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Lieutenant General J. R. Thurman
Brigadier General Robert Arter
Editor in Chief
Col Edward M. Bradford
Associate Editor
Col !'aul R. f{ilty Jr.
Army War College
Assistant Editor
Lt Col Joseph E. Burlas
Features Editor
Lt Col Jamie W. Walton
Managing Editor
Capt Jol.n W. I. Ball
Production Editor
Dixie R. Dominguez
SpanishAmerican Editor
Lt Col Rafael MartillezBoucher
Brazilian Editor
Col Pedro L. A. Braga
Brazilian Assistant Editors
Lt Col Sergio R. N. Franco
Lt Col Geraldo P. Almeida Filho
Publication Officer
Amos W. Gallaway
Art and Design
Jerome F. Scheele
Military Review
Professional Journal of the US Anny
The Making of a Morass
The Case for Cruise Missiles
Reorganization: Revolution in Intelligence
Urban Sprawl and NATO Defense
Biting the Bullet in the Middle East
Improving NATO Defenses: The Institutional
Geopolitical Perspective of Finland
Conversation With Clausewitz
Pyrenees Operations in the Peninsular War
Australia's Foreign Policy
James H. Toner
Capt William I. Hancock, USA
Maj Wayne E. Long, USA
Paul Bracken
. Edward Bernard Glick
Dimension Dov S. Zakheim
Maj Touko I. Rissanen, Flrnish Army
Lt Col Gustav F. Freudenberg, USAR, Ret
Capt Don W. Alexander, USA
B. A. Santamaria
Reader Forum
Others in Review
Under Study
Military Notes
Military Buoks
. 101
MILITARY REVIEW is published monthly in English, Spanish and Portuguese by the US Army Command
and General Staff College, FI Leavenworlh, KS 66027. Use of funds for printing this publicatIOn approved
by Headquarters, Oepartment of the Army, 23 December 1975. Controlled circulation poslage paid at
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US ISSN 00264148
Reorganization Trauma
I considered the article, "Trouble
shooting the New Division Organization,"
by Captain Stephen N. Magyera Jr. in
your July 1977 issue an ou tstanding piece
of writing and a demonstration (thank
goodness) that the Army still has junior
officers who can both think and write.
Would that the Army had more like
Captain 'Magyera, then perhaps it ,,!ould
not be saddled with so many reorganiza
tions, 'each one, of course, !'better than
the others."
If our reorganizers would be as realis
tic as Magyera, if they would consider the
results of their recommendations more
than they are now doing, I think the
Army could field a far more efficient,
hardhitting, durable organization than it
is now capable of doing.
Again, my congratulations to Captain
Lt Gol Albert N. Garland, USA, Ret
Deputy Editor, Infantry
What We Really Need
It is good for the Military Review to
find out what kind of reading military
personnel like, and to cater to their
wishes, somewhat. But as a part of the
Armed Forces, the Military Review has an
obligation to help prepare the military for
the kind of war they are going to have to
fight rather than give them what they
think they may need.
The indications are plain enough that
the principal difference between World
War II and the next war will be in the
increased amount of unconventional war
fare in World War II. We can have the best
weaponry and the most sophisticated
technology in the world and still lose a
war from guerrilla warfare, organized
sabotage, propaganda warfare, spies and
infiltration of enemy partisans into our
own command and political structure.
Our potential enemies have massive
schooling in unconventional warfare. We
I believe, therefore, that this journal
should give us more information on the
several kinds of unconventional warfare.
We were defeated in Southeast Asia by
unconventional warfare and enemy
sympathizers in our own government.
Probably the English scored the most
success against ene my uncon ven tional
warfare in Southeast Asia. We should
study British Army antiguerrilla methods
and develop much more of our own, and
the Military Review should help its read
ers to prepare for that kind of war as well
as a conventional one.
An informed commander can do more
in antiguerrilla warfare with a squad than
a conventionally trained commander can
do with a battalion. If the enemy keeps
too IT.any of our troops tied down wi th
guerrilla warfare, we could lose a war by
not having enough troops to defend
against enemy conventional military op
Lt ColOna B. Ankersheil, USAR. Ret
Multinational NATO Airborne Force
I read Brigadier Maurice A. J. Tug.
well's article, "Day of the Paratroops," in
the March 1977 issue of Military R"eview
with great empathy. I take particular
pleasure and satisfaction in finding out
that my reflections and conclusions are
almost completely identical with those of
the author.
(continued on pnK<' 112)
Military Review
Tugwell presents not only a historical
synopsis about the paratroops, but he
praises the numerous specific operational
criteria of the Warsaw Pact capability and
demands a multinational NATO airborne
force to counter this threat.
Everyone who knows the threat analy-
ses of the last months and the conclusions
drawn therefrom cannot deny the neces-
sity of the existence of such a force for
quick, long-range and powerful reaction.
The extension, modernization and re-
inforcemen t of the Warsaw Pact airborne
and airmobile forces by more paratroop
regiments and some new air (mobile)
assault brigades give them the ability to
seize the airfields at the flanks of the
alliance, preventing the Allied Mobile
Force (AMF) from landing there and
interrupting the necessary balance of
forces in those areas. Thus, partially
eliminated or even destroyed, the AMF,
by reason of tremendously harassed and
delayed deployment, would be neither
effective in projected wartime locations
nor within the planned time frame.
Defense measures, plans and concepts
of operation consequently must not be
limited to the single, typical and con-
tinental focal point of the an tiarmor-de-
fense, but must include also defense
against enemy airmobile forces in the
combat zone (antiairmobilecapacity),
and defense against hostile airborne (para-
chute) forces in the depth, on the flanks,
at vulnerable points, 'at key positions and
in key areas (possibly together with am-
phibious forces) of the whole NATO area
(antiairbornecapacity). For quick reac-
tion against the comprehensive Warsaw
Pact threat, a way should be found as
quickly as possible to build up a multi-
national NATO airborne force. This force
essentially would contribute to a change
of the military imbalance in this danger-
ous sector of airborneantiairborne-capac
L,t Col Rurgar von GrawertMay. FRG Army
Nasty little Wars
Lieute.nan t Colonel Donald B.
Vought's' article, "Preparing for the
Wrong War?" in the May 1977 Military
Review is on target but off course. His
argument that the US Army is more
likely to fight limited, lowintepsity con
flicts in the developing areas of the world
rather than intense armored warfare in
Europe is highly persuasive. What he fails
to note, however, is that our credibility
to win a war of high intensity, mobility,
attrition, technOlogy and potential for
nuclear escalation has been increasingly
dou btful in the face of the growing
potential of the Soviet Union, North
Korea and several Middle Eastern states.
This requires a Field Manual 1005, a
"firstbattle" strategy and a highly
trained, heavy "force in being" with
"total force" integration of Reserves. The
Army has established the infrastructure
to achieve credibility to fight the first
battle and win if the next several years
yield the training readiness and techno
logical improvements being SO aggres-
sively pursued today. Given the credi-
bility to deal with it, the event likely will
be deterred. At this juncture, Lieutenant
Colonel Vought's hypothesis cuts to the
core problem of how to guard our vital
interests short of declared war. Permit me
to develop a scenario.
The setting is global, but likely to be
close to home, Latin America north of the
equator, for example. The time is 1981.
The problems are economic, nationalistic
and ethnocentric but perceived by our
policymakers to be an ideological chal
lenge resulting in confrontation. The blue
force is light, mobile and highly inte
grated with political cadres. Their mission
is to maintain status quo in an area crying
for change. The result is in doubt unless
we begin now to restore our capability to
deal with "nasty little wars" as well.
Lieutenant Colonel Vought's guidance
prc-ides a sorely needed poin t of depar.
Maj Winn 8. Mcdougal, USA
Military Review
The 1977 Reader Suney
This year, Military Revielc used the random selection method
to survey its audience. The US Army Military Personnel Center
furnished a random list of field grade officers representing a cross
section of combat, combat support and combat service support
specialties. We also surveyed our subscribers and other selected
groups. The data from these surveys are good management
We are pleased to report that 85 percent of the field grade officers
see a definite need for a journal to enhance their professional
development. Of these, 79 percent consider Milito)'!! Rcvicu' was
dOing that job as the "Professional Journal of the US Army."
Some 83 percent of those replying are classed as regular readers
and another 13 percent as regular scanners but infrequent
The majority endorsed the physical facets of the magazine such
as size, format and use of illustrations and color. Readability
was about right for 90 percent, and 69 percent opted for the same
number and length of articles as now or a mixture of long and
short articles.
While the majority felt that Military Rcvicu"s content was
meaningful, a sizable minority considered the material not con-
troversial enough.
The survey results reaffirmed the validity of Militw'y Revicw's
efforts to stimulate serious thought about our profession. The
results also pointed out areas such as distribution and design
and layout techniques which require increased attention by our
staff. You, our readers, are the ultimate judges of our success or
failure. We thank you for youI' past support and encourage you
to make MR an even better journal by letting us know your
needs and opinions and, not the least, encouraging your peers and
jUI,Iior officers to read and subscribe to Military Revieu.
The Making
of a Morass
] Clmes I I. Toner
I am cOllVlIJced that we may be required to stay in Korea a
considerable length of time IIJ order to fulfIll our pledge to aid in the
establishment of a free and independent government 1
-President Harry S. Truman lin 1946)
ONTINUAL vituperative exchanges
between Communist and United
Nations Command officers at Pan-
m't.mjom, occasional acts of wanton
violence in the demilitarized zone or at
sea, debate about the character of the
administrations of President Park Chung
Hee in the south and of Kim II Sung in
the north, the worrisome question of
whether the kindling that is Korea will
again ignite into conflagration-all
these things serve to remind us that,
between 1950 and 1953, a conflict
raged across the Utah-sized Korean
Peninsula that left as many as four
million dead or wounded, including
157,530 and came very
close to bringing about full-scale war
between China and the United States.
Korea is a recipe for geopolitical
disas,ter. Not only does North Korea
have about 467,000 troops under arms,
October 1977
but It is contiguous with both China and
Russia. In fact, huge Soviet air and
naval installations in Vladivostok lie
about 100 kilometers from the Korean
border, across Peter the Great Bay. In
addition to its 625,000 troops, South
Korea IS supported by 42,000 US serv-
Icemen In Korea, who remain there in
part because of the 1953 US-South
Korean Security Treaty. Add the "spice"
of a million or so Soviet-Chinese
"volunteers" and of the American
nuclear arsenal on Okinawa (about
1,000 kilometers south of Korea), and
the result is what is p,erhaps the most
dangerous area in the world.
, Today, as the United States explores
the possibility and desirability of
reducing or eliminating its military
presence in the Republic of Korea
(ROK), it may be helpful to examine the
origins of American involvement there.
The proctlcal pOint of departure for such
discussion IS the 1 December 1943
Cairo declaration. by which the Unl,ed
States, China and Great Britain agreed
that "m due COllrse Korea shall become
ire'e' and Independent" DUrln(J the July
1945 Potsdam Conference, ttle
HIJSSlilnS 8dtlerud to the Cnlro
Declaration When the surrender of
~ n a n became Imminent, the decIsion
Wi1S made th"t American soldiers woulcJ
accept the surrendPr of Japanese troops
In Korea below the 38th Purallel, and
ttle RUSSians would accept their sur"
lender above that latitude
The ale had been cast Even the
' tides of the Korean War did not
James H. Toner is assistant
professor of government at Norwich
Unlversl,y He receIVed a B.A. from
St. Anselm's College. an M A. from
the College of William and Mary and
a Ph.D from the University of Notre
Dame. He is a grad'fate of the Officer
Candidate School at Fort Benning,
GA. and has served in the US Army
Reserve. He has been an assistant
professor,. Department of
Government and International
Studies, University of Notre Dame
His article "Exceptional War, Excep-
tional Peace: The 1953 Cease-Fire in
Korea" appeared in the July 1976
Military Review.
substantially changc that demarcation
1mB Korea remfllflS (ilvlded, and
Americans remain In Korea ThiS article
explo"" the 1950 outbreak of <; war
which IS still unsettled today, 24 years
after thf' 1953 cease-fin:.
The OccupatIOn
In August 1945, General John R.
Hodge had been preparing the American
XXIV Corps to take part In the invaSion
of Japan when orders came that he was
to accept the surrender of the Japanese
In Korea south of the 38th Parallel.
American forces landed In Korea on 8
September 1945, Russian forces had
entered Korea on 12 August. As
hlstorl8n Ernest May has observed,
"From the first, IllS [Hodge's] aim was to
get American forces out of the country
at the earliest possible moment "] While
It would be gratifYing to argue tl13t
Hodge was motivated by the highest
Idealism, It IS more likely that he wanted
to extricate himself from one of the
most perpleXing imbroglios In which an
American soldIer has ever found
A more ,nausp,cIOUS start hardly can
be Imagined The day after he arrived,
Hodge announced his intention to ad-
minister southern Korea through
Japanese offiCials already in offic
deCISion seemed a sound one because
there were so few trained Korean (or
American) personnel. But the deCISion
caused an uproar, and the State
Department quickly disclaimed respon-
sibility for Hodge's remarks. General
MacArthur gave orders two days later to
replace Japanese offiCials as promptly
as possible The Koreans, oppressed by
the Japanese for 35 years, had little
experience In self-government From
what source Hodge was to obtain Civil
administrators was a puzzle left for him
to solve.
Hodge's initial blu'nder is easy to
Military Review
understand. He had received no
bneflng, he was accompanied by no
experts on Korean problems, he had no
officers who understood the Korean
language or local customs, and it was to
be nine months before he received a
single policy directive from
As Carl Berger has
The sad truth was that Korea was
the only Important area occupied by
American troops In the Pacific for which
detailed, .concrete preparation had 110t
been made by any branch of the United
States government.'
In this policy vacuum stepped a US
Army officer who very probably would
hAve been a good deal happier
assaulting a beach at Kyushu than
trying to understand the jumble of
Korean politics which at the time
featured some 54 political parties, all
clamOring for a share in the new Korean
government.' It is a small wonder that
Hodge told a fellow general that If he
(Hodge) were a Civilian and free from
military orders, he would not have
stayed on hiS job in Korea for a million
dollars a year r,
The American record in Korea from
the time of Hodge's landing until the
(temporary) Withdrawal of US troops In
.:June 1949 is by no means an entirely
proud and successful one, To use the
metaphor of a kaleidoscope, the em-
branglement in Korea-end the picture
one has of it-is the product of a
number of shifting fragments,
emphasized in various ways by vanous
commentators depending upon their
own judgments and predispositions" In
'lnore recent years, a number of writers
have heaped scorn upon the American
military occupation of Korea. But, while
the American leadership can and should
be taken to task for its fears and failures
in Korea during the occupation, other
fragments i.n the "kaleidoscope" fre-
October 1977
quently seem to escape the attention of
those who rl'eer into It wanting only to
fmd an Image of an Amm lean colossus
Intent upon 1I11pOSing a compatible
political order on a hapless Korea
The conVictIOn that "the United
States sabotaged the will of the majority
of the Korean people"" IS pure
hyperbole Had the United States
received ti,e cooperation and good will
to wilich It was entltled--If only on the
baSIS of the Potsdam Declaration-from
the. Soviet Union, much of the sorrow
and suffering of the Korean people
might have been assuaged. And the
record of the American occupation
might have been Improved substantially
While the American record In Korea
cannot be wholly absolved simply by
pOinting 8n accuSing flnge, at RUSSian
aClivlty In North.Korea, the fact remalfls
that American fear of RUSSian treachery
was justified and that the American
procliVity to favor rightists Ifl South
Korea can In part be explained-
although not entirely excused-by Com-
munist Ifltranslgence Ifl the north
The triumph of Syngman Rhee In
South Korea by no means met With
complete American benediction.
PreSident Truman expressed the
Amencan dilemma'
From the moment of his return to
Korea in 1945, he [Rhee J attracted 10
himself men of extreme right-wing at-
titudes and disagreed sharply with the
poiJtlcal leaders of more moderate
views . ... I did not care for the methods
used by Rhee's police to break up
poiJtlcal meetmgs and control political
enemies Yet we had no choice but
to support Rhee. Korea had been
overrun and downtrodden by the
Japanese since 1905 and had IJad no
chance to develop other leaders find
Rhee generally was regarded as "the
long-time symbol of Korean
Troops of the US 7th Di,ision march into Seoul for the formal occupation of the city
nationalism," and, as Carl Berger has had been established, claiming
pointed out, Rhee's popularity among Jurisdiction over'the entire peninsula
the Koreans was so obvious that he was In late 1945, however, there was still
sought after as a candidate by all fervent hope that the long dream of
political parties, Including the Com- Koreans for freedom, independence and
munlsts unity could be realized. In an effort to
To the Korean people the return of bring about the unity of Korea which
Rhee was a legend come to life; he was was expected shortly after the Japanese
the symbol of their long struggle for had surrendered, the United States, the
independence and his arrival was the USSR and the United Kingdom entered
occasion for spontaneous Into the Moscow Agreement of 27
celebrations 10 December 1945. The agreement
While the American occupation provided for a Joint Commission of
record may, on balance, be one of representatives of the United States'
blundering and befuddlement, it is command in the south and of the
beneficent compared With the Russian Soviets' command in the north to assist
record in the north, While Rhee in forming a provisional Korean
engineered his rise to power in the After the formation of the
south in the face of American am- government, the commission, in con-
biv<llence (or at best half-hearted sultation with that government, was to
support), the leadership in the north make proposals for a four-power
was simply installed. The debut of Kim II trusteeship which was to be composed
Sung on 14 October 1945 was hardly a of the US, the USSR, the United
triumph: The crowd greeted his Kingdom and China for a period of up to
monotonous and extravagant praises of five years.
the Soviet Union with the chant, "He is While the Moscow Agreement
a fake!"" By September 1948, the seemed to make good sense to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea contracting parties, it was met in South
Military Review
Korea by howls of protest. Almost
without the political parties
of South Korea rejected the trusteeship
proposal. The Soviets soon proposed
that those who opposed the Moscow
Agreement should be excluded from the
formation of the government. This
resulted in an amusing twist of events,
The Communists in South Korea were
participating in an antitrusteeship rally
on 1 January 1946 when word arrived
from Moscow that they were to support
trusteeship (to ensUi e their inclusion in
the government); they proceeded to
cross out the "No" in the "No
Trusteeship" banners and to change
their "Down With Trusteeship" banners
to read "Up," The demonstration then
went on.l2
A number of factors then combined
to preclude implementation of the ideas
contained in the Moscow Agreement.
On 8 May 1946, the JOint Commission
adjourned sine die, ostensibly because
of inability to arrive at agreement or
compromise over what were the
"democratic parties and social
organizations" with whom, according to
the Moscow Agreement, the com-
mission was to consult in order to
establish a provisional government. A
more fundamental reason was, as John
C, Campbell put it:
, , the unwillingness of each side to
see [the Moscow decisIOns] carried out
in a way prejudicial to its own position
in that strategically situated country, 13
One who enjoys fatalist theories of
history would relish the Korean Im-
passe, especially after early 1946, Each
side seemed to act, rather naturally, out
of its own self-interest, and the Korean
problem seemed to take on the aspects
of a G reek tragedy, Compromise seemed
impossible, Anxious to depart Korea,
Americans wanted to leave decisions of
any' significance to a united Korean
government which was destined never
ootober 1977
to be formed, and, as' one analyst put it:
,[by] force of circumstances the
United States found itself the defender
of extreme reactionaries, some of whom
were associated in the popular mind
with the system at exploitation under
Japanese rule, 14
The Communists in South Korea
gradually became an insurrectionary
force, and the more they fomented
violence and chaos, the more
tenaciously did General Hodge and his
staff hold to a hard-line approach, The
conclUSion seems entirely justified that
the Soviet Union had decided to have all
of Korea, not merely the north, Writing
to the secretary of state in January
1946, George Kennan, then charge
d'affaires In the USSR, put the matter
There can now be little doubt that
US SR wishes to assure earliest and
most complete exclusion of other great
powers from all connection with Korean
affairS USSR does not heSitate to
advocate arrangements which formally
call for early complete exclusion of all
outside powers because Soviet regime
in contrast to govts of other great
powers has elaborate existing
techniques and machinery for
penetration and puppet domination of
neighboring countries which it is sure it
can apply successfully to Korea if other
foreign influences are removed. It is
reasonable to assume in fact that USSR
has in reserve at least strong nucleus of
ready made governmental apparatus
including bureaucrats, militia and
Korean units from Red Army which can
be depended upon to follow obediently
Moscow direction. "
A kind of vicious political circle ex-
isted, The more the Communists
resorted to espionage and violence, the
more repressive the Rhee ad-
ministration became-and with the
consent, tacit or otherwise, of the
American military regime. By 1947,
with the Joint Commission hopelessly
deadlocked, the paramount American
objective became that of withdrawal.
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
seemed to sum up American sentiment
in an Dean Acheson,
then acting secretary of state:
I am cOlJvinced that the United
States should pursue forcefully a course
of action whereby we get out of Korea at
an early date and believe all our
measures should have early withdrawal
as their overriding objective. 16
Patterson was succeeded in office
(by now the Department of Defense) by
James Forrestal. In September ,.947,
Secretary Forrestal wrote that:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff conSider
that. from the standpoint of military
security, the United States has liltie
strategic interest in maintaining the
presentlroops and bases In Korea. 17
The only solution to the
appeared to be to transfer the problem
to the United Nations (UN). which was
accomplished on 17 September 1947.
The Soviets protested bitterly and, as
Kennan had foreseen, proposed, in-
stead, a rapid Withdrawal of all oc-
cupying troops. The American resolution
passed unanimously (the Soviet bloc
abstained) in the General Assembly on
14 November, and a United Nations
Temporary Commission on Korea
(UNTCOK) was established to facilitate
the formation of a national Korean
government and to supervise the
withdrawal of occupation forces.
Barred from North Korea, UNTCOK
was instructed to implement its program
in South Korea. T:,erefore, on 10 May
1948, UNTCOK observed the election of
the National Assembly in South Korea.
ThiS led to the creation of the Republic
of Korea on 15 August 1948. Not to be
outdone, the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea was established on 9
September. On 12 December, the
General Assembly adopted a resolution
declaring the establishment of a lavyful
government, the Republic of Korea,
based upon.
. elections which were a valid
expressIOn of the free will of the elec-
torate of I/lal part of Korea and which
were observed by the Temporary Com-
mission; and thaI Ihis is Ihe only such
Government in Korea.'8
The early withdrawal of occupying
forces was recorrmended, and a new
seven-nation United Nations Com-
mission on Korea (UNCOK) replaced
The Soviet Union had informed the
United States in September 1948 that
ItS forces would be withdrawn from
North Korea by the end of December of
that year. The United States was quick
to reCiprocate, and UNCOK reported on
29 June 1949 that it had verified the
withdrawal of US occupation forces,
with the exception of a 500-man US
military adVisory group. The USSR,
however, did not reply to an invitation of
the UN secretary general to have UN-
COK verify the evacuation of Soviet
forces from North Korea. At last (or so it
seemed). the United States was out of
Korea. Hodge, exhausted, had gone
home. The occupation was over. But, as
Gregory Henderson records, the
deCISion to withdraw was by no means
a ,prudent one:
A deciSion had been reached: one of
the worst, most ambiguous, and later
most controversial American decisions
of the postwar era. Disengagement took
place, but the 'gracefulness' [Secretary
of War Patterson's term] was missing:
without requisite aid or defense the
Korean policy created by Americans was
a legless monster from birth. This dis-
astrous error-or series of errors-in
judgment [was a] harbinger of more to
come in Asia.. 19
Military Review
, lieutenant General John R. Hodge and Colonel General Shtikof at the first formal
meeting of the Joint AmericanSoviet Commission in Seoul
Invitation to Disaster
If the decision to withdraw from
Korea was mistaken, it is not at-
tributable to anyone person. Plans to
withdraw were in keeping with a policy
approved by the President on 4 April
1948 and based on a recommendation
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) which
The United States should not
become so irrevocably involved In the
Korean situation that an action taken by
any factIOn in Korea or by any other
power in Korea could be considered a
'casus belli" for the United States.
On 22 March 1949, the National
Security Council (NSC), with the ap
proval. of the State Department and the
JCS, recommended the withdrawal of
American forces from Korea, a task
completed by 3D June 1949.
The Joint Chiefs had requested the
advice of the Far East Command-
meaning General MacArthur-before
committing themselves unreservedly to
the evacuation prospect. MacArthur had
October 1977
responded that, with' the resources at
his command, he was incapable of
defending the ROK and, ttlerefore, sup
ported the withdrawal policy. He
suggested as a withdrawal date 10 May
1949, the first anniversary of South
Korea's general election." It is worth
notmg that MacArthur publicly defined
the American defense perimeter in early
March 1949, well before the much
maligned Acheson speech 10 months
Now the Pacific has become an
Anglo-Saxon lake [said MacArthur] and
our line of defense runs through the
chain of islands fringing the coast of
It starts from the Philippines and
continues through the Ryukyu
Archipelago, which includes its main
bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back
through Japan and the Aleutian Island
chain to Alaska. 22
If any further testimony were needed
from high government officials that the
United States had relinquished military
interest in Korea, it was not too long in
forthcoming. On 12 January 1950, in a
speech before the National Press Club,
Secretary of State Dean Acheson used
phrases similar to MacArthur's in
publicIZing those areas in which the
United States was officially interested'
This defensive perimeter runs along
the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to
the Ryukyus.
The defensive perimeter runs from
the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands."
For haVing made this speech,
Acheson later received some terrible-
and, on balance, quite unfair-abuse
Congressman Walter Judd, for example,
attributed the aggression in Korea to
Acheson'S direct "inVitatIOn":
The occupants of the Kremlin looked
at the map and found that Korea, like
Formosa, was beyond our line and
therefore would not be defended by us
So they moved In. Why should anyone
be surprised?2il
Too often the remainder of
Acheson's "perimeter speech" IS
omitted Although Acheson's subse-
quent defense of his speech as a
"warning" to aggressors IS surely ex-
aggerated," his speech did contain a
clear reference to possible UN action in
the event of aggression in the Far East.
So far as the military security of
other areas in the PacifiC is concerned,
it must be clear that no person can
guarantee these areas against military
attack. But it must also be clear that
such a guarantee is hardly sensible or
necessary within the realm of practical
Should an attack occur-one
hesitates to say where such an armed
attack could come from-the initial
reliance must be on the people attacked
to resist it and then upon the com-
mitments of the entire civilized world
under the Charter of the United
Nations. 26
Two scholars have pointed out
recently that, while Acheson did refer to
possible .UN action against aggression,
the speech as a whole probably
weakened the chances of deterring such
an attack." The Army chief of staff at
the time, General J. Lawton Collms,
later said that he was unable to un-
dersta nd why Acheson felt impelled to
make the disclaimer of American
responsibility for Korean defense: "I
Imagine that, like a batter swinging at a
bad ball, he later would have liked to
have had that sWing back again,""
'Although the United States spent
more than a billion dollars between
1945 and 1949 in occupation of and to
help South Korea, the House defeated a
bill on 19 January 1950 which would
have supplied $60 million in
supplementary economic assistance to
the ROK.'" The bill was passed later, but
the tone seemed to be set. Once again,
If amplification were required, it was a
short time in coming. The chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, Tom Connally of Texas, was
asked In May If he thought Korea con-
stituted an essential part of American
defense strategy. His answer: "No. Of
course, any position like that is of some
strategic Importance. But I don't think it
IS very greatly important. "30
As Robert Osgood has pointed out,
the Communists were fairly sure that
they might safelv attack the ROK not
merely because of the American
withdrawal or the p u l ~ c "assurances"
of Acheson and MacArthur. There was
at the time a severe shortage of
American ground troops; indeed,
General George Marshall later testified
that, In the years immediately preceding
the Korean War, he was uncertain
whether the JCS could muster enough
men to guard the airstrips at Fairbanks,
Alaska." This lack of military force, as
much as-and perhaps more than-any
Military Review
public statement, set the stage for the
events of June 1950.
Onset of the War
General agreement exists among
scholars that the war in Korea was
begun by hostilities which erupted at
about 0400 (Korean time)32 on 25 June
1950. But, much beyond this first in-
nocuous agreement, scholarly concord
dissolves into bitter argument and
sometimes wild speculation. Certain
facts, such as MacArthur's August 194B
assertion that the 38th Parallel was "an
artificial barrier" that "must and will be
torn down,"" the definite American fear
that, If Rhee were given the armament
he required, he would soon tear into
North Korea'4 and MacArthur's
knowledge that the adrnlnlstratlon was
preparing for the fall-thought to be
imminent-of Formosa," combined to
lay the foundation for a number of
works which, in essence, maintain that
the aggression In Korea was of
American origin, direct or indirect
Some of these works, such as I. F.
Stone's The Hidden History of the
Korean War, no longer are taken
seriously even by historians of the New
Left The theme that the Korean War
was a plot by certain Americans to
prevent the "loss" of all ASia to the
Communists, or to shore up a sagging
American economy, or to support the
march of right-wing despotism in Asia
rarely is seen today. Occasionally,
however, one still meets a charge such
as that of Karunakar Gupta that "[A]
prima facie case for the South's in-
vasion of the North does exist,"" but
most commentators, even those whose
works are only sophisticated corollaries
of Stone's theories of conspiracy, have
abjured such patent nonsense.
Unfortunately for those who would
revel in the idea that the United States
began the Korean War, UNCOK
October 1977
observers submitted a report to the
secretary general which in part read:
.. , Judging from actual progress of
operations Northern regime is carrying
out well-planned, concerted. and fu/l-
scale invasion of South Korea, second,
that South Korean forces were deployed
on wholly defensive basis in all s'ectors
of the parallel, and, third, that they were
taken completely by surprise as they
had no reason to believe from in-
telligence sources that invasion was
imminent. 31
Hence, those who seek to argue that
the war was of direct American origin
are left to use evidence adduced by
Tass, which reported the heroic North
Korean troops drove back the attackers
from the south, or the recriminations of
Andrei Vishinsky, who sought to prove
that Rhee began the war with American
While this is not the proper forum for
an extended analYSIS of the
historiography concerned with the
Origins of the' Korean War, some
mention must be made of the theOries
purporting to explain the entry-and
subsequent conduct-of the United
States In the war, The newer revisionist
theOries are complex, but It IS possible
to Identify thell main elements No
longer IS It dogma that the south at-
tacked the north, rather, writers such as
Robert Simmons and Richard Barnet
emphaSIZe that, while the north may
have attacked first, it was very probably
only one of such provocations on either
Side, or a preemptive attack by the
This leads to the idea that the
war in Korea was simply a "civil war" in
which the United States had no
legitimate role. Stephen Ambrose
develops the idea that American in-
tervention was mere opportunism that
afforded a beleaguered administration
the chance to sell the NSC-68 program
in a crisis atmosphere, and otherwise to
South Korean recruits march to training center in Pusan
shore' up an enervated defense es-
tablishment In Asia'o SImmons and
Joyce and Gabriel Kolko share Am-
brose's analysIs. But all of them make
the entirely
that the administration did not stage the
war to sell Its programs to the public,
but sold the programs after the war
'In the matter of the origins of the
Korean War, the Kolkos seem to escape
for a time from their consistent ad-
vocacy of theories which Raymond Aron
calls "para marxist"" only to fall into a
far more improbable trap In what is
probably the most bizarre notion of the
origins of the Korean War since I. F.
Stone's simIlar hints of conspiracy, the
Kolkos contend that Rhee, abetted by
General MacArthur, "embarked on a
strategy of predicting doom" and had
their forces fall back without offering
serious combat to the North Korean
People's Army (NKPA) in order to
engineer a massive American com-
mitment. The idea, in short, was to
transform a "civil war" into a greatly
expanded American involvement in the
Far East. The Kolkos even manage to
have MacArthur's generals at the time
"beginning to Ignore his order to retreat
when there was no mIlitary justification
for dOing so. ""
This last notion is so preposterous
that it IS worth taking a moment to
examine. While it is very probable that
MacArthur would have relished a
massive commitment of American
forces to "save" ASIa from communism
(and particularly to preserve Formosa
which seemed on the verge of final
defeat at the hands of the Chinese
Communists), the Kolkos overlook en-
tirely the stark reality that the NKPA
attack literally devastated the Republic
of Korea Army (ROKA). The bullets and
bombs they fired at the panIc-stricken
ROKA, the tanks they used to overrun
the ROKA's defense posts, the power
and coordination of a full-scale attack
which the ROK had not
of these was the product merely of
Military, Review
. ' ~ i : ~ .
~ I'
'; _.
South Korean troop train heads north with replacements for the front lines
MacArthur's fertile imagination or his
purple prose. If MacArthur's cables to
his superiors in Washington "predicted
doom," It was because real miirtary
disaster was staring him in the face.
And the charge that MacArthur's
generals-who remain nameless-
chose to "begin to ignore" their orders
to retreat is equally absurd. Aside from
the fact that "beginning to ignore"
something is similar 10 being a "little
pregnant," the Kolkos offer no evidence
whatever to support their charge of
Finally, the newer revisionist
theories concentrate on the idea that
.',. the NKPA attack was no surprise-a
, kind of "Back Door to Pusan" analysis.
There is a good deal of truth in the
charge that the United States knew an
attack was coming-somewhere,
sometime, by some means-but the use
of this fact to shore up theories of
October 1977
conspiracy is entirely unwarranted. The
question that may be asked IS whether,
even if US authorrties knew an attack
was coming in Korea at 0400 25 June,
anything could have been done about it.
No plans at all eXisted for American
combat in Korea"
The contrasting theory of the origins
of the war involves the Soviet Union as
the major culprit. Ambassador Charles
Bohlen, for example, has argued that
the idea that the war was begun as an
independent act of the North Koreans is
"childish nonsense. "45 In fact, a good
deal of evidence supports the view that
the Soviets concurred in the decision to
attack South Korea.' Perhaps the most
damaging evidence is the mute
tesllmony of recovered reconnaissance
plans of the NKPA which were in the
Russian language." But there seems
little doubt that the Communist Chinese
were connected only peripherally with
the NKPA invasion. An idea as bizarre
on this end of the Korean historiography
as some of the preceding revisionist
Ideas are on their own side is the notion
that the Kremlin planned the attack on
Korea primarily to Induce an American
intervention in order to defeat
Americans in battle." Conspiracy
theories may at times be entertaining.
but they regularly fail chiefly because
they attribute to the supposed con-
spirators (whether the "devil" is, on the
one hand, MacArthur, or, on the other,
Stalin) a power of clairvoyant cunning
and an omnipotence which mere
mortals simply do not possess
The Hegelian syntheSis-and very
probably the correct one-is that the
attack on South Korea, while approved
by Soviet authorities, was undertaken
by Kim II Sung at u time of his own
choosing To use a metaphor advanced
In 1951 by Wilbur Hitchcock "Stalin
may have loaded the gun, but it was
Kim II Sung who seized upon It and
pulled the trigger!"" A number of
problems are involved with any ex-
planation of the start of the war, but the
theory that It was Kim II Sung who
started the war resolves many of them.
If we are to believe the testimony of
Khrushchev, Kill) II SUllg seems to have
convinced Stalin that the conquest of
the south would be an easy victory
because of turmoil In the ROK. For his
part, Stalin may have regarded the
prospect of a triumph by the North
Koreans as highly desirable because it
promised to intimidate Japan, to check
the expansive tendencies of Mao Tse-
tung and to be an easy target: If the
Americans had not intervened to save
the main course of China, surely they
would not trouble themselves about the
hors d'oeuvre of Korea.
If the timing (not to say the
authorization) of the attack was as much
a surprise to Stalin as to Truman, it
would help to explain why the Soviet
Union continued ItS boycott of the
Security Council (which had been going
on sinc!, January in protest against the
UN's failure to admit the Chinese to
membership) and was thus unable to
exercise its right of veto. This point IS
underscored by the fact that the Soviet
Union was scheduled to become
cilairman of the Security Council on 1
August and would have been in an
excellent position to frustrate efforts to
use the Security Council's apparatus to
help South Korea. It IS possible that Kim
II Sung deCided that the prestige he
would gain by a bold and independent
stroke-coupled with a factor often
overlooked In the literature, weather
favoring the NKPA infantrymen
combined to establish a n attack date of
Sunday, 25 June, Instead of, say, 6
August, the first Sunday in the month
that the Soviets were to cha ir the
Security Council.
Finally, the idea put forth by the
Kolkos that the NKPA attack was
directed toward Seoul alone, and that
"the vast bulk of their troops were
engaged In that limited campaign
Without expliCit orders to carry the war
beyond Seoul"" is one that should be
put firmly and finally to rest. "The vast
bulk" of troops very rarely know much
more of their army's plans than those
small unit tactical maneuvers In which
they are involved, that NKPA privates
may not have known their ultimate
destination hardly sustains the theory
that the NKPA attack was merely for a
limited purpose. As UN Secretary
General Trygve Lie later remarked:
The power of the attack showed how
long and carefully prepared it was. The
attack, came in such overwhelming
strength that it almost succeeded in
winning the whole country by force of
arms within a matter of days. 53
And only a few hours after the
Military Review
InvaSion, Kim II himself an-
nounced that unification-or conquest
of the south-was the goal of the attack
(or of the "defense," depending upon
how one looks at itl)"'
But this was no limited obJective'
attack. And within days, events took on
a tWist that no one wanted and that no
one had expected Raymond Aron
seems to penetrate to the heart of the
matter in rendering hiS Judgment that
the Korean War was an "accident"
Intended, as such, by no one, II was
certainly not tile product of some master
plan or global conspiracy." The seeds of
a bitter harvest had be;en sown, and
those whose' fate it was to do the
reaping found small comfort In the
knowledge that the prior planting had
been only an accident.
1 Fon:lyn RefaflOns of (he UflI(f!d Stares.
7946 The Far East. US Department of State
Washmgton. DC. PublicatIon Number 8554 1971
Volun;e VUI p 721
2 Ernest R May, "Lessuns" of (II(' Pilst.
Oxford University Press, NY 1973, p 54
3 Robert TOliver Syngman Rllee. Dodd
Meild & Co NY, 1960 p 204, and E G Mende
Ameflc<7fJ Military Government m Korea King s
Crown Press. NY, 1951 p 225
4 Cad Berger. The Korea Knot. University of
PennsylvanIa Press Philadelphia, PA 1957. p 49
LOUIS HiJlle has reported that. at a meeting In the
State Department In 1945. Secretary StelllnluS
asked one 01 hiS subordinates to tell him where
Korea was LoUIS Halle. The Cold War as History.
Harper & Row NY. 1967. P 202n
5 John C Campbell. The Umted Stares In
World. Affalfs. 1945-1947, Published for the
CounCil on Foreign Relations. Harper & Brothers,
NY. 1947. P 275
6 Mark W Clark, From the Danube to the
Yalu, Harper & Brothers. NY, 1954, P 15
7 Space limitations preclude elaborate
Citations here Readers Interested In a fairly ex-
tenSive review of the literature pertaining to the
subject of thiS article are referred to James H
Toner, "Candlde as Constable The Ameflcan Way
of War and Peace In Korea. 1950-1953." Un-
published doctoral dissertation, University of Notre
Dame, Notre Dame, IN, 1976. ch 1.
8 Jon Halliday. "The United Nations and
Korea," Without Parallel The Amencan-Korean
RelatIOnshIp Smce 1945. EdJled by Frank BaldWin.
Pantheon Books, NY, 1974, p 110
9 Harry S Truman, Memolfs by Harry S.
Truman. Years of Trial and Hope, Doubleday & Co,
Berkel,ey, CA, 1956, Volume II, p 329
10 Flobert A. Scalaplno and Chong-Slk Lee,
October 1977
CornnJlJI1ISIT) ") KorcH Movement, University of
Call1nrnl(l Berkel 'y CA, 1972 Part I p 37,
and Berqer, Of} cd p 4
11 SCillflplno and np CIt PI' 324 25
12 Oliver. 01' Cit. P 217. Rt!l{J(JOns of
the Unlled 1946. The Fe1r East, op CIt. pp
665-67 and 681. (Jnd Scalaplno and Lee op Cit, P
277 and tile followmg pafles
13 Campbell op Cit. P 277
14 John C Campbell. The Umted States In
World Affims. 1947-1948, Published for the
CounCil on Foreign Relations, Harper & Brothers.
NY. 1948. pp 17273
15 Foreign Relations of the Untted States
1946 The Far East. op Cit, p 620
t 6 ForeIgn RelatIons of the Umted States
1947, US Department of State, Washmgton, DC.
1971. Volume V! p 626
17 Ibid. PD 81718
18 A Hlstoflcal Summary of Umted States
Korean Rell1tlOns. us Department of State. Far
Eastern Sefles 115. Publication Number 7446.
1962. P 72
19 Gregory Henderson. Korea The Politics of
the Vortex, Harvard University Press, Cambndge.
MA. 1968. pp 15051
20 J Lawton CollinS, War In Peacetime The
History and Lessons of Korea, Houghton Mlfflln Co ,
Boston, MA, 1969, pp 28-29
21 Ib,d, p 28
22 The New York. Times, 2 March 1949, p 22
23 Department of State Bulletm, 23 Januarv
24 Walter H Judd, "The Mistakes That Led to
Korea," Reader's Digest. November 1950, p 55
25 Dean Acheson's defense of that speech IS
In hIs book, Presenc at the CreatIOn My Yenrs In (Ile.
Scate Deparcment, Signet, NY, 1970, pp 88081 and
26 Department of State Buf/elm, op elf
27 Alexander L George and RIchard Smoke,
Deterrence 111 Ameflcan ForeIgn Policy Theory and
PractIce. Columbia UnrverSlIY Press, NY, 1974, p
28 CoHms, op c((. P 31
}:g Glenn 0 PUlge, The Korean DecIsIon. June
2430. 1950. Free Press Rp,/ersrde. NJ. 1968, P 35
30 US News & World Report. 5 May 1950, p
31 Robert Osgood, Limited War The Challenge
to Amencan StrMegy, University of Chicago Press.
Chicago, IL. 1957, p 164
32 Korea 15 14 hours In advance of eastern
standard tIme Thus. the attack In Korea at 0400
occurred at the W;)shmglon lIme of 1400 on 24
June At th[! tIme, both Korell and Washington
were on daylight savmgs tlm[!
33 Quoted 10 Courtney Whitney, MacArthur
AIf,ed A Knopf, NY. 1956. p 330
34 May, op CIf, P 64
35 See Robert R Simmons The Srramed
Alftance Pekmg, P'yongyang, Moscow and the
Politics of the Korean C/vJ! War, Free Press
Riverside, NJ, 1975, P B7
36 Karunakar Gupta, "How Old the Korean
War Begln
," Chlfla Q'uarter/v, October-December
1972, p 700 The Chinese sitU occasIOnally like to
contend that the United Slates began the war as
part of a plan to Invade Chma, The New York Times
26 October 1975. p 7
37 United Nations document S/1507,
reprinted In United States PO/tCY In (he Korean
Cnsls, US Department of State, Far Eastern Series
34, Publication Number 3922. 1950, p 21
38 The New York Trmes, 26 June 1950, p 3,
and 3 October 1950. p 9
39 See Robert R Simmons, "The Korean CIVil
War," Without Parallel The American-Korean
RelatIOnship Smce 1945, Edited by Frank BaldWin.
op Cit, p 125, and Richard J Barnet, Intervention
and RevolutIon The Umted States in the Thlfd
World. Meridian Book. NY, 1968. pp 66-67
40 Stephen E Ambrose, Rise to Globalism.
1938-,1970, Penguin Books, Baltimore. MD. 1971. p
41 Slmmon!7.op Cit. p141,andseeti1ebltter
debate between Wilham Stueck and Joyce Kolko
and Gabriel Kolka, "An hchange of OpInion,"
PacifIC Historical Review, November 1973, p 561
42 Raymond Aron. The Impenal Republic' The
Umled States and the Wor/{}. 1945-1973,
TranslalCd by Frank Jelhnek, Prentice-Hail.
Englewood Cltffs, NJ, 1974, p 264
43 Joyce Kolka and Gabnel Kolka, The L,mlls I
of Power The World and Umted States Foreign
Poltcy. 1945,1954, Harper & Row, NY. 1972, pp
58093. the quotation IS taken from the "An
Exchange of Opinion," PacifiC Hlstoncal ReVIew. op
CIt, P 564
44 An fnqulry Into the Mllttary Situation In the
Far E<1St US Congress. Senate Committees on
Armed ServIces and Foreign RelatIons, 82d Con-
gress, First Session. June 1951/ IV, p 2671, and
see Matthew B RIdgway, SoldIer, Harper &
Brothers, NY, 1956, p 191
45 Charles E Bohlen, Witness to H,story. W
W Norton & Co. NY, 1973, p 294
46 Pawel Monal, "RUSSians in Korea The
Hidden Bosses," LIfe, 27 June 1960, pp 7677 and
the follOWing pages. and see Alien S Whltmg,
Chma Crosses the Yalu The DeCISion to Enter the
Korean War. Stanford UniverSity Press, Stanford.
CA. 1968. P 42
47 OffiCial Records, UN Security Council,
Supplement for 1 ApTlI-30 June 1951
48 See Harry F Kern, "An Opinion Maybe
Moscow Wasn't Surpflsed," Nevvsweek. 24 July
1950, p'14, and Beverly Smith, "Why We Went to
War In Korea." Saturday Evenmg Post 10
November 1951, pp 22-23 and the follOWing pages
49 Wilbur Hitchcock. "North Korea Jumps the
Gun." Current History. March 1951. p 142
50 Nlkna S Khrushchev, Khrushchev
Remembers. Translated and edited by Strobe
Talbot. Little, Brown & Co" Boston, MA, 1970, pp
36768. but compare Scalaptno and Lee, op Cit, P
51 Whltney,op Cit. p 326
52 Kolka and Kolka, op Cit. p 587
53 Andrew Cordier and Wilder Foote, PubliC
Papers of the Secret8nes-General 01 the United
Na(/OWJ Trygve Lie, 1946 1953. Columbia Unl
verslty Press, NY,. 1969, Volume I, p 350
54 Scalaplno and Lee, op. cit" pp 397 and 397
55 ATon. op. Cit .. pp 46 and 48
__________________________________ ~ I
Military Review
Capl<tin William l. ILlllC()ck, lIS Arm)'
N .JUNE 1943, German scientists
launched the world's first jet-pro-
pelled cruise missile against London. 1
Aside from the weapon's psychologi-
cal effect in bolstering the morale of
the German people, the VI "buzz
bomb" had little influence on the out-
come of World War II. The technology
involved, however, later was trans-
fen'ed to the United States where ex-
perimental de\'elopment of cruise mis-
siles was carried on for
the next 30 ),ears. The submarine-
launched ReYlIllI" and air-launched
SkY/JOlt missiles were outgrowths of
this postwar research. During the
1950s and 1960s, technological prog-
resH in ballistic missilery overshad-
owed the significance of continuously
powered missiles. Only in recent yea),s
have developments in high-efficiency
jet engines, advanced airframe designs
amI' electronic miniaturization again
raised the possibility of using cruise
October 1977
mis . ...;iles as long-range strategic \\'cap-
Current Prototypes
The Ameriean cruise missiles now
tllulcl' development al'e small, ;iubsonie
and can fl) up to 2,000 miles. The.
:-Ia\,\,'s submarine-launched cruise
missile lll'ototype, built b), General Dy-
namics. is 21 feet long, approximatel)'
20 inches in diameter and will fit ilJto
a standard torpedo This mis-
sile (the J'nGMI09) is credited with
a range of 1,500+ miles, but it is esti-
mated that cUlTent developments ill
jet engine technology and high-energy
ftiels rna)' extend this range to several
thousand miles. a For cOf\lpal'ison, a
Millllil'1II011 JI / intercontinental ballis-
tic misoile (ICBM) has a 7,500-mile
The Navy's interest in a long-range,
submarine-launched cruise missile
probably reHulted from two factors-
work in de"ploping the Ha,'-
a ship-bH ... hip con-
\'cntional mis:-;i1e. and the Ail' Force'x
rh'a] effurts to obtain an ail'-launehed
mi"i1e that "ouhl extend the
range and hpl1l'c thl! usefulness of the
aging H52 force. The ail'-lallJl{'hed
l'l'llise missile built by I1oc-
illg, ,maller (0111)' J,I [('ellong) and
i, till' outgrowth of all earlier Air
Foree de,'e)opment called the "",IL-
!-ionic l'J'lli..:.l' armed dCl'IlY" or
"SCAD," "
Unique Features
illan)' of the inherent advantage, (If
l'l'llis'e missiles are obYiollS. Theil' small
!-'izc mealls a small radar xignatul'l'
and case in handling, storage. 1110\'C-
111l'lIt :llld l'oJlt'calml'l1t. Ther tan he
fil'l'd f'wm a variet)' of' launch plat-
fOl'ms. thl'l'Llb.'" h('lpill!.! til that
a Sl'('()wl strike cHpabilit,\' is main-
tained ill 111(' afLennalh of an elH'm,'
attack. TIll' missiles themseh'cs nrc
estimated to al'ound $:)00,000 each
\\ hen prmhu:ed in large quantities.;;
The maintenance of H el'uise
missill' ,11'(' estimated to he t()llsidel'-
ahl:: lower than those of ballistic rnis-
sile ..... l\fol'coYel', they cun he installed
on existing' launch platr01'ms-
Ilameb', submarines and bombers. Un-
like manned ail'craft, cl'uise missile;.;
Caplaill Willia1J/ I, Hallcock i8 S1,
ar/ Sqllar/},(}II, 2d Al'llIfI}'rri ('ami}'!!,
AII11>!',,[/, FRC, He I'ce(,;I'('(1 a B,S,
[/'01J/ th" USMA alld all M,A, ill ill-
iefllaiiflllal rdaliolls f}'(}1J/ !h!' Vlli-
l'Crsi!!! of Califorllia, HI has hdd
a)'}}}()}' aud tal'li('al iutflli[l('}I('C ])/J.';i-
fiolls lI'illl III .. 1,</ CIIl'fllr!! /)il'isiIJ}I,
Pflrl HIJI,lr/, TX, alld lI'ilh Ihe Is1111-
falllr!! Dil'isiIJII ill Slulil/a,'l, FRC,
and was op('ratio}ls ()fficer in GI,
Hcnr/quarl!'}'s, I'll Corps, iilull!larl,
la"k lhe drawback of the
of highly trained Although not
here, developments in the
fIeld of "strategic t'l'lIise nlissilcs abo
might hm'c value fill'
tadical applicatiolls,
Probably lhe
of t'1'uise missiles liel" in their
tial for effecting a quantum increa,e
in the HlTlIl'acy of strategiC' weapOIll',\'.
The l'l'uise missile's l'ombination of
inei'li"l guidance ,)"ten" updated by
terrain "orrelatioll fixe" with pattern-
reloJ..olitioIl terminal guidance. pl'om-
i:-.e:o: to ac:hicve ac:c:ura1.e rEPs (eil'C:U-
Ial' elTOI' probable) evell at extended
range" ,; The abilit)' to hit targets
with ncar 1I1't:uraey mean"
that 10wer-)'ie1d warheads arc "ulli-
tient, allcl collateral damage can be
minimized, The tendenc)' for a nuclear
{',\/,h:l1lgp to onc:e begun might
be det'I'ca,ed by the surgical natu re
()f it cruise missile strike, If olte ac:-
"ept, the ba,ie tenet, of mulual a'-
",Il'ed (lITA])), then the
logic of the pl'cl'cding point is un-
The "Ideal" Weapon?
A supel'fil'ial analysis of truise mis-
illdicates that the "ideal" weapun
nUl)' ha,'e beell found at la,l. Com-
inexpensive, HCl'tll'ate and
cOIl,idered by mall), 10 be relatively
invulnerable, what more could be
a:-:ked '! Before drawing :-;lHh a
,ion, however, the following must be
accomplished, Firsl, lhe military
threat to American ;;ecurity must be
examined along with pre,ent US
strategy to "ee if there i,; indeed a
need for cl"ui:-;e mix8i1es in the nation's
arms inventory, Secondly, Cl'Ui8e mis-
mu,t be evaluated in the light of
alternative weapons system8 "linder
con,;idcration, Ine1uded in the list of
weapon, with which crui"e missile,;
Military Review
Artist's impression of YBGM109 missile
will be di:-:eusscrl arc the Bl bomhel',
the AIX advanced ICBM and the 7'l'i-
{[('Ill submarine.
The Soviet Threat
The premise of this artiele is that,
in the foreseeable future, the strategic
threat to American security is synon-
ymous with Soviet nuclear power. It
is estimated that the ICBM throw-
weight ratio will range from to
G:l in fan". of the Soviet Union in
the period covered uy the SALT II
treaty," 7 According to former De-
partment of Defense oflicial Amos A,
Jordan, "the SO\'iet Union not only
has a throw-\veight Ull t will
likely increase its lead oyer the next
few yeurs." .... The apparent 1w.:k of
concern among American ofIkials hm;
reslilted from believing in the tech-
nological Mlperiority of US mll ltiplc
independentl:, targetable re-entry \'e-
hieles I MIRVs I. The advantage that
MIRVs provide US ICBMs in terms of
accllrac:>, and penetrability now, how-
ever, appears to be losing it:; impor-
tance in the light of similar develop-
in the Soviet Union."
October 1977
Regardle,," of whether or not the
throw-weight ,,,ymmetr
' constitllte's
a gelluine threat to American security,
the fact remains that the Russians evi-
dently believe that additional throw-
power will enable them to "win" a
Iluclear war if one o('cUl'S. 111 Dr. Leon
GOllre pointed out that the marked
Suviet illtel'e:-;t in dvil defense n1Ht-
tel'S emphasizes their to be aule
to wage lludear WHr and emerge in a
l'clati\'ely favorable power PO:-;itiull. 11
Once H PO:-,itiOll of lhrow-weight t-IU-
periority i;-; gained, the So\'ieb I1WY
believe themselve" ahle to get their
WHy whenever an East-\Vest l'ri...;is de-
\'elops. I:.! Amel'ieun negotiators .slund
to lose con,;idel'able politkal leverage
if a US position of strategic inferior-
it,v is allowed lo e\'ol\'O. The American
deployment of cl'uise mh;siles very
well could reduce the possibility of a
So\'iet first st!'ike and increase the
Amel'ican ability tu manage a
trolled nuclear response. Additionally,
the development of cruise missiles
might ael as a brake on Soviet adven-
tu l'ism and hence contribute to the
maintenance of intel'11ational slability.
852H carrying Skybolt missiles
SOYiet Cruiie
A" II'Jth m'lll)' other lI'eapons S)'S-
tems, (he Roviet experience with ''I'liise
mi:i;illc;i appeal':-i to ha\'Q IHu'ulll='led
I'oughl)' that of the United States,
natiolls are H\\-are of 11 dif-
ferent winged 01' enli,e mis,iles in the
Hussian inventory. 1:1 All are
to-slirface missiles with relatively
short ranges, plll'()()rtedly designed for
taelieal use only, They are launched
from surface ship,..;, subnwrilles and
grollnd vehides, Ijeretofore, the So-
viets have plaeed their longest range
cruise miHsiles (450 miles) 011 some
of their oldest ,ubmarines, "an incli-
cation that the SO\'iet crui,e-missile
capability is not an i In m e d i ate
threat." 11
It is no\\' known, however, that the
Rodel Union is adively developing
strategic cruise miRsiles with ranges
as great as 2,000 miles (the SSX12) Y'
Hence, Soviet efforts to obtain ad-
\'anced jet engine teehnology are in-
evita\Jle, Under the guise of requesting
small, highly eflicient engines for in-
<!nsll'ial Ptl)'Il",;e,; Mlth a,; gal; tl'lIllS-
mi"ioll or jluII'et' jlroduction, the So-
viets "all be e>;]Jected to Ill'eB' Western
.. to provide equipment thnt is
readily transferuble to military appli-
cation:'. Providing :mch technology to
the Soviet military could undermine
seri",,,l)' the present American lead
in theeruise missile field,
The Schlesinger Strategy
In .Januar)' Seel'eta!'y of De-
fense ,James Schlesinger held a press
l:ol1ferellce at which he announced a
stralegy that \l'as to become part of
President Kixon's policy of "e"ential
equi\"alel1ce." In mentioning countel'-
force as well HK countel'value targets,
Sccretary Schlesinger revealed pub-
lid,\' fill' the first time the existence of
a flexible range of targeting options
that long had been part of US sh'at-
egr, Options other than mass popula-
tion de,truction are necessary not
only for purposes of damage-limita-
tion, but also because the threat of
destroying Russian cities probably is
Military Review
not a credible deterrent. In urder to
I""" a threat to \\'hat the So"iet lead-
el':-> deem essentiul for survi\'al, 1:8
:-:tl':ltegy mu:-:t C)l(..'ompas;-: a wide range
of carefuli)' seleded targets,
Ilel'llard S. Albert. \\'ho specializes
ill strategic polkr matters, i:-; a cou-
:-;UltHllt to various US
agencies. Lsing lit. Albert's notion of
'\'oullterpo\\'el'." four categ-ol'ie:-: of
targets mu,t be included for US l'e-
to be meaningful.
These categorie:-. are cOlllllcl'fol'l'c.
I'Oll1ltercontrol, COlinterWUl' effort and
COlllltel'resoul'l'e.}li Such H strategy
requires a high degree of :-:.eleeti\'ity
that denwllds betler actul'al'ie:-; and a
nll'iety of overlapping- weapolls sy ... -
tems. Albert state, that:
... lite larlfel 8( /8 W(' Ita,.,. dt-
8rl"i/)(t/ r(I/(lIol be ('[i(Tli/''''!! al/arr.-eri
with f(}drr!l',o.; straft[Jic systelJls bucan,'H'
Iltey /a(r.- lite r(''1uirrd '1l1a/ila/i/'"
elia l'lI('t (Irist ics. po i('ula l'llJ ((('('/{ /,rle 11,
yidd. alld ('OllIpldtiy J/e.rib/I' "da"r/eI-
ill!! ("apal)ilit y. "
The inabilit), to achieve extreme
aCCUl'Ht:y eliminates the of
all effective counterpower strategy.
The "overkill"' characteristic of cur-
rent L"S large-yield llllcleal' weapons
delivered by missiles is required b)"
the iliaCCUl"HC)' of the deliver)" "ehicles,
Illt:rea!':ed <It:<:uracy of delivery vehit:le:-:
and lower-yield wHrheads are major
ingredient:-; of a cOllnter-
l)()wer :-;tl'ategy.
Flaws in the Triad
A wide range of available deli"ery
systems is required fa l' the targeting
strateg)" previously discussed. This j,;
true because of the lack of certainty
,to to the survivability and penetra-
tivity of anyone weapon system. The
US strategic triad has served this pur-
October 1977
pose for almost two decades now, but
the projected Soviet threat to both
manned bomhers and fixed-silo ICBMs
and the possibility of a future anti-
:-:.ubnHll'ine warfare breakthrough have
brought to lig-ht the American nee(i
to modernize the strategic forces. No '
lOIlg-el' call allY of the triad's three
leg-s be J'elied on absolutely to ensure
that the l..:nited States will be able to
launeh an effective second strike.
There i:-: all aPI1arcnt need for Qither
ll1ajOl' in current wenp-
01' the addition of new
\\'capOI1:-: to the sil'ategit ar:iennl.
The B1 ,Bomber
:-; eal"ly ever)'one is acquainted with
the l'Hg"ing o\'cr the pur-
chase of the 81 strategic bomber.
With the [1,;2 force now entering its
thinl decade, it is !lot surprising- that
the Air Force has proclaimed the need
for a new aircl'aft, one de-
e:-:.pecial1y to operHte in the ail'
environment of the 1!180s and beoond.
During' the pm;t 20 great tech-
nological ad\'tlnves been made in
eiel'tl'Onit-s and aircraft design, The Bl
illcludes many impl'oYements over the
J-J."52 and call fly at slipersonic speeds.
It ean f1)' at the extremel;- lo\\" alti-
lleeded to }>enetl'ate modern ail'
defense sy:.:;tem:.:;, ha:.:; a lower radar
:-.igllature ami is hardened to nuclear
blast effects. The B 1 is designed to be
compatible \\" i t h the air-Iaullched
cruise missiles being tested. '" Manned
bombers add significant flexibility to
the American nuclear capability, but
the 852'" capability to penetrate the'
projected Soviet defenses in the mid-
1980s points out the need for the ad-
vanced B 1 bomber.
Assuming a minimum range of
2,500 miles, few targets in the Soviet
Union are beyond the reach of cruise
mfssiles while their flying launch plat-
Harpoon missile being fired from the USS Knox
forms remain of miles out-
"ide the Soy;el ]leri]lhery,
A major advalltage of maintaining
a unmber forl'e able to penetrate eH-
erny air spate is that adversary na-
tions must (,'ontinllc making heavy ex-
penditures on defensive forces to
counler lhe bomber threat. Money
spent on defensive fOl'ees ('annol be
spent Oil ofl'cnsive fortes. This ad-
vantage, however, also is eharHeter-
istic of el"uise missiles. :Morcover, the
huge eo"t difference \\'()uld cnable the
1.Jnited Slates 10 ]lroduce far more
cru ise missiles than R 1 s. Loss of a
crube mi""ile doe" not entail the 10",
of a highly lrained crew,
In future years, as the B52,r; grad-
uallr are retired, ther could be re-
]llaced a" launch ]llatform" by rela-
th'ely chea]l :<ub"titute", A modified
B()";lIfj 747, for in"tance, could carry
up to 71 mi""iles, In all era of limited
resotirces, it may come down to a de-
cision bet,,'een the $20 billion price
lag for 2c11 fils 01' the e"timated $7,8
iJiliion required to refit the pre"ent
fOl'ee uf [.:.)28 with cl'ui."e missiles. 111
Deyeloping ('rui"e mi"sile" for ill"lalla-
tion 011 /):")2.<; or inexpensive future
platforms ran be seen an alterllH-
tin to ]lurcha"ing the Hl bomber, Al-
though the purpo"e of this article is
not to "upport either "ide of the B 1
is:-'l1c, the prercding should
have illu"trated lhe fact that crui"e
Illi,,"ile" can prolong the life of the
l'lIlTent fOl're of H:")2H if llsed in con-
junction with the penetrating Hl
The MX Advanced ICBM
De\'elopmenb in the J\1X program
highlight the COllcern of American
plannerR that the cunent fixed-silo
IC'DM force is becoming increa"ingly
vulnerable to Soyiet de,truction, The
MX, aside from having greater size
Military Review
and throw-weight, iH designed to he
i. mobile s,'Htem that either can he
Hhuttled from one shelter to another
or can he installed in a tunnel rom-
plex with variouH locations from
which it can be launched."" In view
of the cUlTent advanced stale of MIRV
tcchnolng.,, the deciHion to install
larger-yield warheads on the MX than
those of present ICnMs can be at-
tributed to the US: being envisioned
pl'im;lri1y as 11 weapoll for destroying"
hurdened mi!-'sile silos.
Larger 'warhead yields mean grealer
collateral dcstrucliOl;. especially in the
Soviet Ullioll, where silos tend
to be, loc"te,l in jJopulated arcas, The
UX will increaHe the Ameriwll cle-
terrellt only if the dodrine of lllutual
assured destru('lioll is ac.:ccpted hy
both sides. As DOllald I1I'CnnHII has
explained, however, "thcre is llO evi-
dence that the Soviet Union believe,
in MAD.""' lIenee, greater yields
arc a destabilizing factor that ('ould
reHult in uncontrolled escalatiolL The
d{H'trine of "essential equivalence is
a mueh more viable basis for selecting
llew weapons .. . ,"!.!:.! Cruise
mis:-.iles, rather than ballislk mix;-;ilcs,
appeal' to hold mu('h potential for
meeting the requirements of counter-
power. When one adds to this the real-
ization of the probable CaRt of the
kind of multiple-based system envis-
ioned for the MX (perhapH $30 billion
over the next 10 years ",I), it becomes
Hpparent that US policymakers should
conHicler future ballistic miHHile sys-
tem propoRalH wi th a great deal of
SubmarineLaunched Cruise Missiles
The US Nm'>' currently planR to
build 13 new Tridellt Hubmal'ines with
24 missile launchers each. Already de-
ployed on 41 Polaris submarines are
656 launcherH. Bringing the Tride11ts
'October 1977
into the inventory will require elim-
inating a certain HumiJer of laullchers
if the Vladh'ostok aeeord is to be ob-
,<erYelL "' An agreeable solution might
hc to refit SOllle of the present Polaris
l-'uumal'ines with l'l'uise missile":..;. Sub-
marine-Iaullched tl'uise ttdssiles also
could be placed ahoard nuclear attack
submarines. of which thcre are close
to 70. This move would add still
a1lother facl'l to America's second
strike ('allability, making it less likely
that an enemy fil'st strike could be
SlHTC-;o;:;ful. neg-annes:..; of which choices
arc made in the future concerning
majllr US :--iav>' hardware, adding
(,l"U1Se seems to reIH'csent a
polcnti:dly importal1t improvemellt in
the ::\Uyy's ability to slistain its leg'
of the triad,
At this point, it may be appropriate
to I'm"jew sonw of the cl'ui:-;c nlissilcs'
that cOllstitute dl'aw-
uack, to the;" deYelopmenl, Lacking
the adnlntage or human judgment at
the scelle of adion, a cl'uise missile
{'all1lOt be expel'led to })l'O-
dde the flexibility that a manned air-
craft offers. The ability til MIR' a
CI'li ise missile's warhead is l'estl'ieted
by limitations on size Hnd
weight. the teehniques ()f
digital map-matehing and terminal
gtlid<lllce are relati\'cly lInknown out-
,ide'the United States, but, in the
to eome, American deployment
of crui:-:e missiles will
spur their construction at varying
levels of sophistication throughout the
In terms of diplomatk relations,
cruise missiles have other disad\'an-
tageH. Their small Hize facilitates con-
cealment, and their exterior appear-
ance may gh'e no indication of the
strategic verHUS tactical nature of
their intended use {if such a differen-
tiation \. Henee. missiles
realistieall,' cannot oe included in
Hl'm:-l coutrol agreement:-: due to their
inhcl'cn1 inability to be verified.
On l'lo;-:e l'xaminatioll. the ,salient
point:-- ('OIH.:Cl'ning' cruise mis: .. ;jlcs dand
out in favor of their de,'elol'tlJent and
dcplo,nllcnt. Ht'g':tl'dlcss of Uw laullch
plat form seleeted. lTuise mbsiles CUll
play an important role in implement-
ing- a stl'ategy of flexible option:;. An,\'
of a of :-;tol'cd in a
They offer the flexi-
hilit," of ill"tallation oil all,' of a llUtlJ-
iwr of different laulleh platforms, in-
eluding )\01 0111,' ail'('raft and sub-
but aL..;o sUl'fw.:e ships and
g-t'oulld \chkles. III fart. the Toma-
h(/wk SUlJlllarine-lHlIllehed cruise mis-
,'ill' reeenll)' ",as del110llstrated to be
('<l!llpatible "'ilh lhe Army's self-pro-
pelled !Jill{'( launcher, ",'
During the l'oming- yeal'l'i of grow-
illg' Sodet might, would
be wise to fo11o\\' the advil'e of former
Defense Seerela!'), iVIelyin Laird who
,l"led that "the development of the
0)' aJl Oil-hoard cruise is ne<':CSSHl'Y to assure
l'onl,putcl' l'an lJe fed into a l'i'tli:.;c the of futul'e U.S. optiOIll'i
mi:-;:;jI'e. :!;, Cl'ui;--;e mis:-.iles l'elluirc for additional strength.":!7 This state-
Ileithel' spcl'ially. i..'Olll'i{l'ul'ted Iatllll'h lllelll WHl'i made :-;cvend years ago, but
platforms !lor the elah{l}'ate support SelTctary Laircl':-; word:..; are no less
alld muintenalll'c that :ll'('OlllJlHIlY other true today.
'l'hb artlci{' writtl(.n prior to the not to bUild thl' In bomber. -Editor.
I \\'Illiam L. 511111'1", Til, {(nH /fllrl ['flll (If /II<
Thin! It, if'II' Hls/or!1 of 1\'11::1 r;, rmU"!/, Sim"n
& Hdl1l"\PI, Inl'" N\", 1) IUIII,
:! "{JSHH :\Ii.,,,il,,,,," .11'ltlfi(J1I H'I'I,," /lnd SIl'U"
'j',,'JwOlfJI!'/, I:' iota I eh 1'1'j'li, 11
:\ 1'"ll'i." "The Cnd" .. :\1,,,-
"'Ih,," Hu(fd,,, oj .1/(J1IIlt' SCI{')J/Isf'l. Apl'il
p I'j',
IJ/m(" \. 20,
;; "'J'ht' :'li.,,,ill' Thllt Stlll('fllHh'd SALT," Hllsl-
W",,, 2,\ NO\'{'mUl'l' i!I'j'!i, I'
Ii Hi,'lml',! BUIt. "Thl' C'nli"e Mi ...... ik ant! Arm"
Control," Sun'incl. ,Jnnuary-f'eul'ual'Y l!)',(;, " 10,
7 Colin S. Gt'ny, "A Problem (;ui,!c to SALT II."
Surd/'al, Sept<:mbcI'-Ol'tublt' 111,5, I) 2:lol (l'e-
pl'jntet! In ,Udd/'TY U"/'i,'U', April }\17(;, pp
,'" Afllo", A, .JOI't!.1n, "So\'i(t Stn'n).!th un,l U,S,
I'Ul'llo'oe." Forf 11111 /'v/il'!l. N\lmber 2.1, Summel'
1!17H. p ;J5.
!I "'I'll{> Djtnn.., Out of the Bottle." Tile Ef'Ol1()-
millt. Ii Mnl'l'h H!7Li. p o1H,
10PaILI H, Nit1.C', "A'o!:illring Stnlh'gic Stability
in un Ern of Di!tentc." Forci[lll ,llfuir8. January
1!17G, jlP 211-12.
11 Dernl1nl S. Albert. "Cnn"tructi\'(' Counter-
IJOW[') ... Orbis. Volume 20. Numbcr 2. Summl'r
1(176, P, a45.
I:.! Nilzc. Ol!. I'it.
1:1 "USSH ,,11'1I1/ioll H'",,,. t/lld SP/I!'"
T, ,hUO!O!III, OJ', ",1,
11 flj" ('ir" II l!l.
I;; Cllll'i'fll'l' i\, Hollin'>!>n ,JI'" "So\'jpt>l :Of a].\{'
Nl\\ SALT HId," Al'lfltHHI Irl"!.- flild Spt/C('
T"I'!wo!I)IJlI, 2 F"hnl:\I'y In7/). ]I 12.
Iii Albt'lt. 111" fll" I) :1,17,
) l'lar['llt'l' A. Hobin"un ,Jr,. "l.!-l Bomber
l'I'U" of SAC Plan",' Al'iulioll 1I'('f" ulld Spflrc
Tft/1110/0'1II, 10 May lU76, j) -is.
JtJ Iii Jlrop:ram price quote!1 in Ibid, U5.! refit
Ill'Ol!I'am pl'il'e quot('li liy nol)('lt C, Ahil'icit:;:(',
"Mol'(' Pental!on Misrhief." 1'hr NlltlOlI, 14 June
1!175. Jl ,II.
:!Ij Hobin ... nn. "B-1 Bombt'l' CI'llX of SAC P\tln"."
1111, 1'1 f IJ .t,t,
:.!I Albel't, OJI. cit . p 3SH.
:.!:! /lml.. I) :J52.
:!;I Secrt'tary of Donald Humsfeld. ns
quoted in "Shnking up SALT," Till' f.:co))omist, 31
January Uli6, p 2<1.
2 I Tllipi>l. Ojl. /'it" I) 20.
:.!J Aldl'idge, OJ'. cit., p 712.
:.!ti Burt. 011. cit . P 11.
!!'j T!lipis, 01'. 'it., P 19.
Military Review
f'" ": '; """,: i'"F .
.. t1l:
1"",'0 ... .". ,""._ ,., '"
Major Wayne E. L()ng, CS 1\rl11)'
O::lIE ha\"e thai the
l"S Arm)' of break,
through in Hlld
threat. ulldel'guing the fil','.;t peacetime
"revolutiol\" of its 200-yeal'
Perhaps (Jill' of the most striking'
areas ill whith revolutionary change
is takillg' place is ill the field of combat
intelligence. The paradox in phe,
IlomenOIl, hO\\'CVC'l', slems fl'0111 the
fad thal. of all the milita1")'
plilles, the processes Hlld potential of
intelligence are linder,
stoO(I uy US tudical eomnwndel's,
branch l"enter:-, and schools. If a 1'e\,\)-
lutioll is to culminate ill meaningful
changc. these exccutiyC re\'olution-
aries, or l'hange agents, mllst undcl'-
the clll"e,effed elemenb of in-
telligence and, from that of lIn-
derstanding, set concrete goals and
j objectives.
The US Arm)" ,,,uall)" fought,
at 1813. in an
in which it enjo)"ed technical and llU'
merical superiority. The battle doc-
trine which e\"ol\"ed from this expe-
rience has of ter-
rain o\"er defeat of enemy forces in
the field. Given ",lperiority in eombat
power, it has been assumed that, when
key terrain is seized, the enemy is
placed in an untenable position. Anal,
October 1977
y . ...:is uf ellemy di:-'l)():-,itioll}; and proiJ
able intentioll:-;, if l'ollsidcrecl; at all,
havl' not bl'ell cOllsidered
Sin;ilarl)", the notion that one could
be fixed and I>lin(le(1 on key terrain,
while the cncmy flo",s Hl'Olitui him,
1ll:'\'CI' lws had much with the
American tactician. Thc b)'-pr()(luet of
this terrain fixation that command-
ers never have heen mllth interested,
except in extreme stress or in quiet
low-ke)" retrospect, in the institution-
"Iization of combat intelligence organ-
ization:;, and l))'ot:edures. TadkHI in-
telligence rarely has been understood
'" a combat power mUltiplier. Perhaps
the thai illustrates this
lack of appreciation for intelligence
that of a US commander
\\"ho told staff, "I don't want to
know anything abollt the enemy; I
want to kill him."
Force Orientation and a New Process
The of the future battle-
field (a lethal place in which US forces
\I'ill be eon fronted by an aggressive
who will not only outnumber
them at odds of four to six to one,
but who also will enjoy technical par-
ity and, in, some cases, superiority)
dictate that the commander lise his
intellirrenee assets to assist him in
"reading the battle" early. He is con-
to be force-oriented-to kno\\'
enough about the euemy to be able to
defeat him at a Fitical place and llOint
ill time. Armedl kl"ith the knowledge of
the location, types and dispositiolls of
forces in the main and supporting ef-
all innovative commander can
};eize the initiative by canalizing the
enem>' into kill zones and other posi-
lions of disadvantage, Timely intelli-
gence allows the commander to llosi-
tiOll maJlClI\'el' elemellts and to nw!';s
firepo\\,er so that vietory can be
aC'hievell with numerically' inferior
elemellt ill "knowing-
the enemy" is an integrated and dy-
namic intclligclll'C l'ollel'tion eIro1't,
('omplemented timely and aecuraic
analysis of illtcllig-C1H'C from ((ll
:WIU'('('",; at brigade through tom-
nwnd A l'ompl'chcnsi\'c reor-
gallizatioll of lIJ1ib, systems <lnd pro-
cedures has l)l'o\'ed necessary ill ul'der
to obtain this C'ritical intelligence
product for tactical comnHlllders. The
c () n !" e 11 s 11 s recummenda tiOH of all
Army undcrlaken sillte
SUllo Sludy. among' other!'!) has been
lo and detenil'alize the t<1t-
tita} intelligcllte organizatioll; further
complicatioll of current organizatioll
and vertical conlrol procedures have
been \'iewed a:-; zero if not cuunter-
All studies call for ,In intelligence
organization working directly for the
tactical commander alld his intelli-
gence oflieer I Army Security Agenc)' "
is included I, This organization works
'" a single functional entity which
collects the myriad of information on
the battlefield which goes into the
composition of the "battle picture,"
speedily proC'esses that information
from all sources into intelligence and
expeditiously provides it to the com-
mander as well as to other consumers.
The superiority of such a system over
the Clll'l'Cnt system in which signal in-
telligence (SIGINT) is collected and
analyzed In une area, human inteUi-
gence (HUMINT) in another, tacH-
eal unit reports, radar and remote }l;en-
SU}'!,) in another.' and airborne sensors
in yet a fourth, while national level
products are withheld from tactical
commanders altogether, is apparent.
In the area of collection, the gen-
ends; colonels and captains will have
direct Hccess to organic and attached
clement:.; during pel'ioch; of peace, ten-
siOJl HJHl combat. They nlay lise these
,,,sets as they see fit, consistent with
Department of the Army and local reg-
ulalions. Intelligence also is accessi-
hIe thl'Ough the chain of command.
Hequirements which cannot be met
with organk reSOUl'teS must be re-
quested from a higher commander or
supporting sister service, US Ail'
Force collection, for example, can sup-
1)o1't torp;.; l'cquil'emellls,
Corps Intelligence Management System
Although multiple types and num-
bers of eollectioll mealls are important,
JlO information acquisition syslem. ill
and of itself. will analyze the enem>'
commander's fll tllre iutentions, 01'
c\en l'Ol'l'ecily discern the meaning of
his maUCliVel' and fires in the context
of lhe ongoing baltle. AnalysiH is n
fUlll,tion of the human mind. There-
fore. it is vital that the collection ef-
fort. whil'h at corps level im'oh'es
hundreds of acquisition personnel and
associated equipment, be managed
contmll>' and thal the product be chan-
neled i n t 0 a common pl'ocest'ing
agency, the all-source analysis element,
and that this analysis element be in
clo";e proximit>, to the operations ele-
ment and the commander. Inten,.;e
Military Review
Frontal AVID.bon
tube artillery

'900TANKS '6110TANKS
Figure 1
management of these processes and
systems the G2 is
Understanding the relationships,
fund ions and pl'oc:edul'es of the G2's
c.:olledion and nnaly:.;is element:-; is a
fundamental requirement for effective
interaction between intelligence and
operations personnel. The corps level
is the 100vest level in which all collec-
tion systems, from national to com-
llany echelon, are interfaced. Even
here, the methods of the corps are
typical of the management philosophy
that "pplies for all echelons of tactical
organization. The functional roles and
October 1977
relationships ul'e cl'itical to the "work-
auility" of the system.
COII/II/anc/a; .Just as the commander
i$ the senior taetieian in the corps,
so, too, is he the senior intelligence
oilker in the corps. He must demand
a digestible product fl'Ol11 all sources.
He must conc.;eptua1ize what he need:-;
to know abou t the enemy and rela)'
those needs to the G2. He must under-
stand that his requirements are dy-
namic and that they will vary as the
battle jlrogre"ses. Above all, he must
understand his intelligence
G2: The G2 chairs the commander's
intelligence orain trust. He is the
Henemy" expert. He mU:-it anticipate
requil'ements, tUHk through his collec-
tion manager. function the senior
analyst and nHlnage to
higher, lo\\'er and adjacent command-
cr', He ha, staff supervision of all
dedicated intelligence as;o;et:->, as well
as vertkal intelligence author-
ity ovcr (;2, and S2, in the col'['" or-
ganization. HiH mi:-;;-.;iuH is to "trans-
late" the oatlle to the "reader" of the
oattle, the commander, Lastly, the G2
i, a voting memoer in the command-
er's operation, orain trust.
G,I:, The G3 chairs the commander's
lJ}lcl'atiOllH uraiu trllst HlId i:-; a 'Voting
member ill the intclligenec ul'ain h'usL
He i, the l'ommander', alter ego, As
:'HICh, he and the G2 mu:-;t function as
a team. Generally, he is the executive
agent, under the l'ornmandcr's (lirec-
tioJl, fol' the fotus of l'ombal power
(both l11HnCU\'er alld fil'c:-:') on targets
unl'o\'ered by the (;2. He is, in fact,
driven 0)' the GZ', product.
Othl'r Staff: The staffl-) obtains
intelligence from the G2 and ,'esponds
to intelligence requirement, a' re-
lIiuh"I' H!'ad'f/w!'t!'!'s alld Naliollal
IlItelliU<'II('" AIJ(,II('ies: Higher head-
quarters intelligence product, I which
may oe obtained from theater, com-
oined 01' sister senice aHHets) ant! the
data linked intelligence from the
variolls natiollal agencies may be
paxsed directly to the cOl"!" or pas,ed
through intermediate levels if re-
quired, Reque,t, from the corps will
oe handled in the same fashion. In
either case, a national intelligence liai-
son element will be available at corps
The All-S()urce Center: The All-
SOlll'ce Center is composed of an all-
,",ollrce production element and a col-
leclion mission management and intel-
ligence dis,emination element. The
All-Solll'ce Center may be known as
the Battlefield Intelligence COOl'dina-
lion Center 01' the Electronic Warfare!
Intelligence Operations Center,
The jlroduction element of the cen-
ter is the intelligence analysis com-
ponent. It i, the orain center of the
l'orps intelligence system allli; as slIch,
is the recipient of all of the collected
infOl'mation and intelligence relative
to the corps. Its mission is to process
infol'llwtion and othel' intelligence
into a single intelligence product to
,upport the immediate scheme of ma-
neuver, fires, elcctl'ouie warfare and
planning. It performs the legwork
that allows the commander to "read
the battle," as well as providing 10\\'e1'-
l'ornrnandel's and other staff
with a timely picture of the enemy as
the l'orp' sees it. The production ele-
ment al,o make, demands on the col-
lection mission management and
,emination element '0 that intelligence
gap' can oe filled.
In the future, the analysis and pro-
,Iuction element may be augmented oy
autom,;tic data processing (ADP)
equipment to store, depict and possibly
communicate intelligence, In all prob-
ability, analysi, of information will
never fall into the ADP area, The
fragmentary nature Hnd accuracy var-
ialJles of information on un enemy,
who not only denies acce,," out also
attempts vigorously to deceive the in-
telligence sy,tem, renders quantifica-
tion unlikely, Simply stated, the
friendly operations 01' logistic element
of a unit deals in more "knowlls" than
doe, the intelligence element, ADP can
better suit needs in these areas, The
G2 and his analysis element do not
have positive control over nor full
access to the elements of their trade
as do the G3 and G4. The corps is a
Military Review

Figure 2
fig-hting- headquarter" ,.;l1bjcd to bat-
tle damage as well as ellyironmental
illJlUl'IH.:es such as mud, rain, sno\\',
cold. heat. ,.;and. and ";0 'forlh. ADP
breakdown,.; ml1,.;t be expected.
The ,.;econd increment of the AII-
Soul'ee Cenier the collection mis-
sion management and dissemination
(),1::\11) ) sec.;tioll. This organization is
ba,.;ically a floor management func-
tionar>'. It obtain,.; intelligence re-
quiremenl,.; from the G2, the an,lly,.;i";
and production element and from
both higher and ,.;ubordinate com-
mand echelon,.;; then it con\'erts the,.;e
needs into l'olleetion requirements or,
if the information is a\'ailable in the
analy,.;i,.; element, into intelligence up-
dates. It abo disseminates the finished
intelligence product of the analy,.;is
and production team. This collection
and dissemination proceSl"i is charac-
terized by dynamic operations since
subordinate as well a,.; the corps com-
mand and staff depend upon the speed
October 1977
and eiHl'il'l1cy of this process.
In addition to these functions. the
sectioll \\Tites and oversees the ('orps
c'olleelion plan, It cn:;ure,.; that collec-
tiOIl are covered by m; many
acquisitioll mean:-; as possible and that
lhc inputs to the production and analy-
sis arc, ill fact, from all
SOUl'tcs. III oreier to these
l",.;ks rapidly. the terminab for all
jledicated intelligence communication's
mean,.; are located in the ,.;ection, In
the fulure, ADP in sensor
management, requirementH accounting
and communications can be expected.
The :;ame limitation,.; that apply to
ADP dependence in the anal)',.;i" area
apply to the collection and dissemina-
tion function,
US Ail' Fm'cc: The Ail' Force pro-
vides mo,.;t of the tactical imagery
product for the supported ground
commander. The request for this serv-
ice is funneled through the Direct
Ail' Support Center, and the resulting
8 00
OV10 Imagery
Mohawk InterpretatIon
8 088
Collection OneratlOns AviatIon
andProceulng (Rear) (forward)
Interrogation Operations Srcurlty
Figure 3
product relul'lls via the Aerial Ex-
ploitation Battalion of the Corps Elec-
tronic Warfare 'Intelligence Group.
III the future, the Combat Informa-
tion Center of the supporting Air
Force Tadical Air Force Control Cen-
ter will share intelligence directly
with the COl'P" G2's All-Source Center.
X ow such sharing is through the joint
Sul)()}'rlillatl' G2 S2,,: Division and
brigade intelligence centers supporl
their commanders' requirements and
those of subordinate commanders with
inteUigence which exceed organic ca-
pabilitier, and pass intelligence up
when required. Battalion S2s primar-
ily are tolledors and
Lillie analysis is done at that level.
Current theory is that the division
G2s will have Combat Electronic 'Var-
fare Intelligence Battalions available
in their units.
The COli/bat Elect}'ollic Warfare'
1l1tdlil1l'lIc(' Group (CElI'I Group):
Current thinking is that a CEWI
group will support the corps G2 di-
rectly. In the combat environment, a
sllbstantial portion of the grollp staff
and a part of the battalion
AEB, EWB) staifs make liP the AII-
SOli roe Center. The H series G2 tac-
Military Review
tical staff will 'no longer be required
as it duplicates the function of the
center, (It is envisioned that a con-
siderable portion of the center per-
sonnel will be assigned to the G2 in
gal'l'i:-;ol1 io assist in the training alld
security function,) Unless the CEWI
group commander is also (he G2, he
will command the three subordinate
battalions of the group, less opera-
tional control (OPCOX I, in combat.
OPCON of these battalions, the Tac-
tical Exploitation Battalion (TED, re-
sponsible for the HUMIXT increment
of the COl'I" intelligence efl'ort I, the
Aerial Exploitation Ilattalion (AI;n,
respol1:;iblc for the imager>' efIort I
and the Electronic Warfare natlalion
(EWB responsible for SIGINT and
electronic warfare) will be given to
the G2 and handled through the col-
leetion management section.
Each battalion commander and hi:;
staff will manage the operations of
their l'espective units, This means that
those commanders and their opera-
tions :;ectiolls will function as man-
agel'S in MMD (photographic, signal,
human intelligence), Battalion execu-
ollicers and battalion stafIs(-)
will administer and support logis-
tically theil' units from locations out-
side the MlI1D. The dh'erse elements of
the battalions will be deployed in direct
support or general support status
throughout the corps area,
Where to Now?
Command realization that successful
operations are dependent on good in-
telligence is now a fact of life in mo:;t
tactical units, The intelligence portion
of the equatioll Jacks only final concep-
tualization, There is a need for field
commanders and their intelligence ofli-
eel'S to internalize the basic principles
of all-source intelligence operations
ane!. to enunciate their organizational
October 1977
needs to the foree development com-
ml1nit,\', The challenge: to the force
rlcwlopment and resGarch and devel-
opment communities i:.; to te:.;t 01'-
. ganizational concepts and equipment
HO that operational clement:.; be
fielded as soon a:.; po,;sible, In the
interim, the miliiar:, intelligence as-
sets formerly dedicated to Army Se-
('ul'it)' or field a'l'my SU;J)lOI't
mu>'t work in an ad hoe :.;latus with
(,OI'P:-; and diyisionalullib-i so that
mandel'>' can refine needs, The US
A I'm)' has been researching the tacti-
cal intelligence problem sinee 1%5.
The time has come to "get on with it."
Ma,io)' Wallnr E, Don.'! is lI'ith the
5191h Milital'lI Jntelli(lenee Ballal-
ion (Tar'tieal E.1'ploitatir))1J, Fo)'t
HI'(IUi!, NG. He I'e('ci"r'd an M,A., in
iJlf(,J'Jlatimlfli1'c!atir!1l8 ft()m GCOJ'fJl'
H'asliinutm/ Unil'rI'8ilil and is a
1I171i !lmdnatr of the USAC'GSC'.
fJr! has serPN/ in [{orca (Iud Fid-
nom Gud, dUI'i1l1l a lJl'{'ak in sl'l'ric(',
11'01'/.-('(1 with a C'il'iliall a{Jel/Clf iu-
l'oll'N/ in the j)l'o(/udioll ol natitlual
'('I'd intrlliacncr,
IIfa/oJ' LOllY lI'as assistl'd in t!ttl
JI1'(,)Jal'ation ofllris al'ticie /111 lIfaiol'
ThrJlna" M, HI'ou'n, Officr' of ilie
Dcputll Chir'! of Staff (0), RrsfGl'ch,
De"e/oplllcut 0"'/ A r'qllisitirJII , and
MaJoI' Edn'al'd G, Klalls, US' A. 1'11111,
Urban Sprawl and NATO
Palll Bracken
URRENT NATO strategy IS based on
.assumptlons that are being under-
mined Increasingly by several
developments Some of these
developments s u h as the Soviet
preference and capability for short. in-
tense ground wars. or the Impact of new
antitank technologies-have been Iden-
tified Others continue to be Ignored.
One such development IS the changing
character of European terrain Ur-
banIZation In Europe will profoundly
affect the validity of many of the military
and political concepts now underpinning
NATO strategy
While combat In open terrain cer-
tainly will remain the chief contingency
for NATO. the growing importance of
urbanIZation for conflict In Western
Europe IS likely to necessitate some
Significant changes In alliance planning
and force structure. The subject of
urban warfare is unpleasant. None-
theless. failure to conSider the im-
plications of the present-day urban
terrain In Europe could lead to the sort
of major problems which occur when
strategists fall to appreciate geography's
Important Influence on military out-
The terrain of Western Europe is
dominated by cities that have sprawled
outward and converged, becoming ma-
Jor obstacles to the free movement of
military forces. But cities are
strategically important not just because
their continued growth threatens to
engulf open areas, but because they are
communications, economic and pop-
ulation centers. They also are the
political nerve centers of the developed
nations, and, since all military actions
are directed toward political goals, they
will be drawn Into political and military
conflict. Greater urbanIZation will only
Increase the tendency for military forces
to find themselves located in cities.
Almost all scenarios of European
conflict assume that war will occur in
the vacant rolling terrain of the northern
plain of West Germany. Many politically
sensitive questions can be avoided by
holding this assumption. For example,
no serious analysis of what would be
Condensed from Survival IGreat S"talnl. NovemberDecember 1976.
Military Review
involved In defending the urbanized
Rhlne-Ruhr region ever has been under-
taken. And the consequences of urban
necessitated by the
failure of NATO's "forward defense" or
by a deliberate decIsion to fall back, so
as to exploit the enormous defensive
potential of the modern
have been examined adequately In
either the political or military context.
Population protection IS another subject
usually avoided The IssueS of
evacuation and Civil defense seldom
receive attentIon except In the narrow
case of nuclear weapons targeting Yet
a conventional attack on a city can
produce great numbers of cIvilian
experience Indicates,
that more Civilians may perish alter the
battle than dUring It
These and other politically sensitive
subjects have been negJected on the
assumption that war, If It occurs, w;1I
take place on the plainS of Germany and
that all cities wllJ be by-passed. From a
political and milltmy viewpoint, thiS
assumptIon IS no longer tenable.
The Impact of Urbanization
The European city of the late 20th
Century is the historical product of
developments which started In tile
Middle Ages. Each era has left ItS mark,
generally in the form of spreading
regions and rings developing around
those of the prevIous era. The medieval
period contributed the old Inner quarters
With their twisting, Irregular street
pattern. Surrounding these aie
reSidential and commercial areas that
may be termed Renaissance-Baroque.
Paul Bracken is a member of the
research staff at the Hudson In-
stitute. New York.
October 1977
Here, rectangular blocks tended to
develop in regular street patterns;
bulldll1gs were set close together In
what the US Army field manual for
urban warfare describes as block-type
constructIOn Inner courtyards are
sometimes found. and building fronts
are set close to the street curbs, In-
dustrial laneS generally are located
beSide or around this section, This type
of area most often became the site of
military operations on the
Front dUring World War II
Finally, In the most recent zone,
conslstll1g largely of post-1945
reSidential apartment buildings, are the
areas that have stimulated the growth
of the very large conurbations in
Europe. The spatial layout of these
areas tends to be very open, With
buildings set far back from the streets
and other buildings, and they also
contall1 one- or two family dwellings.
These areas. With their low population
densIties, correspond to American sub-
urban zones One of their more In-
teresting characteristics IS the tendency
to converge WIth s',mdar zoneS that have
developed from entirely different Cities
and, In some cases, even different
countrIes In a future war In Europe,
such suburban zones probably would
provide attracllve targets and so would
become major arenas for combat.
HaVing well-developed road networks,
they would offer invadll1g forces
mobility and at the same time
protection, both physical and psy-
chological (sll1ce defenders might be
reluctant to damage their own cities).
While NATO forces would be hampered
by a heavy flow of refugees cloQOll1g the
roads as they fled before a Pact ad-
The greatest problems arise when it
is realized that an entire country can
become urbanized in the sense that
cities become tile dominant features of
tile terrain. Tilis may happen long
before a given percentage of its pop-
ulation lives "m cities of a certain size
(about 70 percent of the West German
population currently lives In urban
areas), for It is not just tile numbers
living in large conurbations which make
urban areas Important but an
agglomeration of factors, includmg the
spatial distribution of small villages, the
location of builtup areas in relation to
forests and rivers and the potential for
exploiting urban terrain as part of some
overall military plan.
It may clarify these pOints If we look
at the problem of small towns. A typical
e f e n ~ l v e position for a NATO armored
brigade oQ the East German border
contams about B5 villages and has a
defensive front of some 25 kilometers
The villages and forests would comprise
nearly 60 percent of the available
terrain, and-because of their spatial
distribution and the domination of roads
and open avenues of approach through
the sector-Warsaw Pact forces at-
tackmg tanks would be unable to by-
pass one Village Without almost Im-
mediately runnmg mto another
However, offiCial thmklng on thiS
subject Seems to accept Implicitly the
proposition that attackmg units would
by-pass all Villages and towns. ThiS
makes for convenient analySIS because
most defenSive tactics are formulated m
terms of open areas Also, estimates of
the collateral damage and CIVilian
casualties caused by an early, forward-
area use of tactical nuclear weapons
can be minimized by assummg that the
warheads are neatly placed between the
viliages-a technique which IS attractive
because It does not raise sensitive
political Issues. As a mathematical
technique, it IS logically correct, but it
not only fails to take account of the
enemy's practical need to proceed
through villages, but, also, It neglects
the possibility of his intentionally using
"urban hugging tactics" in order to
minimize his vulnerability to NATO
nuclear strikes
Yet greater problems appear when
the spread of large urban regions is
taken into account. In the developed
nations, the area of cities has been
growing at two to three times the rate of
population mcrease. And, since area is
more Important than populatIOn as far
as military operations are concerned,
there IS an ever greater chance that
armies will be operating in urban (or
suburban) terrain-particularly when
they must spread themselves over large
areas In order to reduce their
vulnerability to either tactical nuclear
weapons or conventional precision
gUided munitions (PGMs). The largest
urban regions are in the Federal
Republic Rhlne-Ruhr, Rhme-Mam,
Hamburg, Stuttgart, Rhme-Neckar,
MUnich, Hanover, Nuremberg, Bremen,
and SaarbrUcken-V5Ikllngen.
Of these, the Rhine-Ruhr conur-
bation IS especially Interesting because
It IS converging With the large urbanized
Dutch Randstad. When this con--
vergence occurs (sometime In the
1980s, Dutch geographers forecast).
they will form a single gigantiC urban
barrier 300 kilometers long, stretching
down the Rhine from Bonn to the Hook
of Holland. Strategically speaking, this
would block traditional avenues of ap-
proach A great envelopment plan, like
Schlleffen's in World War I or
Eisenhower's In World War II, would
search In vam for an opening in thiS
solid urban wall.
Hamburg, Hanover and Kassel are of
special importance because of their
location in the forward border area of
West Germany While the total pop-
ulation of these and other forward-area
cities is important, it by no means
reveals the more interesting features of
Military Review

Gromngen.; Oldenburg _
I eBrpmC!f)
<. Celie
DUTCH -'I 0 H,no,"' \
RANOSTAOEnS<hOdeJ .... " " OBU<kObU,qOS"'T""<C'
...... __ rMunster -..,. Bu:)lefc!d i ..... '
" 14tE' _ RUHR Gottlngcn)
... " ......
OUssel dar! - l.. 'I'
-. .Colognu
.. -.1 .Bonn /,.
.Saarbrucken Nurernbprq
Urban concentrations, 1980s
.. Areas of further urban spread
urban growth. Forp.casts of the direction
of urban sprawl (primarily of the low-
denSity, suburban variety) show that
Hamburg will expand greatly in area as
development follows the major roads
leading out of the city and may converge
with Luneburg,
cities, such as Celie, MUnster, Verden
and Kassel, also are expected to grow In
both population and area
Hanover, in the British border
defense zone, IS growing along the E-8
aulobahh toward Brunswick in the east
and Buckeburg In the west. Smaller
October 1977
In sharp contrast to the more north-
south growth of urban areas around the
Rhine, expansion in the northeast part
of the Federal Republic will be In an
east-west direction, It will, therefore,
not congeal Into a great urban barrier,
impossible to by-pass, but will parallel
what is generally seen as the likely aXIs
of a mam Warsaw Pact attack, thereby
offering the Pact the possibility of urban
humJl!lg tactics on a major scale
Other features of urbanization are
potentl<llly of military, and
hence political, Hl1portance FIrst 1rr'lOI19
thel11 IS lile physical shrllll<lng of open
areas SUitable tor nrrnored combat
Wilde not a larfJ0-sccl!u process, It
graduZilly bp.conws fllorp
each year (lnd III tlw <Hoa,
amounts to a of ti)(' n1ElIli
east-west channels through whIch
massed armored forces can be sent
Secondly, as a corollury to the urban
IlllgrEl,tlon that h(l5 taken place, 'there
has bean a gr;:)(hJ(ll dpPOPlIliltlon of the
rllral countrysld(' At the Sfllne t11118,
government reforestation programs
have IncrP(1sprl fOTPsted ureus by about
a 8 percent year whil{! ilrea
covered by rOilds has been Increasing by
about 1 nercent per year Both these
trends the tendency for armies
to be rotldboLJnd an especl811y IIn-
portllnt conslderfltlon, given the recent
Warsaw Pact emphasIs on wheeled
UrbanizatIOn and NATO Doctrine
WIlliu off,c,ai documents do make
some reference to urbanizatIOn, there
are almost no NATO statements on the
likely effects of deploYing nuclear or
advanced conventional weapons In an
urban context A great deal of thought
has been given to weapon changes,
relatively little to urbanization, and Vir-
tually none to the interaction of the two
However, It IS stili interesting to ex-
amine the stated views of the United
States and West Germany, and also
those of the Soviet Union, on ur-
banization In Europe.
One of the more recent and more
Important of the many Official
documents expressing US policy toward
the defense of Westen Europe IS the
1975 report by the of defense
10 the Congr"ss on the theater nuclear
force posture In Europe It IS not unlil
late In the document that mention IS
made of cities. and even then the
subject of urban areCiS never actually
arises as IS only that diS-
CUSSions of "collateral damage" are
mild!! expl,cll Tile subJecl of ur-
blnllilt!On and Its Impllcatlons IS totally
(lvolciecl Ii would seem Inconceivable
that a trlctlc<'ll nuclear weapons posture
could be developed or modernized
Without consldermg the vast Increase in
Ihe 51'" of Europe's urban areas though
there are, of course, some exn1anations
for It
RaiSing the Issue of urban warfare IS
a delicate undertakmg because It
stllllillates doubts about NATO doctrine.
To put It Simply, can anyone take
seriously a deterrent which calls for
laying down several thousand nuclear
woapons on the most urbanized terrain
In the world' If thiS deterrent IS
questioned -- as It IS being,
increaSingly-NATO must fall back on
conver:1tlonal options But conventional
war IS likely to be only slightly more
attractive The simultaneous Increases
In firepower, mobility and urbanization
that have taken place Since Wo, Id War II
will make a conventional war In Europe
enormously destructive so that diS-
cussion of thiS Issue between the
United States and ItS allies would be a
very senSitive business to say the least
A bureaucratic factor also suppresses
conSideration of urban warfare: The US
Army is Infatuated with the "plainS of
Germany," and thiS has led to the
development of equipment, weapons
and tactics deSigned for a Patton-style
war of maneuver With combat being
conducted at a range of several
thousand meters,
From ItS Inception, West German
Military Review
military strate9Y l1as been based on
forward defense, And It IS no cOin-
cidence tl1at tile forward area IS fartl1est
frOIll tile country's urban industrial
regions As stated In tile 1976 German
Wl1lte Paper on Defense, tile desire for
forward defense rests on the neeci to
preserve from destructIon the country
whose defense IS at Issue Urban areas
and suburban sprawl, therefore, are not
conSidered merely as additional military
terram features, rather, there IS an
understandable tendency to see them as
vital cent-.ers which must be protected
and preserved from destruction
The Soviet View
How does the other actor 111
European affaIrs view urban sprawl In
Centreli Europe' Wrltlllg about army
operations In Europe In 1971, Malor
General A K Sllovkolovlcll said
Under present-day conditions,
com"at actioll ill A c/ly will be a frequellt
occurrence There are one or two large
cilles all all average for every 200-300
square kilometres TIns Ineans that in
the course of offenSIve operatIons
troops will have to fight to seize a city
every 40-60 ktlometres As a rule, Cities
are located on Important axes In regIons
rtch 111 natural resources They play an
Important role In the economIC and
political Itfe of a country Consequelllly,
cilles will have great military Impor-
tance In any future war the imperialIst
might unleash.
The difference in thinking between
thiS statement and that In the German
White Paper IS strlkmg While the latter
deSCribes urban centers as sensitive
areas and comments that combat must
occur in the forward area of the country,
as far as pOSSible from the densely
populated areas, the Soviet view is that
cities are important because of their
polll1cal and economic influence and'
October 1977
tl1at offenSive combat against them will
be frequent.
Whether or not the Warsaw Pact
consciously used urban hugging
as a penetration tactiC, their use of the
West German roael network would make
combat In urbim areas very likely If Pact
forces (lid make headway Into West
Ger!ll811 cities III FI conventional attack,
then NATO political 'authorities would
face the difficult cleclslon of whether to
order conventional counterattacks to,
reg"l11 them Besides being unlikely,
given NATO's InferiOrity In m'anflower,
such counterattacks raise the specter of
Intense combat In a city full of civilians
An alWrnatlve would be for NATO to
LISP. wenpons ag(JInst CItIes so
as to demonstrate that Soviet clty-
huggln() taCtics would not be tolerated
While thiS might be pOSSible, It IS most
Improbable tl1at any West German
government would allow It. The Soviet
Union would stili retain ItS own tactical
nllclenr option so that, even if We,st
Gerrnany were to engage in nuclear
self-mutilation, It would stili not
necessarily be free from further city
attacks (perhaps nuclear) by the
Warsaw Pact
New Technologies
Tllus, urban sprawl and the ex-
pansion of forests offer the Warsaw
Pact the chance of redUCing ItS own
vulnerability and Simultaneously com-
plicating the task of the defense A
massive conventional attack, based In
part on City-hugging tactics but not
necessarily excluding traditional combat
In open areas, could be termed the
NATO "nightmare scenario,"
Some observers argue that the
Warsaw Pact would avoid urban
operations because they would slow the
speed of advance, but this must be
weighed against the probability that it
would need to make its advance along
the road network that the CIties control.
In addition, the great increase In the
lethality of conventional weapons, par-
ticularly PGMs ,and antitank missiles,
makes the search for cover Increasingly
Important-and It should be
remembered that virtually all these new
weapons are designed to be used In
open areas As General Shovkolovlch
POints out
. condItIOns prevaJ!mg In a city
hamper the employment of antitank
weapons and "mit their sector and
range of fire and, consequent/v. the lime
dUfing which they can fire at en.emy
tanks .Under these conditIOns grenade
launchers, antitank grenades, and other
close cornbat weapons play an IIn-
port ant role
Recent developments In PGMs
generally make the long-range
destruction of targets much eaSier, but.
at closer ranges, they are untested and
are even likely to be inferior to older
weapons It IS true that PGMs worked
well In the latter days of the Vietnam
confllc!, but they were used against
large fixed Installations whose locations
were precisely known from years of
reconnaissance overflights Against
mobile tactical Units, whIch, when dIS-
persed. are exceedingly difficult to
detect In cities. they will offer only
Isolated and Ilmlteci aSSistance,
No current US Army antitank
weapon can be fired from an enclosed
room Without the backblast Injuring the
operator. In addition, wire-guided
weapons like the TOW antitank missile
do not even stabilIZe In flight until they
are beyond the range at which most
urban actIOns are likely to occur, As
these more advanced weapons enter
the Inventory, they will replace older
weapons-but, In the Battle of Hue In
1968, Marine battalion commanders
had ~ scrounge all over the theater to
obtain the few remaining bazookas
which were deemed superior to the
more advanced light antitank weapon
for shootlilg through walls.
New 'technologies, therefore, could
reduce tile effectiveness of NATO forces
In Cities, thus making urban terrain
more attractive to the enemy. Advances
may seem to open up new possibilities
for the defense of open areas, but,
ironically, City-hugging tactics and ur-
ban warfare could prOVide effective
Urb-anlzatlon should spur some
rethinking of weapon design,. West
Germany, for example, already has
developed the small, short-range Arm-
brust antitank weapon, capable of being
fired from a room Without Injury to its
operator The protection of armored
forces in low-density suburban areas
also seems to be receiVing Increased
attention (there IS limited eVidence that
thiS has been a deSign consideration for
new Soviet tanks)
In the nuclear area, however, despite
recent weapon developments, It will be
very difficult to deSign a theater nuclear
force posture Whlcll will be credible in
the context of the projected urbanizatIOn
In Central Europe In the 1980s, Nuclear
weapons With low Yields and special
effects now are being discussed, and
enhanced-radiation and clean
suppressed-radiation weapons and low-
Yield "mini-nukes" may create some
new targeting options However, these
Will have little relevance for a future
European war because an attacker
could counter fleXible nuclear use by
hugging the roads and urban COrridors,
presenting the defense with the
dilemma of whether or not to destroy
what 11 was seeking to save By using
urban areas for protection, Warsaw Pact
forces could also reduce their
vulnerability to speCial-effect tactical
nuclear weapons and long-rang'e con-
Military Review
ventional weapons even if they were
used by the defense.
There IS one possible method of
defense against such a city-hugging
Warsaw Pact attack that appears to
aVOid the dlfflcul1ies associated With the
first use of nuclear weapons. If NATO
were to explOit the convenllonal defense
potential of cities, It would create, in
effect, a super Maglnot line, echeloned
In depth across Western Europe, which
would constitute the largest man-made
military fortificatIOn In history As with
all schemes of fortified defense, large
mobile reserves would be essential. In
addition to the use of the suburban and
urban zones of Europe as a gigantic
antitank barrier Forces would have to
be trained and equipped to fight In
cities, and CIVilian evacuallon plans
would have to be given greater
The alternative IS 10 accept the
political Implications of urban sprawl
which means that Western Europe Will
come to be seen as a region in-
creasingly difficult to defend Ur-
banlZalion will create Increased political
pressure by West Germany for more
forward deployment In the short term,
this would minimiZe the Immediate risk
of collateral damage In the event of war
and, perhaps more Importantly, remove
some peacetime perceptions of the risks
of urban warfare
But, In the long term, emphaSIS on
forward defense will create severe
strains Within the alliance because of ItS
two obvIous disadvantages First, It
resembles a NATO tripwire strategy-
and, in the current era of nuclear parity,
thiS IS not likely to be acceptable to the
United States. Second, its success
depends ultimately on what lies behind
the forward forces. If there IS doubt as
to whether the areas behind the forward
zone will be defended, a seed of distrust
may be created among allied forces. The
October 1977
surest method of saving urban areas is
to declare them open cities-which
amounts to surrender-and a forward
deployed force could find itself
sandwiched between an advancing
Soviet Army and a surrendered ally.
NATO land forces are desi,gned for
'survivability and staYing power. They
have little value for sholt wars In a tiny,
constrained, linear area,
The growth of urbanization in the
NATO central region also presents com-
plicatIOns for the Warsaw Pact forces. If
NATO were seriously to exploit urban
terrain for defenSive purposes, large
armored attacks would prove ex
ceedlngly costly Technological
developments In conventional weapons,
which would oblige armored forces to
aVOid more open areas, thus could force
them Into hlghdenslty formations so
that attack frontages would shrink enor-
mously, even In suburban terrain
However, If the Warsaw Pact believed
that NATO would not defend ItS urban
areas for fear of massive collateral
damage, then Pact strategy could exploit
thiS to NATO's disadvantage. If thiS
happened, the realization that even a
conventional war on West German soil
would be enormously destructive could
lead the Bonn Government to conSider
alternative' political arrangements. Ac-
commodation With the Soviet Union .IS
one pOSSibility. development of a West
German minimum nuclear deterrent
Western governments should ex-
amine these pOSSibilities In detail before
proposing Improvements In NATO con-
ventlOnal or nuclear weapons and
organIZation If these "Improvements"
mean that NATO's defensive options are
reduced to either surrender or the
destruction of its cities, then it is not
Inconceivable that West Germany will
search for alternative political solutions
to its security problem. , ~ I
to Bite
Real Bullet
Edward Bernard Glick
--All Amcri""'l lw",,1 b:lse ill Haifa.
-American air base, and eleelrunic li,tening HtationH in the
Galilee and the Xege\'.
-A small Amel'il'an al'my garrison located almmit any-
where in brHct
-American insistence on a West Bank-Gaza Palestinian Arab
state that will accept Israel's right to exist and prosper within its
1 !'H57 border:-;.
-American support for a Grealer .Ienlsalem that will be phys-
and administrativel"' undi\'ided but pulitically and religiously
-A de"l" binding'. public, written, formal American declaration
in treat" form, if po"ible, thai, like West nerlin, Israel is un "uur
side uf the line" 'Illd Ih"l \\'e \\'ill ilghl "n,\"on8 \\'hu crosses thllt line.
by foree.
HE elemenb of this ]Jolicy
p,lckage are presented in full
a\\'Ul'eneSS of Otll' Vietnam trauma,
the 187:1 Arab oil buycott, the inherent
po",ibility of a So\'iet-American
military confrontation, the negative
read ion within this country at the
mere stationing in the Sinai of
American technicians' to monitor the
Israeli-Egyptian disengagement ac-
curds, the depressing and distracting
state of olll' ecunomy and the inward-
looking, neo-isolationist mood of
man)' today. They are
pre,;ented in an e/fort to break the
bloody deadlock that We have come
Tltl' ,\ il'WS in this llttkll' :U'(' tIlt'
:Lulllol",., find do not I"ellc(,t uf
tilL' DCllllrtment (,( Dcfl'J\:>t' Hr its IlKCndl':->.
to call the Palestine problem or the
Military Review
question for almost 30
yeat':-; now,
Like every set of political sugges-
tion:-;, this one iH a mixture of facts,
timing. assumptions, risks and
presumed advantages. It begins with
what I believe are the positions of
the parties concemed.
Moderate Arabs want an Israeli
return to the borders and
atl'eptalll'e of the ereatioll of a sov-
ereign Arab entity_
Moderate Israelis, who include most
of the senior oflicer corps, have no
wh.;h for a long occupation or annexa-
tion of more than a million Arabs.
Because of their very high birth
rate; the laller would, ill time, peace-
full;' but permanently destroy the
yery of Zionism. which is a
.Jewish majority in a Jewish Israel.
nut moderate Israelis, like their more
uBcompl'ornh-ing countrymen. re-
member that the old pre-Six-Day
War frontiers brought them neither
peace 1101' :-;eclll'ity in the two decades
tha t they served as the de facto
frontiers. This cannot be allowed
to happen again, and America has
no right to put Israel in a position
"'here it might happen again.
Jews wHnt an Israel
without Palestine. Extreme Arabs
want a Palestine "'ithout Israel. The
Russians want influence and power
in the area. Yet they probably will
accept whatever arrangements the
Israelis and Arabs accept even as
the;' try to extract maximum credit
for them. And the Americans cer-
tainly would accept the arrangements,
especially if we were the midwives
and felt they would lead to stability
and peace.
The risks and advantages of the
suggestions flow from their assump-
October 1977
tions. First, America has no naval
and air bases Oil the southet'll shores
of the Mediterranean. How long We
will be able to get or keep them on
the northern shores, in places like
Portugal. Spain, Italy, Greece and
Turkey, is open to question. The same
is true for the electronic listening
stations in Turkey that now monitor
the Soviet Union. Yet it is not
questionable that Amerieali credi-
bility abroad, badly shaken since
Vietnam and Watergate,
naval and ail' facilities,
as \Yell as monitoring in
the region.
Second, all unequivocal puiJlic
American commitment to Israel's
secure survival, solidly backed by the
Htationing of American servicemen
Ed ICard Benw)'d Glick is profes-
SO)' and graduate chairman of po-
litical science at Temple University
in Philadelphia, PA. He received a
B.A. in history'from Brooklyn Col-
lege of the City Uni1'C1"sity of Nell"
York and an M.A. in Latin Ameri-
C((lI ('c01wmic histo1'lj and a Ph.D.
in political science from Ihe UlIi-
versity of Florida. He is the author
of several books, including Latin
America and the Palestine Prob-
lem and Between Israel and Death.
on Israeli soil would prevent either
the 01' the 'Israelis from start-
ing a new war. These servicemen
would not be unarmed United Na-
tions ol."ervers" They would be the
armed forces of a superpower, ancI
the Al'ulm, Israelis and Russians
would think many times before they
would firc upon sUl'h forces.
what I propose would let
the ,Russians know beforehand
e.met/y where America stands, and
how far we are willing to go, in
regard to Israel. Knowing this, they
will draw the propel' Leninist
If after probing you find
hard steel instead of soft flesh, you
pull back allli adjust. The Arabs will
be compelled to make the same
adjustment. E"en anothel' oil boycott
is unlikely, for, if the Americans
actually bring about significant
ISI'aeIi withdrawals and an independ-
ent Arab Palestine, the Saudis
would not join such a boycott. With-
out them, it!-; sllccess is impossible.
As for the Israelis, their soldiers
and their statesmen know that while
they can still win their wars, they
cannot pay for them anymore-not
in money, 110t in weapons, not in lives.
The age of expensive electronic
warfare has taken care of that. They
will return to some form of the 1967
boundaries. They will, in time,
accept a Palestinian Arab state to
their east, just as they were willing
to accept one on a quid pro quo basis
in 1947. But they will accept it only
if, like the Japanese, they are con-
vinced that they are safe and secure
under an American military umbrella
that will not collapse at the first
sign of rain.
This brings us to the Americans.
We are the keystone in this whole
structure. If we are really serious
about our often-stated fears of
another Arab-Israel war, if we really
wan t permanent peace between the
,Jews and the Arabs, if we really
want to avoid a confrontation of
arms with the RusHians, then para-
doxically we shall have to put our
military musele where our political
mouth is.
Somehow, and SOOH, we shall have
rid ourselves of the Great American
Hangup that was and is Vietnam.
Because we fell into a stupid adven-
ture in the Far East, it does not
automatically follow that an Amel'ican
military involvement in the Middle
East may never be justified or bene-
ficial. A global dropout can be worse
[han a world policeman. A military
presence can as em:;ily prevent a
\\'al' as start one.
Every American President from
IIarry Truman to Gel'llld Ford has
urged the Arabs and particularly
the Israelis to "take risks for peace."
They h" ve asked them to forget
their past differences and be as
daring between their wars as they
have been during them. But when
will lI'e take risks for peace? When
will lI'e stop being the prisoners
of our past, a past that has clouded
our thinking and immobilized our
actions with regard to many post-
and iS811es?
If we do not break with this part
of our background, if we do not take
our share of real risks for real
peace, a new Arab-Israel-American-
Soviet war will surely come, When
it does, it will be infinitely more
dangerous than anything suggested
Military Review
Improvhi'g NATO
The \
HE state of NATO's defense posture
continues to be the subject of con-
siderable debate among military experts
and politicians in the United States and
Europe. The debate has focused on the
need for action in two distinct though
interrelated spheres-the military/in-
dustrial and the political/institutional.
Action In the military/industrial sphere
could encompass decisions ranging
from the procurement of common or
interchangeable small arms am-
munition. to joint manufacture and
procurement of major land, naval and
aviation units, to more closely coor-
dinated deployment policies. Action in
the political/institutional sphere could
involve creation of an institutional
framework for making and im-
plementing decisions to rationalize
NATO's posture, however wide-ranging
or restricted those decisions might be.
This article focuses on political and
institutional questions that relate. to
further attempts at "ratlonalizatlon,"1
specifically on those questions that
affect the framework of Intra-European
cooperation among our NATO allies.
Organizing NATO Defenses Today:
The Agenda for Improvements
Recent pronouncements by Senators
Sam Nunn (Democrat-Georgia) and
Dewey Bartlett (Republican-Oklahoma)
upon their return from an inspection
tour of Europe's forward defenses have
highlighted once again the air of un-
reality that surrounds present NATO
As posited by Senator Nunn in a
speech before the New York Militia
Association, six major areas of inade-
quacy focus both on the role of our
troops and on those of our European
allies. These six areas are:
Copyright 1977 by Dov S. Zakheim.
October 1977
NA TO assumptions about the
likely duration of a European war and
about the length of warning time
available to the allies before its out-
break. Present planning assumes a
warning time and a pe'riod of conflict,
both considerably longer than that
which Soviet doctrine and deployment
now seem to predicate.
Present NATO plans. They assume
a trade of land for time or r e t r e t ~ Into
Germany followed by recoupment and
counterattack. Insufficient time may be
available for the trade, or the
recoupment, Or the counterattack.
Firepower. NATO troops are shon
on firepower. Stockpiles, ammunition
and antitank weapons all must be in-
. II
Dov S. Zakheim is an associate
analyst, National Security and Inter-
national Affairs Division, Con-
gressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC. He received a B.A.
from Columbia University and a Ph.D.
from Oxford University He has
served as assistant to the managing
director, International Credit Bank
Geneva (London Branch), London,
The views expressed in this article
are the author's. The Congressional
Budget Office bears no responsibility
for the contents of this article or the
opiniqns of the author.
Troop disposition NATO is
weakest along the North German Plain
where an" attack is most likely and
strongest in the south where terrain
favors defensive forces.
US combat/support ratios. The
United States could shift more of its
European-based personnel from support
to combat units, thereby implicitly
placing a still greater share of the
support requirement upon the European
Interoperabtlity 01 arms and
equipment. A gredter emphasis on stand-
ardizatIOn could lower the excessive
economic costs of duplication.'
Few, if any, of these areas have not
been covered several times before.
Indeed, they have been the subjects of
major and somewhat controversial
studies by Richard Lawrence and
Jeffrey Record for the Brookings In-
stitutIOn and by Steven Canby in a
recent Adelphi Paper.
However, in
order to move in the directions proposed
by either of these studies, or indeed to
facilitate other possible changes in
NATO's present posture, the need is for
joint political as well as military and
industrial decision making among the
member NATO states. With the possible
exception of the North Atlantic Council,
the political structures that can facilitate
these changes generally can be divided
Into those directly linked to the
American decisionmaking process and
those more relevant to the concerns of
our European allies.
Both sets of structures will have to
come into play if NATO's posture is to
be enhanced Significantly. To be sure,
Senator Nunn's immediate concerns,
which prompted his remarks, call for
American solutions to American force
problems. They lie within the capability
of the American decisi0,nmaking ap-
paratus. However, standardization,
firepower, combat/support ratios,
Military Review
reliance on mobilization as a planning
factor and force disposition are also
European problems. The Institutional
apparatus for dealing with these
problems -differs In nature from that
which grapples with American force
questions. This article examines the
European institutional apparatus in light
of the problems which Senator Nunn
and others have highlighted and which
are common In varying degrees to
America and its allies It then offers a
set of proposals for translating what has
been primarily a process of issue con-
Sideration Into one that would allow for
decision making and Implementation
NATO Defense-The European Aspect
of the Nunn Critique
A special "European" aspect to the
Nunn critique derives dire6tlY from the
Achilles heel of Europe's contribution to
allied defenses: the inability of the
various European member states of
NATO to speak, plan and act with one
voice in defense matters. It has been
commonplace to argue that allied
fragmentation has created the vacuum
that has enhal'lced US domination of
allied planning and strategy for a NATO
war. That vacuum continues to exist
today. The allies generally do not initiate
assessments of the future threat or the
appropriate response to it. As one Eu-
ropean parliamentarian testified before
a special subcommittee hearing of the
Senate Armed Services Committee in
March 1976:
wi (tend) . .. to go to the United
States and buy our threat assessment.
The United States is determining what
types of threats we have in Europe
because they have the lead in
developing all kinds of weapons systems
which are going to be dominant in the
Clearly, according to this view, a'
October 1977
stronger European program of weapons
development, one which could be ob-
1ained best through stronger
cooperation among the member NATO
states, could foster an enhanced Eu-
ropean contribution to Western defense
planning. The relative absence of that
, contribution has not, however, been the
only ramification of Western European
The relentless pursuit of individual
national programs of arms manufacture
and procurement has left Europe with a
set of armies whose weapons and
training can be interchanged only with
the utmost ddflculty. Lack of
specialization has resulted from each
state's efforts to preserve an all-purpose
force a nd, in turn, has brought about
shortages in concentrated firepower,
precision guided munitions (particularly
of the antitank vanety) and dedicated
combat manpower.
The absence of a coherent European
policy for standardizing armaments
probably has attracted the most notice
in recent years. Estimates of the waste
resulting from thiS absence vary and are
the subject of considerable discussion.
But there seems to. be general
agreement that the losses involved can
be measured annually in billions of
dollars.' The losses in terms of military
effectiveness are equally if not more
difficult to measure. Nevertheless, they
may be considerable; one widely quoted
estimate posits that "we are losing at
least 30 percent and in some areas 50
percent of our capability due to the lack
of standardization."6
The allies also have continued to
foster independent military programs
based on conceptions of doctrine,
strategy and tactics that hardly are
uniform throughout the alliance. As a
result, serious inconsistencies exist
among national allocations of troops to
support versus combat roles. Ad-
ditionally, troop deployments are not
always consistent with the need to
defend in areas that would be the most
likely locale for an enemy attack. NATO
is plagued by deployments that might
bring about only confusion in the event
of an enemy attack across the German
Fmally, European political and
military disunity has fostered the allies'
preference for the mObilization-oriented
scenario that dominates NATO
planning. Allied reluctance to devote a
greater portion of national income to
defense, and the concomitant
sociological impulse that forces. the
military into a low profile in most
Western European states, has helped to
fashion NATO's inordinate reliance
upon mobilization ilS a means of
bringmg allied defens'es to bear against
the Soviet Union. Mobilization and the
harnessing of peacetime industries to a
wartime effort both take time. They fit
perfectly, however, with a strategy that
assumes that lengthy mobilization times
will be available and that war will drag
on long enough for European resources
to playa significant part in its outcome.
However, there is little indication that
the Soviet Union is planning a war of
this kind. On the contrary, its doctrine
and force deployment run counter to the
wishes of those who would rather
downplay the role and needs of military
establishments except where crisis
manifestly is leading to war. In the short
war that the Soviets propose to fight.
and most likely will fight. allied
mobilization schemes simply will
become irrelevant.
Were there a truly unified European
approach to defense questions,
mobilizing the resources neoessary to
defend Western Europe g i ~ s t attack
probably would be easier. Governments
could seek in unison to stir an apathetic
European public by forcefully and
coherently presenting the threat in its
true light-a huge force massed along
the heart of Germany, poised for a
IIghtnm\j Strike that, if not stopped,
might reach quickly beyond the Rhine.
Governments also could reinforce each
other's demands on the taxpayer for
defense funding which, in any event,
might not grow to excessive proportions.
Rationalization of national force mis-
sions, of planning, of training. and of
infrastructure, as well as standard-
Ization of armaments, are likely to
provide long-term savings. These
savings then might be reapplied to meet
additional defense requirements
without imposing severe burdens on
other parts of governmental budgets or
on the taxpayer. Larger standing forces
might be fielded; dependence on
mobilIZation could be reduced.
European International Institutions:
Litlie Impact on Defense Matters
Since the end of World War II, a
number of organizational devices have
been created to cope with the persistent
reality of a divided Europe. The earliest
of these was the Brussels Treaty
Organization (BTO), founded under the
provisions of the March 1948 8russels
Treaty. The treaty itself was the out-
growth of a series of earlier agreements
between Britain, France and Benelux.
Initially aimed at preventing the
resurgence of a militaristic Germany,
BTO quickly came to focus upon
possible Soviet aggression against
Western Europe. The BTO was not a
unifying force in any true sense,
however. It was more the embodiment
of the allied desire for interstate
cooperation in defense matters rather
than a force that actually engendered
cooperation in all but the most super-
ficial way. Creation of the North Atlantic
Treaty Orgal)ization in 1951, as an
Military Review
outgrowth of the 1949 North Atlantic
Treaty, came to overshadow the BTO. In
turn, European military establishments,
and their priorities and planning, were
eclipsed by that of the United States.
European efforts at Significant military
integration. supplementing the in-
tegrated military command structure
which NATO provided for, came to an
end with the collapse of the European
Defense Community (EDC) in August
1954. Its successor. the Western Eu-
ropean Union (WEU), created but three
months later that year, had little military
sig ificance outside the NATO
fra ework. It was, instead, a vehicle for
as uring West German membership of
NA O. To be sure, it Incorporated a
Stan ing Armaments Committee to
foster of European
weaponry and an Agency for the Control
of Armaments to keep track of the
German rearmament effort. However.
both units played only a peripheral role
in allied military affairs The European
allies turned to economic integration
and culminated their efforts with the
creation of the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in
195B, both of which merged with the
older European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) in 1967. Defense was
specifically excluded from the purview
of these three organIZations.
The growth of intra-Western Eu-
ropean cooperation in the 1960s,
however uneven it may have been, did
spur reconsideration of combining Eu-
ropean efforts in the defense sphere.
France's gradual disengagement from
the NATO integrated military
framework, though significantly not
from the Atlantic Alliance, in the mid-
1960s, and its increaSingly bitter war of
words (and gold reserves) with the
United States added a sharp dimension
to these debates. Arguments were
October 1971
heard in favor of a separate European
nuclear force, in favor of a mUltilateral
nuclear force, In favor of an Atlantic
nuclear force. It was suggested that a
separate European defense posture
rapidly would become a vehicle for
French exclusion of the United States
from Europe. Alternately, it sometimes
was argued that it. would provide an.
excuse for American withdrawal from
Europe. On the other hand, the
arguments In of integrating the
European defense effort stressed
America's interest in lowering the cost
of its Involvement and in greater
burden-sharing on the part of the Eu-
ropean allies. A more Gaullist-oriented
perspective in favor of such integration
pointed to combined European
defense. even without the United
States, as the logical outgrowth of the
European Community.
The debates of the late 1960s were
noteworthy for their prolixity and
staleness. They probably did contribute
to the one significant defense-related
institutional initiative that took place
during that decade-creation of the
Eurogroup. This grouping within NATO,
consisting of the European allies, came
about as a result of a 1968 initiative by
then British Defense Minister Denis
Healey. It was hailed as a first step
toward the definition of a true European
defense identity, as the forerunner of an
equal partnership within NATO. The
Eurogroup had one significant short-
coming, however. It did not include one
of Western Europ!j's leading land
powers, France. by the mid-
1970s, France had the role of
Western Europe's leading sea power as
well. But it never joined the Eurogroup,
and its absence was felt keenly by the
other European allies
Within its limitations, the Eurogroup
has provided some small initiatives in
matters such as increasing Western
Europe's firepower in NATO and
promoting standardization of arms and
equipment. But its accomplishments
have fallen short of the task at hand and
have not been augmented significantly
as a result of the work of other
organizations. Countless WEU, NATO
and national Defense Ministry studies
have been makmg the same obser-
vations and criticisms for more than a
decade. Yet Europe clearly cannot cope
with its military shortcomings if its
national entities continue to pursue
mdependent paths
Some degree of multinational
cooperation IS Imperative. Sqme
organizational structure must eXist as a
locus for that cooperation. Present
organizational structures clearly have
not provided that locus. Is a new
organization necessary, or can one or
more of those that now play so minor a
part in European affairs be
reconstructed to fill the organizational
gap that IS one of the many obstacles to
European defense cooperation? The
latter solution is by far the more prac-
Are New Institutions the Answer?
Europe clearly is the region that has
been the most prolific at spawning
international and supranational
organizations. ECSC, EEC, Euratom,
(Organization for European Economic
Cooperation), OECD (Organization for
Economic Cooperallon and
Development). ELDO (European
Launcher Development Organization)-
all are fundamentally European or
European-oriented groups. Europe
boasts no less than four regional
parliaments-the Nordic Assembly, the
Counpl of Europe Assembly, the WEU
Assembly and the European
Parliament-in addition to holding the
overwhelming majority of seats in a
fifth-the North Atlantic Assembly. All
these organizations and parliaments
have not brought about the unity which
they have been meant to foster" though
some clearly have affected the con-
IInent's economic fortunes. Yet
whether, in the cluttered organizational
atmosphere that already exists in
Europe, a new defense organization is
what is needed IS questionable. Defense
is the most sensitive of all national
issues because defense is what ensures
continued national survival. It evokes
the strongest emotions but also involves
great expenditures and critical political
deCISions that Influence those expend-
HUrDS It IS an area so complex that it
frequently strains the resources of even
the latger, more powerful states. How
would a new organization fare if it
sought to tackle the defense problems of
not one but more than 10 independent
states? To whom would it be account-
able? How would its deCisions be
made? How would its bureaucracy
relate to armaments producers, to
generals, to member governments, to
allies? Clearly, relationships would, or
rather could, develop with time. After
several years, the new organization
would find its place in the international
arena. The problem, however, is that
several years may be too long and that
failure would be disastrous. The Atlantic
Alliance faces immediate problems and
a shortfall of resources available for
defense. The first result of creating a
new bureaucracy, however, would be its
own growth and the concomitant waste
of resources on so-called "ad-
ministrative" functions that would con-
tribute not at all to the solution of the
problems it confronted. No bureaucracy
is immune to waste, but new
bureaucracies are notorious for ex-
ponential growth in the formative years.
Wasted energies, wasted resources-is
Military Review
there no other way to cope with Eu-
rope's organizational needs in the
defense field?
A European Procurement Agency
Yet a new agency is what the Eu-
ropeans now seek to create. On
5 November 1975, the ministers of the
NATO Eurogroup-which does not In-
clude Portugal, Iceland and, most
significantly, France-proposed the
creation of a European Defense
Procurement Secretariat. They also
commissioned a study into the tasks
which a defense procurement
organization might undertake. These
actions highlight the Eur.opean
penchant for organization building The
agency was proposed now, while Its
tasks were to be determined later. What
if a procurement secretariat was found
not appropriate to Europe's needs or
could not win French cooperation? If it
already had been created, it would
remain alive, with headquarters in some
European capital (maybe Strasbourg),
and a staff producing reports WhiCh, like
WEU's, might be first class but, like
WEU's, would have no influence on the
real course of European policy.
A year after the Eurogroup's an-
nouncement, the problems of
rationalization and standardization seem
only sllghtly'nearer solution. France has
joined the "European Program Group"
which is the short-term organization
meant to facilitate standardization of
armaments production and export of
equipment to the United States.
However, in practice, French
cooperation has not been defined fully.
Questions remain about the place of
this body, or of any more far-reaChing
organization, in the European in-
stitutional framework of states, inter-
national bodies and interest groups.
How will it go about winning the
October 1977
cooperation of a group of independent;
independently minded states to pool
their resources for common armaments
in the face of the overwhelming in-
dustrial dominance of US industry? How
will it respond to the differing needs, or
perceived differing needs: of national
commanders? How will it adjudicate
between firms bidding for contracts?
How will it set an order of priorities for
production requirements? When will it
manage to do all of these things? Will
the SOViet Union obligingly wait while
NATO sorts out its problems?
Is the European Community the Answer?
Clearly, if the rationalization of NATO
defenses is an immediate priority, steps
must be taken to ensure that time and
resources are not lost in the exerCise of
institution building. Both can be saved if
an institution that already exists could
take on additional responsibilities. The
European Community comes quickly to
mind Frequently described as an em-
bryonic European government, the Com-
munity has been as frequently decried
as the symbol of misplaced hopes for a
European union that never will be
Nevertheless, the Community offers an
organization that counts seven full
NATO members among its nine
partners. Additionally, its bureaucracy
has decision making experience in a
number of key economic areas and has
international negotiating' experience on
a national government level in both
these areas and several others as well.
Lastly, and importantly, the Community
is recognizable to the public. Any body
that will playa serious part in European
defense planning and programing in-
evitably will have to win public con-'
fidence. The Community, at least, is one
body that the European public already
has learned to live with, albeit perhaps
Several proposals relating to a
possible Community role in defense
matters have been promulgated in
recent years; two are of particular note.
The first, aired by Lord Gladwyn at the
1'971 meetings of the WEU
parliamentary assembly. called for in-
corporation of WEU into the European
Community. The second, put forward by
Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans
in his 1975 report on the future of the
European Union. simply pointed to the
. need for Community involvement In a
variety of aspects of defense issues.
. At first glance, the Gladwyn proposal
seems particularly appealing. WEU has
never pl.ayed a really meaningful r o ~ in
the formulation of European defense
strategy and requirements. WEU was
created as a vehicle for integrating
Germany into the Atlantic Alliance. It
also was meant to monitor the growth
of German armaments and promote the
standardIZation of armaments among its
seven members-West Germany.
Britain, France, Italy and Benelux. But
WEU was quickly relegated to a
secondary position as NATO became the
focus for German military cooperation
With the allies; Germany became a
NATO member in 1955, shortly after
WEU came into being. From the mid-
1950s to the early 1960s, WEU
produced a series of reports on Eu-
ropean military issues that were notable
both for their quality and for their lack of
impact on the European scene. Then, in
the 1960-69 period, the organization
became a focus for British efforts to join
the EEC. After all, WEU's membership
included only the S'x and Britain.
However, this new WEU role had little
to do with defense. In any event, it was
certain to be short-lived since Its end
was inevitable once Britain's future
relationship with the Community was
darified. As things developed, France
pointedly refused to permit the British to
use WEU as a staging ground for
effective approaches to the EEC and for
this reason boycotted the WEU Council
meetings during 1969 and 1970. The
French only returned to the council in
mid-1970 when the issue of British
entry to the Community was shifted to a
different forum-the EEC Council of
Ministers. Thus, when Gladwyn issued
his proposal in 1971, with British entry
to the European Community a real
possibility, he was addressing an
institution-WEU-whose relevance to
the future course of European defense
politics was, at best, highly
Gladwyn's proposal was straight-"
forward and not too detailed. He argued
... there /s a strong case for now
taking over the whole WEU machine as
it is and to a certain extent merging it
with the existing EEC apparatus ..
There would be ... one Council . .. one
parliament. . one budget. 10
The enlarged Community would have
10 members (Norway was expected to
Join). They would comprise the entire
membership of WEU. France would not
object as strongly to incorporating WEU
Into the Community as it would to a
NATO-inspired device since it belonged
to both WEU and the Community.
Furthermore, though Gladwyn did not'
make the point explicitly, European
states could take some steps to plan
their own defenses without Interference
from the United States, at least in the
first instance. Ultimately, of course, the
United States would be involved closely
in any defense planning, but no one, not
even the French, could object to
American involvement in defense of a
continent for which it already provided
the ultimate nuclear umbrella.
Gladwyn's plan did have some
serious flaws, While France may have
been outside NATO, it was very much
Military Reyiew
inside the alliance. Indeed, as one
observer has pointed out, France had
. adopted an "a la carte" technique of
cooperating with those NATO in-
stitutions in which it perceived a speCial
self-interesl." But Ireland, also a Com-
munity member, was not even in the
Atlantic Alliance. Its neutrality clearly
would be threatened by incorporating
defense issues Into the Community's
purview. To be sure, a two-tier system
was pOSSible, and Gladwyn proVided for
II. However, in practice, no two-tiered
scheme eVer has been adapted perfectly
to the Institutional framework of a Eu-
ropean organization though several
have been proposed." It might be
argued that NATO now works as a two-
tiered structure-the first tier including
France, the second excluding il. But,
apart from the fact that this structure is
a product of necessity, not foresight. the
fact is that France does belong to the
alliance which underpins NATO. The
organization is not truly double-tiered In
the sense that the EEC would have to be
Since Ireland would refuse to take part
in any aspect of defense cooperation
Additional problems would arise for
Irish membership apart from the
organizational ones of which meetings
its representatives would or would not
attend. "Defense" IS not an easily dis-
tinguishable area of governmental
concern any more than "social policy"
or "monetary policy" is. It overlaps with
social policy, affecting pay and benefits
for thousands. It also affects the growth
of whole sectors of the economy. It
involves questions of monopolies and
competition, nationalized and private
industries, contracts, bankruptcies and
industrial expansion. If regulations were
passed for defense-related industries,
how could they be divorced totally from
other sect0;f0f the economy and from
other aspec s of economic activity? If
they cann be divorced, how would
October 1971
Ireland react to decisions not of its own
making-since it would not participate
in those decisions?
But the proposal Gladwyn put
forward raises a more serious question.
Must European cooperation in defense
matters be supranational? Cannot closer
transnational cooperation suffice? The
prospect of multinational control of the
French Army contribUted significantly to
the National Assembly's defeat of the
European Defense Community proposal
in 1954. A similar fear of multinational
control of armed forces prevented the
multilateral nuclear force concept from
making any headway in the 1960s. No
one would state that NATO is a Com-
plete failure. It certainly has short,
comings, but it has succeeded thus far
in its major goal-deterring Soviet
aggreSSion In Europe. Yet NATO,
perhaps the most successful
organization of ItS kind in history, is
anything but supranational. What may
be needed IS cooperation that does not
raise the spectre of supranational
control-control by a group of "faceless
bureaucrats" accountable to no one. If
this situation is causing concern with
respect to butter surpluses, can it
reasonably be expected to be tolerated
with respect to the defense of national
Objections to the essence of the
Gladwyn proposal apply equally well to
the Tindemans suggestions of
Dclcember 1975. The Tindemans report
was generally low-key, without im-
mediate grand visions of a united
Europe. In this context, the Belgian
prime minister argued that:
[While] European Union will not be
complete until it has d ~ w n up a
common defense policy . .. our States
are not at present really in a position to
determine the general policy without
which no common defense policy is
possible, and are unlikely or unable to
do so in the near future. 13
Nevertheless, 'Tindemans felt that
some progress could be made, par-
ticularly with respect to exchanges of
views and, more concretely, with
respect to cooperation in the
manufacture of armaments." Unlike
Gladwyn, Tindemans did not sketch any
Institutional framework for this
cooperation other than the Community
inStltutlOns already in existence HIs
concern rather was with broad direc-
tions of policy.
Nevertheless, Tindemans, like
Gladwyn, framed his proposals in the
context of a supranational European
body. Even in the short term, with a
"common European defense" not under
consideration, the states of Western
Europe are unlikely to relinquish to It
the absolute control over armaments
manufacture and procurement for their
own forces. After all, who would
determine armaments requirements-
the commission? If It did so, would It not
then be sensible for the commission
also to determine how these armaments
actually were used? If it did not make
this determination, then surely further
waste would ensue Since there would
be no logical connection between
miSSion requirements and armaments
production. Yet, If the commission did
determine how arms were to be used, it
would, In effect, be planning the
strategy for a common European
defense-precisely the role for which
Tlndemans himself admits that Eu-
ropeans are not prepared. Questions
about Irish participation aSide-and, as
noted above in the context of the
Gladwyn proposals, these questions are
seriOus indeed-the simple fact is that,
if common armaments production could
be pigeonholed as a matter entirely
separate from national defense, as one
that did not strike at the heart of
national sovereignty, it would have been
realized as policy years ago. WEU,
NATO, the US Department of Defense,
allied Ministries of Defense and
countless ,private institutions have
grappled with the standardization
problem for over two decades. Yet their
proposals have made little headway in
practice. Nations, whether they admit it
or not, view armaments production and
procurement as integral to their defense
planning effort, and rightly so .. They are
not yet prepared to place that effort in
the hands of any supranational body.
The EDC remainS dead, and its revival
under a different name remains un-
Back to the Western European Union?
Armaments standardIZation is but
one facet of the many-sided disarray
that IS European NATO. Planning must
be further harmonized, combat to
support ratios improved and in-
frastructure logistics rationalized. As
Senator Nunn insists, something must
be done qUickly
Clearly, given the reality of Irish
neutrality, the unlikelihood of ~ y Eu-
ropean state acquieSCing to
supranational control over any aspect of
defense policy and French reluctance to
jOin NATO, the institutional answer to
Europe's need for a more rational
defense posture must lie in a non-
NATO, non-Communities, multinational
body WEU fills this requirement on
every count, in addillon to already being
in existence, haVing some critical value
in its treaty provisions and haVing very
little else to do.
Frequently forgotten IS that the
treaty provisions binding France, Britain,
Italy, West Germany and Benelux in the
WEU defensive alliance are far stronger
than those of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, the
Brussels Treaty that underpins WEU
Military Review
"provides no legal loophole for any
hesitation in the event 01 aggression
against any member" (emphasis add-
ed)." Article V of the treaty states
categorically that an attack on anyone
m'ember automatically places the other
six at war with the attacker. On the
other hand, the North Atlantic Treaty,
While stating that an attack on one party
is an attack on all, nevertheless permits
each member state to take "such action
as it deems necessary to restore and
maintain international peace and
security" (emphaSIS added)." The
United States has interpreted the
guarantee of the North Atlantic Treaty in
ironclad terms. Nevertheless, the
Brussels Treaty, apart from providing a
guarantee in the hypothetical event of
American withdrawal from Europe, also
ensures that the US response would be
a full one. Clearly provided is that an
attack on one member state will result
in a general European war, a situation
which IS unlikely to permit any measure
of equivocation on the part of the United
From the European point of View, the
Brussels Treaty clearly is worth keeping
(it remains in effect for another 2:1
yearsl. Equally, Americans shou,1d
support preservation of the treaty
precisely because It reassures Eu-
ropeans that the United States will
stand by its NATO commitments. But
disbanding the WEU framework may
involve renegotiation of the Brussels
Treaty Since WEU is an integral part of
that treaty. Even if WEU IS allowed
merely to wither away, the provisions of
Article V could be called into question.
Renegotiating such an article in the
Europe of the late 1970s will be a far
more difficult task than was the original
negotiation in the cold war days of 1948
or in the mid-1950s.
,Yet creation of a new European
standardization organization could
October 1977
sound the death knell for WEU. As long
as nothing was being done about stand-
ardlzation, the pious hope remained
that, when such actiVity was politically
practicable. it could be undertaken
within the contractual treaty framework
that WEU provided If, however, WEU
was seen to be inappropriate (as op-
posed to politically Impotent) for the'
tasks for which its treaty specifically
provides, there would be little pOint in
maintaining WEU's existence any
longer. Article V of the treaty could then
be an additional. if unintended, victim of
this rare case of bureaucracide.
There are positive reasons for
pointing to WEU as a useful framework
for any real standardization efforts on
the part of the European allies. In the
first place, standardization is only one
aspect of a many-sided problem. A new
body devoted solely to fostering joint
procurement or manufacture of ar-
maments may find It difficult to expand
ItS purview to other forms of defense
cooperation Similarly, this would be the
case With the European Community
where a supranational defense
organization seems a nonstarter for
many years to come However, If stand-
ardization were returned to the
purview of WEU, there would be further
scope for additional rationalization of
European armaments, tactics and
strategy within the scope of WEU and
without the fear of supranational
bureaucratic control; WEU is a claSSIC
intergovernmental institution where
each state, equally represented in an
all-powerful council, has the right of
veto over organization policy .
. One final compelling reason for
returning to WEU the powers which
nominally it already has IS the political
sensitivities of the European allies.
WEU, unlike the Community, need not
concern itself with the objections of
neutral Ireland. Unlike NATO, it includes
France as a full and equal partner.
Indeed, 'it was M. Jobert, then French
foreign minister, who in 1973 proposed
that WEU be responsible for ensuring
European harmonization of armaments
procurement and manufacture. Worth
recalling is that Jobert's proposal was
dismissed quickly-presumably on the
grounds that such a move would
weaken NATO and wean Europe away
from its close relationship with the
United States. But the truth is that
Europe, particularly West Germany, is
unlikely to move further from the United
States simply because it will cooperate
more rationally in those areas in which
the United States is itself pressing for
cooperation. A strong European ar-
ma ments industry may affect the
US/European payments balance (and
even that possibility is the subject of
some disagreement among experts), but
It will have little bearing upon a fun-
damental defense relationship that rests
on the unique American nuclear
France presently does not wish to
reJoin NATO. It may not do so for some
time. In fact, one day soon France may
have a new, vibrant Gauilist president,
or it may be governed by a
Socialist/Communist coalition. The
prospects for France rejoining NATO
under Gaullist leadership are fairly
dim,17 under Socialist/Communist rule,
nonexistent. Yet France is a formidable
power, given its nuclear deterrent and
strong conventional warfare
capabilities, perhaps the European
power in the Western Alliance today. It
is in America's interest that France
remain as tightly bound to that alliance
as possible and that maximum
cooperation exist between France and
the other NATO allies. If France wishes
to employ WEU as the vehicle for that
cooperation, or feels most comfortable
with it, that is an excellent reason for
exploring the matter further.
Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Turkey
and Greece are not members of WEU,
yet belong to NATO. However, Portugal
is not even' in the Eurogroup, The two
Scandinavian countries might not be
averse to joining WEU, Turkey and
Greece are not affected d.irectJy by the
concerns voiced by Senators Nunn and
Bartlett. Their worry is with the central
front, and that is composed entirely of
present WEU states.
StandardIZation will not be achieved
easrly, Full rationalization of logistical
communications systems and troop
deployments will be even more difficult.
Most difficult of all will be the need to
convince the peoples of our allied states
thot the Soviet threat has not
diminished with time, that strategies
based on the prospect of shorter war
indeed may call for greater sacrifice but
also are in their own immediate in-
terest. A start must be made, and
attention has been drawn to those areas
that ma ny experts previously have
called ripe' for change. The United
States has signaled that, for its part,
that start will be made. Rational use of a
valuable institutional asset-WEU-can
ensure that our European allies can, in
concert, make that start as well.
1 ThIS article adopts the Department of Defense
deftnlfwn af "rational/zation" as the "broadened
effort 10 ensure more efficient use of resources 10
non-weapons as well as weapons fields" The term
thus encompasses the f,elds of "force structure,
training, communications and logistics," as well as
that of weapons systems, In connection With which
the Department of Defense employs the term
"standardIzation" See Donald Rumsfeld,
"RationalizatIOn/Standard,zation Within NATO
Second Report," January 1976, reprinted In
Hearmgs. European Defense Cooperation, 94-2,
Subcommittees on Research and Development and
on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Armed Serv-
Ices Washington, DC, 1976, p 53.
Military Review
2 Senator Sam Nunn, "Gearing up to Deter
Combat In Europe The Long and the Short of It,"
speech reprinted In the CongressIOnal Record,
13 September 1976, pp S15661 -62.
3 Alchard 0 Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U S
Force Structure In NA TO An AlternatIVe. The
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1974. and
Steven L Canby. The Alliance and Europe. Part IV
MIIllarv Doc/nne and'Technology. AdelphI Papers.
Number 109. The Internattonal Institute for
Strategic Studies, London, Eng, 1975
4 Testimony of Mr DeVries. Hecmngs Eu-
ropean Defense Cooperation. op Cit _ p 143
5 Rumsfeld, op CIt. P 103
6 Ibid, p 105 The estimate was made by
G e n e r ~ Andrew J Goodpaster
7 Nunn, op CIt, P S15661 "I am suggesting
not only a northward redeployment of malor U S
forces but also the eastward relocatIOn of major
NATO combat units to their aSSigned wartime
positIOns" See also Lawrence and Record, op Cit,
pp 105 and the following pages
B See the testimony of Kart Damm of West
Germany, chairman of the North AtlantiC
Assembly's Subcommittee on European Defense
CooperatIOn, and the testimony of Patrick Wall.
Heanngs European Defense Cooperation, op clf,
pp 10 and 144
9 Not all of these bodies have sought the same
degree or type of unity But It IS problematical
whether any has achieved that form of unity which
It has sought
10 Lord Gladwyn, The Brussels Treaty and the
European Institutions (Prospects (or Western Eu-
ropean Union), report submitted to the Assembly of
Western European Union on behalf of the General
Affairs CommIttee, Brussels, Belg. 1971. p 13.
11 Elltot A Goodman, The Fate of the Atlantic
Commumty, Praeger Publishers, Inc, NY, 1975,
p 123
12 For example, the two-tiered system that
Bntaln proposed for the CounCil of Europe See A
H Robertson, The Council 01 Europe Its Structure,
Functions and Ach,evements, Second EdltlOn,
Steve_ns & Sons, ltd, London, Eng, 1961, pp 94-
95, and J Allen Hovey Jr , The Superparltament$.
Interparllamentary Consu/rallon and Atlantic
Cooperation, Praeger Publishers, Inc, NY, 1966,
pp 109-14
13 Leo Tlndemans. European Umon Report to
the European CounCil translation, European Com-
munIty. Brussels, Belg, 1975, p 11
14 Ib,d, p 12
15 Gladwyn, op CIt. P 7
16 Article V of the North AtlantiC Treaty.
repnnted In NATO Handbook, NATO Information
Service. Brussels. Belg. 1971. p 53
17 That Gauillst defense poliCies continue to be
Viewed as runnmg counter to those espoused by
the United States IS made manrfestly clear In a
recent article by General Pierre GallaiS. "French
Defense Plannrng-The Future In the Past," Ineer-
natlona/ Security, Volume I. Fall 1976. pp 29-31
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October 1977
'Finland, From a Geopolitical
Major Touko I. Rissancll, Finnish Army
INLAND provides an interesting
geopolitical object for study be-
cause of its location !Jetll'een the East
anel 'West-two politically, militarily,
culturally, economically and ideologi-
cally difrerent worlds. The question
of Finland's relations with the Soviet
Union, which phIl'S a key role in the
Finnish security policy, is of utmost
interest to the West.
This article addresses Finland's
geopolitical position and its impact on
the development of current Finnish
security polic)'. The author hopes it
will provide a !Jetter understanding of
the realities and pro!Jlems associated
with Finland's geopolitical position
and thus !Jring nell' aspects to the dis-
ctlH:-;ion of "Fin1andization."
Because full understanding of Fin-
lanel's current position and policy can-
not be gained without studying the
past, a historical review of relevant
evenb is
Early History 1
Finland's geopolitical position be-
tween the East and West has resulted
in difficulties since 1150 when the
Swedes penetrated Finland and con-
vel'ted mar!\uding Finns to Christian-
Military Review
ity. Finland becnme a ]lrovince of the
Swedi'h Kingdom bordering on Rus-
sia for nearly 700 years.
During the expansion of the Swed-
i,h Empire and the resulting wars
with the Russian Empire, Finland be-
. came a battlefield. The Russian Em-
pire's strategic goal to secure its
capitol, st. Petersburg (now Lenin-
grad I, by pre\'enting the Swedes from
further expansion. In 1809, the Rus-
sians occupied Finland and l{ept it
more than 100 years as an autonomous
part of the empire where Finns ,,,,ere
governed b,' their own constitution,
parlillment and laws. However, during
the first decade of this century, the
"hanged their policy toward
Finland and attempted to destroy the
rights and autonomy of Finland.
Even during this period of oppres-
HiOH, whith arol1sed amung the Finns
strong resentment toward everything
Russian, the policy of Russian leaders
was guided principally by geopolitical
cOI"iderations. They thought that an
autonomous Finland would be a poten-
tial iJi case of German
and penetration toward St. Peters-
burg. .
The Finns started a l'cHistance
movement, followed by the Declaration
of Independence on G December Inl7.
In a Shol't war, which was also a civil
war between the Red and White
forces, the Red and Russian forces,
were defeated. Aftet' this, relations
between Finland and the Soviet Union
remained cool, even hostile, in the
1 n20s and 19:10s.
The Wars, 193944
The most importUllt Iillk ill the
"haill of eventH that has resulted in
the currenl security policy was the
Winter War of 19:19-40. In the 1930"
Finland tried to follow a policy of neu-
trality, but, despite all efforts, did not
in avoiding conflict with the
Soviet Union. The Soviet;.; clearly ex-
IH'c:.;:.;ed doubts about both Finland's
desire alld to maintain its de-
"Ia"ed neu l,ality. The Soviet delega-
tion visiting Filllalld in l!l:l5 made
this point dear by annollncing,
after the British-German naval agree-
ment that granted full freedom to the
German Fleet in the Baltie, that, in
the evenl of war between the Soviet
Unioll and German.I', the S""iet Gov-
el'llment would Otcupy Finland within
six days.:.!
The Soviet interests concerning
Il'inland were again primarily strate-
gic. Leningl'ad-an important indus-
trial, cultural and population center-
Maju)' Touko I. Rissa,,"n is gen-
oml staff office)', Headqua/'taN, Fin-
"ish A/'med Fo/'ces, in Helsinki,
Finland. He is a 1971 gl'aduate 0/
the Finnish Wa/' Col/ege and a 1976
g/'aduate of the USACGSC. He has
served as staff office)' at Headqua/'-
terN, Finnisft Forces, Gull
has been an inst/'uctor at the Fin-
nish Milita/'y Academy. the Rese)'ve
Officers School and the In/ant)y
October 1977
was only 12 miles from the Finnish
border. However, Finland had no in-
tentions of participating in an attack
on Leningrad ..
In October 1939, the Soviet Union
demanded telTitorial concessions, in-
cluding the main part of the Karelian
Is t h m u" and "orne islands that
guarded the entrance to Leningrad, in
orner to establish a security zone
around Leningrad. Because of strong
distrust, the Finns did not understand,
or did not want to under"tand, the
Soviet security needs and "0 rejected
all the Soviet proposals despite the
fact that some of the Finni"h leaders,
:l1arsha1 Mannerheim among them,
\rere willing to malw partial conces-
ill order to Hvoid war, for which
the Finlls \\'ere not prepared militar-
ily, "
The Nonaggression
Pact signed in August 1939 gave Sta-
lin a free hanl! in Finland and other
naJtic tountries and, for the first time
,illce the Wars of Revolulioll, the So-
viet Union resorted to force to attain
political goa],;, The con,equence was
the Winler War where Fillllish Com-
mlillisb showed, against Soviet ex-
pectatiolls. that they ,,'ere Finlls first
and Communists ,econd, Aftet' a hun-
dred da.\'s of hem'.\' fighting, Finland
was compelled to give up the struggle
alld sign the Treaty of Mosco\\" Under
the terms of this treaty, Finland ceded
to the Soviet Union the Karelian Isth-
mus, some islands at the head of tne
Gulf of Finland, large parts of Salla
and KlIu:-:amo communes on the cen-
tral border and the Rrbachi Peninsula
in the northeast.
Ba:-;ically a similar course of events
OCCUlTed during the War of Continua-
tion, 1941-44, Following the outbreak
of hostilities between Germany and
the Soviet Union, Finland engaged in
the \\'ar against the Soviet Union on
the side of, but without an alliance
with, Germany, pursuing its own lim-
ited goals of gaining back lost terri-
tories. The FinnH at first accomplished
their objectives, but lost them again
in 1944. In September 1944, an ar-
mistice agreement was signed with
the Soviet Union, and, in 1947, the
Treaty of Paris finally ended the war.
In that b'eaty, Finland agreed, as it
had in the armistice agreement, to
return to the boundaries of the 1940
Treaty of Moscow and, in addition, to
cede the Pechenga district to the So-
viet Union, lealie the Porkkala area
for a Soviet naval base for 50 years
and pay a heavy reparation bill in
mallufacil1l'ed goods.
Geopolitical Significance
of Ceded Territories
What were the goals of the Soviet
territorial expansion? What advan-
tages did the ceded territories pro-
vide the Soviet Union '!
All the EU1'opean territories an-
nexed to the Soviet Union had served
a "Rpringboard" for German
\'asion against the Soviet Union. Hit-
ler's first plans for Operation Bar-
flU ,.ossa, for example, were to strike
the Soviet Union through several cor-
ridors, two of which involved Finland:
The corridur from northern Fin-
land against Murmansk and Arch-
The corridor from southern Fin-
land and the Baltic states against
Leningrad, I
Although it would have been pos-
sible militarily, the Finnish Govern-
ment refused to support German at-
tempts to destroY Leningrad and
avoided cutting the Murmansk rail-
road," along which supplies to the
., Soviet Union, coming mainly from the
United States, were transported.
The ceded Pechenga district and
Military Review
R.\bachi Peninsula provided greater
securit)' for the ice-free port and naval
base at Murmansk and for the nearby
K () 1 a apatite resources
'which freed the Soviet Union from
dependence upon imported phos-
phates." Moreover, the Pechenga dis-
trict had another ice-free harbor and
relativel:, nickel are resources
which had been the focus of both So-
viet and German interests before
World War II.
The SaBa and Ku usamo area pro-
October 1977

vided more .,ecuritO' spHce to Kanda-
laksha and the vital Murmansk rail-
road which were only 50 miles from
Finnish territor)' before World War
The Karelian area also increaRed
the security of Leningrad which had
been only 12 miles from the Finnish
border. Moreover, the ceded area had
hydl'Oelectric power plants, paper mills
and the city of Vyborg, Finland's
major export port and economic cen-
The l'orkkala nllml l"l,e and the
i,lal\d" at the head of the Gulf of Fin-
land were l,"ed,'d for the ,'ontl'ol of the
lIa\'al rOllte to Lening'l'ad,
Roviet illtf.>l"l' . ..;t:-; behind thl':-:'c teJ'l'i-
Werl' maillir rnilital'Y
- -that i" to eliminale potential
";.;prillg'bo1tI'th," of ill\'a .... ion. illt'l'ca:w
:--p;tee to \'it:.d Soviet
and fl'pedol'n of ad ion in tl'I'I1L-'; of tilt'
C'olnrnand of interior Hnd marginal
and lanel\\,a,\':-:.
Ih-:-:..pite the tel'l"itol'hil ill
which Finland 10...:t 10 pel'l'l'llt of it:-.
culti\'ated land alHI intlll,trial !1l'od",'-
t idt,' and had to re'C't tie ] 1 peri'ent
of it..:. I)OpuJatioJl, Finlalld \\':1:-: ahlP til
it illdl'lHmtit..'lll't
alld \\,a...:, in
fad. the finly l'(H11l1 in\'llj\,pri ill a
g't'))('l'Cd \\:11' :q!:lin:-! \J1l' ;';o\'iet Cnioll
that Jll'\'PI' wa"- tl('I'upil'd IJ,\' the Heel
Geopolitical Lessons
,,,jth pl'L'(':lriol!"': ''''Pl'ul'ity, Fin-
land h:ld to build :t lJtI\\' po:-:twar :-;e-
polky l'ompletely difrt.'l'elit fr()m
that of other :--:'l'<lndina\'ian
"':11('h n...: ;\()rw(\y and \\ hkh,
\\ ith the help nf the ,,'e<tel'll allie"
\\ l'l'e able' 10 :-;haJlP tfwil' "t'l'urity ]Joli-
CI(" \\'ithill XATO,
Thl' eXpCI'1Plll'e of illt.' 'war year:-;
had taught Fil':-\t, it was
realized that the mo:;t important anel
only really Sm'id intere:-;t ill
Finland is gcupolitil'ai alld clefen:-;ivc-
l)re\-en t hoe,
Secolld, the Sodct Cnion dnminated
thellaltil' Sea \\'hile the ,tl'ategic- in-
tere:-;ts of thc \Ve!-'tcl'n Powers in
northern Europe did not reach the
coasts of Finland, Thir<1, con,.;idering
that S\\'edish neutralit,' blocks an)'
e!feeti\'e hel]l from the We,.;t, a, it did
during the Winter War,
Finland is
in a rather h:olatcd position, MOl'CO\'Cl't
opening U]l Finnish territory to for-
eign und troops could create
:o; eomplieatiol1:-; and scvercly
limit FinlptHl's freedom of al'tion,
;.;ide:-;, considcrillg' the o\'cl'whclmillg
Soviet combat power. Finland':-; inde-
pendence and existeIll't' could he
l'ured only avoiding' ronfl'ontution
\\'ith till' Boviet Union,
In theor)" Finland \\"" facing' three
altel'Jlati\'e HolutiOlb to it,.., nutifHwl
l'i ty prohlem:
,. Alliance with the \\'e,tel'll Po\\,-

Allialll'e with the BOI'iel Union,
HetuI'n to a plllicy of llPull'ality,
Considering the geopolitiL'al l'eali-
tie" the fit',t option \\',,, hardl,' 1'eal-
i:-:tk, l\lol'c(J\"er, HLL'Ol'dillg' to the
of till' Treaty of Mo;;('()\\', Finland Wns
not allowed to enter into all alliallL'e
ag'ain,t the So\'iel lIn ion, The second
opt iOll. a!lialll'c \\,ith the Soviet Ulliol1.
be('anw a real possiiJility when, ill
1!1 IX, the SlIviet Union prol""ed a So-
I'iet-Finni,.;h Treat,l' that \\'a:.; analo-
gous to the Hungarian-Soviet and Hu-
lll:llli!:ll1-So\'iet Treaties," Finlund,
ho\\'c\'el', rejceied this proposal, and
tu rther Begot in t iOI1!" i 11 l\{O;-;l'OW were
l'olHlueied on thc ua..;is of the Fillni:-:h
draft. These negotiation", result cd in
the Treaty of ('ooperation.
and :lTutual A",i,tance I FCMA I with
the SoYict Union, The was re-
newed in H)70 for another 20 years,
FCMA Treaty
The FCMA Treaty is the basis not
onl,' for Finland', Eastel'l1 policy, but
abo for il, foreign policy as a whole,
It is the COl'llerstone of Finland's pol-
ic)' of neutl'ality to remain detached
from great-power conniets, It satis-
fie, the So\'iet Union's security needs
lJ)' assuring that Finland never will
allo\\' hostile foree:.;, like those of Gel'-
Military Review
man)' in 1!l41. to make '''''' of Finnish
tenitm'r-the most natul'al a"d of ten-
used route <tg-ain:-;t Lenin-
gmd and othel' cent 1':11 al'ea, of the
Soviet Union,
Contral'r ttl
the FClllA Treat)' is not a milital'Y
alliance tl'eat)' that would allo\\' till'
Unioll to :-;cnd troop;.; tn Fin-
land automatically ulldel' l'in'ul1l-
stances, It dii}'el" fl'onl milital'Y al-
lianl'e agn'pmcnl:-; iII t ha 1 :
The Soviet l'nioll will render
Finland military nol llCl'PS-
sarily troops, olll,\' ill the e\'ent ()f all
attack 011 FinialHl or Hl'1'o;.;:.:; tel'1'i-
e Such military l'()olwratifJlI i:--: n()t
HlItOI1Wtil'; it first requires mulual
agreement between the Soviet Cnion
and Finland,
Hasicall)', the TI'!'at)' is a
polilil'al Hg'I'Celiwlll whil'h a\:-;o COIl-
taills statement:-; to further i:'l'Ollomie
alld l'ultural l'elations.
In the p"st\\'al' situation, the F(':I'I.-\
Treaty was a solutioll that
:-;ali:-;fied Soviet s1 rategiL- seclll'l
neeos ill l10rthern Europe. }'l'om the
Soviet standpoint, the FCl'IlA Treat)'
W(lS only olle elemellt. a plan t() elimi-
nate tl'aditional and potential "spring-
board;.;" of ill\.[;.;ioJ] against the So-
viet Unioll.
From the Finnish ,tandpoint, the
FCMA Treaty was a better \\'a)' of
!'wlving Soviet security needs than So-
viet militm',\' ol'cupation II'hich hardl),
an)'hnrly in the \\'orld could have pre-
vented in the po:-:twar situation.
Military-Political Situation
Since World War Il, the military-
political situation in nor the I'll Europe
ha::; changed in many l'e:-;pect}; as a
result of military. political and arms
Political and military development
October 1977
ill the I:aitir al'ea of great impol'-
t:lI1t'C !o Finlalld's More than
HO pd'cent of Finland's tmde is im-
jlortl,d b)' sea, The national ca'pitol,
Helsinki. and l110;.;t :-;ig'lIititallt l'cntel';';
of aln1 populatioll are fOllnd
ill the l'();t;.;1ai <ll'e(\ :-;U1Toullded hr the
t:uJf of Finland, the Sldil'g?ll'(1 Sea
and the t:lllf IIf Bothnia,
The Bait il' Sea 'Illd especiall)' the
Danish are of great impol'-
tanl'e to the Soviet Bailie- Fleet and
t I'"dc, A IJ<lut 20 perl'!'nt of the ships
pa",-,dllg" till' Dallish Straits ah2 So-
I'il'l, and the hlilk IIf the remaining
tl'aflk is Ea;.;t EUl'opean.!' During-
World \\'ar II, the S""iet Fleet had
.tt it:-: an ex1I'lnwl,r limited I
kl:-:l' in 1l1l' l'a:-:tel'n (;ulf of Fin-
land, 'j'oda)', th!' \\'arsall' Pad roll-
tro}:, .tIl(' elltire from Y,rJJorg to
IUIg"l'll. III :lClditioll, the g'I'l!atel' part
of it:-. miiital',v f01'l'es are c:olll'entl'uted
in till' sOlltl""'1l pal't of the hallic Spa,
II! till' pre\':tilillg stl'ategil" situatioll,
tht' tl'aditional impol'tall('c of tht' Fin-
nISh (:ulf has almost vanislll'd, The
Sf)yiet LlliolJ drew the;.;p lOlH:lusioll ....
from the l'hallgillg- a:-; earlr
a:-: 1 D;);") Whllll it gave liP the nuval
Im:,e anel 1'C'lUI'llCd till' Porldwla arCH.
Thp fad that strategic intel'e:,t:-:. of
both powe]' lJlo(.::-; no\\" arC' f{J(.:t1!-;ed Oil
the southel'n gallic, close to the Dan-
ish "tl'aits, also has impl'o\'ed the pos-
sibility of neutral
ill a l'ol1llil't.
Leningrad's defense pl'oblem:-; han'
changed dl'asticaIJ,I', An attack thaI
l'equil'ed about aD German di\'isions in
WOl'ld \\'al' II nOli' ran be carl'ied out
\\'ith the aid of nuclear mi"siles high
abo\'e the Balttt: land and sea. The
19G2 agreement 10 leasing the Saimaa
Canal to Finland is a ('lear proof of
the diminished impol'tance of the
Kal'eJian bthmus for Soviet defense,
The strategic environment of the
northern cap area where NATO and
the Pact meet has
changed significantly, The shift of the
Soviet Fleet from the marginal sea to
the open newly discovered nat-
lIl'nl l'CHOlll'eeS and increased military
power on the Kola Peninsula with the
introduction of missile suLmarines
have dl'awn attention to the north,
del'elopment has gil'cn rise to
speCUlation that, in the event of con-
fliel, 1T0rthe!'n Finland-LHplHnd, with
inl}H'O\'ed lines of cummunications,
lllHo' provide power blocs the tempta-
tion to mal(e lise of the r"'innish ter-
ritO!')', Howevcr, the military-geo-
grHphical constraints by 'the
rough 'naturc of the tel'l'ain do not
fa\"ol' large-scale land operations ill
Laplan(!. Besides, blocking the rela-
th"cly few l'oud:-: in Lapland is easy,
at rivcr erossillg:-: and simi-
lar pas:-;agcH.
Lapland is economically important
to Finland. Much of Finland's energy
needs are satisfied Ly water
Because of Lapland's f'trategic im-
portance, Finland has transferred a
fig-hlcl' squadron and an ail' defense
artillery battalion to Lapland, in addi-
tioB to existing forces. These l'ede-
pl()yments emphasize Finland's will to
cOlltrol it:-; northern area and' protect
the countro"s neutralitr through its
own means.
Impacts on Defense Policy
Finland's ,tllnerable geopolitical po-
sition between the great pOl\'ers is
simplified significantly by geographi-
cal condition:-; and the cOllntl'Y':-; rela-
ti\'el,\' :-;lHlr:-;e tOmmlillicatiolls systems
which make rapid penetration by
armed forces diflicult and do not favor
large-scale land operations.
BeCl\USe of the rapid development in
weapons technology and tactical doc-
trines, Finland reviewed its defense
policy in the late The nell' de-
fense policy emphasizes capabilities
to prevent surprise attacks and pro-
duction of resources for a protracted
Geographical realities have influ-
enced the nell' regional defense system
where the key is to hold st!'ategically
important targets, such as important
communications and industrial cen-
ters, with local forces and to repulse
the attacker with other forces by ex-
ploiting telTain.
According to'the Paris Peace Treaty
of Finland's defense forces are
limited to ;)1,400 men in the army,
7,500 men and ]0,000 in the navy
and a,ooo men and 60 aircraft in the
ail' foree. \1 However, these restric-
tions are not decisive since all those
eligible for military service can be
trained within this framework, If it
is necessary, the strength of the Fin-
nish defense forces can be increased
rapidly from 40,000 men to 600,000
Moreover, the new interpretation in
] !1G2 of the treaty's "missile clause"
has enaLled Finnish defense to pro-
ture defensive guided missiles, (Aus-
tria thus far has not ,Hlcceeded in a
similar revision of its treaty.)
Throughout its histoQ', Finland has
been a military, political and cultural
buffer between East and West, Today,
all the Nordic countries are more or
let-';.; a "cl'uRh" zone between power
Finland's security depends on the
geopolitical situation of Europe and
Scandinavia, At this moment-after
the Helsinki Conference where the
borders in Europe were confirmed and
thus the delicate German question was
buried for the present-the European
Military Review
situation appears fairl,' pronuslllg at
least as long as the detente polity ton-
tinues and brings satisfactory
The geopolitital situation in Scan-
dinavia is stable too. Thi.s Nordic bal-
hnte is based 011 three factors. First,
Finland follo\\'s the polic)' of neutral-
ity based on the FCMA Treaty which
satisfies the Soviet Union's secmity
needs. Second, nonallianee
polity, supported by strong defense
forces, b credible and gives reason to
believe that Sweden will stay uncom-
nlitted in a l'ri:-ds situation. Third,
Norway and Denmal'k are members of
",ATO with minimulll obligations;
they do not have nuclear weapons or
other NATO fortes on their soil.
Despite SeatHlinavia's stable posi-
tion, a pos"ible trisis in r:urope, in all
)'robability, would inllueuee the geo-
political position of Finland and other
:-Iot'die tountries. If anyone of the
factors of the Nordic balance l'hanges,
it will immediately affect Finland's
geopolitical ,;ituation.
The l'risis l'ould bring political pres-
sUre 011 Sweden to abandon its neu-
trality. NOl'way and Denmark might
allow nudear weapons and other
'" ATO reinforl'ements on their soil.
The Soviet Union would I"'opose to
Finland military con:-;uitation::. Oil C0111-
mon actions. Further, closing the
Danish Stmils and military move-
ments and preparations in the Nordic
cap l'ould result in attempts by both
power blots to push forward their po-
sitions in Scandinavia using military
The crisis desl'ribed would forte
Finland into a serious situation, ulti-
matel,' making it defend by arms its
territory, independence. and sover-
Before World War II, the Westel'll
World and the Finns themselves
to see Finland in the proud
October 1977
role of the Western World's "outpost"
against the Soviet Union. Unfortu-
nately, this "outpost" l'omanticism
was based mo!'e on hostile feelings
rather than cold reason and did not re-
sult in it realiMic security policy.
"Outpost" romnnticism fhiled and
resulted in t\l'O wars thnt cost Finland
8;;,000 t:tsualties, 11 percent of its ter-
ritory and enormOlls war reparations
to the Soviet Union. On the other
hund, the wars gave birth to a new
realistit' foreign polic,' of neutralitr.
I n other words, Finland learned to
live in peace with its g,lInt neighbor.
Some years ago, a Hew term,
Jandizatioll," Was adopted in po1itical
disl'lIssioll ill EU1'ope. This WUl-' meant
to describe the progression of a small
state (Finland) into dependence on a
great neighbor (the Soviet Union),
thus losing its own freedom of action
and falling under the dominance of its
great neighbol. From the Finnish
point of vie\\', this term is poor, mis-
leading ami even insulting. It in dudes
the remains of the unrealistic and un-
successful "outpost"l policy. It is sim-
ply not true. Many facts sholl' that
Finland has presel'Yed its freedom of
ad ion and has !Jerome, in fact, more
dependent on the Western countries
than the SO\'iet Union. For example,
only about 20 percent of Finnish for-
eign trade is with Socialist countries,
and the majority, 80 percent, with
\\' estern and other countries.
Another indication of the Finnish
independent polk,' is procurement of
armaments. Finland buys arms not
only from the Soviet Union, but also
from the Westel'll countries. Recently,
Finland decided to buy a fighter-
squadron from England.
It makes good sense that Finland,
when making its decisions, must con-
sider its neighbors. The crucial point,
however, is that the decisiOll ulti-
mately derives from a considel'atioll
of Finnish, not Soviet, interests.
If "Finlandization" means a policy
of mutually advantageous cooperation,
nothing is wrong with it. Considering
the muny worldwide problems, stich
as population overgrowth and famine,
all are oeeoming more and
more interdependent, and this kind of
policy will be fur allnatiuns
in order to slirvive.
,Politically. Finland ean be consid-
ered today more a "ehHlluel" than a
"buffer" b-etween East and \Ve,st. Per-
haps the best indication of this and
international recognition of Finland's
Jleutl'aIity -policy is Finland's role as
host of a Ilumber of histol'ically im-
portant meetings such llS SALT nego-
tiations and the Helsinki Conference.
The of the Soviet Union
always has been felt in Finland's geo-
political position. About 20 of
the populatioll has voted Communist
in general eledions. Despite this. the
,Westel'll social. cultural and political
s.lstem is iirmly and deeply rooted in
Finland. As President Kekkonen said
to the Soviet leaders in 1961, Finland
lI'ill remain a Nordic-type democracy
even if "the rest of Europe should
turn communist." '" This Finnish will
of self-determination is understood
and recognized in the Soviet Union.
1 Fill'll! Abuut 1-'11"01111. OtIlV:I Co ..
Hel ... inki, I'in., ur,.1, I' 7.
:.! 1-h'il(\(1 l';',j,l'linen, "lndt'\lt'llJh'IH'l' and Afk!'."
Fi''/1I1111, "" II/tro/lll! tUJlI, (il'Ol'gC Allen & UIl\\ Ill,
Ltll" London, En)!., nlla, Jl 137.
;Il/Jid., p Ga,
I (;(o!/ (/IIA l'o{!t!(','; ill fl World /Jil'id((i,
Etlill'd ur ,saul B, Cohen, O.\fu1'11 PI'l'$",
I'ail' Lnwn, N,J, p 2UU.
;-, E'lki..'itnen, 0Jl. I'lt.
I: Cuhen, oJ I. ril" pp 200201.
';" I;..,kl'lilll'n. OJI. !'it.
"'-l\inw Pujunt'll, "Finland's Security Policy,"
UII FlI1nillh FUrr'I!1I1 flolir/l. HeI...,inki, Fin.,
llJl;!f, p 10.
.John Me{'han, "AFNOfiTH-NATO'!I A;,$:lil_
able Flank'!," Mdililry Uatell', Jnnulll'Y 1!17G, PJ)
10 Ffu,tll About Fit/lewd, op. !'it., p fl.
11/1ncl . p 15.
I:.! I\{'ijo KUl'honl'Il, "Finland :11111 the Soviet
Union," EIJtlCI!}8 UII FilII/ish Forl'tflll l'ulic/I, 0/', cit .
]I, :12.
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hold 12 issues plus the annual index. These are only $5.50 US and
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US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
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Military Review
A Conversation
General Clausewitz
Lieutenant Colonel Gustav F. Freudenberg, US Army Reserve, Retired
c-r-'HE othel' lIi(Jlit, aftcr a restless and dislu1'bh'fl eveni11(J, I had a
L dream. In the dream, I mel a character jamiliar 10 me-a milit(II'/1
mall ill all allcirlll unifol'm ,cilh all illtellectua/ face and melancho/y
HSir, you arc General [{ari run ClauseU'itz?"
"I am, or rather was!"
jjYou are .the autlw}' of tWlIle classic Il'orks on lear/are."
"I was an author, yes. But I do not my works classics.
When I died, they \\"ere still under revision and not in the final
form I enyj!-)ioned."
"We arc aware Ihat YOll did I/ot cOllsider it a finished war/;,
but, fol' 150 !fears, !IOUI' liook, On War, has beCiI regal'ded as a
classic e.l'}J(}sitioH of that .<:;ub,i('ct."
"You are very kind. However, it appears to me that I did not
myself very clearly, judging from the ideas some people
claim they got from it."
"General Clau.<.;eH'itz, wI/ere did Ice go wrong?"
"Go ,wrong? Ah. yes, you mean in your war in Indochina,
do you not'!
"But it is very difficult for me to say. The military decisions
I can JUDge, but the American politics puzzle me, and, of conrse,
the political derisions were the crucial ones. The initial mistake,
perhaps, which may have been the most important one, was when
you committed your forces without any clear idea of your own
or even who ,YOlll' enemy was!"
Military Review
"You mean, IVhell lI'e sellt UIII' tl'UUpS to Vietnall/ /"
"Yes, As long as you were acting merely in support of the
southel'll forces, you had freedom of choke and maneuver. Once
you entered the war yourself, .vour only clear choice waH to defeat
the enemy-the immediate enemy, 1';orth Vietnam. The stakes be-
came much greater, As m;v' great colleague, the Duke of Wellington,
once remarked, 'that for a great nation t\lere is no such thing
as a little war.' "
{lBut, iu the brUi1lUill!J. if waN (mll! a police actio1l, ami it
')le1:e1' ended ill a declared war."
"Such juggling of worels only served to weaken and confuse
yourself. You were at war, nevertheless. The first, the greatest,
the most decisive act of a leader is that which is mmle when he
commits a nation to war. But because YOUI' leaders shrank from
that commitment, and did not wish to call it a war, they failed to
rouse and unify the people to cany it out."
'TOil say we had 1/(1 clear idea of OUI' illli'lItiUllg, Bllt /I'as it
"ot to rief(''}}(Z Smtih Vietnalll /"
"No, sir, the only way you could defend South Vietnam was to
defeat the enemy, Therefore, that should have been your intention,
Now, there are three ways in which this may be accomplished,
"First, by destruction of his military forces,
"Second, by occupation of his land,
"Third, by breaking his will to continue, Now, by YOUI' own
self-imposed restrictions, you denied yourself, from the beginning,
any of the three methods of making a successful end of the war.
How, then, could you hope to "'in it? You reflH'ed to let your
troops pursue the enemy into his own or neutral countries that
were their bases, to occu; his country 01' to break his will by
bombardment and blockade."
Lieutenant Colonel Gustav F,
F"eudenberg, US Army Reserve,
Retired, received a B.S. in mecllan.
ical engineering /rolll the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Tee/moloyy,
While on active duty, he served in
[(m'ea, Japan, Gerlllany and Fmnce,
and It'as assistant professor of mili-
tary science and tactics at Ford-
ham University, teaching military
hist01'lI and logistics,
Octobe'r 1977 69
"If lI'e harl, other POICeI'S miyht lWI.'c come in as his allies."
"You finally took some action in Cambo.dia, and in bombard-
ment and mining' without any such reaction. It is instructive to
note that. after this action, the enemy was forced to call a tem-
halt to the war-which enabled you to remo,'e y.our own
forces. The course"of this war is very reminiscent of the Peninsular
War in which the French marshals fared vcry badly against Lord
Wellington and his S]lanish and Portug'uese allies. Wellington
had made a secure rcfuge for himself in Portugal; the Spanish
guerrillas had their mountains; the French, although superior in
strength, were """'n down b,' the interaction of these two forces
and en:mlually driven out."
"Woulri !IOU saJJ oUI' mililal'!I lcariers II'C"C pl'imal'Uy respon-
sih/e tor faulty df'('isiuHS r'"
"I canJlot :-;ay :-;ineQ the final deei:;ions lay in the handH of
political leadcrs. I cannot tell \\'hat they planned or advised those
leaders. For all I know. they may h",'e been qllOting to themselves
the wonls that my great friend and teacher, Gerhard von Scharn-
hOl')o;t, 1I1lfILl1' :-:imiJal' eil'l'umslalll'es: 'I know right well what
we should do. but what we will do, only God knows!'"
"Th"iI, the political t/('ci:>iuus I('ere the important ones?"
"War is a ]lolitical act. We must remember that the less im-
portant the political object, the less will be the value attached to
it, and the readier will be its abandonment. To your people, the
political objective never seemed urgent; in the end, it was a
nuisanee to be gotten through. To the enemy, it was almost a
matter of survival. Besides, fighting an undeclared war was a
divisive element foJ' you. Some of your important people, even
legislators, gave aid and support to the enemy in a manner I
wou Id deem treasonous."
"Trea.'''I/, uel/era!? 1'ou yourself in 1812, when Prussia ICas
allied to France afJainst Russia, together Il'ith a number of other
officC/'s left the l'russian ArlllY to fight for Russia ayains! you?'
"Yes, you are right, but the alliance of Prussia with France
in 1812 was not a free but an enforced one, to avoid being crushed
by France. You force me back upon a phrase that critics accuse
me of using overmuch-'It all depends upon the circumstances!' "
"What ICas fhe cause of the final collapse of the South Viet-
"First, all you had achieved before you withdrew your troops
a truce, not a ]leace. Second, you made them too de]lendent on
Military Review
your support and not enough on their own efforts. If the preserva-
tion of a state depends almost entirely on external support, that
sta te is not ,iable.
"Finall)', there came this great political turmoil in your coun-
try called Watergate-an affair beyond my comprehension. But I
can see that its effect was to paralyze for a time the executh'e arm,
the leadership. robbing it of the power to intervene decisively.
This was apparent to both North and South Vietnamese leaders."
"Shoold 1/ot the sooth ',,1/'1' pili II]) a bettc)" deiense?"
"War is a malter of moral force as well as physical. The
Watergate affair and the refusal of your legislature to grant addi-
tional aid destroyed the moral force, not very high at best, of the
South Vietnamese leaders. They collapsed spiritually without even
the loss of a great battle."
"What ,,1")llld /1"(' leaI'll il'OIIl this?"
"Learn-war is the most seriolls, bl'lI tal and bloody business.
If )'ou wage it, you must do so to win-in the shortest possible
time. The highest concentration of efTor! and force should be used.
Half measures in warfare usually bring defeat. Attempts to spare
bloodshed in war almost always bring, in the end, far greater
suffering. Never fight but ,vith the idea in mind to defeat the
enemy by all possible means."
"Would that not threaten a nuclear war?"
"Nuclear warfare I do not tOllsidel' a 'possible means.' War-
fare between such nations as the United States and Russia, both
,dth vast nuclear power, is logically impossible. No political object
could possibly warrant the cost of such a conflict to both side,.
Therefore, they must resolve their conflicts through other means.
If they choose to do it through surrogates, let it be so limited.
Actually, I "'Ollld say that the logic of warfare today is continually
diminishing due to immense costs and lack of substantive gains.
What does a nation gain if it gains territory at the risk of pauper-
ism and increased unrest?
"Looking at your affairs from a distance, the seriousness of
the political conflicts that have caused recent wars have been much
exaggerated, mostly by ideological differences. Thirty-five years
ago, Japan and Germany were your great enemies; now, they are"! /'
friends and allies. If such political adjustments are possible, can 'I...........J
you not hope in the futme to make even greater ones without .
warfare? If the political leaders of the great and influential
countries understand the true nature and results of warfare, that
hope may be possible."
~ t
October 1977
France's Neglected Frontier:

Captain Don W. Ale""ndcr, US Army
LTHOUGH the Peninsular War
has attracted the attention of
numerous scholars, historians have
overlooked an important aspect of
this conflict. The operations along the
Pyrenees have received no systematic
analysis ., and have not even been
documented to any great extent. At
best, the standard accounts of the
war, such as those of Gomez de
Arteche y Moru
and Charles Oman,'
have chronicled a few major en-
coun ters. Beyond these meager
descriptions, the actions have been so
ignored that one might question
whether anything of importance did,
in fact, occur,
Far from being a passive theater,
he Franco-Spanish frontier teemed
with activity, and the encounters
there had serious military and
political repercussions on Napoleon's
empire. Eventually, the struggle
raging at France's back door required
Napoleon to commit ever-growing
numbers of troops to protect the
border from Spanish guerrillas,
Geography and Related Problems
Complicating imperial efforts to
secure the border were the Pyrenees
Mountains. This chain spans nearly
the entire 250mile frontier between
Spain and France, descending from
lO,OOO-foot peaks in the middle of the
range to narrow coastal plains at both
ends. Through these coastal areas
passed the two major routes con-
necting the Peninsula with France. Of
course,. numerous defiles through the
middle of the range existed, but they
were completely unsuitable
Copyright 1977 by Captain Don W. Alexander, US Army,
October 1977
thoroughfares. Most of these passes
were little better than trails, and, from
October to May, they were inter-
mittently clogged with snow." Even in
good weather, they were not depen-
dable. The narrow paths offered the
Spanish guerrillas attractive ambush
sites, and the partisans could render
the trails useless by destroying a
bridge or felling trees.' Lateral com-
munications within Spain were even
worse. Along the frontier, the roads
traversed the Pyrenees for miles,
augering catastrophe at dozens of
places along the way.
Besides hindering com-
munications, the Pyrenees also iin-
peded . French military efforts to
destroy the partisans. The broken
terrain provided the guerrillas with
excellent bases and allowed them to
evade French columns probing into
the mountain haunts. Along the
Captain Don W. Alexander
currently is serving with the 256th
Military Police Company, Fort
Hood, TX. He received a Ph.D. in
history from the University of Tex-
as at Austin. He has been a
visiting lecturer at the University
of lllinois' and a lecturer and
teaching assistant at the Un-
iversity of Texas.
frontier, the guerrillas were able t(l
conduct partisan warfare in an op-
timum environment. Usually,
irregular warriors must venture into
open terrain to threaten vital objec-
tives. In the Pyrenees,' however, the
guerrillas could strike critical targets
while remaining within the protective
confines of the mountains. Obviously,
the Pyrenees exacerbated the twin
French objectives of securing their
communications and eliminating par-
tisan opposition.
The Initial Problem
When Napoleon departed the
Peninsula in January 1809 to prepare
for war with ,Austria, defending
southwestern France from Spanish
raids appeared unnecessary.
However, the Spanish recovered from
Napoleon's sledge-hammer offensive,
and, by the spring of 1809, French
troops again were hotly engaged
throughout the Iberian Peninsula. By
this time, the conventional battle
lines had been drawn far beyond the
frontier. so that, when! resistance
flared in the Pyrenees, it took the
form of guerrilla warfare. The par-
tisans' attempts to rekindle opposition
in the mountains quickly met with
success. They slaughtered an imperial
column of 600 troops that had ven-
tured into the Roncal Valley; com-
pelled another detachment of nearly
800 men to surrender near Monzon;
and ambushed a foraging expedition
of 300 soldiers from J aca, killing one-
third and driving the rest back in
disarray. With the French forces in
the region temporarily neutralized,
the guerrillas began carrying the war
to France by raiding several border
communities in the departments of
Hautes and Basses-Pyrenees."
Military Review
The devastating eruptions of
Spanish resistance along the frontier
had caught the imperial high
command off-guard_ Its insufficient
forces had fallen easy prey to the
partisans_ The high command had to
accept the challenge of securing the
border with Spain_ Optimally, the
French could control the frontier by
destroying the partisan menace.
Failing that, the high command could
revert to a defensive posture, secure
the vital positions in the area with
well-supplied garrisons and then
abandon the mountain tops to the
partisans. There, the guerrillas cpuld
either wither away or battle the' im-
perials under conditions chosen by
the high command.
Characteristically, Napoleon
favored the idea of eradicating the
guerrillas with one or two crushing
blows. To this end, the emperor
periodically committed thousands of
troops to sweep the frontier, but the
anticipated decisive encounter always
remained a day's march away.
Napoleon gravely complicated the
French effort to protect the frontier.
He never grasped the unique problems
of guerrilla warfare in the Peninsula,
especially along the Pyrenees,
perhaps because he never personally
confronted them. The directive
emanating from Paris, based on
Napoleon's brilliant methods of
waging conventional war, displayed
little appreciation of the grim reality.
The emperor's generals soon dis-
covered that guerrilla opposition was
too formidable to eliminate, and,
gradually, the French had to commit
more and more troops to a static,
defensive effort.
Thus, almost by default, the war in
the Pyrenees developed into two vir-
tually independent conflicts. One
struggle found the partisans eluding
October 1977
French mobile columns while the
other imperial garrisons
attempting to parry the thrusts of
guerrilla raids. Owing to com-
munication and terrain impediments,
French troops seldom gave or received
mutual support in their battles with
the guerrillas. This lack of centralized
control requires a study of the French
military effort along the border to be
divided between an analysis of those
actions undertaken by the offensive
troops in Spain and those missions
assigned to the defensive personnel
guarding the communication 'routes
and passes leading into southwestern,
France. .
The Mobile War
The debacle which French forces
endured in early 1809 spurred
Napoleon into offensive action. In the
last half of 1809 and the first few
months of 1810, powerful French
detachments maneuvered at will
through the Pyrenees, disrupting the
guerrilla bands, disarming the in-
habitants and inflicting retribution
against those districts which
previously had defied imperial dic-
tates. With the guerrilla band
shattered and their depots captured,
partisan resistance crumbled. The'
bands became disorganized and
isolated from the rest of Spain:"'"
apparently Napoleon's offensive had
mastered the menace the guerrillas
had once posed to the frontier.';
At this point, Napoleon shifted to
other operations the mobile units
which had been so instrumental in
the imperial victories. The emperor,
perusing the reports from Spain,
assumed resistance to be crushed once
and for all; therefore; he retained only
weak, rear-echelon personnel along
the front;(>r. Thc long-term consc-
. quences of thiH tn1l1sfer were diH-
astrous. Th" plwnomenon of guerrilln
rpsistanc{' \vas relatively npw to
Napol{'on and his generals. They did
not realizp that ll1ilitar:v Tem0dips only
arrested not l'liminat"d the symptoms
of tllPir political problpllls. As SOOll as
til(' dOHng" of arm(>d medicine was
reduepd. lh,' partisan gt'rlll revitnliz(,d
itself. Whil" no OJ1? {'an assert that an
indefinite re\ention of the mobile
forcps would have secured the
frontier. their dqHlrturc certainly
('aHed Spanish efforls to continue
GIH'ITilla str(>ngth in the region
Tf'C()VPfpd quiddy, Hnd Napolpon
afterward had to ",deploy his
reguhu8) occasionally as Inuch as '(1
full corps, just to stahilizp til('
situation. I )urin,.; tbesr suhsequent
operations, Fr(>nch troops no longer
eXJx'I;['f](,,1 thl' halcyon triumphs they
had enjoyed in late I RO!). The
guerrillas had used the reprieve
Napoleon inadvertently had gnmted
them to become much better
organized, disciplined and cquipped.
The rabble of IRO!) had
metamorphosed by JRl! into for-
midable warriors.
Once the balancc of strength tilted
in the favor of the guerrillas, French
mobile operations along the frontier
began to follow a futile pattern. The
emperor would order thousands of
regulars to sweep a district; an im-
perial detachment would be defeated,
inducing the commander to concen-
trate his troops to avoid another
reverse; the guerrillas easily could
evade this one lumbering column
until Napoleon had to transfer the
troops elsewhere; their pursuers gone,
the partisans would re-establish
mastE:ry over the area.
simply did not have the manpower
and logistic support nt'eded to qUf'lI
widl'sprpad opposition by offensive
adinn in tllP PY\P1WPS. Consequently.
he had to" adopt a defensive policy.
C The frontier Gamsons
'I'll{' impprinl high command was
fortunate to inhprit a multitude of old
rq(inlP fortrpsses which shielded the
Pyn'n.'es passes. By the time guerrilla
warfare erupted along- the frontier, the
French had seized eVen the Spanish
fortresses, thereby rounding out the
network of fortitications. Admittedly,
many of these bastions were little
mort' than fortified blockhouses, as
were the strong-points which the
French subsequently erect.ed, but all
of them posed formidahle barriers to
irregular units without artillery.'
However, the French were never able
to realize the potential of 'this ready-
made barrier. The terrain was so
barren that a large garrison scarcely
could live off the produce of the local
inhabitants while the road network
and transportation resources were too
inadeq'uate to provide the garrisons
with rations procured from more
fertile regions." Thus, a large garrison
faced the danger of starvation while a
small detachment ran the risk of
defeat if it attempted to leave its walls
and repel an invading partisan band.
Compounding this logistic im-
pediment was the inferior quality of
the personnel available for frontier
defense. National guardsmen, con-
scripts, convalescents, unreliable
foreign contingents, gendarmes and
other grab-bag personnel manned the
fortified positions along the Pyrenees.
With French generals everywhere
pleading for more regulars, the
emperor's decision to employ inferior
troops was reasonable. Unfortunately,
Military Review
these troops had mol'(' riWJl'(Hls dutips
than 'merp}y
walls-they had to be able to engage
and defeat gUl'rrilla bands befml' the
pmtisans could raid a French village
or overwhl'lnl a convoy. Napolpon
appreciated this n(>c('ssi!.y, but Iw
could not justify committing
thousands of regulars to an area that
mig-lit hp"'attackeo only OIH'{' or twicp n
The most readily available gar'
rison perRonnpl w(,1'(' the national
living in the southw('stern'
departments of the 10th and lIth
Military Districts. These soldiers
ferod fraln almost every imaginable
shortcoming. The units J"acked of"-
ficers, and those thev did have were
usually retirpd vetera;)s who were well
past their primp, or mutilated com
manders who were unable to
withstand the rigors of active cam
paigning.'" The rank and file were so
poorly equipped and indifferently
trained that a national unit
probably WaS inferior to a partisan
band of equal size. Although some
contingents acquitted themselves well
enough, others were miserable, One
battalion, having served briefly in
Spain, refused ever to return, and
others had to be relieved of frontier
duties because of their unreliability."
Desertion made steady inroads into
the ranks of the guard, often reducing
units to skeleton size.'"
Aggravating these deficiencies
was the difficulty of mobilizing the
guardsmen. Initially, they were called
to the colors only after a partisan
band had pierced the frontier, and
then dispatched to the endangered
area. This afteraction response
offered little chance of parrying the
blow from a hard-hitting, fastmoving
gUE:rrilla unit. Yet the problems in
herent in the slow mobilization
October 1977
scarcely could' be resolved by putting
a unit on a wartime footing. Many
guardsmen were civilians who
fulfilled their military obligation
simply by affixing their names to the
rolls of a reserve unit. Should a
frontier commander attempt to
mobilize these civiliansoldiers for'an
indefinite period, he inevitably would
encounter the opposition of the
department prefect. While the com
mander could cite his military
problems, the prefect had to be at
tuned to the economic and political
consequences of mobilization.
Deploying 1,000 or 2,000 guardsmen
from a district might satisfy military
exigencies, but it also would disrupt
the agricultural activities and
generate restlessness among the pop'
ulace.'" The ensuing problems might
be inore distressing and widely fert
. than the damage from a guerrilla
raid. This civil-military conflict
reflected the serious dangers which
the Spanish raids' along the frontier
posed. The French military could not
afford to allow the partisans to attack
with impunity, but the civilian com-
munity would not make the sacrifices
necessary for security.
Despite the vexatious political con-
sequences of widespread use of the
national guard, military imperatives
eventually left the high command
with no alternative. In 1809, with
Spanish activity along the border just
beginning. only a few permanently
embodied chasseur de montagne bat-
talions were deployed. In 1810, when
the partisan raids began to intensify
in both frequency and destruction,
every department in the 10th Military
District had to levy a national guard
battalion.14 By the end of 1811, many
of the departments in the 11th
Military District also were furnishing
guard battalions.'f, A few months
later, in March 1812, Napoleon
directed the 9th and 20th Military
Districts to prepare units for serv-
ice along the frontier. II; Altogether,
Napoleon estimated that he had some
45,000 guardsmen earmarked for
service along the frontier although
most of these troops were not con-
stantly under anns. However, the
concomitant political and economic
sacrifices of this policy were not
repaid with military success, and
Napoleon had to bolster his defenses
with additional troops.
Napoleon found himself forced to
augment the national guard with
contingents of conscripts. These
young draftees suffered problems
similar to those which plagued the
guardsmen, and they, too, proved to
be a poor match for veteran partisan
bands)? Besides using conscripts to
garrison the frontier fortresses,
Napoleon deployed large numbers of
them at Bayonne, usually around 20
battalions. 'This force served many
purposes: It patrolled the coastal
plains; it protected the critical bridge
across the Bidassoa River; and it
provided a reserve capable of rein-
forcing an endangered. sector of the
Napoleon's practice of employing
conscripts to garrison rear areas
aroused protests from the frontline
generals who needed these
replacements. The commanders com-
plained that the levies suffered such
excessive losses while they were
stationed along the frontier that, by
the time they joined their regiments,
they were a shadow of their former
strength.'9 This waste of manpower
was yet another sacrifice which had
to be made to protect the frontier.
The difficulties which beset the
hundreds of garrisons stationed in the
Pyrenees might be portrayed best by
an analysis of one of these positions.
The French detachments in the Bas-
tan Valley, located along the Franco-
Navarre'se border. experienced most of
the dangers which haunted every
garrison dotting the Pyrenees. In
1810, the French commander in
Navarre had stationed 400 men here
to defend this gateway to France.'o At
the end of the year, Napoleon decided
to deploy a national guard unit in the
area, and General Quesnel's 11th
Military District dispatched a rein-
forced battalion of nearly 800 men.21
Quesnel regarded this force as insuf-
ficient, and he requested that the
department of Basses-Pyrenees send
1,200 more guardsmen. However,
French Minister of War Clarke balked
at mobilizing yet another contingent
of guardsmen." Instead, Clarke an-
ticipated that Quesnel's troops would
Military Review
receive additional support from the
regular forces already stationed in
Navarre. Napoleon already had
stressed to the provincial governor,
Reille, the importance of furnishing
plentiful supplies and assistance to
this levy of guardsmen in order to
avoid a heavy desertion rate.'"
Reille replied that he could furnish
nothing and that the responsibility
for provisioning the garrison was
incumbent on the 11th Military Dis-
trict. As for troops, Reille had none to
spare. He was governor of Navarre,
and so he had little concern for the
safety of French districts along the
Pyrenees. Consequently, Reille
washed his hands of the problem and
promptly withdrew all his troops in
the valley as soon as Quesnel's
detachment arrived.'"
Inevitably, the guerrillas in the
province, led by Espoz y Mina,
assaulted the isolated detachment.
Although the attack in June 1811 was
not successful, it alarmed 11 th
Military District Headquarters
enough to request additional forces to
bolster the garrison.""'
An infantry division was dis
patched promptly to restore order,
and, at the end of th" year, the high
commnnd replaced this unit with
2,000 conscripts. These rein
forcements accomplished nothing.
Particularly, the Bastan forces made
no effort to assist the French regulars
in Navarre in their operations against
Mina's partisans. In January 1812,
these mobile troops blundered into
Mina at Sangiiesa, a day's march
from Bastan. While the garrison idly
observed empty terrain, their com
rades were mauled. Just as Reille had
refused to support the garrison, so
had the Bastan detachment d.eclined
to assist the regulars.' The virus of
unc'oopera tion festered openly, to the
October 1977
detriment of mobile and static forces.
Finally, in July 1812, the high
command evacuated the garrison. The
remnants of the conscripts joined
their respective units in the Peninsula
while the guard personnel returned to
French influence in the area
vanished immediately. The con-
traband trade, always a problem since
the imposition of the Continental
System, flourished, and the area
became an important depot for Mina's'
ever-expanding guerrilla forces.'" The
detachment in the Bastan Valley, iike .,
most along the Pyrenees, ac-
complished nothing. Food shortages,
personnel deficiencies and the in-
ability, often refusal, to coordinate the
available military resources combined
to render the garrison completely in-
The Bailie for the Pyrenees
A complete chronological account
of the engagements along the
Pyrenees is beyond the scope of this
presentation; nonetheless. an anaiysis
of Some of the action is essential to
demonstrate the extent of the French
effort and mounting difficulties which
the imperial forces encountered as the
war progressed. Initially, Spanish
raids across the border were con-
ducted by small guerrilla bands that
were more interested in plunder than
warfare. As such, these raids were
more of a nuisance than a serious
military threat for the local con-
stabulary. Only as the partisans im-
proved their combat skills and
military organization did they begin
to place the security of the fron tier in
The first serious incursions oc-
curred in mid-1810 when Napoleon
directed the bulk of his regulars in
northeastern Spain to besiege
Tortosa. By this transfer, the emperor
relinquished whatever control the
Fr.ench might have had along the
frontier. Spanish forces in Upper
Aragon and Catalonia quickly seized
their opportunity. They harassed
French garrisons on the Spanish side
of the Pyrenees and launched raids
into HauteGaronne and Ariege. Some
1,200 hastily mobilized guardsmen
were needed to relieve the pressure.""
The Catalans enjoyed even greater
success along the Cerdagne frontier.
They crushed the three national
guard battalions that were protecting
this department and then unleashed a
series 'of unopposed, devastating at-
tacks throughout the area. They
burned scoreS of hamlets and villages,
destroyed crops, stole livestock, kid-
napped hostages for ransom and
murdered hapless civilians:!iJ Besides
terrorizing the French populace, the
Catalans also interdicted the main
road [rom France to Catalonia, cap,
turing a convoy at La Junquera and
annihilating an imperial brigade at
La BisbaL
The high command had to un-
dertake vigorous actions to regain
control along the Catalan frontier,
Operations around Tortosa were
suspended and a corps withdrawn to
restore order in the province,
Napoleon deployed an entire division
in Upper Catalonia to protect the
lines of communication, and he rein-
forced the troops along the Cerdagne
with an. additional brigade, raising
the strength of this detachment to
4,500 men, The emperor also directed
the prefects of the departments of
Ariege and Pyrenees-Orientales to
mobilize another battalion of national
guardsmen each and to hasten the
delivery of arms to the inhabitants of
the frontier communities.'" Thus, by
the end of 1810, the burden of
defending the frontier was beginning
to impinge on French military
resources 'and disrupt conventional
objectives. An ominous trend had
been established that would prevail
until the French Were expelled from
While the Spanish conventional
forces continued to follow their dis-
astrous ways in 1811, the year was
one of splendid success for the par-
tisans operating along the frontier.
Pinprick partisan raids con tin ued un-
til August 1811 when the Catalan
Army, not just small guerrilla bands,
conducted a two-pronged invasion
across the Cerdagne and Ariege fron-
tiers. These sorties produced twin
succe,sses for the Spaniards: They
restored flagging spirits in Catalonia,
and they prompted Napoleon to divert
thousands of regulars to a fruitless
sweep of the Catalan mountain
strongholds. 12
The redirection of the imperial
effort against Valencia at the end of
1811 engendered catastrophe for the
imperial frontier forces. The high
command stripped garrisons
everywhere to bolster the field army
assigned to capture Valencia. Conse-
quently, imperial forces in the
Pyrenees found the balat:Jce of power
hea vily tilted against them. This
weakness invited partisan attack. In
October and December 1811, Espoz y
Mina led his partisan division from
Navarre into Upper Aragon. In these
two forays, Mina captured several
frontier garrisons, annihilated a
mobile column of nearly 1,000 troops
and interdicted the highways from
Aragon to France. When Mina
returned to Navarre in January 1812,
he climaxed his campaign by routing
all the regular French forces in that
province at the Battle of Sangiiesa.
Military Review
Mina's raids had exposed every
French community to invasion, re-
quiring the high command to mobilize
the national guard all along the
border with Navarre and Aragon. The
11 th Military District also sent 2,000
more troops from the reserves at
Bayonne to the Bastan Valley to
reinforce that approach to France.
Finally, all the mobile forces in
Aragon that were supposed to be
rushing to the aid of their comrades at
the Battle of Sangiiesa were, instead,
re-establishing the communication
link with France. Thus, a single par-
tisan division of some 4,000 men had
managed to paralyze French forces in
two provinces, compel a costly levy of
guardsmen and dislocate imperial
The Catalans matched Mina's
success with division-size raids into
France in October and January. In
both instances, the defending
naHonal guard battalions were
October 1977
brushed aside, and the second
division penetrated as far as
Tarascon and Foix before retiring
through PUigcerda,'14
These partisan activities stand in
marked contrast to the first dis-
organized plundering expeditions of
1809. The Spaniards were concen-
trating more on defeating French
detachments and disrupting com-
munications than simply ravaging
the countryside. The partisan leaders
had displayed considerable military
talen t. Already masters of guerrilla
warfare, the Spanish rapidly were
becoming formidable conventional
opponents. They were capable of
fielding division-size units that were
well-trained in linear tactics and ade-
quately backed by an efficient
military administration. The Spanish
possessed the tremendous advantage
of conducting a guerrilla war along
the Pyrenees with units that were able'
to battle their opponents on roughly
equal conv('ntional t('nnf-;.
These disasters rudely awakened
the imperial high commnnd to the
changing nature of warfare on the
border. In the early months of 1812,
the emperor formulated policy to
secure the frontier. To deter partisan
r a i d ~ into France, he put over a dozen
battalions of national guardsmen on
permanent war footing, "solely
charged with the defense. of the
frontier." ,'. He stationcd a division of
conscripts at each end of the Pyrenees
to help guard important passes and to
rush to the assistance of endangered
guard detachments. u, On paper, at
least, Napoleon was committing w'ell
over 1i;,OOO troops to prevent guerrilla
Napoleon did not limit his effort to
a passive defense. He remained in-
toxicated hy his passion to annihilate
the partisans. Many of the regulars
who were released from the Valencian
campaign were aligned against the
partisan threat in the Pyrenees.
Napoleon placed the bulk of these
forces under the newly created Army
of the Ebro, commanded by General
Reille. Two other armies, those of the
north and Catalonia, also were
directed to assist Reille in suppressing
guerrilla resistance on the frontier.
Napoleon's resolve to restore security
throughout his rear area can best be
judged by the number of regulars he
earmarked for this operation. At the
beginning of 1812, the emperor had
90,000 troops deployed in
northeastern Spain-approximately
one-third were committed to clearing
the frontier.:"
Despite this impressive concen-
tration on both sides of the Pyrenees,
the imperial effort ended in dismal
failure. On the French side of the
Pyrenees, the formation of the
national guard units proceeded with
its customary delay. The two reserve
divisions, largely comprised of con-
scripts, were of limited combat value,
and, eventlIally, they were dissolved
to . reinforce the line units in the
Peninsula_: Napoleon's prefects and
military district commanders
remained unahle to translate imperial
mandates into effective action.
Napoleon's commanders in Spain
fared no better. The overconfident
Fl'l'n('h d('tachnwnts initially suffered
s('v('ral hloody defeats:'" Once the
('olumns rpl-(rouped, the partisans
""oi<l('<1 ('omhat until the pressures of
('oJ1vpntional warfare dictater;l a
tram;j'('r or th" line regiments away
f .. oIn til(' fronlier. By the middle of
] ~ J:2. Napojpon's I{rand desil-(n to
(']Par tlw PY1'('nees had collapsed,
.viddinl{ l1othinl-( but frustration.
The utter hopelessness of the im- ~
perial position in the Pyrenees during
the last year of the war deserves some
elaboration. The weak detachments
garrisoning the lines of com-
munication were isolated completely.
The partisan divisions were powerful
enough to besiege and capture these
stronl-(points, and the inadequate
number of French regulars hampered
imperial rescue operations. All along
the frontier, commanders either had
to abandon their communication links
or expose their garrisons to certain
destruction. Spanish units continued
to raid across the border at will-the
commander of the Catalan Army
personally led two incursions onto
French soil in 1814. To the bitter end,
the national guard proved unable to
master the demands of frontier
defense. The problem was always one
of too few troops, too poorly armed .
and organized, responding to the
danger too late.")
The collapse of French military
influence in the Pyrenees also enabled
Military 'Review
the guerrillas to make the final con-
version ,to conventional warriors. The
partisans had an immense region in
which to establish the secure bases
needed to support regular forces. By
1813, General Copons y Navia had
14,000 troops in Catalonia; Espoz y
Mina had a similar number in Upper
Aragon and Navarre; and General
Mendizahal had managed to bring the
thousands of partisans in Biscay and
the northern coast under his direction.
Overall, these soldiers were better
clothed, fed and paid than their
French counterparts, and almost as
wellarmed." The French scarcely
could move in safety with less than a
division-size force.
Only the
evacuation of Spain ended the im-
perial nightmare along the Pyrenees.
Evaluating the Campaign
The imperial army clearly lost the
battle for control of the frontier. Still,
one might question the significance of
this defeat-has the campaign
remained obscure because it was un-
important? If not, to what extent did
Spanish domination of the Pyrenees
contribute to Napoleun's declining for-
The military repercussions can be
assessed easily. Spanish mastery of
the Pyrenees imperiled the vulnerable
French communications. Com-
manders in Biscay, Navarre, Aragon
and Catalonia simply could not coor-
dinate their activities with one
another because their couriers, and
later even their mobile columns, could
not traverse the mountains in safety.
Generals throughout Spain had to
wait months to receive instructions
from Paris. Every convoy and
replacement contingent coming from
had to run the partisan
OctDber 1977
gauntlet thwugh the Pyrenees. Many
never survived t e initial
and many more were encouraged to
desert while Fra ce remained so close
after experiencin ' this grim portent of
their future in S ain.
The partisan hreat to the frontier
compelled Nappleon to mobilize
thousands of fjational guardsmen.
Placing these civilians on a wartime
footing was precarious in that it in-
volved the disruption of the 'local
economy and disturbed political and
social stability in the southwestern
departments. Napoleon also had to
augment his defenses with thousands
of conscripts who were needed to
refurbish the regiments that were
being decimated elsewhere in Spain.
Besides these defensive measures, the
high command deployed powerful
mobile forces to destroy the partisan
menace. All these commitments
siphoned human and material
resources that were needed badly in
other theaters of the war.
Although the consequences of this
military reverse were severe, the
political repercussions may have been
just as devastating. From 1"809 until
the end of the war, every settlement
within 40 miles uf the frontier endured
the specter of partisan attack. For
these inhabitants, Napoleon's affairs
in Spain meant furnishing additional
supplies to the troops stationed in the
border strongpoints, responding to the
tocsin ringing' for service in the
national guard, or watching one's
home and family be destroyed during
a guerrilla raid.
The French inhabitants did not
respond to his pillaging and
murdering with any determination to
repel the invaders. On the contrary, a
disturbing lassitude began to infect
the population. If anything, the.
raiders almost were welcomed, much
83 (
in the same manner as the French in
the eastern half of the realm initially
greeted the allied invaders in 1814.
Some imperiul officials explained this
reaction in terms of despair. The
populace believed that the
government had forsaken them.
Bereft of imperial protection, the
people had abandoned their loyalty to
the empire and resigned themselves to
their fate:"! .
An obvious example of this un-
nerving disaffection was the aid
French inhabitants rendered escaped
Spanish prisoners. Those who were
later recaptured asserted that they
had been able to cross France on the
main' highways, undisturbed, and
that the local civilians had provided
every type of assistance:" Eventually,
Napoleon had to relocate the con-
finement camps away from' the
frontier and increase the guard force.
In addition, imperial officials had to
inflict the most punitive measures,
including execution without trial of
those civilians aiding Spanish
prisoners. I"'
Perhaps the most tlagrant example
of collaboration occurred in March
1811 in the town of Aldudes. Espoz y
Mina had led a small band of 50
horsemen across the mountains into
France and entered Aldudes, a village
of 1,500 inhabitants, one-third of
whom were of military age. These
Frenchmen made no attempt to
capture this harried group of Spanish
intruders. Instead, the leading
citizens warmly greeted the famed
guerrilla leader. The town treated the
band to lunch and furnished a guide
to ensure Mina's safe return through
the Pyrenees. Mina might as well
have been operating in a resort in-
stead of hostile territory. Napoleon
ordered the arrest of the town's prin-
cipal citizens, but he could prescribe
no remedy that would cure the
malaise infecting the frontier:'"
Interestingly enough, the par-
tisans inflicted this defeat with
marginal resources. A 3,000-man raid
into France lasting only a few days
easily might tie down several times
that number of imperial soldiers for
months. An incursion by only 100 or
200 men could paralyze battalions. Of
course, by the final year of the Penin-
sular War, nearly 35,000 partisans
were active along the frontier, so that
they were no longer conducting a
campaign with slender resources.
They had climaxed their effort to
hamstring French communications
and instill political unrest and
economic disruption in the border
departments, and they had converted
a guerrilla movement into a
triumphant Ulnventional operation.
Perhaps the most startling aspect
of the partisan activities in the
Pyrenees was that they shattered the
illusion of a secure metropolitan
France. With the eruption of
hostilities in the Peninsula, French
territory was subjected t.o foreign in-
vasion .. The conflict in Spain rapidly
converted France's southwestern
frontier into an active war theater,
one in which Napoleon's forces
struggled forlornly to preserve im-
perial communications and maintain
the inviolability of French soil. This
relatively obscure clash of arms raged
so fiercely that, as early as 1811, the
prefect of the department of Pyrenees-
Orientales was predicting a total
collapse in the district if'order was not
restored along the frontier. He
foretold of a barren wasteland, with
homeless families wandering across
ravaged fields and through burned
villages." If the prefect's gloomy
prophecy was not fulfilled completely,
the partisans, nevertheless, managed
Military Review
to cripple the economy, terrorize the
communes and drain the spirit of the
The war in Spain often has been
compared to an ulcer. an abscess that
steadily sapped the strength and
vitality of Napoleon's armies. The
contribution of the Spanish partisans
who fought in the heretofore ignored
Pyrenees of operations
deserve for complicating
the emperor's condition. For four
years, they were a major aggravation,
a nagging irritant to soldiers and
civilians alike, reminding them of the
terrible ordeal they were enduring in
behalf of Napoleon's voracious
appetite. I
1 Jose Gomez de Arteche y Mora,
Guerra de 1a independencia, historia mili-
tar de Espana de 1808 a 1814, Deposito
de la guerra, Madrid. Spain, 1886-1903,
14 Volumes.
2 Charles Oman, A History of the
Peninsular War, The Clarendon Press,
Oxford, Eng., 1902-30, Seven Volumes.
3 For the best analysis of the terrain
along the Franco-Spanish border, consult
Jose. Gomez de Arteche y Mora, Geo-
gratia histarico-militar de Espana y Portu-
gal, Aribau y Ca., Madrid, Spain, 1880,
pp 3443 passim; Oman, op. cit., Volume
I, pp 72-74 and 87-88, contains an
adequate account. For the adverse effects
of weather on the passes, consult the
Service historique de ['Armee (SHA),
Ancienne Section, Chateau de Vincennes,
carton C
29, Lomet to Clarke, 22 July
1809; and C
83, Vouillemont to Head-
quarters, 10th Military District, 26 Octo-
ber 1811. Also, Archives Nationales
(AN), carton AFiv 1632.2, Berthier to
Napoleon, 24 March 1812.
4 For example, see SHA CB 25, Ro-
quefery, commandant of Jaca, Rapport
sur la citadelle et place de Jaca, 23 April
5 SHA CB 28, Lomet to Hedouville,
16 June 1809; C
29, Lomet to Clarke, 11
July 1809; C
31, d'Agoult to Clarke, 3
July 1809; AN AFiv 1622.1
, Harispe to
Clarke, 4 June 1809; AFiv 1622.1
Lomet to Berthier, 13 June 1809; AFiv
, Suchet to Clarke, 19 August
.1809; AFiv 1622_1ii, Lomet to Suchet,
23 June 1809; AFiv 1618.1
, Clarke to
Napoleon, 4 July 1809; and SRA C
Suchet to Jourdan, 17 July 1809, and
October 1977
Lomet to Clarke, 22 July 1809.
6 For examples of French I generals'
overconfidence, consult SHA C
39, Su-
chot to Berthier, 11 January 1810; CB40,
Suchet to Berthior, 30 January 1810; and
40, d' Agoull to Berthier, 22, 24 and
28 JanUary 1810.
7 For elaboration of these military
pro bl ems, see Don W. Alexander,
cCFrench Military Problems in Counterin
surgent Warfare in Northeastern Spain,
1808-1813," Military 'Affairs, October
1976, p 117.
8 For some descriptions of these
fortresses, see SHA CB 25, Roquefery,
commandant of Jaca, Rappol't sUr la
citadelle et place de Jaca, 23 April 1809;
83, Vouillemont to Headquarters, 10th
Military District, 26 October 1811, con-
cerning the fort at St. Croix; C
Suchet to Berthier, 30 December 1811,
for the condition of the fort at Benasque;
AN AFiv 1635.1
, Clarke to Napoleon, 2
September 1813, for the condition of
Bellegarde and Mont Louis. Some strong-
points, like Viella, were erected during
the war to control the passes. See Corres
pondance inedite de Napoleon fer, con-
servee aux Archives de la Guerre, Edited
by Ernest Picard and Louis Teu tey, Five
Volumes, Honore Champion, Paris,
France, 1903, Volume III, Decision. 2
December 1810, Number 4875, p 923;
and SHA, Montesquieu, Report, Aran
Valley, 11 March 1811.
9 The supply difficulties which the
French encountered in Spain are well-
recorded. For examples of the particular
problems confronting the forces in the
Pyrenees, consult SRA CB 25, Roquefery,
Rapport sur la citadelle et place de Jaca,
23 April 1809; C
27, Lomet to Clarke,
20 May 1809; C
28, Hedouville to
Clarke, 9 June 1809; C
40, Vouillemont
to Clarke, 30 January 1810; C
41, 3d
Bureau, Ministry of War, 15 February
1810; C
45, 3d Bureau, Ministry of War
to Suchet, 1 April 1810; C
67, Montes-
quieu, Report, Aran Valley, 11 March
1811; and AN AFiv 1633.6, Berthier to
Napoleon, 7 March 1812. For the trans-
port problems, see SHA C
96, Caffarelli
to Clarke, 27 May 1812. For the diffi-
culty of a smaIl garrison in combal with
the j:{UerriBas, see Correspondanc{' de
po/eon [cr, pllbU':c par ordre de l'Empe-
reur NapoleJn 1//, 32 Volumes, Paris,
France, 1858-70, Volume XXI, Napoleon
to Clarke, 10 August 1810, Number
16783, l' 33; also, AN AFiv 1622.1
Lome't to I-Iedouville, 3 June 1809. .
'10 SHA C
40, Suche! to Berthicr, 24
January 1810; C
6S, Suchet to Berthier,
31 March 181l, C
81, Vouillemont to
Hpadquarlers, 10th Military District, J
Novembl'r 1811; and C
102, Quesnel to
Clarke, 13 November 1812.
11 For the most profound criticism of
the natiol1<l1 guard, consult the corre-
spondence of An Loine Lomet, comman-
dant of Jac., both in the SHA and AN;
see SHA C
53, Headquarters, 10th
Military District, to Ministry of War, 13
August 1810.
12 SUll C
28, I-Iedouville to Clarke,
16 June 1809; and C
40, Suchet to
Bcrthier, 30 January 1810.
13 SHA C
66, Clarke to Napoleon, 17
February 1811.
14 Napoleon to Clarke, Oetober 1810,
Correspondance ilu!ditc de Napoleon IeI',
Edited by Ernest Picard and Louis Teu-
tey, Volume 2, Number 4690, PI' 818-19.
15 Napoleon to Clarke, Correspon-
dallce de Napoleon i
, Volume 23, Num-
ber 18309, PI' 54-55.
16 Note pour Ie Ministre de la GueTre,
sur un projet d'organisation de la Garde
Nationale, 6 March 1812, Correspoll-
dance, de Napoleon jcr, Volume 23, Num-
ber 18549, pp 281-86.
17 Consult Don W. Alexander "The
Impact of Guerrilla Warfare in Spain on
French Combat Strength," forthcoming
in The Proceedings of tlze COllsortium all
Reuo[utiona,'Y Europe, Univer;;ity of
Florida Press, Gainesville, FL.
18 AN AFiv 1632.2, Berthier to Na-
poleon, 7 January 1812; Napoleon to
Clarke, 15 Deeember 1809, Carrespon-
dance de fer, Volume 20
ber 16051, PI' 64-65; Napoleon to Clarke,
10,11 and 18 June and 21 October 1811,
Correspondance de Napoleon Jer, Volume
22, Numbers 17791, 17793, 17817 and
18185, PI' 222-23, 226-28, 247-51 and
514; Napoleon to Clarke, 28 May and 13
June 1812, Correspandanee de Napa/eon
, Volume 23, Numbers 18735 and
18786, PI' 447 and 486; and Napoleon to
Clarke, 8 July 1812, Carrespandance de
Napobion fer, Volume 24, Number
18927, PI' 34-35.
19 For complaints of this policy, see
107, Buquet to Berthier, 20 April
1813; C
65, Suchet to Berthier, 8 Febru-
ary 1811; C
90, Observations d'un Offi-
del' sur les Regiments de marche, by
Cornman de,', 5th Battalion, 103d Regi-
ment, Army of the South, February
1812; C
94, Roussel to St. Cyr Nugues,
18 April 1812; C
102, Thouvenot to
Clarke, 9 November 1812; and C8103,
Caffarelli to Clarke, 12 Deeember 1812.
20 For the importance of defending
this sector, see SHA C
47, Dufour to
Berthier, 11 May 1810; and C
59, Reille
to Berthier, 15 November 1810.
21 SHA C
62, Berthier to Clarke, 28
22 SHA C
65, Clarke to Berthier, 3
February 1811; and C
66, Clarke to
Napoleon, 17 February 1811.
23 SHA C
68, Berthier to Reille, 25
March 1811; C
69, Buquet to Clarke, 3
April 1811; and C
70, Berthier to Reille,
18 April 1811.
24 SHA C
69, Reille to Berthier, 5
April 1811; and C
71, Reille to Berthier,
Military Review
25 SHA C
74, Clarke to Napoleon, 27
June 1811; C
77, Berthier to Reille, 5
August 1811; and C
87, Berthier to
Dorsenne, 28 December 1811; for the
battle which occurred in June, see C
Monthion to Berthier, 30 June 1811.
26 For the Battle of Sangiiesa and the
anticipation of aid from the Bastan garri-
son, see SHA C
B7, Bcrthier to Dorsenne,
28 December 1811; and C
88, Abbeand
Dorsenne to Berthier I 15 Jan u ary 1812.
27 SHA C
98, 3d Bureau, Ministry of
War to Suchet, 25 Jul;; 1812.
28 SHA C
102, Buquet to Berthier,
13 November 1812; >Or the development
of the Bastan-Roncal region into a major
base, consult the previously mentioned
correspondence of General Buquct and
249, Registry of the Correspondence
of General Clausel, for the months of
April and May 1813.
29 SHA C
48, Vouillemont to Ber-
thier, 27 May 1810; C
52, Vouillemont
to Clarke, 23 July 1810; C
53, Vouille-
mont to Berthier, 4 August 1810; C
Vouillemont to Clarke, 5 September
1810; C
56, 3d Bureau, Ministry of War
to Vouillemont, 22 September 1810; and
58, Vouillemont to Clarke, 21 October
30 Napoleon to Clarke, 10 August
1810, Correspondance de Napoleon fer,
Volume 21, Number 16783, p 33; SHA
54, 3d Bureau, 10th Military District,
to Ministry of War, 22 August 1810;
57, Headquarters, 10th Military Dis-
trict, to the Ministry of War, 1 October
1810, with attached note by Garreau,
dated 27 September 1810; CB 57, Prefect,
Pyr.;nees-Orien tales, to the Minister of
the Interior, 8 October 1810; and Head-
quarters, 10th Military District, to Minis-
ter of War, 12 October 1812.
31 Napoleon to Cla"ke, 21 and 28
November 1810, Correspondance de Na-
poltfon [eI", Volume 21, Number 17170,
pp 281 and 294; Napoleon to Clarke, 10
October and 14 November 1810, Corres-
pondance, ine'dite de Napoie:Jn Jer, Ed-
ited by Ernest Picard and Louis Teutey,
Volume 3, Numbers 4690 and 4817, pp
October 1977
818-19 and 890; and SHA C
61, Clarke
to MacDonald, 5 December 1810.
32 SHA C
79, Montesquieu to Clarke,
23 August 1811; Oman, op. cit., Volume
4, p 539; and Napoleon to Berthier, 22
August 1811, Correspondance de Napo-
leon fer, Volume 22, Number 18066, pp
33 For detail!? of these engagements,
see SHA C
83, Cicopieri to BellaH, 18
October 1811; C
88, Caffarelli to Ber-
thier, 9 January. 1812; C
88, Abbe to
Berthier, 15 January 1812; AN AFiv
16.33_3, BerthiCl' to Napoleon, 22 January
1812; AFiv 1631.1
;, Berthier to Napo-
leon, 3 November 1811; SI-IA C
Bcrlhicr lo DOl"Senne, 28 December 1811;
Napoleon to Berthier, 5 January 1812,
Drrnieres letires inedites de Napo/Con Jer,
Edited by Leon de Bratonne, Two Vol-
umes, Honore CI:tampion, Paris, France,
1903, Volume 2, Number 988, p 394;
and SHA C
88, Caffarelli to Berthier, 9
and 13 January 1812.
34 Oman, op .. cil .. Volume 5, p 93;
and SHA C
84, Vouillemont to Head-
quarters, 10th Military District, I and
15 November 1811, describes tlie raid of
October 1811; s ~ C
91, Commandant,
Perpignan, to Berthier, 16 February
1812; Gomez de Arteche V Mora,
GuC'rra ele fa independcncia, hisiaria mili-
tar de ESPQlia de 1808 a 1814, op. cit..
Volume 12, pp 340-42; and Oman, op.
cil., Volume 5, p 99, for the raid of
January 1812.
35 The quotation is from Napoleon to
Clarke, 6 December 1811, Correspoll-
dance de Napo[(.on leI', Volume 23, Num-
be,' 18309, pp 54-55. Also, see Note pour
Ie MinistI-c de la Guerre, sur un projet
d'organisation de la Garde Nationale, 6
March 1812, Correspondance de Napo-
leon fer, Volume 23, Number 18549, pp
281-86, and, from the same volume,
Napoleon to Clarke, 2 April 1812, Num-
ber 18625, p 353.
36 Napoleon to Clarke, 29 February
1812, 27 and 28 May 1812 and 13 June
1812, Correspondance de Nap0!Co'l Ier,
Volume 23, Numbers 18531, 18730,
18785 and 18786, pp 260-63, 439, 447
and 486.
37 For the organization and mission
of these forces, see AN AFiv 1632.1,
Berthier to Napoleon, 14 January 1812;
AFiv 1632,2, Berthier to Napoleon, 26
January 1812; SHA C
89, Berthier to
Reille, 26 January 1812; C
91, Berthier
to Reille, 25 February 1812; C
92, Berth-
ier to Reille, 1 and 9 March 1812;
Napoleon to Berthier, 8 Match 1812,
Correspondancc de Napo/eon jer, Volume
23, Number 18557, p 296; and Napoleon
to Clarke, 4 March 1812, Dernicres leltres
inedites de Napoleon [f>r, Edited by Leon
de Brotonne, Volume 2, Number 1000,
p 400.
38 Napoleon to Clarke, J6 June J812,
Correspondancc de Napoleon j{>I', Volume
23, Number 18806, p 501.
39 For an accurate appra;sal of the
French defeat at Sangilcsa, scp SHA
91, Suchet to Berth;er, 25 February
1812, and C
269, Reille to Severoli, ]6
February 1812; for the dcfeat at Roda,
;ee C
269, Reille to Suchet, 8, 9 and 12
March 1812; C
92, Reille to Berthier, 14
March 1812; C
357, Situation Report, 3d
Corps, 16 March 1812; and AN AFiv
1633,6, Berthier to Napoleon, 9 March
and 6 April 1812, The defeat at Sangiiesa
was the second setback suffered at this
location wilhin two months.
40 Thl' testimony to the collapse is
almost QverwhC!lming, Cited arc a few
examples. SHA C
97, Suchet to Reille,
11 June 1812; C
98, Buquet to Clarke,
10 July 1812; C
99, Buquet to Clarke,
14 August 1812; C
99, Thiebault to
Clarke, 31 August 1812; CB270, Reille to
Suchet, 29 October 1812; C
104, Suchet
to Clarke, 19 January 1813, with en-
closed extracts from Henriod to Suchet;
104, Henriod to Mathieu, 2 and 8
January 1813; AN AFiv 1634.4, Report,
Prefect of Pyre'mies-Orien tales, 20 March
1813; and AFiv 1634.3, Clarke to Napo-
leon, 12 March 1813. For Napoleon's
continuing concern, see Napoleon to
Clarke, 13 March 1813, Correspondance
de' Napoleon l<r, Volume 25, Number
19709, p 74. For the raids from Cata-
lonia, see Francisco Copons y Navia,
Memorias de [os anos de 1814 y 1820 al
1824, ,Edited by Francisco de Copons,
Navia, y Asprer, Santiago RodrIguez,
Madrid, Spain, 1858, PI' 20-21.
41 This conversion nearly paralleled
the collapse along the frontier, and the
testimony is just as extensive. See SHA
100, Decaen to SUch"t, 14 September
1812; C
102. Buquet to Berthier, 13
November 1812; CB270, Reille to Suehet,
29 October 1812; CB 104. Decaen to
Clarke. Extract, 14 January 1813. with
attached letter, Henriod to Mathieu, 8
January 1813; C
102, Thouvenot to
Clarke, 27 November 1812; C
100, Bu-
quet to Clarke, 10 September 1812; and
105, Suchet to Clarke, 27 February
42 For the refusal to move with less
than 7,000 men, see SHA G
100, Decaen
to Suchet, 14 September 1812; for Mina's
spectacular triumphs over a 12,OOO-man
army in Navarre, see SHA C
249, Clausel,
Registry of Correspondence, for the pep
riod of March through May 1813.
43 This attitude spanned the duration
of the conflict. See SHA CB 59, Report,
7th Corps, 7 November 1810; and AN
AFiv 1634.4, Rcport, Prefect of Pyre-
nees-Orientales, 20 March 1813,
44 AN F7 6513. Suchet to Savary. 22
November 1810 and 10 December 1811;
79, Reille to Berthier, 22 August 1811;
and C
72, Reille to Berthier, 24 May
45 Napoleon to Savary, 13 October
1811, and Napoleon to Clarke, 23 Octo-
ber 1811, Lettres inedites de Napoleon
l"r (an VII-1815!, Edited by Leon Leces-
tre, Two Volumes, Plan, Nourrit, Cie,
Paris, France, 1897, Volume 2, Numbers
881 and 888; and Napoleon to Berthier,
21 August 1811, Demi;;res lettres inedites
de Napozeon l
, Edited by Leon de
Brotonne, Volume 2, Number '885, p
46 AN F7 6513, Savary to Napoleon, 7
June 1811; SHA C
67, Buquet to Ber-
thier, 15 March 1811; C
67, Reille to
Berthier, 14 March 1811; and Napoleon
to Savary, 2 April 1811, Lettres inedites
de Napoleon 1er, Edited by Leon Leces-
tre, Volume 2, Number 788.
47 AN F7 6513, Prefect, Department
of Pyremies-Orientales, to Savary, 14 Au-
gust 1811.
Military Review
HE strategic, as distinct from
, political, dangers which confront
Austra/Ja are not clanfied by "threat
scenanos"-that is, by attempting to
determine whence this or that threat
will come What matters is the fact 1hat
this country's strategic environment IS
becoming increasingly hostile, so that
where threats once were barely con-
ceivable, they now are very conceivable
indeed and must be guarded against-
not merely by a sufficiency of weapons,
but by a sufficiency of weapons
available in time, Even five years has
become a very long period of time in
world politics, yet few relevant weapon
systems have less than eight to ten
years lead time,
The year 1968 marked the historic
turning point in the security problems of
the countries of Southeast Asia, Prior to
1968, the major contestants for power
and Influence in the region were the
United States and Communist China,
with the Soviet Union playing a
relatlvely'mlnor role, That strategic en-
vironment fundamentally was favorable
to Australia, and any, Australian
Govr;>rnment which" for purely selfish
reasons" did not try to keep the United
States involved in the affairs of
Southeast Asia would have been utterly
recreant to its responsibilities, With
1968, however, came the Tet offensive,
the spread of civil dissension in the
United States, the forced de facto ab-
dication of President Johnson and the
beginning of the withdrawal of
American military forces from Vietnam,
The process which began that year was
completed in the utter defeat of 1975,
and the subsequent removal of all
American military power from mainland
Southeast Asia, Every step since taken
Condensed from ASian Afta"s' An American Review, January/February 1977. Copyrrght ,'-' 1977 by the Amellean-
ASian Educational Exchange, Inc,
, October 1977
by the Washington Government clearly
indicates that the United States has no
vital strategic interests In the region
that it will not trade for greater strategic
interests elsewhere.
After the defeat in Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia In April 1975, the major
contestants for dominance in Southeast
ASia have become the Soviet Union and
Communist China, with the United
States now plaYing a greatly reduced
role Potentially. the region thus has
been transformed into the Balkans of
the 20th Century, with Moscow and
Peking plaYing the role which czarist
RUSSia and Austria-Hungary playeq In
the Eyropean Balkans in the 19th. The
essential difference is that, whereas a
century ago Australia was 10,000 miles
from the real Balkans, today we are
close to the epicenter of the storm The
problem of defense capability, therefore,
becomes real and pressing.
Since Australia at present has no
defense capability at all, it is driven to
base Its national security, not on its own
military capability, but on its foreign
policies But a foreign policy that is no!
based on a commensurate defense
capability is, In the last analysis, little
more than words
The foreign policy of the present
government is based upon two
positions. First, it is clearly re-
emphasizing the Importance of the
American alliance for Australia's
security. Second, It is giving not merely
tacit, but open, support to Peking in its
contest with the Soviet Union, on the
assumption that the Soviets represent
B. A. Santamaria is a television
news analyst and authority on
Australian foreign relations, es-
pecially with South and East Asia.
\.. ~
the greater danger-today, at the level
of the conflict between the super-
powers; tomorrow, if it successfully
establishes' Itself. in Southeast Asia
Itself. Both positiohs are senSible, and I
support them as far as they are safe for
Australia to support them. Yet I submit
that, at this point, they are being made
to carry far greater weight than either of
them is capable of carrying and that,
unless we clearly understand this,
Australia will find itself in deep trouble
My theme In relation to the
American alliance can be expressed
Simply. The damage done to Australia
through the policy of attacking and
antagonizing the United States is self-
eVident We may do equal damage by
exaggerating the ultimate certainties of
the Australia, New Zealand, United
States (ANZUSI Pact.
It is, I believe, common ground that,
Since the Tet offensive in Vietnam and
the "abdication" of President Johnson,
both In 1968, the reliability of the
United States as an ally has declined
fundamentally. But, even before that
date, there was an "important gloss or
qualification on the ultimate value of the
American alliance ~ far as Australia
was concerned. Some Australian com-
mentators attempted to make the point
from the early 1960s when Indonesia
was determined to absorb Dutch New
Guinea, but they were aware that the
audience was not listening. The essence
of that earlier problem was that, even
while the United States was still a
strong and cohesive community before
the Vietnam disaster, it had very
different strategic priorities from
To Australia, Southeast Asia is
everything; to the United States, it
Military Review
was-and is-marginal. Even in the
past, it never could be taken for granted
that America would intervene in
Southeast ASia, even If Australia faced
an incontrovertible threat to its security
Still less could it be taken for granted
that the United States would intervene
Simply because Australia felt that more
general Australian interests were at
risk. ANZUS simply had to be balanced
against other American interests and
; Long before Indonesla's takeover of
Dutch New GUinea, thoughtful
observers pOinted out that, if Australia
and Indonesia were at odds over the
future of the Dutch territory, it was
inevitable that the United States would
support Indonesia against Australia
simply because Indonesia ~ far more
important to the United States. That
was, in fact, what occurred. The point
was made then, and demonstrated then.
It remains true today, even in relation to
a future conflict of interest between
Australia and Indonesia. It will be
doubly true in the event of a future
conflict of interest between Australia
and Japan. Should such a conflict of
interest eventuate, there is no doubt
that the United States would attempt to
mediate. If mediation failed, there is no
conceivable way-without a world
transformation-in which the United
States could prefer Japan's defeat to
Since 1968, a far more critical factor
has entered into the equation: the sub-
stantial weakening of political authority
in the United States, the decline of what
former Secretary Kissinger repeatedly
referred to as America's "political will."
Vietnam, Watergate, the Central In-
telligence Agency "revelations" have
done their deadly work. And the most
important consequence of this dis-
integration of political au/hority has
been that it has torn up whatever basic
October 1977
logic there was in Kissinger's p'olicy of,
From the beginning, Kissinger
pOinted out that la soundly conceived
policy of detente depended, among
other factors, on the subordinate doc-
trine of "linkage," Detente implied that
the United States would make con-
cessions in the one field rn which, even
rn the late 1960s, it was clearly
superior-nuclear armaments. But
American restrarnt in this field, in.
K,ssrnger's view, needed to be "linked"
quite strictly with Soviet "good
behavIor" in areas like Southeast Asia,
the Middle East and Africa where it
possessed perceptible advantages.
If the Soviets violated basic Western
interests in those areas, the United
States would respond suitably. Detente,
as they now say, was to be a two way
street A sUlt"ble response did not
necessarily mean a military response
and, therefore, hostilities If the Western
World had not. srnce 1970, exported
over 50 million tons of cereal grain to
the Soviet Union and ItS satellites, plus
much of ItS most modern technology
and financed the transactions With
Western credit to the extent of 540
billion, the Soviets could not have con-
structed their immense war machine by
spendrng 13 to 15 percent of their gross
national product on war preparations,
while stili keeprng their peoples rela-
tively satisfied
The sad truth is that the United
States no longer has this power of
suitable response. What is even more
dangerous to its allies, Washington has
been caught bluffing: in the Middle East
in 1973 when the United States sub-
mitted to a virtual Soviet ultimatum in
the October War; in Vietnam in 1974-
75; in Angola in 1976. As a result, the
United States has developed the habit of
trading space for time. The time is
reputedly the time needed to recover its
national political will. The space.that is
traded is the territorial space of
America's allies and friends.
It is unfortunate that, in order to gain
lime, the Americans constantly bring
pressure, not upon their potential
enemies, but upon their allies. They did
it to South Vietnam. General Van Tien
Dung, who commanded the final North
Vietnamese attack on South Vi'etnam,
has written that the decision to launch
the attack was made in 1974 when the
North Vietnamese realized that the
United States had permitted South
Vietnam's supply situation to become
imitnevable. They did It to the South
in 1976 when the latter .:vere
encouraged to enter Angola and then
had the rug pulled out from under their
I am not crillcizing the Americans. It
is not easy to propose any other policy
for the United Slates in today's
situation. I am simply stating that this is
what the real situation is, and that we
do no good to ourselves or anyone else
to pretend that it IS otherwise.
The policy of t;ading space for time
has gone furthest in Africa where
recent US policy has a very direct
significance for Australia. The United
States evidently believes that the Soviet
Union no longer sees much risk in
offering military support to its Marxist
clients in Southern Africa, even to the
point of sending in its Cuban
mercenaries. Consequently, more likely
than not, black regimes will come to
power in Southern Africa. The only real
choice facing the United States is to
determine how, when thiS has
happened, it.can still maintain access to
the raw materials hitherto mobilized by
Western corporations. The alternative is
that these raw materials, preeminently
the gold and diamonds of South Africa
and the chrome of Rhodesia, will fall
into 'Soviet hands through their client
regimes. The control of raw materials
either by the Soviet or by the West,
thro'ugh their respective client
minoritiesl IS what it is all about.
Once Rhodesia, and South Africa
have been eliminated, it requires no
great imaginative power to foresee that
Australia must come into the sights of
the dominant Afro-Asian group in the
United Nations. Who can guarantee that
the United States, preoccupied with its
domestic problems, while still guardedly
proclaiming its limited interpretation of
its ANZUS obligations, will not tell
Australia that it has to make the same
necessary "adjustments"? Just as
Kissinger forced Prime Minister - Ian
Smith of Rhodesia to yield by showing
him Western intelligence assessments
of his own poor prospects, now that he
could no longer receive Western aid, a
different secretary of state can recite
the same lesson to Australia. If
Australia should prove more recalcitrant
than RhodeSia, Washington need only
make clear that is would not intervene
against hostile ships that might in-
terfere with Australia-bound tankers in
the Indian Ocean.
I h'ave devoted what is perhaps a
disproportionate amount of space to
conSidering the limitations which logic
imposes on the American alliance, for
one reason. The first postulate on which
the Australian Government's foreign
policy rests-the reality of the American
alliance-is extremely shaky. It may be
necessary to make the American con-
nection the hinge of Australian foreign
policy. But it is extremely unwise to tell
Australians, who, in any event, need no
lessons in how to delude themselves,
that the connection really will take us
very far. The Israelis have a very
powerful electorate working for them in
the United States, which we have not.
But even the Israelis do not delude
themselves as to its limitations.'
Militaty Review
The second postulate of the present
government's foreign policy-that of
tacitly supporting Peking against
Moscow, on the supposition that
Moscow ultimately represents the
greater danger-is right, but only up to a
point, It rests on even more shaky
ground. In the present power struggle m
China, the Australian Government
cannot be entirely sure with whom it IS
dealing. Even less does It know whether
Hua Kuo-feng, or whoever else is in
charge today, will maintain his power
for very long. It is certainly in no
position to say whether he will continue
the quarrel with the Soviet Union.
America's opening to Peking is ob-
viously extremely important to the
chinese regime since the United States.
is a major military power, Australia's is
of barely marginal importance. We
would, therefore, do well to heed
Kissinger's careful words about the
Chinese relationship, even for the
modest object of retaming the good
opinion of the Chinese themselves:
The Chinese have been in business
as a major country for 4,000 years. They
did not survive that long by letting
themselves be used by
foreigners. , .. Much as we value our
relationship to China, it cannot
determine all our other policies. We
must pursue those in our national in-
terest, neither using the Chinese nor
letting them use us.
If it is unwise for the United States to
go beyond these principles, it is cer-
tainly unsafe for Australia to do so,
For example, Chinese support for
Southeast Asian insurgencies has not
been dissipated by their "assurances"
to this country, That support is flatly
opposed to Australia's interest which is
to have stable Southeast Asian states, It
weakens our position with the Asian
OctDber 1977
nations even to imply that Peking has
changed. They know it has not, and can
only conclude that we are simple, The
policy becomes all the more doubtful
when our protestations of friendship for
Peking-which being empty can do
neither Peking nor Australia much
good-cause difficulties with Indonesia,
for example, which is of direct illJpor-
tance to Australia,
The clear lesson IS that there IS no
substitute for a self-reliant defense
capability based on a high level of
domestic production of all types of
military hardware. Nations with a small
population, but with a high level of
technological development-such as
Sweden, Israel and Taiwan-have
shown that this is perfectly feasible both
economically and technologically, Nor is
there any mystery about the basic
structure of the. defense system which
must evolve once the principle of self-
reliance has been accepted.
The critical question for Austra lia
relates to that most intangible of
qualities-political will. As to this, I
agree With Raymond Aron when he
In my opinion, our politicians could
ask much more of the people than they
do today People could and would un-
derstand and accept much more if the
politicians deCided to speak a different
language, Our politicians believe
they must present themselves to the
public as some kind of supermen. They
fail to see the harmfulness of that way
of behaving; they do not realIZe they are
using a technique that basically works
against them. If they were more modest
and more honest, they would impress
ordinary people much more and would
be able to call for greater sacrifices from
"An InterView With Raymond Aron," En-
counter, October 1976. p 64
93 in the US-USSR-China Military
Strategic Power Structure
By JU"rgen Bennecke
Europaische W"hrkunde, May 1977
(West Germany)
This analysis of the three big powers
deals with NATO, Warsaw Pact forces and
China in terms of the military power
resources of the three blocs, their military
strategic relationship and Europe's situ
ation within this structure.
The military potential of China lies in
the sheer numbers of manpower ilvailablc,
to the land forces in the form of militia.
This tcndsto compensate for its obsolete,
inadequate and weak equipment and sea
and air forces. China has the capability
but not the industrial power necessary for
producing modern weapons although it
docs have a nuclear warhead arsenal
estimated at 300.
In terms of nuclear arms, NATO and
Warsaw Pact forces have probably
achieved parity with a balance between
NATO superiority in numbers of war-
heads and Warsaw Pact superiority in
mega tonnage. Warsaw Pact land forces arc
trained, equipped and structured for
rapid offense and outnumber NATO land
forces which arc geared for defense.
NATO also is not standardized in equip-
ment, tactical doctrine or training, and
some of the member nations arc slowly
approaching the militia stage. Despite the
growing threat of the Red Fleet, NATO is
stil) qualitatively stronger than the War-
saw Pact in the air and on the sea. NATO
October 1977
also has about 200 million mOre people
and better economic, <lnd productive
The military strategy of the Warsaw
Pact, more especially that of the USSR,
cannot be called defensive. For about 600
years, Russia has been an expansionistic
imperium, Over the years, its targets have
shifted from Eurasian to mOre global
pursuits, the strongest indication of
which is its enormous amounts of miliw
tary weapons and equipment. Rather
than directly attempting to break through
China's "people power" or NATO's de-
fense forces, the Soviets try to <1ssimilate
through other means targets which are
less obviously dangerous.
NATO's military strategy is defensive
due to the moral nature of its people.
NATO reacts to Soviet strategic moves
direqly in specific a'reas and on a global
scale as required. The new US strategic
reaction to the ideological aggression of
Soviet IIpcaceful coexistence" is human
rights. Other possibilities for countering
aggressive Soviet strategy arc in the eco-
nomic and financial tlTeaS <1l1d could
include terminating deliveries of food and
technology. Military stra tegie reaction
could make usc of the air and sea forces
of NATO countries in key geographical
locations to counter Soviet shows of
aggression in those or nearby areas. This
defensive strategy would tend to make
surprise attacks very difficult and would
confine worldwide military operations (at
least in the beginning) principally to the
seas. This would be less dangerous for
civilian populations, especially in the
event of nuclear detonations. Of course,
in its defense preparations, NATO cannot
depend entirely on its air and sea forces.
The extent to which NATO should
strengthen its conventional land forces
has been discussed hundreds "f times-.JI
that is lacking is the political will to take
the necessary steps.
In the power struggle between the
United States. the USSR and China,
Europe could play a decisive role in
preventing Soviet hegemon y from spread-
ing over Western Europe by supporting
the Chinese defense efforts against the
Soviet Union. This support could be
financial or in the form of weapons in
order to close the gap between Soviet ;md
Chinese levels of sophistication. If China
accepted such "'pport (which may be
doubtful), the situation would turn into a
classical two-front strategy and would
take considerable pressure off Europe.
Such a strategy could be in the mill
already. Recent indications arc that China
apparently is scck,ng closer tics with
Western Europe and is against the Soviet
Union-Japan relationship.
However .Jluring a military collabora-
tion with China might seem at first
glance, there arc still several valid op-
posing arguments to be taken into con-
sideration. It would be hard to coordinate
a two-front strategy with Western (par-
ticularly American) detente policy and
with German Ostpolitik. ~ i n a also
would not be too enthusiastic about an
acceleration of Soviet-American arms
limitation negotiations. The pressure on
the Russians of a two-front strategy
might trigger just that overt reaction
which China and NATO arc trying to
avoid. Then would come the tricky ques-
tion of ' to what extent the front not
directly under attack would really be
willing to support the other.
Several political observers are of the
opinion th'at the Soviet Union is at the
beginning of serious economic setbacks
and increasing political opposition from
within and from other Communist coun-
tries. Either the Soviet Union will change
course toward a sort of democratization
(which would cut down Soviet aggressive
tendencies) or it will tighten the reins. It
wil1 then experience even more problems
with its agriculture, technology and ideo-
logy also causing reduced aggression
through loss of a power base. If these
experts arc right and if such is the casc,
then a two-fron t strategy against the
Soviets would be a step in the wrong
direction. This would be espedally true
if, .IS Russia weakened, China continued
to gain in technology, equipment, weap-
ons, raw material, reserves and influence
in the Third World.
Although there is not much evidence
that it will happen, China could also
collapse because of internal power strug-
gles, leaving the burden of defense against
the Soviet Union entirely with the West.
Battlefield of the 19905:
It's Not Sci-Fi, It's Real
US News and World Report
4 July 1977
This article is reflective of what scien-
tists and analysts in the military'S advance
research programs think the battlefield of
the fu ture rna y resemble-electronically
controlled tanks, laser death rays, un-
manned attack helicopters and brain wave
control. The only trouble with these
predictions is that some people may think
the systems arc available now or in the
near future, thus in9irectly having a
Military Review
negative impact on funds for research .Ind
development. The staff writer for this
article obviously had no gr"sp of the
weapons development process, for, even
though some of the ideas arc technologi-
cally possible, placing their usc in the
time fr"me of the 1990s is a bit
Withdrawal of US Troops From Korea?
By Senator George McGovern and
Gen Richard Stilwell
AEI Defense Review, Number 2
This is the topic of the second issue of
the ,American En terprise Institu tc's new
defense papers, "nd, following their
stated design, a pro and con deb.tte is
presented by experts on the subject.
McGovern, who favors immediate with-
dra wal, bases his reasons en tircly on a
policy of nonsupport to the Park regime.
Stilwell, the recently retired commander
of UN forces in Korea, prescn ts a more
balanced case for maintaining the status
quo. The decision has been made, of
course, but, nevertheless. the argument is
Some Thoughts on Guerrilla Warfare
By R. Planche
Revue Miliraire Suisse
April and May 1977 (Switzerland)
This two-part article deals with guer-
rilla warfare in terms of origins, lessons
learned in World War II, international
legalities, influencing factors and prepara-
tions for guerrilla warfare, both urban
and rural. A nice package on the subject.
Outmoded Ships in the Soviet Navy
By Geoffrey Jukes
Marine-Rundschau, January 77
(West Germany)
The ,wthor thinks that Soviet ship-
building oVer the past three decades
indicates more of a reactionary Or
"catchup" 1l.IV,tl policy than one of
c:'l.p<lI1sionism. The ratio of new construc-
tions to obsolete ships due for moderniza-
tion, decommissioning or scrapping in the
USSR points to a balance of sea power
that will favor the United States as early
itS 1980.
Military Service, Training
and Mobilization in Israel
By Peter Forster
ASMZ, February 1977 (Switzerland)
Becausc it has becn combat tested and
because it makes the state a reality, the
Israeli Armed Forces have' become an
example for many. Exceptional charts,
pictures and statistics help provide a
realistic look at the status of Israel's
Armed Forces today. Emphasis is on the
draft, training <\11d mobilil.ation and the
prevailing .tttitudes of Israelis regarding
their military.
Women in the Military
Armees d'aujourd'hui
June 1977 (France)
This issue of A rmees d ',mjoHrd 'hrd
focuses primarily on women in the mili-
tary, past, present and future. It is di-
rected particularly toward France, with
commentaries by, for and about women
in today's armed forces.
These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort is made to ensure
curate translatIOn and summarization. However, for more detailed accounts, readers should
fer to the original articles. NC? official endorsement of the views, opinions, or factual statements
in these items is intended or should be inferrcd.-The Editor.
October 1977
Under Study
Use of Women in the Military. This study by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics was
completed in May 1977. It examines the performance and potential of enlisted
women in meeting Department of Defense (DOD) manpower requirements and
combat effectiveness. Noting two results from the recruitment of morc
womcn---tluality and savings--thc study reports that the average woman recruit is
brighter, more likely to have a high school diploma, smaller and not as strong as
the average male recruit. The carefully written study also reports women arc
being retained at a slightly higher rate than men in recent experience, arc less
likely to be disciplioary problems'and arc being promoted along with men. DOD
notes the incompleteness of the Army's recent "Women in the Army Study" and
appears to .recommend th:lt the Army plan to recruit more women thanl now
programed. Only the Navy provided dat. comparing time lost for men and
women; the data showed that men have nCClrly twice as much bad time as their
female cOllnterparts. The study is the best soUrce available for factual data on
the while pointing out the many areas which need more study and
Family of Scatterable Mines Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
(FASCAM COEA). Historically, emplaced mines have proved to be an effective
and efficient obstacle system, but the conventional minefields required
significant effort, skill and time to emplace. A more rapid system of emplacing
mines was conceived several years ago, the incorporation of which will add a new
dimellSion to mine warfare and the mechanized battlefield. FASCAM will allow
m.ineficlds to be emplaced quickly in response to;.l committed enemy force. The
systems that have evolved under the FASCAM program are now in various stages
of development. and previous studies have indicated they arc cost-effective.
However, the introduction of new threat information and new tactics, price
changes and the advent of potential new delivery systems required the
be reassessed to ensure that FASCAM systems continue to be
operationally effective and economically feasible when compared with the'
alternatives. The objectives of the current study. which is being completed this
month, was to analyze the alternative systems, recommend the preferred mix of
FASCAM delivery systems employed by combat units and identify the changes
in force effectiveness associated with the introduction of the weapons in a
mid-intensity environment in 1982. The study employed the Europe I. sequence
2A scenario and a base case (control) alternative of conventional mines and the
M56 helicopter mine delivery system. FASCAM alternatives considered were the
Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering System, XM128, the Remote Antiarmor Mine
.System. XM718/741, the Artillery Delivered Antipersonnel Mine, XM692/731,
the Surface-Launched Unit Mine Rocket System, the US Air Force GATOR
Scatterable Mine System and the General Support Rocket System with
FASCAM warhead. The results of the study will be used to support development
acceptance review decisions.
Military Review
An entire family of engineer construction
equipment started government prototype qual
ificatio'n tests this past summer at Fort Belvoir,
Va. Called the Family of Military Engineer
Construction Equipment {FAMECEl. the
equipment is programed to replace many pieces
of construction equipment presently in the
Army inventory,
The machinery was designed and developed
by the Clark Equipment Company of Benton
Harbor, Mich., to increase the capabilities of
airmobile, airborne and other combat engineer
The Tank Automotive Research and oevel
opment Command has initiated a program to
buy a new combat support vehicle to replace
present wheeled vehicles that carry the TOW
missile-the MI51 jeep (nonairmobile support)
and the M274 Mule (airmobile support). With
the Army anxious to field the unit quickly, the
new program has started at a brisk pace.
Requests for proposals were issued in August.
The vehicle, which will be highly mobile and
The equipment consists of a common power
section which may be Coupled with any of eight
working sections. The working sections are
designed to perform as dozers, loaders, dump
ers, distributors, graders, scrapers and two
The FAMECE vehicles are selfpropelled and
have a road speed in excess of 30 miles per hour
for convoy movement. They were designed to
weight and size standards w ~ i h will permit
transportation in and parachuting from Air
Force GI3D transports. Sections of the equip
ment can be lifted by mediumlift helicopters.
more survivable than the equipment it will
replace, will emerge from a competition be-
tween two contractors, each of whom will be
asked to offer four prototypes for evaluation.
The winner of a run-off will receive a contract
to build the vehicle. The Army is expected to
deal only with manufacturers who already have
vehicles on the drawing boards that can be
modified to meet Army specifications for the
new antitank unit.-DMS Intelligence, 1977.
Military Review
A Swiss-designed armored vehicle has been chosen by the Canadian Armed Forces for
integration into regular and militia units. The general purpose wheeled vehicle was selected over
13 others tested in extensive trials at Wainwright, Alberta, Can.
The government plans to purchase 350 vehicles at a total cost of $171 million, with delivery to
be completed by 1981.
The six-wheel vehicle will be made in three models: a Cougar fire-support vehicle with a 76mm
gun on a British Scorpion turret, a Grizzly armored personnel carrier and a Husky maintenance
and recovery vehicle. The vehicle can travel at speeds up to 100 kilometers per hour (62
m"iles per hour), has a cruising range of 600 kilometers (373 miles) and can withstand small
arms fire and artillery fragments.-The Canadian Military Journal.
The MI LlTARV REVIEW and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College assume
no responsibility for accuracy of information contained in the MI LlTA RY NOTES section
of this publication. Items are printed as a service to the readers. No official endnrsement of
the views, opinions, or factual statements is intended.-The Editor. 1977
Japanese artillery batteries are in the process of being equipped with the newly developed Type
75 selfpropelled multiplerocket launcher.
The all-Japanese weapon system is fully tracked, operates with a threeman crew and can fire its
3D-rocket payload singly or in ripples. The 135mm rockets are loaded into the launcher
automatically, have a range of approximately 15,000 meters and a bursting radius similar to
that of a 105mm cannon round.
The Type 75 has been under development by the Japanese Defense Agency for four years.
The Italian firm OTO Melara has signed a .
contract authorizing the Japan Steel Works
(Mitsui) to build 76/62 OTO compact gun
mountings under license at their Hiroshima
The Japanese Navy bought one 76 turret
from OTO Melara in 1975 for experimentation
on the DDE118 Murakumo and decided to
adopt the equipment for replacement pur
poses.-Armees d'aujourd'hui, 1977.
96 . Military Review
According to the Italian Government, the Sistel and Officine Galileo
Companies have developed and are producing the MEl system for air
defense against lowflying aircraft.
Sistel is producing the Indigo missile and launcher. The which
can be launched singly or in salvos. is equipped with a 22kilogram
warhead and impact and proximity fuses. has a speed of m ch 2.5 and
a range of 10 kilometers. The launch vehicle carries Isix Indigo
Launch vehicle
... Radar vehicle
Officine Galileo developed and is manufacturing the Ifire control
system of search and tracking radars. The s,stem allowS two missile
guidance modes; beam riding/radio command with optical
and infrared tracking/radio command. The system is molunted on an
M548 (US MI13 chassis). The radar vehicle also carries the computer
and electronics equipment. I
The MEl is a modified version of the weapon system presently
used by the Italian air defense.-Soldat und Technik, 1f77 .
. OclDber 1977
,<,' ",'" c' '.-
The Czechoslovaks have developed a new civilian protective mask,
model CM4, to replace the CM3 masks now in use.
Many features of their military mask, the MIO, have been
incorporated into the new CM4. It has a headharness, wideangle
lenses and antifogging nosecup valves similar to the military model.
I mprovements over the CM3 include a separate voicemitter and
outlet valve. The outlet valve is located under a snout-mounted
canister which has the same protection rating against chemical and
biological agents as does the old CM3.-AFSTC news item.
Israel Shipyard, Ltd., is building nine patrol
boats of the new Ou935 type. They will have
a range of 4,000 kilometers (2,485 miles) and a
displacement of 850 tons with a length of 75
meters (246 feet). With a maximum speed of 42
knots, the new patrollers will be armed with
Gabriel missiles in addition to its weapon
systems and have landing surfaces for antisub
marine fighter helicopters.-MarineRundschau,
98 Military Review
Israel has entered the first production phase on its new battle tank, Chariot.
According to a spokesman for the minister of defense, the tank was developed by Israel
rather than purchasing from outside sources for several masons: unique operational
requirements of the Middle East; lessons learned from past armored engagements; and the
industrial and technological capacity of the state had reached levels capable of handling the
production. '
While no official data on the Chariot's characteristics have been released, several sources give
the tank's weight as 56 tons, its main armament a 1 05mm gun and an on-board
ammunition capacity of 62 rounds. The front-mounted engine is to be a US-made 900-
horsepower Teledyne Continental. '
The Soviet newspaper, Red Star, reported the tank not only carries an operating crew of
four, but can transport 10 combat infantrymen in a rear compartment.
Israeli defense spokesmen state the cost of producing the Chariot is in line with those being
produced by other countries today, but will be cheaper than those being developed by the
West for use in the future. :
October 1977
1 Flour Storage
Dough Separator
2 Flour Meter
3 Water Meter
8 Oven
4 Salt Solvent 9 Generator
5 Dough Processor
Portable Screw Conveyor Feeder
The Soviet Armed Forces have recently
adopted a new model mobile field bakery,
designated the PKhZ. The bakery is entirely
installed in a semitrailer which is towed by the
ZIL 1378 tractor. The bakery appears to be at
least partially automated-that is, the bakers do
not have to handle the bread at e v ~ r y stage. If
true, this is the first field bakery known to have
this capability.
The se mitrailer bakery is also capable of
baking bread while on the move. It is possible
that the dough is also prepared while moving.
Such capabilities provide extreme logistical
advantages over conventional field bakeries
which require many hours to set up.
'rhe unit is thought to have a capacity of 2
to 2.5 tons of bread per day and is known to be
NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protected.
-AFSTC news item.
Military Review
By Philip 346 Pages.
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, NY. 1977.
A wave of bool'" about the Vietnam
War is inundating the reading pUblic.
While a few are good, many are of
questionable literary value. For each
war, an even fewer llumuel' of the goud
books endure: Erich Remar{jue's All
Quiet IJJ( the Western Fl'OlIt (World
War I) and Guy Saier's The Fm'{fot-
ten Soldier (World War II). Philip
Caputo's A RIlIIIO), of War may well
be the book to enuure for the Vietnam
War-to be read and It is the
personal memoir of 16 months in the
life 'of a young Marine lieutenant-
Philip Caputo, the author. An ex-
October 1977
tremely wcll-written bool', it describes
in vivid detail the brutality of "the
splendid liltle war" that turned out to
be not so splendid. Lieutenant Caputo's
experieJH...'es in Vietnam began 8 l\ial'ch
1%5. Shaped by the age of Camelot
and the challenge to "ask what you
tan do for rOllr (;ountry," Caputo, like
xo many other young college Reserve
Ollicers' Training Corps students of
that era, was "seduced into uniform"
by Kennedy'S challenge. But as 'the
splendid little war" is transformed
from one having a "compelling at-
tractiveness of combat," so the lives
of Caputo and his comrades were
transformed from "the good solid kids
from Iowa" to American soldiers who
Hkill civilians and prisoners."
It was a war for which Caputo and
thousands like him were unprepared
to fight: a war of endless attrition in
life, limbs and sanit):; a war whose
grand strategy of attrition seemed
based on countless ill-conceived search-
and-destroy missions for a phantom
enemy; H WH}, whose WHH meas-
ured by enemy body count and not by
terrain seized and held; a war whose
popular support by the American pub-
lic was never assured; a war Iimited
and highly compartmented by the
geog,:ajJhy and environment of the
land and political objectives; and a
war where the physieal environment
was as mystel'iolls, tl'eaehel'ou:-> und
brutal as the enemy.
'rhe book is a sweeping panorama
of living, fighting and dying in a
Marine infantry platoon engaged in a
SH\'age toniest with un enemy they
had dillkully describing and in a war
lhcJ eventually did nut understand.
Writing about one of the early en-
Caputo reminds us that:
... ollce /lieu IH'J]in killinu it is 1wf
CUNY to stop flJeJ1l.-So we we]'!' lIof
:-;Ul'pJ'i."l'd (JJ' oll/J'a[lcd ll'lieH we [cu')'ncd
how Ih,,1 fir.,1 j'iet Cony-the one /L'ilh
his brains blown mit-had died.
Although C'lIPU to describes several
versions of the event, the reader is
left to believe that "PFC Marsden, a
gl'emldier in Lemmon's platoon, shot
the man in the face with a pistol."
And then allegedly asked himself:
"Now what did I do that for 7" The
Vietcong were equally, if not 'more,
brutal, causing Caputo to send out a
kidnap patrol for two Vietcong sus-
pects'. Neither suspect survived, and
Caputo narrowly escaped being court-
martialed for murder.
From prologue to epilogue, it is a
consuming book that tells a fascinat-
ing story. It leaves one gnawing
thought in my mind. Was there only
one My Lai 01' were they epidemic, dif-
ferentiated only by numbers and bru-
tality 7 Reading this book provides in-
sights for a more rational understand-
ing of why and how My Lai occurred.
A HUlllo/' of War is highly recom-
('01, H. F. MuiDL];TON,
Departlllent of ReNoltrce Manage-
1I1(//t, USACGSC
the Panama Canal, 18701914 by David McCullough.
698 Pages. Simon & Schuster, NY. 1977. $14.95.
We are of len reminded that the
Uniled States and Panama have been
discussing the future status of the
canal since shortly after the 1964
riots. And no one would disagree that
lhis is an unusually long time-at least
until one reads MI'. McCullough's book
and discovers that time has been a
uniquely relative fador in the history
of the canal. The idea for an isthmus
wutel'way, for example, goes back
dreds of years, and the first initiatives
leading to the planning and actual con-
struction spanned more than half a
The i'ath /J('/lI'eell the Seas is the
history of that highly complex, al-
ways demanding,' frustrating and ul-
timately rewarding enterprise. Above
all, it is the history of the men whose
geniuses overcame tremendous odds
and who contrived and connived their
ways through innumerable obstacles
to realize a dream.
This is an extremely well-researched
story that the reader will find difficult
to set aside once he begins it. The
narrative is so fascinating-funny,
sad, bizarre-that the reader does not
Military Review
know at times if he is reading fiction
or Yet the historical incidents
that planted the seeds of discord-
the "creation" of the Republic of Pan-
ama, the role of the Frenchman Phi-
iippe Bunau-VarilIa, the discriminat-
ing gold and silver standard-=-are all
The au thor has not addressed pres-
ent-day issues as such, but, in telling
the history of the Panama Canal, he
has provided, at least tangentially,
those arguments that oppose as well
as thuse which present-day
Panamanian claims.
This highly relevant bouk will cer-
tainly become a primary referenee for
the 'students uf US-Panama relations
and will provide hours of pleasure to
anyone that enjoys good writing.-
I SHOULO HAVE OlEO by Philip Deane, 185 Pages,
Atheneum, NY, 1976, $7,95,
Thhj is a xtrange, intriguing book.
In fact, it is twu books. Philip Dealle
(Gerassimos Gigantes, as he was
known ill Greece) appears first as a
Greek correspondent taken prisoner
in the Korean War. This terrible
three-year experience featured physi-
cuI and mental tortures meted {Jut
with professional efHl'icl1l'Y. One of
his inquisitors-Deane calls them
brainwashers-was Russian. Ao;, they
tried to tear dowll his psychulpgieul
defenses, including his faith in in-
dividual freedom and democracy,
Deane relied more and more upon
these ideals, epitomized by the Ameri-
can experience, as a source of inner
The scene changes dl'amatically in
the second part of the book. Deane
has returned to Greece as secretary
general to the newly crowned King
Constantine. Premier George Papan-
Oclober 1977
dreou, opposed by the king, queen
mother and a powerful military-po-
litical clique of conservative extrem-
ists, finally lI'as ousted from office in
1965,' TlI'o years later, the culonels
took over the Greek Government. King
Constantine's role in the coup is
cloudy; eight months later, he fled to
Throughout these trying times,
Philip Deane aligned himself with
the liberal forces of Papandreuu. The
United States' missiun in Greece
backed the faction that led to Papan-
dl'eou's ouster and the colunels' coup.
Deane claims that American Central
Intelligellle Agency representatives in
Greece were jw..;t as insensitive to-
ward human dignity and individual
rights as had been his inquisitors in
This buok serves as an indictment
of US policy tuward Greece during
this diJlicult periud. In a larger sense,
Deane seems also tu inclid all Ameri-
can tendency to suppurt despotic gov-
Cl'lllnent.., ill the face uf an imagined
specter of eommlll1isrn.
HI(()()KS K KLlcBER, US Ar/lilj
Traininll (lnd J)f)('triuc Command
Organization-Concept of War Weapons and Equip
ment by Friedrich Wiener. Translated by William
J, lewis, 384 Pages, Carl Ueberreuter Publishers,
Vienna, Aus!. 1976, AS 120,
This excellent little handbook on
the Warsall' Pact Armed Forces has
been lIsed by German-speaking ollicers'
for years. Its appearance in English
coincides nicely with heightened in-
terest uf the American military in
Soviet dodrine, ol'ganization and
Wiener devotes the first half of
his guide to the strengths, organiza-
tions, tactical theory, deployment and
paramilitary establishments of the
seven member uation:-;. This
preseHts detailed information oil all
the significallt organs of the Pact
from the leyel of its pOWerful com-
bined secretaJ"iat down to that of the
party auxiliaries and border polke.
The remainder of the bouk deals
exhausliyely with arms and equip-
ment. The data are as good as thut
in our sources and are
more complete than that 'in Field
Manual :1O-40 \\'hich, incidentally, it
outmodes, Ohsolescent arms, l1Oll*
Rus:dun artieles und brand new itemH
are inclUded with excellent illustra-
tion;.;, Indee(l, one of the major
strengths of \Viellel"S book is its
timeliness; for example, it describes
the nell' 1'72, the self-pJ'opelled 122mm
howitzer and the organized
tank trallsport regiment.
The AI'II/;I's of the Warsall' Pacl
Na/;ons scalls the European COIT,-
mUlJist military system completely.
As a peacetime guide, it has great
I'alue for English-speaking soldiers.
It should be offered foJ' sale at US
posts worldwide.
Heae/qua1'iel's, 2d Armoree/ Cavalry
RCi/ill/cut, FRG
BLACK JACK: The Lile and Times 01 John J.
Pershing: Volume I and II by Frank E. Vandiver.
1178 Pages. Texas A & M University Press, Col
lege Station, TX. 1977. $35 two volumes.
A soldier such as General John J.
Pershing deserves the finest biogra-
pher, and "Black Jack" has found his
in Frank Vandiver. Professor Van-
diver worked on his biography of
"Black Jack" for 18 years, and his
two-volume study is undoubtedly the
most inCISIve, comprehensible and
readable biography of this famous
leader to date. His analysis of Per-
shing results in a remarkably inter-
esting Iiortl'ait of the man who was
one of the most important leaders in
Americall" military history.
General Pershing is by no means an
easy suhject for the biographer, for
he was the man who presided over the
emergence of the modern American
ArnlY. He as a cavalryman in
the Indian wars of the 1880s and
1890s, he became a noted leader of the
black truopers of the 10th Cavalry, he
fought against the Moros in the Phil-
ippines, he was a participant in the
Cuban battles of the Spanish-Ameri-
can War, he was one of the original
members of Elihu Root's General Staff
('orp:.::, aud he waH the "star" of the
Punitive Expedition into Mexico to
catch "Pancho Villa." And, of course,
he \l'as the leader of the American
Expeditionary Forces in World War
J, as well as being one of those who
helped create the Army that fought
World War II. As he moved from In-
dian fighter to preeminent military
leader, Pershing became the man who
bridged the old Army with the new.
Professor Vandiver's biography is
especially appealing, for it treats
Pershing's entire life from his child-
hood in Missouri to his final days in
Walter Reed Hospital. Vandiver's
vi vid prose, for example, lets the
reader see Pershing wrestle with
French at West Point, ride in New
Mexico a g a ins t the Indians and
emerge as a remarkably successful pro-
fessor of military science and tactics
at the University of Nebraska. As the
reader follows the interesting nan'a-
tive, the image emerges of a man
driven by love as well as ambition, of
a man who knew the frustrations of
missed opportunities as well as the
glories of greatest achievement, but
also of a likeable man who was mostly
driven by feelings of "honest patri-
Military Review
. otism." As Professor Vandjver ex-
plains, "1 like him "till," and the
reader cannot help but like him, al"(l.
Yet biography is more
than the "tory of a man. It is abo the
story of an The book pro"ides
the reader fre"h insight into the prou-
lem" of an that agollizingly
transfurmed ibelf from a lighter of
Indians, to an agent of eo]onialism, to
the militar.\ force uf a \\'orld pO\\'er,
That process uf ehange was lIot an
easy one, for it was
within Ull diverse and
aware society and in all environment
of immense teehllologicitl change. The
introduction and adoption uf the ma-
chineguI1 and airplane, for example,
\\'ould have been diflicult enough with-
out uther fadOl's compounding and
confusing the process by which mo-
men tOllS decisions were made.
There are other intpl'esting aspec.:ts
of the book, but one of the most stim-
ulating is the discus"ion of General
Pershing's relationship with the mili-
tary leaders of France and Great Brit-
ain. Per"hing's skills in diplomacy had
been "harply honed during his tours
in the Philippines and with the Puni-
t'ive Expedition, uut the squabbles
among the Allied commanders re-
quired all his patience and fortitude.
His insistent demands that the Ameri-
can Army \\,Ollid not serve as fillers
for French and British units and the
plaguing proulems of preparing the
Americans to fight eventually resulted
in an attempt by Marshal Ferdinand
Foch and Georges Clemence'lll to have
him relieved, When the war ended on
11 November 1918, the military uick-
ering finally ended, but Pershing's
Rkills aR a leader and diplomat had
been tested to their utmost.
In the final analysis, Professor Van-
diver' has fashioned a major work
with appeal for any military reader.
October 1977
IIis writing style and subject make
the book e:-.!-'enlial f01" anyone inter-
in the Americ.:an Army and in a
IJl'pa 1'1 II/( III oj' Vlli/ied aud Com-
billl'd nj}('I'alioIlN, [lSACUSC:
Jackson 176 Pages St.' Martin's Press, NY. 1976.
Houel't stlrns up his b('ok
Fillillll' f'ilolN of World War II in
the inirodudioJl whell he sars:
... 10 Ndl'ct fOIl/'l(,1'I1 lil/irll'r pilot.,
froll/ tilt I/(I/It/n'd" who lOar/ht with
diNtilll'lioll oil al/ NidI'S <III rill II Worl<l
11'(11' II haN b(,(,11 a diffi(' lilt , not til say
iJII/JI'rtiunlt task.
Gi\'ell the limitatiolls of space im-
posed iJ"' the coverage of 14 different
<Ll'es, however, the author docs a fail'
jllb. lJeyoting' a chapter to eac.:h ace,
he In iell,. t"aces some of their mOl'e
intel'Cstlllg engagements, inse):ting"
llumerollS aneednles to SIHlI'k interest.
A:-. all Englishman, . . bias
in fav,ur of English f1ghter pilots is
noticeable. Weaving ihn'ugh "ix Brit-
ish aces, he rovers the top-storing
Royal Air Force (HAF) ace, "Johnie"
.Johnsoll, George Belll'ling of Malta
fame s\'cral other prominent
RAF ones. The Americans covered in-
clude Robert S. Johnson, who was the
first American to equal the World
War I score of Eddie Rickenbacker,
and Charles H. MacDonald, the fifth
highest scoring American ace fOl' the
war. The German fighter pilots of
necessity indude Erich Hal'tman-
the "Ace of Aces"-and Adolf Gal-
land, the general in charge of the
German fighter arm for the majority
of the war. The only Japanese ace
mentioned is Sauuro Sakai, and Jack-
Ron concludes with a chapter on the
top nce Ivan Kozhedllb,
An obvious of the book
is the lack of bibliography and foot-
notes. The reader is left wondering
\\'he're the information upon whith the
author ba:-;ed hiH COlH..'lu14ioHH came
from. HeeauHe of thi:->, the :..;eriOUH
student of militnr;. history will fiud
little information of real \'alue in The
Fiflh!!!1' Pilols of ll'ol'ld IVaI' ll, I'or
those with H eusual interest in air
warfare, however, it is an enjoyable
(lC(,Ollllt of Rome of the more colorful
aviators of World War II.
LT THOMAS (;, Jlo\VIE .lll" USAF
Basic Documents, Edited by Morris J, MacGregor
and Bernard C Nally, Scholarly Resources, WiI,
mington, DE. 1977, $59500 13 Voilimes,
WAR II: The Problem of Race Relations by Alan
M, Osu" 227 Pages, OHice of Air Force HIStory,
Washington, DC 1977. $240,
mar'!.'s i)l Ihe U,)litcd Stall's Arlill'd
Fo}'('/'s: Rasir' D()('/f}}I('lIts i:-; <til am-
IJilious l:\-volul11e collection of letter",
and lllemOl'alHlun1S of Federal
ollitia]" tidl rights leader., anrI mili-
tary ollieers, While the Civil War
yolume (II) i....; slim
I it tonsisls of g:\ documents of
pages), the other three l'e-
\'icwed cal'h L'ontained oyer 100 dOL'lI-
and oYer G20 pages. vol-
ume is dividerl inl0 subsections which
prefaced b!' urief remarks by the
editors, and each dotrul11ent is listed
in the table of contents with a one-
sentence synopsis.
There are somg ver;.' important
items included ill these \'olumes, Lit-
tle-known mllterilll such llS the Con-
fedenlte decision to arm slaves, his-
torical summaries of black units in
, WOl'ld Wal' I and the Army's interwar
plans on ho", to best employ blacks in
a future war Hre some examples.
Throughout, the doclIments make clear
the continued and pel'vllsive discrim-
ination endured by lJIlltk servicemen,
and lalel' senicewomen, and the strug-
gle by blacks in and oul of the mili-
tan' to end these policies,
While awed by this mammoth work,
I must point out a number of disturb-
ing question:.;. is the expense
(you read correctly, $5D5 for the set).
[<;ven if individual volumes mlly be
purchased, it would seem that this ef-
fort is aimed chiefly at libraries, or
the man who has everything, Second,
there was 110 indication in the four
volumes l'edcwed aH to how these par-
ticular documents were chosen. Third,
the editors do not indicate how repre-
:..;elltative these items ure, if there arc
more like them 01' what. While these
documents may prove valualJle for
undergraduate work, I expect more
advallced sL'holal's will tend to ue more
frustrated than helped by this series,
Until the last decade, little has been
written abollt ulaeks in the US mili-
tary illlring the 19,1Os although black
history been in vogue for at
10 years, OSllr's uook plllgs lip a large
gap in this suujed joining the other
two l11ajor studies in the field-Ulysses
Lee, Thl' /"IIIP/O!lllll'lIt of NI'!II'O Troop"
11!HiG I, alld Richard 1\1, Dalfiume, DI'-
S('!lI'('!latioll of thl"U,S. Al'ml'd Fol'ces;
Fiyhtill!J oil Two FI'II/(I", 1[}.i,9-1,?:},1
(1 !169)'
Hla('!.'s ill Ihl' Al'my Ail' FOl'ces Dul'-
illY World TVaI'll is well-written and
well-researched, The author makes a
lIlImber of important points. He
clearly shows the great impact of the
b I a e k community the
NAACP (National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People) and
black newspapers 1 in pushing the
Military Review
military toward equal rights. Osur is
critical of the Army Air Forces
(AAF), sometimes a bit too much 1i0.
He points out that the AAF never
willingly accepted blacks and main-
tained segregation. "AAF policies re-
tlected sodetal views," OSlll' writes;
nevertheless, these llulkies "tended to
represent the consel'\'ative bl'anch of
Anlcritan society whose it found
were compatible with its own estab-
lished thoughts." Refreshingly, the
author cites both the successes (par-
ticularlr'the 99th Squadron and
Group) and, in considerable detail,
the failures of the .J77th Group. In
addi.tion, he candidl:.' luitt's of black
protests, demollstrations and yjo1cnt:c
in the AAF.
Relative to the book's positive fea-
tures, il:-; faults arc fc\\', OSlIl"s or-
ganization breaks do\\'n at times a.,,;
he too frequently shifts back to an
earlier period. He makes a few state-
ments that are not, to my satisfactioll.
adequately supported by eithel' text
01' footnotes. While Osur does name
names, he does not assess the AAF's
top leadership. Finally, and mo.,t re-
grettably, his conclusion of onl)' two
and one-half pages is jl"t too brief
for such a stu dr.
This is an important <tlld good book,
well worth the time and money to read.
It is especiall)' recommended for those
interested in black 01' Ail' Force 01'
World War II history. In addition, it
tells much of hoI\' the militar)', the
system and the leadership, deals with
difficult social problems. A final acco-
lade is in order. The Otlice of Ail'
Force History is to be commended for
getting this important book into at-
tractive, inexpensive and what appears
to be error-free print.
Department of Unified and COII/-
bined Operatiuns, USACGSC
October 1977
rorism in Our Time by Frederick J. Hacker, MD.
355 Pages W. W. Norton & Co., NY. 1976. $9.95.
br. Hackel' is well-known in both
the l'iviliall and military communitie8
fol' his writing and lectures on aggres-
sion and terl'Orislll. This uook will be
"articularly interesting to the incli-
vidual who is involved with military
and "aramilitary organizations be-
('allse they are currently the accepted
tools for dealing with terrorists. Many
of the terms Dr. IIacker uses to de-
scribe the terrurists, partkularly Cl'U-
saders, al'e heard fl'equently in mili-
tary cla;.;sl'ooms. I1il-1 book analyzes
issues alld the pal'til'ipanis with a
lIare that creates and holds reader
As the ti tie suggests, Dr. IIackel'
distingui:-.;hes three major categorie;-.;
of terrorists.
('I'II"a(/('I''' (II'<' i(/('((l/!! ill"pil'('d. Th,,!!
.';cdl, Hot p('}'sullal !Iaill, bllt prcstjut'
aud jol' (( ('olll'ctil'(, !foal . ..
('rimiilals hal'(, If'CUItS }}Iuch like anlj-
()}/(' else but J'C'8(1)'t to socially lIna('-
('('pfahlI' }l/ct!wt/s in u}'der to achirT('
thost' {lMli,.; . , ('/'((;:ie8 are emotionally
(/i"iIlI'Ii"t/ iuriieirillal" r!l'i1'(,11 Ii!! I'ca-
,'WUs kllflll'l! olllJl to tll(,}}I.'H!il'('S aud
undr'l'sfuod hy feu'.
The allthor highlights the text \\'ith
clear matrices that compare' his cate-
gories with the motive, the plnyers
and the implications of terrorist goals.
He u;-.;e.s l'ontemporalT characters to
illustrate his definitions. Interesting
groups characterized HR cl"u.sacler.s are
the Palestinian Neo-Zionists and the
Symbionese Liheration Army (SLA).
It is curions to note that an evaluation
of the SLA and Patty Hearst is pre-
sented within the chapters concerning
victims. D. D, Cooper illustrates the
criminal. He parachuted from a plane
he skyjacked over Washington state
. 107
with $200,000 J'an'OIll, C'raz)' terror-
i,ts are exclllplified b.l' the If)7,j AI-
phahet Bomber of Angeles and Idi
Amin of C!l'anda,
Ill', Hackel' stimulates thoug-ht "'ith
pJ'ovoking' alld
of and
c\'L'nls, and his of
tL'ITOI'i:-.m cOI]\'illcil1gly. The lI11all'h'l}J-
tt'!":'; arc devoted to l'ompariJlg' the im-
plied natiollHI pol ivy for dealing with
terrorists in :-;l'vcl'ai {'ountl'ies. among
t1ll'1ll the l'nitcd States, (;erman,I' and
Crusadc}'s, (',imilla},,,, ('/I/zits pr()-
vides illtere:-:ling' in:--ights into the
tYJles of IH.-'ople alld cVl'nls that dom-
UPJ daily llCWS :tlld the political
l'I'l'Ilt., that the militar,' ma,' he rc-
qu i red to support.
(,,\1''1' AltLEY II.
('oll/hiJ/fr/ :11'1118 ('lIlIIhat /Jel'('luII-
l/uIIls .1dil'illl
A Soviet View, Translated and published under
the auspICes of the US Air Force 295 Pages US
Government Printing OffICe, WashillgtOIT, DC $345
Thi;-; l'olledi(lll of tll'til'ie;-;. and ;.;omc
dwptel','-1 frolll tl'an:--iated from
];-; the 11 th volume ill the
',<l'l'i('s ell tit led Soviet
Thol!g'ht, and i;.; divided into fOlll' sel'-
tions: "The Intel'lIational Situation,"
"Theordil'al Foulldation;.; of Radet
Thought," "Command Struc-
ture and Organization" and
"Theory ill Practke." Each ;.;edion is
PI'{'(,l'tieci b,\', all intl'()ciudOl'r note
\\,I'itten il,' IJI', \\'illiam F, Seott, a
retired l"S Ail' Foree colonel who is
the apparent editul', The introductions
identify the and proyide some
hal'kgl'Olllld material 011 the contrib-
uting- II'l'iters \\'ho are all familial' per-
sonal,;ties on the Soviet scene; the.l'
are slIl'h famous and mil-
it:lr,I' theoreticians as the late Soviet
of Dcfense Marshal A: A.
(;l'l'chlw, (;enol':l1 of the Army V. G,
Kulikol' and Marshall', A, Hotmis-
troY amollg' nHilly other;.;.
The first sed ion of Ih'c articles
deals with the g'cncl' .. d question of
East-West relations, slI'ling-I,' defencl-
ing' the of the
Part,\', Prabing' thQ achievomenb; of
the recent ,'ears, ,Marshal Grechko
writes with ",me pl'ide that about 00
percent of the personnel in the armed
f01'ce!'i ill'e memhers of the Communist
1'ar!,' 01' of the Komsllmlii. And, in the
General Chel'ednichenko
notes that a g-J'l'at number of the b.est
and engineers Hre
working- Oil military proulems. cer-
tainly reflee!ed in the large llumber
of wcapollS ... int}'ociucod into
the Soyiei ill\"cntory ill l'ecent yearH.
The second seeiion of six articles
is proiJably the most thought-provok-
ing- part of the uook. It is here among
the yerlJiuge and homage to Ivlarx and
Lenin that the reade}' is introduced
to the man.\" Questions troubling the
SOI'iet militar,I'. There is frequent pre-
OCClIp:ttiOIl with methods of command
and control and the question of man-
machine: the latter term is not de-
fined more closely. Among the many
4uestiol1:-; that are aired and .seem to
preoccupy the Soviet military writers
is the neecl for more fiexibilit,l", inno-
vation Hnd quality,
In the third seelion, Colonel M. P.
Skirclo, in excerpts from his books,
some in ... ight into the bn,sic
stl'llellire of the SOl"iet Armed Forces
OI'er the last sel"eral decarles. This
seelion also deals with the question of
l'espunsibility and decisionmaking in
the militar,l" and political command
IThe fourth section consists of eight
article, which deal with matters of
Military Review
CLlI'l'l'llt pr{lblems of modpl'll warfare,
ladil':-; and :-;lralcg',v, 1Iel't' arc dis-
:-:ul'h dh'l'l':'w topil's ;1" l'OIl<iud
of ail' de\'clopIlll'llt (If lank
forces ill l'tl('ellt alld the St'iCIl-
tilk tl'l'hnical PI'Pg'l'l'SS and troojl
("Clll t 1'01.
OJl tl1(l wholt'. the YOlltnll' is \\'()rth-
whill' and should pro\ idl' tIlt' l't'adcl'
with ..... ()Jl1l' idL'<L of the l'UITPllt tl'<.'I\(\."
ill the Soviet military thillldllg',
OI(Eo'l' KH\1I" ['S .. If(
States and Russia Run the Arms Race by Alva
Myrdal. 40'0 Pages Pantheon Books, NY, 1976,
The the,i" of thi, """k-that
IH'il hcl' superp()\\,l'l' has seriously <It-
tl'l11ptl'd disarn1<lml'nt - -id('lll ineH its
prilll'ipali failure, failillg to strip
away the la.\'Pl's of l':LU:-,l' and efl'l'l't
to Hnal)'ze the ('ore pl'()illl'm ()f why
nat i()ns' seek :I I'manWllt.,-" thp allth()r
has pl'()\'idl'd yet <11I(llher trmw. I>e-
,,-,pite a of IIfal'b," ()f
analysis, and her ()\\'Il experience as
Sweden'" l'hief at tIw
CelJl'vi.t di:..;al'mament :..;hl' ne\'el'
)!I'apple, lI'ith the "omplex weh of
interll( nlld dnme:.;ti<- politie,,,,
Al'll1Hmellt.-.; l'ldled ptJlitil'aJ tensiol1s
and l'l'slllt fl'om politiL'al Oil
l'e-':olll'l'C alloeatiol1s, IIenl'e, if we arc
to l'eHSe buying and greater
iJhcl'urity at higher and higher l'oMs,"
verifiable method:..; to iJll'l'eaSe mutual
in arms l'olltl'ol agreements are
lIer principle"
of rationality alone i:..; insllfiil'ient to
persuade politil'al leaders to abandon
their arscnals,
Frankly, lI'ili he di"'ppointed
by the e,"e ]J,'e,ented bl' thi' Iloted
,,,holar and activist. Her pre-
oCl'iptions inclurle unilateral I'educ-
tions, pledge, of nOIl-firRt use of nu-
October 1977
{'leal' Wpapoll:"; and l'el1f)lllH'cment of
the u,-.:e of Iludea!' \\(!apOllS Hg-ainst
llolllluclear \\ eapons .states, dvk mo\'e-
llWllt:-; supportillg' di"'i(ll'mameni. the
total of further researl'h
alld dt'\'l'lupml'llt. thl' l'limination of
fOl'eigll :l:tse-.: and prohibitiolls against
the (If l'I1l'mil'al ell' "l'I'l1Cl :tnti-
Pl'J':,o II lIel " \\'l':lI)(lIlS, Uniol'lullately.
Ill'j,dl'c{S l'ollsideration of how
till' tlll'J'it.... of t Sllg'g'll;.;t iOlls affect
,tall'", the (';I.<e fol' limite,l
! ill both Sl'()IH' and time) unilateral
!'I'dud \f)IIS l':tll 'H' reasonably made,
J'PllfJIlIl('illg' II !I l'll'tl I' would
pl'O\'icie dp{'i:;jy\! advantages to m<lll-
}lil\\'er-illtl'll:--ivl' adn'I'SHI'il's and el'ode
ddeI'I'C'lll'C sillCl' we ar(' unlikely to
iJllTl':tse general pUI'Jlo"l'
fOl'ce:..;, :\Tol't:'()\'("I', it is simply fo()lish
to lwjieH' that oll-sitl'
inspvl'tifJII .... i.'flllid <It'led \\'papOllS re-
,-':{',II'('h and dt'\'l'lopment OJ' secrel
stockpiling or. chemit'al munitiolls,
Shol't of a 111;"("1' 1"0"" beam that
\\ ipes away all St'it'lltific knowledge
fOl'e\'l:'!', there is no way to :,top the
of sl'ienl'e, F'inally, while
<l)!l'l'eing' that the puulic is ton apa-
lhet il' about these L'l'ut'ial issues, thl'
demi ,e of <?al'liel' "ball the bomb"
J1lO\emcnt."'i illustrate the weakness
(If ('h'it' l))'ganir.nli()llH, The upper n1id-
die ('lass elili:..;m of disarmament ad-
\'ocates ()ften the divided
the el'oJlOmic interest:.;, the
Jlawed and diflicult political
organizatioll required to make even
a minimal impact upon the publi"
Oddly, even though MYl'dal pal'-
ticipated in mallY international l'OH-
fel'ence" she faih; to develop a critique
of negotiating ,tyleo, Her empha,i,
Oil the often repeated al'gumentH de-
prive, hel' of an enlightening hook.
Actequate development of her aHHel'-
tion that MOHCOII' and Washington
(ogethel' Htopped a ])"sHihle tornpl'C-
hellHive tc,;t-han trealy in 1063 would
have made this an work.
we have a modeJ'ately u;-;eful
reference volume on the disarmament
que,-.;tion from an inteJ'Hationulh;t per-
Mall.\ \l'i!! accept her cOlltelllion that
the ar111s race has hel'omc iu.'.;titutioH-
alized-after all. l)Oth superjlower,;
arm:; tontl'ol Ull-
fortllJJately, her ultel'nati\'Q-s will l10t
further the l'aHse of urms reduction
beeau,;e lhey arC politically unwol'k-
able. Rathel', the politind leaders mu,;t
now wt'i!.;h whether they are wHlillg
to aeecpL the dsks inherent in arms
reductiolls which admil a,;ymmelrieal
force postures.
L('f}is/CltiJ'(1 Afu:istant II). Snwl()l'
.T"hn Glenn
America and the Struggle for Independence: From
1760 to the Surrender at Yorktown in 1781 by
Samuel B. Griffith II. 276 Pages. Doubleday & Co,
Berkeley, CA. 1976. $14.95.
General Griflith's portrayal of the
,;[ruggle for American independence
from 1760 lo the ,;urrender al York-
town in 1781 i,; clearly the best writ-
ten and mo,;t complete volume I have
read on lhe subjed thus far.
The reader finds himself immedi-
ately swept up in the debates over
England',; policy toward the American
Colonie,; and i,; guided ,;tep by step
from 1760 to the clash of arm,; at Lex-
ington and Concord in 1775. The full
dimension of the ensuing conflict i,;
accomplished by forcing the reader
from the hall,; of Congress and the
American battlefields into the courts
at London and Versailles to share the
view'S of all the participants. A more
comprehensive single-volume tl'eat-
menl of the period would be hard to
The author relies heal'ily on direct
from the who
pla)'e,] "ital role,; in the drama a,; it
ullfolded. Thi,; is ,;killfully accom-
plished, largely from original ,;ources.
The narrative comes off as very read-
ahle awl yet ,;cholarly enough for the
mo . ...;t :teademic tH:;tC.
The astute military reader will find
(;elleral Griflith's treatment of British
slrategy, or the lack of il, mo,;t inter-
e,;ting and will perhapH be drawn, in
time, to events in another part of the
world 200 yean.; later in search of his-
toric allalogie,;. The problem,; of wide-
slll'ead antiwar ,;cntimcnt in the ,home
l'ountry, oceanwide supply lines, the
elusiveness of an indigenous enemy
and futile atlempts to u,;e ovel'\\'helm-
ing military might to fm'ce ,;olutions
10 political problem,; were not bol'll of
lhe anticolonial struggles in the years
since 1fj,IS. Hi,;tol'Y ha,; much to teach
if we will but listen.
The author's artful battlefield de-
scription,; are high points in the book
allhollgh he doe,; not treat the move-
ments and maneuvers of the armies
in gl'eat detail. Indeed, the military
reader rna)' lament the relative paucit)'
of map,; and battlefield graphics. Hut
clearl,', General Griflith knows troop
behavior. The military reader wilt'find
many gems of wisdom dealing "'ith
the human adions and reactio1l8 of
men at war.
It all ends wi th Y ol'ktown, H'; one
may have gues,;ed. Still, I felt a cer-
tain ,;"dne,;,; to ,;ee the drama come to a
SUl'ely, HH Barbara Tuchman has
,;tated, "I General Gritlith'H 1 book will
prove to be the outstanding historical
narrative pj'oduced during the Bicen-
2d I"fantry DiviNi01l, [(orea
Military Review
'flli" Ji .. ting IIUhh",IH'd to hi in" Ill'\\' ... "jollal hOllk ... to til(>
ath'ntioll of n'lIdet":-. HI'\ II'\\' {'opit'''' hn\\' all'p;uly 1""'11 -.,'111 \11 n \ ilWI) ....
Book ... :Ilt' not otfl'rl'l\ for <;:11(' Ihlr>lI/,dl tht' ,ll,/!lary HI'I'i, 1('.
THE ARMYNAVY GAME by Roy Stratton. 263 Pages
Volta Co., Falmouth, MA. 1977 $13.00
128 Pages. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD
1976. $5.95.
l. R. Wallack. 213 Pages 'Winchester Press, NY
1977. $12.95.
THE ARMS BAllAR: From Lebanon to Lockheed by
Anthony Sampson 352 Pages. Viking Press, NY.
1977. $12.95.
THE BATTLE AT BULL RUN: A History of the First
Major Campaign of the Civil War by WJiliain C.
Davis. 298 Pages. Doubleday & Co .. Berkeley, CA
1977. $995.
by James lamb Free 336 Pages. Coward, McCann
& Geoghegan, NY. 1977. $8.95.
UBOAT KILLER by Captain Donald Macintyre Fore
word by Admiral Robert B. Carney. 176 Pages.
Naval Instil ute Press, AnnapolIS, MO. 1976. $8.95.
THE UNKNOWN WAR: North China, 19371945 by
MIChael lindsay Two Continents, NY. 1975
lentlni. 200 Pages. Glencoe Press, Encino, CA.
1977 $9.95.
A Quantitative and Historical Analysis by Ernest
Duff and John McCamant 322 Pages. Free Press,
RlVersi<le, NJ 1976. $15.95.
865 Pages Congressional Quarterly, Washington,
DC. 1977. $18.00
WASHINGTON'S EYES: The Continental light Ora
goons by Burt Garfield Loescher. 181 Pages Old
Army Press, Ft. Collins, CO. 1977. $10.95.
leather. 264 Pages. Naval Inslitute Press, An
napollS, MD. 1976. $12.50.
INSIDE THE KGB by Aleksei Myagkov 131 Pages.
Arlington House, New Rochelle, NY 1976. $7.95.
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