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Noam Chomsky and the Law

Robert Barsky
Many of those people vaguely familiar with Noam Chomsky's political stance, notably his anarchy, would find it difficult to imagine what relationship might exist between Noam Chomsky and The Law.[1] The reasons for this reflect misconceptions about anarchy, which lead people to associate it quite specifically with lawlessness; chaos, violence, destruction, and challenges to authority (including the police and other representatives of state order). Other people may have heard Chomsky's political lectures, which often contain references, generally positive, to international law, rule of law, domestic law, and specific legal remedies that rely upon documents such as the Bill of Rights, the US Constitution, the Declaration of Rights and Freedoms, as well as a range of United Nations resolutions and international laws. Despite the problems inherent in the status quo, it does have these mechanisms which, if followed would cut down on some of the misery of the world. "Choice of policy is determined by the goals that are sought. [For example,] if the goal had been to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, settle regional issues, and move towards a more decent world, then Washington would have followed the peaceful means prescribed by international law: sanctions and diplomacy. If the goal is to firm up the mercenary-enforcer role and establish the rule of force, then the Administration policy of narrowing the options to capitulation or war has a certain chilling logic.[2] Finally, there are the personal anecdotes about Chomsky, including those that emanate from widely-reproduced articles such as "Noam is an Island", by Jay Parini (Mother Jones October 1988), in which Parini expresses his surprise at the care that Chomsky takes in crossing the street, and his respect for traffic laws generally. I would suggest that Chomsky is wholly consistent in his views of law, and that a critical source for understanding his approach is, yet again, found in the writings of Rudolf Rocker, notably in the 1933 book Nationalism and Culture, if only because it indicates how a link between Cartesian thinking of the type that Chomsky has long upheld and the anarchist society to which he aspires could be made.[3] I will therefore begin with references to Rocker and the law as a means of unearthing them basic values that underwrite Chomsky's anarchist approach to law, discuss current debates relating thereto, notably discussions concerning the rule of law, and then turn to some specific examples in Chomsky's writings to illuminate the uses he makes of this work. Generally speaking, the easiest way to understand Chomsky's approach is to understand first his sense of the functioning of the elitist status quo, which is reinforced by education, and then through reference to a distinction that is everywhere present in his writings, a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate laws, on the one hand, and legitimate and illegitimate applications of those laws on the other. As to the former, we have his discussion about law school, with Michael Albert, the point of which reflects his sense of education overall: NC: Let me tell you a story I once heard from a black civil rights activist who came up to Harvard Law School and was there for a while. This must have been twenty years ago. He once gave a talk and said that kids were coming in to Harvard Law School with long hair and backpacks and social ideals and they were all going to go into public service, law and change the world. That's the first year. He said around April the recruiters come for the summer jobs, the

Wall Street firms. Get a cushy summer job and make a ton of money. So the students figure, What the heck? I can put on a tie and jacket and shave for one day, because I need that money and why shouldn't I have it? So they put on a tie and a jacket for that one day and they get the job for the summer. Then they go off for the summer and when they come back in the fall, it's ties and jackets and obedience and a shift of ideology...Sometimes it takes two years; that's overdrawing the point. But those factors are very influential. I've fought it all my life. It's extremely easy to be sucked into the dominant culture. It's very appealing. And the people don't look like bad people. You don't want to sit there and insult them. You try to be friends, and you are. You begin to conform, to adapt, to smooth off the harsher edges. Education at a place like Harvard is in fact largely geared to that, to a remarkable extent.[4] As to distinction between legitimate an illegitimate laws, we have once again recourse to Rudolf Rocker, who is a central reference for this distinction, and much else, in Chomsky's own writings. In the course of a discussion the subject of free speech, for example, Chomsky reminds us that: [F]reedom of speech is by no means a deeply entrenched tradition even in the United States, which by comparative standards is quite advanced in this regard. The same is true of other rights. Half a century ago, the anarchist writer Rudolf Rocker observed that "Political rights do not originate in parliaments; they are rather forced upon them from without. And even their enactment into law has for a long time been no guarantee of their security. They do not exist because they have been legally set down on a piece of paper, but only when they have become the ingrown habit of a people, and when any attempt to impair them will meet with the violent resistance of the populace." History provides ample warrant for this conclusion. As is well known, even the right to vote was achieved in the United States only through constant struggle. Women were disenfranchised for 130 years, and those whom the American Constitution designated as only three-fifths human were largely denied this right until the popular movements of the past generation changed the cultural and political climate. While the franchise has slowly been extended through popular struggle, voting continues to decline and to become a concomitant of privilege, largely as a reflection of the general depoliticization of the society and the disintegration of an independent culture challenging business dominance, along with popular groupings to sustain it. What formal participation remains is often hardly more than a gesture of ratification with only limited content, particularly at the higher levels of political power. The same is true of freedom of speech. Though these rights appear to be granted in the First Amendment, as interpreted in practice the grant was limited. At its libertarian extreme, the legal doctrine remained that of Blackstone, reiterated in 1931 by Chief Justice Hughes in a decision regarded as a landmark victory for freedom of expression: "Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity." Prior restraint is barred, but not punishment for unacceptable thoughts.[5] So part of the job of an anarchist, surprisingly enough perhaps, is to support legitimate laws, those which incline in the direction of the oppressed against their oppressors. Much of Chomsky's discussion in this regard makes reference

to the US's abuses of international law, however he also makes frequent reference to US allies, and their ability to break similar laws and conventions if it is deemed to be in the US interest.[6] Anarchism as described by Rocker relies very strongly upon another distinction, also present in Chomsky's work but less overtly, between natural and positive law, the former being those which are in line with the fundamental needs of a given society, as demonstrated over a prolonged period of time, and the latter more clearly linked to class and power interests in society. The rhetoric suggests that we are strong upholders of natural law, and the rule of law; but the actions of the US indicate the opposite, something that Chomsky constantly emphasizes in order to draw attention to the hypocrisy of the US system. For example, Chomsky recalls in a discussion of a ruling of the World Court that had gone against the US on the subject of Nicaragua that "the [US] media had dismissed the World Court as a "hostile forum" whose decisions are irrelevant, while liberal advocates of world order explained that the U.S. must disregard the Court decision. With this reaction, U.S. elites clearly articulate their self-image: the United States is a lawless terrorist state, which stands above the law and is entitled to undertake violence, as it chooses, in support of its objectives. The reaction to the "indispensable element" of the Central America accords merely reiterated that conviction.[7] In his view, these laws are legitimately ingrained within the classical liberal conception of law as put forth by the likes of Rousseau, Humboldt, and then upheld in later periods by those who have combated the rise of arbitrary, discretionary, administrative and totalitarian law. It is interesting that prevailing opinions about anarchy exclude the possibility that it could have a legalistic side, just as prevailing opinions suggest that an anarchist society would be necessarily technologically retrograde. Both of these ideas are specifically refuted by Chomsky, and by critical precursors or fellow-travelers such as Seymour Melman, Murray Bookchin, Zellig Harris, Anton Pannekoek and Rudolf Rocker, to no avail; if such ideas were accepted, then anarchism would be examined as the serious challenge that it is, something that's best avoided by ruling class ideologues across the spectrum. It is not, as the accepted wisdom goes, simply violence, chaos or utopianism: The overall viewpoint is that change can occur, and that there's ample evidence that it's desired by the population, which has only to recognize through examination the constant hypocrisy of their own government and media: If we take the trouble to distinguish doctrine from reality, we find that the political and economic principles that have prevailed are remote from those that are proclaimed. One may also be skeptical about the prediction that they are the wave of the future,'' bringing history to a happy end. The same end of history'' has confidently been proclaimed many times in the past, always wrongly. And with all the sordid continuities, an optimistic soul can discern slow progress, realistically I think. In the advanced industrial countries, and often elsewhere, popular struggles today can start from a higher plane and with greater expectations than those of the past. And international solidarity can take new and more constructive forms as the great majority of the people of the world come to understand that their interests are pretty much the same and can be advanced by working together. There is no more reason now than there has ever been to believe that we are constrained by mysterious and unknown social laws, not simply decisions made within institutions that are subject to human will - human institutions, which have to face the test of legitimacy, and if they do not meet it, can be replaced by others that are more free and more

just, as often in the past.[8] Is this nave? Is this utopian? There are concrete examples that suggest that significant moves forward can be made, and that the capacity for populations of being `defooled' is great: "Skeptics who dismiss such thoughts as utopian and naive have only to cast their eyes on what has happened right here in the last few years, an inspiring tribute to what the human spirit can achieve, and its limitless prospects - lessons that the world desperately needs to learn, and that should guide the next steps in the continuing struggle for justice and freedom here too, as the people of South Africa, fresh from one great victory, turn to the still more difficult tasks that lie ahead.[9]
Classical Liberalism and the Rule of Law

Rudolf Rocker insists in his writings about anarchy upon the importance of individual responsibility, which he discusses in the sections of his work that recall the importance of "natural law" for an anarchist society. Rocker links the idea of responsibility to issues of human creativity and potentiality, and thus it is not surprising that in discussions of law and responsibility, he makes frequent reference to the domain of cultural activity. He devotes considerable attention to the cultural forces in society because, in his words, they "involuntarily rebel against the coercion of institutions of political power on whose sharp corners they bark their shins. Consciously or unconsciously they try to break the rigid forms which obstruct their natural development, constantly erecting new bars before it. The possessors of power, however, must always be on the watch, lest the intellectual culture of the times stray into forbidden paths, and so perhaps disturb or even totally inhibit their political activities. From this continued struggle of two antagonistic aims, the one always representing the caste interests of the privileged minority, the other the interests of the community, a certain legal relationship gradually arises, on the basis of which the limits of influence between state and society, politics and economics - in short, between power and culture - are periodically readjusted and confirmed by constitutions." (86) In other words, in a move that seems surprising to those who consider that anarchy is necessarily against organised state institutions, he herein suggests that the judicial system, like government itself, is legitimate to the degree that it promotes freedom, and idea that Chomsky has adopted in his own writings, notably the recent book Power and Prospects. In Rocker's work this idea leads to a fundamental legal distinction: "In law it is primarily necessary to distinguish two forms: `natural law' and so-called `positive law'. A natural law exists where society has not yet been politically organised - before the state with its caste and class system has made its appearance. In this instance, law is the result of mutual agreements between men confronting one another as free and equal, motivated by the same interests and enjoying equal dignity as human beings. Positive law first develops within the political framework of the state and concerns men who are separated from one another by reason of different economic interests and who, on the basis of social inequality, belong to various castes and classes". This "positive law" hands power over to the state which, in Rocker's view, "has its roots in brute force, conquest and enslavement of the conquered" (86). In other words, it is quite possible to promote legal resolutions to conflict, and indeed to found communities upon legal grounds, even from an anarchistic standpoint. There are statements here that, in a postmodern setting, may be considered by some as unsettling or dubious. The idea that

"mutual agreements" could exist between "free and equal" individuals, necessarily constituted as stable subjects with consistent and knowable needs and desires, and upheld by international organs such as the United Nations, has been everywhere upset by postmodern and poststructuralist thought. This is not an area into which I'll venture at any length, but instead would suggest that the reader refer to a current debate between those who uphold the writings of Carl Schmitt as appropriate to our present-day world (notably Chantal Moufffe and Jean Leclau), and those who consider such a heavily discretion-based system as a menace to fundamental rights and freedoms, and thus consider that it was no accident that Schmitt became the advocate and architect of Nazi law (notably William Scheuerman, Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer.[10] What's interesting about Chomsky's adaptation of Rocker's approach is that he suggests that the USA practices positive law, imposing its will virtually wherever it pleases on account of its massive military might and international authority, while it both claims adherence to the rule of law and imposes it upon others when this suits US government or corporate purposes. Here the examples abound, first in terms of the US impeding the work, in this case considered positive, of the UN: "For the past 20 or 25 years the U.S. and Britain have been in a virtual war against international law at the United Nations. If you take a look at the record of the United Nations, that is very clear. In the Security Council since 1970, fully 80 per cent of the vetoes are by the U.S. and Britain, with the U.S. in the lead. In third place is France, and in fourth place, far behind, is the Soviet Union. It has fewer than one-third as many vetoes as England and about one-seventh as many vetoes as the U.S. That is not too surprising. After all, these are the two imperial states, and they are therefore naturally opposed to international law. International law is a very weak barrier against the depredations of the powerful, and naturally the powerful are against it. You have to be willfully blind not to see these things".[11] In the second case, the US uses the UN to satisfy its imperialist will: "Not all U.N. resolutions are ignored. The day before the unreported 1987 General Assembly resolution again calling on the United States to comply with international law, the Times ran a substantial story headlined "U.N. Urges Soviet to Pull Forces from Afghanistan," reporting that the General Assembly voted "overwhelmingly today for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, brushing aside Moscow's first concerted attempt to deflect such criticism from the United Nations" in this "annual resolution." A Times review of the General Assembly session on December 26 is headlined "General Assembly delivers setbacks to U.S. and Soviet," subheaded "Washington Loses on Budget, Moscow on Afghanistan and Cambodia issues." The report mentioned nothing about the 94-to-2 vote on the World Court decision, in which the majority included U.S. allies Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Spain, as well as major Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela), along with Sweden, Finland, and others".[12] Similar to Rocker's view, the classical liberal approach emphasises the need for stable, consistent and founded laws which would be applied in a formal fashion across time and space: The administrative state is an immense and tutelary power, in which the will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting. Such a power

does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannise, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which government is the shepherd. (cited in Boesche, The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville, 251) In line with this view, Scheuerman suggests that the tendency in most Western states is to move away from a classical liberal notion of `rule of law,' with its insistence upon consistent and universal legal norms, and towards a form of law that "takes an increasingly amorphous and indeterminate structure as vague legal standards like `in good faith' or `in the public interest,' proliferate" (1). Scheuerman claims that Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, who were both associated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research in the late thirties and forties, saw in this trend a danger which they saw confirmed in the reliance of the Nazi state upon the work of conservative scholars such as Carl Schmitt and Friedrich Hayek for the elaboration of a legal system appropriate for Nazi Germany. Scheuerman's book has implications beyond either a social history of Germany or a more adequate appraisal of the Frankfurt School, because he discusses the inherent dangers of a system that relies upon situation-specific administrative decrees, or upon interpretations of claims that depend upon notions such as custom, indwelling right, morality, fairness, or discretion. The danger of "extensive state intervention in an unprecedented variety of spheres of social and economic activity" is that the division between state and society is undermined, reducing the degree to which government action can be deemed predictable or, to use Rocker's conception, legitimate. The link to Chomsky, as we'll see, is found in Scheuerman's concern that state action is directed towards solidifying its power and expanding its influence, and that the classical liberal conception of law is one of the only consistent and reliable counter-weights to this move, which suggests that the state's desire to dismantle formal mechanisms of law is not in the interest of fairness but, logically and obviously, in the interests of consolidating illegitimate (from a natural law perspective) authority, which tends to be linked with force. One example that frequently recurs in this area is Israel, in particular in terms of its actions in the occupied territories: David Barsamian: I remember talking to Mona Rishmawi of Al Haq in Ramalla. She told me that when she would go to court, she wouldn't know whether the Israeli prosecutor would prosecute her clients under British mandate emergency law, Jordanian law, Israeli law, or Ottoman law. Noam Chomsky: Or their own laws. There are administrative regulations, some of which are never published. The whole idea is a joke, as any Palestinian lawyer will tell you. There is no law in the occupied territories. There's just pure authority. Even within Israel itself, the legal system is a joke when it comes to Arabs. It has to be covered up here. Arab defendants who come to the Supreme Court come after having been convicted. The convictions are in the high ninetieth percentile based on confessions. When people confess, everybody knows what that means. Finally, after about sixteen years, when one of the people who confessed and was tried turned out to be a Druse army veteran who was proven to have been innocent, it became a scandal. There was an investigation, and the Supreme Court stated that for sixteen years the secret services had been lying to them, had been torturing people and telling them that they hadn't. There was a big fuss in Israel about the fact that they had been lying to the Supreme Court.

How could you have a democracy when they lie to the Supreme Court? Not the torture. Everyone knew it all along.[13] The example here is rather dramatic, but not all commentators would consider that resorting to discretion-ridden administrative law is always negative; Hayek, for instance, proposes that the demise of formal law allows a space for the development of an "egalitarian legal alternative" that would be based upon some form of "indwelling right" or custom. But the real advocate of a turn away from rule of law was Carl Schmitt, a right-wing authoritarian political thinker under the Weimar regime who went on to theorise numerous elements of fascist law. He has been revitalised of late by the left (especially Paul Piccone and G.L. Ulman in Telos), the right (William Buckley and Paul Gottfried in the National Review), by various `postmodern' historians and writers such as Chantal Mouffe, and by mainstream writers including Joseph Bendersky and George Schwab. Chomsky has not entered this debate directly, however as we'll see he has a strong interest in what would be considered formal law through his support for the classical liberal rule of law. Neumann and Kirchheimer supported this idea of the "rule of law" and opposed the Schmitt viewpoint because they upheld a belief that "state action must be based on cogent general rules." In their view, which is supported by Scheuerman, "only clear general norms restrain and bind the activities of the state apparatus, provide a minimum of legal security, and counteract the dangers of a `creeping authoritarianism'" (2). Rather than relying upon legislators or bureaucrats to right the wrongs of modern society, they supported a law which would regulate them because "a genuinely democratic society requires a high degree of legal regularity and predictability to achieve autonomous and uncoerced political deliberation and action" (3). This predictability is for Neumann especially strongly linked to the idea of a legal norm that overrides all other decisions. He defines this norm as "a rule which does not mention particular cases or individual persons but which is issued in advance to apply to all cases and all persons in the abstract; and... as specific as possible in its general formulation".[14] Scheuerman is very sympathetic to this approach, although wary of some of its implications for the present welfare state when he writes that: Neumann concedes that this model can have only limited applicability in a setting necessitating extensive governmental action, and that cogent formal law today is necessarily replaced by vague legal standards and various forms of equity law and bargaining seemingly essential to the contemporary welfare state and its reliance on unprecedented forms of state intervention. Complex state activity requires equally complex (nonformal) modes of law. (207) So even if it could be put into play, the rule of law, according to Scheuerman "can never be rendered perfect, and legal gaps, exceptions, and irregularities are unavoidable side-effects of a social setting having particularistic power concentrations necessarily regulated by clandestine individual measure and administrative commands" (207-8). What Scheuerman does consider a realisable goal is that irregular law be exercises in a rational fashion. This of course is another problem both for the advocates of a postmodern approach to law, and to those who question Chomsky's own appeals to Enlightenment thinking, and to some vague notion of `freedom'. The fact is, and this is the link to Rudolph Rocker and his conception of the anarchist society, freedom also creates

the responsibilities that come naturally in train with liberation: "Only in freedom does there arise in man the consciousness of responsibility for his acts and regard for the rights of others; only in freedom can there unfold in its full strength that most precious social instinct: man's sympathy for the joys and sorrows of his fellow men and the resultant impulse toward mutual aid in which are rooted all social ethics, all ideas of social justice. Thus Godwin's work became at the same time the epilogue of that great intellectual movement which had inscribed on its banner the greatest possible limitation of the power of the state, and the starting point for the development of the ideas of libertarian socialism" (148). Reason and responsibility become the bases for individual decisionmaking, not authority and power. And for this conception of law Rocker draws upon various sources, including Richard Hooker, who "maintained that it is unworthy of a man to submit blindly, like a beast, to the compulsion of any kind of authority without consulting his own reason" (140);[15] John Locke, who maintained "that common and binding relationships existed between primitive men, emanating from their social disposition and from considerations of reason" (142); and to others who "aimed to set limits to hereditary power and to widen the individual's sphere of independence", including Lord Shaftesbury, Bernard de Mandeville, William Temple, Montesquieu, John Bolingbroke, Voltaire, Buffon, David Hume, Mably, Henry Linguet, A. Ferguson, Adam Smith. Most of them, writes Rocker, "inspired by biological and related science, had abandoned the concept of an original social contract" and " recognised the state as the political instrument of privileged minorities in society for the rulership of the great masses". (142) Classical liberalism upholds individual rights against the privileged, partly on account of the world from which it comes, says Chomsky: One may argue, as some historians do, that these principles lost their force as the national territory was conquered and settled, the native population driven out or exterminated. Whatever one's assessment of those years, by the late 19th century the founding doctrines took on a new and much more oppressive form. When Madison spoke of rights of persons,'' he meant humans. But the growth of the industrial economy, and the rise of corporate forms of economic enterprise, led to a completely new meaning of the term. In a current official document, Person' is broadly defined to include any individual, branch, partnership, associated group, association, estate, trust, corporation or other organization (whether or not organized under the laws of any State), or any government entity,''[16] a concept that doubtless would have shocked Madison and others with intellectual roots in the Enlightenment and classical liberalism - pre-capitalist, and anti-capitalist in spirit. These radical changes in the conception of human rights and democracy were not introduced primarily by legislation, but by judicial decisions and intellectual commentary. Corporations, which previously had been considered artificial entities with no rights, were accorded all the rights of persons, and far more, since they are immortal persons,'' and persons' of extraordinary wealth and power. Furthermore, they were no longer bound to the specific purposes designated by State charter, but could act as they chose, with few constraints. The intellectual backgrounds for granting such extraordinary rights to collectivist legal entities'' lie in neo-Hegelian doctrines that also underlie Bolshevism and fascism: the idea that organic entities have rights over and above those of persons. Conservative legal scholars bitterly opposed these innovations, recognizing that they undermine the traditional idea that rights inhere in individuals, and undermine market principles as well.[17] But the new forms of authoritarian rule were institutionalized, and along with them,

the legitimation of wage labor, which was considered hardly better than slavery in mainstream American thought through much of the 19th century, not only by the rising labor movement but also by such figures as Abraham Lincoln, the Republican Party, and the establishment media.[16] What is interesting here in the Rocker-Chomsky relationship is the emphasis placed upon individuality and creativity, both of which will flourish in the anti-authoritarian societies described. But so too will a higher conception of responsibility and ethics for, as Rocker writes, "all schemes having their roots in natural rights are based on the desire to free man from bondage to social institutions of compulsion in order that he may attain to consciousness of his humanity and no longer bow before any authority which would deprive him of the right to his own thoughts and actions" (143). So, like Chomsky, Rocker is animated by a sense that great popular movements should look to overthrow institutions of power and authority in favour of free associations in which the seeds of freedom, and everything that grows along with them, will germinate vigorously; this is not simply a political objective but a personal one as well, for, as Rocker (like Godwin, Warren, Proudhon and Bakunin) recognised, "one cannot be free either politically or personally so long as one is in the economic servitude of another and cannot escape from this condition" (167). One final point; the anarchist conception does not accept compulsion to act, even if around desirable ends, as acceptable; compulsion no matter what the ends is a power relation which will ultimately separate people. Compulsion, says Rocker, "lacks the inner drive of all social unions -- the understanding which recognises the facts and the sympathy which comprehends the feeling of the fellow man because it feels itself related to him. By subjecting men to a common compulsion one does not bring them closer to one another, rather one creates estrangements between them and breeds impulses of selfishness and separation. Social ties have permanence and completely fulfil their purpose only when they are based on good will and spring from the needs of men. Only under such conditions is a relationship possible where social union and the freedom of the individual are so closely intergrown that they can no longer be recognised as separate entities" (246). So what we have here is the anarchist conception, the freedom to act, create and to enter into relationships of love, compassion and responsibility based upon shared and common concerns.

Illegitimate law: Hypocrisy: international law, deemed acceptable by Chomsky, being violated in the name of the "rule of law" by the Americans. 1.The second question is rarely raised explicitly, except in the course of complaints about our faint-hearted and money-grubbing allies, who lack the courage, integrity and sturdy national character of the Anglo-American duo. The general question, however, suffers from no shortage of answers, including impressive phrases about the sanctity of

international law and the U.N. Charter, and our historic mission to punish anyone who dares to violate these sacred principles by resorting to force. President Bush declared that "America stands where it always has, against aggression, against those who would use force to replace the rule of law." While some questioned his tactical judgment, there was widespread admiration for the President's honorable stand, and his forthright renewal of our traditional dedication to nonviolence, the rule of law, and the duty of protecting the weak and oppressed. Scholarship weighed in, adding historical and cross-cultural depth. A noted Cambridge University Professor of Political Science wrote in the Times Literary Supplement (London) that "Our traditions, fortunately, prove to have at their core universal values, while theirs are sometimes hard to distinguish with the naked eye from rampant (and heavily armed) nihilism. In the Persian Gulf today, President Bush could hardly put it more bluntly...." Others too basked in self-adulation, though it was conceded that we had not always applied our traditional values with complete consistency, failures that we are sure to rectify as soon as we have finished with the business at hand.[17] The presses collusion with US violations of international law. 4. The first, and one of the most revealing, is Nicaragua. Recall that just as the Wall fell, the White House and Congress announced with great clarity that unless Nicaraguans voted as we told them, the terrorist war and the embargo that was strangling the country would continue. Washington also voted (alone with Israel) against a UN General Assembly resolution calling on it once again to observe international law and call off these illegal actions; unthinkable of course, so the press continued to observe its vow of silence. When Nicaraguans met their obligations a few months later, joy was unrestrained. At the dissident extreme, Anthony Lewis hailed Washington's "experiment in peace and democracy," which gives "fresh testimony to the power of Jefferson's idea: government with the consent of the governed.... To say so seems romantic, but then we live in a romantic age." Across the spectrum there was rejoicing over the latest of the "happy series of democratic surprises," as Time magazine expressed the uniform view while outlining the methods used to achieve our Jeffersonian ideals: to "wreck the economy and prosecute a long and deadly proxy war until the exhausted natives overthrow the unwanted government themselves," with a cost to us that is "minimal," leaving the victim "with wrecked bridges, sabotaged power stations, and ruined farms," and providing Washington's candidate with "a winning issue," ending the "impoverishment of the people of Nicaragua."[18] US as a lawless state, again unreported by the press. This central feature of the accords is redundant, since such actions are barred by a higher authority: by international law and treaty, hence by the supreme law of the land under the U.S. Constitution, which we are enjoined to celebrate this year. The fact was underscored by the World Court in June 1986 as it condemned the United States for its "unlawful use of force" against Nicaragua and called upon it to desist from these crimes. Congress responded by voting $100 million of aid and freeing the CIA to direct the attack and to use its own funds on an unknown scale. The U.S. vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling on all states to observe international law and voted against a General Assembly resolution to the same effect, joined by Israel and El Salvador. On Nov. 12,


1987, the General Assembly again called for "full and immediate compliance" with the World Court decision. This time only Israel joined with the U.S. in opposing adherence to international law, another blow to the Central American accords, unreported by the national press as usual.[19] Violations of international law. 3. Undersecretary of State Elliott Abrams conducted a news conference by radio in the Central American capitals on Oct. 22, unreported in the national press, at which he announced that the United States will "never accept a Soviet satellite in Central America" -- meaning a country that is not a loyal U.S. satellite -- and that "We're going to continue the aid to the resistance," to be sure, in violation of the "indispensable element" for peace. The Reagan administration announced its intention to seek congressional backing for its war, and Congress obliged by providing "humanitarian" aid -- meaning, any form of aid that the government chooses to send -- in direct violation of the accords. Secretary of State George Shultz informed the OAS that the U.S. would persist in the unlawful use of force by its "resistance fighters" until a "free Nicaragua" is established by Washington standards, thus consigning the accords to oblivion, along with international law. This announcement was noted in a 140-word item in the Times stressing Washington's intent to give the accords "every chance," while a headline in the liberal Boston Globe reported approvingly that the U.S. is "easing stance."[20] International law applies to everyone else except the US; no law, just authority (as in administrative area) DB. The conditions of the US-Israel alliance have changed, but have there been any structural changes? NC. International law transcends state law, but Israel says these resolutions are not applicable. How are they not applicable? Just as international law isn't applicable to the United States, which has even been condemned by the World Court. States do what they feel like -- though of course small states have to obey. DB. I remember talking to Mona Rishmawi, a lawyer for the human rights organization Al Haq in Ramallah on the West Bank. She told me that when she would go to court, she wouldn't know whether the Israeli prosecutor would prosecute her clients under British mandate emergency law, Jordanian law, Israeli law or Ottoman law. NC. Or their own laws. There are administrative regulations, some of which are never published. As any Palestinian lawyer will tell you, the legal system in the territories is a joke. There's no law -- just pure authority. The continued value of the Constitution, UN Charter, US law. These are, again, truisms, with broad application. In the U.S. Constitution and its Amendments, one can find nothing that authorizes the grant of human rights (speech, freedom from search and seizure, the right to buy elections, etc.) to what legal historians call "collectivist legal entities," organic entities that have the rights of "immortal persons"-rights far beyond those of real persons, when we take into account their power. One will search the U.N. Charter in 11

vain to discover the basis for the authority claimed by Washington to use force and violence to achieve "the national interest," as defined by the immortal persons who cast over society the shadow called "politics," in John Dewey's evocative phrase. The U.S. Code defines "terrorism" with great clarity, and U.S. law provides severe penalties for the crime. But one will find no wording that exempts "the architects of power" from punishment for their exercises of state terror, not to speak of their monstrous clients (as long as they enjoy Washington's good graces): Suharto, Saddam Hussein, Mobutu, Noriega, and others great and small. As the leading Human Rights organizations point out year after year, virtually all U.S. foreign aid is illegal, from the leading recipient on down the list, because the law bars aid to countries that engage in "systematic torture." That may be law, but is it the meaning of the law?[21] No restrictions are allowed on investment in countries with human rights violations: South Africa in the days of "constructive engagement," Burma today, etc. It is to be understood, of course, that the Don will not be hampered by such constraints. The powerful stand above treaties and laws. [22]

US can compel others to change their laws, but not vice versa. Inconsistent process, since only the outcome is over any interest (ie. anti formal law) 2. At the very same moment, Washington and the media were lauding the W.T.O. Telecommunications agreement as a new tool of foreign policy'' that compels other countries to change their laws and practices in accord with Washington's demands, incidentally handing over their communications systems to mainly U.S. megacorporations in yet another serious blow against democracy. But the W.T.O. has no authority to compel the U.S. to change its laws, just as the World Court has no authority to compel the U.S. to terminate its international terrorism and illegal economic warfare. Free trade and international law are like democracy: fine ideas, but to be judged by outcome, not process.[23] UN as tool for US desires. In its new-found zeal for international law and the United Nations, the New York Times repeatedly turned to one heroic figure: Daniel Patrick Moynihan. He was brought forth as an expert witness on "the new spirit of unanimity at the United Nations," explaining that there were "some pretty egregious violations of international law in the past," but now "the major powers have convergent interests and the mechanism of the U.N. is there waiting to be used." His "firm espousal of international law" was lauded in a review of his study The Law of Nations. The reviewer took note of his "sardonic, righteous anger," which recalls "the impassioned professor who suspects no one's listening" while he is "clearly fuming that an idea as morally impeccable as international law is routinely disregarded as disposable and naive." In a Times Magazine story, we learn further that Moynihan is "taking particular delight" in being proven right in his long struggle to promote international law and the


United Nations system, "abstractions" that "matter dearly" to him. At last, everybody is "riding Moynihan's hobbyhorse" instead of ignoring the principles he has upheld with such conviction for so many years. No longer need Moynihan "revel in his martyrdom." Now "history has caught up with him." Omitted from these accolades was a review of Moynihan's record as U.N. Ambassador, when he had the opportunity to put his principles into practice. In a cablegram to Henry Kissinger on January 23, 1976, he reported the "considerable progress" that had been made by his arm-twisting tactics at the U.N. "toward a basic foreign policy goal, that of breaking up the massive blocs of nations, mostly new nations, which for so long have been arrayed against us in international forums and in diplomatic encounters generally." Moynihan cited two relevant cases: his success in undermining a U.N. reaction to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor and to Moroccan aggression in the Sahara, both supported by the U.S., the former with particular vigor. He had more to say about these matters in his memoir of his years at the United Nations, where he describes frankly his role as Indonesia invaded East Timor in December 1975: The United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success. He adds that within a few weeks some 60,000 people had been killed, "10 percent of the population, almost the proportion of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during the Second World War."[24] The U.N. episode, briefly sampled here, gives no little insight into the intellectual culture. The U.N. is "functional" today because it is (more or less) doing what Washington wants, a fact that has virtually nothing to do with the end of the Cold War, the Russians, or Third World maladies. The "shrill, anti-Western rhetoric" of the Third World has, very often, been a call for observance of international law. For once, the U.S. and its allies happen to be opposed to acts of aggression, annexation, and human rights violations. Therefore the U.N. is able to act in its peacekeeping role. These truths being unacceptable, they do not exist. They belong to the domain of "abuse of reality" (actual history), not reality itself (what we prefer to believe).[25]
US vetoes of UN resolutions

The U.N. session just preceding the "wondrous sea change" (Winter 1989-90) can serve to illustrate. Three Security Council resolutions were vetoed: a condemnation of the U.S. attack on the Nicaraguan Embassy in Panama (U.S. veto, Britain abstained); of the U.S. invasion of Panama (U.S., U.K., France against); of Israeli abuses in the occupied territories (U.S. veto). There were two General Assembly resolutions calling on all states to observe international law, one condemning the U.S. support for the contra army, the other the illegal embargo against Nicaragua. Each


passed with two negative votes: the U.S. and Israel. A resolution opposing acquisition of territory by force passed 151 to 3 (U.S., Israel, Dominica). The resolution once again called for a diplomatic settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict with recognized borders and security guarantees, incorporating the wording of U.N. resolution 242, and selfdetermination for both Israel and the Palestinians in a two-state settlement; the U.S. has been barring such a settlement, virtually alone as the most recent vote indicates, since its January 1976 veto of this proposal, advanced by Syria, Jordan, and Egypt with the backing of the PLO. The U.S. has repeatedly vetoed Security Council resolutions and blocked General Assembly resolutions and other U.N. initiatives on a whole range of issues, including aggression, annexation, human rights abuses, disarmament, adherence to international law, terrorism, and others.[26] What we're left with are some contradictory opinions about the value of democracy, and the possibilities for change in the status quo. DB: Christmas came early in 1992 for at least six former Reagan administration officials implicated in the Iran-Contra scandal. There was a presidential pardon on Christmas Eve. Bush said of the pardonees, "The common denominator of their motivation, whether their actions were right or wrong, was patriotism." That doesn't sound like the position of German defense lawyers at Nuremberg. NC: No. They couldn't have gotten away with it, but it was quite accurate. Probably Himmler and Goering were acting as patriotic Germans. I frankly didn't take the pardons all that seriously. It was a highly selective prosecution. They didn't go after top people or the important issues. What they were being charged with is minor issues. Lying to Congress is bad, it's a serious violation of law which carries a five-year jail sentence. But as compared with carrying out huge international terrorist operations, it's pretty small potatoes. Nobody was charged with conducting an illegal war against Nicaragua. They were only charged with lying to Congress about it. It indicates the values that lie behind the prosecution. In other words, kill and torture whoever you like, but be sure to tell us. We want to take part too. Administrative law, lack of formal law; law as authority
Rocker, cited by Chomsky

US above international law

After one such border incident in March 1988, the editors of the Toronto Globe and Mail observed that when Nicaraguan forces cross "the border in hot pursuit of the contras," "the United States responds only selectively to this supposed outrage, the deciding factor apparently being whether a contra vote is imminent," as in this case, when "Mr. Reagan was revving up to ask Congress for renewed aid to the rebels." They add that the peace agreement signed by Honduras "forbids Honduras or any other country to give aid to foreign insurgents such as the contras," and


it is far from clear that Nicaragua is in violation of international law in "crossing the border in hot pursuit of contras," apparently penetrating a few kilometers into southern Honduras where the contras had established their bases after expelling thousands of Honduran peasants. It is U.S. policy, not Nicaraguan defense of its territory, that "exhausts outrage," or would, the editors continue, "if it were not for the extraordinary suffering U.S. policy causes in the region." An insight foreign to the Free Press south of the Canadian border, which also cannot permit itself to perceive that what is clearly in violation of international law is the U.S. support for the contra forces attacking Nicaragua from foreign bases. The reigning dogma holds that the United States stands above the law, free to use violence as it pleases, and that this is just and right. Correspondingly, the media avoid repeated Nicaraguan offers to have the border monitored by international authorities, always dismissed by the U.S. for the obvious reasons; and little notice can be given to the World Court's demand that the U.S. cease its aggression and observe its treaty obligations, or its endorsement of Nicaragua's call for reparations from the world's most pious advocate of the rule of law.[27] Relying on international law/disregarding international law The occupation is in violation of UN Security Council resolution 425 of March 1978, calling on Israel to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Lebanon. The government of Lebanon has reiterated this demand, notably in February 1991 during the Gulf conflict; apart from odd corners like this journal, the request was drowned out by the self-congratulatory oratory about the wondrous new order of law and justice. Israel is free to ignore such minor annoyances as the Security Council and international law thanks to the stance of its superpower patron, which is powerful enough to reduce the UN to an instrument of its foreign policy and to shape international law as it chooses, as was seen once again in the ludicrous legal arguments put forth to justify Clinton's bombing of Iraq in June.[28]
Democracy and its demise

Well, without proceeding in detail, if you look through these things, here's what you discover. Decision-making on major issues is now vested in international institutions which are so remote from public influence, that the public


has no idea what's going on. I mean, in the case of NAFTA, incidentally the Labor Advisory Committee report was never reported in the press, right, I'd be surprised if any of you know about it, here's a case where the government radically violated the law, demonstrated utter contempt for the democratic process, rammed through a secret executive agreement of enormous influence, wouldn't even let the one popular group that is supposed to see it by law, the labor- based group, even look at it, they write the report, and then the press censors it. All right, here we have the ultimate in the destruction of democracy, the ideal that everybody's been dreaming of. Not only is the rabble excluded, they don't influence policy, but they don't know what's in policy, and finally they don't know that they don't know. Virtually nobody knows that they don't know what is going on. Well, you know, now we've reached the ultimate. That's the ultimate possibility in the destruction of democracy.[29]
Forgetting the importance of the past: May Day

The effectiveness of the state-corporate propaganda system is illustrated by the fate of May Day, a workers' holiday throughout the world that originated in response to the judicial murder of several anarchists after the Haymarket affair of May 1886, in a campaign of international solidarity with U.S. workers struggling for an eight-hour day. In the United States, all has been forgotten. May Day has become "Law Day," a jingoist celebration of our "200-year-old partnership between law and liberty" as Ronald Reagan declared while designating May 1 as Law Day 1984, adding that without law there can be only "chaos and disorder." The day before, he had announced that the United States would disregard the proceedings of the International Court of Justice that later condemned the U.S. government for its "unlawful use of force" and violation of treaties in its attack against Nicaragua. "Law Day" also served as the occasion for Reagan's declaration of May 1, 1985, announcing an embargo against Nicaragua "in response to the emergency situation created by the Nicaraguan Government's aggressive activities in Central America," actually declaring a "national emergency," since renewed annually, because "the policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States" -- all with the approbation of Congress, the media, and the intellectual community generally; or, in some circles, embarrassed silence.[30]
"Felling Trees and Indians"

These tasks, and the rhetorical accompaniment, have been eminently reasonable by reigning standards of Political Correctness; the challenge to them in the past few years has, not surprisingly, elicited much outrage among guardians of doctrinal purity. Hugo Grotius, a leading 17th century humanist and the founder of modern international law, determined that the "most just war is against savage beasts, the next against men who are like beasts." George Washington wrote in 1783 that "the gradual extension of our settlements will as certainly cause the savage, as the wolf, to retire; both being beasts of prey, tho' they differ in shape." What is called in official PC rhetoric "a pragmatist," Washington regarded purchase of Indian lands (typically, by fraud and threat) as a more costeffective tactic than violence. Thomas Jefferson predicted to John Adams that the "backward" tribes at the borders "will relapse into barbarism and misery, lose numbers by war and want, and we shall be obliged to drive them, with


the beasts of the forests into the Stony mountains"; the same would be true of Canada after the conquest he envisioned, while all blacks would be removed to Africa or the Caribbean, leaving the country without "blot or mixture." A year after the Monroe Doctrine, the President called for helping the Indians "to surmount all their prejudices in favor of the soil of their nativity," so that "we become in reality their benefactors" by transferring them West. When consent was not given, they were forcibly removed. Consciences were eased further by the legal doctrine devised by Chief Justice John Marshall: "discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian right of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest"; "that law which regulates, and ought to regulate in general, the relations between the conqueror and conquered was incapable of application to...the tribes of Indians, ...fierce savages whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest." The colonists, to be sure, knew better. Their survival depended on the agricultural sophistication and generosity of the "fierce savages," and they were familiar with the prevailing norms of violence on all sides. Observing the Narragansett-Pequot wars, Roger Williams remarked that their fighting was "farre less bloudy and devouring than the cruell Warres of Europe," from which the colonists had learned their trade. John Underhill sneered at the "feeble Manner" of the Indian warriors, which "did hardly deserve the Name of fighting," and their laughable protests against the "furious" style of the English that "slays too many men" -- not to speak of women and children in undefended villages, a European tactic that had to be taught to the backward natives. These were common features of the world conquest, as noted earlier.[31]

[1] There are a range of articles by and about Chomsky that deal with law, but seldom directly or in a sustained fashion. See for example Chomsky, Noam. "The Intifada and the Peace Process", The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Summer 1990 14 n2 p345-353; "World Order and its Rules: Variations on Some Themes", Journal of Law and Society, Summer 1993 20 n2 p145-165; Wilson, James G. "Noam Chomsky and Judicial Review", Cleveland State Law Review, Fall 1996 44 n4 p439-472. [2] "The Gulf Crisis" January 1991, Z Magazine, February 1991.[3] I think it crucial that we make reference to the historical precedents that inform Chomsky's work, as does Chomsky himself. It helps guide our understanding of his relationship to earlier milieus, and also helps undermine arguments of those who would use history to justify their oppression. Examples of Chomsky's efforts in this regard abound in his writings; for example: "The effectiveness of the state-corporate propaganda system is illustrated by the fate of May Day, a workers' holiday throughout the world that originated in response to the judicial murder of several anarchists after the Haymarket affair of May 1886, in a campaign of international solidarity with U.S. workers struggling for an eight-hour day. In the United States, all has been forgotten. May Day has become "Law Day," a jingoist celebration of


our "200-year-old partnership between law and liberty" as Ronald Reagan declared while designating May 1 as Law Day 1984, adding that without law there can be only "chaos and disorder." The day before, he had announced that the United States would disregard the proceedings of the International Court of Justice that later condemned the U.S. government for its "unlawful use of force" and violation of treaties in its attack against Nicaragua. "Law Day" also served as the occasion for Reagan's declaration of May 1, 1985, announcing an embargo against Nicaragua "in response to the emergency situation created by the Nicaraguan Government's aggressive activities in Central America," actually declaring a "national emergency," since renewed annually, because "the policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States" -- all with the approbation of Congress, the media, and the intellectual community generally; or, in some circles, embarrassed silence". (Necessary Illusions Copyright 1989, Chapter 2: Containing the Enemy)[4] Michael Albert and Noam Chomsky, From ZNet. In January 1993 Michael Albert and Noam Chomsky recorded a series of conversations which were later distributed by Z Magazine. Here we present a transcription of some material from the 1993 tapes, essentially verbatim. Some of the topical material is now historical, of course, but the rest is as timely as when first discussed. [5] Necessary Illusions, 1989 by Noam Chomsky, Appendix V, The Continuing Struggle 177 [6] The principal offender here is Israel, mentioned frequently in this regard. For example, There is an intriguing sidelight to the US-Israeli insistence that the political representatives of the Palestinians be excluded from negotiations. The official reason is that the PLO is a terrorist organization. Under Israeli law, anyone who has any dealings with it is subject to criminal penalties under the Law for the Prevention of Terror. The prime targets are Palestinians, but the law has also been used to punish Jews for contacts with the PLO, most recently, the courageous Abie Nathan, jailed once again. The background for the law was reviewed by one of Israel's leading legal commentators, Moshe Negbi, discussing a recent academic study of Lehi (the "Stern gang"), published on its 50th anniversary. Negbi's article is entitled "The Law to Prevent Meetings with the Head of State." As he explains, the Law for the Prevention of Terror was instituted on the initiative of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion six days after the assassination of UN Ambassador Folke Bernadotte. Ben-Gurion's goal was to break up Lehi, known at once to be responsible for the assassination. One of the three commanders of Lehi was Yitzhak Shamir. The law not only barred any contact with Shamir, but was also applied against Menahem Begin's terrorist Irgun Zvai Leumi (Etsel), impelling Begin to dismantle his Jerusalem organization. It was also used to jail religious extremists, including Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, currently chief Rabbi. It was bitterly denounced as a "Nazi law, dictatorial, immoral" and hence illegal, by Menahem Begin and other civil libertarians. Despite efforts to have it modified under Labor governments, it remained in force, formally directed against Shamir and his Lehi associates, until 1977, when Begin was elected Prime Minister. Today the "Nazi law" still remains in force, but only to bar contacts with the PLO and to justify the US-Israeli refusal to permit Palestinians to select their own representatives for negotiations. ("Middle East Diplomacy: Continuities and Changes", November 5, 1991, Z Magazine, December 1991).


[7] "Is Peace at Hand?" November 1987, Z Magazine, January 1988. [8] Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality (Davie Lecture, University of Cape Town, May 1997). [9] Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality (Davie Lecture, University of Cape Town, May 1997).[10] Cf. Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law, MIT P 1994.[11] "Noam Chomsky on An Unjust War" V. K. Ramachandran Frontline, March 2-15. The same applies to peacekeeping; U.N. peacekeeping efforts have regularly been frustrated by the United States. The first post-Cold War U.N. session (1989-90) was typical in this regard. Three Security Council resolutions were vetoed, all by the U.S. Two condemned George Bush's murderous invasion of Panama, the third condemned Israeli human rights abuses; the U.S. vetoed a similar resolution the following May. Britain and France joined the U.S. in blocking one of the resolutions on Panama; the other, condemning U.S. violations of diplomatic rights, was voted 13-1, Britain abstaining. The General Assembly passed two resolutions calling on all states to observe international law. The U.S. voted against both, alone with Israel. The first condemned the continuing U.S. support for the contras, the second, U.S. economic warfare against Nicaragua -- both declared "unlawful" by the World Court, but irrelevantly, by the standards of the U.S. and its allies. A resolution condemning the acquisition of territory by force passed 151-3 (U.S., Israel, Dominica); this was yet another call for a political settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict, which the U.S. has blocked for 20 years" ("The Gulf Crisis" January 1991, Z Magazine, February 1991). [12] Necessary Illusions, "Adjuncts of Government". [13] Keeping the Rabble in Line, 1994 by Noam Chomsky and David Barsamian, January 21, 1993[14] Neumann, "The Concept of Political Freedom," 165.[15] . In his work, Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, published in 1593. [16] Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality (Davie Lecture, University of Cape Town, May 1997). [17] "The Gulf Crisis" January 1991, Z Magazine, February 1991. [18] "Democracy Enhancement" Z Magazine, May 1994.


[19] "Is Peace at Hand?" November 1987, Z Magazine, January 1988. [20] "Is Peace at Hand?" November 1987, Z Magazine, January 1988. [21] "Domestic Constituencies". [22] "Domestic Constituencies". [23] Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality (Davie Lecture, University of Cape Town, May 1997). [24] Deterring Democracy, 1991, South End Press. Chapter 6: Nefarious Aggression [25] Deterring Democracy, 1991, South End Press. Chapter 6: Nefarious Aggression [26] Deterring Democracy, 1991, South End Press. Chapter 6: Nefarious Aggression [27] Necessary Illusions Appendix III.[28] "Limited War" in Lebanon Z Magazine, September 1993 [29] Old Wine, New Bottles: Free Trade, Global Markets and Military Adventures, University of Virginia, February 10, 1993 [30] Necessary Illusions Copyright 1989, Chapter 2: Containing the Enemy [31] Year 501 Copyright 1993 by Noam Chomsky. Published by South End Press. Chapter 1: The Great Work of Subjugation and Conquest.