful neighbors. An author
itarian form of government, buttress-
ed by a powerful standing army, was
probably essential for Prussia's sur
vival. .
Only when external pressure is neg-
ligible, the campaign theaters distant,
and the stakes limited, can war be
Military Review
30
conducted by the leisurely methods
of parliamentary deliberation. These
conditions provide the background for
much of lSth and 19th, century Brit-
ish warfare, permitting the contin-
ued existence of a small and exceed-
ingly inefficient military organization
which was far from uniformly suc-
cessful even in its minor operations.
In the present century, when the
very existence of independent Brit-
ain has twice been in jeopardy, it
is significant that Parliament, with
hardly a protest, has temporarily sur-
rendered jealously guarded powers to
a strong executive. The experience
of the two World Wars does not sup-
port the view that democratic gov-
ernment is primarily the offspring of
certain traits in the national charac-
ter.
The role of the British Army in
domestic politics, its social character,
organization, and distribution, must
be viewed against the strategic con-
siderations of naval supremacy, se-
curity from invasion, and limited, de-
fensive objectives on the continent
of Europe.
Unreadiness for War
The price paid to avoid the crea-
tion of an efficient but politically un-
popular professional army was ha-
bitual unreadiness for war. Thus, in
1756, when war with France broke
out, a force of Hessian and Hano-
verian mercenaries had to be brought
over to defend the country against
invasion.
Unwillingness to raise a sufficient
number of reg U I a l' soldiers or to
create a trained reserve entailed the
continued employment of foreigners.
In' the American War of Indepen-
dence, the undisciplined pillaging of
German mercenaries did m u c h to
alienate the sympathies of the colo-
November 1964
nists, and as late as the Crimean
War a foreign legion was recruited.
In 'the absence (before the late
19th century) of a large standing
army stationed at home, the role of
amateur troops was enhanced. The
history of the militia and other aux-
iliary forces shows how governments
have deliberately manipulated military
organization in an attempt to ensure
lack of sympathy on the part of offi-
cers and men toward political activ-
ity by the underprivileged classes.
The militia was essentially a county
f(lrce under the command (If the Lords
Lieutenant. After the Restoration, the
force was provided exclusively by
those with an income of 500 pounds
or more, or a capital of 6,000 pounds
in goods. As Lady Chorley commen-
ted:
Theoretically, it would have been
hard to devise a subtler scheme for
ensuring that a citizen army should
be safe and innocuous from the point
of view of the ruling class.
Militia Problems
In practice, however, even these
regulations did not always secure un-
questioning obedience to government
orders, and in the 18th century the
militia's class character was heavily
diluted by the adoption of recruit-
ment by ballot. In the chronic dis-
order that characterized England dur-
ing the period of the Revolutionary
and Napoleonic Wars, the militia on
numerous occasions showed reluctance
in suppressing local disturbances. The
explanation would seem to be that
the men were t(lO often employed in
their own counties.
Until late 'in Que e n Victoria's
reign, enlistment in the army was
n(ltoriously tantamount to the accept-
ance of long periods of exile; regi-
31
LIONS UNDER THE THRONE
ments might remain continuously on
foreign service for as long as 20
years. A long-service army. policing
and extending an empire far from
home. develops a strong professional
ernment which wishes to uphold the
status quo cannot be overestimated.
This is subject to one condition only
-the officer corps must respect the
civil power. In the present century.
llritJ8h ["formatIon SrTl"rocs
The security provided by British naval power has deaFly influenced the British politicaI'"
climate
spirit and necessarily loses interest in
domestic politics. Also. on foreign
service. the officers' authority is in-
creased.
On the other hand. lengthy resi-
dence at horne. particularly in the
troops' local area. is likely to cause
discipline and morale to slacken. The
Duke of Wellington and other con-
servative statesmen of the early 19th
century may well have had sound
political as well as financial reasons
for scattering the regular regiments
piecemeal among the colonies.
The value of a small. professional.
long-service army to the party or gov-
the remarkable n u b e r of states
with open military dictatorships, or
where governments depend on thinly
veiled military support, underlines the
fortunate combination of circumstan
ces that has preserved Britain from
the rule of the sword. Among these,
a stable monarchy has been a vital,
if not the most vital, factor for the
maintenance of domestic peace.
This concern for a stable dynastic
succession in a constitutional mon-
archy will seem exaggerated unless
it is remembered that tradition and,
indeed, practice have closely associ
ated the armed forces, and especiaJ-
Military Review 32
ly the army. with the person of the
monarch. In 19th century Britain,
a curious situation arose where the
Crown had ceased to wield real pow-
er but continued to receive the per-
sonal allegiance of the army leaders,
though the latter were nominally re-
sponsible to the civil power in the
person of the Secretary for War.
Queen Victoria, especially, cherished
the illusion of a special prerogative
of personal control of the army, and
this inevitably led to friction with
successive governments.
The point to be stressed here is
that the Sovereign and the army
were aligned in resisting constitu-
tIonal development on the vital issue
of ultimate responsibility for the
military forces, but, when pressed to
a deci"ion by a determined Cabinet,
they gave way without so much as
contemplating the use of force.
Political Interests
Lord Edward Cardwell, Prime Min-
ister WIlliam Gladstone's Secretary
for War, 1868-74, succeeded in abol-
ishing purchase, the' system which
permitted men of means to advance
in rank by buying commissions, He
did it only by the expedient of a
Royal Warrant and at the cost of
great personal unpopularity both in
the army and in conservative social
circles.
The protracted debate in the coun-
t1:Y and in Parliament revealed that
the officer cor p s could become in-
tensely political when its own inter-
ests were at stake. It is doubtful
whether the reform could have been
achieved without the government's
generous undertaking to recompense
the omcers affected. Nevertheless,
there was never the slightest pros-
pect that the officers would employ
force to overthrow Gladstone's gov-
November 1964
ernment. It must further be stressed
that the division, though extremely
bitter, was between progressives and
conservatives rather t han between
soldiers and politicians.
Conscription
Statesmen have Ion g recognized
that conscription is a potentially dan-
gerous basis of military organization
in countries where the government
does not stand on a broad, democratic
foundation. In the century succeed-
ing the Napoleonic Wars, Britain was
almost the only major power in, the
world to avoid soine measure of com-
pulsory service. It is noteworthy that
the European monarchies introduced
conscription only after decisive de-
feat in war-Prussia after Jena; Rus-
sia after the Crimean War; Austria
after 1866; and France after 1870.
As a rule, conscripts remain citi-
zens in uniform, receptive to un-
orthodox ideas from their homes and
elsewhere, and prone to be critical of
army life in general and of officers
in particular. The chances that a con-
script army will become politically un-
reliable are increased in war, partic-
ularly if casiialties are so great that
the officer corps also is heavily di-
lu ted with men from nonmilitary
backgrounds,
Even so, a further condition is nec-
essary before the army is likely to
turn against the government-namely,
demoralizing defeat on its own soil.
In this respect, Britain has been ex-
tremely fortunate compared with her
continental neighbors. It is' not diffi-
cult to imagine the revolutionary sit-
uations that would have been created
had tlie humiliating reverses in the
Crimea and South Africa been fol-
lowed up by invasion of the homeland.
In both the World Wars, the British
Army began with defeat and hasty
33
LIONS UNDER THE THRONE
retreat, and, but for the Royal Navy's
command of the Channel, Dunkirk
could have been the prelude to igno-
minious surrender, rather than an in-
spiration to redoubled effort and ul-
timate victory.
Reforms
If British Governments in the 19th
century managed to avoid introducing
conscription by relying on naval su-
premacy and isolation from continen-
tal alliances, they 'were equally suc-
cessful on the domestic scene in miti-
gating the of the masses
without, except on a few occasions
like Peterloo, resorting to the open
use of military force.
Marx' prediction of a relentless
class war was unrealized, partly by
the general improvement in the stand-
ard of living, but also by the un-
military character of the ruling class.
Social, political, and economic reforms
could have been delayed much longer
by a governing 'class resolutely com-
mitted to the use of force. A policy
of repression would have brought the
generals to the forefront of the polit-
ical arena, as it eventually did in Ire-
land.
This readiness to compromise was
shown by the actions of the Duke gf
Wellington, the one famous soldier
who did command political power.
Highly sensitive to the revolutionary
potential of the underprivileged class-
es, he employed his military prestige,
purely in the service of parliamentary
government, to urge important con-
cessions both in 1828 and 1832, rather
than risk a situation where the army
might have to intervene with unpre-
dictable consequences.
The First World War posed prob-
lems of military and civil organiza-
tion which had never occurred before,
and in particular brought out the
equ ivocal nature of the relationship
between the civil and military leaders.
The salient fact to be noted is
that when Britain entered the war
in 1914, Winston Churchill was the
only member of the Cabinet with prac-
tical military experience, and he had
been no more than a subaltern. The
important of this was
that the new War Minister, the taci-
turn and authoritarian Lord Kitch-
ener, was allowed vIrtually a free hand
to run the war, sO that after his
death in 1916 the Cabinet, with David
Lloyd George as Prime Minister, was
confronted with the enormously diffi-
cult task of asserting its authority
over the commanders in the field.
In the early years of the war, also,
the failure of the government to enun-
ciate a clear-cut strategy encouraged
the generals in France to intervene
in politics. The direction of military
policy had clearly reached a situation
bordering on anarchy when, in May
1915, the British commander in chief.
Sir John F r e n c h, attacked Lord
Kitchener by authorizing the military
correspondent of the Times, Colonel
Charles Repington, to publish detailS"
of the shell shortage in France. This
constituted, in the words of Robert
Blake, "the only deliberate attempt in
recent history on the part of a gen-
eral to upset the government of the
day." The actual effect of Sir John
French's political intriguing was, iron-
ically, to increase Kitchener's popu-
larity with the public.
The Struggle for Control
The details of the dispute between
generals and ministers which contin-
ued unresolved throughout the war is
beyond the scope of this article. The
root of the trouble, from Lloyd
George's point of view, was that the
most prominent generals in France
Military Review
34
were held in such high esteem by the
public that the insecure coalition gov-
ernment found it difficult to challenge
etrectively the assumptions on which
their day-to-day conduct of the war
were based.
French's successor as commander
in chief, Sir Douglas Haig, was par-
ticularly well protected by his con-
--...
r
'-- \
us Army
Undisputed control of British military
policy in World War II was vested in the
civilian Prime Mini 5 t er. Winston
Churchill
tacts with the Crown and his influ-
ence with certain newspapers. But,
although the struggle for control of
military policy was conducted with
passion and ruthlessness, it was never
posed in terms of the army against
the government. Haig and his col-
leagues had no desire to take upon
themselves the political responsibility
of government; the dispute was con-
cerned with the best way to win the
war.
In the light of undisputed civilian
control of British military policy in
the Second World War in the hands
of Sir, Winston Churchill, it is easy,
November 1984
but pointless, to condemn the attitude
of the generals in the First World
War. For political control to have
been fully effective, military assent to
the establishment of a comprehensive
command structure would have been
necessary before the outbreak of war.
The experience of almost a century
of delegating policy decisions to the
man on the spot, as was perfectly
sensible in colonial wars and, indeed,
obligatory before the development of
telegraph, proved too strong to be
wholly abandoned in peacetime.
The Absence of Conflict
The most striking consequence of
the conditions which have combined
to restrict the British Army's politi-
cal activity is, with the possible ex-
ception of the Ulster question, the
absence of any ideological conflict
since the revolution of 1688. The offi-
cer corps has never been forced to
take sides in politics as were French
officers during the Alfred Dreyfus af-
fair; neither has promotion been made
to depend on conformity with the
government's religious policy, as hap-
pened, after the Dreyfus affair under
the regime of General Louis Andre.
Again, in contrast to the Reichswehr,
the British Army's sense of political
mission was successfully translated
into imperialism, so that the army
has never considered itself the bul-
wark of the state in opposition to the
legally constituted government,
Only in the event of demoralizing
military defeat-and this seems un-
likely in the nuclear age, short of to-
tal devastation-or an economic ca-
tastrophe comparable to the "slump,"
in 1931, might military power en-
danger the liberties essential to con-
stitutional government. Due to a for-
'tunate and rare combination of the
conditions of a stable constitution, a
35
'LIONS UNDER THE THRONE
"
geographical situation necessitating ties, the B r i tis h Isles have not I
the maintenance of only a limited mil. experienced miHtary domination for
itary capacity, and a general identi almost three centuries. The generals,
fication of interests between the offi- like Sir Francis Bacon's judges, have
cer corps and the major political par- remained lions under the throne.
MIlITARY WRITING AWARD
To stimulate the creative development of professional military literature,
Books offers a $2,500 award for the most promising, unpublished book
manuscript of 40,000 or more words in English, submitted by 31 December 1965.
To be eligible for the award, a manuscript must be authored or coauthored by
an active duty or former member of the United States Armed Forces or of any
other country. by a member of the Reserve forces, by any present or former
civilian employee of any of the military services, or by any present or former
staff member of study, research, and planning organizations serving the military
services.
Any manuscr\pt of professional interest to military men and women is within
the scope of the award. Especially relevant will be manuscripts dealing with
strategy, tactics, weaponry, logistics, military and foreign policy, management.
leadership, science
t
the military role in space, technology, arms control, philosophy
and role of the military in a democracy, and history. The award will be given to
that manuscript which, in the judgment of the editors and their conSUltants, "
makes th" most significant contribution to military thinking and, life.
The $2,500 award consists of $1,000 outright and $1,500 advance on royalties.
The publisher has first option on all manuscripts submitted for the award and
may offer publishing contracts on any,
No entry blanks are needed. Each manuscript submitted should be typewritten,
double spaced, accompanied by a chapter outline and brief summary of the manu-
script, and a short biography of the author. Send manuscripts to Cameron and
Kelker Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105, to arrive not later than 31
December 1965.
Military Review
36
I
.Ii
AView of French Foreign Policy
Howard C. Reese
The views expressed in this arti-
cle are the author's and are not nec-
essarily those of the Department of
the Armll, Department of Defense,
or the U. S. Army Command and
General Staff Col/ege.-Editor.
F
REQUENT examination of the
foreign policies of friendly na-
tions is as necessary as the habitual
scrutiny of the foreign policies of hos-
tile states. This especially applies to
French foreign policy, because France
is one of our principal allies and yet
French aims seem so different from
those of the United States.
It is true that both France and the
United States basically share the same
objectives. Both want peace, not war;
both look toward the eventual recas-
sian of Soviet influence from central
and eastern Europe and the ultimate
defeat of communism; both want the
freedom of Western Eu-
rope. While these similarities should
be strong enough to override the dif-
ferences that do persist, it would be
unrealistic to ignore them.
France is an old and well-established
state whose seeds of national unity
go' back at least to the 14th century
and Joan of Arc. In making an as-
sessment of French policy, therefore,
the effects of history and the develop-
ment of French psychology over the
past six centuries must be taken into
account, In addition, we must consider
the style in which the policy is carried
out as currj!ntly reflected in the dyna-
mism of Charles de Gaulle.
November 1964 37
FOREIGN POLICY
It is of more than general interest
that the life of Charles de Gaulle.
president of the Fifth French Repub-
lic. spans the major political and mili-
tary developments of this century. Al-
ready a mature man when World War
I broke out, he served with distinction
as an -infantry officer. In World War II
his role varied-first as an armored
division commander. and subsequently
as Under Secretary of State for War
in the last Cabinet of the ill-fated
Third Republic. Later. in his capacity
as custodian of the integrity and sov-
ereignty of France. his tutelage as
Chief of State began.
The problems with which he had !to
deal need not be specified here. It is
enough to SaY that they were at least
proportionately greater than those
that faced Churchill and Roosevelt.
Neither the British nor the US leader.
for example. had to contest a spurious
and competing regime that collabo-
rated with the el/emy. Neither had to
think about raising combat forces in
occupied territory. The experience left
its mark on De Gaulle.
Characteristics
Because of his background. De
Gaulle's fixation with the greatness of
France is understandable. the content
of French history and the contribu-
tions of France to the world being
what they are. By tradition aristo-
cratic and conservative. De Gaulle. not
unnaturally. responds to the feelings
of patriotism and nationalism.
Howard C. Reese. a United States
Army Reserve officer, is an Operations
Research Analyst with the Research
Analysis Corporation. He received his
Ph. D. from New York University.
During World War 11. he was with
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expe-
ditionary Force. and served with the
Far East Command in the Korean
Conflict.
At the same time, it is also possible
for him to honor the heritage of the
French Revolution. which keeps him
within the limits of a republican frame
of government. This represents no
conflict for De Gaulle. for the heart
of his policy is the reconciliation of
disparate elements, whether they be
institutions or international events.
What emerges is a pragmatism that,
by its nature. seems more Anglo-
Saxon than French. It is illustrated
by the full circle De Gaulle took 'with
regard to colonialism hetween 1945
and 1960. Flexibility-a willingness to
change course-is characteristic of De
Gaulle. and cu rrent French policy re-
flects this flexibility.
Another of his characteristics is his
unemotional outlook toward commu-
nism. For De Gaulle. it matters little
whether a state is Communist. Such
an attitude shows his belief in the cor-
rectness of his policies. Like the Cath-
olic Church. De Gaulle takes a long-
term view, confident that his strategy
is sound.
Aims of French Policy
In general. there are three princi-
pal and interrelated aims of French"
policy:
The desire to be independent of
both the United States and the Soviet
Union.
The extension of French political.
economic, and cultural influence to
new regions.
Proposals of new formulas to
settle festering problems.
The French seek to be free of US
influence for both political and eco-
nomic reasons. Politically, so m e
sources attribute the French attitude
to dissatisfaction with American lead-
ership. Economically, the government
wants to keep ownership of French
industry in French hands. When this
Military Review
38
objective conflicts with tlle desire to
achieve a technological capability pos-
sible only by thE! admittance of foreign
capital, however, the French Govern-
ment is willing to waive its industrial
nationalism.
For obvious reasons, the French are
not inclined to subordinate themselves
to the Soviets.
Secure in the rectitude of French
aims and in the skill of French di-
plomacy to gain these goals, the
French believe that they are quite ca-
pable of setting their own course.
Whether France, a middle-sized power,
has the resources for such a program
is another matter.
To prove that they recognized the
symbol of international independence
in the 1960's, the French, at great
cost and using their own technological
means, constructed a nuclear deter-
rent. Thus, the primacy of French ob-
jectives has been asserted, notwith-
standing the physical and political
dangers attendant in nuclear prolifer-
ation.
European Unity
In the grand design of French pol-
icy, E u r 0 pea n unity-politically
speaking-is secondary. It is kept in
sight, however, with GaulIist concepts
of a loose confederation of states with
France playing the dominant role.
Meanwhile, emphasis is on expansion
of markets for French agricultural
and industrial goods.
Advantages and disadvantages ac-
crue from this independent policy, On
the plus side, this policy is the object
of some envy by Western European
countries. However friendly those
countries may be to the United States,
they admire the way France has
drawn hJrself away from American
political and economic influence to
make her own accomodation with Mos-
cow and Peking.
On the other hand, French policy
is criticized for the way it has weak-
ened the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) structure through
withdrawals of the French Fleet and
French officers from the NATO plan-
ning staff. The nationalism of French
policy is also lamented for the effect
it may have on the Germans. The
result has been a virtual isolation of
France from her traditional friends.
Furthering French Influence
Current French policy is certainly
aimed at furthering French influence
in regions hitherto deemed beyond the
limits of immediate French interests
-regions such as Latin America.
President de Gaulle in Mexico in
March 1964 showed his awareness of
the interplay of political, economic,
and cultural policies. As the warmth
of De Gaulle's reception in Mexico
revealed, France enjoys a high pres-
tige in Latin America which should
facilitate. the promotion of French ob-
jectives in that region.
In the developing countries gener-
ally, France demonstrates a keen rec-
ognition of the interaction of cultural
and economic programs that smooths
the way for political influence. To
those countries, France distributes a
higher rate of assistance per capita
(2.41 percent) than does the United
States (.97 percent) ; and the former
colonies of West Africa, for example,
recipients of large amounts of French
economic and technical assistance,
support France in the United Nations
and can usually be counted, upon to
lend active or tacit aid to most French
political objectives.
The motives for the underwriting
. of the Algerian economy, on the other
hand, are complex. Certainly, France
November 1964 39
FOREIGN POLICY
cannot expect J\lgerian support to the'
extent that she can anticipate the
backing of her former West African
colonies. In spending more to shore
up the Algerian economy than she de-
voted to fighting the Algerian war,
France has led Algeria to count on
continued French economic and tech-
nological help, a dependence that is
also true in education.
France maintains the diplomatic
initiative by offering' solutions to such
world problems as southeast Asia, and
in recommending structural changes
in organizations such as NATO.
French proposals to this effect, how-
ever, are more often vague than pre-
cise.
It is not clear, for example, what
France really means by neutralization
in southeast Asia-whether South or
North Vietnam should be neutralized
or both. Nor is France more definite
about what she wants in NATO apart
from a recommenl1lation made in 1958
that a directorate be set up consisting
of Britain, France, and the United
States to determine over-all strategy.
Admittedly, this lack of clarity has
the purpose of inviting special notice. ,
Future French Policy
The popularity of French foreign
policy with Frenchmen provides some
clues to what changes, if any, can be
expected when President de Gaulle
leaves office.
By and large, the French people ap-
the present foreign policy of
their government. For the first time
in more than a quarter of a centu ry,
they take pride in the prestige of their
government: Nevertheless, some quar-
ters worry lest the United States be
affronted by the sharpness in which
the independence of French policy is
expressed.
Curiously enough, the farther apart
this policy moves from the United
States, the higher the popular esteem
of Americans. A survey of popular
opinion conducted in late 1963 noted
that the United States was more fav-
orably regarded by the French people
than in previous years. In the late
1940's, by contrast, when the United
States was furnishing large amounts
of economic and military aid, anti-
Americanism prevaiYed to a consider-
able degree. .
Gaullist Influence
In my opinion, no matter who oc-
cupies the Elysee Palace after De
Gaulle, French policy will bear a
Gaullist stamp. Even Gaston Defferre,
the candidate who will oppose
dent de Gaulle in the next election,
accepts the essentials of present
French policy.
True, differences do exist. If Def-
ferre is elected, the nuclear striking
force will probably be assigned to a
European counterpart. Foreign aid,
the least popular component of French
policy, but, perhaps, that which re-
ceives the most careful attention of h
President de Gaulle, will be cut.
I believe France will resume
ties toward NATO. Conformity with
US policy will depend on the evolution
of the international political climate
and the degree of understanding be-
tween Washington and Paris in the
coming years.
The docility of the Fourth Republic
will not be repeated. Toward the
United States and the other states of
the Free World, France will continue
to be the "loyal opposition." Such is
the result of the economic and political
transformation of France in the post-
war world.
Military Review
40
THE FUTURE OF
THE FRENCH ARMY
General L. J. Le Puloch, French Army
A major change in French Army
organization and t act i c s has re-
sulted from a three-year study con-
ducted to determine the best meth-
ods of adapting that army to the
nuclear era. In this article, Gen-
eral Le Puloch describes the con-
clusions drawn from that study.-
Editor.
-
T
HE French Army of the future
must be ready to confront vari-
ous forms of aggression, both politi-
cal and military. This aggression
might be of a neoclassical form; with
nuclear weapons threatening selected
military objectives; or with nuclear
weapons without restriction.
November 1964
The aggressor could use nuclear weap-
ons from the outset, with or with-
out invasion. To confront all these
possibilities, the r e are those who
still profess that it is sufficient to
have one type of defense--the stra-
tegic nuclear force.
This theory of "all or nothing" is,
perhaps, useful between planets, but
it makes no sense for France within
This article was digested from'
a translation of the origina'l, pub-
lished in L'ARMEE (France) May
1964, under the title, "Avenir de
L'Armee de Terre."
General Le Puloch is Chief of
Staff of the French Army.
41
THE FRENCH ARMY
the foreseeable future. If one wishes,
to deter an aggressor, It is necessary
to have plausible and credible argu-
meaning geared to
the threat in whatever form it mani-
fests itself, and credible, meaning the
character to demonstrate our will and
intent and our willingness, if neces-
sary, to accept all the consequences
of our action. In this dialogue of de-
terrence, an appropriately configured
army is an irreplaceable argument.
In the case of aggression by grohnd
forces, only an army provided with
nuclear weapons is capable-whatever
the initial form of the aggression-
of reacting in a sufficiently flexible
and powerful manner to break the
initial thrust of the adversary. By
the judicious use of its nuclear weap-
ons, on the order of the government,
it would demonstrate that France is
ready to accept the risk of thermo-
nuclear war.
Nuclear Firepower
Only nuclear 'weapons will prevent
our forces from being submerged by
numbers. Nuclear fire is the element
of power most capable of rapid adap-
tation to the significance of the enemy
threat, if it is backed up by an ade-
quate array of other weapon systems.
Until the' development of the nu-
clear weapon, the firepower of ground
forces on the battlefield was dispersed
among many weapon systems, most
of which were of short range. The
art of maneuver consisted essentially
in movements which produced supe-
rior firepower-t hat is, troops-at
selected points. Then, through the
breach thus made in the enemy wall
of fire, one pushed troops in such a
manner as to ensure again a local
firepower superiority which, little by
little, led to the physical 0; moral
destruction of the opposing forces.
The relative weakness of firepower
resulted in a close confrontation of
forces.
The development of nuclear fire,
together with the decreasing neces-
sity for volume of fire implicit in
nuc1ellr warheads, has brought a rev-
olution in tactics. Nuclear fire per-
mits the destruction of any military
unit, provided that one k now sits
nature and posture with a certain
degree of precision. The theoretical
conditions of destruction of the ad-
versary promulgated by Joachim du
BeJlay thus become more simple. "If
one knows what the enemy is doing
.. would now be stated, "If
one knows where the enemy is, one
can destroy the enemy."
It is, therefore, around nuclear
firepower that forces must be orga-
nized.
Answers to Questillns
We must concentrate on answering
two questions: Where is the enemy?
When and where will his forces be
the most vulnerable to nuclear fire?
The major elements of our forces
must be organized to respond to these
questions. In addition, we must have
a capability for acquiring necessary
intelligence about an enemy force,
and for delaying initial enemy
thrust until we can bring in our nu-
clear fires.
Thus, the battle will be reduced to
an exchange of nuclear fires, inter-
spersed with pauses during which
each adversary seeks to learn the
posture of the opponent by using all
available intelligence sources.
Once engaged, and provided the nu-
clear arsenals are sufficiently large,
the battle will rapidly reach a crisis.
Losses will be such that the engaged
forces, particularly those which are
the most vulnerable to detection, will
Military Review 42
be put out of action in a very short
period of time-within several hours
or, at the most, several days. Only
a large number of forces dispersed
in great depth can permit such a
battle to be sustained.
Whichever country will not or can-
not commit the required large forces,
or does not possess foom for their
deployment, cannot usefully prepare
..$:
COv.rt!'811 FreJlrb Army
The A/DueUe 111, a light utility helicopter
for a sustained nuclear battle. Bat-
tle no longer has as its purpose vic-
tory by the destruction or capitula-
tion of the enemy at'med forces. A
battle has no other purpose than to
force an enemy to reveal his inten-
tions unequivocally and to convince
him by a most decisive riposte that
his opponent is prepared to accept
the risks of thermonuclear war. By
this kind of decisive action, the ag-
gressor could well be persuaded from
pursuing his purpose.
i .
L:vember 1964
Maneuver Forces
With maneuver forces constructed
around the nuclear weapon, the dis-
tinctionbetween"classicalforces"and
"nuclear forces" becomes arbitrary.
It would be a pity, however, if, de-
.prived of nuclear weapons, the ma-
neuver forces would lose their effec-
tiveness; the circumstances may be
such that a delay is involved before
the use of nuclear weapons is author-
ized. The maneuver forces must be
able to operate in lesser situations
without having recourse to their nu-
clear weapons.
Our maneuver forces in the com-
ing years will be mobile for all types
ofterrain,andcertainofthem,thanks
to the helicopter, will be air mobile.
They will be furnished with many
different target acquisition means,
both electronic and others, and will
have good medium and low-level air
defense. Mostofthemwillbe armored
for maximum protection against the
effects of nuclear explosions. Those
which are not armored will be capa-
ble of rapidly digging in. Their fire-
power, particularly antitank, will be
potent-and will enable them to fight
in small dispersed units.
And because it is no longer pos-
sible to count upon considerable time
in which to mobilize. the maneuver
f o r ~ s integrated into NATO's cover-
ing units will be held permanently at
100-percentstrength; thoseforces de-
ployed in the national territory wi1l
be maintained at 80-percent strength.
These are the forces which, about
1970, will employ the army's nuclear
weapons. At the same time, they will
also have some conventional capabili-
ti_ - .
Maneuver forces, either integrated
into NATO's covering sereen or
placed in national reserve, constitute
43
"
THE FRENCH ARMY
only one m a j 0 r component of the
French Army. Territorial de fen s e
forces also play a major role in our
organization.
The yield and range of weapons,
as well as the great dispersion of the
forces involved, require that the bat-
tlefield be hundreds of kilometers in
depth. One of the missions of the
territorial defense forces is to guar-
antee the security of the rear against
enemy incurs.ions all varietiei-
gions will be charged with this type
of combat. Commando groups and
commando-type training of the units
concerned will provide the capabil-
ity. The reorganization and simplifi-
cation of the mobilization procedures,
and the improvements in the reserve
training programs, now underway,
w:i1I permit the rapid organization of
reserve formations.
We recognize that defense forces,
willing to fight and capable of. pro-
L'Armee
The AMX 3D-ton tank
land, air, or sea-as well as against
the subversive activities which will
accompany those incursions. Included
in this mission is the protection of
sensitive z 0 n e s, particularly those
where strategic nuclear weapon sys-
tems are deployed.
If. France is invaded, the' territo-
rial defense forces must be capable
-as a result of their organization,
armament.. logistics, and training-
of operating as guerrilla forces. The
local defense units within the sub-
divisions of the military regions-
usually one regiment in a subdivision
-as well as the active and reserve
defense brigades of the military re-
longing national constitute
one of the principal elements of de-
terrence.
Intervention Force
Maneuver forces and territorial de-
fense forces comprise that portion of
the French Army which has the mis-
sion of guaranteeing national sover-
eignty. In addition, the army furnishes
units, maintained at lOO-p ere e n t
strength, to a national intervention
force which is capable of interveninf
wherever and whenever French in-
terests or commitments require, par-
ticularly in tho s e African nations
with which France has defense agree-
ments.
Military Review ,
44
Composed of army, navy, and air
force elements, the intervention force
always has a portion of its strength
stationed overseas to protect vit!\l air-
bases, ports, and logistical installa-
tions. The army units assigned to the
two of which are. parachute, for the
national intervention force.
Nine territorial brigades.
The overseas forces.
In the event of mobilization, this
number could be raised to nearly
The la-ton AMX is to be replaced by a vehide with an eight-ton chassis
intervention force are equipped with
conventional arms, and are composed
largely of infantrymen. But these in-
fantrymen are air mobile, many are
parachute trained, and others know
of amphibious operations.
Although deSigned for immediate
foreign intervention, the intervention
force is also capable, in case of a
conllict in Europe, of performing the
mission of maneuver forces and of
acting as intelligence detachments in-
sipe enemy formations.
Total army forces have been fixed
at 350,000 men organized into:
Two army corps of five mecha-
nized divisions for the maneuver
forces.
One division of three brigades,
November 1964
750,00() men in approximately three
days. The majority of the men mo-
bilized would go to the territorial
forces and would constitute reserve
brigades and regiments.
This is the plan for 1970. How
will it be accomplished?
It would be useless to deny that
the national strategic nuclear force
exercises a heavy pressure against
the bud get. But the possession of
such a force is necessary for a coun-
try which wishes to play its own role
in the general strategy of the 'lVorid.
Furthermore, indirectly, the develop-
ment of' techniques and the produc-
tion of strategic nuclear armament
considerably increase the army's value.
Therefore, it has been planned that
45
THE FRENCH ARMY
the quality of army personnel, like
that of materiel, will never be sacri-
ficed to numbers and that the dif-
ferent elements composing the army
will retain the character of a dynamic
the already contradictory imperatives
of universality (of which parentheti-
cally France will soon be the sole
practitioner); of efficiency (because
of what use is a poorly instructed
Courte8U French Annll
French mountain troops
corps capable of evolution. Nonethe-
lesS, this program will not be easily
realized. There are many pitfalls, one
of the most apparent of which is mili-
tafY service.
Reduced to a total of 620,000 men,
the armed forcel! after 1966 will be
unable to absorb the 310,000 men eli-
gible annually for universal compul-
sory service of 18 months. A formula
must be found which will reconcile
and inefficient army); and of less
costly training (because a high degree
of assurance is always costly).
We continue to believe that the
best solution to the problem is the
18 months' service-universal in prin
ciple, but selective in practice; with-
out deferment-but with the possi-
bility of release from service two or
three months early.
We must also continue to recruit
M!litary Review
46
volunteers, some 16,000 each year, if
we do nbt ~ i s to increase the al-
ready considerable number of trainees
and if we wish to put an end to wast-
ing training fun d s inherent in the
present scarcity of volunteers, who,
in 1963, numbered only about 3,600.
In an attempt to rna k e military
service more attractive, certain steps
have been taken to enhance the pres-
tige of the noncommissioned officers.
A national school for noncommissioned
officers has been created at Saint-
Maixent to indoctrinate student non-
commissioned officers fro m all the
services. In addition, a three-year
school for technical noncommissioned
officers has bee n established at Is-
soire.
But the project which seems to pre-
sent the greatest interest for the non-
commissioned officers is the planned
creation of a corps of technician offi-
cers which will further open to them
the door to commissioned ranks.
Recruiting
All these measures, to which should
be added those of more immediate im-
pact such as the increase of recruit-
ment and reenlistment bonuses, are be-
ginning to give results. The departure
of noncommissioned officers with 10 to
15 years' service is slowing up while
recruitment is increasing. In the first
quarter of 1964, the number of en-
listments has been from 60 to 65 per-
cent higher than that for the corre-
sponding period in 1963.
We are still far from the 4,000
every quarter which are needed. But,
however annoying the s e difficulties
may be, we could not expect that they
would be alleviated before we under-
took the considerable training effort
which we needed to master the tech-
niques and the tactics of today and,
even more so, to prepare ourselves
November 1964
to follow tomorrow's rapid evolution.
For the past 20 years, the greater
part of the French Army was trained
in Indochina and Algeria, in a partic-
ularly unpleasant form of war. That
army had neither the time nor the
desire to think of the problems of a
future war in Europe or, more pre-
cisely, of a nuclear war. For that task,
it relied entirely on its allies.
It has been necessary, therefore, to
create a current of thought, to excite
curiosity and criticism. G r 0 ups 'of
French tactical students have been de-
voting themselves for three years to
this task, and, from the progress they
Truppendtenst
The Entac, an antitank missile
have made, we are justified in think-
ing they have not wasted their time...
Officer Education
It has also been necessary to lift the
sights of our young officers beyond the
field of battle of a psychological war
toward other disciplines, such as social
and technical sciences. The res u Its
have been more than we hoped. These
warriors of the jungles who dreamed
of nothing but swamps and forests-
and who had plenty of those-threw
themselves with the same ardor and
the same intelligence into t his new
field of activity.
This enthusiasm in scientific educa-
tion and its success permit us to ex-
pect that, irl the years to come, we
will receive an average of 15 doctors
9r masters in the sciences each year.
On such volunteers the army can ex-
pect to base solid hopes.
47
'THE FRENCH ARMY
Nevertheless, given all that, we will
not succumb to the slogan of the
button war. We believe that, for a
long time to come, the virtues of the
fighting man will have their place in
war. To face the nuclear menace, it is
necessary that combat soldiers be ani-
mated with a willingness to fight to
the end, despite the extreme physical
and psychological stresses they will
undoubtedly encounter. Eve r yon e,
whoever he may be' and wherever he
may be, must be prepared for a war
of survival
To produce this physical and moral
toughness, commando training seems
to offer the greatest possibilities. Such
must be from now on the basic train-
ing of the nghter, and for that reason
the organization of commando train-
ing centers is going forward. This
training also requires of all-particu-
larly from officers and noncommis-
sioned officers-sustained physical con-
ditioning and a to set the
example. All infantry forces, includ-
ing territorial infantry forces, are
going to be trained in this manner.
The Infantry
The good old infantry, the fallen
queen of battle that every Frenchman
knows or believes he knows, has sur-
vived. But on today's battlefield and
that of tomorrow, the little group of
men with the power which modern
light armament gives them can play
a vital role only if they have been
to survive and to fight, iso-
lated, perhaps, in an enemy milieu.
Certainly, the commando t r a i n i n g
they will r e c e i v e will not exclude
any of the needed technical training-
electronics, rocket ballistics, radar op-
eration, communications, and televi-
sion.
If all this is costly, it is also simple.
It is merely a question of planmng
with a strict regard to efficiency and
economy. What is essential is to give
to oijr troops the spirit to face the
cyclone of nuclear war and to fight to
the end. That is the essence of deter-
rence.
Materiel
The army pllln foresees the coordi
nated development of the means for
nuclear fires and of the mechanized
and armored systems required t'1 em
ploy nuclear fires. As far as mecha
nized and armored equipment is con
cerned, the principal materials are
either already in being or far ad-
vanced in study.
The 30-ton tank is the heart of the
armored system, and it appears to be
one of the best, if not the best, of the
tanks of its generation. It will be ca-
pable of incorporating important im
provements such as, the telemetering
laser and rapid missile launchers. It
appears that this family of armor will
not be outdated before 1975.
The standard chassis of the 13ton
AMX tank (MR, Aug 1963, p 103)
will be followed by an eight-ton am
phibious chassis. In tests, the mockup"
argues well for its employment both
as a combat tank and'as a troop trans-
port. The rocket launchers and the
antitank missiles are excellent, and
their guidance systems, weight, and
payload are constantly being improved.
The Alouette II and III helicopters
remain in service as liaison, observa ..
tion, and reconnaissance v e hie I e s.
Their employment in an antitank
can give good results in certain com
bat situations.
The maneuver helicopter, Alouelte
IV, will fly at t,he end of 1965. It has
a carrying capacity of one and one
half tons, a maximum speed of 300 ,
kilometers per hour, and an all
Military Review
48
'feather capability. Maneuverable and
cap a b I e of self-propulsion on the
ground with its rotor stopped, it will
furnish the means of rapid movement
in the combat. zone. In particular, it
will facilitate counteraction against
deep armor penetrations by putting
infantry antitank commandos ahead
of the thrust.
Air Defense
Air defense will be accomplished at
medium altitudes by Hawk missiles
and at low altitudes by "clear weath-
er" (temps clair) missiles-whose pro-
totype is expected in 1966-and by the
double-barreled 30-millimeter gun on
the AMX chassis.
Thus, as far as the concept and the
creation of types of materiel are con-
cerned, the army's plan is capable of
coherent development. The tactical nu-
clear arms and mechanized forces sys-
tem will definitely take its form about
1970, and will develop its full power
between then and 1975. A proposed
law, which will be submitted to Par-
liament this year, will put in concrete
form this plan of development.
The 11th division and its support-
Ing elements, w hie h constitute the
army's component of the national in-
tervention force, will retain its pres-
ent form, receiving only minor im-
provements between now and 1970.
The active territorial forces will be
almost completely organized by the
end of 1964, and will be progressively
equipped with appropriate arms and
other equipment.
Such are the prospects which the
next 10 years offer the French Army.
We wish that the delay in creating a
modern ground force could be shorter.
We wish that this force could be more
numerous. But the realization of a
national strategic force demands this
price, and France must have this in-
strument of' power which alone can
secure her place in the general strat-
egy of the world.
The practice of deterrence, however,
demands a more complex arsenal. Tac-
tical for c e s equipped with nuclear
arms are an indispensable complement
to the national strategic force. And
for a continental country like France,
the army remains irreplaceable. For
national survival, it is essential.
November 1964
49
THE FUTURE Of
THE ~ R E N H NAVY
Rear Admiral M. Y. de Bazelaire, French Navy
T
HE French armed forces are in
a period of change. Government
decisions have brought a reorienta-
tion in outlook and ideas which have
been expressed in important changes
in the structure of these forces.
Despite the profound changes which
25 centuries of sea warfare have
brought, the four essential missions
of a navy are the same today as at
the time of the Salamis Battle. With-
out assigning any order of priority
thes'e missions are:
To protect the sea_ communica-
tions of the country.
To attack enemy commerce.
To defend the country's coasts.
To provide a force whereby war
can be carried to the enemy.
The missions are everlasting, al-
though the form in which these mis-
sions are carried out varies with stra
tegic conditions and the means avail
able. which are in a state of perpetual
evolution.
The various types of ships which
constitute a major fleet can be uti'
lized for a variety of missions as the
need requires. This applies to air
era f t carriers. destroyers. frigates.
submarines. minesweepers. or landing
craft.
The ideal fleet is one with the prop-
er balance of ships and equipment
necessary to execute all of its various
This article was translated and
digested from the original. pub-
lished in the REVU!':' DE DEFENSE
NATIONALE (France) July 1961;.
under the title, "Les Missions de
La Marine."
Military Review
50
missions. But we know only too well
that the cost of such a fleet is a
limiting factor. Moreover, in addition
to pur ely military considerations,
there are those of a political, techni-
cal, or industrial nature which com-
plicate the problem even more.
LongRange Planning
Since the means and the objectives
are constantly changing and there are
always delays in the construction and
development of instruments of naval
'power, the formulation of a naval pro-
gram is all the more difficult. Long-
range plans, taking into account in-
numerable factors, must be made so
that vessels are up to date at the
time they are put into service.
In October 1958 directives we r e
issued which outlined the general de-
velopment of the armed forces. Forces
were to be organized in such a man-
ner as to be able to "strike, inter-
vene, and survive." The first of these
concepts implied the possession of a
strike force to be augmented later by
amphibious units; the second called
for a naval-land-air task force; and
the third implied in principle the or-
ganization of a territorial surface de-
fense.
For the navy, the outlines were
broad-a seagoing naval force con-'
structed around two or three aircraft
carriers, including escort vessels, sub.
marines, and appropriate logistic and
amphibious means. \
Shortly thereafter, the chief of the
general staff of the arm e d forces
specified in particular that the "strike
force" would be a nuclear force. But,
strangely enough, the nuclear subma-
rine, by virtue of its also being a
missile launcher, was to find its place
within the intervention force and not
in the strike force.
In 0 c t 0 b e r 1960 the directives
were changed. It had become neces-
sary to take various factors into ac-
count-the results of the French nu-
clear tests; the changes in France's
overseas territories; and the extreme-
ly high cost of the new weapon sys-
tems. It had been anticipated from
the beginning that the cost would be
high, but estimates had already be-
come much higher.
Deter, Intervene, Defend
France's outlook had changed; her
military views were rev i sed. She
abandoned her traditional military
policy, a policy which had sought
strength in mass and numbers and
which she had pursued for over a
century. In the directives that now
were issued, the "strike, intervene, and
survive" of October 1958 became "de-
ter, intervene, and defend."
Much has been said and written
on the subject of deterrence, and I
b
am not going to reopen the debate.
As far as the armed forces are con-
cerned, the government has made a
clear decision on this issue. But I
should like to point out that the con-
cept of deterrence, a little hazy in
same minds, is not simple and con-
stant. It varies from one promoter
of the idea to the other. Therefore,
it has profoundly changed with time.
From 1945-the year of the Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki bombs-to 1949,
the United States as the sole posses-
sor of the nuclear weapon had a posi-
tion of unquestioned power. It was
the period of a deterrent which some
people, undoubtedly with exaggera-
tion, considered absolute and others
preferred to call unilateral.
To consider, however, the posses-
. sion of the nuclear bomb the only
criteria in the balance sheet of the
Nmmber 1964
51
\
F ~ E N H NAVY
opposing power was to s imp I i f y ,
nificance of this lead was diminish-
things to the extreme. The Soviet
Union's superiority in conventional
NATO Letter
The Clemenceau, one of France's three
aircraft carriers
forces and her more favorable stra-
tegic position in Europe counterbal-
anced to a significant degree the ini-
tially modest stock of nuclear bombs
in the other camp.
Then, in 1949 the Soviets exploded
a nuclear weapon. This came as a big
surprise to the United States which
knew that preparations were being
made but did not expect the event to
take place so soon. To be sure, the
United States still had a comfortable
lead in numbers, but the political sig-
ing.
The race for power was marked by
other stages which excited worldwide
interest. In 1952 it was the United
States high-yield nuclear explosion.
One year later, the Soviets demon-
strated to the world that they were
no longer lagging behind the Ameri-
cans in the field of technology by ex-
ploding their first hydrogen bomb.
This event opened the period of what
is called the mutual deterrent, where
the adversaries were fully aware of
the enormous damage the employment
of these weapons could cause in ei-
ther camp. The potential usefulness
of the deterrent was, therefore, para-
lyzed.
The Graduated Deterrent
With the miniaturization of bombs
and the realization of tactical nuclear
weapons, the theory of the graduated
deterrent was evolved. It envisaged
the use of tactical nuclear weapons,
hoping that war with these weapons
could be confined to the battlefield
while the strategic weapons were kept
in reserve. One might wonder whether
this is only wishful thinking. Witlj,
the panoply of nuclear weapons avail-
able, it is difficult to. determine those
uses which will not degenerate into
a total war.
What position is France going to
take in this game of deterrence?
When France decided to endow her-
self with nuclear arms, it was ob-
vious that, because of the cost in-
volved, she would not be able to build
up an arsenal comparable to that of
the United States or the Soviet Union.
Consequently, she was satisfied with
a more modest deterrent, one called
proportional, based on the theory that,
in order to impress an enemy, one
does not need a "bludgeon" capable
Military Review
52
of crushing him, but only enough
power to be able to inflict damage
greater than the benefit he can hope
to gain from an attack.
From this theory it is possible to
conclude that there are certain con-
stant factors of a deterrent. For ex-
these weapons will be used. In view
of the number and the variety of
means the enemy has for the delivery
of his thermonuclear b 0 m b s, it is
clear that a modest supply of these
weapons cannot pose a threat to the
enemy's nuclear delivery capabilities
France recognizes the threat posed by the large Soviet submarine fleet
ample, it is necessary actually to pos-
sess a powerful weapon. In an era
of well-organized intelligence services,
a bluff would be childish, possibly fa-
tal. Moreover. the adversary must be
convinced that this weapon will be
used when it is required. Too, the
factor of credibility comes into play.
The threat must be serious and plau-
sible in the eyes of the adversary.
The aim is not to convince oneself,
but to intimidate the enemy.
Another conclusion which may be
drawn concerns the fashion in"which
November 1964
-airfields. missile sites, and missile-
carrying ships. Therefore, the coun-
terforce strategy is not for us; the
only formula which can be applied in
ou r case is that of the anticity ri-
poste.
It follows that the list of poten-
tial objectives will be based on indus-
trial and population centers, and that
the minimum threat capable of deter-
ring must be determined and realized.
These factors have defined the first
two generations of the national stra-
tegic nuclear force.
To this end, in the, plans and, bud-
53
F.RENCH NAVY
gets of the armed forces, the gov-
Ilrnmllnt accorded priority to every-
thing which concerned the atom and
its exploitation. This priority leads
us to calculate other expenditures as
closely as possible and might force
us to curtail expenses on other proj-
ects.' This point deserves some com-
ment. Constituting a strategic force
obviously reaches deep into the fields
of technology, industry, and finance,
and implies, above, all, the
ment of a specialized infrastructure.
Thus, to have the enriched uranium
necessary for the reactors of subma-
rines (among other things), it was
necessary to build the isotope separa-
tion plant at Pierrelatte. This is like
having to build a dock to lay down an
escort vessel. It was also important
that this be done quickly. Once a ba-
sic policy is established, priority in
the allocation of budgets follows.
Other Needs ..
But this prior,ity does not altogeth-
er eliminate other requirements, be-
cause the deterrent does not necessar-
ily resolve all problems. There may
be conflicts in which nuclear weapons
may not or should not be employed,
and it would be a paradox to have
this nuclear power and not to have
other operational forces which would
allow us to meet such situations.
Moreover, we have defense agree-
ments with some French-speaking
states in Africa that can call on us
for help. Recent examples in inter-
national politics have shown the ef-
fectiveness of intervention outside
the mother country by naval forces
adapted to such missions. And there
are also our duties vis-a-vis commer-
cial navigation under our flag.
We have learned that the Soviets
have a fleet of submarines which is
without precedent in history. The ap-
pearance of new models indicates'
that they have enlarged and perfec-
ted this naval force. An increasing
number of these vessels have a mis-
sile-Iaunching capability, and this na-
val threat is recognized by everybody.
In a recent speech delivered before
the US Congress, Secretary of De-
fense Robert S. McNamara pointed
out that the United States has no ef-
fective defense against m iss i Ie s
launched by enemy submarines. He
stated that the best possibility <>f an
active defense against this threat lies
in US detection and tracking systems
and the destruction of the submarines
before they can launch their mis:liles.
He further stated that the ships, air-
craft, and submarines of the antisub-
marine forces of the US Navy must
assure this defense.
The French General Staff is quite
aware of the necessities and respon-
sibilities which arise on that account.
But one readily appreciates the diffi-
culty of adapting plans to the actual
needs and modern techniques in a
budgetary context which is far from
following a comparable evolution.
Those of our forefathers who, u'l;
der the second empire, saw the change
from the sail to the'steamboat,
the sadness of giving up the beauti-
ful maneuvers which manifested the
naval spirit of which they were so
proud. They knew indignation when
they saw their skies and bridges cov-
ered with smoke, but they also experi-
enced the feeling of having an instru-
ment in which they could have com-
plete confidence.
,
The evolution which we know is no
less because it has a different nature.
We want to believe that France will
be able to keep a place for her navy
which can never be touched without
risk or misfortune.
Military Review
54
Collection and Dissemination
of Scientific Information
Major Ray M. Dowe, Jr., United States Army
A
s NEVER before, the collection
and dissemination of basic sci-
entific research, particularly that with
militarY application, is receiving in-
creasing attention from many sources.
The impact on our national posture
of the success or failure of our basic
scientific research programs is only
too apparent when we consider the
contributions of yesterday's basic re-
sea r chin atomics, electronics, bio-
physics, and radiation to our military
power today.
The Soviets, too, are well aware of
the military significance of the scien-
tific race. A well-known Soviet mili-
tary analyst has said:
Modern military affairs can be built
on a firm scientific basis, they must
develop constantly, move forward, be
, SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
supplemented with ever new data. Pro-
vision for future war can be made
only by using the aggregate of the
data of all the sciences. From this
standpoint mil ita r y affairs are in
greater need of deep scientific foun-
dations than any other sphere of man's
social activities.
scientific campaign is as inter-
related with contemporary actions on
the economic, political, and military
fronts as are the land, sea, and air
campaigns of an active military op-
eration.
Minimize Waste
But mankind is learning things so
fast that it is becoming more and
more difficult simply to store infor-
mation so that it can be found when
needed. Even today, not finding in-
formation cosb the United States un-
necessary expenditures of well over
a billion dollars a year and, addition-
ally, involves irrecoverable expendi-
tures of time and brainpower.
Consider, for qxample, the case five
years ago when US experts struggled
with the mathematics of an electronic
switching problem vital to military
communications. It was not until they
had solved the problem that they dis-
covered the very same problem and
solution in a Soviet periodical which
had been published in 1950.
Such waste can be minimized only
if the latest data-worldwide and per-
tinent to his field of endeavor-is con-
Major Ray M. Dowe, Jr., a graduate
of the 1963-64 Regular Course of the
U. S. Army Command and General
Staff College, received his M.S. degree
in Nuclear Physics from the Univer-
sity pf Alabama. He has served in
various assignments, including Korea.
Major Dowe is presently with the Ad-
vanced Researc/t Projects Agency, Di-
rector of Defense Research and En-
gineering, Department of Defense.
tinuously made available to the work-
ing scientist. A significant difference
between the two centers of world pow-
er in the efficiency of their collection
and dissemination of baSic research
with military applications today could
well provide one with a decisive weap-
on five years ahead of the other.
No Simple Problem
The problem of scientific informa-
tion collection and dissemination is
not a simple one. The contemporary
progress of science and
bot h as to complexity and rate, is
without precedent in the his tor y
of mankind. These g rea t scientific
achievements are reflected in an ava-
lanche of technical project reports and
scientific articles in scholarly journals.
Today, a research worker can hope to
accumulate only a fraction of the vast
intellectual treasure of knowledge per-
tinent to this field without retrieval
assistance from an information source.
And total retrieval' is becoming vir-
tually impossible, according to A. 1.
Mikhailov, Director of the Institute
of Scientific Information of the USSR
Academy of Sciences (VINITl).
Some 15 years ago, Dr. Vannevar
Bush, then head of the wartime Of"
fice of Scientific Research and Devel-
opment, pointed out' that the means
we were using to thread through the
maze of the then contemporary scien-
tific knowledge to the momentarily im-
portant item had not changed from
the means that were used in the days
of the square-rigged ships-that this
knowledge was not generally consult-
ed but only nibbled at by a very few.
When Dr. Bush made this state-
ment, almost all significant scientific
work was being published in the Eng-
lish, German, French, and Italian lan-
guages. Today, there are more scien-
tific journals in R u s s ian than in
Military Review
56
German, more in Japanese than in
French, and more in Chinese than in
Italian. Today. too, there are between
50,000 and 100,000 technical journals
-plus as man y technical reports-
published in more than 60 languages
throughout the world. To complete a
The Soviets are well aware of the mili
tary significance of the scientific race
description of the problem, the im-
measurable but ever-increasing com-
plexity of the content of these publi-
cations must be considered.
US Organization
Since November 1957 the focal point
of centralized scientific structure in
the United States has been vested in
the Office of the President. No final
commitment has yet been made be-
tween a pluralistic scientific structure
and a monolithic political control of
science, the so-called "scientific anar-
chy." C e r t a i n I y, from a historical
viewpoint. the former has and will
continue to prevail in the Un i ted
States.
Within the Office of the President,
a tripartite scientific structure has
November 1964
evolved which has many characteris-
tics of an ideal scientific organization:
The President's Science Advisory
Committee represents the scientific
community in general and the univer-
sities in particular.
The Federal Council of Science
and Technology is constituted by rep-
resentatives of all scientific agencies
in the Government.
The Office of Science and Tech-
nology provides a staff and headquar-
ters for the Special Assistant to the
President for Science who, in turn,
holds positions in all three structures.
In November 1957, when James R.
Killian was appointed Special Assist-
ant, a somewhat functional organiza-
tion of bas i c research support was
simultaneously evolving, based in four
principal agencies:
The National Science Founda-
tion (NSF), supporting basic research
and education in the sciences, and pri-
marily focused on the civilian scien-
tific community.
The Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC).
The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA).
The Department of D e fen s e
(DOD) w hie h supervises-through
the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering-the Chief of Research
and Development of the Army, the
Research and Development Command
of the Air Force, the Office of Naval
Research, and several defense-wide
agencies.
Flow of Data
A natural consequence of this or-
ganization for basic research support
is a tendency toward functional com-
partmentalization of the flow of scien-
tific data. Several specific organiza-
tions 0 per ate the most significant
information services.
57
SGIENTIFIC INFORMATION -
TheDODoperatestheDefenseDoc-
umentation Center (DDC)-formerly
the Armed Services Technical Infor-
mation Agency-to collect reports of
the results of the research and de-
velopment programs of the DOD and
to make this information available to
defenSe laboratories and contractors.
The Department of Commerce op-
erates an agency known as the Office
of Technical Services (OTS). This
agency has been charged by legisla-
tion .to make available, to industry
and the public, scientific and techni-
cal information derived from the pro-
grams of all Government agencies. In
addition, OTS is also a national, and,
in certain respects, an international,
clearinghouse for all scientific and
technical translations that are avail-
able, generatedeitherwithin theGov-
ernment or by private organizations.
The Office of Science Information
Service of the NSF has Government-
wide and national responsibility for
coordinating activities in this field.
TheAECandtheNASAarerespon-
siblefordisseminating,insofaraspos-
sible, the results of their programs
to the industrial community and the.
public, The operating agency ofAEC,
known as the Division of Technical
Information, is located at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee. TheTechnical Information
Division of NASA is located at the
Goddard Space Flight Center, Mary-
land.
An of these agencies are concerned
directly with processing information
generated under their sponsorship.
They also -procure and translate, as
required, pertinent technical.informa-
tion from all available sour ces-
sources which include the thousands
of journals of the various scientific
societiesofforeigncountriesandcom-
mercially published technical journals
and books.
Information Centers
At the working level, ther e are
over 250 specialized scientific infor-
mation centers <;lperated by Govern-
ment and industry. Almost two-thirds
of these are operated by the Govern-
ment-m0 st Iy by DOD, AEC, and
NASA. A recent US Government re-
portcitingthe growth ofUS Govern-
ment scientific information centers
stated:
There has been continued growth
in the number and use of specialized
information centers both within the
Government's own laboratories and
also through support by some Govern-
ment agencies of information centers
in subjectareas ofparticularinterest.
...The Department ofDefense leads
o(her agencies in the number of spe-
cialized informatibn centers receiving
support, with approximately 100 now
functioning in their fields of compe-
tence and disseminating evaluated,
condensed 'state of the art' reports.
DOD plans to bring these information
centers into a more effectively coor-
dinated network in which there will...
be improved coverage of the major
_ scientific and technical disciplines of
direct interestto theDepartment. The
National Institute of Health is plan-
ning for a program ofspecialized in-
formation evaluation centers. . _ .
Criticalreviews, general-purpose sum-
mary monographs, and similar selec-
tive digests w0 u Id be produced by
each evaluation center. Similarly, the
Atomic Energy Commission has aI,
ready established more than a dozen
such centers at its national labora-
tories, including two within recent
months, 0 ne for radiation shielding
andone for nuclearsafety. Additional
information centersare being planned
Military Review
58
by other agencies to cover a wide va-
riety of scientific and technical areas
in depth.
soviet Union Organization
In the Soviet Union, research in the
natural and technical sciences has al-
ways been considerably ahead of its
application. So vie t nonmilitary re-
search is organized into three basic
categories-the Academy of Sciences
and its institutes, plus the republic
academies of sciences and bra n c h
academies (basic research); branch
specialist research institutes (applied
research) ; and industrial laboratories
(applied and engineering research).
On the all-union level, the Academy
of Sciences is directly subordinate
only to the Council of Ministers. On
other levels, the academies are subor-
dinate to the corresponding ministries
and government committees.
The work of the research institutes
and bureaus is coordinated by the
State Scientific and Technical Com-
mittee of the Council of Ministers
and by similar committees at the re-
public level. In addition to providing
scientific and technical information,
these committees formulate the pro-
gram of their operating groups.
In practice, however, there is little
or no coordination, since not even the
appropriate state scientific and tech-
nical committee has the right to issue
decrees and directives; it functions,
rat her, through "consultations and
recommendations." Further, the com-
mittee does not control the finance
and supply functions which are tied
up in, other cumbersome and bureau-
cratic organizations.
The various institutes' work plans
are not examined by their commit-
tees. Examination is accomplished by
the corresponding institutes of the
Academy of Sciences or its subordi-
NDvember 1964
nate branches, and Soviet scientists
frequently complain about the need to
approach the central offices on every
question. The fact that research in-
stitutes are so cut off from produc-
tion has contributed significantly to
the lag between research and its appli-
cation in the Soviet Union. At the
May 1958 plenary session of the Cen-
tral Committee, Khrushchev admitted
this poor liaison, as well as duplica-
tion, bureaucracy, and a resulting loss
of interest in research, on the part of
Soviet scientists.
Many of these difficulties are now
being eliminated and an improved sys-
tem is evolving-improvements at-
tributable largely to the tremendous
expansion in the intervening years of
the highly centralized Soviet scien-
tific information system.
Major Effort
While the Soviet civil research or-
ganization appears to be relatively
unfavorable, the same cannot be said
of the military area. And it is in this
area that the majority of the Soviet
Union's governmental effort is con-
centrated.
S pee i a I scientific military acade-
mies are operated by the Ministry of
Defense to train personnel for mili-
tary research and to direct and super-
vise research wit h related military
applications.
Unlike the nonmilitary branches of
the Soviet economy, the military sec-
tor's research and designing work is
strictly coordinated and supervised by
special committees under the Ministry
of Defense. The working agencies of
the s e committees are normally at-
tached directly to the appropriate mil-
itary academy, and include the appro-
priate representation fro m govern-
ment ministries, sci e n c e, and the
59
SCIENTIFIC INFOR.MATION.
apPqlpriate engineers and teehni-'
cians.
Several .hmtitutes of the S 0 vie t
Academy of Sciences work directly on
problems of military significance. The
Academy of Sciences Atomic Energy
t Hughes Aircraft COmlJQ,nll
A research worker can hope to accumulate
only a fraction of the vast material per-
tinent to hHs field without retrieval as-
sistance from an information source
Institute, whose research programs
are comparable to that of the US
Atomic Energy Commission, is one
example.
Although the Soviet scientific or-
ganization coordinates short-term re-
search with conceivable military ap-
plication, many Soviet scientists feel
that their present system eventually
will have significant dilatory effects.
These men feel that the Soviet orga-
nization iJ.lhibits the proper develop-
ment of both basic researoo projects
and future research personnel by tak-
ing basic research away from the uni-
versities. 1 zvestiya recently said:
The inadequate scientific activity of
the majority of our hi g It e r educa-
tional establishments continues to reo
main one of the major defects in the
organization of Soviet science.
Augmented Program
In many fields, particularly those
with military ramifications, the Soviet
scientific program is augmented by
programs which incorporate the scien-
tific communities of the entire Soviet
bloc. One such program is the Joint
Institute for Nuclear Research set up
on 26 Mar c h 1956 at Dubno: near
Moscow, with representatives fro m
each of the Soviet bloc countries.
Although the charter of the Dubno
Institute is democratic, the USSR, in
fact, determines policies and subjects
of research. The institute meets twice
a year, but so far has accepted all
the Soviet proposals which come to
i,ts director fro m the ,Academy of
Sciences. The members of the
Dubno Institute staff make frequent,
unpublicized journeys to the various
member countries' institutions for
consultations and lectures.
The institute's foreign department,
under the institute director, super-
vises all liaison of the institute
Western and neutraLstates and sends
abroad reports of the institute's work.
The department has 35 translators
who receive advance copies of scien
tific publications from all countries of
the world.
Additionally, the Dubno Institute
has full access-as do the other So-
viet scientific institutes and military
the VINITI (the So-
viet's central information agency). An
information office has also been es
tablished at Dubno for the specific
purpose of providing member states
with reliable information on the
plications of radioisotopes.
Military Review
60
Single Point
The Soviet Union, unlike the United
States, has a single focal point for
the collection and dissemination of
scientific information-t h e VIN/TI.
lts director, A. 1. Mikhailov, in dis-
cussing the concept of the institute,
said:
It is only within a centralized doc-
umentation service that the world's
overall output of scientific publica-
tions can be processed and knowledge
scattered thru various sources can be
accumulated and systematized. Be-
sides, the centralized system of infor-
mation provides a fair base for effec-
tive mechanization and automation
development.
VINITI publishes its Abstract Jour-
nal (Referativnyy Zhurnal), a science
letters information publication (Eks-
press Informatsiya) , and a state of the
art report (ltogi Nauki). VINITI is
also the coordinator for automation of
information processing. The only US
Government counterpart to VINITI is
found in assembling the like elements
of OTS, NASA, DOD, AEC, NSF, and
the Joint Publications Research Serv-
ice.
In addition to VINITI, and without
parallel in the United States, is the
State Scientific Research Institute of
Scientific and Technical Information
(GOSINTI) , This agency acts as a
central information agency in the col-
lection. storage, and dissemination of
plans, blueprints, and drawings. It
functions as a clearinghouse, support-
ing scientific information c e n t e r s
CONTI's) and academies wit hits
plans in much the same manner that
VINITI provides the ONTI's with its
publications and rep r i n t s of the
world's scientific literature.
In the past several years, the So-
viets have established ONTI's at each
November t964
level of government, industry, and re-
search. Today, there are over 4,000
information centers in the USSR;
they are remarkably similar, both in
organization and functions, to the
US scientific information centers. A
typical center will contain an infor-
mation group and liaison party to the
supported laboratories, an analysis
and rep 0 r t group, a bibliography
group, an editing and publications
group, an organizational methodologi-
cal and propaganda group. a duplicat-
ing group, a technical library, and a
translation group.
The ONT['8 are decentralized ex-
cept that they do fill a slot in the
scientific information network for the
procurement or submission of scien-
tifiF information up and down the net.
They collect, evaluate, condense, and
process scientific information gener-
ated at their institutions on a day-to-
day basis.
Processing in United States
The scientists -of our Nation-as
those of other nations-have, in the
past. relied primarily on technical ab-'
stracts and title catalogs as the prin-
cipal m e d i a of their information
searches. Today, however, there are
too many publications varied in form
for the laboratory scientist to find,
let alone search.
Throughout the world, the old re-
liable abstracting services are del-
uged, running further and further
behind, and are having to find new
methods of information analysis and
cataloging. Much the same is true
with the US Government and its re-
search project reports.
Government agencies must catalog,
store, ret r i eve, crossfeed between
agencies, and distribute to the using
projects, contractors, research cen-
6t
SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION'
ters, and scientists, each 'pertinent
scientific report they come upon from
a worldwide collection system that
supplements their own research out-
put. The growing problems of infor-
US Armu
Expert opinion holds that the average US
scientist is usually better informed than
the average Soviet scientist
mation processing have created an
entirely new field of science-"infor
c
mation science," augmenting or re-
placing, at least in part, conventional
Ulibrary science."
Mechanizing Inventory
DDC. which is the focal point of
military scientific research informa-
tion in the United States. is mecha-
niz{ng a large part of its inventory
of some 700,000 documents-an in-
ventory growing at a rate of almost
50,000 documents a year. DDC has
employed a large-scale computer and
the "descriptor method." The descrip-
tor method at DDC derives the "de-
scriptors" by analyzing a collection of
related documents and drawing up a
&2
dictionary or thesaurus of subject
terminology. Ench given idea is in-
dexed under a "descriptor," not a syn
onym.
The "uniterm" or Taube I. R. sys-
tem is used by some activities for
indexing their own research reports.
This was the first and is yet, perhaps,
the simplest US system. Taube's "uni-
terms" are simply keywords lifted out
of the documents but, unlike "descrip-
tors," without change. Each "uniterm"
is then given its own file card:
Project Echo -
The Air Force Office of Scientific
Research and Development recently
contracted with Documentation, In-
corporated. to monitor some 3,000 Air
Force scientific contracts with univer-
sities and private firms. This is Proj-
ect Echo and represents one of the
fjrst successful mechanizations of re-
search project management. The Air
Force is also seeking to file locations
of knowledge stored in the persons of
individual scientists.
Other. even m 0 r e elaborate. sys-
tems are today in their infancy.
Complementing the s e various in-
dexing, cataloging, and storage mini'"
card-punchcard-digital computer sys
tems are various types of magnetic
carrier and microfilm retrieval sys-
tems and foreign language transla-
tion machines. Such systems are to-
day a long way from adequate. In-
flexibility or overcomplexity h a v e
been alternatives in most of the sys-
tems to date.
Abstracting by computers has now
begun in the United States. both in
business and in science. An IBM ma-
chine called the Luhn Scanner has
found application in ~ i e n e for abo
stracting and retrieval work and in
business as a "machine intelligence
system."
Military Review
A final and no less serious problem
is that of reproduction. A scientist
should not be den i e d information
merely because his budget does not
provide funds for the reproduction
and handling of needed laboratory
work papers. Unfortunately, repro-
duction methods, while improving, are
still too time consuming and costly to
solve the distribution problem.
Although US document deposito-
ries are numerous and well dispersed,
their inventory of scientific documents
is limited to those which the other
Government agencies release to the
DTS. Several DDC outlets also exist,
but access to the DDC facilities re-
quires an entry into official military
channels.
The optimum situation under pres-
ent circumstances occurs when the
scientific laboratory happens to be
physically located near enough to the
primary defense contractor, and that
location, in turn, is in an area where
each of the Government agencies has
concentrated outlets. Such is often the
case at the AEC national laboratories,
NASA space flight centers, and other
major scientific centers, but is seldom
the case with many university and
industrial laboratories which consti-
tute major segments of the US scien-
tific community.
Soviet Processing
A first priority task of VINITI is
the production of a single Russian
language periodical-t h e Abstract
Journal of the Academy of Sciences.
This publication is an abstract of
scientific research reported both in-
side and outside the Soviet Union
and is published in 24 sections en-
compassing all of the principal scien-
tific and technical fields. Because the
over-all quality and quantity of basic
November 1964
research is better in the U nit e d
States than'in the USSR, the Soviets
focus more abroad than do US scien-
tists.
At the present time, the VINITI
is laying great stress on mechaniza-
tion and automation in the processing
of subject, author, patent, and other
indexes for its abstract journals. The
Soviets are convinced that conversion
to machine methods of indexing will
not only facilitate the information
flow, but also bring great savings in
time and money, especially in the
preparation of cumulative
indexes-quinquennial and decennial
-where millions of cards must be
handled.
Punchcard Equipment
The Soviets have carried out ex-
periments with the so-called Bull al-
phabetical punchcard equipment and
have found a promising arrangement
by combining t his equipment with
certain functional units of electronic
digital computers. Their estimates in-
dicate that a machine system for in-
dexing, in which two set s of Bull
punchcard equipment are used, will
be able to cope with the routine sub-
ject indexing operations of all series
of the Soviet abstract journals.
TIie Soviets today are using and
continuing to test machines for key
word system compilations, indexing,
conventiona,l and automatic abstract-
ing, automatic retrieval, mac h i n e
translation of languages, automatic
classification, and routing of infor-
mation. These experiments are being
carried out with the USSR BESM,
Strela, and Ural computers, the US
IBM-650, 305, 701" 705, and Univac
computers, and so m e English and
French general-purpose elect'ronic dig-
ital computers.
Director Mikhailov considers the
63
SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
Information Searching Selector GE-
250 the best presently available mag-
netic tape information recording sys-
tem, but s tat e s that the Discrete
Information Carrier System is far
more promising. For flexible retrieval,
the ~ o v i t s favor thl! magnetic mini-
card system which is presently under
development.
A somewhat less sophisticated Ex-
perimental Information Machine mini-
punchcard system has been developed
and tested by VINITI and is now in
operation. Microfilm continuous car-
rier systems are scheduled for re-
placement by VINITI because of the
disadvantages of their inflexibility.
VINITI has also recently developed
multimillion-item, permanent memory
units, and is presently developing
high-speed electronic logic machines,
translation machines, and automatic
reading units. Other VINITI items
are a machine which recognizes codes
by matrix techniques using informa-
'" tion fragments, improvements in re-
production techniques which parallel
US commercial processes, and new
types of printing machinery.
Policies Today
Today, expert opinion holds that
the average US scientist is usually
better informed th'lll the average So-
viet scientist. It is obvious, however,
upon examination of the Soviet scien-
tific organization, that the Soviet mili-
tary scientist is not the average So-
viet scientist. This is particularly true
so far as information coordination is
concerned.
In VINITl, the Soviets have estab-
lished a central scientific information
headquarters servicing all academies
-priority being given to the military
academies-and ONTI's with bas i c
and applied research data collected
worldwide.
US scientists, on the other hand,
work under a tripartite governmental
scientific structure which, although
providing a more functionally opti-
mum organization than, say, a central
department of science, does break out
information responsibilities. T his
breakout is further diversified by the
organizational and commercial pub-
lication of literally thousands of jour-
nals in many languages reporting the
results of the great majority of scien
tific work of the Western World:
Similar Networks
In contrast to the Soviet system,
the US breakout is extremely difficult
to structure, even though it does have
many amazing parallels to the Soviet
system. Almost all information serv-
ices available to the Soviet scientist
are available to the US scientist-if
the latter only knows where to look
for them. As a recent US Govern-
ment study group put it:
In the US the information service
and center complex is developing with
in the concepts of a free economy (or
capitalistic structure) and a f r e e
press. In the USSR the informalio".,
complex is developing within a planned
economy and a c01ltrolled press.
In the US there are statements re-
lating to a decentralized scientific-
information net w 0 r k. The USSR
claims it has a centralized structure.
Both views are representations of na-
tional intent. Yet, as one studies what
is happening, the trends suggest that
both the US and the USSR are de-
veloping similar netu'orks-modified,
of course, to suit the peculiarities of
the different national philosophies.
Two striking dissimilarities arise
out of this comparison:
The ratio of 4,000 Soviet ON-
TI's to the 250 science information
Military Review
64
centers in the United States points
up the recognition by the USSR that
ONTI's are valid and important ad-
ditions to every scientific institution.
The creation by the Soviets of
the GOSINTI is a step which has no
parallel in US information services.
It is also evident that the Soviets
are not only familiar with, but also
have used, the vast majority of the
computers and other information ma-
chines that have been developed in
the United States-in many instances
improving upon them with their own
improvisations and developments.
Ideal Solution
These facts clea\'ly point up the
problem. The ideal solution would be
to provide our requesting basic and
military research scientists with a
complete bibliography on a particular
subject and with requested copies of
each article and document they stip-
ulate. Although this solution may well
remain a fiscal impracticality and an
actual impossibility, we cannot afford
to be bound by tradition in such a
radically changing field. The tradi-
tional pluralism of our scientific struc-
ture could conceivably be either en-
hanced or rendered impractical by the
very information techniques under de-
velopment today.
The President's Science Advisory
Panel on Scientific Information re-
cently reported that it:
... sees the "pecialized informa-
tion center as a major key to the ra-
tionalization of our information sys-
tem. U It i mat ely 1{'e believe the
specialized center ",ill become the ac-
cepted retailer of information, switch-
ing, interpreting, and otherwise proc-
essing information fro'm the I a I' g e
wholesale depositories and archival
journals to the individual user. The
Panel therefore urges that more and.
better specialized centers be estab-
lished.
No Single Agency
The DOD has made clear its move
in this direction by recently issuing
an instruction establishing a system
of such centers and by stating that
"the (scientific information) program
will be established as a coordinated
structure of decentralized informa-
tion activities." This policy also re-
flects the thinking of a recent Special
Assistant to the President for Science,
who felt that:
... the federal government and its
constituent agencies were developing
principles for an effective science in-
formation system and an articulation
between components that will focu8
activities for a common purpose. In
this regard, rwe have] adopted the
view that it is both unwise and im-
practical to concentrate all of the
science information activities in a
single agency,
The Soviets are well aware of the
importance of the collection and dis-
semination of basic research, partic-
ularly that with military applications.
The draft program of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union says:
The Party will do everything to en-
hance the role of science in the build-
ing of a communist society . ... (It
lI'ill) encourage the efficient organi-
zation of scientific and technical in-
formation and of the whole system
of studying and disseminating pro-
gressive Soviet and foreign methods.
We can iII afford to permit the So-
viets, with the help of our computers,
our information techniques, and our
scientific' research, to gain five years
on us in basic research with its all-
military application.
November 1964
65
CYBERNETICS
Lieutenant Colonel V. Bokariev, Soviet Armu
A
LTHOUGH cybernetics has only
recently become an independent
science, it is now nearly impossible to
imagine technical progress being made
without it. With each year the impor-.
tance Ilf this new branch of knowledge
grows. As indicated in the program of
the Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union, cyber-
netics will be widely used in industry,
transportation, and scientific research.
Electronic decision making and con-
trolling devices will also be used in
planning and management.
The speed and direction of the fu-
ture develqpment of cybernetics de-.
pend upon the study of many prob-
lems. Of special significance is the
study of the philosophical aspects of
the new science. This will determine
the relationship of cybernetics with
other sciences, the objective contents
of this basic concept, and the correla-
tion between the machine and the hu-
man mind.
During the period of the personality"
cult of Stalin, there was, in some fields
of science, a false creative atmosphere;
In addition, the first people who con-
ducted research on cybernetics had a
weak understanding of automation and
the theory of information and calcu-
lating techniques, without which it
This article was translated and
digested from the original, pub-
lished in THE COMMUNIST OF THE
ARMED FORCES (USSR) May
1963, under the title, "The Philo-
sophical Questions of Cybernetics
and Its Part in the Military Art."
Translation by Mrs. N. Nikas,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Military Reyiew
66
was hard to understand the correct
contents of this science.
In 1954-55, following exposure of
the cult of personality in our country,
research of the scientific, technical,'
and philosophical problems of cyber-
netics began to go forward at grow-
matic control of arms and battle tech-
niques. Research in the dynamics of
battle with electronic models presup-
poses the presence of a certain knowl-
edge about the laws of the battle. At
the same time, the accuracy of work.
which is determined by the agreement
Communications links, like this telegraph system, are often loaded with useless
information
ing speed. Now, the Presidium of the
Academy of Sciences of the USSR has
organized a Scientific Council of Cy-
bernetics. There are also institutions
of cybernetics in Kiev and Thilisi. On
the staff of the Scientific Council of
Cybernetics, there is a philosophical
section which organizes and coordi-
nates the solution of philosophical
problems of the new science.
Cyberqetics in the Military
In the military services, cybernet-
ics has emerged as a general theoret-
ical basis of research for systems of
controlling troops and for the auto-
between the results of research and
the results of practice, makes it pos-
sible to find new and better relation-
ships and to establish the quantitative
characteristics of these relationships.
The basic problem of cybernetics is
to make control systems simpler and
more, dependable in the control of
troops, to raise the information-filter-
ing ability of the staff, and to increase
the speep of the transmission of in-
formation between tpe commander and
his subordinates. The result-an in-
crease in a unit's combat capabilities.
The modern theory holds that it is
November 1964
67
CYBERNETICS
possible to evaluate the quantity of
Information contained in a message
and to determine the handling capacity
and the efficiency of a particular chan-
nel of communication. It is, of course,
important to work out methods of
sending and decoding messages, and
methods to solve the many other prob-
lems of managing troops and control-
ling weapons. But it is equally im-
portant to learn to determine the
; meaning and importance of the infor-
mation.
'Military Significance
As an example, imagine that an or-
der sent to subordinate units includes
iriformation previously known to the
commanders of these units. While the
order is being transmitted, the lines
of communication are, therefore,
loaded with information the value of
which is equal to zero. From this it
can be seen that the investigation of
the concept of information and the
qUantity and quality definitions of this
nature of the material has a great
practical significance.
If, when the information is received
by the subordinate unit, it is valuable
to the receiver (man, animal, or auto-,
mat), then it will have an influence
upon the recipient's behavior. The abil-
ity of the information to affect the
condition or the behavior of the re-
ceiver is called "governing." The sci-
ence of cybernetics simply examines
the question of "how to govern." The
purpose of governing'is the subject of
other sciences.
It must not be thought, however,
that the machine can replace the man.
As everyone knows, the commander
has to come to a decision creatively.
He has to have intuition and under-
standing. The usage of machines de-
pends directly on man's knowledge of
. the laws of nature and society.
In the military sphere, cybernetics
applications are useful in those areas
where the laws of armed combat can
be expressed by mathematical equa-
tions or by the formulas of mathe
matical logic. The future growth of
Some Soviet officers believe cybernetics
will profoundly influence military
progress
military strength e p ~ n s to a consid
erable degree on the development 01
cybernetics and on its wide implemen-
tation. This is due to the increased
difficulties in controlling the tremen-
dous power and speed which modern
military units possess.
The revolution in the military art
has sharpened some of the previous
contradictions in the development of
means of armed battle, and has cre-
ated new ones. One of them is the con-
tradiction between steadily rising and
dynamic activity in battIe and the
existing systems of controlling man
and weapons. As the difficulties of con-
. Military Review 68
trolling troops grow, the flow of in-
formation in military communication
links continuously increases. A sim-
ple numerical increase in the number
of staff officers in a headquarters can-
not sufficiently improve the ability of
The goal of C) bernetics is to increase the
combat capabilities of the military forc{"s
a 'taff to control Hubordinate units. It
create, only diHorder and the duplica-
tIOn of effort.
Where, then, is an answer? The
,mswer ig in the automation of the
'Ystem of control "now in the age of
",,h a stormy growth of technique,"
according to Marghal Rodion Y. Ma-
hnovHky. He has also said:
It become. fully clear that the old,
lOllg-e.tablished method.. of control-
/iny the troops and tile battle are out-
moded. Noll', many of the complicated
;8sues have to be solved and executed
in periods of tillle figuted in minutes,
even seconds. It is here that tile ma-
chine:. cOll1e to tile aid of tile COIl1-
"!allder ,and the engineer.
The development of cybernetics has
begun a new stage in the automation
of the armed forces.
Man Is the Key
In the majority of weapons control
systems and battle techniques, the key
is still the man. Therefore, in addition
to the automation of technical equip-
ment, it is still necessary to achieve
optimum coordination of energy, in-
formation, and other, characteristics
between the man and the machine. For
the first time, cybernetics provides the
possibility of examining thoroughly
the characteristics of the nervous sys
tern of man as. one link of an auto-
m t ~ d system of control. It makes it
possible to create an optimum system
which would combine the flexibility
and many sidedness of the human
mind with the quick action and accu-
racy of the machine. One will compen-
sate for the shortcomings of the other.
Some might think that the basic
problem is to replace the man with the
machine. In reality, the goal is to in-
crease the battle capacity of the
troops. The wide use of cybernetics
equipment, of course, would have a
big influence in changing the nature
of military service. By giving to the
machine the execution of simple. rou-
tine tasks in operations, the man
leaves to himself only the creative
work. In controlling units, for in-
stance, it would be possible for the
commander to have much greater free-
dom of action than before. He would
have the chance to make a decision
with a better knowledge of the issue.
The man always emerges as a con-
troller, a supervisor of the process.
This change in the role played by man
does not lower the demantls on his
-moral, physical, and military readi-
ness. On the contrary, it increases
them.
November 1964 69
CYBERNETICS
Although the solution to problems
of controlling troops and weapons is
the main application of cybernetics in
the military art, the new science finds
a wide use in solving many other mili-
tary, military-scien'tific, and economic
problems. The methods of cybernetics
especially provide a way to shorten
drastically the time required for sci-
entific and constructive work. Fur-
thermore, the automation of produc-
tion greatly increases the quantity aJ,ld
quality of weapons and battle tech-
niques which the armed forces will
have at their disposal.
Cybernetics can also be successfully
used in organizing military improve-
ments. Means and methods of cyber-
netics are useful in training men, in
creating the so-called teaching ma-
chines, and in the use of automatic
trainers. Experiences wit h these
means show that they are effectiye in
training troops.
The use of mathematical methods
and electronic techniques in assem-
bling statistical material for military-
psychological research h e Ips detect
improper personnel changes. It also
makes possible scientifically based con-
clusions for the organization of train-
ing and party-political work. The same
methods could be u ~ e for identifica,-
tion of the staff and organizational
structure of units, including task or-
ganizations.
Cybernetics in the future will have
an even bigger influence on the devel-
opment of the means of armed battle
and on the development of tactics.
There are many good reasons for devoting time, effort, and 'money to the
research and development of machines. but this does not mean that we can
ignore in any way the other important factor in the weapons' system-the
human being-the soldier.
Lieutenant General William W. Dick, Jr.
Military Review
70
Getting to the Fight
Colonel Robert Bernstein. United States Army
T
HE sense of relief and the sub-
tle desire for relaxation experi-
enced by the military parachute
jumper after reaching the ground are
actual and "unmistakable. These sen-
sations are variable from person to
person and from situation to situa-
tion, but they can be detrimental to
the interests of the jumper in combat.
When he lands on the drop zone, the
should have at his ready
November 1964
call all the physical str'lngth and men-
tal acuity he can mus'ter. Thus, this
drain which takes the form of a sense
of lIccomplishment, a feeling of fa-
tigue, a desire to rest, no matter the
degree, serves only to impair his effi-
ciency..
Other assault-type troops, such as
amphibious or air-landed forces, ex-
perience a similar reactivn upon reach-
ing their destinations. In a similar
71
GETTING TO THE FIGHT
- way, apart from assault operations, , speed is readily understandable. Far
whenever an individual is transported
through an unfamiliar medium-such
as the sea or; air-into an uncertain
situation, some degree of undesirable
reaction is likely to occur. Unfortu-
nately, the type and extent of such un-
toward reactions are not entirely pre-
dictable. But if sufficient numbers of
a military force are affected in this
way. the successful carrying out of a
mission could be made that much more
difficult. .
Today, this entire sphere of concern
assumes greater significance than ever
before because current US military
policy places a greater-than-ever reli-
ance upon the strategic movement of
forces. However, the often taken-for-
granted concept that any force can be
moved anywhere on earth almost with-
out notice, alight with weapons firing,
and engage the enemy in sustained
combat reflects frank overoptimism
and could be dangerously unrealistic.
Fundamental Purpose
Almost too simply stated, the fun-
damental and manifest purpose of the
movement of military forces to an area
of combat is to increase the fighting
strength at the scene. It becomes es-,
sential, then, that such troops be
ready for commitment soon after
reaching their destination.
In today's circumstances, a need for
Colonel Robert Bernstein received
his M.D. from the University of
Louisville School of Medicine. His as-
signments include duty with the J87th
Airborne Infantry Regimental Com-
bat Team and the !2d Infantry Divi-
sion in Korea; and with the 6!2d Med-
ical Group in Germany. A 1964 grad-
uate of the US Army War College, he
is presently Chief of Plans, Supply,
and Operations, Office of the Surgeon,
US Continental Army Command, Fort
Mourl/e, Virginia,
.less credible, though, is the idea that
the requirement can be satisfied solely
by improving the capacity and velocity
of the means of conveyance. In fact,
and paradoxically enough, the swifter
the trip, the longer may be the period
necessary for the soldier to adjust to
his new situation, thereby permitting
him to return to his former fighting
efficiency. After all. the process of
taking an individual from the relative
safety and stability 'of his home sta-
tion, swiftly transporting him through
the unfamiliar medium of air or sea
in a vehicle to which he is generally
unaccustomed, and placing him in a
strange land to face, at best, an un-
certain military situation is bound to
test almost every stabilizing mecha-
nism, physical and psychological, so
magnificently incorporated into all
a'(erage human beings.
A Spectrum of Risks
A commander planning such an op-
eration will review all available infor-
mation and will attempt to foresee pos-
sible problem areas. There will be
many, some known, many not known,
and even a greater number not clearly
understood. Each, however, will have '"
a bearing upon how well a man will
perform. Each p r s ~ t s a challenge;
thereby representing some risk.
A spectrum of such risks may be
imagined, scaling from those of insig-
nificance to those of critical propor-
tions. Of even greater importance is
the thought that these detrimental in-
fluences are often cumulative and com-
plementary. Although a physically or
emotionally stressful situation may be
weathered easily, if it should occur
too frequently in conjunction with
some other provocation, a significant
impairment of the person's effective-
ness could ensue.
MIlitary Review
72
Problem Areas
For the sake of this discussion, the
problem areas will be grouped under
four headings:
.' Disease.
Environment.
Fatigue.
Psychological Aspects.
This organization is, in a sense, ar-
tificial. There really can be no such
clear-cut definition of the problems
Disease
The contraction of any specific dis-
ease depends upon a set of prevailing
circumstances. The s e include the
strike of a causative agent and a com-
plicated state of susceptibility present
in the body tissues., The latter is not
clearly definable, even less measur-
able, and there may be other impor-
tant, albeit unknown, factors. There
are many specific afflictions that are
,
1
1
,_ J ~
US Army
The concept that any force can be moved anywhere on earth almost without notice,
alight with weapons firing, and engage the enemy in sustained corobat could b.
dangerously unrealistic
which will have to be considered, many
of which will fall into several of the
categories. Furthermore, considera-
tion of the casualties resulting direct-
ly from combat action is not included,
except as that consideration relates
indirectly to the emotional status of
the personnel. As a matter of fact, a ,
commander would quite obviously be
interested in battle casualty estimates.
November 1964
endemic to certain regions of the
world-their incidence is decidedly
above the average when compared to
other areas. On the other hand, we
have inherited the results of many
fruitful years of experimental study
directed at the agents that cause dis-
ease.
It is all too widely known just how
devastating and debilitating a minor
73
GETTING TO THE fIGHT
disease can be, if enough people are
involved. Thetoll ofa widespread up-
per respiratory infection or rampant
diarrhea can significantly influence
the outcome of any operation. In the
tropics, the well-known enigmas of
malariaandfungusinfectionsarestill
prominent, as are many other less
familiar, often more exotic tropical
diseases.
An important statistic ranks skin
diseases as the fourth leading cause
of ineffectiveness in'the US Army:
This incidence increases threefold
among troops in the tropics during
peacetime, becoming even greater
during hostilities.
Environment
The relationship between a person
andthestate'ofhissurroundingsmay
have a great bearing upon his condi-
tion of health, stamina, and conse-
quent ability to perform as expected.
Thefirst manifestationofan undesir-
able relationship of this kind in the
traveling soldier could be the symp
toms of motion sickness while still in
transit. This condition is notonly un-
comfortable, but might easily affect
adverselythe performanceoftheman
fora timefollowingrecoveryfromthe
acute symptoms. '
Through the years, military forces
havehadtocontendwiththe'lxtremes
of environmental conditions in con-
ductingmilitaryoperations.Thereare
some well-known medical causes for
alarm exclusively associated with
each.environment. For instance, in-
tense heat presentsa settinglikely to
generate cases of sunstroke, heat ex-
haustion, heatstroke, and sunburn.
High humidity alone can reduce the
level of efficiency. Similarly, the seri-
ous effects of extreme cold are well
known, although not always too suc-
cessfully thwarted.
A military unit might be directed
to pursue a mission at a very high
altitude. For those men not already
adjusted to the relatively low availa-
bility of oxygen at that high eleva-
tion, their acquittal of an assignment
requiring marked exertion would be
disappointing, if not (jJsastrous. This
is such a well.recognized reality that
many athletic teams are unwilling to.
engage the US Air Force Academy
teamson theloftyheightsofColorado
Springs.
Fatigue
Most experienced soldiers can at-
test to the effects of fatigue on the
battlefield performance of military
units. Military literature is replete
with accounts of failures due simply
to wornout troops who were justtoo
tired to "take the hill." A mo.re in-
sidious aspect (If the problem, how-
ever, is the fatigue-induced impair-
menttothesoldier'smentalcapacities
-tohis memory, perceptio.n, o.r judg-
ment.
Fatigue and the resulting impair-
ment ofa man'scapabilities have un-
dergone considerable study; they are
known to be aggravated by the co.n-
comitant presence of circum- .,
stances. These circumstances include:
Low oxygen availability due to.
altitude.
Lack ofwateror salt.
Nutritional inadequacies.
Mental fatigue, personal factors,
and emo.tional frustrations.
Insufficient sleep and interrup-
tion ofthe sleep-wake cycle.
The precise reparative powers o.f
sleepupon thefatigued bodyare
nificent and essential, but largely be-
yond currentscientific comprehensio.n
ljlI"todetail.Despitetherelativelypoor
1inderstandingofthemechanisms and
intricacies involved in the sleep phe-
Military Review
74
nomenon, many of its characteristics
are well known. For example,' it is
known that the effects of sleep or
sleep loss are highlN variable and un-
predictable. It is estimated that the
maximum stretch of wakefulness dur-
ing which man can stiJI remain some-
what effective cannot exceed 100 to
140 hours.
Sleep loss is also known to be cumu-
lative, an important consideration in
prolonged active combat situations.
Furthermore, the deleterious conse-
quences of sleep loss may be treacher-
ous in their manifestations. Thus, in-
stead of fatigue resulting from sleep
loss over a long period, a functional
aberration of memory, perception, or
judgment could occur and go unde-
tected.
Closely allied to the loss of sleep is
an alteration of the work-rest cycle.
Human performance is influenced pro-
foundly by this cyclic phenomenon.
Man is accustomed to a sleep-wake
cycle of 24 hours' duration. He has
daily variations in all physiological
functions of the body, as well as in
his performance, which are closely
adapted to these rhythmic episodes.
When an irregular cycle is imposed,
his responses can be expected to adapt
somewhat, but not entirely nor equally
for all individuals.
It is also helpful for the military
leader to appreciate that passive du-
ties, such as those involving monitor-
ing or vigilance---guard duty-are
more sensitive to the gradual dimin-
ishing of vigor than are duties which
engage the soldier more actively.
Transporting a person by sea or air
is certainly damaging to the normal
sleep-rest cycle. The faster the trip
the gJ;eater the alteration produced,
November 1964
and the longer the period for adapta-
tiim that may be required.
It is quite apparent that the effects
of fatigue on a military situation usu-
ally cannot be neatly and clearly dis-
tinguished from emotional influences
on the same situation. Actually, they
are overlapping and interrelated con-
siderations. An outstanding iJlustra-
tion of this "gray area" may be seen
in the sensation of "feeling tired."
This is a totally subjective reaction
which need not necessarily result from
prior large expenditure of energy; nor.
is there usually any objective way of
demonstrating the condition. It may
be related to a lack of interest, loss of
motivation, or some other vague cir-
cumstance. Suffice to say, such an
undesirable state of mind can be ju!;t
as harmful to performance as a phys-,
ically worn body.
PsycllOiogi<ai Aspeds
Perhaps the area that needs the
greatest attention by a commander
moving troops into combat is that of
the emotional health of the men. But
this problem is usually the least ap-
proachable from a direct and practical
viewpoint. This essential, although
somewhat abstract, sphere of interest
has been the subject of much study
and many writings. Unfortunately, not
enough is yet known, and the help-
ful knowledge that is available does
not enjoy wide enough dissemination
among many who should be its re-
cipients.
One need not search military lit-
erature exhaustively to uncover, even
tnday, remnant traces of the now
passe attitude that the basical1y welJ.
trained soldier's efficiency in combat
may tie taken for granted. One ex-
ample of this thinking is reflected
in a recent' article which described
heliborne' operatinns. In comparing
75
GETTING TO THE FIGHT
heliborne with parachute operations;
the author states that the former "do
not require specially trained troops-
some familiarization training and a
rehearsal prior to an operation will
s,uffice... I feel that this represents
"
constant challenge from one source
or another. Furthermore, these stress-
es are cumulative and do not neces-
sarily arise from emotional causes.,
It is also recognized that there is a
stress limit for all persons beyond
US ATmy
All serious students of assault operations agree that assault troops must be expected
to give' an extra effort #/'
an extremely dangerous oversimpli-
fication.
By the same token, mental health
alone and military effectiveness are
certainly not necessarily reciprocal in
relationship. It takes many more
"'pluses" besides emotional well-being
to produce an effective unit, and the
often-proved ingredients of goo d
leadership and high morale still re-
main among the requirements.
During hostilities, the psychologi-
cal health of the soldier is under
1 Major L. G. Clark. Australian Army, "Seizing
the Initiative in CountergUerrll1a Operations,"
Mditarfl ReView, December 1963, p 91.
which further pressures cannot. be
managed effectively. This extreme
varies from person to person and even
from time to time in the same per-
son.
The Nuclear Battlefield
Certainly, the prospect of nuclear
war adds immeasurably to the list of
potential hazards that would have to
be considered prior to dispatchIng
troops into combat. In fact, it would
probably add an entirely new dimen-
sion.
Because we can only speculate at
this point ab9ut future warfare if
Military Review
76
nuclear weapons are used-being un-
able to draw from history or personal
experience to any extent-guidelines
for planning would, in great meas-
ure, be drawn from inference, extrap-
olation, or even pure conjecture. It
is a sad handicap, although under-
standable, under which the military
leader would have to operate, and the
resulting uncertainties would serve to
multiply the stresses and strains on
the emotional health of the person-
nel.
There are some items of planning
information that are available in the
event of a nuclear situation. For ex-
ample, a commander would expect to
encounter greater destruction of prop-
erty, larger numbers of casualties,
and emergence of radiation injuries.
Unfortunately, these forecasts only
serve to worsen the atmosphere for
properly preparing the soldier for
active combat.
Time to Fight
Notwithstanding the efforts and
energies expended by assault troops
in hurdling physical and mental ob-
structions on their trip to an area
of active combat, if they cannot im-
mediately, vigorously, and effectively
engage the enemy, all is for naught.
A view of the parachutist's life
prior to an assault would disclose sev-
eral days of mounting emotional ten-
sion. On D-day he would most prob-
ahly be a w a ken e d shortly after
midnight and marched to plane-side,
, first consuming his last hot meal for
several days .to come. I n flight, he
concerns himself with plans and other
aspects of the impending fight, usu-
ally to a degree sufficient to arouse
all of his built-in alarm mechanisms.
In any event, by the time the jump-
er hits the ground, he has had enough
physical exertion and mental stimu-
NDvember 1964
lation for any entire day-but his
day has not yet started. There is
little wonder that following a safe
landing, some sensation of accom-
plishment and contentment comes over
him-he has already endured a great
deal of s t res s . Physiologically, his
body feels a need for rest. He must
ward off that feeling, however, and
conquer other involuntary weaknesses.
Transition
The transition from the relatively
peaceful conditions which prevailed at
the airfield to those unpeaceful con-
ditions of the combat airhead is sud-
den, unreal, and exceedingly difficult
to "take in one's stride." For now,
once on the ground, the man must
use' all of his native abilities and
techniques learned during his exten-
sive training period to carry out the
specific mission at hand. Because of
the usual troop dispersion, and I until
assembly and consolidation are effect-
ed, much of the early act i v i t y is
individually executed. This inability
to share danger is stressful in its own
right in the uncertain, fast-moving,
and 'danger-laden atmosphere of the
battlefield.
There is small wonder that the
landing of an assault force is, in
itself, climactic. The loss of sleep
and expenditure of physical energies
would seem sufficiently fatiguing. In
addition, the imponderable effect of
mental exertion must be added to
the picture. A quantity of nervous
energy cannot be gaged in the way
that muscular energy can be measured
in calories. The nervous system is
known to tire from use, but the pre-
cise nature of this reaction is unknown
and t ~ s far does not lend itself to
quantitative procedures. It is also
known that the efficiency of the nerv-
ous system suffers during such periods
I
77
GETTING" TO tHE FIGHT
of fatigue, and that the body requires
rest to return to normal nervous ac-
tivity.
Vitality of Troops
The German military hierarchy in
World War II, among the earliest
exponents of airborne and other as-
sault operations, concerned themselves
deeply witq this problem of the need
to extend the vitality of assault forces.
In Crete, for example, the ~ r m a n
parachutists carried dried fruit and
glucose tablets, both being rapid
energy foods. In addition, they carried
certain drugs and hypodermic sy-
ringes.
In other areas, air resupply opera-
tions included containers of Wittler
bread, chocolate, coffee, and whiskey,
all of which are stimulants or high-
energy foods. Accounts of German
paratroopers in Norway tell of pre-
medicating the soldiers by means of
hypodermic syringes while they were
being transported. in the troop carrier
planes to drop zones. Fatalities on
the ground in Norway, Belgium, and
France frequently were found to have
small hypodermic sets and ampules of
caffeine sodium salicylate, a well_
known nervous system stimulant.
among their personal effects.
It has been said that all Rommel's
shock troops-parachutists, glidermen,
and tankers-were injected with a
caffeine solution just prior to being
committed. Moments later, they were
given lemonade to drink. The rationale
of this procedure was to produce an
incompatibility within the body be-
tween the. caffeine and the acid con-
tained in the fruit drink, and this was
presumed to increase the "kick" pro-
duced by the caffeine. The men were
trained to inject one another and di-
rected to do so after long periods of
fatiguing activity. Interestingly, and
quite appropriately, the practice Was
even incorporated into their training
exercises.
While there is no scientific evidence
that the stimulating properties of caf-
feine are enhanced by these methods,
the descriptions serve to point up just
how clearly the Germans recognized
and respected the problem.
All serious students of assault op- '
erations agree'that assault troops must
be expected to give an extra effort.
Certainly, the US Military Establish-
ment has neither overlooked nor dis-
regarded the problems of the assault
soldier. Many of the same findings lind
shortcomings uncovered by the Ger-
mans have plagued US assault opera-
tions in the past as well. An effort has
been made to overcome the deficien-
cies.
,The important question, however,
remains: "How does a unit reach that
state of personnel readiness whereby
its members are ready and willing to
give that extra 'something' to ensure
the success of the mission?" There is
today only a partially satisfactory re-
sponse to the question; but with it.
happily, are many opportunities and.
methods of approaching that state of
preparedness.
Remedial Action
At the unit level, a thorough aware-
peas of the possible hazarda by all
troop leaders is requisite to any rea-
sonable remedial action. Furthermore,
since the adverse factors may act in
consort with one another, any improve-
ment in the over-all situation would
enhance the probability of success.
even if the most ominous problems
were not resolved.
The most potent weapons to combat
the diseases of foreign lands are found
in the realm of immunization pro-
grams and other public health meas-
Military Review
78
ures. The US Military Establishment
ranks second to no other in the pro-
tection afforded its personnel by these
procedures. Antimalarial drugs are
constantly being improved, an essen-
tial preventive measure in a great
fort is being maintained by medical
authorities-military and civilian-to
stave off and cure the countless mala-
dies that plague the peoples of the
world. Nevertheless, the commander
stiJI retains responsibility for the
Army News Features
Training must bear as great a resemblance to reality as it is possible to attain
part of the world. Recently, long
strides have been made in the fight
against tropical fungus infections, a
common cause of disability and dis-
comfort in certain areas.
While the oproblem of "travelers' di-
arrhea" remains largely. unresolved,
intensive research continues with sev-
eral new chemical agents being tested.
An interesting dream now approach-
ing reality is an orally taken insect
repellent. The medical significance of
such a development is beyond calcu-
lation, considering the great number
of illnesses carried by insects.
A continuing concerted research ef-
November 1964
health of his forces. He must be aware
of possible, health hazards and must
initiate, in whatever ways are possi-
ble, those steps which will protect his
troops.
In considering the battlefield en-
vironment, many ailments which ap-
pear in troops exposed to unusual con-
ditions can be prevented or treated.
The Armed Forces pioneered much of
this methodology. Motion sickness and
exposure to extremes of cold or heat
fall into -this category, and reasonablY"
effective measures can be taken in
each case.
The serious handicaps arising from
79
. GETTING TO THE FIGHT .
conducting operations at high alti-
tudes, without prior adequate llccli-
matization, remain largely unavoid-
able. Physiologically, the difficulty
stems from the fact that the average
human at sea level does not have suf-
ficient red blood cells to carry neces-
sary oxygen to the tissues, if severe
physical exertion is required. The di-
minished oxygen tension at the high
elevations creates, a necessity for ad-
ditional tcells, and weeks must elapse
before this automatic compensatory
mechanism can be effective. The ur-
gent need is for the development, per-
haps by chemical or other artificial
means, of a method of rapid acclimati-
zation.
In discussing the effects of fatigue,
the importance of the energy level and
vitality of "troops entering battle can-
not be overstated. Loss of sleep is of-
ten unavoidable in the field. Fatigue
due to this circumstance can only be
alleviated by sleep or, at least, rest.
Battlewise commanders are cognizant
of the virtues of the "cat nap" or
"forty winks" when the opportunity
presents itself. This form of instant
rest may be quite effective as an in-'
vigorator. '
Sufficient Rest
The dutiful leader will do all in his
power to ensure that his men obtain
sufficient rest when it is possible to do
so. This may entail scheduling rest
time even during the day. Although
this. procedure might draw scoffs and
complaints from the men, there is no
substitute for rest; ultimately, fa-
tigue could decide the victor.
Some research consideration should
be given to the idea of administering
a period of "forced" sleeping for the
men prior to departure to a field of
combat. This would apply only if the
troop.s were in a protected location and
were not expected to fight for a num.
ber of hours. A shortacting sedative,
without a hangover effect, might be
used. While physiologically it is im.
possible to store rest or sleep, at the
very least, the men should not be hin
dered by a rest deficit at the outset.
I f sudden alterations in the work
rest cycle because of a long plane trip
are anticipated, and the destination
is known sufficiently in advance, why
cannot an effort be'made prior to de
parture to adopt the cycle that' will
prevail at the new area?
Stimulants
To extend the human energy reo
sources in assault troops, additional
'work is called for in the area of nu
tritional and chemical stimulants. The
partial and all too slow rekindling
methods used by the German forces
are still with us, but considerable im
provement in them is necessary be
fore they can be regarded as effective,
An important aspect of the ob
served depression results from the
sense of accomplishment following the
assault. As explained by workers in
the field, this has the effect of a goal.
achievement reaction which physiolog."
ically and subconsciQusly calls for a
period of relaxation.
A logical remedy, then, would be to
advance the goal. Psychological stud
ies confirm that this can be done. The
new goal should consist of successful
completion of the mission or, at least,
taking the first objective. Above all,
it should not be associated with the
landing itself.
There is no general agreement on
how far such a goal may be advanced,
and more investigation is needed in
this area. Early in parachuting his
tory, the Germans made an error by
"separating the initial jump training
from the rest of the training PEo,
Military Review
80
gram." Jumping snould be the "daily
bread," not a "special art." ,
In the important psychological area,
every effort should be made to avert
emotiona\1y stressful situations or to
counter them when they are i m m i ~
nent. It is important for a leader to
recognize and believe that the num-
bers and varieties of potential stresses
are great and to understand something
of how they may affect the soldier.
Leadership
Morale and leadership are not easily
defined or measured, but their impor-
tance to the operational status of a
unit is unquestioned. Among other
factors, good leadership within the
unit helps achieve the desired esprit.
In combat, particularly, the men of a
spirited and efficient unit genera\1y
share these characteristics:
Faith in the common purpose.
Faith in the leadership.
Faith in each other.
Adequate health and a balance of
work, rest, and recreation.
All means of achieving these ends
should be sought and used.
Bravery and resoluteness alone will
not always result in success. While
these are desirable and sometimes
necessary attributes in the fighting
man, other strengths must be present.
The advantages of having we\1-
trained troops cannot be emphasized
too strongly. In order to be more
meaningful, however, such training
must bear as great a resemblance to
reality as it is possible to attain. Ob-
viously, in the absence of actual com-
bat, many aspects of the combat en-
vironment are impossible to achieve.
However, some of the physical
stresses and strains can be imitated.
For example, if the troops are ex-
~ l OpeTutions. A German Apprai8al,
Office of the Chief of Military History. Depart
ment of t h ~ Anny. Washington, 1950, pp 8 and 9.
November 1964
pected to function after very little
sleep, such should be the training set-
ting. Too, individuals may be better
conditioned to withstand pressures of
a\1 types by training and repeated ex-
posures to potential dangers.
Identification
In a\1 phases of training, impor-
tance should be placed on the soldier's
relationship to his squad, platoon, and
company. The psychological advan-
tages of a soldier identifying himself
with a unit prior to being committed
to combat have been demonstrated be-
yond doubt, and it is currently ad-
vocated for training assault-type
troops. The value of this practice can
only be multiplied on the battlefield of
the future. The one sensation more un-
comfortable. than fear itself is lonely
fear.
Courage, will, morale, and similar
terms used in connection with the
fighting man take on a new and in-
teresting perspective when some of
today's potential battlefields are con-
sidered. There is little dispute that
most US military actions in the past
found' patriotic soldiers who loved
their Nation and fought to protect i,ts
ideals by decisively defeating an en-
emy. There was a deep personal invest-
ment at stake which led to a "Let's go
get 'em!" attitude. It made the fight-
ing just a bit easier.
US citizens and soldiers are no less
patriotic today, but current interna-
tional affairs create many ambiguous
settings.
Today's complex conditions often
dictate military actions that cannot
possibly lead to clear-cut victories, or
even to any obvious advantage for this
country. 'Such situations have a tend-
ency to shrink the combatants' will to
fight, an attitude which may be prev-
alent enough to be significant. It is a
81
GmlNG TO THE FIGHT
trying test of leadership for all con-
cerned-from the squad leader to the
Presidept of the United States-to
show the soldier why such "gray" vic-
tories are vital to this Nation's well-
being. Such explanations can and
should be repeated often to attain the
desired state of morale among the
fighting men.
Joint Responsibility
There is ample opportunity for both
the commander and" the medical serv-
ice to improve the situation.
An energetic and sustained drive
on some of the important unsolved
problems is certainly indicated. Much
of this work needs to be done in the
field, at training centers, or preferably
in combat zones, where possible.
The relationship of emotional and
fatigue reactions to physiological
functions needs to be more firmly es-
tablished, and an effort should be made
to quantitate sUfh reactions in some
helpful way. Such studies could pos-
sibly lead to better means of screening
personnel for various ailments.
Current combat medical practice is
changing many of its concepts to re-
flect progress in the medical discipline
and also to support present-day mili-
tary doctrine and tactics. This con-
stant keeping abreast must be main-
tained, and medical field units should
seek to attain the highest possible
standards of medical service. A fight-
ing unit is favorably influenced by
the' knowledge that its medical sup-
port is outstanding. For this reason,
as well as for the actual services ren-
dered, strong command emphasis
should be given to the preparedness of
organic medical units. It would offer
'another small emotional boost for the
soldier.
Subtle preventive psychic support is
an awesome-appearing catch phrase
to suggest a means of better facing
future stresses. It implies that if an
individual's psychic structure can be
gradually strengthened in some way
prior to his being exposed to a stress-
ful situation, he may be likely to with-
stand that situation more effectively.
Such anticipatory support, if achiev-
able, would go far in preventing emo-
tional casualties in the battles to come.
Details of Program
Without going into the details of
. such a program, merely gaining
knowledge of, and appreciation for,
certain aspects of human behavior
would serve as the basis for group
conferences and seminars involving
principally troop leaders. The program
would be under medical service super-
vision, but encouraged free discus-
sion would be a prime requisite. The
goal would be to attain a basic prac-
tical understanding' of individual and
group behavior.
Some of the discussion topics might
be: What is "normal" hehavior? What
factors influence the development of
the soldier's personality and behavior?
What is the role of motivation in tht!'
performance of duty? What is fear?
When is it important to have fear?
What is the difference between fear
and cowardice?
It is naive and scientifically incor-
rect to compare this preventive pro-
gram to that of immunizing against
disease. There is no biologic similar-
ity. However, by periodic exposure to,
and discussion of, these topics, a
strengthening of the participant;s
own resistance against emotional dis-
ease may be anticipated. The program
should not be construed as an attempt
at mass psychoanalysis. Rather, there
is a profound need for this type of
Military ReView
82
'education among the leaders of our
Military Establishment.
Command Effort
As one might expect, command has
the lion's share of the responsibility.
The work, however, revolves mainly
about all of the recognized and proved
principles of good leadership. In every
way, the commander should attempt
to avoid or ease the stresses that
might face his men. Above all, he must
have an awareness of the possible
risks in an impending operation.
One of the most fundamental and
often-proved methods of keeping. men
emotionally fit for fighting involves
keeping them informed. The value of
this has been repeatedly demonstrated
through military history and cited so
often as to seem almost too absurd to
mention. Yet, it is often ignored.
Another basic concept, although
not so widely appreciated, is that in
the learning process as well as in task
performance, an interesting or excit-
ing atmosphere enhances the process
-perhaps by improving motivation.
For example, much can often be done
to make an ordinary assignment or
training exercise more interesting.
Another aspect of the soldier's emo-
tional well-being relates to his con-
cern over his family. If he is to be
sent to a far-off land, his degree of
motivation will be affected by any
uncertainties over the welfare of his
loved ones. This would be especially
true if this Nation were under attack
or even if such attack were credible.
Furthermore. the man might not be
aware of the presence of this harm-
ful influence. He might intellectualize
no such feelings, but suffer subcon-
sciously. All means of allaying these
fears s h o ~ l lie directly and promi-
nently within the realm of the com-
mander's early priority duties.
Need for Understanding
The basic objectives and principles
of good leadership furnish necessary
guidelines for all levels of command.
These can be translated into a greater
and more widespread effort in behalf
of the Army's manpower, not merely
as strength figures, but as living in-
dividuals. There is no better summary
statement on this need for under-
standing than that made by S. L. A.
Marshall:
I know it is said we can train troops
to stand fast against any danger mere-
ly by reiterating what we call 'doc-
trine.' There is a tendency in any mil-
itary organization-not excepting the
Army of the United States-to over-
simplify all problems having to do with
human material. One reason for that
is that during war there is much too
wide a gap separating the tactical op-
erators from those who have an in-
formed and scientifically.enlightened
view of man as a fighting animal.
man in the mass and under pressure,
man as a highly sensitive and fragile
vessel. with definable limits.'
The technological world strides
ahead rapidly. Military methods and
doctrine are changing to reflect these
advances. The fighting man, the user,
cannot be expected to keep pace with-
out a gigantic assist fro m many
sources. Without this help, the gap
will widen. Man is, indeeil, our great-
est resource--he must not be per-
mitted to become outmoded or obsolete.
:IS. L. A. Marshall. "Group Fear and Its Con.
trol in Military Units," MatfaDement of MaB8 CaB.
ualties Publication Number 566. Walter Reed
Army Institute of Research. Walter need Army
Medical Center. Washington. 1955, p 9.
November 1964
83
M B ~ H DETECTION
Brigadier General Robert H. Williams,
United States .lJfarine Corps, Retired
and
Marcel Vigneras
"
. "
T
HE ambush is undoubtedlY one
of the oldest stratagems of com-
bat. Long ago, before the first civiliza-
tions on earth began to formalize war-
fare: the attack from ambush beside
a forest path must have been a com-
mon incident of tribal strife. Even the
invention and refinement of modern
firearms, motor vehicles, and aircraft
have had surprisingly little effect on
the ambush pattern and counteram-
bush techniques. The attack from am-
bush was an action at close quarters
in ancient days, and it still is, despite
the range of modern weapons. *
The ambush is not to be thought of
as particularly a guerrilla or partisan
tactic. Although it is characteristic of
guerrilla warfare, it is also employed
by conventional forces as opportunity
serves. For example, it was employed
by British troops against the Com-
munist terrorists in Malaya.
This article 1S based on a paper prEsented on
24 March 1964 at a symposium on ambush detec-
tion sponsored by the US Army Limited War
Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.
Military Review
84
There is a tendency til regard the
ambush as a practical tactic only for
a small force against a small force,
and this is generally true today. Yet,
one of the famous ambushes of his-
tory was of a large force by another
large force.
Historical Examples
In the early spring of 217 B.C., a
Carthaginian army, 20,000 strong and
led by the renowned warrior leader,
Hannibal, ambushed a larger Roman
army on the north shore of Lake Tras-
imeno, 19 kilometers west of Perugia
(Figure 1). Caught in march order
and unable to deploy in the narrow
defile between the hill of Montigeto
and the town of Torricella, the Ro-
mans were slaughtered. Fifteen thou-
sand Romans were killed with a loss
of only 1,500 Carthaginians.
A more .recent example will serve
Brigadier General Robert H. Wil-
liams, United States Marine Corps,
Retired, joined the staff of the Re-
search Analysis Corporation in 1963.
He organized and commanded the first
parachute company, battalion, and
only parachute regiment of the Ma-
rine Corps during World War II, and
later served in the Pacific theater.
Since his retirement in 1956, he has
been Civil Defense Planner, State of
Wisconsin; on the senior staff of The
Brookings Institution; and consul-
tant. Policy Planning Staff, Interna-
tional Security Affairs, Department of
Defense.
Marcel Vigneras served in the
French Army in both World Wars. A
Professor of French at Western Re-
serve University and Smith College
prior to World War II, he was with
the Office of the Chief of Military His-
tory. Department of the Army. from
1948 to 1952. He joined the staff of
the Research Analysis Corporation in
1952.
November 1964
to demonstrate what slight effect the
development of modern Weapons, air-
craft, and vehicular transportation has
had on the basic p t t e ~ n of the am-
bush. Two South Vietnamese compa-
nies-less than 300 troops in a con-
voy of about 20 vehicles-were am-
bushed by a Viet Cong battalion which
had an estimated strength of between
300 and 400 men.
As the lead vehicle reached the end
of the killing zone-represented by
400 meters of road, along which the
Viet Cong had deployed in conceal-
ment-four mines were detonated and
the Viet Cong opened fire (Figure 2).
The first three vehicles drove on
through until out of range, then
stopped, and the troops dismounted.
The fourth truck also got through.
but only after damage and personnel
casualties that included a company
commander.
Viet Cong Attack
Of the four vehicles that were
stopped in the killing zone, one was
a jeep carrying the officer in command,
one was an empty truck, and two were
trucks filled with troops. Viet Cong
assault parties rushed the four vehi-
cles. The personnel in them fought
back as best they could, but were over-
run and badly shot up. The troops who
dismounted from the vehicles that got
past the killing zone did not react to
any useful extent. The second com-
pany, however, whose vehicles stopped
before reaching the Viet Cong left
flank. dismounted. and with one pla-
toon swinging wide on each side of
the road. advanced toward the am-
bush. Both platoons came under the
automatic fire of Viet Cong security
outposts. but the advance of the one
on the right represented a sufficient
threat to hasten the withdrawal of the
Viet Congo
85
AMBUSH DETECTION
The results-no confirmed Viet ing zone. The troops in the leading
Cong losses, 23 South Vietnamese
trucks that got through and those
killed in action, three South Vietna- that had not entered the killing zone
mese missing in action, and 23 weap- could do nothing to help this one pla-
mmIIIIIII! ROMAH LEGIONS

DEPLOYED CA,RIHAGINIAN TROOPS
CARTHAGINIAN BLOCKING fORCE
AT PASS
ons and two radios captured by the
Viet Congo
This ambush pattern illustrates
how misleading the total comparative
strengths of the opposing forces can
be in the attack from ambush. Ap-
parently, 350 Viet Cong attacked less
than.300troops moving in trucks. But
note that in the 400 meters of killing
zone, there.were only four trucks, one
a jeep, another empty. Actually, the
firepower of a Viet Cong battalion
was directed ata platoon.
The 23 men killed represented only
10 percent of the total personnel in
theconvoy-butmore than 50 percent
ofth<?se actually engaged in the kill-
toon during the few minutes of at-
.tack. When they did dismount and
begin to maneuver, the damage had
been done.
Fundamental Idea
There is a semantic ambiguity to
clarifybeforeidentifyingtheelements
oftheambush. In militaryusage it is
now,generally accepted that the word
ambush includes theattackfor which,
strictlyspeaking,itisonlythesetting!
In reality, however, the ambush it-
self is merely a concealed deployment.
In thissense, theattackismadefrom
ambush. Should the expected target
not appear, and the enterprise be
abandoned, there obviously has been
Military Review
86
no attack, yet there has been an am-
bush.
The idea of entrapment is funda-
mental. The trap is the killing zone
into which the ambush party hopes
that the patrol or convoy, or that part
until the target is entirely within the
killing zone. As the head of the/col-
umn C-D reaches point A, the trap is
sprung. The ambush party opens fire
and seals off the road at A and B to
prevent escape. The obstacle-water,
AMBUSH OF ASOUTH VIETNAMESE MOTOR CONVOY
AUTO RIFlE

VIET COHG
III!lIIImmrlll!llll!!llll!llll
L[N'GTHor CONVOY_2,OOOMTERS
DISTANCE BETWEEN VEHIClES--lOO METERS
LIGHT MACHIHEGUH
VIET CON"G CONCEALEO 10 TO 15 MnERS FROM ROAD
Figure 2.
selected as the target, will move un-
suspectingly. Weapons are generally
positioned parallel to the trail and
sited to fire into the flank of the
marching column after it enters the
killing zone, leaving no part of it un-
covered. The problem of the ambush
party is to reconcile two conflicting
requirements-it must conceal its
presence until the target I is entirely
within the killing zone, and yet it
must have its weapons properly sited.
If the approaching column marches
into the trap, the ambush party com-
mander has the initiative. He can de-
liver a murderous surprise attack at
tlie moment he chooses, with all weap-
ons firing at close range against a
target that is vulnerable and, for a
few moments, almost helpless.
A schematic representation of an
ambush is shown in Figure 3. This is
the per f e c t ambush, not often
achieved. Concealment is preserved
an embankment, or a mined area-
hinders olfroad movement. The maxi-
mum objectives of the
plete destruction of the target and
acquisition of any useful items of its
equipment-are possible to achieve.
Clearly, the problem confronting
the commander of the advancing col-
umn is to discover the presence of the
ambush party before the head of the
column enters the zone. Only
then can he wrest the initiative from
the ambush commander and abort the
ambush by deploying and attacking it
before the column moves into the trap.
Targets
Any military element that moves on
the surface of the earth can be at-
tacked from ambush. This includes
columns and patrols moving on foot,
motor convoys, railroad trains, and
rivercraft. The objectives of the at-
tack from ambush range from com-
plete destruction of the target to de-
November 1964 87
AMBUSH DETECTION
laying a marching column ",nd minor
harassment. For guerrillas, the cap-
ture of weapons, supplies, and equip-
ment is often a major objective. Lines
of communication provide a good set-
The ambush party has a tremendous
tactical advantage. In addition to sur-
prise, it can be reasonably certain of
having an overwhelming advantage in
volume of fire for a few minutes at
THE PERFECT AMBUSH
OBSTACLE
~
KILLING ZONE
" ' ~ B
ting for the ambush. Defiles and
stretches of road through ravines and
wooded areas afford excellent sites,
but ambushes also have been laid in
villages and fairly open country.
Where an attack by ground forces
usually consists of a combination of
fire and movement against relatively,
fixed defensive positions, the roles are
reversed in the attack from ambush.
The target of attack is moving-per-
haps quite aware of the possibility of
ambush-but, nonetheless, forced into
the poor defensive posture of a col-
umn on the march. There is no real
movement of the ambush party dur-
ing the attack. Having positioned
itself beforehand, it is in the same
relative position with respect to the
target-wilen the latter enters the kill-
ing zone-as an infantry unit in the
final minutes of the assault phase of
the normal attack sequence involving
fire and movement against a fixed de-
fensive position.
tne decisive point-the killing zone.
Nothing can be done by the patrol or
convoy as it enters the killing zone to
avoid disaster.
The Fire Fight
The one-sided fire fight is brief. It
may last only three or four minutes,
but it is sudden and violent. The am'"
bush party seeks to develop instanta-
neously its full firepower potential,
with all weapons firing at a rapid rate
at targets looming just beyond the
front sights. After a few minutes of
devastating fire, with destruction
fairly complete, there may occur what
is sometimes termed an assault by the
ambush party. It is, perhaps, more in
the nature of a mopping up, with des-
ignated teams moving into the killing
zone to complete the destruction or
to capture weapons.
If there is any immediate danger
of being cut off or pinned down and
captured by superior forces, all ele-
ments of the ambush party will
Military Review
88
quickly withdraw to a designated as-
sembly point to reform and move
away from the area.
favorite Guerrilla Tactic
Historically, theambush has been a
favorite and! successful tactic of re-
government f(lrces. By operating'un-
der cover, by avoiding decisive con-
ventional engagements with superior
forces, and by exploiting their inti-
mate knowledge of terrain and supe-
rior foot mobility, the insurgents can
EXPLOITING THE AMBUSH
20 ElEMENT
1.200 TO 1,500 METERS
OFF ROAD
1lll\l11ll1ll111 I!lIDIIIIllIll
1ST ELEMENT
5 TO 30 METERS
OFF ROAD
IN AMBUSH
3D L M ~ T
MAIN BODY
1,500 TO 2,500 METERS
OFF ROAD
Figure 4.
sistance movements in areas where
those movements enjoy a measure of
popular support. In such areas, the
government controls little more than
the localities it occupies in force. The
routes linkingtheselocalities can usu-
aUy be keptopen bydailymaintenance
and mine clearing. Because the ~
ernment does not control the terral
on both sides of the roads, howeve ,
it is impossible to eliminate the c -
stant threat of ambush. To re oer
lines of communications secur e
throughout extensive g ray areas
where the population supports the in-
surgents would require a heavy com-
mitment of troops from the govern-
ment.
The ambush enables the insurgents
to overcome the severe over-all dis-
parity in numbers, firepower, and
technology between themselves and
, November 1964
choose the time and place for brief
concentrations to attacksmall govern-
ment elements in transit.
The.ambush is nota warwinner. It
is a feasible small-scale offensive tac-
tic for insurgents who are strategi-
cally committed to the defensive be-
cause oftheirweakness. Its use, how-
ever, in combination with continued
expansion ofareas ofpopularsupport
and recruitment of more guerrilla
bands, tends to lessen government
control. This, in turn, ultimately re-
duces the disparity in strength to a
point where the insurgents can de-
velop unitscapableofchallenginggov-
ernment forces in a moreconventional
type of warfare that can lead to the
latter's defeat.
A transitional tactic-that may be
regarded as being on the borderline
between guerrilla and mobile warfare
89
L
~ . AMBUSH DETCTlON
is the use of the ambush in conjunc- , most of the personnel of the ambush
tion with the quick attack. The tac-
tical doctrine of the People's Army of
North Vietnam exploits the ambush
in a way developed by their predeces-
sors, the Vietminh, against the
French. The entire pattern is some-
times teferred to as a mobile ambush
(Figure 4).
The first element lays an ambush.
';l'he ambush's primary purpose is to
J;top the column and. prevent its fut;-
iher movement, rather than to inflict
casualties on the small portion of the
column that marches into the killing
zone. The second and third elements
are also concealed, but several hundred
meters away from the road-the for-
mer to seal Qff escape to the rear, the
main body to attack the column.
The maneuver is a sound one, but,
viewed as a whole, it stretches the
definition to call it an ambush. The
first element constitutes the ambush.
Elements two and three exploit it.
They advance by fire and movement
to deliver a quick attack against the
main body of the column which will
have some warning and be able to de-
ploy offroad hastily to meet the attacks
of those elements. .
Similarly, the problem of discover-
ing the concealed presence of elements
two and three, several hundred meters
away, is not an ambush detection
problem, but rather one of target ac-
quisition or battlefield surveillance.
Prepafation and Scale
In most cases, great care is brought
to the laying of an ambush. The
thorough preparation may require
three days. during which careful re-
connaissance of the site is made in
daylight and measures are taken to
assure the cooperation of the local
villagers. All movement is at night;
90
party may not move into the position
until after midnight on the day the
target is expected. The trap is lilid,
security detachments are positioned to
guard the flanks and the withdrawal
route, and local informants provide
current information on the approach
of the target. The ambush may be
sprung during the hours of darkness
or in daylight, if there is a target,
but a few successful night attacks
will usually cause the government to
restrict movement to the hours of day-
light.
Size Varies
All this obviously demands the most
rigid discipli.ne and secrecy of move-
ment. The size of the ambush party
varies depending on the target, with
the upper limit being the guerrilla,
battalion-size attack-about 400 mim.
In'Malaya, the Philippines, and coun-
terguerrilla operations during the Ko-
rean War, the size of the ambush
party usually matched that of the
target.
In South Vietnam today the am-
bush party is often superior in num-
bers. Most of the weapons employed ~
are individual weapons-some of them
automatic-and grenades. Mines are
used to halt motor convoys, and light
machineguns. mortars, and recoilless
ritles are used in larger scale attacks.
Casualties in the killing zone are high.
Losses suffered by the ambush party
are invariably light, provided the trap
is undetected.
The ambush accounts for a signifi-
cant portion of all guerrilla activities.
In Malaya attacks against moving tar-'
gets represented about 35 percent of
all incidents. Seven percent of these
were minor-holdups of single vehi-
. cles or a few shots at passing trains
or convoys-but the other 28 percent
Military Review
were ambushes. It is interesting to
note that when the British security
forces reached their most effective
stage of counterguerrilla operations,
35 percent of all their encounters with
the Communist terrorists resulted
from their own use of the ambush.
Effectiveness
The ambush constitutes a major ir-
ritant to the govern!Den(, a cause of
serious losses, and a basis for per-
suasive insurgent promises of ulti-
mate victory in their propaganda ef-
forts to win more popular support.
The effectiveness of the ambush
may also be measured in terms of the
road mileage that the government is
compelled to close to traffic, or over
which security escorts are required.
In Indochina the French found it
necessary to abandon many routes and
restrict the use of others to the hours
of 'daylight. Today, about 70 percent
of the total road length requires se-
curity escorts in South Vietnam. As
a result, much of the road traffic has
been converted to other forms of
transport. The gradual surrender of
surface lines of communication has
serious military and political implica-
tions. The abandonment of roads,
especially in populated areas, gener-
ally leads to the prompt loss of such
areas to insurgent control.
When movement along roads, trails,
and waterways occurs through areas
in which the insurgents enjoy the
support of the population, the coun-
terguerrilla operations of government
troops are severely handicapped by
the intelligence barrier which such
support creates. The villagers, through
sympathy or fear, will not inform lo-
cal internal security forces when a
guerrilla unit enters the area and lays
an ambush. They will often harbor
or hide guerrillas and assist them to
November 1964
escape after an attack. Thus, the in-
telligence of the security forces is re-
duced to their own after-the-fact re-
porting of guerrilla incidents, while
village informants promptly pass on
accurate information on the move-
ments of government forces to the
insurgents.
If the government's counterintelli-
gence effort is weak, and insurgent
agents are able to penetrate its inter-
nal security organization so that
movements are known in advance,
counterguerrilla operations will a l ~
ways be unproductive.
Counterambush Measures
Even so, one may ask, why does a
column, be it a squad or a motorized
division, march into the killing zone
of an ambush? And, if it does, why
cannot better countermeasures be de-
veloped that will serve to neutralize
the advantage of the ambush party?
Countermeasures come under two
classifications-protection and detec-
tion. Each includes techniques and de-
vices, but the purposes of protective
and detective countermeasures are
distinct. The former aim is to neu-
tralize the advantage of the ambush
party when the ambush is sprung,
and the latter is to discover the pres-
ence of the ambush party before the
head of a column enters the killing
zone.
Protective techniques inc Iud e,
among other factors, the organization
and conduct of the march, use of
specially equipped convoy protection
units, immediate action drills, special
weapons, and air cover. An example
of a .protective device is special slip-on
side armor for t);oopcarrying vehicles.
Despite continued research and de-
velopment in this area, though, there
'appears little likelihood that any rev-
olutionary protective techniques or de-
91
AMBUSH DETECTION
vices will be developed which will sig.
nificantly reduce the advantage which
an ambush party has over its target
within the killing zone. Detection
seems to offer more promise.
Detection Techniques
There are two detection techniques
which can discover an ambush before
the head of a column enters the killing
zone-security on the march and a
reliable informant. net.
Security on (he March
. While it is true that modern weap-
ons, aircraft, and vehicular movement
have had little influence on ambush
patterns, it is equally true that the
simplll- security measures for flushing
out an ambush party and seizing the
initiative have been known for thou-
sands of years. The difficulty is that
there is a severe constraint in the
space-time dimension respecting their
use.
The degree of security of a column
on the march may be regarded, rough-
ly, as inversely proportionate to its
rate of march. Security of the main
body is achieved by the exposure of
small detachments between it and a
possible enemy on all avenues of ap-,
proach open to that enemy. For a
column temporarily halted, security is
usually possible. But when the column
is in motion, protection of the flanks
is difficult to gain because offroad
movement is necessarily slower and
sometimes impossible. Too, there is no
time. to investigate the, terrain to a
depth of 100 meters on either side of
the road to assure that any ambush
party lying in wait is flushed out be-
fore the head of the column enters
every possible killing zone. This can
be done, but only if the column is
halted frequently, and it is a process
which is painfully slow and unaccept-
ably time consuming. Some means of
detecting an ambush is needed that
will enable a column to proceed at a
reasonable pace.
The Informant Net
The breakthrough of the intelli-
gence barrier appears to be the surest
method. Winning the bat-
tle, however, requires that the gov-
ernment regain the support of the
people in order to dry up the sea in
which the fish swim. The people must
be convinced that th,e government will
ultimately win, and that they will do
well to identify themselves with the
winner.
The difficulty here is that the proc-
ess of regaining the support of the
population in the gray areas and win-
ning the intelJigence battle amounts
to no less than winning the war. It
is a long, slow process of combined
military-political-social-economic-psy-
chological action.
Summary
In summary, then, the tactical ad-
vantage of the undetected ambush
party consists of its ability to retain
the initiative, and to open the action
with surprise and superiority of fire
which inflicts severe losses in a
period of time.
The counterambush problem-the
problem of the marching column-is
to detect an ambush before the head
of the column enters the killing zone.
Certain protective measures, intended
to offset the tactical advantage 'of the
undetected ambush party at the time
it springs the trap. have a neutraliz-
ing effect, but they do not appear
to hold much promise of ever having
sufficient effect to offset the advan-
tage possessed by the undetected am-
bush party.
Detection techniques are effective,
but their use is severely restricted. A
reliable detection device---biological.
Military Review 92
I
chemical, or physical-that would il)-
dicate the presence of unseen person-
nel ahead of a marching column, would
render the general use of march se-
curity techniques more compatible
with an acceptable rate of march in
sparsely settled areas. A marching
column would have to halt and thor-
oughly investigate the terrain to the
front and to a suitable distance on
either side of the road only when the
device warned of the presence of
humans ahead. The column could then
proceed past even the most poten-
tially dangerous ambush sites with
complete confidence.
Eventually. the government will
have to demonstrate to the villager
that it can protect him from guerril-
las. Only then will it be possible to
create a broad collection base of in-
formants in every village so that the
movements of insurgent units will be
quickly known to district and provin-
cial security officers.
Forewarning of an ambush, almost
to the moment a column enters the
killing zone, will nullify the advantage
of the ambush party. The incidence of
ambushes in an area where the intelli-
gence battle has been won will take
a sharp downtrend because, in these
circumstances, the ambush party can
be destroyed. When the tactic proves
too costly-but only then-the insur-
gents will not use it. When that time
, is reached, the ambush will no longer
be a problem.
COMMENTS INVITED
The Military e v i ~ w welcomes your comments on any mate- .
rial published. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought
will assist us and may lead to pUblication of your ideas. If you
are an authority on a certain subject, why not write an article
for our consideration? If you have only an idea, query us; per-
haps we can assist you in developing an acceptabfe article.
November 1964
93
LIKE
UNTO
WATER
Major E. H. Dar, Pakistan Army
I
NFILTRATION tactics are character-
ized by a fluid type of warfare, where
the effect sought is not to captureanypar-
ticular piece of terrain, but to create and
maintain a devastating effect of paralysis
over the opponent's system of command. .
There is a considerable difference be-
tween infiltration tactics and infiltration
techniques. Wh iI e infiltration techniques
are common to all types ofmilitary opera-
tions, infiltration tactics call for mobile
warfare byhighly trained infantry forma-
tions under suitable tactical and strategic
conditions. The cumulative effect of these
tactics is the destruction of the enemy's
will to fight.
It follows, therefore, that the difference
between a normal offensive maneuver and
infiltration tactics lies in the effect they
have on an opponent. Infiltration aims at
paralyzing the opponent; conventional tac-
tics aim to capture vital ground. Paralysis
can be achieved. most easily if the infiltra-
tion force can snap the bonds which hold
togetherthevariousenemyechelons. There-
by, a series of problems is posed which,
in their cumulative'effect, can neither be
anticipated nor dealt with adequately. Of
this type of fluid war, the most profound
and the greatest' exponent is Sun-tzu.
If a militaryorganizationisprovidedsuf-
ficientsuperiorityin numbersandfirepower
and itsshockaction is exploited by resolute
troops, any vital ground may be captured.
But a conventional offensive is restricted
in space because all maneuvers are chan-
nelized toward the vital ground. It will be
adversely affected in terms oftimebecause
it must follow a set pattern.
Infiltrationovercomesthesedrawbacksof
conventional tactics by neutralizing vital
groundthrough itsparalysis effect. Thevi-
tal ground, as it were, ceases to be vital.
The effect is to make an infiltrating force
temporarily independent ofspace and time.
The Communist Chinese attackon Se La
Pass in theNorth-East FrontierAgency in
Military Review .
94
November 1962 provides an excellent
example. The 4,300-meter Se La. Pass
is a powerful position-the classic vi.
tal ground. In late 1962 it was de-
fended by the 4th Indian Division
which had dug itself in and brought
25-pounder guns to secure the posi-
tion.
While one Red Chinese force launch-
ed a frontal attack, another Red Chi-
nese force carried out a pincer move-
~ n t far to the south. The latter move-
ment cut the only road linking the Se
La Pass with the key defense center
of Bomdi La, 52 air kilometers to the
south, but 130 kilometers by a tortu-
ous road over the mountains. An ob-
server noted:
As a result, the Se La Pass was ren-
dered untenable as a defensive posi-
tirm; its defenders were faced with
a fighting withdrawal down a valley
already cut by the Chinese; and Bomdi
La itself was seriously threatened, the
road having been cut at a point near
that town.
Bomdi La fell on 19 November. In
a three-day advance, the Red Chinese
had covered some 145 kilometers-an
outstanding performance in an area
laced with ridges running up to 5,180
meters.
Erroneous Belief
The paralysis created by the use of
infiltration tactics has to be sufficiently
weighty to be effective. A paralyzed
Major E. H. Dar, Pakistan Army,
is the author of "Mountain Warfare"
which appeared in the January 1961,
issue of the MILITARY REVIEW. He has
served as an instructor at the Paki-
stan School of Infantry and Tactics,
and at the Pakistan Military Academy.
A graduate of The Infantry School,
Fort Benning, and the Staff College,
Camberley, England. he is presently
assigned to the 19th Battalion, Baluch
Regiment, in Cherat.
Lovember 1964
regiment will recover quickly, but a
paralyzed corps may mean the loss of
an entire theater of operations. A col-
lection of small patrols cannot achieve
the desired shock effect in time and
space, and to think that infiltration
tactics consist of isolated platoon or
company actions is erroneous. These
would amount only to pinpricks and
would not, by themselves, create a
paralyzing effect.
The concept of sma 11 ,balanced
groups working their way behind the
enemy finds favor from a misconstrued
study of infiltration tactics employed
in Europe during World War I. In
brief, the particular study stated that:
The German tactics (d uri n g the
1918 offensive) were based on infiltra-
tinn by storm groups of all arms ex-
cept tanks-riflemen, light machine-
gun s, flame throwers and mortars.
These groups were not fixed units but
of any size and composition up to bat-
talion according to the task in hand.
They were not to worry about flanks;
not to preserve a continuous fro n t
line; not to stop (although units of
Below's 17th Army did) in order to
overcome points of resistance. Like a
tide coming in over a rocky foreshore
they were to flow always fOT1card and
round by the paths of least resistance.
... Behind the storm groups came
the battle groups mixed forces again,
including guns and engineers whose
task was to clean up resistance by-
passed by the storm troops.
Nevertheless, the conditions under
which the Germans undertook their
1918 offensive were far from ideal for
the use of infiltration tactics. The of-
fensive was based not on any rational
assessment of chances of. success, but
derived, rather, from the curious as-
> sumption that the army had to carry
out offensive operations.
95
LIKE UNTO WATER
The German infiltration techniques
Wer>e designed to create a series of
gaps to permit the resumption of mo-
bile warfare. Infiltration, therefore,
became synonymous with the creation
of lanes for the battle gr,lUps. One
cannot properly argue that had Below's
17th Army been more agile, or had
Ludendorff made an exploitation plan
and used one gap instead of three, re-
suits would have been different. It is
far more important to see that the
attackers were trying to put the cart
before the horse.
The result achieved-a breach near-
ly 64 meters wide-was due to the
G e r man employment of infiltration
techniques, rat her than infiltration
tactics. Conditions were not conducive
for the employment of infiltration tac-
tics. As was the case with the J ap-
anese at Imphal in World War II, the
time for decision and decisive action
had passed.
Infiltration tactics are no panacea
for success; they will not automati-
cally lead to victory. On the 0 the r
hand, they are the most suitable tac-
tics for highly trained and mobile in-
fantry forces, particularly when those
forces lack air and armor support.
Necessary Reorganization
Not all infantry formations can un-
dertake infiltration tactics; some o r ~
of reorganization is necessary. The
basis of this reorganization is to en-
hance mobility, and firepower is the
factor which suffers in the process.
But if shock effect is the product of
fire 'and maneuver, then any loss in
firepower, in terms of its ultimate ef-
J;ect, can be compensated for by giving
increased value to mobility.
An ideal infiltrating infantry force
should be foot mobile in its entirety,
somewhat a kin to Lettow-Vorbeck's
operations in east A f ric a during
World War I. It may even be found
that bicycles and motorcycles are ex-
cellent adjuncts to mobility. In fact,
the Japanese advance in Malaya in
1942 has been called.a "blitzkrieg an
cycles."
When employing infiltration tactics,
an infantry division or a corps should
consist of a number of flexible' and
balanced task forces, not necessarily
restricted in size. capable of being
combined for effect or separated for
a given time. It is by mobile and -re-
lentless offensive operations that these
forces-using all the tricks of method
and maneuver, of noise, ruse, and psy-
chology, of continuously attacking, dis-
engaging, concentrating, and a g a i n
attacking--create the desired paralyz-
ing effect. The entire operation must
be characterized by speed.
Perhaps Sun-tzu has best described
infiltration tactics:
Military tactics are like unto water,
for water in its natural course runs
away from high places and hastens
downwards. So in war, the way to
avoid what is strong is to strike what
is weak. Water shapes its course ac-
cording to the ground over which it
flows; the soldier works out his vic-
tory in relation to the foe whom he is
facing. Therefore, just 'IS water re-
tains no constant shape so in warfare
there are no constant conditions. He
who can modify his tactics in relation
to his 'opponent and thereby succeed
in winning may be called a heaven
born captain.
Military Review 96
MILITARY
NOTES
UNITED STATES
'XV9A' Helicopter
A new type of helicopter, in which
heavy drive components have been
eliminated, is currently under study.
The components are replaced with a
pneumatic propulsion system which
ejects high-energy gases from rotary
blade tips. Ground tests suggest the
Army News FratuTe8
possihility that the new craft will be
able to lift more than twice its own
weight, in contrast to conventional
helicopters. Maximum cruising speed
is expected to be 150 miles per hour,
with later versions capable of speeds
up to 300 miles an hour.-News item.
Global Reconnaissance
A 2,OOO-mile-an-hour reconnaissance
plane, the RS-71 , has been developed
for use by the Strategic Air Com-
mand.
The new aircraft, which will fly
above 80,000 feet, is now being flight
tested. It was described by President
Johnson as using "the most advanced
observation equipment of all kinds in
the wo-rld."-News release.
November 1964
CombinedArms Research
A series of operations research
studies on how the army of the fu-
ture should fight, be organized, and
be equipped will be performed under
-an Army contract recently awarded to
Booz, Allen Applied Research, Incor-
porated. The Combined Arms .Re-
search Office (CARO) is being estab-
lished by the company at Fort Leav-
enworth, Kansas, and will function
under the Combined Arms Group of
the Army's Combat Developments
Command.
The CARO group will help solve
problems in developing operational
and organizational objectives, doc-
trine, and tactics. The group will par-
ticipate initially in studies of intelli-
gence, firepower, communications, and
mobility. Special tasks will also be
undertaken in the areas of electrical
power and meteorology.
Initially, about 30 CARO scientists
will study the current state-of-the-art
in each area, predict technological
changes, evaluate the impact of such
changes, and recommend how best to
uti li z e technological advances. The
group will use qperations research,
systems analysis, war gaming, and
other techniques.-News release.
Tile MILITARY REVIEW and the U. S.
Army Command Bnd General Staff College 8S-
sume no responsibility for accuracy of infor..
mation contained in the MILITARY NOTES
section of this publieation. Items are printed
as a service to the readers. No official en-
dorsement of the views, opinions, or factpal
statements is intended.-The Editor.
97
MILITARY MOTES
Navy 'UH46A' Helicopter
--
'The first UH-46A's have been deliv-
ered to the Navy.
The primary mission of the UH-46A
will be the transfer of cargo from re-
plenishment ships to combatant ships
while at sea. Secondary missions will
require the helicopter to transfer per-
sonnel from ship to ship and conduct
emergency search-a n d-rescue opera-
tions for al1 ships in a task force.
This method of helicopter transfer
of general supplies, ammunition, mis-
siles, and aviation spares increases
task force mobility and operational
flexibility. Ships being replenished
will not have to reduce speed during
tactic:d operations; thereby maintain-
9a
L
Vertol DlVl$lOn,
The Boemg Company
ing task force formation and eliminat-
ing the possibility of colliSion during
close-in maneuvering.
Powered by two T58-8 turbine en-
gines, the UH-46A cruises at 150 miles
per hour. Because the rear ramp can
be left open during flight, the UH-
46A's can accommodate equipment
which exceeds the length of the cargo
compartment. For rescue missions, the
helicopter can fly 100 nautical miles,
rescue 20 persons, and return.
Other military versions are in pro-
duction for the Marine Corps, the
Royal Canadian Air Force and Army,
and the Royal Swedish Navy and Air
Force.-News release.
Military Review
Satellite Communitations
The first satellite to be used in a
military communications satellite sys-
tem will be launched early in 1966.
The system will pro v ide reliable.
The MaTttn Companll
worldwide circuits, highly resistant to
jamming and physical attack.
The Air Force will orbit a total of
24 satellites to provide two-way voice
circuits between key points around
the world. Plans are to place the satel-
lite in orbit with t h r e e Titan III
.Novemher t964
rockets. each carrying eight satellites.
This program will provide an in-
terim system to be replaced in about
three years by an advanced. long-
lived system.-News item.
New Combat Boot
A new, experimental combat boot
for the American soldier will soon 'un-
dergo testing by Tile Infantry Board
at Fort Benning, Georgia, as well as
in Europe, Korea, and Alaska.
The boot utilizes a modern manu-
facturing technique featuring the
molding of the sole directly to the
upper leather portion of the boot. This
molding process eliminates the leather
midsole of conventional construction
and greatly enhances the waterproof
quality of the boot. Another feature
of the footwear is a cleated sole, de-
signed to provide traction which is
superior to standard boots.
The leather, 8.5-inch-high upper
portion of the boot weighs approxi-
mately five ounces and has a full lace
closure, utilizing eyelets. The outer
sole al}d heel are full cleated and are
attached.to the upper portion through
the direct molding process. The boot
is provided with a slip-in ventilating
insole to provide comfort in 'hot I
weather.-US Army release.
99 .
MILITARY NOTES
Tractor Tests

. . ..
.... .. ,.. .
. ,'!"=- .
A family of construction vehicles
Three versions of an experimental Ballastable Earthmoving Sectionalized
Tractor (BEST), developed by the US Army Mobility Command's Engineer
Research and Development Laboratories at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, have been
delivered to FortBenning, Georgia, for tests by the 11th Air Assault Division.
The BEST, which provides for the application of a wide variety of center
sections tostandard front and rear-powered axle units, is helicopter transport-
able and is designed to meet airassault requirements for high density, mobile,
flexible utilitarian equipment.
A family of construction equipment can be readily formed by joining a
scraper bowl, grader, compactor, membrane layer, flatbed trailer, or a tanker
to eitherbasic unit.-News item.
Jet-Propelled Ship
A new type ofsurfacecraft report- which supports 90 of the
edly under development by the Navy weight of the craft, reOucing drag
has achieved speeds of nearly 50 considerably.
knots. This experimental ship is not to be
The ship is powered by a 2,400- confused with hovercraft which move
pound-thrust jet engine. Air from a about one foot above land and water
lightweightfan is capturedunderand supported by airblasts created by
around the ship's hull by sideboards heavy, ducted fans. Itis
_ extending offside and down into the from hydrofoil craftwhicJ11ise above
water, and across its entire bow and surfaceturbulenceonsIedlikerunners.
stern. This creates an air bubble -News item.
100 Military Review
I
~
Maintenance Ship
The Army will convert a naval ves-
sel for use overseas as a floating air-
craft maintenance base.
The Albemarle (AV-S) , a reserve
fleet seaplane tender, will be used to
provide major repairs and mainte-
nance for Army helicopters and fixed-
wing aircraft wherever needed. It will
also serve as a backup for overseas
land-based facilities.
The need for the ship stems from
the excessive time it takes under the
present system to return aircraft com-
ponents from isolated overseas loca-
tions to continental United States
maintenance shops. The time can be
reduced greatly by having an over-
seas floating repair base.
The Albemarle will be manned and
operated by the Military Sea Trans-
portation Service with a crew of ap-
proximately 135 officers and men. The
maintenance facilities will be manned
by an Army Materiel Command Aero-
nautical Depot Maintenance Battalion
of approximately 380 officers and men.
-DOD release.
New live Fire Training
The United States Continental
Army Command, as a result of a spe-
CIal exercise conducted last February
at Fort Polk, Louisiana, has adopted
a new combined-arms live fire training
exercise for the combat arms. The new
exercise features increased realism
under simulated combat conditions.
The most important changes are:
Overhead fire of tank cannon,
firing direct fire, and using high ex-
plosives or high-explasive practice
training ammunition for ranges up to
2,000 meters.
Overhead fire of the 106-milli-
meter recoilless rifle, using high-ex-
plosive ammunition for ranges up to
2,000 Iljeters.
November 1964
When l05-millimeter howitzers
and 10.7-centimeter (4.2-inch) mor-
tars are used in live fire exercises,
troops may maneuver on the flanks of
an objective as close as 225 to 250 me-
ters (previously this was 500 meters) .
The requirement to check concen-
tration of the 105millimeter howit-
zer within one hour of actual firing
has been eliminated if firing data is
kept current by hourly computation
of weather data.
Overhead fire for the M60 'ma-
chinegun, without the use of travers-
ing and depression stops, will be au-
thorized if there is a 1,200-meter sight
graduation etched on the rear sight
leaf of the weapon.-News item.
"Waterwings"
The "waterwings" shown in the ac-
companying photo enable this 14-ton
truck to swim. They are flotation bags
which are inflated with engine exhaust
Army News Features
gases. Propulsion is obtained from the
wheels churning in the water.
The flotation bags were developed
by a defense contractor, but no an-
nouncement has been made of their
adoption .by the Army.-News item.
101
MILITARY NOTES
'YC H54A Skycrane'
Army News Features
The first of a number of Skycrane helicopters (MR, Nov 1962, p 99) was
delivered recently to the US Army Aviation Materiel Command. The huge hel
icopter is destined for duty with the 11th Air Assault Division at Fort
Benning, Georgia, and is now being used for pilot training.
The YCH-54A can carry a variety of loads beneath its open fuselage or
in a detachable van.-News item.
Materiel Readiness
Emphasis is being given by the US
Continental Army Command to Army
Regulations 11-14, Army Programs-
Materiel Readiness, published 7 Jan-
uary 1963. Stressed is that:
" .. commanders. soldiers. and civil-
ians at all levels [must 1 realize that
the increasing dependency of the
Army on larger qua'lltiti!?s of more
complex materiel carries with it the
mandatory obligation to maintain ma-
teriel in a ready condition.
The regulation points out that ar-
mies are more powerful today primar-
ily because they have better equip-
ment. but that plans are based upon
the use of equipment which is in a
high state of readiness. It requires
several actions by commanders at all
echelons. One is to impress upon every
individual that "the materiel in his
hands today is the materiel with which
he may fight tomorrow."
The regulation also says to:
Provide adequate prime military
man-hours for the performance of
required preventive and corrective
maintenance. The criticality of ma-
teriel readiness must bee considered
equal to that of personnel training
and readiness. A, proper ba:lance must
be maintained among training, main-
tenance, and all other requirements
essential to combat readiness.
Military Review
102
FRANCE
.Nuclear Capability
Soldat utld Technilc
The Mirage IV being refueled by a KC-135 flying tanker
An unofficial French news source The bomb is reported to be a 60-kil-
recently published some statistics on oton weapon. Future yields are ex-
France's nuclear armament. Accord- pected to be as high as 300 kilotons.
ing to the report, there are 14 or 15 By 1966 there will be 62 Mirage IV's.
Mirage IV planes now equipped with Longer range plans call for nuclear
nuclear weapons. This figure is ex- submarines, carrying Pol a r is-type
pected to be increased to 20 by the missiles, to become operational some-
end of 1964. time after 1971.-News item.
Submarine 'Gymnote'
< Wehrkunde:
The French submarine Gymnote was recently launched at Cherbourg. The
vessel will be used for experiments on underwater rocket firing by the crew that
will man the projected French nuclear submarine Q 252 (MR, Feb 1964, p 103).
-News item.
November 1964 103
MILITARY NOTES
Training Of Foreign Military
At the end of 1963, 2,085 foreign
stJldents were being trained at French
military schools. More than 'half were
being trained by the l1ir force. For-
eign students from French-speaking
countries in Africa totaled 985. Mo-
rocco leads this group with 355 stu-
dents, followed" by Senegal with 125
and the Malagasy Republic with 115
students.
The percentage 'of foreign students
at some of the well-known French
military schools was: General Staff
College, 34 'percent; Military Acad-
emy' (first-year student&), 32 percent;
Sa.int Cyr, 18 percent; and
bulary School, 35 percent.-News
item.
GREAT BRITAIN
'Phantom II's' For The Royal Navy
Britain has ordered 130 Phantom II
aircraft for her navy, according to a
European source. The order calls for
a modified version of the craft to fa-
cilitate operation from the smaller
British aircraft carriers. US engines
are to pe replaced by British types,
and there will be changes in the wings
and the rear of the fuselage. Two pro-
totypes of the modified version are
scheduled for delivery in 1965, and in
1968 the Pilantom II craft will be sta-
tioned on the British aircraft carriers
Eagle, Arc Royal, and Hermes.-
News item.
SPAIN
'Hawk' Missiles
Unofficial Spanish news re-
port that Spain, will receive Hawk
air defense missiles froIl! the United
States during the next five years, un-
der extensions of Spanish-United
States military aid agreements.-
News, item.
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
Treaty With Yemen
An agreement between the United
Arab Republic and Yemen coordinat-
ing their political, military, economic,
social, cultural, and propaganda ef
forts has been signed in Cairo.
, As in the case of the recent United
Arab Republic pact wjth Iraq (MR,
Aug 1964, p 105), the treaty provides
establishment of a joint military
command and states that an attack
against one will be considered an at-
tack on both.-News item.
ALGERIA
Soviet Weapons
According to European sources, the
Algerian armed forces are being sup-
plied with Soviet arms. About 150
modern battle tanks. an undisclosed
number of heavy mortars, and at least
one wing of Soviet jet fighter aircraft
are scheduled for delivery. Algerian
soldiers are reportedly being trained
in the use of the new weapons by So
viet instructors. Two hundred Alge-
rian officer can did ate s are being
trained in the Soviet Union.-News
item.
USSR
AirCushion Rivercraft
A Soviet periodical recently carried
a description of a new air-cushion
passenger rivercraft which reportedly
be used to transport up to 50
passengers on rivers.
The Soviets claim that tests con-
ducted with smaller models show that
it can be used either over water or ice.
lt will be equipped with airplane
wheels' for use when the craft emerges
on land.
The new rivercraft will be tested on
the Volga River int1965.-News item.
) Military Review
104
Antirocket Positions Around Moscow
The Soviets are reported to have a
new complex of rocket positions form-
ing a ring around the area of Greater
Moscow. An unofficial West German
news source suggests that these posi-
tions may be launching facilities for
antirocket weapons.-News item.
Development Of Armament,
Although the Soviet effort during
the past decade emphasized closing the
gap in the field of intercontinental
missiles, the armament of the ground
forces was decisively improved during
the same period.
The Soviet goal was to attain
greater firepower, longer ranges, and
the lar,gest degree of mobility possi-
ble for a nuclear theater of war.
The following results are reported
from unofficial sources abroad:
Guided weapons and free rockets
are taking the place of the more vul-
nerable combat aircraft. Four major
types of rockets, credited with ranges
from 25 to 1,000 kilometers, have been
displayed- in military parades. They
are suitable for the delivery of nu-
clear warheads ranging from one kilo-
ton to one megaton and are capable of
employing biological and chemical
warfare agents. Except for the largest
model, which is mounted on a trailer,
the rockets are mounted on tank
chassis.
The development of armored vehi-
cles is designed to give all vehicles a
river-crossing capability and to equip
them with infrared sighting devices
for night combat.
While there are no important
changes in the armament of the indi-
vidual soldier, much attention has
been given to his protection against
chemical, biological, and radiological
warfare. Every soldier has a gas mask
November '1964
and protective clothing. Plans call for
equipping each unit with a detector
and decontamination devices.
Maximum performance of conven-
tional artillery is achieved by the'
towed, rilled 230-millimeter cannon,
which' has a range of 30 kilometers,
and the 280-millimeter, 6-tube rocket
launcher, which is truck mounted and
has a range of 25 kilometers.
Airborne troops are known to have
an 85-millimeter assault gun mounted
on an amphibious light tank which is
equipped for night fighting.
Engineer materiel also shows the
effort made toward complete cross-
country ability. Two 50-ton bridges
mounted on T34 and T5J, tanks are
the latest development.-News item.
New CrossCountry Vehicle
The body of a heavy standard truck
is being used for this cross-country
vehicle which has a new type of bar-
rel-shaped pneumatic tire. While the
ground pressure of a conventional tire
is approximately 13 to 15 pounds per
square centimeter, the ground pres-
Allgemeine SChWetZeTfBche
M,'I,tarzelt8chnft
sure of this new tire is only four-
tenths of a pound on a hard-surface
road and one-tenth of a pound on soft
ground. This increases the cross-coun-
try ability of the new vehicles which
have reportedly proved themselves in
deep snow and swampy terrain. In
water the "air rollers" serve as lIoats.
-News item.
105
MILITARY NOTES ,
Baltic SeaYolga River Canal
The' Soviet Union has announced
completion of a 360kilometer canal
from the Baltic Sea to the Volga River.
The Soviet news agency Tass claimed
it will take over 15 million tons of
cargo a year from overburdened rail-
roads.-News item.
SWEDEN
New Icebreaker
The new icebreaker Tor of the
Swedish Fleet was employed for the
first time in the Gulf of Bothnia
Wchrkuurlc
which is frozen nearly five months
each year. The Tor, which is now the
most powerful Swedish icebreaker,
brings the total to five.-News item.
POLAND
Jet Trainer 'Iskra TS11'
A two-seat jet trainer has been
added to the Polish Air Force. Built
in Poland, its turbojet engine gives
it a top speed of nearly 500 miles an
hour.-News item.
BOLIVIA
Road Project
A major road project, designed to
open up fertile, undeveloped lowlands
in northeast and east-central Bolivia,
will soon begin with assistance from
the US Agency for International De
velopment.
Two sections of the proposed high.
way will connect to form a road from
Cochabamba to Puerto Villaroel on the
Ichilo River. The road will go through
320 kilometers of rugged Andes Moun
tain and jungle terrain, and will link
the highlands to navigable ~ r s
which le;;uI to the Atlantic Ocean) It
will permit a mass migration of In-
dians now barely able to make a living
in the Altiplano and high valleys to
the west. Construction is expected to
be completed in five years.-News
item.
ISRAEL
Military Equipment
Israel is improving her army con-
stantly and is modernizing her motor-
ized units, according to an unofficial
report. A recent example is the French
Soldat und Techmk
155-millimeter field howitzer mounted
on a Sherman tank chassis which was
shown in a parade in Beersheba on the
16th anniversary of t h ~ Republic.-
News item.
Military Review
106
I
.MILITARY
BOOKS
THE MINUTE MAN IN PEACE AND WAR. A
History of the National Guard. By Jim Dan
Hill. Foreword by George Fielding Eliot. 605
Pages. The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa.,
1964. $6.00. .
By MAJ FRANCIS H. HELLER, USAR
Considering the widespread inter-
est in Civil War history, the many
historical accounts of military units,
and the recent spate of work in the
field of state and local history, it
comes as something of a surprise to
realize that no one had ever written
a comprehensive h"jstory of the Na-
tional Guard and its predecessor, the
State Militia. The job has now been
done by Jim Dan Hill, newspaper col-
umnist, historian, college president,
and ex-major general in the National
Guard.
General Hill's massive but highly
readable volume coverstheyearsfrom
the Battle of Concord to the Berlin
crisis of1961.
Theauthorhasnotshiedawayfrom
either controversy or criticism. and
as a result, there will be those who
will no doubt take exception to some
of his interpretations.
General Hill has supplied excellent
bibliographies with each chapter and
indicated a number of opportunities
for further research.
It is possible that this book may,
in time, take its pIace as a much
needed overview of National Guard
history. Itmayalsoserveasanincen-
tive for new writing and research in
military history.
November 1964
WAR EAGLE. A Life of General Eugene A.
Carr. By James T. King. 323 Pages. Univer
sity of Nebraska Press, lincoln, Nebr.,
1963. $6.00.
By COL ALBERT S. BRITT, JR.,
USA, Ret
War Eagle is a well-documented bi-
ographyof BrigadierGeneral EUgene
A. Carr, United States Army, a cav-
alry leader in the Civil War and in
the Indian wars. by Professor James
T. King, a studentoffrontier history.
Although brevetted major general
for gallantry and distinguished serv-
ice during the Civil War, the remain-
derofCarr's militarycareerwas con-
fined to the Indian campaigns on the
Wes.tern frontiers where he was no-
tably successful as a fighting com-
mander and earned the proud name
of "War Eagle" from his Indian foes.
Colonel Carr received many ,honors
for his battles, but he could not "get
along" with higher headquarters.
Frequent bouts with his superiors
and their staffs almost prevented his
ultimate promotion to brigadier gen-
eral.
The author does not stress tactics,
strategy. or logistics. and it is diffi-
cult to follow the campaigns in detail
without adequate maps. Therefore,
the book's chiefvalue lies in its view
of life in the isolated Army frontier
posts of the 1860-90 period, and its
emphasis on the devotion to duty and
sense of responsibility exhibited by
. theleaders in theskirmishesand bat-
tles of the Indian wars.
107
MILITARY BOOKS
JET PIONEERS" By Lieutenant Colonel Gro
ver G. Heiman, United States Air Force. 235
Pages. Duell, Sloan & Pearce, New York,
1963. $4.95.
A narrative of the jet age that cov-
ers the most important developments
and some of the people who pioneered
them.
THE PENTAGON. By Gene Gurney. 146
Pages. Crown Publishers, Inc., New York,
1964. $3.95.
A pictorial story with over 200 pho-
tographs of the Pentagon. It includes
a history of the building and how it
is organized, managed, and main-
tained. Of general interest only.
THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA. By Victor L. Urquidi. Translated
Fr1Jm the Spanish by Marjory M. Urquidi.
Foreword by Frank Tannenbaum. 209 Pages.
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1964.
$6.00 clothbound. $1.95 paperbound.
By 20 LT FRANZ L. HELBIG, QMC
Few works in the vast literature on
the general subject of Latin-American
development have the qualities of this
book. An eminently qualified econo-
mist, an experienced international
planner and teacher, the author pre-
sents a theoretical blueprint for de-
velopment based on economic, social,
and political realities of the region.
A comprehensive statistical appen-
dix supports the author's discussions
of such problem areas as monetary
policies, foreign capital, and the inte-
gration of the Latin-American econo-
mies. His refreshing clarity and frank
honesty make the book valuable when
emphasis on the nationalistic solution
and the centralization of control be-
gins to obscure the view.
Tll.e book is solid background read-
ing on a vital subject.
THE NAVAL WAR IN THE PACIFIC: The Ris-
ing Sun of Nippon. The Military History of
World War II: Volume 11. By Colonel Trevor
Nevitt Dupuy, United States Army, Retir1!d.
90 Pages. Franklin Watts, Inc., New York,
1963. $2.511.
THE NAVAL WAR IN THE PACIFIC: On to
Tokyo. The Military History of World War II:
Volume 12. By Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy,
United States Army, Retired. 89 Pages.
Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1963. $2.50.
THE AIR WAR IN THE PACIFIC: Air Power
Leads the Way. The Military History of
WGrid War II: Volume 13. By Colonel Trevor
Nevitt Dupuy, United States Army, Retired.
88 Pages. Franklin Watts, Inc., New York,
1964. $2.50.
THE AIR WAR IN THE PACIFIC: Victory in the
Air. The Military History of World War II:
Volume 14. By Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy,
United States Army, Retired. 89 Pages.
Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1964. $2.50.
These four volumes complete Colonel
Dupuy's account of the war in the Pa-
cific. They are easy to read, and con-
tain excellent photographs and maps
of use to the general reader.
Volume 11 discusses the growth of
Japan as a naval power and covers
the first part of the naval war until
the end of the battle for Guadalcanal
early in 1943. Volume 12 continues to
the end of the war.
Volume 13, covering the air war,
describes events from the early ef-
forts of General Chennault in 1937 to
the conclusion of the Battle of the
Philippine Sea in June 1944. Volume
14 picks up from that point and ends
with the dropping of nuclear weapons
on Japan.
Two more volumes of this series on
World War II military history are
forthcoming.
Military Review
108
18 MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE: Organiza
tion and Control of the U. S. Armed Servo
ices. By John C. Ries. 228 Pages. The JDhns
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1964. $6.50.
By LT COL CHARLES B. ABLETT, AIS
< This is a provocative, absorbing an
alysis of developments in< US defense
organization at the national level. Mr.
Ries, a member of the Air Force
Academy's Political Science Depart
ment, contends that the central notion
behind defense organizations has al
ways been increased civilian control.
The goal has then been equated to a
particular organhational structure
for achievement. The dominant view
has been the orthodox model of or
ganization, the familiar "pyramid
through which authority and decision
flowed down from the top, while re-
sponsibility and information flowed
up from the bottom." This principle,
in its simplest form. can be stated: in
centralization there is' control.
Mr. Ries traces the origin of the
hierarchical g e n era I staff concept
from the War Department effort to
establish centralization over the semi
autonomous bureaus, services. and de-
partments. The author views the reor-
ganization occasioned by World War
II as evidence that the g o ~ 1 was not
achieved.
Post-World War II reorganizations
attempted to retain the valuable char-
acteristics of the organizational struc-
tures developed during World War II.
but the war experience was inter-
preted superficially-in terms of orga-
nizational structure--rather than as a .
challenge to the orthodox view of an
executive directing all subordinates
aided by a staff. Reorganizations only
perpetuated .the "myths of staff work"
and "proverbs of organization." The <
demands for uniformity. efficiency.
and elimination of waste meant great-
NDV!mber 1964
er control-and this, traditionally,
meant great centralization.
In this context and on this basis the
author interprets and analyzes the
National Security Act of 1947 and
subsequent reorganizations of 1949,
1953. and 1958. Regardless of the in-
tent of the Congress. he feels that the
implementers have conformed to the
principle that control is centralization.
To support the executive, common
operating functions have been consoli-
dated into defense-wide agencies; to
aid the executive in controlling these
agencies. a general staff of assistant
secretaries of defense flourishes. Un-
troubled by responsibility for the end
product of the defense establishment,
the defense-wide agencies and assist-
ant secretaries "are subject only to
management criteria such as costs."
The secretary alone provides the
means for lateral coordination-"an
impossible job for one man. as Mar-
shall discovered in World War II."
In the author's opinion. defense re-
formers have turned the calendar
back 60 years "and are ready to face
the demands of 'modern warfare' with
a bureau system similar to one that
failed to meet the test of the Spanish-
American War."
It is unlikely that anyone will agree
with everything the author contends.
But everyone concerned with national
defense should give serious and ob-
jective thought to the problems which
Mr. Ries has addressed and so lucidly
presented.
AL SIEBER. Chief of Scouts. By Dan L.
1hrapp. 432 Pages. The University of Okla
homa Press, Norman, Okla., 1964. $6.95.
A well-documented biography and
a vivid history of the Indian wars of
the southwestern United States and
the pacification of New Mexico and
Arizona.
109
MILITARY BOOKS
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES. John F. Kennedy. Con
taining the Public Messages, Speeches, and
Statements of the President, January 1 to
November 22, 1963. Foreword by Theodore
C. Sorensen. 1,007 Pages. Superintendent
of Documents, US Government Printing
Office, Washington, D. C. $9.00.
This third and final volume of the
Kennedy administration covers the
period 1 January to 22 November
1963. It includes verbatim transcript"
of the President's news conferences,
speeches, messages to the Congress,
and other materials released by the
White House.
In the foreword, Theodore C. Soren-
sen, Special Counsel to President Ken-
nedy, describes the President as:
. . . the most eloquent and articu-
late leader of our time. His only com-
mitment was to his country and con-
science. and no petty partisan interest
or other narrow dogma could detract
or diminish his determination to do
what was right.
Among the 478 items in the volume
are messages to the Congress on edu-
cation. youth, the needs of senior citi-
zens, and health measures. There are
statements on disarmament, man-
power, speeches on civil rights. the
nuclear test ban treaty, and the tax
reduction bill.
The volume also includes copies of
the two addresses the Pre s Ii den t
planned to make in Dallas on day
of- his assassination. .
Volumes covering the administra-
tion of President Eisenhower and the
first three years of President Tru-
man's administration are also avail-
able. Those covering the other Tru-
man years and the period since Pres-
ident Johnson took office are being
prepared.
ALMANAC OF NAVAL FACTS. 305 Pages.
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis,
Md., 1964. $3.50.
A ready reference source of infor-
mation about the US Navy. It includes
sections on campaigns and battles.
naval explorations, ship losses, and
naval terms and phrases.
EUROPE AGAINST DE GAULLE. By John
Pinder. 160 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger,
Inc., New York, 1963. $4.50.
By COL HERMAN W. LANGE, Arty
One British viewpoint on the future
of Europe and its present problems.
It makes only slight mention of the-
multilateral force, of tactical nuclear
weapons, and of conventional force
availability.
AIR ESCAPE AND EVASION. Edited by Lieu
tenant Colonel James F. Sunderman, United
States Air Force. 289 Pages. Franklin Watts,
Inc., New York, 1963. $5.95.
By MAJ GUY S. MELOY III, In!
An excellent collection of the high-
lights of 31 different evasions and
escapes by Allied and enemy airmen.
The stories presented have been ex-
tracted from official United States Air
Force and Royal Air Force documents.
magazine articles. and pub lis h e d
books.
Colonel Sunderman has selected ac-
counts that emphasize the imagina-
tion and resourcefulness displayed by
those airmen who, after being shot
down or captured, were successful in
returning to their own side. Evasions
and escapes that during
World War I, World War II, and the
Korean _Conflict are described.
Although the book is not, by any
means, a definitive study of evasion
and escape techniques, it is interest-
ing and enjoyable reading.
Military Review
110
PARACHUTE TO SURVIVAL. By Herbert Best.
190 Pages. The John Day Co., Inc., New
York, 1964. $4.50.
A description of the problems and
techniques of survival for those who
abandon an aircraft in flight, based
on unofficial data and observations at
the Combat Survival Training Course
at Stead Air Force Base, Reno, Ne-
vada.
OVERTURE TO SPACE. By Martin Caidin. 300
Pages. Duell, Sloan & Pearce, New York,
1963. $5.00.
A broad review of the first years
of space exploration. The author is
a prolific space-aeronautics writer who
sees great promise in space research
and exploration, but feels the United
States has not done enough to keep
up with the Soviets.
THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY IN LATIN
AMERICA. By John J. Johnson. 308 Pages.
Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif.,
1964. $7.00.
By COL VICTOR J. LAYTON, TC
Spanish-American independence was
not a chi eve d by the will of mass-
es, but by the decisions of isolated
groups. In the early days, conflicts of
interest were held in check by the
force of armies led often by rapacious
military men who, with their mount-
ed peons and gauchos, maintained a
form of stability in an immobile so-
ciety.
From this tortured beginning, Mr.
Johnson traces the evolution and in-
fluence of the military class upon the
economic. and political structures of
emerging Latin-American countries.
He demonstrates how military officers,
formerly allied with the land-owning
elite, are gradually being absorbed by
the moderni::ing middle classes whose
aspirations they promote.
NDvember 1964
Mr. Johnson is Professor of His-
. tory at Stanford University. an au-
thor, and a sought-after lecturer of
authority on Latin-American affairs.
His book is a well-balanced study of
the Latin-American military class, the
dynamic environment from which it
stems, its role in the past, and its po-
tential for the future until stable gov-
ernment, strong institutions, and re-
sponsible leadership emerge.
Source material for the volume is
drawn from national records and the
colorful literature of the South Amer-
ican Republics concerned. Contempo-
rary views are based on a collection
of opinions by military men and civil-
ians. A bibliography is included.
A MILITARY HISTORY AND ATLAS OF THE
NAPOLEONIC WARS. By Brigadier General
Vincent J. EspOSito, United States Army,
Retired, and Colonel John Robert Elting.
382 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New
York, 1964. $19.95.
This volume was prepared specifi-
cally as a study medium for use at
the United States Military Academy
at West Point, but it is nearly c.ertain
to be 'considered a classic in the study
of the Napoleonic Wars.
It is highly readable, with large
maps, an interesting section of bio-
graphical sketches, and a valuable list
of supplementary references. The au-
thors have integrated the maps with
the text, with the result that the nar-
ratives are easy to follow and the ma-
neuvers understood at once.
The authors feel that the modern
battlefield, with both sides possessing
tactical nuclear weapons, will require
the highly mobile forces t hat were
typical of Napoleon. If they are cor-
rect, there may yet be many practical
.lessons to be learned from a study of
the principles and practices of Bona-
parte.
111
, MILITARY BOOKS
THE BAnLE OF STALINGRAO. By Marshal
Vasili I. Cbuikoy, Marsbal of tbe SOYiet
Union. Introduction by Hanson W. Baldwin.
Translated From the Russian by Harold
Silver. 364 Pages. Holt, Rinebart & Winston,
Inc., New York, 1964. $5.95.
By MAJ JACK G. CALLAWAY, Arty
Marshal Chuikov is Commander in
Chief of the Soviet Land Forces and
a member of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party. Twelve
years ago he was commanding the 62d
Army which was responsible for the
defense of the city of Stalingrad. For
"more than five months in the fall and
winter of 1942-43 he waged a success-
ful battle to wear down and fix in
place the German 6th Army.
Some of Chuikov's statements are
surprisingly candid. He admits that,
initially, the Soviet troops were, in
many cases, poorly led and that all
units were not reliable. Some fought
to the last man (long after the last
round had been expended) while
others threw away weapons and ran.
Some senior commanders excused
themselves from the fighting on the
basis of "illness." There are some
likely distortions in the text, but gen-
erally it appears that the truth has
been reported.
A good study of fighting in built-up
areas and of Soviet leadership during
the dark days of World War II.
HEROES AND LEGENDS OF WORLD WAR I.
By Arch Whitehouse. 368 Pages. Doubleday
& Co., Inc. Garden City. N. Y., 1964. $5.95.
By CAPT FREDERICK F. WOERNER, JR.,
In!
A' colorfuT account of some of the
events, people, and legends of World
War I-the development and use of
the tank and the airplane, Nurse Ca-
vell; Alvin York. the Virgin of Albert
Cathedral, and the Angel of Mons.
H2
TURKEY TODAY-AND TOMORROW. An Ex
periment in By Nuri Eren.
276 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger. Inc.. New
York, 1963. $6.50.
By COL WILLIAM J. GALLAGHER. Arty,
The author, a Turkish career diplo-
mat, takes a cold. objective look' at
Turkey's experiment in westerniza
tion. He provides a comprehensive
treatise on the Turkish Government
and constitution, and' analyzes the va-
rious political parties, ideology, and
controversies which have developed
throughout the life of the Turkish Re-
pUblic.
This book is of value to US person-/
nel, civilianpr military, whose career
assignment takes them to this inter-
esting land.
CLASSROOMS IN THE MILITARY. An Account
of Education in the Armed Forces of the
United States. By Harold F. Clark and Har
old S. Sloan. 154 Pages. Bureau of Publica
tions, Teachers College, Columbia Univer
sity, New York, 1964. $3.95.
By COL DANIEL E. HALPIN, In!
This book, by two civilian scholars,
touches upon almost every facet of
military education, using simplified
charts to summarize a very complex
subject.
Underlying the discussion is the
idea that we are living through ape-
of rapid transition-a revolution
that dictates new methods of educa
tion to cope with the challenges being
generated.
The authors refer to the revolution
as the RET (research, education, tech-
nology) revblution and the mil-
itary's contributions and positive re-
sponses to this new revolution.
This book is well worth reading,
and covers all services and ranks.
Military RevIew