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Military Review

August 1978
See "The Electric Piranha," page 36 ...
Published by
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Deputy Commandant
Colonel Edward M Bradford. Ed,tor m Chief
EDITORIAL STAFF' Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E Burlas.
AssIstant EdItor. Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Martinez-
Boucher, Spanish. AmerIcan EdItor. Lieutenant Colonel
Jamie W Walton. Features Editor
PRODUCTION STAFF Ms Df)!,e R DommguPl Proc1uclton teMor Mr Jerome F
Scheele Art and DesIgn Mr Amo!'. W a l t a V l l a ~ Pubf'car,an OffIcer
CIRCULATION Malor A R Bundons Manag,ng [(Mor Sergeant first CIa!'.!'. Felix
A Aguilar Adm,nlstrat,ve Superh50F
EX OFFICIO General Donn A Starr.,. Commanc1pr. Trammg and Doctrme
Command lleutenant General J R Thurman Commander Combmed Arms
Cenfer MalOI General Homer 0 SmIth. Commanaer. LogIstIcs Center. Major
General Henry Mohr Chief US Army Reserve. Major General laVern E=
Weber Ch,P! National Guald Bureau Major Generdl Lows G Menetrey
Deputy Commander. Combmed Arms Combat Development Activity Major
General BenjamJl1 l Hamson. Commander. Admln/stratlOn Center Bngad1er
General Fred K Mahaffey Deputy Commander. Combined Arms Trammg
Developments Actllrfty
ACTIVE Colonel T E Blagg Department of Tactics and Department of Command,
Colonel J E Sutton Department of Resource Management. Colonel R A
Mallion Department of Unlfted and Combmed Operations. Dr Dudley T
Corlllsh John F MorrIson Chair of MIMarr Hlstorv Colonel Carl Acree
National Guard Bureau. Mr Roy Root Office of the Chief. Armv Reserve,
Colonel W S Bayer Combmed Arms Combat DevelDpment Actl\flty. Major W
J Chantelau Adm/lllstratlOn Center lieutenant Colonel K 5 Cropsey,
Combmed Arms Trammg Developments Act/lrltV. Major C W McInnIS Logistics
Center. Colonel Harry A Heath, Forces Command
Military Review
by General Donn A Starry, US Army
by Colonel W"liam V Kennedy, US Army Reserve
by Graham H Turblville Jr
by Lieutenant Colonel James B Channon. US Army
by Captam Shaun M Darragh, Puerto Rican ARNG
by Colonel Ronald J Rabm, US Army
by Benlamm Franklm Coolmg
and Lieutenant Colonel John A Hixson, US Army
by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L Wendt, US Army
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Military Review
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
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Military Review
u.s. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027
Be Involved
Summer IS drawing to a close. The trauma .of your latest change of station IS
beginning to wear oft. MemOrIes of the famIly vacatIOn are fading. Bad moment,
are forgotten. and the good ones reluctantly slIp away It's tIme again for work and

However. in addition to education and the job. another cycle b begInning one
that is the IIteblood of mllItar) communities around the world. It IS time for every
famIl) to a"e" Its needs. deSIres and talents. Each member must decIde on what he
or she wanh from the communIty and what he or she can contrIbute to It.
In other words. it's volunteer tIme. The number and talents of volunteers
determine how active and successful our mIlitary eommunity life WIll be for the
comIng year. Th,' Army CommunIty SerVIces, Red Cross, Teacher AIdes Program.
TutOrIal Program and Crafts acti\ltles Just scratch the surfaee. Scouting and
Explorers, Youth ActIvitIes. sports and hospitab all need volunteers to operate.
Perhaps you are not a camper and can't tell a square knot from a half hiteh, but
you Cdn as"st the scouts b) proVIdIng transportation, workIng WIth awards or
actIng as an admInIstrator. Maybe you don't feel qualified to eoach a sport, but you
can be a team parent, work on the grounds crew or keep ,core. NeIther do you have
to be a doctor or nurse to be a Red Cross volunteer. Our hospItals and Red Cross
staff need you As an Arm) CommunIty ServIces volunteer. you can work In the
office. act as a coumelor or serve on varIOUS worthwhile committees.
Socral programs are necessary and Important IngredIents In our communIty.
Such actIvItIes are Integral parts of our lIves, and all of us soldIers. wIves and
children-mUSI partiCIpate In them lest our communities WIther into factory-type
regImens and our social endeavors die. .
Each of you has a special talent you can share wIth the rest of your eommunity.
You are the heart and soul of its aetivlties. WIthout you. we all lose. You miss a
r;ewardIng pastIme. and we mISs the opportunity to share in your knowledge and
learn from you When Slgnup time comes around, actively JOIn In the programs
available. From top to bottom, our soldiers and dependents make the eommunity
live. They sustain all the endeavors and activitIes which make a meanIngful Army-
career lIfe. Be involved!
15 fEB 78
, ~ . I v .! 1 L. d 1 UI,,,,
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,T 1 " II, LT., ,
ODD 314
The operational concepts set forth in FM 100-5 weren't
arbitrarily set forth in ci vacuum. During the 1970-73 time
frame, when the Army staff was trying to restructure the
Army of the future, three factors influenced its thinking.
First, there was ho well-articulated military policy. Second,
there was a strong determination to avoid the pitfalls of
training to win the last war instead of looking to the future.
Last, the Army realized that the modernization program had
been set aside during Vietnam and it would take years to
catch up. Of the two possible wars in the future, a
mechanized war in NA TO Europe, while the least likely, was
the most important in terms of national survival and the
well-being of Western civilization. By analyzing the po-
tential enemy and studying more than 1,000 tank battles, it
was apparent that the smaller side did not necessarily lose
to the numerically superior enemy. From this grew the
operational concepts which appear in FM 100-5. Using
terrain as a combat multiplier, the defender has to see deep
to find the following echelon, move fast to concentrate
forces, strike quickly before the enemy can break the de-
fense and finish the fight quickly before the second echelon
closes. The active defense is not the old mobile defense
renamed. It is new, and, the sooner we realize the differ-
ences, the sooner we can get on with the job at hand. Our
tactics drive our force structure and equipment development.
They also point out the need for improvements in training.
The combined arms team we place on that future battlefield
must be capable of winning both the first and last battles. As
with most things, there is room for improvement, for re-
finement. If we are to get the most from our operational
concepts, a continuing dialogue is necessary to keep our
tactics dynamic.
General Donn A. Starry, US Army
This article IS an adaptation of an address made by General Starry on 30 March 1978 at the "actlcs/lnter
University Sernlnar Symposium at Fort Leavenworth. Kansas
" :
UR Army has regulations that
cover many subjects-almost all
subjects it would seem save military
tactics. Whether this is by design-to
protect the ignorant-or by oversight is
not at all obvious. Most probably, it's
because, since we all consider ourselves
tactical experts, we can never agree
sufficiently and for long enough to
write a regulation about tactics.
However, we do set forth opera-
tional concepts-tactics-in field
manuals. Normally, these manuals live
a pretty quiet life, serving as references
or as exhibits for various inspectors'
checklists. In many cases, one finds
they are little read, less often followed
and not exactly the prime topic of
Army conversation-professional or
That was true at least until the 1976
edition of Army Field Manual (PM)
. 100-5, Operations, appeared. It's safe to
say that no Army manual has ever
been so widely commented on, debated
and, to a large extent, misunderstood.
It is indeed out of the ordinary for a
field manual to generate such wide
discussion. I'm not quite prepared to
say-why the discussion developed in
this case-but develop it has.
First, I must say that this dis-
cussion is not all bad. About anything
important, a dialogue is essential. Op-
erational concepts are the stuff on
which armies feed and nurture them-
selves, and, so, a dialogue about them
is essential to an army's well-being.
My purpose is not to be defensive about
the tactical concepts we have espoused
for our Army. I don't believe they need
all that much defending. But enough of
the dialogue has struck recurring
themes that it is appropriate to offer
some perspectives on the evolution of
those tactics.
To understand any description of
war and the proposed fighting of it-
both complex problems-it is useful
and quite necessary to understand the
circumstances under which the liturgy
was laid down. Let's begin with that.
The time was 1970-73. The US mil-
itary was withdrawing from Vietnam.
The US Army, Europe, was in dis-
array, rent asunder by its role as part
of the rotation base for forces deployed
in Vietnam. The Army training base in
the Continental United States had
concentrated almost exclusively for
eight years on providing units and
individual replacements to Vietnam.
The combat development community
had concentrated on Vietnam to the
exclusion of work to modernize the
Army's ability to fight in other
theaters. Doctrinal development was
still in the mind-set of the 1950s .
In the Pentagon, the Army staff
was trying to restructure the Army, to
find for it a size, shape, composition
and operational concept consistent
with the needs of the US nlOltional
military policies-whatever those
might be. Three major factors strongly
influenced this restructuring.
First, there was no well-articulated
national military policy. Second, there
was the strong feeling that, after every
war, armies always set out to figure out
,how they might have fought the last
war better. There was an even stronger
determination to avoid that pitfall, and
this time to look ahead, not back.
Finally, there was the grim realization
that modernization of the Army-
normally a constant process-had been
set aside for Vietnam. No matter what
operational concept was derived, the
Army was faced with a desperate need
for a massive' and expensive materiel
acquisition program that obviously
would take years and cost billions.
So, in the context of 197073-times
of social, political and economic up-
heaval in our society-what did we see
for our country and our Army as we
tried to look ahead? We saw the possi-
bility of two wars: mechanized war-
s\lch as we might have to fight in
NATO Europe-perhaps even in the
Middle East; the other war-a Korea, a
Vietnam, a Lebanon CriSIS, a
Dominican Republic. Each war obvi-
ously would require different kinds of
forces-mechanized on the one hand,
light infantry on the other.
Estimating likelihood of occurrence,
war in NATO Europe, while probably
least likely, was certainly the most
important from the standpoint of our
national survival and the well-being of
Western civilization. Contingency oper-
General Donn A. Starry lS commander, US
Army TramlnR and Doctrme Command. lIe
receIVed a B S from the USMA, an M.S from
Georf{e Washmgton Unwerslty and lS a
graduate of the [lSACGSC. the Armed Forces
Staff Col/e{ie and the Army War College. He
has sert'ed as daector of the OperatlOns
Directorate In the Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for MIlztary OperatIOns, commanded
the 11th Armored Cavalry RegIment durmg
one of three tours In Vietnam and was com-
mander of V Corps. US Army, Europe. prior
to becoming TRADOC commander. HIs ar
ttcle "Sergeants' Busmess" appeared in the
May 1978 Mlhtary Review,
ations with light forces, while perhaps
less important to our national survival,
were still probably likely although
perhaps less so than in former times.
With the' Nixon Doctrine beginning
to reaffirm our national interest in
Western Europe, our military focus
narrowed to NATO. Here, our
strongest and most dangerous enemy
was much stronger than when we
turned our backs on him to go to
Vietnam. And he was growing
stronger daily.
So, we decided to begin with devel-
oping operational concepts to cope
with our most difficult problem, the
mechanized war. Here was a battlefield
dense with a wide variety and im-
pressive quantities of sophisticated
weapons systems, many more than we
had ever seen before. The air over the
battlefield, controlled by modern air
defenses, was exceptionally dangerous.
Obstacles on the ground-mostly man-
made-seriously hampered ground
force operations. Command and
control was difficult in the sophisti-
cated electronic warfare environment.
Obviously, only a well-integrated and
highly trained combined arms team
could win.
What might we have to fight
against? Almost every potential threat
mechanized army used Soviet opera-
tional concepts, organizations and
equipment. Key concepts were mass,
momentum and continuous land
combat. Mass meant numbers and
concentration of forces. Momentum
meant sustained advances of 40 to 50
kilometers a day. Continuous combat
meant echelonment of forces; when one
unit was consumed in the battle, the
next one was committed without a
pause. Modern vision equipment on
both sides enabled the fight to continue
around the clock, in smoke and in bad
Operationally, an enemy break-
through attack might find a whole
tank division, more than 300 tanks,
employed on a front as narrow as 5
kilometers, deployed in first and
second echelons. The numbers of
systems in each echelon are indicated
in Figure 1. The depth of the formation
in kilometers and in minutes is on the
left and right ordinates.
Even moving to contact a motorized
rifle division might bc about 15 to 25
speed is equally important (Figure 2).
Operational mass-a problem in
itself-combined with a larger
problem-our historical propensity for
being outnumbered, losing the early
battles, then mobilizing to outnumber
our enemies and so win the war. Our
look 'at the future strongly suggested
that logic to be bankrupt. So, we came
to the visceral question-Can we hope
-to fight outnumbered and win? What
operational concepts would defeat such
an enemy? While there was no rule
that the outnumbered side loses,
1---3.5 KM
5 KM--j
31 ...
_82_ ........ 8 ... 23.
Figure 1
kilometers wide, divided in echelons-
reconnaissance, advance guard, first
and second echelon. The frontage is
wider than the breakthrough, but
mathematicians and statIstIcIans
would have us believe it. So, must we
admit defeat in such a war-especially
in Europe? Had we almost five divi-
~ i ) n s In Europe as a token-a hostage
force-or had we a chance to win?
The answer to those questions was
buried somewhere in the phenomena of
But the history of 1,000 tp.nk battles
told quite a different story. The proba-
bility of victory seemed to change very
little, regardless of the odds, as indi-
r-_______________ '525KM __________ - - ~
!2J 7 , L:'1
4 x ..,234
Figure 2
fighting outnumbered (Figure 3). When
we plotted the probability of victory on
an ordinate and on an abscissa at-
tacker versus defender ratios of 1 at-
tacking 5 to fl attacking 1, traditional
calculus developed the solid line curve.
So, if you were 1 attacking fl, you
couldn't win, but, if you were 5 at-
tacking 1, you won every time. This
was not very encouraging for a country
whose forces, even with allied help,
could expect to be outnumbered at the
outset of a conflict and to stay that
way for a long time.
cated by the dashed line. Apparently,
there was something about battle that
couldn't be described using traditional
calculus. Military forces could and
frequently did fight and win outnum-
So, back to the original question:
What operational concepts could we
employ'? Being realistic about NATO
Europe and a policy prohibiting first
attack, we would begin a war there
defending-just by the circumstances.
The defense also was an appealing
problem because of the natural advan-
tages afforded an outnumbered force-
especially the advantage of using
terrain as a combat multiplier.
We considered it essential to 'use
terrain to beat the enemy-exploiting
his propensity to mass without regard
to the ground. As you know, the de-
fender gives up the initiative to the
attacker. Hut we also believed that, to
win, we needed to regain the initiative.
Even if for short periods, it would be
necessary to attack-attack while de-
fending. To avoid suicidal massed as-
saults of our own, defensive attacks by
echelon, move fast to concentrate
forces, strike quickly to attack before
the enemy can break the defense and
finish the fight quickly before the
second echelon closes; all this while
using the defenders' natural
advantage-terrain-to multiply the
strength of the defense.
Many problems intruded between a
short, snappy operational concept and
a full-blown field manual description.
The full liturgy didn't come easily.
Ancient precepts had to be rethought,
changed or set aside.
Pv .50
1/5 111
Figure 3
fire and maneuver at critical times and
places would be thE! rule.
Eventually, an operational concept
grew: See deep to find the following
The new operational concept un-
veiled new and difficult problems. We
elected to describe how to defeat the
Soviet-style breakthrough attack, be-
Heving that, if we could do that, we
could solve the other problems. We
found that an attacking enemy com-
bined arms army deployed t9 a depth
of about 100 kilometers. Its first-
echelon divisions were 30 kilometers
deep. About 50 to 60 kilometers back
were second-echelon divisions of the'
first-echelon army; 120 kilometers back
were reconnaissance elements' of the
second-echelon army.
According to our operational
concept, we had to "see deep." How
deep? In what detail? To what level? In
what time frame? How and with what?
As the tactical concept developed, some
answers to these questions began to
appear-a scheme of maneuver
We came to believe that the brigade
commander must have information of
second-echelon regiments of the first-
, ec-helon division; the division com-
mander must have information of
second-echelon divisions of the first-
echelon army; the corps commaiIder
must know about the second-echelon
army. Generally, the deeper he had to
see, the more a commander had to rely
on sources he didn't control directly. To
get the right information, each com-
mander had to mount a tough re-
lentless operation using his own and
outside resources-target acquisition
and surveillance resources.
To defend successfully, the defender
needed to deploy forces to find the
enemy and force him to start his main
attack before coming on the main
defending forces. Borrowing an old
term, this was called the covering
force. The use of an old term didn't
help many tacticians because they
transferred the old mission along with
it. However, this covering force was
different. It was meant to FIGHT, not
just to gain time, but to deceive the
enemy as to the whereabouts of our
main battle area and to draw him out
from under his air defenses. The
covering force simply could not afford
to fire a little-too little-move back
too soon and too far-traditional
modus operandi of covering forces.
Now, the covering force was to defend.
Its battalionR and squadrons would
fight, just as would similar units in a
main battle area, where the decisive
defensive battle was to be fought.
Where the real fight was-at bat-
talion and below-the battle co.uld be
won by destroying enemy systems-
servicing targets. A simple explanation
of target servicing in the defense is to
determine how many targets must be
destroyed in time and space in order to
defeat the enemy attack. The battalion
might have to destroy as many as 250
targets in about 10 minutes; the di-
vision more than 2,000 targets in
hours, or perhaps days; the corps more
than 3,000 targets in perhaps three to
five days.
Next, we turned our attention to
"move quickly." If a US division, de-
ployed across about 40 kilometers, was
attacked by anything like a break-
through attack, the division com-
mander would have to concentrate
seven or eight of his 11 or 12 battalions
very quickly. He filled in areas that he
had denuded of ground forces by using
air cavalry and attack helicopter units.
We called this the active defense.
In the main battle area, we believed
we could win by servicing targets,
concentrating on the flanks of the
attack and deploying deep at its front.
The battle would be fought in a series
of successively deeper battle areas and
positions until the attack was killed.
There would be, however, no tradi-
tional massive counterattack to eject
the enemy. We were outnumbered; the
luxury of a large reserve force was
beyond our means. No idea in the
active defen'se doctrine has been
harder to get across than the absence
of a large reserve. It meant everybody
else has to do his job right-the first
Some perceive that we intended no
reserves at all. That was not the case.
What we were trying to say was that
the target servicing problem was likely
to be so acute, especially against a
breakthrough attack, that commanders
would not be able to afford to hold out
a reserve. If a reserve was held out, it
would most likely be a force disposed
in depth astride a major avenue of
approach, where it could defend in
depth, should the main attack develop
there, or be used elsewhere by moving
quickly to wherever the main attack
might be. These were terms familiar in
armor-mechanized doctrine for years-
when forces are slim, the reserve is the
uncommitted or least committed force.
Battalions probably would not have
a reserve, and brigades mayor may
not, depending on the division com-
mander's decision. If the division had
a reserve, brigades would not. The
corps commander may direct his divi-
sions to echelon brigades in depth
along a main avenue of approach in
the main battle area; these brigades to
be deployed under command of the
division commander, but not to be
employed without approval of the
corps commander. These would be both
the corps and division reserve. This
condition would have to obtain until
reinforcement units arrived in suffi-
cient strength and/or the battle stabi-
lized enough for a reserve to be created.
Even when a reserve was possible,
it was not likely that it would be
employed using the terms of reference
once set forth for the reserve in the
mobile defense. For the same reason
that we believed it possible to annihi-
late large numbers of armored forces
coming at us in mass formation, it was
possible for them to do likewise unto
us. That's what was different about the
active defense; that set it apart from
the mobile defense.
The alternative-maintaining a
large reserve as a counterattack force-
seemed and still seems out of the
question. There just aren't enough
forces to bcgin with.
Now, it also was true that a lot of
counterattacking would be necessary.
Remember, we talked of attacking by
fire, and by fire and maneuver, always
bearing in mind that, when the de-
fender got up out of the terrain to
maneuver, he gave up the terrain ad-
vantages that were his as a defender ..
Apparently, that was a harder concept
to grasp than we realized. But it also
was true that our enemy paid little
attention to terrain, and, therefore, it
was the battle multiplying effect of
terrain that could be one of our
greatest advantages, if we learned to
use it properly. Counterattacks were
important, but done in smaller incre-
ments and more quickly than before,
. and done carefully-not cautiously, but
The division normally was to be the
lowest level at which a counterattack
plan was formally prepared. A counter-
attack was by definition a hasty
attack, and, if it was not successful,
then the division may have to conduct
a deliberate attack. Thinking about
this for awhile, it became more and
more logical. Those who criticized this
concept for the lack of a large counter-
attack force frequently complained
about the porous nature of the main
battle area-everything was forward.
Now, holding out a large reserve
couldn't make a battle r e ~ any more
dense. Indeed, the reverse occurred.
You couldn't have it both ways.
. To attack, we found it appropriate
to study how the enemy defends. Eche-
lonment of forces was characteristic of
his defense doctrine. The enemy de-
fense attempted to canalize and Illis-
direct any attack. Massive counterat-
tacks at times and places of his own
choosing also were important. The two
most singular features were density of
troops and the massive size of the
counterattack forces-for a Soviet
front, an entire tank army.
Again, our operational concept was
to see deep, concentrate, suppress
enemy fires, strike into enemy rear
areas. The principles of seeing deep
already discussed apply once again.
This attack concept was somewhat
changed from before. Attacking ~ n e m y
rear areas was now to be a key feature
of any attack rather than a special
operation. This was so because the
main fight must be with the second
echelon; otherwise, we would be caught
in a battle of attrition that could return
us to the tactics of World War 1.
Striking enemy rear areas went hand
in glove with the see deep idea. The
rear area facilities of command,
control, communication and logistics
were the vulnerable parts of an enemy
defensive operation. They must be
destroyed. If we could destroy these by
fire, maneuver or by overrunning
them, the cohesion df the defense
would be broken.
FM 100-5 has been the target of but
one major criticism about offense-
critics say we didn't stress it. Now, in
page count and graphic presentations,
that may be true, but these aren't very
relevant. Lack of stress is in the eye or
mind of the reader. It may be that, for
nearly 20 years, we've been a
defensive-minded Army. We need to
change that, but printing the offense
chapter in blood isn't the way to do it .
It has to be instilled in soldiers' minds.
The best defense is still-as in
football-a good offense. The active
defense was designed as it is to stop
the enemy, to destroy his attack force,
so that we could go on the offense.
One final point is important. We
believed in 1970-73 that, by describing
the battle, we could develop a package
of tactics, force structure, equipment
and training. The operational
concept-the tactics-is now the pace-
setter for force structure and
equipment development. But we didn't
forget the last part-training. From the
tactics, we derived essential training
These principles perceive that wars
are won by the courage of soldiers, the
quality ofleaders and the excellence of
the training. Of the courage of soldiers,
there was no doubt, nor should there
be. The other two principles are related
and require some discussion.
When considering war, it was ob-
vious that, to win, one must think. But
thinking takes time, and, in battle,
there was no time. We must train all
our soldiers-officers and enlisted-to
think things through in advance. Only
if we were mentally prepared ahead of
time could we be successful. The
pressure of combat left no margin for
We and our enemy have similar
weapons. We fight on the same terrain,
in the same weather, and we both fight
fear. Only in the ability of our leaders
was there any difference. Therefore, we
must train our leaders to think logi-
cally about difficult problems and do it
quickly and under pressure so. the
decisions are on time and right-the
first time.
Our commanders must know best
what to do in complex situations-the
rub 'is that, in battle, commanders
couldn't be everywhere. Complex situa-
tions would develop where the com-
mander wasn't present or couldn't get
there. Soldiers must be trained to
handle complex situations with
standard drills-to do something right
un til the boss arrives.
To get things done in battle, deci-
sions must be made and orders given.
A complex battlefield called for
complex orders, and these could easily
go wrong. In battle, such difficulties
could be fatal, so we must train the
whole team through complex situa-
tions regularly.
Our training system was built on
these principles. From Skill Qualifi-
cation Tests and Soldiers' Manuals for
the individual soldier to Army
Training and Evaluation Programs for
unit training, they all support concepts
set forth in FM 100-5, Operations.
This, then, was the evolution of the
tactics that eventually were described
in FM 100-5. In my mind, one im-
portant result of this evolution has
been the subsequent discussions-the
di(llogue I mentioned earlier. Improve-
ments can be made in any operational
concept-FM 100-5 is no exception. The
direction for those improvements can
only be found through honest and
logical discussion. I hope that this
dialogue will continue, for 1t is truly
what keeps the concepts dynamic.
But, first and foremost, the opera-
tional concepts must be regarded, by
one and all, as the driving force behind
our development of organization, ma-
teriel and training. Only by recog-
nizing this purpose can the US Army
put soldiers in organizations and
equipment on the battlefield in an
effective fighting outfit-the combined
arms team. That team is the only
viable solution to the question of how
to fight and win the first and last
battles of the next war.
Army Supersonic Missile Targets. The US Army has awarded
Beech Aircraft Corporallon a $4 B-mlilion follow-on contract to
continue production of the supersonic rocket-powered AOM37A
missile target The award extends production of the Beech missile
targets through December 1979.
The contract IS for the Beech Model 7702. latest version of the
AOM37A The target system has been used since 1963 by the
Navy. Army and Air Force and several foreign nallons in evalu-
allng air-to-air and surface-to-alr missile weapons systems
Capable of simulating aircraft and missile intrUSions, the 13.5
foot-long, 560-pound AOM37A can be operated to a 70,OOO-foot
ailitude and mach 2.5 (1,650 miles per hour) speed. After
launching from an aircraft at up to 50,000 feet, the target IS
controlled In flight through a preprogramed electronic gUidance
Nonnuclear Deterrent
Colonel William V. Kennedy, US Army Reserve
As the Soviets achieve strategic parity with the United
States, our nuclear deterrent becomes less credible. In times
of crisis in Europe or the Middle East, do we have or could
we develop a deterrent capable of offsetting Soviet iniUa-
tiL'es without threatening a general nuclear exchange?
Perhaps the answer lies in the Soviet Kamchatka Peninsula
in the North Pacific. Far removed from the major population
and industrial centers of European Russia, this landmass
contains the only open ocean base for the Soviet Pacific
Fleet. Any US move to control Kamchatka would demand an
immediate Soviet response. Since the United States is strate-
gically stronger than the USSR in the North Pacific and
Kamchatka is not within the vital heartland of the Soviet
Union, a general nuclear exchange as a result of US action
against Kamchatka is unlikely. This option is not a plan of
aggression but should be an added deterrent, just as is our
nuclear options deterrent, geared to reducing the chance of
confrontation in some more critical area-for example, the
Middle East or Europe.
OR the past 30 years, the United
States has kept peace between t ~
major world powers by maintaining an
overwhelming margin of strategic
nuclear power. Even at its most
awesome, however, that power was not
sufficient to prevent the Soviet Union
from the exercise of military force.
Where they considered their vital
interests to be at stake, as in Hungary
in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968,
the Soviets acted directly. When they
have seen, or thought they have seen,
an opportunity for aggrandizement
without effective American response,
they have acted indirectly, but no less
ruthlessly, as in Korea and Vietnam,
and now in Angola.
During the 1973 Middle East crisis,
the Soviets, for the first time, indicated
a willingness to introduce Soviet land
forces into an area where a direct
Copynght 1978 by Colonel Wilham V Kennedy, US Army Reserve
confrontation with the United States
would have been almost certain. The
relationship between this threat and
the fact that the Soviets are rapi,dly
achieving at least equality with the
United States in strategic nuclear force
seems obvious.
The casualty lists of Vietnam and
Korea make a mockery of the idea that
the past quarter-century was a period
of peace. But, to the degree that a
relative peace was maintained, it
seems plain that Soviet aggression was
restrained only because the United
States could pose a direct threat to the
existence of the Soviet state without a
comparable risk to itself. Soviet equal-
ity in nuclear weapons introduces an
element of increasing doubt into this
relationship. The Middle East and
Angola experiences have shown that,
as this element of doubt increases, the
Soviets will become increasingly
bolder. How, then, do we re-establish
the deterrent as a significant and
dependable constraint on Soviet am-
For the moment, the most volatile
area of potential US-USSR confron-
tation is the Middle East. Yet the
Middle East also is one of the most
difficult areas in the world in which to
employ American forces on a scale
equal to the possible demands.
Experience has shown that Europe
cannot be depended upon as a base
from which to oppose Soviet actions
not directly aimed at the NATO allies.
US forces deployed from the Conti-
nental United States to the Middle
East must operate at extreme distances
and under severe handicaps in regard
to overflight rights and the use of
territorial waters. Use of US land
forces anywhere in the Middle East
almost certainly would provoke the
hostility of most of the governments
and peoples of the region. In this
situation, a relatively small com-
mitment of Soviet forces could tie down
a disproportionate share of the Amer-
ican military establishment, largely
in protection of long and vulnerable
lines of communication. The opportu-
nities this would provide for -Soviet
mischief elsewhere are almost li-
Faced with such disadvantages, it
seems reasonable to suggest that we
look for areas where a smaller US force
could exert such a compelling influence
that the Soviets would be forced to
moderate their policies. From past
and current experience, such an alter-
Colonel William V. Kennedy. US Army
Reserve. IS with, the StrategIc Studies In-
stttute, US Army War College, Carlisle Bar-
racks, Pa. He IS a graduate of Marquette
Unwerslty and the USACGSC. He has served
as an mtelltgence off,cer in the Strategic Air
Command. as an Army public affairs officer
in the National Guard Bureau and currently
is a mobtl,zatwn designee to the Office of the
Deputy Ch,ef of Staff for Operations and
Traming. Headquarters. First US Army. Fort
Meade. Md.
native should possess the following
principal characteristics:
Pose a direct threat to Soviet vital
interests, but at a level belo"," strategic
nuclear reaction.
Be free from political restrictions
on use of air and sea space.
Support rather than detract from
the security interests of other major
There is only one area-the North
Pacific-that appears to offer the
means to achieve so special a combi
The United States and the Soviet
Union share a common border in the
Bering Strait. The landmass directly
opposite Alaska-the Chukotski
Peninsula-is of minimal strat 'gic im-
portance to either the United States or
the Soviet Union because of its re-
moteness from any center of major
human activity. To the south, however,
lies an area of considerably greater
strategic importance-the Kamch{ltka
Although icebound for several
months during the year, Petropav-
lovsk, on the southeastern coast of
Kamchatka, is the only Soviet Pacific
Fleet base on the open ocean. Forces
based at Vladivostok and the other
Soviet Pacific coast ports must pass
one of several restricted passages to
gain the open sea. In short, the denial
of Petropavlovsk to the Soviet Union
coupled with air and sea surveillance
of the exits from the restricted
passages to the south would reduce the
status of the Soviet Union drastically
as a Pacific and world power.
The detachment of the Kamchatka
Peninsula itself from Soviet control
would have a far-reaching influence on
the overall strategic balance in North:
east Asia. The threat now posed to
Japan from the Soviet-occupied Kurile
Islands would be reduced. The at-
tention of the Soviet forces on China's
borders would be diverted and the
security of their strategic base
threatened. The eventual return of the
entire Kurile Island chain and of Sa-
khalin to Japan and the possibility of
even more dramatic gains by China
would become much less a remote
possibility than is now the case. Of the
four major powers in the area, only the
Soviet Union would lose. In short, the
vital interests of the Soviet Union in
the Northeast Asian power rela-
tionship would be truly engaged but
without threatening either the exis-
tence of the Soviet Government or of
the Russian homeland-the only two
entities for which there is any
plausible likelihood of a strategic
nuclear response.
To understand the existing and
potential strategic significance of
Kamchatka, it is necessary to examine
its relationship to the Soviet Union as
a whole. Kamchatka is outposted by
the Komandorskiye (Commander) Is-
lands, essentially an extension of the
Aleutians, and by Karaginski Island
closer in to the neck of land, largely
tundra, that connects Kamchatka to
the Siberian mainland.
The peninsula itself is 750 miles
long and 260 miles across at its widest
point. Two mountain ranges divided by
the Kamchatka River Valley run most
of the. length of the peninsula. The
river is navigable by shallow-draft
boats for about 200 miles from its
mouth on the Pacific coast. The
western range of mountains contains
many extinct volcanoes. There are
active volcanoes in the eastern range,
including Klyuchevskaya Sopka, 4,860
meters high. One of the volcanoes,
Stubel, erupted in the winter of 1907
and covered the entire peninsula with
ashes to a depth sufficient to stop dog
sled traffic. A vacha, 30 kilometers
northeast of Petropavlovsk, erupted in
1926 and continues to emit vapors and
sulphurous gases. As would be ex-
pected from the volcanic character of
the mountains, the peninsula is subject
to frequent earthquakes.
The Japan current protects Kam-
chatka from the extreme cold of
mainland Siberia, but the resulting
monsoon-type climate creates some of
the worst fogs in the entire Pacific.
During summer, the coasts are fog-
bound more than half of the time. The
coasts are relatively free of fog in
winter, but ice limits approach from
the sea. Precipitation is heavy with
much snow in the winter except on the
west coast where the winds from the
North Pac,ftc Ocean
Siberian mainland sweep bare the
sand and gravel beaches.
There are forests of mountain birch,
Japanese stone pine, alder and
mountain ash on the slopes and in the
mountain draws. There are meadow-
lands and bogs in the Kamchatka
River Valley.
The Russians arrived' in 1696 and
rapidly submerged the native tribes .
. Today, there is a population of about a
quarter million, of which fewer than
20,000 are natives. Petropavlovsk is
the principal population center, com-
prising about half the total. In addition
to the naval facilities at Petropavlovsk,
the population is supported by fishing,
fish processing, lumbering and mining.
Mining activity is carried out princi-
pally on the west coast where there are
significant deposits of gold, copper,
molybdenum, mercury, coal and appar-
ently oil. The numerous hot springs
associated with the volcanic nature of
the peninsula enabled the Soviets to
establish a 5,OOO-kilowatt geothermal
power station in 1964-the' first of its
kind in the Soviet Union.
The center of the lumbering in-
dustry is Klyuchi, northeast of Petro-
Roads and trails connect
these two points and ports on the east
and west coasts.
Although a peninsula in the tech-
nical sense, Kamchatka is in the
strategic sense more truly an island
separated from the principal centers of
Soviet power less by water than by
huge expanses of difficult terrain and
climate. The peninsula is supported
principally from the Vladivostok
region, 1,500 miles distant by sea and
air. Yakutsk, the nearest inland center
of support, is about the same distance
away across an almost tackless wil
derness. The Northern Sea Route based
at Archangel in European Russia
passes along the Kamchatka coast, but
it is a tenuous link at best.
The remoteness of Kamchatka from
European Russia and even from the
principal center of Soviet Far Eastern
power in the Pacific Maritime Prov-
inces led to a bizarre incident
whereby the peninsula might have
come under American influence or
control almost for the asking.
Victimized by his own propaganda
and stereotypes, Lenin in 1920 was
almost conned by one Washington
Baker Vanderlip into an agreement by
which Kamchatka would be leased to
the United States for a period of 60
years. "We shall give America a ter-
ritory," Lenin wrote of the deal. "In
this way we incite American imperi-
alism against the Japanese bour-
The scheme collapsed when Lenin
finally became aware that Vanderlip
had no official standing. The Brooklyn
Bridge had never been sold, or nearly
sold, on so grand a scale.
The incident tells something of
where Russian interests are focused in
time of crisis. Lenin obviously was
preoccupied with events in European
Russia. Now, as in Lenin's day, that is
where the great preponderance of the
Russian people live. Experience with
forced and induced migrations of Rus-
sians into Eastern Siberia indicates
that European Russia is also the place
where the great majority of Russians
prefer to go on living. As a result, the
Soviets never have been able to pop-
ulate their Far Eastern territories to a
degree commensurate with the re-
sources of the region. Further, there is
evidence of a resentment in European
Russia of the large sums spent to
develop the Far Eastern provinces. In
short, the huge sums needed to
overcome the permafrost and extreme
cold of Siberia would be more pro-
ductive if invested in the European
The nightmare of the Soviets is the
knowledge that 'U"apanese capital and
Chinese labor C;buld develop Eastern
Siberia more n/pidly and more fully
than can the Russians. This fear is
certain to increase as the growth of the
overall Russian Caucasian population
slows or declines while the numbers,
needs and aspirations of the East
Asian peoples continue to increase.
The population gap between the Rus-
sians and their Far Eastern neighbors
probably never will be closed, but the
technology gap that is the foundation
of Russian superiority in East Asia is
being closed rapidly.
Can the United States use the weak-
nesses and the inherent,vulnerabilities
of the Russian position in East Asia to
reinforce or restore deterrence?
The strategic position of the United
States in the North Pacific is relatively
stronger than that of the Soviet Union.
American naval and amphibious
forces can maneuver anywhere in the
North Pacific without passing the sort
of strategic defiles that confront the
greater part of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.
The Aleutians provide the United
States with the means to project land-
based tactical air power to within 600
miles of Petropavlovsk-in effect, a
protected corridor spanning the Pa-
cific. The principal base for projection
of US power in the region is the North-
western United States. That base area
cannot be attacked successfully except
by triggering a strategic nuclear ex-
change. There are no political restric-
tions posed by the territorial waters or
air space of third nations.
The absence of large civilian popu-
lations and of the potential for colla-
teral damage to anything but ocean
and sub-Arctic wilderness suggest that
the risk of tactical nuclear warfare
might be higher in the North Pacific
than elsewhere. Because of their rela-
tively weak strategic position in the
region, the use of tactical nuclear
weapons might be more attractive to
the Soviets than to the attacker.
Without discounting the seriousness
of the tactical nuclear risks, it can be
concluded that, by deliberately and
publicly posing a threat to Kamchatka,
the United States would be in a po-
sition to exact from the Soviets a high
price for Soviet adventurism in the
Middle East, Europe or other areas of
vital or major interest to the United
States and its allies.
The upper range of likely Soviet
r s p o n s ~ already has been mentioned.
There is a range of other responses
available to the Soviets, but they are
all severely limited by considerations
of logistics and geography.
The Soviets could reinforce a
threatened Kamchatka by air, but they
could_ not support a sizable garrison
except by sea. As noted, support by sea
must come through narrow and easily
blocked passages from the south or
around the Siberian landmass. Any
attempt by the United States to detach
Kamchatka from Soviet control could
trigger a naval war in the North Pa-
cific supported by transfer of Soviet
naval forces from Europe. These forces
would be exposed in transit to the same
hazards that led to the destruction of
an earlier Russian fleet in 1904. Even if
they arrived safely, it is doubtful that
the existing base and industrial
structure of the Soviet Far East could
support them for long.
Similar limitations apply to the
marshaling of tactical air power in
Eastern Siberia. Forced to organize a
defensive effort of this magnitude, it is
doubtful that the Soviets would wish to
continue major military initiatives in
Europe or the Middle East, particularly
with China, whether openly hostile or
nominally friendly, waiting on the
flank for what Mao Tse-tung has called
,China's "accounting" with the Rus-
What is presented here is not a plan
for aggression against the Soviet
Union, any more than the mai!1te-
nance of an adequate strategic nuclear
deterrent represents such a plan. By
discussing inherent Soviet weaknesses
in East Asia, it is meant simply to
point out that it is not always neces-
sary to confront the Soviets at the
point or points of their greatest
strength in order to dissuade them
from a dangerous course of action.
The US forces necessary to detach
Kamchatka from Soviet control are
largely already in existence, Employed
in the North Pacific, these forces could
divert a much larger proportion of
Soviet military strength and economic
reSources than would be the case if the
same US forces were to be transported
to theaters on the doorstep of the
principal centers of Soviet power, as in
Europe or the Middle East. The
statement attributed to Prime Minister
Harold Wilson of Britain that "one
soldier east of Suez is worth a
thousand on the Rhine" is truer in the
North Pacific and Northeast Asia than
anywhere else.
The ability to create and to make
believable this added deterrent rests on
the ability of the United States to
retain or establish air and naval supe-
riority in the North Pacific. Security of
the Alaskan North Slope oil fields
would seem sufficient in itself to justify
such a capability. Some further devel-
opment of the mainland Alaska and
Aleutians base system and an increase
in amphibious shipping probably
would be necessaTY. Annual exercises
on the Alaskan coast and in the Aleu-
tians in various seasons would be
essential. Linkage of the Alaska
Railroad to the continental system
would strengthen the overall US
strategic position in the North Pacific,
but it would require consideration of
Canadian sensibilities concerning
shipment of military freight during a
crisis in which Canada did not con-
sider itself involved.
The actual employment of forces
against Kamchatka would presume
that a major crisis involving the
United States and the Soviet Union
already had occurred. Exercise of the
Kamchatka deterrent, therefore, would
be aimed at lessening the dangers
inherent in confrontation in some more
critical area, such as Europe or the
Middle East.
The emergence of nuclear parity
marks the end of a period of relative
certainty in the relationships between
the superpowers. The history of
mankind indicates that, when any
weapon reaches thIs stage, it is no
longer the weapon itself that is a
determinant of action, but how the
weapon is used. It would be reckless to
depend on the destructiveness of
nuclear weapons as, ipso facto, a ne-
gation of all of this long history. If we
are to continue to maintain a pre-
carious peace, new ways to reinforce
deterrence must be found. To accom-
plish this, it will be necessary to widen
the spectrum of strategic thought
beyond Europe and, lately, the Middle
East. The North Pacific offers possibil-
NOTICE. The February 1978 Issue of the MR contained an Item In the
"Under Study" feature on a new publication. Review of the Soviet
Ground Forces The agency which distributes the Review, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, has asked that requests for the monthly publication
be submitted through commal)d channels rather than directly to the
agency as previously stated
Soviet Bloc
Recent Exercise Patterns
Implications for European
and Their
Graham H. Turbiville Jr.
Since the signing of the Final Act at the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe in Hel8inki in Augu8t
1975, the Soviets have announced several Soviet/pact ma-
neuvers. However, none have been on the scale of those held
in the 1960s and early 1970s. The West has no way of
knowing if other field exercises were held or how many or of
what magnitude. The West remembers the exercises that
took place prior to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.
While the "confidence-building measures" contained in the
CSCE Final Act may have had some impact, any future
agreements on prior notification of large-scale military
activity must include a workable verification clause.
OVIET and Warsaw Pact maneuvers With exercises Dnieper, Dvina (1970)
have long held a fascination for and Yug (1971). the paradrop/airlanding
Western military observers. In the 1960s of entire airborne divisions gave Soviet
and early 1970s, a series of Widely threats to use military force in the 1973
publicized, large-scale exercises taking October War added credibility. In ad-
place in Eastern Europe, the Soviet UnIOn dltlon, a number of exercises since the
and throughout the world's oceans have mld-1960s have Indicated a growing
afforded the West with at least a limited Soviet Interest In nonnuclear operations.
opportunity to study and assess how well Exercises like Opal-71 (1971) and Shield-
Soviet and pact armed forces could Im- 72 (1972) made It clear that the most
plement the tactical doctrine and opera- probable contingency for pact forces In
tlonal concepts governing the em- Hungary Will be commitment against the
ployment of those forces designated to NATO Central Region,
carry out wartime operations against A number of Western military writers
NATO have discussed Soviet bloc maneuvers,
Beginning In the early 1960s and with many Interpretations of their slgnlfi-
continuing to 1972. the USSR-either cance haVing been offered.' But by far
Unilaterally or 10lntly with other Warsaw the greatest concern to Western decl-
Pact states-camed out at least one sionmakers has been In the area of
well-publicized military maneuver a year
(see the accompanYing table for a
lengthy. but by no means complete,
listing of Soviet/pact exercises) So-
viet/pact press releases on these .exer-
cises almost always rewarded the careful
reader with some inSight Into Warsaw
Pact military capabilities and planning
and, on occasion. revealed the eXistence
of some new piece of military hardware.
It was In Dmeper (1967), for example.
that the Soviets demonstrated the em-
ployment of helicopters in a ground
attack and antlarmor role, an event that
'heralded the Widespread introduction of
armed helicopters Into Soviet forces In
the exercises Oder (1967), Sever-58
(1968), Oder-Neisse (1969), Oke,m
(1970) and Comrades-in-Arms (1970),
the Warsaw Pact demonstrated ItS capa-
bility and its almost certain intent In
wartime to carry out numerous am-
phibIOus operations against the NATO
Northern and Central Regions (and to th\3
south as well).
IndiCatiOnS and warning of hostilities.
While fully recognizing that the pact has
many reasons for conducting exercises.>
pia nners cha rged with the defense of
Western Europe must view any unusual
Warsaw Pact troop concentration or
movement as a pOSSible prelude to
hostile military operations.
That exercise activity could be used as
a means of preparing for actual combat
operations was, of course, a precedent
set long before the existence of the
Warsaw Pact and NATO. But the Soviet-
led invaSion of Czechoslovakia freshly
illustrated how attack preparations in'
Europe could be carried out under the
cover of exercise activity' ExerCise
Sumava, the huge logistic Neman ex-
ercise, Sever-58, Sky Shield and others
(all In 1968 and all discussed In the
Soviet/pact press) are viewed by most
Western observers as being conducted at
least in part in preparation for the inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia' Thus, large-
scale pact exercises-announced or
otherwise-must remain a cause of some
concern to the West.
It has been principally for this
reason-the uncertainties surroundiNg
large pact troop movements-that
Western negotiators have pushed for
provisions calling for the prior notifi-
cation of-and exchange of information
on-military exercises and troop move-
ments in both the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
and the continuing Mutual and Balanced
Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. Before
discussing recent trends In Soviet bloc
maneuvers, it IS worth briefly reviewing
the prior notification proVisions of the
CSCE Final Act and what is apparently
being discussed In thiS area at the MBFR
"Confidence-Building Measures"
and "Associated Measures"
Since the signing of the CSCE Final
. Act in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, world
attention has centered most heavily on
the human rights provisions of the
agreement It IS with those portions of
the Final Act labeled "confldence-
building measures,"' however, that are of
most concern here. Under the heading
"document on confidence-building meas-
ures and certain aspects of security and
disarmament,'" it was noted that each of
the participating states (which the So-
viets Invariably refer to as "33 European
states, the USA and Canada") had agreed
to notify all other signatories of any
military exercise exceeding 25,000
troops "independently or combined with
any pOSSible air or naval components (in
thiS context, the word troops includes
amphibiOUS and airborne troops):'6 This
meant, then, that, of the 25,000 troops,
only ground, airborne and naval infantry
(marine) personnel would be counted
regardless of how many naval and air
force personnel were Involved. It also
was stated that:
.. notification will be given of major
military maneuvers which take place on
the territory, in Europe, of any particI-
pating state as well as, If applicable, In
the .adjoining sea area and air space.
[For those states] ... whose terntory
extends beyond Europe, prior notification
need be given only of maneuvers which
take place in an area within 250 kil-
ometers from Its frontier facing or
shared With any other European partici-
pating state.
Thus, prior notification of all major
exercises taking place In the East Eu
ropean Warsaw Pact states should be
given, as well as exercises taking place in
Graham H Turblvd'e Jr IS currently at the
University of Montana working toward hiS doc-
torate In history He recefved a B A In RUSSIan
from Southern IIImols University and an M A
In RUSSIan studies from George Washmgton
UnIverSity From 1969 to 1975. he was WIth the
Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of
Defense H,s artIcle "Paradrop at the Buknn
Bndgehead An Account of the SOVIet Dmeper
Airborne OperatIon"' appeared In the December
1976 Military ReVIew
1961-July 1977
Unnamed] Dc. 1961 East Germanv USSR East Germany3
Unnamed Sep 1962 Poland USSR. Poland. East Germany
Unnamed Sep 1962 Czechoslovakia USSR. Czechoslovakia, Poland
Unnamed Oct 1962 Rumania USSR, Rumania, Bulgaria
Quartet Sep 1963 East German'll USSR. East Germany. Poland.
Unnamed Jun 1964 Czechoslovakia USSR, Czechoslovakia, East
Unnamed Sep 1964 Bulgaria USSR, Bulgaria. Rumania
Unnamed Apr 1965 East Germany USSR. East Germany
October Storm Oct ,1965 East Germany USSR, East Germany. Poland.
Vita va Sep 1966 Czechoslovakia USSR. Czechoslovakia, East
Germany. Hungary
Unnamed Jun 1967 ,Czechoslovakia, Hungary USSR. Czechoslovakia. Hungary
Rhodope Aug 1967 Bulgaria. USSR USSR. Bulgana, Rumanta
Florett Aug 1967 fast Germany USSR. East Germany
Dnteper Sep 1967 USSR USSR
Oder Oct 1967 Poland USSR, Poland, East Germany
Sumava Jun 1968 USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia. USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Hungary East Germany. Hungary
Jul 1968 Naval/amphibIous operatIons USSR, Poland, East Germany
BaltiC and North AtlantiC
Sky Shield JullAug 1968 USSR, Eastern Europe USSR, Warsaw Pactwlde
Neman Jull Aug 1968 USSR. Poland. East Germany USSR. Poland. East Germany
Unnamed Aug 1968 Hungary USSR. Hungary
Unnamed Aug 1968 USSR, Poland. East Germany USSR. Poland, East Germanv
Unnamed Mar 1969 East Germany USSR. East Germany
Sprmg-59 MarfApr 1969 East.Germany. Poland. USSR. Poland, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia
Oder-Neisse Sep 1969 Poland USSR, Poland, East Germany,
Unnamed Junl Jul 1') 1970 CzechoslovakIa USSR. CzechoslovakIa
OVlna Mar 1970
Unnamed Aug 1970 Czecho51ovakla
USSR. Czechoslovakia
CDmradesInArms Oct 1970 East Germany
USSR. East Germany. Poland.
Czechoslovakia. Hungary, .
Bulgaria, RumanIa
Okean 70 Apr/May 1970
WorldWide naval exerCise with USSR
amphibious landings by fleet
manne elements
Yug Jun 1971 USSR
Opaf.71 Aug 1971 Czechoslovakia, Hungary USSR. Czechoslovakia, Hungary
Unnamed Oct 1971 Czechoslovakia USSR. Czechoslovakia
Unnamed Feb 1972 RUmanIa USSR. Rumania. Bulgana
Unnamed Apr 1972 Poland USSR. Poland
Sprmg72 May 1972 Poland Poland
Shleld-72 Sep 1972 Czechoslovakia USSR. Czechoslovakia, East
Germany. Poland.
Vertes-73 Sep 1973 Hungary USSR. Hungary
Summer. 74 Jun 1974 Poland USSR Poland
Okean- 75 (Also Apr 1975 WorldWide naval exerCise USSR
called Sprmg-75J
Kavkaz76 Jan/ Feb 1976 USSR USSR
Jun 1976 USSR USSR
Shield 76 Sep 1976 Poland USSR. Poland, East Germany
Unnamed Oct 1976 Hungary USSR, Hungary
Unnamed Jul 1977 Naval In Baltic Sea USSR. Poland. East Germany
Karpaty 77 Jul 1977 USSR USSR
1 ThiS table Shpuld m no sense be regarded as a complete listing of those Soviet and Warsaw Pact maneuvers held
from 196177 and discussed In the Sovletl pact media but only as a compIlation of some of the more prominent ones
2 Whenever possible the names of Soviet/pact exercises have been mcluded Howe\ier In a number of Instances
exercises were either unnamed or their deSignations were not revealed In the Sovletlpact media sources used to compile
the table In those cases the exercIses are listed as unnamed
3 Oleg PenkovsklY The PenkovsklY Papers. Translated by Peter Deflabm. Avon Books. N Y 1965 pp 241-45
mdlcated that. In October 1 161, general strategic military exerCises would commence and that these exercIses would
take place over the entire temtory of the SovIet UnIon and the terTifory of the people s democracies With the mam strIke
directed against maps, of course The armed forces of the people s democracIes were to partiCipate as
well Whether the October 1961 Warsaw Pact exercise listed abo\ie represented a part or all of the exercise PenkovsklY
beheved would take place at the same time cannot be determmed but a relationShIp seems likely
the westernmost 250 kilometers of the
USSR (with the exceptl6ns of those noted
In footnote 8). It also was stated that
prior notification would be given 21 days
or more before the exercise "or In the
case of a maneuver arranged at shorter
notice at the earliest possible opportunity
prior to the starting date. "9 Other
co'nfldence-bulldlng measures prOVided
for the exchange of observers at exer-
cises. the prenotification of other smaller
exercises not reaching the 25,000-man
level (If deSired by the participant holding
the exerCise as a tension-reducing
measure) and the prior notificatIOn of
major military movements at the
discretion of the Signatories '0 These
measures were seen as haVing the po-
tential for easing military tensions In
Europe generally (by the West at least),
while promoting stability and redUCing
the chances of misunderstandings o v e ~
military activity which could lead to war 1
Western negotiators reportedly are
push Ing for Sl mila r prior notification ar-
rangements In the MBFR talks (the of-
fiCial deSignation IS Mutual Reduction of
Forces and Armaments and ASSOCiated
Measures In Central Europe). The prior
notification diSCUSSions failing under the
"associated measures" area of the talks
have seen the West calling for exchanges
of information on both large-scale exer-
cises and unit redeployments, as well as
other subjects."
Some Soviet spokesmen have been
less than enthUSiastic' over the asso-
Ciated measure provISions. For example,
Soviet commentator Yu. Kostko, writing
during the preparatory stages of the
MBFR talks In the June 1972 Issue of
Mlrovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye
otnoshenniye (World Economics and In-
ternatIOnal RelatIOns), noted in regard to
the Ineffectiveness of assOCiated meas-
ures "It IS well known that It was the
practice during the thirties to inVite
foreign military observers to attend ma-
neuvers, and at the same time the world
was plunging rapidly toward World War
II," With Kostko gOing on to state that
assOCiated measures "have the objective
of preserving Intact the eXisting NATO
military mechanlsm."'2
In any event, despite the opposition of
at least some elements of the Soviet
government. the Issue of announcing
exercises and troop movements prior to
their commencement became a tOPIC for
negotiation in both the CSCE and the
MBFR talks With the signing of the Final
Act In August 1975, and the Soviet
agreement to abide by the prOVISions,
Western observers awaited with conSid-
erable Interest for the prior notification
of-and inVitatIOn of observers to-the
first Soviet/Warsaw Pact exercise
Initial Soviet Reaction to the Military
Provisions of the Final Act
Shortly after the signing of the Final
Act. NATO stepped up preparations for
carrying out a series of scheduled ma-
neuvers In Europe which were to take
place over a period of some two months
and would Include the movement of US
troops to Germany In the annual Re-
forger exerclse.
As a NATO commu-
nique noted'
In accordance with the provisions of
the Final Act, the Allies concerned have
already notified all CSCE partiCipants of a
number of military maneuvers and have
Invited observers. The Allies look for the
Implementation of such measures also by
the members of the Warsaw Pact. ,.
Soviet reaction was not long in
coming It took the form of Widespread
and heated denunciations of the United
States and NATO for raising tensions In
Europe by carrYing out and publicizing
the exercises-all of which were carried
out and announced by NATO in strict
adherence to the agreements signed only
weeks earlier The NATO invitations to
send observers were ignored by the pact
nations. Citing violations of the "liplrit of
Helsinki," one Soviet source presented
the following review of these events'
It would seem that a certain decline in
the mllitaflstlc activIties of the bloc
should have occurred after the suc-
cessful conclusIOn of the Conference on
Secunty and Cooperation In Europe,
However, thIs has not been the case.
Instead, the NA TO leadership undertook
a whole series of large military ma-
neuvers (8arfrost-75, 8ig Rochade, Deep
Express, and others). This kind of saber
rattlmg, so charactenstlc of the Cold War
days, is in fundamental contradIction to
the atmosphere of detente and the spirit
of the European Conference whIch was
perceIved everywhere as the beginmng
of a new stage In the life of European
nations. 15
And. in another Soviet publication,
Lieutenant Colonel N Chaldymov ob-
The militant circles of NA TO are
vigorous opponents of detente ThIs IS
confirmed among other things by the fact
that soon after the European Conference
in autumn last year the NA TO staffs
carried out a whole series of military
exercIses in Western Europe. As the
Washington Post put it, they were con-
ducted on a scale and accompamed by
propaganda trumpeting that would have
been regarded as provocative even in the
years of the cold war. 16
While Dr Joseph Luns, secretary
general of NATO, and others were qUick
to pOint out the absurdities in the Soviet
charges." the most pressing question
was this' Would the Warsaw Pact ac-
tually give prior notification of their own
larger exercises according to the ground
rules of the Final Act-particularly in.
light of Initial Communist reaction? Given
the pact penchant for large, we 1(-,
publicized maneuvers, It could be ex-
pected that this question would be an-
swered qUickly-or could it? A closer look
at the Warsaw Pact exercise pattern
suggests that a definite-If not
permanent-change had taken place
some three years prior to the Signing of
the Helsinki document. at a time when
the prior notification Issue was beginning
to be seriously discussed
From Shleld-72 to Kavkaz-76
Warsaw Pact exercise took
place from 4-16 September 1972 and
Included the partiCipation of Soviet,
Czechoslovak. East German, Polish and
Hungarian armed forces elements It
was In every sense a "large-scale" ex-
erCise, with the pact media reporting that
"several tens of thousands of troops and
several thousands of combat vehicles;'
were participating 18 The exercise was
observed by a number of high-ranking
Soviet and Warsaw Pact officials, to
Include then Soviet defense minister,
Marshal Andret Grechko, and former
Warsaw Pact commander in chief,
Marshal I I. Yakubovsky. When speaking
of Warsaw Pact exercises generally, and
Shield-72 In particular, one pact com-
mentator stated the follOWing:
Joint exercises are of extraordinary
importance for further strengthening of
the combat readiness and coordination of
the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact
Treaty member states. T-hey have shown
traditionally the high degree of !;ombat
readmess of troops, reliability of weap-
onry, mastery in its operation, high
organization ability of commanders,
staffs, political bodies, (Communist) Party
and youth orgamzations, as well as the
good tramtng and morale, political and
combat Qualities of military units
This year's JOint exercises will be
called Shleld-72 ... (EmphaSIS added.)'9
The above passage IS typical of many
pact media reports on the exercise, and
the language Illustrates the fact that pact
exercises had by 1972 become "tradi-
tional" and yearly occurrences Upon
Shield 72's termination. Marshal Yaku-
bovsky noted that "one of the major joint
exercises of the JOint Armed Forces of
the Warsaw Pact had ended."20 The
completion of the exercise also marked
the last of those widely publicized "tradi-
tional JOint exercises" and of well-
publicized. large-scale Soviet/pact exer-
cises generally for several years.
To be sure, there were relatively terse
press announcements of exercises and
limited commentary on them, most
notably the Vertes-73 and Lato74 ma-
neuvers One Western European press
source-In a quote attributed to the
exercise commander-Indicated that
Vertes-73 Involved "several tens of thou-
sands of soldiers" ("mehrere zehn-
tousend soldaten'V' But, while this
could well have been the case, the next
three years saw an uncustomary silence
on the part of the Warsaw Pact nations
regarding their maneuvers. This does not
mean that they did not conduct any
large-scale field training exercises.
During this period, Soviet military
journals related countless examples of
"lessons learned" from unidentified field
training which could have ranged in size
from company level to several divisions.
In addition, the value of field training was
constantly put forth as the most valuable
type of training for troops and units.
Havmg said all this, it is necessary to
examine possible explanations for this
rather sudden down-playing of their mil-
Itary exercise actIVity which earlier they
had reported with such pride. First of all,
the years 1 972-76 saw a continuation of
the alarming Soviet/pact military
bUildup, a process that had been going
on for some years. In reviewing the pact
bUildup during thiS period, the North
Atlantic CounCil noted in May 1976 that:
Accordingly, ministers felt they must
once again vOice their concern at the
sustained growth in the Warsaw Pact
countries military power on land, at sea,
and in the air beyond levels apparently
justified for defensive purposes. 22
But, while the pact steadily was Intro-
ducing new equipment into the forward
area, the Soviets also were pushing for a
European security conference and had-
reluctantly---'agreed to undertake the
MBFR discussions. If one looks at the
1 972 press releases on Shield-72, he
Will fmd that the descriptions of the
exercise were accompanied with calls for
the long-deSired security conference. For
example, Czechoslovak Central Com-
mittee general secretary, Gustav Husak,
speaking at the parade terminating
Shield-72, noted:
Recognition of existing realities and of
the inviolability of the frontiers estab-
lished after World War I/, renunciation
of the use of force or the threat to use
force, and all our other pOSitive proposals
contained in the Prague declaration of
the meeting of the Political Consultative
Committee of the Warsaw Pact in
January of this year [1972] are a sound
basIs on which future cooperation among
European nations could develop. These
Questions shOUld be a topic of discussion
at a prepared conference on European
seCUrtty and cooperation. ... 23
It may have occurred to the Soviets
and their pact allies at about thiS time
that the continued publicity they were
giving to Warsaw Pact military capabil-
Ities was not really commensurate With
their proclamations on European security
and their desire for the European con-
ference While there was apparently no
question about curtailing the Introduction
of more and newer equipment Into
Eastern Europe (it continued at any rate),
there was no question but what the
large, well-publiCized combined arms
maneuvers were very vIsible Indeed.
Too, it was very difficult to critiCize
NATO exercises and actions while car-
rying out larger troop maneuvers them-
selves. (as was the case With Shield-72
where Soviet critiCism of NATO's Strong
Express conducted concurrently had to
be somewhat muted) It seems likely,
then, that the Soviets-greatly deSirous
of the CSCE-decided sometime In late
1972 to curtail publiCity sharply on their
exercises and to present, as much as
pOSSible, a picture of relative military
inactivity throughout EaStern Europe.
Also, the Soviets were apparently unen-
thusiastic over the prospect of exercise
prenotification provisions becoming a
part of any agreement, and may well
have Wished to down-play their con-
tinued Importance in order to negotiate
the most favorable-and least specific-
arrangement for the confidence-building
measure proviSions under the CSCE.
The realization of thiS apparent Soviet
Wish for a lower military profile In Europe
may have been helped, in part, by im-
proved Soviet training techniques and
concepts. There IS some evidence that at
least some Soviet officers believe that a
number of the benefits derived from the
larger exercises can be gained in other
ways. Thus, one article by a junior Soviet
officer expressed the following view
As is known, the activeness of the
'enemy' in exercises and training and the
strengthening of the impact of its real
presence are factors which raise the
results of training time. But among some
there IS the opinion that this can be
achieved only on large-scale exercises.
However, the training and exercise prac-
tices in the subunits mdicate the mva-
Ifcllty of such an opinion.
The article went on to describe how
realistiC opposed-force training was
carried out In a subUnit With excellent
results. The view expressed in the above
passage was expanded upon by the
deputy commander for combat training of
the Central Group of Forces (CGF),
Czechoslovakia, Lieutenant General V.
Bukharenko, who observed the follOWing
about an unidentified CGF exercise held
In the fall of 1976:
The final exercise demonstrated that
m many Units and subunits the ability of
commanders to organize and mamtam
coordmated action has increased. This
has been promoted by tactical drills and
command-staff exercises held m the
field, durmg which commanders learned
to coordinate the actions of the various
elements m the. combat formation and all
subunits partiCipating In the en-
gagement. Brief tactical exercises and
group dnlls involved working on'
problems of controllmg subUnits with the
aid of various means of communication
and prearranged signals. Drills and exer-
cises would be directed as a rule by the
regimental commander or by one of his
deputies. The results convince us that
the expended labor was not in vain. 25
Other articles emphaSizing the
conduct of numerous, complex field exer-
cises at regimental or lower level, as well
as the col'iduct of "command-staff" exer-
cises involVing higher level personnel but
few troops In the field, have been ap-
pearing in the Soviet military press for
the last few years (Summer-74 being an
example of a large "command-staff'
exercise). It IS possible that the Soviets
and their Warsaw Pact allies may not
have perceived the absolute need for
exercises on the same scale as a VIta va
or Shield-72.26
While there IS still every indication
that the Soviets believe sizable joint
exercises involving two or more member
nations or unilateral exercises involving
several divIsions must be held periodi-
cally, there also may have been the
feeling that the pact forces were not
risking any degradation In combat read-
Iness for foregOing those combined arms
exercises involving 100,000 or more
personnel-at least for several years and
perhaps as a standard practice. Unpubll-
clzed maneuvers of aboui half that size or
smaller would be far less viSible and,
possibly In the Soviet/pact view, Just as
effective when combined With the ben-
efits derived from more freq-uent
commandstaff exorcises and opposed-
force field training held at division level
and below
At any rate, In the first months fol-
lOWing the signing of the Final Act (1
August 1975), the Warsaw pact nations
had not announced their attention to hold
any military exerctses. Reports abounded
In the West European press that the
Soviets were, In fact, carrYing out exer-
cises In excess of 25,000 troops and
Simply not announcing them. Whatever
the accuracy of these reports, the USSR
surprised many Westetn observers in the
first nine mOnths of 1976 by giving prior
notification of three exercises-two
Soviet and one Warsaw Pact-and by
Inviting a limited number of observers to
attend each of them. It IS worth briefly
discussing these three exercises and
attempting to determine what they mean
for future pact maneuver activity and the
"reduction of tension in Europe."
The 1976 Training Year:
Exercises Kavkaz-76. Sever-76 and Shield-76
In January 1976, the USSR Ministry
of Defense announced that "corps-level"
maneuvers code-named Kavkaz-76
would be carried out in the
Transcaucasus Military District from 25
January to 6 February. Taking place in
the areas of Kutalsi, Yerevan and Tbillsi,
the exercise was said to Involve "nearly
25,000 officers and men" though, under
the CSCE, the air force elements would
not be counted. As regards the CSCE, the
Soviets stressed their compliance With
the provIsions of the Final Act, noting:
True to the peace-loving policy the
Soviet Government while carrying into
life the Peace Programme adopted by
the Communist Party, is fulfilling exactly
the clauses of the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation
In Europe. In conformity with the Final
Act the Soviet Union invited observers,
representatives of the People's Republic
of Bulgaria, the Republic of Greece, the
Socialist Republic of Rumania, the Re-
public of Turkey and the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia to attend the
'Kavkaz' manoeuvres.
The exercise was attended by former
Soviet Minister of Defense Grechko
whose presence usually was noted only
at the most important exercises. The
tactical play was notable for the con-
tinued Soviet interest it revealed in con-
ventional operations (featuring a now
often-rehearsed dismounted infantry
attack against prepared defenses), its
emphasis on mountain operations and
the employment of several relatively new
items of eqUipment, most notably the Mi-
24 Hind helicopter gunshi p28
The exercise was, by Soviet
standards, not particularly remarkable-as
regards Size, Involving no more than two
divisions and perhaps-considering the
probable presence of nondivisional lo-
gistic support personnel-only elements
of two divIsions. Kavkaz-76 was signif-
icant mainly in that it was the first
exercise the USSR had announced under
the CSCE provIsions and the first to
which they had invited observers from
the West under these provisions. And it .
broke a three-year virtual silence on
publicizing specific combined arms ma-
In less than four months follOWing the
completion of Kavkaz-76, the USSR had
announced its Intention to hold yet
another exercise, this time opposite the
NATO Northern Region. Code-named
Sever-76, the exercise was announced
by the Soviets to include again "nearly
25,000 officers and men." Taking place
in the Leningrad Military Dlstnct and
centering in the Petrozavodsk, Ses
troretsk and Vyborg areas, the opposed
force exercise emphasized operations by
"Northern" and "Southern" forces in the
marshy, rugged terrain so typical of these
northern regions. A prominent place In
the exercise was occupied by heliborne
assault operations, with armed Mi-24
Hind gunships and MI-8 Hip transport
helicopters conducting at least two taco
tical assault landings. An assault
crossing of the Vuoksi River was carried
out (with heavy heliborne and artillery
One of the most Interesting aspects of
the river-crossing phase was the subse-
quent crosSing of the new M1974
122mm self-propelled gun over a PMP
heavy pontoon bndge. These self-
propelled weapons were pictured on a
number of occasions in Soviet-released
photographs of Sever-76, and It was
pointed out in the Soviet military press
that the new weapons were highly
mobile even In the rough topography of
the exerCise area. Another relatively new
Item of equipment which was promi-
nently displayed was the 11-ton GT-T
M1970 Infantry combat vehicle, designed
especially for transporting troops over
extremely rugged, marshy terraln.
least part of the maneuver was carried
out in a nuclear environment, with Frog
7 tactical nuclear launchers much in
As with Kavkaz-76, the Sever-76
maneuver was not large by Soviet
standards. Several years earlier, the\!,
would not have attracted much attention
if indeed the Soviets would have men
tloned them in the media at all. And it
should be noted that the pnor notification
of these exercises of "nearly 25,000"
troops was purely "discretionary" unaer
the terms of the CSCE confldence-
building measure provIsions. The impli-
cation was that these maneuvers were
the largest that the Soviets had held
since August 1975 and were announced
as a gesture of good will In accord With
the "splnt of Helslnkl."30 .
Finally, from 9-16 September 1976,
the Warsaw Pact command held its first
Widely publiCized maneuver In four years.
. ThiS exercise-called ShIeld 76-took
place In western Poland and involved
Soviet, POliSh, East German and Czech-
oslovak forces Troop strength for the
exercise was announced at "approxI-
mately 35,000 men" or no more than a
total of three or four diVISion equivalents
for the four nations participating.
Nevertheless, the maneuver was
carned out with much the same fanfare
of earlier Warsaw Pact exercises. In
addition to the pact representatives, ob-
servers from Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia,
Yugoslavia, Austria, Sweden, Finland and
NATO-member Denmark attended. Soviet
Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinqv also was
present, indicating the high-level Soviet
Interest that traditionally has marked
"Important" maneuvers. Ignoring the fact
that there had not been a major pact
maneuver announced for sometime,
Krasnya Zvezda (Red Star) observed that:
. . . combined exercises of the Joint
Forces of the Warsaw Pact member
nations have become a tradition,3
that] ... close contacts, particularly
JOint exerCises, are becoming an increas
ingly effective form of improving combat
skills and promote a deepening of inter-
national ties. 32
That much attention must be devoted
to the problems of multinational staffs
working together was rndicated by the
comment that "on the communications
channels one could hear POliSh, Russian,
German and Czech "33 One staff officer
at the Shield-76 joint headquarters mini-
mized the significance of such language
diversity In multinational exercises by
obserVing that "If any problem of u nder-
standing arises ... we switch to Russian
which we all know."34
Tactical play in the exercise again
featured heliborne operations in con-
Junction with the always impressive pact
tank and motorized Infantry operations .
One source noted-rather redundantly in
view of the major Soviet effort in this
area-that "these rotary-wing aircraft
are acqUiring an increasingly broad range
of combat employment."35 Shield-76 also
involved another assault river crossing of
the type the pact performs so well, with
BMP infantry combat vehicles playing a
major role in the crossing. The crossing
also included the construction of a PMP
heavy pontoon bridge which, according to
one source, was "built literally in min-
utes."36 Also of note was the dropping of
a Soviet airborne regiment in the latter
The representatives of the Soviet. Polish. Czechoslovak and East German armed forces were participants
In Shield 76
Soviet BMP-equipped motorIZed rifle company on a tactical training exercise
part of the exercise.
With regard to the CSCE aspects of
the exercise, the Soviets were pleased to
quote a Finnish officer observing the
exercise who reportedly said:
As a representative of the country
where the historic Conference was held
m 1975 I am happy to stress that our
presence here fully corresponds to the
decisions and spint of the Conference in
HelSinki and that thIs wIll undoubtedly
promote cooperation between different
states in the fIeld of military science 37
Thus, the Soviet/pact 1976 training
year saw what was described by the
Soviets as three "large-scale" exercises.
As Krasnya Zvezda (Red Star) put It.
The emphasis in the current traming
year [1976) IS a campaIgn to achIeve
further Improvement m combat read
mess, to improve the quality of combat
performance, as well as persistent mas-
termg of new eqUIpment and weapons
Throughout the entlfe period of training
considerable attentIon is focused on
problems of tactics. 38
This statement was, In fact, well-
reflected in the three "large-scale" exer-
cises briefly discussed above. They did
Involve the continued exercising and
testing of relatively new equipment and
concepts (self-propelled artillery and its
employment, armed helicopters and hell-
borne assault operations, the integration
of BMPs mto the combined arms team,
and so forth), but were no more than
tactical In scope-at least Insofar as
Soviet/pact media sources have revealed
and nonpact observers at the exercises
were allowed to witness.
In accord With patterns established In
1976, the first Widely publiCized exercise
of 1977 was announced In compliance
With the HelSinki Final Act. Exercise
Karpaty-77 involved 27,000 troops and
was held In the Lvov-Lutsk-Rovno area of
the Carpathian MIlitary District from 11-
16 July 1977. ThiS opposed-force ex-
ercise was directed by the Carpathian
M,litary District commander, Colonel
General V Vorennikov, who, In a 13 July
article In Sotslaflsticheskaya mdustriya
(Socialist Industry), noted: "These are
planned exercises. Very ordinary. The
main goal is to work out tactical missions
and coordination of vaned branches of
troops."" "Southern" (offensive) and
"Northern" (defensive) forces carned out
combined arms operations which were,
in part, witnessed by nonpact observers
from the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Austria, France and Yugoslavia.
Again, the impressive operations by
Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters in an
antitank role IS worthy of note, as was
the widespread employment of self-
propelled artillery units. The exercise
scenario saw Southern units, who were
said to be "somewhat superior In forces
and means," attack Northern troops who,
despite heavy resistance, have their de-
fenses penetrated, fall to halt a Southern
river croSSing, and in the face of unsuc-
cessful counterattacks are forced to
withdraw. Pursuing Southern units, after
a chase of "several hundred kilometers,"
overtake Northern forces and engage
Northern march security elements' and
hastily brought up reserves In a meeting
engagement. Southern "superiority" and
"combat initiative" ultimately win the
Reported field activity in Karpaty-77,
as with those exercises of the 1976
training year, emphasized tactics at di-
vision level and lower, as well as the
employment of new equipment. It was
comparable In size to those 1976 exer-
cises, and, as with those maneuvers, the
CSCE aspects received special attention
In the exerCise reporting. Soviet/pact
exercise activity had evolved from the
huge, highly publiCized maneuvers of the
1960s and early 1970s to a period of
near silence on the subject extending
from late 1972 to early 1976. The 1976
training year and the first half of 1977
saw increased publicity given to what are
really relatively small exercises-if Soviet
announcements are to be believed. What
this means in terms of European se-
curity, the reduction of tension and the
bUilding of confidence and stability de-
serves closer attention.
The Warsaw Pact and Prior Notification
of Maneuvers: Some Thoughts for the Future
In 1935, a number of Western military
observers were Invited to attend major
Soviet army exercises in the USSR.
Soviet Lieutenant General I. I. Lisov
described one aspect of this event as
DUring Red Army maneuvers near
Kiev in the fall of 1935 the foreign
generals present saw how 2,500 Red
Army men in complete order landed from
the air within a period of 10 minutes and
immediately opened fire from automatic
rifles But as [Soviet Defense Commissar]
Voroshilov reported, they did not see the
simultaneous landing in another part of
the SOVIet Union by a force of 5, 700 men
(more than a brigade) which carried out
the very same operation. And still later
they learned that the number of jumps
made by the populace was approaching a
million. 40
Soviet political commentator Yu.
Kostko may have had similar incidents in
mind when he delivered his comments
on the ineffectiveness of Western pro-
posals to exchange information and ob-
servers during maneuvers. In any event,
his observations should be kept in mind
by Western planners as well-that IS,
that ground observers at exercises-
particularly when limited as they have
been under the CSCE-serve a limited
purpose. As trained observers will attest,
determining the number of troops and
units participating in as fluid and
complex an event as a military exercise
spread over many square miles of terrain
can be as difficult as counting beans in a
jar-and sometimes no more accurate.
A central question regarding So-
viet/pact exercises is the number and
size of those actually conducted. While
there IS no way to estimate the size of
maneuvers accurately on the basIs of
press reports, there IS every reason to
believe that the Soviets and their allies
have conducted far more JOint maneuvers
than those reported In the pact press or
otherwise coming to the attention of the
usually sensitive West European media
How often the Soviets and other pact
nations actua lIy conduct JOint exercises
involving at least two participating na-
tions may \ have been revealed by East
German Major General Werner
Fleisswer, deputy defense minister In
1969. The general noted that, during the
period 1964-68, Soviet and East German
forces conducted 10 JOint command and
staff exercises for higher staffs, 10
command and staff exercises for two
divIsions (on each occaSion, one East
German division and one Group of Soviet
FOl'Ces, Germany, divIsion); 16 ground
force JOint maneuvers and troop exer-
Cises, and four joint air and joint naval
Needless to say, few of these exer-
Cises were reported at the time In the
pact or Western press, and the actual
number of troops deployed in the field
cannot be determined But. when one
considers that a command and staff
exerCise for higher staffs, a command
and staff exercise at division level, a JOint
ground force maneuver, a JOint air ex-
ercise and a jOint naval exercise for pac!
forces In East Germany all carried out
concurrently may be only a few steps
away from creating the command
structure for a fully operational wartime
. front (army group). the magnitude of the
problem facing NATO planners can be
Such JOint exerCises, exclusive of the
larger, better publicized pact and Soviet
maneuvers, are probably carried out In
the Dther groups of forces as well. De-
spite pact Silence about them, they most
likely have been-and are-going on at a
pace commensurate with that desCribed
by General F.lelsswer 42 (it should be
noted that these smaller JOint eXerclses-
and certainly the command and staff
exercises-could fall below the 25,000
troop mark and quite probably do In most
cases. But such exercises taking place
with some frequency must add to the
uncertainties surrounding pact exercise
As noted earlier in the article, there
may well have been a reduction in the
Size of Soviet/pact training exercises
overall. but, for the pact to maintain ItS
combat readiness, both staffs and ma-
neuver units must be exercised Jointly
While a great deal can be accomplished
at lower echelons and through small Joint
exerCises, even the most recent Soviet
sources indicate that the larger-
particularly multinational-exercises
remain a key element In the pact training
program Whether such exercises Will
ever reach the 100,000 troop level agai n
remains to be seen But It can be ex-
pected that future Soviet/pact exercises
will be of suffiCient size to constitute an
Imminent potential threat to NATO.
The capability of the Western allies to
assess the scope and Intent of So-
viet/pact exercises is not known. As
General James H. Polk, commander In
chief of the US Army In Europe during
the August 1968 Soviet invaSion of
Czechoslovakia, indicated, NATO knowl-
edge of the many exercises preceding
the invasion was best for those taking -
place In East Germany and Czechoslo-
But, as General Polk has pointed
out, assessments of Soviet activity in
Czechoslovakia were influenced in some
measure by press reports, with knowl-
edge of the activity of Soviet units in
Poland and Hungary "not precise, either
as 10 strength or location" due to the
closing of border-staging areas to foreign'
NATO commanders appar-
ently were left to draw what conclusions
they could largely 'on the basIs of pact
press and radio reports on exercise ac-
tivity in Poland, Hungary and the USSR
(see the table). However much NATO's
ability to assess pact exercise activity
may have changed in the 10 years since
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it would
seem that large troop movements and
maneuvers must remain Just as ambig-
uous In intent
The confidence-bUilding measure pro-
vIsions of the CSCE Final Act and the
associated measures which are part of
the MBFR talks represent efforts to re-
solve some of the uncertainties sur-
rounding large maneuvers. Under the
confidence-building measure provisions,
the Soviets have been In recent months
more forthcoming about a few of their
exercises than many analysts may have
anticipated. However, Just how well the
Soviets have met the terms of the ex-
ercise prior notification agreement is a
subject of some dispute, with spokesmen
as prominent as NATO Secretary General
Luns questioning the Soviet perform-
ance 41j
There IS no question that the Soviets
can and have manipulated their .. coverage
of exercises, with the treatment of the
military activity preceding the invasion of
Czechoslovakia being a particularly good
example. The military provIsions of the
CSCE have done little to create an "at-
mosphere of mutual trust." Soviet ac-
tions in the CSCE (and the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as well as
earlier precedents) have convinced a
number of analysts that the USSR will
push any agreement to Its limit and
perhaps beyond,
The ongoing MBFR talks are dealing
with issues at least as complex as the
SALT agreement and the CSCE. Western
negotiators reportedly have pushed for
the Inclusion of "associated measures"
dealing with the prior notification of
exerCises and exchange of information
on other troop movements along with
actual troop reductions in Central
One certainly could see NATO nations
gaining some additional security by being
Informed of such details as when So-
viet/pact exercises or major troop rede-
ployments would take place, the number
of troops and units imlolved, the area of
activity and other information. But, given
the ambiguous nature of any military
exercise activity, the Soviet history of
obscuring or at least attempting to ob-
scure the size, scope, frequency and
Intent of their maneuvers, and the So-
viet's past performance on international
agreements, it is questionable just how
useful such data would be unless NATO
possesses, or through the talks estab-
lished, the means of verifying them.46
An MBFR-associated agreement on
the prior notification of large-scale mil-
itary activity which was not based on
reliable verification means would have
little more utility than a voluntary CSCE-
style declaration of peaceful intent and
good will. Such an agreement might do
no more than foster the kind of wishful
thinking that has characterized Western
expectations In past dealings with the
USS R but, at worst, could lead to the
most dangerous kind of self-deception.
1 For a dIscussion of a humber of SovIet and Warsaw Pact
e ... erClses, see John E'nckSon MIlItary Power. Royal UnIted
SerVices InstItute London 1970 DP 9396 and TlTomas W
Wolfe SOviet Power and Europe 19451970 The Johns
UnIverSIty Press BaltImore Md. 1970 pp 47782 For a 100R at
certa,n dspects 01 several of the larger Sovret/pacl maneuvers see
also John F Meehan III SovIet Maneuvers Summer 1971
Military Re ... rew Ap\ll 197:7 DD 1421 Thomas M Salisbury III
KAyKAZ 76 M./tfary Rpvlevo. June 1977 pp 47 55 and Graham
H Turblvolle Jr 'Warsaw Pact E ... erClse ShleJd 72 Military ReVIew
Jul.,. 1973 pp 1724 Warsaw Pact !=orces In Hungary A Key
Element In Pacl ContIngency Plannong Journal of the Royal Umted
ISen"ces Institute lor Defence Studies December 1976 PD 47 51
and 'Warsaw Pact amphlb ops ,n Northern Europe Marine Corps
Gazette Octobp.r 1976 pp 20 27
2 The most notable reasons tor conducting exerCises Include
those str,ctly mlhtarv reasons Uest."g new doct"nal concepts and
contIngenCIes trdlnrng staffs and troops testing new equipment and
so forthl the deSIre to Impress the West and the world with
SovIet/Warsaw Pact milItary capabilItIes the need to present and
fOSler a pIcture of bloc milItary solidaTity to external and Internal
observers and In some cases as an ,"strumenl of milItary coerCion
3 The OcTober 1973 MIddle East War represents a more recent
e){ample of how maneuvers can be successfully employed 10 dlsgurse
attack preparatIons
4 See for example Erockson op CIt. pp 9495
5 The Department 01 State Bullerm 1 September 1975 pp 321
6 Ibid p 326 All notifICations are of course VOluntary
8 Ibid II was further noted that the particIpatIng State need not.
however gIve notifIcation In cases In whICh that area IS also
contiguous to the partlclpatong State 5 frontier faCing or shared WIth
a non European non partICipating Stale Thus a SovIet exerCIse
conduCTed along the SovIet IranIan border IIran being a non
European nonpartlc,.,atln9 natIon) but WIth." 250 kt10melers of
Turkey la CSCE SIgnatory) need not be announced
9 Ibid
10. See Ibid pp 32729 for a full dISCUSSIon of these and other
confidence bUlldmg measures disarmament and general conSldera
11 See for example A:..el Horhager The Talks Problems
and Prospects International Defense ReVIew Apnl1976 DP 189
12 Vu Koo;tk.o On the Problem of ReductIon of Armed !=orces In
Europe M,rov(jl'a ekonomd/.a I mezhdunarodmyf' otno!Jhemye
(Wotld EconomICS ana InternatIonal Affa,r!J1 as found In ForeIgn
Broadcast InformatIon Service-Dally Report-Soviet Umon 25 June
1973.-V 11
t 3 See. for ellample CraIg R WhItney Communists Get NATO
InvltatlOno; The New York Times 13 September 1975 for a
diSCuSSion Of Impending NATO exerCIses In the tall of 1975
14 The Department of State Buf/elm 12 January 1976 p 57
15 A Svetlov The Sov,et UnIOn s Struggle for MIlitary Detente
Internat,onal Affairs January 1976 as translated In Straff'fjlC
ReView W"'ler 1977 pp 11826
16 N Chaldymov NATO and Delente Sov,et Military RpVIf'w
february 1976 p 42
17 For some of Dr Luno; remark.s see Sovlel Is CrItiCized by
Leader of NATO. The New York Times 26 September 1975
18 Budapest MTI (Magyar TavlTafl Irodal Domestic ServIce In 0700 GreenWIch Mean T,ffle (GMT) 12 September 1972
as found In Foreign Broadcast Informal/on Sefilice-Dally Rpport-
Eastern Europe 13 September 1972 p Jl
19 Prague CTK (Ceskoslovenska Tlskova Kancelarl InternatIOnal
Service In English 0948 GMT 6 September 1972 as found In
ForeIgn Broadcast InformatIon SerVice-DatiI' Report Eastern
Europe, 6 September 1972. p 05
20 Prague DomestIc ServIce In CleCh 0930 GMT 16 September
1972 as found In foreign Broadcast Information Service-Daily
Report-Eastern Europe 18 September 1972 p J9
21 See Allgememe Schwelzeflsche Mlfltarreltschrlft Number 2
1974 p 77
22 The Department of State Bulletm 21 June 1976 p 774
23 Prague DomestIc ServIce In Czech 0930 GMT 16 September
1972 op Cit p J7
24 N Velovrk Duel on the MinefIeld Krasnya Zvezda IRed Star)
12 January 1977 as translated In Tran/atlons on USSR Mllitar"
Affairs US JOInt Pubhcatlons Research Service {JPRSJ. Number
68517 pp 49 50
25 V Buk.harenko Art of Coordinated ActIOn Thoughts on the
Result$. of the TraIning Year Krasnya Zvezda (Red Star), 21 OC1ober
1976 as translated In Tlan!JlatlOns on USSR M,litary AffairS. JPRS
Number 66517 pp 49-50
26 Shleld72. for e){ample was ostlmated to ,"valve some
100000 !roope; See John ErIckson Sh,eld 72 Warsaw Pact
MIlitary E ... erclses Jovrnal of the Royal Umted SerVIces Institute fOI
Defence Studies December 1972. pp 32 34
27 The Kavkaz Manoeuvres SovIet Md,taryRevrevv May 1976
p 5 For a fme Western analysrs of the exercIse see Salisbury op
Cit pp 47 55 An account of a rare earlier Instance In whIch the
USSR mVlted foreIgn observers to wItness a post.World War II
exerCIse IS found In Seymour Topptng RUSSIa E'xhlblts AtomIC
Intantrv The New Yorlr Times 18 August 1961
28 Forces m the Transcaucasus M,htary DIStTlC! would In wartime
probably be tasked to conduct operatIonS agalno:;t the NATO Southern
RegIon ExerClseo; In thIS mlillar". dlstnct rellect a SovIet concern WIth",
operaHons In mountainOUS terra on a type of operatIon whIch has as
mUCh application to Turkey and Greece as to the Caucasus
29 !=or some e){celtent color photographs of Sever 76 see So
vetsk,,, vom (SoVIet Sofaler), Number 16 1976
'30 Wh,le the CSCE confIdence buold'"g measure prOVISIons de
flvmg from polItIcal deCISron rest upon a voluntary baSIS, the
SIgnatories solemnly pledged to adhere to them T .... ere are some
prOVISIonS that are however SImply allowed for at the discrellon
of the partIcipatIng countfles The prior notillcation of mlhtar".
exerCIses of less than 2S 000 troops falls Into the latter category and
are therefore even more VOluntary than the forme I
31 Krasnya Zverda (Rea Star) 9 Seplember 1976 as translated In
Translations on USSR M,litary Affalr!J JPRS Number 88372 p 2
32 IbId p 3 .
33 Krasnya lverda (Red Star) 15 September 1976 as translated
In TranslatIons on USSR Mlbtary Affalfs JPRS Number 68372 p 5
34 /(ra!Jnya /veraa (Red Starl 10 September 1976 as translated
!n Trans/atlon!J on USSR Military Affalfs. JPRS Number 68372 p 5
35 Krasnya Zvezda (RedStar! 15 September 1976 op CIt p 10
36 IOId. p 12 The opposrte bank had been selled bv a hellborne
assaull torce and remforced by amph'blOus vehIcles arld snorkeling
37 The Shchlt 76 Manoeuvres SovIet Mlli(ary Re""ew
January 1977 p 32
38 Krasnya Z"erda (Rea Stat) 14 Seplember 1976 as translated
In Tram lations on USSR Military AflalfS JPRS l\Iumb'r 68372 p 19
39 L Somlk The Iron D'VISIon Allacks Sotslaltst,cheskaya
mdustflya (SOCIalist Indu!JtrYI 17 July 1977 p 6 as tranSlated In
Translations 0/1 USSR M,f,tar" AffaIrs JPRS Number 69709 p 43 It
IS worth not,ng too that the Warsaw Pact car ned out a JOInt naval
eller!;',se rn the o;outhern part of the 8alt,c Sea In mrOsummer
1977 Pact commander Marshal of the Soviet UnIon y G Kullkov
directed the exerCIse whrrr, was saId to demonstrate the mcreao;ed
level of operatIonal tactIcal tramlng of the staffs and the hIgh speCIal
tramlng and naval skIrts at the forces partrclpat'mg In It See
Sovetskaya E!Jtonlya ESlonla) 8 Jul". 1977 p 4 dS translated
In Translations on USSR Military AffaIrs JPRS l\Iumber 69906 p 81
40 I I Lrso\! Desafllnllrl-voraushnne desanty {Parachutists -
A,rbome Landmgl, Mlltlar". PubliShIng House of the Mtnrslr". of
Defense of the USSR Moo;cow USSR 1968 p 27 m the edillon
tlanslated by the US Army foreIgn SCience and Techn01og". Center
{F5TC HT 23 27 701
41 vollrsarmee (People s Army), Number 1969 p 3
42 MedIa reporto; on trammg ,n the SovIet groups of forces
mdlcate a very hIgh level at act""ty but are often vague as to the full
scope of the tramlng An example of <;uch a )Olnt group natIonal
ellercrse that has come 10 WeSlern attentIon SInce the CSeE was the
Soviet Southern Group of Force,> Hungar". Hungarian People s Army
maneuver carned out ,n October 1976
43 General James H Polk Reflectlono; on the Clechoslo\lak!an
InvaSIOn 1968 Straleg'c ReView W,nter 1977 pp 30 37
44 Ibid p 32
45 In December 1975 Dr Luns md!c.ated that the USSR had not
gIVen nohhtalron of a recent mll,tary e)(erClse See StrategIc Survey
1975 The InternatIonal InstItute for Strategic StudIes London Eng
1976 ., 120
46 For a good diSCUSSIon of the vero/,callon ISSue ,n arms control
agreements see Ibid. pp 1 t 1 16
Boris Popov
and the
Lieutenant Colonel
James B. Channon, US Army
Boris Popov commands a large mechanized army which has
invaded the land of Durndl. His offense is rolling along
covering the prescribed number of kilometers per day.
However, he is losing. His forces are being decimated by an
enemy who operates in small, highly mobile teams which
appear out of nowhere, night and day, to attack his flanks
and rear, then disperse before his forces can engage them in
close combat. The electric piranha is a combination of our
conventional weapons technology and some of the not so
conventional tactics we learned in Vietnam. Dispersion,
speed and night operations coupled with our superior
technology might give us "little guys" an edge if we adopt
hit-and-run tactics instead of trying to slug it out "toe-to-
toe" u'ith our "big guy" adversaries.
OMETIME In the future, in a land not too unfamiliar, a ponderous figure
strides about his command post BOris Popov IS fuming. His staff snivels at
the tails of his greatcoat. He screams, "Four days In the attack, no real enemy
and I'm losing'" True enough, the great war machine of Boris Popov had
spearheaded Into the land of Durndl, yet, by all reports, he was losing. The
babushkas under BOris' command were following their rote and practiced
offense. moving forward like a giant machine, taking measured strides each
day. Following their great curtain of fire and under a veil of smoke, they were
making ground-gaining progress to be sure. But there were no fixed enemy to
key on, and each day'S situation reports showed that Boris' force was being
eaten away like a cancer .
He bellowed again, "Where are they, staff? Where are they?" The staff
cowered under his presence, for Boris ran the 3d Siberian Motorized Foot
Horde with an iron hand
One of them offered, "They just can't be seen. They come out at
night. ... They work In small teams, they seem to be everywhere."
"Do you think I'm a fool?" he shouted back. "You know very well Uncle
Sam's boys always line up neat clusters on the military crest well forward in
the field of battle. . and so you tell me they are not to be seen?"
"That IS true, Comrade General. is true. They just don't seem to be
anywhere in particular."
"But they can see us all nght!" Bons wailed again and turned, thrashing
about the small command post. "They can see us all nght, and how do you
explain that, Anatoh?"
The staff officer cnnged, looked up at Boris and said, "They can see at
night. They have strange masks which they wear, and they can see at night
Not only can they see well, but they can see far. It's amazing! I think they are
electric glasses."
Bons said, "And I suppose after they shoot at you, you can't see them?':
"Oh, yes, Comrade General, we can see them; however, they fire but once,
and then they are off on their trail bikes, off Into the woods They vanish."
"Vanish!" Popov said. "Vanish, and I suppose that the large barrage we
received on our mass tank formation was done by a small team?"
Lieutenant Colonel James B Channon IS With the Olfec-
tOrate of Education and CUrriculum AffairS. USACGSC He
receIved a B A In fme arts and an M A In behaVIoral
communications from the Un/verslly of Kentucky and an
M MAS from the USACGSC He has served m Infantry and
mtelllgence POSItIons In the United States. Vietnam and
Germany H,s article "Prep8nng the Off,cer Corps for the
19905" appeared In the May 1978 MIlitary Review
"Yes, strange as it seems, they only use one medium rocket launcher in
one location. Nearly as we can tell, it's fired by two men, and those two men
have other Jobs In the rear somewhere: gasoline, transportation, supply or
something of that sort. The rocket launcher system is preaimed into the kill
zone; they Just go out and trigger the launcher. It's terrible."
"Yes, I know," said Bons, "any fool can fire a rocket launcher How IS it
they are also able to fire at our tanks with such pinpOint accuracy? Tell me
"Well, they use electnc pOinting devices. They shine long red lights at our
tanks, and then the rounds seem to fall out of the sky They never seem to
miss If It Isn't artillery, It'S the aircraft they call on single Side band."
"That doesn't seem likely We travel at such a speed, shrouded by such a
veil of smoke and dust. that it's Impossible for any army to see us from their
positions Our suppressive fires must surely drive them to cover."
"That's what we thought, Excellency, but they have small metal shelters
called 'boxholes' which they use as temporary shelter to ward off shrapnel
and chemicals and afterward shed like so much extra clothing."
"Ah! So they do fiX themselves for a time!"
"Yes, normally, Comrade General, that IS true, but those Wily deVils lay
under cover, let us go by and shoot us from the rear where we are not masked
by our smoke screens .... They shoot us at night, and they shoot us from
unexpected places. They seem to be everywhere."
"And how do they coordinate such a skillful and well-sequenced kind of
offensive defense?" BOris asked.
"Well, we haven't been able to Jam their communications because they
don't seem to use their radios. They Just operate autonomously out of their
own given sector. They have plenty of room to move about, and they
communicate by shooting flares overhead in very simple codes. When they
sense a decIsive engagement, they simply splinter off to fight another time."
"Very well, very well, what about our progress? We are moving into the
enemy's territory according to the timetable even though we are losing
people Are we going to make the river on schedule?"
"Sir, we may make the river on schedule, but we may not have any
effective forces once we get there. Right now, our lines of supply are
dangerously unprotected, and ammunition in our lead elements IS Just about
exhausted We have tanks; we have firepower. But I'm afraid our mass and
momentum will be spent by the time we get to the Rhine."
"Well." Boris'muttered, "perhaps our comrades' attack from the north will
be enough to carry the day"
"Well, It'S not qUite that e<:!sy. I'm not sure our tanks will arrive because of
fuel problems," Anatoll stammered
"What fuel? We Just take fuel from the homes and factories of the
DLI"rndllans, Isn't that rlghP" .
"That's right, Your Excellency, but they have polluted It With some kind of
contaminate, and Irs beginning to freeze our engines while they are on the
Why don't they stand up and fight like men?"'
What Is an Electnc Piranha?
The electriC piranha IS a tactic, albeit portrayed In somewhat catchy terms,
but not so unconventlOl;al as It may seem The electriC piranha, as a symbol,
represents a simple syntheSIS of our conventional weapons teChnology and
some of the not so conventional tactics we learned In Vietnam.
We were the big guys In Vietnam, the firepower kids, fighting a Shadow
enemy In any way you assess that confliCt. you must agree that, pound for
pound, our firepower was frequently wasted against their tactics. In the next
conflict, It IS BoriS who Will be the big guy We will be the Side subjected to a
massive curtain of suppressive fires and :smoke It IS we who cannot afford to
become the easy, fixed, concentrated target of those massed fires Therefore,
It seems prudent to adopt tactics of disperSion, speed and operations at night
If these tactics are Intelligently combined With the unquestionable
technological superiority we will enjoy-for example, precIsion gUided
munitions (PGMs)-then we Will have a reasonable opportunity to thwart a
numerically superior opponent.
Principles of War or Operational Art
It seems that when you are the little guy-little In numbers or little In
equipment-modified principles of war apply Lessons learned from the
Vietnam and Middle East Wars prOVide excellent examples The principles of
war we have operated With for so mpny years would not have served the
North Vietnamese very well. But those principles espoused by Mao and Glap
could effectively be woven Into the fabriC of our doctrine of the future We can
be like the fish in the sea; In fact, In order to keep from being easy targets, we
must be the fish In the sea. Yea, verily, the piranha!
Some of the techniques found in the oriental martial arts are insightful.
The ability to take a force coming at you and direct it away from your sensitive
areas, and Into an area that Will diSSipate It. IS fundamental. .The foll()wing
principles, sifted from the martial arts, are useful for viewing the battlefield
from the perspective of the little guy:
Multisensory dominance-Seeing the enemy With every Interpretive
sense you have before and during the engagement will reveal how to use hiS.
great strength against him and how to use your reduced strength optimally.
Never duck-never close your eyes-heads up!
Critical target focus-Never lose track of those vital pOints in his
corporate body that can bring him down. Close hiS eyes first With two pointed
fingers, then shut his communications WIth a shaft of fingers In his throat,
then let the bulk of hiS power lash out blindly, then sever his spinal cord and
thus completely destroy his means to find you and organize and direct hiS
total force against you.
Spend your opponent's energy-If you cannot stop your opponent's blow
before it gains momentum, then, with minimum energy, deflect this blow onto.
unimportant terrain. If he wants to put his main effort into one spearhead,
help him go quickly to that end. Let him overextend himself while you nibble
away at his life line.
Combine and focus your energy-Strike with your hind legs collected
under you. Strike back after you have softened the opponent and when you
can sustain your drive with prevIOusly hidden resources Make a rapid
commitment to the area most critical to his defeat.
Setstrike-set-Focus on a soft spot, then strike with power. Do this
over and over, remembering to focus each time. Do not flail away blindly; that
wastes energy. Keep the momentum of this sequence, but do not be careless
about it.
Have staying power-When two forces are nearly equally expended, the
one who claims victory may, In fact. convince the other he has something left.
With flags, broadcasts, leaflets and resolve, the fight continues till one Side
says "uncle," or the other Side convincingly claims "victory." (Note: These
notions are really more akin to the Soviet Idea of operational art-somewhere
between principles of war and tactics.)
We In the Un Ited States have a great deal of which to be proud. Across the
board, our technological achievements can give our fighting men great
advantages. The question about whether better advantage can be gained from
ponderous, complex pieces of equipment or by light and versatile pieces of
equipment has been a matter of debate since the land combat study was
completed by the US Army Combat Developments Command in 1972 That
study suggested that very lightweight tanks and antitank weapons should be
the staple for our Army. Somehow, the logic of that study was defeated at
higher echelons. Whether the decision was political or based on sound theory
IS not clear. A novel proposal that seems to have the greatest promise, the
trail bike, received poor reception at tl"]e higher levels Perhaps such an
uncomplicated idea did not require great expenditures in defense dollars and,
therefore, was not so appealing to some
In any case, tactics uSing light antitank weapons and fast, mobile teams
mounted on trail bikes may be just the counter to the tactics of our rather
awesome and ponderous potential enemy. Standing In front of this battering
ram would be the last way to achieve a ratio of e?<change favorable to us.
Attacking from the oblique might be a better solution; attacking within an
overall scheme of prolonged attritIOn uSing the night, weapons system
mobility and accuracy to our advantage seems to be a more Intelligent
strategy yet
You might argue that, In order to win battles, you need to control key
terrain with a sizable force. That is a tactic not easily executed with such a
decentralized concept as I would suggest. But the notion of a highly technical
guerrilla force that operates at night in sma II areas of responsibility seems
Our Army traditionally has had peacetime discipline problems when It
structured units Into small "elite" groups. In this case, "elite" is going to be
the only way to deal with a numerically superior enemy. If David had not hit
Goliath smack between the eyes, his hours on earth would have been
numbered. The battlefield where we may fight our next battle differs from our
recent experiences, for we now have different weapons systems to employ in
new ways.
A technOlogical guemlla concept is not wllhout precedent In modern
armies. The Yugoslavian nation is, in fact. an armed populace. Likewise, the
Swiss rely on the citizen-soldier literally fighting in his own backyard. They do
not have night vision deVices and the kind of preCision weaponry available to
our forces. However, their scheme of operations remains effective and does
not violate the lessons of Mao.
An advantage of operating In this guerrilla mode is the opportunity to
recruit partisan help. One of the prinCipal imponderables of any kind of
defense In Europe IS the unknown congestion presented by a populace fleeing
in front of an advancing Invader. If, during training, the guerrillas would
Include the citizenry In their operations, the chances of having partisan help
dUring confhct would be greatly Improved The populace can help fight, but,
more importantly, It can help With the pre-positIOning and delivery of
ammunition, fuel and food. If they are gainfully employed, they need not be an
obstacle on the highways
'The offense. the primary way to Win in war, would be frequently employed
by these small teams. The best way to achieve a favorable force ralio With
respect to your enemy IS to assemble units rapidly at the place on the
battlefield where you Wish to engage. This permits a temporary, but deCISive,
advantage at POints of our choosing Preemptive attacks on the enemy
assembly ~ e s are very much a part of the ongoing concept. Small teams
helicoptered or biked Into the enemy's rear could cause a great deal of
destruction and confUSion at rally POints or along predictable enemy approach
routes and firing POSitions It may be that operating just over the border dunng
hiS initial assault would give us the most protected area In which to attnt his
forces and cut hiS supply lines'
We also should operJte against hiS "nervous system," those com-
mand/control and fire direction facilities, for. Without that "nervous system,"
he loses flexibility and confidence dUring dnves for deep objectives.
In the best tradition of the martial arts, let us never stand directly In the
path of our enemy's directed energy. Let us permit him to proceed to any
place he Wishes to go In such a manner that he will extend himself far beyond
hiS means to sustain hiS energies And, dUring that period of extenSion, attrlt
him like a cancer, making It Impossible for him to arrive at hiS final objeclive
With either a coherent force or the confidence to claim victory
The follOWing charactenstlcs exemplify the concept of the technological
guernlia E'ach of these features attempts to use the utmost energies of our
fighting technology and the best taclics of a lightly manned guerrilla force
Small, highly Independent fighting teams
"""Night VISion technology IS no longer Buck Rogers' stuff The cost redUCtion for Infrared
goggles for an Infantryman has and probably Will continue to make dramatic progress Newer
cheaper goggles do not see a5 far, but. when covpled With "arming light" technology, they give
the mfantryman hiS first night offensive capability An Infrared light IS pOInted from the hip. and,
when on target, the goggled soldier blasts away
High mobility for man-portable weapons systems uSing trail bikes and
PinPOint accuracy provided by PGMs
Dispersed, difficult to detect or neutralize "killing power" provided by
medium rocket launchers spread throughout the rear service area.
Chemical and nuclear protection provided by the "boxhole."
Deep strike capability provided by the Air Force
Continuous day-night operation prescribed by an area of responsibility.
Reduced vulnerability to electronic warfare by autonomous action and
by use of simple prearranged audio and visual signals.
Continued ability to engage the enemy uSing pre-positioned rations and
Partisan support provided by close working relationships in training with
the indigenous population.
Favorable combat power ratios by chOOSing the pOint of attack.
Attacking the enemy system at ItS weakest pOints along extended supply
The preceding analogies-electric piranhas or technological guerrillas and
the martial arts technlques--were created to showcase Ideas The nexus of
such an Idea should be examined. Remembering that the principles of
guerrilla warfare historically have worked very well against a large conven-
tional force, we should use those proven lessons to our advantage.
Another way to gain an advantage over an enemy is to use well those
systems which ~ has not perfected like the precIsion day/night weapons
technology we possess. Remember, you cannot use a 3-kilometer-range
precision weapon well If you are in the midst of a hall of suppressive fires and
your target bobs up and down at 13 kilometers an hour In a veil of smoke.
Optimization IS the name of the game. And, In case you forgot, we are now
the little guys. ""R
The Puerto
Captain Shaun M. Darragh, Puerto Rican Army National Guard (a nom'a Ie), n., pl. -lies 1. a deviation from the
common rule, type or form. 2. someone or something anom-
alous. The Carribean island of Puerto Rico certainly fits the
definition in the Random House dictionary. Its Spanish-
speaking people are American citizens but pay no US income
taxes. Those who are on the federal payroll pay taxes to the
US government, but cannot vote. Puerto Ricans do .not
consider their country a state, yet neither do they fit the
description of a commonwealth. Add the Puerto Rican Na-
tional Guard to the mixture and even more of an anomaly
emerges; a state instit'ution which exists within a country
which is not a state; a military force founded by an Irish
general, funded for the most part by the United States and
composed of Latin-Americans; a force whose official lan-
guage, English, is a foreign one. Yet the Puerto Rican
National Guard is highly successful. Here are some of the
reasons why.
Condensed from An. CosantOlr. September 1977
UERTO Rico is the easternmost
and smallest island of the Greater
Antilles chain. Measuring approxi-
mately 100 miles in width and 30 mifes
in depth, it is tropical in climate and
inhabited by some three million people
whose means of livelihood range from
subsistence farming and the culti-
vation of sugar cane and coffee, to the
manufacture of pharmaceuticals, com-
puters and the world-famous Puerto
Rican rums.
Presently a "Free Associated State"
of the United States by virtue of the
1952 Puerto Rican Constitution, the
island is a former colony of both Spain
and the United States. The exact defi-
nition of what constitutes a "Free
Associated State" is a recurrent theme
in the Puerto Rican political scene. By
anyone's definition, Puerto Rico is not
a "state," and what distinguishes it
from the other states of the union and
miscellaneous territories is that the
country considers itself a nation.
Puerto Ricans have considered them-
selves such since the 18th century, and,
despite the fact that it has never been
an independent country, it has jeal-
ously guarded its right to proclaim
itself to be. The right of Puerto Rican
independence has been affirmed by
both the United States and the United
As is only natural in an envi-
ronment where two free and sovereign
peoples coexist as the result of a pact
freely entered by both of them, certain
This article represents the views of the author
only and should not be construed as representing
any official or unofficial point of view of the
Puerto Rican military forces.
anomalies exist. One of these anom-
alies is the Puerto Rican National
Guard (PRNG). .
The Fuerzas Militares de Puerto
Rico are authorized under Puerto Rican
law. However, the Puerto Rican mil-
itary forces are, in reality, a state
Army and Air National Guard of the
US National Guard. Though they are
by their own definition the organized
military force of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, they are also an integral
part of the US Army and Air Force.
The US government, in fact, pays
all federally recognized personnel for
participation in authorized drills and
for active duty in connection with
training or mobilization. The United
States also procures and issues uni-
forms (enlisted men), arms and
equipment, and provides funds for both
ordnance and quartermaster stores, as
well as station property. It further
matches Puerto Rican funds for the
construction and maintenance of
training facilities.
The US government audits and
inspects every unit of the Puerto Rican
National Guard at least once annually.
In this regard, the Puerto Rican Na-
tional Guard is no different from any
other component of the US National
The PRNG is directly responsible to
. the governor of Puerto Rico who is its
commander in chief through the ad-
jutant general of Puerto Rico. Through
the adjutant general, the Puerto Rican
government appoints, promotes,
transfers, assigns and separates all
officers, warrant officers and enlisted
men in the PRNG. This force totals 662
officers and 7,497 enlisted men whose
members, with the possible exception
of a few immigrants, are native Puerto
The dual mission of the Puerto
Rican military forces is demonstrated
by the composition of the Puerto Rican
Army National Guard which has both
tactical combat forces, their supporting
elements, and internal security forces.
The two elements directly below the
adjutant general are the 92d Infantry
Brigade and the 292d Area Head-
The 92d Infantry Brigade is a sep-
arate, standard infantry organization
capable of independent operations
under a corps structure or inclusion
within a divisional element. The
brigade structure is as follows:
Headquarters Com,pany, 92d In-
fantry Brigade
Troop E, 192d Cavalry (Armored)
892d Engineer Company (Combat)
2d Battalion, l62d Artillery (105mm
1st Battalion, 65th Infantry
1st Battalion, 295th Infantry
1st Battalion, 296th Infantry
192d Support Battalion
The infantry battalions of the 92d
Brigade are organized into a head-
quarters company, three rifle compa-
nies and a combat support company.
The rifle companies consist of three
rifle platoons armed with the 5.56mm
Captam Shaun ~ \ Darra&h, Puerto Rlcan
Army NatIOnal Guard. IS a graduate of both
the Officer Candidate School-Armor and the
US Manne Corps AmphIbIOus Warfare
School. He holds a degree m Latm Ame;ican
hlstory and tS studymg law at the Umt'erslty
of Puerto R,co.
M16Al rifle, as well as such standard
infantry weapons as the M79 40mm
grenade launcher and the M1911Al
.45-caliber pistol. The weapons platoon
is equipped with the 81mm mortar and
M60 machineguns. The combat
support company contains the bat-
talions' moun ted reconnaissance
platoon, 4.2-inch mortar platoon,
mounted antitank platoon and air de-
fense and ground surveillance ele-
The cavalry troop, which consti-
tutes the brigade's organic reconnais-
sance element, is equipped with the
MI13-series armored personnel carriers
and M48A3 medium tanks.
The 292d Area Headquarters pro-
vides command and control for the
remaining elements of the Puerto
Rican Army National Guard. They
include the:
201st Surgical Hospital
1st Battalion, 162d Artillery
124th Military Police Battalion
125th Military Police Battalion
130th Engineer Battalion
248th Army Band
Company E, 65th Infantry
Company E deserves special
mention in that it is an airborne
ranger company whose primary
mission entails long-range reconnais-
sance, including insertion into the area
by either airmobile means or para-
The Puerto Rican Air National
Guard consists of the 156th Tactical
Fighter Group, whose subordinate
198th Tactical Fighter Squadron con-
tains F J04C and F I04D model aircraft,
and the 140th Aircraft Control and
Warning Squadron. The air element
is the smaller of the two, and its chain
of command comes through the as-
sistant adjutant general for air.
Despite the fact that Puerto Rican
military forces are obviously American
in organization and equipment, their
origins predate the US invasion by
over a century.
_ 1\'rior to the 18th century, the de-
feftsle of the island was left largely in
the hands of the Spanish regular forces
who garrisoned the massive El Morro-
San Cristobal fort system in San Juan.
The remainder of the island had a
loose system of militia based solely
upon the requirement that its members
were physically fit to bear arms.
Spain's disastrous losses in the Seven
Years' War, however, forced a reorgani-
zation of its overseas empire. Irish
General Alejandro O'Reilly was dis-
patched to the Indies with, among
other things, the mission of reorganiz-
ing the Caribbean defenses.
O'Reilh's reforms included a
system of semiregular militia, or-
ganized, equipped and trained in line
with the regular army, backed up by a
lesser trained urban corps. This body
was designated the Disciplined Militia
and constituted seven battalions of
infantry, one squadron of cavalry and
several batteries of both field and coast
artillery. Active by 1 April 1766, the
Milicia Disciplinada saw active service
against the English in 1797 as well as
the Dominican Republic and is ac-
cepted by US, Spanish and Puerto
Rican historians as the immediate
forerunner of the PRNG.
The Disciplined Militia was dis-
banded at the outbreak of the Spanish-
American War, and its personnel were
transferred into volunteer battalions of
the Spanish army. The subsequent
defeat of these armies in the field led to
the dissolution of the Puerto Rican
armed forces.
The colonial regime which followed
the American armies raised a Puerto
Rican regiment later incorporated into
the Regular US Arniy as the 65th
Infantry Regiment. Following World
War I, during which Puerto Ricans
fought in the 373d Infantry, the terri-
torial National Guard was organized
under the direction of a presidentially
appointed US governor. Despite the
fact that an American governor held
the reins, the PRNG raised in 1919 was
organized, recruited and trained by
native Puerto Ricans.
In 1952, this organization passed
under the control of an elected Puerto
Rican governor and thus obtained the
curious duality of being both a federal
National Guard and the Fuerzas Mili-
tares de Puerto Rico recognized by the
Commonwealth government.

. __ ------1
The PRNG maintains a full-time
recruiting effort through a technician
on the adjutant general's staff. He, in
turn, supervises a program through the
unit-level recruiting and retention non-
commissioned officers. This program
includes radio broadcasts, activities
centered upon the unit armories and
CIVIC action projects designed to
identify the unit with the local com-
munity. The effectiveness of this
program can be judged by the fact that
most unit strengths seldom dip below
the 1 DO-percent mark and remain
closer to the lID-percent maximum
authorized strength.
Ironically, the atmosphere most
conducive to successful recruiting is
found in the rural communities and
small towns while the San Juan metro-
politan area is the most difficult. This
can be explained, in part, by the differ-
ences between Puerto Rican and Amer-
ican cultures. That of the Puerto
Rican residing outside the San Juan
are'a is centered upon traditional
Hispano-American values which in-
clude a fierce loyalty to one's town or
region, as well as a' generally more
respectful attitude toward authority.
Rare is the town without an avenue
named in honor of the 65th Infantry,
and many towns have streets and
barrios named after heroes of the mi-
litia such as Pepe Dlaz and Capitan
Enlistment and IndiVidual Training
Persons who join the PRNG sign a
loyalty oath to both the Common-
wealth and the United States. Their
commitment is for six years. They are
then sent to the United States for six
months' training which includes both
basic infantry training and advanced
individual training in a particular
skill. Unfortunately, all instruction
during this period is in English, and,
while recruits may improve their
second language somewhat, they often
fail to grasp many important military
subjects. This places an even greater
burden upon the unit training pro-
grams within the PRNG where in-
struction is in Spanish.
When the soldier returns to the unit,
there are still several sources of indi-
vidual training available. The first of
these is the correspondence instruction
available through such institutions as
the various nonresident instruction
departments of the US Army and
Marine Corps Institute. Courses range
from mortar gunnery and forward
observation techniques to the handling
of supplies, and both officer and en-
listed participation is high, especially
since many of the courses are needed to
qualify for promotion.
The second is instruction at either a
Reserve school within Puerto Rico or
one of the resident courses in the
United States or the School of the
Americas in the Panama Canal Zone.
Attendance at the Reserve school us-
ually means participation in night
classes and summer attendance at a
particular phase of instruction at a
regular service school. The level of the
Reserve schools is usually that of the
senior noncommissioned officer and
commissioned officer.
The third means of individual
training is provided through the PRNG
itself. Courses currently stressed by the
PRNG include a recondo
(reconnaissance-commando) course, a
Noncommissioned Officer Academy
and attendance at the Puerto Rico
Military Academy which offers a year
and a half program leading to a com-
Unit Training
Training at the unit level follows a
strict regimen outlined in both Army
and National Guard Board publica-
tiuns. Each unit has a training
schedule based upon 48 paid drills a
year and a 15-day active duty training
period in the summer. Each drill is a
four-hour period. Members receive one
day's pay based upon their years of
CD English class
CD Mortar training
CD CBR training
CD Inspecting aircraft
service and rank for each drill period.
National Guard pay tables are com-
patible with those of the Active Army.
Puerto Rico is one of the most
densely inhabited countries in the
world, and, therefore, the lack of ade-
quate training facilities presents a
problem. The PRNG maintains a
training site at Salinas on the southern
coast of the island where units may
maneuver and conduct field firing of
certain types of weapons. However, the
Salinas site is only 6,000 acres, and,
thus, space for the infantry battalions
is limited. Certain types of ammunition
must be prohibited due to safety
factors. An M48 tank-firing armor-
piercing, discarding-sabot ammu-
nition, for example, can easily fire
more than halfway across the island.
Of a more immediate concern is
whether or not the effectiveness of a
unit which habitually uses the same
training area can really be evaluated.
At a training site where phase lines,
unit boundaries, checkpoints, coordi-
nation points and observation posts
inevitably coincide with last year's
terrain features, it obviously cannot be.
This obstacle to a valid training and
evaluation vehicle has been overcome
somewhat in recent years through
amphibious operations to several of
Puerto Rico's outlying islands. Many
units of the PRNG also conduct their
annual training at sites within the
Continental United States and
This training program has un-
dergone a rapid expansion in recent
years. Weapons qualification is now
accomplished during a weekend prior
to the summer encampment, making
more time available for specialized unit
training. Classroom instruction is kept
to a minimum, and emphasis is placed
upon learning through execution of the
The danger confronting the armed
forces of any small nation is that self-
evaluation leads to complacency. This
was avoided in O'Reilly's militia since
the governor general was either a
Spanish military officer or had a reg-
ular officer to whom he delegated his
authority as captain general. Under
the Spanish system, the Puerto Rican
militia performed its duties under the
strict evaluation of experienced regular
officers assigned to the governor gen-
eral's staff.
This system is generally in effect
today but with several important dif-
ferences. First, the PRNG does
evaluate itself since the adjutant
general of Puerto Rico bears the ul-
timate responsibility for its success or
failure. However, in this task, he is
advised and assisted by Regular of-
ficers of the US Army and Air Force
who are assigned to the PRNG Ad-
visory Group of the Army Reserve
Readiness Command. They advise and
assist within specifically established
guidelines and perform the addi-
tionally important function of evalu-
ation. Their evaluation furnishes the
commanders and staffs of the Puerto
Rican military forces with a two-
dimensional point of view.
At the beginning of this article, the
PRNG was termed an anomaly. It is
an anomaly primarily because it is a
state institution which exists within a
country that is not a state. It is a
military force founded by an Irish
general, funded, for the most part, by
the United States and composed of
Latin-Americans-a force whose of-
ficial language, English, is a foreign
The United States needs competent
military Reserve forces. The Puerto
'Rican military forces were federally
mobilized during World War II and the
Korean War. An analysis of both occa-
sions reveals that the PRNG has been
historically deployed in conjunction
with the Caribbean defenses in which
the defense of their own country was
an inherent mission. Only when such
danger was past were they redeployed,
as for the invasion of Japan, or demo
bilized, as in the case of Korea. Of
particular significance is the fact that
the United States did not attempt to
mobilize, even partially, assets of the
Puerto Rican military forces for the
Vietnam War despite the fact that
National Guard units from the United
States served in that theater. Elements
of the Puerto Rican Air National
Guard were mobilized for the 1962
Cu ban missile crisis. J
The basic question is: Can the
PRNG continue to fulfill this dual
mission now that Puerto Rico is
moving toward more complete au-
tonomy from the United States and
still retain the option of future possible
independence? Perhaps, and perhaps
not. It is obvious, however, that a
thorough review of the "status" of the
Puerto Rican National Guard is long
overd ue. "i..
Information Needed From Nuclear Test Participants Military and
Civilian persons who participated In atmospheric nuclear testmg
conducted from 194963 should contact the Department of
Defense (DOD) at Its toll free 800638-8300 number DOD
estimates that some 200.000 to 300.000 persons. most of them
no longer In serVice. participated In the tests
The primary reason for contacting nuclear test participants IS to
determine If there are any health hazards connected With the
tests OffiCials indicate that the radiation dosage from anyone of
the tests IS far below industrial tolerances It was set at about 2
REMs. the same amount of radiation received from two X-rays or
from the sun by liVing 10 years at a higher altitude such as
Denver. Colo
One former Serviceman Involved In the tests developed leu-
kemia about a year ago. and the Defense Department and other
governmental agencies want to make sure that extensive followup
testing IS conducted
Successful Evaluation
Colonel Ronald J. Rabin, US Army
E['aluation can work for any organization which has specific
goals and objectil'es in mind and possesses the organiza-
tional maturity to use it properly. Evaluation performs two
important functions for an organization: quality control and
feedbacll. The higher the quality of feedback, the higher the
quality of decision regarding allocation of resources and
furthering organizational goals. To accomplish successful
el'aluation, the el'aluators have to be independent and
objectil'e-outside the span of control of those being eval-
uated. El'aluators also must have sufficient experience and
expertise in the areas they check. Data analysis is a critical
step in the-proeess and may be done on a statistical signifi-
cance basis or on an interpretatil'e, practical significance
ba . is. El'aluation does not have to strike fear into the hearts
of those being el'aluated if el'aluation is removed from the
personality lel'el and put to work on the organizational
goals level to assist the decisionmaking process.
VALUATORS, through proper
evaluation processes, perform two
baHic and essential functions for their
organizations: quality control and
Being an evaluator at the US Army
Infantry School (USAIS) at Fort
Benning, Georgia, is exciting and of no
mean value to the infantry and the
Army. The problem is that disserta-
tions concerning evaluation qua evalu-
ation can be a little less exciting than
the job itself or the results. In fact,
discussions concerning evaluation can
be deadly, but no more so than organi-
zations conducting business as usual
in the absence of a sound evaluation of
their products and processes.
In this short article, I will try to
persuade you that independent, ob
jective evaluation is necessary to an
organization and is an achievable or
ganizational goal. You may think that
your organization has a good evalu
ation system-but, in fact, it may not,
and good evaluation can save re-
sources. Finally, I will put some
USA IS Directorate of Evaluation
(DEV) concepts of operation on the
table for your consideration.
Organizations need quality feed-
back for a variety of reasons. From
a systems point of view, organizations
must receive feedback or ultimately
suffer the catastrophic effects of en-
tropy. Military organizations are no
exception. In fact, some feedback loop
is usually present within the overall
construct of our organizations. Hind-
sight or foresight-chicken or egg-
makes no difference. The important
thing is that the loop exists. Great! So,
now we don't have to be concerned
about entropy (if, in fact, we were at
all). Maybe so. I would offer that it is
not simply getting feedback or getting
a lot of it that is important. The im-
portant aspeat is its quality.
Feedback enters into the organiza-
tion's problem-solving/decisionmaking
process, and organizational decisions
drive resource allocation. Because all
organizations should want to max-
imize resources in the accomplishment
of organizational goals, it is essential
that decisions affecting resource allo-
cations be high-quality decisions.
Therefore, quality feedback is also
essential to the organization. If
feedback is of high quality and used in
the decisionmaking process, it will
contribute to higher quality decisions
which, in turn, maximize resources.
-In addition to theory (entropy) and
utility (quality decisions), there are
other reasons why evaluation is a
necessary and important part of orga-
nizational process. Not the least of
these other needs for evaluati6n is our
society's everincreasing and ex-
panding technological base. Tech-
nology is driving us into an increas
ingly sophisticated, complex
environment. Command and control
systems, weapons systems, training
systems-you name it and it is be
coming increasingly specialized and
Patting our tummies and pontifi:
cating solutions in the absence of good
quantitative analysis is the wrong way
to do business in this kind of environ
m ~ n t A solid evaluation system is
invaluable in helping the organization
keep pace-it is your sextant, or loran,
or whatever, that tells you where you
are. Knowing where you are is funda
mental to deciding where you are going
and why. To quote one of my col
leagues, "I don't want the data to
dictate the results." Neither do 1. But I
understand even less how one can
make decisions in the absence (or
complete disregard) of hard data.
Simply stated, in today's environment
an organization needs quality feedback
to function effectively and efficiently.
In the absence of quality feedback,
quality decisions are not apt to
happen. Obviously, this has no small
Colonel Ronald ,J Rabm IS director. Dlree
torate of EvaluatIOn, US Army Infantry
School. Fort Benntn{!,. Ga He has attended
MISSISSIPPI Southern College. the Unwerslty
of Southern MISSIS81PPI and Geor{!,e Wash
zngton Un WertH ty. and lS a graduate of the
Defense Language Institute. West Coast
Branch. the USACGSC and the Natwnal War
College He has served In Korea. Vletnam and
wah the Orrlce of the ChIef of Stafr, US
Army, Washm{!,ton. D C.
impact on resource utilization.
In the foregoing. the word "quality"
was linked to feedback. This was to
brir:lg out the distinction between
feedback and quality feedback. The
terms will be used interchangeably. but
quality [{'pdback is what we are talking
There are spveral wavs to check
your organization's mecha-
nism to determine if your feedback has
the e requIsite quality. I offer two
qupstions you can ask which may help
you determine whether or not your
evaluation' quality control resource is
hpmg used to its maximum potential in
produeing quality feedback. Is your
evaluator independent and objeetive?
Is your organizational climate con,
dueiv(' to recpivmg independent and
objective feedhack-bad ncws as well
as good'?
The requirement that evaluators be
indeppnd"ent and objective stems from
a simple (yet often ignored) idea: If you
want to know the answer to the
question How is "it" working?, you will
probably get a more valid and.
t1H'refore. more useful response if the
person you ask is not the same person
as thl' one who put "it" together-
whatevpr "it" happens to be. In other
words, the builder of a house may not
I", the hest person to ask if that house
is well,conFtructed. You will prohably
gpt a heltpr answpr-more independent
and ohjectIve-if you ask someonp
other than the builder. Hut that
someone also must understand how
housps should be built.
This independent, objective concept
for evaluation is in operation at Fort
Benning as follows: With regard to all
systems-weapons or training-for
which the USAIS is proponent, the
combat developer (CD) andior training
developer (TD) develop "it" and "its"
related training delivery system (the
CD/TD interface); the trainer (the
USAIS or units in the field) imple-
ments/uses "it," and the evaluator
tells the commandant how "it" is
Our independence is assured be-
cause we are not organizationally sub-
ordinate to any of the developers of
"it," and, so, we have no intraorganiza-
tional biases to cloud issues. Our objec-
tivitv is retained because we do not
participate in the combat or training
developments programs; therpfore, we
have no ego involvemeillt in the fielded
systpms (weapons or training).
If your organizational evaluation
system is not independent and ob-
jective. you may not really have a
system that pays its own way in terms
of contributions by way of quality
feedback to the organization's problem
solving, decisionmaking processes. In
such an environment, one wastes re-
sourcps in at least two ways. First,
resources committed to the evaluation
effort are not heing maximized.
Sl'cond, organizational decisions con
cerning resource allocation probably
will not be of the quality they would be
if quality feedback were available.
All the quality feedback in the
world will not help an organization
which lacks the maturity to use it. If
your organizational climate is not con-
ducivp to reeeiving and considering all
the feedback-the good news and the
bad-then you cannot capitalize on the
full potential of that feedback.
The creation of the right kind of
climate is. of course, leadershiprelated.
Organizational leaders must establish
a climate which allows the evaluator to
evaluate objectIvely and to present his
findings candidly. It isn't a question of
honesty or integrity. It is a question of
objectivity or, better stated, the lack
thereof on the part of the developer.
Developers, like commanders, like
engineers, like electricians, and others,
belil2ve that their products (whatever
their form) are the best. Quality control
(evaluation) is essential because of, not
in spite of, this honest conviction. It is
extrl2mely difficult for leaders or
managers to identify urgent problems
within their own systems. (If this were
not the case, a lot of consulting firms
wuuld be uut of business!)
While the organizational leader
must establish a climate which nur-
tures good evaluation, the evaluator
has to carry the ball. He must "stand
and be cuunted." At times, evaluators
will find themselves m conflict with
their cu-workers. Further, this conflict
usually involves not only co-workers,
but also supervisors. Quite often, the
developer co-worker will have "sold" a
program to a supervisor who is a
mutual supervisor of both the de-
I. veloper and the evaluator. By ap-
proving a developer's program, the
supervisor assumes some responsibili-
ty/ego involvement of his own. On a
"bad news" day, the evaluator, in
effect, will be telling his supervisor
that he (the supervisor) may have
made a bad program decision. It can
get uncomfortable, but it is a challenge
and certainly can be exciting.
The preceding concepts concerning
evaluation are considered to be gen-
erally applicable. Essentially, these
concepts say that good evaluation:
Is necessary to an organization.
Must be independent and ob-
jective to be effective in providing
quality feedback.
Is invaluable to quality decision-
making and maximizing resources.
Requires organizational maturity.
The USAIS has succeeded in
putting these general concepts into
action. That sounds like program de-
veloper talk, but, in this case, we have
the results of our evaluations to sub-
stantiate the claim. These results,
however, are related to something more
than the implementation of the general
conceptual framework outlined above.
During our two years' existence, we
have developed concepts of operation
which form the real substantive base
for our evaluation effort. The rest of
this article will concentrate on these.
The first problem we faced was
determining how we should organize
internally in order to conduct effective
evaluation operations. The US Army
Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) Staffing Guide provided a
cornucopia of missions and functions
for the DEV-the scope of these was
broad but definable, therefore
manageable. The organization
espoused by the Staffing Guide was
not really functional in that it sepa-
rated the basic evaluative functions of
data collection and data analysis
into separate subcells.
We modified that organizational
concept into one which emphasizes a
functional approach wherein a team is.
given a particular system to evaluate.
That team not only designs the data
collection effort, but also collects and
analyzes the data. In addition to these
functional teams, we retain a small
group of "technical experts" (four
Ph.D.s of various disciplines) who
provide intraorganizational assistance
as needed.
The final aspect of the TRADOC
Staffing Guide had to do with the
allocation of personnel resources. In
terms of numbers of people, the con-
straint was and remains severe. Since
we could not disregard this
constraint-we worked around it.
Based on the idea that the evaluator
must have sufficient experience and
expertise to check the homework of the
developers we were able to
write job descriptions which allowed us
to recruit the requisite experience and
expertise through an improved grade!
rank structure. As a result, size is
less a deterrent to our evaluation
program-at least in the quality of
product area-than it would have been
as originally designed. Broad mission,
functional organization, relatively
small size and high levels of expertise
descrihe the USAIS Directorate of
Evaluation. These descriptors also fa
cilitate effective evaluation.
Concurrent with solving those or
ganizational problems, we had to de-
velop methods of operation which
would facilitate the accomplishment of
our mission. Given a fielded system,
our hroadly defined mission is to
identify training, training development
and com hat development problems;
define those problems; determine the
nature of prohlem solution; and pass
those prohlems to the developers for
The key is mission accomplishment
in terms of fielded systems. We ration
alized that the USAIS is proponent for
two basic kinds of systems: training
systems and weapon systems. In this
context, training systems are defined
as those which deal with a variety of
technical and tactical skills which
infantrymen must master and which
are encompassed in a course of in-
struction or training program devel-
oped by the USAIS for use at the
. school or by units in the field or both
(for example, the Infantry Officers'
Basic Course or the 11 Series Soldiers'
Manuals and Skill Qualification
Weapon systems are those in which
a weapon is the focal point and the
training of individuals or units is re-
lated to maximizing the effects of that
weapon (for example, mortars, the
TOW and the M16). This is important
because, as the proponent agency for
infantry training and weapons
systems, the USAIS is responsible for'
providing the field a complete package
called a training delivery system (TDS)
for each of the programs or systems.
When delivered to the trainer, the TDS
package should provide all the training
support materials needed to conduct
productive training.
The recognition of proponent re-
sponsibility for training delivery
systems provides a key element in our
evaluation effort because it answers
the question what, or in what context,
we should evaluate. A TOS is designed
so that, all other things equal and
given the training prescribed in the
TDS, a particular target audience
would be trained to a level which
would help to maximize its combat
effecti veness.
This means that, to some extent at
least, units in the field can be only as
effective as the training delivery
system provided by the proponent. It
cannot be overemphasized that, if the
TOS is inadequate, it will have an
adverse effect on units, individuals and
weapons system effectiveness. Since
quality control must focus on organiza-
tional outputs, the object of the USAIS
quality control or evaluation effort
must be USAIS proponent training
delivery systems .
Having identified the what of our
evaluation (the TDS), the next decision
had to do with where we ought to
concentrate our efforts. In keeping
with TRADOC's School Model '76 and
the natural inclination of the infan1;ry
to believe that the best place to find out
"how it is working" is wherever the
action is, we decided to concentrate on
individual and unit performance in the
field. At the USAIS, we believe that the
measure of success of any TDS we
produce is the level of performance by
individuals and units in the field.
While we continue to collect a:-.d
analyze data concerning resident
courses and students, our emphasis is
on effectiveness in the field. This ob
jective of TDS evaluation is a subject
we painstakingly explain to units in
the field which provide us with sub-
jpcts for evaluation. We attempt to
make our evaluations norisk proposi-
tions (unit and individual anonymity).
This benefits the unit in two ways.
First, the feedback obtained causes the
TDS to improve over time, thereby
enhancing unit effectiveness. Second,
units can get a detailed fix on where
they are without expending precious
unit resources.
-So, what we evaluate is the TDS,
and where we do it is primarily in the
field. Hoou we do it is fundamentally
related to several guidelines that we
developed. These are based on two
formulas that are fairly well-known
within TRADOC. The first one says
that a total weapon system consists of
the soldier, his training and his
weapon. The second one says that
battlefield effectiveness is a function of
the weapon, the soldier's proficiency
and the tactic or technique of em-
ployment. We have combined these two
ideas as shown in Figure 1.
In carrying out our mission, we
develop methods and techniques for
collecting data-both objective (quanti-
tative) and subjective (qualitative)-in
each of the applicable areas of focus.
While all of our study efforts may not
include all of the five focal points
shown at Figure 1, they all do include
the soldier, his training (because it is
intimately related to the TDS) and his
resultant proficiency. As a result, we
expend a good deal of our resources in
these three areas. Here is why:
- The soldier is one component of a
system within which he operates.
Performance standards (demon-
strated proficiency) must be in terms of
outputs required from the soldier for
the total system to function effectively
and efficiently. Any analysis of profi-
ciency must include objective data
using hands-on performance testing
whenever possible. This helps to
answer the question, Can he?
In addition to demonstrated profi-
ciency, training or weapon system
evaluations must consider other
aspects related to soldiers' perform-
ance. Because the soldier is a person,
many internal and external factors
affect his duty performance, which is
the behavior we observe. While many
aspects of human behavior can be
quantified, analysis of such data is
largely a subjective process. Will he?
Does he want to?
If combat or training developers
do not consider Can he?, Will he? and
Does he want to?, there cannot-be the
requisite match of system
componenfs-man, weapon and
training-necessary for effective and
efficient operation of that system. As a
result, maximum battlefield effec-
tiveness cannot' be reached.
In carrying out our mission, we
conduct what we call total system
evaluations (TSEs). We look at one of
two basic kinds of systems: training or
weapon. Obviously, some of the
subsets of these two systems could be
so large and complex as to ,defy defin
itive evaluation. As a result, we define
the system before we begin. We also
know that. in those systems, some or
all of the areas of focus shown at
Figure I will obtain. All that remains
is to determine which kind of system
we are evaluating, what are its key
subsystems and which areas of focus
need to be considered.
For example, when we did our in
fantry advanced individual training
(AIT) TSE, we knew that it was a
training system; that a soldier would
receive training in multiple infantry
skills; that the soldier would bring two
things to training with him-what he
learned formally and informally as a
civilian and what he learned in basic
combat training; and that he would
perform at some level of effectiveness
in a unit after AlT. Schematically, the
system we were evaluating took the
form shown in Figure 2. The process of
system definition is an essential first
step in the evaluation process.
This second part concentrated on
how the USAIS has operationalized
quality control!feedback. Of course, a
lot of the nitty-gritty of instrument
design, collection, planning, data anal-
ysis, and so forth have been omitted.
That could get laborious and, the more
we get into details, the less general
utility for the reader. I would suggest
that the more scientific and disciplined
your evaluation, the better the results.
In addition, if you do not put the
computer to work for you, you may
Focus of USAIS Evaluations
1. Total Weapon System = Soldier + training + weapon
2. Battlefield Effectiveness =
F (Weapon x proficiency x tactic and technique of employment)
3. Synthesis:
Soldier + training = proficiency
Weapon is constant
Tactic and technique of employment (doctrine) maximizes employment
of the system
4. Therefore:
Focus on: A. Soldier as a person (think-feel-behave)
B. Training (design and conduct)
C. Proficiency (result of combining A and B)
D. Weapon (include simulators)
E. Tactic and technique (understood-executed)
Figure 1
Note E Effectiveness of AIT graduate in field
Figure 2
never get finished. In this latter
regard, planning your computer pro-
grams concurrent with developing your
data collection instruments can reduce
yOUr time by as much as one-half.
Operationalization of the quality
control/evaluation/feedback concept
at the USAIS is predicated on organiz-
ing functionally; ensuring that expe-
r i ~ n e and expertise are present in the
organization; ensuring that we
oriented evaluation on the USAIS
product (TDSs for training and
weapons systems); and clearly articu-
lating where evaluation had to focus so
as to deliver a useful product to meet
USAIS organizational needs.
There is one final area to consider:
analysis of the data. This is the biggest
challenge to the evaluator, but it may
well be the most satisfying part of the
job. The data analysis phase probably
can be handled in two general ways.'
First, you can present the data as the
computer delivers it to you (statisti-
cal significance). In a sense, this is
analysis because the computer will
provide you significances and devia-
tions and all of that. Secondly, you can
add an interpretation to the data (prac-
tical significance). What does it mean?
I believe that the latter is the evalu-
ator's job. It adds to your risks and
your confrontations with co-workers,
but, if you have it together, it is the
real essence of being an evaluator.
Evaluation at USAIS is a success. I
believe that it can be successful in any
organization given that the organi-
zation has specific goals and Dbjectives
in mind and has the maturity to put
evaluation to work. ~
Interoperability of Allied Forces
in Europe:
Some Historical Peacetime Realities
Part I
Benjamin Franklin Cooling
Lieutenant Colonel
John A. Hixson, US Army
~ : "
The Roman legions initially had effective cooperation with
Rome's allies. But, as time passed and peace came, this
cooperation dwindled to the point that, when war came
again, there was mass confusion and finally defeat. After the
Middle Ages, the lack of interoperability among nation-
states in a coalition was again evident. The Spanish Army of
Flanders and the international force of the Duke of Marl-
borough are prime examples. Napoleon's repeated victories
over the coalition forces opposing him speak to the lack of
interoperability among these allies. The Triple Entente of
Ru88ia, France and Great Britain and their foes, the Triple
Alliance of Central Powers consisting of Germany, Austro-
Hungary and Turkey, were no better prepared to operate as
coalition armies on the eve of World War I. Lessons learned
as a result of previous coalitions during wartime were
forgotten during periods of peace and had to be relearned in
each subsequent war.
EALING with the enemy is a simple
and straightforward matter when
contrasted with securing close cooper-
ation with an ally. By the same token no
small part of our War College Studies
should be devoted to an endeavor to
foresee exactly what to expect and how
to reduce friction should we have Allies,
which may God forbid, in the next war.'
So concluded Major General Fox
Conner in a lecture delivered at the Army
War College in 1939. Best known as the
mentor of General Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, Conner's experience had been
with Allies In wartime; hiS cYnicism was
repeated both by his own generation of
military professionals as well as those
who served with Ike and Patton later on.
But the sentiments might Just as well
have been uttered by a Roman, Eng-
lishman, Frenchman, Russian, German,
Pole or Turk. All had reaped the
whirlwind of wartime Allied difficulty
from 1914 to 1918 by failing to develop
some very baSICS in a peacetime envI-
ronment. Even there, however, they were
part of an almost ageless tradition.
Historical analysis of the peacetime
interoperabillty of Allied forces In Europe
at the field army level tends to be diS-
turbing. Countless studies have analyzed
actual wartime coalitions and Joint opera- .
tlons. Similarly, the very top echelons of
political and military planning and coop-
eration have faSCinated historians and
policy analysts for sometime.
But an
abiding and gnawing question remains
largely unanswered: What pellcetime
measures have been applied to achieve a
higher level of international force inte-
gration which would be expected to fight
in a defensive posture? Historical ex-
amples dating from the ancient o m a n ~
may give us some clues.
Part II of this article Will appear In the September 1978 M,llt8ry Re'lliew
~ = = = = = = = = >
Ancient Rome
~ ~
Certain experiences and patterns of
Roman and allied interoperability were
established early In the history of that
ancient state. They continued in some
form to the so-called "fall" of Rome in
the Christian epoch. Allied contingents
attached to regular Roman legions pro-
vided both strength and weakness in
military, political and cultural terms.
Early Roman armies of the republic
comprised both Roman citizens and non-
citizens drawn from Italian "allies" of the
city-state. Such allies were the fore-
runners of auxiliary contingents recruited
in outer and more primitive provinces as
well as from client states beyond the
frontier. Motivation for "alliance" was
communicated to the serving ranks in the
form of common enemy, financial subsi-
dization or threat of reprisal to parent
tribe or client state, promises of land and
booty and even Internal competition be-
tween Roman and allied units and their
individual warriors But from the bloody
social war of 91-87 B.C. dated the
primary Inducement to alliance-the
promise of eventual Roman citizenship
generally upon demobilization.
Within a tWin-level Roman army
structure, the citizen legion, ordinarily
well-disciplined and reliable, tacitly
served to keep the noncitizen auxilia
under control, even resorting to the,lr
tactical superiority where necessary. This
was a latent function of the legion ai-
though by no means slight.
The preindustrial age rendered
minimal the problems of "standardi-
zation" in weaponry, logistics and com-
munication for ally and Roman alike.
Battlefield signals were either aural
through blaring trumpets or the visual
sign of the eagle standard. Similarly, if
Latin accompanied the spread of Roman
civilization, then the language of the
masters was never a major impediment
to relations between Rome's legionnaires
and their auxilia allies.
Certainly, liaison officers from both
parties may have smoothed the rough
edges, but Roman officers commanded
both legions and allied units. Moreover,
the long time span of Roman history
tends to level the peaks and valleys In
terms of problems with allied forces. But
the auxilia genera Ity provided capable
scouts, skirmish troops, light infantry
and, above all, cavalry so desperately
needed by the heavy infantry of the
Roman legion.
We do know, however, that, as the
centuries passed, the reward of citi-
zenship was a double-edged sword. As
the perimeters of empire stabilized in the
Imperial Age, line legions became locked
to permanent stations and provincialized
by local recruitment. Whole tribes of
barbarians became integrated into
Roman Units by 382 B.C., serving under
their own chieftains not under Romans.
The allure of Rome became gold, not
citizenship. To the emperor on the banks
of the Tiber, any recrUit be'came a po-
tential warrior for battles between rival
contestants for his throne.
Coupled to "Germanization" of the
western Roman army was a failure to
secure a partnership between the bar-
barian immigrants and Roman land-
owners In Europe, a partnership
doomed to founder upon traditional Latin
feelings of superiority over Unter-
menschen, or legal relations between
patron and client. Perhaps German le-
gionnaires remained loyal, but not so tHe
federates. Surrounded by Roman racial
hatred, they naturally felt no fealty
toward a distant ideal of another place
and time. By 409 A.D .. such allied troops
failed to prevent other German tribes
from crossing into Spain. Ethnic disunity
contributed to the abandonment of
Britain and sections of the Danubian
frontier line.
Thus, in the end, the superb team of
legIOnnaires from Rome and allied pro-
vincial auxilia gave way, first to inte-
gration in fortified camps along the
strategic boundanes of the empire, and
later to complete provinclalizatlon of the
imperial armies. What the new breed of
native defense forces desired by the
fourth and fifth centunes was akin to
modern "national
and self-
The resultant failure of allied Interop-
erabllity gave way to the Dark or Middle
Ages where the glOries that were Rome
became ad hoc alliances and allegiances
to powerful princes linked by feudal ties
of fealty and force. Patron and client In
allied relations assumed only slightly
different meaning.
Allied Forces in the
Early Modern Period
Alliances and coalitions accompanied
the nse of modern nation-states after the
"darkness and chaos" of the Middle
Ages. The emergence of England. France,
Portugal and Spain-OWing fealty to a
particular sovereign-meant that an
almost ceaseless pattern of both do-
mestic and international conflicts would
Involve each or all In warfare on the
European continent. or outSide Europe
dunng the Crusades. Historical records
remain Indistinct for determining
strengths and weaknesses of allied oper- .
atlons. But analYSIS of several case
studies including the Spanish "Army of
Flanders" in the 16th and 17th centuries.
as well as the international force of the
Duke of Marlborough In the 18th century.
Will Illustrate allied Interoperability In
that age.
The Spanish Army of Flanders (1567-
1659) reflected the transitIOnal penod
between the demise of the Roman
Empire and the appearance of our
modern natlon-state.
The early modern
empire of the Spanish Hapsburgs. like
the Romans. covered a sizable geo-
graphical and multiethnic area although
linked through the common bond of the
Holy Roman CatholiC Church. Communi-
cation and control were pnmitlve and
The empire's armed forces reflected
the composition of sOCiety-deriving from
no less than SIX different "nations."
some even beyond the stnct adminis-
. trative boundanes of the Hapsburgs.
Spain. Italy, Burgundy, Germany and the
Bntlsh Isles prOVided units to fight beSide
local Walloons in the Army of Flanders.
Even the armies of England and France
consisted of multinational contingents.
Manpower was a never-ending re-
qUirement for power-hungry sovereigns
seeking European hegemony.
But how to control such diverse ele-
ments In one's army. that was the
question. The ostenSible purpose of the.
Spanish Army of Flanders was to stifle_
domestic ;nsurrectlOn in the Dutch prov-
inces. But. to reduce friction between
contingents. the national contingents
were maintained 'as separate adminis-
trative Units Only Spaniards could serve
In or command Spanish contingents.
Even Englishmen were forbidden to
cOr(lmand Scottish or Irish units. and
Milanese or Roman troops were for-
bidden to serve In Napolese units.
Germans were carefully recruited from
Hapsburg patrimonial estates such as
Austria. Alsace and Tyrol to assure their
political and religious conformity.
The fact that such an army was a
Jumble of nationalities. none of them
calling the Netherlands home. was not
necessarily a disadvantage Like the
Romans before them. tre Spanish Haps-
burgs felt that stationing a Unit far from
its homeland ensured solidity and alle-
giance The Walloons. for e)(ample. were
counted upon to have the highest de-
serlion or defection rate In the Flanders
force-yet they were necessary Simply
for numbers' sake. Similarly. the Duke of
Alva never forgot that Germans In the
army had proved Intractable In earlier
German Protestant revolts simply be-
cause many of the rebels were relalives.
servants. neighbors or friends. The
BriliSh units had notorious procliVities for
deserting their erstwhile Dutch allies.
and even the Italians were suspect
In the end. they all proved their
fighting mettle. but at the top of the
pecking order stood the Spanish Infan-
trymen. Surely. the caste feeling of their
Spanish Hapsburg employers had a rip-
pling effect down through the national
order of command
More at Issue were matters of
weapons. subsistence. supply. and so
forth. While standardization of uniforms
was frowned upon (again national con-
tlngent dress supposedly promoted esprit
de corps). the Hapsburg treasury took
care of weapon and logistical responsibil-
ities. If standardization was not a
problem for this multinational a,rmy.
getting men and material across an often
hostile. checkerboard Europe was a
never-ceasing Issue.
In the end. the abiding problem of the
multinational armies of the early
Hapsburg 'estate remained fiscal and
geographical. Use of troops raised in one
area to fight In another combined with
weaknesses of the Hapsburg treasury.
When men are not paid or fed or quar-
t e r ~ over long campaign periods. then
multinational forces, like national armies,
lose their efficiency as instruments of
state policy. And so it was with the
Spanish Army of Flanders.
There was nothing wrong with
Spain's military organization. The multi-
national army remained the hallmark of
the Hapsburgs until 1918 when the last
force of the Austro-Hungarian dynasty
mobilized With the aid of recruiting
posters printed in no less than 15 lan-
guages It continued to fight even after
the collapse of the empire it had sworn to
defend. On the other hand. the interoper-
ability of early modern multinational
armies possibly owed more to so-called
"great captains" of the time than to any
foreru nners of present-day devices for
ensuring alliance force solidity.
The mercenary allegiance to Unit
captains. growing largely out of Roman
patron-client relatIOnships or feudal ar-
rangements of the Middle Ages, led
eventually to veneration of leaders from
Gustavus Adolphus to Frederick of
Prussia. They were hereditary rulers as
well as great battle chieftains. Yet few
surpassed 52-year-old. John Churchill,
Earl (later Duke) of Marlborough. He
displayed an uncanny knack for smooth-
ing the differences between allies of the
By the 18th century, France followed
Spain as the supreme threat to the
European balance of power. As Louis XIV
snatched European hegemony from the
Hapsburgs, stili another coalition of allies
was forged to counter his threat. The
Holy Roman Empire Jeamed with Prot-
estant England and the Netherlands for
the Crown of Spain The Dutch aligned
with their traditional English enemies In
order to preserve eXistence. The English
teamed with a collection of "unspeakable
foreigners" In the name of self-
preservation of their Protestantism and
liberty as well as power. Prusslans cast
covetous eyes on allies' property Savoy
had little affinity for distant peoples but
was concerned with ItS own independ-
ence and what It would gain from France
As Marlborough observed on the eve of
Doual In 1710'
This army is compos'd of eight dif-
ferent nattons and next to the bles.omg of
God, we owe all our success to our
unammity which has been hitherto as If
in reality we were but one nation 4
l]1e success of the coalition against
France may be seen too much at this
distance I as the personal success of
Marlborough. Yet, lacking eVidence to the
contrary, it was he who overcame the
natural differences emitting from nation-
ality, strains of war and goals and
methods. And supposedly it was he who
overcame continental antipathy to a
general who had "never grounded
himself in the theory of war by profes-
sional study," but who owed his position
as English commander In chief In the
Netherlands and subsequently deputy
captain general of the Dutch forces to
"court favor, diplomatic influence, a
chain of accidents and the mutually
destructive claims of better men."
Marlborough accomplished unity on
politico-military as well as allied military
levels. His protagonists ranged from
Dutch field deputies like De Renswoude,
Van Collen or Gosllnga, and Dutch gen-
erals Overklrk, Opdam and Glnkel, to
Eugene of Savoy and George of Hanover
Yet adroit use of Integrity and trust allied
with patience, politeness and charm
enabled Marlborough to cajole and
dictate. acquiesce and demand In order
to bind up the fragile alliance to the
common cause.
Marlborough's headquarters was
staffed by Englishmen yet It was open
equally to any British or allied general
desirous of communication with Marl-
borough It may be that long years In
coalition fighting had "natlvlzed" Marl-
borough at the expense of his home
political base. Perhaps It was merely that
tired continental professional so'ldlers
saw thiS Englishman as.
a new, a pnvate man, a subject,
acqUIred by merit and management, a
more decIding mfluence than hIgh birth.
conftrmed authonty and even the crown
of Great Bntam had gIven to King
. William.
Stili, nothing succeeds like success
Had Marlborough not won the Battles of
Blenheim. Ramlilies and Malplaquet, all
of his suavity and diplomacy might have
gone for naught Victory Infected both
peers at command level and men In the
ranks of allied armies If not necessarily
given to formal councils of war. a su-
preme commander of the Age of Marl-
borough had frequent contact and dis-
cussIOn with his own countrymen as well
as generals of foreign conlingents. At
this time, the staff was not necessarily
the commander's major source of com
mUnicatlOn. He was In close and almost
daily contact with hiS subordinate com
manders, and language proved no barner
for the Interpersonal relations of men of
the same class. banded together through
long-term service against a common
Those nationally organized contln'
gents at lower echelons could thus be
Impregnated easily With the SPirits of
their own commanders once Marl-
borough and hiS chieftains had earned
their colleagues' respect. A magic key
may be detected although ItS secrets not
completely set free In the words of one
Marlborough analyst
as ttme passes and hiS authorltv
becomes established . . '. one cannot tell
the difference from the wording of the
letter between ally and English ad
The Age of RevolutIOns ';r

. '.. - - - \ :; ('1
.. .r
o '--____
SophistIcated nation-states had
emerged by the end of the 18th and the
onset of the 19th centuries. Their Jealous
striving for power and wealth Injected an
unstable element to the world scene
thereafter AllIances were at best left to
the diplomats. and military profeSSIOnals
thought little of prewar negotiations
except at the very highest level ShlftJrig
sands of diplomacy rendered prewar
military conversations a.lmost moot. The
military prepared to fight anyone deemed
the enemy of the state by the politicians.
Peacetime planning for wartime cooper-
ation In an era of great national rivalries
was somewhat unfathomable to soldiers
and sailors of the age.
A pattern became set. Prewar paper
coalitions went calmlY and loosely to
war. NatIOnal armies and navies gen-
erally moved independently or in very
loose cooperalion against a common foe
In the opening campaigns. Then, as
defeats or victories failed to produce
resolution, time effected changes and
more complex interallied planning Still,
thiS planning remained at the highest
levels-almost always divorced from op-
eratIonal realities. The era from the
French Revolution to the century aber-
ratIOn known as the Crimean War pro-
VIdes excellent examples of mteropera-
blilty In an age of revolutions.
In these Instances, coalitions of Eu-
ropean natIOns arrayed themselves
against commonly perceived threats to
the balance of power and stability of the
continent. From 1789 to 1815, It was
revolutionary and NapoleonIC France. At
mldcentury, It was czarist Russia threat-
ening to untidy the face of the Middle
East. particularly the Turkish Straits. In
these coalitions, several strong and weak
powers attempted to effect military
strategic policy divorced from the real-
Ities of military operations and knowl-
edge of military capabilities The results
were often less than deSired, particularly
With respect to Interoperability of allied
OperatIOns against revolutionary and
NapoleoniC France consumed nearly a
quarter-century and completely disrupted
European affairs in the process. The
emergence of a social and political threat
to the established ruling oligarchies pro-
foundly rocked European capitals. True,
there had been a revolution m distant
North America. That was thought to'have
been an internal English problem, or ill
best a fleetmg opportunity for European
powers like France and Spain to twist the
lion's tail abroad It was not anticipated
as a forerunner of things to come m
contmental Europe. Yet, after 1789, fear
and hatred of Jacobmlsm quickly cat-
alyzed as /iberte. ega/lte, and fraternite
emblazoned across the face of the con-
tment, wmnmg colleagues and allies to
the French cause
How does one overthrow revolution
and restore the Bourbon monarchy? Time
after time, until Waterloo ended It all for
France, the coalition of allies moved With
grand design and lofty plans, only to be
roundly defeated piecemeal by the
French and their satellite states. Either
the lack of agreed-upon political alms or
an overriding strategic plan has reo
celved the blame But British cries of
"cowardly allies" only dimly veil the
difficulties that were experienced at op-
erational levels below planning and
treaty level once the actual fighting
For example, the grandiose plans of
the Second Coalition In 1798-99 called
for Austrian and Russian armies to drive
the French from Italy and SWitzerland
before movmg mto France An Anglo-
Dutch expeditionary force m the Nether-
lands would thrust through Belgium
toward Paris, possibly brlngmg Prussia
Into the war In ItS wake.
In the end, however, the coalition
enjoyed success only In Italy The thrust
through SWitzerland ended With the dis-
persion and defeat of the Austrians, and
the Anglo-Dutch expeditlo.nary force was
stopped a few miles beyond the
beachhead, forced to capitulate and re-
er"bark. ThiS pattern continued for most
of the period until, eventually, years of
experience enabled an Arthur Wellesley
(Wellington) to forge an allied army,
redeem the Iberian Peninsula from Na-
poleon and, finally, stand the ultimate
test at Waterloo in 1815.
The passage of the French emperor
from' the stage of history promised 100
years of peace. True, there were no
major wars until 1914, but the century
was hardly peaceful. In the 1850s, the
colonial struggles of expansive Russia
and Imperial Britain disrupted the
balance of power as had a wave of
internal revolutions In the 1830s and
The relatively short. almost forgotten
conflict In the Crimea highlighted opera-
tional problems of allies and their military
institutions. The victors of the past-such
as the Duke of Wellington and his
lieutenants-remembered almost noth-
Ing about the whims of allied Interoper-
ability and the need to prepare for them
In peacetime.
ViCtOriOUS Britain had led the Concert
of Europe after 1815
But Its Instru
m n ~ s of military force grew obsolete and
stolid The Royal Navy was the first line'
of defense, while the army sagged under
memories of peninsular VictOrieS, the
aged hand of Wellington and the eternal
British curse of having to hire ItS man-
power rather than conscript It Fur-
. thermore. home administration was bi-
furcated and political.
By contrast, the defeated French had
reformed and centralized Military'
conduct of colonial operations In Algena
In the 1830s had given them a Jump on
tailOring forces for overseas military op-
erations Their war minister was a
soldier, their soldiery flushed With Al-
gerian victory. France was clearly the
superior military partner at the time of
Traditional Francophobia and its tradi-
tional hauteur based on maritime superi-
ority kept Britain from an Integrated
approach to the Crimea For-
gotten by its antiquated senior veteran
commanders who had fought with Wel-
lington were the peninsular experiences
with allies. Of course, Integration of
Spanish and Portuguese or the Dutch-
Belgian units in the NapoleoniC era
always had been the weaker with the
stronger under British supreme
gUidance. The French felt equal to the
British as a nation and a military force.
Napoleon wanted the British to command
by sea, the French by land, with a
supreme war council to coordinate The
English wanted none of that. "Cooper-
ation" was their answer-that IS, sep-
arate national land and forces
working In parallel, coordinated fashion
Two disastrous Crimean winters and
many combat miscues finally produced
some effort at a supreme council. But It
came too late. RUSSia anticipated Aus-
trian intervention in early 1856 and sued
for an armistice "Cooperation" With all
ItS anticipated difficulties was the actual
legacy of Crimea. The price paid for
unrestricted national sovereignty was a
prolonged war, duplication of effort, un-
necessary suffering and a waste of good
men and material resources due to a lack
of prewar Interoperability planning.
The lessons of history once more
receded from View after Crimea. That
neither Britain nor France reflected long
upon the reluctance of both states to
subordinate their national sovereignties
could be seen In events on the eve of and
early In World War I. Over 60 years after
the Crimea, the British had forgotten
allied lessons of the Crimea, and both
France and Britain paid no attention to
Napoleon Ill's enjoinder at unified
command. Why should they? Within 20
years, Napoleon III had gone the way of
hiS uncle. Sedan for the French and the
colonial fights of the British "unlearned"
the lessons of allied interoperability from
the French Revolution to the Crimea for
stili another generation of Anglo-French
military professionals, Everyone seemed
possessed by a "small-wars" mentality.
Allies on the Eve of World War I
Nineteenth-century Europe moved in-
exorably onward through a succession of
unification wars in Italy and Germany,
flareups In the Balkans and overseas
races for colonies and raw materials.
Intense nationalist rivalries seemingly
mitigated against military alliances, and
even the experience of an allied expedi-
tionary force In China at the turn of the
century was an aberration.
Vast, new power blocs were destined
to develop under such unsettling condi-
tIOns. But soldiers and sailors particularly
remained SUSPICIOUS of diplomats' at-
tempts to find friends in a hostile world.
The earlier wartime lessons of Napoleon
and the Crimea meant little to a new
generation of xenophobic members of the
War Office, Admiralty or Genera/stab.
The European balance of power by
1914 was reflected by two major and
contending alliances with RUSSia, France
and Great Britain roughly aligned as the
Triple Entente, and Germany, Austro-
Hungary and Turkey grouped as the
Triple Alliance of Central Powers. Britain
remained rather weakly committed, and
Italy had just recently withdrawn
the Triple Alliance. Both groupings diS'
played all the traditional weaknesses and
omiSSions associated With peacetime
systems of thiS type. particularly at an
operational level. Very little preparation
on either side had been made to ensure
coordination and victory should such
deterrence fail
The whole Improbability of the Central
Powers alliance seems qUite apparent In
retrospect 7 A coalition of states charac-
terized by extremely divergent war alms.
radically different socioeconomic struc
tures and contrasting strategic capabil-
ities. even their cultural and geographical
differences. were enormous. If Germany
provided the linchpin of the coalition and
fountainhead of strategic gUidance.
moral sustenance and financial largess.
It also projected a condescending attitude
toward ItS lesser colleagues. thereby
aggravating the strains and "minority"
status of the latter.
Part of the problem was the extreme
formality of men and their institutions at
this time. German Kaiser Wilhelm and
Austro-Hungarlan Emperor Franz Josef
might agree upon strategic objectives
during protocol Visits to one another's
capitals. But,relatlons up and down the
hierarchical chainS were strict. formal
and cold-completely untrammeled by
political interference or Influence from
parliamentary Institutions. Moreover. the
German-Austrian relations symbolized
differences between a people who made
"lack of system a way of life and another
that seemed to deify order and live for It
alone"-Prusslan effiCiency contrasted
With Austrian GemUtlIchkeit.
Long before 1914. the well-trained
Prusslan staff officers and attaches who
had any contact With their Austrian
counterparts seemed puzzled and
shocked With the way their southern
associates looked upon military matters.
From the time of the elder Helmuth
Moltke onward. there was a minimum of
anything approaching comb'lned
Count Alfred von Schlleffen displayed
complete mistrust of the Austrians
durmg his prewar period as chief of staff.
He chose to communicate With them as
httle as pOSSible. and. when he did. scant
attention was paid to courtesy or the
views of the Austrians When SchlieHen
shifted. the German focus of planning
was only belatedly passed to Vienna.
Erich von Ludendorff admitted later that
he really learned about the Austrian ally
oQly after the shooting started
The German General Staff possessed
only the most rudimentary knowledge of
the strength. organizatIOn. command
structure. national composition and tac-
tical forms of ItS Austro-Hungarlan ally.
Moreover. German and Austrian chiefs of
staff hated one another With a passion
Lost In the ethnlclsm. nationalism and
false confidence were the realities of
military morale. an ineffiCient and un-
Wieldy reserve system, unsatisfactory
munitions and deterioration of the
strategiC railway net-all Austnan weak
POints vis-a-vIs the enemy on Its front,
czanst Russia The unreality _ reached a
pOint In August 1914 when the younger
Mottke rather off-handedly brushed aSide
the Austrian liaison officer Stlirgh With
the- comment "You have a good army
You'll beat the Russians"
The prewar situation for Germans and
Turks was qUite Similar. Major General
Otto Llman von Sanders went to Turkey
to train the land forces In 1913 It was
not long before his 42-member miSSion
extended authonty over German and
TurkiSh military establishments alike,
evoking passive resistance from the ally
and strong notes of protest from St
Petersburg Von Sanders concluded later
The German officers, unfamiliar with
the language and wltn but superficial
understanding of the country and of the
Turkish Army, should never have been
made to shoulder the responsibility for
conditions strange to them to the e,xtent
that It was done
Under their stern gaze, however, the
Turks Improved pay, administration,
clothing and sanitatIOn Yet, once again,
German superiority and ethniclsm
erected a barrier between allies Neither
German nor Turk really knew much
about Turkish army dependability under
Surely, more might have been ex-
pected from the Grand Alliance facing
the disparate Central Powers 8 Anglo-
French cooperation talks began as early
as 1906 and continued despite many
hardships through the years They were
much closer than Similar Franco-RUSSian
or Anglo-RUSSian conversations, staff
VISitS and protocol miSSions
The Bntish never lost their awe of the
"paper tiger" army of czanst Russ'm
which many of their officers had seen In
frontier operations In India and Afghan-
Istan. But most English officers had
little firsthand knowledge save what
attaches and army chiefs brought home
from Infrequent tours In the Russian
Of the French, of course, It was
different A whole coterie of Francophihc
British staffers sprang up during the
decade before World War I. Through
adrOit maneuver, secret planning and
drive, they managed to commit a Bntish
Expeditionary Force on paper to some
future battle in Fla nders without the
general knowledge of either the British
government or the general public. On
both Sides of the channel, they effected
peacetime Anglo-French cooperation at
various stages of liaison and staff work,
planning In the directorates of military
operations and curricular instruction. In
the entangling continental COMmitments,
the French could never be quite sure of
perfidious Albion.
Even at that, It was all terribly
traditional-natIOnal armies planning to
fight Side by Side in carefully delineated
sectors, liaison never going lower than
general staff levels and cooperation
largely confined to French-speaking Eng-
lishmen like Spears (himself a product of
an Anglo-French family, background and
culture) Called -into the Military Intelli-
gence 5 sectIOn at the War Office, Spears
received instructions to create an Anglo-
French code. The War Office admitted
only one bilingual code eXisted-in
Japanese-and It could not find that
copy Spears recalled that he was handed
a number of old codes to browse over,
"but when I asked for French codes I was
told the French would not let us even see
any of theirS, not even an old one."
Undaunted, the young Englishman
stumbled through the exercise, and pres-
ently found himself, codes in hand, as-
signed to English signal umts
messages to the French army
neuvers across the channel.
recalled later'
on mao
Neither the French nor the English
operatives were to know they were com
municatmg With a foreign army. but it
1 Conner, The Allted High Command and Allied Un,t ... of
Direction' Lecture at the US Army War COllege 10 February 1939
Army War College OperatIonal Arch, .. e5 US Army M,llta'" History
Institute Carlisle Barracks Pa
2 See tor 81<.8mple Roy Chowdbury Military Alftances ana
Neutrality In War and Peace Onent longman5 India 1966
Sir Fredenck Maunce Lessons of A/hed CooperatIon Na"al Military
and Air. 7914 7918 OldordUmver<;ltvPre'is N Y 1942Stan1eyR
Larsen and James Lawton Collins Jr Alherf PartlCIf)BCton In Vietnam
Department of the Army, WashingTon D C 1975 David!=" Trask.
The United Stares In the Supreme War CounCIl Ameflcan War Arms
ana IntElr Alhed Strategy 191' 1918 WeSleyan UmverSltv Press
Middletown. Conn 1961 or Forrest C Pogue The Supreme
Commana. Department of the Army Washington D C 1954
3 Geoffrey Parker The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Roaa
15677659. Cambridge UniverSIty Press N Y 1972
4 R E Scouller Marlborough-The International Commander
The Army and Defence Journal July 1972 pp 438 SO
5 Piers Mackesy Statesmen at War The Strategy 01 Overthrow
179B 1799 Longman Inc: N Y 1974
6 James B Agnew The Great War That Almost Was The
Cnmea 1853 1856' Parameters Volume 111 Number 1 1973 pp
46-57 and A J Barker Thp War Agamst Russ,a 1854 7856. Holt
Rinehart & Winston N 'y 1970
7 James B Agnew The ImpOSSible .o.Jhance The Central
BenJamm Franklm Coolmg IS aSsistant di
rector, H,stoflcal Services. US Army MIlitary
HIstory Institute. Carlisle Barracks. Pa He reo
celVed a B A from Rutgers University and an
A M and Ph D from the Umverslty of Pennsyl
vania HIS article -'Crelghton Abrams at the US
Army War College" appeared In the June 1978
MIlitary ReView
was Interesting to see how our men
instantly spotted by the way the Morse
signals were transmitted that they were
not being sent by Englishmen.
Such were the conditions of allied-
interoperability In Europe on the eve of
World War I.
Powers and Coalrtmn Warfare 19141918 Parameters Volume I.
WrntEH 1972 pp 3649 Gordon A Craig The World War I Alliance
of the Central Power5 In RetrOSpect The Military CoheSion of the
Alliance. Journal o{ Modern HIMor}' September 1965 pp 336 44
Otto llman von Sander!;, Five Years m Turkey US Naval Inst,tute
Press AnnapoliS Md 1927 J M McGanty ForeIgn Influence on
the Ottoman 1 urk.lsh Army 1800-1918 Ph D dissertatIon Amer.
Ican UniverSity 196a UnlverSl1y Mlcrofllm5. Ann Arbor Mlch
1968 and Ulrrch Trumpener, German AId to Turkey In
t914 An H.stoncal Reevaluation Journal of Modern History June
1960 pp 14549
8 allan Bond The V,ctofJan Army and the Staff Cof/ege 1854
1914 Eyre Methuen London Eng 1972 NIchols J D Ombram
The Impenal General Stall and the M,litary POliCY of a Contlnentat
Strategy Dunng the 1911 InternatIonal Cns.s Mtlllary Afftllrs
October 1970 pp 83 93 M,chael D Krause Anglo French MIlitary
PlannIng. 1905 19t4 Before the Flfst World War A Stuoy In
MIlitary DIplomacy Ph 0 d,ssertat,on Georgetown Unlver5Jty
1968 UmverSlty Microfilms Ann Arbor MI(,h 1968 Edward
Spears L,alson. 1974 A Narrative of the Great Retreat Stern & Oa'y
N y 1968 fdwaro Spears The Plcn,c BaSket W W Norton & Co.
Inc N Y 1967 and Samuet R WIllIamson The Poht'C5 of Grana
Strategy Brrta,n and France Prepare for War 1904 1914 HarvarQ
Umve'sl!y Press Camb"dge Mass 1969
LIeutenant Colonel John A Hixson IS
chief, Oral History. US Army Military History
InstItute. Carlisle Barracks. Pa He received a
8 S from the USMA. an M A from Rice Um-
vefSlty and IS a 1977 USACGSC graduate He
has served In the History Department at the
USMA and with the XVIII Alfborne Corps Ar
Ullery. Fort 8ragg. N C
The 1974 decision to implement a new Enlisted Personnel
Management System triggered a revolution in training de-
velopment. With the development of the Instructional
Systems Development Model, the adoption of Criterion Ref-
erenced Instruction and the acceptance of self-paced in-
struction as the primary teaching method in the Army, the
training development revolution took form. However,
without the necessary organizations, people and timing, the
revolution would have met an early demise. Despite initial
problems, the training development record of accomplish-
ments has been generally good. The revolution is continuing
and marks a turning point in Army training.
OR the past several years, a remarkable change has been taking place
within the Army's training community. In fact, it has been more than a
change. It is an allencompassing revolution in training philosophies, concepts
and methodology. Thousands of people are involved in researching, designing,
developing and implementing new courses, documentation and supporting
materials. Tens of millions of dollars are being spent annually on these efforts
and to upgrade and provide facilities and equipment to support this revolution.
The reasons behind this quiet revolution in training developments are many,
and they vary in complexity and origin. Unfortunately, with the exception of
the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and those elsewhere
in the Army who deal directly with training on a day-to-day basis, the vast
majority of the Army do not comprehend the tremendous changes taking place.
By not understanding the big picture, as well as the many smaller ones, fear,
anxiety and even resistance to change are prevalent throughout the Army
To better comprehend what is taking place, the program must be fully
understood by all concerned. To ensure this is accomplished, the Army must
adequately explain the major factors influencing this so-called revolution; their
impact upon TRADOC and its subordinate schools; and the resulting philoso-
phies, concepts and processes involved. .
Perhaps the most significant single action signaling the beginning of this
revolution was the Army chief of staffs 1974 decision to implement a new
enlisted personnel management system (EPMS). Under this new system, the
Army proposed to integrate the four components of the system into a single,
well-coordinated entity. Training, testing, classification and promotion would
be interdependent for the first time in the Army's history. Said differently, a
soldier first must be trained in his military occupational specialty (MaS), must
successfully pass the new Skill Qualification Test (SQT) and must be
reclassified to the next higher skill level before he or she is eligible for
promotion to the next higher grade. The EPMS was to be a phased operation
with implementation covering a multiyear period from 1976 through 1979.
Inherent in this system were a number of actions which caused TRADOC
and its subordinate schools to re-examine the entire training scheme. First, it
required a thorough examination of each career management field (CMF) or
grouping of related jobs to ensure a proper relationship of skills and a viable
career pattern for all. Similarly, each MaS, or job, was examined to ensure
sufficient challenge to the individual and proper progression in the job-related
Second, each MaS was divided into five distinct skill levels with COrre-
sponding levels of training. This scheme ensured continuous training through-
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Wendt lS WIth the US
Army MLSs!le and MUnltLOns Center and School. Redstone
Arsenal. Ala lie recewed a B.S. In physical sCIences from
Washington State Unrverslty. an M.S. in educatlOnal
adminlstratzon {rom Kansas State Unwerslly and tS a
1977 graduate of the USACGSC. He has served In Europe
and Vietnam and with the Safeguard Systems Command.
HuntsvIlle. Ala., and the KwaJalem MIssile Range.
out a soldier's career and provided for training when and where the individual
soldier required it. A typical progression/schooling pattern might resemble the
following model.
After entering the service, a soldier would attend basic. combat training
(BCT), followed by advanced individual training (AIT). Upon successful
completion of AIT, the service member would be awarded an MOS with a skill
level 1. Skill level 1 would include grades El to E4 and could be defined as a
first-term or apprentice period. The soldier would perform in this MOS and skill
level until promotion to the grade of E4.
At this point, the soldier would attend a Primary Noncommissioned Officers
Course (PNCOC) to train for skill level 2 or grade E5. Once this training was
completed, the soldier would be tested through the SQT. Achievement of a
higher passing score on the SQT would bring reclassification to skill level 2 and
then, and only then, eligibility for promotion to the grade of E5. Achievement of
a minimum passing score would verify the soldier's current skill level and
require a retest the following year in order to become eligible for promotion.
Failure of the SQT would also require a retest the following year. A second
failure would result in reclassification to another MOS or elimination from the
The same scheme would continue with the senior E5 receiving training at a
Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC) and being tested to qualify
for a skill level 3 designation and promotion to E6. Similarly, senior E6s would
attend the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC) to achieve a
skill level 4 designation and to qualify for promotion to E7. Senior E7s and EBs
would attend Senior Noncommissioned Officers Courses (SNCOCs) or the US
Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA), if selected, to prepare for skill
level 5 senior NCO positions.
To provide for selected highly technical MOS training, Prim'ary Technical
Courses (PTCs) and Basic Technical Courses (BTCs) were established as
counterparts to the PNCOCs and BNCOCs. In addition, a Primary Leadership
Course (PLC) was established to provide training in technical leadership skills.
The training was to be a combination of institutional and extension courses.
The BCT and AIT were to be institutional and provided at a Continental United
States service school or training center. The PNCOC, BNCOC and PLC were to
be taught in division NCO academies or at overseas training centers for better
proximity to the majority of potential attendees. Due to the technical nature of
the instruction and equipment requirements, the PTC and BTC for technical
MOSs were to be taught at the proponent service schools. The ANCOC, SNCOC
and courses for sergeants major were to be taught in residence for those
selected. In general, greater emphasis was placed on noninstitutional training
at the middle skill levels in order to allow more people to accomplish more
training as close as possible to their job sites.
Another aspect of EPMS philosophy was to train a soldier only in those
critical tasks which he or she mus,t master to do a particular job. An elaborate
job-task analysis of each skill level of each MOS was conducted. Only the most
critical tasks were to be taught in residence with the less critical information
taught through nonresidence courses or eliminated from the curriculum.
A final provision was the development of the supporting manuals tests and
associated documentation. These included the Soldiers' Manual, the Com-
manders' Manual, the Job Book and the Skill Qualification Test.
The Soldiers' Manual was the soldier's bible, so to speak. It contained a
listing of all of the critical tasks that the soldier was required to perform in his
MOS at the current and next higher skill level. In addition, it provided the cues,
conditions and standards for each task along with the equipment required and
the appropriate references. Mastery of the tasks should guarantee successful
passage of the SQT. One Soldiers' Manual was to be developed for each, skill
level of each MOS. '
The Commanders' Manual provided a complete listing of critical tasks by
skill level for a complete MOS. Using this manual, a commander or NCO would
know exactly what each of his soldiers was responsible for knowing in his
particular job, the references required and the standards to be met.
The Job Book is a supervisory training record for skill level 1 and skill level
2 personnel. It contains a listing of critical tasks and space for the midlevel
supervisor to record comments with regard to the proficiency and initiative of
each of his charges. .
The SQT is a new concept in MOS proficiency testing. This test represents a
radical departure from the traditional MOS tests. First of all, it is performance-
based. Demonstration of one's ability to perform a critical task is all-important.
The SQT contains three components-written, performance certification and
hands-on. The written component is somewhat similar to the old MOS test
except that it is performance-oriented and tests only those tasks critical to a
soldier's job performance. The performance or commander's certification
component contains tasks that are too complex, difficult or time-consuming to
be tested during the immediate testing period. The commander or supervisor
simply certifies that the soldier has, in fact, successfully performed those tasks
in the previous 12 months. Examples are physical training, marksmanship or,
the repair/theck-out of a complex radar system.
The final component is the hands-on component. Here, the soldier has to
perform a selected number of critical tasks at the time of the test. Examples of
this type of testing might be weapons assembly, parts or ammunition identifi
cation, or fonns completion. In all c a ~ e s the tests are perfonnance-oriented and
rated by a go-no go method.
A second fac'tor which contributed substantially to the revolution in training
development was the adoption of the Instructional Systems Development (lSD)
model. In 1973, the Combat Arms Training Board (CATB) at Fort Benning,
Georgia, contracted with Florida State University for development of a total
systems approach to training development. The result ot this contract was the
publication, in 1975, of a five-volume set of documentation called the Inter-
service Procedures for Instructional Systems Design, commonly called the ISD
model or the ISD approach. By coincidence as much as design, these procedures
supported the efforts that were required of TRADOC schools if they were to
realign their instructional programs properly with EPMS philosophies and
The ISD model was based upon basic research in the management,
communicative and behavioral sciences. It was based heavily on occupational
surveys and job analyses and on absolute standards ofperfonnance. It brought
together many innovations in training methodology which allowed for adap-
tation of anyone of a number of schemes to fit most any situation. Finally, the
ISD approach stressed the application of modern technology to optimize
training effectiveness, efficiency and cost.
The ISD model incorporated five phases. They included analysis, design,
development, implementation and control. The analysis phase stressed a
detailed and exhaustive front-ehd analysis. Without a good look at just what
tasks were to be performed at certain skill levels within each MOS, it was
impossible to design and develop an adequate training program. In this phase,
detailed task lists were developed by proponent schools and validated in the
field. The critical tasks for adequate job performance were selected for training
either by extension or in residence at a TRADOC center or school. Supporting
data to include cues, conditions and standards, plus applicable references, were
The second step, or Phase II, of the process was design. Here, the data
developed during the analysis phase was further manipulated to detennine the
learning objectives involved as well as appropriate methods for testing each
task. Finally, the sequencing of tasks for course development was accom-
The third phase was that of development. Here, for the first time, the lesson
and course development process was evident. Data from the analysis and
design phases were classified by objective, media selections were made and
development of instruction and materials took place. This process was the same
for resident or extension training and individual or group training. It was
viewed as a whole and not as separate entities.
The implementation phase incorporated the training itself, accompanied by
the myriad of related resource, staff, faculty and documentation requirements.
Finally, there was the control phase. This consisted of the evaluation process
which operated on feedback data and served as the quality control function for
the center and school commanders.
A related development which strengthened the performance-based character-
istics of the ISO approach was the incorporation of Robert F. Mager's Criterion
Reference Instruction (CRI) into the Army's training development fold. While
the ISO approach to training development was the best and most complete
process available to Army educators, it did have its weaknesses. The design and
development phases allowed for wide latitude in the selection of training modes
and media. The CRI approach placed a great deal more emphasis and structure
into the conversion of the job-task analysis data to learning processes and
stressed performance-oriented training.
In 1976, the Training Management Institute, a subordinate agency within
TRADOC headquarters and an offshoot of the CATB, contracted with Or.
Mager and associates for instruction and materials relating to his CRI
approach. The CRI appeared to be just the vehicle to augment the ISO model
and ensure that performance-oriented training would, in fact, be the accepted
method of training in the TRAOOC schools.
A third factor in the training development revolution was the incorporation
of self-paced instruction as a primary method of instruction. It lent itself well to
the performance-oriented aspects of the EPMS, ISO and CRI. Through use of
the self-paced mode, students could progress at their own rate via individual
programed tests, slide presentations, audio and video tapes, 8mm and 16mm
films and training devices and equipment. Self-paced instruction also leveled
out peak loading problems, reduced attrition rates and allowed full implemen-
tation of the go-no go testing method.
A fourth item of significance involved organizations, people and timing. If it
had not been for these factors, it is probable that the revolution would have met
an early death. Organizationally, Department of the Army directed implemen-
tation of the EPMS and assigned a stringent, phased implementation schedule
to TRADOC. TRAOOC, already at work on the ISO, performance-oriented
training and self-paced instruction, tied the many pieces together_
General William E. DePuy, commanding general, TRAOOC; Major General
Paul F. Gorman, TRAOOC deputy chief of staff for training; and Colonel Frank'
Hart of the Training Management Institute played key roles in comprehending
and molding the many processes and pressing forward with the job at hand.
Finally, timing must be considered to be crucial. Had the right organizations,
the right people and the right programs not at approximately the
same time, it is doubtful that the job could have been accomplished.
The impact of these various factors upon TRADOC and its many service
schools was tremendous. It appeared as if a dam had broken and the
floodwaters were everywhere at once. There was so much to do, so few people
and such little time to do it. These normally conservative institutions suddenly
were inundated with new ways of doing business. Included were reorganization
of the schools; reorientation of philosophies, concepts and methods; extensive
'education and training of personnel; and requirements for additional resources.
It became apparent early that the existing organization of the service
schools did not facilitate this revolution. Training development activities had
been decentralized in the combat development and training areas. Both of these
organizations had their primary missions to consider first, and training
analysis, design and development were given lower priorities. In addition, the
status quo prevailed.
In late 1975, General DePuy directed that each of the schools implement a
new school organizational model which included, for the first time, a Direc-
torate of Training Development (DTD). This organization was created from
existing resources within the school and had as its mission the implementation
of the EPMS. The creation of this organization was intended to develop a group
of people devoted solely to training development activities. They were to be
independent of the trainers, with an eye toward development of a systematic,
logical and efficient training system. By fall 1976, all of the schools had
completed this reorganization." There was a good deal of resistance within the
training community. The status quo had been challenged. In many cases, the
DTD personnel were ignored initially, then viewed as a threat and, finally,
reluctantly accepted as necessary elements within the school environment.
A second impact upon TRADOC and the schools was the process of re-
education. What was this thing called the EPMS? What were the products that
must be produced? What was lSD, CRI, self-paced instruction, and so forth?
How did they fit together? To answer these questions to the satisfaction of the
various staff and faculty elements was a significant undertaking. Efforts to do
this were made on a broad front. Department of the Army began a compre-
hensive information program to acquaint personnel with the EPMS. TRADOC
established lSD, CRI and self-paced workshops for managers at all levels. The
individual schools established in-house staff and faculty educational programs
to educate the workers and home in on the more specific problems facing that
particular schoo!.
In many cases, a great deal of time was lost in this massive redirection and
re-education effort, but the job was accomplished. Generally, it can be said that
those who the significance and importance of the retraining effort
early fared better in the long run.
Finally, resources in terms of people, money and time were required.
Suddenly, the schools found a significant increase in workload at their
doorsteps. At the same time, the Army as a whole, and TRADOC in particular,
were being forced by Congress an.d the Department of. Defense to tighten their
collective belts. With additional permanent employees not authorized, schools
were forced to look within and "rob Peter to pay Paul." In some cases, monies
were allocated to fund temporary employees to pick up the slack, but these cases
were few.
To produce the required Soldiers' and Commanders' Manuals, Job Books
and Skill Qualification Tests alone required in the tens of millions of dollars.
Add to that the costs of workshops, training materials, travel and temporary
employees, and the investment becomes tremendous.
Time was perhaps the driving force in the whole process. Detailed, time-
phased schedules were established with milestones based upon optimistic,
success-oriented planning. Little or no deviation was allowed without signi
ficant extenuating circumstances. This tended to compound the people and
money resource problem. If it were not for the command emphasis at TRADOC,
and the efforts of a small but dedicated and overworked group at the service
schools, the effort may never have been accomplished.
Having examined the factors influencing the training development revo-
lution and the resulting impacts upon the schools, we must examine the
resulting processes and systems. Perhaps this can best be accomplished by
examining the organization primarily involved and the process or flow of
activities through this organization.
The reorganization of each TRADOC school created a Directorate of
.Training Development. For th'e first time, an organization was devoted totally'
to the training development function. Activities included the determination of
what was to be taught, where it was to be taught, why it was to be taught, how
it was to be taught and when it was to be taught. In addition, all resident and
extension courses, complete with supporting documentation, and all EPMS-
directed products originated within the .confines of this organization.
The directorate was composed of a relatively large group of people organized
along the lines of the ISD model. Exact size depended upon the job required at
any particular school. Size was determined by the number of MOSs for which a
school was proponent and, to some degree, by the complexity of these MOSs.
The primary operating elements were the Training Analysis and Design
Division and the Course Development Division. These were, in turn, broken into
individual and collective, and resident and extension segments, respectively. In
addition to these primary organizations, there was a training literature group
and a staff and faculty development organization, both of which were found in
previous school models. Each school was given some flexibility in its detailed
organization but was generaUy bound to fit within the envelope prescribed by
The exact processes used to support this revolution in training developments
varied slightly in each school and somewhat depended on the personalities
involved. However, a typical methodology follows.
The first step in EPMS implementation and in this process was the eMF
and MOS redesign. It was necessary that each eMF be examined to ensure that
every enlisted soldier had the opportunity to progress from EI to E9 within that
eMF. Second, the MOS or jobs within that eMF had to be related or compatible
to ensure that individuals could progress and work in fields that were
complimentary. Finally, each MOS was examined thoroughly in breadth and
depth to ensure a viable and challenging field for every soldier. In many cases,
the eMF and MOS structures were found lacking and changes were made.
Once these parameters were established, the true training development
process was initiated in line with the ISD and eRI models. The initial step was
to conduct a thorough job-task analysis of every MOS. The accepted procedure
involved development of a comprehensive task list. The tasks were further
assigned to the skill level at which they would be performed initially. These
preliminary task lists were developed within the confines of a particular school
and represented a first cut at the job.
The task lists then were subjected to a field validation process whereby job
incumbents verified the accuracy of the tasks and the skill level placement.
Along with this validation, a determination of task criticality was made and
quantified. Factors considered in this process included the percent of incum-
bents performing the task, frequency of performance, consequence of inade-
quate performance, task delay tolerance, training difficulty and implications of
training site selections.
Armed with this information, the job-task analysts developed the final task
list containing those tasks which were critical to job performance and which
required . training at some point in a soldier's career. The key questions were
when and where. The "when" was easily answered by checking the skill level at
which this task must be performed initially. The "where" posed another
problem. Emphasis was on reducing the resident training base and pushing as
much training as practicable to the field. Those tasks which could be taught in
the field were selected for the extension mode of training. This was tempered by
assessing what the individual was required to know upon arrival in order to be
productive and the unit's ability to train the individual once on board.
After completion of the what, where, when, why and how, there existed a
substantial data base upon build the training system. This data base
would be used to develop the products required by the EPMS. By following the
data closely, the Soldiers' Manuals, Commanders' Manuals, Job Books and
Skill Qualification Tests would reflect those critical tasks required of a soldier
at each skill level of each MOS.
At the same time, this data base was used to the resident and
nonresident courses and materials required to teach the individual soldier. It
was an absolute requirement that every critical task have a training site and a
positive training method. Nothing was to be left to chan;:e. Tasks listed as a
skill level 1 requirement were included in BCT or ArT resident courses or
provided in extension courses or formal on the job packages as appropriate.
Skill level 2 tasks were scheduled for the Primary Noncommissioned Officer
Courses, Primary Technical Courses, Primary Leadership Courses or self-study
as appropriate. Skill level 3 tasks were designated for the Basic Noncommis-
sioned Officer Courses, Basic Technical Courses, Primary Leadership Courses
(skill level 2 and skill level 3) or by individual extension courses. Skill level 4
and 5 tasks were included in the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Courses,
Senior Noncommissioned Officers Courses or the US Army Sergeants Major
Academy respectively. Parallel extension courses were developed for these
senior courses as selection for the resident courses was centralized at De-
partment of the Army level and was very competitive.
Again, the system required that every task identified with an MOS be taught
through resident or extension modes. The emphasis on extension, or nonres-
ident, training represented a new thrust in Army training. Extension training
had been a hit-or-miss proposition and had been left to the field umts for
implementation. Under the EPMS, the schools became responsible for the
development of all extension training. This training took the form of Training
Extension Course packages, training circulars, graphic training aids, formal on
job packages, and so forth. It also included printed, audio only, visual only
,and audio-visual modes.
Initially, the primary emphasis centered on the support of active forces. This
emphasis shifted in 1977 as the Reserve and National GuarCl forces became
prime targets for this training offensive. Every unit in the total force has or
soon will have access to the products' of this training revolution. These
products, developed using the latest in educational I/hilosophy and technology,
will have a positive effect on the posture of our fotces.
As can Ihe seen, the training development revolution has been, and is, a
complex and dynamic process. To date, the record of accomplishment has been
generally good. Certain problems and delays have been experienced, but not as
many as one might expect for an undertaking of this scope and depth.
Resistance continues, but the rpalities of the situation present a clearer success
story as the days pass. Without a doubt, the revolution has succeeded and will
be looked upon as a turning point in Army training for many years to come.

The Neutron Bomb for NATO Defense:
An Alternative
By R. G. Shreffler
Orb/s, Winter 1978
The US proposal to refit the Lance
missile with an enhanced radiation or
fusion warhead has produced an issue of
major proportions on the national and
international scene. The furor accom-
panying the debate has been mostly emo-
tional with poorly grounded arguments. Is
this article any different?
Shreffler, who served as the first NATO
director of nuclear weapon planning,
thinks the new Lance warhead should not
be deployed. First, he argues, is the suita-
bility of the Lance missile itself. Equipped
with an inferior inertialguidance system,
50 percent of the missiles fall outside of an
area with a radius between 400 and 450
meters. With such low accuracy, it is dif-
ficult to engage acquired targets on the
battlefield. The use of large lethal areas,
which could partially justify a preference
for fusion warheads, onlY partially compen-
sates for this deficiency. Of course, along
with large lethal areas goes higher collat-.
eral damage which defeats the advertised
advantage of the fusion warhead.
Secondly, says the author, NATO has
never had an adequate doctrine for the use
of battlefield nuclear weapons. Even
though the Army has made some concerted
efforts recently to be more specific in its
doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons,
neutron bomb or otherwise, will not find
acceptance in Europe because of the at-
tendant danger of extremely high civilian
casualties. He advocates using a fixed
border nuclear defense (not necessarily a
fusion one) along the forward edge of a 100-
kilometerdeep defensive zone. This is a
departure from present doctrine and may
have some merit, when placed
in political perspective.
Both of Shreffler's theses have been,
and will continue to be, debated. At least,
they have added some substantive fuel to
the flames.
The Strategic Intentions of the Soviet Union
An Institute for the Study of Conflict
Special Report
March 1978 (Great Britain)
No analysis of Soviet strategic inten-
tions is valid unless due weight is given to
the ideological self-justification of the
regime. To ignore or discount this fador,
and the closed and totalitarian nature of
the Soviet system, can only lead to mis-
judgment. The issues are of such im-
portance that any such misjudgment could
be costly and dangerous or, at the very
least, lead to disappointed hopes and expec-
tations unfulfilled in any negotiations with
the Soviet Union.
In this special report, the Institute for
the Study of Conflict as C) considers the
ideological basis of Soviet military doctrine
and examines the decisionmaking process
as well as the actual state of weaponry on
either side in the Strateg;c Arms Limita-
tions Talks (SALT).
Although the report principally involves
consideration of SALT for which the
United Slates bears the major burden of
responsibility, the gravamen of the report
applies equally to other aspects of Western
What are the issues? They include not
only war and peaee and the survival of
mankind, but the preservation of pluralistic
and representative societies in which free
inquiry is possible. ISC has laid some cold,
hard facts on the line in this one.
Terrorism: An International Journal
Volume 1, Number 1, 1977-78
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It
was probably ancient history to Genghis
Khan, but its modern forms are introducing
unique 'and formidable problems to the
Recognizing the seriousness and com
plexity of these new modes of violence in
the framework of conflict resolution, the
editors have launched a new journal, Ter
rorism: An International Journal, in an
attempt to isolate for critical scrutiny the
many problems associated with world ter-
rorism. The quarterly publication has as its
mission the examination of the types,
causes, consequences, control and meaning
of all forms of terrorist action. According to
the editor in chief, Yonah Alexander, it will
present the results of original research
without restrictions on the ideological or
political approach of contributors and will
offer dialogue on the subject for the purpose
of advancing the cause of peace with
Some titles from the first issue are:
"Terror: The Crime of the Privileged,"
"Profile of a Terrorist," "Treating the
Symptoms of Terrorism" and "The Problem
of International Terrorism at the United
Nations." The journal also offers abstracts
of documents on terrorism and a selected
bibliography each month. Requests for
information and manuscript submission
should be to the editor in chief in care ofthe
State University of New York, Oneonta,
N.Y. 13820.
Compensation and the Military Institution
By Charles C. Moskos Jr.
Air Force MagaZine, April 1978
With the advent of the all-volunteer
force, the underlying premise of the mil-
itary organization, along with its compen-
sation system, has come under redefinition.
Cost-benefit analyses have dominated the
debate on military compensation. How does
this issue bear on national security and the
institutional integrity of the armed forces?
According to Moskos, one of the
country's leading military sociologists,
clearly discernible trends indicate the
American military is moving from an insti-
tutional form to one more and more resem-
bling that of an occupation. Some of these
trends are termination of the draft, linking
military pay with civilian rates, reliance on
monetary incentives and the increasing
reliance on civilian contractors to carry out
the tasks heretofore in the domain of uni-
formed personnel. These changes foster a
calculati ve and utilitarian approach to
service life and can result in two unde-
sirable consequences. It can lead to com-
plete occupationalism with a resulting con-
fusion of the military role, internally and
externally. It also can cause a backlash of
deliberate conservatism on the part ofthose
who will invoke traditional values as rep-'
resentative of the "real military."
The damaging effects on the armed
forces of such confusion and dissension
would be incalculable. The solution, says
the author, is to break the mind-set that
sees the all-volunteer force as possible only
in terms of the marketplace.
These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort is made to
ensure accurate translatIOn and summarization. However, for more detailed
accounts, readers should refer to the original articles No official endorsement of
the views, opinions or factual statements in these items is intended or should be
~ T U I E S .
Forty-five of the Anny's most important manuals, published by the US Anny
Training and Doctrine Command as Department of Army publications, are
classified as "How to Fight" field manuals (FMs). Twenty-one of these "How to
Fight" manuals have been published to date and are listed in Department of the
Army Circular 3101, Military Publications, 21 October 1977. Below are those yet
to be published and their projected publication dates. Users should expect a small
delay after publication to allow for distribution to the field.
Publication Number and Title
FM 78, The Light Infantry Platoon and Squad
FM 710, The Infantry Company
FM 7-30, Infantry Brigade Operations
FM 2175, Combat Skills of the Soldier
FM 305, Combai Intelligence
FM 713, Armored and Mechanized Brigade Operations
FM 71101, Air Assault Division Operations
FM 71102, Infantry and Airborne Division Operations
FM 10015, Corps Operations
FM 100 ,Operational Terms and Graphics
FM 1015, Command and Control of Combat Operations
FM 387, NBC Reconnaissance and Decontamination Operations
FM 621, FIeld Artillery Battalion
FM 622, Division Artillery, FA Brigade, Corps Artillery
FM 1192, Corps Signal Communications
FM 902, Tactical Deception
FM 904, Airmobile Operations
FM 905, Jungle Operations
FM 906, Mountain Operations
FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations
FM 90-10, Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain
FM 9011, Operations in Cold Weather
FM 90-13, Rwer Crossing Operations
FM 9014, Rear Area Combat Operations
Sep 78
Dec 78
Jan 79
Oct 78
Dec 79
Apr 79
Feb 79
Mar 79
Jun 79
Sep 78
Dec 78
Jan 79
Aug 78
Sep 78
Aug 78
Nov 78
Dec 78
Jun 79
Items in thls department are Bummaries of studies currently underway or
recently completed in the defense community. While every effort is made
to ensure accuracy. publication lead time may result in differences
between the summaries and the actual study program.
~ T T R S 0
On the New Military Review
.. journal now looks like a proper one
rather than a little digest journal.
Dr. Frank N Trager
.. noted the changes in Military
Review with pleasure. What took you so
Brig Gen Robert A. Sullivan, USA
.. April issue of MR floored me. I agree
it has eye appeal, but will it continue the
usual good articles of old?
Brig Gen A. J. Maxham, Army NGUS, Ret
.. refreshing to see MR moving out
aggressIVely at a time when so many
military publications are retrenching.
Col Wil Ebel. USAR
Only Adulation
I am perplexed why Colonel T. N.
Dupuy's book A Genius for War: The
German Army and the General Staff, 1807-
1.945 (Military Review, May 1978, pp 8889)
is receiving such a high degree of acclaim
and interest. Are readers ignoring the
established works of Gordon Craig and
Walter Goerlitz? If so, what is in Dupuy's
work that makes it "a challenging new
explanation of why, for over a century,
Germany produced the world's best
armies"? Dr. Brooks Kleber, in his recent
review for the Military Review, points out
that "Not all of Dupuy's arguments neces-
sarily hold water." I'd like to expand Dr.
Kleber's views.
Dupuy's purpose in writing is to find an
explanation for German battlefield effec-
tiveness when fighting outnumbered, out
gunned and otherwise constrained-
certainly a germane topic to most Army
officers. His explanation is found in the
institutionalization of military excellence
typified by the German General Staff and
its impact upon the German army. This
leads me to expect a much needed scrutiny
of the effects of that institution upon doc-
trine, training, planning, officer education,
operational conduct, institutional devel
opment and its historical evolution. I was
disappointed. Dupuy covers the wellplowed
field of the politics of the General Staff and
its effect on the army. Furthermore, he
writes with uncritical adulation.
In the attempt to correlate battlefield
effectiveness with General Staff institution-
alized excellence, Dupuy discovers the
central ideas of the Prussian reformers of
1806: He correctly analyzes the motivating
forces of these reformers and marvels at
their creation of the General Staff. Cer-
tainly, the reformers sought to create a
unified institution for planning, raising,
provisioning, training and directing armies
in peace and war. They wanted to institu-
tionalize military genius as Dupuy puts it.
Yet their instrument was to be not only the
General Staff itself as a planning and
operational executing agency but, most
importantly, a unified concept of inter-
action between a General Staff, personnel
and logistical agencies, all within a unified
War Department and controlled by a war
I submit that Dupuy has misjudged this
central concept. As the General Staff 'rose
in stature and became independent of the
War Department (de facto 1866 and de jure
1883). unified approaches to defense
problems receded. For example. the
planning aspect of the General Staff during
Schlieffen's tenure was not correlated to the
actuality of raising and provisioning an
army with the War Ministry. This led
Schlieffen to calculate forces that were not
in the force structure nor even advocated by
the war minister.
In Dupuy's treatment, other problems
are excluded. Germane to contemporary
consid .. rations is officer education. A de-
tailed examination of the German Kriegsa
kademie as an institution upon which the
excellence of the General Staff was based
would be necessary to support Dupuy's
contention. He does not examine, for ex-
ample, the fertile 1870-1914 period which
embraces several interesting changes.
For example, originally, the size of the
student body in the Knegsakademle was
tied to the number of eligible officers.
Although there were increases in the size of
the classes prior to 1914, these were not
large enough to offset the tremendous
growth of the number of positions in the
General Staff. By 1914, in contrast to-1870,
most graduates of the Kriegsakademle
went into the General Staff instead of re-
entering the mainstream of the army. The
Knegsakademie thereby became a General
Staff institution rather than its intended
purpose of educating selected officers
throughout the army. It is this type of
topical detail which is missmg from
Dupuy's pages.
Fully one-half of the book is devoted to
the post1914 German army. This 20th-
century period is intensely interesting for
its institutional and doctrinal development.
Yet too few are examined in detail. While
Hutier tactics are mentioned and evaluated
as the predecessor of the blitzkrieg tactics,
further analysis is lacking. Scant mention
is made of Guderian's contribution. Again,
too much familiar territory is covered
without reflective analysis. General
Seeckt-the sphynx of the Weimar period-
is treated with adulation. Certainly, one
needs to ask whether a soldier sworn to
uphold and defend the government of
Weimar should not be charged with de-
sertion when that government faced a coup.
lncreduously, Dupuy heaps praise on
Seeckt for the ultimate defeat of the coup
while scant attention is given to the
Socialist-led general strike. .
Dupuy covers more familiar ground in
his treatment of the German army after
1933. He has much to say on Schleicher's
part in the takeover of power. He mentions
several changes in the structure of the High
Command, and the army leader's part in
the elimination of the SA (storm trooper)
leadership. He does not critically examine
the nature of the General Staffs low as-
sessment of Russia's war-making potential.
Undoubtedly, Dupuy is too much swayed
by Halder's assessment of operations in the
war to view Hitler's input in the decision-
making process to be at all positive. During
the war itself, much could have been said
about the methods of training, incorpor-
ation of battlefield experience into doctrine
and General Staff training. Disappoint-
ingly little is mentioned.
In conclusion, there is vait'e in Dupuy's
view of the combat effectiveness of the
German army being due to its institutions;
what is lack'ing is the development of this
theme from an institutional viewpoint.
Mal Michael D. Krause. USA
Letters is a feature designed expressly to afford our reader. an opportunity to air their
opinions and ideas on military topics. It i. not restricted to comments or rebuttals on
previously published material but is open to any variety of expression which may
stimulate or improve the value of thought in the military community.
The right to edit is reserved by the staff of the magazine and exercised primarily in
deference to available space.-Editor.
~ W S .
The Pentagon has decided to buy
Norway's Penguin lightweight antiship
missile system The anticipated buy
would represent only the second foreign
missile bought for the US Armed Forces.
The Roland II. a Franco-German surface-
to-air antiaircraft missile. is the first (MR.
Mar 1978. p 101). The Penguin would
provide an offensive punch to small
displacement US naval craft. The $7.000
missile has a 17-mlle range and would
complement more expensive. US-made
Harpoon missiles on surface combatant
E!.uilt by McDonnell Douglas, the ship
or submarine-launched Harpoon has a
long range (35 miles) and a bigger price
tag-half a million dollars.
Greece, Sweden. Turkey and Norway
currently have the Penguin In their in-
ventories. and an improved version is
reported under development in Norway.
In another move toward increased
standardization of NATO's military
eqUipment, the Army has announced It
will purchase $100 million worth of
German-made trucks. buses and fork lifts
in the first major overseas procurement
of military vehicles for US forces. The
initial order Involves 8.641 vehicles and
will be followed by additional purchases
In later years -OMS Intelligence.
The Milltarv Review, the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff
College assume no responsibility for accuracy of mformatlon contained In the NEWS section of thiS
publicatIon Items are printed as a service to the readers No official endorsement of the Views,
opinions or factual statements IS Intended -Editor
Plans to provide foxhole covers, devel-
oped in 1970 by the US Army Mobility
Equipment Research and Development
Command, as standard issue for combat
personnel operating forward of brigade
rear boundaries were announced re-
cently by the Department of the Army.
Tactical survival stucjles conducted by
the US Army Engineer-School stressed
that the highly mobile modern battlefield
demands timely positioning of combat
forces to achieve maximum effec-
Today's soldier, the report states,
must be able to dig in qUickly, fight and
move out while under hostile fire.
Foxhole covers will hopefully eliminate
time-consuming work of hardening
(making less vulnerable) fighting posi-
Constructed of woven dacron fabric,
the cover weighs 1 pound, 10 ounces
and is 6 feet by 5 feet, 4 inches. Tubular
sections along each side can be filled
with dirt and anchored In shallow ditches
on all sides.
When topped by 18 inches of soil, the
cover is capable of withstanding effects
of shrapnel, blasts and other debris. Two
or more covers can be joined by use of
snap fasteners located on each side of,;
the cover.-Army Research and Devel-'
According to recent NATO infor-
mation. two prototypes of a new Soviet
Interceptor are in the test phase. Aircraft
experts disagree as to the designation of
the new aircraft which appears to be
eqUipped With two large Tumansky en-
gines and twin tail finS.
The question arises over whether the
aircraft IS really a Mlkoyan Construction
Collective new development called
MIG29 or a further development of the
MIG25 Foxbat which Lieutenant Viktor
8elenko first mentioned after his flight to
Japan with a MIG25.
Indications that the new aircraft is a
. "super" MIG25 include the twin tail i ~
feature and US Defense Intelligence
Agency information that it is a modified
dual seat MIG25 with new engines and
bigger afterburner sections. The fuselage
apparently is .91 meters (almost 3 feet)
longer; the wings, 1 meter (3.28 feet)
longer each; and the tail unit, stretched
by .2 meters (.656 feet).
The new interceptor also seems to be
eqUipped with an advanced radar system,
probably that of the Flogger D. The total
concept of this new aircraft would seem
to indicate that it was deSigned for
fighting cruise missiles. Western experts
do not expect the aircraft to go into series
production before 1980.-Soldat una
Technik, 1978.
Currently undergomg manufacturer's
trials is a new infantry fighting vehicle
(IFV) developed by the West German firm
of Thyssen Henschel.
The Condor is a fully amphibious 4
wheeled armored vehicle developed as
an IFV but is sUitable fbr operation in a
number of other roles. For mstance. the
vehicle may be employed as a personnel
carrier. reconnaissdnce vehicle. logistics
vehicle or weapons carrier.
The interior of the Condor is designed
to carry 12 men (3 crew and 9 mfantry).
Water and airtight. the vehicle has ex-
cellent nuclear. biological. and chemical
The IFV's main armament consists of
a Rhelnmetall T/i20 15 one-man turret
eqUipped with a 20mm cannon. A coaxial
machinegun also may be fitted.
The six-cylinder. water-cooled diesel
can drive the Condor at a road speed of
150 kilometers per hour at ranges up to
500 kilometers.-International Defense
Review, 1978.
~ O O S
Politics in the Soviet Military
THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER. Edited by lawrence l Whelten 182 Pages Crane, Russak & Co, N Y
1977 $1450
One of the problems of Soviet studies is that publications on the subject quickly
become out of date. It, therefore, becomes imperative for Sovietologists to obtain
good recent studies of the Soviet scene and not waste their time on the many
mediocre volumes on the USSR which are published annually. One such good
volume is Professor Whetten's compendium of articles dealing with Soviet foreign
policy. This book, the result of an international conference on Soviet affairs held in
May 1975, surveys the various areas of the world where the Soviet Union is
attempting to assert its dominance. The areas discussed in this volume are: Western
Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and India, and East and
Southeast Asia. Other articles deal with Soviet defense policy, the Ostpolitik, and
Soviet-American bilateralism.
As ~ i t h Dr. Whetten's companion volume, The Future of Soviet Military Power
(MR, September 1977, pp 99-100), the title may mislead one into assuming that the
book treats "military" foreign policy as some separate strategy of the Kremlin. It
does no such thing-the military is scarcely mentioned in several of the articles-
rather, the writers consistently recognize the fact the Soviets use the military as but
one of many resources in their global strategy and treat their studies accordingly.
Of particular interest are areas of the world where the Soviets are weak, notably
the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. One wonders, after reading William E.
Griffith's article "The Decline of Soviet Influence in the Middle East," why the
Carter administration recently provided the Soviets with a re-entry into this area via
the Geneva negotiating table, especially when good will toward the Soviets had
declined so much in its closest Middle East allies. The intricacies of Soviet-Chinese
relations in Asia are discussed in Joachim Glaubitz' article, "Some Aspects of
Recent Soviet Policy Toward East and Southeast Asia." It is one of the best brief
accounts of the changing relations between the two nations written to date.
If I have to disagree on any points made in this book, it would be in the area of
Eastern Europe. The time when these articles were written (1975) has no doubt dated
them slightly, and Western Europe is no longer as weak nor Eastern Europe as
strong as in that time of the energy crisis. For this reason, the articles dealing on
these subjects should be considered with an eye to more recent internal changes
within these two European power blocs.
The overly publicized ups and downs of SovietUnited States foreign relations
have sometimes obscured the generally consistent path that the two nations have
trod in avoiding armed confrontation with each other. Recent Soviet military
buildups and muscleflexings have caused numerous Western political scientists and
military strategists to worry that an unexpected turn in the road is in the offing. Yet,
to look into the future, one needs to orient himself as to where the Soviets are now in
the various parts of the world.' To me, Whetten's collection should be a must for
anyone new to Soviet foreign affairs. Certainly, it is a valuable volume to all the
"oldtimers" who have been studying the USSR in the recent past.
George Kalbouss. OhIO State Umverstty
POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES by MIChael J Deane 297 Pages Crane. Russak & Co. N Y 1977 $1750
The stated purpose of Deane's authoritative new study of Soviet partymilitary
relations is to:
... analyze the changing relationship among the MPA (Main Political Adminis
tration, a section of the CPSU's Central Committee which insures the political
reliability of the Soviet Armed Forces), the Party and the professional military.
Through policy and content analysis of numerous Soviet and non-Soviet publica-
tions and an explanation of the careers and backgrounds of major Soviet political
and military leaders, the work outlines the political-military policies advocated by
the- three groups and provides an assessment of the future significance of political
control in party-military relations.
Deane's study is a welcome complement to Roman Kolkowicz' pioneering effort,
The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, since he essentially picks up where,
the latter left off, with Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, Deane's book is free of
his predecessor's bias. Kolkowicz set out to prove that:
. , . the relationship between the Communist Party and the Soviet military is
essentially conflict-prone and thus presents a perennial threat to the political
stability of the Soviet state.
Deane concludes that the military is "less than" a homogeneous interest group.
But, while he several times reminds us of Lenin's words that, in modern warfare, "he
who has the greatest equipment, the greatest level of organization, discipline, and
the best vehicles is the victor," Deane does not seem to appreciate the extent to
which Soviet society itself has been militarized. He chooses to put Brezhnev's and
l)'stinov's promotions to marshal of the Soviet Union in quotations, indicating that
they are less than military.
Deane's study examines only one of the several overlapping and redundant
control organs which lace the Soviet armed forces. No mention is made of the KGB
(Committee of State Security) "Special Departments," the military councils, party
control commissions or people's control bodies, and little attention is devoted to
party and Komsomol organieations.
Despite these two deficiencies, the work is a comprehensive study of the party's
political control apparatus, beginning with an examination of socialist views of the
military before the Bolshevik Revolution. He points out that political commissars
had been appointed in the field army of Kerensky's Provisional Government as early
as June 1917, and notes that Trotsky's goal of unified command envisioned that
eventually unit leaders would become both commander and commissar. He notes
that commissars first began to file attestations of command as early as 1919, a
political "laying on of hands" certifying political reliability which continues to this
The study provides good coverage of the Stalinist and early post-Stalinist years,
but focuses mainly on events since Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. Its concentration on
the era of detente should recommend it to a wide circle of Western policymakers as
well as informed citizens. We are reminded that Brezhnev remarked at the 25th
Party Congress (February-March 1976), "We make no secret of the fact that we see
in detente the way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and
communist construction." As Deane also notes, the Soviets openly state that their
increased military might-the shift in the "correlation of forces" in socialism's
favor-forced the capitalist states to confront "reality" and yield to Soviet demands
for "peace."
Detente, however, does not prevent Soviet political workers from instilling a class
hatred toward the aggressive intrigues of imperialism. Reading Deane's book, one
realizes that the Soviets see the present as "an increasingly acute ideological
struggle," even at a time when many respected Western analysts see ideology as a
dead issue. I hope this book will have a wide readership.
Mal Eugene D. Betlt, USA
Take Me to Your Leaders
I .

MANAGEMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES by John Downey 221 Pages McGraw HIli, N Y 1977 550
What is the military profession for? The natural reply is: to fight. But, in fact, its
role is now usually to prevent war. Here is the principal theme of this extraordinary
The emphasis on the Army's mission being "success in combat" is familiar to all
of us who have received training in US military schools. Yet, as Downey points out,
"Combat is the last resort of modern defense, and if it occurs it is a sign of failure."
We particularly recognize in this expression the importance of deterring nuclear war.
"In international relations," says Qowney, "where Clausewitz saw war as an
extension of politics, politics has become an extension of, or a substitute for, war."
This may be one of the most crucial issues facing the military professional today.
The warrior concept, according to the author, is "not merely becoming more
complex, but is stood on its head." In his terms, "Military organization and
management is in a state of latent revolution."
Downey and his collaborators (a vice admiral, a brigadier and a group captain)
demonstrate remarkably clear insight into the current relationship of the military
profession and defense management in the Western industrialized world. They see
the higher direction of defense policy as a meeting point for three streams of ideas:
the will of the people, decisions of government and ideas of the military themselves.
They observe that, because of the military emphasis on war, its influence in defense
policy is declining.
The military emphasis of combat operations, often known as the "G3 complex," is
brought clearly into focus:
Generalists trained in purely military skills are heavily indoctrinated with the
self-asserted goals of the system and tend to reject others as contaminatory.
Advisory or research functions are less favored as employments than command
functions since, although the former are increasingly more relevant, the latter are
associated with the ethos of the system and carry the higher status.
The chapter on leadership is one of the best in print on that subject and puts to
rest the notion that the military can exercise more authority with less real leadership
than other organizations. Nominal authority (position power) is correctly seen as
only an element of real authority which is the essence of personal leadership.
The military is good at combat leadership-personal leadership. But it is
recognized that leadership is not an end in itself, and the military is not as good in.
elucidating ends (conducting, guiding, persuading) toward which leadership is a
means and which are vital skills for influencing higher defense policy. In a military
officer's "dual career," the early qualities of command leadership must give way to
the development of skills of influence and resource management if the military is to
remain influential in defense policy.
A need is seen for a "stronger" for the military profession.
The fundamental change required, says Downey, is "away from a system modeled
solely on the battlefield" and "towards a system designed to manage the military
part of a multi-disciplined corporate science."
Today, we see an emerging awareness of these issues in the military profession.
Are they valid? Are we losing influence in defense policy? We need look only at the
demise of the BI bomber and at military budget cuts to answer such questions. What
we choose to do about it will depend, in part, upon how well we understand the kinds
of issues which Downey expresses so clearly.
In my opinion, this book will become a landmark of military thought and should
be high-priority reading for every military professional.
Lt Col MelVin J. Stanford. USAR Consultmg Faculty. USACGSC
ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY INCOMPETENCE by Norman DIXon 448 Pages BasIc Books. N Y 1976 $1250
Despite its provocative title, this book is neither an attack on the military nor a
quick dip into pop psychology at the professional soldier's expense. Rather, it is a
detailed and well-documented study of one aspect of command-that of the psycho-
logical makeup of military leaders. If modem methods of analysis show that
effective leaders have traits in common-the US Army lists "fourteen characteristics
of a good leader"-is it not also likely that inadequate leadership also has common
traits? This is the author's thesis, and he states, "In theory, then, errors of
generalship could be prevented by attention to these causes."
Dixon cites both military studies and medical research in support of his ideas.
The first third of his book consists of detailed accounts of 12 campaigns, illustrating
how their outcomes resulted. from the personalities of the leaders involved. All the
examples are taken from British military experience, thus obviating any stigma of
anti-Vietnam bias on the part of the author.
The second section discusses the officer's perception of his role and his rela-
tionship to his peers and to society as well as to his superiors and subordinates. The
author concludes that three situations encourage incompetence. They are, first, the
fact that "the leadership qualities required at one level may result in promotion (but)
are often not those relevant to a higher level"; second, that more mistakes have
resulted "from a dearth of boldness than from a lack of caution"; and third, that
"fear of failure rather than hope of success tends to be the dominant motive force in
decisionmaking." .
Following a detailed discussio'n of these situations, the final portion of the book
gives examples of both successful and unsuccessful leadership. More important, the
author demonstrates that some leaders who possessed negative characteristics
achieved greatness in spite of their flaws, while others overcame their deficiencies by
conscious effort. Even a reader who does not agree with Dr. Dixon's initial premise
will appreciate this section.
The author's style is articulate and entertaining and is entirely free of the snide
put-down too often found in current "military" writings authored by civilians. The
footnotes are extensive, and the bibliography is quite useful.
Capt Richard E. Wynn. USAR
'FINLANDllATlON": A Map to a Metaphor by Adam M
Garfmkle Foreword by Robert StrauszHupe 56 Pages
Foreign Pohcy Research Institute. Philadelphia, Pa 1978
Rlmlands, and the TechnologICal Revolution by Cohn S
Gray 80 Pages Crane, Russak & Co, N Y 1977 $6 ~
clothbound $295 paperbound
FOCKE WULF 190 AT WAR by Alfred P"ce 160 Pages
Sc"bner's, N Y 1977 $12 50
Gebhard Aders 392 Pages. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart, FRG
FULfiLLMENT Of A MISSION: SYria and Lebanon, 1941-
1944 by MaforGeneral Sir Edward Spears 311 Pages Archon
Books. Hamden, Conn 1977 $19 00