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Just as when I say ‘all animals’ this e!"ression cannot "ass #or a $oology so it is e%ually "lain that the words ‘the Di&ine’ ‘the A'solute’ ‘the (ternal’ etc) do not e!"ress what is contained in them* and only such words in #act do e!"ress the intuition as something immediate) +hate&er is more than such a word e&en the transition to a mere "ro"osition contains a 'ecoming,other that has to 'e ta-en 'ac- or is a mediation) .)+)F) Hegel The /henomenology o# S"irit
0) /ros"ect +hat is Hegel’s dialectics1 In 0234 +erner Flach claimed that the research on Hegel had not "ro&ided an ade%uate re"ly to this %uestion 5see Flach 0234: 667348) 9ore "essimistically some years later Hans,Friedrich Fulda admitted that des"ite the considera'le e##orts o# scholars our Auseinanderset$ung with the #amous Hegelian method ‘has not led so #ar to any satis#actory result’ 5Fulda 02:;: <;08) In order to address such a tric-y %uestion in this "a"er I e!"and some as"ects o# the current Anglo,American re&itali$ation o# Hegelian "hiloso"hy)0 9y reading is 'ased on a &ery sim"le idea: the in#erential intuition that an essential "art o# what it is to gras" a conce"tual content and to 'e a'le to a""ly it correctly to an o'=ect consists in mastering its connections with the conce"ts it entails and with the conce"ts that entail it) < These connections can 'e e!"ressed 'y meaning "ostulates) The suggestion that Hegel’s dialectics o"erates on meaning "ostulates as #ar as I -now has 'een largely ignored 'y traditional,minded scholars) >e&ertheless it "ro&ides a "romising "ath towards a new Hegel? towards a 'etter understanding o# his "hiloso"hy and in "articular o# its core the dialectical method) It has 'een widely recogni$ed that dialectics assumes as its starting "oint ordinary language 5in the 'road sense in which it includes scienti#ic and somewhat technical "hiloso"hical terminology8) In "articular it in&estigates the meanings o# conce"tual terms shared 'y com"etent s"ea-ers and constituting their le!ical com"etence) As Hegel says in the /re#ace to the second edition o# the Science o# @ogic:
(uro"ean Journal o# /hiloso"hy 06:0 ISS> A233,B;:; "") 027;2 r <AA: The Author) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: 23AA .arsington Road C!#ord CD4 <DE FG and ;6A 9ain Street 9alden 9A A<04B FSA)
Francesco Berto The #orms o# though t are in the #irst instanc e dis"la yed and stored in human langua ge) >owa days we cannot 'e too o#ten remind ed that it is thin-in g which disting uishes man #rom the 'easts) Into all that 'ecom es somet hing inward #or men an image or conce"
t i o n a s s u c h i n t o a l l t h a t h e m a e s h i s o w n l a n g
uage has "enetr ated and e&eryt hing that he has trans#o rmed into langua ge and e!"res ses in it contai ns a catego ry? concea led mi!ed with other #orms or clearly determ ined as such so much is logic his natural eleme nt indeed his own "eculi ar nature) 5+@: ;08; This is the
B48) @ogical &oca'ulary "ro&ides the resources to e!"ress the in#erential commitments articulating descri"ti&e conce"tual contents) As Brandom himsel# o'ser&es the resulting structure o# e!"lanation is distincti&ely Hegelian 5see Brandom <AAA: <<8)4 A #ew lines a#ter the "assage %uoted a'o&e Hegel says that the categories o# the @ogic are ‘thoroughly #amiliar to educated "eo"le’ ‘determinations o# thought which we .terminus a %uo o# dialectic s) Crdinar y languag e is theory. laden and dialectic s e!"licat es 5as we shall see in a #orm &ery similar to the one o# meaning "ostulat es8 the "resu"" ositions and theoretic al correlati ons that underlie the semantic settleme nt o# conce"t ual terms and go&ern their actual use) Such an idea o# a ‘logical e!"licati on o# the im"licit’ comes #rom Ro'ert Brandom’s wor-s) In 9a-ing It (!"licit Brandom argues that logic should "lay the e!"ressi&e role o# the organ o# semantic sel#. consciousness 5see Brandom 0224: .
37 :8) /hiloso"hy thus has to 'egin with natural language) Hegel thoroughly o""oses those authors such as S"ino$a who start with a regimentation o# it or with sti"ulati&e de#initions) But Hegel is o'&iously not a descri"ti&e .em"loy on e&ery occasion which "ass our li"s in e&ery sentence we s"ea-’) >e&erth eless ‘it does not #ollow H) ) )I that they are intellige ntly a""rehe nded’) /hiloso" hical or s"eculati &e logic is the intellige nt a""rehe nsion o# this #amiliari ty the e!"licati on o# this im"licit or in the Hegelia n =argon the de&elo" ment o# the an sich in the an und für sich) A cou"le o# "ages later we read that ‘natural logic’ is ‘unconsciously 'usy’ with the categories o# language and thought) S"eculati&e logic ma-es theoretical commitments which are im"licit in our ordinary language e!"licit: ‘as im"ulses the categories are only instincti&ely acti&e’ and ‘the lo#tier 'usiness o# logic there#ore is to clari#y these categories and in them to raise mind to #reedom and truth’ 5+@: .
"hiloso" her o# ordinary languag e)6 For ordinary e!"ressi ons can 'e &ague their meaning s can 'e only "artially determin ed and most interesti ng #or the dialectic al "rocedur e the class o# their synony ms can 'e incohere nt gi&ing rise to inconsist encies) There#or e "hiloso" hy also has to resha"e meaning s and intensio nal contents : it can critici$e control and im"ro&e our linguistic 'usiness in order to introduce distinctions and recti#ications where there was only con#used unconscious "ractice) But let Hegel say so himsel#?in a way one could hardly im"ro&e: /hilos o"hy has the right to select #rom the langua ge o# comm on li#e which is made #or the world o# "ictori al thin-in g such e!"res sions as The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: r .
Hegel’s Dialectics as a Semantic Theory <0 s e e m t o a " " r o ! i m a t e t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o # t h e .
>otion) There cannot 'e any %uestion o# demonstrating #or a word selected #rom the language o# common li#e that in common li#e too one associates with it the same >otion #or which "hiloso"hy em"loys it* #or common li#e has no >otions 'ut only "ictorial thoughts and general ideas and to recogni$e the >otion in what is else a mere general idea is "hiloso"hy itsel#) It must su##ice there#ore i# "ictorial thin-ing in the use o# its e!"ressions that are em"loyed #or "hiloso"hical determinations has 'e#ore some &ague idea o# their distincti&e meaning* =ust as it may 'e the case that in these e!"ressions one recogni$es nuances o# "ictorial thought that are more closely related to the corres"onding >otions) Cne will 'e less ready "erha"s to admit that something can 'e without e!isting* 'ut at least one will hardly use ‘'eing’ as co"ula o# the =udgement as interchangea'le with the e!"ression ‘to e!ist’ and say ‘this article e!ists dear suita'le etc)’ ‘gold e!ists a metal or metallic’ instead o# ‘this article is dear suita'le etc)’ ‘gold is a metal or metallic’) And surely it is usual to distinguish 'etween 'eing and a " " e a r i n g a " " e a r a n c e a n d a c t u a l i t y a s w e l l a s t o .
Its truth.conditions we may say are all here: in the gesture "ointing to the red sur#ace in our "erce"tion o# the colour) Howe&er as Hegel o'ser&es: It is one o# the most #undamental logical "re=udices that .A."ositi&istic tradition were those that Hegel may ha&e called ‘=udgements o# e!istence’ or ‘%ualitati&e =udgements’ 5see WL: 3.distinguish mere 'eing #rom actuality and still more all these e!"ressions #rom o'=ecti&ity) Howe&er e&en should they 'e em"loyed synonymously "hiloso"hy will in any case 'e #ree to utili$e such em"ty su"er#luity o# language #or its distinctions) 5+@: :AB7 283 % u a l i t a t i & e = u d g e m e n t s s u c h a s : ‘ T h e r o s e i s r e d ’ <) ‘Eualitati&e Judgement’ In#erential Jommitment The most authoritati&e candidates to the role o# elementary sentences in the neo.08) These are sentences in which an o'ser&ational "ro"erty or in the Hegelian =argon an ‘immediate %uality’ is ascri'ed to a gi&en indi&idual) The e!am"le in the § 0:< o# the Encyclopaedia is: ‘The rose is red’ (Enz: <428 5'ut something li-e: ‘This rose is red’ or sim"ly: ‘This is red’ coming with a deictic act may wore%ually well8) It seems that such a sentence can 'e understood with no "articular re#lection or mediation.
or: ‘is not red’ can contain truth) Correct they may 'e 'ut only in the restricted con#ines o# "erce"tion #inite re"resentation and thin-ing* this de"ends on the content which is =ust as #inite and untrue on its own account) But the truth rests only on the #orm i)e) on the "osited Jonce"t and the reality that corres"onds to it* truth o# this -ind is not "resent in the %ualitati&e =udgement howe&er) (Enz: <42 § 0:<8 The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: r .
< < Fr an ce sc o B er to + h a t i s ‘ c o r r e c t ' u t n o t t r u e ’ i n t h e % u a l i t a t i .
#u nc tio n an d it is n’ t de #i ne d 'y an e! "r es si on w hi ch co nt ai ns on e) B ut .& e = u d g e m e n t 1 C n Ko u m ay cal l th e se nt en ce ‘H er e th er e is a re d ro se’ an ele m en tar y "r o" osi tio n) Th at is to sa y it do es n’ t co nt ai n a tr ut h.
#u nc tio ns w e ar e "r es u" "o si ng th at w e ha &e an id ea o# w ha t su ch an ‘a .i# we ’re to sa y th at a "r o" osi tio n isn ’t an ele m en tar y "r o" osi tio n un les s its co m "l ete lo gi cal an al ysi s sh o ws th at it isn ’t 'u ilt ou t o# ot he r "r o" os iti on s 'y tr ut h.
na lys is’ w ou ld 'e ) 5I' id: <0 08 B C ne im m ed iat e co ns e% ue nc e o# su ch an in# er en tia l de m ar cat io n o# th e co nc e" tu al is th at on e m us t ha &e m an y co nc e" ts in or de r to ha &e an y) Fo r gr as "i ng a co nc e" t in &o l& es m as ter in g th e "r o" .
ert ies o# in# er en tia l m o& es th at co nn ect it to m an y ot he r co nc e" ts: th os e w ho se a" "li ca 'il ity #ol lo ws #ro m th e a" "li ca 'il ity o# th e co nc e" t in %u es tio n H‘i # ! is re d th en ! ha s a co lo ur ’I th os e #r o m w ho se a" "li ca 'il ity th e a" "li ca 'il ity .
o# th e tar ge t co nc e" t #ol lo ws H‘i #! is sc arl et th en ! is re d’I th os e w ho se a" "li ca 'il ity "r ecl ud es or is "r ecl ud ed 'y it H‘i # ! is re d th en ! is no t gr ee n’ I) C ne ca nn ot ha &e =u st on e co nc e" t) T hi s ho lis m a' ou t co nc e" ts co nt ra sts wi th .
r T .
Hegel’s Dialectics as a Semantic Theory <. t h e a t o m i s m t h a t w o u l d r e s u l t i # o n e i d e n t i # i e .
8 The e!am"le gi&en in the "usatz o# § 0:4 o# the Encyclopaedia Logic is: ‘This "lant is curati&e’ (Enz: <6<8) The "r o "e rt y o# 'e in g cu ra ti &e o# co ur se is n ot "e rc e" tu al ly gi &e n &i a in st an t o 's er &a ti o n o# th e "l an t) .d conce"ts with di##erential res"onsi&e dis"ositions) 5I'id8 Brandom clearly ascri'es such an in#erential holism not only to Sellars 'ut also to Hegel)B The rest o# this "a"er aims at showing why such an ascri"tion is %uite correct) According to Hegel in#erential connections come into "lay #irst o# all in what he calls ‘the =udgement o# re#lection’) The determination o# the content o# such a -ind o# sentences re%uires re#erence to the content o# many other sentences since "ro"erties or conce"ts 2 that come into "lay here are mediated ones: In the =udgement that has now arisen H)))I the uni&ersal is no longer an abstract uni&ersality or a single property 'ut is "osited as a uni&ersal that has gathered itsel# together into a unity through the relation o# distinct terms* or regarding it #rom the "oint o# &iew o# the content o# &arious determinations in general as the ta!ing together o# &arious "ro"erties H)))I) /redicates o# this "eculiar -ind H)))I e!"ress an essential determination 'ut one which is in a relationship or is a unifying uni&ersality) 5+@: 34.
etc) The im"ortant "oint is that such e!"ressions always stand #or concepts: ‘the t0’ 5e)g) ‘the Ideal’8 is a short #orm #or: ‘the conce"t t0’ 5‘the conce"t 3deal() or: ‘the conce"t called ‘‘t0’’ ’ 5‘the conce"t called ‘‘Ideal’’’8) I# Fulda is right then Hegel’s logic constantly s"ea-s to us a'out conceptual relations.#or.ion) ‘@imit’ (-renze). com"ound e!"ressions li-e ‘Being.other’ (/ein1für12nderes).+e can say truly that the "lant is curati&e 'ecause it has some other s"eci#ic "ro"erty 5e)g) that o# ha&ing "uri#ied wounds to which it has 'een a""lied8 whose "ossession ma-es the in#erence to the more a'stract conce"t curati#e legitimate?that is to say in Hegelian terminology it mediates the a""lication o# the latter conce"t to the "lant) Further e!am"les "ro&ided in the $a%or Logic are: ‘This thing is use#ul’ ‘This thing is harm#ul’ and the e&ergreen: ‘9an is mortal’ 5see +@: 34. Some e ! a m "l es #r o m th e #i rs t c h a "t er s o# th e L o gi c: ‘ R ea lit y H)) )I is d et er m in at e ' ei n g’ ( * ie + .: <6<8) This I shall call the Hegelian Schema) ‘t0’ and ‘t<’ can 'e su'stituted in it 'y &ariously sha"ed a'stract or general terms: a'stract common nouns li-e ‘Di##erence’ (*ifferenz) ‘Re#lection’ (+efle. nominali$ed ad=ecti&es or &er's li-e ‘Becoming’ (Werden) ‘Being’ (/ein) ‘In#inite’ (0nendliche).8) .) Semantic Ascent and 9aterial In#erence: the Hegelian Schema According to Fulda most o# the strictly theoretical sentences o# the Logic ha&e the #orm: ‘der 5die das8 t& ist der 5die das8 t<’ 5or: ‘der 5die das8 t& ist t'() 5See Fulda 02:.
)I ist *asein) (WL: 0068* ‘Being..ealit4t H.other is H)))I r The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: .#or.
istierende *ing) (Enz: 02.ualitati#e <uantum) (Enz: 0:A § 0A:8* ‘(ssence HisI 'eing that has gone into itself (das Wesen das in sich gegangene /ein ist) (Enz: 0:6 § 00<8* ‘+hat e!ists is thing( (ist das E..8 ist 7..8 der 9rozess des Werdens) (WL: 06A8) Further e!am"les #rom the Encyclopaedia: ‘9easure is %ualitati&e %uantum’ (*as ma: ist das . § 0<48) Ta-ing into account such conce"ts 'y e!"ressing their in#erential relations with ..)I ist H)))I 5egation der einfachen 6eziehung des /eins auf sich) (WL: 0<A8* ‘Ideality H)))I is H)))I the "rocess o# becoming( (*ie 3dealit4t 7.<4 Francesco Berto a negation o# the sim"le relation o# 'eing to itsel# (*as /ein1für1 2nderes H...
In Word and =b%ect Euine calls ‘semanti c ascent’ the mo&e #rom tal-ing in certain terms to tal-ing a'out them?#or instance the shi#t #rom talo# miles to talo# ‘mile’) In the #ollowing I shall gi&e the locution a much more realistic #la&our: it e!"resses our coming to ma-e re#erence to 5%uanti#y o&er etc)8 things o# a higher order than the ones we started with) Ty"ically it is the mo&e #rom tal-ing a'out indi&idual o'=ects #alling under conce"ts 5e)g) a'out Socrates who is a man8 to tal-ing a'out conce"ts 5the conce"t man) under which o'=ects #all) This is "articularly clear in many ste"s o# the Logic.other conce"ts is accordin g to the Hegelia n strategy the duty o# "hiloso" hical or s"eculati &e logic as ‘the organ o# semantic sel#. For instance tal-ing a'out the conce"t something in the cha"ter de&oted to Determinate Being Hegel . consciou sness’) And since conce"ts used in ordinary languag e to talabout o'=ects 'ecome themsel &es the o'=ect o# s"eculati &e logic what we ha&e here is some sort o# semanti c ascent.
But he immedia tely adds: ‘howe&e r somethi ng is still a &ery su"er#ici al determin ation’ (Et>as ist noch eine sehr oberfl4c hliche 6estimm ung) (WL: 0068) In the #irst occurren ce o# ‘Et>as( re#erenc e is made to somethi ng ha&ing a certain im"ortance #or the ?orstellung. S"eculati&e logic "roduces a semantic ascent with res"ect to e&eryday language) Jommon language uses such e!"ressions as ‘Et>as( to ma-e generic re#erence to the things o# ordinary e!"erience) /hiloso"hical logic assumes as an o'=ect o# re#erence and theoretical consideration the conce"t something das Et>as.says that ‘in our ordinary way o# thin-ing somethi ng is rightly credited with reality’ (Et>as gilt der ?orstell ung mit +echt als ein +eelles). Further e!"loration o# Hegel’s theory o# =udgement can hel" us understand how such a semantic ascent ta-es "lace) As a #irst instance o# the ‘der t& ist t<’ schema let us ta-e the e!am"le o# a . The second occurrence though clearly "oints to the concept something.
8) +hen we assert 508 we do not ascri'e a "ro"erty 5that o# 'eing mortal8 to a conce"t 5the conce"t man). To use a Fregean =argon: we do not assert that this conce"t immedia tely #alls under a higher order one?as it would 'e i# we said somethi ng li-e: (<) The conce"t man is a conce"t which has changed in the course o# history) Human 'eings not conce"ts are mortals e&en though conce"ts can change in the course o# history According to the usual "ara"hrase what we are saying 'y asserting 508 is: r The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: .=udgeme nt o# re#lectio n "ro"ose d in the Logic: (0) 9an is mortal 5see +@: 34.
) All men are mortal) B ut i# ‘a ll m e n’ a " " ea rs in 5. 8 as th e gr a m m at ic al su '= ec t su c h a -i n d o# su '= ec t .Hegel’s Dialectics as a Semantic Theory <6 (.
disa""ears in the standard Fregean analysis o# %uanti#ied sentences) +hat we ha&e is uni&ersal %uanti#ication on a sentential #unction with the sha"e o# a conditional: (4) V!(H(!)->9(!)). >ow in his treatment o# the last #orm o# the =udgement o# re#lection? which is e!actly the uni&ersal =udgement?Hegel cheer#ully concedes that the grammatical sha"e o# such a -ind o# sentence has to do with a set o# indi&iduals 5today we may say: the o'=ects in the domain o# %uanti#ication8) +hat is im"licitly in %uestion here though is a relation 'etween concepts: Fni&ersality as it a""ears in the su'=ect o# the uni&ersal =udgement is the e!ternal uni&ersality o# re#lection .press relations bet>een concepts and we "oint to the "articular -inds o# such relations through those words ))) 5Frege 0B2<: 0:< my italics8 I# as Frege o'ser&es here we are e!"ressing relations 'etween conce"ts then 'y saying that all men are mortal we highlight some relation 'etween the conce"t man and the conce"t mortal. a l l n e s s : ‘ a l l ( m e a n s a l l i n d i # i d u a l s a n d i n i t t h and as Frege says in Concept and =b%ect It is to 'e o'ser&ed that the words ‘all’ ‘e&ery’ ‘not any’ ‘some’ stand in #ront o# words denoting conce"ts) In the general and "articular a##irmati&e and negati&e sentences >e e.
a'out something Et>as to tal. Hence the result is in truth ob%ecti#e uni#ersality. it is the >otion that #orces its way 'eyond the stu''orn indi&iduality to which un"hiloso"hical thin-ing clings and 'eyond the e!ternality o# its re#lection su'stituting allness as totality H)))I) There#ore this reflection which e!tends indi&iduality to allness is not e!ternal to it* on the contrary this re#lection merely ma-es e.e indi#idual remains unchanged) This uni&ersality is there#ore only a ta!ing together o# inde"endently e!isting indi&iduals H)))I) But there is here a &ague awareness o# the true uni&ersality o# the 5otion.plicit what it already is in itself.a'out miles to tal. instead o# all men we ha&e now to say man.a'out the conce"t something d a s E t > a s #r o m ta la ' o ut m e n to ta la ' o ut m a n et c) F nl ie E ui n e th o u g h H e g el .28 Hegel is in&iting us to "er#orm some sort o# intensional semantic ascent: =ust as there is to ad=ust Euine’s e!am"le an ascent #rom tal. so there is an ascent #rom tal. The HgrammaticalI su'=ect has thus stri""ed o## the #orm determination o# the =udgement o# re#lection which "assed o## #rom this Hi)e) the singular sentenceI through some Hi)e) the "articular sentence li-e ‘some men are 'ald’I to allness. (WL: 34:.a'out the mile.
ian ascent entails ontological commitment to The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: r .
Such a semantic ascent 'eing o# an intensional -ind 5not into sets 'ut into conce"ts8 re&erses the inclusion relation: .8 saying that all indi&iduals 'elonging to the s"ecies man ha&e the "ro"erty o# 'eing mortals that 'ecomes an assertion concerning the species in the sense that it e!"oses an in#erential relation 'etween the conce"t man and the conce"t mortal.<3 Francesco Berto some sort o# conce"tual realism) As Hegel says ‘What belongs to all the indi#idual of a genus belongs to the genus by its nature( so that ‘the su'=ect #or e!am"le all men stri"s o## its #orm determination and man is to ta-e its "lace’ (WL: 36A8) So it is sentence 5.
e!tensio nally to say that all men are mortal is to say that the set o# men is a 5"ro"er8 su'set o# that is to say it is include d in the set o# mortals) But when we come to tal.o# semantics #or ordinary language: the one &ia meaning "ostulates . ment that that sentence ma-es e!"licit) These conce"tual relations are the "rime matter and the starting "oint o# Hegel’s dialectics as a holistic semantic theory) Jonce"tual contents are determined inso#ar as they entertain &arious relations with other contents) Gnowledge and mastery o# such relations constitutes 5the in#erential as"ect o#8 le!ical com"etence) And dialectical "rocess as we -now ma-es these holistic connections 'etween meanings e!"licit) Such a treatment is not &ery di##erent #rom the one commonly "ro&ided 'y any te!t'oo.o# the conce"t man it is this conce"t that includes as its conce"t ual note or semanti c as"ect some re#erenc e to the conce"t mortal ?the re#erenc e gi&en 'y the in#erenti al commit.
"ro"osition does not #urnish what its #orm demands’ (Enz: 0BA § 0068) >e&ertheless we sometimes #ind in Hegel’s writings such e!"ressions as ‘the su'=ecti&e H)))I is merely su'=ecti&e’ (Enz: <B2 § <048 or ‘the #inite H)))I is only #inite’ (das Endliche ist nur das Endliche) (WL: 0.A8) This ha""ens "recisely in those conte!ts in which Hegel critici$es the a'stracting ?erstand. The Fnderstanding is ty"ically the . symmetr ic relation) Re#le!i& ity is what Hegel o'&iousl y #inds less interesti ng not to say disa""oi nting 'ecause it does not "ro&ide any #urther determination o# the in&ol&ed conce"t) To say that man is ))) man contradicts the "romise o# "ro"ositional connection in general: ‘a "ro"osition "romises a distinction 'etween su'=ect and "redicate’ 'ut ‘the identity. negati&e sentence s) The co"ula ‘ist( in the sentence s instantia ting the Hegelia n Schema ‘the t& is 5the8 t<’ e!"resse s a re#le!i& e transiti& e 'ut non.which are e!actly modal im"licat i&e or im"licat i&e.
at some instance s o# this schema in the #ollowing when we shall discuss Hegel’s shi#t #rom the =udgement to the syllogism8) That the relation is not symmetric #inally is clearly e!hi'ited 'y Hegel’s re=ection o# the mere re&ersi'ility o# su'=ect and "redicate) In his treatment o# the s"eculati&e =udgement in the /re#ace o# the 9henomenolog y of /pirit he "oints out that when we say ‘The actual is the uni#ersal( (das Wir!liche ist das 2llgemeine)? which is o'&iously nothing 'ut an instance o# the ‘the t& is 5the8 t<’ schema ?‘das 2llgemeine( is not =ust a di##erent name #or the same conce"t The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: r .-ind o# thought which seems una'le to "roceed 'eyond the isolated conce"t 'y gras"ing its relations with other conce"ts )04 Trans iti&ity o# the relation emerges #rom the #act that many Hegelia n argumen ts ha&e the #orm o# the schema: ‘i# the t& is 5the8 t' and the t' is 5the8 t@ then the t& is 5the8 t@( 5we shall loo.
N $C. y)G9(.theoretic semantics 5ty"ically "ossi'le worlds semantics8 as restrictions on admissi'le models that is to say #ormulas o# the language that are su""osed to 'e true in all acce"ta'le inter"retations) This means that their semantic role is to e.son relation8: 568 538 5:8 LM!My5F5! y) .N n+5!88 LDE.5:8) Such a "rocedure is closely related with what Brandom calls #ollowing Sellars ‘material in#erence’)03 The usual notions o# &alidity logical conse%uence etc) concern all inter"retations and in this sense they are formal 'asing themsel&es only u"on logical &oca'ulary) 9eaning "ostulates e!"ress in#erences entailments and conse%uences in&ol&ing non.that conce"tual content to others* #or instance to the conce"t mortal.Aegel(s *ialectics as a /emantic Theory <: designated 'y ‘das Wir!liche(. y)) >ecessarily whoe&er is someone’s #ather is a male is not a woman is someone’s "arent) 9eaning "ostulates can 'e understood in model.clude some inter"retations: to assume on the 'asis o# the shared le!ical com"etence that necessarily no married man is a 'achelor is to acce"t only inter"retations that assign to ‘))) is a 'achelor’ and ‘) ) ) is a married man’ se"arate e!tensions in all worlds o# the model) To acce"t 538 is to e!clude that in some world someone is 'oth a #ather and a woman) Semantic connections im"licit in the understanding o# the meaning o# words li-e ‘'achelor’ ‘mother’ or ‘woman’ are made e!"licit &ia the elementary logical &oca'ulary 5sentential connecti&es and %uanti#iers8 in such e!"ressions as 568.28 that is to say ‘the uni&ersal’ stands #or an internal determinacy or a necessary conce"tual note o# the conce"t actual.DEy(F(.)) LM!My5F5! y8 .logical content o# descri"ti&e &oca'ulary) They do it 'y im"osing restrictions on the semantic inter"retation: one cannot r The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: . (ntailment is a re#le!i&e and transiti&e 'ut not symmetric relation) And a conditional is the logical sym'ol we use to ma-e conce"tual entailments e!"licit &ia meaning "ostulates) A "art o# the le!ical com"etence an (nglish s"ea-er needs in order to understand the meaning o# the word ‘man’ and to correctly a""ly the "redicate ‘ ))) is a man’ is the commitment to such an entailment as the one e!"ressed 'y 548) Cne -nows what it means to say that something is a man?i)e) the word ‘man’ has a #i!ed meaning #or her?only inso#ar as she -nows the semantic connections that lin. Cn the contrary ‘the uni&ersal is meant to e!"ress the essence o# the actual’ (9h4n: .&B And e&en though the "redicate e!"resses?at least inso#ar as s"eculati&e sentences are concerned? something essential to gras" the meaning o# the su'=ect this is not to legitimate "er#ect synonymy 'etween the two in&ol&ed conce"tual terms) >ow these #ormal "ro"erties o# the relation e!"ressed 'y the ‘ist( o# the Hegelian Schema are e!actly those o# entailment. Since Jarna" though meaning "ostulates are understood as modal assertions) For instance a "art o# the im"licit shared meaning o# the word ‘#ather’ can 'e made e!"licit 'y e!hi'iting the in#erential connections o# the relation ))) is the father of? as #ollows 5with 9 W 9 standing res"ecti&ely #or the "ro"erties o# 'eing a male a woman and the "arent.
<B Francesco Berto claim to ha&e access to the shared meaning o# ‘#ather’ i# she a""lies to something the conce"t father while re#using to a""ly to that &ery thing the conce"t parent too) This is #or'idden 'y "ostulate 5:8) Cn this 'asis it is easy to de#ine a notion o# semantic conse%uence as logical conse%uence restricted to the admissi'le models i)e) to those that are not e!cluded 'y the "ostulates) The "rocedure o# semantic determination e!"ressed 'y in#erential connections 'etween conce"ts holds in general #or the meaning o# conce"tual words) It holds thus in "articular #or the categories o# thought the ‘"ure essences’ Hegel’s logic deals with) The ‘semantic sel#. .
2A8) +e also dee"en our understanding o# the conce"t being as o""osed to .consciou sness’ "roduce d 'y s"eculati &e logic consists #irst o# all in illumina ting the intensio nal content o# conce"t ual terms e!"ressi ng such categori es 5terms li-e ‘Determ inate 'eing’ ‘Someth ing’ ‘Being. other’ ‘(ssence ’ ‘@imit’ etc)8 &ia the intensio nal content o# other terms that is to say 'y ma-ing the holistic relations 'etween the in&ol&ed meanings e!"licit through e!"ressions o# the #orm ‘the t& is 5the8 t<’. Such e!"ressions constitute "artial determinations o# the conce"ts at issue: to say that the t& is 5the8 t' is to say that the intension o# ‘t<’ is a semantic constituent o# the intension o# ‘t0’: an essential conce"tual note o# the conce"t t& which is thus to 'e considered 5and i# it is the case reconsidered8 in terms o# the conce"t ‘t<’ stands #or and to which is now in#erentially connected) +e gain a "artial determination o# the conce"t essence when we are told that it is the completed return of being into itself (WL: . #or.
+e get closer to such a generic notion as the one o# thing (*ing) when we -now that it is nothing 'ut >hat e.essence when we learn that essence is the truth of being (WL: .ists in general (Enz: 02. § 0<48) 4 ) D i a l e c t i c a l > e g a t i o n 9 a t e r i a l I n c o m " a t i ' i l i t y Such an a""roach to dialectics as a semantic theory .B28) +e are su""ose d to -now somethi ng more a'out the conce"t ideality when we understa nd that 5and why8 it is the process of becomin g.
can hel" us understa nd why in the e!"ositi on o# his dialectic al method Hegel claims that its essence is em'edd ed in a certain conce"t o# negation : the one accordin g to which ‘the negation is a s"eci#ic negation it has a content’) 9ore than this the ‘%uite sim"le insight’ o# ‘the logical "rinci"le that the negati&e is =ust as much "ositi&e’ 5See +@: 648 is all we need in order to understand dialectics) @et us see why) The "ostulates o# modern model. theoretic semantics are the inheritors o# the e!"ressions instantiating the Hegelian Schema ‘der 5die das8 t0 ist der 5die das8 t<’ or ‘der 5die das8 t0 ist t<’ 'y which s"eculati&e logic in#erentially articulates the meanings o# conce"tual terms) But the most im"ortant semantic idea o# Hegel’s dialectics in&ol&es the determination o# conce"ts &ia modally %uali#ied relations o# e!clusion) These relations can 'e e!"ressed 'y modal im"licati&e. negati&e statements: sentences asserting that i# something instantiates a gi&en conce"t then it cannot .
instantia te some other) Such a -ind o# relation 'etween The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: r .
"ati'ility holds 'etween "ro"erties /0 and /<) @et us la'el material incom"ati'ility with a sym'ol logicians -now &ery well: ‘ ? ’ 5 ? is o'&iously su""osed to 'e symmetric i)e) i# /0 ? /< then /< ? /08) Mery small #ine.tunings would e%ually allow us to e!"ress it in terms o# conce"ts states o# a##airs or worlds de"ending on one’s meta"hysical "re#erences) For instance we may say that material incom"ati'ility holds 'etween two conce"ts J 0 and J< i# and only i# the &ery instantiating J 0 'y ! e!cludes the "ossi'ility that ! also instantiates J < and &ice &ersa) Cr we may say that it holds 'etween two states o# a##airs s0 and s< i# and only i# the holding o# s0 5in world w at time t8 "recludes the "ossi'ility that s< also holds 5in world w at time t8 and &ice &ersa) ? is thus a dee"ly meta"hysical notion: it is rooted in our e!"erience o# the world not only in semantics or "ragmatics) It is also a strongly modal one: material incom"ati'ility does not hold 'etween two merely di##erent "ro"erties .Hegel’s Dialectics Semantic Theory <2 as a the meanings o# conce"tual terms e!hi'its the Hegelian idea o# determinate negation a dee"ly intensional notion) As Brandom has o'ser&ed: Hegel’s two central semantic conce"ts in the 9henomenology are 'oth in#erential notions) ‘9ediation’ his term #or in#erential articulation is deri&ed #rom the role o# the middle term in syllogistic in#erence) ‘Determinate negation’ is his term #or material incom"ati'ility #rom which he ta-es it the notion o# #ormal negation is a'stracted) 5Brandom 0224: 2<8 +e will consider mediation 5?ermittlung8 in the ne!t section) @et us concentrate now on material incom"ati'ility and the a'straction o# #ormal 5i)e) regular logical8 negation #rom it) According to Hegel the determinacy o# the world is e!"ressed &ia "redication ascri"tion o# "ro"erties to things) But any "redication has a determinate content only inso#ar as it entails the e!clusion that the thing ! to which some "ro"erty /0 is ascri'ed has some other "ro"erty /<: omnis determinatio est negatio) +e can say then that the relation o# material incom.
li-e 'eing red and 'eing circular which can 'e instantiated 'y the same o'=ect e&en though sometimes they are not) It holds 'etween two "ro"erties such that an o'=ect instantiating one o# them has dismissed any chance o# simultaneously instantiating the other li-e 'eing circular and 'eing s%uare) >ow according to Hegel something is a determinate 'eing a Dasein or 'estimmtes Sein 5not the em"ty Sein which is nothing 'ut >ichts8 only inso#ar it has "ro"erties or #alls under conce"ts) But that something has some "ro"erty is itsel# a determinate state o# a##airs only inso#ar as its holding e!cludes the holding o# other states o# a##airs) This in turn entails the determinacy o# the "ro"erty or o# the conce"t which is o'tained &ia relations o# strongly modal material incom"ati'ility with other conce"ts or "ro"erties) To say that ! has some "ro"erty /0 is to say something with a determinate content and something in#ormati&e with res"ect to ! only inso#ar as such a "redication entails the e!clusion o# the "ossi'ility that ! has some other itsel# determined "ro"erty /<) r The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: .
.)C5!88) So not only 'eing a man entails 'eing mortal* 'ut also 'eing a .N .A Francesco Berto This ‘other’ "ro"erty 9' is according to Hegel a determinate negation (bestimmte 5egation) with res"ect to 9&.N .O . +e said that meaning "ostulates holistically articulating the content o# conce"ts can 'e seen as restrictions on admissi'le models) For instance 5with 9 / D = standing res"ecti&ely #or the "ro"erties o# 'eing a man a stone a dog an o&i"arous8: 5B8 528 LM!59 5!8 .HD5!88 50A8 LM!595!8 .nS5!88 LM!59 5!8 .
50A8 is a "art o# what it is to gras" the conce"t man. uni&er sal) This determ ination is comm only treated in logic in conne !ion .man e!cludes 'eing a dog a stone an o&i"arou s) And -nowled ge o# 5B8. +hat is so s"ecial then with dialectic al negation as determin ate negation with res"ect to standard negation 1 In his treatmen t o# negati&e =udgeme nt in the Logic Hegel maintain s that the mere contradi ctory of a conce"t is not the -ind o# thing that can hel" us gras" the conce"t itsel#: I# we sticto the negati #e in the com"l etely a'strac t determ ination o# immed iate non1 being then the "redic ate is only the compl etely indete rmi1 nate not.
w i t h c o n t r a d i c t o r y n o t i o n s a n d i t i s i n c u l c a t e d a s a matter o# im"ort ance that in the negati #e o# a notion one is to sticto the negati &e only and it is to 'e regard ed as the merely indete rminat e e!tent o# the other o# the "ositi& e notion) (WL: 3.B8 The mere negation (blo:e 5egation) or contradictory o# a conce"t is what we o'tain &ia a'straction #rom the conce"ts which constitute determinate negations o# .
O n95!88) >ecessa rily i# somethi ng is a stone a dog an o&i"arou s it is not a man) /ossessi on o# any o# those "ro"erti es "re&ents the chance that . The generic contradictory o# the conce"t man or the ‘mere negation’ o# the #act that .(=( .) . has the "ro"erty o# 'eing a man can thus 'e de#ined in the in#erential #ramewor. has the "ro"erty o# 'eing a man 5or e%ually: #alling under one o# the conce"ts stone dog o#iparous "re&ents the chance o# #alling under the conce"t man).as the minimal incom"ati'le notion with res"ect to man: it is that which #ollows #rom all that is materially incom"ati'le with man. It is thus the result o# an a'straction #rom all the relations o# material incom"ati'ility that hold 'etween a "ro"erty and the "ro"erties that constitute determinate negations o# it .8 L?.5i)e) are materiall y incom"a ti'le with8 that conce"t) For instance: 5008 LM!5S5 !8 ?P Q95!88 50<8 LM!5D5 !8 ?P Q95!88 50.
in the sense that it is entailed 'y any o# them) So i# we only consider ed the o""ositi on 'etween man r The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: .
Aegel(s *ialectics as a /emantic Theory ..old'latt de#inition o# ortho .&on >eumann.B8 As a matter o# #act de#initions o# #ormal negation &ia material incom"ati'ility are %uite #re%uent in contem"orary logic) For instance here is an account which ada"ts the idea "ro"osed 'y J)9) Dunn that ‘one can de#ine negation in terms o# one "rimiti&e relation o# incom"ati'ility H)))I in a meta"hysical #ramewor-’ 5Dunn 0223: 28) Dunn re#ers to the Bir-o##.3 R 0028 Jon&ersely it is 'ecause the conce"t man entertains relations o# material incom"ati'ility with se&eral other conce"ts that we can deri&e &ia a'straction its #ormal negation or contradictory) Such incom"ati'ility is la'elled material e!actly to stress the #act that it is not a merely logical in the sense o# formal notion: it is 'ased on the material content o# the in&ol&ed conce"ts) So Hegel would "ro'a'ly endorse Huw /rice’s claim: The a""rehension o# incom"ati'ility HisI an a'ility more "rimiti&e than the use o# negation) The negation o"erator is 'eing e!"lained as initially a means o# registering 5"u'licly or "ri&ately8 a "ercei&ed incom"ati'ility) H)))I For "resent "ur"oses what matters is that incom"ati'ility 'e a &ery 'asic #eature o# a s"ea-er’s 5or "roto.0 and not man that is to say i# this were #or us the only connection the conce"t man entertained according to Hegel it would 'e an empty notion: In the doctrine o# contradictory conce"ts one conce"t is #or instance called blue H)))I the other not1blue so that this other would 'e not an a##irmati&e 5li-e #or instance yello>) 'ut is =ust the a'stractly negati&e that has to 'e held #ast) That the negati&e is also "ositi&e within itsel# H)))I is already im"lied in the determination that that which is o""osed to another is its other) (Enz: 0B6.s"ea-er’s8 e!"erience o# the world so that negation can "lausi'ly 'e e!"lained in terms o# incom"ati'ility) 5/rice 022A: <<3.
old'latt 02:48) Ta-e an ordered cou"le oS S@ P where S is a set o# "ro"erties and S@ is our 'inary relation o# material incom"ati'ility de#ined on S) Then we ha&e: 5D#Q8 Q/05!8 Td# @9'(9'(.negation a notion originally de&elo"ed within %uantum logic) +hat ma-es this characteri$ation interesting is that it uses "recisely a relation o# incom"ati'ility 5also called ‘orthogonality’ or sim"ly ‘"er"’: see Bir-o## and &on >eumann 02.@/<8. Such a "artial indeterminacy in the in#ormation con&eyed 'y an e!"ression containing ‘not’ re#lects a &ery sim"le #act o# ordinary language) +hen we say ‘The car is red’ this is not the wea-est or less in#ormati&e sentence incom"ati'le with the sentence ‘The car is 'lue’) The wea-est sentence incom"ati'le with ‘The car is 'lue’ is ‘The car is not 'lue’ which gi&en 5D#Q8 merely says that the car has some other 5materially r The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: .3 .) A/0. To say that something is not 9& is to say that it has some "ro"erty 9' which is materially incom"ati'le with res"ect to 9&.
Here Hegel clearly maintains that a determinate world cannot 'e articulated &ia relations o# ..< Francesco Berto incom"ati'le8 "ro"erty than that o# 'eing 'lue not s"eci#ying which one) The car is red’ s"eci#ically says which other incom"ati'le colour the car has) >ow Hegel undou'tedly endorsed the e!"ressi&e instance according to which the content o# conce"tual terms has to 'e made e!"licit &ia in#erential relations o# material incom"ati'ility) Among the many "laces in his wor-s ma-ing this "oint we may consider the cha"ter dedicated to /erce"tion in the 9henomenolog y of $ind.
clusi# e (ausschl ie:ende) di##erenc es that is to say determin ate negation s) At the end o# the cha"ter dedicate d to Sense Jertaint y we o&erco me the idea that the things o# our e!"erien ce are immedi ate data o# senses) /erce"ti &e conscio usness assumes its o'=ect then as an indi&idu al which is not a 'are "articular 'ut something #alling under conce"ts ha&ing "ro"erties) The thing is what unifies the many "ro"erties it has: Since the "rinci "le o# the o'=ect the uni&er sal is in its sim"li city a media ted uni&er sal the o'=ect must e!"res s this its nature in its own sel#) This it does 'y showi ng itsel# to 'e the thing >ith .mere (gleichg ültige) di##erenc e: it has to de&elo" into e.
(9h4n : 3B8 >ow Hegel adds "erce"ti&e consciousness in the 'eginning tends to concei&e the "ro"erties as ‘related HonlyI to themsel&es . H ) ) ) I J o n s e % u e n t l y t h e s e n s e .m a n y p r o p e r t i e s . e l e ment is still "resen t 'ut not in the way it was su""o sed to 'e in Hthe "ositio n o#I imme diate certain ty: not as the singul ar item that is ‘mean t’ 'ut as a uni&er sal or as that which will 'e de#ine d as a prope rty.
H)))I indi##ere nt to one another each on its own and #ree #rom the others’: T h i s s a l t i s a s i m " l e H e r e a n d a t t h e same time mani# old* it is white and also tart also cu'ica l in sha"e o# a s"eci#i c gra&ity etc) All these many "ro"er ties are in a single sim"le ‘Here’ H)))I) And at the same time withou t 'eing se"ara ted 'y di##ere nt Heres they do not a##ect each other in this inter"e netrati on) The .
28 But now dialectics demands that "ro"erties are themsel&es articulated &ia relations o# determinate negation or material incom"ati'ility with res"ect to other "ro"erties) The thing is a bestimmtes .w h i t e n e s s d o e s n o t a # # e c t t h e c u ' i c a l s h a " e a n d n either a##ects the tart taste etc)* on the contra ry since each is itsel# a sim"le relatin g o# sel# to sel# it lea&es the others alone and is conne cted with them only 'y the indi##e rent Also) (9h4n : 3B.
/ein inso#ar as it is an e. related they would not 'e The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: r .clusi# e core with res"ect to conce"t s material ly incom"a ti'le with the ones it instantia tes) Thus the initial idea o# "erce"ti on aiming to descri'e the thing through a mere con=unct ion o# sentence s attri'uti ng to it its "ro"erti es 5the ‘indi##er ent Also’8 has to 'e aufgeho ben: I # the many deter minate "ro"er ties were strictl y indi##e rent to one anothe r i# they were sim"ly and solely sel#.
Hegel’s Dialectics as a Semantic Theory determinate* #or they are only determinate in so #ar as they di##erentiate themsel&es #rom one another and relate themsel&es to others as to their o""osites) Ket* as thus o""osed to one another they cannot 'e together in the sim"le unity i# their medium which is =ust as essential to them as negation* the di##erentiation o# the "ro"erties in so #ar as it is not an indi##erent di##erentiation 'ut is e!clusi&e each "ro"erty negating the others thus #alls outside o# this sim"le medium* and the medium there#ore is not merely an Also an indi##erent unity 'ut a Cne as well a unity which e!cludes an other) 59h4n: 328 ..?That is e&ery thing is a singular which is inwardly a uni#ersality or inner nature in other words a uni#ersal that is made singular’ (Enz: <43 § 03:8) This means as we -now that things are not 'are "articulars inso#ar as they ha&e "ro"erties: they are o'=ects 5‘singulars’8 #alling under conce"ts 5‘uni&ersalities’8) But conce"ts themsel&es are determinate conce"ts 'ecause o# their in#erential relations o# entailment and material incom"ati'ility with other conce"ts) This means that conce"tual contents e!"ressed 'y a sentence can 'e determinately gras"ed only inso#ar as they are lin-ed to many other conce"tual contents e!"ressed 'y other sentences) +e ma-e such relations e!"licit 'y ta-ing into account entailments in which ordinary reasoning is articulated) Hence comes the Hegelian idea that ‘The truth o# the =udgement is the syllogism’ (WL: 3:<8) Just li-e according to Brandom’s dictum one cannot ha&e e!actly one conce"t so according to Hegel one cannot gras" anything meaning#ul through e!actly one sentence) This emerges "articularly in the last -ind o# =udgement considered 'oth in the $a%or Logic and in the Encyclopaedia Logic: the =udgement o# the notion) Here the route to syllogism is "ro&ided 'y a #orm the a"odictic =udgement which contains some sort o# internal in#erence) Assertoric =udgement as such?#or instance: ‘This house is good’?stands in need o# =usti#ication: as Hegel says ‘accordingly H)))I is con#ronted with e%ual right 'y its contradictory’) It is a mere assurance it ‘is there#ore essentially "ro'lematic’ 5+@: 33A8) But it #inds its #oundation 'y 'eing de&elo"ed into the a"odictic =udgement: ‘This?the immediate singularity?house?the genus?being constituted so and so?"articularity? is good or 'ad’ (Enz: <63 § 0:28) Here ‘'eing constituted so and so’ is the middle term grounding or as we may say mediating the a""lication o# the conce"t good to this house on the 'asis o# an im"licit "attern: if a house is constituted so and so 5#or instance #ollowing certain criteria or construction using certain stu## etc)8 then it is a good house* 'ut this house is constituted so and so* there#ore it is a good house) +e o'ser&ed that the conce"tual relation e!"ressed 'y the Hegelian Schema ‘der 5die das8 t& ist der 5die das8 t<’ is a transiti&e one) Hegel o#ten em"hasi$es r The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: . 6) ?ermittlung and Syllogism According to the Encyclopaedia ‘E#ery thing is a %udgement.
.4 Francesco Berto the role o# the middle term in in#erences o# the #orm ‘i# the t& is 5the8 t' and the t' is 5the8 t@ then the t& is 5the8 t@ . They o#ten turn into: ‘the t& is as t< the t@ 5#or instance: ‘The continuity o# the "ro"erty H)))I is as this negati#e unity the restored something o# thinghood’ WL: 42<8* or: ‘the t0 >hich is determined as the t' is the t@( 5#or instance: ‘HTheI thing which has determined itsel# as the merely %uantitati&e conne!ion o# #ree matters is the sim"ly altera'le thing’ WL: 4248) The "aradigm o# ?ermittlung is the middle term o# the syllogism) This hel"s us see why according to the Encyclopaedia we should not =ust say that ‘(&ery thing is a =udgement’ .
3 § 0<8 But the Hegelian notion o# mediation is clearly connected with the one o# determinate negation too) Relations mediating conce"ts with each other are #irst o# all those .'ut also that ‘(&eryth ing is a syllogis m’ (2lles ist ein /chlu:) (Enz: 'BH § 0B08) It is thus clear that the notion o# ?ermittl ung has to do with the in#erenti al mo&eme nt through conce"ts ) Hegel characte ri$es it this way in the Introduc tion o# the Encyclo paedia: 9 e d i a t i o n i s a 'eginn ing and a ha&ing ad&anc ed to a second in such a way that this second is only there 'ecaus e one has come to it #rom somet hing that is other &is7aU. &is this second ) (Enz: .
clusion 'ecause determinatio est negatio. As Brandom .clusio n 5see Brando m <AA08) Determination o# o'=ects &ia "redication ascri"tion o# "ro"erties which mani#ests itsel# in the =udgement "asses into determination o# "ro"erties &ia in#erential relations 'etween =udgements which mani#ests itsel# in the syllogism) And such a determination has as its essential "ro"er "art the intensional e!clusions the relations o# determinate negation 'etween materially incom"ati'le "ro"erties or conce"ts: conclusion is rooted in e. Finally determinacy o# the meaning o# conce"tual terms =ust li-e their mastery is a matter o# degree.o# material incom"a ti'ility or reci"roc al modally %uali#ie d e!clusio n: the conce"t which is ‘mediate d’ is determi ned &ia another conce"t which is its determi nate negation ) As Brando m o'ser&es schlie:e n the "assage into the conclusi on o# the syllogist ic in#erenc e is rooted in ausschli e:en e.
or.o'ser&e d accordin g to the in#erenti al semanti cs mastery o# a "ro"osit ional content is not an all. And the ac%uisition o# such awareness is the duty o# s"eculati&e logic or 'etter ‘the lo#tier 'usiness o# logic’) . ar'itrary "lace to the &arious "roductions o# the -eist. nothing situation ) This holds 'oth #or the meta"hy sical conce"ts Hegel’s logic in&estig ates and #or ordinary and em"irica l conce"ts ) The degree o# indi&idu ation o# a conce"t may &ary on the 'asis o# the di##erent -inds o# linguisti c com"ete nce* that is to say on the 'asis o# the num'er and &ariety o# the in#erential connections and meaning "ostulates o# which the s"ea-er is conscious) Hegel would "ro'a'ly ha&e endorsed the idea that the meanings o# our general conce"tual terms li-e ‘man’ ‘tiger’ ‘elm’ ‘'eech’ ‘essence’ ‘a""earance’ is determined within our shared theories) He would also ha&e added that a>areness o# this is the "eculiarly "hiloso"hical as"ect o# the story) It is this awareness that assigns a non.
r The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: .
Hegel’s Dialectics Semantic Theory .6 as a As >elson .oodman once said ‘The "ractical scientist does the 'usiness* 'ut the "hiloso"her -ee"s the 'oo-s’ 5.oodman 02:<: 03B8) F r a n c e s c o B e r t o F n i & e r s i t y o # / a d u a D e " a r t .
m e n t o # / h i l o s o " h y / i a $ $ a J a " i t a n i a t o . 6 0 . 2 / a d . .
i&en8 /i""in 02BB /in-ard 0224 Redding 0223) 9cDowell "resents 9ind and +orld as ‘A "rolegomenon to a reading o# Hegel’s /henomenology’ 59cDowell 0224: i!8) 9y "rimary de'ts in this "a"er though are towards Ro'ert Brandom’s in#erential semantics as we shall see in the #ollowing) < This 'i.o & a I t a l y # r a n c e s c o ' e r t o V t i n ) i t >CT(S Such a re&itali$ation is rooted in +il#rid Sellars’ (m"iricism and the /hiloso"hy o# 9ind un#olded in John 9cDowell’s =ustly cele'rated 9ind and +orld and Ro'ert Brandom’s wor-s?'ut see also e)g) @am' 02:2 5which antici"ates much o# the current re disco&ery o# Hegel as a critic o# the 9yth o# the .dimensional account o# content gi&en in terms o# circumstancesW 0 .
A:7B8) 6 As Jaesch-e 02:2 and SchnaXdel'ach 0222 #or instance ha&e #orce#ully stressed) I ha&e argued at length on this "oint in Berto <AA6: Jhs) 0 and B) 3 According to K) Ko&el Hegel’s enter"rise aims at ‘creating a new "hiloso"hical glossary 'y e!"loiting e!isting am'iguities and connotations o# ordinary language) In declaring this "rogram H) ) )I Hegel s"eci#ically o##ers to ma-e systematic distinctions 'etween terms that are usually considered to 'e synonyms es"ecially the set: (!isten$ Dasein +ir-lich-eit etc)’ 5Ko&el 02B0: 00:8) : @et us listen to 9cDowell’s &ersion in 9ind and +orld: ‘For e!am"le consider =udgements o# colour) These =udgements in&ol&e a range o# conce"tual ca"acities that are as thinly integrated into understanding o# the world as any) (&en so no one could count as ma-ing e&en a directly o'ser&ational =udgement o# colour e!ce"t against a 'ac-ground su##icient to ensure that she understands colours as "otential "ro"erties o# things) The a'ility to "roduce ‘‘correct’’ colour words in res"onse to in"uts to the &isual system 5an a'ility "ossessed I 'elie&e 'y some "arrots8 does not dis"lay "ossession o# the rele&ant conce"ts i# the su'=ect has no com"rehension o# #or instance the idea that these res"onses r The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: . See the closing Re#erences #or the a''re&iations o# Hegel’s wor-s) /age num'ers always re#er to the (nglish translations listed in the Re#erences) 4 As M) HoXsle o'ser&ed in a recent com"arison o# Brandom and Hegel ‘For Brandom as #or Hegel logic is more than the ela'oration o# a consistent system o# a!ioms* "hiloso"hical logic must aim at a =usti#ication o# the #undamental logical locutions it must clari#y the relation 'etween conce"ts "ro"ositions and in#erences it must 'e to %uote Brandom again ‘‘the linguistic organ o# semantic sel#.8) . consciousness and sel#.conse%uences o# a""lication e!tends to descri"ti&e &oca'ulary .control’’’ 5HoXsle <AA.ent$en’s in#erential treatment o# logical &oca'ulary &ia introductionWelimination rules in natural deduction 5see e)g) Dummett 02:.: .
.3 Francesco Berto re#lect a sensiti&ity to a -ind o# state o# a##airs in the world something that can o'tain anyway inde"endently o# these "ertur'ations in her stream o# consciousness) The necessary 'ac-ground understanding includes #or instance the conce"t o# &isi'le sur#aces o# o'=ects and the conce"t o# suita'le conditions #or telling what colour something is 'y loo-ing at it 59cDowell 0224: 0<8) ‘Cne o# the most im"ortant lessons we can learn #rom Sellars’s masterwor‘‘(m"iricism and the /hiloso"hy o# 9ind’’ 5as #rom the ‘‘Sense Jertainty’’ section o# Hegel’s 9henomenology) is the in#erentialist one that e&en such nonin#erential re"orts must 'e in#erentially articulated) +ithout that re%uirement we cannot tell the .
28) Th roughout this "a"er I always use ‘conce"t’ and ‘"ro"erty ’ as synonym ous) This can 'e settled semantic ally &ia a Fregean account: a "redicati &e term e!"resses a sense and 'y &irtue o# it it stands #or a conce"t) Jonce"ts thus 'elong to the le&el o# re#erence: they are something general or uni&ersal =ust as "ro"erties are su""osed to 'e within ontological realism: something we can s"ea. and what is true o# the actual is only true in #irtue of these forms through them and in .o# and %uanti#y o&er) That this was Hegel’s "osition is %uite clear) Hegelian idealism ta-es conce"ts to 'e o'=ecti&e and real not at all a'stractions whose only home would 'e within our heads) Among the many "assages in Hegel’s wor-s that argue #or this "oint it may su##ice #or instance to ha&e a loo.di##erenc e 'etween nonin#ere ntial re"orters and automatic machiner y such as thermosta ts and "hotocell s which also ha&e relia'le dis"ositio ns to res"ond di##erenti ally to stimuli’ 5Brando m <AAA: 4B.at the § 03< o# the Encyclopaedia Logic with its com"laint against ‘what is usually understood 'y ‘‘conce"ts’’’ that is to say ‘=ust general notions(. Cn the contrary conce"ts are ‘the li#ing spirit of >hat is actual.
them( (Enz: <.% or r’’’) It should 'e stressed that Hegel’s "osition on the duality 'etween e!tensional and intensional o'=ects may 'e seen as a re&ersal o# our current ‘analytic’ assum"tions) +hereas such e!tensional o'=ects as sets would 'e considered 'y ." or r’’ is im"lied 'y the con=unction o# ‘‘(ither not.2 03<8) § T he im"ortan ce o# Hegel’s theory o# =udgemen t in his Doctrine o# the Jonce"t has 'een stressed 'y Theuniss en who considers the co"ula ‘ist’ o# the Hegelian Schema e!actly as the o"erator o# conce"tu al mediatio n 5see Theuniss en 02BA: 43 and BA8) Th at the language o# Hegel’s dialectics is ty"ically committe d to such a #orm o# a'stractio n or semantic ascent is argued among others in Barth 02B0: 6B##) A similar "osition is held in J)>) Findlay’s wor-s e)g) Findlay 026B) See also Findlay 02B0: 0.language to a meta. language that dis"oses o# richer resources and in which though the conclusion is in a sense im"lied 'y the "remises it is not im"lied 'y them in the straight#orward sense in which ‘‘(ither not." or %’’ and ‘‘(ither not.<: ‘Dialectical reasoning in short in&ol&es that genuine "assage 'eyond "remises that is also in&ol&ed in "assing #rom an o'=ect.B.
Hegel as a'stract things? in the negati&e sense in which he o#ten uses the word ‘a'stract’ ? intension al ascent into conce"ts would not 'e seen 'y him as such a ‘'ad’ #orm o# a'stractio n at all) Accordin g to the ty"ical Hegelian doctrine a concept is "recisely the concrete as"ect o# a thing "ro&iding it with unity "ersisten ce in 'eing and characteri stic acti&ity and "ur"oses 'y 'eing literally em'edde d in it) I am inde'ted to an anonymous re#eree #or this "oint) Cn the structure o# le!ical com"etence and es"ecially on the distinction 'etween its re#erential and in#erential as"ects see 9arconi 0226 022:) 04 As 9arconi o'ser&ed in the s"eculati&e "rocedure ‘sentences o# the #orm ‘‘the t0 is the t&’’ are really used to e!"ress our 5"ossi'ly tem"orary8 ina'ility to go 'eyond a conce"tual determination such ‘‘going 'eyond’’ 'eing the ratio essendi o# the "ro"ositional The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: r .
Hegel’s Dialectics as a Semantic Theory .: #o r m) H) ) )I Se nt en ce s o# thi s #o r m ar e th er e# or e tr ue 'u t tri &i al) In th e co nt e! t o# a sc ie nti #ic 'o oth eir on ly "o .
.int is a rhetorical one) They are there only to 'e su"erseded 'y a genuine conce"tual ad&ance’ 59arconi 02BA: :28) 06 According to H).adamer thus the ty"ically Hegelian ‘s"eculati&e =udgement’ does not sim"ly "ro"ose a new conce"t &ia its "redicate 'ecause the role o# "redicate is to dee"en our im"licit understanding o# the meaning o# the su'=ect 5see ."ragmatist semantic a""roach Brandom may not #ind my traditional.minded intensional "resentation &ery "alata'le) Cn this di##erence 'etween my a""roach and Brandom’s see Berto <AA6: Jh) 3) 0: ‘As e!am"les consider the in#erence #rom ‘‘/itts'urgh is to the west o# /hiladel"hia’’ to ‘‘/hiladel"hia is to the (ast o# /itts'urgh’’ the in#erence #rom ‘‘Today is +ednesday’’ to ‘‘Tomorrow will 'e Thursday’’ and that #rom ‘‘@ightning is seen now’’ to ‘‘Thunder will 'e heard soon’’) It is the contents o# the conce"ts +est and (ast that ma-e the #irst a good in#erence the contents o# the conce"ts +ednesday Thursday Today and Tomorrow that ma-e the second in#erence correct and the contents o# the conce"ts lightning and thunder as well as the tem"oral conce"ts that underwrite the third) (ndorsing these in#erences is "art o# gras"ing or mastering those conce"ts %uite a"art #rom any s"eci#ically logical com"etence’ 5Brandom 0224: 2:72B8) It should 'e remar-ed that Findlay too stressed Hegel’s continuous insistence on entailments and internal relations 'etween conce"ts not reduci'le to logical conse%uences o# #ormal logic 'ut e! "r es se d 'y sc he m as o# m at eri al in #e re nc e 5s ee e) g) Fi nd la y 02 6B 8) 0B For a "rese ntatio n o# the techn ical detail s o# such a negat ion see Berto <AA3 a <AA3 ') R .) .adamer 02:08) 03 Although it should 'e stressed that #ollowing his neo.
+est#aXlischen A-ademie der +issenscha#ten Bd) 2: /haXnomenologie des .eraets +) A) Suchting and H) S) Harris) Hac-ett: Indiana"olis 0220) /hZn6.esammelte +er-e in Mer'indung mit der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinscha#t hrg) &on der Rheinisch.+est#aXlischen A-ademie der +issenscha#ten Bd) 00: +issenscha#t der @ogi-) (rster Band) Die o'=e-ti&e @ogi50B0<W0.eistes) Ham'urg: 9einer 02BA* tr) The /henomenology o# S"irit 'y A) M) 9iller) C!#ord: C!#ord Fni&ersity /ress 02::) +@6.(F(R(>J(S 0) Hegel’s wor-s HRe#erences are to (nglish translations o# the #ollowing wor-sI (n$6 +er-e in $wan$ig BaXnde hrg) &on () 9oldenhauer und G)9) 9ichel BaXnde B.esammelte +er-e in Mer'indung mit der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinscha#t hrg) &on der Rheinisch.8) Bd) 0<: +issenscha#t der @ogi-) Yweiter Band) Die su'=e-ti&e @ogi.oder die @ehre &om Begri## 50B038) Ham'urg: 9einer 02:B.ermany around 0B0A’ in +) Bec-er and +) G) (ssler 5eds)8 Gon$e"te der Diale-ti-) Fran-#urt a)9): Glostermann) Benci&enga () 5<AAA8 Hegel’s Dialectical @ogic) C!#ord: C!#ord Fni&ersity /ress) .rundrisse) Fran-#urt a)9): Suhr-am" 02:A* tr) The (ncyclo"aedia @ogic 5with the YusaXt$e8 'y T) F) .0A: (n$y-lo"aXdie der der "hiloso"hischen +issenscha#ten in .02B0* tr) Hegel’s Science o# @ogic 'y A) M) 9iller) >ew Kor-: Humanity Boo-s 022B) The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: r <) Cther wor-s Barth () 9) 502B08 ‘Reconstruction o# Hegelian and other Idealist @ogic in .
.) and &on >eumann J) 502.: <B.72:) Bir-o## .:: B<.) Brandom R) B) 502248 9a-ing It (!"licit) Jam'ridge 9A: Har&ard Fni&ersity /ress) ?? 502228 ‘Some /ragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism: >egotiation and Administration in Hegel’s Account o# the Structure and Jontent o# Jonce"tual >orms’ (uro"ean Journal o# /hiloso"hy :: .74.38 ‘The @ogic o# Euantum 9echanics’ Annals o# 9athematics .) ?? 5<AA3'8 ‘9eaning 9eta"hysics and Jontradiction’ American /hiloso"hical Euarterly 4.B Francesco Berto Berto F) 5<AA68 Jhe cos’eU la dialettica hegeliana1 Fn’inter"reta$ion e analitica del metodo) /ado&a: Il /oligra#o) ?? 5<AA3a8 ‘Jharacteri$ing >egation to Face Dialetheism’ @ogi%ue et Analyse 026: <4073.
0347B2) ?? 5<AAA8 Articulati ng Reasons) Jam'ridg e 9A: Har&ard Fni&ersit y /ress) ?? 5<AA08 ‘Holism and Idealism in Hegel’s /henome nology’ Aegel1 /tudien ;3: 6:7 2<) ?? 5<AA<8 Tales o# the 9ighty Dead: Historical (ssays on the 9eta"hys ics o# Intention ality) Jam'ridg e 9A: Har&ard Fni&ersit y /ress) Bu'ner R) 502BA8 Yur Sache der Diale-ti-) Stuttgart: Reclam) ?? 5022A8 Diale-tials To"i-: Bausteine
$u einer le'ensweltlichen Theorie der RationalitaXt) Fran-#urt a)9): Suhr-am") Jo##a J) A) 502208 The Semantic Tradition #rom Gant to Jarna": to the Mienna Station) Jam'ridge: Jam'ridge Fni&ersity /ress) Dummett 9) 502:;8 Frege) /hiloso"hy o# @anguage) @ondon: Duc-worth) ?? 502208 The @ogical Basis o# 9eta"hysics) @ondon: Duc-worth) Dunn J) 9) 502238 ‘.enerali$ed Crtho >egation’ in H) +ansing 5ed)8 >egation) A >otion in Focus) Berlin,>ew Kor-: De .ruyter) ?? 502228 ‘A Jom"arati&e Study o# Marious 9odel,Theoretic Treatments o# >egation: A History o# Formal >egation’ in D) .a''ay and H) +ansing 5eds)8 +hat is >egation1 Dordrecht: Gluwer) Findlay J) >) 5026B8 Hegel: a Re,e!amination)
@ondon: Allen L Fnwin) ?? 502B08 ‘Dialectic s as 9eta'asi s’ in +) Bec-er and +) G) (ssler 5eds)8 Gon$e"te der Diale-ti-) Fran-#urt a)9): Glosterm ann) Flach +) 502348 ‘Hegels diale-tisc he 9ethode’ Hegel, Studien 0: 66734) Frege .) 50B2<8 ‘FX 'er Begri## und .egensta nd’ Miertel=ah rsschri#t #uXr wissensc ha#tliche /hilos o"hie 03: 02<7 <A6 re"r) in Gleine Schri# ten Yweit e Au#la
ge) Hildesheim: .eorg Clms Merlag 022A) Fulda H) F) 502368 Das /ro'lem einer (inleitung in Hegels +issenscha#t der @ogi-) Fran-#urt a)9): Glostermann) ?? 502:;8 ‘Fn$ulaXngliche Bemer-ungen $ur Diale-ti-’ in R) Heede and J) Ritter 5eds)8 Hegel,Bilan$) Fran-#urt a)9): Glostermann re"r) in R),/, Horstmann 5ed)8 Seminar: Diale-ti- in der /hiloso"hie Hegels) Fran-#urt a)9): Suhr-am") ?? 502:B8 ‘Hegels Diale-tials Begri##s'ewegun g und Darstellungsweis e’ in R),/) Horstmann 5ed)8 Seminar: Diale-ti- in der /hiloso"hie Hegels) Fran-#urt a)9): Suhr-am") Fulda H) F) Horstmann R),/) and Theunissen 9) 502BA8 Gritische Darstellung der 9eta"hysi- (ine Dis-ussion uX'er Hegels ‘@ogi-’) Fran-#urt a)9): Suhr-am") .adamer H),.)
502:08 Hegels Diale-ti-) TuX'inge n: 9ohr) .old'latt R) I) 502:48 ‘Semanti c Analysis o# Crthologi c’ Journal o# /hiloso" hical @ogic ;: 027;6) .oodman >) 502:<8 /ro'lems and /ro=ects) Indiana"o lis: Bo''s 9errill) Henrich D) 5023:8 Hegel im Gonte!t) Fran-#urt a)9): Suhr-am ")
The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA:
2 .Hegel’s Dialectics as a Semantic Theory .
Jonsciousness) Jam'ridge: Jam'ridge Fni&ersity /ress) /rawit$ D) 502368 >atural Deduction) A /roo#.: <."hiloso"hische A'handlung’ Annalen der >atur"hiloso"hie 04 5re&) ed) Tractatus logico.Theoretical Study) F""sala: Alm%&ist L +il-sell) /rice H) 5022A8 ‘+hy ‘‘>ot’’1’ 9ind 22: <<07.HoXsle M) 502BB8 Hegels System: Der Idealismus des Su'=e-ti&itaXt und das /ro'lem der Intersu'=e-ti&itaXt &oll) I7II) Ham'urg: 9einer) ?? 5<AA.) ?? 502228 Hegel $ur (in#uXhrung) Ham'urg: Junius Merlag) Sellars +) 502638 (m"iricism and the /hiloso"hy o# 9ind) Jam'ridge 9A: Har&ard Fni&ersity /ress) Tennant >) 502228 ‘>egation A'surdity and Jontrariety’ in D) .8 ‘In#eren$ialismo in Brandom e olismo in Hegel) Fna ris"osta a Richard Rorty e alcune domande "er Ro'ert Brandom’ in @) Ruggiu and I) Testa 5eds)8 Hegel contem"oraneo) @a rice$ione americana di Hegel a con#ronto con la tradi$ione euro"ea) 9ilano:.) 5026A8 A Study o# Hegel’s @ogic) C!#ord: Jlarendon) Jarna" R) 502.@ondon: Fni&ersity o# Jhicago /ress) /in-ard T) 502248 Hegel’s /henomenology) The Sociality o# Reason) Jam'ridge: Jam'ridge Fni&ersity /ress) /i""in R) B) 502BB8 Hegel’s Idealism) The Satis#actions o# Sel#."hiloso"hicus) @ondon: Routledge L Gegan /aul 02<<8) ?? 502:48 /hiloso"hical .) 502B08 Der s"e-ulati&e Sat$) Bemer-ungen $um Begri## der .rammar) C!#ord: Blac-well) ?? 5<AAA8 Big Ty"escri"t) +ien: S"ringer Merlag) +ohl#ahrt .B) Euine +) M) C) 5023A8 +ord and C'=ect) Jam'ridge 9A: 9IT /ress) Redding /) 502238 Hegel’s Hermeneutics) Ithaca L @ondon: Jornell Fni&ersity /ress) SchnaXdel'ach H) 502B:8 ‘Diale-ti.uerini) Inwood 9) J) 502B.a''ay and H) +ansing 5eds)8 +hat is >egation1 Dordrecht: Gluwer) Theunissen 9) 502BA8 Sein und Schein) Die -ritische Fun-tion der Hegelschen @ogi-) Fran-#urt a)9): Suhr-am") +ittgenstein @) 502<08) ‘@ogisch.:) @am' D) 502:28 @anguage and /erce"tion in Hegel and +ittgenstein) A&e'ury) 9arconi D) 502BA8 Jontradiction and the @anguage o# Hegel’s Dialectic: a Study o# the Science o# @ogic 5Doctorate Thesis8) /itts'urgh) Fni&ersity 9icro#ilms International) ?? 502268 ‘Cn the Structure o# @e!ical Jom"etence’ /roceedings o# the Aristotelian Society 26: <46730) ?? 5022:8 @e!ical Jom"etence) Jam'ridge 9A: 9IT /ress) 9cDowell J) 502248 9ind and +orld) Jam'ridge 9A: Har&ard Fni&ersity /ress) 9ure .7.und Dis-urs’ Allgemeine Yeitschri#t #uXr /hiloso"hie 0<: 07<.:8 The @ogical Synta! o# @anguage) @ondon: Routledge L Gegan /aul) ?? 5024:8 9eaning and >ecessity) Jhicago.8 Hegel) @ondon: Routledge L Gegan /aul) Jaesch-e +) 502:28 ‘C'=e-ti&es Den-en) /hiloso"hiehistorische (rwaXgungen $ur Gon$e"tion und $ur A-tualitaXt der s"e-ulati&en @ogi-’ The Inde"endent Journal o# /hiloso"hy .
S"e-ulation 'ei Hegel) Berlin.>ew Kor-: De .ruyter) +ol## 9) 502B08 Der 'egri## des +iders"ruchs) (ine Studie $ur Diale-tiGants und Hegels) GoXnigstein: Hain) Ko&el K) 502B08 ‘Hegel’s Dictum that the Rational is Actual and the Actual is Rational) Its Cntological Jontent and Its Function in Discourse’ in +) Bec-er and +) G) (ssler 5eds)8 Gon$e"te der Diale-ti-) Fran-#urt a)9): Glostermann) r The Author <AA:) Journal com"ilation r Blac-well /u'lishing @td) <AA: .
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