Table of Contents

Keith Parker’s Notes from USC Volume 2 of 5

Junior Year, First Semester Page Content IR-210 1 Course Documents 21 Class Notes 82 Assignments 109 Exam Questions 111 UN Report 183 UN Report Analysis 211 244 251 256 267 275 285 326 352 370 378 395 401 406 420 IR-324 Class Notes Assignments Midterm Final Essay IR-383 Syllabus Class Notes Midterm Questions and Answers Final Questions and Answers Final Paper WRIT-340 Short Assignments Assignment #1 Assignment #3 Assignment #4 Final Portfolio Sailing Class Review

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IR-210: Course Documents

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Course Documents

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Course Documents

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Course Documents

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Course Documents

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IR-210: Course Documents

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Course Documents

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Course Documents

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Course Documents

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Course Documents

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Course Documents

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IR-210: Course Documents

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Course Documents

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IR-210: Course Documents

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Course Documents

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Course Documents

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Course Documents

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Course Documents

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Course Documents

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Course Documents

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210

IR-210: Class Notes
10/12/05 10:01 AM

International Relations as a theoretical study during the cold war was grounded in European history and relegated the rest of the world to lower ontological status. The third world was characterized by overgeneralizations if not ignorance. –K. Holsti Announcements: • Review Sessions started today- schedule on blackboard Return to waves of IR theory Cold war thinking • • • • • • A mix of realism and Wilsonian liberal int’l Triad: democracy, capitalism, rule of law, multilateralism US Goal- organize the west in our interests- led creation of UN and Bretton woods system Funded European Union NATTO and defense alliances to contain USSR Nuke weapons to deter enemies- Regimes to control proliferation

What is the Cold War Operational Code dominant policy belief system that shaped other world leaders -System is anarchic -Self-help -National interest over human interest -Limits to cooperation -Duality of morality -Power= Force -Conflict Endemic (Don’t try to wish it away, it is part of the system) -Stability with BOPO not peace -Cold War = A constant state of war and competition for the hearts and minds of all human beings -The hearts and minds of all human beings -FOPO sextant – National Security Council (NSC) 68 -Building an economic system to serve US and Western interests- Bretton Woods system

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes

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-Study of IR heavily influenced by Cold War: Area and language studies -High Politics vs. low politics -Research funds Who was bringing socialism in the 80s: the south, where capitalism wasn’t working for them The structure of the system is analyzed by neo-realism Neo-liberalism Rationalists: economists, et cetera -Wave VI: Academic World: how we study debate issues – Qualitative vs. qualitative or counters vs. poets -Desire to have the certainty of the sciences US IR: Neo-realism or structural realism – Can focus on one variable – good; but if a question can’t be analyzed by a computer, the question isn’t asked Liberal institutionalism Outside US: English school, neo-marxist as a structural treaty, integrationists

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210

IR-210: Class Notes
10/14/05 10:14 AM

Reformist ideas: NIEO and NWIO Wave VII: Globalization, governance and human security Real debate in both policy and theory Policy debates: economic world = neoliberal vs. neomercantalism Political/military = realism and democratic peace liberalism Cultural = critical voices like post colonial theories, neomarxist and WOMP Social world: Feminists, ecotopians, utopians, anarchists and other marginalized voices Key issues: how to protect the state and how to manage globalization Kant 1783 essay contest: • Sapere Aude – Have the Courage to Know • Written in an essay contest for a newspaper • We all need skepticism • All ideas must face skepticism • Tolerance: Consider and honor all legitimate ideas • Guarded optimism: Through reason (knowledge) human beings – regardless or traditions and culture – can discover the universal rules by which we should live our lives Need to consider how each approach contributes to scholarship Handout #21, in folder II. How we study IR: Explaining and understanding How can we be certain a fact is a fact How do we develop and then test our hunches or theories about the world

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes

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Explaining = social scientists – middle range theories – objectivity – standing outside and make generalizations Causes of war, poverty, et cetera Explanations for Nixon policies – look at it from his worldview he is a maintainer et cetera If a leader has a realist point of view, they will take advantage of opportunities to increase their power We know what we have to explain – in search of the independent variable: why did he/she do it? Explaining second handout Second handout is an assignment, don’t know when it is due Not due until after the midterm Study this handout, though Assignment explanation • A puzzle • Foreign policy puzzles

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210

IR-210: Class Notes
10/17/05 10:10 AM

Back to levels of analysis and how we study IR • Historian- traditional approach, qualitative, descriptive, area studies • Constructivist- ideas, norms, beliefs shape our choices and our “construction” of a situation • Social scientist- explaining, testable propositions, quanititative or qualitative research E in our Depp skills Goal = good middle range theory If X then Y X independent variable Y dependent variable How do we know the above quote to be true? What is his hypothesis? If X then Y Y is the condition or behavior you are trying to explain X is the possible case Midterm Question: What are three ways of studying IR? How would scholars using these three methodological approaches explain the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto treaty? The theories/hypothesis you suggest are first Hunches or intuitive theories Put in testable form: • Empirical or Causal

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
If it raises moral questions and is prescriptive: • Normative theories Some theories help us construct the world – theories we accept set the rules: • Constructive theory What is • • • • • • a good hypothesis/theory? Fruitful: Large explanatory power Simplicity/parsimony: Clearly framed Elegant: Prescriptive richness Satisfies our curiosity Powerful: focuses on important issues Commonsensical

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For midterm: know Mann: the state, and war Transcends time-culture-personality Your confirmed hypothesis never equals the truth; Nothing is ‘proven’ Why care about theory? From Readings: Agnew and Pyke: • Order out of complexity • Simplify Decision making (DMaking) • Putting puzzles together • Predicting and prescribing • Communicating across disciplines and cultures Rosenau: • Order out of chaos • Classifications and patterns Van Evra: • Describe and explain causes and effects of classes of phenomena Martin Wight:

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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• •

IR-210: Class Notes
No theory no understanding Insights into core ideas of era/ pragmatic and normative

Levels of analysis handout #21 Which level to select? When level 1? • Dictatorship, few people in power • Emergency, quick acting event: few people involved in the decision Leaders make decisions – other factors move decision-maker away from rationality or provide options Bounded rationality: Herbert Simon In FOPO, rationality not probable. Cannot know all options or values Goal is satisfying not maximizing Previous experience – interests-intuition – Help to eliminate numbers of options Muddling through – simplify the process Cybernetics: John Steinbruner – Dmaking (Decision making) is an adaptive process. What has worked before minimize complexity (Tool) Biological explanations Tension between reason and passion – behavior is linked to biological traits Instincts (aggression, sex and hunger) drive decision-making The end of every act is the self-preservation of the actor. Spinoza Lorenz on aggression – 1967

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
Aggressive behavior more dangerous in a world with push-button warfare Instinct and biological explanations - heart of realism Reason does not overwhelm passion - original sin Passion directs humans to be first among all Hans Morganthau: Man is born seeking power and because there exists no authority over him in the international sphere, the use of force and violence results -Some Guy Robert Andrey - The territorial imperative - defense of homeland and territory Freud and Dollard writing about frustration and aggression Also frustration leads to apathy, withdrawl, repression, and resignation

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210

IR-210: Class Notes
10/19/05 10:12 AM

Less inclined to be an empire builder due to concern for others Need for achievement Takes only moderate risks – fears greater loss Study of US presidents – Winter and Stewart Power: affiliated with war and fewer treaties Need and affiliation: Less war and cooperation High motivation for power – the more activist prone High motivation for affiliation • Want to do things with other High motivation for achievement: neo-isolationism Tool: Personality types • Adorno’s F-scale: authoritarianism-fascism; authoritarian personality o Tendency to dominate subordinates o Deference toward superiors o Sensitivity to power o Need for a structured world o Excessive use of stereotypes o Nationalistic/ ethnocentric o Hates ambiguity Rokeach: close-minded or dogmatic personality • Unlikely to see all options • Perceive conspiracies and stereotypes of the enemy in crisis • Reject information that contradicts their belief system • Tend to use force to close situation • Low self-esteem = hostile and uncooperative

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
• High self-esteem = trust

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Hawk-Dove-Owls • Hawk: power, force • Dove: Peaceful, cooperative, discuss thing • Owl; Academic scholar, apply theories Barber's studies of presidents: Level of energy in office • Active-passive Like/dislike for office • Positive-negative John Kennedy was active as a president, very positive Eisenhower was passive and negative Hermann’s studies of 10 leaders: levels of nationalism, cognitive complexity, control, dogmatism More nationalistic – tend to get involved in conflict More cognitively complex - more cooperative Tool: perceptions and images – How we see the world Lens (That we look at the world through) based on traditions, experiences, and beliefs Mirror images - images of the enemy Holsti's study of J.F. Dulles = view of Soviets of an evil empire led to goal of retaining military superiority – one of the most important viewpoint of the Cold War

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

All moves are seen as negative Image - shapes our perceptions of individuals and event We see the world through that lens/image and beliefs = we process info and we seek cognitive consistency and avoid or reduce cognitive dissonance Images of world = stereotypes, myths and misperceptions New importance in a world of ethnic conflict and the clash of civilizations

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210
Choice of foreign policy

IR-210: Class Notes

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Small states can be active but tend to limit the scope of their activities Consider a develping state like Thailand… How influenced by size and resource base? Location- Geopolitics Karl Haushofvr – Lebensraum Isiah Bowan – American Empire National attributes: size, location, et cetera FOPO of New Zealand Small and Wealthy Regionally: Major power in South Pacific New Zealand: declared a Nuke-free zone in the south pacific to add to their image. Also decided: ODA (Official development assistance) focused their attention on the small islands Globally • Low bilateral action with larger powers • Connected with former colony • Narrow scope of activity with foreign policy Economic focus • Multilateralism and activism in all global FORA Moral emphasis on big global issues Influenced more by NGOs and public opinion

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IR-210: Class Notes

Tend to have a more informed and active public Resource base • Oil, water, food, forests… • Shaping policy choices and reactions from other states Political Structure: • Constitutional Power Map • Federal system or centralized political party structure; Parliament or Congress How might these influence FOPO? Propositions? Ex: Democracy = Peaceful; Authoritarian = Warlike Economic System: Most of the world is capitalist but which production and trade sectors lead? Agrarian - Industrial – Service Hamilton/list - Never become vulnerable in core industries EH Carr: Military, economics, and control over public opinion • Sources of power in each world o Hard power vs. soft power  Hard power: force power  Soft power: ideological power Domestic Politics • Two elements- Desire to be elected/re-elected and desire to build policy coalitions to pass other laws and programs • FOPO deals - Bush supporting intervention in Sudan to get support of Christian groups • Rejection of Kyoto-business support

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
Tool: Decision style and structures

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210 Discussion

IR-210: Class Notes
10/27/05 9:14 AM

Discussion on assignment handed out about a week ago Difference between GDP and GNP Foreign aid • Norway gives more than 1% of its foreign aid o Middle range theory: Political culture; Level two analysis; in the political or cultural world Level three • Political: level of interest in power Middle range theories • Fitting one’s hypothesis into a level (i.e. Level II theory) • Grand theories Specific climate factors will be state level, while a hole in the ozone over a country will be a level IV, the global level Theories about middle powers, et cetera Keep questions 1 and 3 to one page each Due a week from today

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210

IR-210: Class Notes

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(Independent variables) One hypothesis Tool: Decision style and decision structure (political culture and structure shape these) How we do things or SOP Style: How decisions are made – precedent important also depends on leader’s personality Expert deference model Janis group think George's multiple advocacy model • Bring people in who disagree with you • Not many presidents do this- especially Dubya Decision Structure: Where are decisions made and how organizations shape decisions and choices Bureaucratic organizations – conservative and protective of their interests Michael Barnett – Identity and indifference in UN Allison's classic work explaining JFK decision in the Cuban Missile crisis Model 1: RAM (Rational Actor Model) Model 2: Organizational (SOP [Standard Operating Procedure]) Model 3: Bureaucratic

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

Hybrid analytical approaches: Combine levels Tool: Second image - Domestic attributes How domestic factors influence international relations Now reverse it: How do system changes influence domestic politics? Gourevitich: How international regimes influence domestic policies Kahlker: How decolonization influenced domestic elections in France and UK Tool: Two level games Robert Putnam: Playing Texas Hold-um at two tables with one hand Great analytical tool to explain negotiations between states or other actors FR Leaders ----- Game 2 ------ US Leaders | | Game 1 Bargaining Game 1 | | Domestic Domestic Level 3: International system = created by the interactions of states Neorealists Waltz: Structure of the system explains the most and most powerful tool of analysis All states must react to anarchy in the system Tool: nature of anarchy and order or governance in the system Anarchy ------------------------------- World Government

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes

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Walktz: Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states... JJ Rousseau: States must arm themselves to prepare for the contingency… Anarchy – Security Dilemma Anarchy - Lack of control Tool: Distribution of power • Classic Balance of Power: Uncertain, dangerous, difficult – keeping • • • • • • together a coalition of independent states Cold War tight bipolarity Loose bipolarity Multipolarity Regionalism Concert Hegemony/ empire

Consider how states will act in each system For Wednesday: How does a system shape FOPO? Which

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210

IR-210: Class Notes
11/2/05 10:03 AM

Consider how states will act in each system How does this system shape foreign policy? Which is… Regionalism: countries located in the same part of the world have formed regional governments which control resources, industry, and trade within each region. Relations between regions are governed by regional interests. Bi-polar: Two superpowers have divided the world. Each controls a large group of countries, and controls the resources, industry, and trade within its bloc. Relations between the two blocs are determined by the superpowers to serve their own interests. • • • • • • Cold War tight bipolarity Loose bipolarity Multipolarity Regionalism Concert Hegemony/ Empire

Consider how states will act in each system Hypothesis • More bipolar system states follow lead of great powers • More multipolar system more independent FOPO • More interdependent system more cooperation • Less independent more conflict Tool: International obligations: Formal = treaties, alliances; informal = traditions, cultural connections – kinship Informal also includes – rules of right or wrong – ethical norms discovered by reason – obligations of global community

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
Hypothesis • More inflexible alliance structure great chance for conflict • More system is governed by formal treaties greater chance for cooperation • Greater the sense of community among the great powers more chance for reciprocity in interactions Tool: Regimes or governing arrangements Usually govern in specific issue areas – research to regulation Regimes work when the big powers want them to work Maintained by the state and non-state actors – promoting certain behavior and making regulations Regimes that matter today: • WTO Free trade regimes • Human rights regimes • Arms control regimes • Global environment regimes: manage global commons areas, e.g. Oceans Level four: Global Natural conditions - weather patters, global warming Factors resulting from human actions Global factors that might shape foreign policy choices: • Tool: Global social movements TSMOS/ TANS – Use their sources of power including expertise and media to shape policy One Campaign - Jubilee movement

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IR-210: Class Notes

New focus of human security movement is protecting aid workers and journalists Funded by Trudeau foundation Focus on governments to change policies How will global warming shape foreign policies? Could an earthquake or tsunami help change conflict situations? Sri Lanka Cyprus-Greece and Turkey Kashmir Can be a motivating factor and provide an opportunity to act but conditions need to be right for the “Warm and Fuzzy” feeling to be more than temporal • Tool: Global Media and information technology – A major force of change

CNN effect framing strategies - knowledge factors – WAG the Dog

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210 Discussion
Going over midterm

IR-210: Class Notes

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Neopluralism: less variety, more elites Number 10 on Midterm: reference the readings Number 11: Would want to bring an article into this answer from each of the four worlds Depends on your worldview For questions on grade on midterm, or questions on midterm, go to early 8 AM session Read case for tomorrow- can be found on the website listed on the syllabus • Some Georgetown site • Address on syllabus is slightly wrong, but case can be found through that site with some effort

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210

IR-210: Class Notes
11/7/05 10:04 AM

Why world-views – How these core assumptions help us construct the world? Three traditions: SM-SR-ST • Images of humankind, society, rights, laws, war, system order and problem solving Wednesday: “Melian Dialogue” DEPPP chart Main thing on final: be able to DEPPP issues The people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the objective facts of the situation – whatever that may mean, but their image of the situation. It is what we think the world is like not what it is really like – that determines out behavior. A. Why Worldviews? Prism that we use to assess the world Worldview = images of the world/operational code = research or info gathering strategy = theory = facts = ordering priorities = evaluation of policy options = selection of policy = strategy = action Worldviews: Beliefs, norms, values and acceptable practices Essential for scholarship – considering all relevant voices Are not all decision-makers rational actors? Lamy: Worldviews matter because people do not act according to laws of logic or economic self-interest. We respond to what we believe is reason and reality…

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
Worldviews: screening, sorting, defining, salience, evaluation, legitimate, rationalize Holsti: The mind is a belief seeking and not a fact seeking device… Fisher: in/out basket – uses: agenda of priorities, constrains behavior, stability and continuity, rationalizing policy decisions, cope with complexity, enhance national unity… Vertzberger: The world in their minds WVS (Worldviews) critical for info processing A framework of mental constructs with cognitive and effective side • Beliefs – images/perceptions – stereotypes – assumptions – values – attitudes – habits… • People strive to lighten the burden of info processing by avoiding comprehensive expenditures of thought and energy. Our belief systems and eventually our worldview is used to pigeon-hole info… Dominant WV category System maintainer • Realism, neorealism and neoliberalism • Recessive (Marginalized) System • • • transformers Utopians (WOMP) Marxist/ Neomarxist Critical theorists

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Middle Path System Reformers Reform internationalists

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

C. Remind me why should I care about worldview analysis? • Avoid dogmatism – rejecting others as irrelevant • Rigidity/ close minded • With one WV, less creativity and less aware of world around you • Tend to exaggerate your distance between you and others • With one WV, acceptance narrows and rejection broadens I. Foundational realism key voices: Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes As we go through these voices consider their contributions to present day thinking. What are four or five contributions from Thucydides and St. Augustine that you see as relevant today? Develop your own tradition on each author. Machiavellian tradition: Man? State? Place of war? Ethics? Role of leaders? Chances of peace? World order? World government? Thucydides born 460 BC Classical historian Peloponnesian wars 431-404 Major Influence on many realists from Hobbes to Morgenthau Less fundamental than Machiavelli – not just about evil and self-interest • Not just about anarchy (structure) must look at all three levels: Man-State-System Melian Dialogue Contributions to the realist tradition? (Lamy found 11! Woohoo!)

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes

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States are confronted with external necessities and driven by internal compulsions that impel them to violate moral principles in foreign affairs.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210

IR-210: Class Notes
11/14/05 10:02 AM

Realist Tradition – foundational voices Fourth voice: Thomas Hobbes 1651 The Leviathan Ten contributions to realist thinking Left with #5 – strong states and alliances may prevent some conflicts State provides defining activities and addresses issues of wealth, trust and fear Other factors that prevent conflict? • Prudence (Main factor) – Moral convictions – altruism Do not count too much on morality… • Kings whose power is greatest, turn their endeavors to assuring it at home by laws or abroad by wars 6. Is the international system in a constant state of war? • People use violence for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and many other signs of undervalue 7. In a system of anarchy - any way of avoiding war? • Prudence (Morgenthau borrows from this): Fear of costs and fear of defeat 8. What about cooperation? Alliances to prevent war? • Alliances based on the adaptation of independent wills easily fall apart when it comes to implementation Cooperation is not part of human nature 9. Any chance for peace? • Not without a central power

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
• BOPO and economic linkages may cause caution – Prudence

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Covenants without swords are but mere words. Alliances should never be based on morality or altruism • Countries should seek peace and be fair and forgiving but because self-interest rules and survival is a higher value – no country should take risks to achieve these duties 10. What about the security dilemma? Can we overcome that insecurity with alliances or collective security arrangements like NATO? • No… Foresight, prepare for war and bolster one’s capacity to defend…

Modern realism • Modern realism ruled from 1648-1920 • Assumptions o No common power o Strong state o Normative ideal – democracy and capitalism o National interests over global or human interests o War is a constant possibility o Cooperation is limited o Self assertion J.J. Rousseau's stag hunt: • No state is prepared to give up the possibility of gaining individual advantage over the rest. Sovereignty and independence get in the way of rational world peace. Modern voices: E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau Both influential in post war situations – grotain moments Carr = post WWI – critical of utopian schemes that left tyrants unchecked… BOPO or an effective league would have worked

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

Morgenthau = Post WWII – with Kennan convinced us leaders of the need to be strong and need to lead to secure national interests Rekindle Roosevelt era of US expansion and exceptionalism US foreign policy – global, interventionary and costly Voice: #1 E.H. Carr journalist and diplomat Woodrow Wilson professor of IR from 1936-47 Complex and inconsistent realist: actually advocated more integration and an early European Union Concern with social injustice Influenced by failure of liberal internationalism to establish peace post WWI Counteracting the dangerous and glaring defect of nearly all thinking – neglect of power Bankruptcy of liberalism - The twenty years crisis (1939) – This is where he trashes Wilson, peace advocates and others Utopian world order designed by the winners - excessive idealistic All fields start out idealistic - need a blend of utopian and realist thinking • Example of medicine Middle ground - democracies should take some of the good lessons from communism E.H. Carr = Main contribution to realists – avoid extreme positions No universal solutions – go for moderation and prudence

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes

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Life is about opposites: left vs. right; good vs. evil Key is to find a path of theory and practice in the middle May have led him to support appeasement policy toward Hitler His five objections to utopian thought Examples of his criticism of utopian/ liberal international • Assumptions that leaders have a broad range of choices – • • • • rationalism – and domestic policies will work internationally Harmony of interests among all people of the world Faith in human reason Laws/ moral code apply equally to all War is irrational behavior

Carr agreed with utopians on the dangers of nationalism = called for going beyond the state-EU type of organization Sought some morality in politics: • Fatal in politics to ignore power…

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210

IR-210: Class Notes
11/16/05 10:03 AM

Teach for America Presentation We do not possess our ideas, they posses us, and force us into the arena to fight for them. At times, to be martyred by them. -Jane Addams Announcements • Speaker on Friday – Gillian Sorensen – UN Foundation. Public talk at noon, please be on time! • Last TA session this week – a discussion on the Last Best Chance assignment – not formal presentations Primary question is how should we respond to this challenge? Strategy/prescription? Today: Finish Carr, Kennan and Morgenthau What about neorealists? Wight’s grotain tradition E.H. Carr - seeking a middle path between idealism and realism What is power? 3 Dimensions IR is a zero-sum game so always accommodate those with power Morality? State is not a person – 10 commandments do not apply to a state – duality argument Why states will not honor moral codes • States will not set aside power interests • Patriotism/ Nationalism – usually very militaristic • Lack of an enforcer No moral code because no community!

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
Why no • • • community? Failure to treat others as equals No loyalty and identity with international community All behavior encourages "I over We"

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Are we going to always be controlled by those with power? Rule-maker vs. rule taker? Yup... Just hope for altruism and restraint What about international law? Minimal function - keeps the weak in line No enforcer Simply does not match up to force! Kennan and Morgenthau echo many of his views in the post WWII era – shaped the new rules and the new rule-maker George • • • • Kennan – Diplomat – soviet something FOPO advisor – academic Considered author of US “containment” policy Did not support militarization of “containment” Was opposed to legalistic and moralistic FOPO It is the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspiration of governments by them acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints. –Kennan

Pursuit of moralistic goals incompatible with limited national objectives A pragmatic voice that urged leaders to focus on National Interest (NI) and not moralistic plans Friends with Hans Morgenthau 1904-1980

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

Came to the US in 1937 Books that he wrote • Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (1946) • Politics among nations (1948) IR is all about power Criticized by many in US as presenting a Germanic way of looking at things Too much focused on the pursuit of power Did say this pursuit must be kept in socially tolerable bounds Moral principles and national interests are not opposing forces But moral principles must be applied with: Realism, prudence and full regard of the political situation

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210

IR-210: Class Notes

Page 54 11/21/05 10:05 AM

Announcements • Check course announcements page for review sessions, etc. • Review questions – on course documents soon Politics among nations Not a criticism of idealism – develop a theory to explain/guide relations between states Ideas embraced by US leaders • No isolation • • • • No idealism Active leadership Using power to secure national interest Confront USSR

A few critical ideas: • Human nature: constant, egoistic, self-serving • Political relations: struggle for power • Remember, he was criticized for being ‘too German’ • Duality of morality: separate ethics for pubic and private spheres One can be ethical if it serves interests and enhances power and security • Separate spheres for human activity • Rejects the “end justifies the means” argument Influenced by Weber – use moral judgment to select most effective and least Evil Criticism of US FOPO Neorealism I. Analytical side Waltz’s structural realism

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

Anarchy shapes interests of states Also, rational choice theorists fit here Instrumental thinking: maximum benefit and minimum costs II. Security Side • Offensive – Mearsheimer: Increase relative power – expand and improve position in world; wary of all states seek hegemony • Read Chapter 9 for Final • Defensive – Jervis, Synder more concerned with absolute power – preserve BOPO; cooperation likely among friends; possible to create security institutions

Bush II Doctrine: Primacy and empire? Preemption and not containment Which is the Bush Doctrine? • For defensive realists, the international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states. • Offensive realists seek to enhance power at the expense of rivals. A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemony in the system. – Mearsheimer

Second worldview category System reformers/ reform internationalist International social democrats Rationalist tradition

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
Grotian tradition More Kant and less Machiavelli • Guarded optimists; Man is sociable and cooperative • Communal values over individualism We over • • • • • the I Political culture Associational Compromise and accommodation diplomacy over force Legalistic; equity International governance; Rule-based society develops through reciprocity of needs and hopes of mutual gain

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Regimes and institutions as problem-solving not only as managers • States share stage with other actors – still primary Goal is to make the state system better and… Huig De “Miracle • • • Groot – Hugo Grotius 1583-1645 King of France called him the of Holland” Dutch legal scholar Context and background Not really father of international law

Critical contributions- the Grotian tradition: • Sovereignty of states • Right to wage just war • Existence of shared values • Necessity for rules Particularly important as we wage war in Iraq and Afghanistan 1625 he codified this notion of war Law of the Sea - Written to protect Dutch East Indies ships

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

Modern day Grotians - English school - Two groups: • Pluralists: Bull, Wight (Hobbesian) • Solidarists

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210

IR-210: Class Notes

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In any particular situation, we have an unconditional obligation to do only what we can honestly wish all other people… Kant’s categorical Imperative – not optional – a universal rule of ethical behavior that can discovered by reason Last 4 lectures! Read Chapters 8, 9, and 10 in B & S Kantian Tradition: Clearly informed by liberal ideas = commercial, republican, sociological (Community) Influenced Wilson and modern liberal internationalism: • States best formed on basis of democratic self-determination • Open – free trade economies (Not ever complete, we always interfere in economics) • Anti-imperialism • International organizations (IOs) to keep peace • US leadership ST criticism of Wilson: too much capitalism, big power interests in IOs, eurocentrism Realist criticism: idealistic, moralistic, and utopian Smokescreen to rally public opinion Peace movement shapes policy: Three types of idealism • Traditional views – some form of world government or European senate to answer problem of war: Dante, De Monarchia WM PennQuaker, Abbe St. o Pierre-European senate • Liberalism-capitalism: Bentham and Cobden • Kant's Idealism more republican-democratic peace, cosmopolitan rights, a federation of small republics

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

Also champion of individual freedoms – real problem is absolute power • Freedom from arbitrary authority • Free speech and press • Political participation • Private property • Equality of opportunity Inspired modern idealists like G. Lowes Dickson (1920) Possibility of an international community and life is not a constant struggle for power Key voice: J.A. Hobson Towards International Government (1915) • Saw Woodrow Wilson as someone who gave idealists a bad name In the spirit of our UN reform assignment = saw sovereignty as obsolete move from NI to HI • Interdependence = more common problems and more need for common action • Good domestic legal systems model for international law • International law cannot be voluntary – backed with force • Traditional diplomacy - elitist - class-based and militaristic. Sought popular control over FOPO! • BOPO a war system because of security dilemma One quick decision leads to war Hobson favored some form of IO with a strong collective security system Other Kantian Ideas: • Key Factor: Moral Freedom= o The right to be treated and the duty to treat others as ethical subjects Elements of a contemporary Kantian tradition: • Human security must be part of national security

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
• • • • • • IR is not just about survival of the state-protection of basic rights and provision of BHN (Basic Human Needs) Trade and interdependence lead to cooperation and spread of ethical ideas Explored why war – used levels Democratic states less likely to go to war with other democracies Knowledge - discovery will lead to solutions to global problems like war and Have the courage to know Reason will lead to truth and in democracies those with higher values will socialize others

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Progeny = Mitrany/Functionalism basis for the European Union Global commissions, reports and global conferences environmental summits sustainable development/ N-S Other assumptions that make up the tradition: • Eliminate standing armies – Fuels arms race – expensive – negative political force at home • Deal with anarchy - federation of states as opposed to world government • Moral interdependence – increase connections among citizens

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210

IR-210: Class Notes
11/30/05 10:07 AM

According to me… should be such that no.. • Ghandi Review schedule is on the announcement page Make-up lecture on Monday 10-10:50 in SGM 123 Good luck to Andrea and Deborah in NCAA fro VBall Today: Kant and modern day Kantians? Friday case study – use to find out how much you have grown intellectually • Bring worksheet – filled in or empty! Your choice. Reference case! Be clear, concise, neat and on that sheet. Cannot read – no points What are these transformers complaining about? Persistence of war and inequality – we have not solved the issues of structural violence J. Galtung’s Cruise Liner Yearly average children killed in conflict: 1990-2000 = 200,000 Yearly average children made homeless: 1990-2000 = 1.2 million Number of people undernourished declined from 816 million to 798 million, 17% of the world’s population 113 million children do not attend school 1 billion people live on less than $1 a day 1 billion have no safe drinking water

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
Millennium development goals are targeted for 2015.. promises began in 1970. UN development decades For Wompers - what is the problem? Marxists – neomarxists? Return to Kantian tradition: • Idea of community – Kant believed economic interdependence and linkages • Links to moral interdependence • • • Plan for • • • • • Universalists – cosmopolitan right – apply to all States must protect the rights of all Cannot ignore utopian ideas and goals moral improvement: Abolish war Education Deal with anarchy Eliminate standing armies Increase moral interdependence

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Key point: states should base their FOPO on the categorical imperative: Act according to a maxim you can at the same time will that it shall become a general or universal law All worldviews have views on human security… approaches and providers Freedom from fear/safety of peoples; freedom from want/social justice; liberty rights and rule of law Kantian cosmopolitans = TSMOS, TANS and GCS Liberal institutions = stronger IOS and regimes Minilateralists = hegemonic leaders…

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

A worldview… World order models project Normative FOPO – peace, social justice, economic well-being, ecological balance Modern Kantian – WOMP • Richard Falk (1968) concerns: o The cartography of human suffering Recognizes his permanent marginalization ALL politics involves normative concerns Problems cannot be solved by states alone Distrust of centralization Rejection of all violence that does not respect innocence of civilians o Activism – we are all guilty o o o o o Every child is born with the message that god is not yet discouraged with humanity – R. Tagore Five ways: • State centrism – power/conflict • High politics and not trans-disciplinary • Claim of objectivity • Disregard realities that suggest the system is not working • Power game and not basic human needs Falk - 20 years later... a normative project to achieve humane governance • First, tame war • Rid world of war system • Accountability • Collective security • Rule of Law • Nonviolent revolutionary politics

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
• Human rights

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210 Midterm Review

IR-210: Class Notes
10/16/05 3:01 PM

Difference between levels 2 and 3 • 2: Right inside the state • 3: Interaction of international community, systemic issues Nature of international system • Realist: its anarchic • Reformer: much more multilateral, more regime based Maintainer English school- what’s the nature of the system? • Headley Bull in an English school: How he would see the international system o See the system as pluralistic o It’s an international society o It’s not anarchic- formal and informal treaties Formal constraint in the system • Treaty, alliance Informal constraint • Informal constraint • Past behavior The system is not anarchic: Belief of the English school Notre Dame game last Saturday (Yesterday) First big challenge to Realism • Westphalia o If we have a state system rather than empires, we can create a less-anarchic system o States are the principle actors End of WWI was the next big challenge • Grecian moments: time to go to a rule-based system o Too-idealistic o There weren’t enough powers to start this: who will be first?

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes

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Things become embedded in our institutions • Things such as the cold war, it still lingers on • There's always an enemy in our system • Key leaders never lost their construction of the world as realists • Wouldn’t change their world view until they can be assured that they won’t lose power Why would somebody choose to be a middle power • They get more power from alliances, et cetera • Define power differently: see it as prestige, image, whatever niche they can find to emphasize their strengths Why would somebody want to transform the system? • Because they are left out The list of rule-makers hasn’t changed much What would cause the world to move? The major powers would have to change their viewpoint Rule-maker vs. rule-taker Who gives the most aid: middle powers. That is their niche • Rule makers, but not the great powers The main goal in the system is to enhance one’s state’s power Your foreign policy will follow one of four paths • Intransigence: Challenge the system; North Korea; Iran; Venezuela • Promotive: If you benefit from the system; Soviets in Cold War • Acquiescent: Want to be noticed • Preservative: Losing power and want to hold on to it; European powers

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

Blair is taking the stance of: we are a major power like the United States, but we do things a bit differently than the US Economic world: Promotive policy in EU, China, Oil Producing economies Accepting a theory and seeing the world through that theory Rules one accepts: interpret these rules and this is called ‘practices’ • “Conflict is endemic in the system” • “Complete peace cannot exist” Rules as a realist • Power is force • Always on guard, don’t trust people • Flood at the gates • Who has agency? Rules as a reformer • People aren’t inherently evil • Can create rules and regulations • International law • Cooperation • Who has agency? United Nations, Regional organizations, et cetera UN doesn’t have their “foreign policy act together” because they don’t have force • Two different sets of rules from which nations develop their perspective The US is dominated by realists • Doesn’t matter if you have a democratic or republican president When do theories/paradigms change and shift? • Sometimes by discovery of new information Why is realism still dominant? Not enough “fossils” (evidence against it)

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes

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Why hasn’t the EU model worked in Africa, among other places? • Must be fairly successful to give up something • Who paid for the EU? The US. The US protected them from the soviets • If African Union takes off and starts to work- there’s more fossils for you • Realist assumptions haven’t been replaced by workable plans • No historical examples of idealism working • Many historical examples where idealists took realists down the wrong paths Idealism: World order models project • How do we make the system more transparent and democratic • What perpetuates inequalities • Peace, well-being, social justice, economic well-being for all, environment-friendly • Large academic group working on these things, designing systems that are more regional and decentralized • How do we break down foreign policy so people have more access to it • Look at their plans and they seem too idealistic • NGOs tend to be more representative • Idealism is a transformative world-view Realism is an incomplete theory…. How would realists respond to this… (In handout, number 5) • Realists believe that everything that goes on inside a state is the responsibility of the state What has changed the world is globalization • Now foreign policy and domestic policy • We face an ‘inter-mestic’ world • A 'Glocal' community • Realism says: there is a separation between domestic and international policies

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

Morality in IR is choosing a path that is the least costly with the most benefits. Can be moral at home, then bomb everyone else if it benefits you most. Biggest • • • Liberal • Globalization is an economic problem problem realists have with globalization is that it threatens security Open borders, et cetera Internet and all that Security

Reformer • Globalization is a inequity problem, don’t want more people to become transformers How do you make globalization fair, and a positive change Transformer • Challenge of globalization is that things are coming from above. Also, how do you use the forces of globalization to make the world a better place. Maintainer viewpoint • Problem: now we can possibly destroy the entire world (Because of the proliferation of nuclear weapons) • The problems we face: very few can be solved unilaterally Countries that are best prepared for globalization: reformers • Exemplified by first gulf war Sample midterm questions Do not repeat the question • Don’t waste your time

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes

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Outline your response • The question has three elements… et cetera Break the question down, spit it into elements If you have a question, ask Standard advice for taking a midterm 1) How would you define power… • • • • • • • Open ended question Realists: force Reformer: economy Neo-liberal: having control over the institutions that manage the global economy Diplomatic skills Transformer: Value of your ideas, convincing people that you’ve got the best idea Another way of answering the question: o Four worlds: how this is seen through each of the four worlds o Is the US the most powerful? Depends on which world is the most important o Of all four worlds, where is the US? Number one with political-military; top five in world economy; traditional/cultural world, not too prominent; political world US-based; consumer world US-based; social world, not in a good position, the US doesn’t share power is critical... Learning to do things from three world-view perspectives Described in detail in the syllabus Why study IR? Depends on your world-view o Maintainer: to know the rules in order to maintain their power o Reformer: learn as much as possible to solve the global problems

2) What • • •

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IR-210: Class Notes
 IR could be argued to have been born from Reformers o What is the natural US view? o Transformer: learn to change the system, emancipation, emancipator globalists

3) How do you think... • First chapter of Bailey’s and Smith • Change in theory of IR since 9/11 o A small group can change the world, states don’t control everything o Non-state actors can change things immensely o Policy world o Reformers: we have to ask the question: why are these people terrorists  IR theory has to emphasize different things o Realists: more weapons, “we need to get those people over there before they get us here,” more intelligence, et cetera o Peace, social justice, economic well-being, ecological: four goals on world-views o Chapter #1 on world views: very, very important Possible 15 to 20 years of occupation for everything to go through 4) With Lamy’s world-view… • Requires that you read that CH. #1, on blackboard I think 5)You have a tool box… • Handout #21, almost completely • Puzzle: unexpected behavior: North Korea abandoning publicly their nuclear missile program o Looking for the independent variable: NK gives up nuclear weapons o Individual rationality: maximize benefits for lowest cost o Man is inherently evil o Focus on the individuals in this case: because it is a dictatorship

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
o Maybe its his personality type o Hawks, doves, owls o Maybe leader of NK wants to belong, or have power, but none of these really make much sense o Need for aid is a big factor: Level two on handout #21  Put this together in a hypothesis: If a country has great economic needs it will set aside national interests for international interests  So we're assuming that the motivating factor is great economic needs  Change it to make it more precise: If a country has great economic needs, the greater the leverage the international community possesses Can be revised in many different ways, even to represent different levels of Handout #21

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Low range theory defines individuals. If we used the word ‘North Korea’ instead of ‘country’ in the previous hypothesis, it would be low range. Using countries makes in middle range. Using ‘world community’ or something that applies universally, it would be a grand theory. Is conflict endemic in the system? • The belief system • Analogical reasoning o Based on previous experiences in your head: have I been in this situation before? • Fuzzy analog: one that doesn’t really apply to many cases • Persona analog: Hitler: if he’s like Hitler, I don’t like him • Movies: He’s an Al Bundy type or Archie Bunker type How do you explain that Denmark is the #1 aid giver? • Best explanation: Level 2 (Handout #12) tools. National belief system • Denmark: political culture is a social democracy • Middle power, political culture

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

If international community is anarchic, middle powers will develop Why does NK need weapons • In an anarchic international system, all states seek weapons (Hypothesis) The fourth level: very rarely causal, usually just affects the previous three levels Pandemic is a fourth level: Bird flu, weather patterns, et cetera As pandemics increase, instability in countries also increase. Aids decreases stability, which results in poverty, et cetera. This is a fourth level causation Don’t choose a question that references a article which you have not read: there will be choice on the exam Samuel Burger and Condoleezza Rice articles for some of the questions First article in the political world about International community Cultural World Number 8: waves of IR theory: should we cover every single wave? No. Tell him what the major developments are in the field. Of all the waves there are debates between five different traditions, some traditions overlap, every period of human activity falls under maintainer/reformer/transformer, debates between the three groups • Ideas that effect debating on everything o Realism o Rationalism o National Law o Fideism o Historicism • Because of events, certain people come out on top o Events in human activity cause the switch

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
o Enlightenment period Something like: “I want to focus on this and the group of realists, Europeans, et cetera”

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Preemption is a very good thing to do in an exam Know Martin Wight Very important questions for the exam: Numbers 1, 4, 5, 7, 11, 13 on five point questions Numbers 3 (Very important), 4, 7, 9 on ten point questions Responding to challenges (Question number 5) depends on one’s world view • Maintainer: Force • Reformer: Establish international regimes • Transformer: Change the system Overcome constraints • Trying to avoid vulnerability • Reformer: create dependencies, et cetera Constant search for order • BOPO (balance of power) • Reformer: concert • Transformer: won't have problems of order if there weren't competing states, so create a world democracy o Global governance

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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Midterm Review #2
Constructivist Critical Conventional

IR-210: Class Notes
10/17/05 2:08 PM

Culture – Rules – Practices • Institution – Agency The institution exists regardless of who is president • The Cold War is more of a security institution Setting up a Regime to govern an area USC students are all under a regime, a ‘governing arrangement’ Landmine campaign was an attempt to create a regime Question #5 on five-point questions • Denmark is a puzzle, level two might be the reason for the decision (to give large amounts of aid, or other things) • France’s decision to not support the United States o Why is this a puzzle? o We would assume that the French would support us o French are independent, also a member of NATO o Looking for an explanation o Not a crisis situation o Probably a level two: the issue was discussed by a group of leaders, who had time to decide o Domestic politics: all politicians are concerned about two thing: re-election and making sure their ideas are pushed through and passed o France has the largest Muslim population of European countries o Long history of not liking the United States o Sold well to the French population for them to be independent • Germany resisted the US as well • How could one use level 3 or 4?

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
o Why    is Iran developing nuclear weapons? Iran wants to make nuclear weapons Anarchy in the system (system level) In an anarchic system, states will always pursue the development of arms to strengthen security  Anarchic middle east o Level 4 is rarely causal  Tends to be more intervening or secondary variable  Avian flew will influence foreign policy, but it won’t cause somebody to attack another country or completely change policy (usually)  AIDS is another one  Droughts  Has nothing to do with the interaction of states o Third level has more to do with the interaction of states o Media falls into the global level  The internet, et cetera If a political culture is social-democratic, you can expect certain decisions from its leaders Distribution of power • Hegemony – One power, not much distribution here • BOPO system, states tend to follow one of the two major powers • Bipolar system, states tend to follow one of the two poles How would one explain the coalition of the willing • Denmark sent troops to Iraq: why?? • Why would Poland join the coalition of the willing • Less flexibility in a tight hegemonic system o More constraints • In a bi-polar there’s a little more flexibility Canada’s decision to lead the landmine campaign • Why is this a puzzle? o The US is one of the leading landmine producers and users

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IR-210: Class Notes
o The US is Canada’s leading trading partner o Why would Canada lead a campaign that might upset the US? All nations want to develop a niche

The more powerful the military in a bureaucratic structure, this a level two Never talk about the Cuban missile crisis Bureaucratic politics; international rational actor idea Standard operating procedures • • Sample gets 50 million, then gives it to the engineering school to decide where it goes Cuban missile crisis, if the president had told the defense department to deal with the crisis, they probably would have bombed Cuba to no end

The kinds of theory that are dealt with • Constitutive • More… Make the argument that politics are shifting away from the state • Shifting power away from the state: who would disagree and who would agree • Could answer this question using the three world views • Disagree, Agree, Explore • SM – State, International organizations, temporary coalitions • Many of these guys participate in regimes • States are the only groups who can legitimately use power to get what it wants • System reformers believe that the state is losing power o in some sectors, states are losing power o Power is shifting away if states cannot organize to hold onto power and cooperate • Who thinks that this is really happening (agrees)? • Shifting attention away from NGOs and TSMOs

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
• Could answer this question: three perspective o Hyperglobalists o Skeptics o Transformationalists

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Dominant idea in the international system are idealists SM, SR, ST (System Maintainer, Reformer, Transformer) – These are the three major categories created by Martin Wight • SM: Mach: Pessimistic • SR: Grotian: Pessimistic/Optimistic • ST: Kantian: Optimistic

How do you see the world? • SM: System is anarchic, no common power. Build up arms, security dilemma. Use arms to mitigate anarchy. • SR: Develop a rule based system to mitigate the effects of anarchy • ST: Move towards a world government. They see the SMs as the problem. Get people involved in the system, effectively moving towards global governance Sovereignty is so important… maintainers would say it is not our responsibility to take care of problems in other states, unless its in our national interest The OZ case: who's responsibility was that? Reformer and transformer view: it is humanities responsibility. Maintainer Australia says, “Not out problem” Social scientists are shooting for a theory so deep that the government will fund them further Discussion of theories as they occur in different subjects Puzzle why did the US invade Grenada • Small island in the Caribbean

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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• •

IR-210: Class Notes
Monroe doctrine: stay out of the western hemisphere Monroe’s doctrine and how it affects politics Roosevelt corollary: nobody can have a government in our hemisphere that we don’t like

How America was losing power to the Soviets in Central America Regan wanted to show that he was tough, because Carter wasn’t tough Three years before elected, Regan broadcast shows on his radio program about Soviets coming into ‘Our Lake’ Ford screwed up huge trying to recover a freighter off of Cambodia, but his popularity in the polls were the highest in his presidency because he used force Distribution of power Everything was always attributed to the Cold War Early 1950, US decided to start giving aid. Why? The Cold War States are losing power because of • Crisis of legitimacy, authority, efficiency • State nationalists to ethnic nationalists • Solution: network states o states open themselves up to working with other actors • Emanuel Castels: need to know (In notes somewhere) OZ case: big issue is sovereignty – Human rights issues also colliding Make sure to give a sense in the essays that you know what the four worlds are Emphasis on human rights is a part of political culture

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Class Notes
What were the key issues in the case? The golden straight jacket • Friedman suggests that after the end of the Cold War we built up a world where there is only one economic system. He would not agree that there are three different systems. Only one highway: Neo-liberal highway • Within liberalism there are a few different kinds of liberalism • Create institutions and make the state pay for them • IMF, World Bank; Created regimes to make it easier for people to make money • • • Neo-liberal: not 100% liberal, because 100%’s don't support any kind of government interference Neo-liberals want the state to create institutions to make money If you put on the jacket and go with it, you'll get rich. Straight jacket, because there's only one way to go. Don't try to play with the system, go with it

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Know the critical differences between each of the three world views • Biggest difference is the difference between the maintainers and transformers • Key controversies of the four worlds • Foreign affairs reader Know reading in foreign affairs reader for references in essay Is it possible to win the war on terrorism? Any broad question like this, explain from the perspective of each world view Final exam is cumulative Universal view is held usually by transformers who think that we all have universal rights, states can’t take these away. Other view says that the state provides us with rights Positivism is a social science, someone who is positive all the time

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: Class Notes

Bailey’s and Smith’s chapter on critical theory • Problem solving theory • Critical theory: start with the assumption that the system is corrupt We don’t challenge paradigms, until evidence piles up and one can no longer accept the paradigm. “fossils’ idea Post-modernist We can create capitalism with a 'human face' (Reformers) Marxists say ‘all your doing is pushing the veggies around the plate’

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Assignments
Keith Parker IR-210 Analytical Exercise Why Did It Happen? The Indian and Pakistani governments have continually tested nuclear weapons, despite pressure from most of the rest of the world not to do so. This dispute over the Kashmir area has almost led to a nuclear war between the two nations a few times, the most recent being only a few years ago in 2002 after an attack on the Indian parliament. The two states have attempted peace talks numerous times, but have never come to a viable solution in dealing with the Kashmir area. Recently, deals have made possible a somewhat stable Kashmir area. This year, a bus service was opened between the two regions, in a landmark move. Nonetheless, the two states have continued nuclear testing. Why does nuclear testing continue despite world pressure? (BBC World News, 2005) The US continues to trade extensively with China, and sign trade agreements. NGOs, though, have accused China of human rights violations on many occasions. NGOs and human rights groups argue that the US should not be promoting China’s actions by signing trade agreements. China, though, is the US’s largest trade partner. China has been the most attractive location for FDI for many years now. Why would the US continue to trade despite opposition from major groups? (BBC World News, 2005) Despite being a major trade partner with the US and usually being in good standing with the US, France opposed the US plan to subjugate Iraq. Even after pressure from much of the EU and especially the US, France would not budge in its stance. While trade with France has not faltered since the beginning of the US conquering of Iraq, a political opposition seemed to be in bad taste. Why would France risk bad relations with the US by opposing the Iraqi takeover? (BBC World News, 2005)

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Puzzle Hypotheses

IR-210: Assignments

Pakistani and Indian Governments’ reluctance to end nuclear testing 1) In an anarchic international system, if a state has nuclear technology, its neighboring states will seek the same for defense. 2) If two or more states believe that they have a religious right to a piece of land, then they will seek out all options for securing that land, including military superiority. 3) If two states with opposing ideologies share a border, then they will both seek defense equal to that of their neighboring state. 4) If a state is structured upon a religion, then it will seek to assert its political power over neighboring populations of the same religion, especially if those populations are under the control of a state based on a differing religion. 5) If the international community is pressing for change in a state’s policy, namely over the occupation of territory, then that state will seek a military with similar power to those pressing for change. US Trade with China 1) If it is in the best interest of a state to trade with another state, then minor moral issues will be disregarded. 2) If a state is considering increased trade relations with another state, then issues that do not affect the actual trade agreement are of no concern. 3) If human rights violations in a foreign state are out of the home state’s public’s sight, then trade relations between the two countries will not be influenced.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: Assignments
4) If human rights violations are a natural part of a state’s social structure, then foreign trade partners will be reluctant to push for an end to the human rights violations. 5) If there is a massive overpopulation of a state with incredibly low income per capita, then human rights violations will be less of a concern to foreign trade partners France’s opposition to the US takeover of Iraq 1) If a state’s presence in the international world in diminishing, then they will cease to be acquiescent to the world’s superpowers. 2) If a state has a history of independent thinking in its social system (France was home to the first university in the modern sense of the word), then that state will be less likely to change its stance because of international pressure. 3) If a large portion of a state’s population is of a religion that is threatened by the conquests of a foreign state, then that state will oppose the foreign state’s actions. 4) If a state is well developed and its government feels no need to be acquiescent to the world’s superpowers, then that state will feel less obligated to support another state’s self-interests. 5) If a state’s economic interests are affected by another state’s self-interested military actions (Iraq had many oil trade agreements with France, which might have dissolved after a US occupation of Iraq), then that state will oppose the military actions of the other state.

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IR-210: Assignments
Hypotheses with most powerful explanations The most plausible explanation for the nuclear proliferation in both India and Pakistan is found in the second hypothesis mentioned above: If two or more states believe that they have a religious right to a piece of land, then they will seek out all options for securing that land, including military superiority. In the case of India and Pakistan, the land for which nuclear weapons are being developed to secure is in dispute because of religious presence in the region. Of course, the original reason for dispute was somewhat careless decolonization; the current debate, though, is based largely on the presence of dominant religions in certain areas of Kashmir. The US decision to continue trade relations with China and sign major trade agreements can be explained best by the first hypothesis mentioned above: If it is in the best interest of a state to trade with another state, then minor moral issues will be disregarded. As trade with China is such an important piece of the US economy, and without it the US would be an unimaginably different place, minor issues of human rights aren’t enough to put pressure on China and potentially disrupt the currently positive political relations with China. If there were larger human rights issues in China, such as genocide, one can safely assume that the US would not overlook the possibility of putting mammoth pressure on China. France’s opposition to the US subjugation of Iraq can best be explained by the third hypothesis listed above: If a large portion of a state’s population is of a religion that is threatened by the conquests of a foreign state, then that state will oppose the foreign state’s actions. As France has a very large Muslim population, it is thus likely that France will not support the US in its plan to conquer the Muslim nation of Iraq. France’s opposition to the takeover merely appeases its Muslim population.

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IR-210: Assignments

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IR-210: Assignments
The problem embodied by the potential nuclear threat to the United States can be articulately solved through the ideas of a system transformer. Many transformationalist ideas have clear flaws that are solvable only by synthesizing these ideas with those of the system maintainer and reformer; nonetheless, it is important to clearly lay out the perspective of a transformer before borrowing from it ideas for a final solution. The issue with which the international community, namely the United States, must confront in this case is presented in the short drama Last Best Chance. For the most part, the problem lies in the ability, or inability, of the international community to control the proliferation and potential use of WMDs, specifically among those in the terrorist community. From a strictly transformationalist point of view, the nature of the problem lies in society’s inability to view the world as an international state with individuals concerned with human security across the globe, not only among their own culture and society. The international community is far too centered on the all-too-common powerpolitics system that dominates nearly every state’s political culture across the world. It is known that nuclear proliferation is incredibly difficult to control, mostly because there are many venues from which terrorists could gather materials needed and the ability to create WMDs. Further, the international community does not know exactly where and how active many of these venues are. It is presumed that, given the proper fiscal resources, terrorists are able to access the materials and processing methods needed to build WMDs. The problem has developed largely from the result of increased terrorist activity and funding over the past few years, after an overall drop in terrorism in the decade prior to 9/11. The root of the problem arose from the proliferation of the powerpolitics system, when nations were building as many deadly weapons as they could to

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stay ahead in the arms race. Russia’s inability to secure their WMDs supplies in entirety has added to the problem significantly. Richard Falk, a proponent of transformationalist propositions, might recommend a variety of responses to this problem. First, an overall decrease of WMDs across the world, including rule-making states, would be advised. The end goal would be the extinction of WMDs. According to Falk, “We oppose on principle and for reasons of prudence, the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, by any country.” Further, more interaction with individual terrorists or potential terrorists would be advised. By lowering borders between states, individuals and states would tend to feel as if they were more a part of an international community rather than an anarchic group of power-hungry states. With a lowering of borders, states would be on a more equal playing field with other states. Thus, any increase in the power of one state would be an increase in the power of all states. If this goal were accomplished, individuals and whatever state governments are left would feel less of a need to gain a power advantage over other states. Though this prospect sounds solid, there are a few gaps in the plan that have yet to be solved. First, no state is willing to be the first to give up their supply of WMDs, for the fear of being susceptible to other states. Further, the maintainer perspective of ‘securing national interests first’ is too widespread. With this worldview being most dominant in the political system, it will be hard to convince states to lower borders and become more vulnerable to security threats.

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Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 kaparker@usc.edu GIN Assignment TA: Daniel Tauss Massive Step-up in the fight against poverty To tackle the fight against poverty worldwide, a combination of public, private, and civil society actors must be aligned strategically and uniformly for success to be achieved. In order to break down the elements of this ‘Global Issues Network’ (GIN), I have broken down each actor piece into three segments. First, I will list the actors to be involved, the sector under which they fall, then an explanation of why that actor was chosen. The explanation will detail the resources, expertise, and experience that each will bring to the process of solving the problem, one-by-one. Global Issues Network  US Government – Public/ Civil Society Actor – The US Government has an enormous amount of capital for which to use in the fight against poverty. Of all the actors who may potentially be involved in this fight, the US has the largest pool or resources. The American media often places the issue of global poverty in the spotlight, thus raising the issue to a higher level on the American peoples’ agenda of concerns periodically. While many other governmental operations compete for this pool, Americans’ will to fight poverty has kept the government devoted to setting funds aside for this issue. Further, the government has a great track record in the fight against poverty. The amount of time this actor has devoted to the issue of global poverty has placed it at the forefront of the fight against poverty, in terms of experience. In direct input to the fight against poverty, the US government leads the world in contributions. In 2000, the US donated US$10 billion to Official

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development assistance. Most importantly, though, the US has led the international community in bringing good governance and sound economic policies to developing countries through political interaction. As the US Government also donates to civil society actors, I have included it as an actor in the civil society sector as well.  Russia – Public Actor – Russia has access to a large amount of resources, just as the US Government does. With capital to work with, Russia has much to offer the international community in the fight against poverty. In the years between 1998 and 2004, Russia wrote off US$16.5 Billion worth of African countries’ foreign debt. Many of the most impoverished states in the world are located on the African continent. Russia, during much of the liberating of states in Africa in the 1960s and 70s, had worked closely with many of the nations now needing international help. Through this interaction, Russia has gained the first-hand knowledge and experience needed to successfully bring about the lessening of poverty in this region. Further, being one of the world’s most powerful states, Russia has the diplomatic pull needed to push though important economic changes that could have a profound effect in many of these states.  European Union – Public Actor – “The European Union, European Commission and other member states of the EU provide half the aid to the developing nations” (Benn, Hilary). To stress again the importance of capital in the fight against poverty, the EU has made arrangements to increase the supply of foreign aid to impoverished African states by US$25 billion by 2010. Further, the EU has a geographic advantage to providing foreign aid to Africa, where many of the world’s impoverished nations are located, as mentioned earlier. This strategic location has provided the EU the

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opportunity to help with the development of economies and stable governments many times in recent history, such as Italy’s contribution to the establishment of a stable infrastructure in Mozambique.  United Nations – Public Actor – One of the United Nations’ most important goals is the reduction of poverty around the world. The United Nations, while it may lack the enormous amount of capital available to some of the world’s most powerful states, has a very strong political and diplomatic position in the world. As far as the UN’s direct fight against poverty goes, member states provide funding that goes directly to the development of impoverished states. The UN also provides direct aid in the form of food or other living necessities to the world’s impoverished peoples. Further, the UN has the political leverage to promote the contribution of member states to developing countries in the form of monetary aid or political support and development.  War on Want – Civil Society Actor – The War on Want organization provides a segway for society to make donations to promote the development of underdeveloped states. This actor provides the GIN with a very strong public stance on the issue of lessening poverty: to stop it at its core through the elimination of inequality and injustice. The organization mostly works directly with the developing states in order to achieve its goal. The War on Want organization was founded in 1951, and its long history has provided it the valuable experience needed to succeed in its goal. Further, this actor lobbies for its cause with governments around the world who have the power to bring down global poverty.

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 Red Cross – Public/ Private/ Civil Society Actor – The Red Cross is supported financially and politically by every sector of the GIN. The Red Cross has a very extensive history in the promotion of poverty diminishment, thus greatly enhancing their current ability to deal with complex situations involving the fight on poverty. The Public sector, i.e. governments around the world, donates directly to Red Cross in order to perpetuate their cause. Individuals in the Civil Society sector donate for various reasons, often for personal moral reasons or tax incentives. The private sector donates for yet another reason: good publicity, among other things. The Red Cross does most of its work through direct material donations to impoverished peoples, though it has plenty of political roots as well.  CARE – Civil Society Sector – This actor is supported almost solely by individual civil society donors. The organization has a strong history, giving it the experience credentials needed to succeed. The resources provided by individual donors doesn’t quite compare to those of large governments or many private organizations, but including an organization which has fewer political and private ties is essential to the GIN. Most of CARE’s work is done on the ground in Africa, providing goods and services directly to the people who need it.  Pfizer – Private Sector – This private company has continually donated to important causes around the world, specifically the War on Poverty. Among its recent large donations, Pfizer donated US$10 Million to aid in development after the tsunami hit Southeast Asia in 2004. It is important to include an actor that is specific to the private sector of the GIN largely because of the efficiency that big businesses tend to bring with them. Large corporations are often as successful as they are because of

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how well they do their job, specifically they are known for great efficiency. In order for a development program to work successfully, it must be efficient in both dispersing the funds made available by the big capital donors, as well as allocating resources to political development in developing states.

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Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 kaparker@usc.edu Searching for Academic Resources (Using MLA format) TA: Daniel Tauss 1) Articles in Academic Journals a. Malik, Mohan. “Nuclear Proliferation in Asia: The China Factor.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 53.1 (1999): 31-41 (Reformer) b. Klingebiel, Stephen, Huria Ogbamichael. “Poor Performers in SubSaharan Africa.” African Security Review 13.1 (2004): 13-19 (Maintainer) c. Quille, Gerrard. “The European Security Strategy: a framework for EU security interests?” International Peacekeeping 11.3 (2004): 422-438 (Reformer) d. Owen, Tyler. “Human Security - Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition.” Security Dialogue 35.3 (2004): 373-387 (Maintainer) e. Wade, Robert Hunter. “Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality?” International Journal of Health Services 34.3 (2004): 381-414 (Reformer) f. Smith, Steve. “Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11.” International Studies Quarterly 48.3 (2004): 499 (Transformer) 2) Sources to keep informed a. Public views on terrorism: i. Waheed, Imran. “Viewpoints: Islam and London Bombings.” BBC News 7/19/05 World Edition ii. Scroope, Heather. “Sept. 11: Four Years Later.” Fox News 9/11/05

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iii. Ethan, Rose. “Viewpoint: Self-fulfilling Prophesies.” Middle East News 9/15/05 International Edition b. Latin American views on U.S. foreign policy: i. Brasil, Agência. “BNDES has US$ 2.6 billion to finance exports to South America.” Agencia Brasil 8/28/05 ii. Toothaker, Christopher. “Chavez Raises His Profile at U.N. Summit.” Guardian Unlimited 9/20/05 iii. James, Deborah. “Time for a New Foreign Policy Toward Venezuela: When Apologies are Not Enough.” Venezuela Analysis 8/25/05 c. The Role of the African Union in Sudan: i. Eibner, John. “Sudanese Hope Relies on American Hope.” Sudan Tribune 9/21/05 ii. Lazarus Antoinette. “Additional SA contingent deployed to Sudan.” SABC News 9/14/05 iii. Gantz, Peter H. “The UN Summit: U.S. Spoiler Role Weakens Draft Outcome Document.” Refugees International 9/14/05 3) News Magazines a. Pachauri, R.K. “The Black Gold’s Curse.” Outlook India Magazine. 28 Apr. 2005: 12 b. Gustave, Speth James. “The Kyoto No-Show Can Still Go Green.” Yale Global Magazine. 16 Feb. 2005 4) Television and Radio sources a. U.S. public opinion related to the reform of the UN: i. CSPAN (TV) – Maintainer ii. CNN (TV) – Reformer iii. Air America (Radio) – Transformer b. Should the U.S. and its allies get involved in Darfur? i. Fox (TV) – Maintainer ii. Radio Left (Radio) – Reformer iii. Counterspin (Radio) – Transformer

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c. Is the idea of an American Empire a good one? i. Jim Hightower (Radio) – Maintainer ii. BBC News (TV) – Reformer iii. KCNA of DPRK (North Korean News) (Radio) – Transformer 5) Research Paper a. Primary Sources: i. Boron, Atilio. Interview with Noam Chomsky. Rec. 14 June 1003. What’s Happening? ZNet Online. ii. Larson, Alan P. Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Rec. 4 June 2003. UNSC Resolution 1483: A Framework for Reconstruction. US Department of State. iii. United Nations. Security Council. Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution. S/2003/556, 2003. b. Secondary Sources, Books: i. United Nations Association USA. Global Agenda: Issues Before the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations. New York: United Nations Association of the USA, 2004. ii. Hunt, Scott. The Future of Peace: On the Front lines with the World’s Great Peacemakers. New York: HarperCollins, 2004. iii. Malone, David M. The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. c. Secondary Sources, Academic Journals: i. Tharoor, Shashi. “Why America Still Needs the United Nations.” Foreign Affairs 82.5 (2003): 67-80 ii. Albright, Madeleine. “Think Again: The United Nations.” Foreign Policy September/October (2003): 1-6 iii. Weiss, Thomas G. “The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform.” The Washington Quarterly 26.4 (2003): 147-161 6) ‘Favorites’ list Websites for sources a. Foreign policy debates in your home country:

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i. Maintainer: http://www.brookings.edu - The Brookings Institute focuses mostly on domestic issues, and refers to foreign states usually only in reference to their impact on the US. ii. Reformer: http://www.foreignpolicy.com - This website represents the reformer view by condemning rich nations’ tendency to put up trade barriers against foreign firms, especially in the article “Ranking the rich 2005.” iii. Transformer: http://www.opednews.com - Many articles in OpEdNews focus primarily on the need for the US to open up trade, and end it’s concern for domestic development, which according to the site is already thriving well enough. b. The status of major environmental concerns: i. Maintainer: http://earthjustice.org - This site focuses on the general gaining of support for domestic lobbying against environmental damage, and focuses very little on the international aspect of it all. ii. Reformer: http://www.wetland.org - Most prominent is education about damage to the environment, and how damage can be lessened from the bottom up. iii. Transformer: http://www.eco-pros.com/globalchange.htm - This site includes links to many environmental sites advocating largescale change to environmental policies. The site itself is dedicated to major change through the masses to create change. c. The human security movement: i. Maintainer: http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/ - Developed with the United Nations, the information on this site is delivered through the eyes of a large organization attempting to solve human security problems. ii. Reformer: http://www.humansecuritybulletin.info - This Canadian site provides relatively liberal information on the most recent occurrences having to do with human security.

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iii. Transformer: http://www.fcnl.org/ - This site promotes the idea of putting pressure on the government through the masses in order to keep peace in the world, mostly in relation to human security. d. EU-Russian Relations: i. Maintainer: http://www.upi-fiia.fi/ - This Finnish site provides somewhat critical information about EU-Russian relations, and how lowering borders may be harmful in the end. ii. Reformer: http://www.europaworld.org - This site provides information that focuses on the opening of relations with Russia, but not completely taking down borders. iii. Transformer: http://www.euractiv.com - Some of the articles in this site strongly support the opening of relations with Russia to the strongest degree possible. e. The possibility of war with North Korea: i. Maintainer: http://www.cnn.com - This US site tends to promote the dismantling of North Korea, rather than promote diplomatic resolutions. ii. Reformer: http://news.bbc.co.uk - This globally centered site provides information on North Korea which is neither extremely liberal nor does it promote lessening relations with the state. iii. Transformer: http://www.antiwar.com - Clearly an anti-war site, the information here promotes the development of diplomatic relations rather than war. f. The control of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs): i. Maintainer: http://www.frontpagemag.com - The articles featured here focus on tough control of WMDs around the world. ii. Reformer: http://www.armscontrol.org/ - This site promotes the control of WMDs, but still realizes nations incentives to break the demands of control coming from other nations. iii. Transformer: http://www.alternet.org - Many of the articles on this site criticize the current administration’s focus on strict control of

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WMDs and stress alternative methods to merely controlling the world’s stock of WMDs. g. Women’s rights in the developing world: i. Maintainer: http://www.peacewomen.org - This site promotes the idea of working through specific governments to develop the cause of women’s rights from within the state. ii. Reformer: http://www.hri.ca - This site works closely with many NGOs and other civil society organizations. The information provided here promotes the development of human rights in the developing world, but doesn’t have a radical stance on the implementation of this. iii. Transformer: http://www.cwluherstory.com/ - The information on this site focuses on the lack of women’s rights from the bottom-up, and promotes change from the voices of the people. 7) Talking Heads: a. Maintainer: Daniel W. Drezner – This author strongly supports the importance of concern for the homeland over concern for the international community. His blog has recently been focused on the low number of workers in US manufacturing. b. Reformer: David Laws – David focuses on the development of the international community one step at a time (By developing close ties to economic partners, but not by completely opening up world trade). c. Transformer: James P. Cannon – James writes mostly on reforming the way the world’s economic and political system works, mostly form a Marxist point of view. He stresses change from the bottom-up.

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Summary of ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ By Anna Baxter One World Trust December 2004 On the 2nd December a High-Level Panel of the United Nations (UN) released the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, called A more secure world: our shared responsibility. The report contained recommendations on changes that could be made within the UN system so that it might better address today’s security challenges. It was commissioned by the Secretary General to attempt to address the deep divisions among Member States on the nature of the security threats faced today, and the appropriateness of the use of force to address those threats. (For more information on the composition of the Panel see Note A) When the United Nations was created in 1945 its main concern was to ensure that the horrors of the World Wars would never be repeated. Accordingly, its attention was primarily devoted to the threat of aggressive wars between states. The past sixty years, however, have witnessed massive changes in political geography. Whilst progress on life expectancy and per capita income has been made in some areas of the developing world, large areas of the world continue to experience life threatening poverty as a daily reality. In recognition of the impact that these changes have had on security, the report calls for a broader, more all-encompassing conception of the threats and challenges that we face. The report has a number of sections addressing key security concerns, the most important of which are summarized below. Collective security: One of the aspirations of the UN, as expressed in the Charter, is to provide collective security for all. The report highlights the continuing relevance of the idea of collective security today, emphasizing the mutual vulnerability of weak and strong that results from increasing global economic integration. Whilst the duty of the State to protect and provide for the welfare of its own people is recognized, historical evidence demonstrating that the state can also be unable or unwilling to perform this role is taken into account. The report insists that the principles of collective security require the international community to step in to assist in the provision, or development of the capacity to provide, necessary protection where needed. Past failures of collective action are recognized, with the report noting that ‘early warning is only effective when it leads to early action for prevention.’ A broader conception of security: In stark contrast to more traditional conceptions of security the report identifies six clusters of threats with which the world must now be concerned as elements that can feed

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into each other to produce deadly cycles of civil violence. (For more information see Note B) Sustainable development and security: Emphasis is placed on the importance of promoting development as the ‘indispensable foundation for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously.’ The report calls on all States to recommit to the goals of eradicating poverty, achieving sustained economic growth and promoting sustainable development. More specifically it calls for donor countries to establish a timetable for reaching the 0.7 per cent gross national product target for Overseas Development Assistance, for greater debt relief and improved access to global markets for poorer countries, for more resources to be channeled to stemming the AIDS pandemic, and for new initiatives to assist in the development of public health systems and to help tackle global warming. Conflict prevention: The Panel emphasizes the need for conflict prevention efforts by UN to be improved. One of their most significant recommendations is for the Security Council to be more ready to use the authority invested in it by the Rome Statute to refer cases to International Criminal Court. They also recommend that more resources be channeled through the Department of Political Affairs for diplomacy and mediation, and that sanctions be used to better effect. National leaders and parties to conflict are encouraged to make constructive use of the option of preventative deployment. The use of force: On the question of the use of force in cases where there is a perceived threat, but that threat is not immediately imminent, the Panel make it clear that they consider Article 51 of the UN Charter to provide adequate guidance. They recommend that in such cases the evidence should be presented to the Security Council, which can then decide whether or not to authorize action. If they decide not to authorize action, other options should be explored further, before potentially revisiting the military option. The Panel are clear that they do not endorse unilateral preventative action. Collectively endorsed military action, on the other hand, when all other preventative efforts have failed, is seen by the panel as a cornerstone of effective collective security. The report defines five criteria of legitimacy to govern the use of force (for more information see Note C). The Panel recognizes the need to develop the capacity of the Security Council to respond when a decision has been taken to use force, and makes recommendations to those Member States that have significant military capacity to place it at the disposal of the UN. Recommendation

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Recognizing the central importance of peacekeeping efforts to long-term, lasting peace, the report highlights the need for more effective coordination between the various bodies engaged in peacekeeping. The Panel recommends that national authorities be at the heart of coordination efforts, and that robust donor coordination efforts be made. Making the UN more effective: The report recommends changes to the structure of the Security Council (for more information see Note D here)It also recommends the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission. This commission would address the lack of any place in the UN system specifically designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war, or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace. It should, they propose, work in partnership with national governments to provide proactive assistance in such cases. Terrorism: The Panel suggest a definition of terrorism that emphasizes that acts of terrorism constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity (for more information see Note E). The report emphasizes the need to address the causes of terrorism and extremism as well as strengthening prevention efforts. Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons: The Panel recommends that new enthusiasm be directed towards disarmament, and that efforts be made to reduce the supply of nuclear weapons. They also recommend improvements to the enforcement capacity of the Security Council and better public health defenses to combat the threat of biological weapons. Footnotes Note A) Composition of the High Level Panel: Anand Panyarachum, former Prime Minister of Thailand CHAIR, Robert Badinter (France), João Baena Soares (Brazil), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Mary Chinery Hesse (Ghana), Gareth Evans (Australia), David Hannay (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay), Amre Moussa (Egypt), Satish Nambiar (India), Sadako Ogata (Japan), Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation), Qian Qiqian (China), Salim Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Nafis Sadik (Pakistan) and Brent Scowcroft (United States of America). Note B) A Broader Conception of Security (Synopsis to Part two) The six clusters of threats, identified in the report, as elements that can feed into each other to produce deadly cycles of civil violence are;

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• Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation • Inter-state conflict • Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide, and other large-scale atrocities • Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons • Terrorism • Transnational Organised Crime Note C) Criteria to define the use of force (207) • seriousness of threat • proper purpose • last resort • proportional means • balance of consequences Note D) Reform of the Security Council (251-254) The Panel offer two suggestions, Models A and B, of how the Security Council might be reformed. Their suggestions are guided by a desire to increase the involvement in decisionmaking of those who contribute most to the UN financially, militarily and diplomatically (in line with Article 23 of the Charter) and make the decision-making process more democratic, accountable and representative of the broader membership. • Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created and three new two-year non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas. • Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight fouryear renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas. Note E) Description of Terrorism (164 (d)) ‘Any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.’

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A more secure world: Our shared responsibility
Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

IR-210: UN Report

Keith Parker, University of Southern California
United Nations 2004

Contents
Paragraphs Page

Foreword by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Transmittal letter from Panel Chair Anand Panyarachun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The United Nations gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the United Nations Foundation for the printing of this publication.
I. II.

Part 1 Towards a new security consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Different worlds: 1945 and 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16 . . . . . . . . . . 10 The case for comprehensive collective security . . 17-43 A. Threats without boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-23 B. The limits of self-protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-28 C. Sovereignty and responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . 29-30 D. Elements of a credible collective security system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31-43 1. Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32-36 2. Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37-39 3. Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-43 . . . . . . . . . . 14 . . . . . . . . . . 14 . . . . . . . . . . 16 . . . . . . . . . . 17 . . . . . . . . . . 17 . . . . . . . . . . 17 . . . . . . . . . . 18 . . . . . . . . . . 19

Designed by the Graphic Design Unit United Nations Department of Public Information

Part 2 Collective security and the challenge of prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
III. Poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44-73 A. The threats we face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44-58 B. Meeting the challenge of prevention . . . . . . . 59-73 1. More resources and action . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59-65 2. New initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66-73 IV. Conflict between and within States . . . . . . . . . . 74-106 A. The threat of inter-State conflict . . . . . . . . . . 74-83 B. The threat of internal conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . 84-88 C. Meeting the challenge of prevention . . . . . . 89-106 1. Better international regulatory frameworks and norms . . . . . . . . . . . . 89-97 2. Better information and analysis . . . . . . . . 98-99 3. Preventive diplomacy and mediation . . 100-103 4. Preventive deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . 104-106
iii

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. . . . . . . . . . 24 . . . . . . . . . . 24 . . . . . . . . . . 27 . . . . . . . . . . 27 . . . . . . . . . . 29 . . . . . . . . . . 31 . . . . . . . . . . 31 . . . . . . . . . . 33 . . . . . . . . . . 35 . . . . . . . . . . 35 . . . . . . . . . . 37 . . . . . . . . . . 37 . . . . . . . . . . 38

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Paragraphs

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V.

X.

Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210-220 . . . . . . . . . . 67 Regional cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 . . . . . . . . . . 69 Post-conflict peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221-230 . . . . . . . . . . 70 A. The role of peacekeepers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221-223 . . . . . . . . . . 70 B. The larger peacebuilding task . . . . . . . . . . 224-230 . . . . . . . . . . 71 Protecting civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231-239 . . . . . . . . . . 72 United Nations staff security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 . . . . . . . . . . 74

XI.

Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107-144 A. The threats we face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107-116 1. Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107-112 2. Radiological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 3. Chemical and biological weapons . . . . 114-116 B. Meeting the challenge of prevention . . . . . 117-144 1. Better strategies to reduce demand . . . 118-126 2. Better strategies to reduce supply . . . . . 127-138 3. Better enforcement capability . . . . . . . . 139-141 4. Better public health defences . . . . . . . . 142-144 . . . . . . . . . . 39 . . . . . . . . . . 39 . . . . . . . . . . 39 . . . . . . . . . . 40 . . . . . . . . . . 41 . . . . . . . . . . 41 . . . . . . . . . . 42 . . . . . . . . . . 43 . . . . . . . . . . 46 . . . . . . . . . . 46 XII.

VI. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI.

Part 4 A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century . . . . . 75
The General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240-243 . . . . . . . . . . 78 The Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244-260 . . . . . . . . . . 79 A Peacebuilding Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261-269 . . . . . . . . . . 83 Peacebuilding Support Office . . . . . . . . . . . 266-269 . . . . . . . . . . 84 Regional organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270-273 . . . . . . . . . . 85

Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145-164 A. The threat we face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145-146 B. Meeting the challenge of prevention . . . . . 147-164 1. A comprehensive strategy . . . . . . . . . . . 147-148 2. Better counter-terrorism instruments . . 149-153 3. Assisting States in confronting terrorism 154-156 4. Defining terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157-164 . . . . . . . . . . 52 . . . . . . . . . . 52 . . . . . . . . . . 54

. . . . . . . . . . 47 . . . . . . . . . . 47 . . . . . . . . . . 48 . . . . . . . . . . 48 . . . . . . . . . . 49 . . . . . . . . . . 50 . . . . . . . . . . 51

VII.

XVII. The Economic and Social Council . . . . . . . . . . 274-281 . . . . . . . . . . 86 Achieving policy coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280-281 . . . . . . . . . . 88 XVIII. The Commission on Human Rights . . . . . . . . 282-291 . . . . . . . . . . 88

Transnational organized crime . . . . . . . . . . . . .165-177 A. The threat we face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165-170 B. Meeting the challenge of prevention . . . . . .171-177 1. Better international regulatory frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .172-176 2. Better State capacity-building . . . . . . . . . . . .177 . . . . . . . . . . 54 . . . . . . . . . . 55 XIX.

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VIII.

The role of sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .178-182 . . . . . . . . . . 55

The Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292-296 . . . . . . . . . . 90 A. Strengthening support for the Secretary-General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293-294 . . . . . . . . . . 91 B. A competent and professional Secretariat . . 295-296 . . . . . . . . . . 91 XX. The Charter of the United Nations . . . . . . . . . 297-302 . . . . . . . . . . 92

Part 3 Collective security and the use of force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
. . . . . . . . . . 62 . . . . . . . . . . 62 . . . . . . . . . . 63 . . . . . . . . . . 63

IX.

Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
I. II. III. IV. Summary of recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Panel members and terms of reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Panel secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Panel meetings, regional consultations and issue workshops . . . . . . . 123

Using force: rules and guidelines . . . . . . . . . . .183-209 A. The question of legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185-203 1. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and self-defence . . . .188-192 2. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and external threats . .193-198 3. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, internal threats and the responsibility to protect . . . .199-203 B. The question of legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . .204-209 . . . . . . . . . . 65 . . . . . . . . . . 66
iv

Keith Parker, University of Southern California
v

Foreword by the United Nations Secretary-General
Historians may well look back on the first years of the twenty-first century as a decisive moment in the human story. The different societies that make up the human family are today interconnected as never before. They face threats that no nation can hope to master by acting alone - and opportunities that can be much more hopefully exploited if all nations work together. The purpose of this report is to suggest how nations can work together to meet this formidable challenge. It is the work of a panel of sixteen eminent and experienced people, drawn from different parts of the world, whom I asked a year ago to assess current threats to international peace and security; to evaluate how well our existing policies and institutions have done in addressing those threats; and to recommend ways of strengthening the United Nations to provide collective security for the twenty-first century. The Panel has met, and even surpassed, my expectations. This is a report of great range and depth, which sets out a broad framework for collective security, and indeed gives a broader meaning to that concept, appropriate for the new millennium. It suggests not only ways to deal with particular threats, but also new ways of understanding the connections between them, and explains what this implies in terms of shared policies and institutions. In so doing, it also offers a unique opportunity to refashion and renew the United Nations, which world leaders defined four years ago, in the Millennium Declaration, as “the indispensable common house of the entire human family”.

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Findings and recommendations
I wholly endorse the report’s core argument that what is needed is a comprehensive system of collective security: one that tackles both new and old threats, and addresses the security concerns of all States - rich and poor, weak and strong. Particularly important is the report’s insistence that today’s threats to our security are all interconnected. We can no longer afford to see problems such as terrorism, or civil wars, or extreme poverty, in isolation. Our strategies must be comprehensive. Our institutions must overcome their narrow preoccupations and learn to work across the whole range of issues, in a concerted fashion. The report argues that the front line in today’s combat must be manned by capable and responsible States. I agree. The task of helping States improve their own capacities to deal with contemporary threats is vital and urgent. The United Nations must be able to do this better. The Panel tells us how.

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Other findings of the report that I consider particularly important include the following:

• Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding-ground for other threats, including civil conflict. Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals.

of domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilitities, and calls for a voluntary time-limited moratorium on the construction of any such facilities. These suggestions, if implemented swiftly and firmly, offer us a real chance to reduce the risk of a nuclear attack, whether by States or non-State actors. They should be put into effect without delay. • No less important are the recommendations for adapting the United Nations for the twenty-first century. The report criticizes several areas of the United Nations performance and - however implicitly - United Nations management, for which I take responsibility. These criticisms deserve to be taken seriously, and acted upon. • All the United Nations principal organs are in need of change, including the Security Council. The report offers two alternative formulae for expanding the Council’s membership, which I hope will make it easier for Governments to reach a decision in 2005. • The report rightly identifies post-conflict peacebuilding as an area of vital concern, and offers new ideas for improving our performance in this area including a new inter-governmental body, the ’Peacebuilding Commission’, whose task would be to help States make a successful transition from the immediate post-conflict phase to longer-term reconstruction and development.

• We need to pay much closer attention to biological security. Our response to HIV/AIDS was, as the report says, “shockingly late and shamefully illresourced”, and donors are still not providing anything like the amount of aid needed to halt the pandemic. But the report goes further. It calls attention to the overall deterioration of our global health system, which is ill-equipped to protect us against existing and emerging infectious diseases; and it highlights both the promise and the peril of advances in biotechnology. It calls for a major initiative to rebuild global public health, beginning with a concerted effort to build public health capacity throughout the developing world, at both local and national levels. This will not only yield direct benefits by preventing and treating disease in the developing world itself, but will also provide the basis for an effective global defence against bio-terrorism and overwhelming natural outbreaks of deadly infectious disease.

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• While our principal aim should be to prevent threats from emerging, when they do emerge we must be better prepared to respond. Two of the tools we have for this are sanctions and mediation. The Panel recommends ways to strengthen both. I urge Governments to adopt them.

• The report also recommends changes to the Commission on Human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains one of the United Nations greatest achievements, and we should all be proud of the Organization’s work in developing international human rights norms and standards. But we cannot move forward without restoring the credibility and effectiveness of our human rights mechanisms and refocusing ourselves on the protection of individual rights. • Finally, the report makes recommendations, which I welcome, for strengthening the Secretariat. The world needs, and is entitled to expect, an effective United Nations Secretariat, which can attract and retain the best people from all parts of the world.

• When all else fails, it may be necessary and legitimate to use force. The report makes a crucial contribution to the search for common criteria, by which to decide when the use of force is justified. I hope Governments will consider its recommendations very carefully. A new consensus on this issue is essential if our collective security system is ever to be truly effective.

• The United Nations must make better use of its assets in the fight against terrorism, articulating an effective and principled counter-terrorism strategy that is respectful of the rule of law and universal human rights. One of the obstacles to this up to now has been the inability of United Nations members to agree on a definition of terrorism. The report offers a definition which, I believe, will help build the consensus we need if we are to move forward quickly.

Conclusion
I hope people all over the world will read this report, discuss it, and urge their Governments to take prompt decisions on its recommendations. I believe the great majority of them will share my feeling that there is an urgent need for the nations of the world to come together and reach a new consensus - both on the future of collective security and on the changes needed if the United Nations is to play its part. For my part, I will move quickly to consider and implement, as appropriate, those recommendations that are within my purview. I urge the other organs of the United

• There is a real danger that we could see a cascade of nuclear proliferation in the near future. The report recommends ways of strengthening the nonproliferation regime by creating incentives for States to forego the development

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Nations to do the same. And on those issues - such as the rules and norms governing the use of force - which go to the very heart of who we are as the United Nations and what we stand for, I believe decisions should be taken by world leaders next September, when they meet for a special summit at United Nations Headquarters in New York. In March 2005 I shall submit a report of my own, which I hope will help to set the agenda for that summit.

Transmittal letter addressed to the Secretary-General from the Chair of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
I have the privilege to transmit to you the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, entitled “A more secure world: our shared responsibility.” The report puts forward a new vision of collective security, one that addresses all of the major threats to international peace and security felt around the world. Our research and consultations revealed that ours is an age of unparalleled interconnection among threats to international peace and security, and mutual vulnerability between weak and strong. We found that the United Nations has been much more effective in addressing the major threats to peace and security than it is given credit for, but that nonetheless major changes are needed if the United Nations is to be effective, efficient and equitable in providing collective security for all in the twenty-first century. Our mandate from you precluded any in-depth examination of individual conflicts and we have respected that guidance. But the members of the Panel believe it would be remiss of them if they failed to point out that no amount of systemic changes to the way the United Nations handles both old and new threats to peace and security will enable it to discharge effectively its role under the Charter if efforts are not redoubled to resolve a number of long-standing disputes which continue to fester and to feed the new threats we now face. Foremost among these are the issues of Palestine, Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula. The members of the Panel may not be in full agreement with every specific point and detail of the report, but they all endorse the report and generally agree with its findings. I undertake to draw to your attention, however, that the members of the Panel disagree about the models put forth for Security Council expansion and the method for determining criteria for Security Council membership. Some members of the Panel believe strongly that only the model involving expansion of permanent membership, albeit without a veto, will equip the Security Council to deal with the new century’s threats. Others believe equally strongly that the alternative model involving elected, long-term but non-permanent members is the better way to proceed. We all agree, however, that it would be a major error to allow the discussions needed to move towards a decision between the two options to divert attention from decisions on the many other necessary proposals for change, the validity and viability of which do not depend on Security Council enlargement. Our report is addressed to you, but many of our recommendations will require commitment from and action by heads of Government. Only through their leadership can we realistically forge the new consensus required to meet the threats described in our report.

Finally, I would like to express my sincere admiration for the work of the Chair and members of the Panel in producing this report. They did not shrink from tackling the toughest issues that divide us. That such a diverse group, composed of such experienced people, could reach consensus on such farsighted, yet workable, recommendations gives me hope that the nations of the world can do the same, thereby giving new meaning and resonance to the name “United Nations”.

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Kofi A. Annan Secretary-General of the United Nations

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Towards a new security consensus

Our deliberations drew on inputs from a wide range of sources, including Governments, academic experts and civil society organizations across the globe. None of our work would have been possible were it not for the extensive support we received. The following Governments made generous financial contributions to our work: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and United Kingdom. The following foundations and think tanks made financial or in-kind contributions to our work: Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, International Peace Academy, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, New York University Center on International Cooperation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Rockefeller Foundation, Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanley Foundation, United Nations Foundation and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

I should like to conclude by thanking you most warmly on my own behalf and that of other members of the Panel for the honour of entrusting to us this important task. I also wish to register our gratitude to all those who have contributed over the past year to our process of reflection, and above all to our Research Director, Stephen Stedman, and the Secretary of the Panel, Loraine Rickard-Martin, and their staff, without whose hard work and intellectual contributions the present report would not have seen the light of day.

The United Nations was created in 1945 above all else “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” - to ensure that the horrors of the World Wars were never repeated. Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security threats we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive war. They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The threats are from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State security. The preoccupation of the United Nations founders was with State security. When they spoke of creating a new system of collective security they meant it in the traditional military sense: a system in which States join together and pledge that aggression against one is aggression against all, and commit themselves in that event to react collectively. But they also understood well, long before the idea of human security gained currency, the indivisibility of security, economic development and human freedom. In the opening words of the Charter, the United Nations was created “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” and “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”. The central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a new and broader understanding, bringing together all these strands, of what collective security means - and of all the responsibilities, commitments, strategies and institutions that come with it if a collective security system is to be effective, efficient and equitable. If there is to be a new security consensus, it must start with the understanding that the front-line actors in dealing with all the threats we face, new and old, continue to be individual sovereign States, whose role and responsibilities, and right to be respected, are fully recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. But in the twenty-first century, more than ever before, no State can stand wholly alone. Collective strategies, collective institutions and a sense of collective responsibility are indispensable. The case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples and not to harm its neighbours. We must not underestimate the difficulty of reaching a new consensus about the meaning and responsibilities of collective security. Many will regard one or more of

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Anand Panyarachun Chairman High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

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the threats we identify as not really being a threat to international peace and security. Some believe that HIV/AIDS is a horrible disease, but not a security threat. Or that terrorism is a threat to some States, but not all. Or that civil wars in Africa are a humanitarian tragedy, but surely not a problem for international security. Or that poverty is a problem of development, not security.

Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being. Differences of focus lead us to dismiss what others perceive as the gravest of all threats to their survival. Inequitable responses to threats further fuel division. Many people believe that what passes for collective security today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful. Such perceptions pose a fundamental challenge to building collective security today. Stated baldly, without mutual recognition of threats there can be no collective security. Self-help will rule, mistrust will predominate and cooperation for long-term mutual gain will elude us.

nent and those that are imminent do not actually become destructive. This requires a framework for preventive action which addresses all these threats in all the ways they resonate most in different parts of the world. Most of all, it will require leadership at the domestic and international levels to act early, decisively and collectively against all these threats - from HIV/AIDS to nuclear terrorism - before they have their most devastating effect. In describing how to meet the challenge of prevention, we begin with development because it is the indispensable foundation for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. It serves multiple functions. It helps combat the poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation that kill millions and threaten human security. It is vital in helping States prevent or reverse the erosion of State capacity, which is crucial for meeting almost every class of threat. And it is part of a long-term strategy for preventing civil war and for addressing the environments in which both terrorism and organized crime flourish.

What is needed today is nothing less than a new consensus between alliances that are frayed, between wealthy nations and poor, and among peoples mired in mistrust across an apparently widening cultural abyss. The essence of that consensus is simple: we all share responsibility for each other’s security. And the test of that consensus will be action.

Collective security and the use of force

Collective security and the challenge of prevention

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Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international security. So defined, there are six clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead:

• Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation • Inter-State conflict • Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities • Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons • Terrorism • Transnational organized crime

What happens if peaceful prevention fails? If none of the preventive measures so far described stop the descent into war and chaos? If distant threats do become imminent? Or if imminent threats become actual? Or if a non-imminent threat nonetheless becomes very real and measures short of the use of military force seem powerless to stop it? We address here the circumstances in which effective collective security may require the backing of military force, starting with the rules of international law that must govern any decision to go to war if anarchy is not to prevail. It is necessary to distinguish between situations in which a State claims to act in self-defence; situations in which a State is posing a threat to others outside its borders; and situations in which the threat is primarily internal and the issue is the responsibility to protect a State’s own people. In all cases, we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task: Article 51 needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope, and Chapter VII fully empowers the Security Council to deal with every kind of threat that States may confront. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better than it has.

In its first 60 years, the United Nations has made crucial contributions to reducing or mitigating these threats to international security. While there have been major failures and shortcomings, the record of successes and contributions is underappreciated. This gives hope that the Organization can adapt to successfully confront the new challenges of the twenty-first century.

The primary challenge for the United Nations and its members is to ensure that, of all the threats in the categories listed, those that are distant do not become immi-

That force can legally be used does not always mean that, as a matter of good conscience and good sense, it should be used. We identify a set of guidelines - five criteria of legitimacy - which we believe that the Security Council (and anyone else involved in these decisions) should always address in considering whether to authorize or apply military force. The adoption of these guidelines (seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences) will not produce agreed conclusions with push-button predictability, but should significantly

Keith Parker, University of Southern California
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improve the chances of reaching international consensus on what have been in recent years deeply divisive issues.

We also address here the other major issues that arise during and after violent conflict, including the needed capacities for peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the protection of civilians. A central recurring theme is the necessity for all members of the international community, developed and developing States alike, to be much more forthcoming in providing and supporting deployable military resources. Empty gestures are all too easy to make: an effective, efficient and equitable collective security system demands real commitment. • • • •

A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century

and diplomatically should participate more in Council decision-making, and those who participate in Council decision-making should contribute more to the Organization. The Security Council needs greater credibility, legitimacy and representation to do all that we demand of it. There is a major institutional gap in addressing countries under stress and countries emerging from conflict. Such countries often suffer from attention, policy guidance and resource deficits. The Security Council has not made the most of the potential advantages of working with regional and subregional organizations. There must be new institutional arrangements to address the economic and social threats to international security. The Commission on Human Rights suffers from a legitimacy deficit that casts doubts on the overall reputation of the United Nations. There is a need for a more professional and better organized Secretariat that is much more capable of concerted action.

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The United Nations was never intended to be a utopian exercise. It was meant to be a collective security system that worked. The Charter of the United Nations provided the most powerful States with permanent membership on the Security Council and the veto. In exchange, they were expected to use their power for the common good and promote and obey international law. As Harry Truman, then President of the United States, noted in his speech to the final plenary session of the founding conference of the United Nations Organization, “we all have to recognize - no matter how great our strength - that we must deny ourselves the licence to do always as we please”. In approaching the issue of United Nations reform, it is as important today as it was in 1945 to combine power with principle. Recommendations that ignore underlying power realities will be doomed to failure or irrelevance, but recommendations that simply reflect raw distributions of power and make no effort to bolster international principles are unlikely to gain the widespread adherence required to shift international behaviour.

The reforms we propose will not by themselves make the United Nations more effective. In the absence of Member States reaching agreement on the security consensus contained in the present report, the United Nations will underachieve. Its institutions will still only be as strong as the energy, resources and attention devoted to them by Member States and their leaders.

Proposed changes should be driven by real-world need. Change for its own sake is likely to run the well-worn course of the endless reform debates of the past decade. The litmus test is this: does a proposed change help meet the challenge posed by a virulent threat?

Throughout the work of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, we have looked for institutional weaknesses in current responses to threats. The following stand as the most urgently in need of remedy:

• The General Assembly has lost vitality and often fails to focus effectively on the most compelling issues of the day. • The Security Council will need to be more proactive in the future. For this to happen, those who contribute most to the Organization financially, militarily

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Part 1 Towards a new security consensus Synopsis
The United Nations was created in 1945 above all else “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” - to ensure that the horrors of the World Wars were never repeated. Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security threats we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive war. They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The threats are from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State security. The preoccupation of the United Nations founders was with State security. When they spoke of creating a new system of collective security they meant it in the traditional military sense: a system in which States join together and pledge that aggression against one is aggression against all, and commit themselves in that event to react collectively. But they also understood well, long before the idea of human security gained currency, the indivisibility of security, economic development and human freedom. In the opening words of the Charter, the United Nations was created “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” and “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”. The central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a new and broader understanding, bringing together all these strands, of what collective security means and of all the responsibilities, commitments, strategies and institutions that come with it if a collective security system is to be effective, efficient and equitable. If there is to be a new security consensus, it must start with the understanding that the front-line actors in dealing with all the threats we face, new and old, continue to be individual sovereign States, whose role and responsibilities, and right to be respected, are fully recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. But in the twenty-first century, more than ever before, no State can stand wholly alone. Collective strategies, collective institutions and a sense of collective responsibility are indispensable. The case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples and not to harm its neighbours. We must not underestimate the difficulty of reaching a new consensus about the meaning and responsibilities of collective security. Many will regard one or more of
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A more secure world: Our shared responsibility

Part 1: Toward a new security consensus

formed a majority in the General Assembly and through it gained a voice in international politics largely denied to them outside the institution. 3. The second half of the twentieth century was a struggle for the viability of these new States and the well-being of their citizens. They inherited arbitrary colonial boundaries and colonial economies designed to serve the needs of the metropole. Independence was the start of a race to educate and develop the professional, scientific and technological expertise to run modern States and economies. All of this took place in an era of huge expectations about what States could and should deliver, when most models of economic growth relied on heavy State control. In the last 40 years, life expectancy in developing countries has increased by 20 years, and per capita income has doubled in such countries as Botswana, Brazil, China, the Republic of Korea and Turkey in less than a third of the time it took to do so in the United Kingdom or the United States a century or more earlier. Despite such progress, however, large parts of the world remained mired in life-threatening poverty. Between 1975 and 1999, sub-Saharan Africa saw no overall increase in its per capita income. By the 1980s, many of these new States faced crises of State capacity and legitimacy, reflected in the rise of internal wars as the dominant form of warfare in the second half of the twentieth century (see figure below).

the threats we identify as not really being a threat to international peace and security. Some believe that HIV/AIDS is a horrible disease, but not a security threat. Or that terrorism is a threat to some States, but not all. Or that civil wars in Africa are a humanitarian tragedy, but surely not a problem for international security. Or that poverty is a problem of development, not security.

Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being. Differences of focus lead us to dismiss what others perceive as the gravest of all threats to their survival. Inequitable responses to threats further fuel division. Many people believe that what passes for collective security today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful. Such perceptions pose a fundamental challenge to building collective security today. Stated baldly, without mutual recognition of threats there can be no collective security. Self-help will rule, mistrust will predominate and cooperation for long-term mutual gain will elude us. 4.

What is needed today is nothing less than a new consensus between alliances that are frayed, between wealthy nations and poor, and among peoples mired in mistrust across an apparently widening cultural abyss. The essence of that consensus is simple: we all share responsibility for each other’s security. And the test of that consensus will be action. 5.

I. Different worlds: 1945 and 2005

1.

Wars
1946-2002
Number of ongoing civil wars

50 40 30 20 10 0
1946 1950

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The United Nations was created in a spirit of optimism fuelled by the end of the Second World War and the will to avoid a repeat of its horrors and those of its predecessor. For many of the States most traumatized by two world wars, the experiment has been successful. Over the subsequent 60 years, many parts of the world have enjoyed unparalleled peace and prosperity. The dynamics and tensions that led to the Second World War were laid to rest, war between the great Powers was avoided and a stable peace emerged in Europe. Japan, Germany and Italy were successfully integrated into the family of nations and are currently the second, third and sixth largest financial contributors to the United Nations.

Number of ongoing inter-State wars

2.

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000
Source: Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University; and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

In the first 30 years of the United Nations, dozens of new States emerged from colonial systems that, until recent times, tied half of mankind to a handful of capitals. Assisting new States into being was a seminal contribution of the United Nations during this period. Decolonization in turn transformed the United Nations. At the creation of the United Nations in 1945, there were 51 members; today there are 191. The General Assembly was transformed from a body composed of States that largely resembled one another to one whose membership varied dramatically. By the mid-1960s, developing countries

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6.

As we enter the twenty-first century, these struggles are far from over. More than a billion people lack access to clean water, more than two billion have no access to adequate sanitation and more than three million die every year from water-related diseases. Fourteen million people, including six million children, die every year from hunger. There were 842 million undernourished people in 2000; 95 per cent lived in poor countries. 13.

Council authorized the use of force against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. The Security Council broadened the interpretation of threats to international peace and security to authorize an intervention for humanitarian purposes in Somalia. The United Nations helped bring to an end several protracted wars in Central America and Southern Africa.

7.

Almost 30 million people in Africa now have HIV/AIDS. In the worst-affected States, middle-aged urban elites are heavily afflicted, eroding State capacity and decimating the economic activity of what should be a State’s most productive group. The increasing number of infected women and girls is threatening food and agricultural production. If trends are not reversed, some of these States face collapse under the combined weight of poverty and HIV/AIDS.

8.

Decolonization was only one of the forces that shaped the United Nations. The United Nations founders did not anticipate that the United States and the former Soviet Union would soon embark on a global rivalry, developing and deploying tens of thousands of nuclear weapons capable of destroying the world many times over. 14.

9.

Controlling the destructive capability of nuclear technology and harnessing its promise became central to the work of the United Nations. The very first resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 called for the disarmament of “weapons adaptable to mass destruction”.

10.

The cold war shaped much of global politics for the next 45 years. The rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union blocked the Security Council from playing a dominant role in maintaining international peace and security. Nearly all armed conflicts and struggles for liberation were viewed through the prism of East-West rivalry until the historic collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe.

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The moment was short-lived. It quickly became apparent that the United Nations had exchanged the shackles of the cold war for the straitjacket of Member State complacency and great Power indifference. Although the United Nations gave birth to the notion of human security, it proved poorly equipped to provide it. Long-standing regional conflicts, such as those involving Israel/Palestine and Kashmir, remained unresolved. Failures to act in the face of ethnic cleansing and genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia eroded international support. Optimism yielded to renewed cynicism about the willingness of Member States to support the The attacks of 11 September 2001 revealed that States, Organization. as well as collective security The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on New institutions, have failed to York and Washington, D.C., brought with them a keep pace with changes in glimpse of the potential for renewed collective secuthe nature of threats. rity. On 12 September 2001, France introduced and the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1368 (2001), which condemned the attacks and opened the way for United States-led military action against the Taliban regime in self-defence. On the same day, the General Assembly condemned terrorism and the attacks. On 28 September 2001, the Security Council adopted resolution 1373 (2001), which obligates all Member States, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to take specific actions to combat terrorism. Three months later, the United Nations presided over the Bonn Agreement, which created an interim government to replace the deposed Taliban regime. The United Nations stood behind the interim government in Afghanistan as custodian of the peace process and helped to draft the country’s new constitution. 15. 16. This spirit of international purpose lasted only months and was eroded by divisions over the United States-led war in Iraq in 2003.

Nonetheless, without the United Nations the post-1945 world would very probably have been a bloodier place. There were fewer inter-State wars in the last half of the twentieth century than in the first half. Given that during the same period the number of States grew almost fourfold, one might have expected to see a marked rise in inter-State wars. Yet that did not occur and the United Nations contributed to that result. The United Nations diminished the threat of inter-State war in several ways. Peace was furthered by the invention of peacekeeping; diplomacy was carried out by the Secretary-General; disputes were remedied under the International Court of Justice; and a strong norm was upheld against aggressive war.

12.

The dramatic but peaceful end of the cold war opened an opportunity for collective security to flourish. The first years after the end of the cold war seemed to point towards a new role for the United Nations. In 1990, the Security

The attacks of 11 September 2001 revealed that States, as well as collective security institutions, have failed to keep pace with changes in the nature of threats. The technological revolution that has radically changed the worlds of communication, information-processing, health and transportation has eroded borders, altered migration and allowed individuals the world over to share information at a speed inconceivable two decades ago. Such changes have brought many benefits but also great potential for harm. Smaller and smaller

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absence of human rights and democracy; by religious and other intolerance; and by civil violence - a witch’s brew common to those areas where civil war and regional conflict intersect. In recent years, terrorists have helped to finance their activities and moved large sums of money by gaining access to such valuable commodities as drugs in countries beset by civil war. 22.

numbers of people are able to inflict greater and greater amounts of damage, without the support of any State. A new threat, transnational organized crime, undermines the rule of law within and across borders. Today, more than ever before, a Technologies designed to improve daily life can be transthreat to one is a threat to all. formed into instruments of aggression. We have yet to The mutual vulnerability of fully understand the impact of these changes, but they weak and strong has never herald a fundamentally different security climate - one been clearer. whose unique opportunities for cooperation are matched by an unprecedented scope for destruction.

II. The case for comprehensive collective security

A. Threats without boundaries

Poverty, infectious disease, environmental degradation and war feed one another in a deadly cycle. Poverty (as measured by per capita gross domestic product (GDP)) is strongly associated with the outbreak of civil war (see figure below). Such diseases as malaria and HIV/AIDS continue to cause large numbers of deaths and reinforce poverty. Disease and poverty, in turn, are connected to environmental degradation; climate change exacerbates the occurrence of such infectious disease as malaria and dengue fever. Environmental stress, caused by large populations and shortages of land and other natural resources, can contribute to civil violence.

17.

Today, more than ever before, threats are interrelated and a threat to one is a threat to all. The mutual vulnerability of weak and strong has never been clearer.
12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0%
$250 $1,000

The link between poverty and civil war

18.

Global economic integration means that a major terrorist attack anywhere in the developed world would have devastating consequences for the well-being of millions of people in the developing world. The World Bank estimates that the attacks of 11 September 2001 alone increased the number of people living in poverty by 10 million; the total cost to the world economy probably exceeded 80 billion dollars. These numbers would be far surpassed by an incident involving nuclear terrorism.
Predicted probability of civil war onset within five years (percentage)

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19.

$2,000

$3,000
GDP per capita (in US$)

Similarly, the security of the most affluent State can be held hostage to the ability of the poorest State to contain an emerging disease. Because international flight times are shorter than the incubation periods for many infectious diseases, any one of 700 million international airline passengers every year can be an unwitting global disease-carrier. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) spread to more than 8,000 people in 30 countries in three months, killing almost 700. The influenza pandemic of 1919 killed as many as 100 million people, far more than the First World War, over a period of a little more than a year. Today, a similar virus could kill tens of millions in a fraction of the time.

$4,000

$5,000

20.

Source: Research undertaken by Macartan Humphreys (Columbia University), based on data provided by the World Bank, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

Every threat to international security today enlarges the risk of other threats. Nuclear proliferation by States increases the availability of the materiel and technology necessary for a terrorist to acquire a nuclear weapon. The ability of non-State actors to traffic in nuclear materiel and technology is aided by ineffective State control of borders and transit through weak States.

23.

21.

International terrorist groups prey on weak States for sanctuary. Their recruitment is aided by grievances nurtured by poverty, foreign occupation and the

Transnational organized crime facilitates many of the most serious threats to international peace and security. Corruption, illicit trade and money-laundering contribute to State weakness, impede economic growth and undermine democracy. These activities thus create a permissive environment for civil conflict. The prospect of organized criminal groups providing nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapon to terrorists is particularly worrying. Increasing drug

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C. Sovereignty and responsibility
29.

trade partly accounts for rapidly increasing levels of HIV/AIDS infections, especially in Eastern Europe and parts of Asia. And organized criminal activities undermine peacebuilding efforts and fuel many civil wars through illicit trade in conflict commodities and small arms.

B. The limits of self-protection

24.

No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. Every State requires the cooperation of other States to make itself secure. It is in every State’s interest, accordingly, to cooperate with other States to address their most pressing threats, because doing so will maximize the chances of reciprocal cooperation to address its own threat priorities. 30.

25.

In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit from the privileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community. But history teaches us all too clearly that it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own people and avoid harming its neighbours. And in those circumstances, the principles of collective security mean that some portion of those responsibilities should be taken up by the international community, acting in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to help build the necessary capacity or supply the necessary protection, as the case may be. What we seek to protect reflects what we value. The Charter of the United Nations seeks to protect all States, not because they are intrinsically good but because they are necessary to achieve the dignity, justice, worth and safety of their citizens. These are the values that should be at the heart of any collective security system for the twenty-first century, but too often States have failed to respect and promote them. The collective security we seek to build today asserts a shared responsibility on the part of all States and international institutions, and those who lead them, to do just that.

Take, as one example, the threat of nuclear terrorism. Experts estimate that terrorists with 50 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), an amount that would fit into six one-litre milk cartons, need only smuggle it across borders in order to create an improvised nuclear device that could level a medium-sized city. Border controls will not provide adequate defence against this threat. To overcome the threat of nuclear terrorism requires the cooperation of States, strong and weak, to clean up stockpiles of HEU, better protect shipping containers at ports and agree on new rules regulating the enrichment of uranium. Cooperation in the sharing of intelligence by States is essential for stopping terrorism.

26. 31.

Similarly, in order to stop organized crime States must cooperate to fight moneylaundering, trafficking in drugs and persons, and corruption. International efforts to stem the problem are only as strong as the weakest link. Ineffective collective security institutions diminish the security of every region and State.

D. Elements of a credible collective security system

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27.

To be credible and sustainable a collective security system must be effective, efficient and equitable. In all these respects, the multilateral system as we now know it, in responding to the major security threats which the world has confronted in recent decades, has shown that it can perform. But it must be strengthened to perform better - in all the ways we spell out in the present report.

1. Effectiveness
32. Whether by reducing the demand for nuclear weapons, mediating inter-State conflict or ending civil wars, collective security institutions have made critical contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security, although those contributions are often denigrated, both by those who would have the institutions do more and by those who would have them do less. 33. Collective security institutions are rarely effective in isolation. Multilateral institutions normally operate alongside national, regional and sometimes civil

The most robust defence against the possible terrorist use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons would seek to control dangerous materials, deter and capture terrorists, and address the broader threats that increase the risk of terrorist action. Civil war, disease and poverty increase the likelihood of State collapse and facilitate the spread of organized crime, thus also increasing the risk of terrorism and proliferation due to weak States and weak collective capacity to exercise the rule of law. Preventing mass-casualty terrorism requires a deep engagement to strengthen collective security systems, ameliorate poverty, combat extremism, end the grievances that flow from war, tackle the spread of infectious disease and fight organized crime.

28.

Thus all States have an interest in forging a new comprehensive collective security system that will commit all of them to act cooperatively in the face of a broad array of threats.

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society actors, and are most effective when these efforts are aligned to common goals. This is as true of mediation as it is of post-conflict reconstruction, povertyreduction strategies and non-proliferation measures.

failure to invest time and resources early in order to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflicts leads to much larger and deadlier conflagrations that are much costlier to handle later.

34.

3. Equity
40. The credibility of any system of collective security also depends on how well it promotes security for all its members, without regard to the nature of wouldbe beneficiaries, their location, resources or relationship to great Powers.

States are still the front-line responders to today’s threats. Successful international actions to battle poverty, fight infectious disease, stop transnational crime, rebuild after civil war, reduce terrorism and halt the spread of dangerous materials all require capable, responsible States as partners. It folMonitoring and verification lows that greater effort must be made to enhance the capacwork best when they are ity of States to exercise their sovereignty responsibly. For all treated as complements to, not those in a position to help others build that capacity, it substitutes for, enforcement. should be part of their responsibility to do so. 41.

35.

Collective action often fails, sometimes dramatically so. Collective instruments are often hampered by a lack of compliance, erratic monitoring and verification, and weak enforcement. Early warning is only effective when it leads to early action for prevention. Monitoring and verification work best when they are treated as complements to, not substitutes for, enforcement.

36.

Collective security institutions have proved particularly poor at meeting the challenge posed by large-scale, gross human rights abuses and genocide. This is a normative challenge to the United Nations: the concept of State and international responsibility to protect civilians from the effects of war and human rights abuses has yet to truly overcome the tension between the competing claims of sovereign inviolability and the right to intervene. It is also an operational challenge: the challenge of stopping a Government from killing its own civilians requires considerable military deployment capacity. 42.

Too often, the United Nations and its Member States have discriminated in responding to threats to international security. Contrast the swiftness with which the United Nations responded to the attacks The credibility of any system on 11 September 2001 with its actions when conof collective security also fronted with a far more deadly event: from April to depends on how well it mid-July 1994, Rwanda experienced the equivalent promotes security for all its of three 11 September 2001 attacks every day for members, without regard to 100 days, all in a country whose population was one the nature of would-be thirty-sixth that of the United States. Two weeks into beneficiaries, their location, the genocide, the Security Council withdrew most of resources or relationship to its peacekeepers from the country. It took almost a great Powers. month for United Nations officials to call it a genocide and even longer for some Security Council members. When a new mission was finally authorized for Rwanda, six weeks into the genocide, few States offered soldiers. The mission deployed as the genocide ended.

2. Efficiency
43.

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37.

Similarly, throughout the deliberation of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, we have been struck once again by the glacial speed at which our institutions have responded to massive human rights violations in Darfur, Sudan. When the institutions of collective security respond in an ineffective and inequitable manner, they reveal a much deeper truth about which threats matter. Our institutions of collective security must not just assert that a threat to one is truly a threat to all, but perform accordingly.

Some collective security instruments have been efficient. As the institutional embodiment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of considerable long-term success in preventing widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - with its regular budget of less than $275 million - stands out as an extraordinary bargain. Similarly, the Secretary-General’s mediation efforts, though grossly underresourced, have helped reduce international tensions.

38.

But more collective security instruments have been inefficient. Post-conflict operations, for example, have too often been characterized by countless illcoordinated and overlapping bilateral and United Nations programmes, with inter-agency competition preventing the best use of scarce resources.

39.

The biggest source of inefficiency in our collective security institutions has simply been an unwillingness to get serious about preventing deadly violence. The
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Part 2 Collective security and the challenge of prevention

Part 2 Collective security and the challenge of prevention Synopsis
Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international security. So defined, there are six clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead: • Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation • Inter-State conflict • Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities • Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons • Terrorism • Transnational organized crime In its first 60 years, the United Nations has made crucial contributions to reducing or mitigating these threats to international security. While there have been major failures and shortcomings, the record of successes and contributions is underappreciated. This gives hope that the Organization can adapt to successfully confront the new challenges of the twenty-first century. The primary challenge for the United Nations and its members is to ensure that, of all the threats in the categories listed, those that are distant do not become imminent and those that are imminent do not actually become destructive. This requires a framework for preventive action which addresses all these threats in all the ways they resonate most in different parts of the world. Most of all, it will require leadership at the domestic and international levels to act early, decisively and collectively against all these threats - from HIV/AIDS to nuclear terrorism - before they have their most devastating effect. In describing how to meet the challenge of prevention, we begin with development because it is the indispensable foundation for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. It serves multiple functions. It helps combat the poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation that kill millions and threaten human security. It is vital in helping States prevent or reverse the erosion of State capacity, which is crucial for meeting almost every class of threat. And it is part of a long-term strategy for preventing civil war, and for addressing the environments in which both terrorism and organized crime flourish.

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III. Poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation

A. The threats we face

44.

Global Programme on AIDS, came only in 1987, six years after the first cases of HIV were identified and after it had infected millions of people worldwide. Nine years and 25 million infections later, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) was created to coordinate United Nations agencies working on HIV/AIDS. By 2000, when the Security Council first discussed HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security, the number of deaths per year from HIV/AIDS in Africa had outstripped the number of battle deaths in all the civil wars fought in the 1990s. By 2003, when the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was created, there were more than 11 million children orphaned by HIV/AIDS in Africa. 49. That Africa has borne the brunt of the HIV/AIDS pandemic raises the troubling question of whether international response would have been so slow if the disease had reduced life expectancy by 30 years in non-African countries.

Since 1990, while developing countries’ per capita income has increased an average of 3 per cent annually, the number of people living in extreme poverty has increased in some regions by more than 100 million people. In at least 54 countries, average per capita income has declined over the same period. Every year, almost 11 million children die from preventable diseases and more than half a million women die during pregnancy or childbirth. Increasing poverty is accompanied by an increase in global inequality and income inequality in many poor countries. In parts of Latin America, for example, the income of the wealthiest fifth of households is 30 times greater than that of the poorest fifth. Worldwide, women and youth are disproportionately poor. 50.

When poverty is added to ethnic or regional inequalities, the grievances that stoke civil violence are compounded. While it may not International response to reach the level of war, the combination of a surging youth HIV/AIDS was shockingly population, poverty, urbanization and unemployment has slow and remains shamefully resulted in increased gang violence in many cities of the ill-resourced. developing world. As one woman poignantly asked during the Panel’s consultation with civil society organizations in Africa, “How have we let what should be our greatest asset, youth, become a threat to our security?” 51.

45.

Progress in stemming other lethal infectious diseases remains elusive. The global drive to control tuberculosis has shown significant advances, including improvements in political commitment, financing, strategy formulation, access to medication and medical research. Yet more than 8.5 million new cases of tuberculosis emerge and more than two million people die of tuberculosis every year. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that, if current trends continue, between now and 2020 nearly one billion people will be newly infected, 150 million will develop the disease and 36 million will die. Further improvements in the affordability and accessibility of medicines - not just for tuberculosis - are still sorely needed. The recent international experience in combating SARS shows how the spread of infectious disease can be limited when effective global institutions work in close partnership with capable national institutions. Rapid response by WHO and national agencies contained the spread of the disease and prevented a far more serious outbreak that could have threatened thousands of lives on several continents. No State could have achieved this degree of containment of the disease in isolation.

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46.

The continent hardest hit by poverty is Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, average life expectancy has declined from 50 to 46 since 1990. Whereas in the developed world less than one in 100 children die before age five, in most of subSaharan Africa that number is one in 10, and in 14 countries it is one in five. In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people living on less than $1 a day has increased since 1990. While undernourishment decreased worldwide in the 1990s, it increased in Africa.

52.

47.

Over the past three decades, the world has seen the emergence of new infectious diseases, a resurgence of older diseases and a spread of resistance to a growing number of mainstay antibiotic drugs. Recent outbreaks of polio threaten to undermine its near eradication, which was one of the great accomplishments of the twentieth century. These trends signify a dramatic decay in local and global public health capacity.

48.

International response to HIV/AIDS was shockingly slow and remains shamefully ill-resourced. The first major international initiative on HIV/AIDS, the

Current trends indicate persistent and possibly worsening food insecurity in many countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Population growth in the developing world and increased per capita consumption in the industrialized world have led to greater demand for scarce resources. The loss of arable land, water scarcity, overfishing, deforestation and the alteration of ecosystems pose daunting challenges for sustainable development. The world’s population is expected to increase from 6.3 billion today to 8.9 billion in 2050, with nearly all of that growth occurring in the countries least equipped to absorb it. Feeding such a rapidly growing population will only be possible if agricultural yields can be increased significantly and sustainably.

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53.

Environmental degradation has enhanced the destructive potential of natural disasters and in some cases hastened their occurrence. The dramatic increase in major disasters witnessed in the last 50 years provides worrying evidence of this trend. More than two billion people were affected by such disasters in the last decade, and in the same period the economic toll surpassed that of the previous four decades combined. If climate change produces more acute flooding, heat waves, droughts and storms, this pace may accelerate.

54. 58.

Rarely are environmental concerns factored into security, development or humanitarian strategies. Nor is there coherence in environmental protection efforts at the global level. Most attempts to create governance structures to International institutions and tackle the problems of global environmental degradation States continue to treat have not effectively addressed climate change, deforestation poverty, disease and environ- and desertification. Regional and global multilateral treaties mental degradation as stand- on the environment are undermined by inadequate implealone threats. mentation and enforcement by the Member States.

Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa, and the International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico, have led to global understanding and ambitious programmes for alleviating poverty, providing food security, growing economies and protecting the environment in ways that benefit future generations. The United Nations Millennium Declaration contains an ambitious but feasible set of agreed targets and benchmarks, later consolidated into the Millennium Development Goals, ranging from halving extreme poverty and protecting the environment to achieving greater gender equality and halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015.

55.

In 2002, world leaders agreed at Monterrey that aid donors and aid recipients both have obligations to achieve development. The primary responsibility for economic and social development lies with Governments, which must create a conducive environment for vigorous private-sector-led growth and aid effectiveness by pursuing sound economic policies, building effective and responsible institutions and investing in public and social services that will reach all of their people. In return for substantive improvements in the policies and institutions of developing countries, donor nations agreed to renew their efforts to reduce poverty, including by reducing trade barriers, increasing development assistance and providing debt relief for highly indebted poor countries.

B. Meeting the challenge of prevention
1. More resources and action
59.

International institutions and States have not organized themselves to address the problems of development in a coherent, integrated way, and instead continue to treat poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation as stand-alone threats. The fragmented sectoral approaches of international institutions mirror the fragmented sectoral approaches of Governments: for example, finance ministries tend to work only with the international financial institutions, development ministers only with development programmes, ministers of agriculture only with food programmes and environment ministers only with environmental agencies. Bilateral donors correctly call for better United Nations coordination but show little enthusiasm for similar efforts on their own account.

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56.

Existing global economic and social governance structures are woefully inadequate for the challenges ahead. To tackle the challenges of sustainable development countries must negotiate across different sectors and issues, including foreign aid, technology, trade, financial stability and development policy. Such packages are difficult to negotiate and require high-level attention and leadership from those countries that have the largest economic impacts. At the moment, there is no high-level forum which provides leaders from large industrial and developing economies a regular opportunity for frank dialogue, deliberation and problem-solving. 60.

With the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the international community committed itself to dramatically reduce poverty by 2015. Assessments by the Millennium Project indicate that, while some regions of the world are on track to reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than $1 a day, other regions have regressed. In the area of reducing child mortality and increasing primary education enrolment, the world continues to lag behind its commitments. Little has been done to address the gender aspects of the Millennium Development Goals. Although poor and rich countries have pledged to take action to address social and economic threats, pledges have not materialized into resources and action and long-term commitments are scant. All States must recommit themselves to the goals of eradicating poverty, achieving sustained economic growth and promoting sustainable development. We believe that the Millennium Development Goals should be placed at the centre of national and international poverty-reduction strategies. The dramatic shortfall in resources required to meet the Millennium Development Goals must be redressed, and the commitments to sound policies and good govern-

57.

The United Nations comparative advantage in addressing economic and social threats is its unparalleled convening power, which allows it to formulate common development targets and rally the international community around a consensus for achieving them. In recent years, the World Summit on Sustainable

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ance at all levels must be fulfilled. For the least developed countries, official development assistance (ODA) will be crucial and should be structured to support countries’ Millennium Development Goal-based poverty reduction strategies. The many donor countries which currently fall short of the United Nations 0.7 per cent gross national product (GNP) target for ODA should establish a timetable for reaching it.

where Governments have refused to acknowledge the gravity of the threat and failed to address the problem, countries have experienced a dramatic turn for the worse and international efforts to address the problem have been hampered. Leaders of affected countries need to mobilize resources, commit funds and engage civil society and the private sector in disease-control efforts.

61.

2. New initiatives
66.

After years of debate on whether to develop innovative approaches to financing for development, such as the International Financial Facility, donors have shifted to discussions of how to do so. We welcome this and encourage donors to move quickly to decisions on this issue.

62.

Despite all we know about the human toll of HIV/AIDS - the numbers of infections, the deaths, the children who are orphaned - we are left to guess what the long-term effect of the pandemic will be on the States most afflicted by the disease. While HIV/AIDS depletes the capacity of States and economies in Africa faster than it can be replenished, we do not know the cumulative effects of loss of government officials, skilled health professionals, teachers, service providers, caregivers, police, soldiers and peacekeepers. In the absence of good research into these questions, we cannot begin to develop a strategy for countering the long-term effects of HIV/AIDS on governance and State stability.

In Monterrey and Johannesburg, leaders agreed that poverty alleviation is undermined by continuing inequities in the global trading system. Seventy per cent of the world’s poor live in rural areas and earn their income from agriculture. They pay a devastating cost when developed countries impose trade barriers on agricultural imports and subsidize agricultural exports. In 2001, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Declaration explicitly committed signatories to put the needs and interests of developing countries at the heart of negotiations over a new trade round. WTO members should strive to conclude the Doha development round at the latest in 2006. 67.

63. 68.

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Governance reforms and improvements in trading opportunities will not by themselves bring about meaningful poverty alleviation in a significant number of the least developed countries - many of them in sub-Saharan Africa - where development efforts are undermined by poor infrastructure, low productivity agriculture, endemic disease and crippling levels of external debt. Developed countries will also have to do more to address the challenge in the poorest countries of debt sustainability - which should be redefined as the level of debt consistent with achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Lender Governments and the international financial institutions should provide highly indebted poor countries with greater debt relief, longer rescheduling and improved access to global markets.

The Security Council, working closely with UNAIDS, should host a second special session on HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security, to explore the future effects of HIV/AIDS on States and societies, generate research on the problem and identify critical steps towards a long-term strategy for diminishing the threat.

64.

The fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria depends on capable, responsible States with functioning public health systems. The absence of health facilities is the primary factor spurring the proliferation of malaria. Funding gaps are preventing health-sector reforms in many heavily burdened countries, particularly those in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Inconsistent or partial treatment, resulting from insufficient funding, has allowed new strains of tuberculosis to develop that are far more difficult to treat. Even when programme funding for HIV/AIDS is available, inadequate or non-existent health facilities in the poorest areas of sub-Saharan Africa hinder programmes from being effectively or sustainably implemented. International donors, in partnership with national authorities and local civil society organizations, should undertake a major new global initiative to rebuild local and national public health systems throughout the developing world. 69.

Despite major international initiatives, the spread of HIV/AIDS is still rampant. In the most affected countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the impact of the pandemic is becoming more acute. In Asia, the number of infections exceeds seven million and is increasing rapidly. Although international resources devoted to meeting the challenge of HIV/AIDS have increased from about $250 million in 1996 to about $2.8 billion in 2002, more than $10 billion annually is needed to stem the pandemic.

65.

The experience of some countries shows that properly funded and institutionalized efforts can yield remarkable successes in the fight against HIV/AIDS. By contrast,

Such efforts should be undertaken simultaneously with improving global disease monitoring capabilities. This is triply imperative - as a means of fighting new emerging infectious disease, defending against the threat of biological terrorism and building effective, responsible States. Members of the World Health Assembly should provide greater resources to the WHO Global

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Outbreak Alert and Response Network to increase its capacity to cope with potential disease outbreaks. 73.

70.

In extreme cases of threat posed by a new emerging infectious disease or intentional release of an infectious agent, there may be a need for cooperation between WHO and the Security Council in establishing effective quarantine measures (see section V below).

71.

The United Nations and the international financial institutions should also do more to assist those States most vulnerable to severe natural disasters, the effects of which can be destablizing as they were in 2004 in Haiti. The World Meteorological Association has estimated that investments in vulnerability reduction could drastically reduce the number of deaths associated with natural disasters. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank should work in a more integrated fashion - and in partnership with Governments and outside research institutions - to improve vulnerability assessments and work with the most affected Governments to strengthen their adaptive capacity.

IV. Conflict between and within States
A. The threat of inter-State conflict
74.

In order to address problems of climate change modern economies need to reduce their dependence on hydrocarbons and should undertake a special effort to devise climate-friendly development strategies. Member States should place special attention on the development of low-carbon energy sources, including natural gas, renewable power and nuclear power, and should place special emphasis on the development of low-greenhouse-gas technologies. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has encouraged the development of renewable energy sources that could gradually correct today’s excessive dependency on fossil fuels. To further encourage this, States should provide incentives for the further development of renewable energy sources and begin to phase out environmentally harmful subsidies, especially for fossil fuel use and development.

72.

Although the world has seen few inter-State wars over the past 60 years, the threat of inter-State war has not vanished. Unresolved regional disputes in South Asia, North-East Asia and the Middle East continue to threaten international peace and security. These disputes may unravel 40 years of efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and more than 75 years of efforts to banish the scourge of biological and chemical weapons. In turn, inter-State rivalry in some regions fuels and exacerbates internal wars, making them more difficult to bring to a close. Such rivalry, by promoting conventional weapons build-ups, diverts scarce resources that could be used to reduce poverty, improve health and increase education. 75. War and ongoing instability in Iraq and Palestine have fuelled extremism in parts of the Muslim world and the West. This issue is complex and multidimensional and defies any simplistic categorization. Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the ability of extremist groups to foster perceptions within the West and within the Muslim world of cultural and religious antagonism between them, the dangers of which, if left unchecked, are profound. 76. In the past, the United Nations helped to reduce the threat of inter-State conflicts through the Secretary-General’s “good offices”, or quiet diplomacy aimed at defusing crises and providing hostile parties the opportunity to talk freely and test intentions. Successive Secretaries-General have played this role despite little capacity within the Organization to support it. 77. With the end of the cold war, the Security Council became increasingly active in addressing international threats. The average annual number of resolutions it passed increased from 15 to 60, or from one resolution a month to one a week. Before 1989, the Council applied sanctions twice; since then it has imposed

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The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol after ratification by the Russian Federation is a positive development, even though the Protocol by itself is not sufficient to solve the challenge of limiting greenhouse gas emissions. The Protocol has encouraged the development of renewable energy sources that could gradually correct today’s excessive dependency on fossil fuels. Yet problems remain. Some advanced industrialized nations are on track to meet their Kyoto targets for reasons outside the realm of climate policy, e.g., a sharp reduction in their industrial production. The United States, which accounts for about one quarter of world emissions of greenhouse gases, refuses to ratify the Protocol. At the same time, developing countries, which now account for almost half of today’s net emissions of greenhouse gases (but only one tenth of per capita emissions), have been opposed to accepting any binding emission caps, which they perceive to be impediments to economic growth. Industrialized nations are likely to be more resistant to accepting costly reductions without increased developing country participation. Most importantly, the Protocol does not contain any obligations beyond 2012. We urge Member States to reflect on the gap between the promise of the Kyoto Protocol and its performance, re-engage on the problem of global warming and begin new negotiations to produce a new longterm strategy for reducing global warming beyond the period covered by the Protocol.

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sanctions 14 times and for an increasingly diverse range of stated purposes, including to reverse aggression, restore democratic Governments, protect human rights, end wars, combat terrorism and support peace agreements.

78.

Several of these sanctions regimes were at least partially effective. In some cases, they helped to produce negotiated agreements. In others, they combined with military pressure to weaken and isolate rebel groups and States in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions.

79.

with its resolutions. Others argue Security Council irrelevance because the Council did not deter the United States and its coalition partners from waging war. Still others suggest that the refusal of the Security Council to bow to United States pressure to legitimate the war is proof of its relevance and indispensability: although the Security Council did not deter war, it provided a clear and principled standard with which to assess the decision to go to war. The flood of Foreign Ministers into the Security Council chambers during the debates, and widespread public attention, suggest that the United States decision to bring the question of force to the Security Council reaffirmed not just the relevance but the centrality of the Charter of the United Nations.

B. The threat of internal conflict
84.

Sanctions failed when they were not effectively targeted and when the Security Council failed to enforce them. Weak enforcement results Sanctions failed when they from the strategic interests of powerful States; a lack of clarwere not effectively targeted ity about the purpose of sanctions; “sanctions fatigue” and when the Security Council brought about by concern over their humanitarian impact; failed to enforce them. insufficient support from the respective sanctions committees; and insufficient State capacity to implement sanctions.

80. 85.

As a result of growing concern over the humanitarian impact of comprehensive sanctions, the Security Council stopped imposing them after the cases of Iraq, former Yugoslavia and Haiti, and turned exclusively to the use of financial, diplomatic, arms, aviation, travel and commodity sanctions, targeting the belligerents and policy makers most directly responsible for reprehensible policies.

Since the end of the cold war, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding in civil wars have become the operational face of the United Nations in international peace and security.

81.

The rapid growth of United Nations activity in civil wars coincides with a sharp decline in their numbers (see figure below). Since 1992, civil wars have declined steadily, and by 2003 had dropped by roughly 40 per cent to less than 30 wars. In the last
1970-2002
Number of ongoing civil wars

In the last 15 years, more civil wars were ended through negotiation than in the previous two centuries in large part because the United Nations provided leadership, opportunities for negotiation, strategic coordination, and the resources needed for implementation.

Ending civil wars and building peace

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50 40 30 20 10 0
19 70
19 72

Increased activity does not necessarily produce increased results. Not all situations that justified Security Council attention received it and not all its resolutions were followed by effective enforcement action. Yet two trends of the 1990s indicate increasing effectiveness in regulating international conflict. First, with the Council increasingly active and willing to use its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the balance between unilateral use of force and collectively authorized force has shifted dramatically. Collectively authorized use of force may not be the rule today, but it is no longer an exception. Second, and perhaps the most striking indicator of the growing importance of the role of the United Nations in regulating international conflict, is the recent expectation that the Security Council should be the arbiter of the use of force.

Number of ongoing UN peace-keeping and peacebuilding operations deployed in civil wars

82.

Many people assumed it was quite natural that the United States should seek Security Council support for going to war against Iraq in 2003. Superpowers, however, have rarely sought Security Council approval for their actions. That all States should seek Security Council authorization to use force is not a timehonoured principle; if this were the case, our faith in it would be much stronger. Our analysis suggests quite the opposite - that what is at stake is a relatively new emerging norm, one that is precious but not yet deep-rooted.

83.

The case of Iraq prompted much difference of opinion. Some contend that the Security Council was ineffective because it could not produce Iraqi compliance

19

74

19

76

19

78

19

80

19

82

19

84

19

86

19

88

19

90

19

92

19

94

19

96

19

98

20

00

20

02

Source: Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University; and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

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C. Meeting the challenge of prevention
1. Better international regulatory frameworks and norms
89.

15 years, more civil wars were ended through negotiation than in the previous two centuries in large part because the United Nations provided leadership, opportunities for negotiation, strategic coordination, and the resources needed for implementation. Hundreds of thousands of lives were saved, and regional and international stability were enhanced.

86.

The role of the United Nations in preventing wars can be strengthened by giving more attention to developing international regimes and norms to govern some of the sources and accelerators of conflict. A very wide range of laws, norms, agreements and arrangements are relevant here, covering legal regimes and dispute resolution mechanisms, arms control and disarmament regimes, and dialogue and cooperation arrangements. Some examples are set out below. In the area of legal mechanisms, there have been few more important recent developments than the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court. In cases of mounting conflict, early indication by the Security Council that it is carefully monitoring the conflict in question and that it is willing to use its powers under the Rome Statute might deter parties from committing crimes against humanity and violating the laws of war. The Security Council should stand ready to use the authority it has under the Rome Statute to refer cases to the International Criminal Court.

90.

This unprecedented success, however, was also coupled with major failures. Mediation produced settlement in only about 25 per cent of civil wars and only some of those attracted the political and material If the 1991 Bicesse resources necessary for successful implementation. As a Agreement for Angola and the result, many implementation efforts failed, sometimes 1993 Arusha Accords for with disastrous consequences. If two peace agreements, Rwanda, had been successfully the 1991 Bicesse Agreement for Angola and the 1993 implemented, deaths Arusha Accords for Rwanda, had been successfully attributable to war in the implemented, deaths attributable to war in the 1990s 1990s would have been would have been reduced by several million. If the reduced by several million. Security Council had been seriously committed to consolidating peace in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, more lives could have been saved, the Taliban might never have come to power and Al-Qaida could have been deprived of its most important sanctuary. 91.

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87.

More legal mechanisms are necessary in the area of natural resources, fights over which have often been an obstacle to peace. Alarmed by the inflammatory role of natural resources in wars in Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, civil society organizations and the Security Council have turned to the “naming and shaming” of, and the imposition of sanctions against, individuals and corporations involved in illicit trade, and States have made a particular attempt to restrict the sale of “conflict diamonds”. Evidence from Sierra Leone and Angola suggests that such efforts contributed to ending those civil wars. A new challenge for the United Nations is to provide support to weak States - especially, but not limited to, those recovering from war - in the management of their natural resources to avoid future conflicts. 92. The United Nations should work with national authorities, international financial institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector to develop norms governing the management of natural resources for countries emerging from or at risk of conflict. 93. There should also be a focus on the development of rules, for example through the International Law Commission, for the use of transboundary resources, such as water, oil and gas. 94. The United Nations should seek to work closely with regional organizations that have taken the lead in building frameworks for prevention. The United Nations can benefit from sharing information and analysis with regional

The biggest failures of the United Nations in civil violence have been in halting ethnic cleansing and genocide. In Rwanda, Secretariat officials failed to provide the Security Council with early warning of extremist plans to kill thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. When the genocide started, troop contributors withdrew peacekeepers, and the Security Council, bowing to United States pressure, failed to respond. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, United Nations peacekeeping and the protection of humanitarian aid became a substitute for political and military action to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide. In Kosovo, paralysis in the Security Council led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to bypass the United Nations. Only in one instance in the 1990s - in East Timor - did the Security Council, urged on by the Secretary-General, work together with national Governments and regional actors to apply concerted pressure swiftly to halt large-scale killing.

88.

The large loss of life in such wars and outbreaks of mass violence obliges the international community to be more vigilant in preventing them. When prevention fails, there is urgent need to stop the killing and prevent any further return to war.

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reporting. All Member States should report completely and accurately on all elements of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the Secretary-General should be asked to report annually to the General Assembly and Security Council on any inadequacies in the reporting.

2. Better information and analysis
98.

early-warning systems, but more importantly regional organizations have gone farther than the United Nations in setting normative standards that can guide preventive efforts. For example, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU) agree on the need to protect elected Governments from coups. The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has developed operational norms on minority rights. The United Nations should build on the experience of regional organizations in developing frameworks for minority rights and the protection of democratically elected Governments from unconstitutional overthrow.

95.

Prevention requires early warning and analysis that is based on objective and impartial research. Although the United Nations has some early-warning and analysis capacity scattered among different agencies and departments, the Secretary-General has not been able to establish any properly-resourced unit able to integrate inputs from these offices into early-warning reports and strategy options for purposes of decision-making. The best option for creating a coherent capacity for developing strategic options is to strengthen the Office of the Secretary-General through the creation of a Deputy Secretary-General for Peace and Security (see section XIX below).

In the area of arms control and disarmament regimes, much more needs to be done, not only in the context of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (see section V below) but in relation to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In the 1990s, small arms, light weapons and landmines were the primary weapons in most civil wars. While concerted action by civil society organizations and concerned Member States led to a ban on landmines, efforts to limit the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons have barely moved beyond rhetoric to action. 99.

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96.

Although some field-based agencies participate in early-warning mechanisms and international non-governmental organizations have played a major role in recent years in providing timely information, analysis and advocacy, the Secretary-General’s access to local analysis of conflict is sharply limited. Greater interaction by United Nations political, peacekeeping and humanitarian departments with outside sources of early-warning information and of local knowledge of conflicts would enhance United Nations conflict management. Also, in the past few years, research institutions (in academia and in other international organizations) have begun to compile both the necessary data and sophisticated analysis of various causes and accelerators of different kinds of conflict. United Nations policy sections should engage more actively with local sources of knowledge and outside sources of research.

A comprehensive approach to the small arms problem emerged in the late 1990s and seeks to create international action to limit their production and spread. The key global instrument for this approach is the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, a comprehensive set of recommendations aimed at preventing and eradicating the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons. The Programme of Action makes innovative use of regional bodies, such as the Nairobi Secretariat, which, inter alia, monitors the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, to report, monitor and verify State compliance. It should be considered a start rather than an end-point for United Nations efforts. Member States should expedite and conclude negotiations on legally binding agreements on the marking and tracing, as well as the brokering and transfer, of small arms and light weapons.

3. Preventive diplomacy and mediation

97.

100. United Nations efforts to prevent outbreaks of internal violence have met with less success than its efforts to prevent inter-State wars, and they are often inhibited by the reluctance of Member States to see their domestic affairs internationalized. But more effort could and should be made in this area, particularly through the appointment of skilled, experienced and regionally knowledgeable envoys, mediators and special representatives, who can make as important a contribution to conflict prevention as they do to conflict resolution. 101. In making such appointments, the Secretary-General should place high-level competence above all other criteria and do more to nurture internal and exter-

The United Nations can also help to prevent inter-State conflict by increasing the transparency of Member States’ conventional weapons holdings and acquisitions. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, established in 1991, enhances military transparency by soliciting annual declarations of Member States on their sale and purchase of conventional weapons and existing weapons holdings, as well as their defence postures, policies and doctrines. However, the Register is marred by incomplete, untimely and inaccurate

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nal expertise in this respect. This would be made easier by the establishment of a facility for training and briefing new or potential special representatives and other United Nations mediators, and we so recommend.

106. Good communication between mediators and peacekeeping planners can also help identify opportunities for preventive deployments. The now occasional practice of peacekeeping planners sitting in on mediation processes should be standardized.

V. Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons
A. The threats we face
1. Nuclear weapons
107. Any use of nuclear weapons, by accident or design, risks human casualties and economic dislocation on a catastrophic scale. Stopping the proliferation of such weapons - and their potential use, by either State or non-State actors - must remain an urgent priority for collective security. 108. The threat posed by nuclear proliferation - the spread of nuclear weapons among States - arises in two ways. The first and most immediate concern is that some countries, under cover of their current Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons membership, will covertly and illegally develop full-scale weapons programmes, or that - acting within the letter but perhaps not the spirit of the Treaty - they will acquire all the materials and expertise needed for weapons programmes with the option of withdrawing from the Treaty at the point when they are ready to proceed with weaponization. 109. The second longer-term, concern is about the erosion and possible collapse of the whole Treaty regime. Almost 60 States currently operate or are constructing nuclear power or research reactors, and at least 40 possess the industrial and scientific infrastructure which would enable them, if they chose, to build nuclear weapons at relatively short notice if the legal and normative constraints of the Treaty regime no longer apply.

102. Mediators and negotiators need adequate support. Although the demand for United Nations mediation has skyrocketed in the past 10 years, resources devoted to this function have remained minimal. The deliberate underresourcing of the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat by Member States is at odds with these same States’ professed desire for a strong United Nations. The Department of Political Affairs should be given additional resources and should be restructured to provide more consistent and professional mediation support.

103. While the details of such a restructuring should be left to the SecretaryGeneral, it should take into account the need for the United Nations to have:

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(a) A field-oriented, dedicated mediation support capacity, comprised of a small team of professionals with relevant direct experience and expertise, available to all United Nations mediators; (b) Competence on thematic issues that recur in peace negotiations, such as the sequencing of implementation steps, the design of monitoring arrangements, the sequencing of transitional arrangements and the design of national reconciliation mechanisms; (c) Greater interaction with national mediators, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations involved in conflict resolution; (d) Greater consultation with and involvement in peace processes of important voices from civil society, especially those of women, who are often neglected during negotiations.

4. Preventive deployment

104. In cases of mounting tensions, the early deployment of peacekeepers can reassure parties seeking peaceful resolution to a conflict and deter would-be aggressors. It is notable that the only clear case of preventive deployment to date, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, was requested by the national authorities and was manifestly a success. We encourage national leaders and parties to conflict to make constructive use of the option of preventive deployment.

105. The Security Council should also note that in countries that have emerged from conflict, the deployment of small numbers of peacekeepers to train national armed forces can serve an important preventive function.

110. Both concerns are now very real: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not as effective a constraint as it was. In 1963, when only four States had nuclear arsenals, the United States Government predicted that the following decade would see the emergence of 15 to 25 nuclear-weapon States; others predicted the number would be as high as 50. As of 2004, only eight States are known to have nuclear arsenals. The strong non-proliferation regime - embodied in IAEA and the Treaty itself - helped dramatically to slow the predicted rate of proliferation. It made three critical contributions: it bolstered a normative prohibition against the ownership, use and proliferation of these weapons; it ensured that States could benefit from nuclear technologies, but with oversight; and it reassured States about the capacities

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of neighbours and potential rivals, allowing them to avoid unnecessary arms races.

3. Chemical and biological weapons

111. But the nuclear non-proliferation regime is now at risk because of lack of compliance with existing commitments, withdrawal or threats of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to escape those commitments, a changing international security environment and the diffusion of technology. We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.

112. Regardless of whether more States acquire nuclear weapons, there are also grave risks posed by the existence of large stockpiles of nuclear and radiological materials. Today 1,300 kilograms of highly enriched uranium exist in research reactors in 27 countries. The total volume of HEU stockpiles ... the nuclear non-proliferation is far greater, and many HEU storage sites in the world are regime is now at risk ... inadequately secured. States have publicly confirmed 20 cases of nuclear material diversion and more than 200 incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear materials have been documented over the past decade. Scientists have repeatedly warned of the ease with which terrorists could, with parts from the open market, assemble a simple “guntype” nuclear device that simply collides two quantities of HEU. Experts suggest that if a simple nuclear device were detonated in a major city, the number of deaths would range from tens of thousands to more than one million. The shock to international commerce, employment and travel would amount to at least one trillion dollars. Such an attack could have further, far-reaching implications for international security, democratic governance and civil rights.

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2. Radiological weapons

114. Chemical and biological materials also pose a growing threat: they share with nuclear weapons the awful potential of being used in a single attack to inflict mass casualties. Chemical agents are widespread and relatively easy to acquire and weaponize. There are almost 6,000 industrial chemical facilities worldwide, posing potential targets and opportunities for the acquisition of materials. Chemicalweapon States have lagged behind in the destruction of chemical weapons scheduled by the Chemical Weapons Convention: of the 70,000 metric tons of declared weapons agents, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has verified the destruction of only 9,600, and if the current pace persists, the Convention’s goal of the complete destruction of chemical weapons agents will not be met even by the agreed extended While scientific advances in the deadline of 2012. biotechnology sector hold out 115. While rapid growth and scientific advances in the the prospect of prevention and biotechnology sector hold out the prospect of prevencure for many diseases, they tion and cure for many diseases, they also increase also increase opportunities for opportunities for the development of deadly new the development of deadly new ones. Dramatic advances in recombinant DNA techones. nology and direct genetic manipulation raise the spectre of “designer bugs”, which may be developed to reconstruct eradicated diseases and to resist existing vaccinations, antibiotics and other treatments. There are countless fermentation, medical and research facilities equipped to produce biological agents. Meanwhile, the biological toxin ricin has been discovered in several terrorist workshops. Unlike anthrax, which can be treated by antibiotics, ricin has no antidote and is lethal to humans in quantities smaller than the size of a pinhead. Use of similar materials to cause deliberate outbreaks of infectious disease could prove equally if not more lethal than a nuclear detonation. Under worst-case assumptions, an attack using only one gram of weaponized smallpox could produce between 100,000 and 1,000,000 fatalities. 116. That a high-damage attack has not occurred is not a cause for complacency but a call for urgent prevention.

B. Meeting the challenge of prevention
117. Multilayered action is required. The first layer of an effective strategy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons should feature global instruments that reduce the demand for them. The second layer should contain global instruments that operate on the supply side to limit the capacity of both States and non-State actors to acquire weapons and

113. A different threat is posed by radiological weapons, which are more weapons of mass disruption than mass destruction. Radiological weapons can use plutonium or highly enriched uranium but can rely simply on radioactive materials, of which there are millions of sources used in medical and industrial facilities worldwide. The immediate destructive effect of a radiological or “dirty” bomb is only as great as its conventional explosive, and even the radiation effects of such a bomb are likely to be limited. The more harmful effects of disruption and economic damage would be prompted by public alarm and the necessity of evacuating and decontaminating affected areas. The ubiquity of radiological materials and the crude requirements for detonating such a device suggest a high likelihood of use. This puts a premium on educating the public about the limited consequences of radiological weapons in order to mitigate some of the alarm and uncertainty that would be unleashed in the event of an attack.

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the materials and expertise needed to build them. The third layer must consist of Security Council enforcement activity underpinned by credible, shared information and analysis. The fourth layer must comprise national and international civilian and public health defence.

122. In addition, we believe it would be valuable if the Security Council explicitly pledged to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear-weapon State.

1. Better strategies to reduce demand

118. Lacklustre disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States weakens the diplomatic force of the non-proliferation regime and thus its ability to constrain proliferation. Despite Security Council commitment to the contrary (resolution 984 (1995)), these nuclear-weapon States are increasingly unwilling to pledge assurances of non-use (negative security assurances) and they maintain the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons against chemical or biological attack.

123. Given the challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime posed by States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recognizing the impact of that challenge on regional insecurity, we recommend that negotiations to resolve regional conflicts include confidencebuilding measures and steps towards disarmament. 124. States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, demonstrating their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which are open to nuclearweapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions similar to those established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South-East Asia. 125. For biological and chemical weapons, there is both an obligation and a historic opportunity to fully eliminate all declared chemical weapons stockpiles: all chemical-weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012. 126. Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention should also be further strengthened, and the long-standing impasse over a verification mechanism for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which has undermined confidence in the overall regime, should be overcome. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention must increase bilateral diplomatic pressure to universalize membership.

119. Despite the end of the cold war, nuclear-weapon States earn only a mixed grade in fulfilling their disarmament commitments. While the United States and the Russian Federation have dismantled roughly half of their nuclear weapons, committed to large reductions in deployed strategic warheads and eliminated most of their non-strategic nuclear weapons, such progress has been overshadowed by recent reversals. In 2000, the nuclear-weapon States committed to 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, which were all but renounced by them at the 2004 meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

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120. The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament:

(a) They must honour their commitments under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilment of those commitments; (b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, to further diminish the perceived value of nuclear weapons, and secure robust international cooperation to staunch proliferation, formalizing such commitments in pending and future nuclear-weapon-free zones agreements.

2. Better strategies to reduce supply
127. We recognize that nuclear energy, in the view of many, is an important source of power for civilian uses and may become even more crucial in the context of a worldwide effort to reduce dependency on fossil fuels and emissions of greenhouse gases. At the same time, the mounting tension between the goals of

121. The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons.

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achieving a more effective non-proliferation regime and the right of all signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to develop civilian nuclear industries needs to be addressed and defused.

132. Recent experience of the activities of the A.Q. Khan network has demonstrated the need for and the value of measures taken to interdict the illicit and clandestine trade in components for nuclear programmes. This problem is currently being addressed on a voluntary basis by the Proliferation Security Initiative. We believe that all States should be encouraged to join this voluntary initiative. 133. In order to reinforce international legal provisions against the illicit trafficking of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials, ongoing negotiations at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to amend the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation should be completed in a timely manner. The Security Council may need to be prepared to consider mandatory action if progress in the Convention negotiations is unsatisfactory. 134. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provides the right of withdrawal from the Treaty, States should be urged not to do so. Those who withdraw should be held responsible for violations committed while still a party to the Treaty. A State’s notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided by IAEA should be withdrawn. 135. Urgent short-term action is needed to defend against the possible terrorist use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons. High priority must be accorded to consolidating, securing, and when possible eliminating potentially hazardous materials, and implementing effective export controls. To that end, we welcome the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which facilitates (a) the reduction of global highly enriched uranium stockpiles, (b) the conversion of HEU research reactors to “proliferation-resistant” reactors, and (c) the “downblending” of existing HEU. The proposed timeline for implementing the Global Threat Reduction Initiative should be halved from 10 to 5 years. 136. The Security Council, acting under its resolution 1540 (2004), can offer States model legislation for security, tracking, criminalization and export controls, and by 2006 develop minimum standards for United Nations Member State implementation. To achieve that goal, the implementation committee of Council resolution 1540 (2004) should establish a permanent liaison with IAEA, OPCW and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 137. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should also negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish binding international standards for the export of

128. Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons guarantees States parties’ rights to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; this right must be preserved. The Treaty also specifies that this right must be used in conformity with its articles I and II; this obligation also must be respected. In recent years, it has become clear that the proliferation risks from the enrichment of uranium and from the reprocessing of spent fuel are great and increasing. These two processes in particular provide a route by which Treaty signatories can (and in some cases have) clandestinely pursued activities not in conformity with the Treaty and designed to give them the option of acquiring a nuclear-weapon capability.

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129. Two remedies are required. First, the inspection and verification rules that have governed IAEA through the mid-1990s have proven increasingly inadequate. IAEA initiated more stringent inspection rules in the Model Additional Protocol, but as yet only one third of the States parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons have ratified the Protocol. The IAEA Board of Governors should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today’s standard for IAEA safeguards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with nonproliferation and safeguards standards.

130. Second, we urge that negotiations be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of articles III and IX of the IAEA statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users. Such an arrangement would need to put the Agency in a position to meet, through suppliers it authorized, demands for nuclear fuel supplies of low enriched uranium and for the reprocessing of spent fuel at market rates and to provide a guarantee of uninterrupted supply of these services, as long as there was no breach of safeguard or inspection procedures at the facilities in question.

131. While that arrangement is being negotiated, States should, without surrendering the right under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to construct such facilities, voluntarily institute a time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further enrichment or reprocessing facilities, with a commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market rates.

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such agents. Within a designated time frame, States parties to the Convention should refrain from participating in such biotechnology commerce with nonmembers.

ment). Well-prepared societies may thus be able to avoid the worst-case scenarios of biological attacks. 143. However, at present, international aid for infectious disease monitoring, detection and response is lacking, security planning and spending are poorly coordinated with health-care policies and budgets, and there is insufficient understanding that an inevitable, new biological future makes active bio-defence the most viable option against the likelihood of attack.

138. IAEA member States should increase funding for its programmes that help to locate and secure radioactive sources and that assist States in establishing pertinent domestic legislation. Moreover, the Conference on Disarmament should move without further delay to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that, on a designated schedule, ends the production of highly enriched uranium for non-weapon as well as weapons purposes.

3. Better enforcement capability

139. The Security Council today has few arrows in its quiver other than sanctions and military force to enforce non-proliferation agreements. Moreover, a special referral to the Security Council that results in no action is worse than no referral. The ability of the Security Council to generate credible information about potential instances of proliferation should be strengthened.

140. To that end, links between IAEA and OPCW and the Security Council must also be strengthened. The Directors-General of IAEA and OPCW should be invited by the Security Council to report to it twice-yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

144. Given the potential international security threat posed by the intentional release of an infectious biological agent or an overwhelming natural outbreak of an infectious disease, there is a need for the WHO Director-General, through the Secretary-General, to keep the Security Council informed during any suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease. In such an event, the Security Council should be prepared to support the work of WHO investigators or to deploy experts reporting directly to the Council, and if existing International Health Regulations do not provide adequate access for WHO investigations and response coordination, the Security Council should be prepared to mandate greater compliance. In the event that a State is unable to adequately quarantine large numbers of potential carriers, the Security Council should be prepared to support international action to assist in cordon operations. The Security Council should consult with the WHO Director-General to establish the necessary procedures for working together in the event of a suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease.

VI. Terrorism
A. The threat we face
145. Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that protect civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Terrorism flourishes in environments of despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extremism and human rights abuse; it also flourishes in contexts of regional conflict and foreign occupation; and it profits from weak State capacity to maintain law and order. 146. Two new dynamics give the terrorist threat greater urgency. Al-Qaida is the first instance - not likely to be the last - of an armed non-State network with global reach and sophisticated capacity. Attacks against more than 10 Member States on four continents in the past five years have demonstrated that Al-Qaida and associated entities pose a universal threat to the membership of the United Nations and the United Nations itself. In public statements, Al-Qaida has sin-

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141. The Security Council should also be prepared to deploy inspection capacities for suspected nuclear and chemical violations, drawing on the capacities of IAEA and OPCW. Until multilateral negotiations yield a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention verification mechanism, the Security Council should avail itself of the Secretary-General’s roster of inspectors for biological weapons, who should remain independent and work under United Nations staff codes. This roster of inspectors should also be available to advise the Council and liaise with WHO authorities in the event of a suspicious disease outbreak, as discussed below.

4. Better public health defences

142. Scientific advancements in biotechnology and the ubiquity of facilities capable of producing biological agents circumscribe prospects for the elimination of biological weapons and complicate verification efforts. But unlike nuclear weapons, many (though not all) biological agents can be countered by vaccinations and effective responses (including rapid diagnosis, quarantines and treat-

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gled out the United Nations as a major obstacle to its goals and defined it as one of its enemies. Second, the threat that terrorists - of whatever type, with whatever motivation - will seek to cause mass casualties creates unprecedented dangers. Our recommendations provided above on controlling the supply of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological materials and building robust global public health systems are central to a strategy to prevent this threat.

B. Meeting the challenge of prevention

1. A comprehensive strategy

(b) Efforts to counter extremism and intolerance, including through education and fostering public debate. One recent innovation by UNDP, the Arab Human Development Report, has helped catalyse a wide ranging debate within the Middle East on the need for gender empowerment, political freedom, rule of law and civil liberties; (c) Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism cooperation, all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil liberties and human rights, including in the areas of law enforcement; intelligence-sharing, where possible; denial and interdiction, when required; and financial controls; (d) Building State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations; (e) Control of dangerous materials and public health defence.

147. Throughout the Panel’s regional consultations, it heard concerns from Governments and civil society organizations that the current “war on terrorism” has in some instances corroded the very values that terrorists Terrorism attacks the values target: human rights and the rule of law. Most of those who that lie at the heart of the expressed such concerns did not question the seriousness of Charter of the United Nations: the terrorist threat and acknowledged that the right to life is respect for human rights; the the most fundamental of human rights. They did, however, rule of law; rules of war that express fears that approaches to terror focusing wholly on milprotect civilians; tolerance itary, police and intelligence measures risk undermining among peoples and nations; efforts to promote good governance and human rights, alienand the peaceful resolution ate large parts of the world’s population and thereby weaken of conflict. the potential for collective action against terrorism. The crucial need, in relation to the States in the regions from which terrorists originate, is to address not only their capacity but their will to fight terror. To develop that will - with States drawing support rather than opposition from their own publics - requires a broader-based approach.

2. Better counter-terrorism instruments
149. Several United Nations anti-terrorist conventions have laid important normative foundations. However, far too many States remain outside the conventions and not all countries ratifying the conventions proceed to adopt internal enforcement measures. Also, attempts to address the problem of terrorist financing have been inadequate. While in the three months after 11 September 2001 $112 million in alleged terrorist funds were frozen, only $24 million were frozen in the two years that followed. Seized funds represent only a small fraction of total funds available to terrorist organizations. While many States have insufficient anti-money-laundering laws and technical capacity, the evasion techniques of terrorists are highly developed and many terrorist funds have a legal origin and are hard to regulate. 150. Member States that have not yet done so should actively consider signing and ratifying all 12 international conventions against terrorism, and should adopt the eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-supported Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering and the measures recommended in its various best practices papers. 151. The Security Council has played an important role in filling gaps in counterterrorism strategy. Since the early 1990s, the Security Council has attempted to weaken State support for and strengthen State resistance to terrorism. From 1992 onwards, the Security Council applied sanctions against individuals and States that supported terrorism - including, in 1999 and 2000, Osama Bin Laden and AlQaida and the Taliban. The initial response by the Security Council to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 was swift and impressive. Security Council reso-

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148. A thread that runs through all such concerns is the imperative to develop a global strategy of fighting terrorism that addresses root causes and strengthens responsible States and the rule of law and fundamental human rights. What is required is a comprehensive strategy that incorporates but is broader than coercive measures. The United Nations, with the Secretary-General taking a leading role, should promote such a comprehensive strategy, which includes:

(a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, including through promoting social and political rights, the rule of law and democratic reform; working to end occupations and address major political grievances; combating organized crime; reducing poverty and unemployment; and stopping State collapse. All of the strategies discussed above for preventing other threats have secondary benefits in working to remove some of the causes or facilitators of terrorism;

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lution 1373 (2001) imposed uniform, mandatory counter-terrorist obligations on all States and established a Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor compliance and to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to States.

measures to ensure compliance, and should devise a schedule of predetermined sanctions for State non-compliance.

4. Defining terrorism
157. The United Nations ability to develop a comprehensive strategy has been constrained by the inability of Member States to agree on an anti-terrorism convention including a definition of terrorism. This prevents the United Nations from exerting its moral authority and from sending an unequivocal message that terrorism is never an acceptable tactic, even for the most defensible of causes. 158. Since 1945, an ever stronger set of norms and laws - including the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court - has regulated and constrained States’ decisions to use force and their conduct in war - for example in the requirement to distinguish between combatants and civilians, to use force proportionally and to live up to basic humanitarian principles. Violations of these obligations should continue to be met with widespread condemnation and war crimes should be prosecuted.

152. However, the Security Council must proceed with caution. The way entities or individuals are added to the terrorist list maintained by the Council and the absence of review or appeal for those listed raise serious accountability issues and possibly violate fundamental human rights norms and conventions. The AlQaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee should institute a process for reviewing the cases of individuals and institutions claiming to have been wrongly placed or retained on its watch lists.

153. Sanctions imposed by the Security Council and the work of its Counter-Terrorism Committee have played an important role in ending the support of some States for terrorism and mobilizing other States in the fight against it. However, Council sanctions against Al-Qaida and Taliban suffer from lagging support and implementation by Member States and affect only a small subset of known Al-Qaida operatives, while a number of States are lagging behind in their compliance with the directives of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. We believe that further action is needed to achieve full implementation of these directives.

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3. Assisting States in confronting terrorism

154. Because United Nations-facilitated assistance is limited to technical support, States seeking operational support for counter-terrorism activities have no alternative but to seek bilateral assistance. A United Nations capacity to facilitate this assistance would in some instances ease domestic political constraints, and this can be achieved by providing for the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to act as a clearing house for State-to-State provision of military, police and border control assistance for the development of domestic counterterrorism capacities. The Security Council, after consultation with affected States, should extend the authority of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to perform this function.

159. The norms governing the use of force by non-State actors have not kept pace with those pertaining to States. This is not so much a legal question as a political one. Legally, virtually all forms of terrorism are prohibited by one of 12 international counter-terrorism conventions, international customary law, the Geneva Conventions or the Rome Statutes. Legal scholars know this, but there is a clear difference between this scattered list of conventions and little-known provisions of other treaties, and a compelling normative framework, understood by all, that should surround the question of terrorism. The United Nations must achieve the same degree of normative strength concerning non-State use of force as it has concerning State use of force. Lack of agreement on a clear and wellknown definition undermines the normative and moral stance against terrorism and has stained the United Nations image. Achieving a comprehensive convention on terrorism, including a clear definition, is a political imperative.

155. Non-compliance can be a matter of insufficient will but is more frequently a function of lack of capacity. United Nations members and specialized bodies should increase their efforts to provide States with access to effective legal, administrative and police tools to prevent terrorism. To aid this process, the United Nations should establish a capacity-building trust fund under the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate.

156. If confronted by States that have the capacity to undertake their obligations but repeatedly fail to do so, the Security Council may need to take additional

160. The search for an agreed definition usually stumbles on two issues. The first is the argument that any definition should include States’ use of armed forces against civilians. We believe that the legal and normative framework against State violations is far stronger than in the case of non-State actors and we do not find this objection to be compelling. The second objection is that peoples under foreign occupation have a right to resistance and a definition of terrorism should not override this right. The right to resistance is contested by some. But it is not the central point: the central point is that there is nothing in the fact of occupation that justifies the targeting and killing of civilians.

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161. Neither of these objections is weighty enough to contradict the argument that the strong, clear normative framework of the United Nations surrounding State use of force must be complemented by a normative framework of equal authority surrounding non-State use of force. Attacks that specifically target innocent civilians and non-combatants must be condemned clearly and unequivocally by all.

direct threat to State and human security, and also constitutes a necessary step in the effort to prevent and resolve internal conflicts, combat the spread of weapons and prevent terrorism.

162. We welcome the recent passage of Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), which includes several measures to strengthen the role of the United Nations in combating terrorism.

163. Nevertheless, we believe there is particular value in achieving a consensus definition within the General Assembly, given its unique legitimacy in normative terms, and that it should rapidly complete negotiations on a comprehensive convention on terrorism.

166. One of the core activities of organized criminal groups - drug trafficking - has major security implications. It is estimated that criminal organizations gain $300 to $500 billion annually from narcotics trafficking, their single largest source of income. In some regions, the huge profits generated through this activity even rivals some countries’ GDP, thus threatening State authority, economic development and the rule of law. Drug trafficking has fuelled an increase in intravenous heroin use, which has contributed in some parts of the world to an alarming spread of the HIV/AIDS virus. There is growing evidence of a nexus between terrorist groups’ financing and opium profits, most visibly in Afghanistan. 167. States and international organizations have reacted too slowly to the threat of organized crime and corruption. Statements about the seriousness of the threat have rarely been matched by action. Three basic impediments stand in the way of more effective international responses: insufficient cooperation among States, weak coordination among international agencies and inadequate compliance by many States. 168. Effectiveness in tackling specific incarnations of organized crime varies. Anticorruption efforts suffer from a lack of commitment and understanding about the types, levels, location and cost of corruption. In the effort to curb the supply of narcotics, successes in some countries are often offset by failures in others. National demand-reduction initiatives in the industrialized world have been similarly ineffective, and the total number of opium and heroin users has remained relatively stable over the last decade. 169. Responses to organized crime during and after conflict have been decentralized and fragmented. In the post-war period, former belligerents seek to exploit criminal connections and know-how developed during the war, thus undermining international peacebuilding efforts. Entrenched corruption, the use of violence to protect criminal activities and close ties between criminal enterprises and political elites hinder establishing the rule of law and effective State institutions. International efforts in curbing arms trafficking have been insufficient and sanctions regimes are insufficiently enforced.

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164. That definition of terrorism should include the following elements:

(a) recognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity; (b) restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conventions are terrorism, and a declaration that they are a crime under international law; and restatement that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols; (c) reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004); (d) description of terrorism as “any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.

VII. Transnational organized crime

A. The threat we face

165. Transnational organized crime is a menace to States and societies, eroding human security and the fundamental obligation of States to provide for law and order. Combating organized crime serves the double purpose of reducing this

170. Organized crime is increasingly operating through fluid networks rather than more formal hierarchies. This form of organization provides criminals with diversity, flexibility, low visibility and longevity. Connections among different networks became a major feature of the organized crime world during the 1990s, thus creating networks of networks. The agility of such networks stands in marked contrast to the cumbersome sharing of information and weak cooperation in criminal investigations and prosecutions on the part of States.

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B. Meeting the challenge of prevention

171. Combating organized crime requires better international regulatory frameworks and extended efforts in building State capacity in the area of the rule of law. Concerted efforts against human trafficking are also required.

should sign and ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and parties to the Protocol should take all necessary steps to effectively implement it.

1. Better international regulatory frameworks

176. The United Nations should further promote technical cooperation among countries and international law enforcement agencies to secure the protection of and support for victims of trafficking in countries of origin, transit and destination. In particular, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Labour Organization (ILO) should aggressively promote the human rights of women and children, and should integrate specific strategies to assist them into their programmes and help protect them against becoming victims of human trafficking.

2. Better State capacity-building
177. Lagging implementation is also a function, in some cases, of limited State capacity. In order to address this problem international organizations, most prominently the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, have set up technical assistance and training programmes aimed at the building of effective national law enforcement and judicial institutions. However, these activities are insufficiently resourced. The United Nations should establish a robust capacity-building mechanism for rule-of-law assistance. Regional organizations and multinational financial institutions should actively join these efforts.

172. Several recent international conventions hold the potential to level the playing field by allowing quicker, closer cooperation by States. Such conventions, however, lack universal adherence and suffer from inadequate implementation and observance by participating States. There is a need for mechanisms to monitor Member States’ compliance with their commitments and to identify and remedy legislative and institutional deficiencies. The collective response to organized crime depends on the consolidation and strengthening of the international treaty framework. More than half of the Member States of the United Nations have not yet signed or ratified the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three Protocols and the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption, or adequately resourced the monitoring provisions of these Conventions and Protocols. Member States that have not signed, ratified or resourced these Conventions and Protocols should do so, and all Member States should support the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in its work in this area.

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173. Organized crime groups move freely across borders; legal cooperation is impeded by them. Member States should establish a central authority to facilitate the exchange of evidence among national judicial authorities, mutual legal assistance among prosecutorial authorities and the implementation of extradition requests.

VIII. The role of sanctions
178. In dealing preventively with the threats to international peace and security, sanctions are a vital though imperfect tool. They constitute a necessary middle ground between war and words when nations, individuals and rebel groups violate international norms, and where a failure to respond would weaken those norms, embolden other transgressors or be interpreted as consent. 179. Targeted sanctions (financial, travel, aviation or arms embargoes) are useful for putting pressure on leaders and elites with minimal humanitarian consequences, provide a less costly alternative to other options and can be tailored to specific circumstances. By isolating violators of international standards and laws, even modest sanctions measures (including sports embargoes) can serve an important symbolic purpose. The threat of sanctions can be a powerful means of deterrence and prevention. 180. The Security Council must ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented and enforced:

174. Unlike terrorists, criminals are motivated by financial gain. The single best strategy for weakening organized crime is to eliminate its ability to launder money. Transnational organized crime generates income of about $500 billion a year, with some sources estimating triple that amount. In 2000, between $500 billion and $1.5 trillion were laundered. Despite the magnitude of these sums and their role in furthering organized crime, many States do not regulate money-laundering. Indiscriminate enforcement of bank secrecy and the rapid development of financial havens remains a serious obstacle to tackling this problem. A comprehensive international convention on money-laundering that addresses these issues needs to be negotiated, and endorsed by the General Assembly.

175. The most obscene form taken by organized crime is the traffic in human beings, and all Member States should take decisive action to halt it. Member States

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(a) When the Security Council imposes a sanctions regime - including arms embargoes - it should routinely establish monitoring mechanisms and provide them with the necessary authority and capacity to carry out high-quality, in-depth investigations. Adequate budgetary provisions must be made to implement those mechanisms; (b) Security Council sanctions committees should be mandated to develop improved guidelines and reporting procedures to assist States in sanctions implementation, and to improve procedures for maintaining accurate lists of individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions; (c) The Secretary-General should appoint a senior official with sufficient supporting resources to enable the Secretary-General to supply the Security Council with analysis of the best way to target sanctions and to assist in coordinating their implementation. This official would also assist compliance efforts; identify technical assistance needs and coordinate such assistance; and make recommendations on any adjustments necessary to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions; (d) Donors should devote more resources to strengthening the legal, administrative, and policing and border-control capacity of Member States to implement sanctions. These capacity-building measures should include efforts to improve air-traffic interdiction in zones of conflict; (e) The Security Council should, in instances of verified, chronic violations, impose secondary sanctions against those involved in sanctions-busting; (f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, should ensure that an appropriate auditing mechanism is in place to oversee sanctions administration.

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181. Sanctions committees should improve procedures for providing humanitarian exemptions and routinely conduct assessments of the humanitarian impact of sanctions. The Security Council should continue to strive to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of sanctions.

182. Where sanctions involve lists of individuals or entities, sanctions committees should establish procedures to review the cases of those claiming to have been incorrectly placed or retained on such lists.

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Part 3 Collective security and the use of force Synopsis
What happens if peaceful prevention fails? If none of the preventive measures so far described stop the descent into war and chaos? If distant threats do become imminent? Or if imminent threats become actual? Or if a non-imminent threat nonetheless becomes very real and measures short of the use of military force seem powerless to stop it? We address here the circumstances in which effective collective security may require the backing of military force, starting with the rules of international law that must govern any decision to go to war, if anarchy is not to prevail. It is necessary to distinguish between situations in which a State claims to act in self-defence; situations in which a State is posing a threat to others outside its borders; and situations in which the threat is primarily internal and the issue is the responsibility to protect a State’s own people. In all cases, we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task: Article 51 needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope, and Chapter VII fully empowers the Security Council to deal with every kind of threat that States may confront. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better than it has. That force can legally be used, does not always mean that, as a matter of good conscience and good sense, it should be used. We identify a set of guidelines - five criteria of legitimacy - which we believe the Security Council (and anyone else involved in these decisions) should always address in considering whether to authorize or apply military force. The adoption of these guidelines (seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences) will not produce agreed conclusions with push-button predictability, but should significantly improve the chances of reaching international consensus on what have been in recent years deeply divisive issues. We also address here the other major issues that arise during and after violent conflict, including the needed capacities for peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the protection of civilians. A central recurring theme is the necessity for all members of the international community, developed and developing States alike, to be much more forthcoming in providing and supporting deployable military resources. Empty gestures are all too easy to make: an effective, efficient and equitable collective security system demands real commitment.

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IX. Using force: rules and guidelines
1. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and self-defence

183. The framers of the Charter of the United Nations recognized that force may be necessary for the “prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace”. Military force, legally and properly applied, is a vital component of any workable system of collective security, whether defined in the traditional narrow sense or more broadly as we would prefer. But few contemporary policy issues cause more difficulty, or involve higher stakes, than the principles concerning its use and application to individual cases.

184. The maintenance of world peace and security depends importantly on there being a common global understanding, and acceptance, of when the application of force is both legal and legitimate. One of these elements being satisfied without the other will always weaken the international legal order - and thereby put both State and human security at greater risk.

188. The language of this article is restrictive: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security”. However, a threatened State, according to long established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate. The problem arises where the threat in question is not imminent but still claimed to be real: for example the acquisition, with allegedly hostile intent, of nuclear weaponsmaking capability.

A. The question of legality

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185. The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 2.4, expressly prohibits Member States from using or threatening force against each other, allowing only two exceptions: self-defence under Article 51, and military measures authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII (and by extension for regional organizations under Chapter VIII) in response to “any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression”.

189. Can a State, without going to the Security Council, claim in these circumstances the right to act, in anticipatory self-defence, not just pre-emptively (against an imminent or proximate threat) but preventively (against a non-imminent or non-proximate one)? Those who say “yes” argue that the potential harm from some threats (e.g., terrorists armed with a nuclear weapon) is so great that one simply cannot risk waiting until they become imminent, and that less harm may be done (e.g., avoiding a nuclear exchange or radioactive fallout from a reactor destruction) by acting earlier. 190. The short answer is that if there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by definition, time to pursue other strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment - and to visit again the military option. 191. For those impatient with such a response, the answer must be that, in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all. 192. We do not favour the rewriting or reinterpretation of Article 51.

186. For the first 44 years of the United Nations, Member States often violated these rules and used military force literally hundreds of times, with a paralysed Security Council passing very few Chapter VII resolutions and Article 51 only rarely providing credible cover. Since the end of the cold war, however, the yearning for an international system governed by the rule of law has grown. There is little evident international acceptance of the idea of security being best preserved by a balance of power, or by any single - even benignly motivated superpower.

187. But in seeking to apply the express language of the Charter, three particularly difficult questions arise in practice: first, when a State claims the right to strike preventively, in self-defence, in response to a threat which is not imminent; secondly, when a State appears to be posing an external threat, actual or potential, to other States or people outside its borders, but there is disagreement in the Security Council as to what to do about it; and thirdly, where the threat is primarily internal, to a State’s own people.

2. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and external threats
193. In the case of a State posing a threat to other States, people outside its borders or to international order more generally, the language of Chapter VII is inherently broad enough, and has been interpreted broadly enough, to allow the

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Security Council to approve any coercive action at all, including military action, against a State when it deems this “necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”. That is the case whether the threat is occurring now, in the imminent future or more distant future; whether it involves the State’s own actions or those of non-State actors it harbours or supports; or whether it takes the form of an act or omission, an actual or potential act of violence or simply a challenge to the Council’s authority.

198. The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to address the full range of security threats with which States are concerned. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make the Council work better than it has.

194. We emphasize that the concerns we expressed about the legality of the preventive use of military force in the case of self-defence under Article 51 are not applicable in the case of collective action authorized under Chapter VII. In the world of the twenty-first century, the international community does have to be concerned about nightmare scenarios combining terrorists, weapons of mass destruction and irresponsible States, and much more besides, which may conceivably justify the use of force, not just reactively but preventively and before a latent threat becomes imminent. The question is not whether such action can be taken: it can, by the Security Council as the international community’s collective security voice, at any time it deems that there is a threat to international peace and security. The Council may well need to be prepared to be much more proactive on these issues, taking more decisive action earlier, than it has been in the past. States for whatever happens within their borders.

3. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, internal threats and the responsibility to protect
199. The Charter of the United Nations is not as clear as it could be when it comes to saving lives within countries in situations of mass atrocity. It “reaffirm(s) faith in fundamental human rights” but does not do much to protect them, and Article 2.7 prohibits intervention “in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any State”. The principle of nonThere has been, as a result, a long-standing argument intervention in internal in the international community between those who affairs cannot be used to insist on a “right to intervene” in man-made catastro- protect genocidal acts or phes and those who argue that the Security Council, large-scale violations for all its powers under Chapter VII to “maintain or of international humanitarian restore international security”, is prohibited from law or large-scale ethnic authorizing any coercive action against sovereign cleansing 200. Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), States have agreed that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish. Since then it has been understood that genocide anywhere is a threat to the security of all and should never be tolerated. The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to protect genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing, which can properly be considered a threat to international security and as such provoke action by the Security Council.

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195. Questions of legality apart, there will be issues of prudence, or legitimacy, about whether such preventive action should be taken: crucial among them is whether there is credible evidence of the reality of the threat in question (taking into account both capability and specific intent) and whether the military response is the only reasonable one in the circumstances. We address these issues further below.

196. It may be that some States will always feel that they have the obligation to their own citizens, and the capacity, to do whatever they feel they need to do, unburdened by the constraints of collective Security Council process. But however understandable that approach may have been in the cold war years, when the United Nations was manifestly not operating as an effective collective security system, the world has now changed and expectations about legal compliance are very much higher.

197. One of the reasons why States may want to bypass the Security Council is a lack of confidence in the quality and objectivity of its decision-making. The Council’s decisions have often been less than consistent, less than persuasive and less than fully responsive to very real State and human security needs. But the solution is not to reduce the Council to impotence and irrelevance: it is to work from within to reform it, including in the ways we propose in the present report.

201. The successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and now Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated attention not on the immunities of sovereign Governments but their responsibilities, both to their own people and to the wider international community. There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the “right to intervene” of any State, but the “responsibility to protect” of every State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe - mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease. And there is a growing acceptance

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that while sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community with it spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered societies. The primary focus should be on assisting the cessation of violence through mediation and other tools and the protection of people through such measures as the dispatch of humanitarian, human rights and police missions. Force, if it needs to be used, should be deployed as a last resort.

objectively best outcome will always prevail. It is rather to maximize the possibility of achieving Security Council consensus around when it is appropriate or not to use coercive action, including armed force; to maximize international support for whatever the Security Council decides; and to minimize the possibility of individual Member States bypassing the Security Council. 207. In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Security Council should always address - whatever other considerations it may take into account - at least the following five basic criteria of legitimacy:

202. The Security Council so far has been neither very consistent nor very effective in dealing with these cases, very often acting too late, too hesitantly or not at all. But step by step, the Council and the wider international community have come to accept that, under Chapter VII and in pursuit of the emerging norm of a collective international responsibility to protect, it can always authorize military action to redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is prepared to declare that the situation is a “threat to international peace and security”, not especially difficult when breaches of international law are involved.

203. We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.

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B. The question of legitimacy

204. The effectiveness of the global collective security system, as with any other legal order, depends ultimately not only on the legality of decisions but also on the common perception of their legitimacy - their being made on solid evidentiary grounds, and for the right reasons, morally as well as legally.

(a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended? (b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved? (c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other measures will not succeed? (d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question? (e) Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction? 208. The above guidelines for authorizing the use of force should be embodied in declaratory resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly. 209. We also believe it would be valuable if individual Member States, whether or not they are members of the Security Council, subscribed to them.

205. If the Security Council is to win the respect it must have as the primary body in the collective security system, it is critical that its most important and influential decisions, those with large-scale life-and-death impact, be better made, better substantiated and better communicated. In particular, in deciding whether or not to authorize the use of force, the Council should adopt and systematically address a set of agreed guidelines, going directly not to whether force can legally be used but whether, as a matter of good conscience and good sense, it should be.

X. Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability
210. When the Security Council makes a determination that force must be authorized, questions remain about the capacities at its disposal to implement that decision. In recent years, decisions to authorize military force for the purpose of enforcing the peace have primarily fallen to multinational forces. Blue helmet

206. The guidelines we propose will not produce agreed conclusions with pushbutton predictability. The point of adopting them is not to guarantee that the

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peacekeepers - in United Nations uniform and under direct United Nations command - have more frequently been deployed when forces are authorized with the consent of the parties to conflict, to help implement a peace agreement or monitor ceasefire lines after combat.

absence of a commensurate increase in available personnel, United Nations peacekeeping risks repeating some of its worst failures of the 1990s.

211. Discussion of the necessary capacities has been confused by the tendency to refer to peacekeeping missions as “Chapter VI operations” and peace enforcement missions as “Chapter VII operations” - meaning consent-based or coercionbased, respectively. This shorthand is also often used to distinguish missions that do not involve the use of deadly force for purposes other than self-defence, and those that do.

212. Both characterizations are to some extent misleading. There is a distinction between operations in which the robust use of force is integral to the mission from the outset (e.g., responses to cross-border invasions or an explosion of violence, in which the recent practice has been to mandate multinational forces) and operations in which there is a reasonable expectation that force may not be needed at all (e.g., traditional peacekeeping missions monitoring and verifying a ceasefire or those assisting in implementing peace agreements, where blue helmets are still the norm).

216. At present, the total global supply of personnel is constrained both by the fact that the armed forces of many countries remain configured for cold war duties, with less than 10 per cent of those in uniform available for active deployment at any given time, and by the fact that few nations have sufficient transport and logistic capabilities to move and supply those who are available. For peacekeeping, and in extreme cases peace enforcement, to continue to be an effective and accepted instrument of collective security, the availability of peacekeepers must grow. The developed States have particular responsibilities here, and should do more to transform their existing force capacities into suitable contingents for peace operations. 217. Prompt and effective response to today’s challenges requires a dependable capacity for the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment for peacekeeping and law enforcement. States that have either global or regional air- or sealift capacities should make these available to the United Nations, either free of charge or on the basis of a negotiated fee-based structure for the reimbursement of the additional costs associated with United Nations use of these capacities. 218. Member States should strongly support the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations Secretariat, building on the important work of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see A/55/305-S/2000/809), to improve its use of strategic deployment stockpiles, standby arrangements, trust funds and other mechanisms to meet the tighter deadlines necessary for effective deployment. 219. However, it is unlikely that the demand for rapid action will be met through United Nations mechanisms alone. We welcome the European Union decision to establish standby high readiness, self-sufficient battalions that can reinforce United Nations missions. Others with advanced military capacities should be encouraged to develop similar capacities at up to brigade level and to place them at the disposal of the United Nations.

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213. But both kinds of operation need the authorization of the Security Council (Article 51 self-defence cases apart), and in peacekeeping cases as much as in peace-enforcement cases it is now the usual practice for a Chapter VII mandate to be given (even if that is not always welcomed by troop contributors). This is on the basis that even the most benign environment can turn sour - when spoilers emerge to undermine a peace agreement and put civilians at risk - and that it is desirable for there to be complete certainty about the mission’s capacity to respond with force, if necessary. On the other hand, the difference between Chapter VI and VII mandates can be exaggerated: there is little doubt that peacekeeping missions operating under Chapter VI (and thus operating without enforcement powers) have the right to use force in self-defence - and this right is widely understood to extend to “defence of the mission”.

214. The real challenge, in any deployment of forces of any configuration with any role, is to ensure that they have (a) an appropriate, clear and well understood mandate, applicable to all the changing circumstances that might reasonably be envisaged, and (b) all the necessary resources to implement that mandate fully.

Regional cooperation
220. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a trend towards a variety of regional- and subregional-based peacekeeping missions. This trend holds the promise of developing regional capacity to address shortfalls in the numbers of peacekeepers, and it should augment and not detract from the ability of the United Nations to respond when blue helmets are requested. This poses a challenge for the Security Council and regional organizations to work closely with each other

215. The demand for personnel for both full-scale peace-enforcement missions and peacekeeping missions remains higher than the ready supply. At the end of 2004, there are more than 60,000 peacekeepers deployed in 16 missions around the world. If international efforts stay on track to end several long-standing wars in Africa, the numbers of peacekeepers needed will soon substantially increase. In the

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and mutually support each other’s efforts to keep the peace and ensure that regional operations are accountable to universally accepted human rights standards. We address this question in part four below.

assessments and organize the start-up of police components of peace operations, and the General Assembly should authorize this capacity.

XI. Post-conflict peacebuilding

B. The larger peacebuilding task
224. Deploying peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces may be essential in terminating conflicts but are not sufficient for long-term recovery. Serious attention to the longer-term process of peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions is critical; failure to invest adequately in peacebuilding increases the odds that a country will relapse into conflict. 225. In both the period before the outbreak of civil war and in the transition out of war, neither the United Nations nor the broader international community, including the international financial institutions, When peacekeepers leave a are well organized to assist countries attempting to country, it falls off the radar build peace. When peacekeepers leave a country, it screen of the Security falls off the radar screen of the Security Council. Council. While the Economic and Social Council has created several ad hoc committees to address specific cases, results have proven mixed and even the proponents of these committees acknowledge that they have not succeeded in generating crucial resources to assist fragile transitions. What is needed is a single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peacebuilding, empowered to monitor and pay close attention to countries at risk, ensure concerted action by donors, agencies, programmes and financial institutions, and mobilize financial resources for sustainable peace. We address this need in part four below.

A. The role of peacekeepers

221. It is often necessary to build confidence among former adversaries and provide security to ordinary people trying to rebuild their lives and communities after conflict. The mediation and successful implementation of a peace agreement offers hope for breaking long-standing cycles of violence Resources spent on implementhat haunt many war-inflicted countries. Resources spent tation of peace agreements and on implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding peacebuilding are one of the are one of the best investments that can be made for conbest investments that can be flict prevention - States that have experienced civil war face made for conflict prevention a high risk of recurrence.

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222. Implementing peace agreements to end civil wars poses unique challenges for peacekeepers. Unlike inter-State wars, making peace in civil war requires overcoming daunting security dilemmas. Spoilers, factions who see a peace agreement as inimical to their interest, power or ideology, use violence to undermine or overthrow settlements. Peacekeeping fails when resources and strategies are not commensurate to meeting the challenge they pose - as occurred repeatedly in the 1990s, for example in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. When peacekeeping operations are deployed to implement peace agreements, they must be equipped to repel attacks from spoilers. Contingency plans for responding to hostile opposition should be an integral part of the mission design; missions that do not have the troop strength to resist aggression will invite it. In some contexts, opposition to a peace agreement is not tactical but fundamental. We must learn the lesson: peace agreements by Governments or rebels that engage in or encourage mass human rights abuses have no value and cannot be implemented. These contexts are not appropriate for consent-based peacekeeping; rather, they must be met with concerted action. The Secretary-General should recommend and the Security Council should authorize troop strengths sufficient to deter and repel hostile factions.

223. Most peacekeeping situations also require policing and other law and order functions, and the slow deployment of police contingents has marred successive operations. The United Nations should have a small corps of senior police officers and managers (50-100 personnel) who could undertake mission

226. Similarly, at the field level, many different elements of the United Nations system and the broader international community engage in some form of peacebuilding, but they work too slowly and without adequate coordination. Effective coordination is critical. National authorities should be at the heart of this coordination effort, and should be supported by coherent United Nations and international presences. Robust donor coordination mechanisms at the field level, involving Governments, bilateral donors, the international financial institutions and the United Nations coordinator (special representative of the Secretary-General or resident coordinator) representing the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, have proved their value for ensuring effective peacebuilding. Special representatives should have the authority and guidance to work with relevant parties to establish such mechanisms, as well as the resources to perform coordination functions effectively, including ensuring that the sequencing of United Nations assessments and activities is consistent with Government priorities.

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more are displaced internally or across borders. Human rights abuses and gender violence are rampant. 232. Under international law, the primary responsibility to protect civilians from suffering in war lies with belligerents - State or non-State. International humanitarian law provides minimum protection and standards applicable to the most vulnerable in situations of armed conflict, including women, children and refugees, and must be respected.

227. Given that many peace operations can expect resource shortfalls, the efficient use of resources is all the more important. Demobilizing combatants is the single most important factor determining the success of peace operations. Without demobilization, civil wars cannot be brought to an end and other critical goals - such as democratization, justice and development - have little chance for success. In case after case, however, demobilization is not accorded priority by funders. When peace operations are deployed, they must be resourced to undertake the demobilization and disarmament of combatants; this is a priority for successful peace implementation. These tasks should be integrated into the assessed budget of peacekeeping operations, under the authority of the head of mission. The Security Council should mandate and the General Assembly should authorize funding for disarmament and demobilization programmes from assessed budgets.

228. But these programmes will be ineffective without the provision of resources for reintegration and rehabilitation. Failure to successfully implement such programmes will result in youth unemployment and fuel the development of criminal gangs and violence and ultimately a relapse into conflict. A standing fund for peacebuilding should be established at the level of at least $250 million that can be used to finance the recurrent expenditures of a nascent Government, as well as critical agency programmes in the areas of rehabilitation and reintegration.

233. All combatants must abide by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. All Member States should sign, ratify and act on all treaties relating to the protection of civilians, such as the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Particularly egregious violations, such as occur Court and all refugee conventions. when armed groups 234. Humanitarian aid is a vital tool for helping Governmilitarize refugee camps, ments to fulfil this responsibility. Its core purpose is require emphatic responses to protect civilian victims, minimize their suffering from the international and keep them alive during the conflict so that when community, including war ends they have the opportunity to rebuild shatfrom the Security Council tered lives. The provision of assistance is a necessary part of this effort. Donors must fully and equitably fund humanitarian protection and assistance operations. 235. The Secretary-General, based in part on work undertaken by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and strong advocacy efforts by nongovernmental organizations, has prepared a 10-point platform for action for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The Secretary-General’s 10-point platform for action should be considered by all actors - States, NGOs and international organizations - in their efforts to protect civilians in armed conflict.

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229. Along with establishing security, the core task of peacebuilding is to build effective public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, can establish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law. Relatively cheap investments in civilian security through police, judicial and rule-of-law reform, local capacity-building for human rights and reconciliation, and local capacity-building for public sector service delivery can greatly benefit longterm peacebuilding. This should be reflected in the policies of the United Nations, international financial institutions and donors, and should be given priority in long-term policy and funding.

230. To address this task, United Nations field representatives (including heads of peacekeeping operations) require dedicated support on the broader aspects of peacebuilding strategy, especially in the area of rule of law. The creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office (see part four below) would address this need.

236. From this platform, particular attention should be placed on the question of access to civilians, which is routinely and often flagrantly denied. United Nations humanitarian field staff, as well as United Nations political and peacekeeping representatives, should be well trained and well supported to negotiate access. Such efforts also require better coordination of bilateral initiatives. The Security Council can use field missions and other diplomatic measures to enhance access to and protection of civilians. 237. Particularly egregious violations, such as occur when armed groups militarize refugee camps, require emphatic responses from the international community, including from the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Although the Security Council has acknowledged that such militarization is a threat to peace and security, it has not developed the

XII. Protecting civilians

231. In many civil wars, combatants target civilians and relief workers with impunity. Beyond direct violence, deaths from starvation, disease and the collapse of public health dwarf the numbers killed by bullets and bombs. Millions

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capacity or shown the will to confront the problem. The Security Council should fully implement resolution 1265 (1999) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

238. Of special concern is the use of sexual violence as a weapon of conflict. The human rights components of peacekeeping operations should be given explicit mandates and sufficient resources to investigate and report on human rights violations against women. Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security and the associated Independent Experts’ Assessment provide important additional recommendations for the protection of women. The Security Council, United Nations agencies and Member States should fully implement its recommendations.

United Nations staff security

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239. The ability of the United Nations to protect civilians and help end conflict is directly related to United Nations staff security, which has been eroding since the mid-1990s. To be able to maintain presence, and operate securely and effectively, the United Nations needs four things: the capacity to perform its mandated tasks fully; freedom from unwarranted intrusion by Member States into operations; full respect by staff of United Nations codes of impartiality; and a professional security service, with access to Member States’ intelligence and threat assessments. The Secretary-General has recommended the creation of such a service, headed by a Director who will report directly to him. Member States should support and fully fund the proposed Directorate of Security and accord high priority to assisting the Secretary-General in implementing a new staff security system in 2005.

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Part 4 A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century Synopsis
The United Nations was never intended to be a utopian exercise. It was meant to be a collective security system that worked. The Charter of the United Nations provided the most powerful States with permanent membership on the Security Council and the veto. In exchange, they were expected to use their power for the common good and promote and obey international law. As Harry Truman, then President of the United States, noted in his speech to the final plenary session of the founding conference of the United Nations Organization, “we all have to recognize - no matter how great our strength - that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please”. In approaching the issue of United Nations reform, it is as important today as it was in 1945 to combine power with principle. Recommendations that ignore underlying power realities will be doomed to failure or irrelevance, but recommendations that simply reflect raw distributions of power and make no effort to bolster international principles are unlikely to gain the widespread adherence required to shift international behaviour. Proposed changes should be driven by real-world need. Change for its own sake is likely to run the well-worn course of the endless reform debates of the past decade. The litmus test is this: does a proposed change help meet the challenge posed by a virulent threat? Throughout the Panel’s work, we have looked for institutional weaknesses in current responses to threats. The following stand as the most urgently in need of remedy: • The General Assembly has lost vitality and often fails to focus effectively on the most compelling issues of the day. • The Security Council will need to be more proactive in the future. For this to happen, those who contribute most to the Organization financially, militarily and diplomatically should participate more in Council decision-making, and those who participate in Council decision-making should contribute more to the Organization. The Security Council needs greater credibility, legitimacy and representation to do all that we demand of it. • There is a major institutional gap in addressing countries under stress and countries emerging from conflict. Such countries often suffer from attention, policy guidance and resource deficits.

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community. Smaller, more tightly focused committees could help sharpen and improve resolutions that are brought to the whole Assembly. 243. We believe that civil society and non-governmental organizations can provide valuable knowledge and perspectives on global issues. We endorse the recommendation of the recently released report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations (see A/58/817) that the General Assembly should establish a better mechanism to enable systematic engagement with civil society organizations.

• The Security Council has not made the most of the potential advantages of working with regional and subregional organizations. • There must be new institutional arrangements to address the economic and social threats to international security. • The Commission on Human Rights suffers from a legitimacy deficit that casts doubts on the overall reputation of the United Nations. • There is a need for a more professional and better organized Secretariat that is much more capable of concerted action. The reforms we propose will not by themselves make the United Nations more effective. In the absence of Member States reaching agreement on the security consensus contained in the present report, the United Nations will underachieve. Its institutions will still only be as strong as the energy, resources and attention devoted to them by Member States and their leaders.

XIV. The Security Council

XIII. The General Assembly

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240. The General Assembly is, first and foremost, a universal body, representing almost every State in the world. Its unique legitimacy must be used to move us towards global consensus on the policy issues of greatest contemporary importance. We cannot overestimate the importance of holding a general debate every year in which the view of every Government is presented, providing a crucial opportunity to gauge the pulse of the international community. The General Assembly provides a unique forum in which to forge consensus. Members should use the opportunity provided by the Millennium Review Summit in 2005 to forge a new consensus on broader, more effective collective security.

244. The founders of the United Nations conferred primary responsibility on the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council was designed to enable the world body to act decisively to prevent and remove threats. It was created to be not just a representative but a responsible body, one that had the capacity for decisive action. The five permanent members were given veto rights but were also expected to shoulder an extra burden in promoting global security. Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations established that membership in the Council as a whole was explicitly linked not just to geographical balance but also to contributions to maintaining peace and security. 245. Since the Council was formed the threats and challenges to international peace and security have changed, as has the distribution of power among members. But the Security Council has been slow to change. Decisions cannot be implemented just by members of the Security Council but require extensive military, financial and political involvement by other States. Decisions taken and mandates given have often lacked the essential components of realism, adequate resources and the political determination to see them through. The SecretaryGeneral is frequently holding out a begging bowl to implement Security Council decisions. Moreover, the paucity of representation from the broad membership diminishes support for Security Council decisions.

241. The keys to strengthening the General Assembly’s role are focus and structure. Its norm-making capacity is often squandered on debates about minutiae or thematic topics outpaced by real-world events. Its inability to reach closure on issues undermines its relevance. An unwieldy and static agenda leads to repetitive debates. Although some resolutions, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 2000 United Nations Millennium Declaration, are highly significant, many others are repetitive, obscure or inapplicable, thus diminishing the credibility of the body. But detailed procedural fixes are not going to make the General Assembly a more effective instrument than it is now. That can only be achieved if its members show a sustained determination to put behind them the approach which they have applied hitherto.

242. Member States should renew efforts to enable the General Assembly to perform its function as the main deliberative organ of the United Nations. This requires a better conceptualization and shortening of the agenda, which should reflect the contemporary challenges facing the international

246. Since the end of the cold war, the effectiveness of the Council has improved, as has its willingness to act; but it has not always been equitable in its actions, nor has it acted consistently or effectively in the face of genocide or other atrocities. This has gravely damaged its credibility. The financial and military contributions to the United Nations of some of the five permanent members are modest compared to their special status, and often the Council’s non-permanent members have been unable to make the necessary contribution to the work of the Organization envisaged by the Charter. Even outside the use of a formal veto, the ability of the five permanent members to keep critical issues of peace and security off the Security Council’s agenda has further undermined confidence in the body’s work.

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247. Yet recent experience has also shown that the Security Council is the body in the United Nations most capable of organizing action and responding rapidly to new threats.

251. Models A and B both involve a distribution of seats as between four major regional areas, which we identify respectively as “Africa”, “Asia and Pacific”, “Europe” and “Americas”. We see these descriptions as helpful in making and implementing judgements about the composition of the Security Council, but make no recommendation about changing the composition of the current regional groups for general electoral and other United Nations purposes. Some members of the Panel, in particular our Latin American colleagues, expressed a preference for basing any distribution of seats on the current regional groups. 252. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas as follows: Regional area Number of States 53 56 47 35 191 0 1 3 1 5 Permanent seats (continuing) Africa Asia and Pacific Europe Americas Totals model A Proposed new permanent seats 2 2 1 1 6 Proposed two-year seats (non-renewable) 4 3 2 4 13 Total

248. Thus, the challenge for any reform is to increase both the effectiveness and the credibility of the Security Council and, most importantly, to enhance its capacity and willingness to act in the face of threats. This requires greater involvement in Security Council decision-making by those who ... the challenge for any contribute most; greater contributions from those with reform is to increase both the special decision-making authority; and greater consultaeffectiveness and the credibility tion with those who must implement its decisions. It also of the Security Council and, requires a firm consensus on the nature of today’s threats, most importantly, to enhance on the obligations of broadened collective security, on the its capacity and willingness to necessity of prevention, and on when and why the Council act in the face of threats should authorize the use of force.

249. We believe that reforms of the Security Council should meet the following principles:

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253. Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year nonpermanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows: Regional area Africa Asia and Pacific Europe Americas Totals model B Number of States 53 56 47 35 191 Permanent seats (continuing) 0 1 3 1 5 Proposed Proposed two-year seats four-year renewable seats (non-renewable) 2 2 2 2 8 4 3 1 3 11 Total

(a) They should, in honouring Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically - specifically in terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA should be considered an important criterion of contribution; (b) They should bring into the decision-making process countries more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world; (c) They should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council; (d) They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body.

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250. The Panel believes that a decision on the enlargement of the Council, satisfying these criteria, is now a necessity. The presentation of two clearly defined alternatives, of the kind described below as models A and B, should help to clarify - and perhaps bring to resolution - a debate which has made little progress in the last 12 years.

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tors have rights under Article 44 of the Charter to be fully consulted concerning the deployment of troops to Council-mandated operations. We recommend that processes to improve transparency and accountability be incorporated and formalized in the Council’s rules of procedure. 259. Many delegations on the Security Council lack access to professional military advice. Yet they are frequently called upon to take decisions with far-ranging military implications. We recommend therefore that the Secretary General’s Military Adviser and the members of his staff be available on demand by the Security Council to offer technical and professional advice on military options. 260. We welcome greater civil society engagement in the work of the Security Council.

254. In both models, having regard to Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, a method of encouraging Member States to contribute more to international peace and security would be for the General Assembly, taking into account established practices of regional consultation, to elect Security Council members by giving preference for permanent or longerterm seats to those States that are among the top three financial contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular budget, or the top three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three troop contributors from their regional area to United Nations peacekeeping missions.

255. The Panel was strongly of the view that no change to the composition of the Security Council should itself be regarded as permanent or unchallengeable in the future. Therefore, there should be a review of the composition of the Security Council in 2020, including, in this context, a review of the contribution (as defined in para. 249 above) of permanent and nonpermanent members from the point of view of the Council’s effectiveness in taking collective action to prevent and remove new and old threats to international peace and security.

XV. A Peacebuilding Commission
261. Our analysis has identified a key institutional gap: there is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace. That this was not included in the Charter of the United Nations is no surprise since the work of the United Nations in largely internal conflicts is fairly recent. But today, in an era when dozens of States are under stress or recovering from conflict, there is a clear international obligation to assist States in developing their capacity to perform their sovereign functions effectively and responsibly. 262. The United Nations unique role in this area arises from its international legitimacy; the impartiality of its personnel; its ability to draw on personnel with broad cultural understanding and experience of a wide range of administrative systems, including in the developing world; and its recent experience in organizing transitional administration and transitional authority operations. 263. Strengthening the United Nations capacity for peacebuilding in the widest sense must be a priority for the organization. The United Nations needs to be able to act in a coherent and effective way throughout a whole continuum that runs from early warning through preventive action to post-conflict peacebuilding. We recommend that the Security Council, acting under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and after consultation with the Economic and Social Council, establish a Peacebuilding Commission.

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256. Neither model involves any expansion of the veto or any Charter modification of the Security Council’s existing powers. We recognize that the veto had an important function in reassuring the United Nations most powerful members that their interests would be safeguarded. We see no practical way of changing the existing members’ veto powers. Yet, as a whole the institution of the veto has an anachronistic character that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly democratic age and we would urge that its use be limited to matters where vital interests are genuinely at stake. We also ask the permanent members, in their individual capacities, to pledge themselves to refrain from the use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses. We recommend that under any reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto.

257. We propose the introduction of a system of “indicative voting”, whereby members of the Security Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed action. Under this indicative vote, “no” votes would not have a veto effect, nor would the final tally of the vote have any legal force. The second formal vote on any resolution would take place under the current procedures of the Council. This would, we believe, increase the accountability of the veto function.

258. In recent years, many informal improvements have been made to the transparency and accountability of the Security Council’s deliberative and decisionmaking procedures. We also remind the Security Council that troop contribu-

264. The core functions of the Peacebuilding Commission should be to identify countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict

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peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary.

transitional political arrangements or building new State institutions. It should submit twice-yearly early warning analyses to the Peacebuilding Commission to help it in organizing its work. 268. The Peacebuilding Support Office should also maintain rosters of national and international experts, particularly those with experience in post-conflict cases. 269. The Office should have an inter-agency advisory board, headed by the Chair of the United Nations Development Group, that would ensure that the Office worked in effective cooperation with other elements of the system that provide related support.

265. While the precise composition, procedures, and reporting lines of the Peacebuilding Commission will need to be established, they should take account of the following guidelines:

XVI. Regional organizations
270. The ability of the Security Council to become more proactive in preventing and responding to threats will be strengthened by making fuller and more productive use of the Chapter VIII provisions of the Charter of the United Nations than has hitherto been the case. 271. Since the establishment of the United Nations, a considerable number of regional and subregional groupings have been established. Some of these groupings have made important contributions to the stability and prosperity of their members, and some of them have begun to address directly threats to peace and security. We believe the United Nations should encourage the establishment of such groupings, particularly in highly vulnerable parts of the world where no effective security organizations currently exist.

(a) The Peacebuilding Commission should be reasonably small; (b) It should meet in different configurations, to consider both general policy issues and country-by-country strategies; (c) It should be chaired for at least one year and perhaps longer by a member approved by the Security Council; (d) In addition to representation from the Security Council, it should include representation from the Economic and Social Council; (e) National representatives of the country under consideration should be invited to attend; (f) The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, the President of the World Bank and, when appropriate, heads of regional development banks should be represented at its meetings by appropriate senior officials; (g) Representatives of the principal donor countries and, when appropriate, the principal troop contributors should be invited to participate in its deliberations; (h) Representatives of regional and subregional organizations should be invited to participate in its deliberations when such organizations are actively involved in the country in question.

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Peacebuilding Support Office

266. A Peacebuilding Support Office should be established in the Secretariat to give the Peacebuilding Commission appropriate Secretariat support and to ensure that the Secretary-General is able to integrate system-wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations.

272. Recent experience has demonstrated that regional organizations can be a vital part of the multilateral system. Their efforts need not contradict United Nations efforts, nor do they absolve the United Nations of its primary responsibilities for peace and security. The key is to organize regional action within the framework of the Charter and the purposes of the United Nations, and to ensure that the United Nations and any regional organization with which it works do so in a more integrated fashion than has up to now occurred. This will require that: (a) Authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional peace operations, recognizing that in some urgent situations that authorization may be sought after such operations have commenced; (b) Consultation and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations should be expanded and could be formalized in an agreement, covering such issues as meetings of the heads of the organizations, more frequent exchange of information and early warning, co-training of civilian and military personnel, and exchange of personnel within peace operations;

267. The Office should comprise about 20 or more staff of different backgrounds in the United Nations system and with significant experience in peacebuilding strategy and operations. In addition to supporting the Secretary-General and the Peacebuilding Commission, the Office could also, on request, provide assistance and advice to the heads of peace operations, United Nations resident coordinators or national Governments - for example in developing strategies for

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(c) In the case of African regional and subregional capacities, donor countries should commit to a 10-year process of sustained capacitybuilding support, within the African Union strategic framework;

(d) Regional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping should place such capacities in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System;

(e) Member States should agree to allow the United Nations to provide equipment support from United Nations-owned sources to regional operations, as needed;

level. Second, the United Nations has an unrivalled convening power, on the basis of which the General Assembly and the major conferences and summits it has convened in the last three decades have generated consensus around internationally accepted goals, especially in the social field. Third, the United Nations shows that it has strong grass-roots support for its goals and can thus mobilize public opinion in their favour. Three strategies can help the Economic and Social Council enhance its relevance and contribution to collective security, building on United Nations comparative advantages, as described below. 276. First, the Economic and Social Council can provide normative and analytical leadership in a time of much debate about the causes of, and interconnections between, the many threats we face. To that end: (a) We recommend that the Economic and Social Council establish a Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Security Threats, and that it use its powers to commission research and develop better understanding about the economic and social threats to peace, and about the economic and social aspects of other threats, such as terrorism and organized crime; (b) We welcome the recent improvement in the exchange of information between the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council, for example through regular meetings of their Presidents, and encourage both bodies to regularize these exchanges. 277. Second, it can provide an arena in which States measure their commitments to achieving key development objectives in an open and transparent manner. 278. Third, it can provide a regular venue for engaging the development community at the highest level, in effect transforming itself into a “development cooperation forum”. To that end: (a) A new approach should be adopted within the Economic and Social Council agenda, replacing its current focus on administrative issues and programme coordination with a more focused agenda built around the major themes contained in the Millennium Declaration; (b) A small executive committee, comprising members from each regional group, should be created in order to provide orientation and direction to its work and its interaction with principal organs, agencies and programmes; (c) The annual meetings between the Economic and Social Council and the Bretton Woods institutions should be used to encourage collective action in support of the Millennium Development Goals and the Monterrey Consensus;

(f) The rules for the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the United Nations the option on a case-by-case basis to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council with assessed contributions.

273. In recent years, such alliance organizations as NATO (which have not usually been considered regional organizations within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter but have some similar characteristics) have undertaken peacekeeping operations beyond their mandated areas. We welcome this so long as these operations are authorized by and accountable to the Security Council. In the case of NATO, there may also be a constructive role for it to play in assisting in the training and equipping of less well resourced regional organizations and States.

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XVII. The Economic and Social Council

274. The framers of the Charter of the United Nations understood that peace and security were inseparable from economic development. The institutional problem we face is twofold: first, decision-making on international economic matters, particularly in the areas of finance and trade, has long left the United Nations and no amount of institutional reform will bring it back; and second, the Charter allowed for the creation of specialized agencies independent of the principal United Nations organs, reducing the role of the Economic and Social Council to one of coordination. The fragmentation of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies makes this a difficult proposition in the best of times. It would not, however, be realistic to aim for the Economic and Social Council to become the centre of the world’s decision-making on matters of trade and finance, or to direct the programmes of the specialized agencies or the international financial institutions.

275. And yet the United Nations does have potential assets in the areas of economic and social development. First, the United Nations is the only place where the issues of peace, security and development can be addressed together at the global

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(d) The Economic and Social Council, with inputs from its secretariat and the United Nations Development Group, should aim to provide guidance on development cooperation to the governing boards of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies;

Rights is entrusted with promoting respect for human rights globally, fostering international cooperation in human rights, responding to violations in specific countries and assisting countries in building their human rights capacity. 283. In recent years, the Commission’s capacity to perform these tasks has been undermined by eroding credibility and professionalism. Standard-setting to reinforce human rights cannot be performed by States that lack a demonstrated commitment to their promotion and protection. We are concerned that in recent years States have sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others. The Commission cannot be credible if it is seen to be maintaining double standards in addressing human rights concerns.

(e) The Economic and Social Council should provide strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Development Group to strengthen the coherence of United Nations action at the field level and its coordination with the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors.

279. We believe the time has arrived to reconsider the manner of and quantity of funding for the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. New initiatives in this regard have been explored recently and deserve the special attention of the international community.

Achieving policy coherence

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280. While the strategies above are important for a better functioning Economic and Social Council, we appreciate that historical developments in the governance of the multilateral system have limited the capacity of that body to influence international policies in trade, finance and investment. There still remains a need for a body that brings together the key developed and developing countries to address the critical interlinkages between trade, finance, the environment, the handling of pandemic diseases and economic and social development. To be effective, such a body must operate at the level of national leaders.

284. Reform of this body is therefore necessary to make the human rights system perform effectively and ensure that it better fulfils its mandate and functions. We support the recent efforts of the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to ensure that human rights are integrated throughout the work of the United Nations, and to support the development of strong domestic human rights institutions, especially in countries emerging from conflict and in the fight against terrorism. Member States should provide full support to the Secretary General and the High Commissioner in these efforts. 285. In many ways, the most difficult and sensitive issue relating to the Commission on Human Rights is that of membership. In recent years, the issue of which States are elected to the Commission has become a source of heated international tension, with no positive impact on human rights and a negative impact on the work of the Commission. Proposals for membership criteria have little chance of changing these dynamics and indeed risk further politicizing the issue. Rather, we recommend that the membership of the Commission on Human Rights be expanded to universal membership. This would underscore that all members are committed by the Charter to the promotion of human rights, and might help to focus attention back on to substantive issues rather than who is debating and voting on them. 286. In the first half of its history, the Commission was composed of heads of delegation who were key players in the human rights arena and who had the professional qualifications and experience necessary for human rights work. Since then this practice has lapsed. We believe it should be restored, and we propose that all members of the Commission on Human Rights designate prominent and experienced human rights figures as the heads of their delegations. 287. In addition, we propose that the Commission on Human Rights be supported in its work by an advisory council or panel. This council or panel would consist of some 15 individuals, independent experts (say, three per region),

281. While the annual meetings of the G8 group at head of State or Government level fulfil some of the characteristics required to give greater coherence and impetus to the necessary policies, it would be helpful to have a larger forum bringing together the heads of the major developed and developing countries. One way of moving forward may be to transform into a leader’s group the G20 group of finance ministers, which currently brings together States collectively encompassing 80 per cent of the world’s population and 90 per cent of its economic activity, with regular attendance by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, WTO and the European Union. In such meetings, we recommend the inclusion in the group of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations and the President of the Economic and Social Council to ensure strong support for United Nations programmes and initiatives.

XVIII. The Commission on Human Rights

282. One of the central missions of the United Nations is to protect human rights, a mission reaffirmed by the Millennium Declaration. The Commission on Human

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appointed for their skills for a period of three years, renewable once. They would be appointed by the Commission on the joint proposal of the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner. In addition to advising on country-specific issues, the council or panel could give advice on the rationalization of some of the thematic mandates and could itself carry out some of the current mandates dealing with research, standard-setting and definitions.

A. Strengthening support for the Secretary-General
293. The creation of the post of Deputy Secretary-General in 1996 helped bring far greater coherence to the work of the United Nations in the economic, social and development fields and on issues of management reform. Given the enormous increase in the workload of the Secretary-General in the area of peace and security in the 1990s, creating a second Deputy SecretaryGeneral post for peace and security would ensure that the Secretary-General’s efforts in this area are equally well supported. To assist the SecretaryGeneral, an additional Deputy Secretary-General position should be created, responsible for peace and security.

288. We recommend that the High Commissioner be called upon to prepare an annual report on the situation of human rights worldwide. This could then serve as a basis for a comprehensive discussion with the Commission. The report should focus on the implementation of all human rights in all countries, based on information stemming from the work of treaty bodies, special mechanisms and any other sources deemed appropriate by the High Commissioner.

289. The Security Council should also more actively involve the High Commissioner in its deliberations, including on peace operations mandates. We also welcome the fact that the Security Council has, with increasing frequency, invited the High Commissioner to brief it on country-specific situations. We believe that this should become a general rule and that the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission should request the High Commissioner to report to them regularly about the implementation of all human rightsrelated provisions of Security Council resolutions, thus enabling focused, effective monitoring of these provisions.

294. With one Deputy Secretary-General focusing on the economic and social development work of the United Nations, the additional Deputy Secretary-General and his/her office would assist the Secretary-General in systematically overseeing the work of the United Nations system in the area of peace and security, with the aim of formulating integrated strategies and ensuring concerted action. Such an office should not be operational and would not duplicate, but instead rationalize and make more effective, existing bureaucratic functions. It would integrate inputs from the various departments and agencies and prepare early-warning reports and strategy options for decision by the SecretaryGeneral. It should comprise approximately 15 Professionals able to perform strategic analysis, planning and coordination tasks. It should also provide the Secretary-General with new expertise to deal with new threats - for example, the scientific advice necessary to address questions of environmental and biological security.

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290. More also needs to be done with respect to the funding situation of the Office of the High Commissioner. We see a clear contradiction between a regular budget allocation of 2 per cent for this Office and the obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to make the promotion and protection of human rights one of the principal objectives of the Organization. There is also a need to redress the limited funding available for human rights capacity-building. Member States should seriously review the inadequate funding of this Office and its activities.

B. A competent and professional Secretariat

291. In the longer term, Member States should consider upgrading the Commission to become a “Human Rights Council” that is no longer subsidiary to the Economic and Social Council but a Charter body standing alongside it and the Security Council, and reflecting in the process the weight given to human rights, alongside security and economic issues, in the Preamble of the Charter.

XIX. The Secretariat

292. A strong Secretary-General at the head of a more professional and better organized Secretariat is an essential component of any effective system for collective security in the twenty-first century.

295. The burden of implementing the decisions of Member States and providing them with timely analysis and advice rests not only on the Secretary-General but on the Secretariat as a whole. If the United Nations is to be effective, it needs a professional and well-trained Secretariat whose skills and experiences have been adapted to match the tasks at hand. The last 15 years have witnessed a large expansion in work related to conflict prevention and peacekeeping, the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements, and peacebuilding. And yet, despite the increase in demand since the end of the cold war total Secretariat staff has declined since 1990, while only 6 per cent of the staff of the Secretariat are responsible for the entire range of issues that include mediation, the organization and management of peacekeeping operations, support for the Security Council, disarmament, elections support and sanctions. Many of those based at Headquarters have no field experience or training and the existing rules militate

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against their gaining it. In addition, there is little or no expertise for tackling many of the new or emerging threats addressed in the present report.

decolonization. The United Nations should turn its back on any attempt to return to the mentalities and forms of colonialism. 300. Article 47 (The Military Staff Committee) should be deleted, as should all references to the body in Articles 26, 45 and 46. It is no longer appropriate for the joint chiefs of staff of the five permanent members to play the role imagined for them in 1945. We have in paragraph 258 above addressed the need for the Security Council to have better military advice. 301. We believe, however, that the Charter as a whole continues to provide a sound legal and policy basis for the organization of collective security, enabling the Security Council to respond to threats to international peace and security, both old and new in a timely and effective manner. The Charter was also farsighted in its recognition of the dependence of international peace and security on economic and social development. 302. All Member States should rededicate themselves to the purposes and principles of the Charter and to applying them in a purposeful way, matching political will with the necessary resources. Only dedicated leadership within and between States will generate effective collective security for the twenty-first century and forge a future that is both sustainable and secure.

296. The Secretary-General should be provided with the resources he requires to do his job properly and the authority to manage his staff and other resources as he deems best. To meet the needs identified in the present report, we recommend that:

(a) Member States recommit themselves to Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) Member States review the relationship between the General Assembly and the Secretariat with the aim of substantially increasing the flexibility provided to the Secretary-General in the management of his staff, subject always to his accountability to the Assembly; (c) The Secretary-General’s reform proposals of 1997 and 2002 related to human resources should now, without further delay, be fully implemented; (d) There should be a one-time review and replacement of personnel, including through early retirement, to ensure that the Secretariat is staffed with the right people to undertake the tasks at hand, including for mediation and peacebuilding support, and for the office of the Deputy Secretary-General for peace and security. Member States should provide funding for this replacement as a cost-effective longterm investment; (e) The Secretary-General should immediately be provided with 60 posts less than 1 per cent of the total Secretariat - for the purpose of establishing all the increased Secretariat capacity proposed in the present report.

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XX. The Charter of the United Nations

297. Our recommendations on Security Council reform will require the amendment of Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations. In addition, we suggest the following modest changes to the Charter:

298. Articles 53 and 107 (references to enemy States) are outdated and should be revised – revisions should be appropriately drafted to avoid retroactively undermining the legal provisions of these articles. The Charter should reflect the hopes and aspirations of today, not the fears of 1945.

299. Chapter 13 (The Trusteeship Council) should be deleted. The Trusteeship Council of the United Nations performed an important task in helping the world emerge from the era of colonialism and steering many cases of successful

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Annex I Summary of recommendations
Note: The number in parentheses that appears after each summarized recommendation refers to the paragraph in the main report that contains the complete text of the recommendation.

Contents
Recommendations Page

Part 2 Collective security and the challenge of prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11 . . . . . 99 Conflict between and within States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transnational organized crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The role of sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-20 . . . . 100 21-37 38-44 45-49 50-52 . . . . 101 . . . . 103 . . . . 104 . . . . 105

Part 3 Collective security and the use of force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Using force: rules and guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability . . . . . . . . . . Post-conflict peacebuilding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Protecting civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53-57 58-62 63-65 66-69 . . . . 106 . . . . 107 . . . . 107 . . . . 108 Part 4 A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 The General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-72 The Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73-81 A Peacebuilding Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82-85 Regional organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 The Economic and Social Council. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87-89 The Commission on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90-94 The Secretariat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95-96 The Charter of the United Nations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97-101 . . . . 109 . . . . 109 . . . . 111 . . . . 112 . . . . 112 . . . . 113 . . . . 114 . . . . 114

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Part 2 Collective security and the challenge of prevention Poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation
1. 2. All States must recommit themselves to the goals of eradicating poverty, achieving sustained economic growth and promoting sustainable development. (59) The many donor countries which currently fall short of the United Nations 0.7 per cent gross national product target for official development assistance should establish a timetable for reaching it. (60) World Trade Organization members should strive to conclude the Doha development round of multilateral trade negotiations at the latest in 2006. (62) Lender Governments and the international financial institutions should provide highly indebted poor countries with greater debt relief, longer rescheduling and improved access to global markets. (63) Although international resources devoted to meeting the challenge of HIV/AIDS have increased from about $250 million in 1996 to about $2.8 billion in 2002, more than $10 billion annually is needed to stem the pandemic. (64) Leaders of countries affected by HIV/AIDS need to mobilize resources, commit funds and engage civil society and the private sector in disease-control efforts. (65) 7. The Security Council, working closely with UNAIDS, should host a second special session on HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security, to explore the future effects of HIV/AIDS on States and societies, generate research on the problem and identify critical steps towards a long-term strategy for diminishing the threat. (67) 8. International donors, in partnership with national authorities and local civil society organizations, should undertake a major new global initiative to rebuild local and national public health systems throughout the developing world. (68) 9. Members of the World Health Assembly should provide greater resources to the World Health Organization Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network to increase its capacity to cope with potential disease outbreaks. (69) 10. States should provide incentives for the further development of renewable energy sources and begin to phase out environmentally harmful subsidies, especially for fossil fuel use and development. (71)

3. 4.

5.

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Summary of recommendations

11.

We urge Member States to reflect on the gap between the promise of the Kyoto Protocol and its performance, re-engage on the problem of global warming and begin new negotiations to produce a new long-term strategy for reducing global warming beyond the period covered by the Protocol (2012). (72) 20.

(c) Greater interaction with national mediators, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations involved in conflict resolution; (d) Greater consultation with and involvement in peace processes of important voices from civil society, especially those of women, who are often neglected during negotiations. (103) National leaders and parties to conflict should make constructive use of the option of preventive deployment of peacekeepers. (104)

Conflict between and within States

12.

The Security Council should stand ready to use the authority it has under the Rome Statute to refer cases of suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court. (90) 21.

13.

Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons
The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament:

The United Nations should work with national authorities, international financial institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector to develop norms governing the management of natural resources for countries emerging from or at risk of conflict. (92)

14.

The United Nations should build on the experience of regional organizations in developing frameworks for minority rights and the protection of democratically elected Governments from unconstitutional overthrow. (94) 22.

(a) They must honour their commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilment of those commitments; (b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. (120)

15.

Member States should expedite and conclude negotiations on legally binding agreements on the marking and tracing, as well as the brokering and transfer, of small arms and light weapons. (96)

16. 23.

All Member States should report completely and accurately on all elements of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the Secretary-General should be asked to report annually to the General Assembly and Security Council on any inadequacies in the reporting. (97) 24. 25.

The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons. (121) The Security Council should explicitly pledge to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear weapon State. (122) Negotiations to resolve regional conflicts should include confidence-building measures and steps towards disarmament. (123)

17.

A training and briefing facility should be established for new or potential special representatives of the Secretary-General and other United Nations mediators. (101)

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18.

The Department of Political Affairs should be given additional resources and should be restructured to provide more consistent and professional mediation support. (102)

19.

While the details of such a restructuring should be left to the Secretary-General, it should take into account the need for the United Nations to have:

States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, demonstrating their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which are open to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions similar to those established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South-East Asia. (124) 26. All chemical-weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012. (125)

(a) A field-oriented, dedicated mediation support capacity, comprised of a small team of professionals with relevant direct experience and expertise, available to all United Nations mediators; (b) Competence on thematic issues that recur in peace negotiations, such as the sequencing of implementation steps, the design of monitoring arrangements, the sequencing of transitional arrangements and the design of national reconciliation mechanisms;

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27. 37.

States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry. (126)

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention. (140) The Security Council should consult with the Director-General of the World Health Organization to establish the necessary procedures for working together in the event of a suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease. (144)

28.

The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today’s standard for IAEA safeguards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards standards. (129)

29. 38.

Terrorism
The United Nations, with the Secretary-General taking a leading role, should promote a comprehensive strategy against terrorism, including:

Negotiations should be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of Articles III and IX of the IAEA statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users. (130)

30.

While that arrangement is being negotiated, States should, without surrendering the right under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to construct uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, voluntarily institute a time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further such facilities, with a commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market rates. (131)

31.

All States should be encouraged to join the voluntary Proliferation Security Initiative. (132)

32.

(a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, including through promoting social and political rights, the rule of law and democratic reform; working to end occupations and address major political grievances; combating organized crime; reducing poverty and unemployment; and stopping State collapse; (b) Efforts to counter extremism and intolerance, including through education and fostering public debate; (c) Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism cooperation, all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil liberties and human rights, including in the areas of law enforcement; intelligence-sharing, where possible; denial and interdiction, when required; and financial controls; (d) Building State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations; (e) Control of dangerous materials and public health defence. (148) 39.

A State’s notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided by IAEA should be withdrawn. (134)

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33.

The proposed timeline for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to convert highly enriched uranium reactors and reduce HEU stockpiles should be halved from 10 to five years. (135) 40.

34.

States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish binding international standards for the export of such agents. (137)

Member States that have not yet done so should actively consider signing and ratifying all 12 international conventions against terrorism, and should adopt the eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-supported Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering and the measures recommended in its various best practices papers. (150)

35.

The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee should institute a process for reviewing the cases of individuals and institutions claiming to have been wrongly placed or retained on its watch lists. (152) 41.

The Conference on Disarmament should move without further delay to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that, on a designated schedule, ends the production of highly enriched uranium for non-weapon as well as weapons purposes. (138)

36.

The Security Council, after consultation with affected States, should extend the authority of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to act as a clearing house for State-to-State provision of military, police and border control assistance for the development of domestic counter-terrorism capacities. (154) 42. To help Member States comply with their counter-terrorism obligations, the United Nations should establish a capacity-building trust fund under the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate. (155)

The Directors-General of IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons should be invited by the Security Council to report to it twice-yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the

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43.

The Security Council should devise a schedule of predetermined sanctions for State non-compliance with the Council’s counter-terrorism resolutions. (156)

49.

The United Nations should establish a robust capacity-building mechanism for rule-of-law assistance. (177)

44.

The General Assembly should rapidly complete negotiations on a comprehensive convention on terrorism, incorporating a definition of terrorism with the following elements:

The role of sanctions
50. The Security Council must ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented and enforced:

(a) recognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity; (b) restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conventions are terrorism, and a declaration that they are a crime under international law; and restatement that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols; (c) reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004); (d) description of terrorism as “any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”. (163-4)

Transnational organized crime

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45.

Member States that have not signed, ratified or resourced the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three Protocols, and the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption should do so, and all Member States should support the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in its work in this area. (172)

46.

(a) When the Security Council imposes a sanctions regime - including arms embargoes - it should routinely establish monitoring mechanisms and provide them with the necessary authority and capacity to carry out highquality, in-depth investigations. Adequate budgetary provisions must be made to implement those mechanisms; (b) Security Council sanctions committees should be mandated to develop improved guidelines and reporting procedures to assist States in sanctions implementation, and to improve procedures for maintaining accurate lists of individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions; (c) The Secretary-General should appoint a senior official with sufficient supporting resources to enable the Secretary-General to supply the Security Council with analysis of the best way to target sanctions and to assist in coordinating their implementation. This official would also assist compliance efforts; identify technical assistance needs and coordinate such assistance; and make recommendations on any adjustments necessary to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions; (d) Donors should devote more resources to strengthening the legal, administrative, and policing and border-control capacity of Member States to implement sanctions. Capacity-building measures should include efforts to improve air-traffic interdiction in zones of conflict; (e) The Security Council should, in instances of verified, chronic violations, impose secondary sanctions against those involved in sanctions-busting; (f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, should ensure that an appropriate auditing mechanism is in place to oversee sanctions administration. (180) 51.

Member States should establish a central authority to facilitate the exchange of evidence among national judicial authorities, mutual legal assistance among prosecutorial authorities and the implementation of extradition requests. (173)

47.

A comprehensive international convention on money-laundering that addresses the issues of bank secrecy and the development of financial havens needs to be negotiated, and endorsed by the General Assembly. (174)

Sanctions committees should improve procedures for providing humanitarian exemptions and routinely conduct assessments of the humanitarian impact of sanctions. The Security Council should continue to strive to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of sanctions. (181) 52. Where sanctions involve lists of individuals or entities, sanctions committees should establish procedures to review the cases of those claiming to have been incorrectly placed or retained on such lists. (182)

48.

Member States should sign and ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and parties to the Protocol should take all necessary steps to effectively implement it. (175)

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Part 3 Collective security and the use of force
57.

The above guidelines for authorizing the use of force should be embodied in declaratory resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly. (208)

Using force: rules and guidelines
58. 59.

Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability
The developed States should do more to transform their existing force capacities into suitable contingents for peace operations. (216)

53.

Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations should be neither rewritten nor reinterpreted, either to extend its long-established scope (so as to allow preventive measures to non-imminent threats) or to restrict it (so as to allow its application only to actual attacks). (192)

54.

Member States should strongly support the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, building on the important work of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of the United Nations Secretariat, to improve its use of strategic deployment stockpiles, standby arrangements, trust funds and other mechanisms in order to meet the tighter deadlines necessary for effective deployment. (218)

The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to address the full range of security threats with which States are concerned. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make the Council work better than it has. (198) 60.

55. 61.

The Panel endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. (203) 62.

States with advanced military capacities should establish standby high readiness, self-sufficient battalions at up to brigade level that can reinforce United Nations missions, and should place them at the disposal of the United Nations. (219) The Secretary-General should recommend and the Security Council should authorize troop strengths for peacekeeping missions that are sufficient to deter and repel hostile factions. (222) The United Nations should have a small corps of senior police officers and managers (50-100 personnel) who could undertake mission assessments and organize the start-up of police components of peace operations, and the General Assembly should authorize this capacity. (223)

56.

In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Security Council should always address - whatever other considerations it may take into account - at least the following five basic criteria of legitimacy:

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Post-conflict peacebuilding
63. Special representatives of the Secretary-General should have the authority and guidance to work with relevant parties to establish robust donor-coordinating mechanisms, as well as the resources to perform coordination functions effectively, including ensuring that the sequencing of United Nations assessments and activities is consistent with Government priorities. (226) 64. The Security Council should mandate and the General Assembly should authorize funding for disarmament and demobilization programmes from assessed budgets for United Nations peacekeeping operations. (227) 65. A standing fund for peacebuilding should be established at the level of at least $250 million that can be used to finance the recurrent expenditures of a nascent Government, as well as critical agency programmes in the areas of rehabilitation and reintegration. (228)

(a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended? (b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved? (c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other measures will not succeed? (d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question? (e) Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction? (207)

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Protecting civilians Part 4 A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century The General Assembly
70.

66.

All combatants must abide by the Geneva Conventions. All Member States should sign, ratify and act on all treaties relating to the protection of civilians, such as the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and all refugee conventions. (233)

67.

The Security Council should fully implement resolution 1265 (1999) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. (237)

68. 71.

The Security Council, United Nations agencies and Member States should fully implement resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. (238)

Members of the General Assembly should use the opportunity provided by the Millennium Review Summit in 2005 to forge a new consensus on broader and more effective collective security. (240) Member States should renew efforts to enable the General Assembly to perform its function as the main deliberative organ of the United Nations. This requires a better conceptualization and shortening of the agenda, which should reflect the contemporary challenges facing the international community. Smaller, more tightly focused committees could help to sharpen and improve resolutions that are brought to the whole Assembly. (242) Following the recommendation of the report of the Panel on Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, the General Assembly should establish a better mechanism to enable systematic engagement with civil society organizations. (243)

69.

Member States should support and fully fund the proposed Directorate of Security and accord high priority to assisting the Secretary-General in implementing a new staff security system in 2005. (239)

72.

The Security Council
73. Reforms of the Security Council should meet the following principles: (a) They should, in honouring Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically - specifically in terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to the voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance should be considered an important criterion of contribution; (b) They should bring into the decision-making process countries more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world; (c) They should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council; (d) They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body. (249)

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74.

A Peacebuilding Commission
82. The Security Council, acting under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and after consultation with the Economic and Social Council, should establish a Peacebuilding Commission. (263) The core functions of the Peacebuilding Commission should be to identify countries that are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary. (264) While the precise composition, procedures and reporting lines of the Peacebuilding Commission will need to be established, they should take account of the following guidelines:

A decision on the enlargement of the Council, satisfying these criteria, is now a necessity. The presentation of two clearly defined alternatives, of the kind described below as models A and B, should help to clarify - and perhaps bring to resolution - a debate which has made little progress in the last 12 years. (250) 83.

75.

Models A and B both involve a distribution of seats as between four major regional areas, which we identify, respectively, as “Africa”, “Asia and Pacific”, “Europe” and “Americas”. We see these descriptions as helpful in making and implementing judgements about the composition of the Security Council, but make no recommendation about changing the composition of the current regional groups for general electoral and other United Nations purposes. Some members of the Panel, in particular our Latin American colleagues, expressed a preference for basing any distribution of seats on the current regional groups. (251) 84.

76.

Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas. Model B provides for no new permanent seats, but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year nonpermanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas. (252-253)

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77.

In both models, having regard to Article 23 of the Charter, a method of encouraging Member States to contribute more to international peace and security would be for the General Assembly, taking into account established practices of regional consultation, to elect Security Council members by giving preference for permanent or longer-term seats to those States that are among the top three financial contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular budget, or the top three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three troop contributors from their regional area to United Nations peacekeeping missions. (254)

78.

There should be a review of the composition of the Security Council in 2020, including, in this context, a review of the contribution (as defined in paragraph 249 of the main report) of permanent and non-permanent members from the point of view of the Council’s effectiveness in taking collective action to prevent and remove new and old threats to international peace and security. (255) 85.

79.

The Panel recommends that under any reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto. (256)

(a) The Peacebuilding Commission should be reasonably small; (b) It should meet in different configurations, to consider both general policy issues and country-by-country strategies; (c) It should be chaired for at least one year and perhaps longer by a member approved by the Security Council; (d) In addition to representation from the Security Council, it should include representation from the Economic and Social Council; (e) National representatives of the country under consideration should be invited to attend; (f) The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, the President of the World Bank and, when appropriate, heads of regional development banks should be represented at its meetings by appropriate senior officials; (g) Representatives of the principal donor countries and, when appropriate, the principal troop contributors should be invited to participate in its deliberations; (h) Representatives of regional and subregional organizations should be invited to participate in its deliberations when such organizations are actively involved in the country in question. (265)

80.

A system of “indicative voting” should be introduced, whereby members of the Security Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed action. (257)

A Peacebuilding Support Office should be established in the Secretariat to give the Peacebuilding Commission appropriate Secretariat support and to ensure that the Secretary-General is able to integrate system-wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations. (266)

81.

Processes to improve transparency and accountability in the Security Council should be incorporated and formalized in its rules of procedure. (258)

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Regional organizations

86.

In relation to regional organizations:

(a) Authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional peace operations;

(a) A new approach should be adopted within the Economic and Social Council agenda, replacing its current focus on administrative issues and programme coordination with a more focused agenda built around the major themes contained in the Millennium Declaration; (b) A small executive committee, comprising members from each regional group, should be created in order to provide orientation and direction to the work of the Economic and Social Council and its interaction with principal organs, agencies and programmes; (c) The annual meetings between the Economic and Social Council and the Bretton Woods institutions should be used to encourage collective action in support of the Millennium Development Goals and the Monterrey Consensus; (d) The Economic and Social Council, with inputs from its secretariat and the United Nations Development Group, should aim to provide guidance on development cooperation to the governing boards of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies; (e) The Economic and Social Council should provide strong support to the efforts of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Development Group to strengthen the coherence of United Nations action at the field level and its coordination with the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors. (278)

The Commission on Human Rights
90. 91. Membership of the Commission on Human Rights should be made universal. (285) All members of the Commission on Human Rights should designate prominent and experienced human rights figures as the heads of their delegations. (286) 92. 93. The Commission on Human Rights should be supported in its work by an advisory council or panel. (287)

(b) Consultation and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations should be expanded and could be formalized in an agreement, covering such issues as meetings of the heads of the organizations, more frequent exchange of information and early warning, co-training of civilian and military personnel, and exchange of personnel within peace operations; (c) In the case of African regional and subregional capacities, donor countries should commit to a 10-year process of sustained capacity-building support, within the African Union strategic framework; (d) Regional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping should place such capacities in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System; (e) Member States should agree to allow the United Nations to provide equipment support from United Nations-owned sources to regional operations, as needed; (f) The rules for the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the United Nations the option on a case-by-case basis to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council with assessed contributions. (272)

The Economic and Social Council

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87.

The Economic and Social Council should provide normative and analytical leadership in a time of much debate about the causes of, and interconnections between, the many threats we face. To that end, the Economic and Social Council should establish a Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Security Threats. (276)

88.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights should be called upon to prepare an annual report on the situation of human rights worldwide. (288) 94.

The Economic and Social Council should provide an arena in which States measure their commitments to achieving key development objectives in an open and transparent manner. (277)

89.

The Economic and Social Council should provide a regular venue for engaging the development community at the highest level, in effect transforming itself into a “development cooperation forum”. To that end:

The Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission should request the High Commissioner for Human Rights to report to them regularly on the implementation of all human rights-related provisions of Security Council resolutions, thus enabling focused, effective monitoring of those provisions. (289)

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The Secretariat

95.

To assist the Secretary-General, an additional Deputy Secretary-General position should be created, responsible for peace and security. (293)

with the necessary resources. Only dedicated leadership within and between States will generate effective collective security for the twenty-first century and forge a future that is both sustainable and secure. (302)

96.

The Secretary-General should be provided with the resources he requires to do his job properly and the authority to manage his staff and other resources as he deems best. To meet the needs identified in the present report, the Panel recommends that:

(a) Member States recommit themselves to Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) Member States review the relationship between the General Assembly and the Secretariat with the aim of substantially increasing the flexibility provided to the Secretary-General in the management of his staff, subject always to his accountability to the Assembly;

(c) The Secretary-General’s reform proposals of 1997 and 2002 related to human resources should now, without further delay, be fully implemented;

(d) There should be a one-time review and replacement of personnel, including through early retirement, to ensure that the Secretariat is staffed with the right people to undertake the tasks at hand, including for mediation and peacebuilding support, and for the office of the Deputy Secretary-General for peace and security. Member States should provide funding for this replacement as a cost-effective long-term investment;

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(e) The Secretary-General should immediately be provided with 60 posts – less than 1 per cent of the total Secretariat capacity – for the purpose of establishing all the increased Secretariat capacity proposed in the present report. (296)

The Charter of the United Nations

97.

In addition to any amendment of Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations required by proposed reform of the Security Council, the Panel suggests the following modest changes to the Charter:

98.

Articles 53 and 107 (references to enemy States) are outdated and should be revised. (298)

99.

Chapter XIII (The Trusteeship Council) should be deleted. (299)

100. Article 47 (The Military Staff Committee) should be deleted, as should all references to the Committee in Articles 26, 45 and 46. (300)

101. All Member States should rededicate themselves to the purposes and principles of the Charter and to applying them in a purposeful way, matching political will

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Annex II Panel members and terms of reference
Members
Anand Panyarachun, Chair (Thailand) Robert Badinter (France) Former Prime Minister of Thailand Member of the French Senate and former Minister of Justice of France Former General Secretary of the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil and Secretary-General of the Organization of American States Former Prime Minister of Norway and DirectorGeneral of the World Health Organization Vice-Chairman of the National Development Planning Commission of Ghana and former Deputy Director-General of the International Labour Organization Gareth Evans (Australia) President of the International Crisis Group and former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia David Hannay (United Kingdom) Former Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations and United Kingdom Special Envoy to Cyprus

João Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil)

Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway)

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Mary Chinery-Hesse (Ghana)

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Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay)

Terms of reference
1. The past year has shaken the foundations of collective security and undermined confidence in the possibility of collective responses to our common problems and challenges. It has also brought to the fore deep divergences of opinion on the range and nature of the challenges we face and are likely to face in the future.

President of the InterAmerican Development Bank and former Minister for Foreign Relations of Uruguay Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt 2. Former Lt. General in the Indian Army and Force Commander of UNPROFOR President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency and former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Former Vice Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs of China Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for HIV/AIDS in Asia and former Executive Director of the United Nations Population Fund Former Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania and Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity Former Lt. General, United States Air Force and United States National Security Adviser 5. 4. Specifically, the Panel will: 3.

Amre Moussa (Egypt)

Satish Nambiar (India)

The aim of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change is to recommend clear and practical measures for ensuring effective collective action, based upon a rigorous analysis of future threats to peace and security, an appraisal of the contribution collective action can make and a thorough assessment of existing approaches, instruments and mechanisms, including the principal organs of the United Nations. The Panel is not being asked to formulate policies on specific issues, nor on the role of the United Nations in specific places. Rather, it is being asked to provide a new assessment of the challenges ahead and to recommend the changes which will be required if these challenges are to be met effectively through collective action.

Sadako Ogata (Japan)

Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation)

Qian Qichen (China)

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Nafis Sadik (Pakistan)

Salim Ahmed Salim (United Republic of Tanzania)

(a) Examine today’s global threats and provide an analysis of future challenges to international peace and security. While there may continue to exist a diversity of perception on the relative importance of the various threats facing particular Member States on an individual basis, it is important to find an apropriate balance at the global level. It is also important to understand the connections between different threats; (b) Identify clearly the contribution that collective action can make in addressing these challenges; (c) Recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective action, including but not limited to a review of the principal organs of the United Nations. The Panel’s work is confined to the field of peace and security, broadly interpreted. That is, it should extend its analysis and recommendations to other issues and institutions, including economic and social ones, to the extent that they have a direct bearing on future threats to peace and security.

Brent Scowcroft (United States)

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Annex III Panel secretariat
Stephen Stedman (Research Director) Loraine Rickard-Martin (Secretary to the Panel) Bruce Jones (Deputy Research Director) Muhammad Zeeshan Amin Tarun Chhabra Sebastian Graf von Einsiedel Angela Irving Graham Maitland Angelica Malic Thant Myint-U Maria Zaroui

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Annex IV Panel meetings, regional consultations and issue workshops
Panel meetings
Date and place 5-7 December 2003 Princeton, United States of America 13-15 February 2004 Mont Pelerin, Switzerland 30 April-2 May 2004 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 16-18 July 2004 Baden, Austria 24-26 September 2004 Tarrytown, United States of America 3-5 November 2004 New York City, United States of America

Regional consultations and issue workshops
Date (2004) and place 13-14 January Harriman, United States of America Meeting/theme “The Secretary-General’s Highlevel Panel: maximizing prospects for success” Organizer Stanley Foundation

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29 January New York City, United States of America

Briefing to NGOs on United Nations reform initiatives and the High-level Panel

Department of Public Information of the United Nations Secretariat 16 February Paris, France Meeting of the High-level Panel with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

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Panel meetings and consultations

Date (2004) and place Date (2004) and place 7 and 8 March Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Regional consultations Meeting/theme Organizer “Addressing contemporary security threats: what role for the United Nations?” “Security Council reform” 12-14 March 26-27 March Manhasset, United States of America Retreat for permanent representatives and Panel members to discuss the work of the High-level Panel Yale Center for the Study of Globalization Wilton Park

Meeting/theme

Organizer

23-25 February West Sussex, United Kingdom

27 February New Haven, United States of America

Viva Rio and New York University Center on International Cooperation

1 March Stanford, United States of America “Nuclear proliferation” Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanley Foundation and United Nations Foundation 18-20 March Oslo, Norway

Governments of Australia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Singapore and South Africa, and International Peace Academy

Regional consultations

1 and 2 March Harriman “Use of force”

Norwegian Institute for International Affairs and New York University Center on International Cooperation Workshop on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and future threats to international security Government of Switzerland

2 and 3 March Harriman Stanley Foundation and United Nations Foundation

“Intervention in humanitarian crises”

28-30 March Geneva, Switzerland

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4 March New York City “Terrorism and non-State actors”

29 and 30 March Harriman

“Small arms and light weapons”

Stanley Foundation and United Nations Foundation 2-4 April Hangzhou, China 5 April Cambridge, United States of America Asia High-level Symposium on Threats, Challenges and Change “Nuclear arms control and proliferation” Government of China

Stanley Foundation, United Nations Foundation and Ralph Bunche Institute of International Studies Government of New Zealand and International Peace Academy

5 March New York City “The future of the weapons of mass destruction regimes”

Harvard University Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Nuclear Threat Initiative and United Nations Foundation
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Panel meetings and consultations

Date (2004) and place Outreach to humanitarian and human rights NGOs Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and United Nations Foundation Meeting with African civil society organizations Outreach to civil society, economic and social development NGOs 30 April Addis Ababa High-level meeting with the Commission of the African Union

Meeting/theme

Organizer

Date (2004) and place

Meeting/theme

Organizer High-level Panel secretariat and Bureau of the Chairperson of the African Union High-level Panel secretariat Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and United Nations Foundation Stanley Foundation and United Nations Foundation

8 April New York City

16 and 17 April Stanford “Governance and sovereignty” 2 May Addis Ababa 6 May New York City Stanford Institute for International Studies

19 April Washington D.C., United States of America “Bio-security” United States National Academies of Sciences, Nuclear Threat Initiative and United Nations Foundation 10 and 11 May Warrenton, United States of America

“Development, poverty and security”

21-24 April Singapore “Dialogue on security in Asia: concepts, threats and assurances after 9/11” Singapore Institute for International Affairs and New York University Center on International Cooperation 13 and 14 May Washington D.C. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Inter-Africa Group and New York University Center on International Cooperation 17-19 May Mexico City, Mexico

Conference on Security Council change

Johns Hopkins University Institute for Transatlantic Relations “Governance, democracy and free markets”

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25-27 April Shanghai, China

Meeting on the work of the High-level Panel at the sixtieth session of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) Regional consultations

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and United Nations Foundation 21-23 May Cape Town, South Africa “The United Nations, regional organizations and future security threats in Africa” Center for Conflict Resolution, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and United Nations Foundation

27-29 April Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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Panel meetings and consultations

Date (2004) and place “New threats, new responses” 28 and 29 June Oxford, United Kingdom “Security for the billion at the bottom” Government of Poland

Meeting/theme

Organizer

Date (2004) and place

Meeting/theme

Organizer Oxford University and Stanford Institute for International Studies Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies and United Nations Foundation Government of Japan

24 and 25 May Warsaw, Poland “The United Nations and new threats: rethinking security” 1-3 July New Delhi, India “United Nations and the new threats: rethinking security”

27-29 May Rome, Italy

Istituto Affari Internazionali, Aspen Institute Italia, Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, United Nations Foundation and United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 6 and 7 July Kyoto, Japan “Threats, challenges and change: internal violence” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and United Nations Foundation Government of Denmark 11 and 12 September Cairo, Egypt “Threats, challenges and reform: building security in the Mediterranean and Gulf region”

2 June Washington D.C. “Environment and security”

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8 and 9 June Copenhagen, Denmark “Strengthening United Nations capacity for crisis management” Thirty-ninth Conference on the United Nations for the Next Decade Stanley Foundation

Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, United Nations Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Istituto Affari Internazionali

11-16 June Prouts Neck, United States of America

17 and 18 June London, United Kingdom “Poverty and security: an integrated approach” London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom Department of International Development and United Nations Foundation

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IR 210 Professor Lamy Discussion Handout # 2 1 Levels of Analysis: Explaining the Behavior of International Actors-the Search for the Independent Variable In the analysis of decision-making the starting point is rationality. We assume that most decision-makers will act to maximize benefits and minimize costs. This is called instrumental thinking. Other variables that might influence behavior are assumed to be less important. This rational choice model, although popular in economics and now in political science, discounts other factors or variables. If parsimony is your goal, the rational choice is the way to go. Considering other variables, however, may give the researcher a more comprehensive picture of the policy-making process. A traditional framework of variables suggests four levels: Level One: Individual Level of Analysis

Bounded Rationality/cybernetics Biological explanations Motivational/personality Perception/Images Belief system/operational code Level Two: National Attributes and Domestic Factors a. More permanent elementsSize and resource base Geographic factors Political structure Economic system Political Culture b. Changing elements • • • Power capabilities Domestic politics: finding coalitions for policy and support for retaining power Decision-making style and structures: bureaucratic politics and organizational behavior

Level Three: Systemic Attributes: Nature and Structure of International System • Level of Anarchy-Order • Distribution of Power • Obligations, treaties, alliances • Regimes or governing arrangements Level Four: Global Factor*: Transboundary/Man-made and natural factors Global Social Movements Environmental conditions and challenges Media and popular cultural forces Decisions by TNEs and other economic actors Ideas, values, and norms that transcend culture and time

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: UN Report Analysis
Nathan Wood, Maintainer Mari Dumlao, Reformer Keith Parker, Transformer TA Dan Tauss Prof. Steven Lamy

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UN Report Analysis: Three Lenses

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Nathan Wood IR210 Lamy TA: Dan Tauss Chicago and Milan Firm The position of Machiavelli, Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Mearsheimer is one of realism. The basis of all these voices believe in is the struggle for power. Foundational realisms like Machiavelli believe that everyone is out to get us, which can closely be paralleled with Mearsheimer’s “Offensive Realism”. What they believe is that we stop thinking of wishful behavior of what we should do and take care of what needs to be done now to retain political power. They will also forgo any ethics, religion, or charity in order to gain political power. This thought is explained by sacrificing morals for what is more important. What is more important than morals and ethics is to enhance the power and security of the state. Morganthau, the father or realism, echos the duality of morality. His voice is therefore less crude and would choose to act in the lesser evils, but will also forgo ethics to gain political power and security. Morganthau is a voice that doesn’t believe in taking offensive stances. He would rather let the world come to the individual state rather than go out and solve problems. Mearsheimer also believes in state-interests as their policy for action, but takes a more aggressive stance on his offensive realist view. They all carry a very barbaric and selfish policy to realism excluding Morganthau who believes in keeping morals as long as it doesn’t stand in the way of high-policy issues. In applying the UN reforms to each of the major voices we hear a collective realist view. Machiavelli would be more likely to push his policy on the UN reforms to strengthen his exclusive state interests. The recent reforms cover an all-inclusive world, which Machiavelli could not even begin to take interest in. He would rather that his state internally became powerful and then start cutting off competitors to power. Which

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: UN Report Analysis
follows his notion of climbing up the ladder and pulling it up behind him. Morganthau of the three realists, would accept the most of all the aspects of each present UN reform. Morganthau being the most acceptant of ethical and moral actions to a further point than Machiavelli and Mearsheimer, would function within an ethical and moral manner inside the state’s interest. Mearsheimer finds none of the reforms beneficial at all besides the fact that the UN could be used as an aggressive vehicle to make his state the hegemone. The most useful recommendations are the ones involving better representation of the states the provide the resources and arms in the UN. Reforms that were unacceptable are the powers to give the Security Council more authority to hand over conflicts to the ICC to help prevent conflict. The ICC believes in surpassing state sovereignty which then is opposite of what maintainer voices like Morganthau and Machiavelli believe. What’s missing if that the UN could give more incentives to being involved to rewarding those who participate the most in the UN and give most of their resources and arms to have the most voice and representation in the workings of the UN.

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I am writing this brief as a junior partner in the law firm Grotius, Mitrany, Pearson and Brandt (Amsterdam and Toronto). I met with Grotius, Mitrany and Brandt and the following ideas are based both on my views and their suggestions on the UN’s major recommendation in their 2004 report. My position is based on a system reformer worldview and it is reflected in our recommendations of what we agreed with and what we did not agree with about the report. In our current system, there are a lot of issues that need to be addressed in order to reform the system. To do this, states must not only pledge their help and cooperation, they must truly commit themselves in order to ensure that positive changes are made. Multilaterism and cooperation from the P-5 and from other member states is key to the successful execution of reforms. This is difficult when we live in a maintainer society, so another issue is illustrating that it is in everyone’s national interest to reform and counter the threats and problems that are plaguing our world. Many of the problems that the world face are interrelated or perpetuate other and bigger issues. To create cooperation there needs to be a creation of International Law and international regimes. Grotius believed in International Law in which he explained in Laws of War and Peace. Grotius believed that to expand peace, their needed to be some system of rule that could govern all states P 54. His ideas were some of the foundational ideas of International Law and cooperation. Natural Law is part of the Grotian perspective in that human nature upholds certain standards and morals that reason is needed in order to apply rules and laws p 693. International Law has evolved from the age of Grotius to involve the idea of reciprocity or how International law was the result from cooperation of states; states are obliged by this law to uphold the rules.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: UN Report Analysis
International law and a rule based system will create system or reciprocity. Through reciprocity, states will uphold the rules because of the mutual benefits, and hope of mutual gain and needs. In Grotian time, people were obliged to uphold rules because God deemed it so, but now it is based on states consent and every state has sovereignty to make their own decisions. p. 355. The system is anarchic so it is important to organize society through international Law and these laws will be enforced by people in the International society (notes). Man is both good and evil and the system is anarchic; International Law is important in creating cooperation and counter the anarchy of the system and a platform in which reform can be enacted. (Wight handout). It is meant to both manage the system but also work to solve the problems in the system. Grotius also advocated the idea of “just war” or jus ad bellum described in Laws of War and Peace. This is the laws that dictate when it is legal to wage war and under what circumstances.p350. P 193 David Mitrany was an integration theorist. Integration theorists believe in integration or the process in which there is a growing cooperation and union between states in a regional or international context (200). The cooperation includes problem solving of technical problems or ramification as Mitrany described it. Mitrany believed that in order for states to problem solve or to modernize their needed to be transnational cooperation to deal with common problems. His process of “ramification” meant that if their was cooperation in one sector or area, it would lead to governments spreading that cooperation into other sectors. The increased integration of states in cooperation efforts would mean that there would be higher costs if they decided to withdraw their support. This idea was also called “functionalism” or how states could cooperate to create regimes in certain areas that would have a “spillover” affect ion onto other areas. (notes and bs).

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Brandt and Brandt Report

The discrepancy between the North and South and the concerns that came along with how underdeveloped the global south remains well the global north experiences economic growth is of much concern. This report examined elements and challenges of interdependence and development and how to create modernization and growth in the global south. P 331. Issues of poverty and disease need to be addressed along with the economic issues of how countries can work together to help the less fortunate. Other issues include environmental degradation which can perpetuate other problems. http://www.stwr.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=7#OVERVIEW

There are many important issues discussed in the report but there are only 3 I will discuss that I believe will get support of the maintainers.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: UN Report Analysis
Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 TA Dan Tauss Prof. Lamy Detailed position statement, from the collective worldviews of Kant, Penn, J. Adams, and Falk, on the recommendations set forth by “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.” (United Nations Report) The proposed ideas and UN reforms set forth in “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” closely mirror the opinions of those in our law firm in many respects. First, the UN report suggests that the cornerstone to the development of world security and peace lies in the development of those countries that are considered undeveloped. The UN suggests that the nations that are already developed contribute more to the development of these undeveloped nations; the report calls for donor countries to reach a 0.7 percent gross national product target for Overseas Development Assistance.1 The Kantian perspective acknowledges the importance of such suggestions. Our firm believes that states should be more economically interdependent and establish stronger linkages.2 We understand that the suggestions set forth by the UN would help advance this goal by helping to enable less developed states to participate further in the world economy. Concurrently, our firm promotes the idea that all states should contribute to the advancement of rights for under-developed states. In this UN report, the responsibility of individual states to provide for the welfare of its own people is recognized but the importance of the advancement of collective security is emphasized. The establishment of a Peacekeeping Commission that would address the collapse of

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Anand Panyararachun. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004 p. 28; sec. 60 2 Lamy, Steven. "IR-210 Lecture." University of Southern California. 11.30.05

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states and the rebuilding of post-war states is also recommended in the report.3 Furthermore, our firms’ stance on war, which mirrors Falk’s recommendations, is well represented in the UN report. Richard Falk emphasized that war must be tamed in order for humane governance to be achieved.4 The UN report provides a close parallel to this stance in its report. Conversely, though, our firm recommends the elimination of standing armies, while the UN report does not provide a significant stance on the advancement of this doctrine. Furthermore, the UN report calls for a greater enthusiasm for disarmament, namely the reduction of the world’s supply of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, the report allows for the execution of war on states based on five criteria: seriousness of the threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences.5 Our firm takes an opposing stance on war. We believe that, in order for peace to ensue, accountability and collective security must be emphasized rather than war and violence. The most useful recommendations of the UN report, unacceptable recommendations of the report, and missing elements Our firm considers most of the UN report to contain very useful recommendations to states, namely developed nations. Nonetheless, many of the recommendations provided in the report are unsatisfactory. Our firm supports the emphasis placed on collective security. It is the responsibility of the world’s developed nations to assist in the economic and social development of undeveloped states. We take this stance because the individual governmental powers of undeveloped states are not always strong enough to provide for the necessary human rights and economic advancement accommodations
3

Anand Panyararachun. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004 p. 83; sec. 261-269 4 Lamy, Steven. "IR-210 Lecture." University of Southern California. 11.30.05 5 Anand Panyararachun. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004 p. 67; sec. 207

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to materialize. Furthermore, if developed states were to implement this recommendation, the increased interdependence resulting from states’ development would advance the spread of ethical ideas and cooperation. On the other hand, we disagree with the report’s apparent acceptance of war. While the UN insists that war only be a last resort, we propose that war be abolished altogether. Moreover, standing armies should be eliminated. Standing armies do not advance world security; much to the contrary standing armies fuel the world arms race, drain resources, and have a negative impact on politics in the home country.6 Our firm is further supportive of the UN redefining of the security threats that face our world today. While the UN was created mostly to prevent the atrocities of the World Wars from being repeated, more unique threats face the world today. In connection with the UN’s acknowledgement that many states cannot take on problems alone, the UN has taken on more responsibility by including on their agenda threats such as: economic and social threats, inter-state conflicts, terrorism, international organized crime, and nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons.7 In regards to the reform of the UN Security Council, our firm takes an opposing stance. In dealing with an anarchic system of states, a federation of states is recommended. The proposed UN Security Council reforms would give more power to states that contribute the most to the UN financially, militarily and diplomatically. In doing this, the UN is recommending a move to a more ‘world government’ based system rather than a federation of equal states.

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Lamy, Steven. "IR-210 Lecture." University of Southern California. 11.28.05 Devon Curtis, Paul Taylor. The Globalization of World Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005 p. 415

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While the UN report recommends the advancement of greater collective security, it fails to address the issue of education. In recommending greater collective security the UN report focuses mainly on the prevention of state collapse, the advancement of human rights and basic human needs, and economic development. Education among LDCs leads to the advancement of economic interdependence and ethical ideas.8 Furthermore, a more educated world advances the Kantian idea of a world community.9

8 9

Lamy, Steven. "IR-210 Lecture." University of Southern California. 11.30.05 Lamy, Steven. "IR-210 Lecture." University of Southern California. 11.21.05

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Final Consensus Our three law firms discussed the UN reforms and have come to a consensus on some UN reforms but have also disagreed on certain aspects of others. The first reform we discussed was nuclear proliferation and the terrorism threat. We have decided that non-proliferation of WMDs is a positive reform and worth devoting special attention. The law firm Machiavelli, Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Mearshimer (MNMM) believe that security is as important as political power; therefore, they support all actions of nonproliferation. All three firms want to ensure that WMDs do not fall into the hands of terrorists. However, maintainers will maintain their current defense systems until they have guaranteed that all other countries are following protocol. The law firm of Grotius, Mitrany, Pearson, and Brandt (GMPB) agrees with non-proliferation, but for different reasons. They believe it is everyone’s best interest that states cooperate because if the UN does not have the commitment of states, this reform will not be as effective or credible. The law firm of Kant, Penn, J. Addams, and Falk (KPJF) as transformers are very much in agreement of this reform however war and standing armies should be eliminated all together. Another reform on which the firms found consensus is the collective security reform. Each firm supports the idea of cooperatively suppressing global threats. From the maintainer law firm, collective security would be supported as long as it beneficial to their national interest. The reformer law firm believes that collective security is definitely an important reform because through multilateralism and cooperation, they can work to overcome global threats. KPJF supports collective security to fight global threats, but they also go a step further by supporting the development of the global south.

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The last reform the firms discussed was conflict prevention. MNMM supports certain aspects of conflict preventions long as they can maintain a position as a rulemaker. For example, they are not against the strengthening of the ICC, however they are not in support of the policies that weaken their sovereignty. Maintainers do not promote governing management of natural resources to countries in conflict, unless it is their interest. The reformer law firm believes that this reform is extremely important. In terms of internal conflict, GMPB believes that this reform will save resources by making sure the problem does not escalate into a more complex and difficult issue.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: UN Report Analysis
Nathan Wood IR210 Lamy TA: Dan Tauss Chicago and Milan Firm The position of Machiavelli, Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Mearsheimer is one of realism. The basis of all these voices believe in is the struggle for power. Foundational realisms like Machiavelli believe that everyone is out to get us, which can closely be paralleled with Mearsheimer’s “Offensive Realism”. What they believe is that we stop thinking of wishful behavior of what we should do and take care of what needs to be done now to retain political power. They will also forgo any ethics, religion, or charity in order to gain political power. This thought is explained by sacrificing morals for what is more important. What is more important than morals and ethics is to enhance the power and security of the state. Morganthau, the father or realism, echos the duality of morality. His voice is therefore less crude and would choose to act in the lesser evils, but will also forgo ethics to gain political power and security. Morganthau is a voice that doesn’t believe in taking offensive stances. He would rather let the world come to the individual state rather than go out and solve problems. Mearsheimer also believes in state-interests as their policy for action, but takes a more aggressive stance on his offensive realist view. They all carry a very barbaric and selfish policy to realism excluding Morganthau who believes in keeping morals as long as it doesn’t stand in the way of high-policy issues. In applying the UN reforms to each of the major voices we hear a collective realist view. Machiavelli would be more likely to push his policy on the UN reforms to strengthen his exclusive state interests. The recent reforms cover an all-inclusive world, which Machiavelli could not even begin to take interest in. He would rather that his state internally became powerful and then start cutting off competitors to power. Which

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follows his notion of climbing up the ladder and pulling it up behind him. Morganthau of the three realists, would accept the most of all the aspects of each present UN reform. Morganthau being the most acceptant of ethical and moral actions to a further point than Machiavelli and Mearsheimer, would function within an ethical and moral manner inside the state’s interest. Mearsheimer finds none of the reforms beneficial at all besides the fact that the UN could be used as an aggressive vehicle to make his state the hegemone. The most useful recommendations are the ones involving better representation of the states the provide the resources and arms in the UN. Reforms that were unacceptable are the powers to give the Security Council more authority to hand over conflicts to the ICC to help prevent conflict. The ICC believes in surpassing state sovereignty which then is opposite of what maintainer voices like Morganthau and Machiavelli believe. What’s missing if that the UN could give more incentives to being involved to rewarding those who participate the most in the UN and give most of their resources and arms to have the most voice and representation in the workings of the UN.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: UN Report Analysis
Summary of ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ By Anna Baxter One World Trust December 2004 On the 2nd December a High-Level Panel of the United Nations (UN) released the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, called A more secure world: our shared responsibility. The report contained recommendations on changes that could be made within the UN system so that it might better address today’s security challenges. It was commissioned by the Secretary General to attempt to address the deep divisions among Member States on the nature of the security threats faced today, and the appropriateness of the use of force to address those threats. (For more information on the composition of the Panel see Note A) When the United Nations was created in 1945 its main concern was to ensure that the horrors of the World Wars would never be repeated. Accordingly, its attention was primarily devoted to the threat of aggressive wars between states. The past sixty years, however, have witnessed massive changes in political geography. Whilst progress on life expectancy and per capita income has been made in some areas of the developing world, large areas of the world continue to experience life threatening poverty as a daily reality. In recognition of the impact that these changes have had on security, the report calls for a broader, more all-encompassing conception of the threats and challenges that we face. The report has a number of sections addressing key security concerns, the most important of which are summarized below. Collective security: One of the aspirations of the UN, as expressed in the Charter, is to provide collective security for all. The report highlights the continuing relevance of the idea of collective security today, emphasizing the mutual vulnerability of weak and strong that results from increasing global economic integration. Whilst the duty of the State to protect and provide for the welfare of its own people is recognized, historical evidence demonstrating that the state can also be unable or unwilling to perform this role is taken into account. The report insists that the principles of collective security require the international community to step in to assist in the provision, or development of the capacity to provide, necessary protection where needed. Past failures of collective action are recognized, with the report noting that ‘early warning is only effective when it leads to early action for prevention.’ A broader conception of security: In stark contrast to more traditional conceptions of security the report identifies six clusters of threats with which the world must now be concerned as elements that can feed

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into each other to produce deadly cycles of civil violence. (For more information see Note B) Sustainable development and security: Emphasis is placed on the importance of promoting development as the ‘indispensable foundation for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously.’ The report calls on all States to recommit to the goals of eradicating poverty, achieving sustained economic growth and promoting sustainable development. More specifically it calls for donor countries to establish a timetable for reaching the 0.7 per cent gross national product target for Overseas Development Assistance, for greater debt relief and improved access to global markets for poorer countries, for more resources to be channeled to stemming the AIDS pandemic, and for new initiatives to assist in the development of public health systems and to help tackle global warming. Conflict prevention: The Panel emphasizes the need for conflict prevention efforts by UN to be improved. One of their most significant recommendations is for the Security Council to be more ready to use the authority invested in it by the Rome Statute to refer cases to International Criminal Court. They also recommend that more resources be channeled through the Department of Political Affairs for diplomacy and mediation, and that sanctions be used to better effect. National leaders and parties to conflict are encouraged to make constructive use of the option of preventative deployment. The use of force: On the question of the use of force in cases where there is a perceived threat, but that threat is not immediately imminent, the Panel make it clear that they consider Article 51 of the UN Charter to provide adequate guidance. They recommend that in such cases the evidence should be presented to the Security Council, which can then decide whether or not to authorize action. If they decide not to authorize action, other options should be explored further, before potentially revisiting the military option. The Panel are clear that they do not endorse unilateral preventative action. Collectively endorsed military action, on the other hand, when all other preventative efforts have failed, is seen by the panel as a cornerstone of effective collective security. The report defines five criteria of legitimacy to govern the use of force (for more information see Note C). The Panel recognizes the need to develop the capacity of the Security Council to respond when a decision has been taken to use force, and makes recommendations to those Member States that have significant military capacity to place it at the disposal of the UN. Recommendation

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IR-210: UN Report Analysis
Peacekeeping: Recognizing the central importance of peacekeeping efforts to long-term, lasting peace, the report highlights the need for more effective coordination between the various bodies engaged in peacekeeping. The Panel recommends that national authorities be at the heart of coordination efforts, and that robust donor coordination efforts be made. Making the UN more effective: The report recommends changes to the structure of the Security Council (for more information see Note D here)It also recommends the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission. This commission would address the lack of any place in the UN system specifically designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war, or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace. It should, they propose, work in partnership with national governments to provide proactive assistance in such cases. Terrorism: The Panel suggest a definition of terrorism that emphasizes that acts of terrorism constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity (for more information see Note E). The report emphasizes the need to address the causes of terrorism and extremism as well as strengthening prevention efforts. Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons: The Panel recommends that new enthusiasm be directed towards disarmament, and that efforts be made to reduce the supply of nuclear weapons. They also recommend improvements to the enforcement capacity of the Security Council and better public health defenses to combat the threat of biological weapons. Footnotes Note A) Composition of the High Level Panel: Anand Panyarachum, former Prime Minister of Thailand CHAIR, Robert Badinter (France), João Baena Soares (Brazil), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Mary Chinery Hesse (Ghana), Gareth Evans (Australia), David Hannay (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay), Amre Moussa (Egypt), Satish Nambiar (India), Sadako Ogata (Japan), Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation), Qian Qiqian (China), Salim Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Nafis Sadik (Pakistan) and Brent Scowcroft (United States of America). Note B) A Broader Conception of Security (Synopsis to Part two) The six clusters of threats, identified in the report, as elements that can feed into each other to produce deadly cycles of civil violence are;

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• Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation • Inter-state conflict • Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide, and other large-scale atrocities • Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons • Terrorism • Transnational Organised Crime Note C) Criteria to define the use of force (207) • seriousness of threat • proper purpose • last resort • proportional means • balance of consequences Note D) Reform of the Security Council (251-254) The Panel offer two suggestions, Models A and B, of how the Security Council might be reformed. Their suggestions are guided by a desire to increase the involvement in decisionmaking of those who contribute most to the UN financially, militarily and diplomatically (in line with Article 23 of the Charter) and make the decision-making process more democratic, accountable and representative of the broader membership. • Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created and three new two-year non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas. • Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight fouryear renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas. Note E) Description of Terrorism (164 (d)) ‘Any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.’

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: UN Report Analysis
Mari Bumlao TA Dan Tauss Prof. Lamy I am writing this brief as a junior partner in the law firm Grotius, Mitrany, Pearson and Brandt (Amsterdam and Toronto). I met with Grotius, Mitrany and Brandt and the following ideas are based both on my views and their suggestions on the UN’s major recommendation in their 2004 report. My position is based on a system reformer worldview and it is reflected in our recommendations of what we agreed with and what we did not agree with about the report. In our current system, there are a lot of issues that need to be addressed in order to reform the system. To do this, states must not only pledge their help and cooperation, they must truly commit themselves in order to ensure that positive changes are made. Multilaterism and cooperation from the P-5 and from other member states is key to the successful execution of reforms. This is difficult when we live in a maintainer society, so another issue is illustrating that it is in everyone’s national interest to reform and counter the threats and problems that are plaguing our world. Many of the problems that the world face are interrelated or perpetuate other and bigger issues. To create cooperation there needs to be a creation of International Law and international regimes. Grotius believed in International Law in which he explained in Laws of War and Peace. Grotius believed that to expand peace, their needed to be some system of rule that could govern all states P 54. His ideas were some of the foundational ideas of International Law and cooperation. Natural Law is part of the Grotian perspective in that human nature upholds certain standards and morals that reason is needed in order to apply rules and laws p 693. International Law has evolved from the age of Grotius to involve the idea of reciprocity or how International law was the result from cooperation of states; states are obliged by this law to uphold the rules.

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International law and a rule based system will create system or reciprocity. Through reciprocity, states will uphold the rules because of the mutual benefits, and hope of mutual gain and needs. In Grotian time, people were obliged to uphold rules because God deemed it so, but now it is based on states consent and every state has sovereignty to make their own decisions. p. 355. The system is anarchic so it is important to organize society through international Law and these laws will be enforced by people in the International society (notes). Man is both good and evil and the system is anarchic; International Law is important in creating cooperation and counter the anarchy of the system and a platform in which reform can be enacted. (Wight handout). It is meant to both manage the system but also work to solve the problems in the system. Grotius also advocated the idea of “just war” or jus ad bellum described in Laws of War and Peace. This is the laws that dictate when it is legal to wage war and under what circumstances.p350. P 193 David Mitrany was an integration theorist. Integration theorists believe in integration or the process in which there is a growing cooperation and union between states in a regional or international context (200). The cooperation includes problem solving of technical problems or ramification as Mitrany described it. Mitrany believed that in order for states to problem solve or to modernize their needed to be transnational cooperation to deal with common problems. His process of “ramification” meant that if their was cooperation in one sector or area, it would lead to governments spreading that cooperation into other sectors. The increased integration of states in cooperation efforts would mean that there would be higher costs if they decided to withdraw their support. This idea was also called “functionalism” or how states could cooperate to create regimes in certain areas that would have a “spillover” affect ion onto other areas. (notes and bs).

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: UN Report Analysis
Brandt and Brandt Report

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The discrepancy between the North and South and the concerns that came along with how underdeveloped the global south remains well the global north experiences economic growth is of much concern. This report examined elements and challenges of interdependence and development and how to create modernization and growth in the global south. P 331. Issues of poverty and disease need to be addressed along with the economic issues of how countries can work together to help the less fortunate. Other issues include environmental degradation which can perpetuate other problems. http://www.stwr.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=7#OVERVIEW

There are many important issues discussed in the report but there are only 3 I will discuss that I believe will get support of the maintainers.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 Prof. Lamy

IR-210: UN Report Analysis

Detailed position statement, from the collective worldviews of Kant, Penn, J. Adams, and Falk, on the recommendations set forth by “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.” (United Nations Report) The proposed ideas and UN reforms set forth in “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” closely mirror the opinions of those in our law firm in many respects. First, the UN report suggests that the cornerstone to the development of world security and peace lies in the development of those countries that are considered undeveloped. The UN suggests that the nations that are already developed contribute more to the development of these undeveloped nations; the report calls for donor countries to reach a 0.7 percent gross national product target for Overseas Development Assistance.1 The Kantian perspective acknowledges the importance of such suggestions. Our firm believes that states should be more economically interdependent and establish stronger linkages.2 We understand that the suggestions set forth by the UN would help advance this goal by helping to enable less developed states to participate further in the world economy. Concurrently, our firm promotes the idea that all states should contribute to the advancement of rights for under-developed states. In this UN report, the responsibility of individual states to provide for the welfare of its own people is recognized but the importance of the advancement of collective security is emphasized. The establishment of a Peacekeeping Commission that would address the collapse of states and the rebuilding of post-war states is also recommended in the report.3
1

Anand Panyararachun. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004 p. 28; sec. 60 2 Lamy, Steven. "IR-210 Lecture." University of Southern California. 11.30.05 3 Anand Panyararachun. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004 p. 83; sec. 261-269

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: UN Report Analysis
Furthermore, our firms’ stance on war, which mirrors Falk’s recommendations, is well represented in the UN report. Richard Falk emphasized that war must be tamed in order for humane governance to be achieved.4 The UN report provides a close parallel to this stance in its report. Conversely, though, our firm recommends the elimination of standing armies, while the UN report does not provide a significant stance on the advancement of this doctrine. Furthermore, the UN report calls for a greater enthusiasm for disarmament, namely the reduction of the world’s supply of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, the report allows for the execution of war on states based on five criteria: seriousness of the threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences.5 Our firm takes an opposing stance on war. We believe that, in order for peace to ensue, accountability and collective security must be emphasized rather than war and violence. The most useful recommendations of the UN report, unacceptable recommendations of the report, and missing elements Our firm considers most of the UN report to contain very useful recommendations to states, namely developed nations. Nonetheless, many of the recommendations provided in the report are unsatisfactory. Our firm supports the emphasis placed on collective security. It is the responsibility of the world’s developed nations to assist in the economic and social development of undeveloped states. We take this stance because the individual governmental powers of undeveloped states are not always strong enough to provide for the necessary human rights and economic advancement accommodations to materialize. Furthermore, if developed states were to implement this recommendation,

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Lamy, Steven. "IR-210 Lecture." University of Southern California. 11.30.05 Anand Panyararachun. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004 p. 67; sec. 207

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-210: UN Report Analysis
the increased interdependence resulting from states’ development would advance the spread of ethical ideas and cooperation. On the other hand, we disagree with the report’s apparent acceptance of war. While the UN insists that war only be a last resort, we propose that war be abolished altogether. Moreover, standing armies should be eliminated. Standing armies do not advance world security; much to the contrary standing armies fuel the world arms race, drain resources, and have a negative impact on politics in the home country.6 Our firm is further supportive of the UN redefining of the security threats that face our world today. While the UN was created mostly to prevent the atrocities of the World Wars from being repeated, more unique threats face the world today. In connection with the UN’s acknowledgement that many states cannot take on problems alone, the UN has taken on more responsibility by including on their agenda threats such as: economic and social threats, inter-state conflicts, terrorism, international organized crime, and nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons.7 In regards to the reform of the UN Security Council, our firm takes an opposing stance. In dealing with an anarchic system of states, a federation of states is recommended. The proposed UN Security Council reforms would give more power to states that contribute the most to the UN financially, militarily and diplomatically. In doing this, the UN is recommending a move to a more ‘world government’ based system rather than a federation of equal states. While the UN report recommends the advancement of greater collective security, it fails to address the issue of education. In recommending greater collective security the

6 7

Lamy, Steven. "IR-210 Lecture." University of Southern California. 11.28.05 Devon Curtis, Paul Taylor. The Globalization of World Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005 p. 415

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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UN report focuses mainly on the prevention of state collapse, the advancement of human rights and basic human needs, and economic development. Education among LDCs leads to the advancement of economic interdependence and ethical ideas.8 Furthermore, a more educated world advances the Kantian idea of a world community.9

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Lamy, Steven. "IR-210 Lecture." University of Southern California. 11.30.05 Lamy, Steven. "IR-210 Lecture." University of Southern California. 11.21.05

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, Page 4 of 4

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Final Consensus

IR-210: UN Report Analysis

Our three law firms discussed the UN reforms and have come to a consensus on some UN reforms but have also disagreed on certain aspects of others. The first reform we discussed was nuclear proliferation and the terrorism threat. We have decided that non-proliferation of WMDs is a positive reform and worth devoting special attention. The law firm Machiavelli, Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Mearshimer (MNMM) believe that security is as important as political power; therefore, they support all actions of nonproliferation. All three firms want to ensure that WMDs do not fall into the hands of terrorists. However, maintainers will maintain their current defense systems until they have guaranteed that all other countries are following protocol. The law firm of Grotius, Mitrany, Pearson, and Brandt (GMPB) agrees with non-proliferation, but for different reasons. They believe it is everyone’s best interest that states cooperate because if the UN does not have the commitment of states, this reform will not be as effective or credible. The law firm of Kant, Penn, J. Addams, and Falk (KPJF) as transformers are very much in agreement of this reform however war and standing armies should be eliminated all together. Another reform on which the firms found consensus is the collective security reform. Each firm supports the idea of cooperatively suppressing global threats. From the maintainer law firm, collective security would be supported as long as it beneficial to their national interest. The reformer law firm believes that collective security is definitely an important reform because through multilateralism and cooperation, they can work to overcome global threats. KPJF supports collective security to fight global threats, but they also go a step further by supporting the development of the global south.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-210: UN Report Analysis
The last reform the firms discussed was conflict prevention. MNMM supports certain aspects of conflict preventions long as they can maintain a position as a rulemaker. For example, they are not against the strengthening of the ICC, however they are not in support of the policies that weaken their sovereignty. Maintainers do not promote governing management of natural resources to countries in conflict, unless it is their interest. The reformer law firm believes that this reform is extremely important. In terms of internal conflict, GMPB believes that this reform will save resources by making sure the problem does not escalate into a more complex and difficult issue.

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IR-324: Class Notes
10/12/05 12:00 PM

Midterm: themes or questions? Read Chapter 7 for next lecture Chapter 5: multilateral Chapter 6: Businesses policing themselves Handout: News article from Wall Street Journal: Syria Moves to Attract Investors Trust in the Syrian government: may go down when/if found guilty of Lebanon PM assassination Syria's chances may not be good: not a very stable government, competition from surrounding countries When you have countries with oligarchies in power, the government competes somewhat, and FDI is actually not as attractive Does the US presence affect Syria pulling out of Lebanon? Possibly a big factor What banks are going to go there? Nobody trusts banks there How can less developing countries attract FDI? FDI and globalization • When Nike hires out work to another country, it isn’t FDI WTO: possible body to enforce labor standards Could play the role of the Benevolent dictator Cheating or free riding • WTO could step in

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Class Notes

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WTO: problem: the power depends on the consent of the members. League of nations surviving body: ILO NAFTA: adhere to the ILO standards. Right to assemble, no mandatory overtime, et cetera. If you feel this is happening, you can report this. How well does this work in reality? What is the role of the ILO? A group in the UN devoted to labor issues. Provide many data. Wages, labor costs. Employment, unemployment. Need a third party that is assumed to be objectual What can we do? Target trade, but who do you target if there’s a violation • Could be the firm, could be all the products in the country High skilled industries would be hurt, low skilled would increase. This would not improve the conditions of labor. Actors will always act on their best interests Issue of sovereignty. There’s no way many countries would go for this Adding a tax decrease taxes for relocation and training of workers by MNCs. Progression from low skill to high skill How to define labor standards? Culture, purchasing power, income, et cetera What about fines? Well, how do you enforce the fines? Group of countries: collective action problems, some free-riders, things break down Labor standards and unfair advantages for exporters.

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• • •

IR-324: Class Notes
Race to the bottom Is this race to the bottom really in this firms advantage Is suppressing labor a good thing? Yes and no. Yes for very unskilled jobs, in an isolated place. For the most part, it is not beneficial to suppress labor.

Kohls’ Jeans: Jeans retail at 21.99, unit labor cost per jean .66. This is 3%. How would cutting labor costs benefit the company significantly? For the firm itself, it’s not too big of a deal to cut labor costs Low labour standards to not seem to significantly enhance the competitiveness of exports. Do they offer an unfair advantage to FDI? US firms tend to invest in countries with high labour standards, with conditions similar to the US In countries with low labor standards, less investment than would be expected (Rederick study)

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR 324

IR-324: Class Notes

Page 214 10/14/05 12:05 PM

Passed out review for midterm Basic tenants of realism • actors govern themselves with self-interest and self-help • IR are a zero sum according to realists • According to Marxists, more of a negative sum • Liberals: positive sum Know one school of thought from each of the topics on the review Why are mercantilists realists? • • • Increase state power Fundamentally fits in the realist framework Decrease imports

Keynesian thought Key difference between dependency theory and Marxist • Dependency theory: negative • Marxist: positive and necessary: workers of the world will unite stronger The basics about MNCs and FDI • OLI is geared towards: why firms go abroad o Advantages, such as internalization, competitive advantage in organization, et cetera Bargaining models • Know Botswana and Brazil cases o Botswana: successful venture between government and firms o Brazil: auto industry Why would firms not want to work with the government • Gives a bad image of running everything, even politically o Seems exploitative at times

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-324: Class Notes

Know a few reasons why Resnick thinks autocracies strengthen FDI incentives Labor being a large input cost As discussed yesterday, how much does a slightly smaller wage effect the firm? • In terms of overall cost of a product, labor costs may be a very small proportion Rules on international investment – Number 5 on review sheet • Just know the basics for these

6 and 7 are the most important • Know ISI policy • Know the idea of how FDI may increase development o Within firms o backward linkages, et cetera • Understand Akin and Harrison argument o May be competing effects • FDI and protection o FDI will increase domestic protection if it is import complementing  Import complementing: when ‘they’ go to a foreign country they import whatever imports they need into the production process • Backward linkages vs. industry spillover effects o Backward linkages  Increase the amount they are buying from local firms, gives them more of a competitive advantage  Inputs going into production must come from within the country (Backward linkages)  If it has to be a joint venture  They bring inferior technology  Doesn't enhance the development process

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Class Notes
Best way for them to develop is: • Develop tight linkage to firm and subsidiary • Parent firm has a large stake in the subsidiary • Need tight production process • Create the best backward linkages possible Botswana would be an exception to this Overall, the best way to use FDI for development, control the whole subsidiary process When putting 'technology sharing requirements,” “Backward linkages,” et cetera, it doesn’t work out best for either the state of the firm Does FDI seek lowest wage labor On Chapter #7 FDI was commonly thought to increase amount of… Roamer says: I developed a huge economic theory based on the observations of (Insert some little country here) • Its much more than just saving that FDI brings • They bring hard-to-replicate technology, business techniques, the list goes on • More than just the common-knowledge financial capital brought to developing state What can host countries do to maximize benefits and minimize costs? • Should they insure that investors are tightly integrated with foreign firms Horizontal and Vertical FDI • Horizontal: market seeking • Vertical: EPZs: cheap labor, export from that market

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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Auto Industry

IR-324: Class Notes

Many states wanted to insure that FDI would contribute more to development With too much of these, countries end up having many small plants that never achieve an economy of scale Many of these regulations end up preventing foreign firms from bringing their best technology to he state: run the risk of expropriation Electronics industry: same effects, even worse. Lack of backward linkages, brought older technology Data from 183 projects show that the majority of the operations increase income • Data also revealed that a large minority of the operations, the host nations income decreased o In whole, the overall income decreased o This was a result of high levels of protection Key here: development prospects for host country (less developed country): domestic protection requirements don’t help production and development • Want to encourage the parent country in the country to have as much control as possible o These close connections can create the backward linkages between parent and subsidiaries o May lead to reliable networks of suppliers o Many examples of this in the auto industry Discussion on expertise moving overseas (from student) • Is there less opportunity in the US now? More competitive? • More education: we are a service-based economy o broad skill o

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324

IR-324: Class Notes

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In chapter one: failure of multi-lateral agreement on investment • Why this agreement failed • Forces opposed to globalization • Contributed to this agreement failing • Agreement will kill poor countries o This is ironic • Anti-globalization debate • Different cities where the debate got going • City council of Seattle decided that they wouldn’t honour its agreements For Wednesday: Skim chapter 1, skim 2 and 3, in random book that is supposedly on the syllabus IMF and World Bank were created at a conference in New Hampshire France or Germany weren't there in 1944 Main thinker representing the UK: Kaines Five parts of the World Bank • IBRD: International bank for Reconstruction and development • International development association • IMF • International labor organization • More... OECD: Organization for economic cooperation and development • Development • Exception: Poland, Hungary, South Korea, Czech Republic • Mainly an organization of rich, developed countries Types of regional development organizations • Economic, political union Free trade area: Like NAFTA

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-324: Class Notes

Customs union • Differs from a free-trade area because: NAFTA would need the same tariffs for outside countries • Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay are part of something that sounds like “America-guay” Common market • Includes: all members have the same internal and external tariffs, add free mobility of factors of production • Such as EU: labor can move freely through the EU Economic union • Add: same currency, same fiscal and monetary policy • Means that they share a central bank • Inflation needs to be homogenous within the members, this is the solution • Like the US or Mexico Political • • • Union Control over defense policy and foreign policies The EU is fairly far off from this France and Dutch said no to the constitution

Federalist system • Levels of government o Federal, state, local  Power is shared amongst those levels Union: power is horizontal, as opposed to more ‘vertical’ for federal Big idea: income disparities in the US • How much of this can we attribute to globalization o Disparity between skilled workers and unskilled workers is very large in the United States

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Class Notes
Long discussion about the value that college adds to your life – somewhat pointless conversation

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-324
Books for the class

IR-324: Class Notes
10/19/05 12:08 PM

Friday: read chapter 4 from book online (important) Read chapter 6 for Monday Describe the “internal” and “external” hypotheses regarding the failure of the MAI • The failure of this agreement • External say: external factors (the NGOs) pressured them so it failed • Example: US and Mexico; “tuna fishing” environmental issue; American NGOs wanted Mexican fishers to be more ecologically friendly o At this point NGOs became very involved in the environmental issue o Evolved into concern about NAFTA, that it would turn everything into a race to the bottom o Positive effect? Economies of scale, more efficient o NGOs sold this agreement to make it look like it applied to the less developed countries as well, but it didn’t Internal Factors: next few questions cover this o This is an agreement between developed countries o Primarily developed countries, though some aren’t all that developed

Describe the possible political reason why the MAI failed. Hint: It has to do with the governing elite versus the governing bureaucracy • Bureaucracy was pushing this forward • Unless one gets the big image from the elite, without elite support, it was doomed (Internal) • Divisions within the countries • Jessie Helms: Helms Burton act. Senator from the south, highly conservative o Geared towards: Cubans, designed towards Cuba  Cubans in Miami don’t like the Cuban government

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Class Notes
o Allows people to expropriate Cuban capital in Miami, et cetera o Cubans in Miami loved the Helms Burton act. o Clinton signed it  Florida was a very important state o Introduction of this act made the MAI even further failed Describe the five obligations that host countries would have been required to adhere to under the MAI. Note: MFN, national treatment, transparency, performance requirements (see p. 62), investment incentives • MFN: Most Favored Nation o Foreign investment o Everybody in the group must get the same treatment o Can't tell somebody from Poland “we’ll sweeten your deal a little” et cetera o Best deal applies to everybody National Treatment: same regulations and standards and treatment to everybody who you’ve made this agreement with Transparency: All signatory countries must make publicly available all laws and regulations for foreign investors Performance requirement: Have to use input of everyone in the agreement o Can’t require that places have to transfer technology, move headquarters, establish joint venture o All os this would not be possible under the MAI agreements o Those who aren't part of the agreement don't have to apply to these thing, this is what the NGOs didn’t tell the public Investment incentives: can’t do them under MAI. o Investment incentives are wasteful

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• • •

Describe the two dispute settlement procedures that the MAI had in the draft • State to State • State to investor Important parts of this that we should know • It failed o Why did it fail

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-324: Class Notes
o Both internal and external reasons Make the process more transparent, so the NGO couldn’t skew things and make it fail Must include the elite Trying to create frameworks to regulate investment will be difficult o Investment adds a whole new dimension, rather than just trade  Trade is more short term  Control of the factors of production Huge opposition o This is the heart of globalization, and many people see this as exploitative

• • •

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR 324

IR-324: Class Notes

Page 224 10/21/05 12:08 PM

Subcontractors are being outsourced to NGOs say workers are being exploited immensely Argument that foreign firms are profiting off of the hard labor of workers overseas? • This is not true • There aren't incentives for firm to do this • Will the gap increase: everyone gains but the rich gain more • How do you define the race to the bottom • A position taken by some US anti-globalists: the wages paid are • • • lower than the worker is outputting, that’s how the rich gain more The value of what they produce exceeds what they are paid Isn't good data on this The incentive in this is for the firm to hire more workers until the marginal productivity is even. So, economically, these US antiglobalists don’t have an economically sound argument Assume the market is competitive; if it’s not, the US anti-globalists may be right Two different time frames, we are talking about the short-run

• •

What is the benefit of analyzing this in the short-run? (Question asked by student) • Data isn’t really very available for the long-run Globalization may be good, but are we making too big of a deal out of it? There are many other important factors that contribute to success of states Key argument: is globalization good or bad? When you want to keep jobs at home, are you really helping those overseas by not outsourcing (as many NGOs may say) or are you hurting them? If MNCs come home, they will be operating more inefficiently, will probably go out of business, et cetera. One of the big reasons they went overseas is

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-324: Class Notes

to survive. So bringing them home won’t necessarily decrease unemployment very much If MNCs come home, who loses? • Consumers lose o Prices go up, then interest rates increase, economy would slow Caines came in at a time when there wasn’t much employment • It was the governments responsibility to answer this question Offering a different perspective to the anti-globalization debate Should there be a world minimum wage: who wins and who loses? • Can’t really think of anyone who wins Y = C + I + G + NX (Not on midterm) • NX = Exports minus imports

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324
Handed in Midterms Trade =
Exports + imports GDP

IR-324: Class Notes

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Cuba, Iran score 2-3 higher then the US • Trade dependence Balance of payments classified in to two difference accounts • Current account • Capital and financial account • • New capitol account include foreign aid, debt relief Financial account includes capital flows

Capital is tough to define Major part of current account is the trade balance Trade deficit is not necessarily bad Know the three major accounts • Current • Financial • Capital Current account imbalance is the difference between savings and investment Increasing economic interconnections make the likelihood of conflict go down China is export led growth Big issue for China and the US: Human rights issues in Taiwan Chile was led by a Marxists for a while in the 60s • This was a problem for the US o Cold War

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IR-324: Class Notes

Chile’s strategy to ‘Open Up’ • Tried to join NAFTA • Only joined Merrick Osur (sp?) • Don’t want to be burdened by high external tariffs • Agreements with México, Canada, Bolivia Chile History • Spanish came in 1546, set up a forced labor system • Resistance by the locals • 1810, a group of nationalists declared independence, Spain tried to • • • • • • • • • • re-establish control Independence began with an Irish dictator Declared a parliamentary democracy in 1891 Chile is now a presidential democracy These last 50 years, Chile has been successful, with the exception of a few dark periods, namely in the 70s In 1964, Frei won the presidency under the banner of revolution and freedom Ambitious program for reform, housing programs Foreign mining interests Economic program: imposed price control, nationalized private firms These policies led to high inflation and high public sector deficits Middle class turned against him and Pinochet, army commander, assumed control

University of Chicago Economists – Re-structuring Chile under Pinochet • Structured the economy in Chile o Stabilization policies o Dismantle controls on exchange rate o Removed controls on international capital flow • Trade liberalization • Privatization • Further tax reforms • Social policies

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Class Notes
• New economic team who promotes FDI

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Opponents of NAFTA in Chile said: we are the low man on the totem pole • We will be exporting low-income things • Have no say compared to the US

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IR-324

IR-324: Class Notes
10/31/05 12:17 PM

What drives current account? • Trade deficit in the US • Really strong demand in the US, lots of consumption BOP (Balance of Payment) deficit, governments can do two things to deal with this • Adjust or finance o Adjust: Monetary (access to money), fiscal (tax), commercial (subsidies, tariffs, etc.) o Finance: borrow from external sources (politically costly, especially dealing with the IMF) US deficit only started in the 70s • Gold backing the greenback How is the international monetary system structured • Major movement in this system is FDI o Going in and taking control • Fixed system • Does FDI affect trade imbalance • Was 35 dollars for an ounce of gold • Gold standard set up a fixed exchange rate, rates were set up in relation to gold o Opened things up internationally o Liberals were in favor of this system o Promotes market integration From WWI and WWII, what was the system like? • It was competitive • Protection through tariffs • Currency competition The problems with the floating exchange rate • Volatility in the short run • Misalignment in the long run (A rate which is not optimal for you)

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Class Notes
Period between WWI and WWII • Monetary relations were competitive, disruptive • Now it is more free • At the end of WWII, Breton Woods o Encouraged a more open international system o To prevent many political problems, and thus wars o Trade prevents political problems  States depend on other states and have interest in them o We don’t have the fixed exchange rates anymore o Based on post-war, interventionist, liberal compromise o o o o o o o o Monetary stability Ensured flexibility to ensure domestic interests Fixed, but adjustable exchange rate Major result: creation of the IMF IMF role: lender of last resort Support for capitol controls over speculative, short-term FDI Chile did do this Chile discouraged speculation by increasing taxes for certain things  If one took money out within a year, had to pay higher taxes, et cetera

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Success • • •

of the IMF is a big debate Choose to join the IMF, pay a quota based on GDP Countries can barrow beyond their quota When borrowing from the IMF, the big deal is conditionality o The IMF then controls fiscal and monetary policy in the borrowing country, to a point dependent on the amount borrowed compared to GDP

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IR-324

IR-324: Class Notes
11/2/05 12:02 PM

Reading for today: Cohn chapter 7 Debt and debt crisis • What happened in Latin America in the late 80s domestically? • One option: borrow from the IMF • Strong political effect from high debt • Debt as a percentage of exports • Exports: earn foreign exchange and ability to pay off debt Debt relief • Originally made up of church groups • Jubilee: an NGO o Started the movement to wipe away debt

Paper could be about the movement of debt relief • Much of which could be focused on what is happening now A country have deficit when payments abroad are greater than what they receive Debt crisis is when country cannot pay principle and/or interest payments with export income Major periods of debt crisis • One in the 30s, 70s, 80s, 90s Difference between the 30s and the 70s • Losses in the 30s were fragmented among individual bondholders • In the 70s, the banks were doing the lending A spike in oil prices in the 70s • Income by oil companies went to banks in the US, who in turn made incredible amounts of loans • There was large amount of money available In 1994

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Class Notes
• • • • • • Presidential candidate was assassinated in Mexico Assassination signaled political instability People sold stock in Mexico, huge increase in the supply of Pesos, inflation and crisis The US bailed Mexico out with a huge loan If one expects currency to lose value, one sells stocks, et cetera Other factors influencing this: Overvalued exchange rate (Import substitution) and new president in ’94 began devaluation process of the Peso IMF lending may be too slow, and bias on IMF lending: Mexico may get funding and Kenya may not

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Exports is an indicator of ability to bring in reserves Liberalizing capitol account: that’s what this is all about • Allowing people to buy stocks and bonds in one’s country • Countries open up FDI first • For countries having trouble managing this Debt relief • Is it good or bad? • How is it beneficial to wipe out debt of another country? Alternatives to debt relief • Trade agreements The higher the debt-to-export ratio, the bigger the effect on FDI going into that country If borrowed money goes into things that may increase FDI, there would be a positive effect on democracy If this doesn’t work, one would have to borrow from IMF, which may have a negative effect on democracy

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IR-324: Class Notes
11/7/05 12:03 PM

Handed back midterms: got a 14 out of 15 Capitol controls don’t really work • Looks primarily at Chile • Main problems with capitol controls: people find a way around them o Besieged by loopholes o Leads to corruption • Two types of capitol controls o Formal: government is monitoring o Indirect: taxes, currency, exchange rates • Capitol coming in would appreciate its exchange rate • • • • In Chile, it was more of a development tool In the 90s, it was designed to respond to crisis Political corruption o Corruption more prevalent on the outflows Controls on Short-term capitol o Total amount of capitol controls did not go down o Long-term capitol went up, while short term went down o Small producers hurt by this  Only have access to local markets Short-term controls could become long-term, and could then be inefficient Why not recommend this policy for Ethiopia? o It assumes that foreign investors are going there o Short-term capitol controls would create even more uncertainty

• •

Other good points in this article • Countries were trying to maintain a fixed exchange rate, but this didn’t help. Had to keep a floating exchange rate • Chile focused on the short term, while focusing on keeping the long-term things open • Malaysia: responded negatively to IMF, who promoted one-size-fitsall perspective • Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Class Notes
• • • Malaysia cut government spending, but didn’t have IMF to use as a scapegoat Three groups: Malays, Indians, and Chinese How does this play into the capitol controls o Socialist-like policy of creating equality o Social equality How does this matter for Malaysia’s response to the crisis? o The IMF has a cookie-cutter prescription for changing policy o Malaysia came up with a special prescription catered to Malaysia Has Malaysia been successful? Yes, in the short-term Need confidence in the exchange rate IMF prescribed tied fiscal and monetary policies, bank closures, improvement in banking regulations and oversight, structural reforms (liberalization of trade, ownership of monopolies [increasing market competition])

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IR-324: Class Notes
11/14/05 12:08 PM

Creating societies with overlapping identities • When groups begin to struggle, it will be less likely that it will result in violence • How does globalization fit in? o Foreign firms typically have more sophisticated management ideas  Bringing this into foreign states can help overlap identities Problem systems for minorities • Multicultural policies can be good, but what if those cultural policies • violate our idea of human rights, et cetera Allowing for multiculturalism is more complex than may seem, because of contradictions between cultures

Theories promoting the idea that growth is resultant of a society’s culture are problematic Myth: having a lot of diversity ends in clashes in culture • Usually is merely a struggle over inequality and resources • Economically oriented • Example: France: it is mostly a result of unemployment; but most of the unemployed are of a certain culture Corruption causes huge inefficiencies Three myths • Some cultures are more likely to make development progress than others ROMA: the gypsies • Widely discriminated against • Associated with laziness, unproductiveness • Largely uneducated

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Class Notes
In Brazil, only two of the cabinet members are Afro-Brazilian, though almost half of the population is Afro-Brazilian Going from a majoritarian system to a proportional system • Trying to be more inclusive of minorities • Government spending goes up • Example: New Zealand; A parliamentary system

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Chapter 3 of reading

IR-324: Class Notes
11/16/05 12:00 PM

Majority rule can persecute minorities How to build a democracy in the midst of a very diverse state Africa: many different languages Fundamental to democracy • Education • Voting Federalism and a proportional electoral system Indigenous people can be hurt by governments working with multinationals Nigeria is much more diverse then Botswana • Leaders come from the same groups, and identify with the people • If a state is more diverse, redistribution may be less ‘fair’ Should legal system be common law, or traditional • Traditional law is often underdeveloped and arbitrary • For a multinational, traditional law is problematic Wall Street Journal Article • China’s anti-monopoly laws • Could be used in a bad way • Mush world political oversight • China is not ready to enforce this law: lack of training and infrastructure • The Chinese have let foreign firms in very easily before this, and even beforehand States in the US compete for FDI

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Class Notes
May be easier for FDI to manipulate a federalist system than other, such as centralized If Wal-Mart were to move overseas, is it an extension of US nationalism, i.e. the US government

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11/21/05 12:03 PM

Teach for America presentation Review for Final December 5th noon – 1 pm • Bring exam 1 and 2 from this semester “Globalization, Gender, and Poverty: Bangladesh, Woman Workers, in Export and Local Markets” • Journal of International Development 2004 (16) p. 93-109 • Kabeer, Naila and Mahmud, Simeen Roderick and Dresnic Trying to Debunk the myth that MNCs contribute to the ‘race to the bottom’ Roderick • Sense and non-sense in the globalization debate • After the great depression o Social agreement between people and government o FDIC created, Social Security, Government would provide jobs o Government has to spend more money to do all of this • Globalization tears at these arrangements • Opens up new markets for employers, but not employees • Who does it hit the worst in the US? o Low skilled workers o Workers who are most replaceable o These people are hurt by globalization, which is problematic • Globalization makes the bargaining power of labor less effective • ISI: substitute imports with domestic production • Low wages are directly related to low productivity • Trade deficits: the result of savings and investment o US has a very low savings rate, high investment rate o This results in an imbalance • Misconception: life hasn’t improved for Southeast Asian workers o Life has improved overall • If we ship jobs to China: scarcity of aggregate demand

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Class Notes
o Would argue differently; any economist would point out: productivity from the Chinese worker would be less Multinationals engage in: regulatory arbitrage In many countries, there are no standards The race to the bottom hypothesis appears logical, but it is not FDI is flowing to the regions and countries with the highest standards, for the aforementioned reasons and more

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• • • •

Analytical literature review for essay: 5-7 pages • Make the end a research question • Look at 3-5 academic articles

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IR-324: Class Notes
11/28/05 12:02 PM

Regression Results handout Globalization, Gender and Equality Women working under EPZs are unequivocally better off EPZs are specifically set up by the host government for the foreign firms Bangladesh • Overpopulated, unskilled, small geographically • High population density • Patriarchal society

Labor market in Bangladesh • People are migrating to urban cities • Agriculture is not a viable future for Bangladesh • Enormous surplus of labor In the 80s, Bangladesh turned to globalization • That’s the point of this article • Bangladesh hit its stride in the 90s • Bangladesh pioneered micro-credit accounts The rise of an export centered garment industry has changed the face of the female work sector • Has been largely female employment (garment industry) • Female employment in the garment industry has increased exponentially Why the preference for woman? • They are cheaper Lower returns than men with equivalent skills Woman workers offers employers a low-cost workforce that is more docile then the male workforce

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IR-324: Class Notes

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Tables presented in article Most important uses of earnings per category of workers In the case of Bangladesh, globalization has had a positive impact on women in a number of ways When looking at the women surveyed, it is clear that the women in the EPZs are better off Another issue: the transformation that this has had on the relation between men and woman and how each are viewed in their society 39% of EPZ garment workers are self-reliant • Really important in patriarchal societies It is important to choose carefully the two or more groups being compared, as it has an enormous effect on what the results portray

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Creating the final exam Regulating FDI

IR-324: Class Notes
11/30/05 12:01 PM

Final is from 11-1 on the 9th Mmmmm… Pizza Main topics: FDI, labor, government, pros and cons of globalization, regulation Final questions • *1) Should LDC view MNCs as a positive force in development? • *2) How has FDI affected labor in LDCs?; What effect does FDI have on unskilled workers? What is the reality of the race to the bottom? Roderick, Dresner, Muran • *3) How has globalization been a positive or negative force on culture? Explain which you believe. • *4) How does globalization help women in a patriarchal society? Cite an example. • **5) What is the most important thing you have learned in this class, and how does it relate to world politics? Explain. • *Pick two, but must know answer to all; **Must do • A page to a page an a half each

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Assignments
IR 324: Homework 1 Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77
1. The class IR 324 is designed to teach students to understand the way in which the world is globalizing, including how it will continue to do so; more specifically the way in which Multinational Enterprises influence and are influenced by the changes that globalization has brought about. The class avoids the traditional IR topics of nation-states as actors in the global picture and instead concentrates on MNEs and their role as actors in the world economy and politics. 2. The US firm would benefit greatly from its purchase of the call center in India which it had outsourced to previously, given the right conditions. First and foremost, it would eliminate another link in its chain of production (or service in this case, as it is a call center) and would thus eliminate a drain of potential profit. Concurrently, the firm could “Transfer prices” and avoid taxes by depressing profits in the state with a higher tax rate and inflate profits in the state with a lower rate. 3. Net foreign factor income is, in essence, the difference between Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Product. NFFI would indicate the extent to which a country is invested in foreign states in relation to the extent that foreign states are invested in the said country. This is important to IR students mainly because it illustrates the degree to which a state has globalized, and where it stands in comparison to other states (i.e. Is it a third-world state or developed superpower?)

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4. Of the three approaches to IR, the liberalists consider transnational actors to be most important, in relation to the other theories’ followers. Liberalists envelope more of a bottom-up approach than, say, realists; most importantly the theory
2

explicitly promotes the idea that other states are very important actors in the

global economy, and must be understood and dealt with in some way. Realists take the opposite approach in that they hardly consider the importance of foreign states, and are more concerned with defending the security of their own state. 5. BOP, or Balance of Payments, is an indicator of the extent to which a state is receiving funds from foreign states minus the amount that it is paying out to foreign states. For example, the United States has been running a BOP deficit for some time now, because it imports a large quantity of products (thus pays out large sums to foreign states) and doesn’t export as much (thus doesn’t receive as many funds from foreign states).

2 Keith Parker

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Assignments
IR 324: Homework 2 Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77
1. In the UN World Investment Report, the chapter entitled “The Shift Towards Services” can be summer up by three major points. First, outsourcing various services has increased in recent years, and the services are becoming more diverse. Large corporations have moved many services, which would have not been seen as outsourcing candidates years ago, overseas. Some of these services include R & D in all fields, business processing, and many other services. Secondly, as technology and education in developing countries increases, the outsourcing of these services has become more widespread. While companies originally may have been skeptical about trusting a firm in India with their firm’s accounting, evidence has shown that it is well worth it to do so. The reasons for this include financial incentives, but it is also being noticed that the quality of work is quite impressive in most cases. Lastly, outsourcing is not only done in developing countries, it is often carried out in developed countries: Ireland has a very large amount of call centers servicing foreign firms. Furthermore, outsourcing is not a “zero-sum” operation. If a company outsources to another state, both states gain from the transaction. Most importantly, jobs aren’t lost in the home country, in the long term at least. 2. If your firm is merely outsourcing to another state, it is not an MNC. To be an MNC, the corporation must have a physical presence within the border of another state. Foreign direct investment would qualify a corporation as being an MNC.

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3. The government of Ethiopia is trying to play an important role in promoting FDI in the state mostly by making it easy to be done. The government has made quicker and simpler many processes that are required to invest in the state through various means. One point in which the government of Ethiopia may improve their income of FDI is though promoting the benefits of investment, rather than just the ease of entry. Further, a more stable government and more deal making with MNCs may improve the position of Ethiopia. 4. The top countries of the Inward FDI Performance Index tend to be either small city-states, such as Singapore, or underdeveloped countries only recently moving into the world economy, such as Congo. At first glance the country list wouldn’t seem to be accurate, but this may be a result of the method they use to make the list. The list is weighted by the size of the country, so what the list is actually telling the reader is the amount of FDI inflow a state is receiving in comparison the states entire economy, in relation to other states. The measure could be good for some purposes, such as identifying which countries’ governments are particularly skilled at promoting FDI or how dependent a state is on foreign firms. For other purposes, such as identifying which states have the most overall FDI or which states the world economy is most willing to enter, the measure is not very reliable. 5. In this class, the most important thing I have learned so far would be the way in which governments work so closely with outside firms who may or may not be willing to invest in their country. Also, the way in which governments incite firms to invest and the type of government to look for when a firm is searching for

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-324: Assignments
potential states in which to invest. This is most important largely because it applies directly to my Business major, though the other elements of the class may arguably be more important depending on the career path I choose.

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IR-324: Assignments

AT Kearney’s study on trends in FDI raises a variety of facts that would potentially help many executives in decisions of FDI. First, Executives are less wary in entering foreign markets. This is exemplified by the fact that fewer CEOs prefer mergers and acquisitions as their preferred mode of entry into a foreign market this year. While 45% preferred mergers and acquisitions last year, only 39% do this year. As firms become more daring in entering foreign markets, they begin to prefer more direct forms of FDI rather than the safer path of merging with or acquiring foreign firms that are already established. This is important to know because if provides executives with the knowledge of what other executives are doing; further, the trends that are advancing must have some sort of extra value and are most likely worth looking into. Secondly, the US and Europe seem to be coming closer in relations, at least in terms of FDI. This year, as compared to last, the US ranked European countries higher in desirability for FDI. The Europeans, in turn, also ranked the US higher than they had previously. Despite the growing FDI desirability of many other low-cost FDI options overseas, firms are leaning more and more towards states that are already developed in terms of infrastructure, economy, and other issues. This is seen by firms in the US to rate higher FDI prospects in Europe, and vies versa. This is important to know, as the fact demonstrates which qualities other firms are viewing as most valuable in potential candidates for FDI. Furthermore, more countries this year are deciding to offshore, despite image concerns. Previously, firms had often been unwilling to offshore operations, as it often

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Assignments
deteriorates the firm’s image in the global community. As more firms become less worried about image deterioration, it becomes apparent that consumers are becoming less concerned about a firm’s decision to offshore. This analysis reflects on the social trend of consumers. This is important for an executive as it opens the door wider for offshoring. Further emphasizing a previous point, the study has found that developed countries tend to be more desirable for FDI. Firms prefer countries that are developed, even if they cost significantly more than undeveloped countries. This is for a variety of reasons including stability, education, intellectual property protection, and others. This is important to know, as most common knowledge suggests otherwise: that firms are looking for the cheapest country possible. This information displays the idea that not every industry prefers under-developed countries for FDI, and further illustrates the difference between labor and wages. Despite increased interest from the US to Europe for FDI, the 10 new EU members have a few visible problems that must be overcome in order to be more attractive to investors. Of these, the most prominent are poor infrastructure, corruption, and deteriorating low-cost advantage. This is important to know, as this analysis breaks down the broad fact that the US is viewing Europe as more desirable for FDI. It is shown that, while many European countries have strong attractiveness, namely the UK, Ireland, Germany, and France, others are not as attractive. Further, these facts inform a firm as to what needs to be developed in, say, one of these 10 new EU members after entering the country (i.e. corruption or education).

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IR 324 Midterm Answer all three questions and be specific 1. Describe how FDI flows and which countries have the largest stocks of FDI flows. Is this data important to know? Why? 2. In your opinion is FDI beneficial for workers in LDCs? Explain your answer in detail. 3. Is it necessarily in the best interest of MNCs to exploit labor? Can you give an example to support your answer?

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Midterm
Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 Midterm 1. Describe how FDI flows and which countries have the largest stocks of FDI flows. Is this data important to know? Why? FDI, foreign direct investment, flows from countries that are economically, and usually politically, prosperous. These countries are typically in the ‘North.’ The major players in FDI are the United States, Japan, The EU, and increasingly China. After the Second World War, the United States accounted for three-quarters of new FDI. FDI has risen in importance over the last few decades, and now accounts for more than twenty percent of global GDP. After flowing from the aforementioned affluent nations, FDI flows to underdeveloped nations. These nations are typically in the ‘South’ and are considered LDCs. Key players on the receiving end of FDI include China, India, and many other states around the world. Because most of the world isn’t ‘developed’ (in the American sense of the word), most of the world is potentially at the receiving end of FDI. It is important to know where FDI flows to and from, largely because FDI has a strong influence on control and the economy. The controlling aspect of FDI is somewhat complex. Before the initial investment in a foreign state, the investor typically has the most control. After the investment, though, it is the state receiving the investment that has the control. Nonetheless, this idea is merely a theory, and is not concrete in its validity. Information on the flow of FDI is also important in analyzing the economies of both the receiving and investing states. Information on the amount of FDI coming from a state, as well as FDI coming into a state, combined with other factors such as the improvement of a state’s economy, can help other states to understand what might be the best state policy to adopt in regards to FDI.

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2. In your opinion is FDI beneficial for workers in LDCs? Explain your answer in detail. FDI can be beneficial to workers in LDCs and has been beneficial in a variety of ways. First, it is nearly impossible to argue that people being employed as a direct result of FDI are making less money than they would have absent the FDI. FDI benefits workers more than just monetarily, though. The firms associated with FDI in a foreign state are usually more technologically advanced than the local firms in the foreign state. Further, these firms tend to be more advanced in organization and management, among other aspects of operation. Consequently, workers gain valuable knowledge that they keep with them even after leaving the company from which they gained it. In relation to the value added to workers after leaving a company, an externality is created for the state itself if those workers go on to start their own company or work for a local firm. Although it is seen that workers benefit in many ways from FDI, it should be understood that most controversy related to workers’ benefits is derived from the working conditions that one is faced with. Though conditions are often extremely subpar to what society in the West is accustomed to, the state receiving the FDI has a few options to change these conditions. Of these, the most prominent option is to increase the education of workers. By doing this, labor resulting from FDI moves from the unskilled sector to the skilled sector. Ergo, companies will treat their workers better so as not to lose them, because they will be harder to replace. Yet another benefit to workers comes from lower prices for goods that the workers may purchase for living expenses, and increased wages for workers in firms associated with inter-industry trade with the aforementioned company. Through backward linkages, firms within a state benefit from the foreign firms purchase of goods in bulk. The increase in production by those in the backward linkages lowers

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-324: Midterm
prices, and often results in knowledge gained by these firms. Though this principally benefits other firms, the effects are felt by workers as well, especially the workers of the firms in the backward linkages. This is only true for inter-industry trade, though. Intraindustry trade may see some companies going out of business, which could hurt workers. It is thus evident that many factors play into the extent to which workers benefit from FDI. Nonetheless, in my opinion the effects of FDI on workers is much more positive than it is negative. 3. Is it necessarily in the best interest of MNCs to exploit labor? Can you give an example to support your answer? While society often views MNCs in LDCs to be exploitive by nature, this is usually not the case. MNCs tend not to exploit labor largely because it is not beneficial to them. Consider the case of the Philippines’ first EPZ, or Export Processing Zone. This EPZ was geographically isolated and the labor force was largely unskilled. The EPZ failed for these reasons. Following this failure, the next three EPZs established by the Philippine government were successful. They were successful because they were located near larger urban centers whose workforce was more skilled. Unskilled workers are easily exploitable, because they can be replaced easily. Skilled workers, on the other hand, are harder to replace and are exploited less for that reason. In summary, MNCs had the choice of exploiting unskilled workers in the Philippines and didn’t take advantage of it. When MNCs later had the chance to hire more skilled workers, they jumped at the opportunity. The reason for this decision made by MNCs can be found in simple economics. Consider the following scenario. An MNC needs workers for building computer motherboards. The MNC could hire 40 unskilled workers for $0.25 an hour to get the job done (thereby exploiting these workers), or hire 20 more skilled workers for

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$0.40 an hour. If the MNC were to exploit unskilled workers, it would cost $10 an hour to build their product. If the MNC were to use more skilled workers, it would only cost them $8. Therefore, it is in MNCs’ best interest not to exploit workers. Often, MNCs even help to educate their employees and effectively make them more skilled and less exploitable, as is the case with Intel’s operations in Costa Rica today.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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IR-324: Final Essay
Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 Prof. John Doces

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Article Analysis: Effects of Globalization on Central Africa

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In analyzing the effect of globalization on underdeveloped countries in Africa, namely central Africa, articles presented by Shang-Jin Wei, Yi Wu, Georgi M. Deruguian, Jeffrey Sachs, R. Sudharshan Canagarajah and C. Mark Blackden provide helpful insights into the way in which globalization has altered the economies and societies of this region. Beginning with a broad perspective, the article “Life and Death Implications of Globalization” by Shang-Jin Wei1 and Yi Wu2 provides a unique analysis of globalizations effects on society. While most research in this area analyzes the direct impact of globalization on the economic growth of a state or region, this article compares globalizations rise to the rise or fall of life expectancy and infant mortality rates. In making this comparison, a more insightful knowledge of globalization’s effect on a society at a community level is brought to light. In the article, the importance of life expectancy and infant mortality as important dimensions of a society’s well being are emphasized. Furthermore, the connection between a society’s health status and globalization provides a better picture of globalization’s effects, as the connection between economic growth and a society’s well being are not very strong.3 Moreover, studies connecting globalization with income inequality are often inaccurate because poverty and income distribution are measured differently across countries. For these reasons, the use of life expectancy and infant mortality rates provides for a much clearer and accurate analysis. One of the most apparent ways in which globalization effects life expectancy and infant mortality comes from globalization’s effects on a country’s income

1 2

Shang-Jin Wei works for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Brookings Institution, and NBER Yi Wu is a professor at Georgetown University 3 This viewpoint is presented in a review, by Rodriguez and Rodrik, of literature connecting society’s well being with economic growth. 2001

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-324: Final Essay
or growth rate. A change in income would affect the ability of a people in a country to afford medicine, health care, proper nutrition, et cetera. Naturally, though, this analysis is dependant on the effect of globalization on a country’s income and growth rate, which is highly controversial. A more stable analysis looks directly at globalization’s effect on the distribution of income, holding a country’s average income as a constant. This article has assumed that a nation’s health status is largely a reflection of the health status of its low-income members.4 Therefore, according to the article’s authors, anything that improves or worsens the income distribution of a country (holding the average income constant) tends to improve or worsen that country’s health status.5 Furthermore, if the globalization increases the income inequality of a country, as many studies suggest that is does, that country’s public health status may decline. In a counter-argument to this, one might suggest that the health status of a country may rise as a result of globalization even is income inequality worsens. First, if highincome members of a society benefit from globalization by earning higher wages, a spillover effect may actually improve the health conditions of the society’s low-income workers. For example, if high-earners are able to afford more medical treatment, then hospitals will accumulate more advanced medical technology and hire more experienced staff. When low-earners go to these same hospitals, they will benefit from this as well. Second, the above argument holds constant the average income of a country. Globalization has been shown to increase the average income of a country. Therefore, if

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Wagstaff (2000) calculates child mortality rates by quintile of equivalent consumption for 9 developing countries (Three of which are in central Africa, and another being South Africa). He finds that in many countries there is a large gap between the bottom quintile and the rest of the population. 5 Many authors have shown that countries with a more equal distribution of income are healthier. See Rodgers, 1979; Flegg, 1982; Walsdmann, 1992; and Wilkinson; 1992. It is often argued that income inequality will play a more important role once the average income passes a threshold of income level (Wilkinson, 1996). Deaton (2001) surveys the literature and argues that the empirical link between income inequality and ill health is not robust.

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average income is increasing, the income of the lower-income members of a society can still increase even if income distribution is increasing as well. Further contradicting the argument made by the article’s authors is evidenced by the current state of health in central Africa. As FDI has continued to fall in Central Africa, so also have health rates. If this were a causal relationship and not just a correlation, it would be clear that the reverse would also be true: an increase in globalization would result in the increase of health. Nonetheless, this argument may not hold much water. A causal relationship must be proven; there are many other factors contributing to a society’s health than merely globalization, such as governmental provisions of health care and outside factors like AIDS.6 One of the largest problems in present-day Africa is violence, particularly between different groups. Georgi M. Derluguian7 addressed this issue in the article, “Does Globalization Breed Ethnic Violence?” Georgi raises the questions: Does globalization breed violent anti-enlightenment reactions? Can democracy take root in non-Western societies? His stance is that violent ethnic politics of recent years did not arise in a direct reaction to globalization, though they may have arisen as an indirect result. Rather, he suggests, this violence was the result of desperate attempts to dismantle the wave of developmental regimes that in some cases resulted in the collapse of states. The states under developmental regimes became impossible to sustain because they could no longer deliver on the promise of progress and national development. Therefore, violence was the result of unsuccessful globalization, namely in the central African region. The reasons for globalization’s lack of success in central Africa are numerous.

6 7

AIDS has increased as FDI has decreased, which may be the reason for declining health rates Georgi M. Derluguian is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Northwestern University

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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Many of these issues went unsolved by these developmental regimes, such as dealing with those who may bear the costs of globalization, who will regulate the profit of those who gain from it, and who will support the new system of capitalist property rights. Another problem, as presented in the article “International Economies: Unlocking the mysteries of Globalization,” by Jeffrey Sachs,8 is the geographic isolation of much of Central Africa. According to Sachs, “The gains from trade depend on the transportation costs between a national economy and the rest of the world being low enough to permit an extensive interaction between the economy and world markets.” Central Africa, due to its size, is home to a very large amount of landlocked area that suffers from this situation. Moreover, tropical areas, such as much of Central Africa, impose additional burdens such as infectious disease and poor agricultural conditions that involve soil water and pests. Sachs further asserts what has already been mentioned in this analysis: globalization may promote growing inequality and further quandaries as to whether the problem is limited to low-skilled workers in advanced economies or is this inequality is a deeper result of intensifying market forces all over the world. Going back to ethnic conflict, Georgi states that ethnic conflict is the result of globalization-gone-wrong, but there could be other reasons as well. One might assume that when income inequality increases in a society, violence does as well. Furthermore, Globalization has been shown to increase income inequality and thus may be the reason for some of the increase in violence occurring in many of these areas.

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8

Jeffrey David Sachs is an American economist known for his work as an economic advisor to governments in Latin America, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Asia, and Africa. He proposed shock therapy (though he himself hates the term) as a solution to the economic crises of Bolivia, Poland, and Russia. He is also known for his work with international agencies on problems of poverty reduction, debt cancellation, and disease control—especially HIV/AIDS, for the developing world.

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Changing perspectives, the question might be asked: Is globalization in central Africa necessary for the survival of Central Africans? It is estimated that Africa would need to grow by five percent every year just to keep the number of poor from rising. Further complicating Africa’s situation, the African economy, in terms of its share of exports and imports, has been declining. From 1970 to the end of the 1990s, Africa’s share of world exports has fallen from 3.5% to 1.5%.9 Keep in mind, though, that this represents their share of the world economy, not an actual increase or decrease in exports or imports. From this analysis, it is clear that globalization in Central Africa has had some negative effects on its society, such as the indirect (or direct) increase in violence. Further, many argue that globalization in underdeveloped countries merely results in increased income inequality and potentially even lower health. Nonetheless, studies have indisputably shown that globalization is, overall, healthy for an economy. With all of the current crises looming over Africa, is globalization necessary in order to pull Africa out of a slump, or will it cause more harm then help?

9

From “Gender and Growth in Africa: Evidence and Issues,” by C. Mark Blackden and R. Sudharshan Canagarajah, World Bank, 2003 Keith Parker, Page 5 of 5

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Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 Prof. John Doces

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Final Exam

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How has FDI affected labor in LDCs? What effect does FDI have on unskilled workers? What is the reality of the race to the bottom? FDI often has a negative connotation. Nonetheless, FDI has had an enormous impact on the lives and standard of living for citizens of foreign countries, namely LDCs. This impact has been largely positive. Furthermore, FDI not only benefits the host country but also the home country. When considering FDI, the citizens of the home country often believe that jobs are merely being ‘shipped overseas’ and unemployment will rise. For those in the host country, FDI seems to be monopolizing the local market, keeping locals from ‘making it big,’ while all of the ‘good’ jobs and benefits stay home. First, in considering the home country, FDI makes it possible to accomplish things overseas for a much lower price and makes possible the existence of many firms that could not compete without this option (thus providing more jobs). Second, FDI into a host country is extremely beneficial to the local economy. FDI provides an inflow of capitol into countries in dire need of it. Furthermore, FDI provides thousands of jobs to people in LDCs that offer a much higher pay than what is already offered in the local market, as proven by numerous studies. While the jobs provided to those in the host country are often not as skilled or ‘professional’ as those offered by the same firms at home, the labor usually provides a variety of benefits to the employee. Primarily, as previously mentioned, the people employed through FDI gains financially. The employee also gains skills that can be used in the local market. For example, an employee working for a foreign firm will gain valuable knowledge and experience in doing the work. Foreign firms are usually more technologically advanced than local firms, as well as more organized and efficient. After gaining this knowledge from the

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foreign firm, the employee might leave and start his own company, thus adding to the local economy. In addition to providing individual employees with benefits, FDI also benefits already existing local firms. Through backward linkages, firms provide jobs to those in other firms that supply the foreign firm with the production materials that are needed for operation. For example, a firm making computers in a LDC will need silicon for the chips inside the computer. The foreign firm will buy silicon from local firms, and may even incite the formation of more local firms to meet the foreign firms’ silicon demands. In doing this, even more jobs are created for the local population. Furthermore, just as mentioned earlier for individual employees, the foreign firm may provide useful information and techniques to the aforementioned local firm as to how they might make silicon more efficiently of how to better organize their company. In doing this, the foreign firm might lower their silicon costs, while also creating a stronger local economy. The race to the bottom is more of a myth than a truism. Research has shown that foreign firms prefer more stable democracies to invest in. Many of the nations at the ‘bottom’ can’t provide foreign firms with the security of many of the rights needed to competitively run a firm; entering into these countries runs the risk of being nationalized, which is not a risk that many firms are willing to take. Therefore, firms do not prefer the countries at the bottom, but instead prefer countries that can offer the stability needed for operation. Furthermore, foreign firms prefer states that can provide a knowledgeable workforce. With a more educated workforce a firms labor costs will be lower, even if the wages they pay are higher per employee; an educated worker provides more output than an uneducated worker.

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How has globalization been a positive or negative force on culture? Explain which you believe. Globalization has been both a negative and positive force on culture. As mentioned previously, globalization provides many advancement opportunities to a country. In educating both the workforce and local supplying firms, FDI adds to the diversity of a culture. Furthermore, globalization provides a culture with a more hopeful future. Nonetheless, some of the effects globalization has on a society’s culture are negative. For example, namely in LDCs, societies begin to lose much of their national identity and heritage because of globalization. Many call this effect the McDonaldization of the world. Additionally, when a firm enters into a foreign market the jobs offered to the local people are often completely different from what their society has traditionally done. For example, many LDCs were, and still largely are, farming and agriculture based. If shoe-making firms were to enter into this market, many former farmers would begin to work in the shoe-making factory making, say, shoe soles. After time, these workers and much of the local society would lose their traditional work identity. Nonetheless, in my opinion the benefits provided by globalization, both financial and cultural, outweigh what is lost in heritage and tradition. What is the most important thing you have learned in this class, and how does it relate to world politics? Explain. This class has provided me insight into the many ways in which MNCs and FDI have affected the world, both in LDCs and our own country as well. For our home country, foreign investment has given us the possibility of expanding beyond what could traditionally be done domestically. Most importantly, though, the knowledge of FDI’s influence in LDCs has provided me the ability to understand the actual benefits of

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globalization on the world as a whole. Further, with knowledge of both arguments that are pro-globalization and anti-globalization, I am able weigh both costs and benefits. From this, I am able to choose more effectively the states that are more desirable for FDI, and those that are not suitable for investment. For example, a state that offers an MNC very low wages, but has a very uneducated and unskilled workforce is much less desirable than a state whose workforce requires slightly higher wages but offers a more educated and skilled workforce. Furthermore, it is helpful to understand the benefits that LDCs derive from FDI. The benefits derived from backward linkages and the spread of knowledge across an entire employee base helps to explain the reasons behind the bids for foreign investment by local governments. Overall, the class has cleared many of the questions that I had about investment in foreign markets, namely LDCs, by explaining the reasons and motivation behind the large-scale decisions made by MNCs everyday.

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IR-383: Syllabus University of Southern California

School of International Relations
International Relations 383-Fall 2005 Wednesday 6:30-9:30 pm; SOS B44

“Negotiating the End Conflicts in the Third World”
Professor Gerald J. Bender VKC 314 – 740-2127 bender@usc.edu Office Hours: M,W 3:30-5:30 & by appointment

Course Description: The aim of this course if to introduce students to the interesting subject of the origins and nature of conflict in the Third World with an emphasis on international efforts to mediate an end to the conflicts. Special attention is accorded the mediation efforts of the United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Great Powers. Several cases outside the Third World are added to illustrate the universality of the problems that need to be solved to obtain peace. Negotiations are usually highly complex and not merely a matter of agreeing to a cease-fire and separating military forces. It involves identifying the sources of conflict, developing a system of early warning about deteriorating conditions that might lead to conflict, and motivating the right people to act on the warnings. It also involves, once peace is achieved, the establishment and nurturing of key elements of reconciliation and reconstruction – political, social, cultural, legal, and economic – that can allow peace to take root and flourish. Usually the mediators are under funded and understaffed and must rely on their own instincts and judgments as well as their dedication. Each student will select one crisis area to focus on. The list of cases is found at the end of this syllabus. The course also includes a number of case studies based on crises in different parts of the world. Each student is expected to come to class prepared to participate in each of the cases.

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Requirements and Grading:
There are three main components to your grade in this course, with a possibility of a bonus if you participate in the Teaching International Relations Project (TIRP) or the Joint Educational Project (JEP).
Thirty Percent (30%) of your total grade is based on a closed-book, mid-term examination that will cover the readings, lectures, and class discussions. The mid-term examination will be given on Wednesday October 19th. Ten Percent (10%) of your total grade is based on your classroom participation of the case studies. Twenty-five Percent (25%) of the total grade in IR 383 is based on your individual case study paper (including your oral presentation to the class). This paper is due on the last day of class, November 30th. Thirty-five Percent (35%) of the total grade in IR 383 is based on a onehour final exam to be held on Wednesday, December 8 from 7:00-9:00 pm. Three Percent (3%) Bonus for (satisfactory) participation in the Joint Educational Project (JEP) or Teaching International Relations Program (TIRP). If you earn an A or solid B (or C or D) this will not affect your grade, but if you earn a high B+ (or C+ or D+) in all combined components of the course, this bonus could push you over the threshold to an A- (or B-, C-). The JEP & TIRP programs will be explained during the second day of class.

Required Texts
Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson, & Pamela Aall (eds.) Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World. Washington: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 1999. This can be purchased from the USC Bookstore. Gerald J. Bender (ed.), Case Studies on: Third World Negotiations. This can be purchased from The Magic Machine in the Village.

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Weekly Assignments:
Week One (August 24): Introduction

 Introduction and Organization of the course.

Week Two (August 31):
 Lecture on growing importance of ethnic and religious factors behind conflicts in the world today. (From Herding Cats)  Introduction Chester A. Crocker, Fen Oster Hampson, and Pamela Aall; pp. 3-18.  Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle Chester A. Crocker, Fen Oster Hampson, and Pamela Aal; pp. 19-46.  The Practitioner's Perspective Chester A. Crocker, Fen Oster Hampson, and Pamela Aall; pp. 47-62.

Week Three (Sept 7): Nicaragua Case Studies (All Readings in Case Study Reader)
 Douglas Chalmers, "The United States and Anastasio Somoza: Dealing with Friendly Dictators Who Are Losing Their Authority” pp. 26-45.  Bruce Bagely & Juan Tokatlian, "Contradora: The Limitations of Negotiations" pp.46-117.  Rhoda Howard & Jack Donnelly, "Confronting Revolution in Nicaragua: U.S. and Canadian Responses” pp. 118-132..

Week Four (Sept 14): Rhodesia Case Studies (All Readings in Case Study Reader)

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• Herbert M. Howe, "Dancing on Cobwebs: The 1976 American Diplomatic Participation in the Rhodesian Peace Process" pp. 133-152. 194.

• Stephen J. Stedman, "The Lancaster House Constitutional Conference” pp. 153Week Five (Sept 21): South Africa Case Study
 Gregory Treverton and Pamela Varley, "The US and South Africa: The Sanctions Debate of 1985” CASE STUDY READER, pp. 1-25.

Week Six (Sept 28):
(From Herding Cats)  The Road to Madrid James A. Baker III; pp. 183-206.  The Road to Sarajevo Richard Holbrooke; pp. 325-344.

Week Seven (Oct 5:
(From Herding Cats)  Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Namibia-Angola Settlement of 1988 Chester A. Crocker; pp. 207-244.  Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant'Egidio Andrea Bartoli; pp. 245-274.  Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement Aldo Ajello; pp. 615-644.

Week Eight (Oct 12): Lebanon Case Studies (All Readings in Case Study Reader)
 Richard Haass & David Kennedy, "The Reagan Administration and Lebanon" pp. 195-213.

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 Barry Rubin & Laura Blum, "The May 1983 Agreement Over Lebanon.” Pp. 214-230.

Week Nine (Oct 19): Week Ten (Oct 26):

Mid-Term Examination

Vietnam Case Studies (All Readings in Case Study Reader)
• David Painter, "The Geneva Conference of 1954: Indochina (Part A)” pp. 231249. tion and War Termination” pp. 250-285

• Gary Geipel, "The Nixon Administration and Vietnam: A Case Study in NegotiaWeek Eleven (Nov 2): Haiti (Reading in Case Study Reader)
• Curtis H. Martin, “President Clinton’s Haiti Dilemma: Trail by Failure.” pp. 286-293.

Week Twelve (Nov 9): Student Presentations
(From Herding Cats)  Bringing Peace to Cambodia Richard H. Solomon; pp. 275-324.  Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador Alvaro de Soto; pp. 345-386.

Week Thirteen (Nov 16): Student Presentations
(From Herding Cats)  The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland John de Chastelain; pp.431-468.

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 Multiparty Mediation in Northern Ireland
Paul Arthur; pp. 469-502.

Week Fourteen (Nov 23): Student Presentations
(From Herding Cats)  Canada and the Crisis in Eastern Zaire Gordon Smith and John Hay; pp. 85-106  Burundi:A Case of Parallel Diplomacy Fabienne Hara; pp. 135-158.

Week Fifteen (Dec 1):
(From Herding Cats)

Student Presentations

 Rising to the Challenge of Multiparty Mediation Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall; pp. 665-699.

Final Examination: Wednesday, December 7th (7-9:00 pm)

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Individual Case Studies
Each student in the class is to select an individual case, which will be presented orally to the class and in a written form (6-10 pages, double spaced). Please turn in on the second day of class a sheet of paper that has your name and e-mail clearly written and a list of your top five choices for case studies (in order of preference). The list to choose from is found below. If you would like to do a case on an area not on the list please contact me by e-mail (bender@usc.edu). If the case is covered in our classroom discussions you will be expected to deal with different dimensions not covered in class.
 Your paper should be a retrospective on the case, which enriches our understanding. If the case happened some time ago then how does it look retrospectively? If it occurred only a short time ago then what new information is available to enhance our understanding?  Your papers should be thoroughly documented (i.e. footnotes) with secondary and, definitely, some primary sources. The major problem of the past is that students do not include footnotes so make sure that you include footnotes!  I will meet with each student for a half hour to discuss your progress prior to the mid-term. A sign up sheet will be passed out in class. 1. South Africa 2. Angola 3. Namibia 4. Zimbabwe 5. Mozambique 6. Dem. Rep of Congo 7. Liberia 8. Sierra Leone 9. Horn of Africa 10. Somalia (1993-95) 11. Ethiopia/Eritrea 12. Burundi 13. Rwanda 14. Sudan 15. Western Sahara 16. Kashmir 17. Nicaragua 18. El Salvador 19. Haiti 20. Vietnam 21. Cambodia 22. Bosnia 23. Kosovo 24. Macedonia 25. Sri Lanka 26. Nagorno-Karabakh 27. Georgia 28. Tajikistan 29. Chechnya 30. East Timor 31. Cyprus 32. Iraq 33. Israel & PLO 34. Lebanon

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School of International Relations
International Relations 383-Fall 2001 Wednesday 6:30-9:20 pm

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“Negotiating to End Conflicts in the Third World”
Professor Gerald J. Bender VKC 314 – 740-2127 Bender@usc.edu Office Hours: M,W 3:45-5:30 & by appointment

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Lebanon

IR-383: Class Notes
10/12/05 6:37 PM

Handed out questions for exam, 2 of the 8 questions given will be on the test New York times article about Mozambique: on Blackboard. Rivalries solved, national anthem, flag, et cetera Signup sheets for next week, meeting with professor Main groups in Lebanon • Christians/Armanarites, Muslims (Sunnis, Shiites, Drews [not arab, sometimes play obstructionist rule, sometimes helpful]), Militia 1941; great compact signed. Mostly between Shiites and Moslems. Demographics were changing, fewer Christians and more Moslems. Christians had control, and didn’t want to lose it Moslems and Christians never really got along very well. They used to be a colony of France Lebanon was very successful before this 1975 Syrians came in to help the Christians, though they were mostly Moslem. This was to help stability in the region Syria basically brought an end to this civil war, but there were still different militia in different regions At that time, Syria’s entrance was very respected The PLO was also a bit of a major player, they helped the Shiites In 1982, PLO made many journeys around the middle east. Now, they’ve settled around Gaza Maronites and Israelites cooperated immensely

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The PLO is getting out of control, causing serious problems President is assassinated. First president was a natural leader, while his brother, who took over after him, wasn’t very stable US and others create MNF to help the PLO safely leave Lebanon First one made deals willingly, entered alliances more willingly The Israelites decided to move into a 25 mile buffer zone to eliminate PLOs that were remaining They just went all the way in and took Beirut Israel surrounded the camps, and allowed Christian militias to come in and kill over 700 Palestinians in retribution for the president’s assassination Israel swings back and forth between giving up territory for peace or gaining territory to use as a buffer The Israelites were getting nowhere and spending lots of money Modern: pulling out of Gaza might pit the Palestinian PLO against those who don’t recognize Israel at all as a nation More about Israel and the west bank Back to the Massacre, instability in Lebanon First group from US came back, but again left two weeks later • Get all foreign forces out of Lebanon • Provide stability to Lebanese government Stimulate a peace movement in the middle east Syria and Israel war: get it out of Lebanon

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Build the Lebanese army into a force that could keep the peace in Lebanon Unify the country, build up the parliament Every time the US gets involved in the middle east, the US is “beginning to spread peace to the middle east.” Sent in the Marines A dispute in the administration as to what would be happening Shultz and Rumsfeld from the US state department in Lebanon: read a article “You are where you sit” this doesn’t apply in this case, it is quite the opposite 700 American troops at an airport hotel were supposed to get all of this done CIA bombing in Lebanon was a very devastating blow to the US Kidnapping was before the bombing 241 were killed in the CIA bombing in the embassy The US response: send in a battleship, fired into the mountains where the Drews were, who the US blamed for much of the instability Other groups were in these mountains as well, some Israeli, some of our allies as well We were killing our allies just as much as we were killing the enemy The case doesn't tell you: Reagan starts getting worries that the policy is becoming self-defeating. Decides to pull the remaining 400 or so troops out

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IR-383: Class Notes
of Lebanon in the middle of the night. That was the end of US troops in Lebanon. Strangely, this being about a year before the 1984 elections, this never comes up in the elections. Reagan wasn’t scolded for it at all. Used to have a third case dealing with the war powers act • Before troops are killed, issue comes up o Does Reagan have to declare that we were at war o Reagan maintained that there was no war in Lebanon, thus congress had no power because “there was no war going on” o Ted Stevens advised against this • When a couple troops are killed, it is explained as random fighting The US wanted a ban on foreign forces in Lebanon Demilitarized regions of Israel The Christian militias weren’t protected, everybody knew that they had worked with Israel Where do the US and Israel differ • US didn’t want King Hussein to play a role, Israel wanted him Syria and the United States • Syria didn’t want to get out of Lebanon • Shared goals: a stable government in Lebanon o Syrians had the means to provide this, while the US only brought over 700 troops to get this done, which wasn’t enough US and Lebanon • Lebanon didn’t have much choice in accepting US support, US promised economic aid among other things It seems that every time there is a crunch in the middle east, everybody turns to the US. Largely because the US is seen to be the only state that has leverage against many of these countries

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Soviets increase aid to Syria when US increases aid to Israel Very few members of the US government will go against anything Israel The parliament in Lebanon has never really had any power. Lebanon has had and has democratic institutions, but has never really been a democracy More points of view are represented in Parliament Israel; nothing can happen on the Sabbath, millions spent on schools specifically on orthodox Jews, et cetera Are there cold war dimensions in this situation? • An east-west dimension, Lebanese dimension, Isreal-Syria dimension, PLO dimension • For Washington, the Cold War dimension was probably a fairly large factor The US thought Israel couldn’t improve on US technology. They did, and the US even bought back some of the enhanced technology Israel air force: average age is 19. Most are recruited from an area where people grow up to the idea of ‘collective good’ US was • • • slow to negotiate until the last moment. This was resultant from: Great concern about a Israeli Syrian war War of superpower-backed states Made this more urgent, it seems

Gave Israel a 25-mile buffer zone Israel has never really trusted the UN When Israeli PM stayed through UN talks, it was amazing (news article last weekend)

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This was largely because of Gaza pullout (Again, recent news) Israel doesn’t belong to any regional organization The idea that the ability for Lebanon to support a stable government, true? • Wasn’t a question of timing, a question of ability Could the US succeed in Lebanon? • Waited too long, maybe • Another question of timing • More pressure possibly

Reagan wasn’t very active in any decisions • Never really kept up with foreign policy Reagan did good with domestic economy, but lacked in foreign affairs Bush traveled only twice before presidency: Mexico and Gambia Bush is retarded To succeed, we needed more military power than we put in US needed to put much more pressure on Israel to withdraw, which would have led to a possible Syrian withdraw • Unfortunately this didn’t happen The US has never been able to force Israel out, why could they have done it in the early 80s? This wasn't even on their own turf, was there any hope for US success? When US troops first came to Lebanon, they were seen as liberators. Once they left, they were seen as occupiers. Tangent to Iraq?

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Tangent to Germany (brought up by classmate) November 1984: Casper Weinberger laid down six conditions for the US to meet before it could stay in Lebanon • A determination of the existence of US vital national interests • A commitment of force of adequate size (700 was far from adequate) (Tangent: Iraq: can’t be Lean and Mean and still hold control of everything in a state. Some say the only hope in Iraq is for the US to double troops. Rumsfeld would never do this) • The presence of clear (realistic) objectives • A constant willingness to reassess and adjust policy • • A reasonable assurance of congressional and public support The elimination of other options so that force is the last resort

As is evident, these six requirements were not followed Weinberger: we paid a price for not following these requirements, but should learn and follow them in the future Passed out 8 possible exam question: 2 will be chosen for the hour-long midterm next Wednesday

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Vietnam

IR-383: Class Notes

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Professor Bender is sick today, will be lectured for a bit, then a documentary Things that threatened the West • Social revolutions • Rise of socialist regimes Rise of nationalist regimes were also a bit threatening The British accepted the logic of withdrawing from India Situation in Vietnam was similar to the Dutch in the East Indies Indochina posed the greatest problems for France Forces led by the communist leader: … Hanoi: communists forced out, 6,000 people die Washington supplies military aid for the French, then took over issue with Vietnam itself Geneva South), • • • • • • • • • conference: Cambodia, France, UK, Laos, Vietnam (North and US, Soviets July 1954 Ceasefire along the 17th parallel, divided Vietnam into two halves Conference called for the unification of Vietnam in two years with free elections Two years later, when it was found that elections would result in a guy winning, a guy the US didn’t like Fighting continued South Vietnamese received aid from the US for war Continued Cold War policies Opposed sending in troops Continued sending military advisors and a lot of money

Killed in '63

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Before if was clear what he was going to do in Vietnam

Linden Johnson • Following JFK’s previous path in regards to Vietnam • Something changed with Vietnam Two American destroyers attacked in international waters by a torpedo boat from North Vietnam Decision to escalate the war North Vietnamese attack was provoked Energy and attention shifted to North Vietnam, instead of withdrawing from the war, decided to escalate the war • Operation rolling thunder o Continuous air war on North Vietnam o Many planes bombed civilians, temples, villages o Majority of people killed by the strikes were the weak • First troops landed in Dat Nang in March ‘69 • Soon, number of troops surpassed 500,000 Tet offensive • Vietcong occupied Sigon including US embassy Anti-war sentiment in the US • Prominent artists, musicians began to critisize the war • Men burning their draft cards • Demonstrations provoked violent reaction: Kent University o National guard shot at the crowd, killing four students 1969: Nixon elected president • Ran on peace plan platform o Had a secret solution to winning the war o Once elected, never put his ‘secret solution’ into effect o Continued the war

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Many documents publicized now show that there was no way we could win the war through all of these administrations War expanded to Cambodia and Loas • Nixon began to take peace talks seriously • War was evenually 'lost' by the US Video with interviews including Kissinger and Nixon, et cetera

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IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers

NGO
Example 1: “Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant’Egidio” *Community of Sant’Egidio -the community entered negotiations when level of violence was high -during that time, the situation was “ripe” because Renamo and Frelimo were both exhausted from war, and ready for peace -approach was more social-psychological as the NGO: -focused on processes of communication -involved principle civil leaders -assisted dialogue  tried to find different ways for groups to communicate -the NGO’s negotiation process was simultaneous, as it encouraged/got the involvement of many different state and non-state actors  political latitude -Mozambique civil society -Catholic Church -NGO worked with Vatican and local Catholic leadership to settle disputes with the Mozambican government -United States -Italian government -played into political interests of the Italian Community Party -the party wanted to establish closer ties with Catholic organizations as it had extensive political and economic ties with Frelimo -United Nations -random: Kenya, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Britain, Portugal, Russia -also established friendly relations with the Mozambican government by promoting Mozambican culture and knowledge within Italy -also sought relationship with Renamo, when its military victory stopped being a possibility  created synergies, which were based on direct relationships between representatives of different interests and organizations  there was no single powerful actor that had compelling interest in Mozambique to force itself into negotiations -its goals were focused on: -pluralism and inclusiveness -political control of military forces -encourage of direct personal contact -adherence to human rights standard -acceptance of national sovereignty and borders -though did not bring much leverage to the table, brought many different actors together that brought something -United States agreed to indirectly support the efforts -provided expertise in military, legal, economic and institutional fields -UN: symbolic role

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
-Italy provided financial support and provided political atmosphere -Mozambique civil society involved caused the process to feel inclusive  also helped that the Mozambicans wanted peace, not retributive justice -therefore had impact on negotiations, because focus on development of relations among different actors, lack of self-interested goals (though motivated to help the Catholic community), “weakness” -the NGO’s lack of international power and prestige allowed it to be free of traditional formalities -Community of Sant’Egidio is a fellowship of small communities sharing a spiritual life in a secular setting while serving the poor in friendship -members are unpaid, therefore mediators seen as altruistic and unmotivated -lack of political prestige prevented it from being an coordinator, but was able to see the coherence in the actions of the actors involved in the process – cooperation vs. coherence -negative aspects of roles -not much leverage power -many limitations in regards to money, expertise and prestige -positive aspects of roles -free from traditional formalities -more wiling and able to work with different actors – realize its own limitation -able to get others to agreed to work with it as no stigma, obligations -willing to share information -willing to keep confidentiality as well – need for Frelimo, which had hardliners that were against compromise with Renamo -b/c didn’t have own agenda, could make parties fully responsible for the peace process, and to draw in the international community as significant but nonintrusive actors  resulted in the General Peace Agreement  brought end to 16 years of civil war Example 2: “Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement” *United Nations: Aldo Ajello -peace keeping mission = United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) -4 components: political, military, humanitarian and electoral -later on added a civil police component -political component: -key commission: Supervision and Monitoring Commission (CSC): empowered to replace the gov’t in all matters related to the implementation of the agreement -CSC: members of the 2 parties and various international partners meet and agree on a decision  consensus -consisted of subsidiary bodies: the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF)

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-the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers (CORE) -the Commission for the Police (ComPol) -the Commission for Intelligence (ComInfo) -Commission for the Formation of the New Army (CCFADM) -the Commission for the Territorial Administration -National Election Commission  ONUMOZ can only chair CSC, CCF, and CORE, rest by Mozambicans  but Felimo and Renamo asked them to chair CCFADM -military component: -consisted of 350 UN observers and 5 infantry battalions w/ necessary logistical, transportation, and communication support structure -job: supervise the assembly and demobilization of both gov’t and Renamo soldiers -monitor cease-fire; investigate any alleged violations of the peace agreement -allow effective delivery of humanitarian aid and orderly return of refuges and displaced people -humanitarian component: -coordinated by the UN Office of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator (UNOHAC) -job: coordinate humanitarian assistance of UN organizations, and NGOs -major target groups: Mozambicans returning to their villages -electoral component: -relatively small -job: monitor and observe -civil police: -confidence building measure requested by Renamo -impact was marginal -in the General Peace Agreement, it was established that the UN would be the locomotive moving the entire process forward  this gave the UN influence over the course of the events -the UN has to make sure process moves forward or else will be scapegoat -it is watched by the media and other countries -the United Nations’ credibility was tested by the GPA, as its timetable was unrealistic -When Renamo boycotted the work of the commissions and recalled its delegation to the bush, Ajello did not pressure him to return because he knew that Renamo needed to train a team of new officials -Ajello had to understand the different needs of the two parties -When Dhalakama launched an attack and captured the towns of Angoche, Maganja da Costa, Memba and Lugela  UN was confronted with a serious crists -Ajello had to draw on the socio-psychological method, in which he recognized that Dhalakama wanted to be acknowledged by the international community -Ajello illustrated the importance of for Renamo to change its image in order to ensure a political future -Ajello had to make sure that he was seen as a representative of the international community in order to keep the peace process on track

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IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
-Also, Ajello made sure that the international community was follow involved in the decision making role by securing agreement from members of the CSC -UN assembled, disarmed, demobilized troops  formed a special Technical Unit of civilians to take the lead in demobilization -UN needs to realize how to offer assurance: -has to take initiatives that may not be that popular with the rest of the world, but thinks is necessary – setting up a fund for Dhalakama Dhlakama said wouldn’t participate in elections the day before b/c he thought it was all a fraud due to: -several days before the elections, a doc was mysteriously faxed to UN and Renamo  listed ways that Frelimo could win through fraud -Ajello said would declare elections a fraud if any of the things happened, but Dhlakama thought he was just covering for the gov’t -activities of the National Election Commission came under suspicion -frontline states said Renamo had to accept election results no matter what or military intervention  Ajello got as many heads of state and gov’t to say that they didn’t understand Dhlakama’s decision and that he was losing credibility  Dhlakama said would participate if CSC and Ajello agreed to investigate elections criticisms: -military component too big and inefficient -Trust Fund to help Renamo go from military org to political -effectiveness of humanitarian component: -excess of bureaucratic rules -approach of weapons -UN has many organizations within, which allows it to specialize in certain areas -is able to draw from different sources of information, expertise and policy planning which allows it to be more effective -Ajello used symbolic leverage, instead of military threats -recognition, support from community -negative aspects of roles -because big member of the international community, the United Nations is constantly being watched and criticized for its mistakes -it is expected to make/fulfill certain guarantees, as a result it does not have much leniency -it must get support from its members – because so many members, hard to please everyone -some nations may not trust UN because has leanings towards certain policies -positive aspects of roles

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-wide recognition and respect -has the ability to draw from its different members, as well as other NGOs that are willing to work with it -some nations are more inclined to trust it -huge symbolic leverage

STATE METHODS
Example 1: “The Road to Madrid” Focus more on the structuralist method -US involved in the Middle East peace process because it has a strategy relationship with Israel, and the political power of the American Jewish community makes it a fixture in domestic politics -types of leverage -US used its political and military leverage: -took advantage of the fact that it defeated Iraq in the Gulf War -US also used its credibility in the region because it had left Iraq promptly after liberating Kuwait -has leverage with each party: blaming others for scuttling the process -economic leverages -“creative ambiguity”: US willing to be vague in certain areas so to give other states room to interpret events on their own terms -the US has power to pressure each side for certain concessions; also, it is able to make concessions Example 2: “The Lanchester House of Constitutional Conference” -Carrington also implemented the structuralist track in the peace process -Britain’s types of leverages: -economic sanctions on Rhodesia -offered parties an alternative to war: took responsibility to bring Zimbabwe independence -used socio-psychological leverage on Murzorewa -Britain said it would give him formal recognition if the conference failed -able to bring together/get support from Frontline states -Frontline states pressure Patriotic Front to participate in conference -threats to leave out the party that refused to participate -Carrington was firm in his plans, refusal to change outline of conference -he had enough power/leverage so that he did not need to cater to the different parties

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IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
-leverage: threat to leave out the party that did not participate  non-state actors are more flexible, where as state actors are more set/rigid in its policies and plans

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How has ethnicity and religion affected, complicated, and in some cases eased negotiations? What steps were taken to lessen the impact of ethnic/religious tensions? How would you recommend dealing with such delicate issues? From the time of the toppling over of the Tower of Babbel, religion and ethnicity have been the primary causes for conflicts—big and small. Although different, both ethnicity and religion share a similar influence on someone’s will to compromise to absolve such conflict. Because both ethnicity and religion carry with them connotations of a person’s character, biasing one over the other, it is hard to resolve conflicts of this nature as trust is hard to gain. While some conflicts that were started hundreds of years ago continue today, a certain hope exists in the immediate and outside parties to gain such trust and, hence, achieve peace. The following cite specific examples to illustrate weaknesses and strengths in negotiating ethnic and religious conflict. I. Ethnicity and Religion mostly complicate, but sometimes ease negotiations A. Further weakens trust of participants in potential negotiations i. Arab-Israeli peace process of 1991 a. Simply creating a dialogue (again) between the Israelis and the Palestinians would prove fruitless as a result of mistrust between the two groups—based on the history between the two religious groups. ii. Many black South Africans—even after the end of Apartheid—have issues trusting Afrikaaners as many were tortured and killed, not to mention thousands more who were hindered from any social mobility based on the color of their skin. B. History of these conflicts tend to be longer and more emotionally-charging i. Often times colonial states or superpowers drew political lines irrespective of ethnic and religious groups. ii. Land is a hot issue in the Middle East—deciding who deserves the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, etc. As both groups believe that they inherited various areas from God, it is hard to resolve such a conflict. They either compromise their beliefs or their safety. iii. In Rwanda, a genocide occurred largely in result of divisions that colonial powers made, dividing up the country into two new ethnic groups—the Hutu and the Tutsi—which supposedly determined whether or not they could have any sort of power. C. Lose momentum for negotiating with these particular conflicts i. Arab-Israeli conflict has been going on for years and years and is more complicated now than ever. Any possible momentum of the 1991 peace talks was lost as the ethno-religious aspects of the conflict overshadowed any possible strides for peace. Steps taken to lessen impact of ethnic and religious tensions A. Find and bring in a neutral negotiator i. Nicaragua peace process

II.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
1. Canada was considered more neutral than the US under Reagan’s administration, particularly when it came to human rights violations. ii. Arab-Israeli peace process of 1991 1. UN did not have credibility with Israel because of the Zionism= Racism policy of the UN 2. The US was the only country known for its potential leverage with Israel; thus, Baker was sent. iii. Mozambique peace process—1990 to 1992 1. Major powers (US, Italy, etc.) were not as appealing to facilitate negotiations, although involved 2. Saint Egidio provided a “mental path to peace for the participants,” according to Andrea Bartoli. B. Bilateral concessions—furthering credibility of negotiators i. Arab-Israeli peace process 1. Baker asked for simultaneous concessions from Israel, PLO, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon & Saudi Arabia a. “Parallel reciprocity”: parallel confidence-building steps to demonstrate simultaneous will towards peace. 2. Substance over symbols a. Baker refused to come to Jerusalem to discuss two years of automatic vetoes in the Security Council on any proposal which Israel opposed. b. Baker confronted Palestinian demand for US official support of an independent Palestinian state. i. “…the question of East Jerusalem would be on the agenda at some point. If that’s not good enough, I said, then I must tell you that your position is that symbols are more important than substance---and, unfortunately, that position has helped to create and sustain the Palestinian tragedy. For God’s sake, don’t let Israel hide behind symbols.”1 ii. Bosnia 1. Holbrooke and Wes Clark were able to get the Serbian leaders to “cease all offensive operations” and remove large weaponry from the area in and around Sarajevo within a week.C.iii.2 2. Holbrooke also promised that he would “recommend” that NATO discontinue bombing—only resuming after 72 hours if the Serbs did not fulfill their promise.2 C. Put players on the defensive i. Arab-Israeli peace process of 1991 1. Jordan, for example, was willing to meet US terms because of their economic aid needed by US.
1 2

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Baker, James A. III. “The Road to Madrid.” Crocker, Chester, et al. Herding Cats. p. 202. Holbrooke, Richard. “The Road to Sarajevo.” Crocker, Chester, et al. Herding Cats. p. 343, 342.

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2. Especially since Israelis wanted out of the war anyway, Baker convinced Assad to put Israel on the defensive by breaking the taboo of sitting down to peace talks with Israel. ii. Lebanon peace process 1. Sharon put on defensive as discontent grows among the Israeli populace after their involvement in the massacres of over 700 Palestinian civilians. iii. Bosnia 1. The UN put sanctions on Yugoslavia for supplying weapons to and support of the Serbs—the ones who massacred thousands of Muslims in Sarajevo. not very fruitful 2. According to Holbrooke, only force or its “credible threat” would elicit cooperation from the Serbian leaders (“bullies”). a. leave without any (nearly) guarantees of concessions, especially from NATO, if Mladic (and Karadzic) insisted not to give up any of their “sacred … soil!”2 D. Maximize window of opportunity created by major historical events i. Fall of the Soviet Union—loss of Soviet patronage for many states 1. Syria was newly open to US initiatives in the 1991 Arab-Israeli peace talks with the fall of the USSR. ii. End of the Gulf War iii. Changing political climates within a country 1. Mozambique—willingness to promote peace 2. Israel—diminishing support for the state of war Recommended steps to take when dealing with these fragile tensions A. Examine weaknesses in unresolved ethno-religious conflicts i. Little trust, little leverage ii. Poor use of timing, momentum lost iii. Many lives displaced and many lost B. Examine strengths in resolved conflicts i. Ability of negotiators to elicit steady, phased negotiations ii. Credible, strong but flexible leaders and negotiators iii. Ability to compromise and put welfare of the people as first priority iv. Not allowing issues that have been unresolved for years (such as claim to Jerusalem) to get in the way from resolving any other issues.

III.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
QUESTION #2:
The non-state actors involved in Third World Negotiations can be playing the part of (1) a mediator or (2) a direct negotiating party, such as a group that can be considered to be a "winner" or "loser" in the conflict. The methods they use when involved in negotiations, therefore, are determined by the role that they are playing. As I see it, each of the cases that we reviewed in class, except for South Africa, includes contributions from non-state actors. In terms of non-state mediators, only the case of the negotiated settlement of Mozambique did an independent non-state actor or group (the community of Sant'Egidio) facilitate the negotiations, and for this reason I have spent a great deal of space dissecting this case. In terms of negotiating parties, any conflict negotiation that involved guerrilla or militarily active opposition groups- Nicaragua, Rhodesia, Namibia-Angola, and Mozambique thereby included non-state actors (even though some of these groups were more involved in the actual negotiations than others.) Guerrillas were not the only non-state actors to be direct participants, though. In "The Road to Madrid," the Palestinians (and ostensibly behind them, the PLO) were not guerillas, nor state actors, yet still active participants with a real stake in the outcome of negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis. Somewhat similarly, in “The Road to Sarajevo,” the questionable titles or leadership of the so-called BosnianSerb President Radovan Karadzic and his right-hand man General Mladic seem to put them more in the position of non-state actor than state-actor. Below I have outlined two different cases which concern non-state actors, one in each of the two roles. My answer includes the actors’ methods, influence on outcomes of the negotiations to which they were a part, and the positive or negative aspects of their roles. The problem with outlining the non-state negotiating party involvement in many of the other cases is that, while these actors were present and active, their actions were not always very well covered in the readings.

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Mozambique: Mozambique is unique concerning the pertinence of non-state actors to the resolution of its conflict because not only one of its disputing parties (Renamo) but also its team of mediators were non-state actors. I will concentrate on the team of mediators. Background: Sant’Egidio, an international Roman Catholic association, is “a fellowship of small communities sharing a spiritual life in a secular setting while serving the poor in friendship.” It was not a professional conflict resolution agency, but rather involved itself in Mozambique through the group’s personal relationship with a young Mozambican priest named Goncalves. In the mid-1970’s, it first established contacts with the extremely influential Italian Communist Party, which had extensive political and economic ties with the Mozambican government (Frelimo) and was interested in strengthening its ties to the Catholic Church. Aiming to play on PCI’s interests, Sant’ Egidio then established very positive ties to Frelimo by promoting Mozambican culture within Italy. In the late 1980s, when it became obvious that a military victory was not feasible and Frelimo’s leader Chissano decided to explore the option of a dialogue with Renamo (its armed opposition),

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Goncalves and Sant’Egidio were well-positioned to bring the Renamo leadership in to begin discussions. In 1990, after direct meetings with Renamo’s leader, Alfonso Dhlakama, Sant’Egidio took on the status as observer to the talks that both sides were trying to organize. A few months into the process, the four member team was asked to become a full-fledged mediation team. Method: The mediation team’s method was neither clear-cut nor pre-planned, but it stayed, at minimum, focused on the peace process and committed to its wider strategy of maintaining the open dialogue it created between the two movements. Concretely, Sant’Egidio provided the organizational space (in its headquarters in Rome) for the two sides to complete whatever activities were necessary to the process as well as a team of volunteers to carry out whatever support (logistics, translation) was needed during the two year negotiating period. Sant’Egidio did not act alone, but rather with financial and political aid from the government of Italy, the strong, rather symbolic, backing of the United Nations, the technical (military, legal, economic, and institutional) support of the United States, and the cooperation of various other countries in the region and internationally- all of which enlarged the political space in which the dialogue took place as well as the credibility of Sant’Egidio. The mediation team gathered and fused together the leverage of other disparate actors to create political latitude that would not have existed either with it on its own or with only a major power mediator. It had a realistic evaluation of its own strength and created direct personal relationships between representatives and organizations (such as with the Italian ambassador to Amputo, Manfredo Incisa di Camerana and various members of the US government) that could be used to create a complex dynamic favorable to conflict resolution. Delegation members also created these kinds of close personal relationships with delegations from the government and Renamo, directly nourishing them with ideas, suggestions, and critical observations. More than right answers to specific crisis, however, the mediators created a framework within which all crisis could be assessed and addressed. The interpersonal bonds became significant assets by enabling members to better cope with these crisis encountered in later stages of the process. To compensate for its lack of experience and expertise, the team used a strategy of incremental success in which the first step, the joint communique signed in 1990, opened the door to further meetings and negotiations. It also worked to ensure that the channels of communication between the delegations in Rome and the political or military leaders back home were open in such a way as to ensure that all agreements made in Rome were binding to the two sides. The careful management of information concerning the peace process was also necessary in order to minimize a possibly disruptive and inflammatory diffusion of information about sensitive discussions or agreements taking place in Rome. The influence of the mediation team: Sant’Egidio was chosen because of its moral and political authority, not the amount of leverage that it could exert over the situation. The weakness of the negotiation team

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IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
reduced the possibility of imposing outside solutions through coercive diplomacy or military threat, thereby forcing the parties to negotiate for themselves. Andrea opines that the success of Sant’Egidio as a “conduit of negotiation” was due to this weakness because it ensured that it avoided being cast into and constricted by the formalities of more traditional mediation initiatives. Their method was to get the adversaries to talk with one another and others in a setting that was conducive to dialogue, and this method delivered results. Positive or Negative? The role of Sant’Egidio was obviously positive in terms of the resolution of the conflict between Renamo and Frelimo seeing as their work created the environment that led to the signing of a peace agreement in 1992. In fact, the example of Sant’Egidio’s work in Mozambique shows that NGOs can contribute positively to the resolution of deadly conflict and that, under certain circumstances, they may be better placed than more traditional diplomatic actors to play the lead role in such circumstances, thereby providing new options for the negotiation of peace.

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The Road to Madrid (Peace Conference): While the peace talks in Madrid could not directly include the PLO because of the adamant objections of Israeli Prime Minister Shamir, the groups of Palestinians leaders with whom Secretary of State Baker met during the time leading up to Madrid certainly were a significant party to the negotiations, seeing as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was the most divisive issue at hand. Baker's main goal was to get a Palestinian delegation that would agree to attend the talks and that would be accepted by Shamir. Method: In terms of method, these Palestinians argued mainly about three things, (1) that the issue of Jerusalem must be addressed before peace talks could begin, and later, that (2) they did not want a joint delegation, and (3) they wanted some PLO and East- Jerusalemite representation in whatever delegation was conceived. Baker told the leaders with whom he spoke that they were putting symbols over substance, meaning that if they would let go of the representation issue, they would actually be able to get to the negotiating table with Israel as opposed to allowing the Israelis to continually settle more of their land. In the end, the Palestinians were the last to agree to go to the Madrid Peace Talks. Not only did they decide to (in vain) call for the United States to change long-standing policy opposing an independent Palestinian state, but continuously brought up the issue of Jerusalem and representation until the very last day of Baker's shuttle diplomacy. In the end, Baker had to explode and walk out on their talks before the Palestinians would agree to a jointPalestinian delegation with Jordan that included 14 (non-PLO) Palestinians that were acceptable to Israeli PM Shamir. Influence:

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As to how they influence the negotiations, I would say that they didn't have much of an impact, seeing as, in the end, they were forced to accept the conditions that were acceptable to Shamir. Their biggest impact was on Baker; he certainly got a workout trying to get them on-board. Positive or Negative?: With that said, I am not sure if I would say that the Palestinian role in the “road to Madrid” was positive or negative. Despite the fact that their resistance hindered the success of Baker’s shuttle diplomacy, their final acquiescence was critical to the success of Baker’s strive to break the “greatest taboo in the Arab-Israeli dispute”- the unwillingness of the different parties to even meet with each other.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
Do you believe that the US foreign policies are related to its domestic politics? Explain, supporting your argument with several cases we read. The US foreign policies are related to its domestic politics. Even today’s case of President Bush can be applied to this. For example, the fact that he sent out troops to Iraq to fight the “War on Terrorism” is disliked by many Americans, who are against Bush’s foreign policies. As a result, he barely passed with a couple of votes as the US’s next president. “Right now, then, is the time for a maximum effort to exert political influence by all of us who believe that the U.S. should change its internal security, military, and above all foreign policies.” This is nothing but clear evidence that voters in this country are turning against current U.S. policies associated with the so-called war on terrorism, which will bring about changes that many of Americans think are necessary. One case study that supports this is the Angola case study of 1975. The US was supporting two parties, and in the middle of negotiations, the US passed an amendment which prohibited that the US supports Angola. Another case study was the Rwanda case where Tutsi and Hutu tribes were fighting for six days between each other. This was as a result of the Germans, who owned the colony, said that the Tutsi can have power in Rwanda because they are better educated and wealthier. Both tribes were very similar and for Germans very hard to distinguish, but the tribes began fighting with each other as a result of that proclamation. For example, Bosnians, Serbians and Muslims (the story about the interview and the bread that Professor Bender mentioned in class). For those who think the exercise is doomed because votes in the U.S. are rarely influenced by foreign policies, we should emphasize that the stringent and even unconstitutional internal security policies that now affect us all are directly related to and

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caused by the foreign policies we are talking about. All the lobbies powerful in U.S. politics--lobbies for Israel, arms manufacturers, energy conglomerates, or any others you want to name--cannot prevent us forever from influencing the policies of this benighted administration.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
Question #3: How can economic sanctions influence the process of mediation and negotiations? Assess their effectiveness in the cases covered. Suggestions: Make up whatever thesis you want to say whether sanctions are ultimately effective E.g. Could argue that sanctions would be effective if there was worldwide cooperation in imposing them. However, U.S. often does not participate in UN resolutions to impose sanctions, and since U.S. can have much economic influence, other attempts at sanctioning fail. Could also use South Africa example (listed below) as a model to explain arguments against and for sanctions…. Overview of Economic Sanctions in South Africa (SA): Summary: • At first (during Reagan’s first term) only Democrats pushed bills for Sanctions on SA. • In 1984, violent confrontations between SA security forces and black demonstrators increased. • National TV showed SA riots, putting SA policy into spotlight. • So bill to impose sanctions sailed through House with bipartisan support. • Both house and senate seemed prepared to override a presidential veto. • Instead, president forestalled passage of sanctions legislation by issuing executive order. • 1986—congress did override pres veto for more sanctions History: • Series of events (massacres, detention of any leaders of black sonsciousness movements), led to 1977 UN Secuirty Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo on SA. o First embargo imposed by UN on one of its members. • Other countries in South Africa, black-ruled nations, were sympathetic, but could not do much cuz economically dependant on SA. o e.g. SA sole buyer of electricity from a plant in Mozambique. 1963—US arms embargo. 1977—Carter joined UN arms embargo 1978—US government barred US exports to SA military, po,ice, or apartheid-enforcing agencies of the gov. 1960’s-70’s: US private sector had lucrative financial dealings with SA US was SA’s primary trading partner Crocker’s Constructive Engagement. • Recognized leverage the US had in dealing with SA was relatively small • Plan was that continuing engagement with SA, could encourage SA to move away from apartheid system.

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Proper US role would be to encourage reform efforts. o Establish friendly relations. o Shold respect arms embargo. o But not economic warfare According to Crocker: • Regarding sanctions, compare to bullets in gun: once u fire them, they’re gone and what to do then. Sanctions aren’t a policy, but a gesture. When they’re done theyre’d done and your leverage is reduced. Still media attention on SA in US….Tutu criticized policy of Constructive Engagement, said they should apply pressure on SA. Debate over imposing sanctions on SA: Areas of Disagreement • Role of SA Economy o Healthy SA economy would serve as engine of race reform, or whether further entrench the ruling white minority. o Liberal critics especially disputed this: Successful capitalism and apartheid can, and have been, co-existing…so clearly change wont come from healthy economy. • Role of American Investment in SA o Did it help move apartheid forward or was it a force for race reform, providing better working conditions for blacks than would otherwise be available? o Liberal argument that the companies did more for government than it ever helped blacks. • Would Sanctions Hurt Blacks? o Thought SA sanctions might hurt other black south African countries. o Liberals argued that prominent black south African leaders advocated US economic pressure. • Would Sanctions Work at all? o e.g. Arms embargo encouraged SA to develop strong arms-production industry. o But many pointed out contradiction in administrations policies to sanction communist countries but not SA. o Sanctions advocates argued that it would make a difference Pro sanctions argued that there was a moral responsibility to act. Make it plain what we stand for… Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 Proposed banning new bank loans to SA gov, prohibit sales to gov of computer equipment, barred US citizens from purchasing Krugerrands, prohibited new investment in SA by any US firms. Part could be postpaid if SA took series of significant steps including: Release political prisoners

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IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
Full citizenship to blacks Remove race-based restrictions on where black people could live and work Negotiate with black leaders to establish representative political systems End SA control of Namibia This bill was modified and forms of it passed around the house and senate. Then US blocked UN sanctions resolution By 1985 clear that constructive engagement wasn’t working Reagan wanted to reject sanctions bill, but speech by Botha where he was supposed to announce reforms and didn’t, made it impossible to stop sanctions bill So instead issued executive order Eventually, apartheid system ended and black majority rule came into play. But hard to argue to what effect sanctions influenced this outcome. Rhodesian Case: Once Ian Smith becomes leader and Rhodesia declares itself independent (1966), UN immediately applies sanctions • However, sanctions don’t work at all if frontline state does not accept them (e.g. unlikely that SA would abide by sanctions) 1971 Byrd Amendment: Permitted U.S. to purchase chrome and other minerals from Rhodesia if the only other supplier was the Soviet Union. 1976—U.S. lacked leverage because Rodesian government has survived over ten years without significant American diplomatic or economic assistance. World sanctions had created among many white Rhodesians a strong nationalism and hostility to world public opinion • Note: Could argue that Sanctions just make countries more hostile and unresponsive to world pressure, and are thus ineffective. During negotiations, Smith tries to persuade Kissinger that Rhodesia deserved aid, not sanctions, in its fight against communist encroachment. Kissinger refused, instead gave Smith a list of points including one that stated “Rhodesia agrees to black majority rule within two years” Smith agrees, but adds his own concessions. Could argue that economic sanctions had some influence in ultimate success of transition to majority rule

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Madrid Conference Case Economic sanctions were not an option because U.S. could not afford to cut off oil supply from Arab countries

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
Question # 6:

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What role does military force or the threat of force play in the negotiations process? Having the backing of military force or the threat of using military force provides leverage in negotiations. It also gives the ability to make demands, without a backing of military force it is hard to push a view on an opposing side during negotiations.

Should force be used to bring parties to the table? This is an opinion section of the question…but I would say No. In the readings Bagely and Tokatlian (Contadora: The Limitations of Negotiations) point out the fact that legitimate and moral authority can give a party sufficient leverage in negotiating (pg. 108 of the orange book). To get the backing of a majority is more important than using military force to bring parties to the table. This allows a peaceful negotiation where parties are not intimidated into negotiations but influence into making needed changes.

If so when should it be used and how effective is it? However, in many cases getting a majority backing is very difficult and the threat of force becomes necessary to get parties to participate in negotiations. A good example to use here is the marines in the airports in the Lebanon case. As Bender always says: There will be no negotiations if one side wants to continue to fight. This is where military can influence parties into negotiations. It makes it extremely difficult to continue to want to fight if you know you will not win.

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IR 383 Midterm Question #7 There are many examples of how the previous policies of the Great Powers have caused the modern day problems in the decolonized countries. The colonial powers would cause divisions based on arbitrary factors. In Rwanda it had to do with the slimness of the nose versus the actual percentage of the African population that have the majority. In other places, they would use natural factors such as rivers to divide people. Obviously, this was not the right way to divide up the people, so when the colonists left, it caused problems. In Rwanda, there was the slaughtering of Tutsis by the Hutus because of the unfair advantages the former had due to colonization. In Zimbabwe, formerly, Rhodesia, once the power was restored to the Africans, corruption ensured because the new leaders all wanted the chance to have power and shape the new, free country. In South Africa, Blacks to this day, do not lead equal lives to their whites counterparts even thought they are now allowed to participate in the political process. Whites, who have remained in South Africa, are still more advantaged than the Blacks due to the racist policies of Apartheid. The Israel and Palestine conflict is still brewing. Even thought the UN declared in 1947 that there should be two separate states, only one was created. Israelites and Palestinians constantly fight over territory and rights to even small things like electricity and power. In Lebanon, the conflict among the different groups dates back to an archaic law that used to give the Christians more power and standing in the government. Even though there was an increase in the Muslim population, the Christians were not willing to give up their power—or let alone, distribute the power more evenly.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
Namibia- Angola Settlement of 1988
Problems: 1. In 1975 there is a coup in Portugal because the military leaders were tired of fighting colonial wars. They give independence to Mozambique and Angola in one of the most irresponsible de-colonization moves. 2. The UN declared that Namibia is independent and South Africa’s military presence illegal 3. Cuban troops are in Angola supposedly to help fight against UNITA, the primary Angolan opposition.

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Three Conflicts: 1. South African Defense Force (SADF) fight in Namibia against the Namibian liberation movement SWAPO on the northern Namibia border. SWAPO is 90% Obvano, which is the same group that is on the southern Angolan Border. (Look at Map) 2. SADF vs. Cuban MPLA in Angola when the SADF fights alongside UNITA or enters Angola to strike SWAPO camps 3. UNITA vs. MPLA Resolving the first two would make it easier to deal with the civil war. 1981 the Regan Administration has 3 options: 1. have a Namibia-only approach that would be ineffective but buy time with allies and avoid trouble 2. downgrade relationship with South Africa and pressure them 3. Incorporate the Angola factor. Until then the Cuban troops in Angola had been largely ignored. Crocker choose the third. He proposed a settlement whereby South African troops would withdraw out of Namibia if Cuban troops left Angola. South Africa was uncooperative throughout the negotiations because they had nothing to gain by leaving Namibia. The conflict wasn’t ripe. They kept fighting alongside UNITA in Angola causing the Cuban troops to increase five fold.

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In the US they were trying to repeal the Clark Amendment so that the US would have the option of offering aid to UNITA. This would distance UNITA from South Africa and put pressure on the MPLA. When the amendment was repealed the US did give aid to UNITA. The key to the agreement was that the Cubans, Angolans and South Africa all had to save face in the agreement: South Africa launched a major attack in Angola that became a quagmire, making the conflict VERY unpopular home and increasing the pressure for it to end. Because the Angolans had helped turn the attack into quagmire they felt good about themselves and were willing to negotiate. The Cubans were willing to negotiate when they launched a major attack against a dam in Namibia. They could say they were victorious. They signed the agreement in 1988 when South Africa had no support from home, and they saw that George Bush won the election and the negotiations would continue. Namibia reached its independence in 1990. This is a Cold War case, which might limit its usefulness. Also it is a specifically Africa Case which limits the regions where it could be applied. It is a useful illustrator of “borrowing leverage.”

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
Tamiel Holloway #7 The policies of the Great Powers in the 19th century /early century contributed too many of the contemporary conflicts such as that of Rhodesia, and South Africa. South Africa was colonized by the Belgium and later by the British. Rhodesia was colonized by the British. When the countries left they pulled out and left a small white minority in control of the country. In turn this left the majority of the country disenfranchised and without rights. There existed a horrible racially motivated apartheid system in South Africa, and similar programs in place in Rhodesia. Wayne Fredericks argued the US had to come out against white domination and condemn apartheid in South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies. The US was reluctant to turn their support from the former colonial powers and the left over white ruling majorities because the US had high stakes in the imports it brought in from those areas; the US didn’t want to loose allies and trade.

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In the case of South Africa the US did not want to loose one of its few democratic allies in the midst of lots of newly formed African countries with socialist Marxists regimens. This system perpetuated by the Afrikaner (white) population perpetuated the negative race relations present in that country at the time that exasperated the US relationship with South Africa. The United States had an ongoing policy of supporting the colonial powers. The US was afraid that if white Majority rule were to leave South Africa the country might abandon democracy. The US former Presidents such as Nixon, and Ford were very friendly to these all white regimens, Carter on the other hand condemned them and declared the US should fight the white minority rule, which was not

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very democratic. Under Carter the UN voted to increase sanctions against all these regimens. The stance developed by the Reagan administration of “constructive engagement” exasperated the deplorable race relations already present in the country and ongoing racial discontent amongst black Americans. The US thought therefore that it may be best to verbally condemn but not cut off relations or trade. They wondered how their country could be friends with a nation that mistreats its black citizens so terribly with a notion once acceptable in the US of “separate but equal”. Under the apartheid system white South Africans controlled 2/3 of the disposable income, and the land. This thus perpetuated a system in which certain areas of the country were deemed white, black citizens had to carry passes late at night, and to visit certain areas. The black majority was rounded up and deposited onto 10 homelands with no job opportunities which perpetuated a system of migrant labor. A civil rights movement highly similar to that which took place a few decades earlier in the US with opposition groups called the (ANC) African National Congress, and the (PAC) the Pan African Congress. This movement began perpetuating major violent conflicts such as the “Sharpeville massacre”, followed by rioting from the “black consciousness movement”. The UN Security Council reprimanded one of its members for the first time when it imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. Do to outside pressure South Africa entered negotiations with Ronald Reagan who was more sympathetic to their system than some of the past presidents they encountered. The problems in South Africa were more exasperated by their constant attacks on their self ruled neighbor Angola. These attacks ultimately forced the US to take action. In 1980 they launched a major attack on Angola and continued an ongoing presence there that leads to more Cubans traveling to the region.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
Assistant negotiator of African policy Chester Crocker felt that the only way to get the Cubans out of the area was to invite them to negotiations. The reason the Cubans were in the area was to aid the Angolans in preventing the UNITA from rule. The US was reluctant to sanction South Africa under P. W. Botha because they felt that was an “action”. Crocker felt the US had very little leverage in South Africa when in actuality they had the power to sanction, cut off supplies and goods. The US wanted more stability in the region for business, the abolishment of apartheid however slow, and South Africa to leave Namibia as well as the Cubans to go home. Crocker had a very ambitious plan to get the South African rebels to stop running to their neighbors for protection and for South Africa to stop destabilizing borders. Things exploded when South Africa created a new constitution that showed some deference for non whites and non blacks but no representation for the black majority. Eventually with the help of Senator Richard Lugar the Senate started changing its stance on the issue it come closer and closer to passing sanctions until it was inevitable. The Gray bill was one push that the South African Government needed to backs off. Shortly after sanctions were put in place and Reagan’s veto was overrode.

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Similar to South Africa’s case was the Rhodesian conflict. White left over from the British settlers gave them an exaggerated sense of importance and stated that the country was not ready for majority rule. Their emphasis on racism and ethnocentrism perpetuated a regimen that acted mainly in the interest of its ruling white minority. Henry Kissinger went into these negotiations with bias and a lack of information about the region. He felt a kinship with the Rhodesian Hero Ian Smith and rather than

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encourage majority representation he acted in the favor of whites. In his National Security Study Memorandum 39 the 5 options he heavily weighed were to ignore blacks, furnish whites with weapons to maintain control, or cut whites off and give weapons to blacks. It was in the US interest to maintain the status quo they also felt it might be the best option against communism. The settlement of whites in Rhodesia was fairly recent in 1888 under Cecil Roads. Steadily the white population grew but never came close to a majority. The English eventually began considering it a referendum. The White minority in control claimed they were not racists because rather than racial restrictions they only had economic restrictions. The economic restrictions were created to keep the disenfranchisement of blacks in place though. Great Britain as in the case of the US in South Africa greatly ignored the leverage it had against Rhodesia; they maintained veto power in the area but severely hesitated on exercising it. They were suppose to exercise their power to veto to protect Africans but ignored it all together. The “portioning act” was another racist’s act aimed at maintaining the disenfranchisement of blacks it did not allow communal land ownership. This land grab would certainly push the blacks into a black proletariat working class. Africans could only own plots o 6-8 acres. 97% of whites lived in cities, 3% on the land. This land grab led to serious health and educational problems for the Africans. This move by the white ruling elite exasperated the state of affairs there an led to the need for foreign mediation because it pushed the majority to rebel with more and more denial of rights with acts like the preventive detention bill, the vacancy act, and the unlawful organization act.. Prime ministers Todd and Whitehead shared a belief in a multiracial state but in actuality this system would take years for blacks to “earn” their way to a majority. They lack of support from Great

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
Britain was egregious. When Rhodesia declared itself independent the UN applied sanctions. In 68 the “Fearless talks” reached two agreements which allow for freedom with option of majority rule. Smith and Britain attempted to work out a plan that would allow blacks more representation but were ultimately unsuccessful; ultimately the Pierce Commission’s findings made it quite clear that Rhodesians were not satisfied with the state of their representation. Ultimately Kissinger got far too involved with Ian Smith to be effective at working out negotiations. He terribly misused the influence he had with the frontline states with deceit further alienating them and exasperating their trust of super powers. During the Lancaster talks Lord Carrington was able to effectively unite the actors and really help bring about a settled peace by showing respect to the Frontline states and using his leverage to push Ian smith very hard. Another major problem that arose from colonialism exasperated by these issues was the lack of black unifications against the colonizing forces and the left over white minorities. Especially in Rhodesia it was hard for the blacks to gain power while they had major conflicts amongst each other exasperated by the way colonial lines were drawn around these nations. In Rhodesia (ZANU) Zimbabwe African National Union and (ZAPU) the Zimbabwe African National Union could not really agree on anything but the elimination of white rule.

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Colonization and decolonization in these two African nations lead to the political problems that surfaced in the twentieth century. The people were so disenfranchised that the only way they would ever be able to improve their circumstances without pushing for it themselves. When they formed organizations that were banned and later expelled from the countries they responded with violence which leads to retaliatory violence from the

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white regimens. These nations forced cultures traumatized by colonialism and racists practices to make peace and find and identity under white ruling elite, abandoned by their original colonizers that had the leverage they desperately needed to bring about majority rule these nations. The negotiators that should have been more active should have been that of their host countries. It seems that US policies were largely influenced by an initial attempt to maintain the status quo in these areas but do to the heavy race relation problems and lack of majority representation for the black majority caused them to look toward establishing majority rule.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
Question 1 – Has mediation and the role of the mediator changed over the past century? What different types of mediation can exist during negotiations? Discuss and support your answer by citing examples from specific cases. Mediation has become more common and complex, but same basic task – make independent parties w/o desire/obligation to compromise work together. “herding cats” - the mediator is primarily a "process person," helping the parties define the agenda, identify and reframe the issues, communicate more effectively, find areas of common ground, negotiate fairly, reach an agreement, implement settlement. Types of negotiation: - prevent conflict from erupting, intervene in active conflict to bring about settlement, facilitate implementation of negotiated agreement Phases of 20th century: collapse of Ottoman & Austro-Hungarian empires, collapse of colonial empires, collapse of Soviet empire. Factors that have changed mediation: (see introduction to Herding Cats, 1st lecture notes) Many conflicts caused by post-imperial drawing of borders - boundaries don’t coincide with population divisions (Iraq, Afg, throughout ME, Africa) - unequal distribution of resources - some groups favored at expense of others  resentment, anger. (Rwanda) intrastate conflicts last longer than interstate conflicts guerilla/terrorist tactics, and cross-border support outsiders stay away when conflict appears intractable (Iraq – coalition has shrunk) identity tied up in conflict (Kurds) disaffected groups hesitant to form coalition with others migration – groups will sometimes leave, train military/regroup, and return UN sovereignty issue in charter Not easy to tell good guys from bad guys Advent of democracy gives groups a voice to express grievances COLD WAR - disappearance of constraints imposed by rival superpowers - disappearance of bipolarity states vulnerable to reassertion of old antagonisms among national, religious, ethnic groups o conflicts multiple and escalated o demagogic leaders use ethnicity, religion to gain/solidify power o proxy battles  civil/intercommunal conflicts  Soviet/Cuban/US rivalry complicated Mozambique, Angola, South Africa mediations during Cold War  conflict in former Yugoslavia – ethnic, religious divisions

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• intervention: EC/European Union, UN, Jimmy Carter, NATO bombing

GLOBALIZATION - instantaneous, global media coverage o domestic publics more aware of leaders’ decisions (Vietnam, Lebanon…) - increased interest in human rights, democracy, rule of law. o South Africa - apartheid - proliferation of number/types of 3rd-party intervenors o regional orgs, NGOs, UN, states, coalitions of small/mid-sized powers  Sant Egidio – Mozambique  Contact Group – Namibia  Contadora -- Nicaragua o peacekeeping forces, development agencies, lone operators  management issues, level of commitment, responsibility Roles of mediator: - facilitate communication, either directly or through shuttle diplomacy (common in Middle East, where it’s particularly hard to agree on meeting face-to-face) - set up logistics/create framework for talks – who to talk to, when o Carrington – Lancaster House vs. Kissinger - Prod parties into compromise o Leverage: economic/military/humanitarian aid, sanctions, prestige/reputation  NATO bombing in Bosnia - Enforce cease-fires o Peacekeeping  Rwanda, Lebanon - Create “hurting stalemate” and/or ripeness o Assist weaker side to equalize conflict

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
How has ethnicity and religion affected, complicated, and in some cases eased negotiations? What steps were taken to lessen the impact of ethnic/religious tensions? How would you recommend dealing with such issues? Rhodesian crisis 1890 – British settlers entered, conquered, and ruled Rhodesia. 1923 – Britain granted Rhodesia internal self-government 1960’s – ZAPU and ZANU had been established; they opposed white domination, but they disagreed over ethnic, personal, ideological issues ZAPU – 19% Ndebele ethnic group; Nkomo ideology was pro-west ZANU – 80% Shona-speaking ethnic group; Mugabe ideology was Marxist Ethnic differences made it difficult for the US to intervene because they had to deal with divisions within the nationalist movement. ZANU leaders and The African National Conference leaders were both split within each group. The Smith government was able to exploit the divisions among the black forces so that they can buy time until the West would eventually be on their side. Also the fact that the Rhodesian government was headed by white officials stirred tensions amongst the majority black population. With the support of South Africa and the frontline states, the US was able to begin the process of negotiating a peace agreement. The US knew that the frontline states were important because they supplied the guerilla groups. They also knew that South Africa was important because they were the outlet for the Rhodesian government’s trade operations. Great Britain along with the US adopted a proposal that they could negotiate with all representatives if Rhodesian gov would accept 4 conditions: 1) majority rule 2) no independence before majority rule 3) elections within next 2 years 4) no prolonged negotiations With ZANU growing rapidly into Rhodesia, South Africa pulled out half of the troops in Rhodesia, nearly crippling the air strike and also threatened to limit rail traffic into Rhodesia unless Smith agreed to negotiate. It was the first time Vorster, Rhodesia’s military supplier, publicly declared support for majority rule. Kissinger had a meeting with Smith and stated that the US would never aid his government and that intelligence research was concluding that Rhodesia was doomed to collapse. After long talks and Smith believing that there were more possibilities to the Rhodesians if he accepted Kissinger’s proposal, he agreed to majority rule in 2 years. Even though these negotiations failed due to 1) Smith disliking the last minute modifications of the proposals and 2) Smith offering no alternatives at the Geneva conference, Kissinger still gained a major breakthrough by having Smith agree to majority rule, kept hopes alive for a peaceful settlement, and lessening violent conflicts.

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I would start off dealing with this issue in the same way that Kissinger approached it because it was clever of him to use each countries supply lines as leverage to get both countries to the negotiating table. By cutting off their main source of military supplies, it makes each country very vulnerable. An aspect that I would have done differently is to remain focused throughout the whole negotiation process. Kissinger was too excited at the fact that Smith had agreed to majority rule so he made any concessions to get the agreement signed. Arab-Israeli Conflict There was strong racial tension. No country in the middle east was willing to make the first initiative in gaining peace, no country wanted to accept any sort of blame for the hindering of the peace process. Also no Arab country wanted to deal with the Israelis. Both sides have been stating for years that they wanted to hold a conference to discuss peace. US decided to begin a process of leading a Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and also an Israeli-Arab conference sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union where all parties would be represented. The main idea that the US had to get across to all parties was parallel reciprocity (confidence building measure to demonstrate to both sides that each side is willing to negotiate for peace). US suggested that the Saudis could drop the economic boycott of Israel, reject the 1975 UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, end the formal state of belligerency with Israel, meet with Israeli officials at a low level, or exchange intelligence info on terrorist activities. In turn, Israel would halt the deportation and detention of Palestinians and withdrawal of troops in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. US knew that the peace process would fail without the participation of Syria for the Arabs and Jordan for Israel. The US had leverage with Jordan. Jordan needed economic help and King Hussein needed to rebuild ties with Washington and Riyadh. The US got one leader at a time to join the conference by having them compromise to each others requests. And having large impacting countries such as Syria to attend the conference provided the US with leverage in influencing others to follow. The US sent letters to all of the countries urging them to be more flexible so that a peace conference can be held, but Shamir rejected the proposal and would not budge concerning the full UN involvement. The only option was to get Assad to compromise. Eventually after the US’s constant effort to meet with Middle Eastern leaders to reach a compromise to attend the conference, the US got Shamir to finally attend as well as Assad. There were 4 factors that allowed US diplomacy to succeed: 1) the defeat of Iraq and collapse of communism which created a dynamic for peace 2) US leadership in the defeat

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
of Iraq, combined with credibility of compromising with both side 3) two-track approach and parallel reciprocal confidence building 4) take or leave it mentality I would recommend that the US handled the Arab-Israeli conflicts very well to the parties that they were dealing with. All the racial tension between Arabs and Israelis certainly made it very difficult for the US because each country was not willing to compromise. It forced the US to constantly setup meetings with leaders and eventually use the leaving a dead cat on the doorstep tactic to get all the countries to attend the conference.

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#6 What role does military force or the threat of force play in the negotiations process? Should force be used to bring parties to the table? If so when should it be used and how effective is it? Illustrate your answer with reference to cases discussed in class. Relevant Cases: • “The Reagan Administration and Lebanon” • “The Road to Sarajevo” • One condition for military force is that it needs to be used for mediation purposes, military force with an inherent interest in the conflict usually is more hurtful than helpful because it is trying to defend it’s own interests rather than aid in everyone’s interest with negotiations. • Also when military force is coordinated with diplomatic efforts it works well, not to solve the problem distinctly, but in aiding the negotiations to gain ground with obstructionists or those who will not accept negotiations at all. • The most obvious example of where there wasn’t sufficient coordination and it hurt the negotiators was in the case of “The Reagan Administration and Lebanon”. o Because Department of Defense and the State Department weren’t on the same page their compromises on how to use military power resulted in inefficiency. The DOD agreed to send in military force, but wouldn’t allow them to do anything. Their main role was intimidation that would be used by the mediators to get fighting to stop and Israel and Lebanon to the table. o But because the Diplomats involved in negotiating, namely Habib and Shultz, wanted more and expected more in the way of military action, they made promises beforehand to try and elicit concessions from Lebanon, but what they had promised them in return was military support from the US and that never materialized making them seem untrustworthy and harder to negotiate with. o As the situation became slightly more stable, the Multi National Forces (including US Marines) were pulled out and proved to everyone their importance of being there when the president of Lebanon (Gameyal) was assassinated. o When the time was ripe to use military power to gain ground on the peace process it wasn’t used. When Israeli forces had humiliated Syria and there was a strong anti-war sentiment domestically in Israel due to the massacres Sharon was held responsible for and the expense of the war, military force could not be wrenched out of the Pentagon’s closed fist to close the deal.  The military was sent back in, but with the same policy- no fighting (except in self-defense). As a result Syria was allowed to revamp it’s military mission with the help of the Soviets and Israel was given time to take care of its domestic politics, both giving new fire to the conflict.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
It wasn’t until military forces of all sides had penetrated the country and distinction was nearly impossible, that the US forces stepped up their policy and began firing upon insurgents and enemy forces. But by then it was too late, Syria was too strong and Israel was determined to stay in the country, at this time the US military force only added to the complexity of the conflict. One case that exemplifies the effectiveness military force can have on negotiations is “The Road to Sarajevo”. • In the Balkans conflict, Serbian President, Milosevic was unwilling to engage in serious negotiations, the whole thing was a kind of game to him, a means to more power and authority over the region. • He continued to give the negotiation team, led by Richard Holbrooke, the run around, never admitting he had ties or influence on the Bosnian Serb forces that were causing the most damage. • The negotiating team was able to narrow the differences, politically, between the warring sides, but peace continued to be elusive, no party was willing to stop fighting and could not be diplomatically coerced to do so. • It wasn’t until NATO began launching air strikes that Milosevic was ready to be serious about negotiating. Almost immediately after the air strikes the negotiating team was able to get what it needed from him because he definitely wanted the conflict ended rather than an escalation of NATO involvement. • The US team met with Milosevic and his delegation of Bosnian Serb military leaders and drafted a ceasefire/peace agreement including a lifting of the siege of Sarajevo. NATO air strikes continued to be the enforcement for this agreement, if fighting didn’t stop they knew the NATO air strikes would begin again. • In this case military force was essential to the negotiation process if it were to be successful. Milosevic could have handled all the diplomatic efforts the mediators threw at him, that is not what he is intimidated by. The only thing that resounded with him was force. It is what he uses against his enemies when he is serious and needs to get a point across and as a result it is the only thing that will work with him to convey seriousness and urgency. Military force should definitely be used to bring parties to the table, but with much discretion. Who ever is making the decision should know how the party will respond to such force, the situation and level of conflict must be taken into consideration. It is only one weapon in an array that can be effective in negotiating peace and is often not the most effective. Milosevic was a key candidate for military force because of his history in dealing with external pressure. In 1992, UN imposed sanctions on Serbia for supplying Bosnian Serbs with military equipment, in response to this, Milosevic immediately closed borders with Bosnia and cut off his ties with insurgents to induce the lifting of sanctions. In the case of Lebanon, history of the actors must also be taken into consideration along with the situation and level of conflict. Israel has been known to be stubborn and averse to backing down to the United States, Syria has been known to be the same way as exemplified in some of the cases we have read in this class. With the added support of the Soviets, the negotiating diplomats must realize this and use force at the appropriate times (when they were weak and had other factors going against them), if at all. In the

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Lebanon case there was simply too much disunity across departments and agencies and not enough teamwork or leadership to effectively deal with the situation. Military force should not be seen as a last resort it should be used as a strategic tool only where it is going to draw out the results needed. *I hope this helps you- April.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
Question 7: How have policies of the Great Powers in the 19th/early 20th century contributed to many of the contemporary conflicts that we have covered? Throughout history, external powers played a critical role in shaping modern states. Colonial powers’ policies of decolonization, haphazard creation of states, and racial policies greatly contributed to many contemporary conflicts. The Great Powers of the 19th and early 20th century often relied on the manipulation of conflict between ethnic and racial identities in order to keep populations from uniting against the occupying power. However, with the advent of de-colonization, these strategies left a legacy of partition and racism. The African continent is one of tremendous diversity-linguistic, tribal, and religious. With colonization, these very diverse groups were forced into haphazard colonial boundaries determined by the Europeans. However, once African nations finally gained their independence, they were left with these same unstable and irrational borders. After becoming independent, Africans had to try to adjust to this new political structure and live with fellow citizens not of their own choosing. Many wars erupted due to the fact that many tribes of Africans were divided between states. Also, in nations where two tribes were forced together, violence often emerged over which tribe should have political control. In short, the haphazard drawing of nation borders by uneducated Europeans caused much of the conflict still occurring today. For example, the Congo River, although it appears to be a natural geographic boundary, had groups that otherwise shared a language, culture or other similarities and resided on both sides. However, division of the land between Belgium and France along the river isolated these groups from each other. In adddition, those who lived in Saharan or Sub-Saharan Africa who had traded across the continent for centuries, often found themselves crossing "borders" that often existed only on European maps. Another large contributing factor to the current conflict in African due to colonization is the racial policies that were instilled by the Great Powers of the 19th and early 20th century. European powers often created ethnic divides where they did not previously exist, in order to serve their needs. Rhodesia, which is now Zimbabwe, was governed by Britain until 1980. Prior to 1888, there were no whites in Rhodeisia. However, when settler Cecil Rhodes brought settlers as part of his vision of imperialism, this all changed. In order to achieve his goal of “painting the African map red (symbolizing British control)“ he dreamt of developing a Cape-Cairo railway route. By 1922, there were 35,000 whites in Rhodesia. While there were no racial restrictions on voting, there were educational and property ones, whose requirements were so high that it made it almost impossible for blacks to votes. In 1930, the Land Apportionment Act, which no longer acknowledged the ownership of communal land, furthered the divide between Africans and white settlers. In response to this divide, two nationalist groups emerged. ZAPU, headed by Joshua Nkomo, and ZANU, headed by Robert Mugabe, began to rise up against the government. Despite multiple negotiations and peace talks, Zimbabwe still remains in shambles. Mugabe became arrogant and corrupt, and has acted in response to years of oppression by the whites. He now has a self-destructive policy of seizing white land. This year, a few million Zimbabweans now face starvation and the ZIN dollar has fallen greatly. This current conflict can all be traced back to oppressive racial policies by the colonizing power. De-colonization, although it seems like a good thing upon first glance, also has its problems. For example, many new leaders and independent people faced the enormous task of creating a stable and independent economic base in the aftermath of de-colonization. Usually, they lacked the necessary capital, industrial infrastructure such as factories, transportation and communication systems. In addition, there is often a power vacuum after colonization. Most governments, if even instilled, faltered due to civil wars, armed take over by military on the right, or radical left based revolutionary leadership. After Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, it was left in chaos. Upon losing control of Mozambique, some Portuguese settlers try a coup d'etat against Frelimo. The coup failed when put down by united forces from Frelimo and Portugal, however, on their retreat many settlers destroyed as much as they possibly could-houses, livestock, cars, infrastructure and machinery-to prevent others from using it. In many ways the Portuguese settlers left a large gap which could not easily be filled without education, governance and experience. In the following years, civil war broke out between Frelimo, and anti-Communist South African supported government, Renamo. Conflict surrounding this civil war has encompassed Mozambique for over twenty years since the end of colonization. Although there is now peace in Mozambique, it is still extremely fragile. This explicitly shows the detrimental effects that de-colonization can have on a nation. In conclusion, while the abolishment of colonial rule has in part eliminated some of exploitation and suffering that took place under imperialism, the problems of political instability, civil violence, poverty, and racism still remain. The policies of the Great Powers in the 19th and early 20th century Colonialism had a destabilizing effect on many ethnic groups, the repercussion of which are still being felt in African politics. The negative effects of imperialism are extremely apparent in all aspects of African nations, and the policies of European colonization greatly contributed to many contemporary conflicts.

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
Rosella Cappella 8. Do you believe that the US foreign policies are related to its domestic politics? a. US foreign policies are related to its domestic politics. US foreign policies relation to its domestic politics can be illustrated into the context of the role of the mediator as the mediator deals not only with the parties to the conflict, but also with his own domestic constituencies. The mediator’s challenge in maintaining unity grows more severe when the policy debates become more politicized. i. The congressional disputes about US policy and broader public arguments about US policy toward southern Africa in the 1980s could have served to undercut the authority of the mediators by seeming to offer different venues—as well as different priorities and different leanings—to the parties in conflict. 1. Namibia-Angola. US mediators had critics on both flanks during the 1980s—in congress, within the administration itself, and from media and public sources. As a result of US domestic politics in the Namibia-Angola case, Washington did not possess the means to enforce its will. Critics on the right felt that the US negotiators were not sufficiently tough with the Marxist parties and they did not want Cubans involved in negotiators nor condemn South Africa who was anti-Marxist. Critics on the left claimed to perceive US collusion in permitting Pretoria to get away with its failure to implement Resolution 435. Thus, the mediators could not apply pressure on the parties. 2. Namibia-Angola/South Africa. By 1985 the US domestic political scene had shifted in favor of the mediator. During the summer of 1985, US diplomats sought to convert the mounting domestic American sentiment against both the apartheid regime and Soviet-aligned Angolans into leverage on them to more forward in the talks. Thus, they used the growing antiapartheid fervor at home as the basis for imposing limited sanctions on South Africa. These developments in 1985 demonstrate the extreme complexity facing US mediators: ground was shifting under our feet at home which were changing the calculations of both parties. Thus, reflecting that US foreign policies are related to its domestic politics. 3. Rhodesia. When Americans were entering the Rhodesia conflict domestic politics looked to limits US foreign policy regarding its ability to deliver. While most Americans cared little about specific African situations, any perceived strong American commitment to either combatant could raise problems to Pres. Ford during the presidential year of 1976. By spring of 1976 Ford was expecting a strong convention challenge from conservative

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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Regan. Conservatives had supported Rhodesia would oppose any American “tilt” toward the Patriotic Front. Conversely, given the predicted closeness of the upcoming November election and the importance of the black votes, Ford could ill-afford to support the white Rhodesian government.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Final Questions and Answers
IR-383 Study Question 8) Discuss how colonial policies are, at least in part, the cause of many of the conflicts covered in the class. What lessons should be taken from this when dealing with conflicts with colonial roots? Use evidence from cases. Colonial policies are, at least in part, the cause of many of the conflicts covered in class • Colony owners drew borders between states regardless of any previously existing relations in the area o Tribes were often split apart, as was the case in Rhodesia and surrounding states. Telling a tribe/group that they are now two different entities, and then forcing half of the tribe together with another enemy tribe does not end well. o Because many places weren’t used to having specific borders, the idea of not being able to go somewhere had an effect on groups’ outlooks • Colony owners imposed white rule over areas o For obvious reasons, the leaders of many tribes/groups were angry o This is applicable all over, such as Apartheid rule in South Africa, Rule in Rhodesia, and almost everywhere else that there was a colony • When leaving colonies and accepting colonies’ declarations of independence, many colony owners didn’t set up a good system after leaving. This is especially true for any of Portugal’s colonies. o This is also related to the drawing of borders. Colonies were set up splitting tribes/groups, and forcing them together with other tribes/groups. Then, they left. With the European hierarchal government and land ownership idea in mind, tribes/groups fought for power.

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o Kashmir is a good example of this. Britain did a fairly good job of leaving, but didn’t follow through. Kashmir was left to be fought over by India and Pakistan. The conflict is now considered one of the most dangerous in the world, as both countries have nuclear capabilities. The lessons that should be taken from this when dealing with conflicts with colonial roots • Understand the uniqueness of the situation. Conflict without colonial roots are often over security or the pursuit of land/oil et cetera. With colonial roots, though, each party may believe that they have a right to control over something (land or otherwise) because of historical tradition. • As conflicts with colonial roots are relatively new problems in the world, they cannot be dealt with in traditional ways (i.e. giving each party half of the land they want, et cetera). Unique solutions must be presented. In Kashmir, for example, the Livingstone Report presents a solution that would unite Kashmir as an independent state for domestic issues, but their current controlling state would deal with foreign issues. This report was seriously considered by India.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Final Questions and Answers
1) Has mediation and the role of the mediator changed over the past century? What different types of mediation can exist during negotiations? Discuss and support your answer by citing examples from specific cases. Early in the 20th century, mediation consisted of very few different elements, in comparison with today’s complex hierarchy of mediation techniques and theories. The field of mediation focuses mainly on settling disputes between two or more states. This applies to both the early years and late years of the 20th century. The difference is seen when analyzing the parties involved in settling the dispute between the states. In the early years of the 20th century, mediation, in the true sense of the word, hadn’t much of an impact on the international community. Third-party mediators would often make legitimate attempts to solve conflicts between two parties in a non-violent way, but their influence was usually limited. First, states would tend to stay out of international conflicts that were unrelated to their own; this tendency came mostly from individual states inherent nature to work towards their own self interested goals. While this may still be true today, a couple of major events have outweighed this ‘inherent nature’ and begun a period of deep involvement in mediation throughout the international community, even when the dispute doesn’t directly effect the mediating state. WWII brought a realization of the importance of mediation abroad. For mostly blatantly obvious reasons, the US found that the result of neglecting boiling disputes overseas was that the effects would eventually come back home. Thus a new era of mediation began, one with many distinct types of mediating. First, mediation can be carried out by thinking of a reasonable compromise in the dispute and speaking with the leaders of each state (or with the leaders of the disputing

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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parties within a state), effectively ‘talking them into peace.’ One of the most prominent examples of this type of mediation comes from the dispute in Southern Africa between South Africa and Rhodesia. Kissinger, a US diplomat, was the most active mediator in this case. Kissinger developed a compromise between Smith’s white-led government in Rhodesia and the demands of the majority black community. Though it was the British who were eventually successful in the negotiations of Rhodesia, Kissinger made much of the headway needed by speaking with the leaders, most notably Smith, and telling them directly what needed to be done before peace could occur. Force, especially in the realist-dominant United States, is a common method of mediation between two parties when every other option is exhausted. This was the case of Bosnia, shortly after its declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. When demands made by the international community for the Serbs in Bosnia to end the massacre of Moslems weren’t met, the UN proceeded to bomb many of the Serb camps. This methodology proved to be successful. Many variations of force and negotiations have proven to be both successful and failures. Nonetheless, over the course of the past century the international community has developed a better understanding of the types of mediation that must take place in order for a more peaceful world to be realized.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

-removal of Cold War rigidities has opened up a range of conflicts to entry and political participation by previously excluded or marginal actors IR-383: Final Questions and Answers -greater global consensus Page 330 -support for political means for managing conflicts and for experimenting with expanded UN roles -opened up opportunities for other actors to play mediating roles (e.g. Canada) -the possibility that conflict will spread has provided the rationale for a number of international interventions -current climate of mediation: confusion of objectives, approaches, instruments employed by the international community in the response of conflict may cause more harm than good -the role a mediator plays in the peace process depends in good part on his relationship to the parties and the objective of mediation -mediator uses what ever tools are available: threats of sanctions, promises of trade relations, international law, pressure from neighboring states… get to talk rather than fight -the multiplication of mediators is less a matter of choice than a fact of life in today’s world *multi-party mediation can mean different things in different contexts: simultaneous, sequential, composite mediated interventions -multiparty and sequenced mediation can promote peacemaking in concrete ways -have unique pathologies -but if not working together, they can make matters worse -UN has taken on greater roles, as well as Japan, Germany, European Community, South Africa, Nigeria -community Sant’Egidio *regional organizations: -strengths: -closer to the problems -have better understanding -weakness: -too close, cannot intervene effectively -weaker in general resources *NGOS: -weakness: -depend on their relationships with the governmental and intergovernmental players -borrow political leverage where they can -strengths: -offer space to parties: (space is an important component of the process that allows parties to conceive and accept alternatives to their hardened positions)  manipulated in Zaire (pg 85 in Herding) -the ability to use force lends credibility to the mediation and allows the mediator to level the playing field in situations of uneven power distribution  problems of coordination: (e.g. b/w UN, military and NGOs) -lack of unity in an effort to prevent conflict, to bring parties to the table, or to impel them to act on what they have agreed weakens the peace negotiations -needed to move between stages of peace process -undercut one another -*benefits of multiparty mediation: -it is not always possible for one institution or country to fulfill these requirements  need more than one 3rd party to prepare/establish a way to peace -2 paradigmsKeith Parker,structuralist and social-psychological models California of multiparty mediation: University of Southern

-diff individuals and institutions have diff strengths -e.g. low end of conflict curve – nonofficial actors IR-383: Final Questions and Answers -set up parallel tracks for informal dialogue  reduce tensions and encourage the development of trust and working Page 331 relationships -opening new avenues for dialogue -creating leverage, isolating spoilers, and sharing costs and risks -catalyzing systemic change -building supportive constituencies within society -informal discussions helped build trust in the gov’t and opposition as well with other int’l organizations -mediation efforts that are tired to wider exit strategies can lead coherence to multi-party mediation efforts provided that the various parties to the joint effort share similar strategic goals -multiparty mediation can also be related to a wider strategy of political engagement by external actors in a country or a region *liabilities: -keeping on target -forum shopping and mixed messages -negotiations conducted on separate tracks and with different constituencies -efforts undermined if parties can go “forum shopping” -perceive that mediators are working at cross-purposes -dropping the ball -hand-off problems when different mediators try to engage parties in negotiations over a prolonged period of time -misunderstanding about implementation are common -buck passing and blame avoidance -duck tough issues and try to pass the responsibility/blame when things go wrong -lack of resources -Burundi: A Case of Parallel Diplomacy -external actors initiated a large number of explicitly conflict-oriented activities, in addition to the more standard humanitarian and development programs -although NGOs proved to have competitive advantages in dealing with the conflict and had accomplishments to their credit, they also augmented the fragmentation of the international response -competing definitions of the problems and the resulting mismatch of responses led to a general misdiagnosis of the conflict’s most critical forces -efforts by private actors cannot substitute for strategic commitment by states to deal with the issue of violence -Community of Sant’Egidio helped play a role in the secret negotiations to the signing of an agreement on interBurundian negotiations b/w Pres. Pierre Buyuya and Hutu rebel leader Leonard Nyangoma -the Great Lake region have had a lot of official and private diplomatic agents involved -the expansion and decentralization of the diplomatic field to include private entities has fostered the emergence of a “parallel” diplomacy -the agendas of different agents interconnect like dominoes laid out on a table, creating an odd assortment of coalitions -e.g. in 1996, the gov’t of Rwanda formed an alliance with Kinyarwanda-speaking members of the Tutsi elite  financed by American Canadian and South African mining companies; also, backed military by troops from Angola, Burundi, Eritrea Uganda -orphaned by the Manichaean system of policies and references of the Cold War, the superpowers find it difficult to perceive the link b/w these conflicts and their own national interest, to identify their intervention responsibilities -b4, private humanitarian organizations assumed the responsibility of launching international response  but costly, fighters manipulate humanitarian aid programs -more mediators involved: -countries become more interested University of Southern California Keith Parker,

Page 332 -many members of the international community saw Burundi as a laboratory test new conflict resolutions and prevention approaches -NGOs had found themselves playing almost gov’t roles in Burundi – sit as partners at the negotiation table, promote dialogue and enjoy access to wealth of resources
-in 1993, 1st democratically elected Hutu pres was assassinated by Tutsi officers from the Burundi army -after several months of negotiating and fighting: decided to have Hutu pres and Tutsi PM -however, a Hutu fraction didn’t want to share power so made own army which caused civil war and thousands to be killed -Major Pierre Buyoya claimed power through coup  caused sanctions by other states in the region -various dialogues have taken place: -the Arusha process: pres of Tanzania -Sant’Egidio process -internal dialogue b/w Pierre Buyoya’s gov’t and FRODEBU  1998 international partnership for peace -UN -AU: sent military observers -EU, US, Canada, South Africa and Kenya appointed special enjoys in 1996 -although coordination efforts are officially part of each official mediator’s agenda, the sheer number of special envoys reflects the diversity of their agendas and motivations  tends to jeopardize the official claim that the international community wants peace, or at least the same peace, for the region -private orgs and churches: launch own reconciliation and dialogue initiatives to make up for the states’ cynicism -give priority to the interests of the own population -special enjoys: represent the interests of the institutions and gov’ts giving them authority -the struggle for influence b/w France and US -geopolitical and economic interests of the countries in the region  all official mediators suspected of partiality -their work not backed by intermediaries who work to build trust among warring fractions  faith in the international community eroded as implement drastic solutions that have no political logic or real concrete results (only symbolic ones) -NGOS try to solve the problems on two levels: 1) by conflict resolution programs and by “assisting” in official mediation -NGOs have tried to reintroduce the elements of time and psychology into the mediation process by expanding the field of parallel diplomacy to include a wide variety of activities specifically geared toward conflict resolution -a key element of the NGO contribution has been to introduce Burundians by way of trips and training seminars to political figures experienced in conflict resolution in South Africa and other countries in transition -have Hutus and Tutsis work together on common projects and by building “common ground” -Search for Common Ground (an American NGO) to provide public with independent source of info -Hutu and Tutsi journalists -in rural areas/capitals: agents of parallel diplomacy enjoyed tremendous autonomy and direct/indirect influence on the management of the Great Lakes region’s many conflicts -the number, commitment and competence allow them to have a “cognitive” role in the definition of gov’t agendas -watchdogs (e.g. International Crisis Group established presence in Burundi)  such actions clearly helped the different private and public actors face up to their responsibilities, forcing gov’ts to be accountable to an informed constituency, as well as same NGOs to one another -parallel diplomacy in the Great Lakes region has worked alongside official mediations and complemented state diplomacy -e.g. high level representatives from multinational orgs (e.g. UN) capitalize on NGO creativity, flexibility and skill  synergies b/w gov’t and private sector -e.g. UN special envoy for Burundi made sure his activities complemented NGOs’ -encouraged external activities to University of Southerncosts of travel and other things Keith Parker, offer certain individuals funds to cover the California

-universities study the field -NGOs offer new skills and creative projects IR-383: Final

Questions and Answers

 gave him leverage, establish informal penalty-and-reward system for those who helped/hindered in the peace process  developed a practical method of cooperation and subcontracting b/w public and private IR-383: Final Questions and Answers sectors Page 333 -in 1993, NGOs took over some official mediation processes in Burundi -mediation activities have been pluralists in nature, and focal point has changed several times -certain private actors have successfully jump-started parallel political negotiations on a head-of-state level -decentralization and the splitting of negotiation levels have depoliticized outside contributors, giving them a comparative edge in terms of access to the parties in conflict -e.g. Pres Carter and former pres of Mali, and Archbishop of Desmond Tutu rbought together leaders of warring countries and neighboring nations to address the Burundi situation -politicians are driven by the logic of the political world -private entities usually drive by variety of different motivations -Community of Sant’Egidio: international commit on religious research to unite humankind -Synergies Africa: bridge gap b/w internt’l community and local actors in the conflict HOWEVER: -private agents have been eager to compensate for official diplomatic mistakes, but their initiative no only have failed to solve the problems of communication gridlock but have also contributed to the incompatible mix of messages e.g. by 1996, various interpretations and definition of the country’s prob produced fragmented and inconsistent international response -in order to promote their own solutions, private agents took part in every debate, pushing for cause after the next  identifying many aspects of Burundi’s situation without ever being able to grasp the full picture -humanitarian and human rights problems led to short term goals -mediation initiatives and conflict resolution projects were sponsored but tended to only address one issue  ppl thought that the sum of all these efforts could reduce the level of violence -burundians were able to profit from the confusion, with agents manipulating the different negotiations in order to gain maximum legitimacy -it appears that every political tendency has found a temporary ally among the international organizations  become part of the problem -Burundians have intensified division among various international agents by underlining and exploiting their different agendas -parallel diplomacy can help to initiate a negotiation or facilitate a political process  but cannot substitute for state diplomacy when it comes to obtaining concessions from warring factions -having private agents become de facto representatives of the international response presents the grave danger of eroding the responsibility of states to intervene Multiparty Mediation in Northern Ireland -the Northern Ireland conflict has had a life cycle of thirty years -the world of IGs and NGOs must be emphasized -role of American diplomacy was paramount in securing the Good Friday Agreement -EU and Eminent Peron’s Group (EPG) -one of the first decisions made was the creation of a new Police Commission to begin work on a fundamental review of the Royal Ulster Constabulary -headed by former governor of Hong Kong -composed of a 7 member commission draw from Canada, Ireland, UK and US -Commonwealth = agent of preventative diplomacy and soft power -offers experience

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

-special relationship with Queen Elizabeth w/o having to be worried about being party of a uniquely Britishdominated entity IR-383: Final Questions and Answers Page 334 -as sovereign boundaries diminish in the context of increasing globalization, there is a greater incentive for intervention -the increase in the number of states at the negotiation stage can impose a lack of coherence as well as additional points of leverage -context: -community felt as if they were victimized: memory -unionist refused to trust their British overloads and instead relied on local arrangements -Catholic community thought that it was a persecuted minority: believe that unity would be achieved through physical force or demographic change -unionist and protestant community too close: couldn’t work together  violence began -minorities moved to other communities to become the majority  expulsed ethnic opponents -no resolution b/c violence had not reached intolerable levels -Northern Ireland society shunned visionary leadership and emanated “bottom up” -suspicious of state -Protestants suspicious of intention of the center, particularly the British government -no one church can represent all -ethnic conflict can be irreconcilable and thus most harmful to nation-building when each of the chief contestants is politically underdeveloped -fraught with internal dissent and suspicion, each community is incapable of presenting leaders who can negotiation and institutions that can accurately represent the community’s views -e.g. unionism presented by 5 diff parties -nationalism divisions were fewer but more profound: divided into constitutional and physical force traditions -miscommunication b/w the people and leaders: leaders thought voters more extreme than they were, so they took on extreme positions  the people thought the situation was worse that it really was -egoism of victimization: there is no other memory than the memory of wounds -1990s: hurting stalemate -where there is intense and protracted communal conflict, moderates will often attempt to build relationships with moderates on the other side of the divide, to bridge the gap, and develop a “centering” dynamic -negotiating middle is required for peace processes to take hold -N. Ireland lacked strong center until the 1990s: -problem strength of the center was compromised by the weakness of its members  elements outside the 2 groups could use violence as form of veto  they had to be brought into negotiations -key players in the Irish American diaspora also played their part in bringing the IRA into the fold  Clinton administration granted Gerry Adams to attend a conference in New York -reinforced the call to Sinn Fein to engage in the process of political dialogue -intense pressure from Irish Americans succeeded in lobbying Congress over Irish immigration issues -loyalist paramilitaries persuaded to follow the lead of IRA’s declaration of cessation of violence in 1994  one IRA stopped, they did not need to fight against it -track-two diplomacy: unofficial, informal interaction b/w representatives of adversary groups or nations which aims to develop strategies and create and environment which could contribute to the resolution of their conflict -not substituting track one (gov’t to gov’t, leader to leader contact) -helping to assist official leaders by compensating for the constraints imposed upon them by the need to be seen as strong in the face of the enemy  workshops: bill of rights, human rights culture -Harvard

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

-N Ireland participants learned from the first hand experience of those who were involve din the South Arican negotiation process IR-383: Final Questions and Answers Page 335

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Final Questions and Answers
Why was the Vietnam Peace agreement acceptable in 1973 but not in 1969 even though the agreement on the table was practically the same? What can this teach us about the negotiating process?

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In 1969, the US tried to decouple the military and political aspects of the war – which ignored the North’s entire motivation for fighting (which was to determine the South’s political future.) - US wouldn’t consider anything that included overthrow of Thieu - Henry Cabot Lodge tried to start w/ mutual withdrawal from south, and neutral Cam/Laos o North had no intention of leaving the South. o South couldn’t move toward a political settlement without endangering its existence. Thieu had very little support.  There were no neutral figures who could play a role in a future settlement. o US couldn’t take a softer stance because of domestic pressures/international reputation. (Kissinger argued we should have offered a generous proposal and then stood on it without further concessions until there was reciprocity.) o “We could have neither peace nor our prisoners until we achieved what Hanoi apparently no longer trusted itself to accomplish: the overthrow of our ally.” - North argued that South had to be settled according to program of the NLF – which didn’t include Thieu staying in power. In March of 1972, North invaded. Kissinger saw this as Hanoi’s last throw of the dice. There would now be serious negotiations, but substance would depend on who won on the battlefield. - ARVN shouldered burden, but w/ heavy US aid, returned military situation to a relative stalemate by mid-June. - MUCH at stake for US policymakers – in Vietnam and in international realm (allies…) o began to work Moscow/Beijing connections. They were restrained – offered Hanoi no support.  Used meeting w/ Brezhnev to test out stance, so he could pass it on to Hanoi and urge its acceptance. o Used (and were hurt by) pressure of upcoming US election.  North – make agreement before or hold firm, hoping to wear down US resolve?  US – suspend talks until they had a fresh mandate, or compromise further to reach an accord? • Nixon didn’t want to seem weak, anxious, desperate - Pushed South harder – told them there would be an inevitable and immediate termination of US eco and mil assistance. In 1969, North still thought they could accomplish their goals through force. Time was on their side – could wear down the South, especially considering Vietnamization. This teaches us that negotiations will not be successful if one side still wants to fight. - You have to create a stalemate that will force both sides to compromise o North to accept compromise on political future o South (Thieu) to realize that they were too weak to be stubborn. One could argue the same happened in Bosnia. - NATO used air power to get the Serbs to try to capitulate, but it was not decisive enough to get them to assign the agreement until demonstrative use of power. o Serbs felt their advantage was significant enough to continue pushing for more territory before signing a cease-fire. o Croats/Muslims at times also hindered the process, thinking their piece of the pie was too small - Military force has to be substantial enough to show you’re serious, and committed to the cause to commit resources.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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Question # 6 • • The Kosovo Conflict was based on ethnicity and religion. Discuss: a) The war in Kosovo can be largely considered a religious conflict between the Serbs who mainly belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the ethnic Albanians who are mainly Muslims, and part Roman Catholics. • In this case the ethnicity and religion complicated the issue and negotiations were difficult because the two parties would not even be in the same room together at the same time. The two sides were even more split due to the attitudes of the radicals of each party. Steps were taken to get the leaders of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Party) and the Yugoslavian gov’t to agree to meet or NATO would keep bombing Serbs and they threatened to abandon the KLA and leave them on their own to fend for themselves against the much larger Yugoslavian government. Both sides eventually agreed to negotiations However, today relations are still bad between the two parties and NATO troops are still forced to keep the peace and look out for Serbs still living in Kosovo.

To resolve issues that deal with ethnic and religious conflicts the negotiator must first figure out how to bring the two parties to the table while having them willing to deal with each other and give into compromises. This part requires motivation for both sides. IN the case of Kosovo the motivation was brought in by military intervention and the threat of leaving ethnic Albanians on their own to deal with the Serbs. Even with this type of motivation tensions will still be high and negotiations will be difficult. A negotiator must not give in to biases that he or she has and must accept the ideology of both sides and understand that the way they think is not the way that the other side thinks.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Final Questions and Answers
Question #7. The Cold War affected some, but not all, of the cases we studied this semester. Citing specific cases show how the cold war complicated the achievement of a successful outcome of negotiations. Now that the cold war is over, do you believe that it is easier to successfully conclude negotiations of conflicts in the Third World?

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Example 1: Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Namibia-Angola Settlement of 1988 (Herding Cats, p. 207) Setting: • -In 1968 Namibia became independent state. Presence of South Africa there declared illegal. • -1974 Portugal’ withdrawal from African colonial empire was followed by Soviet-backed Cuban intervention in Angola. • -South Africa maintained presence in Namibia—launched attacks into Angola from position there Ways in which Cold War complicated situation: South Africa upset that West had not responded to 1975 Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola • Meant that it did not trust the West • Did not listen to West’s demand for its withdrawal from Namibia West’s justification for not putting enough effort to Cubans in Angola problem: • Undercut Angola’s cooperation in Namibian diplomacy • Accusations that the West was more concerned about communist presence in Angola than about colonialism and racism in South Africa-ruled Namibia • Any Western nation that publicly raised issue of Cubans in Angola would be criticized by non-aligned and communist groups in UN Situation: • South Africa would not withdrawa from Namibia because claimed that Cubans in Angola posed a threat • Angolan government would not let Cubans leave because they said their presence was needed against attacks across the border from South Africa in Namibia Linkage Policy: Eventually U.S. adopted linkage policy • Withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola + South African forces from Namibia • So neither side could justify presence by danger posed by other side Results: Linkage policy worked Clearly solution took a while and was complicated by Cold War Example #2: Nicaragua (In Case Study Reader) Background: • Unrest in Nicaragua

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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• Somoza regime overthrown by Sadinistas backed by Cuba • Somozas were very unpopular • 1979 Sadinistas formed new governments East-West perspective: • Dominated U.S. view towards Nicaragua • This perspective believes that unrest in Latin America is caused by Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements acting at instigation of Soviet Union • Poverty and inequality seen as problems that could be dealt with by non- revolutionary political means if it were not for Soviet interference • (contrast to North-South perspective) Overriding Interests of U.S.: • Preserve U.S. regional hegemony and deny the Soviet Union another base of operations in the hemisphere • Prevent another Cuba U.S. Actions in Nicaragua Based on Cold War Thinking: • Earlier had decided to back Somoza regime even though they were unpopular and committed human rights violations • Once Sandinistas were in power, U.S. backed the Contras, who fought against the Sadinistas from bordering countries o U.S. did not like that Sandinistas had maintained a Marxist-Leninist ideology and ties to communist countries • Efforts were ultimately unsuccessful

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Final Questions and Answers
Question 7 the cold war polarized many conflicts (which could have been solved easily if handled simply and directly) into conflicts of supranational ideology, bringing in 3rd parties and which often resulted in stalemates, thus delaying the resolution of the actual conflict issue. i think the cases most affected by the cold war are Angola, Mozambique, South Africa Angola SWAPO, though not truly marxist or socialist, exploited the Communist movement for Soviet weapons and Cuban soldiers. South Africa as the main anti-communist force in the region supported UNITA, and supplemented the fight along the Angola-Namibia border with its own SADF America as anti-communist allies of South Africa, could not threaten or coerce South Africa to withdraw from Namibia this was counterproductive because the Cubans were willing to leave if only South Africa would back down and retreat from Angolan-Namibian borders. The Cold war legitimized American presence, but at the same time gave Angola reason to doubt the sincerity of their [american] intentions as any more than cold war tactics. Mozambique newly independent Mozambique is run by Marxist government FRELIMO RENAMO is created to oppose Frelimo, thus garnering support from anticommunist South Africa, conflict escalates. At end of Cold War South Africa pull out support for Renamo. In this case the end of the cold war helped the situation by cutting Renamo's support and making it aware that it couldnt win the conflict on its own. Mention of South Africa USA verbally condemned Rhodesia and South Africa for their human rights violations but never stopped trade with the white regimes. It was President Reagan that hailed the South Africans as Anti-Communist Friends

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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#8 Discuss how colonial policies are at least in part, the cause of many of the conflicts covered in the class. What lessons should be taken from this when dealing with conflicts with colonial roots? Use evidence from cases. Thesis: Throughout history, colonial powers’ policies of de-colonization, haphazard creation of states, and racial policies th th greatly contributed to many contemporary conflicts. The Great Powers of the 19 and early 20 century often relied on the manipulation of conflict between ethnic and racial identities in order to keep populations from uniting against the occupying power which left a legacy of partition and racism with de-colonization. When dealing with conflicts with colonial roots, Problems with colonization: 1 Imperial powers’ racial policies A. European powers often created ethnic divides where they did not previously exist, in order to serve their needs EX: Rhodesia -No whites prior to 1988 -When settler Cecil Rhodes came with vision of imperialism he dreamt of developing a Cape-Cairo railway route. By 1922, there were 35,000 whites in Rhodesia -Racial restrictions -there were no racial restrictions on voting, there were educational and property ones, whose requirements were so high that it made it almost impossible for blacks to votes. -In 1930, the Land Apportionment Act, which no longer acknowledged the ownership of communal land, furthered the divide between Africans and white settlers. -In response: ZAPU, headed by Joshua Nkomo, and ZANU, headed by Robert Mugabe, began to rise up against the government. -Now: Mugabe became arrogant and corrupt, and has acted in response to years of oppression by the whites. He now has a self-destructive policy of seizing white land. This year, a few million Zimbabweans now face starvation and the ZIN dollar has fallen greatly◊ALL DUE TO IMPERIAL RACIAL POLICIES 2. Haphazard drawing of state lines -With colonization, these very diverse groups were forced into haphazard colonial boundaries determined by the Europeans. -once African nations finally gained their independence, they were left with these same unstable and irrational borders -Forced to live with people not of their own choice -in nations where two tribes were forced together, violence often emerged over which tribe should have political control -Many wars erupted due to the fact that many tribes of Africans were divided between states -Ex: Kurds in Iraq 3. Imperial powers’ racial policies didn’t just go away when the country was decolonized. -EX: Rwanda: -Since the Belgians had favored the Tutsis, after de-colonization the Hutus sought out revenge through killing and repressing over 80,000 Tutsis. -Power vacuum 4.New leaders faced the enormous task of creating a stable and independent economic base in the aftermath of decolonization. Usually, they lacked the necessary capital, industrial infrastructure such as factories, transportation and communication systems. EX: Mozambique -. Upon losing control of Mozambique, some Portuguese settlers try a coup d'etat against Frelimo

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IR-383: Final Questions and Answers
-on their retreat many settlers destroyed as much as they possibly could-houses, livestock, cars, infrastructure and machineryto prevent others from using it. -Portuguese settlers left a huge gap that could not be filled without education and experience -civil war broke out between Frelimo, and anti-Communist South African supported government, Renamo. -Now peace in region, but very fragile Lessons to be Learned: 1. In order for peace to be negotiated in conflicts dealing with colonial roots, the major controlling powers must have the desire to disengage from the country in way that will not leave it in chaos. EXAMPLE: Cambodia case -One of the main reasons that the situation in Cambodia was able to be negotiated peacefully was due to the desire of major powers to normalize their bilateral relations and disengage from Indochina. -These “ripe” circumstances were reinforced by the efforts of several regional states - such as Indonesia, Thailand, Australia, and Japan - to eliminate foreign intervention from Indochina and stabilize Southeast Asia in an era of accelerating economic growth -Through the negotiated settlement, Indochina gained stability through the withdrawal of major power intervention, affirmation of the integrity of its three separate states (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), and integration of the three states into ASEAN. 2. NGOs can be quite helpful in resolving conflicts that have colonial roots. BURUNDI Background: Burundi, which was colonized by Germany in the late 19th century and under German and then Belgian administration until its independence in 1962, developed conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis after gaining independence. Benefits of NGOs: In order to effectively negotiate the conflict, NGOs that were specialized in mediation and conflict resolution were especially effective in the prengoitiation phase by helping to spur dialogue between the protagonists. They can also alert public opinion to official policies and impose norms of action. Drawbacks of NGOs: -Their sheer number -Divergin institutional agendas -Various definitions of the problem ***All these problems risk fragmenting and therefore hindering the international response

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Question # 8: As a good example might be Sri Lanka Case Study. Sri Lanka was known as Ceylon before it gained independence in 1948. The name was changed from Ceylon to Sri Lanka in 1972. Occupied by the Portuguese in the 16th century and by the Dutch in the 17th century, the island was ceded to the British in 1796 and became a crown colony in 1802 • Was ruled by western nations, there were two distinct kingdoms on the island a) the Tamil Kingdom in the north b) the Sinhala kingdom in the South The British gave Ceylon independence in 1948, handing over control of the entire island to a Sinhalese government, based in Colombo, which renamed the island Sri Lanka • The Sinhalese were proclaimed as the majority group and as a result received the entire island, while the other one was called Tamil, a minority group. • The conflict between those two groups was called an “ethnic conflict” and the civil war erupted in mid-1983 between separatist Tamil guerrillas(LTTE Liberation of Tamil Tigers Elam) and the Sri Lanka armed forces. • Sri Lanka has been a poor country with a high unemployment rate and, after gaining independence, it possessed an agricultural and fishing economy • Most of the population survived by farming • Sri Lanka is multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-lingual The conflict between these divided societies began as a result of these differences among them and due to the British colonialism • In fact, in 1505, when Sri Lanka became a colony of Portugal, the Sinhalese and Tamils lived separately to a certain extent without fighting any wars among each other • The British created an English-speaking elite out of the Tamils, who benefited from a comfortable position in the organization: “[The British] favoritism engendered an opposition that took racial and religious overtones.” Buddhists and Sinhalese speakers did not belong to the elite, and as a form of retaliation they began to advance the racist belief that Sinhalese are superior: “The Sinhalese believe that Sri Lanka is largely a Sinhalese-Buddhist country and all other religious or language groups are alien. Sri Lanka, they argue, is the only country of and for the Sinhalese people.”. Despite the racist beliefs of the Sinhalese, “the Tamils thought of themselves as equal in status to the Sinhalese during the colonial era • Once the Sri Lankan independence was gained, the Sinhalese group, which had control over the state of Sri Lanka, began to discriminate against the Tamils. The Tamils were excluded from higher education, jobs and land, which resulted in Sinhala becoming the official language. • The educational structures were altered to restrict Tamil admissions to higher education: “[The Tamils’] decreased levels of participation in higher education and public employments since the end of the colonial era are probably the most important cause of Tamil separatism

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Final Questions and Answers
• In July 1983 the worst riots in Sri Lanka’s history—full-scale, anti-Tamil attacks—took place in the capital, Colombo The violence was so eruptive and so contagious that Colombo was closed down for almost two weeks and it moved to surrounding cities and towns Even during the war, the exhaustion of the fighters was visible because there were 30,000 desertions from the Sri Lankan army of 150,000. The high level of desertions was explained by the fact that Sri Lanka has been in civil war since 1983 The number of deaths recurrently destabilized and damaged the society: “More than 60,000 Sri Lankans were killed in the war between 1983 and December 2000.

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Elizabeth Barreras Question #8: 3rd World Final Question Breakdown: 1. How are colonial policies (at least in part) the cause of many of the conflicts covered in the class? 2. What lessons should be taken from this when dealing with conflicts with colonial roots? 3. Use specific examples from cases. A. Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) 1. Cecil Rhodes and his imperialistic policies encouraged the 35,000 whites (British) to “paint the African map red” and wanted to develop a Cape-Cairo railway route. 2. No racial restrictions on voting, but there were educational and property restrictions which were directly correlated with voting. You had to have so much property and the restrictions were so high that most blacks never had the opportunity to vote. 3. Land Apportionment Act, which no longer acknowledged the ownership of communal land, furthered the divide between Africans and white settlers. a. This triggered the conflict against the government and ZAPU and ZANU (headed by Mugabe) emerged, lack of black unification though as a result. b. Mugabe became corrupt and arrogant, and began his self-destructive policy of seizing white land without actually achieving anything for blacks. c. This year, millions of Zimbabweans face starvation and the ZIN has fallen greatly – a great destabilizing effect 4. Lessons in dealing with conflict with colonial roots: a. When decolonizing, the necessary capital and industrial infrastructure needs to be established. Also, the colonizing country needs to disperse the power accordingly between groups in power with political leverage, otherwise radical revolutionary groups will emerge and upset the decolonized country. B. South Africa (Afrikaners) 1. Racially motivated apartheid system. White South Africans owned 2/3 of disposable income and land, even though whites were a very small portion of the population. a. Perpetuated a system where certain parts of the country were deemed white, and black citizens had to carry passes late at night and passes to visit certain areas – blacks were put into 10 different homelands and a system of migrant labor developed.

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2. When a new constitution was developed, there was some deference for nonwhites and non-blacks, but no representation for the black minority still 3. Sanctions were imposed a. Blacks were penalized to some extent as outside countries were trying to be reserved to protect their own agendas (ex. US was trying to keep good relations with S. Africa because they had good business with them.) 4. Fighting between rebel groups and government, ex. SADF and UNITA v. MPLA as a result, international mediators were counting on the fact that S. Africa would be very cooperative, which turned out to be very wrong. 5. Lessons: a. Negotiators should’ve been more involved in the situation and the US needed to exercise its leverage in the situation instead of shying away because of big business interests. Lack of representation before and after colonization once again proved detrimental. Sanctions can’t replace a tried and true solution. C. Mozambique (Sant’ Egidio Case) 1. Colonized by Portugal, ended in 1974. Power turned over to nationalist movement Frelimo which was formed in 1963 from 3 nationalist groups a. Frelimo was suppose to unify the country and build national identity, but they ended up using a socialist structure of power and it provoked resentment and opposition. Renamo emerged as a result. 2. Renamo became the biggest military resistance to the government a. A bloody civil war ensued for 15 years b. Conflict fed by global tensions from Cold War and the fact that Rhodesia and S. Africa supported Renamo. 3. Lessons: a. A solid political structure must be established before the ruling/colonial power parts from the country. When a strong-voiced nationalist group emerges, chances are they aren’t free and fair toward everyone as their cause is to oust the government in rule. The problems with the Frelimo government were glaring and were apparent in the fact that they had such a large military resistance against them. National elections and free and fair politics are necessary to get a country on their feet, as was mediated by NGO’s and major world actors.

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IR-383 Study Question 8) Discuss how colonial policies are, at least in part, the cause of many of the conflicts covered in the class. What lessons should be taken from this when dealing with conflicts with colonial roots? Use evidence from cases. Colonial policies are, at least in part, the cause of many of the conflicts covered in class • Colony owners drew borders between states regardless of any previously existing relations in the area o Tribes were often split apart, as was the case in Rhodesia and surrounding states. Telling a tribe/group that they are now two different entities, and then forcing half of the tribe together with another enemy tribe does not end well. o Because many places weren’t used to having specific borders, the idea of not being able to go somewhere had an effect on groups’ outlooks • Colony owners imposed white rule over areas o For obvious reasons, the leaders of many tribes/groups were angry o This is applicable all over, such as Apartheid rule in South Africa, Rule in Rhodesia, and almost everywhere else that there was a colony • When leaving colonies and accepting colonies’ declarations of independence, many colony owners didn’t set up a good system after leaving. This is especially true for any of Portugal’s colonies. o This is also related to the drawing of borders. Colonies were set up splitting tribes/groups, and forcing them together with other tribes/groups. Then, they left. With the European hierarchal government and land ownership idea in mind, tribes/groups fought for power.

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IR-383: Final Questions and Answers
o Kashmir is a good example of this. Britain did a fairly good job of leaving, but didn’t follow through. Kashmir was left to be fought over by India and Pakistan. The conflict is now considered one of the most dangerous in the world, as both countries have nuclear capabilities. The lessons that should be taken from this when dealing with conflicts with colonial roots • Understand the uniqueness of the situation. Conflict without colonial roots are often over security or the pursuit of land/oil et cetera. With colonial roots, though, each party may believe that they have a right to control over something (land or otherwise) because of historical tradition. • As conflicts with colonial roots are relatively new problems in the world, they cannot be dealt with in traditional ways (i.e. giving each party half of the land they want, et cetera). Unique solutions must be presented. In Kashmir, for example, the Livingstone Report presents a solution that would unite Kashmir as an independent state for domestic issues, but their current controlling state would deal with foreign issues. This report was seriously considered by India.

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How has ethnicity and religion affected, complicated, and in some cases eased negotiations? What steps were taken to lessen the impact of ethnic/religious tensions? How would you recommend dealing with such issues? Rhodesian crisis 1890 – British settlers entered, conquered, and ruled Rhodesia. 1923 – Britain granted Rhodesia internal self-government 1960’s – ZAPU and ZANU had been established; they opposed white domination, but they disagreed over ethnic, personal, ideological issues ZAPU – 19% Ndebele ethnic group; Nkomo ideology was pro-west ZANU – 80% Shona-speaking ethnic group; Mugabe ideology was Marxist Ethnic differences made it difficult for the US to intervene because they had to deal with divisions within the nationalist movement. ZANU leaders and The African National Conference leaders were both split within each group. The Smith government was able to exploit the divisions among the black forces so that they can buy time until the West would eventually be on their side. Also the fact that the Rhodesian government was headed by white officials stirred tensions amongst the majority black population. With the support of South Africa and the frontline states, the US was able to begin the process of negotiating a peace agreement. The US knew that the frontline states were important because they supplied the guerilla groups. They also knew that South Africa was important because they were the outlet for the Rhodesian government’s trade operations. Great Britain along with the US adopted a proposal that they could negotiate with all representatives if Rhodesian gov would accept 4 conditions: 1) majority rule 2) no independence before majority rule 3) elections within next 2 years 4) no prolonged negotiations With ZANU growing rapidly into Rhodesia, South Africa pulled out half of the troops in Rhodesia, nearly crippling the air strike and also threatened to limit rail traffic into Rhodesia unless Smith agreed to negotiate. It was the first time Vorster, Rhodesia’s military supplier, publicly declared support for majority rule. Kissinger had a meeting with Smith and stated that the US would never aid his government and that intelligence research was concluding that Rhodesia was doomed to collapse. After long talks and Smith believing that there were more possibilities to the Rhodesians if he accepted Kissinger’s proposal, he agreed to majority rule in 2 years. Even though these negotiations failed due to 1) Smith disliking the last minute modifications of the proposals and 2) Smith offering no alternatives at the Geneva conference, Kissinger still gained a major breakthrough by having Smith agree to majority rule, kept hopes alive for a peaceful settlement, and lessening violent conflicts.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Final Questions and Answers
I would start off dealing with this issue in the same way that Kissinger approached it because it was clever of him to use each countries supply lines as leverage to get both countries to the negotiating table. By cutting off their main source of military supplies, it makes each country very vulnerable. An aspect that I would have done differently is to remain focused throughout the whole negotiation process. Kissinger was too excited at the fact that Smith had agreed to majority rule so he made any concessions to get the agreement signed. Arab-Israeli Conflict There was strong racial tension. No country in the middle east was willing to make the first initiative in gaining peace, no country wanted to accept any sort of blame for the hindering of the peace process. Also no Arab country wanted to deal with the Israelis. Both sides have been stating for years that they wanted to hold a conference to discuss peace. US decided to begin a process of leading a Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and also an Israeli-Arab conference sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union where all parties would be represented. The main idea that the US had to get across to all parties was parallel reciprocity (confidence building measure to demonstrate to both sides that each side is willing to negotiate for peace). US suggested that the Saudis could drop the economic boycott of Israel, reject the 1975 UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, end the formal state of belligerency with Israel, meet with Israeli officials at a low level, or exchange intelligence info on terrorist activities. In turn, Israel would halt the deportation and detention of Palestinians and withdrawal of troops in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. US knew that the peace process would fail without the participation of Syria for the Arabs and Jordan for Israel. The US had leverage with Jordan. Jordan needed economic help and King Hussein needed to rebuild ties with Washington and Riyadh. The US got one leader at a time to join the conference by having them compromise to each others requests. And having large impacting countries such as Syria to attend the conference provided the US with leverage in influencing others to follow. The US sent letters to all of the countries urging them to be more flexible so that a peace conference can be held, but Shamir rejected the proposal and would not budge concerning the full UN involvement. The only option was to get Assad to compromise. Eventually after the US’s constant effort to meet with Middle Eastern leaders to reach a compromise to attend the conference, the US got Shamir to finally attend as well as Assad. There were 4 factors that allowed US diplomacy to succeed: 1) the defeat of Iraq and collapse of communism which created a dynamic for peace 2) US leadership in the defeat

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of Iraq, combined with credibility of compromising with both side 3) two-track approach and parallel reciprocal confidence building 4) take or leave it mentality I would recommend that the US handled the Arab-Israeli conflicts very well to the parties that they were dealing with. All the racial tension between Arabs and Israelis certainly made it very difficult for the US because each country was not willing to compromise. It forced the US to constantly setup meetings with leaders and eventually use the leaving a dead cat on the doorstep tactic to get all the countries to attend the conference.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Final Paper
Points to Make Most of the conflict from 1987 and on is centered on the Indian-controlled side of Kashmir Further, Kashmiriyat identity was already being formed in the mid 80s There was a rise in Muslim education around this time as well, mostly because of a lack of Indian-provided alternatives Kashmiris began to feel neglected by India Many of the new Kashmiris were more open to new ideas about how Kashmir should be run An Action Committee was formed after the theft of a Muslim relic from Hazratbal in Kashmir Farooq Abdullah, the Indian-supported candidate in the 1987 elections, was thought to be below in the runnings India rigged the elections, and Abdullah won After this, Kashmiris began to understand that they could not get their way though the political system, and began to result to violence Violence escalated, tourism dropped, and the Indian forces could not stop the violence New Delhi dismissed the Abdullah government and placed Jammu and Kashmir under Central Indian Rule In the five years following this, violence increased. Most of the activity came from the JKLF (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front) led by Amnullah Kahn who demanded a sovereign Kashmir By 1996 many other groups began militant operations, including Afghans, Uzbeks, and Arabs Most of these groups relied on covert Pakistani training and entering Indian-controlled Kashmir over the Line of Control Pakistan’s experience in the training of insurgents for the Afghan insurrection against the Soviets proved helped in providing an infrastructure for the training of Kashmiri militants The Inter-services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), an arm of the Pakistani military without oversight, was responsible for most of this

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Nonetheless, most of the conflict was local, from within Kashmir Since 1989 more than 350,000 Hindus were displaced by violence in Kashmir Zia-al-Haq’s Pakistani military regime is largely responsible for spreading the idea that India-controlled Kashmir was largely a religious issue for Muslims Islamic extremist groups were emerging in part because of this, including the Lashkar-eTayaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad groups of militants These organizations began to become more organized and assertive. The United Jihad Council was one of these organizations. It was an umbrella organization with many groups under it From 1988 to 1999, Zia’s military successors all supported the Kashmir Jihad. The elected officials during this period were more or less acquiescent India’s response to violence after 1989 was force. By 1994, there were over 500,000 Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir Indian troops were involved in massive human rights violations, which only deepened anti-Indian sentiments. Between 1987 and 1995, over 76,000 people had been arrested with only 2 percent being convicted of a crime While sticking to its coercion strategy, India began to hold elections from 1995-1996. During this, militant groups only multiplied. The groups had begun fighting each other as well as Indian security forces In 1994, APHC (All Parties Hurriyat Conference) was formed as a political front to advance Kashmiri objectives. The APHC consisted of some 38 parties with a threeoption referendum: independence, accession to Pakistan or accession to India. The APHC was very brittle. Coherence was hard to achieve with both extremist and moderate parties on both sides of the spectrum The 1996 election returned the ousted Farooq Abdullah to power amid widespread violence by both Indian Security groups and Militants. The APHC boycotted the election Abdullah, in coherence with India’s BJP Hindu nationalist party, merely continued the administration of Kashmir based on Article 370 Nonetheless, even amid violence, the economy in the Valley gradually improved from 1990 to 1998, largely as the result of central government encouragement

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Final Paper
Even though the economy was doing better, the future looked grim. In 1998 a report by the Indian government pointed out that 758 educational institutes had been destroyed. In reality, many of these institutions had been converted into army barracks. In 2001, the Indian government pointed out that nearly all sports and recreational facilities were closed or damaged In 1998, Nuclear tests were carried out by both countries In 1999, India found that Pakistani-based insurgents, along with Pakistani troops, had intruded into Kargil in Indian-controlled Kashmir When India threatened war with Pakistan, Pakistan’s prim minister Nawaz Sharif sought US mediation. Clinton was successful in convincing the militants to leave Kargil Sharif pinned the blame on the failure on Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf. In October 1999, Musharraf ousted Sharif and imposed military rule In September 2000, over 200,000 Kashmiri Hindus were living as refugees. In 2001, terrorist attacks were carried out on the Indian Parliament. India blamed the Jaish and Laskhar Pakistani-based militant groups for the attack and amassed troops along the LOC. Pakistan moved troops to their side of the LOC, and war seemed immanent. India then pulled its troops from the border, but war tensions were still high In 2002, state elections produced fresh bursts of violence. Hundreds were killed, including several candidates. One of the candidates killed was the much-respected Law Minister Lone. The turnout was higher than expected, at about 44%. Because participating in the elections meant an acceptance of Indian control of Kashmir under their terms, the APHC again boycotted the elections The National Conference, who previously controlled Kashmiri politics, had lost its domestic standing within Kashmir The National Conference had strong ties to the Indian central government, and thus contributed to the alienation of Kashmiris from politics The Peoples Democratic Party’s (PDP) leader Mufti Muhammed Sayeed, a Sunni Muslim, won the election. The PDP favored talks with the militants. Sayeed made contact with the APHC and released some of the militants detained in Kashmir under state provisional laws Sayeed also promoted full autonomy within the state of Kashmir

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New Delhi has made it hard to talk with the APHC, as they view the APHC as Pakistani puppets Since the Kargil crisis in 1999, India was relatively successful in isolating Pakistan. The crisis led to a US formal recognition of the sanctity of the LOC and informal Pakistani recognition After September 11, Pakistan became more important to the US in the ‘War on Terror’ that again put Pakistan in the international spotlight In order to gain US backing, though, president Musharraf was forced to clamp down on Muslim extremists Musharraf banned many prominent Muslim groups, including the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Much of this was merely cosmetic though. Many of the groups re-opened under different names. The US also put pressure on Pakistan to restructure the ISI, but the organization still plays a proactive role in interventionist policies in Kashmir. US support for Pakistan relies heavily on its prevention of Taliban insurgents from using Pakistan’s soil for strikes against US and Afghan forces in Afghanistan Further, the Pakistani military is hesitant to end its support for insurgency in Kashmir, which could possibly trigger Indian military response Possible Solutions The basic possible solutions: Finalize the LOC and end militancy India would like to formalize this status quo and make it the accepted international boundary. But Pakistan and Kashmiri activists reject this plan because they both want greater control over the region. They see all the militancy as a result of Pakistani intervention. India views the Kashmir issue as an internal affair and does not want to include Pakistan in talks. India’s position has increased the factionalism within the APHC. Some group members insist that Pakistan be included in talks, while others disagree. Further dividing the APHC is the disagreement on whether violence should be continued.

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One solution to the crisis is presented in the Livingstone Report The Livingston Report came from the Kashmir Study Group in 1998 The solution presented would result in the solidifying of the LOC, in some respects Further, Pakistan-controlled and Indian-controlled Kashmir would be a sovereign state in regards to domestic issues. For foreign policy and defense, each entity would rely on its current host country One of the problems with this solution is the interpretation of the solution. For example, “independence” would mean complete sovereignty to the Kashmiris, but would not mean the same thing to India India publicly dismissed the report but actually gave it serious consideration Kashmir joins Pakistan Pakistan pushes for Kashmir to join Pakistan Because of Kashmir’s majority Muslim population, Pakistan believes that they would vote to become a part or Pakistan However, this plan would compromise the minority Hindu population in Kashmir It has become clearer to the political leaders of Pakistan, though, that continued support of Kashmir insurgency would not support its cause Pakistan has been leaning towards a more peaceful alternative The political elite in Pakistan, though, are not included in policy-making decisions. It would be up to the military leadership to end insurgency support With Pakistan ready to find a peaceful alternative, the peace process would go much more smoothly if India would officially recognize that Pakistan has legitimate interests in Kashmir that should be taken into consideration Kashmir joins India This solution would be unlikely to yield any piece in the region There are few supporters of this solution Independent Kashmir

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Kashmiris push for an independent Kashmir Kashmiris have developed a very unique identity, after having a very unique status in the international community for over 50 years during the Kashmir dispute The difficulty in this proposal is that it requires both India and Pakistan to give up territory, which they are not willing to do A solution must include Kashmiri demands in order to end violence India has been committed to a democratic Kashmir, but fears losing too much control and national unity An independent Kashmir may not be a feasible solution, but India and Pakistan must include Kashmiri demands in peace talks in a way that is radically different from all past attempts in order to gain momentum in the peace process A small independent Kashmir from the Kashmir Valley, and the acceptance of the LOC outside of that A smaller completely independent and sovereign Kashmir could be created from the Kashmir Valley and possibly include Azad Jammu and Azad Kashmir This solution would give both Pakistan and India most of the land that they want, and also give an independent Kashmir to those militants who have been fighting against central rule since 1989 Critics of this proposal say that the smaller independent Kashmir would not be economically sustainable Further, it is unlikely that India or Pakistan would be willing to consider this option in talks International role in negotiations As the Kashmir dispute has been so long lasting, it will be hard for either Pakistan or India to make concessions on their own. The two countries have fought three wars since 1947 Now that both countries have nuclear capabilities, it will be even harder for the countries to make concessions to each other Since 1990, the US has intervened numerous times to pull the two countries away from war

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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The countries seem to have set into a ritual of negotiation and threats that have accomplished nothing India has traditionally rejected appeals for international help, saying the issue is domestic and should be dealt with as so Pakistan, on the other hand, has generally favored international support More recently, though, India has been more accepting of international support The international community has a lot to offer Including the exchange of views between the two countries and reassurance of each country’s cooperation and the concessions that each country is willing to make Further, UN could provide personnel to oversee the any negotiated settlement that might arise Current situation The Bus service, which began on April 7 this year, has been seen as a big step towards peace in the region. The service carries passengers back and forth between Pakistanadministered Kashmir and the Indian-administered side Many argue that the bus service has not moved peace forward at all, as both India and Pakistan haven’t changed their views on how to deal with Kashmir The Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers signed a security deal on October 3 of this year, which included a promise of advance warnings of ballistic missile tests and a hotline between the two nation’s coastguards. India’s view has not changed much. Indian premier Manmohan Singh told Bush recently that they believe Pakistan still controls the flow of terror across the line of control Domestic support for a settlement in the region has risen, putting pressure on both governments It is clear that any settlement will result in a less-than-ideal outcome for at least one of the parties involved. The parties need to be prepared to accept this for any peace settlement to gain momentum

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Kashmir Since 1989: History and Proposed Solutions

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

IR-383: Final Paper
This essay will detail the events that took place in Kashmir, as well as happenings in India and Pakistan related to Kashmir, from 1989 and on. Further, viewpoints of the parties involved will be discussed. A quick overview of the situation in Kashmir that led to violent rebellions starting in 1989 will also be covered. References to events before 1989 will also be included. For the most part, most of the conflict in the Kashmir area since 1989 has occurred in the geographical section of Kashmir referred to as ‘Indiancontrolled’ Kashmir and Jammu; the discussion here will focus primarily on this area. By the mid-1980s, a Kashmiriyat identity had already been developing. As conflict had surrounded the people of Kashmir for almost 40 years, a new generation of Kashmiris who had been surrounded by conflict their entire life were beginning to change the culture in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Around this time, there was a sharp rise in Muslim education in the region. The reason for this rise was mostly the result of India’s negligence in providing other education to the Kashmiris. Furthermore, Kashmiris were beginning to feel neglected by the Indian central government. This new generation of Kashmiris were much more open to new ideas and methods of achieving these ideas than their predecessors. Farooq Abdullah was the candidate most supported by the Indian central government in the 1987 Kashmir elections. Fearful that Abdullah would lose the election in Kashmir to anti-Indian sentiments, India decided to rig the election. Following Abdullah’s victory in the election, the people of Kashmir felt more isolated from India than ever before. Feeling unable to achieve their agenda through the political system, Kashmiris began to resort to violence as a reasonable alternative. In 1989, consistent anti-Indian violence in Indian-controlled Kashmir began and hasn’t completely ceased

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since. India made a strong attempt to end the violence with force, by sending in more Indian security troops. The failure of these troops to achieve their goal ended in the Indian government’s ousting of Abdullah from his position as leader of Kashmir. Kashmir and Jammu were placed under Central Indian rule. In the five years following 1989, violence continued to increase. Most of the violent activity within Kashmir was under the name of the JKLF.1 Amnullah Kahn, who demanded a completely independent and sovereign Kashmir, led the JKLF; the Indian central government would not consider this agenda as an option, and has continued this stance ever since. By 1996, many other outside militant groups had begun to cross the LOC2 into Indian-controlled Kashmir including Afghans, Uzbeks and Arabs.3 Most of these groups relied on covert Pakistani training and assistance from Pakistan for entering Indian-controlled Kashmir. The ISI4 has been responsible for most of the support provided to these insurgents. The ISI is an arm of the Pakistani military that was created partly for providing training for insurgents into Afghanistan to fight against Soviets, an agenda that was strongly supported by the US at the time. The ISI also has very little oversight from the Pakistani government, and reports directly to the military. It should be noted, though, that the far majority of the conflict in Indian-controlled Kashmir was local, coming from within Kashmir itself. Zia-al-Haq’s5 Pakistani military regime, which existed prior to 1989, is held largely responsible for spreading and promoting the concept that India’s control of Kashmir is a religious issue, pitting the Muslim majority in India-controlled Kashmir
1 2

Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front Line Of Control 3 See ICG, “Kashmir: Learning From The Past,” Brussels, 2003, p. 13 4 Inter-services Intelligence Directorate 5 Zia-al-Haq died in a suspicious airplane crash in 1987

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against the Hindu-controlled Indian central government. As an indirect result of this ideology, more than 350,000 Hindus from Indian-controlled Kashmir have been displaced by violence since 1989.6 Many of the groups responsible for the violence since 1989 were Muslim extremist groups following this ideology. The United Jihad Council, an umbrella organization under which many militant groups operated, was the most prominent of the Muslim extremist organizations. From 1988 to 1999, all of Zia’s military successors have supported the Kashmir Jihad through the ISI. The politically elected officials of Pakistan during this time were mostly acquiescent to the military regime. India’s response to the aforementioned militant groups following 1989 was the direct use of force, as mentioned earlier. By 1994, there were over 500,000 Indian security troops in Jammu and Kashmir.7 These troops operated under a strong, upperhanded policy that worked only to alienate further the Kashmir people from India. Indian troops were involved in massive human rights violations in the region. Between 1987 and 1995, over 76,000 people had been arrested, with only two percent being convicted of a crime.8 Further, India also attempted to counteract the negative attention that they were receiving from Kashmiris by holding elections that would remove the India central government from direct rule over Kashmir.9 During the first of these, from 1995-1996, militant groups multiplied and even began fighting each other as well as the Indian security forces. Before this, in 1993, the APHC10 was formed as a political front designed to advance the agenda of many of the groups, militant and otherwise, operating
6

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See Jag Mohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir (New Delhi, 1992) A number of Kashmiri Hindus (Pandits) also became refugees after the communal riots that accompanied India and Pakistan’s partition in 1947 7 See ICG, “Kashmir: Learning From The Past,” Brussels, 2003, p. 15 8 See Human Rights Commission of India, “Report on Kashmir,” New Delhi, 2001, p. 21 9 The Indian Central Government had direct control over Kashmir since the ousting of Farooq Abdullah in 1989 10 All Parties Hurriyat Conference

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in the region. The APHC consisted of 38 parties with a three-option referendum: independence, accession to Pakistan, or accession to India.11 The organization was very brittle, as it included groups from many extremes; coherence in the APHC was very difficult to achieve. The APHC boycotted the 1996 election, as participating in it would include agreeing to prolonged Indian control over the region. Amid widespread violence, the 1996 election returned the ousted Farooq Abdullah to power. Abdullah’s administration achieved very little change, and mostly continued the provisions set forth by Article 370.12 Even amid persistent violence from 1990 to 1998, the economy in the Kashmir Valley gradually improved; this improvement was largely the result of government encouragement. Though the current economy was looking better, the future looked worse. An Indian report in 1998 pointed out that 758 educational institutes had been destroyed.13 In reality, many of these institutions had been converted into army barracks for the Indian security forces.14 Further, in 2001, the Indian government reported that nearly all sports and recreational facilities were closed or damaged.15 In 1998, India proved its nuclear capabilities by testing warheads near the LOC. Pakistan returned by testing six, one more than India, nuclear warheads near the LOC.16 Without warning, in 1999 India discovered that Pakistani-based insurgents, along with Pakistani troops, had made their way over the LOC into Kargil in Indian-controlled

11

See ICG, “Kashmir: Learning From The Past,” Brussels, 2003, p. 16. Many APHC parties had their own militant wings operative in the field against Indian security forces and against each other 12 Article 370 of the Indian constitution grants special status to Jammu and Kashmir. Article 370 made Jammu and Kashmir a country within a country, with its own flag, emblem, constitution and Sadr-i-Riyasat (Prime Minister) 13 See National Commission on Human Rights, “Special report on Kashmir, 1997-98,” New Delhi, 1999 14 The report released by the Indian government did not include this reality 15 See Interim Report, ministry of sports and welfare, New Delhi, 2001 16 See BBC News Online, “India Pakistan | Timeline,” Nuclear Rivalry chapter, 2005. The United States ordered sanctions against both countries, freezing more than $20bn of aid, loans and trade. Japan ordered a block on about $1bn of aid loans

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Kashmir. After India threatened war with Pakistan and launched an air strike against the insurgents in Kargil, Pakistan’s PM Nawaz Sharif sought US mediation. Clinton was successful in convincing Pakistan to withdraw from Kargil and India to end air strikes.17 Sharif tried to blame the ordeal on the Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf. In retaliation, Musharraf ousted Sharif from power in October 1999 and imposed military rule over Pakistan. In September 2000, over 200,000 Kashmiri Hindus were still living as refugees.18 The next year, terrorist attacks were carried out on the Indian parliament. India blamed the Jaish and Laskhar Pakistani-based militant groups for the attack and amassed troops along the LOC. Pakistan did the same on their side of the LOC, and war seemed imminent. Though the troop build-up along the LOC slowly eased after promises by Pakistan to end its support of insurgents, war tensions remained high. In 2002, a fresh burst of violence came with state elections in Kashmir. Hundreds were killed, including several of the political candidates. The APHC again boycotted elections, but the voter turnout was higher than expected at about 44 percent.19 The National Conference, who had controlled Kashmir before elections, had lost considerable standing in Kashmir due primarily to its strong connection to the Indian government and lack of proactive action. The People’s Democratic Party (PDP), founded by its leader Mufti Muhammad Sayeed, a prominent Sunni Muslim, won the election. Much of the PDP’s support came from its favor of talks with militants. Sayeed promoted full autonomy within the state of Kashmir, began talks with the APHC, and released some of
17

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See text of Vajpayee-Clinton Joint Vision Statement, The Times of India, 21 March 2002. During the last days of the Clinton administration, India was relatively successful in isolating Pakistan 18 See Chindu Streedharan, “The Lost Generation: The Story of Children in Kashmir,” National Foundation of India, New Delhi, 2002. After becoming refugees, these Kashmiris were fearful of returning to Srinagar ever since 19 See ICG, “Kashmir: Learning From The Past,” Brussels, 2003, p. 16. The turnout was lower than for elections held before the 1989 uprising

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the militants detained without conviction. New Delhi slowed much of Sayeed’s progress in talks with the APHC, as India views the APHC as a group of Pakistani puppets. Following the 11 September attacks on the US, Pakistan became important to the US ‘War on Terror.’ In order to gain US backing, Pakistan’s Musharraf was forced to clamp down on its support of Muslim extremists. Musharraf banned many prominent Muslim groups, including Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Though these efforts satisfied the US, they resulted in very little change. Many of the groups re-opened under different names, which were later banned by Musharraf, then re-opened again under new different names.20 Regardless, the majority of Muslim extremists in the region continued operations. The US also put pressure on Pakistan to restructure the ISI, however the organization still plays a major role in interventionist policies in Kashmir. Even under US pressure, the Pakistan military is hesitant to end support for insurgency into Indian-controlled Kashmir; the perpetuation of this interventionist policy could potentially trigger an Indian military response. Both the parties involved and outside groups have presented a variety of possible solutions. The most straightforward of these solutions have been in circulation for years, but have yet to materialize due mostly to the unwillingness of the parties involved to accept anything other than what would be ideal for them. First, the LOC, set forth as a temporary border between Indian-controlled and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir could be formalized and made to be the accepted international boundary.21 Pakistan-controlled Kashmir would become a part of Pakistan,
20 21

See Staff Reporter, “Three more outfits put under ban: Offices’ Sealing Ordered,” Dawn, 21 November 2003 See BBC News Online, “Kashmir Flashpoint | The Future of Kashmir?” Scenario one: The status quo, 2005. Under United Nations' supervision, India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire along a line which left one-third of the state, comprising what Pakistan calls Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and the Northern Areas administered by Pakistan and twothirds, Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir Valley, administered by India

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and the Indian-controlled portion would become a part of India. This is India’s preferred solution. India views the militancy and violence in Kashmir to be mostly the result of Pakistani intervention; a formalization of the LOC would further allow for India to deal more effectively with any internal uprising in Kashmir. Both Pakistan and Kashmiri activists are quick to reject this proposal, as they would prefer greater control over the region. Further complicating this proposal and all others is India’s reluctance to include Pakistan in talks over the region. India’s position has also further increased factionalism in the APHC, causing even more unrest from within Kashmir. Some APHC members insist that Pakistan be included in talk, while others disagree. More factionalism results from groups’ disagreements on the use of violence in Kashmir to promote their agendas. Another solution is presented in the Livingstone report, published by the Kashmir Study Group in 1998.22 If this plan were implemented, the LOC would be formalized, but only to an extent. A new Kashmir, which would include both the Indian-controlled and Pakistani-controlled regions, would be a sovereign independent state responsible for all of its own domestic issues. For foreign policy and defense, though, Kashmir would be considered two separate entities divided by the current LOC. The foreign Policy and defense of each region would be the responsibility of its current host country, India on the Indian side and Pakistan on the Pakistan side.23 India has publicly dismissed this possibility, but had actually given it serious consideration. The most prominent problem with this solution is its interpretability. For example, “independence” for Kashmir would

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22

See “Kashmir: The Way Forward, 1998” at www.kashmirstudygroup.net. Farooq Kathwari, an American of Kashmiri descent, heads the Kashmir Study Group. 23 Full text of the report at www.kashmirstudygroup.net/awayforward/proposal.html. Kashmir Study Group members have political, diplomatic, business and academic backgrounds and search for innovative solutions to the conflict in Kashmir

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most likely be interpreted by Kashmiris differently than by the Indian central government.24 The technicalities of this solution may prove to be overwhelming. The solution most preferred by Pakistan is for all of Kashmir and Jammu to join Pakistan.25 With Kashmir’s majority Muslim population, Pakistan believes that if given the choice Kashmiris would vote to become a part of Pakistan. However, this proposal would compromise the minority Hindu population in Kashmir. Further, the solution obviously disregards the demands of both Kashmiri activists and India. As Pakistan has more recently been leaning towards a more peaceful solution, this option has become less desirable. Because of this, it has become clearer to Pakistani politicians that continued support of Kashmir insurgency would not support its cause. However, the military leadership in control of insurgency policy seems to have not come to the same conclusion. Possibly the least likely solution is for the entirety of Kashmir to join India. This solution would be unlikely to yield any peace in the region, with Kashmir’s majority Muslim population. None of the parties involved have strong support for this solution. Kashmiri activists push for a completely independent and sovereign Kashmir. Kashmiris, after being the center of the dispute for over 50 years, have developed a very strong national identity separate from both India and Pakistan. The difficulty in this proposal is that it requires both India and Pakistan to give up territory, which they are not willing to do. 26 India has been committed to a democratic Kashmir, but fears losing all control over the region. A completely independent and sovereign Kashmir may not be the most probable solution, as it completely disregards both India and Pakistan’s
24 25

See ICG, “Kashmir: Learning From The Past,” Brussels, 2003, p. 22 See BBC News Online, “Kashmir Flashpoint | The Future of Kashmir?” Scenario two: Kashmir joins Pakistan 26 See BBC News Online, “Kashmir Flashpoint | The Future of Kashmir?” Scenario four: Independent Kashmir.

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demands. Even so, it is important to include Kashmiri demands in any talks in order for peace to develop in the region. Another solution proposes the creation of a small independent Kashmir from the Kashmir Valley, and a formalization and international recognition of the LOC outside of the Valley.27 This proposal would give Pakistan much of the land that they want, and give an independent Kashmir to those militants who have been fighting against central rule since 1989. Critics of this proposal argue that a small, landlocked independent Kashmir would not be economically sustainable. Further, it is unlikely that either India or Pakistan would consider this option. It is important to understand that, given the duration of the Kashmir dispute, it would be difficult for a solution to be implemented without international intervention. Every solution presented so far requires some concession from at least one of the parties involved. Further, now that both countries have nuclear capabilities, the possibility of making concessions without international intervention is very unlikely.28 India has traditionally rejected appeals for international intervention, stating that the Kashmir issue is a domestic dispute; Pakistan has been much more accepting of international support. The international community, namely the US, the UN, and the EU, can offer a more fluid exchange of views between the two countries and reassurance to all parties involved that all parties involved will be making concessions in order to provide for a solution. Further, the community, particularly the UN, can provide personnel to oversee the implementation of any settlement.

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27

See BBC News Online, “Kashmir Flashpoint | The Future of Kashmir?” Scenario five: A smaller independent Kashmir 28 See Tariq Rauf, “Learning to Live With The Bomb in Southeast Asia: Accommodation Not Confrontation,” CNS Reports, 1998, p. 1

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The most recent peace movements in the Kashmir dispute have been sluggish, but many analysts argue that steps towards peace in Kashmir are being made. The Kashmir bus service, which began on 7 April this year, has been seen as a big step towards peace. The service, which runs one bus every two weeks, carries passengers between Pakistancontrolled Kashmir and Indian-controlled Kashmir. 29 Though the bus service might be a step towards peace, it is worth pointing out that Kashmiri activists, India, and Pakistan have not changed their demands. In addition, on 3 October, the Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers signed a peace deal that will promise the advance warning of ballistic missile tests and a hotline between the two nation’s coastguards.30 Further, domestic support for a Kashmir settlement in both India and Pakistan has risen, putting more pressure on the respective governments to make concessions. It is clear that any settlement will result in a less-than-ideal outcome for at least one of the parties involved. The parties must be prepared to accept this concept and be willing to make any necessary concessions needed for any peace settlement to gain momentum.

29 30

See BBC News Online, Sanjoy Majumder, “Bus aids Kashmir's road to peace,” 2005 See BBC News Online, “S Asia Rivals Sign Security Deals,” 2005

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Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 Prof. David R. Samuelson Writing 340 MWF 1-2 PM Section #91035 Problem – Dan and Vic Dan will be found guilty of Burglary, regardless of other charges that may apply to this crime. Dan hadn’t known that he’d commit a crime once breaking into Vic’s home. Nonetheless, Dan had the intent to commit a crime sometime that night, vis-à-vis his decision to carry a firearm with him when searching for Vic and the statement he made before leaving his home. The jury will find that Dan was in violation of every element of the law and is thus guilty. By smashing in the window of a home that was not his and entering the home, Dan was already guilty of breaching the law of Breaking and Entering. Dan did not know that he was entering his target’s house at this point in the progression of events. Dan had the intent to enter Vic’s home and commit a crime with the aforementioned firearm he had brought with him, as further displayed by his exclamation, “I’ll nail that guy for cheating me out of $500.” Problem, at 1. The case includes the facts that “Dan took a loaded pistol with him. Not knowing where Vic lived…” Id. at 1. By taking a loaded pistol with him, Dan showed intent to commit a crime. Additionally, by acknowledging that he hadn’t known where Vic lived, and further by searching for Vic’s home, Dan showed intent to commit the crime in Vic’s home. The jury will find Dan guilty of Burglary, as the elements of the crime of Burglary are fully met in this case. Dan, as shown formerly, had the intent to commit a crime in the home of Vic. The crime of Burglary is clear, as seen through the progression

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of events that night: During the night, Dan broke into the Vic’s home by smashing the window, bringing with him the intent to commit a crime inside the aforementioned home with the firearm he carried. The law of burglary is defined as, “The breaking and entering of the dwelling of another, in the nighttime, with the intent to commit a crime therein.” Id. at 1.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 Prof. David R. Samuelson Writing 340 MWF 1-2 PM Section #91035 Problem – Dan Golfing 1) Dan did not commit assault, as Tom never saw the ball coming at him. a) Had Tom seen the ball coming towards him, which was originally intended to hit Tom, Dan could be convicted of assault. b) Tom and Paul did commit assault towards Dan, with the threat of ‘Smacking’ Dan. Dan could easily perceive this as an imminent threat. 2) Through transferred intent, Dan would be guilty of battery, though this was an act of self-defense. a) Dan intended to injure Tom. b) Paul was injured as a result of Dan’s intent to injure Tom. This falls under the ‘transferred intent’ law. 3) Dan could be found guilty of ‘Trespass to Chattel’ a) For the same reason as being guilty of battery, he is guilty through ‘transferred intent’ b) This does not fall under self-defense, as it was against an object, not a person displaying an imminent threat towards Dan 4) The attack could be considered self-defense a) Paul told Dan he would smack him if he didn’t hurry up, thus potentially giving Dan a reasonable fear of imminent battery. This is considered Assault.

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b) Dan used a reasonable force, the hitting of a ball towards the plaintiff, which he was entitled to because of Tom and Dan’s assault. The assault was a threat of imminent battery. 5) False imprisonment does not apply a) Paul and Tom confined Paul to the space in front of them with assault, though Dan had the option of leaving the area and merely filing a complaint.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Short Assignments
Keith Parker Tragni Case Summary October 16th 2005 Seven private garbage truck workers were indicted for crimes of burglary in the third degree (first count) and attempted burglary in the third degree (second count) for an event that occurred on January 26th, 1981. Four of the defendants, all helpers on the garbage trucks, were ultimately acquitted. On January 16th, 1981 at about 4:30 AM two members of the group began to drill two holes into the wall of the China Jade Company jewelry store on Canal Street in Manhattan. The two holes were on an exterior wall of the building. It appears that the two holes were purposefully drilled on each side of a 3,000-pound safe that was located directly within the premises and adjacent to the exterior wall. These two men do not currently stand trial, and were not included in the seven men previously mentioned. While these two men were drilling, defendants Tragni and Barrios made an attempt to mask the sounds of the drilling operation. The two men were long-time garbage truck drivers. They positioned their respective garbage trucks in front of the jewelry store and revved their engines to both shield the driller’s operations and mask the sound of the drilling. A third defendant, Mazzocchi, acted as a lookout. The four men who were eventually acquitted stood idly on the nearby sidewalk. After the two men working on the drilling operation had completed drilling one hole and had partially drilled the second hole, they aborted their tasks. It appears that the reason for this was an alert through radio that the police were on their way. Indeed, the Fifth Precinct station house of the New York City Police Department around he corner

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had been monitoring the defendants, though its anticrime unit. Once the drilling had stopped, the anticrime unit apprehended all of the defendants. The People speculated that the objective of the defendants was to pull the safe through the exterior wall through which they were drilling the holes. Once the holes were drilled the defendants would have inserted something through the openings and slipped it around the safe so that it could be pulled through the wall and removed. None of the defendants invaded the airspace of the jewelry store with a physical limb of their body. Nonetheless, at the moment that the first of the two holes was completed, the drill bit on the drill entered into the airspace of the jewelry store. This decision will be one of first impression, as no New York court has been confronted with a similar instrumentality problem under the revised Penal Law.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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Keith Parker Tuesday, October 25, 2005 Winterbottom v. Wright Facts Summary The defendant contracted a mail-coach to the Postmaster General. The defendant’s obligation was to keep the mail-coach in good operating condition. The mail-coach was contracted to the Postmaster General for the purpose of conveying mailbags from Hartford to Holyhead. With this contract fulfilled, the Postmaster General made a contract with a Nathaniel Atkinson. Mr. Atkinson’s duty was to supply the horses and the coachman for the mail-coach. Mr. Atkinson fulfilled part of his duty by contracting the plaintiff as the coachman for this particular mail-coach. While under the impression that all other contracts were fulfilled, the plaintiff accepted this contract. The plaintiff’s concern for the extent to which other related contracts were fulfilled arises from the fact that the mail-coach’s maintenance was contracted to the defendant. Ergo, his occupational safety was in the hands of the defendant. All parties made the assumption that all contracts related to this particular mailcoach had been fulfilled. The defendant was erroneous in his assumption. The defendant, under contract to keep the mail-coach in a safe condition, had not maintained the mail-coach properly. In fact, the mail-coach was in a “frail, weak, infirm, and dangerous state.” On the 8th of August 1840, the plaintiff was driving the aforementioned mail-coach from Hartford to Holyhead when the mail-coach gave way and broke down. The plaintiff was then thrown from his seat and, from the injuries that he received as a direct result of the crash, became lamed for life. There were no extenuating circumstances that would have caused the mail-coach to be under unnatural stress.

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The plaintiff intends to sue the defendant. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant, having assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the mail-coach, is responsible for the failure of the mail-coach in the 8th of August 1840. Further, the defendant is responsible for the injuries sustained from the mail-coach’s failure. The plaintiff further asserts that he would not have driven the mail-coach if he had knowledge that the other contracts related to the mail-coach had not been fulfilled, namely the contract related to maintenance. The defendant did not fulfill his part in the contract, which as a direct result lamed the plaintiff for life. The plaintiff’s case relies on these points. The defendant, the supposed maintainer of the mail-coach, argues that the plaintiff has no right to sue. He argues that, because there was no direct contract between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot sue. Indeed, the defendant never signed a contract with the plaintiff. The defendant also asserts that, if the plaintiff is allowed to sue, there will be no limit to the domino effect that will be created by this case. He states that, if the plaintiff wins this case, then everybody could sue indefinitely. Potentially, the plaintiff could also sue the steel maker who made the axle for the mailcoach. The defendant’s case relies heavily on the negative precedent that could be set forth by this case.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Assignment #1
Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 Prof. David R. Samuelson Writing 340 MWF 1-2 PM Section #91035

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Assignment #1 Memorandum on Speluncean Explorers

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Memorandum To: Senior Partner Fr.: Associate Keith Parker Re: Speluncean Defendants September 25, 2005 Facts Five amateur speluncean explorers are charged with the unlawful homicide of Roger Whetmore. These five explorers, Roger Whetmore among them, planed to explore a limestone cave for the weekend. They left a note at the Speluncean Society, which they were all members of, detailing the itinerary for their trip. Their plan was to enter a limestone cavern for a short period of time; they packed few supplies, including a wireless communication device, and entered the cave in July of 2005. While they were deep in the cave, a landslide occurred which blocked the only known entrance to the cavern. The families of these five men became concerned when they did not arrive when expected, and notified the Speluncean Society. The society promptly dispatched a rescue party to the site. Additional funds needed to complete the rescue were being raised through a legislative grant and popular subscription. During the next twenty days, several further landslides occurred, killing ten of the workmen at the site. The five men trapped in the cavern began to worry about their chances of survival. On the twentieth day of the rescue attempt, the rescuers learned that the men had with them the wireless communication device. Oral communication was henceforth established. The head engineer on site quoted the men at least ten days, barring further landslides, before completion of the rescue. The chairman of the committee of physicians informed the group that they had little chance of surviving a further ten days, given their current condition. During an eight hour break in communications, initiated by the trapped men, Mr. Whetmore proposed that the men eat one of their number to perpetuate the existence of the others. He suggested that they use a method of casting

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lots to identify the one to be eaten. The other men were reluctant initially. Whetmore then re-established communication with the head physician, and inquired as to whether eating one of their number would allow the other four men the ten more days needed to survive. While the physician answered in the affirmative, the physician would not advise the men to proceed in doing so. When the trapped men asked for another physician, minister, or priest to assist them in their choice, none of those found would promote the measure. No further communication was made, and the rescuers assumed the batteries were dead in the men’s wireless device. After much deliberation, the five men decided to proceed with the measure. They proceeded to work out a mathematically fair method of casting lots. Following this, the groups’ finalization of a proper method of casting lots, Whetmore had a change of mind and recommended they wait a further 48 hours. The others scolded him, and continued to cast the dice they carried with them. This was their 23rd day in the cavern. One of the men cast the dice for Whetmore, who they report had no objections to another member casting the die in place of him. Whetmore lost the throw and was killed then eaten by the other four spelunceans. On the 32nd day of the rescue effort, success was achieved. The four men were treated for malnutrition and shock. It was found that the batteries were operational in the wireless device until the 32nd day. The men were subsequently charged for the homicide of Roger Whetmore. Analysis In order to overcome the prosecution of a homicide charge, the defendants must demonstrate that the killing of Roger Whetmore took place under a provable condition on necessity. They must also demonstrate that all five speluncean explorers were treated as though they were on equal footing, and that no one explorer was treated with a bias. Keith Parker, 2

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Further, they must prove that each member of the group was given a fair chance to survive. The case United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360 (1842), mirrors the case of the spelunceans in the conditions which prove the necessity of murder. This precedent is known as the “Law of Necessity.” In the case of the speluncean explorers, the facts presented by the remaining four members will demonstrate to the jury that the killing of Mr. Whetmore took place under a provable condition of necessity. The facts indicate that the five men were in a position that required them to result to cannibalism in order for survival. Furthermore, the men were on equal footing and weren’t operating under any bias. The men also gathered as much information as was possible to them under the circumstances, and made their decision using this information, as well as the opinions set forth by each member in discussion. Further, the choice of the killing was made to be fair to all five men. Provable Condition of Necessity The element of prevailing importance in defining the law of necessity is that of the requirement of killing in order to preserve life. Provable condition of Necessity exists when there is no method that would preserve the lives of the members of a group, except for the sacrifice of one of the members. The members must further be presented with information that proves without reasonable doubt that the entire group would perish without the sacrifice of one’s life. A provable condition of necessity exists in the case of Holmes insofar as the crew on board the vessel had reason to believe that, based on past experience and basic knowledge of the ocean, the entire group on board would not survive if none of the passengers were sacrificed Id. at 2. The case of the explorers had a similar disposition. When contact was made with the rescue crew on the 20th day of confinement, the five explorers were informed that they Keith Parker, 3

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would not continue to exist if they did not consume any substance within the next ten days. Further, the engineers informed the explorers that the rescue would take ten or more days to complete. After an enquiry by the explorers, the head physician on site informed the men that the consumption of human flesh would perpetuate their existence. As human flesh was the only available nutrient known to the men to be inside the cavern, it is clear that their only option was to consume this available nutrient. According to the information that was available to them at the time, death by starvation would have followed if they did not consume human flesh. The prosecution would argue that the killing was not necessary on the grounds that the men had not enquired about their ability to survive for a further 48 hours without consuming human flesh. Roger Whetmore proposed the 48-hour wait time. Though informed about a further ten-day wait until rescue, the men weren’t required to result to cannibalism so quickly. Given the knowledge that the men could survive another 48 hours, they may have been able to find another nutrient in the cavern that would have spared the life of Roger Whetmore. However, this argument is likely to be unpersuasive because the men, after agreeing that one of them would be killed, couldn’t be sure of Mr. Whetmore’s intentions. Mr. Whetmore may have had the intention of bypassing the drawing of lots and taking the life of another member in the next 48 hours in an effort to potentially save his own. As the decision that one member must die was made, it was necessary for the killing to take place immediately thereafter to prevent any scandal. Equal Footing The five spelunceans explorers were decidedly on equal footing. To be on equal footing all members must have considered themselves equal in importance in regards to their survival. As all five members were of a similar skill level, there was no dependency Keith Parker, 4

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on a specific member for survival. Vis-à-vis, no member of the group would be excluded from the drawing of lots for reasons of dependency. The members went so far as to “discuss the mathematical problems involved” S.E., at 2, of casting lots in attempt to ensure unequivocal fairness in the choice of the man to be sacrificed Id at 1-3. The case of United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360 (1842), a close precedent to the case of the speluncean explorers, the situation of equal footing differs. In the case of Holmes, the lives of the passengers depended on the skill and knowledge provided by the crew. Therefore, the crew would be the last to be sacrificed. This disposition made the choice of sacrifices simpler, as those who were needed least would be chosen. For the spelunceans, where equal footing was established, the most viable method of choice would be by casting lots in a mathematically fair way. This being the method chosen by the five men, the assumption that all five men were on equal footing is made valid and conclusive. Consultation Consultation with the rescue crew was of utmost importance to the five men trapped inside the cave, as was consultation with each other. Unrestricted communication with all available parties and discussion of available information is necessary to making a well informed decision, especially when the choice involves cannibalism. Once communication was established on the 20th day of their imprisonment, the five men gathered information from both the head engineer and head physician. They also attempted unsuccessfully to gather the opinion of either a judge, official of the government, minister, or priest. By communicating to this extent, the five men proved that they had extensively discussed the method to which they would cast lots S.E. at 3. Keith Parker, 5

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Assignment #1
Fairness The five spelunceans made use of every resource available to them in order to ensure the fairness of the casting of lots. It was necessary that the choice of whom to sacrifice be fair in every respect, so as not to promote one’s life as being more important than another’s. As all members were on equal footing, the members decided through consultation that they should each have an equal chance of surviving long enough to be rescued. They deliberately took extensive steps in order to ensure the fairness of the casting of lots. The prosecution will argue that the casting of lots was not fair because of the disagreement that Roger Whetmore had with the proposed plan. Mr. Whetmore originally agreed to, as well as proposed, their plan for survival through casting lots and cannibalism. Nonetheless, before the lots were cast, he would not cast the dice himself and proposed waiting another 48 hours before casting lots. The other four men, charging Mr. Whetmore with a breach of faith, continued with the plan. One of the four cast the dice in place of Mr. Whetmore. The roll went against him. Though the four reported that Mr. Whetmore declared no objections to another member rolling the dice in place of him, it is hard to verify this statement. Only the testimony of the remaining four men is available Id. at 3-4. Nonetheless, this argument is likely to be unpersuasive because of the lack of alternative options available to the four men who charged Mr. Whetmore with a breach of faith. Having already decided on cannibalism as the only path to survival, the men found it necessary to continue with the casting of lots immediately. The decision to continue immediately may be partly because of suspicion as to the intention of Mr. Whetmore in his proposal of a 48-hour wait time, as mentioned earlier. Further, there wasn’t any Keith Parker, 6

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viable reason to wait another 48 hours, as the engineer had informed the men that they would surely not escape within the next ten days. The men weren’t rescued for another twelve days after communication was established, thus concluding the validity of the head engineer’s statement Id. at 3-4. Conclusion The four defendants will not be found guilty of the unlawful homicide of Roger Whetmore. The prosecution will not be able to present a persuasive argument based on the lack of information supporting an unlawful homicide charge. All of the elements leading up to a provable condition of necessity will be sufficiently met, given the information made available by the four defendants and the rescue crew operating outside of the cavern. It will be shown that the five men were on equal footing, consulted sufficiently and operated in complete fairness to every member. In their decision to kill and consume Roger Whetmore, the four defendants will convince the jury that they operated under the “Law of Necessity.”

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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Memorandum To: Senior Partner Fr.: Associate Keith Parker Re: Speluncean Defendants September 25, 2005 Five amateur speluncean explorers are charged with the unlawful homicide of Roger Whetmore. These five explorers, Roger Whetmore among them, planed to explore a limestone cave for the weekend in July of 2005. They left a note at the Speluncean Society, which they were all members of, detailing the itinerary for their trip. The Speluncean Society is an organization of amateurs interested in the exploration of caves. Their plan was to enter a limestone cavern for a short period. They packed few supplies, including a wireless communication device. While they were deep in the cave, a landslide occurred which blocked the cave’s only known entrance. Further, the explorers were unaware of any food in the cave for the duration of their entrapment. The families of these five men became concerned when they did not arrive when expected, and notified the Speluncean Society. The society promptly dispatched a rescue party to the site. During the next twenty days, several further landslides occurred, killing ten of the workers at the site. The five men trapped in the cavern began to fear death by starvation. On the twentieth day of the rescue attempt, the rescuers learned that the men had with them the wireless communication device. Oral communication was established. The head engineer on site quoted the men that it would be at least ten days, barring further landslides, before completion of the rescue. The chairman of the committee of physicians informed the group that they had little chance of surviving a further ten days without food, given their current condition.

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During an eight-hour break in communications, initiated by the trapped men, Mr. Whetmore proposed that the men eat one of their number so that the others may survive. He suggested that they use a method of casting lots to identify the one to be eaten. The other men were reluctant initially. Whetmore, who had been serving as the group’s spokesman, then re-established communication with the head physician and inquired as to whether eating one of their number would allow the other four men the ten more days needed to survive. The physician answered in the affirmative. Whetmore further asked if it would be advisable to cast lots. The physician would not advise the men to proceed in doing so. When the trapped men asked for another physician, minister, or priest to assist them in their choice, none of those found would promote the measure. No further communication was made, and the rescuers assumed the batteries were dead in the men’s wireless device. After much deliberation, the five men decided to proceed with the measure. They proceeded to work out a mathematically fair method of casting lots. Next, Whetmore had a change of mind and recommended they wait a further 48 hours. The others accused charged Whetmore with a breach of faith, and continued to cast the dice that Whetmore carried with him. This was their 23rd day in the cavern. One of the men cast the dice for Whetmore, who had no objection to the fairness of the throw. Whetmore lost the throw and was killed then eaten by the other four spelunceans. On the 32nd day of the rescue effort, success was achieved. The four men were treated for malnutrition and shock. It was found that the batteries were operational in the wireless device until the 32nd day. The men were subsequently charged for the homicide of Roger Whetmore. The issue here is whether the four remaining speluncean explorers should be held responsible for the killing of Roger Whetmore. The case United States v. Holmes, 26 Keith Parker, 2

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Assignment #1
Fed. Cas. 360 (1842), is a precedent for the case of the spelunceans in the conditions which prove the necessity of murder. In order to overcome the prosecution of a homicide charge, the defendants must demonstrate that the killing of Roger Whetmore took place under a provable condition on necessity. They must also demonstrate that all five speluncean explorers were treated as though they were on equal footing, and that no one explorer was treated with a bias. Further, they must prove that each member of the group was given a fair chance to survive. This precedent is known as the “Law of Necessity.” In the case of the speluncean explorers, the facts presented by the remaining four members will demonstrate to the jury that the killing of Mr. Whetmore took place under a provable condition of necessity. The facts indicate that the five men were in a position that required them to choose cannibalism in order to survive. Furthermore, the men were on equal footing and were not operating under any bias. The men gathered as much information as was possible to them under the circumstances. They made their decision using this information, as well as the opinions set forth by each member in discussion. Moreover, the choice of the killing was made to be fair to all five men. In the case of Roger Whetmore, there is a provable condition of necessity. Provable condition of Necessity exists when there is no method that would preserve the lives of the members of a group, except for the sacrifice of one of the members. The element of prevailing importance in defining the law of necessity is that of the requirement of killing in order to preserve life. The members must further agree that the entire group would perish without the sacrifice of one’s life. A provable condition of necessity exists in the case of Holmes. In Holmes, the crew on board the vessel had reason to believe that, based on past experience and basic knowledge of the ocean, the entire group on board would not survive if none of the passengers were sacrificed Id. at 2. Keith Parker, 3

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A provable condition of necessity existed in this instant case as well. After contact with the rescue crew on the 20th day of confinement, the five explorers were informed that they would face certain future peril if they did not consume any substance within the next ten days. Further, the engineers informed the explorers that the rescue would take ten or more days to complete. After an enquiry by the explorers, the head physician on site informed the men that the consumption of human flesh would perpetuate their existence. As human flesh was the only available nutrient known to the men to be inside the cavern, it is clear that their only option was to consume this available nutrient. According to the information that was available to them at the time, death by starvation would have followed if they did not consume human flesh. The prosecution would argue that the killing was not necessary on the grounds that the men had not enquired about their ability to survive for a further 48 hours without consuming human flesh. Roger Whetmore proposed the 48-hour wait time. Though informed about a further ten-day wait until rescue, the men weren’t required to result to cannibalism so quickly. Given the knowledge that the men could survive another 48 hours, they may have been able to find another nutrient in the cavern that would have spared the life of Roger Whetmore. Furthermore, it would be argued that the men should have at least kept in contact with the rescuers for the possibility of new, helpful information. However, this argument is likely to be unpersuasive because the men, after agreeing that one of them would be killed, could not be sure of Mr. Whetmore’s intentions. As the decision that one member must die was made, it was necessary for the killing to take place immediately thereafter to prevent any scandal. Further, the necessity of the killing was made clear by the dire condition of the remaining explorers when they were rescued twelve days after communication ended. Keith Parker, 4

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Assignment #1
The five spelunceans explorers were on equal footing. To be on equal footing all members must have considered themselves equal in importance in regards to their survival. As all five members were of a similar skill level, there was no dependency on a specific member for survival. Vis-à-vis, no member of the group would be excluded from the drawing of lots for reasons of dependency. The members went so far as to “discuss the mathematical problems involved” S.E., at 2, of casting lots in attempt to ensure unequivocal fairness in the choice of the man to be sacrificed Id at 1-3. In Holmes, the situation of equal footing differs. The lives of the passengers depended on the skill and knowledge provided by the crew. Therefore, only the needed passengers would be the last to be sacrificed. This disposition made the choice of sacrifices simpler, as those who were needed least would be chosen. For the spelunceans, where equal footing was established, the most viable method of choice would be by casting lots in a mathematically fair way. This being the method chosen by the five men, the assumption that all five men were on equal footing is made valid and conclusive. Consultation with the rescue crew was of utmost importance to the five men trapped inside the cave, as was consultation with each other. Unrestricted communication with all available parties and discussion of available information is necessary to making a well informed decision, especially when the choice involves cannibalism. Once communication was established on the 20th day of their imprisonment, the five men gathered information from both the head engineer and head physician. They also attempted unsuccessfully to gather the opinion of either a judge, official of the government, minister, or priest. By communicating to this extent, the five men proved that they had extensively discussed the method to which they would cast lots S.E. at 3. Keith Parker, 5

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The five spelunceans made use of every resource available to them in order to ensure the fairness of the casting of lots. It was necessary that the choice of whom to sacrifice be fair in every respect, so as not to promote one’s life as being more important than another’s. As all members were on equal footing, the members decided through consultation that they should each have an equal chance of surviving long enough to be rescued. They deliberately took extensive steps in order to ensure the fairness of the casting of lots. The prosecution will argue that the casting of lots was not fair because of the disagreement that Roger Whetmore had with the proposed plan. Mr. Whetmore originally agreed to, as well as proposed, their plan for survival through casting lots and cannibalism. Nonetheless, before the lots were cast, he would not cast the dice himself and proposed waiting another 48 hours before casting lots. The other four men, charging Mr. Whetmore with a breach of faith, continued with the plan. One of the four cast the dice in place of Mr. Whetmore. The roll went against him. Though the four reported that Mr. Whetmore declared no objections to another member rolling the dice in place of him, it is hard to verify this statement. Only the testimony of the remaining four men is available Id. at 3-4. Nonetheless, this argument is likely to be unpersuasive because of the lack of alternative options available to the four men who charged Mr. Whetmore with a breach of faith. Having already decided on cannibalism as the only path to survival, the men found it necessary to continue with the casting of lots immediately. The decision to continue immediately may be partly because of suspicion as to the intention of Mr. Whetmore in his proposal of a 48-hour wait time, as mentioned earlier. Further, there wasn’t any viable reason to wait another 48 hours, as the engineer had informed the men that they Keith Parker, 6

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would surely not escape within the next ten days. The men weren’t rescued for another twelve days after communication was established, thus concluding the validity of the head engineer’s statement Id. at 3-4. The four defendants will not be found guilty of the unlawful homicide of Roger Whetmore. In their decision to kill and consume Roger Whetmore, the four defendants will convince the jury that they operated under the “Law of Necessity.”

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Facts Summary Five amateur speluncean explorers, a Roger Whetmore among them, left a note at the Speluncean Society, which they were all members of, including the itinerary for their trip. Their plan was to enter a limestone cavern for a short period of time; they packed few supplies, including a wireless communication device, and entered the cave in July of 2005. While deep in the cavern, a landslide occurred which blocked the only known entrance to the cavern. The families of these five men became concerned when they did not arrive when expected, and notified the Speluncean Society. The society found the note that the five spelunceans had deposited at the headquarters, and promptly dispatched a rescue party to the site. The society was running out of funds quickly, while additional funds were being raised through a legislative grant and popular subscription. During the next twenty days, several further landslides occurred, killing ten of the workmen at the site. The five men trapped in the cavern, emaciated by their lack of substance, began to worry about their chances of survival. On the twentieth day of the rescue attempt, the rescuers learned that the men had with them the wireless communication device. Once a similar device was installed outside of the cave entrance, oral communication was established. The head engineer on site quoted the men at least ten days, barring further landslides, before completion of the rescue. Conversely, the chairman of the committee of physicians informed the group that they had little chance of surviving a further ten days, given their current condition. During an eight hour break in communications, initiated by the trapped men, Mr. Whetmore proposed that the men eat one of their number to perpetuate the existence of the others. He suggested that they use a method of casting lots to identify the one to be eaten. The other men were reluctant. Whetmore Keith Parker, 1

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Assignment #1
then re-established communication with the head physician, and inquired as to whether eating one of their number would allow the other four men the ten more days of survival. While the physician answered in the affirmative, he or she would not advise the men to proceed in doing so. When the trapped men asked for another physician, minister, or priest to assist them in their choice, none of those found would promote the measure. No further communication was made, and the rescuers assumed the batteries were dead in the men’s wireless device. After much deliberation, the five men decided to proceed with the measure. Following the groups’ finalization of a proper method of casting lots, Whetmore had a change of mind and recommended they wait a further 48 hours. The others scolded him, and proceeded to cast the dice they carried with them. One of the men cast the dice for Whetmore, who they report had no objections to this. Whetmore lost the throw and was killed then eaten by the other four spelunceans. On the 32nd day of the rescue effort, success was achieved. The four men were treated for malnutrition and shock. It was found that the batteries were operational in the wireless device until the 32nd day. The men were subsequently charged for the homicide of Roger Whetmore.

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Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 Prof. David R. Samuelson Writing 340 MWF 1-2 PM Section #91035

Assignment #3 Cash v. Klopps

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Assignment #3
Les D’Mented is CEO and owner of D’Mented and Son Builders. Mr. D’Mented told Miss Inga Noar, the CFO of the building company, to place an order for new scaffolding. Noar went to Cy Klopps, owner of K.C. Building Supplies, for the new order of scaffolding. Miss Noar was in charge of a cost-cutting operation at D’Mented and Son Builders. Cy Klopps suggested to Noar that using common chain link fasteners on the scaffolding instead of using reinforced steel fasteners could reduce the price of the scaffolding. Mr. Klopps also insisted that the scaffolding would last for years, and he could not foresee any problems with its use. Miss Noar was an accountant, and knew very little about the technicalities of scaffolding building. Noar assumed that Mr. Klopps was correct in his statements, and ordered the scaffolding to be made with common chain link fasteners. Both Mr. Klopps and Miss Noar informed D’Mented that the chain link fasteners were a workable alternative. Using chain link for fasteners, Mr. Klopps and a number of his workers built the scaffolding for D’Mented and Son Builders. After completing the project, Klopps tested the scaffolding using 500 pounds of dead weight. The scaffolding held steady under this weight. Klopps then delivered the scaffolding to D’Mented and Son Builders. The next day, D’Mented and Son was working on a sand blasting operation that required a worker to be hoisted to the top floor of a building on scaffolding. Using the new scaffolding built by Mr. Klopps for the first time, D’Mented’s team began hoisting Ivan Cash, an employee of D’Mented, up on the scaffolding with an air compressor also on the scaffolding. The combined weight of Mr. Cash and the compressor was about 450 pounds. After being risen to a height of about 10 feet, one of the chain link fasteners gave way, causing both Mr. Cash and the compressor to fall off of the scaffolding. Mr. Cash fell on top of the air compressor, breaking both

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his leg and shoulder. Vis-à-vis the incident, Mr. Cash was expected to be out of commission for about five months. (Cash v. Klopps Deposition Summaries) There are three contracts that are of reasonable relevance to this case. First, Mr. Klopps was in contract with D’Mented and Sons Builders to build scaffolding to the specifications set forth by the purchaser for D’Mented and Sons, Miss Inga Noar. Further, Miss Inga Noar was in contract with Les D’Mented to provide him accurate information on the products that she had ordered to be made. Finally, Les D’Mented was involved in a contract with Ivan Cash to provide equipment to be used on the construction site by his workers, and to ensure that the equipment provided is safe enough to be used without incident during regular working conditions. Conversely, there is a public duty for the maker of a product to ensure that the product will not place the user at a level of threat that is above and beyond the standard risk involved, regardless of contract linkages. This public duty was argued in the case of Thomas v. Winchester (6 N.Y.) 2 Seld., 397, in which the defendant labeled a bottle of poison as medicine, which resulted in the injury of the plaintiff with which there was no contractual relation. In order for the prosecution to be successful, the plaintiff must convince the jury that Mr. Klopps owed a public duty to Mr. Cash to build a set of scaffolding that could be safely used. In this sense, Mr. Klopps was in a breach of his public duty by building scaffolding that was instable and not on par with safety standards. Further, the plaintiff must assert that, by Mr. Klopps recommending unsafe scaffolding and assuring the purchaser of its safety, Mr. Klopps was in a direct breach of a public duty to D’Mented and Sons Builders and its employees. Public duty exists regardless of contractual ties and could be argued to be applicable to this case. This case is similar to other cases in which

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public duty is referred, insofar as that the plaintiff with no contractual ties to the defendant was injured by the defendant’s manufacturing of a product that would almost certainly cause injury to the user. The outcome of the case of Cash v. Klopps revolves around the existence of a public duty link between the defendant and the plaintiff. This link can be made in a variety of ways, which will be mentioned in the latter pages of this memorandum. It is certain, though, that there was no legal contract ever made between the defendant and the plaintiff. Certainly, there was a breach of contract between the defendant and D’Mented and Son Builders, in that Mr. Klopp’s product was not equivalent to the product that he had promised. Further, the contract between Les D’Mented and Ivan Cash was broken, insofar as Mr. D’Mented did not provide Mr. Cash a safe working environment. According to law, though, multiple breaches of interconnected contracts cannot be linked together in order for a party on one end of the spectrum to bring action against a party on the opposite end. The defendant and plaintiff may be linked through a tie of public duty, which need not be signed or legally verified by either party. In the aforementioned case of Thomas v. Winchester (6 N.Y.) 2 Seld., 397, the argument was made by the defendant that there was no contractual relationship between himself and the plaintiff, thus there were no grounds for a lawsuit. The plaintiff, conversely, argued that a public duty existed between the defendant and plaintiff. The argument was made that, under normal circumstances, there would be no grounds for the plaintiff to bring legal action against a party with which the plaintiff has no legal contract. Nonetheless, the case involved the mislabeling of a bottle of poison as a bottle of medicine. This mislabeling would almost

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certainly bring harm upon the consumer of the product. As the bottle was labeled as medicine, the plaintiff had no way of knowing that the product was dangerous. The same principle would go for any purchaser of the mislabeled bottle. The mislabeling of the bottle thus presents a hidden danger to the lives of any member of the public who might have decided to purchase the medicine. Had the product been a gun or hunting knife, the public would be aware of the danger it presents to one’s life, and thus would handle it accordingly. In the case of a bottle of medicine in which the public assumes the bottle’s contents to be harmless to one’s life, the manufacturer has public duty to whoever might purchase the bottle to ensure that the contents are not life-threatening, regardless of the lack of a contract between the manufacturer and consumer. In the case of Cash v. Klopps, the same aforementioned duty exists. An unused set of scaffolding is not an item considered by the public to be dangerous, outside of the possibility of injury resultant from some type of user misuse. A set of scaffolding used correctly should not injure the user, just as a bottle of medicine used correctly should not harm the consumer. In selling and building the scaffolding, Klopps made the scaffolding appear to be safe and useable while also describing it as such. Klopps’ negligence in building the scaffolding in a way that makes it harmful to the user under normal conditions was a breach of the public duty that he owed to any user of the scaffolding, regardless of contract affiliations. In breaching this public duty, Klopps is liable for the damages done to the public. The public entity injured was Mr. Cash, thus Mr. Klopps is liable for whatever damages that were caused by his breach of duty. Conversely, the defendant may argue that no public duty existed. They would argue that the product delivered to D’Mented and Son’s Building was exactly as ordered

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by the purchaser at D’Mented and Sons. Further, the information provided by Mr. Klopps to Miss Inga Noar was correct to the extent of Mr. Klopp’s knowledge. Therefore, there was no wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Klopps. The defense may further argue that Mr. Klopps was not responsible for injury caused by an item that was known by some people to be dangerous in nature. Mr. I. N. Spector, the Chief Engineer of SoCal Metallurgy, has the opinion that scaffolding made with common chain link fasteners is unsafe for use. Therefore the scaffolding was unsafe in nature, and the user is responsible for injury to oneself when using a dangerous product. The plaintiff will counter this argument by arguing the validity of the defendant’s claim. The defendant claims that the scaffolding was dangerous by nature. Scaffolding, though, has a very specific place in its use for construction. Scaffolding to be used for construction, and ordered specifically for that use, is assumed by the public to be safe for use in construction. Use in construction would include the withstanding of the weight of a worker and the equipment the worker may need. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff Ivan Cash will be successful in bringing legal action against the defendant Cy Klopps. The jury will find that Mr. Klopps, in the manufacturing of a product known by the public to be safe when used under normal circumstances, owed a public duty to build the product to be so.

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Keith Parker ID# 6390.4899.77 Prof. Samuelson December 2nd, 2005

WRIT-340: Assignment #4

Johnson v. Bush

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Assignment #4
The litigation of the case of Johnson v. Bush legally began on September 21, 2000. On September 14, 2005, the litigation effort ended when the U.S. Supreme court refused to consider a challenge1 to Florida’s ban on voting rights for ex-felons as described in Article VI §4 of Florida’s Constitution.2 Under Florida’s State constitution, disenfranchisement is permanent after a person has been convicted of a felony, unless a pardon is granted by the governor with the approval of three members of the cabinet. This is a class-action lawsuit, where the plaintiffs are civil-rights groups who argue on behalf of 600,000 ex-felons without voting rights. Under Jeb Bush, governor of Florida, the process of regaining one’s voting rights after a felony conviction have loosened. As an indirect effect of this case, Florida felons have their voting rights automatically restored after five years without committing another crime, unless they were convicted of several specific violent crimes. Further, a felon can regain voting rights if an appeals process is completed.3 The appeals process is seen by many to be too complex and unachievable. In addition to losing voting rights, ex-felons who have not regained their voting rights cannot hold public office, serve on a jury, own a firearm, or hold professional licenses. When the suit was filed in 2000, fourteen states permanently barred ex-felons from voting, unless they underwent an appeals process. Now, only Florida, Kentucky, and Iowa impose automatic lifetime bans on felons.4

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The decision was reached by the justices without hearing the merits of the case See also Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 97.041(2), 98.093, 98.0975 and 944.292. Fla. R. Exec. Clemency 5(I)(E), 5(II), 9(A)(2) and 9(A)(3) (permanently denies persons convicted of a felony unless granted clemency by the governor). 3 The appeals process requires ex-felons to provide copies of their birth certificate, driver’s license, and Social Security card; any education certificate attained; a complete and detailed twenty-year residential history; a complete employment history of the past twenty years, including the names of all supervisors; copies of all bank, mortgage and credit detailing the previous three-years’ worth of income-tax returns; copies of all court documents pertaining to the applicable copies of all traffic tickets ever received, along with proof of payment; and character-reference letters. (Jim Green, Abramsky, supra note 9, at 3) 4 See “State’s Ban On Felons Voting Rights Stands,” Lesley Clarck and Gary Finout, Miami Herald, 2005

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The Supreme Court case of Hunter v. Underwood provides an important precedent to this case. In Hunter v. Underwood, the Supreme Court decided that, under the fourteenth amendment, the Alabama disenfranchisement law was invalid. The court reasoned that the law was invalid because it was enacted with racial motivation. Furthermore, in Ramirez v. Brown, the California Supreme Court ruled that the disenfranchisement of felons’ voting rights was unconstitutional and was an unnecessary safeguard against voter fraud.5 Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of Ramirez v. Brown in Richardson v. Brown. The court decided that the state of California had a right to disenfranchise felons’ voting rights under the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment. The second section states, “…except for participation in rebellion, or other crime…” The court found that ‘other crime’ could apply to felons.6 This decision was a major blow to any challenges to the felon disenfranchisement based on the Fourteenth amendment. Following a thorough evaluation of the case, it has become clear that the U.S. Supreme Court has made the incorrect decision. During the last five years, the number of states permanently disenfranchising felons fell from fourteen to three. This drop clearly displays that the majority opinion on voter disenfranchisement is negative. Further, there has surfaced decisive evidence that the original voter disenfranchisement laws, which were enacted primarily in the south after the U.S. Civil War, were inspired by racism. States in the former confederacy enacted laws that disenfranchised felons for crimes such as intent to steal, using insulting gestures or language, or preaching the gospel without a

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See Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1348-1349 See Richardson v. Brown, 418 U.S. at 27

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license.7 These laws were primarily applied to blacks. Furthermore, the laws continue to affect blacks much more than members of other races. There are an estimated 1,600,000 voting-age African Americans in Florida, of which 256,392 are disenfranchised. Therefore, while over 16 percent of voting-age African Americans cannot vote, only 4.4 percent of non-African Americans cannot vote.8 Though it may not be true that lawmakers intentionally were racist in creating disenfranchisement laws, the law clearly affects African Americans in a much higher proportion than it does whites. Put a different way, a fewer percentage of blacks in Florida can vote than non-blacks. This inequality is in violation of the fourteenth amendment, which guarantees equal rights to vote regardless of race. Nonetheless, in Richardson v. Brown, the U.S. Supreme court upheld that disenfranchisement was legal under the fourteenth amendment. Further, many would argue that the laws are fair, regardless of which race they apply most to. Florida, the state with the highest number of disenfranchised voters of the three states with these laws, has made it possible to regain voting rights after one’s sentence is served. In the words of Governor Jeb Bush’s spokesperson, “The decision not to hear the case simply reaffirms that the clemency process which is laid out in our Constitution is a fair one which allows felons to regain their rights through a thoughtful process.”9 Further, many prodisenfranchisement arguments are based on the moral correctness of disenfranchisement laws. This moral correctness must be covered, as the laws are primarily based on the moral idea that a felon should not be allowed to participate in the political process.

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7 8

See Sasha Abramsky, The Other Election scandal, Rolling Stone, Aug. 30, 2000 at 50 See Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraception? Political Consequences of Florida Disenfranchisement in The United States, 67 Am. Sec. Rev. 777, Appendix Table A (2002) 9 See “State’s Ban On Felons Voting Rights Stands,” Lesley Clarck and Gary Finout, Miami Herald, 2005

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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Further, there exists the notion that disenfranchisement is merely another punishment, such as prison or community service. The majority of those who hold these prodisenfranchisement views are republican, the reasons for which vary. Certainly, republicans tend to advocate stricter penalties for those who break the law then democrats. Furthermore, the 2000 presidential elections would have resulted in a democratic presidential outcome, displacing Bush from victory, had the disenfranchisement laws not been in place.10 Regardless of morality, the Florida disenfranchisement laws were clearly created to be racist, as they were enacted directly after the Civil War and applied to crimes most committed by African Americans. Furthermore, the disenfranchisement laws are a direct assault on the rights given to citizens under the fourteenth amendment; thus, disenfranchisement should not be used as a punishment in addition to prison time or other penalties. Disenfranchisement laws are unconstitutional, affect one race much more than others, and have altered the political world by placing Bush in office in 2000. Therefore, the Supreme Courts decision should be reversed.

10

See Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraception? Political Consequences of Florida Disenfranchisement in The United States

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Parker, 4 of 4

WRIT-340: Final Portfolio
Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 Prof. David R. Samuelson Writing 340 MWF 1-2 PM Section #91035

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Assignment #3 Cash v. Klopps

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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WRIT-340: Final Portfolio
Memorandum To: Senior Partner Fr.: Associate Keith Parker Re: Cash v. Klopps November 12, 2005 Les D’Mented is CEO and owner of D’Men ted and Son Builders. Mr. D’Mented told Miss Inga Noar, the CFO of the building company, to place an order for new scaffolding. Noar went to Cy Klopps, owner of K.C. Building Supplies, for the new order of scaffolding. Miss Noar was in charge of a cost-cutting operation at D’Mented and Son Builders. Cy Klopps suggested to Noar that using common chain link fasteners, used for connecting the plank to the lift, on the scaffolding instead of using reinforced steel fasteners could reduce the price of the scaffolding. Mr. Klopps also insisted that the scaffolding would last for years, and he could not foresee any problems with its use. Miss Noar was an accountant, and knew very little about the technicalities of scaffolding building. Noar assumed that Mr. Klopps was correct in his statements, and ordered the scaffolding to be made with common chain link fasteners. Both Mr. Klopps and Miss Noar informed D’Mented that the chain link fasteners were a workable alternative. Using chain link for fasteners, Mr. Klopps and a number of his workers built the scaffolding for D’Mented and Son Builders. After completing the project, Klopps tested the scaffolding using 500 pounds of dead weight. The scaffolding held steady under this weight. Klopps then delivered the scaffolding to D’Mented and Son Builders. The next day, August 2nd, D’Mented and Son was working on a sand blasting operation that required a worker to be hoisted to the top floor of a building on scaffolding. Using the new scaffolding built by Mr. Klopps for the first time, D’Mented’s team began hoisting Ivan Cash, an employee of D’Mented, up on the scaffolding with an air compressor also on the scaffolding. Ivan Cash had extensive

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Final Portfolio
previous experience with scaffolding. Cash did not test or inspect the scaffolding prior to its first use. The combined weight of Mr. Cash and the compressor was about 450 pounds. After being risen to a height of about 10 feet, one of the chain link fasteners gave way, causing both Mr. Cash and the compressor to fall off of the scaffolding. Mr. Cash fell on top of the air compressor, breaking both his leg and shoulder. Vis-à-vis the incident, Mr. Cash was expected to be out of commission for about five months. (Cash v. Klopps Deposition Summaries) There are three contracts that are of reasonable relevance to this case. First, Mr. Klopps was in contract with D’Mented and Sons Builders to build scaffolding to the specifications set forth by the purchaser for D’Mented and Sons, Miss Inga Noar. Further, Miss Inga Noar was in contract with Les D’Mented to provide him accurate information on the products that she had ordered to be made. Finally, Les D’Mented was involved in a contract with Ivan Cash to provide equipment to be used on the construction site by his workers, and to ensure that the equipment provided is safe enough to be used without incident during regular working conditions. Conversely, there is a public duty for the maker of a product to ensure that the product will not place the user at a level of threat that is above and beyond the standard risk involved, regardless of contract linkages. This public duty was argued in the case of Thomas v. Winchester (6 N.Y.) 2 Seld., 397, in which the defendant labeled a bottle of poison as medicine, which resulted in the injury of the plaintiff with which there was no contractual relation. The plaintiff must convince the jury that Mr. Klopps owed a public duty to Mr. Cash to build a set of scaffolding that could be safely used. In this sense, Mr. Klopps was in a breach of his public duty by building scaffolding that was instable and not on par with safety standards. By not doing so, Mr. Klopps placed the user of the scaffolding in Parker, Page 2 of 5

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imminent danger. Further, the plaintiff must assert that, by Mr. Klopps recommending unsafe scaffolding and assuring the purchaser of its safety, Mr. Klopps was in a direct breach of a public duty to D’Mented and Sons Builders and its employees. Public duty exists regardless of contractual ties and could be argued to be applicable to this case. This case is similar to other cases in which public duty is referred, insofar as that the plaintiff with no contractual ties to the defendant was injured by the defendant’s manufacturing of a product that would almost certainly cause injury to the user. The outcome of the case of Cash v. Klopps revolves around the existence of a public duty link between the defendant and the plaintiff. This link can be made in a variety of ways, which will be mentioned in the latter pages of this memorandum. It is certain, though, that there was no legal contract ever made between the defendant and the plaintiff. Certainly, there was a breach of contract between the defendant and D’Mented and Son Builders, in that Mr. Klopp’s product was not equivalent to the product that he had promised. Further, the contract between Les D’Mented and Ivan Cash was broken, insofar as Mr. D’Mented did not provide Mr. Cash a safe working environment. According to law, though, multiple breaches of interconnected contracts cannot be linked together in order for a party on one end of the spectrum to bring action against a party on the opposite end. The defendant and plaintiff may be linked through a tie of public duty, which need not be signed or legally verified by either party. In the aforementioned case of Thomas v. Winchester (6 N.Y.) 2 Seld., 397, the argument was made by the defendant that there was no contractual relationship between himself and the plaintiff, thus there were no grounds for a lawsuit. The plaintiff, conversely, argued that a public duty existed between the defendant and plaintiff. The argument was made that, under normal Parker, Page 3 of 5

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Final Portfolio
circumstances, there would be no grounds for the plaintiff to bring legal action against a party with which the plaintiff has no legal contract. Nonetheless, the case involved the mislabeling of a bottle of poison as a bottle of medicine. This mislabeling would almost certainly bring harm upon the consumer of the product. As the bottle was labeled as medicine, the plaintiff had no way of knowing that the product was dangerous. The same principle would go for any purchaser of the mislabeled bottle. The mislabeling of the bottle thus presents a hidden danger to the lives of any member of the public who might have decided to purchase the medicine. Had the product been a gun or hunting knife, the public would be aware of the danger it presents to one’s life, and thus would handle it accordingly. In the case of a bottle of medicine in which the public assumes the bottle’s contents to be harmless to one’s life, the manufacturer has public duty to whoever might purchase the bottle to ensure that the contents are not life-threatening, regardless of the lack of a contract between the manufacturer and consumer. In the case of Cash v. Klopps, the same aforementioned duty exists. An unused set of scaffolding is not an item considered by the public to be dangerous, outside of the possibility of injury resultant from some type of user misuse. A set of scaffolding used correctly should not injure the user, just as a bottle of medicine used correctly should not harm the consumer. In selling and building the scaffolding, Klopps made the scaffolding appear to be safe and useable while also describing it as such. Klopps’ negligence in building the scaffolding in a way that makes it harmful to the user under normal conditions was a breach of the public duty that he owed to any user of the scaffolding, regardless of contract affiliations. In breaching this public duty, Klopps is liable for the damages done to the public. The public entity injured was Mr. Cash, thus Mr. Klopps is liable for whatever damages that were caused by his breach of duty. Parker, Page 4 of 5

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Conversely, the defendant may argue that no public duty existed. They would argue that the product delivered to D’Mented and Son’s Building was exactly as ordered by the purchaser at D’Mented and Sons. Further, the information provided by Mr. Klopps to Miss Inga Noar was correct to the extent of Mr. Klopp’s knowledge. Therefore, there was no wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Klopps. The defense may further argue that Mr. Klopps was not responsible for injury caused by an item that was known to be dangerous in nature, such as a gun. Mr. I. N. Spector, the Chief Engineer of SoCal Metallurgy, has the opinion that scaffolding made with common chain link fasteners is unsafe for use. Therefore the scaffolding was unsafe in nature, and the user is responsible for injury to oneself when using a dangerous product. The plaintiff will counter this argument by arguing the validity of the defendant’s claim. The defendant claims that the scaffolding was dangerous by nature. Scaffolding, though, has a very specific place in its use for construction. Scaffolding to be used for construction, and ordered specifically for that use, is assumed by the public to be safe for use in construction. Use in construction would include the withstanding of the weight of a worker and the equipment the worker may need. In relation to this case, the provision of scaffolding that does not meet these requirements by Mr. Klopps provided an imminent danger to Mr. Cash. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff Ivan Cash will be successful in bringing legal action against the defendant Cy Klopps.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Parker, Page 5 of 5

WRIT-340: Final Portfolio
Keith Parker ID#6390.4899.77 Prof. David R. Samuelson Writing 340 MWF 1-2 PM Section #91035

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Assignment #1 Memorandum on Speluncean Explorers

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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WRIT-340: Final Portfolio
Memorandum To: Senior Partner Fr.: Associate Keith Parker Re: Speluncean Defendants September 25, 2005 Five amateur speluncean explorers are charged with the unlawful homicide of Roger Whetmore. These five explorers, Roger Whetmore among them, planed to explore a limestone cave for the weekend in July of 2005. They left a note at the Speluncean Society, which they were all members of, detailing the itinerary for their trip. The Speluncean Society is an organization of amateurs interested in the exploration of caves. Their plan was to enter a limestone cavern for a short period. They packed few supplies, including a wireless communication device. While they were deep in the cave, a landslide occurred which blocked the cave’s only known entrance. Further, the explorers were unaware of any food in the cave for the duration of their entrapment. The families of these five men became concerned when they did not arrive when expected, and notified the Speluncean Society. The society promptly dispatched a rescue party to the site. During the next twenty days, several further landslides occurred, killing ten of the workers at the site. The five men trapped in the cavern began to fear death by starvation. On the twentieth day of the rescue attempt, the rescuers learned that the men had with them the wireless communication device. Oral communication was established. The head engineer on site quoted the men that it would be at least ten days, barring further landslides, before completion of the rescue. The chairman of the committee of physicians informed the group that they had little chance of surviving a further ten days without food, given their current condition.

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Final Portfolio
During an eight-hour break in communications, initiated by the trapped men, Mr. Whetmore proposed that the men eat one of their number so that the others may survive. He suggested that they use a method of casting lots to identify the one to be eaten. The other men were reluctant initially. Whetmore, who had been serving as the group’s spokesman, then re-established communication with the head physician and inquired as to whether eating one of their number would allow the other four men the ten more days needed to survive. The physician answered in the affirmative. Whetmore further asked if it would be advisable to cast lots. The physician would not advise the men to proceed in doing so. When the trapped men asked for another physician, minister, or priest to assist them in their choice, none of those found would promote the measure. No further communication was made, and the rescuers assumed the batteries were dead in the men’s wireless device. After much deliberation, the five men decided to proceed with the measure. They proceeded to work out a mathematically fair method of casting lots. Next, Whetmore had a change of mind and recommended they wait a further 48 hours. The others accused charged Whetmore with a breach of faith, and continued to cast the dice that Whetmore carried with him. This was their 23rd day in the cavern. One of the men cast the dice for Whetmore, who had no objection to the fairness of the throw. Whetmore lost the throw and was killed then eaten by the other four spelunceans. On the 32nd day of the rescue effort, success was achieved. The four men were treated for malnutrition and shock. It was found that the batteries were operational in the wireless device until the 32nd day. The men were subsequently charged for the homicide of Roger Whetmore. The issue here is whether the four remaining speluncean explorers should be held responsible for the killing of Roger Whetmore. The case United States v. Holmes, 26 Keith Parker, 2

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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Fed. Cas. 360 (1842), is a precedent for the case of the spelunceans in the conditions which prove the necessity of murder. In order to overcome the prosecution of a homicide charge, the defendants must demonstrate that the killing of Roger Whetmore took place under a provable condition on necessity. They must also demonstrate that all five speluncean explorers were treated as though they were on equal footing, and that no one explorer was treated with a bias. Further, they must prove that each member of the group was given a fair chance to survive. This precedent is known as the “Law of Necessity.” In the case of the speluncean explorers, the facts presented by the remaining four members will demonstrate to the jury that the killing of Mr. Whetmore took place under a provable condition of necessity. The facts indicate that the five men were in a position that required them to choose cannibalism in order to survive. Furthermore, the men were on equal footing and were not operating under any bias. The men gathered as much information as was possible to them under the circumstances. They made their decision using this information, as well as the opinions set forth by each member in discussion. Moreover, the choice of the killing was made to be fair to all five men. In the case of Roger Whetmore, there is a provable condition of necessity. Provable condition of Necessity exists when there is no method that would preserve the lives of the members of a group, except for the sacrifice of one of the members. The element of prevailing importance in defining the law of necessity is that of the requirement of killing in order to preserve life. The members must further agree that the entire group would perish without the sacrifice of one’s life. A provable condition of necessity exists in the case of Holmes. In Holmes, the crew on board the vessel had reason to believe that, based on past experience and basic knowledge of the ocean, the entire group on board would not survive if none of the passengers were sacrificed Id. at 2. Keith Parker, 3

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Final Portfolio
A provable condition of necessity existed in this instant case as well. After contact with the rescue crew on the 20th day of confinement, the five explorers were informed that they would face certain future peril if they did not consume any substance within the next ten days. Further, the engineers informed the explorers that the rescue would take ten or more days to complete. After an enquiry by the explorers, the head physician on site informed the men that the consumption of human flesh would perpetuate their existence. As human flesh was the only available nutrient known to the men to be inside the cavern, it is clear that their only option was to consume this available nutrient. According to the information that was available to them at the time, death by starvation would have followed if they did not consume human flesh. The prosecution would argue that the killing was not necessary on the grounds that the men had not enquired about their ability to survive for a further 48 hours without consuming human flesh. Roger Whetmore proposed the 48-hour wait time. Though informed about a further ten-day wait until rescue, the men weren’t required to result to cannibalism so quickly. Given the knowledge that the men could survive another 48 hours, they may have been able to find another nutrient in the cavern that would have spared the life of Roger Whetmore. Furthermore, it would be argued that the men should have at least kept in contact with the rescuers for the possibility of new, helpful information. However, this argument is likely to be unpersuasive because the men, after agreeing that one of them would be killed, could not be sure of Mr. Whetmore’s intentions. As the decision that one member must die was made, it was necessary for the killing to take place immediately thereafter to prevent any scandal. Further, the necessity of the killing was made clear by the dire condition of the remaining explorers when they were rescued twelve days after communication ended. Keith Parker, 4

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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The five spelunceans explorers were on equal footing. To be on equal footing all members must have considered themselves equal in importance in regards to their survival. As all five members were of a similar skill level, there was no dependency on a specific member for survival. Vis-à-vis, no member of the group would be excluded from the drawing of lots for reasons of dependency. The members went so far as to “discuss the mathematical problems involved” S.E., at 2, of casting lots in attempt to ensure unequivocal fairness in the choice of the man to be sacrificed Id at 1-3. In Holmes, the situation of equal footing differs. The lives of the passengers depended on the skill and knowledge provided by the crew. Therefore, only the needed passengers would be the last to be sacrificed. This disposition made the choice of sacrifices simpler, as those who were needed least would be chosen. For the spelunceans, where equal footing was established, the most viable method of choice would be by casting lots in a mathematically fair way. This being the method chosen by the five men, the assumption that all five men were on equal footing is made valid and conclusive. Consultation with the rescue crew was of utmost importance to the five men trapped inside the cave, as was consultation with each other. Unrestricted communication with all available parties and discussion of available information is necessary to making a well informed decision, especially when the choice involves cannibalism. Once communication was established on the 20th day of their imprisonment, the five men gathered information from both the head engineer and head physician. They also attempted unsuccessfully to gather the opinion of either a judge, official of the government, minister, or priest. By communicating to this extent, the five men proved that they had extensively discussed the method to which they would cast lots S.E. at 3. Keith Parker, 5

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

WRIT-340: Final Portfolio
The five spelunceans made use of every resource available to them in order to ensure the fairness of the casting of lots. It was necessary that the choice of whom to sacrifice be fair in every respect, so as not to promote one’s life as being more important than another’s. As all members were on equal footing, the members decided through consultation that they should each have an equal chance of surviving long enough to be rescued. They deliberately took extensive steps in order to ensure the fairness of the casting of lots. The prosecution will argue that the casting of lots was not fair because of the disagreement that Roger Whetmore had with the proposed plan. Mr. Whetmore originally agreed to, as well as proposed, their plan for survival through casting lots and cannibalism. Nonetheless, before the lots were cast, he would not cast the dice himself and proposed waiting another 48 hours before casting lots. The other four men, charging Mr. Whetmore with a breach of faith, continued with the plan. One of the four cast the dice in place of Mr. Whetmore. The roll went against him. Though the four reported that Mr. Whetmore declared no objections to another member rolling the dice in place of him, it is hard to verify this statement. Only the testimony of the remaining four men is available Id. at 3-4. Nonetheless, this argument is likely to be unpersuasive because of the lack of alternative options available to the four men who charged Mr. Whetmore with a breach of faith. Having already decided on cannibalism as the only path to survival, the men found it necessary to continue with the casting of lots immediately. The decision to continue immediately may be partly because of suspicion as to the intention of Mr. Whetmore in his proposal of a 48-hour wait time, as mentioned earlier. Further, there wasn’t any viable reason to wait another 48 hours, as the engineer had informed the men that they Keith Parker, 6

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Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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would surely not escape within the next ten days. The men weren’t rescued for another twelve days after communication was established, thus concluding the validity of the head engineer’s statement Id. at 3-4. The four defendants will not be found guilty of the unlawful homicide of Roger Whetmore. In their decision to kill and consume Roger Whetmore, the four defendants will convince the jury that they operated under the “Law of Necessity.”

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, 7

Sailing Review
Nautical Science 301A

Sailing Class Review

Page 420 11/28/05 2:08 PM

Final will be all multiple choice questions Seamanship • Rights of Way o Sail o Power  3 types of vessel encounters  Meeting • Recommend that they pass port-to-port Overtaking • Vessel in Front has the right of way  Crossing • Works with the light system o Determining a collision course  Constant bearing and Decreasing range  Characteristics of planning hulls and displacement hulls Theoretical hull speed How to • • • measure the length of vessels Overall length On-Deck length Waterline length

Draft: amount of water required to keep a vessel afloat Lubber-line: The keel line or a line parallel to the keel line • Significant because compass has to be set lined up with the lubber line

Rigging

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Page 421
• • • • Shrouds Sheets Halyards Stays

Sailing Class Review

Types of sailing vessels • Sloop • Cutter • Schooner • Ketch • Yawl "In-Irons" know what this is Sailing positions Sailing maneuvers: a changing of something (i.e. “coming about”) Parts of sails The rest is in notebook Luff

Feet Venturri and Bernini effect Third law of motion • Action and reaction Navigation • Figure course heading and distances Lighthouses • Identify lights in three ways o Color  Red, Green, White, Amber

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Sailing Class Review
o Phase Character (Kind of signal)  Flashing, Occulting signal, et cetera o Period (Has to do with time of the signal) Feet in a nautical mile: 6,076 Feet (about 800 feet more than a standard land mile) • 1 Nautical mile is equal to 1 minute of arc of latitude o Very important to use minutes of latitude, as it is consistent everywhere on the map of the earth Tossing a banana peel off the bow • Speed = (.6 * length of travel) / seconds

Page 422

Range of lights • Geographic, has to do with the curvature of the earth • Nominal o Luminosity (Brightness of light) o Metrological visibility (If there is fog, et cetera) Magnetic compass error • Deviation o Error in the magnetic compass due to the effect of the vessel of her cargo on the compass • Variation o An error in the compass due to the difference between the magnetic north pole and the geographical north pole Change from white to blue on a chart indicates a change to shallow water The three R’s • Red (keep red markers to the right) • Right • Returning • Also, even numbers are kept to the right Average high tide: benchmark for heights above water

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Page 423

Sailing Class Review

Average low tide: benchmark for depths (10 ft = 10 ft below average low tide) Different kinds of tide • Spring tide (has nothing to do with the season) o Dramatic high and dramatic low tides • Neap tides o The opposite Review the 3-bearing fix Large-scale charts cover small areas Small-scale charts cover large areas 1 nautical fathom is 6 feet Charts may be lain out in different units Four sounding devices that will be found on buoys and lighthouses • Bell (Gives single tone) • Horn • Whistle • Gong (Gives multiple tones)

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

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