Keeping Up Appearances In The Face of Uncertainty: North Korean Nuclear Diplomacy

Alexander G. Gershon A Thesis In International elations
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts 2011 BA in International Relations

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!"ignature# "u$ervisor of %hesis

%a&le 'f (ontents

List of Abbreviations 2 Abstract ) !hapter ": Introduction Introduction * , -ethodology 1* Research .oals 1/ 11 !hapter #: $hat Do $e Kno%& %heoretical Frame2or3 14 Research Design 2) 5iterature Revie2 2, 'rgani0ation of %hesis Research +uestions

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!hapter ': A Glance into the (ermit Kingdom Internal "tructure )4 67ternal 8ie2s )9 Chinese-North Korean Relations *0 South Korean-North Korean Relations ** United States-North Korean Relations *4 !hapter ): The *ix +arty Tal,s A Brief Introduction into the "i7 Party %al3s *9 %he Fifth Round of the "i7 Party %al3s /2 The End of the Fourth Round—A Precursor to Trouble Se te!ber "#th $oint State!ent%&ssue of Li'ht (ater Reactors /1 %he Fifth Round: Phase I /9 A (hole Lot )f Nothin' /9

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An Eventful *ear 10 Not *our T+ ical ,th of $ul+ Fire-or.s Sho1) )ctober Nuclear Test 11 A /olte-Face0 The Chan'in' US Polic+ A ro os of North Korea 40 %he Fifth Round: Phase II 41 %he Fifth Round: Phase III 4* !hapter -: !onclusion ;hat ;e <ave 5earned 41 Im$ortance of %his "tudy to International Relations 4, =eed for -ore Research ,0 %he Future ,1 (or.s Cited ,*

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A&&reviations
BDA DPR> <6U <F' IA6A I(B>(=A >6D' >PA 5;R -FA => =P% "P% U= U="( U""R ;-D ;P> Banco Delta Asia Democratic Peo$le?s Re$u&lic of >orea <igh 6nriched Uranium <eavy Fuel 'il International Atomic 6nergy Agency Intercontinental Ballistic -issile >orea (entral =e2s Agency >orean Peninsula 6nergy Develo$ment 'rgani0ation >orean Peo$le?s Army 5ight 2ater Reactor -inistry of Foreign Affairs =orth >orea %reaty of =on Proliferation of =uclear ;ea$ons "i7 Party %al3s United =ations United =ations "ecurity (ouncil Union of "oviet "ocialist Re$u&lics ;ea$ons of -ass D estruction ;or3ers? Party of >orea

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A.stract
%he $ur$ose of this study is an attem$t to understand the utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy &y =orth >orea as its main foreign $olicy since the First =uclear (risis1 in 199)@ %his thesis argues that =uclear Di$lomacy is em$loyed &y =orth >orea as a means for the >im regime to maintain $o2er@ In this studyA the term B=uclear Di$lomacyC 2ill not only &e limited to nuclear 2ea$ons &ut also to other ty$es of military 2ea$onry that have &een utili0ed as a su$$lement to nuclear 2ea$ons &y =orth >orea@2 "ince the First =uclear (risisA =orth >orea has utili0ed Brin3manshi$Dthe conce$t of constantly tittering on the line of nuclear 2arDin an attem$t to o&tain economic and $olitical concessions from the United "tatesA "outh >oreaA and various multilateral organi0ations such as the "i7 Party %al3s@ %hese concessions range from more $al$a&le demands such as economic aid and assistance in &uilding 5ight ;ater Reactors for energy to more di$lomatic centered requests such as high level summit meetings 2ith the United "tates@ 'ne reason &ehind $ursuing this study is that the im$ending succession of >im Eong Un recast =orth >orea?s nuclear ca$a&ilities into the glo&al s$otlight@ In order to com$letely understand ho2 to vie2 =orth >orea?s actions surrounding this succession it is vital to accurately and e7haustively calculate the im$ortance of said 2ea$ons to the =orth >orean state@ AlsoA =orth >orea can roughly &e utili0ed as a de facto re$resentation of the contem$orary threat $osed &y =uclear Proliferation s$reading to rogue states@ %his is im$ortant in International Relations for there is an un3no2n entityA >im Eong UnA rising to $o2er in a rogue stateA &eing =orth >oreaA 2hich $osses a nuclear arsenal there&y
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%he First =uclear (risis descri&es a &rief eighty nine day $eriod from 199) 199* 2hen =orth >orea 2ithdre2 from the =P% and declared its intention to nucleari0e@ It 2ill &e e7tra$olated u$on later on in this thesis@ 2 %his includes missile launchesA naval confrontationA and threatening di$lomatic overtures 2hich 2ill all &e encom$assed &y the term BBrin3manshi$C@

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dealing directly 2ith the contem$orary fears of =uclear Proliferation@

!hapter I: The Introduction
'n %uesdayA =ovem&er 2)A 2010A the "outh >orean island of Feon$yeongA in =ortheast >oreaA 2as heavily shelled &y the Democratic Peo$le?s Re$u&lic of >orea !henceforth 3no2n as =orth >orea# in res$onse to live fire "outhern military drills that 2ere occurring on the island@) %2o days laterA the &eleaguered "outh >orean Defense -inister resigned amidst a storm of controversy surrounding the halfhearted "outh >orean res$onse to this attac3@* 'n $ar 2ith $rior events in the regionA the United "tates rehashed its $romise to stand &ehind "outh >orea 2hile (hina attem$ted to assuage the situation so as to mitigate the international res$onse against =orth >orea@ %he consistent involvement of these t2o su$er$o2ers only escalates the an7iety on a $eninsula that has &een a &oiler of tension for the $ast half century@ %he actions of =orth >oreaA 2hile a$$earing a&normal to the casual o&serverA follo2 a calculated &lue$rint set forth since the ince$tion of =orth >orea?s foreign $olicy of =uclear Di$lomacy@ %he elements $resent in this study are of great im$ortance to the contem$orary International Relations 0eitgeist@ First is the issue of =uclear Proliferation 2hich has a tectonic affect in the contem$orary IR $aradigm 2or3ing its 2ay into the rhetoric of $olicyma3ers and 2orld leaders ali3e@ From the fear of non state actors acquiring nuclear 2ea$ons to the =e2 "%AR% treaty &et2een the United "tates and RussiaA =uclear Proliferation su&sumes a large $ortion of contem$orary international security@ =orth >orea is not only a rogue state $ossessing nuclear ca$a&ilities &ut is 3no2n to have sold
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B= >orea 2arns region on &rin3 of 2ar after more artillery fire heardAC $a an No-A =ovem&er 21A 2010A htt$GHH222@Ia$antoday@comHcategoryH2orldHvie2Hartillery fire heard on yeon$yeong island@ 4 Eac3 >imA B"outh >orea Defense -inister +uits After Attac3CA ReutersA =ovem&er 2/A 2010A htt$GHH222@reuters@comHarticleHidU"5)61-=0"+2010112/@

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these 2ea$ons to various nefarious countries including "yriaDa &reeding ground of terrorist activity@/ AdditionallyA the $ossi&le colla$se of =orth >orea 2ould lead to the $ossession of their nuclear arsenal &y either a rogue military figure or a non state actorD &oth of 2hich are quite trou&lesome to contem$orary $olicy ma3ers@ "econdlyA the conce$t of a unified >orean PeninsulaA 2hich could result if =uclear Di$lomacy is &eing utili0ed as a last ditch effort for the survival of the current =orth >orean regimeA is something that 2ould com$letely change the $o2er dynamic in the 6ast Asian region@ If this occurredA (hinaA reali0ing its 2orst fearA 2ould have a unifiedA $ro ;est >orea directly on its &orderDseverely altering its future actions in the region and challenging its attem$ts at regional hegemonic rule@ %he colla$se of the =orth >orean regime 2ould also lead to a mass e7odus of thousands u$on thousands of severely malnourishedA im$overished =orth >oreans into &oth (hina and "outh >orea@ %his 2ould $ut a severe financial strain on &oth economies as they attem$ted to handle this increase in $o$ulation@1 %hirdly is the im$ortance of "outh >orea to the United "tates@ "outh >oreaA on numerous occasionsA has &een given the full &ac3ing of the United "tates? military in any situation that might arise on the $eninsula@ %he involvement of the United "tates on the >orean Peninsula has more than once dra2n the ire of (hina 2ho vie2s the United "tates

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(olum 5ynchA B=orth >orea Accused of 8iolating U@=@ "anctions on =uclear 2ea$ons %radeAC Forei'n Polic+A =ovem&er 9A 2010A htt$GHHturtle&ay@foreign$olicy@comH$ostsH2010H11H09HnorthJ3oreaJaccusedJofJviolatingJunJsanctionsJonJn uclearJ2ea$onsJtrade@ 6 IncidentallyA last year 5ee -yung &a3A the current Prime -inster of >oreaA $ro$osed a unification ta7 Iust incase this scenario occurred 2hich sho2s its im$ortance in the greater conte7t of International Relations@ !"ourceG Eennifer 5indA B%he 'nce and Future >imG "uccession and "tasis in =orth >oreaAC Forei'n AffairsA 'cto&er 2/A 2010A htt$GHH222@foreignaffairs@comHarticlesH11,40H&y Iennifer lindHthe once and future 3imK$ageLsho2@#@

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as an un2elcomed visitor in their s$here of influence@4 Any conflict that 2ould em&roil the $eninsula 2ould involve &oth the United "tates and (hinaD&urgeoning the chances of it turning into a glo&al conflict@ %his ma3es =orth >orea relevant to the United "tates and (hina for it is the main varia&le that could lead to a $hysical confrontation &et2een the 2orld?s t2o su$er$o2ersDsomething that neither of them 2ant@ FourthlyA the im$ending succession of little 3no2n and untested >im Eong Un as the leader of the ;or3ers? Party of >orea, only furthers the volatility of the situation for there are no2 internal murmurs of a $o2er struggle for control of =orth >orea and its nuclear arsenal@9 In order to quell such dissentA >im Eong Un must solidify his hold on $o2er through an e7ternal sho2 of force 2hich might e7$lain the recent attac3s on Feon$yeong Island@10 If this attac3 is a $rognosticator for future actions &y the =orth >orean regime under >im Eong Un?s rule then it a$$ears as if the B-ilitary FirstC 11 $olicy created under >im Eong Il 2ill continueDadding another dimension to the =orth >orean threat@ %his is relevant to the field of International Relations for =orth >orea?s B-ilitary FirstC $olicy is one of the main $illars &ehind its utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy and &uttresses their nuclear threat@ 5astlyA the (old ;ar is still officially occurring on the >orean Peninsula &ecause
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BU@"@ (arrier "tri3e .rou$ 6m&ar3s for the Fello2 "eaAC StratforA =ovem&er 2*A 2010A htt$GHH222@stratfor@comHmem&ershi$sH14111/HanalysisH2010112*JusJcarrierJstri3eJgrou$Jem&ar3sJyello 2Jsea@ 8 %he only $olitical $arty in =orth >orea 9 @ Ro&ert (arlin and Eoel ;itA B "i7 -ysteries of =orth >orea?s "uccession DramaCA Forei'n Polic+A "e$tem&er 1)A 2010A htt$GHH222@foreign$olicy@comHarticlesH2010H09H1)Hsi7JmysteriesJofJnorthJ3oreaJsJsuccessionJdramaK $ageL0A0@ 10 Andre2 "almonA B%heories a&ound on =@ >orea attac3AC CNNA =ovem&er 2*A 2010A htt$GHHarticles@cnn@comH2010 11 2*H2orldHnorth@3orea@attac3@analysisJ1Jdefense minister 3im tae young $yongyang succession $rocessKJsLP-G;'R5D@ 11 =orth >orea?s B-ilitary FirstC $olicy of Son'un !선군# $rioriti0es the >orean Peo$leMs Army in the affairs of state and allocates national resources to the army first@

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the armistice that ended the >orean ;ar 2as never officially ratified into a $eace treaty@12 It is for this reason that >im Eong Il Iustifies 3ee$ing the >PA !>orean Peo$le?s Army# at constant military alertness@ 'ne minor miscommunication in such a constant state of vigilance is the difference &et2een relative $eace on the $eninsula and a full fledged 2ar 2hich 2ouldA most li3elyA lead to the mutual destruction of &oth =orth and "outh >orea and has the $ossi&ility of creating another 2orld 2ar@ I 2ill &e arguing that the >im regime utili0es =uclear Di$lomacy as a means to maintain $o2er through sta&ili0ing internal dissent 2hilst o&taining e7ternal concessions to aid their dila$idated infrastructure@

esearch /uestions
%he overall research question is 2hy has =orth >orea utili0ed =uclear Di$lomacy as its main international di$lomatic tool since 199*K %he su& questions are as follo2sG are =orth >orean $olitics as military oriented as they a$$earK Is =orth >orea a&le to act rationally in the conte7t of nuclear $roliferationK ;hat is the im$ortance of a nuclear arsenal to =orth >orea and is it more com$le7 than for mere $o2er gainsK ;hy does =orth >orea vie2 multilateral organi0ations as an affront to their sovereigntyK ;hy is the United "tates vie2ed 2ith the u$most im$ortance to =orth >oreaK <o2 does >im Eong Il utili0e nuclear 2ea$ons to solidify his hold on $o2er and continue his su&Iugation of the =orth >orean $eo$leK I argue that =orth >orean $olitics are as military orientated as they a$$ear@ %his stems from the internal structure of =orth >orea &eing &ased off of >im Eong Il?s B-ilitary FirstC $olicy 2hich is utili0ed to maintain the conce$t of the ever $resent
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@ .lyn Ford and "oyoung >2onA North Korea on the 1rin.0 Stru''le for Survival !5ondonG Pluto PressA 200,#A *)@

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outside threat $osed &y the United "tates@ If this threat is ta3en a2ayA 2hich means an alleviation of this em$hasis u$on the militaryA then the cri$$ling environment in 2hich the =orth >orean $eo$le live &ecomes overtly a$$arent@ =orth >orea is a&le to act rationally1) in the conte7t of =uclear Proliferation in the sense that they 2ill never launch a nuclear 2arhead unless fired u$on first@ %he reason for this is that the function of the nuclear 2ea$on to =orth >orea is as a device to o&tain concessions from foreign $o2ers as 2ell as a means to u$hold the aforementioned conce$t of the omni$otent outside threat Dfiring a =uclear 2ea$on 2ould lead to the loss of 3ey di$lomatic tool@ %he United "tates is vie2ed as the main enemy of =orth >orea $artially stemming from their im$ortance on the 2orld stage and role in the >orean ;ar: it is the Io& of the >im regime to confront them as to $rotect the security of the =orth >orean $eo$le@ %he United "tates is also an economic su$er$o2er and has &een a maIor contri&utor of aid to the =orth >orean regime since the end of the >orean ;ar@ %his is of im$ortance for the >im regime cannot merely acce$t this aid for the image of the villainous American 2ould quic3ly unravel@ InsteadA it must utili0e acts of &ra0en $hysical force against the United "tates so it a$$earsA at least to the $eo$le of =orth >oreaA that America is $roviding =orth >orea 2ith concessions deriving from their fear of the =orth >orean state@ 5astlyA nuclear 2ea$ons are used &y the >im regime to continue their hold on $o2er and their su&Iugation of the =orth >orean $eo$le@ %hese 2ea$ons &olster the conce$t of the ever $resent outside threat &y ma3ing it tangi&le through their $hysical $resence@ %he regime constructs this image of the >im regime as the final &arrier &et2een the (a$italist ;est
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Before e7$laining =orth >orea?s rationality it is im$ortant to first $lace a disclaimer u$on this discussion for the term BrationalityC is a &y0antine conce$t 2ith $rofuse amounts of literature $resent e7tra$olating on its true definition@ For this $a$erA the term rational 2ill &e the a&ility to consistently act in one?s &est interest@ ;hile this might a$$ear too a&stractA it is im$ortant that it remains in such a state to avoid an ontological discussion of its meaning@

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and total domination of =orth >orea andA through thisA u$holds the falsehood of the >orean $eo$le needing the leadershi$ of the >ims@ %hese questions arise through a duality of analysisG one of the current literature on =orth >orea?s use of =uclear Di$lomacy and the other an amalgamation of real 2orld events@ ;ith regards to contem$orary literature on =orth >oreaA the questions derive out of a$$lying the structural lens of B"u&versive RealismC1* to the a$$lica&le literature@ "u&versive Realism is an amalgamation of (lassical RealismA (onstructivismA and Post "tructuralism 2hich 2ill &e discussedA in de$thA in the $roceeding cha$ter@1/ %he "u&versive Realist theory 2as utili0ed to discover issues that arose out of the literature surveyed for this study@ %hese issues ranged from not fully e7tra$olating on to$ics deemed germane to the thesis or misinter$reting data &y utili0ing erroneous assum$tions@ %he real 2orld events from 2hich the questions arise are chronologically set from 199) to the contem$orary era@ %he First =uclear (risis !199) 199*# laid the foundation for =orth >orea?s utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy as its eighty nine day 2ithdra2al from the =uclear =on Proliferation %reaty set actions in motion that 2ould sha$e the future of =orth >orea?s foreign $olicy@11 ;hile this crisis ended $eacefully through the 199* Agreed Frame2or314 signed alongside the United "tatesA =orth >orea?s utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy and its su&sidiary of Brin3manshi$ 2ould &ecome their !odus
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"u&versive Realism is a theory that 2as created &y the author@ =ote that for the remainder of this $a$er the terms (lassical Realism and Realism 2ill &e used interchangea&ly@ 16 .lyn Ford and "oyoung >2onA North Korea on the 1rin.0 A Stru''le for Survival !Ann Ar&orG Pluto PressA 200,#A 1/0@ 17 %his 2as an agreement &et2een the United "tates and =orth >orea that 2as signed on 'cto&er 21A 199*@ %he aim of this agreement 2as free0ing and re$lacing =orth >oreaMs indigenous nuclear $o2er $lant $rogram 2ith 5ight ;ater Reactors !2hich are less $rone to nuclear $roliferation# 2hile normali0ing relations &et2een the t2o countries@ %his agreement 2as constantly &eleaguered &y em$ty $olitical rhetoric and di$lomatic strong handing and 2as never fully u$held@ It eventually com$letely dissolved around 200)@

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o erandi 2hen securing international concessions@1, 'ther events that follo2 along this $attern that hel$ed generate the research questions for this study include the 2002 ;est "ea Incident19A the First and "econd =uclear %ests !2001A 2009#A and the "i7 Party %al3s !200) 2009#Dthe maIority of 2hich 2ill &e e7tra$olated u$on in the later cha$ters of this study@20 %he aforementioned questions can &e ans2ered through loo3ing at &oth the internal and e7ternal dynamic of =orth >orea@ InternallyA one must loo3 at the dire economic situationA the im$ortance of the military in the sustaina&ility of the regimeA and the $ersonality cult21 surrounding the >ims@ 67ternallyA one must analy0e the ever changing dynamic &et2een =orth >oreaA "outh >oreaA and the United "tates 2hile also not underestimating the im$ortance of a (hinese ally@ %his last $ointA regarding (hinaA is $ertinent to the survival of the =orth >orean regime and has &ecome a $oint of contention 2ith the recent release of classified United "tates documents that sho2 ho2 (hina might &e losing control over =orth >orea@22 ;hile these documents have lead certain academics to &elieve the (hinese =orth >orean relationshi$ is falling a$artA as 2ill &e sho2n later onA their relationshi$ is as strong as ever@
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Bruce 6@ BechtolA Red Ro'ue0 The Persistent Challen'e of North Korea !DullesG Potomac Boo3sA IncA 2004#A 1*@ 19 'n Eune 2,A 2002A during the closing days of the 2002 ;orld (u$ !co hosted &y "outh >orea#A t2o =orth >orean =avy $atrol &oats crossed the =orthern 5imit 5ine !an ar&itrary line demarcating =orth and "outh >orean in the ;est "ea# and o$ened fire as "outh >orean =avy shi$s a$$roached@ A miniature &attle ensued in 2hich one of the => shi$s 2as sun3A four "outh >orean sailors 2ere 3illedA and eighteen 2ounded@ !"ourceG B=orthern 5imit 5ine !=55# ;est "ea =aval 6ngagementsAC in 2lobal Securit+A htt$GHH222@glo&alsecurity@orgHmilitaryH2orldH2arHnll@htm@# 20 =arushige -ichishitaA North Korea3s 4ilitar+-5i lo!atic Ca! ai'ns6 "#77-899: !=e2 For3G RoutledgeA 2010#A 1/0@ 21 %his term 2ill &e e7tra$olated u$on later on in this thesis &ut I 2ill $rovide a &rief descri$tion of it here@ A $ersonality cult arises 2hen an individual uses mass media and $ro$aganda to create an ideali0ed and heroic $u&lic image@ %his is usually achieved through means such unquestioning flattery and $raise@ 22 (hris <oggA B;i3ilea3s ca&lesG (hina Nfrustrated? &y =orth >oreaCA 11CA =ovem&er )0A 2010A htt$GHH222@&&c@co@u3Hne2sH2orld us canada 11,411*1@

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=uclear Di$lomacy is due to t2o main factorsG $olitical $o2er and economic des$air@ %his $olitical $o2er can &e vie2ed as &oth $o2er 2ithin the international community and $o2erA in a su&servient senseA over the =orth >orean $eo$le@ =orth >orea !read >im Eong Il# lusts to &e a maIor voice in the international community and reali0es thatA in order for that to ha$$enA =orth >orea must have something to offer that other countries need@ %he fact of the matter is that the =orth >orean infrastructure has atro$hied since the do2nfall of the "oviet Union and lac3s anything to offer and therefore has to rely on the $o2er and fearfulness of nuclear 2ea$ons to garner international clout@ ;ith regards to $o2er in the conte7t of the =orth >orean $eo$leA >im Eong Il utili0es fear as a means of maintaining the their su&servience to him and as a reason to $rolong his military first $olicy of Son'un !선군)@ Unli3e his fatherA 2ho had the military credentials to garner res$ectA >im Eong Il needed to $rove his legitimacy as the ruler of the =orth >orean $eo$le and sho2 them that they needed the $rotection his rule offered@ <e accom$lished this through his alienation of the rest of the 2orld !mainly the United "tates and "outh >orea# and the constant fear that these countries could attac3 =orth >orea at any given moment@ In order to ma3e this fear $al$a&leA >im Eong Il utili0es nuclear armament to sho2 the =orth >orean $eo$le that the outside threat is a serious matter@ %hrough this he is a&le to masquerade the o&vious suffering of the =orth >orean $eo$le and his $oor internal governance under the guise of utter tre$idation@ %he des$air arises out of the fact that =orth >orea lac3s infrastructure and a develo$ed economyDheavily relying on foreign aid Iust to function@ -any instances in 2hich =orth >orea has threatened 2ar have &een out of a not so su&tle need for economic aid@ %his includes monetary donationsA the construction of infrastructure !such

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as 5ight ;ater Reactors for electricity#A and co$ious amounts of food@ %he =orth >orean regime cannot merely as3 for international aid for then the constructed image of the villainous outsiders unravels: it is for this reason that =orth >orea must utili0e =uclear Di$lomacy to o&tain this aid@ %hrough acting as if the aid is a concessionA something given u$ &y other sovereign institutions out of a fear of the =orth >orean stateA the >im regime can maintain their air of im$ortance and the vie2 of the 2ic3ed outsider@ AlsoA the sale of nuclear material to other states has $roven to &e an im$ortant source of income for the =orth >orean state@ It is their only real source of incomeA outside of economic aidA that they have@ %he nuclear 2ea$onry of =orth >orea is an im$ortant crutch that is holding u$ the ailing regime@ >im Eong Il uses the military and =uclear Di$lomacy to solidify his role as BDear 5eaderC and it currently a$$ears that the same methodology is &eing utili0ed to ease the transition from >im Eong Il to the mysterious and novice >im Eong Un@

0ethodology
%he methodology im$lemented in this study 2ill &e 'dell?s BDisci$lined Inter$retative (ase "tudyC 2ith the case study &eing the Fifth Round of the "i7 Party %al3s !henceforth 3no2n as the "P%# 2hich lasted from =ovem&er 200/ to Fe&ruary 2004 and involved =orth >oreaA "outh >oreaA Ea$anA (hinaA RussiaA and the United "tates@2) %he Disci$lined Inter$retive (ase "tudy Binter$rets or e7$lains an event &y a$$lying a 3no2n theory to the ne2 terrain@ %he more e7$licit and systematic the use of theoretical conce$tsA the more $o2erful the a$$lication@C2* It allo2s for the utili0ation of
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Eohn "@ 'dellA B(ase "tudy -ethods in International Political 6conomyCA &nternational Studies Pers ectives 2 !2001#G 11) 11/@ 24 I&id@

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various $ers$ectives on the Fifth Round of the "P% to Bshar$enA refineA and contrast them 2hile 2or3ing 2ith them@C2/ %his design 2ill allo2 the im$lementation of the case centric theory of "u&versive Realism 2hich 2ill &e discussed in the $roceeding $ages of this thesis@ %he "P%A as an overly encom$assing conce$tA consisted of a sle2 of gatherings centered on security concerns regarding =orth >orea?s $ursuit of nuclear 2ea$onry@21 %he reasoning &ehind choosing this event as the case study for this analysis is that it enca$sulates an amalgamation of varia&les that sha$e =orth >orea?s =uclear Di$lomacy@ "ome of these varia&les include the utili0ation of threatening overtures 2ithin the international community to gain concessionsA occasionally using $hysical force to $rove their $ointA and e7$laining their actions as manifest from the threatening overtures of other countriesDmainly the United "tates@ In order to see ho2 one event or decision in the "P% lead to an outcomeA 'dell?s theory 2ill &e used alongside 8an 6vera?s conce$t of Process %racing@24 8an 6vera?s conce$t of Process %racing 2ill give a &etter understanding of ho2 events $rogress from $oint A to $oint B and 2ill allo2 for an analysis of all of the varia&les at $lay in the case study and see ho2 their interactions $roduce a varying array of results@ %his also allo2s the a&ility to &ranch out in the tracing of events@ Instead of &eing limited to the normal linear $rogression of A to BA Process %racing allo2s the accommodation of outliersD things that turn the linear $rocess into more of a 2e& li3e structure@ %his can
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I&id@ (harles 5@ PritchardA Failed 5i lo!ac+0 The Tra'ic Stor+ of ;o- North Korea 2ot the 1o!b !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ings Institution PressA 2004#A 1*1 112@ 27 "te$hen 8an 6veraA 2uide to 4ethods for Students of Political Science !IthacaG (ornell University PressA 1994#A 11@

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tremendously add to the dynamic value of the assessment occurring in this thesis@

esearch Goals
%he $ractical goal of this study is to $rovide a general frame2or3 to understand =uclear Di$lomacy as it a$$lies to =orth >orea@ %his requires ta3ing the case study utili0ed in the analysis and e7tra$olating u$on it in order to $roduce a tem$late that should &e a$$lica&le to any instance of =uclear Di$lomacy &y =orth >orea@ %he academic goals of this study center around understanding 2hy =orth >orea acts the 2ay that it does 2ithin the conte7t of the international community@ ;hy they constantly forgo $eaceful negotiations andA insteadA chose to turn the international community into a 0ero sum game@ Building u$on this is an inquiry as to if =orth >orea?s utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy has more de$th than it a$$ears to the casual o&serverHis $ortrayed in the ne2s@ %his can &e understood as an inquiry into 2hether =uclear Di$lomacy is the means to the end of this threatening overture that =orth >orea ta3es 2ith the international community or if there is more &eneath the surface that is not a$$arent from a cursory glance@ Eutting off of this is the intellectual goal of understanding 2hy =orth >orea vie2s multilateral organi0ations as an affront to their sovereignty@

1rgani2ation of the Thesis
%his thesis can &e &ro3en u$ into four sections that center around o&taining a &etter understanding of =orth >orean =uclear Di$lomacy and its im$ortance to the >im regime@ %he first section 2ill $rovide a &asic tem$late of the thesis 2hich includes the 5iterature Revie2A in 2hich the contem$orary literature on the su&Iect 2ill &e discussedA and the Research Design in 2hich the case study and the methodological a$$roach to this $a$er 2ill &e laid out@

.ershon 1,

%he second section 2ill consist of an e7$lanation of some fundamental conce$ts that are 3ey if one 2ants to underta3e the analysis of =orth >orea offered in this study@ %his 2ill include a discussion of the internal structure of =orth >orea and its relations 2ith the United "tatesA "outh >oreaA and (hina@ %he third section of this thesis 2ill center around the "P% and =orth >orea?s utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy during this time $eriod@ %his section 2ill $rovide an in de$th analysis of the Fifth Round of %al3s and 2illA thereforeA &e &ro3en u$ into three tem$oral categoriesG the events that occurred at the end of the Fourth Round !Euly "e$tem&er 200/# of %al3s that set the stage for the Fifth Round: the Fifth Round !=ovem&er 200/ Fe&ruary 2004#: and a &rief discussion regarding the end of the Fifth Round at the affect that it 2ould have on the eventually 2ithdra2al from the "P% &y =orth >orea in 2009@ %he final section of the $a$er 2ill &e the conclusion in 2hich the tem$late created in the $rior cha$ters 2ill &e a$$lied to the recent actions of =orth >orea to generate a &etter understanding of the events@ %hese events 2ill then &e e7tra$olated u$on in an attem$t to conIecture u$on 2hat they might tell a&out the future of =orth >orea@

!hapter #: $hat Do $e Kno%&
Theoretical Frame%or,
%he theoretical frame2or3 of this study encom$asses the theories of (onstructivism2,A Realism29A and Post "tructuralism)0@ %he amalgamation of these 2ill
28

(onstructivist thin3ers in the field of International Relations include Ale7ander ;endtA Eohn RugieA and >athyrn "i33in3@ 29 Realist thin3ers in the realm of International Relations include <ans -orgenthauA >enneth ;alt0A and Eohn -earsheimer@ 30 Post "tructuralist authors include -ichael FoucaultA Eacques DerridaA and Roland Barthes 2ho are

.ershon 19

hel$ $rove the argument of this thesis 2hich is that >im regime utili0es =uclear Di$lomacy as a means to maintain $o2er through sta&ili0ing internal dissent 2hilst o&taining e7ternal concessions to aid their dila$idated infrastructure@ %he utili0ation of (onstructivism is im$ortant 2hen dealing 2ith ho2 =orth >orea vie2s entities such as the "i7 Party %al3sA states such as the United "tates and "outh >oreaA and 2hen vie2ing the means &y 2hich the >im Regime maintains its legitimacy@ Unli3e >im Il "ungA 2ho 2as a revolutionary that fought against the Ea$anese in -anchuriaA neither >im Eong Il nor >im Eong Un have military e7$erience on their resume@)1 From a sociological stand$ointA this $resents a maIor hindrance on the legitimacy of their rule for they do not have this $ersonality of a fearlessA nationalistic leader that formulated around >im Il "ung@ ;hat is necessary for the ruler of an autocratic regime is the develo$ment of a cult of $ersonality centered around the ruler &ased off of 2hat sociologist -a7 ;e&er descri&ed as charismatic authority@)2 For >im Il "ungA this 2as sim$le for his actions during ;;II and the >orean ;ar 2ere enough to solidify his cult@ %he $ro&lem that =orth >orea faces 2ith >im Eong Il and >im Eong Un is that they had to routini0e this charisma so that they are vie2ed in the same light as >im Il "ung@))%he $ro$aganda machine in =orth >orea turns adoration and veneration for their leaders into a $ersonality cult ma3ing the leaders demigods@ An e7am$le of this is ho2 >im Il "ung is still
vie2ed as the three founding mem&ers of Post "tructuralism@ 31 .lyn Ford and "oyoung >2onA North Korea on the 1rin.0 A Stru''le for Survival !Ann Ar&orG Pluto PressA 200,#A 2*@ 32 -a7 ;e&er originally defined it as BOresting on devotion to the e7ce$tional sanctityA heroism or e7em$lary character of an individual $ersonA and of the normative $atterns or order revealed or ordained &y him@O "ince his original descri$tion of this term it has &ecome &astardi0ed into the sense that it is utili0ed todayD&eing charisma@ !"ourceG -a7 ;e&erA The Theor+ )f Social And Econo!ic )r'ani<ation !=e2 For3G Free PressA 1994#@# 33 =o one 2ill ever &e as idoli0ed in =orth >orea as >im Il "ung currently is@ It has &een said that many mem&ers of the =orth >orean $o$ulation 2ill &egin to Ioyfully cry 2hen discussing the im$ortance of >im Il "ung to =orth >orea@

.ershon 20

considered the B6ternal PresidentC des$ite his death nearly si7teen years ago@)* In order to com$letely understand ho2 =orth >orea maintains this sense of a $ersonality cult amongst its $eo$le and the means &y 2hich it accom$lishes thisA 2hich include the demoni0ation of the ;estA one must utili0e the (onstructivist lens@ %he fallacy of solely utili0ing (onstructivism is that it does not account for the im$ortance of military $o2erA 0ero sum gameA and securityDall of 2hich are varia&les that are 3ey to fully understanding =orth >orea@ Realism $rovides an e7cellent analysis of these varia&les: it can &e utili0ed to understand a maIority of =orth >orea?s actions on the international stage as 2ell as hel$ing to add some insight into the im$ortance of nuclear 2ea$ons to =orth >orea@ It can also hel$ e7tra$olate u$on the security dynamic in the =ortheast Asian region 2hich 2ill shed light u$on the actions of the United "tatesA "outh >oreaA and (hina in relation to =orth >orea@ A fallacy is solely utili0ing the Realist lens is that it cannot e7$lain ho2 legitimacy can &e a source of military $o2er 2hich is $ertinent to understanding =orth >oreaDthis can &e analy0ed utili0ing (onstructivism@ Post "tructuralism 2ill &e utili0ed to com&ine the theories of Realism and (onstructivism@ %he $ro&lem 2ith Post "tructuralist theory is that it is too esoteric in nature to &e a&le to &e a main theory in this research@ ;hile Realism and (onstructivism are mainstream theories in International RelationsA there&y not needing a cursory e7$lanation of 2hat they entailA Post "tructuralism is not normally utili0ed in the International Relations rhetoric requiring a &rief e7$lanation of the theory and 2hat it entails@
34

.lyn Ford and "oyoung >2onA North Korea on the 1rin.0 A Stru''le for Survival !Ann Ar&orG Pluto PressA 200,#A 2*@

.ershon 21

Post "tructuralismA instead of treating the $roduction of 3no2ledge as sim$ly a cognitive matterA treats it as a normative and $olitical matter@)/ It states that $o2er and 3no2ledge are mutually su$$ortive matters: that $o2er sha$es 3no2ledge and 3no2ledge sha$es $o2er@ '&Iectivity in 3no2ledge does not e7ist for all 3no2ledge is sha$ed through the $o2er dynamicDhistory is 2ritten &y the victor@ Post "tructuralism concerns itself 2ith counter historiesA Be7$osPingQ the $rocess of e7clusion and covering 2hich ma3e $ossi&le the teleological idea of history as a unified story unfolding 2ith a clear &eginningA middleA and end@C)1 As e7am$le of thisA $ertinent to this studyA is Roland Blei3er?s 5ivided Korea 0 To-ard a Culture of Reconciliation 2hich utili0es this conce$t of $o2er sha$ing 3no2ledge to understand the roots of the conflict on the >orean Peninsula and to recommend $olicy o$tions to2ards a more $eaceful future in =orth and "outh >orean relations@)4 %oo fe2 authors and $olicy ma3ers engage 2ith this sense of a counter history 2hen dealing 2ith =orth >orea 2hich &ecomes a glaring issue 2hen formulation $olicy recommendations and attem$ting to e7$lain 2hy =orth >orea has acted the 2ay that it does@ %he means &y 2hich this $a$er 2ill attem$t to achieve this counter historyA in regards to =orth >oreaA is through the utili0ation of t2o of Post "tructuralism?s founding $illarsDDeconstruction and Dou&le Reading@ Deconstruction is Ba general mode of radically unsettling 2hat are ta3en to &e sta&le conce$ts and conce$tual o$$ositions@ Its main $oint is to demonstrate the effects and costs $roduced &y the settled conce$ts and
35

"cott BurchillA Richard Deveta3A Eac3 DonnellyA Andre2 5in3laterA %erry =ardinA -atthe2 PatersonA (hristian Reus "mitA and Eacqui %rueA Theories of &nternational RelationsA Fourth ed !=e2 For3G Palgrave -acmillanA 2009#A 1,*@ 36 I&id@A 1,/@ 37 Roland Blei3erA 5ivided Korea0 To-ard a Culture of Reconciliation !-innea$olis G University of -innesota PressA 200/#@

.ershon 22

o$$ositionsA to disclose the $arasitical relationshi$ &et2een o$$osed terms and to attem$t a dis$lacement of them@C), (once$tual o$$ositions are never neutralA they are inevita&ly hierarchicalA and Deconstruction loo3s for this hierarchical structure@ It is $articularly concerned 2ith locating the elements of insta&ility that ineradica&ly threaten any totality@)9 It?s concerned 2ith &oth Bthe construction and deconstruction of any totalityA 2hether a te7tA theoryA discourseA structureCA etc@*0 Dou&le Reading is the means &y 2hich Deconstruction is achieved: the $rocess &y 2hich a Dou&le Reading occurs is through the reading of a 2or3 t2ice over@ %he first reading is Ba commentary or re$etition of the dominant inter$retationDthis isA a reading 2hich demonstrates ho2 a te7tA discourse or institution achieves the sta&ility effect@C*1 %he $oint here is to search for ho2 the te7t is coherent and consistent 2ith itselfDit attem$ts to ela&orate on ho2 the identity of the te7t is constituted@ %he second reading attem$ts to unsettle the discoveries of the first reading &y Ba$$lying $ressure to those $oints of insta&ility 2ithin a te7t@@@C*2 It e7$oses the internal tensions and ho2 they are incom$letely covered over in the te7t@ %he te7t is never totally at one 2ith itself: it al2ays carries 2ithin it elements of tension and crisis 2hich render the entirety of the document unsta&le@*) %he tas3 of Dou&le Reading as a mode of Deconstruction is an attem$t to understand ho2 Ba discourse or social institution is assem&led or $ut togetherA &ut at the

38 39

I&id@A 191@ I&id@A 192@ 40 I&id@A 192@ 41 I&id@A 192@ 42 I&id@A 192@ 43 I&id@A 192@

.ershon 2)

same time to sho2 ho2 it is al2ays already threatened 2ith its undoing@C** It is not the intention of DeconstructionHDou&le Reading to arrive at a singleA conclusive readingDthe tension creating &y this duality of readings is something that is omni$resent@ %he $oint of this e7ercise is to Be7$ose ho2 any story de$ends on the re$ression of internal tensions in order to $roduce a sta&le effect of homogeneity and continuity@C*/ %he im$ortance of Dou&le Reading and Deconstruction in the greater conte7t of Post "tructuralism as it a$$lies to this thesis is that it is a means to ci$her out the &iases innately $laced in the literature on =orth >orea@ -uch of the literature on =orth >orea 2ill only attem$t to convey a single $oint andA through the utili0ation of these $illars of Post "tructuralismA the undercurrent that it attem$ts to cover u$ 2ill &e hashed out@ In the greater 2holeA Post "tructuralism allo2s an analysis of the im$ortance of the =orth >orean regime and its $romulgation of $ro$aganda conveyed as 3no2ledge to its $eo$le@ It sho2s ho2 the =orth >orea $o2er structure controls the 3no2ledge of the =orth >orean $eo$leDthere&y controlling them and &eing a&le to indoctrinate them to 2hatever cause they 2ant@ %his theory also allo2s one to loo3 at mutual relationshi$s@ %oo often than notA scholars merely loo3 at ho2 =orth >orean $olicy affects the United "tates and other great $o2ers as o$$osed to this &eing a reci$rocal affect: the utili0ation of Post "tructuralism 2ill allo2 for this mutuality to &e studied@ Instead of continually having to rehash that the theory &eing utili0ed in this study as an amalgamation of RealismA (onstructivismA and Post "tructuralismA these theories 2ere com&ined into a ne2ly du&&ed theoryD"u&versive Realism@ %his theory is merely a conglomeration of the $revious three theories de$icted a&oveDthe unification of the
44 45

I&id@A 192@ I&id@A 19)@

.ershon 2*

strong $oints from all of these theories $rovides the most accurate chance at understanding =orth >orea?s actions in the conte7t of =uclear Di$lomacy@ %he $ro&lem 2ith utili0ing a ne2 theory is that it has &een untested andA thereforeA its validity is questiona&le@ %his can &e negated for t2o reasonsG authenticity of the varia&les and real 2orld error@ ;hile "u&versive Realism is a ne2ly defined theoryA it is a com&ination of authentic International Relations varia&les 2hich hel$ Iustify its legitimacy@ ;ith regards to the real 2orld errorA all IR theories run into the issue of a$$lica&ility in the real 2orld andA thereforeA this issue can &e negated for this theory is no different from any other theory $ostulated &y an academic scholar@ ;ith the methodology no2 in $laceA it is $ossi&le to e7$lain ho2 the study of =orth >orean =uclear Di$lomacy 2ill &e a$$roached@

esearch Design
%his thesis 2ill argue that the >im regime utili0es =uclear Di$lomacy as a means to maintain $o2er through sta&ili0ing internal dissent 2hilst o&taining e7ternal concessions to aid their dila$idated infrastructure@ As mentioned in the Introductory (ha$ter of this thesisA the em$irical testing ground for my thesis 2ill &e the utili0ation of a single case studyA the Fifth Round of the "i7 Party %al3sA as the event to 2hich I 2ill a$$ly 'dell?s Disci$lined Inter$retative (ase "tudy and 8an 6vera?s Process %racing@ A case study allo2s the testing of theories against real 2orld events to see 2hich $ortion!s# of the theories hold u$ 2hen $laced in the conte7t of reality: it $rovides a means to 2hich the hy$othesis can &e accurately tested@*1 ;ithout the utili0ation of a case study the thesis

46

"te$hen 8an 6veraA 2uide to 4ethods for Students of Political Science !IthacaG (ornell University PressA 1994#A 11@

.ershon 2/

is merely a meta$hysical gathering of a&stract thoughts that do not actually $rove or dis$rove anything grounded in reality@ %he reasoning &ehind the selection of the Fifth Round of the "i7 Party %al3s as the case study in this analysis arises from its tem$oral locationA the involvement of a multitude of countriesDall of 2hich $oses a different means in confronting the =orth >orea $ro&lemA and the fact that this $ortion of the "i7 Party %al3s has the most $recise instances of =uclear Di$lomacy and Brin3manshi$ 2hich 2ill &e of great assistance to this study@ 'n to$ of thisA there is an a&undance of literature from a 2ide range of academic sources on the Fifth Round of the "P% &ecause of the im$ortance of the events that occurred during its s$an@ %he case study &eing the Fifth Round of %al3s 2ill allo2 an analy0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy in the conte7t of the Euly /th missile launchesA the first =orth >orean nuclear testA and various other forms of Brin3manshi$ that s$anned this round of %al3s@*4 %he "i7 Party %al3sA as a 2holeA are im$ortant for the 2ay that they endedA 2ith =orth >orea storming offA refusing any future multilateral tal3sA and $erforming their "econd =uclear ;ea$ons %estA 2hich set the tone for the future international rhetoric of =orth >orea@*, %he Disci$lined Inter$retative (ase "tudyA alongside Process %racingA 2ill 2or3 alongside the im$lementation of "u&versive Realism in an attem$t to ci$her out ans2ers to the research questions $osed in the Introduction@ ;hat 2ill &e occurring 2ith the Disci$lined Inter$retive (ase "tudy is an attem$t to understand the use of =uclear Di$lomacy through the "P% &y a$$lying "u&versive RealismDa theory that has never &e
47

=arushige -ichishitaA North Korea3s 4ilitar+-5i lo!atic Ca! ai'ns6 "#77-899: !=e2 For3G RoutledgeA 2010#A 11)@ 48 -ar3 5andlerA B=orth >orea "ays It ;ill <alt %al3s and Restart Its =uclear ProgramCA Ne- *or. Ti!esA A$ril 1*A 2009A htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2009H0*H1/H2orldHasiaH1/3orea@htmlKJrL1@

.ershon 21

a$$lied to any study of =orth >orea?s =uclear Di$lomacy@ <o2everA t2o issues arise from the utili0ation of the Disci$lined Inter$retative (ase "tudyG selective reconstruction and the fallacies of "u&versive Realism@ %he later of the t2o 2as hashed out in the $revious cha$ter so it is a non issue@ "elective reconstruction is the $ro&lem of su&liminally reconstructing an event so that it melds 2ith the study &eing conducted and the theories &eing a$$lied to it so that one arrives at a certain ans2er@*9 %he 2ay that this 2ill &e avoided is through a cogni0ant analysis of all events utili0ing Post "tructuralism?s Dou&le Reading 2hich 2ill force an avid study of every as$ect of the literature so as to not negate anything of im$ortance to the research@ Process %racing allo2s the &ac32ards tracing of the Bcausal $rocess that $roduces the case outcomeA at each stage inferring from the conte7t 2hat caused each cause@C/0 %he cause and effect lin3 that connects &oth the inde$endent varia&le and outcome is divided into smaller ste$s and then each ste$ is analy0ed for o&serva&le evidence@/1 %his methodology hel$s &rea3 do2n the "P% into individuali0ed segments and see ho2 some varia&les lead to one outcome in the "P% 2hile other varia&les lead to other outcomes@ %he research methods 2ill &e utili0ing $rimary and secondary sources to gather information@ Primary resources enca$sulate AmericanH"outh >orean ne2s$a$ersA s$eeches &y foreign di$lomatsA Iournal articles from esta&lished organi0ations such as Forei'n Polic+6 (orld AffairsA etc@A and official documents from the United "tates? .overnmentA the U=A and the "P%@ %he secondary sources 2ill come from &oo3sA Iournal
49

Eohn "@ 'dellA B(ase "tudy -ethods in International Political 6conomyCA &nternational Studies Pers ectives 2 !2001#G 11*@ 50 "te$hen 8an 6veraA 2uide to 4ethods for Students of Political Science !IthacaG (ornell University PressA 1994#A 11@ 51 I&id@A 1*@

.ershon 24

articlesA and intervie2s from e7$erts on =orth >orea and the =ortheast Asian region@ %his amalgamation of sources allo2s for a &road range of information to &e $rocessed there&y lo2ering the chance of missing an im$ortant $oint that could end u$ s3e2ing the study@

3iterature e4ie%
%he &oo3s analy0ed in this study can &e divided into four se$arate categoriesG Regional =orth >orean PolicyA United "tates? =orth >orean PolicyA the internal structure of =orth >oreaA and the gro2th and utili0ation of =orth >orea?s =uclear Di$lomacy@ %he first set of &oo3s deal 2ith the regional $olicies of =orth >orea 2ith an em$hasis on "outh >oreaA Ea$anA and (hina@ All of these &oo3s 2ere $u&lished after 199) so each has the threat of =uclear Di$lomacy intert2ined into its foreign di$lomatic analysis for 199) introduced the 2orld to =orth >orea?s utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy and Brin3manshi$ through the First =uclear (risis@/2 %hese &oo3s see3 to analy0e various conce$ts surrounding =orth >orea such as =orth >orean $olicy coordination in the conte7t of great $o2er relations in =ortheast Asia: ho2 the handling of =orth >orea &y the great $o2ers in =ortheast Asia influences the $o2er dynamic of the region: and the gro2ing economic ga$ &et2een =orth >orea and "outh >orea and its affect on inter >orean relations@ %he im$ortance of "outh >orea in the =orth >orean dynamic is multifaceted and revolves around its historical narrative a$ro$os of =orth >orea as 2ell as its im$ortance on the international stage@ "outh >orean safety is constantly utili0ed as a &argaining tool for =orth >orea &ecause "eoul 2ould &e the main target of any =orth >orean military
52

=arushige -ichishitaA North Korea3s 4ilitar+-5i lo!atic Ca! ai'ns6 "#77-899: !=e2 For3G RoutledgeA 2010#A 9)@

.ershon 2,

attac3 stemming from of its relative closeness to the =orth and its glo&al economic im$ortance@ Des$ite thisA as authors such as -yers $oint outA "outh >orea?s strong sense of ethno nationalismA $lus many "outh >orean ne2s$a$ers? leftist vie2s regarding =orth >oreaA constantly ta$er "eoul?s res$onse to any =orth >orean $rovocation@/) %his creates an interesting dynamic amongst scholars 2hose 2or3s contri&ute to this $a$er for there are certain theorists !i@e@ "on and >im# 2ho &elieve "outh >orea should reesta&lish the economic engagement 2ith =orth >orea that &egan 2ith the regime of >im Dae Iung under the nomenclature of the Sunshine Polic+@/* %his is Iu7ta$osed 2ith vie2s of other academics !i@e@ Pritchard and FordH>2on# 2ho $oint out that economic engagement is merely utili0ed &y =orth >orea as leverage in their $ursuit of nuclear 2ea$ons@// %hey &elieve that "outh >orea must sto$ treating =orth >orean $rovocations so lightly for these actions are inter$reted &y the =orth as an intrinsic 2ea3ness in "outh >orea 2hich can &e e7$loited@ %hese authors vie2 "outh >oreanH=orth >orean relations through a Realist or a (onstructivist lensDacting as if these t2o theories are mutually e7clusive@ For e7am$leA -yers utili0es a (onstructivist lens in his arguement that =orth >orea has an u$$er hand on "outh >orea for the collective identity/1 of the "outh >orean $eo$le is one that encom$asses the =orth >oreans too and therefore handica$s them 2hen it is time to
53

B@R -yersA B=orth >orea ;ill =ever Play =iceAC The Ne- *or. Ti!esA =ovem&er 2*A 2010A htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2010H11H2/Ho$inionH2/myers@html@ 54 >ey young "onA South Korean En'a'e!ent Policies and North Korea !5ondonG RoutledgeA 200)#@ 55 (harles 5@ PritchardA Failed 5i lo!ac+0 The Tra'ic Stor+ of ;o- North Korea 2ot the 1o!b !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ings Institution PressA 2004#: .lyn Ford and "oyoung >2on@ North Korea on the 1rin.0 A Stru''le for Survival !Ann Ar&orG Pluto PressA 200,#@ 56 A collective identity refers to individualsM sense of &elonging to a grou$@ %he collective identity forms a $art of the $ersonal identity of the $erson over time@ ;hen this sense of a collective identity &ecomes strong enough it can trium$h over $ortions of one?s $ersonal identity there&y ta3ing a2ay a sense of individualism@ !"ourceG B@R@ -yersA The Cleanest Race0 ;o- North Koreans See The!selves—And (h+ &t 4atters !Broo3lynG -elville <ouseA 2010#@#

.ershon 29

$ressure or $unish the =orth >orean regime for its aggressive actions@/4 <e fails to com&ine this collective identity 2ith the $aranoia of the >im regime in its struggle for regional $o2er and security from the threat of the $ro ;estern forces@ %his is a consistent issue arising from this set of literature that Iustifies the need for a ne2 analy0ation through the innovative theory of "u&versive Realism@ %hese &oo3s $resent some incorrect assum$tions that Iustify the need for this research $a$er@ A maIor assum$tion in this literature is that "outh >orea lac3s the $hysical a&ility to standu$ to =orth >orea@ 6conomicallyA 2here it is vastly su$erior to =orth >oreaA its attem$ts to im$ose sanctions have &een negated through the constant funneling of funds through =orth >orea?s northern neigh&orA (hina@ %he authors assume that &ecause of "outh >orea?s sense of ethno nationalism and the constant threat of an attac3 &y =orth >orea that "outh >orea?s res$onse to nearly any $rovocation &y =orth >orea 2ill &e su&dued@ ;hile this has &een the case in $ast $rovocationsA recent events !i@e@ (heonan sin3ing and Feon$yeong Island shelling# $resent a strong $ossi&ility of changing this dynamic@ %he Feon$yeong Island attac3 2as the first attac3 since the end of the >orean ;ar/, that not only occurred on "outh >orean land &ut also involved the loss of civilian life@/9 %his inserts a varia&le that has never truly &een in $lay &efore in this dynamic &eing a direct attac3 on "outh >orean soil 2hich resulted in the loss of non military life@ AlsoA these &oo3s fail to com$letely analy0e the im$ortance of "outh >orea &eing a democratic institution and the affect this has on its relations 2ith a nucleari0ed
57

B@R -yersA B=orth >orea ;ill =ever Play =iceAC The Ne- *or. Ti!esA =ovem&er 2*A 2010A htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2010H11H2/Ho$inionH2/myers@html@ 58 %he >orean ;ar is technically not over for the 19/) Armistice 2as never fully ratified into a $eace treaty &ut most academics merely state that it is over for the dearth of military confrontation since this time $eriod@ 59 B@R -yersA B=orth >orea ;ill =ever Play =iceAC The Ne- *or. Ti!esA =ovem&er 2*A 2010A htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2010H11H2/Ho$inionH2/myers@html@

.ershon )0

=orth >orea@ An e7am$le of this is that during the s$an of the "P%A "outh >orea under2ent three $residential changes !>im Dae IungA Roh -oo hyunA and 5ee -yung &a3# each of 2hom &rought a ne2 =orth >orean $olicy to into office 2ith them@10 %he lac3 of a consistent =orth >orean $olicyA 2hich is a general fallacy of democratic institutionsA ma3es it so certain reforms $ut in $lace are not given the necessary time to develo$ and mature in an effective manner@ %he literature on (hina and =orth >orea in the age of =uclear Di$lomacy $resents a more unified vie2 amongst academics in that many of them !i@e@ >2a3HEooA (oo$erA and Pritchard# vie2 (hina as a maIor $layer in the =orth >orean $aradigm and one in 2hich there is an immeasura&le influence on the e7ternal actions of =orth >orea@11 (hina?s $osition in the "P% 2as constantly grounded in $ro =orth >orean rhetoric: this can also &e said for (hina?s role on the United =ations "ecurity (ouncil !U="(# in 2hich its veto $o2er leads to any sanctions against =orth >orea &eing categorically 2atered do2n@ ;hat ma3es this literature im$ortant is 2hat 2as discovered 2hen various confidential United "tates documents lea3ed to the $u&lic in =ovem&er 2010@ %hese documents $resent a (hina that is not as in control of =orth >orea as analysts have &elieved and one that has &ecome fed u$ 2ith the constant actions of an irrational regime that acts li3e a Bs$oiled childC@12 It is im$ortant to re engage 2ith these te7ts for this 2ill sho2 the fallacies in these documents@
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U3 <eo and %erence RoehrigA South Korea Since "#:9 !=e2 For3G (am&ridge University PressA 2010#@ %ae <2an >2a3 and "eung <o EooA eds@A Peace Re'i!e 1uildin' on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian Securit+ Coo eration !"urreyG Ashgate Pu&lishing 5imitedA 2010#: <elene (oo$erA BAs3ing (hina to Act 5i3e the U@"CA The Ne- *or. Ti!esA =ovem&er 24A 2010A htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2010H11H2,H2ee3inrevie2H2,coo$er@html: (harles 5 PritchardA Failed 5i lo!ac+0 The Tra'ic Stor+ of ;o- North Korea 2ot the 1o!b !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ings Institution PressA 2004#@ 62 (hris <oggA B;i3ilea3s ca&lesG (hina Nfrustrated? &y =orth >oreaCA 11CA =ovem&er )0A 2010@A htt$GHH222@&&c@co@u3Hne2sH2orld us canada 11,411*1@

.ershon )1

%he main theory utili0ed in this set of literature derives from the Realist school of thought@ %he authors $ortray (hina?s su$$ort of =orth >orea as a manifestation of its anti ;estern rhetoric for a colla$se of =orth >orea $resents the strong $ossi&ility of a $ro ;estern unified >orea &ordering (hina 2hich 2ould acutely hinder its desire for hegemonic rule in the region@1) =orth >orea needs (hina to &olster its im$ortance u$on the international stage and as a means to confront the $ro ;estern forces that have maIor qualms 2ith =orth >orea?s actions@ %he issue arising in this te7t is that the hegemonic structure of the (hina =orth >orean friendshi$ is one that $resents the $erfect o$$ortunity to utili0e Post "tructuralist theory@ %he authors see this friendshi$ as mutually &eneficial &ut see (hina as the main actor 2ith =orth >orea follo2ing 2hen one must loo3 at ho2 certain actions of =orth >orea force the hand of (hina@ %he maIor assum$tion amongst these authors is that (hina isA &y farA the most informed country regarding =orth >orea?s actions and that =orth >orea does not act on the international stage 2ithout either having (hina?s $ermission or 2ithout vie2ing their actions in the conte7t of ho2 it might affect their friendshi$ 2ith (hina@ Recently $u&lished documentsA as noted a&oveA lay out a different structure in 2hich =orth >orea is not as o&servant to (hinese hegemony as $reviously thought and the (hinese are &eginning to &ecome aggravated 2ith =orth >orea?s actions@1* ;hen one $laces this ne2 $aradigm in the conte7t of the "P% the 0eitgeist of the "P% changes dramatically and must &e scrutini0ed more so than occurs in this literature@ %he second set of &oo3s deal 2ith the United "tates relations 2ith a nucleari0ed
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"eung <o Eoo and %ae <2an >2anA eds@ North Korea=s Second Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Securit+ !<am$shireG AshgateA 2004#@ 64 (hris <oggA B;i3ilea3s ca&lesG (hina Nfrustrated? &y =orth >oreaAC 11CA =ovem&er )0A 2010A htt$GHH222@&&c@co@u3Hne2sH2orld us canada 11,411*1@

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=orth >orea@ %hese &oo3s focus on =orth >orean =uclear Di$lomacy through the lens of the United "tates as o$$osed to an 6ast Asian lens that is vie2ing United "tatesH=orth >orean relations@ %his is im$ortant for it infuses a ;estern vie2 into a mostly 6astern literature set@ %he authors in this category can &e divided into t2o sections 2ith one tending to focus on U"H=orth >orea relations in the conte7t of the "P% !i@e@ Pritchard# 1/ 2hile other authors tend to focus on $ost "P% and the ramifications this has on the contem$orary $o2er dynamic on the >orean Peninsula@11 %he difference is that this later set of &oo3s are more concerned 2ith 2hat the $ossi&le colla$se of =orth >orea could mean regarding =uclear Proliferation and >orean Unification and ho2 the United "tates fits into this situation@ ;hat is very im$ortant a&out these &oo3s is that they sho2 the United "tates? governmental vie2 of =orth >orea@ %his offers a &etter understanding of the actions ta3en &y the United "tates since 199) regarding its =orth >orean $olicy@ %he United "tates isA argua&lyA the most im$ortant $layer in dealings 2ith =orth >orea for many of =orth >orea?s demands deal 2ith &ringing the United "tates to the negotiating ta&le@ =orth >orea vie2s the United "tates as the main $o2er &ro3er in the multilateral organi0ations and therefore &elieves that it must circumvent the road&loc3s $osed &y these organi0ations and directly deal 2ith the United "tates if it 2ants to o&tain its foreign $olicy goals@ %he maIor assum$tion in this literature 2hich $rovides a reason for this research
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(harles 5 PritchardA Failed 5i lo!ac+0 The Tra'ic Stor+ of ;o- North Korea 2ot the 1o!b !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ings Institution PressA 2004#@ 66 Donald A@ 5@ -acintyreA .i ;oo3 "hinA and Daniel (@ "neiderA eds@A First 5rafts of Korea0 The U>S> 4edia and Perce tions of the Last Cold (ar Frontier !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ings Institution PressA 2009#: 5eon 8@ "igalA 5isar!in' Stran'ers0 Nuclear 5i lo!ac+ -ith North Korea !PrincetonG Princeton University PressA 1994#@

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is that this literature vie2s =orth >orean United "tates relations solely through a Realist lens@ %he &lame for this does not com$letely fall u$on the academics forA as (arles 5@ Pritchard the am&assador and s$ecial envoy for negotiations 2ith =orht >orea !2001 200)#A so a$tly descri&ed it the United "tatesA during .eorge ;@ Bush?s tenureA vie2ed =orth >orea only as a &ellicose actor@ %his is sho2n &y the quoteA attri&uted to then 8ice President Dic3 (heneyA statingA BI have &een charged &y the $resident 2ith ma3ing sure that none of the tyrannies in the 2orld are negotiated 2ith@ ;e don?t negotiate 2ith evil 2e defeat it@C14 %he Bush administrations ina&ility to vie2 =orth >orea as anything &esides this BA7is of 6vilC severely limited their $olitical leverage regarding the <ermit >ingdom@ %hese actions and vie2$oints set the United "tates =orth >orean relations &ac3 years and negated any $rogress made during the (linton Administration@ %he dealings &et2een =orth >orea and the United "tates must include &oth a (onstructivist and Post "tructuralist vie2$oint to have any validity@ (onstructivism hel$s one understand ho2 the =orth >orean regime must indoctrinate its $eo$le 2ith the collective identity of America as a serious threat so that the $ersonality cult surrounding its leaders remains@ Post "tructuralism is im$ortant for many of these 2or3sA Iust li3e the $reviously discussed 2or3s on (hinaA negate loo3ing at the duality of the relationshi$ &et2een =orth >orea and the United "tates@ %hey 2ould rather vie2 the United "tates as reacting to =orth >orea?s actions as o$$osed to these t2o things not &eing mutually e7clusive@ %his relation is much too com$le7 to merely &e vie2ed through a theoretical conce$t 2hose main focus is $o2er relations and a 0ero sum game@ In order to truly understand this relationshi$ a study must enca$sulate the Realist $ers$ective 2ith
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(harles 5 PritchardA Failed 5i lo!ac+0 The Tra'ic Stor+ of ;o- North Korea 2ot the 1o!b !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ings Institution PressA 2004#A 10)@

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(onstructivism 2hile utili0ing Post "tructuralism as an under$inning@ %he third set of 2or3s revolves around the internal structure of =orth >orea@ ;hile the $revious t2o sets of literature have loo3ed at ho2 =orth >orea?s =uclear Di$lomacy sha$ed relations &et2een =orth >orea and various statesA this set of literature offers a glance inside the <ermit >ingdom 2hich can offer a &etter insight into the im$ortance of nuclear 2ea$ons to =orth >orea@ (ertain 2or3sA such as Ford and >2onA discuss the history of =orth >orea from the $ost >orean ;ar era until contem$orary times@1, %he im$ortance of this set of literature is that it $rovides the &ac3ground from 2hich the gro2th of =orth >orea?s =uclear Di$lomacy can &e scrutini0ed@ Allo2ing one to see 2hat internal events 2ere occurring in the country during certain 3ey e7ternal events !i@e@ the =uclear %estsA the 199) 2ithdra2al from the =P%A etc@# allo2s for a more e7tensive vie2 as to 2hy these e7ternal events occurred and can lead to the discovery of $ertinent information that 2as not discussed in the literature availa&le@ AlsoA 2hen dealing 2ith a to$ic as sensitive and controversial as =orth >orea the more facts that one is a&le to collect the &etter for it $rovides a &roader vie2 of events there&y assuaging any &iases that are innately $resent in the literature@ %hese 2or3s? casual arguments can &e divided into t2o distinct sectionsG those that utili0e the (onstructivist vie2$oint 2hen vie2ing =orth >orea?s internal structure and those that utili0e a Realist vie2$oint@ %hose utili0ing the (onstructivist vie2$oint include FordH>2o3A FosterA and -artin 2ho vie2 internal change in =orth >orea in the conte7t of ho2 it might alter the collective identity of the =orth >orean $eo$le and the

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.lyn Ford and "oyoung >2onA North Korea on the 1rin.0 A Stru''le for Survival !Ann Ar&orG Pluto PressA 200,#@

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$ersonality cult that surrounds the >im family@19 %his contri&utes to this thesis for it sho2s ho2 =uclear Di$lomacy is &eing utili0ed to maintain this aura of a collective identity in the sense of ho2 the =orth >orean?s vie2 their leader and ho2 they vie2 the outside 2orld &oth of 2hich are vital to the maintenance of the regime@ %hose utili0ing the Realist vie2$oint include -ichishitaA -yersA Eong FilA and "almon 2ho vie2 changes in the internal structure of =orth >orea in the conte7t of ho2 it threatens the via&ility of the >im regime and ho2 it alters their vie2s of the >orean Peninsula as a 0ero sum game@40 In this conte7tA =uclear Di$lomacy can &e seen as the means &y 2hich =orth >orea can flaunt its $o2er and $rove that it has maIor influence on the international stage@ InternallyA it is struggling &utA as this literature suggestsA that 2ill not matter as long as the BthreatC of outside forces is great enough to distract the =orth >oreans from their o&vious suffering@ A maIor assum$tion in this literature that furthers the need for a re analy0ation of the facts $resented is that these authors assume that =orth >orea can &e vie2ed through either a Realist or (onstructivist lensDmuch li3e many of the $reviously authors@ %he $ro&lem 2ith this is that =orth >orea is such a com$le7 entity that vie2ing it merely though either the Realist or (onstructivist lens only covers a minute amount of the causal
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.lyn Ford and "oyoung >2onA North Korea on the 1rin.0 A Stru''le for Survival !Ann Ar&orG Pluto PressA 200,#: Aidan (arter FosterA BFor the >imsA the ;ea3est 5in3 is FamilyCA Asia Ti!esA 'cto&er 22A 2010A htt$GHH222@atimes@comHatimesH>oreaH5E22Dg01@html: Bradley >@ -artinA B=orth >oreaG Pity the "on of >im Eong IlCA 2lobalPostA "e$tem&er 24A 2010A htt$GHH222@glo&al$ost@comHdis$atchHnorth 3oreaH100924H3im Iong il un succession@ 70 B@R -yersA B=orth >orea ;ill =ever Play =iceAC The Ne- *or. Ti!esA =ovem&er 2*A 2010A htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2010H11H2/Ho$inionH2/myers@html: =arushige -ichishitaA@ North Korea3s 4ilitar+-5i lo!atic Ca! ai'ns6 "#77-899: !=e2 For3G RoutledgeA 2010#: Andre2 "almonA B%heories a&ound on =@ >orea attac3CA CNNA =ovem&er 2*A 2010A htt$GHHarticles@cnn@comH2010 11 2*H2orldHnorth@3orea@attac3@analysisJ1Jdefense minister 3im tae young $yongyang succession $rocessK JsLP-G;'R5D: Ra Eong FilA B=orth >orea?s N-ilitary First? Politics are Behind Recent Attac3sCA Christian Science 4onitorA =ovem&er 21A 2010A htt$GHH222@csmonitor@comH(ommentaryH'$inionH2010H112)H=orth >orea s military first $olitics are &ehind recent attac3s@

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varia&les $resent andA if a fully detailed analysis of =orth >orea?s =uclear Di$lomacy is to &e generatedA one must loo3 at all of the varia&les $resent@ AlsoA 2ith the e7ce$tion of FordH>2onA the authors do not mention the effect of the colla$se of the U""R on the contem$orary =orth >orean structure@ %he do2nfall of the U""R &eget an economic do2nturn in =orth >orea for the U""R $rovided =orth >orea 2ith 2ea$onsA aid !&oth monetary and $hysically#A and &ac3ing in the international community@ %his s$urred a $eriod of economic decline that continues to this day and is only assuaged 2ith the hel$ of (hina@ %he situation created &y the do2nfall of the U""R is something that cannot &e neglected in the conte7t of =orth >orea?s =uclear Di$lomacy for it 2as only four years after its do2nfall that the First =uclear (risis occurred setting a ne2 $ath in =orth >orean foreign di$lomacy@ %he forth set of literature deals 2ith the gro2th of =orth >orea?s nuclear $ro2ess and its ever gro2ing use of =uclear Di$lomacy@41 %hese set of &oo3s analy0e the gro2th of =orth >orea?s =uclear Di$lomacy and the meaning of nuclear 2ea$ons to =orth >orea@ %his is very im$ortant &ecause in order to com$rehend the larger $icture !i@e@ =uclear Di$lomacy# it is im$ortant to understand all the little $arts that ma3e u$ the 2hole !i@e@ the meaning of nuclear 2ea$ons to =orth >oreaA the utili0ation of military threats as o$$osed to various other means of di$lomatic interactionsA etc@#@
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Bruce 6@ BechtolA Red Ro'ue0 The Persistent Challen'e of North Korea !DullesG Potomac Boo3sA IncA 2004#: (harles 5@ PritchardA Failed 5i lo!ac+0 The Tra'ic Stor+ of ;o- North Korea 2ot the 1o!b !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ings Institution PressA 2004#: .lyn Ford and "oyoung >2onA North Korea on the 1rin.0 A Stru''le for Survival !Ann Ar&orG Pluto PressA 200,#: =arushige -ichishitaA North Korea3s 4ilitar+-5i lo!atic Ca! ai'ns6 "#77-899: !=e2 For3G RoutledgeA 2010#@

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%he maIor assum$tion in this set of literature is that =orth >orea utili0es =uclear Di$lomacy for mere $o2er gains@ Po2erA as it is discussed in these 2or3sA deals 2ith having a $resence on the international stage@ ;hile it is true that =orth >orea does not $osses the economic means to hel$ it evolve into a maIor $layer on the glo&al stage there is much more to this than is discussed in the aforementioned literature@ %o truly understand the im$ortance of =uclear Proliferation to =orth >orea it is vital to loo3 at the historical narrative of the >orean PeninsulaA the influence of $o2er $olitics in the regionA and intra =orth >orean $olitics amongst an amalgamation of other issues@ %his study 2ill attem$t to delve into all of these to $rovide a more scru$ulous vie2 of the =orth >orean nuclear $rogram and =orth >orea?s use of =uclear Di$lomacy@ It is 2ith this laid out that this thesis can no2 $rogress into a discussion of the internal structure of the <ermit >ingdom@

!hapter ': A Glance into the (ermit Kingdom
Internal *tructure
'ne of the maIor overarching fallacies in any =orth >orean analysis is a misinter$retation of its internal structure ranging from the social structure to the etymological nomenclature $rescri&ed to the form of government $resent in Pyongyang@ In order to $roduce a via&le analysis of =orth >orea?s em$loyment of =uclear Di$lomacy it is $ertinent to $roduce a clear and concise definition of certain termsA such as the governmental structure or =orth >orea and the $ersonality cult around >im Eong IlA so that for the duration of this study their significance is not misconstrued@ %he ho$e of this section is to $resent a cursory glance of these varia&les so that the common fallacies

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are $ointed out@ %his section 2ill not aim to $rovide a detailed analysis of these definitions for that 2ould shift the em$hasis of the $a$er a2ay from its original $ur$ose &eing that the >im regime utili0es =uclear Di$lomacy as a means to maintain $o2er through sta&ili0ing internal dissent 2hilst o&taining e7ternal concessions to aid their dila$idated infrastructure@ %he governmental structure of the regime in Pyongyang is Authoritarian 2ith the legitimacy of rule not stemming from some divine &eing &ut from the conce$t of a $ersonality cult@ %he term that can &e used to descri&e this structure is a B(ommunist -onarchyC &utA al2ays &earing in mindA that the term (ommunist is not synonymous 2ith "oviet Russia@ %he ty$e of rule in =orth >orea is vastly different to that of its father stateA the U""R@42 ;ithout $roviding tangential informationA the differences &et2een =orth >orea and the U""R range from the 2ay in 2hich the leaders are $raised to the 2ay that the $eo$le vie2 themselves as citi0ens of the state@ A $ersonality cult manifest itself 2hen a Bone man dictatorshi$ $resents itself as a democracyC and the goal of this $ersonality cult is to Bconvey im$ression that due to the ruler?s unique qualifications and unanimity of the $eo$le?s love from himA his rule constitutes the $erfect fulfillment of democratic ideals@C4) %he utterance of BDemocracyC should not &e inter$reted as the yearning for the >im regime to $resent itself as a bona fide form of rule $roduced from some meta$hysical lining of democratic norms $resent in =orth >oreaDquite the o$$osite is true@ %he term Democracy in this sense s$ea3s more to fact that natural forces endo2ed the >im lineage 2ith the $erfect em&odiment of ethnic virtues ma3ing them the
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Aidan (arter FosterA BFor the >imsA the ;ea3est 5in3 is FamilyAC Asia Ti!esA 'cto&er 22A 2010A htt$GHH222@atimes@comHatimesH>oreaH5E22Dg01@html@ 73 I&id@A 9,@

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Iust rulers for the >orean $eo$le@ In order to do thisA the =orth >orean $ro$aganda machine must convey the sense that 2hatever >im is in charge is the most BnaRveA s$ontaneousA lovingA and $ure >oreanDmost >oreanA >oreanDever@C4* %his sho2s a difference &et2een Pyongyang and the U""R for BP$Qraising a leader as the $erfect em&odiment of ethnic virtues is less e7travagant than $raising himA as "talin 2as $raisedA as the highest authority in every science@C4/ By truncating the level of e7travagant $raise $laced u$on the ruler to more tangi&leA more humanesqueA it $resents the =orth >orean $eo$le 2ith a conce$t that is much easier to &elieve than claiming that their leader is as a demigod of academia@ %he im$ortance of understanding the internal structure of =orth >orea to this thesis revolves around the utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy &y the >im regime as a means to maintain $o2er over the =orth >orean $eo$le@ In order to fully com$rehend ho2 this is accom$lished it is vital to understand ho2 the country is internally structured@ =ot only this &ut understanding the internal structure of =orth >orea 2ill hel$ in understanding a variety of their actions during the Fifth Round of the "i7 Party %al3s@

5xternal 6ie%s
%he &rief overvie2 of the internal structure of the =orth >orean government creates the grounds from 2hich a discussion of their e7ternal vie2s can &e constructed@ Discussing the e7ternal vie2s of the <ermit >ingdom alone could &e the su&Iect of an entirely se$arate thesis and for this reason this discussion 2ill &e limited to their vie2s regarding the three most im$ortant actors in the Fifth Round of the "i7 Party %al3sG (hinaA "outh >oreaA and the United "tates@ %he reasoning &ehind attri&uting these three
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I&id@A 9,@ I&id@A 11/@

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states !and =orth >orea# as the most im$ortant actors in the "i7 Party %al3s 2ill &ecome more a$$arent the more this $a$er delves into the to$ic@ ButA as a cursory e7$lanationA Ea$an?s main concern during the entirety of the "P% 2as on re$arations from the =orth >orean 3idna$$ing of Ea$anese citi0ens earlier in the century and Russia 2as only &rought into the "P% at the &ehest of =orth >orea to &alance out the "outh >orean Ea$an United "tates alliance@ (hina is =orth >orea?s main ally and functions as their $ro7y on the United =ation "ecurity (ouncil@ "outh >orea and the United "tatesA on the other handA function as the sca$egoat for the =orth >orean $ro$aganda machine@ !hinese7North Korean elations (hinese >orean relations 2ere forged on the &attlefield during the >orean ;ar 2hen (hinese troo$s crossed the &order to aid their >orean comrades in the fight against the BIm$erialistC Americans@41 %he (hinese =orth >orean relationshi$ can &e quite intricate de$ending on the conte7t in 2hich it is analy0ed@ From the (hinese $oint of vie2A =orth >orea is a strategic asset a$ro$os of its relations 2ith America@44 =orth >orea $resents a geo$olitical &uffer &et2een (hina?s Asiatic hegemonic as$irations and the largest threat to this dreamD$ro American "outh >orea@ It is for this reasonA and the fact that the colla$se of the =orth >orean regime 2ould lead to a mass influ7 of malnourished and im$overished >oreans into (hina?s northeast regionA that (hina is the largest economic donor to the >im regime@ Because of the fear of this flood of =orth >orean immigrantsA a $revie2 of 2hich occurred during the 2ides$read famines in the

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Ra Eong FilA B=orth >orea?s N-ilitary First? Politics are Behind Recent Attac3sAC Christian Science 4onitorA =ovem&er 21A 2010A htt$GHH222@csmonitor@comH(ommentaryH.lo&al 8ie2$ointH2010H1121H=orth >orea s military first $olitics are &ehind recent attac3s@ 77 I&id@

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mid 1990s4,A (hina 2ill never ta3e severeA de ha&ilitating actions against =orth >orea@49 (hina?s t2o &illion dollars 2orth of annual trade 2ith Pyongyang accounts for more than forty $ercent of =orth >orea?s e7ternal trade@,0 AlsoA B&y some estimatesA (hina $rovides eighty $ercent of =orth >oreaMs consumer goods and forty five $ercent of its food@C,1 %he discussion of the (hinese vie2s of =orth >orea is im$ortant for it 2ill hel$ convey ho2 com$le7 the =orth >orean vie2s and treatment of (hina are &y com$arison@ =orth >orea has &ecome quite de$endent on (hinese assistance since the do2nfall of the "oviet UnionDa fact that they are not 2illing to readily admit for that 2ould question the strength of the >im regime and everything that they have told their $eo$le@ %he most accurate 2ay to descri&e the =orth >orean stance on (hina is anecdotally through the First =uclear (risis !2001# 2hich 2ill &e discussed in de$th later on in this $a$er@,2 =orth >orea is 2ell a2are that (hina is their only true ally and $ossesses an Oemerging role as a glo&al actor 2ith increasing international res$onsi&ilities and $restige and a commitment to =orth >orea as an ally 2ith 2hom (hina shares longstanding historical and ideological ties@O,) %his came into their calculation 2hen they attem$ted their First =uclear %est forA des$ite the fact that (hina signed U= "ecurity (ouncil Resolution 141,,* follo2ing the testA =orth >orea is 2ell a2are of their mutually &eneficial
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6stimates are that a million $eo$leDroughly /S of the =orth >orean $o$ulationDdied from hunger related causes during the 2orst $eriod of the famine !199/ 1994# 2ith ten of thousands fleeing to (hina@ !"ourceG B@R -yersA The Cleanest Race0 ;o- North Koreans See The!selves—And (h+ &t 4atters !Broo3lynG -elville <ouseA 2010#A /)#@ 79 I&id@A 2,@ 80 %ae <2an >2a3 and "eung <o EooA eds@A Peace Re'i!e 1uildin' on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian Securit+ Coo eration@ "urrey !Ashgate Pu&lishing 5imitedA 2010#A 2,@ 81 Eayshree BaIoriaA B%he (hina =orth >orea Relationshi$AC Council on Forei'n Relations6 'cto&er 4A 2010A htt$GHH222@cfr@orgH$u&licationH11094HchinanorthJ3oreaJrelationshi$@htmlT$)@ 82 I&id@ 83 I&id@ 84 %his resolution im$osed sanctions u$on =orth >orea: its full descri$tion can &e accessed hereG htt$GHHdaccess dds ny@un@orgHdocHU=D'(H.6=H=01H/42H04HPDFH=01/4204@$dfK'$en6lement

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relationshi$ 2ith (hina@ It is for this reason that they do not fear a volte-face &y (hina and canA there&y: assert their im$ortance on the international stage through acts such as this 2ithout the fear of ruthless (hinese retri&ution@ %hese actions can also &e e7$lained &y loo3ing at the aid that =orth >orea receives from (hina@ If =orth >orea merely received goods from (hinaA 2ithout these ty$es of $hysically threatening actionsA it could &e seen as BaidC des$ite 2hatever the local $ro$aganda might $ur$ort@ %he ina&ility of the local $ro$aganda to fully s2ay the =orth >orean $eo$le is a contem$orary $ro&lem facing the <ermit >ingdom due to the deterioration of the information cordon,/@ Because of thisA =orth >orea must su&stantiateA in the eyes of its $eo$leA that it has the u$$er hand in the (hinese =orth >orean relationshi$@ %he relationshi$ must come off as a hierarchical one in 2hich Bsu&servientC (hina is more or less $aying tri&ute,1 to the >im regime through their economic offerings@ %his anayl0ation of the hierarchical structure of the =orth >orean (hinese relationshi$ is a $erfect instance to im$lement the utili0ation of Post "tructuralism@ In realityA (hina is far su$erior to =orth >orea in argua&ly every measura&le as$ect &ut through the >im regimes control over the means of 3no2ledge dis$ersion !e@g@ the ne2sA the educational systemA etc@#A the >im regime can ma3e the =orth >orean $eo$le &elieve that =orth >orea is the su$erior country@ ;hat can &e gleaned from the $rior t2o $aragra$hs is that (hina needs =orth
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In the late 1990sA 2hen =orth >orean?s 2ere fleeing over the &order into (hina during the famineA many of them 2ould not live in (hina andA insteadA o$t to &ring goods &ac3 to their starving families@ Included in these goods 2ere smuggled %8s 2hich are utili0edA to this dayA to illegally 2atch (hineseH"outh >orean ne2s@ %his ne2ly discovered access to information is du&&ed Bthe deterioration of the information cordonC for the =orth >orean $eo$le no2 have other 2ays to get their ne2s &esides government sanctioned ne2scasts 2hich ma3es it much harder on the =orth >orean regime to &end the truth@ 86 ;hat is interesting in this is that it is an attem$t to com$letely reserve the historical narrative forged &et2een the t2o countries@ U$ until around the time of the '$ium ;ars !mid 19th century#A the >orean Peninsula 2as a tri&utary of the (hinese 6m$ire@

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>orea as a $hysical landmass to se$arate it from "outh >orea 2hile =orth >orea direly needs the (hinese economic aid and $olitical clout &ut cannot o$enly admit this and must convey the vie2 that they are the more $o2erful state in this t2o state dynamic@ %hese &rief descri$tions should &e enough to $rovide a strong critique of the recent articlesA stemming from the accidental release of classified "tate De$artment documentsA that (hina has &ecome Bfed u$C 2ith =orth >orea and 2ould not render the unification of the >orean Peninsula under control of "outh >orea out of the question@,4 (urrentlyA the only government 2ho 2ants >orean UnificationA 2hether their o&Iection is for economic or geo $olitical reasonsA is =orth >oreaDas long as they are the ones doing the reunifying@ Any bona fide scenario concerning a "outhern lead reunification of >orea must involve the demise of the DPR>Dthe outcome of 2hich could &e disastrous@ %his discussion relates to the argument $osed in this thesis in that it enca$sulates &oth the $olitical $o2er and the des$air varia&les in the logic &ehind =orth >orea?s utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy@ (hina manifests itselfA to =orth >oreaA as an entity to hel$ =orth >orea circumvent the occlusion &et2een them and a $resence on the 2orld stage@ 'n to$ of thisA (hinaA as mentioned a&oveA is a maIor su$$lier of aid to =orth >orea 2hich hel$s 3ee$ the regime running@ =orth >orea cannot &e seen as a lesser state than (hinaA 2hich it 2ould a$$ear so if it Iust acce$ted the aid given out &y the (hineseA so it must act 2ith threatening overtures on the 2orld stageDthoughA it is im$ortant to remem&erA never acting in such a manner directly to2ards (hina@ %his 2ayA =orth >orea receives the aid they so des$erately need 2hile maintaining their aura of near infalli&ility amongst the =orth >orean $eo$le@
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"imon %isdallA B;i3ilea3s ca&les reveal (hina Mready to a&andon =orth >oreaMAC 2uardian6 =ovem&er 29A 2010A htt$GHH222@guardian@co@u3H2orldH2010HnovH29H2i3ilea3s ca&les china reunified 3orea@

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*outh Korean7North Korean elations Relations &et2een "outh >orea and =orth >orea are even more com$le7 than they are &et2een =orth >orea and (hina for the historical narrative and collective identity amongst the t2o &ordering nations &egets an oddA al&eit ever changingA dynamic@ %he =orth >orean regime vie2s "outh >orea as a colony of the BFan3eesC !i@e@ America# and it is =orth >orea?s Io& to free their enchained &rethren@,, ;hileA &ecause of the deterioration of the information cordonA the =orth has had to admit the higher quality of life in the "outhA this is negatedA in the eyes of the =orthern $ro$aganda machineA &y the national and moral inferiority of their "outhern &rethren through their interactions 2ith America@,9 ;hat =orth >orean $ro$aganda $ur$orts is that B no amount of 2ealthUcan still the southern &rethren?s yearning for freedom and $urification@C90 "oA 2hile their "outhern &rethren may &e &etter off monetarilyA they are enca$sulated &y the American nightmare and it is the Io& of their $o2erful =orthern &rothers to free them@ =orth >orean $ro$aganda has also $ermeated the idea that "outh >oreans revere >im Eong Il even more than their elected leadersD2ho areA according to =orth >oreaA chosen &y the United "tates in rigged elections@ ;hat has anchored the "outh >orean $eo$le to their =orthern &rethren is their

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infalli&le sense of ethno nationalism91 that has 2ithstood various =orth >orean attac3s92 throughout the years@9) %hough 2hat has &eleaguered a consistent "outh >orean $olicy to2ards the =orth is the variance in elected officials vie2s to2ards =orth >orea@ For instanceA u$ until the election of >im Dae EungA all "outh >orean Presidents9* held strict anti engagement vie2s to2ards =orth >orea@9/ %his 2ould change under >im Dae Eung 2ith the im$lementation of the Sunshine Polic+91 2hich 2ould last until the election of 5ee -yung Ba3 in 200, 2ho reverted to a much stronger anti =orth >orean stance@ %he lac3 of a consistent a$$roach to =orth >orea is something that ma3es negotiations much more difficult for Pyongyang is cogni0ant of the fact that the "outh >orea?s $olicy one year might &e the antithesis of the $olicy the ne7t year@94 AlsoA occluding a straightfor2ard relationshi$ 2ith =orth >orea are "outh >orea?s relationshi$s 2ith the
91

%his ethno nationalism has &egun to 2aver 2ith the recent attac3s $reviously mentioned in this $a$er@ %here is not enough anecdotal evidence during the 2riting of this $a$er to clearly state that the "outh >orean sense of ethno nationalism has all &ut dissi$ated@ It is for this reason that 2e 2ill assume that it remains strong@ 92 For a summary of all the =orth >orean attac3s on "outh >orea visit this 2e&siteG htt$GHH222@google@comHfusionta&lesHData"ourceKdsrcidL)14111@ 93 B@R@ -yersA B=orth >orea ;ill =ever Play =iceAC The Ne- *or. Ti!esA =ovem&er 2*A 2010A htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2010H11H2/Ho$inionH2/myers@html@ 94 %echnically s$ea3ingA >im Foung "am 2as the first democratically elected civilian President in 199)@ Before thatA there 2ere a sle2 of military dictatorshi$s@ 95 B@R -yersA The Cleanest Race0 ;o- North Koreans See The!selves—And (h+ &t 4atters !Broo3lynG -elville <ouseA 2010#A //@ 96 %his $olicy 2as named Bafter the Aeso$ fa&le in 2hich the "un is a&le to $ersuade a man to ta3e off his coat after the =orth ;ind fails to do so@C %he $olicy had three com$onentsG 1# "eoul 2ould never tolerate armed $rovocation of any 3ind from =orth >orea 2# "eoul has no intention to undermine or a&sor& =orth >orea and )# "eoul 2ill actively $ush reconciliation and coo$eration &et2een the t2o >oreas &eginning 2ith those areas that can &e most easily agreed u$on@ %his o$ened u$ economic and social interactions amongst the t2o countries including the reunification of families 2ho 2ere se$arated during the >orean ;ar@ It is arguedA &y many scholarsA to have $roduced the closest relations amongst the >oreas since the >orean ;ar@ !"ourceG .ordon .@ (hangA Nuclear Sho-do-n0 North Korea Ta.es on the (orld !=e2 For3G Random <ouseA 2001#A 101 102@# 97 %he reference to the lac3 of a consistent a$$roach does not ta3e into account any $rovocations &y =orth >orea@ It is merely stating thatA even if =orth >orea did not change its $olicies or force any $rovocations &et2een regimesA the $olicies &et2een "outh >orean Presidents? 2ould still change@ As 2ill &e sho2n during this $a$erA this is a maIor fallacy in dealing 2ith democratic nations during long dra2n out negotiations such as the "i7 Party %al3s@

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United "tates and 2ith (hina@ %he United "tates hasA for the most $artA maintained a vehemently anti >im regime stand$oint in dealing 2ith =orth >orea@ %his $resents a $ro&lem to "outh >orea for the United "tates $rovides "outh >orea 2ith a nuclear um&rella9,A a means of $rotection against =orth >orea99A and 2ith military $ersonal and equi$ment@100 It is for this reasonA and a sle2 of others101A that "outh >orea must al2ays ta3e into careful consideration the o$inion of America 2hen dealing 2ith =orth >oreaDfurther convoluting their =orth >orean $olicy@ ← (hinese o$inionA regarding "outh >orea?s =orth >orean $olicyA cannot &e

ignored for the im$ortance of (hina to "outh >orea@ =ot only has "outh >orea &enefited the most economically amongst its Asian neigh&ors from the rise of (hina !it is the second largest e7$orter to (hina# &ut di$lomatically (hina is a force that "outh >orea cannot ignore if it 2ants to reach its full $otential on the 2orld stage@102 Adding this varia&le into the equation $roduces a result in 2hich "outh >orean foreign strategic $olicy regarding =orth >orea fluctuates &et2een domestic o$inion !2hich is constantly changing#A United "tates o$inion !constantly anti =orth >orean#A and (hinese o$inion !constantly $ro =orth >orean#A 2hichA o&viouslyA $roduces quite the &y0antine $olicy@ %his relates to the argument $resented in the thesis for it dra2s u$on the $olitical
98 99

A Bnuclear um&rellaC refers to a $romise &y a nuclear state to defend a non nuclear state if it is attac3ed@ ;hat is interesting is that neither Russia nor (hina $rovides =orth >orea 2ith a nuclear um&rella 2hich adds to =orth >orea?s list of reasons for 2hy it needs nuclear ca$a&ilities@ !"ourceG %ae <2an >2a3 and "eung <o EooA eds@A Peace Re'i!e 1uildin' on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian Securit+ Coo eration !"urreyG Ashgate Pu&lishing 5imitedA 2010#A ,4@# 100 %ae <2an >2a3 and "eung <o EooA eds@A Peace Re'i!e 1uildin' on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian Securit+ Coo eration !"urreyG Ashgate Pu&lishing 5imitedA 2010#A ,4@ 101 "ome of the other reasons includeG the economic im$ortance of the United "tates to "outh >oreaA their historical friendshi$A and the im$ortance of the United "tates on the 2orld stage@ 102 Francoise =icolasA Korea and the 5ual Chinese Challen'e !"eoulG >orea Institute for International 6conomic PolicyA 200/#A 1*@

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$o2er argument and hel$s further e7$lain the utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy &y =orth >orea@ 'ne of the main o&Iectives of the =orth >orean state is to have a voice on the international stage and one 2ay to accom$lish this is through di$lomatic channels@ Because of the &y0antine and tenuous $olicies of "outh >orea accredited toA amongst other thingsA their Democratic $olitical structureA =orth >orea cannot rely $urely on these di$lomatic channels 2ithout the threat of nuclear 2ea$ons@ %he reason for this is that the nuclear 2ea$ons $rovide a constant threat to the "outh >orean regime so that they must al2ays &e consistent in at least one category 2hen dealing 2ith =orth >orea@ ;hile "outh >orea is one of the most im$ortant actors vis V vis =orth >orean =uclear Di$lomacyA this thesis 2ill not actively engage 2ith the state@ %he reason for this is that =orth >orean actions are intrinsically laced 2ith $olicy agendas regarding "outh >orea@ %his section $rovides $ertinent information that should &e carried throughout the thesis even if it is not e7$unged u$on@ United *tates7North Korean elations As has &een hashed out a&oveA the United "tates $erce$tion of =orth >orea and the >im regime has &een quite consistent throughout the yearsD=orth >orea is the BremnantsC of the former U""R molded into something slightly different yet Iust as evil@ ;hat is salient for a com$rehensive understanding of the "i7 Party %al3s is the a&ility to fully com$rehend ho2 =orth >orea vie2s the United "tates@ ;hat must &e understood is that in order for the $ersonality cultA and the conce$t of the B$rotective motherC10)A to 2ithstand the varia&les $resent in =orth >orea !i@e@ a d2indling economyA 3no2ledge of
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%his term B$rotective motherC refers to the 2ay in 2hich the =orth >orean $eo$le vie2 >im Eong Il@ Unli3e in the U""RA 2here the leader 2as vie2ed as the educating fatherA =orth >orea has their $eo$le vie2 their leader as a loving mother 2hose Io& it is to $rotect her young and let them gro2 though ma3ing errors 2hile maintaining their aura of naivety@ !"ourceG B@R -yersA The Cleanest Race0 ;o- North Koreans See The!selves—And (h+ &t 4atters !Broo3lynG -elville <ouseA 2010#@#

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the socio economic affluence of their southern neigh&orsA etc@# and still &e vie2ed as infalli&le there needs to &e an e7ternal threat from 2hich the $eo$le are $rotected: this threat manifests itself in the form of the United "tates@ ;hat is interesting is that the United "tates o$erates under the conviction that the =orth >orean regime &elieves the o$$osite of 2hat it tells its $eo$le@ United "tates di$lomats have &een quoted sayingA B>im Eong Il doesn?t &elieve the stuff Pi@e@ the $ersonality cult and all of its e7ternalitiesQ himself@ <e told -adeleine Al&right it?s all fa3e@C10* It is their &elief that the =orth >orean leadershi$ can &e &argained 2ith and are ca$a&le of &eing convinced of nuclear disarmament@ %his statement is erroneous for 2or3ing alongside the United "tates 2ould question the mere e7istence of the DPR>: the DPR> functions on convincing its citi0ens that it is the &etter >oreaA the one in the right@ ;or3ing alongside the United "tates 2ouldA indirectlyA ac3no2ledge "eoul?s right to rule the $eninsula@ %he dissolution of one of the founding $illars of the DPR> could lead to innumera&le issues for the <ermit >ingdom including the usur$ation of the >im regime andA it is for this reasonA that =orth >orea can never 2or3 alongside the United "tates@ =orth >orea must al2ays either have the u$$er hand or &e a&le to convince its citi0ens that it has the u$$er hand@ In the follo2ing cha$ters it is im$erative that one al2ays 3ee$s this in mind@ ;ith this in mindA the discussion can no2 continue on into the "i7 Party %al3s@

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!hapter ): The *ix +arty Tal,s
A 8rief Introduction into the *ix +arty Tal,s
Before launching into the case study of this thesis it is $aramount to $rovide a &rief introduction to the "i7 Party %al3s so that the intricacies of the %al3s can &e analy0ed later on 2ithout having to interru$t the analysis to delve into the &asics@ 'n 'cto&er )A 2002 in Pyongyang there 2as a &ilateral meeting held &et2een the United "tates and =orth >orea in 2hich the United "tates alerted =orth >orea that it had information on the construction of a Bsecret uranium enrichment $lantC in =orth >orea 2hich 2as against the 199* Agreed Frame2or3@10/ >im Eong Il?s right hand manA >ang "o3 EuA the First 8ice -inster re&uttedA BP2Qhat is 2rong 2ith us having our o2n Uranium 6nrichment ProgramK ;e are entitled to $osses our o2n <6U P<ighly 6nriched UraniumQA and 2e are &ound to $roduce more $o2erful 2ea$ons than that@C101 "tatementsA such as this oneA that are delivered 2ith a threatening nuance 2ithout $lainly threatening the o$$osing $artyA is a sta$le of =orth >orean =uclear Di$lomacy and its su&sidiary of Brin3manshi$@ %hey usuallyA as 2ill &e sho2n in the later $ortions of this cha$terA deliver these statements in such a manner that $laces the &lame u$on the United "tates for the continual develo$ment of =orth >orea?s nuclear arsenal: if it 2as not for the threatening overtones of the United "tates then =orth >orea 2ould have no need to
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%he 199* Agreed Frame2or3 signed &et2een the United "tates and =orth >orea in .eneva halted the construction of nuclear reactors &y =orth >orea@ In this documentA the t2o governments agreed to re$lace =orth >orea?s gra$hite moderated reactors and related facilities 2ith light 2ater reactor $o2er $lants !less $rone to nuclear $roliferation# &y 200)@ %hey also agreed to Breduce &arriers to trade and investmentA to o$en a liaison office in each other?s ca$italA and to u$grade &ilateral relations to am&assadorial level@C %he full details of the frame2or3 can &e found hereG htt$GHH222@3edo@orgH$dfsHAgreedFrame2or3@$df@ !"ourceG (hae Ein 5eeA A Troubled Peace0 U>S> Polic+ and The T-o Koreas !BaltimoreG %he Eohns <o$3ins University PressA 2001#A 144 14,@ 106 Foichi Funa&ashiA The Peninsula ?uestion0 A Chronicle of the Second Nuclear Crisis !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ing Institution PressA 2004#A 9*@

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develo$ these 2ea$ons@ After the declaration of their Uranium 6nrichment ProgramA =orth >orea then declared the 199* Agreed Frame2or3 nullified &ut it 2ould not &e until Eanuary 10A 200) that they 2ould 3ic3 out IA6A !International Atomic 6nergy Agency# ins$ectors and 2ithdra2al from the =P%104@10, %heir reasoning &ehind the nullification of the frame2or3 is multifaceted &ut is rooted in the harsh rhetoric of the United "tates a$ro$os of =orth >orea@ It 2as also due to the lac3 of any su&stantial $rogress to2ards the creation of 5;Rs des$ite the fact that the Agreed Frame2or3 clearly stated that the rough deadline for construction 2ould &e 200)@ %ensions continued to escalate as sho2n &y the A$ril 200) $ronouncement &y =orth >orea that only a $hysically deterrent force !readG nuclear 2ea$ons# could avert a 2ar and $rotect the =orth >orea $eo$le from the hostility of America@109 ;ith tensions risingA (hina ste$$ed in and organi0ed a set of trilateral meetings &et2een themselvesA =orth >oreaA and the United "tates from the t2enty third to the t2enty fifth of A$ril in BeiIing@110 %he (hinese reasoning &ehind this can &e vie2ed as merely self &eneficial@ (hina needs =orth >orea to act as a &uffer &et2een its northern &order and "outh >orea and also does not 2ant the =orth >orean regime to colla$se for that 2ould lead to a mass e7odus of =orth >orean $eo$le into (hinaDan event for 2hich (hina is not currently $re$ared@ ;ith regards to the United "tatesA the United "tates is a maIor (hinese trading
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%he %reaty on the =on Proliferation of =uclear 2ea$ons !=P%# isA in its most &asic formA a treaty to limit the $roliferation of nuclear 2ea$ons !"ourceG .ordon .@ (hangA Nuclear Sho-do-n0 North Korea Ta.es on the (orld !=e2 For3G Random <ouseA 2001#A 19,@# 108 =arushige -ichishitaA North Korea3s 4ilitar+-5i lo!atic Ca! ai'ns6 "#77-899: !=e2 For3G RoutledgeA 2010#A 11*@ 109 Foichi Funa&ashiA The Peninsula ?uestion0 A Chronicle of the Second Nuclear Crisis !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ing Institution PressA 2004#A 11/@ 110 <a0el "mithA Reconstitutin' Korean Securit+0 A Polic+ Pri!er !%o3yoG United =ations University PressA 2004#A 1/2@

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$artner so it is im$ortant for (hina to maintain a certain level of ra$$ort 2hen dealing 2ith the United "tates@ During these meetings there 2as a very fine line of discourse that needed to &e follo2ed@ %he United "tates refused to engage in &ilateral negotiations 2ith =orth >oreaA a hallmar3 of the Bush PresidencyA so if the meeting a$$eared to &e headed in that direction the United "tates 2ould 2al3 out@111 'n the other handA =orth >orean $rovocations over the recent months 2ereA in $artA due to their yearning for &ilateral negotiations 2ith the United "tates112A so it 2as im$ortant to them that these tal3s a$$ear some2hat &ilateral in nature@ -ean2hileA (hina could not ta3e sides other2ise it 2ould lose its favora&le $lace 2ithin these tal3s@ ;hile these tal3s o$ened the dialogue regarding =orth >orea?s nuclear armament it 2as o&vious that it 2ould &e a long road to a mutual agreement amongst the $arties involved@ %he question then $resented itself as to if it 2ould &e &etter to maintain the trilateral format or if it 2ould &e more fitting to o$en the tal3s to other interested $artiesA mainly "outh >orea and Ea$anD&oth of 2hom have a legitimate role and interest in the denucleari0ation of =orth >orea@11) Pyongyang did not mind the addition of these countries under t2o conditionsG it 2ould &e allo2ed to meet 2ith the United "tates &ilaterally on the sidelines during these meetings and that Russia 2ould also &e added to &alance out the states $resent@11* Follo2ing thisA there 2ere a sle2 of di$lomatic
111 112

I&id@A 1/2@ %his is a $rime e7am$le of =orth >orean Brin3manshi$@ %heir threat of nuclear armament and 2ithdra2al from the =P% 2asA in $artA due to their desire to &ring the United "tates to the negotiating ta&le@ %hey could not merely as3 the United "tates to tal3s for that 2ould ma3e =orth >orea a$$ear 2ea3 andA to maintain the gri$ over the =orth >orean $eo$leA this could not ha$$en@ It is for this reason that they had to utili0e this &rin3manshi$ to o&tainA al&eit $artiallyA their o&Iective@ 113 I&id@A 1/)@ 114 I&id@A 1/)@

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&ac3channel tal3s amongst (hina and various other states 2hich manifested itselfA eventuallyA in the &irth of the "i7 Party %al3s@ %he a&ility to &ring together these si7 very different nations to discuss the denucleari0ation of =orth >orea 2as quite an accom$lishment and it must &e ac3no2ledged that this gathering 2as due to (hinese di$lomatic ca$a&ilities@11/ ;ith the outline of the "i7 Party %al3s laid outA the thesis can no2 2or3 its 2ay into a discussion of the late Fourth RoundHearly Fifth Round of %al3s@

The Fifth ound of the *ix +arty Tal,s
The 5nd of the Fourth ound9A +recursor To Trou.le “T-o Asian !en accused of s!u''lin' -ea ons and counterfeit bills into the United States laundered @">"A !illion in 4acau ban. accountsB""7 -United Press &nternational %he Fifth Round of the "i7 Party %al3s is of $aramount im$ortance in the study of =orth >orea?s utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy &ecause of the events that occurredA not only during itA &ut leading u$ to it@ 'n August 2/A 200/A in &et2een the First and "econd Phase of the Fourth Round of %al3sA the a&ove dis$atch &egan circulating throughout ;ashingtonDthe rever&erations of 2hich 2ould sha$e the future of the "i7 Party %al3s@ %hese menA 2ho 2ere $art of a larger crime syndicateA Bre$ortedly received W1@1/ million from undercover la2 enforcement agents in e7change for W)@)/ million in high quality counterfeit dollarsC 2hile also receiving a de$osit to2ards a million dollar shi$ment of arms including Bseventy five anti tan3 missilesA fifty roc3et $ro$elled grenade
115

;hile there intentions may have &een more self centered !i@e@ im$roving their di$lomatic clout on the international stage and ho$ing that multilateral tal3s 2ould $roduce a 2atered do2n agreement as is $ar 2ith treaties $roduced via multilateral tal3s# one still must ac3no2ledge the im$ressive feat that (hina accom$lished@ 116 Foichi Funa&ashiA The Peninsula ?uestion0 A Chronicle of the Second Nuclear Crisis !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ing Institution PressA 2004#A *10 *11@

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launchersUC amongst a sle2 of other 2ea$ons@114 ;hile this a$$ears to lac3 any correlation to =orth >oreaA as more details &ecome 3no2n it 2as discovered that one of the &an3s at the forefront of the investigation 2as the Banco Delta Asia !BDA# headquartered in -acauDforty $ercent of 2hose &usiness directly relates to =orth >orea@11, %he BDA 2as long sus$ected as &eing a $rimary &an3 in =orth >orean money laundering schemes: all these arrests did 2as $rovide tangi&le evidence to corro&orate this claim@ ;hile the counterfeiting of United "tates? currency 2as quite disconcertingA it 2as not until the conclusion of the Forth Round of %al3s that the United "tates formally accused =orth >orea of illegally manufacturing money119 and issued a 2arning to U@"@ &an3s a&out doing &usiness 2ith the BDA@120 %he timing of this action 2as highly calculated to the have the largest im$act u$on the "i7 Party %al3s@ By 2aiting to ma3e a formal accusation follo2ing the Fourth Round of %al3sA the United "tates allo2ed $lenty of time for &ac3channel discussions leading u$ to this Fifth Round of %al3s@ =ot only this &ut the United "tates &elieved that these actions 2ould ham$er =orth >orea enough that they 2ould concede some of their demands at the start of the Fifth Round of %al3s@ %his 2as $oor di$lomatic leveraging &y the United "tates for =orth >orea is not a country that concedes to others andA 2hen it feels its &eing &ac3ed into a cornerA 2ill fire &ac3 2ith a sho2 of $hysical force@ Adding to the list of $unitive measures vis V vis =orth >orea?s money laundering

117 118

I&id@A *11@ I&id@A *12@ 119 %he actual accusation 2as surrounding high quality counterfeit W100 Bsu$ernotesC !"ourceG (harles 5@ PritchardA Failed 5i lo!ac+0 The Tra'ic Stor+ of ;o- North Korea 2ot the 1o!b !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ings Institution PressA 2004#@# 120 (harles 5@ PritchardA Failed 5i lo!ac+0 The Tra'ic Stor+ of ;o- North Korea 2ot the 1o!b !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ings Institution PressA 2004#A 129@

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scheme 2as the 'cto&er 200/121 announcement that Bunder 67ecutive 'rder 1)),2CA all assets of $roliferators of ;-Ds and their delivery vehicles 2ere to &e fro0en alongside the %reasury De$artment $rohi&iting all transactions &et2een Beight =orth >orean com$anies and any U@"@ $erson and fro0e any assets that the com$anies had under U@"@ Iurisdiction@C122 In layman?s termsA the United "tates successfully fro0e many =orth >orean assets in this &an3 and issued a 2arning to United "tates? com$anies to stay a2ay from any investmentA lin3ed even in the most indirect of 2aysA to =orth >orea@ DuallyA this threat 2as utili0ed as a means to convince others to follo2 suit in the free0ing of =orth >orean assets 2hich occurred 2hen the -acanese fro0e certain =orth >orean accounts in BDA that 2ere valued at W2* million@12) %hese $unitive measures 2ere $art of a ne2 $olicy the United "tates 2as attem$ted to im$lement leading into the Fifth Round of %al3s@ %he United "tates B2as ta3ing these more aggressive tactics in the ho$e of enhancing its &argaining $o2erC a$ro$os of =orth >orea 2ithout ta3ing into consideration that they 2ere utili0ing tactics against the country 2ho mastered the utili0ation of the e7act same tactics@12* %he United "tates 2as attem$ting to $ut $ressure u$on =orth >orea to concede some of their demands heading into the Fifth Round of discussions through these harsh economic sanctions@ Utili0ing these actions against =orth >orea only did one thing though 2hich 2as ma3e =orth >orea even more u$set and

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'ne month &efore the Fifth Round 2as scheduled to start@ B%reasury %argets =@ >orean 6ntities for "u$$orting ;-D ProliferationAC US Fed Ne-sA 'cto&er 12A 200/A htt$sGHHustreas@govH$ressHreleasesHIs29,*@htm@ 123 (harles 5@ PritchardA Failed 5i lo!ac+0 The Tra'ic Stor+ of ;o- North Korea 2ot the 1o!b !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ings Institution Press#A 1/1@ 124 =arushige -ichishitaA North Korea3s 4ilitar+-5i lo!atic Ca! ai'ns6 "#77-899: !=e2 For3G RoutledgeA 2010#A 140@

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$rone to $hysically intimidating the United "tates through a variety of measures includingA as 2ill &e discussed laterA various missile launches and a nuclear test@ ;hen it comes to o&taining concessions from =orth >orea the route to $ursue is not one stee$ed in economic sanctions and thinly veiled threats@ %his only gives =orth >orea more ammunition in the theatrical $lay 2here they are the $oorA innocent country 2ho is merely utili0ing nuclear em$o2erment as a deterrent against a largerA much more threateningA enemy !readG the United "tates#@ As $reviously mentionedA one of the mainstays of =orth >orean =uclear Di$lomacy is the conce$tA $ur$orted &y the =orth >orean $ro$aganda machineA that the United "tates and its aggressive rhetoric are 2hat is the driving force &ehind =orth >orea?s attem$ts to gain a nuclear arsenal@ ;hat this event 2ould eventually sho2 is the different 2ays of thin3ing &et2een the United "tates and =orth >orea@ It 2as the understanding of the =orth >orean delegation that this issue of the fro0en accounts 2ould &e discussed and resolved at the ne7t round of %al3s !i@e@ the Fifth Round# 2hile the United "tates delegation vie2ed this issue as com$letely detached from the "i7 Party %al3s@12/ %his lac3 of communication 2ould occlude any serious discussion from occurring during the First Phase of the Fifth Round of %al3s and &e one of the main reasons 2hy =orth >orea left the %al3s and ended u$ testing their first =uclear ;ea$on@ As is one of the main $oints of this thesisA =orth >orea utili0es =uclear Di$lomacy to gain clout u$on the international stage@ If =orth >orea does not thin3 that its voice is &eing heard or that it is not &eing ta3en seriouslyA then it counteracts this &y some out2ard dis$lay of a $hysical force@ Furthering this lac3 of a tangi&le discussion during the Fifth Round of %al3sA 2hich furthered the reasoning
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I&id@A 1/1@

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&ehind the nuclear 2ea$ons testA 2as the issue of the 5ight ;ater Reactors stemming from the "e$tem&er 19th agreement@ *eptem.er ":th ;oint *tatement<Issue of 3ight $ater eactors At the end of the "econd Phase of the Fourth Round121 of %al3sA the si7 nations involved signed a Ioint agreement of $rinci$les !3no2n as the "e$tem&er 19th Eoint "tatement# outlining a detailed roadma$ for achieving denucleari0ation of the >orean Peninsula@124 %his statement reaffirmed that Bthe goal of the "i7 Party %al3s is the verifia&le denucleari0ation of the >orean Peninsula in a $eaceful mannerAC and $rovided that BPtQhe DPR> P2asQ committed to a&andoning all nuclear 2ea$ons and e7isting nuclear $rograms and returningA at an early dateA to the %reaty of the =on Proliferation of nuclear 2ea$ons and to IA6A safeguards@C12, -any scholars $oint to the im$ortance of this document for it 2as a formal recording of =orth >orea?s intent to denucleari0e in a $eaceful and verifia&le manner@ %he true im$ortance of this is the fact thatA if analy0ed from the "u&versive Realist $ers$ectiveA it is o&vious that this statement 2as doomed from the onset 2hich only furthered =orth >orea?s drive to2ards com$lete nucleari0ation@ 'ne of the most im$ortant $arts of this documentA the reason that it 2as doomed to failA that is rarely vie2ed as suchA is the =orth >orean demand for 5ight ;ater Rectors to &e &uilt to hel$ out their energy de$rived country@ ;ithout the assurance that mem&ers of the "i7 Party %al3sA mainly the United "tatesA 2ould construct theseA =orth >orea 2as
126 127

<eld in BeiIing from "e$tem&er 1) 19A 200/@ "eung <o Eoo and %ae <2an >2anA eds@ North Korea=s Second Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Securit+ !<am$shireG AshgateA 2004#A 14@ 128 Foichi Funa&ashiA The Peninsula ?uestion0 A Chronicle of the Second Nuclear Crisis !;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ing Institution PressA 2004#A )92@

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not going to &udge on the nuclear issue@129 %his issue of the 5;R 2as a continuation of =orth >orea?s frustration stemming from the clause in the 199* Agreed Frame2or3 that =orth >orea 2ould shut do2n their infant nuclear $rogram if >6D' !>orean Peninsula 6nergy Develo$ment 'rgani0ation# 1)0 constructed a 5;R in $lace of the =uclear Plant@ %his construction never manifested itself through di$lomatic tight ro$ing &y the United "tates@ During this discussionA the United "tates claimed that a single 5;R 2ould cost around t2o to three &illion dollars to &uild and ta3e u$ to a decade to constructD2ith this 3ind of commitment the United "tates refused to even &egin the official stages of discussions on the issue until =orth >orea 2as com$letely denucleari0ed@1)1 %his 2ould not 2or3 alongside =orth >orean =uclear Di$lomacy for one of the reasons for the utili0ation of said di$lomatic tool is to o&tain concessionsA such as the 5;RsA to &uttress =orth >orea?s ailing economy and atro$hying infrastructure@ -a3ing =orth >orea &asically give u$ this di$lomatic o$tion 2ithoutA firstA giving them concessions goes against the entire $rinci$le that is =uclear Di$lomacy@ %he only reason that this statement 2as agreed on 2ith such an occlusionA &eing the United "tates refusal to act until =orth >orea 2as verifia&ly denucleari0edA 2as that the United "tates s3irted this issue to the side saying it 2ould &e 2illing to leave aside the issue of civilian usage of nuclear technology for no2 so that this agreement 2ould $ass@1)2 %his agreement 2as merely another case of em$ty rhetoric utili0ed amongst the
129

"eung <o Eoo and %ae <2an >2anA eds@ North Korea=s Second Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Securit+ !<am$shireG AshgateA 2004#A 1,@ 130 >6D' 2as founded on -arch 1/A 199/ &y a conglomeration of the United "tatesA "outh >oreaA and Ea$an@ Its $ur$ose 2as the im$lementation of the 199* U@"@ =orth >orea Agreed Frame2or3 2hich fro0e =orth >oreaMs indigenous nuclear $o2er $lant in Fong&yon in e7change for the construction of a light 2ater reactor nuclear $o2er $lant@ %he originally target date of com$letion of this 5;R 2as 200) &ut it 3e$t getting $ushed &ac3 through di$lomatic leveraging &y the United "tates@ 131 I&id@A 1,@ 132 I&id@A 1,@

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si7 nations $resent in the "i7 Party %al3s all of 2hom had their o2n $olicy goals in mind@1)) %he $ro&lem 2ith thisA es$ecially in relation to the United "tatesA "outh >oreaA and Ea$an is that in dealing 2ith =orth >orea?s =uclear Di$lomacyA one mustA at least actA as if they are $lacing =orth >orea?s $olitical agenda first@ 'ther2iseA =orth >orea 2ill counteract this 2ith a $hysical dis$lay of force 2hich 2ould eventually occur after the First Phase of the Fifth Round of %al3s@ It 2as 2ith this agreement &eing signed that signaled the end of the Forth Round of %al3s and 2ould &e on the forefront of the agenda at the start of the Fifth Round@ Before continuing on into a discussion of the Fifth Round of %al3sA it is im$ortant to reiterate the argument of this thesis 2hich is that that the >im regime utili0es =uclear Di$lomacy as a means to maintain $o2er through sta&ili0ing internal dissent 2hilst o&taining e7ternal concessions to aid their dila$idated infrastructure@

The Fifth ound= +hase " >: No4 ? "" No4 #@@-A
A $hole 3ot of Nothing 'n Eanuary 1/thA 2001A in an intervie2 2ith Dan Rather for 79 4inutesA the =orth >orean 8ice -inister >im .ye g2an stated that BP2Qe have the o$$ortunity to secure a system for sto$$ing the $roliferation of 2ea$ons of mass destruction@ I thin3 this 3ind of o$$ortunity 2ill not come again@ Under current conditionsA 2here there is no trustA ho2 can 2e give u$ our 2ea$ons firstKC1)* %his quotation is a good indicator of the
133

For instanceA Ea$an 2anted re$arations for the 3idna$$ing of their citi0ens &y =orth >orea and (hina 2anted to maintain its favora&le $osition in these discussions and on the international stage@ 1)* I&id@A 1)2@

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atmos$here of contem$t surrounding the First Phase of the Fifth Round of %al3s: =orth >orea 2anted the air of gravity surrounding the %al3s to &e fully understood 2hile rationali0ing their stance on nuclear 2ea$onry@ %his 2as also an attem$t to force the United "tates into a corner utili0ing Brin3manshi$@ =orth >orea 2as setting the stage so that 2hen they did not denucleari0e it 2ould &e vie2ed as a failure on the $art of the United "tates@ =orth >orea is ascri&ing their ina&ility to denucleari0e to the United "tates? threatening overtones 2hilst trying to maneuver in such a 2ay that they o&tain the 5;Rs they so des$erately need@ =either the United "tates nor =orth >orea 2ere 2illing to &udge on the issues of the 5;Rs during the First Phase of %al3s@ %he United "tates 2anted verifia&le denucleari0ation &efore any investment in 5;Rs 2ould &e made and =orth >orea 2ould not denucleari0e until they received the 5;Rs@ A consistent issue that $lagued the "i7 Party %al3s 2as this ina&ility to agree on the semantics of the %al3sDon 2hat 2as to &e included in themA 2hat 2as notA and also the $rocess &y 2hich anything 2ould &e im$lemented@ For instanceA =orth >orea 2anted the "e$tem&er 19th Eoint "tatement to &e im$lemented in $hases and refused to ma3e any attem$ts at denucleari0ation until the financial sanctions $laced u$on themA via Banco Delta AsiaA 2ere lifted@1)/ %his 2as in line 2ith their utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy and 2ould &e their !odus o erandi throughout the entirety of the "i7 Party %al3s@ %he t2o days that encom$assed the First Phase of the Fifth Round of %al3s 2ere un su&stantive for the deadloc3 regarding the issues discussed a&ove@ An 54entful Bear Follo2ing the conclusion of the First Phase of the Fifth Round of %al3sA there 2as
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B>im >ye .2an Intervie2ed in BeiIingCA KCNAA =ovem&er 12A 200/A htt$GHH222@glo&alsecurity@orgH2mdHli&raryHne2sHd$r3H200/Hd$r3 0/111* 3cna01@htm@

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an air of uncertainty as to 2hen the ne7t $hase 2ould ta3e $lace and the events that occurred after this First Phase 2ould $ut into question if the %al3s 2ould ever resume@ Directly follo2ing the conclusion of the First PhaseA the U@"@ Agency for International Develo$ment $u&lically stated its cessation of food aid to =orth >orea and >6D' &egan $reliminary discussions regarding the dissolution of the 5;R $roIect@1)1 'n to$ of thisA the United "tates 2as a co s$onsor on a resolution $resented &efore the United =ations .eneral Assem&ly that o$enly condemned =orth >orea?s $oor human rights record@1)4 %hese t2o thingsA alongside the continuation of the free0e of the =orth >orean accounts in the BDAA greatly $iqued the =orth >oreans@ %he United "tates attem$ted to assuage this tension &y offering to send its main negotiator to the "P%A (hristo$her <illA into a &riefing session 2ith =orth >orea regarding the economic sanctions@ %hings did not go as $lanned andA in Decem&er 200/A the =orth >orean -inistry of Foreign Affairs !-FA# o$enly denounced the actions of the United "tates and dre2 a direct correlation &et2een the resum$tion of the "i7 Party %al3s to the United "tates? attitude@1), 'nce againA =orth >orea $laced the &lame on the United "tates in an attem$t to &ac3 them into a corner andA ho$efullyA force their hand so to save face amongst the international community@ Furthering the dissolution of the tenuous relationshi$ &et2een =orth >orea and the United "tates 2as the Eanuary 2001 2ithdra2alA &y >6D'A of all 2or3ers from the 5;R site in =orth >orea@1)9 %his 2asA in $artA di$lomatic leveraging &y the United "tates
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=arushige -ichishitaA North Korea3s 4ilitar+-5i lo!atic Ca! ai'ns6 "#77-899: !=e2 For3G RoutledgeA 2010#A 140@ 137 I&id@A 140@ 138 BF- "$o3esman Blasts 8irulent 'utcries of U@"@ Am&assador to "@ >oreaAC KCNAA Decem&er 10A 200/A htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$HitemH200/H200/12Hne2s12H12@htm@ 139 =arushige -ichishitaA North Korea3s 4ilitar+-5i lo!atic Ca! ai'ns6 "#77-899: !=e2 For3G

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to force =orth >orea to sto$ forging United "tates currency &ut all that it accom$lished 2as to continue the do2n2ard s$iral of relations &et2een the t2o countries@ In -archA there 2as a meeting in =e2 For3 &et2een the t2o countries in 2hich =orth >orea reem$hasi0ed that lifting economic sanctions against it 2ould &e a $rerequisite for the =orth?s return to the "i7 Party %al3s@1*0 In a ty$ical sho2 of Brin3manshi$A =orth >orea em$hasi0ed the im$ortance of &ringing them &ac3 to the "P% &y launching t2o anti shi$ missiles into the "ea of Ea$an@1*1 %he United "tates res$onded &y having the U@"@ De$artment of the %reasury add a "2iss com$any to the list of Bdesignees su$$orting the $roliferation of ;-D for their involvement 2ith =orth >orea@C1*2 =eedless to sayA this 2as not the res$onse that =orth >orea e7$ected: they res$onded accordingly and escalated tensions further@ In -ayA there 2ere re$orts of sightings of $reliminary $re$arations for a missile test in =orth >orea@ %his 2asA unfortunatelyA follo2ed &y >6D'?s announcement that it 2ould officially &e terminating the 5;R $roIect indefinitely@1*) In res$onse to this actionA the -FA announced that the escalation of hostility &y the United "tates 2ould only &e met 2ith an increase in military &uildu$ &y =orth >orea@ <o2everA they did e7tend an invitation to (hristo$her <ill to visit Pyongyang1** 2hichA in returnA 2as reIected &y the

RoutledgeA 2010#A 141@ 140 I&id@A 141@ 141 I&id@A 141@ 142 B"2iss (om$anyA Individual Designated &y %reasury for "u$$orting =orth >orean ;-D ProliferationAC U>S> 5e art!ent of the Treasur+A -arch )0A 2001A htt$GHHustreas@govH$ressHreleasesHIs*1**@htm@ 143 =arushige -ichishitaA North Korea3s 4ilitar+-5i lo!atic Ca! ai'ns6 "#77-899: !=e2 For3G RoutledgeA 2010#A 141@ 144 %his is inline 2ith =uclear Di$lomacy for =orth >orea 2ants to maintain their air of su$eriorityHthreatening nature &ut still needs to &e some2hat di$lomatic so states 2ill still &argain 2ith it and not totally refuse di$lomatic engagement !e@g@ =on state actors#@

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United "tates government@1*/ %he a&Iect refusal to engage 2ith =orth >orea and the continual reci$rocated elevation of threats manifested itself in a dis$lay of military &ra0en &y the =orth on Euly /th !or the afternoon of Euly *th in America#@ %houghA &efore analy0ing the details &ehind this eventA it is im$ortant to &rea3 do2n the a&ove information and sho2 ho2 it su$$orts the argument laid out in the thesis@ %he argument sti$ulates that =orth >orea utili0es =uclear Di$lomacy to gain clout u$on the international stageA to maintain the su&servience of the =orth >orean $eo$leA and to gain concessions to &olster its struggling economy@ %he varia&le that 2ill &e utili0ed as a e7$lanation regarding ho2 these actions &y the United "tates only &olster =orth >orea?s utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy is the 2ithdra2al of food aid@ %he conce$t that the American cessation of food aid 2ould someho2 convince the ruling $arty of =orth >orea to lighten its demands is a&solutely ludicrous@ ActuallyA this action hel$s add validity to the conce$t of =uclear Di$lomacy and furthers the >im?s hold on $o2er@ %he 2ithdra2al of food aid from =orth >orea &y the United "tates 2as utili0ed &y the =orth >orean $ro$aganda machine to $ur$ort the conce$t of the evil American forcesDfurther Iustifying their need for =uclear Di$lomacy to $rotect the =orth >orean $eo$le@ 'ne 2ould not ta3e food a2ay from a starving dog for that 2ould merely antagoni0e the animal and the same can &e a$$lied to =orth >orea@ =orth >orea utili0es =uclear Di$lomacyA in $artA to o&tain food aid from the United "tates soA &y ta3ing this a2ayA the United "tates is merely giving =orth >orea a reason to utili0e this form of di$lomacy@ =ot only this &ut =orth >orea vie2s this cessation of food aid as an affront to their $osition on their international stageDif they allo2 the United
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BDPR> Foreign -inistry: DPR>?s "tand on "i7 Party %al3s ReclarifiedAC KCNAA Euly 1A 2001A htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$HitemH2001H200101Hne2s01H02@htm@

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"tates to dictate their inta3e of aid then it questions ho2 much clout they truly $osses on the 2orld stage and can &ring into question the validity of the ruling $arty@ It is 2ith this in mind that the discussion regarding the Euly *th missile launch can occur@ Not Bour Typical )th of ;uly Fire%or,s *ho% From ) a@m@ until /G20 $@m@ on Euly /th !=orth >orean time#A =orth >orea launched seven B"cudA =o DongA and %ae$o Dong 2C missiles1*1 in the "ea of Ea$an des$ite strong international 2arnings against such actions@ %he ne7t dayA the -FA issued a statement in 2hich they noted that Bthe missile launches had &een $art of routine military e7ercises to increase defense ca$acityCA that the >orean Peo$le?s Army !>PA# 2ould continue 2ith missile launch e7ercises in the near futureA and that the DPR> 2ould ta3e sterner $hysical actions if they faced increasing $ressure from the international community@1*4 %hese actions 2ere ta3en out of frustration over the ina&ility to ma3e in $rogress in the conte7t of the "i7 Party %al3s soA as is common$lace 2ith =uclear Di$lomacyA 2hen things do not a$$ear to &e going =orth >orea?s 2ayA they use a dis$lay of &ra0en $hysical force to sho2 the gravity of the situation@ A little over a 2ee3 laterA on Euly 1/A the U="( ado$ted Resolution 119/ 2hich required mem&er states to $revent the transfer and $rocurement Bof missiles and missile related itemsA materialsA goods and technology to and from =orth >oreaA as 2ell as the transfer of any financial resources in relation to =orth >orea?s missile or ;-D
146

%he firstA fourthA and si7th missiles 2ere classifiedA res$ectivelyA as "cud DA "cud (A and "cud 6R missiles 2hile the secondA fifthA and seventh as =o Dong and the third &eing classified as a %ae$o Dong 2 missile@ %he "cud and =o Dong missiles 2ere successfully launched in the northeast direction &et2een the Russian Far 6ast and <o33aido Island !=orthern Ea$an# &ut the %ae$o Dong 2 launch failed misera&le 2ith the missile disintegrating mere tens of seconds after its launch@ !"ourceG Adam ;ardA ed@A B=orth >orea?s / Euly -issile %estsA Strate'ic Co!!entsA vol 12A issue 1 !5ondonG %aylor X Francis 5tdA Euly 2001##@ 147 BDPR> Foreign -inistry "$o3esman on Its -issile 5aunchesAC KCNAA Euly 1A 2001A htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$HitemH2001H200104Hne2s04H04@htm@

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$rograms@C1*, ;hile this a$$eared to &e a very im$ortant resolutionA es$ecially &ecause it meant that (hina 2as agreeing 2ith the United "tates since they are &oth on the U="( and have the $o2er to veto any resolutionA the resolution did not $ermit the use of force so there 2as no means of im$lementing the resolution@ ;ithout having the a&ility to forceful chec3 =orth >orean cargo shi$s for ;-D materialA the mem&er state of the U= 2ould have to as3 the $ermission of the cre2 to &oard the shi$ 2hich they o&viously 2ould not &e granted@ It is for this reason that this Resolution can &e seen as em$ty rhetoric and a di$lomatic master$iece &y (hina@ (hina 2as a&le to maintain its face in the international community &y $lacing $unitive measures u$on =orth >orea &ut did not cri$$le the =orth >orean regime through the a&sence of this use of force measure@ %he =orth >orean res$onse to this action 2as arguing that the United "tates 2as attem$ting to Bdescri&e the issue &et2een the DPR> and the U@"@ as an issue &et2een the DPR> and the U= and form an international alliance against the DPR>@C1*9 %hey 2ent on to state that the DPR> 2ould B&olster its 2ar deterrent for self defense in every 2ay &y all means and methodsC sending a clear message to the United "tates@1/0 'nce againA =orth >orea is Iustifying their utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy as stemming from the harsh rhetoric of the United "tates in an attem$t to $lace the &lame for =orth >orea?s actions on the United "tates in ho$es that this 2ould force the United "tates to change their =orth >orea $olicy@ %he o$$osite occurred and the United "tates res$onded &y stating that the Ban3 of (hina had also recently fro0en some =orth >orean assets in its
148

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-acau Ban3 2hich 2as a ver&al sla$ in the face &y the United "tates for they 2ere $u&lically ac3no2ledging that (hinaA =orth >orea?s most im$ortant allyA had sided 2ith the United "tates on this issue@1/1 ;hile these actions &y (hina should &e vie2ed more as (hina saving face amongst the international community as o$$osed to turning on =orth >oreaA the United "tates used these actions as di$lomatic leveraging and s3e2ed them as (hina turning on =orth >orea@ For some reasonA the United "tates &elieved that going toe to toe 2ith =orth >orea 2ould lead to =orth >orea &ac3ing do2n and toning do2n its demands &utA as can &e e7$ected &y no2A the o$$osite ha$$ened manifesting itself in the 'cto&er 2001 =uclear %est@ The 1cto.er Nuclear Test %he refusal of the United "tates to unfree0e its financial sanctions and the continual ina&ility for either =orth >orea or the United "tates to ma3e any $rogress to2ards finding common ground on a sle2 of issues &ecame a $oint of frustration for =orth >orea@ %he failure of the Euly *thH/th missile launches to gain any concessions from the United "tates truly $ut =orth >orea in an a232ard situationDtheir !odus o erandiA the utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy to gain concessions and to move the dialogue in a more favora&le $osition for themselvesD2as failing@ =ot only this &ut (hinaA =orth >orea?s largest allyA not only let a U="( Resolution $ass against =orth >orea 2ithout vetoing it &ut the (entral Ban3 of (hina follo2ed the United "tates is free0ing =orth >orean assets in the BDA@ ;hile the aura in the international environment 2as slo2ly turning against =orth >oreaA =orth >orea did have one maIor advantage in having the "P% stalledDit allo2ed them time to further develo$ their nuclear arsenal@
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In mid August 2001A memos 2ere circulating throughout ;ashington that there 2as surmounting evidence of a nuclear test in the ma3ings in =orth >orea: around a sus$ected test site there 2as sus$icious vehicle movement alongside B2ire &undles used to monitor an underground test@C1/2 Follo2ing this discoveryA on "e$tem&er 21stA (hristo$her <ill $u&lically revealed that he $ro$osed a B&ilateral 2or3ing grou$ Palongside =orth >oreaQ to discuss financial sanctions on the condition that the =orth >oreans came &ac3 to the "i7 Party %al3s@C1/) ;hile it is dis$uted ho2 much the discovery of the nuclear test site had on this announcement it should &e noted the time $eriod and the location in 2hich this announcement 2as made@ %his announcement came a&out a month after the discover of the nuclear test site and 2as delivered at the United =ationsDensuring that =orth >oreaA and the rest of the 2orldA 2ould hear it@ %his can &e vie2ed as an attem$t &y the United "tates to sho2 the 2orld that they 2ere actively attem$ting to engage in discussions 2ith =orth >orea there&y attem$ting to circumvent the stalemate that 2as occluding the "i7 Party %al3s@ A maIor do2nside to this deliveryA and the reason 2hy it can &e vie2ed as em$ty $olitical rhetoric aimed at the United "tates saving face amongst the international communityA is that the United "tates sti$ulated that =orth >orea !ust return to the "P% in order for a discussion regarding the financial sanctions to even &e &roached@ It should &e &ecoming quite a$$arent that ma3ing =orth >orea act firstA 2ithout giving them any concessions is doomed to fail@ %his is es$ecially true 2hen the to$ic at hand is one of the $illars of their =uclear Di$lomacyDeconomic incentives@
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%he failure to reach a common ground 2ith =orth >oreaA once againA &egan to negatively manifest itself on 'cto&er ) 2hen the -FA released a three $oint statement 2hich e7$lained thatG 1# =orth >orea 2as going to conduct a nuclear testA 2# =orth >orea 2ould never use the nuclear 2ea$on first and 2ould strictly $rohi&it the threat of a nuclear 2ea$on transferA and )# the =orth >orean government 2ould 2or3 its hardest to Breali0e the denucleari0ation of the $eninsula and give momentum to 2orld2ide nuclear disarmament and ultimate denucleari0ation@C1/* ;hat is interesting is the innate contradiction &et2een the first and third $ointsD=orth >orea 2as going to test a nuclear 2ea$on &ut 2as fully committed to denucleari0ing the >orean Peninsula@ Des$ite this contradictionA this statement is com$letely in line 2ith =orth >orea?s =uclear Di$lomacy@ In order for =orth >orea?s threats to &e ta3en seriouslyA and to continue the ra$$ort it has constructed 2ithin the international communityA =orth >orea needs to continue the gro2th of its =uclear Program@ %his 2ayA the threatening overtures that they ta3e vis V vis the international community are seen as bona fide 2hich increases the chance of them manifesting themselves in the form of concessionsDeither $hysical or monetarily@ %he mentioning of the commitment to the denucleari0ation of the >orean Peninsula 2as a mere $olitical $erfunctory move to elucidate the feeling that =orth >orea?s =uclear Program 2as for defensive $ur$oses there&y directing the &lame for the develo$ment of the $rogram onto the United "tates@ It 2as from this statement that the motions 2ere $ut in $lace for the actual nuclear test on 'cto&er 9th@ 'n 'cto&er 9thA 2001A around eleven a@m@ >orean timeA =orth >orea conducted its first official nuclear test in the =ortheast region of the country@ Follo2ing this 2as a t2o
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day $eriod in 2hich =orth >orea let the 2orld revel in its actions &efore having the -FA issue an 'cto&er 11th statement in 2hich it reiterated its stance that it conducted the nuclear test &ecause of threatening overtures from the United "tates &ut 2as still dedicated to the denucleari0ation of the >orean Peninsula@1// %he statement continued &y saying that the nuclear test Bdoes not contradict the "e$tem&er 19th Eoint "tatement under 2hich it committed itself to dismantle nuclear 2ea$ons and a&andon the e7isting =uclear ProgramC citing that the nuclear 2ea$ons test constituted a $ositive measure for the im$lementation of the "e$tem&er 19th Eoint "tatement@1/1 %his statement concluded 2ith the omni$otent 2arning that if the United "tates increased the $ressure u$on the <ermit >ingdom that =orth >orea 2ould vie2 this as a declaration of 2ar and ta3e the a$$ro$riate $hysical countermeasures@1/4 %his 2as a merely reiteration of the 'cto&er )rd statement 2ith the only variance &eing that =orth >orea $roduced tangi&le $roof of their nuclear ca$a&ilities 2hich em$hasi0ed the im$ortance of time in relations to moving $ast the stalemate@ As is common$lace 2ith most =orth >orean $rovocationsA the res$onse to these actions 2as the 'cto&er 1*th unanimous ado$tion of a U="( ResolutionDthis time &eing Resolution 141,@ %his required the mem&er states of the United =ations to ta3e the necessary measures to ma3e it difficult for =orth >orea to acquire Ba# maIor conventional 2ea$on systemsA &# all itemsA materialsA equi$mentA goodsA and technology 2hich could contri&ute to nuclear related &allistic missile relatedA or other ;-D related $rogramsA

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and c# lu7ury goods@C1/, 5i3e $revious resolutionsA Resolution 141, mentioned (ha$ter 8II and Article *1 of the U= (harterA 2hich Ballo2ed for such measures as interru$tion of economic relations and the severance of di$lomatic relationsCA &utA once againA did not mention Article *2 2hich allo2ed the use of military force to enforce said regulations@ 'nce againA this 2as more em$ty rhetoric &y the United =ationsDattem$ting to $unish the =orth >orean regime 2ithout $roviding the means &y 2hich to u$hold this $unishment@ An 6olte7Face: The !hanging U* +olicy Apropos 1f North Korea %he United "tatesA instead of a&iding &y their normal $ra7is of merely utili0ing the U= to $unish =orth >oreaA changed their $aradigm a$ro$os of =orth >orea and o$ted for direct engagement@ 'n 'cto&er )1stA a mere t2enty t2o days after the First =uclear ;ea$ons %estA &ilateral discussions &et2een the United "tates and =orth >orea 2ere held in BeiIing@ During these tal3sA <ill reiterated the United "tates 2illingness to resolve the BDA issue se$arately from the "P% and it 2as under this &ac3dro$ that =orth >orea announced it 2ould return to the "P%@1/9 %o2ards the end of =ovem&erA additional U" DPR> &ilateral meetings 2ere held in BeiIing in 2hich the B6arly <arvestC $ro$osal 2as $resented to =orth >orea@110 %his $ro$osal set forth a reci$rocal arrangement &et2een the United "tates and =orth >orea in 2hichA if =orth >orea sto$$ed its nuclear activities at =yong&yon111A allo2ed IA6A

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United =ations "ecurity (ouncilA Resolution 141, !2001#A "HR6"H141,A 'cto&er 1*A 2001@ -i3e (hinoyA 4eltdo-n0 The &nside Stor+ of the North Korea Nuclear Crisis !=e2 For3G "t@ -artin?s PressA 200,#A )01 )04@ 160 =arushige -ichishitaA North Korea3s 4ilitar+-5i lo!atic Ca! ai'ns6 "#77-899: !=e2 For3G RoutledgeA 2010#A 14)@ 161 %he Fong&yon =uclear "cientific Research (enterA a maIor com$onent of the =orth >orean =uclear ProgramA is located here

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ins$ectors &ac3 into the countryA $resented a list of its nuclear related $rograms and facilitiesA and shut do2n its nuclear test sites &y 200, then the United "tates 2ould send food and energy aidA discuss 2ays in 2hich to &est end the BDA sanctionsA normali0e di$lomatic relationsA and esta&lish a $eace regime on the >orean Peninsula@112 'nce againA attem$ting to have =orth >orea ma3e the first move 2as a $olitical nightmare and the =orth >orean regime 2as o$$osed to these terms and 2ould only consider them if the BDA issue 2as first addressed@ Des$ite thisA one must analy0e the im$ortance of the 'cto&er =uclear %est in relations to =uclear Di$lomacy and &ringing the United "tates to the negotiating ta&le@ %he United "tates decision to &egin &ilateral negotiations 2ith =orth >oreaA something that 2as anti$odal to their strategy utili0ed u$ until this $ointA 2as $artially a result of =orth >orea?s successful utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy@ =orth >orea 2as not $leased that their list of demands 2ere not &eing treated as seriously as they should and vie2ed this as a direct affront to their $osition amongst the 2orld community@ It 2as under this $rete7t that the "econd Phase of the Fifth Round of %al3s &egan on Decem&er 1,thA 2001@

The Fifth ound= +hase II >Decem.er "Cth7##ndD #@@EA
%his $hase of the %al3s started off 2ith >im >ye .2anA the =orth >orean re$resentative to the "P% and the First 8ice -inister of the -inistry of Foreign AffairsA stating that the "e$tem&er 19th Eoint "tatement 2ould not &e im$lemented until the BDA sanctions 2ere lifted@11) %he issue of the BDA sanctions 2ere &eing hashed out outside
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the conte7ts of the "P% &et2een the United "tates and =orth >orea and culminatedA at the end of the Fifth Round of %al3sA 2ith =orth >orea critici0ing the United "tates for failing to lift the sanctions 2hich occurred concurrently as the United "tates discovered rene2ed nuclear actives in =orth >orea@11* %his ina&ility to come to terms 2ithA not only the terms 2ith 2hich the BDA issue 2ould &e metA &ut the ina&ility to figure out the structure of the discussions constantly $lagued this round of the "i7 Party %al3s@ It 2as events li3e this one that occluded a serious discourse during this round of %al3s and &eget events li3e the Euly *th -issile 5aunch at the 'cto&er 9th =uclear ;ea$ons %est@ %hese actionsA thenA can &e seen as an attem$t to Ium$start this stalemateA via =uclear Di$lomacyA and have the United "tates ma3e some concessions to =orth >orea in this de$artment@ -uch li3e the First Phase of the Fifth Round of %al3sA the "econd Phase did not ma3e any $rogress to2ards dealing 2ith =orth >orea?s =uclear ;ea$ons Program &ecause of certain road&loc3s such as this stalemate over the BDA issue@ All that 2as formulated during this $hase 2as the reaffirmation that each side 2as committed to im$lementing the "e$tem&er 19th Eoint "tatement 2hich had come into &eing over a year ago and yet there 2as still no tangi&le evidence of the si7 nations moving any closer to the ratification and im$lementation of said statement@ It 2ould not &e until the end of the %hird Phase of the Fifth Round of %al3sA in Fe&ruary 2004 that an action $lan 2ould &e ado$ted on ho2 to im$lement the 200/ Eoint "tatement@ %he slo2 $ace at 2hich the "P% o$erated also had a negative affect u$on dealing 2ith =orth >orea and $layed directly into their utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy@ In
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dealing 2ith a country that is a gro2ing nuclear threat time is one of the most im$ortant factors for it is a necessity to find a common ground 2ith said country &efore their nuclear arsenal is fully functional and &egins to out2ardly e7$and@ Part of =orth >orea?s =uclear Di$lomacy centered around utili0ing itA at certain 3ey timesA to remind the 2orld of the im$ortance of haste in dealing 2ith their demands@ By not actively engaging 2ith =orth >orea andA insteadA allo2ing time to $ass the United "tates and the other nations of the "i7 Party %al3s $layed into =orth >orea?s hand@ %hey allo2ed =orth >orea to gain a nuclear arsenal 2hilst allo2ing them to hide &ehind the veil of innocence $ur$orted &y the tem$oral longevity &et2een meetings@ 'ne 2ould e7$ect thatA since no $rogress 2as made during this $hase of the %al3sA =orth >orea 2ould act out on the international stage ala 2hat occurred follo2ing the First Phase of %al3s@ %he reason that this did not ha$$enA there&y holding u$ the assum$tions set forth in this $a$erA is that the United "tates 2as concurrently engaging in &ilateral tal3s 2ith =orth >orea duringA and follo2ingA the "econd Phase of %al3s@ In factA in Eanuary 2004A there 2as an agreement reached &et2een the United "tates and =orth >orea du&&ed the BBerlin AgreementsC11/ in 2hich =orth >orea $romised to shut do2n their nuclear facilities in =yong&yon 2ithin a si7ty day timeframe andA in e7changeA 2ould receive heavy fuel oil !<F'#111Dthe details of said agreement 2ere set to &e formali0ed at the ne7t session of the "i7 Party %al3s@114 'nce againA a meeting
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It 2as named this &ecause the tal3s 2ere held in Berlin@ ;hat is interesting is that these tal3s did not occur in BeiIing 2hich had &ecome common$lace &et2een =orth >orea and the United "tates@ =orth >orea allo2ing this meeting to &e held in a ;estern countryA and outside their comfort 0oneA is quite unusual for the <ermit >ingdom@ 166 %he e7act amount of <F' 2as /00A000 tons $er year@ !"ourceG -i3e (hinoyA 4eltdo-n0 The &nside Stor+ of the North Korea Nuclear Crisis !=e2 For3G "t@ -artin?s PressA 200,##@ 167 -i3e (hinoyA 4eltdo-n0 The &nside Stor+ of the North Korea Nuclear Crisis !=e2 For3G "t@ -artin?s PressA 200,#A )20@

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occurred &et2een these t2o $o2ers 2here they reached a conclusion &ut refused to fully im$lement it until a later date@ AlsoA later in EanuaryA =orth >orean and American officials met again to discuss the financial sanctions the United "tates still had against =orth >orea &ut there 2as not any $rogress made &et2een the t2o@ It 2as 2ith this in mind that the %hirdA and finalA Phase of the Fifth Round of %al3s &egan@

The Fifth ound= +hase III >Fe.ruary Cth7 "'thD #@@FA
%he main em$hasis heading into this $hase of %al3s 2as finally ado$ting the 200/ Eoint "tatement 2hich meant intense $olitic3ing so that all involved $arties 2ould find the terms agreea&le@ 'n the final day of the %al3sA Fe&ruary 1)thA this came into fruition 2ith a $lan of action to ado$t the Eoint "tatement finally &eing agreed u$on@ %his $lan 2ould &e im$lemented in t2o $hases 2ith the first &eing a si7ty day initial $hase in 2hich =orth >orea 2ould Bshut do2n and seal for the $ur$ose of eventual a&andonment the =yong&yon =uclear FacilityA including the re$rocessing facilityA and invite &ac3 IA6A $ersonnelC 2ith the other countries $roviding Bemergency energy assistance equivalent to /0A000 tons of <F'@C11, 'nce this 2as com$letedA the second $hase 2ould &e im$lemented in 2hich =orth >orea 2ould $rovide a com$lete declaration of all their nuclear $rograms and all e7isting nuclear facilities 2ould &e disa&led and in return the other countries 2ould $rovide =orth >orea 2ith BeconomicA energyA and humanitarian assistance u$ to the equivalent of one million tons of <F'A including the initial shi$ment equivalent to /0A 000 tons@C119 Alongside this 2as the $romise that the United "tates and =orth >orea 2ould continue the discussions regarding the BDA sanctions 2ithin thirty
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days of the conclusion of the Fifth Round of %al3s@140 In -archA directly follo2ing this round of %al3sA the United "tates De$artment of the %reasury unfro0e roughly t2enty five million dollars that 2ere fro0en in BDAD effectively lifting the $re Fifth Round "anctions@141 %his 2ould &e follo2edA a fe2 months laterA 2ith =orth >orea shutting do2n and sealing their nuclear reactors there&y fulfilling their end of the agreement@ %his raises the issue of 2hy did =orth >orea follo2 through 2ith 2hat they $romised seeing that closing the nuclear reactors 2ouldA argua&lyA end their utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy for they could no longer threat the usage of nuclear 2ea$ons to gain concessions from other $o2ers@ %his issue can &e s3irted aside for t2o reasonsG the first &eing that =orth >orea has toA occasionallyA concede to some demands so that they a$$ear rational enough to &argain 2ith in the conte7t of the international community@ If =orth >orea only threatened other 2orld $o2ers 2ithout ever sho2ing their 2illingness to 2or3 alongside said $o2ers then no one 2ould &e 2illing to coo$erate 2ith them or attem$t to reach a common groundDmuch li3e ho2 countries refuse to engage 2ith certain non state actors such as Al +aeda@ %he 3ey term in =uclear Di$lomacy is di$lomacyDthe art of dealing 2ith other countries in an effective manner@ It 2ould &e very ineffective to only demand concessions from other countries 2ithout ever 2illing to sho2n one?s 2illingness to give &ac3@ %he second reason 2hy this issue is not as serious as it a$$ears is that it is almost common$lace 3no2ledge that =orth >orea has more clandestine nuclear reactors@ %he
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sti$ulations of the Eoint "tatement laid out that =orth >orea had to disclose all of their nuclear facilitiesA allo2 IA6A ins$ectors &ac3 into their countryA and close off said reactors in order to receive the aid $romised &y the other countries@ %here is no tangi&le evidenceA a$art from conIectureA that =orth >orea $osses these hidden nuclear sites so there is no reason for =orth >orea to declare that they e7ist &ecause no one can $rove other2ise@ %his agreement $lays quite 2ell into =orth >orea?s handDthey can declare that they are nuclear freeA receive the concessions that they dearly needA and yet secretly maintain their nuclear 2ea$ons@ %his 2ay if things are not going their 2ay or if other countries are &eginning to &ac3trac3 on their $romises !readG the United "tates and the 199* Agreed Frame2or3# =orth >orea canA once againA declare themselves a nucleari0ed state and resume their utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy@

!hapter Fi4e: !onclusion
$hat $e (a4e 3earned %he argument laid out in this thesis is that =orth >orea utili0es =uclear Di$lomacy to accom$lish three main goalsG maintaining $o2er over its $eo$leA have a voice 2ithin the international communityA and to hel$ &uttress its ailing infrastructure@ %he 2ay =uclear Di$lomacy is utili0ed to maintain the su&servience of the =orth >orean $eo$le is through the constantA internally constructedA outside threat that Iustifies the utili0ation of >im Eong Il?s B-ilitary FirstC $olicy@ By 3ee$ing the military on constant high alert and increasing =orth >orea?s nuclear arsenalA >im Eong Il ma3es the conce$t of a villainous and threatening America a tangi&le notion@ It is through this tangi&le manifestation that >im Eong Il and the =orth >orean $ro$aganda machine can im$ress u$on the =orth >orean $eo$le their need for >im Eong Il as their $rotector@

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%his utili0ation of =uclear Di$lomacy forms a collective identityA utili0ing the (onstructivist lensA amongst the =orth >orean $eo$le that >im Eong Il is the last line of resistance &et2een the innocent =orth >orean $eo$le and the villainous ;est there&y Iustifying his rule@ If it 2ere not for this constant threat $osed &y the outside 2orldA the =orth >orean $eo$le 2ould &egin to see ho2 dire their situation is and >im Eong Il?s hold on $o2er 2ould halter for there 2ould no longer &e need for himA and his B-ilitary FirstC $olicyA to $rotect the $eo$le@ =uclear Di$lomacy is utili0ed to gain clout on the international stage for it $rovides something that the rest of the 2orld must ta3e into account 2hen formulating their foreign $olitical agenda@ =orth >oreaA a$art from their nuclear arsenalA has nothing of im$ortance to offer on the 2orld stage@ %heir infrastructure has atro$hied since the do2nfall of the U""R and there are no natural resources $resent thereDthe only thing they have to offer on the 2orld stage that ma3es them of im$ortance is their volatile threats of a nuclear holocaust@ It is &ecause of said arsenal that countries must al2ays account for the =orth >orean varia&le 2hen formulating 6ast Asian $olicy o$tions@ =uclear Di$lomacy guarantees that =orth >orea?s voice 2ill al2ays &e audi&le on the 2orld stage and is one of the reasons 2hy =orth >orea 2ill never denucleari0e@ =o matter 2hat incentives are $resented to =orth >oreaA denucleari0ation means that =orth >orea looses their largest &argaining tool on the 2orld stage and the varia&le that hel$s maintain the vie2 of the villainous outsider@ %he threat of the =orth >orean nuclear arsenal $resents the $erfect means &y 2hich to gain concessions from the outside 2orld and &uttress their ailing economy@ =orth >orea is constantly in dire need of aidA &oth $hysical and monetaryA to continue to

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function &ut it cannot merely as3 for said aid for that 2ould deconstruct the image set forth &y the =orth >orean $ro$aganda machine that =orth >orea is the greatest country in the 2orld@ =ot only thisA &ut receiving unconditional aid from the United "tates 2ould go against decades of $ro$aganda 2hich hel$ formulate the collective identity of the United "tates as this evil outside force set on the destruction of the =orth@ If this image 2ere deconstructed then >im Eong Il 2ould lose one of the 3ey $illars Iustifying his rule 2hich could set in motion a stream of events leading to the eventual do2nfall of the Dear 5eader@ It is for this reason that any aid that =orth >orea receives must &e vie2ed as a concession from the other $arty out of said $arty?s fear of =orth >orea?s nuclear arsenal@ In layman?s termsG =orth >orea must al2ays &een seen as having the u$$er hand in any situation so as to maintain the air of su$eriority amongst its $eo$le@ The Importance 1f This *tudy To International elations %he im$ortance of this study in the greater conte7t of International Relations is that is $rovides tangi&le $roof of 2hat occurs 2hen a rogue state o&tains nuclear 2ea$ons@ =uclear Proliferation has &ecome a hot &utton issue in the International Relations $aradigm regarding glo&al security 2ith one of the maIor areas of concern &eing 2hen rogue states or non state actors o&tain nuclear 2ea$ons@ =orth >orea cannot &e utili0ed to conIecture 2hat 2ill occur 2hen non state actors o&tain nuclear 2ea$ons forA as a sovereign nationA they o$erate differently than a non state actor 2ould@ <o2everA they are a rogue state and their situation can there&y &e &roadened to o&tain an outline for 2hat occurs 2hen rogue states o&tain the &om&@ ;hat can also &e gleaned from this study is the im$ortance of =orth >orea?s =uclear Di$lomacy in sha$ing the future of the >orean Peninsula andA in a greater

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conte7tA the future of 6ast Asia@ (urrentlyA the >orean Peninsula is the story of $olar o$$ositesDa free "outh >orea 2ith a &ooming economy and an o$$ressive =orth >orean regime 2ith a desolate economy@ For decadesA $undits have falsely declared the looming end of the =orth >orean regime and the $ossi&ility of a unified >orean Peninsula@ ;hile these claims have yet to come trueA one must 2eigh the im$ortance of the =orth >orean arsenal should the =orth >orean regime to$$le or &egin to to$$le@ If the =orth >orean regime &egins to colla$seA one must account for the fact that =orth >orea does have nuclear 2ea$ons and 2ould &e more inclined to use them if it &ecame &latantly o&vious it 2as the end of the =orth >orean state@ If this did occurA there is a real $ossi&ility that these 2ea$ons 2ould &e directed at "eoul andA should they successfully ma3e contact in "eoulA 2ould send "eoulA and the rest of "outh >oreaA &ac3 into third 2orld status 2hile creating unimagina&le damage@ 6ven if this did not occurA a =orth >orean colla$se means the $ossession of nuclear 2ea$ons &y rogue military generals or non state actors@ %o this $ointA the 2orld has yet to co$e 2ith such a scenario &utA should it occurA it 2ould generate enormous tension 2ithin the conte7t of the international community@ ;ith regards to the greater conte7t of 6ast AsiaA =orth >orea $resents a geo$olitical &uffer &et2een (hina and $ro America "outh >orea and &et2een $otential (hinese Asiatic hegemony and a stronger American influence in the region@ "hould =orth >orea colla$seA the most li3ely scenario 2ould &e a unifiedA $ro United "tatesA >orea 2hich 2ould &e a serious affront to (hinese hegemony in the region@ %his 2ould further increase the tensions &et2een the t2o $o2ersA es$ecially considering that one of the t2o states !"outh >orea or (hina# 2ould garner $ossession of the =orth >orean nuclear arsenal@ ;hile (hina is a nucleari0ed stateA "outh >orea has relied on the nuclear

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um&rella of the United "tates for $rotection and their garnering of =orth >orea?s =uclear Program 2ould have serious im$lications on the future of 6ast Asian security and $olitical discourse@ The Need For 0ore esearch ;hile this thesis has ans2ered the questions generated in the First (ha$terA it has also discovered certain questions that generate the need for more research to &e conducted@ For instanceA this research did not touch on the im$ortance of Ea$an and Russia a$ro$os of =orth >orean =uclear Di$lomacy@ ;hileA this thesis negated Ea$an?s role for their refusal to engage in the "i7 Party %al3s outside of the conte7t of receiving re$arations for the =orth >orean 3idna$$ing of Ea$anese citi0ensA this refusal to engage $ast this $oint must have some effect on the 2ay in 2hich =orth >orea o$erates@ (oncurrentlyA this thesis did not even attem$t to cover the Russian influence on =orth >orean =uclear Di$lomacy &ecause of the $arameters set forth regarding the length of the thesis and the need to fully engage 2ith 2hat I &elieve 2ere the most im$ortant countries to =orth >oreaDthe United "tatesA (hinaA and "outh >orea@ If =orth >orea 2anted Russia to Ioin the "P% to counteract the additions of "outh >orea and Ea$an then they must have had a reason for this and this reason should &e fully e7tra$olated u$on@ =ot Iust this &ut even amongst the most im$ortant countries to the "P%A "outh >orea 2as not engaged 2ith to the fullest e7tent@ 'ne could 2rite a thesis solely on the "outh >orean =orth >orean relations vis V vis the "P% and =orth >orean =uclear Di$lomacy@ -ore a&stractlyA it 2ould &e very interesting to see ho2 a$$lica&le the study of =orth >orean?s =uclear Di$lomacy 2ould &e to other rogue states and their attem$ts to garner nuclear 2ea$ons@ ;hile it 2as &riefly mentioned at the start of this cha$terA there

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is much more research to &e conducted on this to$ic 2hich 2ould &e e7tremely valua&le in the formulation of foreign $olicy@ 6s$ecially no2A 2ith the air of revolution &re2ing in many of these rogue statesA ho2 the conce$t of =uclear Proliferation sha$es these countries should &e of the u$most im$ortance@ =ot only thisA &ut the conce$t of =uclear Proliferation is a relatively ne2 conce$t and is in dire need of some ne2 research to hel$ develo$ the data on it further@ The Future It is e7tremely difficult to $redict the future in International RelationsA es$ecially 2hen dealing 2ith a country as volatile as =orth >oreaA &ut this section 2ill attem$t to e7tra$olate on current events in =orth >orea and 2hat they might say a&out the future of the <ermit >ingdom@ %he t2o events that 2ill &e analy0ed are the sin3ing of the R'>" Cheonan in -arch 2010 and the shelling of Feon$yeong Island in =ovem&er 2010@ %hese t2o events 2ill &e analy0ed simultaneously &ecause their causual varia&les are the sameDthe im$ending succession of >im Eong Un@ In "e$tem&er 2010A in &et2een these t2o eventsA the ;P> met for the first time in thirty years and >im Eong Un 2as anointed the im$ending leader of the DPR>@ %he im$ortance of these t2o events is that they 2ere utili0ed to solidify the >im?s hold on $o2er and ease the transition from >im Eong Il to >im Eong Un@ %hese events 2ere ris3y for they 2ere direct military attac3sA one of 2hich 2ere the first attac3 on "outh >orean soil since the >orean ;ar and accrued civilian deathsA &ut this ris3iness sho2ed the military?s dedication to the >im Regime@ %his is quite im$ortant in the $o2er transition for =orth >orea o$erates on a B-ilitary FirstC $olicy so an out2ard dis$lay of military su$$ort for the >im Regime internally hel$ed

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quell any dissent that might have arisen in the >;P over the succession of the relatively un3no2n and un$roven >im Eong Un@ (urrentlyA =orth >orea has stated their intent to test a third nuclear 2ea$on sometime in 2011@142 Utili0ing the analysis $resented in this thesis to conIecture the meaning &ehind this actionA it a$$ears to &e in $art due to >im Eong Un asserting his $resence on the 2orld stage14) and in $art an attem$t &y the >im regime to &ring America &ac3 to the negotiating ta&le@14* =orth >orea 2as relatively quiet follo2ing the Feon$yeong Island shelling and this 2ea$on test 2ill allo2 it toA once againA reassert its $resence on the 2orld stage@ =ot only this &ut it 2ill &e a 2ay to ma3e sure that =orth >orean has not fallen off of the United "tates? agenda@ In summationA one can e7$ect the same harsh rhetoric and &ra0en attac3s &y the <ermit >ingdom as have &ecome common$lace over the $ast years for as long as the >im Regime remains in $o2erD 2hich it a$$ears it 2ill &e doing for a long time@

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"unny 5eeA B=orth >orea "et 'n %hird =uclear %estAC Asia Ti!esA Eanuary 22A 2011A htt$GHH222@atimes@comHatimesH>oreaH-A22Dg01@html@ 173 ;hile >im Eong Il is technically in $o2er until his deathA his failing heath and the need to indoctrinate >im Eong Un as soon as $ossi&le in the $osition of ruler of =orth >orea can lead to the assum$tion that the maIority of =orth >orea?s action from here on out 2ill &e the doing of >im Eong Un@ 174 'n A$ril /A 2009A =orth >orea attem$ted to launch a satellite into s$aceA des$ite international $ressure not to do so@ %he main reason for the international $ressure 2as a fear that the satellite 2as actually a %ae$odong 2 I(B- !Intercontinental Ballistic -issile#@ %his test 2as a failure and the satellite fell into the Pacific 'cean &riefly after launch@ 'n A$ril 1)A 2009A the U="(A the United "tatesA and "outh >orea im$osed heavy sanctions u$on the <ermit >ingdom for the launch and =orth >orea res$ondedA on A$ril 1*A 2009A 2ith a statement that it 2as officially leaving the "i7 Party %al3sA 2ould never again $artici$ate in such a gatheringA and informed the IA6A that it 2ould resume its =uclear 2ea$ons Program@ %henA on -ay 2/A 2009A =orth >orea successful detonated its second =uclear ;ea$on@ 6ver since this timeA =orth >orean United "tates relations have &een very tenuous 2ith a lac3 of dialogue &et2een the t2o &eing the $aradigm@

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;or3s (ited DDD@ BBefore %al3sA =orth >orea Accuses U@"@ of N<ostile? Policy@C Ne- *or. Ti!esA Decem&er 14A 2001@ htt$GHHquery@nytimes@comHgstHfull$age@htmlK resL9,0(62DF1))1F9)*A2/4/1(1A9109(,B1)@ DDD@ B(hief of >PA .eneral "taff on DPR>?s Intention to Bolster Its =uclear Deterrent@C KCNAA A$ril ,A 200/@ DDD@ BDPR> "uccessfully (onducts Underground =uclear %est@C KCNAA 'cto&er 9A 2001@ htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$Hinde7 e@htm !'cto&er 1*A 2001#@ DDD@ BDPR> Foreign -inistry (larifies "tand on =e2 -easure to Bolters ;ar Deterrent@C KCNAA 'cto&er )A 2001@ htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$HitemH2001H200110Hne2s10H0*@htm@ DDD@ BDPR> Foreign -inistry: DPR>?s "tand on "i7 Party %al3s Reclarified@C KCNAA Euly 1A 2001@ htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$HitemH2001H200101Hne2s01H02@htm

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DDD@ BDPR> Foreign -inistry Refutes NResolution of U= "ecurity (ouncil@C KCNAA Euly 11A 2001@ htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$HitemH2001H200104Hne2s04H1,@htm@ DDD@ BDPR> Foreign -inistry "$o3esman on Its -issile 5aunches@C KCNAA Euly 1A 2001@ htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$HitemH2001H200104Hne2s04H04@htm@ DDD@ BDPR> Foreign -inistry "$o3esman on U@"@ -oves (oncerning Its =uclear %est@C KCNAA 'cto&er 11A 2001@ htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$HitemH2001H200110Hne2s10H12@htm@ DDD@ BDPR> F- on Its "tand to "us$end Its Partici$ation in "i7 $arty %al3s for Indefinite Period@C KCNAA Fe&ruary 10A 200/@ htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$HitemH200/H200/02Hne2s02H11@htm@ DDD@ BDPR> Foreign -inistry Refutes NResolution of U= "ecurity (ouncil@C KCNAA Euly 11A 2001@ htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$HitemH2001H200104Hne2s04H1,@htm@ DDD@ BDPR> Foreign -inister "$o3esman %otally Refutes U="( NResolution@?C KCNAA 'cto&er 14A 2001@ htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$Hinde7 e @htm@ DDD@ BDPR> Foreign -inister "$o3esman on its -issile 5aunches@C KCNAA Euly 1A 2001@ htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$Hinde7 e @htm@ DDD@ BF- "$o3esman Blasts 8irulent 'utcries of U@"@ Am&assador to "@ >orea@C KCNAA Decem&er 10A 200/@ htt$GHH222@3cna@co@I$HitemH200/H200/12Hne2s12H12@htm@ DDD@ B Initial Actions for the Im$lementation of the Eoint "tatement@C 4inistr+ of Forei'n Affairs of the Peo le=s Re ublic of ChinaA Fe&ruary 1)A 2004@ htt$GHH222@fm$rc@gov@cnHengH0777Ht294*1)@htm@ DDD@ BEa$an?s Defence Pro&lematiqueC@ The Pacific Revie- , !199/#G )*@

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DDD@ B>im >ye .2an Intervie2ed in BeiIing@C KCNAA =ovem&er 12A 200/@ htt$GHH222@glo&alsecurity@orgH2mdHli&raryHne2sHd$r3H200/Hd$r3 0/111* 3cna01@htm@ DDD@ B-onitors of =orth >orean =e2s =ote Di$ in Reverence of >im@C Ne- *or. Ti!esA =ovem&er 1,A 200*@ htt$GHHquery@nytimes@comHgstHfull$age@htmlK resL9A0462D91))FF9)BA2/4/2(1A9129(,B1)@ DDD@ B=orth >orean -edia Dro$ >im Eong Il?s Dear 5eader %itleC@ Chosun &lboA =ovem&er 1,A 200*@ htt$GHHenglish@chosun@comHsiteHdataHhtmlJdirH200*H11H1,H200*111,1101*@html@ DDD@ B= >orea 2arns region on &rin3 of 2ar after more artillery fire heard@C $a an No-A =ovem&er 21A 2010@ htt$GHH222@Ia$antoday@comHcategoryH2orldHvie2Hartillery fire heard on yeon$yeong island@ DDD@ B=orthern 5imit 5ine !=55# ;est "ea =aval 6ngagements@C In 2lobal Securit+@ htt$GHH222@glo&alsecurity@orgHmilitaryH2orldH2arHnll@htm@ DDD@ B'rder no@ 00)* of the >PA "u$reme (ommanderC@ P+on'+an' Ti!esA -arch ,A 199)@ DDD@ B"eoul &ac3s =orth?s nu3e Nright@?C (ashin'ton Ti!esA August 11A 200/@ htt$GHH222@2ashingtontimes@comHne2sH200/HaugH11H200/0,11 10040) 21*2rH@ DDD@ B"outh >orea?s <o$es for NPeaceful =uclear "overeignty@C StratforA 'cto&er 2)A 2010@ htt$GHH222@stratfor@comHmem&ershi$sH14*))1HanalysisH20101022JsouthJ3oreasJho$ esJ$eacefulJnuclearJsovereignty@

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DDD@ B"2iss (om$anyA Individual Designated &y %reasury for "u$$orting =orth >orean ;-D Proliferation@C U>S> 5e art!ent of the Treasur+A -arch )0A 2001@ htt$sGHHustreas@govH$ressHreleasesHIs*1**@htm@ DDD@ B%he United "tates -ust (ome Forth to DPR> U@"@ Direct %al3s@C Rodon' Shin!unA -arch 11A 200)@ DDD@ Tools for 1uildin' Confidence on the Korean Peninsula> "toc3holmG "toc3holm International Peace Research InstituteA 2004@ DDD@ B%reasury %argets =@ >orean 6ntities for "u$$orting ;-D Proliferation@C US Fed Ne-sA 'cto&er 12A 200/@ htt$sGHHustreas@govH$ressHreleasesHIs29,*@htm@ DDD@ BU@"@ (arrier "tri3e .rou$ 6m&ar3s for the Fello2 "ea@C StratforA =ovem&er 2*A 2010@ htt$GHH222@stratfor@comHmem&ershi$sH14111/HanalysisH2010112*JusJcarrierJstri3eJ grou$Jem&ar3sJyello2Jsea@ DDD@ B;est "ea (lash@C *oha Ne-s A'enc+ Ne-sA 2002@ htt$GHH222@yonha$ne2s@co@3rHengservicesH@ BaIoriaA Eayshree @B%he (hina =orth >orea Relationshi$@C Council on Forei'n Relations6 'cto&er 4A 2010@ htt$GHH222@cfr@orgH$u&licationH11094HchinanorthJ3oreaJrelationshi$@htmlT$)@ BechtolA Bruce 6@ Red Ro'ue0 The Persistent Challen'e of North Korea@ DullesG Potomac Boo3sA IncA 2004@ BechtolA Bruce 6@ BAssessing the Present and (harting the Future of U" DPR> RelationsG %he Political Dimension of the =uclear (onfrontation@C In The United

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States and the Korean Peninsula in the 8"st Centur+A edited &y %ae <2an and "eung <o EooA 119 2)@ AldershotG AshgateA 2001@ Blei3erA Roland@ 5ivided Korea0 To-ard a Culture of Reconciliation@ -innea$olis G University of -innesota PressA 200/@ BraniganA %ania and 62en -acAs3ill@ B=orth >oreaG a Deadly Attac3A a (ounter "tri3e Y =o2 >oreans <old %heir Breath@C The 2uardianA =ovem&er 2)A 2010@ htt$GHH222@guardian@co@u3H2orldH2010HnovH2)Hnorth south 3orea crisis conflict@ BraniganA %ania and 62en -acAs3ill@ BU" to Press (hina to Rein in =orth >orea After Attac3@C The 2uardianA =ovem&er 2*A 2010@ htt$GHH222@guardian@co@u3H2orldH2010HnovH2*Hus china north 3orea attac3@ BurchillA "cottA Richard Deveta3A Eac3 DonnellyA Andre2 5in3laterA %erry =ardinA -atthe2 PatersonA (hristian Reus "mitA and Eacqui %rue@ Theories of &nternational Relations@ Fourth ed@ =e2 For3G Palgrave -acmillanA 2009@ (arlinA Ro&ert and Eoel ;it@ B "i7 -ysteries of =orth >orea?s "uccession Drama@C Forei'n Polic+A "e$tem&er 1)A 2010@ htt$GHH222@foreign$olicy@comHarticlesH2010H09H1)Hsi7JmysteriesJofJnorthJ3oreaJsJ successionJdramaK$ageL0A0@ (hangA .ordon .@ Nuclear Sho-do-n0 North Korea Ta.es on the (orld> =e2 For3G Random <ouse6 2001@ (hangA "emoonA Foung Bac3 (hoiA Fesoo3 -errillA and Fung F@ FangA eds@ Pers ectives on Korean Unification and Econo!ic &nte'ration@ (heltenhamG 6d2ard 6lgar Pu&lishing 5imitedA 2001@ (hinoyA -i3e@ 4eltdo-n0 The &nside Stor+ of the North Korea Nuclear Crisis@ =e2

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For3G "t@ -artin?s PressA 200,@ (hoeA "ang <un@ B=orth >orea Perfects Its Di$lomatic .ameG Brin3manshi$@C Ne- *or. Ti!esA A$ril 2A 2009@ htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2009H0*H0)H2orldHasiaH0)3orea@html@ (hoeA "ang <un@ B=orth >orea %ies %al3s to 6nd of U@"@ "anctions@C &nternational ;erald TribuneA Decem&er 1A 200/@ (odyA 6d2ard@ B=uclear %al3s ;ith =@ >orea 6nd in FailureA "i7 Party Process %hro2n Into Dou&t@C (ashin'ton PostA Decem&er 2)A 2001@ htt$GHH222@2ashington$ost@comH2$ dynHcontentHarticleH2001H12H22HAR20011222002*2@html@ (oo$erA <elene@ BAs3ing (hina to Act 5i3e the U@"@C The Ne- *or. Ti!esA =ovem&er 24A 2010@ htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2010H11H2,H2ee3inrevie2H2,coo$er@html@ (oynerA %om@ B'ffering =orth >orea an 67it "trategy@C Korea $oon'An 5ail+6 'cto&er 2)A 2010@ htt$GHHIoongangdaily@Ioins@comHarticleHvie2@as$KaidL2924*12@ DaoA Eames@ BU@"@ "ha$ing =orth >orea "anctionC@ Ne- *or. Ti!esA Fe&ruary 24A 200)@ 6mmersA Ralf@ 2eo olitics and 4ariti!e Territorial 5is utes in East Asia@ =e2 For3G RoutledgeA 2010@ 6$steinA 6than@ B"taring at =orth >oreaG 5i3e 5oo3ing Bac3 In %ime@C SlateA 'cto&er 1A 2010@ htt$GHH222@slate@comHidH2219090HentryH2219,4*H@ FordA .lynA and "oyoung >2on@ North Korea on the 1rin.0 A Stru''le for Survival@ Ann Ar&orG Pluto PressA 200,@ FosterA Aidan (arter@ B(hina <el$ 2ith =orth >oreaK Fuggeda&outitZC Forei'n Polic+A

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=ovem&er 21A 2010@ htt$GHH222@foreign$olicy@comHarticlesH2010H11H21HchinaJhel$J2ithJnorthJ3oreaJfu ggeda&outit@ FosterA Aidan (arter@ BFor the >imsA the ;ea3est 5in3 is Family@C Asia Ti!esA 'cto&er 22A 2010@ htt$GHH222@atimes@comHatimesH>oreaH5E22Dg01@html@ Funa&ashiA Foichi@ The Peninsula ?uestion0 A Chronicle of the Second Nuclear Crisis@ ;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ing Institution PressA 2004@ .iacomoA (arol@ B=@ >orea hints at cur&ing money laundering@C Reuters6 Eanuary 2/A 2001@ htt$GHH222@chinadaily@com@cnHenglishHdocH2001 01H21HcontentJ/1/42*@htm@ .rahamA %homas ;@ B%he International Atomic 6nergy AgencyG (an It 6ffectively <alt the Proliferation of =uclear 2ea$onsKC In U>S> Polic+ and the Future of the United NationsA edited &y Roger A@ (oateA ,9 112@ =e2 For3G %2entieth (entury Fund PressA 199*@ .reimelA <ans@ BU@"@A =@ >orea Agree to <old =u3e %al3s@C Associate PressA Eanuary 20A 2004@ htt$GHH222@thefreeli&rary@comHU@"@A[=@[>orea[agree[to[hold[nu3e[tal3s a01111)2,99,@ <a23enA Angela and -att 5eighty@ B;ant to >no2 ;hat =orth >oreans %hin3 A&out >im Eong UnKC Forei'n Polic+A =ovem&er 2/A 2010@ htt$GHH222@foreign$olicy@comHarticlesH2010H11H2/H2antJtoJ3no2J2hatJnorthJ3ore ansJthin3Ja&outJ3imJIongJun@ <eoA U3 and %erence Roehrig@ South Korea Since "#:9@ =e2 For3G (am&ridge University PressA 2010@ <odgeA <omer %@ B=orth >orea?s -ilitary "trategyC@ in Para!etersA "$ring 200)@

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htt$GHHcarlisle 222@army@milHusa2cHParametersH0)s$ringHhodge@htm@ <oggA (hris@ B;i3ilea3s ca&lesG (hina Nfrustrated? &y =orth >orea@C 11CA =ovem&er )0A 2010@ htt$GHH222@&&c@co@u3Hne2sH2orld us canada 11,411*1@ <olstA Eohan EorgenA and >aren -elander@ B6uro$ean "ecurity and (onfidence Building -easuresC@ Survival * !EulyHAugust 1944#G *1@ <yunA In %ae3A "hin 2ha 5eeA and .il&ert Ro0manA eds@ South Korean Strate'ic Thou'ht To-ard Asia@ =e2 For3G Palgrave -acmillanA 200,@ EooA "eung <o and %ae <2an >2anA eds@ North Korea=s Second Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Securit+@ <am$shireG AshgateA 2004@ Eong FilA Ra@ B=orth >orea?s N-ilitary First? Politics are Behind Recent Attac3s@C Christian Science 4onitorA =ovem&er 21A 2010@ htt$GHH222@csmonitor@comH(ommentaryH'$inionH2010H112)H=orth >orea s military first $olitics are &ehind recent attac3s@ >ahnA Eose$h@ B=orth >orea "ays It ;ill A&andon =uclear 6fforts@C The Ne- *or. Ti!es6 "e$tem&er 19A 200/@ htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH200/H09H19HinternationalHasiaH193orea@html@ >ellyA Eames A@ B=orth >oreaG %o2ards a =e2 International 6ngagement Frame2or3CA Remar3s to the Research (onferenceA ;ashingtonA D(A Fe&ruary 1)A 200*@ >ellyA Eames@ BU@"@ Policy in 6ast Asia and the PacificG (hallenges and PrioritiesAC %estimony &efore the "u&committee on 6ast Asia and the PacificA <ouse (ommittee on International RelationsA ;ashingtonA D@(@A Eune 12A 2001@ htt$GHH222@state@govH$Hea$HrlsHrmH2001H)144@htm@

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>eohaneA Ro&ert@ BInternational InstitutionsG %2o A$$roachesC@ &nternational Studies ?uarterl+ )2 !19,,#G )92@ >esslerA .lenn and (olum 5ynch@ BU@=@ 8otes to Im$ose "anctions on =@>oreaA (ouncil Demands 6nd to =uclear Program@C (ashin'ton PostA 'cto&er 1/A 2001@ htt$GHH222@2ashington$ost@comH2$ dynHcontentHarticleH2001H10H1*HAR2001101*00)/*@html@ >imA Eac3@ B"outh >orea Defense -inister +uits After Attac3@C ReutersA =ovem&er 2/A 2010@ htt$GHH222@reuters@comHarticleHidU"5)61-=0"+2010112/@ >imA >yuryoonA ed@ North Korea=s ECternal Econo!ic Relations@ "eoulG >orea Institute for =ational UnificationA 200,@ >imA "amuel "@A ed@ &nter-Korean Relations0 Proble!s and Pros ects@ =e2 For3G Palgrave -acmillanA 200*@ >imA %ae2oo >im@ BEa$an?s =e2 "ecurity Roles and R'> Ea$an RelationsC@ The Korea $ournal of 5efensive Anal+sis 11 !1999#G 11* ,@ >ir3A Donald@ B=orth >orea?s =e2 Da2n 2ith >im Eong Un@C Christian Science 4onitorA 'cto&er /A 2010@ htt$GHH222@csmonitor@comH;orldHAsia "outh (entralH2010H100/H=orth >orea s ne2 da2n 2ith >im Eong un@ >2a3A %ae <2anA and "eung <o EooA eds@ Peace Re'i!e 1uildin' on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian Securit+ Coo eration@ "urreyG Ashgate Pu&lishing 5imitedA 2010@ 5ands&ergA -itchell@ B=@ >orea =uclear %al3s 6nd 2ith =o Resolution@C Los An'eles Ti!es6 Decem&er 2)A 2001@ htt$GHHarticles@latimes@comH2001HdecH2)H2orldHfg nor3or2)H)@

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5andlerA -ar3@ B=orth >orea "ays It ;ill <alt %al3s and Restart Its =uclear Program@C Ne- *or. Ti!esA A$ril 1*A 2009@ htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2009H0*H1/H2orldHasiaH1/3orea@htmlKJrL1@ 5eeA Brian@ BDefense Pa$erG =orth Boosts Artillery &ut (uts %an3sA ArmorC@ $oon'an' &lboA Fe&ruary /A 200/@ 5eeA (hae Ein@ A Troubled Peace0 U>S> Polic+ and The T-o Koreas@ BaltimoreG %he Eohns <o$3ins University PressA 2001@ 5eeA (hung -in and Eonathan D@ Pollac3@ Pre arin' for Korean Unification0 Scenarios and &! lications@ "anta -onicaG RA=DA 1999@ 5eeA "ung Foon@ B%he Pyongyang Play&oo3@C Forei'n AffairsA August 21A 2010@ htt$GHH222@foreignaffairs@comHarticlesH11/,1Hsung yoon leeHthe $yongyang $lay&oo3K$ageLsho2@ 5eeA "unny @ B=orth >orea "et 'n %hird =uclear %est@C Asia Ti!esA Eanuary 22A 2011@ htt$GHH222@atimes@comHatimesH>oreaH-A22Dg01@html@ 5imA Ro&yn@ The 2eo olitics of East Asia@ =e2 For3G RoutledgeA 200)@ 5indA Eennifer@ B%he 'nce and Future >imG "uccession and "tasis in =orth >orea@C Forei'n AffairsA 'cto&er 2/A 2010@ htt$GHH222@foreignaffairs@comHarticlesH11,40H&y Iennifer lindHthe once and future 3imK$ageLsho2@ 5ynchA (olum@ B=orth >orea Accused of 8iolating U@=@ "anctions on =uclear 2ea$ons %rade@C Forei'n Polic+A =ovem&er 9A 2010@ htt$GHHturtle&ay@foreign$olicy@comH$ostsH2010H11H09HnorthJ3oreaJaccusedJofJviolati ngJunJsanctionsJonJnuclearJ2ea$onsJtrade@

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-acintoshA Eames@ Confidence 1uildin' and Securit+ 1uildin' 4easures in the Ar!s Control Process0 A Canadian Pers ective> 'tta2aG De$artment of 67ternal AffairsA 19,/@ -acintyreA Donald A@ 5@A .i ;oo3 "hinA and Daniel (@ "neiderA eds@ First 5rafts of Korea0 The U>S> 4edia and Perce tions of the Last Cold (ar Frontier@ ;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ings Institution PressA 2009@ -artinA Bradley >@ B=orth >oreaG Pity the "on of >im Eong Il@C 2lobalPostA "e$tem&er 24A 2010@ htt$GHH222@glo&al$ost@comHdis$atchHnorth 3oreaH100924H3im Iong il un succession@ -ichishitaA =arushige@ North Korea3s 4ilitar+-5i lo!atic Ca! ai'ns6 "#77-899:@ =e2 For3G RoutledgeA 2010@ -yersA B@R@ B=orth >orea ;ill =ever Play =ice@C The Ne- *or. Ti!esA =ovem&er 2*A 2010@ htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2010H11H2/Ho$inionH2/myers@html@ -yersA B@R@ The Cleanest Race0 ;o- North Koreans See The!selves—And (h+ &t 4atters@ Broo3lynG -elville <ouseA 2010@ =atsiosA Andre2@ The Politics of Fa!ine in North Korea0 S ecial Re ort A"> ;ashington D@(@G U" Institute of PeaceA 2 August 1999@ =icolasA Francoise@ Korea and the 5ual Chinese Challen'e> "eoulG >orea Institute for International 6conomic PolicyA 200/ 'dellA Eohn "@ B(ase "tudy -ethods in International Political 6conomy@C &nternational Studies Pers ectives 2 !2001#G 111 141@ 'lsonA 5a2rence@ $a an in Post-ar Asia@ 5ondonG Pall -all PressA 1940@

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PerryA ;illiam E@ Revie- of United States Polic+ To-ard North Korea0 Findin's and Reco!!endations6 Unclassified Re ort> ;ashingtonA D@(@G %he United "tates De$artment of "tateA 'cto&er 12A 1999@ PritchardA (harles 5@ Failed 5i lo!ac+0 The Tra'ic Stor+ of ;o- North Korea 2ot the 1o!b@ ;ashingtonA D@(@G Broo3ings Institution PressA 2004@ RamstadA 6van@ B>orea?s >im 6levates "on@C (all-Street $ournalA "e$tem&er 2,A 2010@ htt$GHHonline@2sI@comHarticleH"B10001*2*0/24*,40*1/*00*/4//14*4024//1001*@h tmlK>6F;'RD"L68A=[RA-"%AD@ RiceA (ondolee00a@ '$ening Remar3sA "enate Foreign Relations (ommitteeA ;ashingtonA D@(@ Eanuary 1,A 200/@ "almonA Andre2@ B%heories a&ound on =@ >orea attac3@C CNNA =ovem&er 2*A 2010@ htt$GHHarticles@cnn@comH2010 11 2*H2orldHnorth@3orea@attac3@analysisJ1Jdefense minister 3im tae young $yongyang succession $rocessKJsLP-G;'R5D@ "angerA David 6@ B=orth >oreans Unveil =e2 Plant for =uclear Use@C Ne- *or. Ti!es6 =ovem&er 20A 2010@ htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2010H11H21H2orldHasiaH21intel@htmlK JrL2Xh$@ "angerA David 6@ BU@"@ "aid to ;eigh a =e2 A$$roach on =orth >orea@C Ne- *or. Ti!esA -ay 1,A 2001@ htt$GHH222@nytimes@comH2001H0/H1,H2orldHasiaH1,3orea@html@ "cala$inoA Ro&ert A@ North Korea at a Crossroads> "tanfordA (AG <oover Institution PressA 1994@ "igalA 5eon 8@ BAn Instinct for the (a$illaries@C =ortheast Asia (oo$erative "ecurity

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ProIect at the "ocial "cience Research (ouncil "eoul ;ashington ForumA co hosted &y the "eIong Institute and the (enter for =ortheast Asian PolicyA the Broo3ings Institution ;ashingtonA -ay 1A 2001@ htt$GHH222@&roo3ings@eduHcommHeventsH20010/01Jsigal@$df "igalA 5eon 8@ 5isar!in' Stran'ers0 Nuclear 5i lo!ac+ -ith North Korea@ PrincetonG Princeton University PressA 1994@ "mithA <a0el@ Reconstitutin' Korean Securit+0 A Polic+ Pri!er@ %o3yoG United =ations University PressA 2004@ "mithA "teve@ B;endt?s ;orld@C Revie- of &nternational Studies 21 !2002#G 112@ "onA >ey young@ South Korean En'a'e!ent Policies and North Korea@ 5ondonG RoutledgeA 200)@ "oraceA (hristian@ O"aint -ao@O In E1SC) 4e'aF&LE> htt$sGHH$ro7y@li&rary@u$enn@eduHloginKurlLhtt$GHHsearch@e&scohost@comHlogin@as$7K directLtrueXd&L3ehXA=L/19)*024XsiteLehost live@ %ama3iA %a3u@ 5econstructin' $a an=s &!a'e of South Korea0 &dentit+ in Forei'n Polic+@ =e2 For3G Palgrave -acmillanA 2010@ %isdallA "imon@ B;i3ilea3s ca&les reveal (hina Mready to a&andon =orth >oreaM@C 2uardian6 =ovem&er 29A 2010@ htt$GHH222@guardian@co@u3H2orldH2010HnovH29H2i3ilea3s ca&les china reunified 3orea@ U@"@ De$artment of the %reasury@ B"tatement &y the DAD .laser on the Dis$osition of DPR> Related Funds Fro0en at Banco Delta Asia@C <P )22A -arch 19A 2004@

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United =ations "ecurity (ouncilA Resolution ,2/ !199)#@ "HR6"H,2/@ United =ations "ecurity (ouncilA Resolution 141, !2001#A "HR6"H141,A 'cto&er 1*A 2001@ 8an 6veraA "te$hen@ 2uide to 4ethods for Students of Political Science@ IthacaG (ornell University PressA 1994@ ;altA "te$hen@ B;hat %o Do A&out =orth >orea@C Forei'n Polic+@ =ovem&er 2*A 2010@ htt$GHH2alt@foreign$olicy@comH$ostsH2010H11H2*H2hatJtoJdoJa&outJnorthJ3orea@ ;ardA Adam ed@A B=orth >orea?s / Euly -issile %ests@C Strate'ic Co!!entsA vol 12A issue 1@ 5ondonG %aylor X Francis 5tdA Euly 2001@ ;e&erA -a7@ The Theor+ )f Social And Econo!ic )r'ani<ation@ =e2 For3G Free PressA 1994@ \a3ariaA Fareed@ B5et %hem 6at (arrots@C Ne-s-ee.A 'cto&er 2)A 2001@ htt$GHH222@ne2s2ee3@comH2001H10H22Hlet them eat carrots@html@

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