An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

An Analytical Summary of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing Brands: Part 1, The First Qabas on the Three Kinds of Creation and the Three Containers of Existence: Time, Perpetuity, and Eternity (published in International Journal of Sh Studies 3:1) by Keven Brown Mr Dmd (d. 1631) has become known among students of Islamic philosophy as one of the leading figures of the School of Ifahn, the teacher of Mull adr, and the proponent of the theory of udth dahr (perpetual creation) with its accompanying trifold division of existence into time, perpetuity, and eternity.[1] The theory of udth dahr is the main subject of Mr Dmds most celebrated philosophical work, al-Qabast, whose full title is Qabast aqq al-Yaqn f udth al-lam, which means Blazing Brands of the Truth of Certitude on the Creation of the World. By his own testimony, Mr Dmd affirms in a poem: In al-Qabast I became the sea of certitude. The script of doubt and uncertainty I destroyed.[2] The purpose of this article is to explain Mr Dmds objective in writing al-Qabast and to give an analytical summary of the contents of the first chapter, or qabas, of al-Qabast.[3] As a philosopher, Mr Dmd was primarily a Peripatetic philosopher following in the tradition of Al-Frb and Ibn Sn, whom he frequently calls his two companions in instruction and in leadership,[4] though he differed with them substantially on the issue of the creation of the world. On the subject of creation, Mr Dmd was more closely aligned with the theologians, though not according to their premises, as will be discussed shortly. In al-Qabast, which consists of ten chapters, each called a qabas, or blazing brand,[5] his goal is to demonstrate by means of the rational methods of the Peripatetics and based upon principles established by the Peripatetics themselves that the universe in its entirety, in both its material and immaterial dimensions, is created by God at the level of perpetuity and preceded by its real non-existence. He does not believe, like Aristotle, Ibn Sn, and most of the Peripatetics that the universe as a whole is eternal, nor does he believe like most of the early Mutazilite and Asharite theologians that it was created in time. Mr Dmd devotes the first six chapters of al-Qabast to demonstrating, through a series of demonstrations, his alternate thesis of udth dahr (perpetual creation). In all, according to his own account, he presents eight different principles upon which he builds his demonstrations for the creation of world[6] in the domain of perpetuity preceded by real, unquantifiable non-existence. He says: By the leave of God, His grace, and His mercy, we have investigated the eight principles which are the principles for the demonstrations of the creation of the world in this book. The first is the

1 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

knowledge of the containers of existence, namely, time, perpetuity, and eternity; the second is the knowledge that existence is identical to the essentially necessary Being but added to the possible quiddities; the third is the knowledge of the three kinds of essential priority and their characteristics; the fourth is the knowledge of the two kinds of separate priority, the eternal and the temporal, and their characteristics; the fifth is the knowledge of the three kinds of creation and their requirements; the sixth is the knowledge of quantitative relation and everlasting relation and the distinction between them; the seventh is the knowledge of the mode of existence of the unqualified natures and the settling of their affair; the eighth is the knowledge of the continuity of motion and time and what is associated with that.[7] In the Seventh Qabas, Mr Dmd responds directly to specific arguments of the philosophers for the eternity of the world, and in the last three qabast he addresses subsidiary subjects, such as the power of God and His will, the chains of beginning and return, the secret of predetermination and fate, and the question of evil. Each qabas of al-Qabast consists of short sections which he designated a flash (wama) or gleam (wam) of light. Mr Dmd states in his introduction to al-Qabast that it is hoped that by the flashes and gleams emanating from these firebrands, the reader may obtain a glimpse of the face of God.[8] Mr Dmds theory is not that the universe and time have a beginning in time, but that both have a beginning with their Creator. This view differs from that of Al-Frb, Ibn Sn, and Ibn Rushd by the critical premise that the universe and time are finite in the direction of the past and do have a beginning; and it differs from the view of the Mutakallimn by the equally important premise that the beginning of the universe is not temporal. In other words, the universe was not created in time, but time was created simultaneously with the universe. Furthermore, what Mr Dmd means by having a beginning is having a cause of existence and being preceded by real non-existence, or privation (adam ar). As Ibn Sn perceptively observes: It is not possible to remove time from the estimative faculty (wahm), for if you imagine it removed, the estimative faculty then compels the existence of another time in which time is removed.[9] The estimative faculty, therefore, compels the mind to believe that if the universe is really posterior to the Creator, it must be temporally posterior, as the Mutakallimn hold. In the same way, the proposition that the emanation of God cannot not exist, compels the mind to believe that the universe must be temporally co-eternal with God, as the philosophers hold. Dmd is saying that neither of these positions is correct due to the distortion of the estimative faculty. The correct position, as his demonstrations will prove, is that the creation is, in fact, actually separate from God in the stage of the cause with an unquantifiable, atemporal posteriority and simultaneous with Him in the stage of the effect with a perpetual simultaneity.

Summary of The First Qabas: On the kinds of creation (udth) and the divisions of existence according to them, establishing the bases of judgment, and defining the area of dispute (pp. 3-37).

2 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

In the First Qabas, Mr Dmd establishes two of the principles which he says demonstrate the creation of the world in perpetuity, namely, (1) the three kinds of creation and their prior non-existences, and (2) knowledge of the three containers of existence: time, perpetuity, and eternity. He also defines the area of dispute among the respected philosophers, showing that it is not essential creation and temporal creation which are disputed, but perpetual creation. Lastly, he counters the arguments of the Mutakallimn for the creation of the universe in time. On the Three Kinds of Creation: In Wama 1.1, Mr Dmd establishes three kinds of creation and three corresponding kinds of non-existence (adam) by starting with an analysis of a passage of Ibn Sn in Book Six, Chapter Two of the Metaphysics of the Shif. The passage from Ibn Sn reads as follows: The meaning of that which is called primary origination (ibd') by the philosophers is causing something to exist after an absolute non-existence (lays mulaq), for the effect is non-existent by virtue of itself (f nafsihi), while [at the same time] it is existent through its cause. That which belongs to something by virtue of itself is more prior for the mind, essentially (ind al-dhihn bil-dht), not temporally, than that which belongs to it from something else. Therefore, every effect is existent after being non-existent, where after means essentially [and not temporally] posterior. If the term creation is applied [in this manner] to everything which possesses existence after non-existence, then every effect is created (mudath). If, however, the term is not applied in this way, but rather the condition of a created being is that a time precedes it which ceases with its coming into existence, since temporal posteriority cannot coexist with temporal priority, but rather is distinct from it in existence, then not every effect is created, but only those which are preceded by time and, without doubt, movement and change. This you know, and we will not dispute the terms. Now, a created being in the sense which does not necessitate time is such that its existence must either come after an absolute non-existence or after a non-absolute non-existence (lays ghayr mutlaq), that is to say, after a contrary, specific privation (adam) in an existing matter, as you know. If its existence comes after an absolute non-existence, its emanation from its cause is called primary origination (ibd). This is the most excellent form of giving existence, because its privation has been categorically prevented and existence imposed upon it. For if privation were enabled to precede [its] existence, its coming-into-being (takwn) would be impossible except through matter, and the power of giving existence would be weak and deficient from the beginning.[10] Ibn Sn is, in fact, referring to three kinds of creation (udth) and three types of non-existence (adam or lays) in this passage. The three kinds of creation are (1) temporal creation and two types of atemporal creation: (2a) not requiring matter and preceded only by absolute non-existence, and (2b) requiring matter and preceded by non-absolute non-existence. The three types of non-existence are (1) temporal non-existence, (2) absolute non-existence, and (3) non-absolute non-existence. In the first paragraph Ibn Sn is explaining the first kind of atemporal creation, which is called primary origination (ibd) and essential creation (udth dht). Ibn Sn himself states in his

3 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

Ishrt that ibd refers to existence coming to something from another, dependent on it only, and not on the intermediary of matter, instrument, or time. But that which is preceded by temporal non-existence can never dispense with an intermediary. Ibd, therefore, is superior in degree over generation (takwn) and production (ihdth).[11] The use of the term absolute (mulaq) qualifying non-existence in the first sentence of the passage from Ibn Sn means that this non-existence is unrestricted and unqualified. It belongs to all things by virtue of the nature of possibility. In other words, absolute non-existence refers to the essential, logical non-existence of possible things in themselves. Mr Dmd explains: The meaning of absolute non-existence, here, is a non-existence which is simple and unqualified, as compared to that non-existence which is qualified by not being able to coexist with actual existence and which is contradictory to it, and not conjoinable with it in the thing itself whatsoever.[12] In another place, he clarifies that this type of non-existence, termed absolute non-existence, is essential and commensurate with the nature of possibility (imkn); it belongs to every possible existent from the moment it exists.[13] In other words, it cannot be separated from possible things after they are given existence. Therefore, it is a purely conceptual non-existence, not a real contradictory non-existence that cannot coexist with existence. Ibn Sn says above that the non-existence of the effect, in this sense, is more prior for the mind, that is, conceptually, not temporally, than its existence through its cause. Therefore, in actuality, this kind of effect, which is the result of primary origination, temporally coexists with its cause and is eternal with the eternity of its cause. An example of this kind of relation is the motion of a ring which moves simultaneously with the motion of the hand it is upon. This is Ibn Sns position. From this it follows that an existent through primary origination, according to Ibn Sn, has never been actually non-existent, and it may only be conceived as non-existent in itself (f nafsihi) in the mind (bil-martaba al-aqliyya), as Ibn Sn says. The creation of such an existent, therefore, is also no more than an essential, or logical, creation, not a real creation, with respect to its eternal dependence upon its eternal cause. This is why Ibn Sn states in the passage quoted by Mr Dmd: If the term creation is applied [in this manner] to everything which possesses existence after non-existence, then every effect is created (mudath). If, however, the term is not applied in this way, but rather the condition of a created being is that a time precedes it which ceases with its coming into existence, since temporal posteriority cannot coexist with temporal priority, but rather is distinct from it in existence, then not every effect is created, but only those which are preceded by time and, without doubt, movement and change.

4 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

In Ibn Sns system, the celestial intelligences and the intelligible forms of things in Gods knowledge belong to this category of essential creation. They have never experienced real creation, in the sense of a prior, contradictory non-existence and an actual separate posteriority to their Creator. Rather, they arise naturally from the existence of God and have a potential existence in Him, in the same way that our thoughts arise naturally from our minds and have a potential existence in them. One of Mr Dmds central goals in al-Qabast is to prove that the essential creation of the intelligences and immaterial substances described by Ibn Sn must also involve their real creation at the level of perpetuity (dahr), which Dmd distinguishes from the level of eternity (sarmad). The term eternity (sarmad) is reserved by Mr Dmd exclusively for the station of God in His pure oneness and isolation from all else besides Him. He alone, having no cause for His existence and hence no prior non-existence, has no beginning and no end in any respect. The term perpetuity (dahr), however, encompasses whatever has an atemporal beginning but which has no end. This includes time itself and its contents in an unchanging way, the universe as a whole, and the intelligible separate substances. Lastly, the term time (zamn) refers to the domain of changing things which have both a beginning and an end in time. Mr Dmd finds support for his idea of the real creation of the intelligences and the quiddities of things at the level of perpetuity in the second kind of atemporal creation mentioned by Ibn Sn, that requiring matter and preceded by non-absolute non-existence. In Ibn Sns system, this kind of atemporal creation belongs to the celestial spheres and their accompanying souls. Mr Dmd adopts Ibn Sns non-absolute non-existence as a prerequisite for the timeless creation of the intelligences as well, but he drops the requisite of the presence of matter, which the spheres require. Mr Dmd explains that what Ibn Sn means by non-absolute non-existence is real non-existence (or: privation adam ar), which is contradictory to the occurrence of actual existence in the real world. He continues: This is what he intended by the statement: After a non-absolute non-existence, that is to say, after a contrary, specific privation (adam) in an existing matter. This kind of non-existence has no essential priority but a separate, distinct, atemporal, non-flowing, unmeasurable, unquantifiable priority. This kind of creation is nothing but perpetual creation (udth dahr). The emanation of existence following pure unquantifiable non-existence is called production (idth) and fashioning (un' ) by the philosophers, and real non-existence and actual existence cannot coexist in the same matter or place with respect to the thing itself whatsoever.[14] The term adam means both privation and non-existence. Mr Dmd explains that adam is of three kinds in the usage of Ibn Sn, and it is only the third kind which corresponds in meaning to privation because of its association with matter. I usually translate the phrase adam ar as real

5 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

non-existence, rather than real privation, because it is, in fact, one of three kinds of non-existence, and of the three kinds it is the true contradictory of actual existence. Seyyed Amad Alaw, Mr Dmds student and commentator, explains that adam in the sense of privation is itself of two distinct kinds. The first kind is perpetual privation, which precedes all created thingswhether they be the separate incorporeal intelligences, which are devoid of matter, or temporally generated creaturesby virtue of their being possible in themselves. For Ibn Sn, in contrast, no privation, or real non-existence, of any kind precedes the celestial intelligences. This is an innovation of Mr Dmd. Perpetual privation, therefore, according to Mr Dmd, is something other than the potential state of prime matter, and he holds that it is associated accidentally with the essential possibility (imkn dht) of the quiddity just as absolute non-existence is associated with it essentially. The second kind, which is the only kind of privation, or real non-existence, accepted by Ibn Sn, is temporal privation, which belongs to all changeable things, insofar as they are changeable and seeking perfection, via their matters. It cannot be removed from changeable, generated things, because it is the very principle by which they are able to change. This is connected to the concept of dispositional possibility (imkn istidd), which is the potentiality of matter to become actualized by taking on ever new forms.[15] Ibn Sn remarks about this second kind of privation in the Physics of the Shif: Privation is a condition in order for a thing to be changeable or seeking perfection. Were it not for the presence of a privation, it would be impossible for it to be seeking perfection or to change, for its perfection would always be actual. Consequently, whatever is changeable and seeks perfection requires a privation prior to it so that its being changeable and seeking perfection may be realized.[16] Privations must be removed and replaced by possessions, and this process requires the presence of prime matter, since contradictories cannot become one another. For example, in order for a cold body to become warm, the state of being cold, which is the privation of heat, must be removed from prime matter and replaced with the possession of heat. It is not that cold has a cause and is some thing; it is rather the privation of the cause of heat in that which has the capacity to be hot. In the same way, Mr Dmd maintains that there is a non-existence prior to the existence of things in perpetuity which must be removed and replaced with existence. It is not that that non-existence has a cause and is some thing; it is merely the privation of the cause of existence. The bestowal of existence following this type of non-existence, not in time but in perpetuity, is called by Mr Dmd perpetual creation (uduth dahr). Privations and possessions are termed contradictories (naqn), not contraries (din), since the latter refer to two existent attributes which are opposed to each other, not the privation of an opposite. Each member of a pair of contraries has its own positive existence and its own cause. The contraries of

6 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

black and white, sweet and bitter, for example, each have their own cause. A privation, in contrast, needs no cause of its own, its cause being the absence of the cause of a positive state. For example, blindness is the absence of the cause of the positive attribute of sight. The contradictories of motion and rest, vision and blindness, existence and non-existence, do not each have a cause, but only the positive member of each pair has one. Just as blindness is the privation of vision in something that has the capacity to see, the real non-existence (adam ar) which Mr Dmd posits to precede the existence of all besides God in perpetuity should be the privation of existence in that which may exist, since absolute nothingness does not have the capacity to exist. In this regard, Mr Dmd fails to draw the conclusion that an eternal prime matter is needed for perpetual creation to take place,[17] and instead he appears to follow the orthodox view of creation ex nihilo. This is evident when he has God create the possibility of somethings existence when He bestows existence upon it,[18] and when he states that the Creator invented both matter and what possesses matter in perpetuity, not from matter and not from anything, but after real non-existence, not in any time or place at all.[19] Without a separate eternal matter for God to create things from, however, it would seem impossible for the universe to be anything other than a conglomeration of ideas in Gods mind. In other words, if Mr Dmds non-absolute, real non-existence (adam ar) preceding all contingent things is interpreted as the privation of existence in that which may exist, as logically it must be, then what is that which may exist if not eternal prime matter? It cannot be the substance of the Creator, which contains no privation, nor can it be form, which is pure actuality. Ibn Sns commentator, Nar al-Dn al-s, explains that Ibn Sn means by fashioning (un) bringing something into existence preceded by privation [in matter].and he means by primary origination (ibd) the opposite of this, namely, bringing something into existence not preceded by privation.[20] As already explained, Ibn Sn associates primary origination with the essential creation of the celestial intelligences, which have no actual non-existence, or privation, preceding them, and he associates fashioning and production with the perpetual creation of the celestial spheres and their souls, which are preceded essentially but not temporally by a contrary, specific privation in the stage of their matters. In the system of Ibn Sn, the prime matter of each celestial sphere is a unique species belonging only to one sphere and emanating from its corresponding intelligence.[21] The celestial matters of the spheres, therefore, are not subject to dispositional possibility, since, unlike the sublunar matter of temporal things, they eternally retain the same form. The matters of the spheres, therefore, only precede them essentially but not temporally.[22] Both of these types of atemporal creation, therefore, belong to the category of essential priority and posteriority, not temporal, and for this reason Ibn Sn makes them coeternal with God. As Fazlur Rahman notes: Yet the one is not preceded by any actual non-existence while the other is. It is this second which has an existential rupture with Gods being, which leads Dmd to his postulate of dahr and which Ibn Sn also, to all appearances, puts at the level of dahrsince it cannot belong to the realm of time, being supra-temporal on the one hand, and yet cannot belong to the realm of simple eternity because its existence is preceded by actual non-existence. The doctrine of dahr is thus available to

7 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

Dmd ready-made, indeedbut for one important difficulty: apparently Ibn Sn puts in dahr only the heavenly spheres and time itself as a whole, while he puts the transcendent Intelligences in the realm of simple or pure eternity. Dmd must interpret and reconstruct Ibn Sns doctrine in such a way that all essential contingency entails a real dislocation of being with God and is preceded by actual non-existence, whether heavenly spheres or Intelligences.[23] In other words, in order for the intelligences and all contingent things to be separate in substance from God and posterior to Him in existence, Mr Dmd holds that they must be preceded by a non-absolute, real, contradictory non-existence, not just an essential, or absolute, non-existence commensurate with the nature of essential possibility. Essential creation (udth dht), therefore, which only indicates dependency upon God without requiring the antecedence of actual non-existence, does not qualify to be an act of real creation, if this is interpreted as bringing something into existence separate in substance from its Creator. For this, Mr Dmd asserts, the priority of real, unquantifiable non-existence is necessary, and this is what he calls perpetual creation (udth dahr). The third kind of creation described by Ibn Sn in the above-quoted passage from the Metaphysics of the Shif is temporal creation (udth zamn). Dmd explains: As for creation in the sense which requires time, it is of only one kind. This is the existence of something being in time preceded by its temporal, quantifiable, and flowing non-existence. Before here means a quantifiable and temporal priority [as opposed to an essential priority or an atemporal unquantifiable priority]. Bringing something into existence in time after its temporal, quantifiable, flowing non-existence, which is included in the genus of extension and non-extension, duration and non-duration,[24] is called generation (takwn). These are the three primary categories of creation as explained in the Shif. [25] According to Mr Dmd, temporal creation as well, which only pertains to the successive generation of things in time preceded by a temporally quantifiable non-existence, does not qualify to be an act of real creation, which requires the removal of somethings actual non-existence and the bestowal of existence by the Creator outside of time. Mr Dmd points out that a things temporal non-existence in a prior time is not contradictory to its temporal existence in a subsequent time, since they belong to two different boundaries of the extension of time. The criterion for contradiction is two contradictory things being in the same place at the same time. Therefore, somethings temporal non-existence in a prior boundary of time is not removed by its generation in a subsequent boundary of time, since these two states coexist in separate boundaries. This being the case, then only its contradictory, real non-existence in perpetuity needs to be removed for its generation in time; otherwise it could not exist. Consequently, temporal creation itself depends upon and is subsequent to perpetual creation. Mr Dmd summarizes the three kinds of creation: the essential, the temporal, and the perpetual, as follows: It is apparent that creation (udth) has three significations which correspond to the three kinds of non-existence: (1) Essential creation, which is existence being preceded by absolute non-existence

8 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

with respect to the stage of the essence; this is an essential priority, not a separate priority. (2) Temporal creation, which is existence following temporal non-existence, where the posteriority is separate and quantifiable. (3) Perpetual creation, which is existence following real non-existence, where the posteriority is separate and unquantifiable.[26] Mr Dmd stresses that the priority of non-existence with respect to essential creation is an essential, or logical, priority. It is not that existence has been preceded by a real non-existence contradictory to it, since the negation of existence in the station of the quiddity itself, insofar as it is itself, does not contradict the existence it acquires accidentally in the real world from its efficient cause, but rather it coexists with it. In the same way, the priority of non-existence with respect to temporal creation is a temporal priority. It is not that a temporally created existent is preceded by a non-existence contradictory to it in the extension of time, because they belong to two different temporal boundaries which cannot come together in the extension of time. Consequently, for these two kinds of creation, the essential and the temporal, there is no opposition between priority and posteriority at all. But the matter differs for the third kind of creation, which is perpetual creation (udth dahr), because the locus of prior real non-existence (adam ar) in perpetuity is identical to the locus of created existence after that, since perpetuity has no quantifiable extension whatsoever; therefore, non-existence in perpetuity must be removed and replaced by existence. In short, by showing that neither essential creation nor temporal creation suffice to explain the real creation of anything, Mr Dmd demonstrates that only perpetual creation succeeds in this regard. Essential creation, for example, only requires something to be preceded by an absolute, or conceptual, non-existence, which is essential to it by virtue of the nature of possibility. Since this type of non-existence is not removed by its existence, but coexists with it, this type of creation cannot be regarded as real creation, which requires the removal of somethings real, contradictory non-existence. Real non-existence is associated accidentally with the quiddities of things prior to their actualization, just as actual existence is associated accidentally with them after their actualization. This is why the universe and its parts are inherently liable to destruction, despite their perpetuity with the perpetuity of the emanation. Temporal creation, in like manner, only refers to something being generated in a boundary of time subsequent to the time of its continuous non-existence in the extension of time. Since its prior temporal non-existence is in a boundary separate from the boundary of its posterior existence, these two are not contradictory to each other, and one does not remove the other. Temporal creation, also, therefore, does not qualify to be an act of real creation. Since perpetual creation, on the other hand, refers to the removal of real contradictory non-existence by the creation of real existence in its very locus in perpetuity, without any quantifiable extension between them whatsoever, it alone qualifies to be an act of real creation.

The Three Containers of Existence: Time, Perpetuity, and Eternity: In Wama 1.2, Mr Dmd quotes a passage from Abul-Barakt Baghdd in the Mutabir which shows that the extension of time is irrelevant to the act of creation. He has already shown in Wama 1.1 that the removal of somethings real non-existence cannot be in time, but takes place at a level of being

9 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

called perpetuity (dahr). Since its privation cannot be in the substance of the Creator at the level of eternity, Mr Dmd deduces that there must be three distinct levels of being: time, perpetuity, and eternity. In Wama 1.3, he states: Therefore, three containers (wi ) are required for existence with respect to the thing itself: (1) time (zamn), which is the container of measurable, flowing existence or measurable, continuous non-existence belonging to changeable beings insofar as they are changeable; (2) perpetuity (dahr), which is the container of real existence preceded by real non-existence, beyond the horizon of quantification and non-quantification, belonging to changeless things insofar as they are changeless, and it is the inner dimension of the real world (qq matn al-wqi); (3) eternity (sarmad), which is the container of pure, real, changeless existence utterly sanctified from the occurrence of change and exalted above any precedence of non-existence whatsoever. It is pure, real, unqualified actuality in every respect. Just as perpetuity transcends and encompasses time, so does eternity transcend, encompass, and illuminate the world of perpetuity. Therefore, when real non-existence is understood to precede creation (udth), it is best named perpetual creation.[27] The three containers of existence are necessary for perpetual creation to take place and for God to be able to have one changeless relation to His creation. Were it not for the domain of perpetuity, an impossible situation would exist, which would be for the changeless First Cause, which is absolutely one in every respect, to cause the multiplicity of changing things directly, whereas Mr Dmd demonstrates in the Sixth Qabas that time, motion, and space are necessary for this. The changeless principles of the things which change and the substratum for their realization, therefore, need to be created first, and since this is neither possible at the level of eternity, which has no beginning, nor possible at the level of time, which itself requires these things, it remains for them to be created at a level which is neither beginningless nor subject to time, and this is perpetuity. In Wama 1.3, Mr Dmd draws extensively from the words of several of his predecessors in philosophy to establish the characteristics of eternity, perpetuity, and time, such as from Ibn Sns Talqt, Shif, Uyn al-ikmat, and Najt; from Bahmanyrs Tal; and from the Murat of Suhraward.[28] Above all, he pays attention to the words of Aristotle in the Theology, which Muslim scholars mistakenly ascribed to Aristotle but which is really a paraphrase of the Enneads of Plotinus. Regarding the level of time (zamn), from Ibn Sns Talqt we learn that this is the temporal dimension of changeable things as such, which have beginnings and ends, where the end is different from the beginning, where past and future, before and after, apply in actuality. This is the domain of constant flux and transformation from one state to another. Time is an effect of perpetuity and is connected to it because it is produced by the motion of the heavenly sphere, which belongs to perpetuity. The changeable aspect of things exists in time, and time itself does not exist in time. From Suhraward we are given that the body is in time only with respect to its motion, but anything changeless associated with the body is in perpetuity. Alaw sums up: Existing beings, like the created bodies, insofar as they are existent, are atemporal, but insofar as they are changeable, are temporal.[29]

10 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

Regarding the level of perpetuity (dahr), from Ibn Sns Talqt we learn that this is a state of existence which surrounds and contains time, and is with it, not in it. On the one hand, it is the heavenly sphere, which does not change in itself, but is that upon which motion depends. On the other hand, it is also the relation of changeless things, like the immaterial intelligible substances, to the changeable. That which is with time does not change with the changes of the things in time. In the Shif he says that perpetuity is the effect of eternity, just as time is the effect of perpetuity. If the relationship of the causes of bodies in time to their principles at the levels of perpetuity and eternity were not perpetual, the former would cease to exist. Alaw comments on this point: In other words, the parts of their existence which are their causes are united to the principles of their existence, which are purely incorporeal things belonging to the intelligible substances. From this it is apparent that time is like an effect of perpetuity. Eternal existence (sarmad), in turn, is the efficient cause of the perpetual existences, and thus necessarily encompasses them.[30] Furthermore, from the Uyn al-ikmat we learn that the changeless aspect of changeable things, insofar as they are changeless, does not exist in time, but rather with time [i.e., in perpetuity]. Then in the Physics of the Najt we are given that the unchanging nature of perpetuity coincides with (mubiq) the unchanging aspect of the contents of time. Rahman feels that this statement represents the closest determination of its [perpetuitys] nature by Ibn Sn. He takes it to mean that perpetuity is a kind of fixed or frozen time in which there is no temporal flow but otherwise is co-terminous or parallel with time, and if you remove the extension of time from the world, what remains is dahr, where the order of events remains without past, present, and future.[31] This conception of perpetuity as the state of temporal things without the flow of time resembles the modern scientific view, as explained by Brian Greene, that all the slices of space-time actually exist simultaneously as one whole as seen from outside, from what encompasses time.[32] We only experience them separately and sequentially from within time. Therefore, whatever has existed or will exist in time exists in perpetuity in a timeless present. This view is confirmed by Mr Dmd in the First Qabas, and it is clearly stated in the Theology of Aristotle, as will be seen shortly. Mr Dmd also explains in his book al-irt al-Mustaqm, that if the future of the progressive existent, i.e., time, in post-eternity is considered with respect to its occurrence in the container of perpetuity, and with respect to its relation to God, it is an actual infinity, even though with respect to elapsing and renewal in the external world it is finite.[33] To illustrate the extensionless, timeless quality of perpetuity, Mr Dmd quotes the following passage from Mmar Eight of the Theology, which has Aristotle state: The higher world is a perfect living being containing all things, because it was created perfect by the First Maker. In the higher world every soul and every intelligence exists, and there is no poverty there or need, because everything there is imbued with richness and life, a life that is abundant and overflowing. The flowing of the life of those things issues from only one spring. It is

11 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

not like one brook or one breeze of wind by itself, but all things there partake of one state in which every state exists. Every wayfarer there, whether an intelligence or a living being, no matter what path he travels, always travels it to its end without having left the beginning, contrary to what is experienced in the world below. Here if a traveler on a certain road comes to the end of that road, the place of the end and all the parts in between are separate from that of the beginning, so that the traveler is only at the end, that is at the place wherein he is. But the traveler in the domain of life can travel to the utmost reaches of that realm without having left his point of departure, so that he is simultaneously at both the end and the beginning and in all the states in between. Furthermore, that world does not need to progress or change in any way, since it is already in the utmost state of perfection and completion. Thus all of His virtues always occur with perpetuity, not with time. The state of subsistence there is perpetual, without a past or future time. That is to say, the future there is the same as the present, and so is the past, because things there ever continue in one unchanging state.[34] In Wama 1.4, Mr Dmd explains that the absence of something from the domain of time does not require its absence from the domain of perpetuity. Just because something is temporally non-existent before and after the time of its existence in time does not require its non-existence in perpetuity nor the termination of its relation with God. Mr Dmd elaborates upon this principle as follows: Since you recognize that eternity (sarmad) transcends perpetuity (dahr), and perpetuity transcends time (zamn), know that if the temporal non-existence belonging to a certain temporal thing, insofar as it is temporal, is posited to be continuous for the whole extension of time, then without a doubt its real perpetual non-existence is necessitated as well.But if it [that temporal thing] is particularized to a part of the extension of time in its particularity, its non-existence in perpetuity is certainly not required. In this case, would not its subject (mard) be existent in what is outside of the time of non-existence belonging to time? Perpetuity is more encompassing and more universal than any part of time, and than the extension of the whole of time, for it is the domain of the real world (matn al-wqi) separate from the two dimensions of time and space and from time and space altogether. The non-existence belonging to a temporal thing in a part of time does not require its non-existence in perpetuity, due to the possibility of its temporal existence in perpetuity not in that particular time. Furthermore, the non-existence of a separate thing (al-shay al-mufraq) in the whole extension of time does not require its non-existence in perpetuity, nor does it conflict with its perpetual existence in objective reality and the actual world not in any particular time or place at all. Therefore, it is possible for existence to be removed from a part of time, but it cannot be removed in perpetuity from the whole extension of time; or it can be removed from the whole extension of time [in the case of separate, incorporeal things], but not removed in the domain of perpetuity from actual reality. Therefore, it is clear that the cause of temporal non-existences belonging to changeable and corruptible things, insofar as they are changeable and corruptible, is merely the absence of a particular existent, which exists for a definite duration within the extension of time, from other than the time of its own existence, not [its absence] in perpetuity from the whole of time. The cause then is the absence of a temporal from another temporal [extension], not [its absence] from the One Who is exalted above the dimensions of time and space, and Who encompasses all times and all places, and what is in them and with them, even its pebbles and its rocks, with an eternal, unchanging, unquantifiable relation.[35]

12 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

The intent of this passage is clear. Once a temporal thing has been created, it can never be removed from the dimension of perpetuity, which is the domain of atemporal beginning and changeless existence without end, even though its temporal existence in time ceases to exist. All of its temporal states and spatial locations exist in perpetuity in a single state. Elsewhere Mr Dmd confirms: The removal of an actual thing from the domain of perpetuity is impossible, otherwise extension would be required in perpetuity.[36] Regarding the level of eternity (sarmad), Ibn Sn holds that this state of existence encompasses perpetuity, and it is the relation of the changeless to the changeless. Alaw, commenting on this, states that Ibn Sn alludes to this relation in his Rislatul-udd, where he explains that the existence of spiritual, atemporal, and non-spatial substances emanates from Him, which are absolutely unchanging, whose relation to their Creator is eternity (sarmad).[37] Like perpetuity, extension and quantification in any form are inconceivable here. Gods knowledge at the level of eternity consists of one timeless, immutable relation to all things, both universal and particular. It cannot be temporal; otherwise past, present, and future could be added to it as a new factor and change would occur to this attribute of His essence. Mr Dmd differs from Ibn Sn on two points. First, Mr Dmd stresses that the domain of eternity (sarmad) belongs solely and exclusively to Gods essence, and it does not belong to the atemporal, non-spatial substances mentioned by Ibn Sn above. These, insofar as they are caused and separate in substance from their Creator, belong to the domain of perpetuity. The Creator alone has no cause, no prior quiddity, and no beginning in any respect. The strict separation of eternity from perpetuity and the inadmissibility of the co-eternity of creatures in any respect is elaborated upon by Mr Dmd in the Third Qabas, where he compares the relation between eternity and perpetuity to the relation between cause and effect. Just as causal priority can only be followed by posteriority in being-an-effect, not causal posteriority, which is nonsensical, so eternal priority can only be followed by perpetual posteriority, not eternal posteriority. The relation of the changeless to the changeless, therefore, is not eternity (sarmad), as Ibn Sn proposes, but eternal priority/perpetual posteriority. Second, the domain of perpetuity (dahr) is both the container of time in its entirety without its extension and flow and the container of immaterial, changeless things which have never existed in time, such as the human rational soul. Unlike Ibn Sn, who holds that primary originated things are co-eternal with God and only preceded by conceptual non-existence, Mr Dmd emphasizes that they do have a beginning, just not in time, inasmuch as they are preceded by a real non-existence contradictory to

13 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

existence, and that God precedes them with a separate priority in existence, not just an essential priority. Perpetuity, therefore, is the domain of all things besides God with respect to having an atemporal beginning but no end, and with respect to being changeless in His presence, such that the relation of the entire system of creation to God, whether past or future, is the relation of a single entity to Him with one everlasting, unquantifiable relation. This is necessary; otherwise the unchanging First Cause could be qualified by the attribute of change. The concept of everlasting, unquantifiable relation vs. temporal, quantifiable relation is one of the topics Mr Dmd explains in the Third Qabas.

Defining the Area of Dispute Another objective of Mr Dmd in the First Qabas is to show that the real area of dispute between the respected philosophers on the subject of the eternity of the world vs. its creation is not essential creation or temporal creation, but perpetual creation. He explains: It is widely known and confirmed by unbroken traditions, both oral and written, transmitted over the course of centuries and ages, that there has been continuous and widespread disagreement between the respected philosophers regarding the creation (udth) of the world and its eternity (qidam).The leader of philosophy, the divine Plato, and the six philosophers preceding him, are the seven primary philosophers.[38] These philosophers and others who followed them believed that this Great Man, which is the cosmoswith all of its parts and members, whether concrete or intelligible, material or spiritual, in other words, everything in the two realms of Command and creationwas created (dith) and not eternally existent (mutasarmad al-wujd), and that the true Creator is its Originator and its Fashioner. The teacher of the Greek Peripatetics, Aristotle, and a number of his followers and supporters, like the Greek Master [Plotinus], Proclus, Themistius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Porphyry, and their followers, believed that part of the cosmos, like the individual originated existents [such as the incorporeal intelligences] and the unqualified natures of the species and the genera, is eternally existent and eternally perpetual in actuality, and that the First Maker is their Originator, while the only created part of the cosmos are the individual generated, material existents, which are subject to essence and existence through their potential possibilities, and nothing else, and that the Agent Maker is their Fashioner.[39] In this passage, the position for eternity is clearly identified with Aristotle and his followers, while the position for creation is identified with Plato, the six philosophers preceding him, and their followers. Mr Dmd asserts that the area of dispute is clearly not essential creation, which only implies the dependence of possible things upon another for their existence. This belongs to everything which is possible in itself, and the majority of the philosophers have accepted the proof for this kind of creation. Certainly, Plato and Aristotle have accepted it. It is equally incorrect to think that the area of dispute between these respected philosophers is temporal creation, because no one in the circle of the learned accepts the creation of the universe in time, save for the Mutakallimn, whom Mr Dmd refers to as those who meddle with what does not concern them, and the respected philosophers agree upon the nature of the things that are generated in time. What is being disputed then is the status of those objects

14 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

which the Aristotelians say are eternal and the Platonists say are perpetually created. The Aristotelians, Mr Dmd says, hold that the First Maker only essentially precedes certain parts of the cosmos, namely, the originated existents (mubdat), with respect to the intelligible order only, but He does not precede them separately in existence with respect to the positively real world. Consequently, they follow after Him in the intelligible order with respect to essential creation, but they do not follow after Him in the objective world outside of mental intellection and in the real world with respect to creation in perpetuity.[40] The Platonists, on the other hand, hold that both types of priority and posteriority, namely, the essential and the separate, fully encompass all things besides God. The difference between these two types of priority and posteriority is one of the main subjects of the second and third qabast. Consequently, Mr Dmd continues, the universe in its entirety and all of its parts, including the worlds of Command and creation, and the realms of the visible and the invisible, are in relation to the true Creator, with respect to essential posteriority and separate posteriority, in the position of this temporal creature (dith yawm).[41] In other words, everything besides God universally and without exception, like a temporal existent, has both essential posteriority and separate posteriority to God, and accordingly is subject to both essential and perpetual creation. Not all things, however, are subject to temporal creation, but only those things which are subject to generation and corruption in time. Mr Dmd unambiguously and energetically advocates the position he ascribes to the Platontists. He states: This is the clear path, upon which the law-giving Messengers among the infallible Prophets and Chosen Ones agree.By them it is established that God was alone and nothing was with Him. Other clear verses in the Noble Book, the Sacred Law, and the traditions of the pure and holy Family support this theme.[42] In other words, God cannot be conceived of as being alone if He does not possess a real, separate, atemporal priority, not just an essential priority, to the entirety of His creation. From this Mr Dmd concludes that every essential creation is a perpetual creation as well. The two are, in fact, inseparable due to the quiddity prior to actualization having two kinds of non-existence associated with it: (1) the essential, or conceptual, and (2) the real, or contradictory. Perpetual creation is disputed by the Aristotelians, however, because they do not agree that primary originated things, like the intelligences and the unqualified natures of species and genera, are preceded by real non-existence. Ibn Sn had limited primary origination (ibd) to the essential creation of the celestial intelligences and the unqualified natures of things, which hence were not, in his view, preceded by real non-existence. Mr Dmd is now saying in the name of the Platonists and the Prophets that every essential creation is also a perpetual creation. Ibd, therefore, cannot include only essential creation, but must include perpetual creation as well. Accordingly, he moves it down from the level of eternity to the level of perpetuity. Mr Dmd says: The emanation (fay) of the Active Maker with respect to the contents of perpetuity is termed primary origination (ibd) and fashioning (un), and with respect to temporal creatures, it is termed production (idth) and generation (takwn).[43] By having ibd apply

15 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

to the contents of perpetuity, Dmd, therefore, is indicating that the intelligences and the unqualified natures are also preceded by real non-existence, not just conceptual non-existence. In this passage, he is also introducing the term un as an equivalent of ibd in order to emphasize that whatever emanates from God by ibd is also truly fashioned by Him. At this juncture, Mr Dmd reiterates the thesis which he wishes to prove in al-Qabast based upon the principles of the Peripatetics: namely, that the Creator extracted the system of the world in its entirety from real non-existence all at once, perpetually, not in time, and not through matter, instrument, or motion. This is a proposition he says, for which no demonstration has yet been given by rational methods down to our own time and age.[44] Aristotle and his followers, according to Mr Dmd, did not posit its extraction from real non-existence, but only submitted that the world as a whole is essentially posterior to God, not actually so. Something which is only essentially posterior to another thing, like heat in relation to fire, arises naturally from it, not because it causes it but because of it. It cannot be any other way. If something is separately posterior, however, it may or may not exist. It only exists if its agent voluntarily causes it to exist. This is the meaning of creation.

Refuting the Mutakallimn Argument for Creation in Time The last subject that bears mentioning in this analytical summary of the First Qabas is Dmds arguments against the Mutakallimn, whom he specifies as the Mutazila and the Ashariya, for why the universe as a whole cannot have been created in time. He states that they believed that between the Creator and the beginning of the world there was a hypothetical, extended, flowing non-existence, in other words, a temporal non-existence, whose hypothetical continuation extended in the direction of sempiternity (azal) without any end, but which ended in the direction of everlastingness (abad) with the creation of the beginning of the world. His arguments against this conception are as follows: First, [if]no series of boundaries is conceivable in perpetuity, no elapsing or renewal, no falling behind or overtaking, no extension or termination, no continuation or flow, as these are among the concomitants of the existence of motion, change, and the gradual progression of one thing after another, then how is it possible to imagine for real non-existence and sheer, absolute non-being any distinction of boundaries, succession of states, variation of moments, and differences of time, so that continuation and flow, finite and infinite might be conceived? Second, if what they imagine regarding non-existence were possible, it would be time itself or motion itself, since it is quantifiable, flowing, its whole certainly greater than a part thereof, and its parts succeeding one another in discrete units. Either it is essentially in this form, in which case it is time, or it is accidentally in this form, in which case it is motion. They have only applied to time or to motion the name non-existence. Third, in that case, the Creator would exist within a boundary which itself belongs to that extension of non-existence. Exalted is He from that! And the world would exist within another boundary by itself, so that the interposition of that hypothetical extension between God and the world would be admissible, and the posteriority of the world and its coming after Him in existence would similarly be admissible. However, if that extension is an infinite continuity, the infinite would be confined between two confines, which would be its borders and edges, [which is
16 von 21 22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

absurd]. Fourth, if the boundaries of that extension are equal and alike, since there is no difference in non-existence and no particularization of any potentiality, or motion, or anything else, then for what reason did He single out the world for this boundary but not single out its creation for another boundary before it? Fifth, if He who is sanctified above encumbrances and conditions coexists without magnitude with any extension assumed, then the singling out of the world to one of the boundaries in that hypothetical extension will not result in its posteriority to its Creator at all. Sixth, time and space are twin brothers nurtured in attributes by the same milk from the same breast. Therefore, just as beyond the extension of space, in other words, beyond the outermost sphere which bounds the directions of the world, there is real non-existence, not void or plenum, extension or non-extension, infinitude or finitude, in like manner, beyond the extension of time, there is real non-existence, not extension and non-extension, duration and non-duration, infinitude and finitude, increase and decrease.[45] Mr Dmd asks how it is possible to conceive of boundaries, elapsing and renewal, continuation and flow in a state of real non-existence? By giving the non-existence before the world the qualities of extension and flow, the Mutakallimn have merely described time and motion. God would then be placed in the position of being in a temporal extension before the creation of the world and time itself would be created in time. Moreover, if the boundaries of that extension are all alike, then what would motivate the Creator to pick one boundary over another for the moment of creation? If the Creator coexists with any assumed extension, then the particularization of the creation of the world to a part of that extension would not result in its posteriority to Him. Mr Dmd concludes that just as there is no space beyond space, in like manner, there can be no time before time. Ibn Sn presents nearly the same arguments against the Mutakallimn, but uses them instead as evidence for the eternity of the world in time. He states in the Talqt: It is not possible to remove time from the estimative faculty (wahm), for if you imagine it removed, the estimative faculty then compels the existence of another time in which time is removed. For this reason the Mutazila asserted a fixed extension between the First and the creation of the world, which they called non-being. This is like the case of those who assert a void in which the world exists, and if the world is presumed to be removed, still require the existence of dimensions.In the impossibility of their removal from the estimative faculty is a proof that time is eternal and the world is eternal, and that the First only precedes it essentially. If we suppose a beginning for the creation of the world in the manner the Mutazila hold, an impossibility follows necessarily, for they hypothesize something before this event. In that thing which they hypothesize, they assume the possibility of different motions. But the different motions can only be true with the possibility of measuring them, and the possibility of measuring them must coincide with the existence of time. Consequently, the hypothesis of the possibility of the existence of different motions [in that thing before creation] presupposes the existence of time. Hence, another time would exist before time. [But since time can only be one, therefore time is eternal.][46] Mr Dmd counters Ibn Sns conclusion by asserting that Ibn Sns proof is a dialectical proof

17 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

following from their assumed postulates, not a demonstrative proof based upon sound principles and rational foundations. For just as the impossibility of removing a spatial extension from the estimative faculty is not a proof that the dimensions are infinite and that beyond the determined directions there is another continuous space and extended dimension, in like manner, the impossibility of removing a temporal, flowing extension from the estimative faculty is not a proof that time is eternal or that before time another extension and measure existed.[47] Mr Dmd remarks that Ibn Sns goal is to invalidate the belief of the Mutakallimn which places the creation of the world somewhere in the middle of their hypothetical extension yet allows for the potential creation of body and motion in a prior time before this event. Mr Dmd emphasizes that this only invalidates the precedence of temporal non-existence to the creation of the world, but it does not prove the worlds eternity nor invalidate the precedence of perpetual real non-existence. The transcendence of the Creators act of creation from any connection to time will be further explained by Mr Dmd in the Third Qabas. Another proof, which is not mentioned here, but which is implied by the Peripatetic principle of the inseparability of time, motion, and spatial magnitude, is as follows. According to the Peripatetics, who follow Aristotle on this, time is the measure of motion, and motion, in turn, depends upon the presence of physical bodies. Therefore, without physical bodies there can be no time. Time, therefore, came into existence when the physical universe did, and since it did not precede its creation, creation did not occur in time.

Conclusion Mr Dmd has succeeded in demonstrating in the First Qabas, on the basis of two of his eight principles for the creation of the world, that the very nature of possible things prevents them from being eternal (sarmad), although they may be everlasting and perpetual (dahr). To be eternal means to be without a cause, and thus without a beginning, while all possible things have a cause, and thus a beginning, through which their existence is actualized. Mr Dmd has also demonstrated how possible beings are preceded by real non-existence, or privation, in the stage of their quiddities, not essentially, but accidentally, although if being preceded by real non-existence is interpreted as coming into existence from nothing, then his demonstration fails in this regard. Actual existence is something which is given to the possible by another from outside. Only that whose existence belongs to it essentially, through itself, can be regarded as truly eternal. This is why essential creation, which only requires dependency upon a cause and the priority of conceptual non-existence, not existence after real non-existence, is not sufficient

18 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

for an act of real creation. Since the celestial intelligences are possible in themselves, not necessary in themselves, they, too, according to Mr Dmd, must be preceded by real non-existence, and their creation, which can neither be at the level of eternity nor of time, must be at the level of perpetuity. Mr Dmd has shown that temporal creation as well, which only describes the generation of things in time, is itself dependent upon perpetual creation preceded by real non-existence in perpetuity. This is because a things temporal non-existence in a prior time is not contradictory to its temporal existence in a subsequent time, since they belong to two different boundaries of the extension of time. If its temporal non-existence is not removed by its temporal existence, this means that only its contradictory, real non-existence in perpetuity is removed by its temporal existence, and the removal of contradictory non-existence in perpetuity is the very meaning of perpetual creation.

[1] See, for example, Hamid Dabashi, Mr Dmd and the founding of the School of Ifahn, History of Islamic Philosophy, ed. Oliver Leaman and Seyyed Hossein Nasr (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 597-634; Fazlur Rahman, Mr Dmds Concept of udth Dahr: A Contribution to the Study of God-World Relationship Theories in Safavid Iran, Journal of Near Eastern Studies 39.2 (1980), pp. 139-151; Toshihiko Izutsu, Mr Dmd and His Metaphysics, English introduction to al-Qabast (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1977), pp. 1-15; and Henry Corbin. Mr Dmd, Anthologie des Philosophes Iraniens, ed. Sayyed Jalloddn Ashtiyn (Teheran and Paris 1971), pp. 15-30. [2] Qtd. in Dabashi, Mr Dmd, p. 605. This article is adapted from my dissertation, Time, Perpetuity, and Eternity: Mr Dmds Theory of Perpetual Creation and the Trifold Division of Existence: An Analysis of Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing Brands, University of California, Los Angeles, 2006 (UMI Dissertation Publishing 2006). In subsequent articles, I will give analytical summaries of the remaining chapters of al-Qabast. [4] See al-Qabast (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1977), pp. 72, 77, 191, 365. He also refers to Ibn Sn separately as my companion in leadership and to Al-Frb as my companion in instruction. [5] The inspiration for this title may have come from the story of Moses sighting of the burning bush as related in the Qurn 27:7: Behold! Moses said to his family, I perceive a fire. I will bring you tidings from there, or I will bring you a blazing brand (qabas) that you may warm yourselves. [6] By the world (al-lam) Dmd means everything other than God, both material and immaterial. [7] Qtd. in Seyyed Ahmad Alaw, Shar al-Qabast (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1997), p. 395. [8] Al-Qabast, p. 2. [9] Qtd. in Mr Dmd, al-Qabast, p. 33. [10] Shif: Ilhiyyt (Cairo 1960), ed. G. C. Anawati, et al, pp. 266-267; qtd. in al-Qabast, pp. 3-4. [11] Al-Ishrt wal-Tanbht (Cairo 1960), ed. S. Duny, Nama Five, Chapter 9, p. 524. [12] Al-Qabast, p. 4. [3]

19 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

[13] Qtd. in Alaw, Shar al-Qabast, p. 93. [14] Al-Qabast, p. 4. [15] Shar al-Qabast, pp. 169-170. [16] Qtd. in Alaw, Shar al-Qabast, p. 171.

[17] This argument is given by Aristotle: If matter came to be, there would have to be something underlying out of which, as a constituent, it came to be. But to be such is the nature of matter itself, for by matter I mean the primary underlying thing in each case out of whichsomething comes to be. So if matter came to be, it would have to be before it had come to be. And if it passed away, this would be what it would ultimately arrive at, so it would have passed away before it had passed away. [Consequently, matter is eternal] (Physics i.9, 192a, 29-34). [18] Al-Qabast, p. 267. [19] Ibid., p. 134. [20] Ishrt wal-Tanbht, p. 485. [21] See al-Qabast, p. 414. [22] See Alaw, Shar al-Qabast, pp. 113, 158. [23] Concept of udth Dahr, p. 147. [24] Extension and non-extension refer to line and plane vs. point (which is non-extended), and duration and non-duration refer to time vs. the now (which is non-extended and indivisible). [25] Al-Qabast, pp. 4-5. [26] Qtd. in Alaw, Shar al-Qabast, pp. 93-94. [27] Al-Qabast, p. 7. [28] See al-Qabast, pp. 7-11. [29] Shar al-Qabast, p.101. [30] Ibid., pp. 106, 111. [31] Concept of udth Dahr, pp. 140, 142. [32] See Fabric of the Cosmos (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004), Chapter Five, The Frozen River. [33] Qtd. in Shar al-Qabast, pp. 486-488. [34] Qtd. in al-Qabast, p. 13. [35] Al-Qabast, pp. 15-16. [36] Ibid., p. 210. [37] Qtd. in Shar al-Qabast, p. 117. [38] Alaw identifies these six philosophers prior to Plato as Pythagoras, Empedocles, Anaximander, Thales, Agathodaemon,

20 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04

An Overview of Mr Dmds Kitb al-Qabast: The Book of Blazing ...

http://users.sisqtel.net/kevenbrown/summaryfirstqabas.html

and Hermes. He says: What our teacher has stated is that upon this question these philosophers are our fellow believers. In truth, we thirst for them and hold fast to their hands (Shar al-Qabast, p. 162). [39] Al-Qabast, pp. 24-25. [40] Ibid., pp. 25-26. [41] Ibid., p. 26. [42] Ibid. [43] Ibid., p. 26. [44] Ibid., p. 29. As mentioned earlier, Mr Dmds demonstration only succeeds if his real non-existence (adam ar) preceding all created things is interpreted as the privation of existence in that which may exist. Even God cannot create something that does not have the capacity to exist. This is why creation from pre-existing, eternal matter seems to be necessary, even where the intelligences are concerned. [45] Al-Qabast, pp. 31-32. [46] Qtd. in al-Qabast, p. 33. [47] Al-Qabast, p. 34.

21 von 21

22.01.2013 16:04