Transport
2.

0

A
Feasibility
Analysis
of
Next‐Generation
 Ground
Transport
in
Rwanda

 

David
Shlachter



PED
250
Second
Year
Policy
Analysis
(“SYPA”)
 
 March
2009
 
 Prepared
For
 Client:
Office
of
the
President
of
Rwanda
 Advisor:
Matt
Andrews
 Seminar
Leader:
Jay
Rosengard



Submitted
in
fulfillment
of
the
requirements
for
the
degree
of
Master
of
Public
Administration
in
International
 Development,
John
F.
Kennedy
School
of
Government,
Harvard
University.



 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


 I
am
deeply
indebted
to
Professors
Matt
Andrews
and
Jay
Rosengard
for
their
guidance,
support
 and
constructive
feedback.
 
 I
 would
 especially
 like
 to
 thank
 Minister
 Romain
 Murenzi
 and
 Mike
 Hughes
 of
 the
 Office
 of
 the
 President;
Minister
Albert
Butare
and
Eva
Paul
of
the
Ministry
of
Infrastructure;
John
Mirenge
of
 Electrogaz;
 George
 Katureebe
 of
 the
 Ministry
 of
 Finance
 and
 Economic
 Planning,
 Dr.
 Ir.
 Munyakazi
 Louis
 of
 the
 National
 Institute
 of
 Statistics
 of
 Rwanda,
 Kanyangeyo
 Agnes
 of
 the
 Rwanda
 Revenue
 Authority;
 Kayitare
 Celestin
 of
 the
 National
 Post
 Corporation,
 Prof.
 Silas
 Lwakabamba
 of
 the
 National
 University
 of
 Rwanda;
 Al
 Watkins,
 Victoria
 Kwakwa
 and
 Erik
 Fernstrom
of
the
World
Bank;
Lucy
Mbabazi;
and
Majaliwa
Arlly.

This
document
would
not
have
 been
possible
without
your
generous
contributions
of
time
and
information.
 
 I
would
also
like
to
thank
the
60
drivers
of
Kigali
who
took
time
from
their
extremely
trying
and
 busy
lives
to
answer
questions
about
the
local
transportation
industry.
 
 Finally,
I
would
like
to
thank
Harvard
University’s
Center
for
International
Development
and
the
 SEVEN
Fund
for
providing
a
travel
grant
that
enabled
me
to
conduct
field
research
in
Rwanda
in
 January
2009.



 


2


TABLE
OF
CONTENTS


 ACRONYM
GUIDE
&
DEFINITIONS……………………………………………………………………..

 4
 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY………………………………………………………………………………………
 5
 
 1 INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………………………
 6
 1.1 BACKGROUND
&
PURPOSE………………………………………………………………………………
 6
 1.2 KEY
QUESTIONS……………………………………………………………………………………………
 6
 
 2 METHODOLOGY……………………………………………………………………………………………
 7
 2.1 PRIMARY
&
SECONDARY
RESEARCH…………………………………………………………………..
 7
 
 3 ANALYSIS………………………………………………………………………………………………………
 8
 3.1 KEY
DATA
RELEVANT
TO
THE
SHIFT
FROM
TRANSPORT
1.0
TO
2.0………….........................
 8
 3.1.1 Ground
Transport
Industry………….……………………….………………………………..
 9
 3.1.2 Minibus
Taxi
Industry.……………………………………………………………………………
10
 3.1.3 Electricity
Issues…………………………………………………………………………………
 13
 3.1.4 Investment
Climate………………………………………………………………………………
 15
 3.1.5 Efficiency
Gains
from
Lithium‐Ion
Batteries
vs
ICE
Engine….……………………………
 16
 3.2 THE
VULNERABILITY
AND
DANGER
OF
TRANSPORT
1.0……………………………………….….
 16
 3.2.1 Oil
Issues……………………………………………………………………………………………
17
 3.3 TRANSPORT
STAKEHOLDER
ANALYSIS………………………………………………………………..
 20
 3.4 ANALYSIS
OF
ICE
&
ALTERNATIVE
FUEL
VEHICLE
OPTIONS…………….………………………..
 22
 3.4.1 Internal
Combustion
Engine
(“ICE”)………………………….………………………..……..
 22
 3.4.2 Biofuel………………………………………………………………………………………………
 22
 3.4.3 Hybrid………………………………………………………………………………………………
 22
 3.4.4 Plug‐in
Hybrid
Electric
Vehicle
(“PHEV”).……………………………………………………
 23
 3.4.5 Liquefied
Natural
Gas
(“LNG”).…………………………………………………………………
 23
 3.4.6 Pure
Battery‐Electric
Vehicle
(“EV”).………………………………………………………….
 24
 3.4.7 Summary
of
Alternatives
Analysis
and
Conclusion……...…………………………………..
 24
 3.5 SWOT
ANALYSIS
FOR
SHIFT
TO
TRANSPORT
2.0
IN
RWANDA…………………………………….
25
 3.6 ADMINISTRATIVE
FEASIBILITY………………………………………………………………………….
 27
 3.7 THE
BUSINESS
CASE
FOR
TRANSPORT
2.0
IN
RWANDA…………………………………………….
28
 
 4 RECOMMENDATIONS……………………………………………………………………………………..
 31
 4.1 RATIONALE
FOR
FRAMEWORK
OF
RECOMMENDATIONS…………………………………………..
31
 4.2 SPECIFIC
RECOMMENDATIONS…………………………………………………………………………..
31
 4.3 CONCLUSIONS
AND
DIRECTIONS
FOR
FURTHER
RESEARCH………………………………………
31


 APPENDIX
A:
List
of
Expert
Interviewees
for
Primary
Research……………………………………
33
 APPENDIX
B:
Questionnaire
for
Rwanda
Taxi
Drivers…………………………………………..……
34
 APPENDIX
C:
Dataset
Produced
by
Questionnaire…………………………………………..………...
35
 APPENDIX
D
:
SWOT
Analysis
diagram…………………………………………………..………………
36
 APPENDIX
E:
Photos
and
Images…………………………………………………………………………
 37
 


BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………………………………
42
 ENDNOTES…………………………………………………………………………………………………………...
45
 
 3


ACRONYM
GUIDE
&
DEFINITIONS


 AFV
=
Alternative
Fuel
Vehicle
 Battery
Operator
=
Manager
of
the
distribution,
charging
and
exchange
of
batteries
for
EVs
 BBL
=
Barrel
of
oil,
1
barrel
is
equal
to
42
gallons
or
~160
liters
 CDM
=
Clean
Development
Mechanism
 Chargespot
=
Device
resembling
a
parking
meter
where
an
EV
can
be
plugged
in
 CIF
=
Cost,
Insurance,
Freight
 COMESA
=
Common
Market
for
Eastern
and
Southern
Africa
 EAC
=
East
African
Community
(includes
Rwanda,
Burundi,
Tanzania,
Kenya
and
Uganda)
 EBITDA
=
Earnings
before
interest,
taxes,
depreciation
and
amortization
 EIA
=
Energy
Information
Agency
 E‐Taxi
=
EV
minibus
taxi,
similar
to
the
15‐seat
Toyota
Hiace
minibus
minibus
taxi
 EV
=
Electric
Vehicle
(pure
battery‐electric
vehicle
that
does
not
use
any
liquid
fuel)
 FRW
=
Rwandan
Francs
($1
USD
=
555
Frw)
 Gallon
=
3.8
liters
 GHG
=
Greenhouse
Gas
 GNI
=
Gross
National
Income
 ICE
=
Internal
Combustion
Engine
 IPP
=
Independent
Power
Producer
 KIST
=
Kigali
Institute
of
Science
&
Technology
 KM
=
Kilometer
 kW
=
Kilowatt,
a
measure
of
power
 kWh
=
Kilowatt‐hour,
a
measure
of
energy
 LNG
=
Liquefied
Natural
Gas
 Minibus
Taxi
=
Toyota
Hiace
or
Coaster,
shared
by
up
to
36
passengers
at
a
time
 MW
=
megawatt,
or
1,000
watts
 NIS
=
National
Innovation
System
 NISR
=
National
Institute
of
Statistics
of
Rwanda
 NUR
=
National
University
of
Rwanda
 OECD
=
Organization
of
Economic
Cooperation
and
Development
 PHEV
=
Plug‐In
Hybrid
Electric
Vehicle
(hybrid
that
runs
on
batteries
and
gasoline)
 RDB
=
Rwanda
Development
Board
 RRA
=
Rwanda
Revenue
Authority
 RURA
=
Rwanda
Utilities
Regulatory
Agency
 SWOT
=
Strengths,
Weaknesses,
Opportunities,
Threats
 Transport
1.0
=
Refers
to
the
incumbent
oil‐based
transportation
system
 Transport
2.0
=
Refers
to
the
next‐generation
electricity‐based
transportation
system
 USD
=
United
States
Dollars
 VAT
=
Value
Added
Tax
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4


EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY


 This
 document
 is
 motivated
 by
 the
 hypothesis
 that
 an
 electric
 vehicle
 (“EV”)
 transportation
 system
 designed
 for
 OECD
 countries
 could
 be
 adapted
 for
 implementation
 in
 Rwanda.
 
 To
 test
 this
 hypothesis,
 it
 explores
 Rwanda’s
 urban
 transport
 culture
 as
 a
 means
 to
 discover
 what
 adaptations
 would
 be
 necessary
 for
 private
 sector
 implementation
 with
 minimal
 cost
 to
 the
 government
or
donor
agencies.
 
 Rwanda
should
kick
its
addiction
to
oil
to
increase
the
chances
of
meeting
its
ambitious
goal
of
 reaching
middle‐income
status1
by
2020.2

Currently,
Rwanda
is
transferring
~85%
of
its
annual
 foreign
exchange
earnings
to
other
nations
in
exchange
for
oil.3

This
document
describes
how
an
 alternative
 transportation
 model
 could
 be
 embraced
 to
 keep
 all
 of
 that
 wealth
 inside
 Rwanda’s
 economy,
while
providing
additional
benefits
to
the
environment.

 
 The
proposed
model
involves:
 
 • A
 paradigm
 shift
 from
 the
 incumbent
 internal
 combustion
 engine
 (“ICE”)‐powered
 Toyota
 Hiace
minibus
taxi
to
an
EV
version
of
the
minibus
taxi
(“E‐Taxi”)

 
 • The
 creation
 of
 a
 new
 private
 industry
 of
 “Battery
 Operators”
 who
 manage
 the
 purchase,
 distribution,
charging,
and
exchange
of
batteries
for
E‐Taxis
 
 • A
system
in
which
all
E‐Taxi
batteries
in
the
economy
would
be
charged
overnight
to
absorb
 surplus
electricity
generation
that
would
otherwise
not
go
to
productive
use
 
 This
document
lays
out
an
analysis
of
alternative
fuel
vehicles,
a
financial
analysis,
a
stakeholder
 analysis
and
a
“SWOT”
analysis
to
demonstrate
that
this
initiative
is
the
technically
correct
path
 toward
 a
 sustainable
 transport
 future,
 and
 that
 it
 would
 be
 financially
 profitable,
 politically
 feasible
and
administratively
implementable
in
the
context
of
Rwanda’s
current
environment.
 
 Finally,
this
document
recommends
the
following
policy
actions
to
various
Rwandan
government
 agencies
 as
 a
 means
 to
 enable
 the
 private
 sector
 to
 develop
 a
 sustainable
 transportation
 alternative
for
Rwanda:
 
 • Office
of
the
President:
Subsidize
discovery
costs
to
demonstrate
viability
of
EV
technology
 • NUR:
Launch
a
nationwide
competition
to
discover
appropriate
EV
adaptation
needs
 • RURA:
Standardize
the
size
of
battery
modules
to
overcome
coordination
failure
 • RURA:
Regulate
tariffs
for
battery
leases
that
reflects
the
needs
of
business
and
consumers
 • Electrogaz:
Offer
variable
electricity
pricing
to
reflect
peak
and
off‐peak
demand
 • RRA:
Relax
import
tax,
excise
tax
and/or
VAT
to
EVs
and
relevant
components

 • Ministry
of
Infrastructure:
Facilitate
loan
guarantees
from
IFC
for
infrastructure
build‐out
 • Ministry
of
Infrastructure:
Avail
land
for
infrastructure
build‐out
 • ONTARACOM:
Run
an
early
pilot
project
to
demonstrate
viability
in
the
transport
sector
 
 
 
 
 5


1. INTRODUCTION


1.1


 Oil
 exploitation
 has
innumerable
 negative
 environmental,
economic
and
 political
consequences.

 The
 transportation
 sector
 is
 a
 major
 contributor
 of
 greenhouse
 gas
 (GHG)
 emissions,
 which
 pollutes
the
air
and
contributes
to
climate
change.4

The
inelastic
demand
for
oil
–
a
commodity
 subject
 to
 wild
 price
 fluctuations
 –
 is
 damaging
 both
 to
 households
 and
 to
 the
 macroeconomy
 when
prices
rise.

As
oil
becomes
increasingly
scarce,
the
negative
geopolitical
implications
of
oil
 exploitation
and
distribution
will
become
even
more
pronounced.
 
 In
 2008,
 Rwanda
 imported
 1.1
 million
 barrels5
 of
 diesel
 and
 gasoline,
 at
 an
 estimated
 market
 value
 of
 almost
 USD
 $150
 million.6
 
 By
 means
 of
 comparison,
 Rwanda
 earned
 a
 total
 of
 about
 $176
 million
 in
 foreign
 exchange
 during
 the
 same
 year.7
 
 Although
 Rwanda’s
 minibus
 taxis
 account
for
only
about
10%
of
four‐wheeled
automobiles,8
they
are
the
most
ubiquitous
vehicles
 on
the
road
as
they
drive
an
average
of
236
kilometers
per
day
to
meet
the
transportation
needs
 of
 Rwanda’s
 countless
 carless
 commuters.
 
 Thus,
 targeting
 this
 segment
 of
 the
 transportation
 economy
for
a
shift
to
Transport
2.0
(i.e.,
next‐generation,
electricity‐based
transportation)
could
 have
 disproportionately
 large
 returns
 vis‐à‐vis
 decreased
 oil
 dependence
 and
 reduced
 GHG
 emissions.
 
 Like
all
countries,
Rwanda’s
transportation
system
is
completely
reliant
on
oil‐based
fuels.

This
 addiction
will
prove
to
be
increasingly
problematic
for
Rwanda’s
economy,
which
hopes
to
stay
 on
a
trajectory
toward
middle‐income
country
status
by
2020.

Rwanda
has
the
potential
not
only
 to
surmount
this
challenge,
but
also
to
lead
the
way
toward
an
oil‐free
transportation
solution
for
 the
East
African
Community
and
beyond.


 
 


BACKGROUND
&
PURPOSE


1.2


 Recognizing
 that
 the
 era
 of
 cheap
 oil
 is
 coming
 to
 an
 end,
 businesses
 in
 OECD
 countries
 are
 starting
to
invest
billions
of
USD
to
develop
the
infrastructure
and
networks
necessary
to
enable
 the
mass
deployment
of
EVs.9

The
dominant
model
being
implemented
includes
the
deployment
 of
 chargespots
 and
 automated
 battery
 exchange
 stations
 (see
 Appendix
 E
 for
 images);
 the
 ubiquity
and
sophistication
of
the
network
is
a
critical
aspect
of
the
consumer
value
proposition
 upon
which
the
business
model
depends.
 
 The
key
question
of
this
paper
is:
 
 • How
 could
 the
 OECD
 model
 for
 an
 EV
 infrastructure
 and
 network
 be
 adapted
 for
 implementation
in
Rwanda?
 
 In
order
to
answer
this
question,
the
following
sub‐questions
needed
to
be
answered
first:
 
 • Who
are
the
key
stakeholders
in
Rwanda’s
transportation
sector?
 • What
are
the
key
characteristics
of
Rwanda’s
urban
transportation
system?
 
 6


KEY
QUESTIONS


• What
is
the
driving
behavior
of
Rwandan
taxi
drivers?
 • What
is
the
current
status
and
future
plan
for
electricity
generation
and
pricing
in
Rwanda?
 
 Finally,
after
asserting
that
an
adaptation
of
the
existing
EV
deployment
model
could
be
adopted
 by
 Rwanda,
 the
 paper
 addresses
 what
 various
 agencies
 in
 Rwanda’s
 government
 could
 do
 to
 expedite
successful
implementation.
 
 The
key
contribution
of
this
paper
is
that
it
provides
the
first
argument
showing
how
the
OECD
 model
for
EV
deployment
could
be
adapted
and
implemented
in
a
developing
country
context.
 
 
 


2. METHODOLOGY


 


2.1


 In
 January
 2008
 the
 author
 spent
 eleven
 days
 in
 Kigali,
 Rwanda
 to
 gain
 an
 appreciation
 of
 the
 local
transport
industry.

The
research
methodology
was
divided
into:
(Type
1)
interviews
of
60
 drivers
of
various
types
of
taxi
conveyances,
and
(Type
2)
interviews
of
experts
(see
Appendix
A
 for
list
of
experts).


 
 The
 first
 set
 of
 interviews
 was
 designed
 to
 inform
 Sections
 3.1.1
 and
 3.1.2,
 which
 explore
 the
 landscape
of
Rwanda’s
transport
industry
in
general,
and
taxi
industry
in
particular.

The
second
 set
 of
 interviews
 served
 the
 purpose
 of
 informing
 issues
 of
 political
 feasibility,
 administrative
 implementability
and
technical
correctness
of
the
ultimate
recommendations.
 
 Type
1
interviews
were
conducted
at
several
different
taxi
depots
in
Kigali,
including
City
Center
 and
 the
 Nyabugogo
 Taxi
 Park.
 
 The
 author
 and
 a
 Rwandan
 interpreter
 /
 research
 assistant
 approached
drivers
at
drop‐off
/
pick‐up
areas,
compensated
each
one
with
500
Frw,
and
asked
a
 series
of
qualitative
and
quantitative
questions
about
their
occupation
(see
Appendix
B
for
the
 actual
questionnaire).
 
 In
 addition
 to
 providing
 qualitative
 data
 that
 explained
 the
 general
 landscape
 of
 the
 transport
 industry,
the
interviews
of
60
drivers
produced
a
quantitative
dataset
on
the
following
variables:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7


PRIMARY
&
SECONDARY
RESEARCH


FIGURE
2.1
 



 
 Secondary
 research
 was
 used
 to
 corroborate
 the
 findings
 from
 both
 Type
 1
 and
 Type
 2
 interviews,
 using
 the
 following
 types
 of
 sources:
 local
 newspaper
 articles
 (primarily
 from
 The
 New
Times),
data
provided
by
the
National
Institute
of
Statistics
Rwanda
(“NISR”),
data
provided
 by
the
Rwanda
Revenue
Authority
(“RRA”),
the
Rwanda
Development
Board
(“RDB”),
the
World
 Bank,
and
various
other
credible
sources.


 
 
 


3. ANALYSIS


 


3.1

KEY
DATA
RELEVANT
TO
THE
SHIFT
FROM
TRANSPORT
1.0
TO
2.0




 The
 model
 proposed
 in
 this
 paper
 involves
 a
 paradigm
 shift
 from
 the
 incumbent
 internal
 combustion
 engine
 (“ICE”)‐powered
 Toyota
 Hiace
 minibus
 taxi
 to
 an
 EV
 version
 of
 the
 minibus
 (“E‐Taxi”),
 enabled
 by
 a
 new
 private
 industry
 of
 “Battery
 Operators,”
 who
 would
 build
 and
 manage
a
recharging
infrastructure.
 
 In
 an
 effort
 to
 determine
 how
 to
 adapt
 the
 fledgling
 OECD
 model
 for
 an
 electric
 vehicle
 ecosystem,
several
types
of
analysis
are
conducted
in
this
section.


 
 The
interviews
with
minibus
taxi
drivers
produced
a
dataset
that
describes
the
ground
transport
 industry,
including
cost
of
a
minibus
taxi,
types
of
vehicles
driven,
number
of
distances
driven
per
 day,
 amount
 spent
 on
 gasoline
 per
 day,
 ownership
 statistics,
 and
 where
 taxis
 are
 parked
 overnight.
 
 The
 interviews
 with
 local
 experts
 on
 policy
 and
 energy
 produced
 information
 on
 electricity
 issues,
 investment
 climate,
 and
 other
 variables
 that
 will
 be
 instrumental
 in
 assessing
 the
 risks
 and
opportunities
of
the
implementation
of
Transport
2.0.
 
 This
 section
 also
 provides
 a
 stakeholder
 analysis,
 analysis
 of
 alternative
 vehicle
 types
 and
 a
 “SWOT
Analysis.”
 
 
 
 
 
 8


3.1.1 GROUND
TRANSPORT
INDUSTRY
 
 In
 descending
 order
 of
 expense,
 ground
 transport
 options
 in
 Rwanda
 include
 privately
 owned
 vehicles,
“private
taxis”
geared
toward
one
person
or
a
unified
group,
motorcycle
taxis
that
can
 only
 take
 one
 passenger
 at
 a
 time,
 city
 owned
 bus,
 and
 minibus
 taxis
 that
 can
 hold
 up
 to
 36
 passengers
at
a
time.


 
 As
 Rwanda
 does
 not
 produce
 any
 vehicles,
 consumers
 who
 elect
 to
 purchase
 a
 private
 conveyance
are
subject
to
three
types
of
taxes:
import,
excise
and
value‐added
tax
(“VAT”).

At
the
 time
of
publication,
the
following
tax
rates
were
in
effect
for
vehicles:
 
 FIGURE
3.1.1
 



 
 This
 tax
 is
 based
 on
 the
 cost
 (i.e.,
 actual
 purchase
 price,
 whether
 the
 vehicle
 is
 new
 or
 used),
 shipping
insurance
and
freight
cost
(“CIF”)
of
the
vehicle.

Most10
minibus
taxis
are
purchased
in
 the
 secondary,
 used
 vehicle
 market
 in
 Dubai,
 and
 the
 cumulative
 tax,
 shipping
 and
 insurance
 costs
regularly
exceed
the
actual
purchase
price
of
the
vehicle.
 
 100%
 of
 transportation
 is
 powered
 by
 petroleum
 products
 including
 gasoline
 and
 diesel,
 provided
by
private
sector
retailers
(See
Section
3.2.1).

There
are
currently
about
53,000
motor
 vehicles
in
Rwanda,
including
over
18,000
motorcycles.11


 
 The
number
of
urban
commuters
increased
by
155%
from
about
470,000
to
1,200,000
from
2005
 to
2006.12

According
to
NISR,
even
though
the
number
of
city‐owned
and
operated
buses
more
 than
 doubled
 during
 the
 same
 year
 (from
 62
 to
 126),13
 only
 22
 of
 these
 buses
 are
 dedicated
 toward
urban
transport
(i.e.,
transport
within
Kigali),
and
are
unable
to
meet
the
rapidly
growing
 needs
of
the
commuting
public
in
the
capital.
 
 Although
 the
 NISR
 does
 not
 collect
 data
 to
 confirm
 this,
 it
 was
 corroborated
 informally
 among
 100%
of
interviewees
that
this
need
is
being
met
by
growth
in
the
minibus
taxi
industry,
which
is
 the
dominant
modality
of
public
transport
in
Rwanda.


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9


3.1.2 MINIBUS
TAXI
INDUSTRY
 
 The
public
transport
industry
in
Rwanda
is
dominated
by
shared
minibus
taxis
that
provide
(1)
 intercity
travel
with
Kigali
as
either
a
starting
point
or
destination,
and
(2)
intracity
travel
within
 Kigali.


 
 There
are
two
main
types
of
minibus
taxis:
the
Toyota
Hiace,
which
has
15
seats
(but
typically
is
 overloaded
with
a
driver,
conductor
and
18
passengers)
and
the
larger
Toyota
Coaster,
which
has
 36
seats
(see
Appendix
E
for
photos
of
the
two
types
of
minibuses).

As
demonstrated
in
the
 following
figure,
the
Toyota
Hiace
represents
the
vast
majority
of
minibus
taxis.
 
 
 FIGURE
3.1.2A:
MINIBUS
TAXIS
BY
TYPE
(n
=
60)
 

3%
 9%


88%



 
 Minibus
 taxis
 follow
 predictable
 routes
 –
 both
 for
 intercity
 and
 intracity
 transport,
 using
 the
 Nyabugogo
Taxi
Park
(see
Appendix
E
for
photos)
in
Kigali
as
the
centrally
located
base
where
a
 commuter
 can
 catch
 a
 ride
 to
 any
 urban
 or
 suburban
 destination
 in
 Rwanda.
 
 About
 half
 of
 minibus
taxis
are
parked
at
drivers’
homes
overnight,
while
the
other
half
are
parked
at
rented
 lots,
company
fleet
lots,
or
at
petrol
stations
for
a
fee
of
300
–
500
Frw
per
night.


 
 
 FIGURE
3.1.2B:
NIGHT
TIME
PARKING
LOCATION
(n
=
60)
 

3%
 15%


Toyota
Coaster


Toyota
Hiace


Various


32%


50%


Company
Lot


Home


Petrol
Station


Rented
Lot


10


Fares
are
controlled
by
the
Rwanda
Utilities
Regulatory
Agency
(“RURA”),14
with
a
fixed
rate
of
 150
 Frw
 per
 ride
 for
 intracity
 travel
 (regardless
 of
 the
 distance
 traveled
 or
 vehicle
 type),
 and
 variable
rates
for
intercity
travel
that
are
proportionate
to
the
distance
traveled,
but
regardless
of
 vehicle
type.


 
 Public
transportation
is
relatively
expensive
when
measured
against
Rwanda’s
per
capita
gross
 national
 income
 (“GNI”)
 of
 USD
 $320
 in
 2008.15
 
 If
 the
 average
 person
 were
 to
 commute
 on
 a
 minibus
 taxi
 –
 the
 least
 expensive
 method
 of
 transport
 in
 the
 country
 –
 twice
 per
 day,
 then
 he/she
 would
 spend
 approximately
 USD
 $200
 per
 year16,
 or
 63%
 of
 his/her
 entire
 income
 on
 transportation
alone.


 
 This
relatively
high
cost
is
a
reflection
of
the
high
price
of
fuel
of
the
pump
(see
Section
3.2.1).


 
 Unlike
in
other
African
countries,17
where
the
taxi
industry
is
incumbent
of
mafia‐like
control
and
 gang
warfare,
the
drivers
of
the
Rwandan
minibus
taxis
are
not
ultra
competitive
and
generally
 enjoy
a
harmonious
relationship
with
one
another.

One
contributing
factor
to
this
phenomenon
 might
be
the
overwhelmingly
high
(and
growing)
demand
for
minibus
taxi
transport
services.
 
 Including
taxes
shown
in
Figure
3.1.1,
the
all‐in
cost
of
a
used
Toyota
Hiace
is
about
11.5
million
 Frw
 (USD
 $20,700),
 and
 the
 all‐in
 cost
 for
 a
 new
 Toyota
 Coaster
 is
 about
 38
 million
 Frw
 (USD
 $68,400).
 
 Kigali
 minibus
 taxi
 drivers
 travel
 an
 average
 of
 236
 km/day
 (standard
 deviation
 =
 107.5
 km/day).
 
 Figure
 3.1.2C
 shows
 the
 distribution
 of
 km
 driven
 per
 day,
 as
 reported
 by
 Kigali
 minibus
taxi
drivers.


 
 
 FIGURE
3.1.2C:
KILOMETERS
DRIVEN
PER
DAY
(n
=
60)
 

40%
 35%
 30%
 25%
 20%
 15%
 10%
 5%
 0%
 50‐149
 150‐249
 250‐349
 350‐449
 20%
 10%
 5%
 35%
 30%



 
 Figures
3.1.2D
and
3.1.2E
show
the
distribution
of
Kigali
minibus
taxi
drivers’
daily
expenditure
 on
 fuel,
 in
 Rfw
 and
 USD,
 respectively.
 
 The
 interviewees
 reported
 spending
 an
 average
 of
 approximately
Rfw
28,500
(USD
$51)
per
day
on
fuel.
 
 
 
 11


450‐549


FIGURE
3.1.2D:
MINIBUS
TAXI
DRIVERS’
EXPENDITURE
ON
PETROL
PER
DAY,
FRW
(n
=
60)
 

40%
 35%
 30%
 25%
 20%
 15%
 10%
 5%
 0%
 2%
 7%
 17%
 23%
 17%
 35%



 
 
 

25%
 23%
 20%


FIGURE
3.1.2E:
MINIBUS
TAXI
DRIVERS’
EXPENDITURE
ON
PETROL
PER
DAY,
USD
(n
=
60)


20%


15%


15%


10%


10%


10%
 7%


5%


5%
 3%


5%
 2%


0%
 10‐19
 20‐29
 30‐39
 40‐49
 50‐59
 60‐69
 70‐79
 80‐89
 90‐99
 100‐110



 
 12


Figure
3.1.2F
shows
that
only
23%
of
Kigali
minibus
taxi
drivers
reported
to
own
their
vehicles.

 The
other
77%
of
drivers
engage
in
a
variety
of
different
agreements
with
vehicle
owners.

Some
 are
 “simple
 drivers”
 who
 are
 paid
 a
 small
 wage
 by
 a
 minibus
 taxi
 agency
 that
 owns
 a
 fleet
 of
 vehicles.

Others
have
agreements
in
which
they
lease
vehicles
from
an
independent
fleet
owner
 and
pay
the
owner
a
set
fee
every
day
for
use
of
the
vehicle,
keeping
all
revenue
that
they
make
in
 excess
of
that
fee.
 
 
 FIGURE
3.1.2F:
DRIVERS’
OWNERSHIP
OF
MINIBUS
TAXIS
(n
=
60)
 


23%


77%



 
 There
 is
 a
 variety
 of
 privately
 owned
 minibus
 taxi
 operating
 agencies
 including
 Sotra
 Tours,
 Stella,
Volcanoes
Express,
Virunga,
Trans2000,
Omega
Car
and
Muhabura
Travel.

Most
of
these
 operators
 offer
 minibus
 taxi
 service
 to
 urban
 and
 suburban
 destinations
 outside
 of
 Kigali.

 Typically,
a
single
minibus
taxi
owned
by
the
operator
will
make
two
or
three
round
trip
journeys
 from
the
operator’s
base
in
Kigali
to
the
destination.
 
 ATRACO
is
a
special
operator,
as
it
also
serves
as
the
primary
association
of
taxi
drivers,
claiming
 membership
of
about
80%
of
all
drivers
in
Rwanda.

Independent
driver
entrepreneurs
can
buy
a
 minibus
 in
 the
 international
 market,
 import
 it
 into
 Rwanda,
 join
 ATRACO,
 and
 coordinate
 with
 ATRACO
 as
 to
 which
 route
 should
 be
 driven.
 
 This
 association
 controls
 nearly
 all
 intracity‐ traveling
 minibus
 taxis.
 
 Additionally,
 ATRACO
 operates
 the
 main
 taxi
 park
 at
 Nyabugogo,
 charging
a
fee
to
taxis
for
entering
the
park,
and
charging
them
an
additional
fee
for
keeping
their
 vehicles
there
overnight.


 
 
 3.1.3 ELECTRICITY
ISSUES
 
 Traditionally,
 all
 of
 Rwanda’s
 electricity
 has
 been
 generated
 by
 hydro
 power
 plants.
 
 After
 enjoying
high
“bounce
back”
economic
growth
in
the
wake
of
the
1994
genocide,
the
limitations
 of
 electricity
 supply
 started
 to
 serve
 as
 a
 constraint
 to
 Rwanda’s
 growth.18
 
 In
 2004,
 Rwanda
 experienced
 a
 significant
 drought
 that
 lowered
 the
 levels
 of
 lakes
 Burera
and
Ruhondo,19
 thus
 reducing
 its
 hydro
 electricity
 output
 (and,
 therefore,
 all
 of
 its
 electricity
 output)
 by
 23%.20

 Electricity
generation
rebounded
the
following
year,
but
load
shedding
and
blackouts
highlighted
 the
vulnerability
of
the
national
energy
system.21
 
 13


Driver
Does
Not
Own
Taxi


Driver
Owns
Taxi


Although
the
World
Bank
is
planning
a
USD
$70
million
project
to
increase
electricity
access
to
 16%
over
the
next
five
years,22
only
6%
of
Rwandans23
(i.e.,
92,000
households24)
currently
have
 access
 to
 electricity
 in
 their
 homes.
 
 Most
 of
 these
 fortunate
 few
 subscribe
 to
 a
 prepay
 system
 with
 ELECTROGAZ,
 the
 national
 utility
 monopoly,
 for
 122
 Frw
 (USD
 $.22)
 per
 kWh
 (Electrogaz
 does
 not
 currently
 offer
 variable
 pricing
 for
 peak
 and
 off‐peak
 electricity
 consumption25).
 
 The
 remaining
 94%
 light
 their
 homes
 with
 kerosene
 lamps.
 
 Those
 who
 own
 mobile
 phones
 but
 do
 not
 have
 grid
 access
 pay
 a
 fee
 of
 several
 hundred
 Rwf
 to
 charge
 their
 devices
 on
 large
 car
 batteries
 owned
 by
 opportunistic
local
 shopkeepers
 who
 carry
the
 battery
to
 urban
 centers
 for
 periodic
recharging.


 
 Due
 to
 the
 social
 implications
 of
 extremely
 limited
 national
 electric
 grid
 access,
 many
 interviewees
 expressed
 concern
 that
 electrifying
 vehicles
 might
 be
 a
 suboptimal
 allocation
 of
 such
 a
 scarce
 resource.
 
 The
 response
 to
 this
 concern
 is
 that
 100%
 of
 the
 electricity
 used
 to
 propel
 EVs
 would
 come
 from
 surplus
 electricity
 generation
 produced
 overnight,
 when
 the
 base
 load
exceeds
the
demand.26
 
 Rwanda
currently
has
a
cumulative
installed
generation
capacity
base
of
approximately
55
MW,
 supplied
by
domestic
hydro,
regional
hydro
(i.e.,
shared
with
the
Democratic
Republic
of
Congo
 and
Burundi),
and
diesel‐powered
generation
on
a
portfolio
of
owned
and
rented
machines.

To
 put
this
into
perspective,
55
MW
of
electricity
is
roughly
equivalent
to
the
output
of
a
small
wind
 farm
consisting
of
~75
medium‐sized
windmills,27
which
could
hypothetically
power
about
eight
 average‐sized
 cement
 factories.28
 
 Through
 its
 installed
 capacity,
 Rwanda
 produces
 about
 134
 million
kWh
of
energy
per
year,29
which
is
about
0.1%
of
the
electricity
generated
in
Thailand
(or
 0.6%
of
the
electricity
generated
on
a
per‐capita
basis).

As
another
basis
of
comparison,
the
tiny
 two‐island
nation
of
St.
Kitts
and
Nevis
produces
about
the
same
amount
of
electricity
as
Rwanda,
 but
Rwanda
has
a
population
that
is
almost
240
times
greater.30

 
 Figure
3.1.3
gives
a
breakdown
of
the
relative
contribution
of
each
electricity
generation
method
 to
the
installed
base.


 
 
 FIGURE
3.1.3:
Contribution
To
Overall
Electricity
Supply
 


32%


36%


32%


Domestic
Hydro


Regional
Hydro


Diesel


14


Electrogaz
 currently
 has
 plans
 to
 bring
 an
 additional
 10
 MW
 online
 by
 2010
 through
 the
 implementation
 of
 one
 new
 hydro
 electricity
 plant,
 and
 another
 27.5
 MW
 through
 the
 implementation
of
another
hydro
plant.31


 
 A
private
Israeli
company32
has
been
working
on
a
contract
basis
for
the
Rwandan
government
to
 establish
 the
 feasibility
 of
 extracting
 methane
 gas
 trapped
 in
 Lake
 Kivu
 and
 converting
 it
 into
 electricity.
 
 Although
 there
 are
 some
 remaining
 challenges
 regarding
 the
 tradeoff
 between
 flow
 rates
and
purity
of
the
gas,
a
pilot
project
has
been
implemented
successfully,
and
the
concept
has
 been
 proven.33
 
 An
 American
 independent
 power
 producer
 (“IPP”)
 has
 signed
 a
 contract
 with
 Electrogaz
to
exploit
the
methane
resource
and
scale
up
the
electricity
plant
by
a
magnitude
of
 approximately
25
MW
each
year.34

The
methane
in
Lake
Kivu
has
the
potential
to
provide
300‐ 500
 MW
 for
 the
 next
 50‐100
 years,
 and
 offers
 Rwanda
 its
 single
 greatest
 hope
 of
 energy
 independence.
 
 Further,
 when
 the
 Lake
 Kivu
 methane
 and
 the
 new
 hydro
 power
 plants
 come
 online,
 Rwanda
 will
 be
 able
 to
 phase
 out
 its
 expensive
 diesel
 (and
 planned
 heavy
 fuel)
 plants,
 thus
reducing
the
cost
of
electricity
for
consumers.
 
 The
 nature
 of
 both
 methane
 and
 hydro
 powered
 electricity
 plants
 are
 that
 they
 continuously
 produce
 electricity
 24
 hours
 per
 day.35
 
 It
 is
 predicted
 that
 within
 2‐3
 years,
 the
 Lake
 Kivu
 methane
 plant
 and
 the
 new
 hydro
 plants
 will
 be
 producing
 excess
 electricity
 during
 off‐peak
 hours,
which
presents
Electrogaz
with
an
opportunity
to
find
a
customer
for
power
in
the
middle
 of
the
night.

Electrogaz
may
be
able
to
offer
variable
pricing,
with
reduced
off‐peak
rates.36
 
 
 3.1.4 INVESTMENT
CLIMATE
 
 According
 to
 the
 World
 Bank’s
 Doing
 Business
 Report,
 Rwanda
 has
 climbed
 against
 other
 countries
 in
 such
 indicators
 as
 Starting
 a
 Business,
 Dealing
 with
 Construction
 Permits,
 and
 Employing
 Workers
 and
 Registering
 Property.37
 
 Rwanda
 also
 benefits
 from
 macroeconomic
 stability
 (i.e.,
 low
 inflation)
 and
 high
 GDP
 growth,
 and
 established
 institutions
 such
 as
 the
 Rwanda
Investment
Promotion
Agency,
which
facilitates
investment
in
domestic
businesses.38


 
 According
 to
 the
 Common
 Market
 for
 Eastern
 and
 Southern
 Africa
 (“COMESA”),
 Rwanda’s
 relevant
investment
incentives
include39:
 
 • Duty
exemptions
on
plant,
machinery
and
equipment
 • VAT
 exemptions
 on
 all
 imported
 raw
 materials
 and
 imported
 vehicles
 for
 investors
 and
 their
foreign
employees
 • Exemption
from
withholding
tax
 • 100%
write‐off
on
R&D
cost
 • Reductions
in
corporate
income
tax
 • Accelerated
rates
of
depreciation
of
40%
in
the
first
year
for
investments
in
Kigali
 
 Although
 a
 full‐scale
 analysis
 of
 Rwanda’s
 investment
 climate
 is
 outside
 the
 scope
 of
 this
 document,
it
should
suffice
that
there
is
no
immediately
obvious
indication
that
Rwanda
would
be
 an
unattractive
place
for
investment
at
the
time
of
publishing.
 
 
 
 15


3.1.5 EFFICIENCY
GAINS
FROM
LITHIUM­ION
BATTERIES
VS
ICE
ENGINE
 
 Lithium‐ion
batteries,
which
are
commonly
found
in
consumer
electronics
such
as
mobile
phones
 and
laptops,
are
rechargeable
batteries
in
which
a
lithium
ion
travels
between
and
anode
and
a
 cathode.40
 
 The
 advantages
 of
 lithium‐ion
 batteries
 over
 older
 generations
 of
 batteries
 are
 that
 they
 can
 be
 smaller
 or
 lighter,
 have
 a
 higher
 voltage
 and
 hold
 a
 charge
 much
 longer
 than
 predecessors
such
as
nickel
metal
hydride
(NiMH)
or
lead‐acid
batteries.41
 
 Companies
such
as
A123Systems
(United
States),
Johnson
Controls
(United
States),
BYD
(China)
 and
 NEC
 (Japan)
 are
 starting
 to
 mass‐produce
 safe
 lithium‐ion
 batteries
 for
 the
 automotive
 sector,
 particularly
 for
 hybrid‐electric
 vehicles
 (“hybrids,”),
 plug‐in
 hybrid
 electric
 vehicles
 (“PHEVs”)
 and
 EVs.
 
 In
 November
 2008,
 U.S.
 utility
 Southern
 California
 Edison
 reported
 that
 it
 had
 tested
 a
 lithium‐ion
 battery
 produced
 by
 Johnson
 Controls
 by
 simulating
 the
 conditions
 of
 what
 might
 be
 experienced
 by
 a
 light
 commercial
 van.
 
 The
 simulation
 found
 that
 the
 battery
 could
propel
the
van
295,000
km
with
minimal
deterioration
on
the
battery.42

 
 Lithium‐ion
batteries
are
reported
to
propel
a
5‐seat
sedan
approximately
7.5
km
per
kWh.

With
 off‐peak
electricity
prices
at
USD
$.10
per
kWh,
the
per
kilometer
energy
cost
of
operating
an
EV
 powered
 by
 a
 lithium‐ion
 battery
 would
 be
 USD
 $.013.
 
 Assuming
 that
 a
 larger
 minibus
 loaded
 down
with
passengers
would
get
1/3
of
the
“mileage”
from
a
kWh
of
energy,
the
per
kilometer
 energy
cost
would
be
USD
$.04.


 
 Based
 on
 data
 collected
 from
 taxi
 drivers
 in
 Kigali,
 the
 Toyota
 Hiace
 has
 a
 fuel
 efficiency
 of
 approximately
6.5
km/liter
(sd
=
2.2).

With
gasoline
selling
at
a
constant
rate
of
756
Frw/liter,
 this
translates
into
a
cost
per
kilometer
of
116
Frw
(USD
$.21),
or
over
five
times
the
energy
cost
 per
kilometer
of
driving
an
E‐Taxi.



 
 However,
the
fixed
cost
of
the
battery
must
be
considered
in
addition
to
the
variable
energy
cost.

 At
the
time
of
publishing,
the
future
cost
of
advanced
lithium‐ion
battery
packs
in
2010
has
been
 predicted
to
be
anywhere
between
$150
and
$700
per
kWh.43

Thus,
under
the
assumption
that
 an
E‐Taxi
would
experience
“fuel
efficiency”
of
2.5
km
per
kWh,
the
E‐Taxi
would
require
two
sets
 of
battery
packs
totaling
40
kWh
(exchanged
once
at
midday)
to
propel
it
200
km
in
a
single
day.

 The
 battery
 cost
 of
 the
 requisite
 80
 kWh
 per
 vehicle
 would
 be
 between
 USD
 $12,000
 and
 USD
 $40,000.
 
 Assuming
 a
 lifespan
 of
 300,000
 km
 per
 battery,
 this
 would
 represent
 a
 cost
 per
 kilometer
 of
 USD
 $.04
 ‐
 $.13.
 
 Thus,
 the
 aggregate
 cost
 of
 propelling
 an
 E‐Taxi
 (including
 electricity
 and
 battery)
 would
 be
 USD
 $.08
 ‐
 $.17,
 or
 19%
 ‐
 62%
 less
 expensive
 than
 the
 fuel
 operating
costs
of
an
ICE
minibus
in
Rwanda.
 



 3.2

THE
VULNERABILITY
AND
DANGER
OF
TRANSPORT
1.0




 The
 primary
 vulnerability
 of
 Transport
 1.0
 in
 Rwanda
 is
 that
 100%
 of
 the
 system
 is
 reliant
 on
 petroleum
products
that
must
be
imported.

Section
3.2.1
delineates
the
particular
challenges
of
 oil
 procurement,
 but
 a
 general
 vulnerability
 is
 that
 an
 oil
 price
 shock
 or
 a
 protracted
 period
 of
 incremental
 price
 increases,
 as
 predicted
 by
 the
 International
 Energy
 Agency
 (“IEA”)44
 could
 adversely
affect
Rwanda’s
economy.

Thus,
there
is
strong
political
will
to
offset
this
vulnerability
 by
shifting
the
transport
sector
toward
viable,
sustainable
alternatives.
 
 16


3.2.1

 OIL
ISSUES
 
 Petroleum
products
power
100%
of
vehicle
transport
in
Rwanda,
and,
as
it
is
completely
bereft
of
 oil
 resources,
 Rwanda
 imports
 100%
 of
 its
 fuel.
 
 Devoid
 of
 refining
 capacity,
 it
 also
 pays
 a
 premium
 for
 importing
 all
 of
 its
 fuel
 as
 value‐added
 products
 including
 gasoline
 and
 diesel.

 Complicating
matters
further,
Rwanda
is
landlocked
and
without
a
railway
or
pipeline.

Thus,
all
 of
its
fuel
must
be
imported
by
trucks
that
travel
either
from
Kenya
or
Tanzania
on
roads
that
are
 decrepit
in
places.45

 
 Although
only
private
firms
(such
as
Kobil,
Discentre,
Total
and
Hass)
offer
gasoline
and
diesel
to
 the
market,
the
retail
price
is
regulated
by
the
government.

At
the
time
of
publication,
both
diesel
 and
 gasoline
 were
 offered
 at
 756
 Frw
 per
 liter
 (about
 $5
 USD
 per
 gallon)
 at
 all
 retail
 stations
 throughout
 the
 country
 (see
 Exhibit
 E
 for
 photographic
 evidence).
 
 An
 association
 of
 petroleum
 product
 retailers
 holds
 periodic
 negotiations
 with
 the
 government,
 in
 which
 they
 communicate
their
expenses
and
settle
on
a
uniform
retail
price.
 
 The
vulnerability
of
the
country’s
access
to
oil
is
highlighted
by
the
fuel
shortage
in
early
January
 2009,
 which
 resulted
 in
 protracted
 queues
 at
 the
 pump
 and
 attempts
 to
 hoard
 fuel
 based
 on
 expectations
of
future
unavailability.


 
 Due
to
renovations
of
antiquated
pipelines
in
Kenya,46
concerns
over
Somali
pirates
disrupting
oil
 supplies,47
 reduction
 in
 orders
 for
 oil
 based
 on
 expectations
 of
 continued
 price
 drops
 in
 the
 international
commodities
markets,48
and
–
as
alleged
by
the
Prime
Minister
of
Kenya
–
possible
 collusion
among
oil
suppliers
to
create
an
artificial
shortage
to
drive
up
retail
prices,49
Rwanda
 was
unable
to
receive
adequate
supplies
to
meet
its
domestic
fuel
demand
during
the
2008‐2009
 holiday
 season.
 
 In
 response,
 the
 government
 released
 5
 million
 liters
 of
 fuel
 from
 its
 strategic
 reserves,
 instituted
 emergency
 rationing
 regulation
 (capping
 consumption
 at
 20
 liters
 per
 day
 per
vehicle),
and
instructed
retail
fuel
outlets
not
to
refill
any
vehicles’
tanks
already
more
than
¼
 full.50
 
 The
 government
 generally
 maintains
 a
 practice
 of
 softening
 the
 fluctuations
 of
 retail
 gasoline
 prices
by
reducing
its
taxes
on
fuel
imports
in
times
of
high
oil
prices,
and
increasing
its
taxes
on
 fuel
 imports
 in
 times
 of
 low
 oil
 prices.
 
 During
 the
 recent
 crisis,
 for
 example,
 the
 government
 reportedly
forewent
taxes
by
60%51
to
69%52
to
cushion
the
price
shock
at
the
retail
pump.53
 
 
 FIGURE
3.1.4A
 



 
 
 17


Figure
3.1.4B
shows
that
in
2003
(the
latest
data
available),
petroleum
products
were
used
for
 the
transport
sector
(69%),
households
(16.5%)
and
manufacturing
(14.5%).

Although
such
data
 is
not
publicly
available,
it
is
known
that
as
of
2009
several
million
liters
of
diesel
are
used
per
 year
to
produce
electricity
in
Rwanda.
 
 
 FIGURE
3.1.4B:
PETROLEUM
USE
BY
SECTOR
 


17%
 14%
 69%



 
 At
 the
 time
 of
 publication,
 Rwanda
 was
 importing
 an
 average
 of
 200,000
 liters
 of
 petroleum
 products
per
day.54

The
amount
of
money
that
Rwanda
collectively
spends
on
petroleum
product
 imports
 per
 year
 is
 not
 publicly
 available,
 but
 the
 following
 approach
 is
 employed
 to
 make
 a
 reasonable
estimation,
with
results
reflected
in
Figure
3.1.4C.
 
 First,
 records
 from
 the
 RRA
 give
 an
 accurate
 accounting
 of
 the
 number
 of
 liters
 of
 refined
 petroleum
products
imported
into
Rwanda
from
2004
–
2008.

Dividing
this
figure
by
3.8
liters
 per
 gallon
 and
 again
 by
 42
 gallons
 per
 barrel
 gives
 the
 number
 of
 barrels
 of
 refined
 petroleum
 products
imported
annually.
 
 Next,
this
figure
is
multiplied
by
the
inflation‐adjusted
average
international
price
per
barrel
of
 crude
 petroleum55
 to
 fill
 the
 column
 “Market
 Value
 (Unrefined).”
 
 According
 to
 the
 EIA,
 the
 average
cost
of
refining
crude
oil
into
refined
petroleum
products
(i.e.,
gasoline)
during
2000
–
 2007
was
approximately
33%
of
the
market
price
of
crude
oil.56

Thus,
the
column
“Market
Value
 (Refined)”
 is
 33%
 higher
 than
 the
 previous
 column,
 representing
 an
 estimate
 of
 the
 annual
 outflow
of
Rwanda’s
foreign
exchange
to
import
petroleum
products,
ignoring
transportation
and
 other
operations
costs
associated
with
the
oil
trade.57
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18


Transport


Manufacturing


Households


FIGURE
3.1.4C:
ESTIMATION
OF
IMPORT
COSTS
OF
REFINED
PETROLEUM
PRODUCTS
 



 To
put
these
figures
into
perspective,
the
following
chart
represents
the
differential
between
 Rwanda’s
cumulative
annual
exports
and
imports
from
2004
–
200858
(with
2008
figures
 estimated
by
annualizing
Q1
data
provided
by
NISR).59
 
 
 FIGURE
3.1.4D
 


The
following
chart
puts
these
figures
further
into
perspective,
by
comparing
Rwanda’s
annual
 total
exports
with
its
annual
imports
of
petroleum
products
alone.

As
demonstrated
by
the
chart,
 Rwanda’s
annual
oil
import
expense
is
approaching
the
value
of
its
total
annual
exports.



 
 
 
 
 


 19




 FIGURE
3.1.4E



 


3.3. TRANSPORT
STAKEHOLDER
ANALYSIS



 Through
 interviews
 with
 taxi
 drivers
 and
 experts
 (see
 Appendix
 A
 for
 list
 of
 experts),
 the
 author
gathered
qualitative
data
that
informed
an
analysis
of
the
stakeholders
currently
involved
 in
 the
 transport
 sector,
 and
 who
 would
 possibly
 be
 affected
 by
 the
 shift
 to
 Transport
 2.0.
 
 The
 results
are
summarized
in
Figure
3.3.
 
 
 FIGURE
3.3:
SUMMARY
OF
STAKEHOLDER
ANALYSIS




 20


Private
Vehicle
Owners
 
 If
the
shift
to
Transport
2.0
focuses
on
minibus
taxis,
then
private
vehicle
owners
will
likely
not
 be
affected
in
the
short
term.

If
the
recharging
and
battery
exchange
infrastructure
develops
over
 time,
then
private
vehicle
owners
could
eventually
benefit
from
network
externalities
that
could
 make
feasible
the
private
ownership
of
vehicles
that
comply
with
the
network
standards.
 
 Public
Transit
Commuters
 
 Public
 transit
 commuters
 who
 are
 accustomed
 to
 using
 minibus
 taxis
 could
 potentially
 benefit
 from
 reduced
 fares,
 if
 RURA
 elects
 to
 pass
 on
 cost
 savings
 to
 those
 who
 commute
 in
 E‐Taxis.

 Additionally,
public
transit
commuters
would
benefit
from
riding
in
newer,
more
comfortable
E‐ Taxis
instead
of
older
(and
frequently
decrepit)
minibus
taxis.
 
 International
Oil
Supply
Chain
Members
 
 Although
they
were
not
interviewed,
it
is
likely
that
the
international
oil
supply
chain
members
 would
not
look
upon
the
shift
to
Transport
2.0
in
an
enviable
light,
as
it
necessarily
reduces
the
 demand
for
petroleum
products.
 
 Domestic
Gas
/
Diesel
Retailers
 
 Similarly,
 although
 they
 were
 not
 interviewed,
 the
 domestic
 gas
 /
 diesel
 retail
 business
 community
 in
 Rwanda
 would
 likely
 not
 favor
 the
 shift
 to
 Transport
 2.0,
 as
 it
 would
 reduce
 demand
for
their
product.
 
 Transport
Workers
 
 If
the
lease
model
outlined
in
Section
3.7
is
embraced,
then
the
shift
to
Transport
2.0
could
give
 “simple
 drivers”
 their
 first
 opportunity
 to
 manage
 their
 service
 provision
 as
 a
 private
 business
 rather
than
serving
as
a
lowly
paid
worker.60

Interviews
with
the
60
Kigali
minibus
taxi
drivers
 indicated
great
excitement
about
the
prospect
of
being
more
like
a
vehicle
owner
and
less
like
a
 servant.61
 
 Mechanics,
on
the
other
hand,
might
oppose
the
shift
to
Transport
2.0
as
it
could
reduce
demand
 for
 their
 specialized
 services,
 which
 currently
 focus
 on
 the
 maintenance
 and
 repair
 of
 the
 incumbent
 ICE
 vehicles.
 
 However,
 if
 E‐Taxis
 are
 phased
 in
 over
 time,
 then
 entrepreneurial
 mechanics
 will
 have
 the
 opportunity
 to
 learn
 the
 trade
 of
 maintaining
 and
 repairing
 EVs.

 Unfortunately
 for
 mechanics,
 EVs
 have
 much
 simpler
 mechanical
 architecture
 and
 are
 far
 less
 likely
to
need
maintenance
and
repair
as
frequently
as
ICE
vehicles.

Thus,
the
shift
to
Transport
 2.0
could
result
in
the
precipitous
decline
of
the
mechanic
service
industry.


 
 Transport
Entrepreneurs
 
 Transport
entrepreneurs
such
as
fleet
operators
and
owner
/
operators
have
much
to
gain
by
the
 shift
 to
 Transport
 2.0,
 primarily
 due
 to
 the
 reduced
 costs
 of
 operation
–
 both
 for
 “fuel”
 and
 for
 maintenance.


 
 21


Finally,
 the
 general
 urban
 population
 in
 Rwanda
 would
 benefit
 from
 cleaner
 air
 if
 the
 shift
 to
 Transport
2.0
resulted
in
the
wholesale
transition
from
ICE
minibus
taxis
to
E‐Taxis.



 
 3.4 


ANALYSIS
OF
ICE
&
ALTERNATIVE
FUEL
VEHICLE
(“AFV”)
OPTIONS


3.4.1 INTERNAL
COMBUSTION
ENGINE
(“ICE”)
 
 Currently,
100%
of
motor
vehicles
in
Rwanda
are
of
the
ICE
variety,
and
the
minibus
taxi
industry
 is
dominated
by
one
model
in
particular:
the
Toyota
Hiace.

The
advantages
of
ICE
vehicles
are
 that
they
are
generally
reliable,
can
be
fixed
inexpensively
by
mechanics,
and
use
a
standardized
 fueling
 procedure
 that
 benefits
 from
 ubiquitous
 refueling
 stations.
 
 The
 disadvantages
 are
 that
 they
 rely
 on
 a
 single
 type
 of
 fuel
 that
 is
 subject
 to
 wild
 price
 fluctuations
 on
 the
 international
 commodities
market,
and,
as
delineated
in
Section
3.2.1,
Rwanda
has
experienced
difficulties
in
 maintaining
a
consistent,
predictable
flow
of
gasoline
fuel
at
a
reasonable
price.
 
 
 3.4.2 BIOFUEL
 
 Biofuel
is
one
of
the
most
frequently
discussed
alternative
fuels
to
power
vehicles,
as
it
offers
a
 liquid
 fuel
 solution
 similar
 to
 gasoline,
 can
 utilize
 slightly
 modified
 versions
 of
 existing
 vehicle
 fueling
 infrastructure
 can
 be
 produced
 from
 renewable
 sources,
 and
 could
 decrease
 CO2
 emissions
by
up
to
90%.62

Tropical,
sugar‐producing
countries
such
as
Brazil
have
successfully
 implemented
Biofuel‐powered
transportation
systems.63

However,
Biofuels
come
with
their
own
 set
of
challenges.

First,
if
generated
by
edible
crops,
the
shift
to
a
Biofuel‐powered
transportation
 economy
could
produce
significant
food
shortages.64

If
generated
by
non‐edible
crops,
so‐called
 “second
 generation”
 Biofuels
 (which
 are
 not
 economically
 viable
 without
 significant
 subsidies)
 would
still
require
significant
energy
to
transport
biomass,
and
produce
and
deliver
liquid
fuels.65

 At
the
time
of
writing,
a
major,
U.S.‐based,
publicly‐traded
Biofuel
company
called
VeraSun
had
 filed
for
bankruptcy
protection
and
shut
down
most
of
its
manufacturing
facilities,
due
to
weak
 demand
for
Biofuel
and
volatile
feedstock
prices.66
 
 
 3.4.3 HYBRID
 
 A
 hybrid
 electric
 vehicle
 contains
 both
 an
 ICE
 power
 train
 and
 an
 electric
 power
 train,
 and
 automatically
 switches
 between
 the
 two
 to
 optimize
 energy
 utilization
 based
 on
 conditions
 programmed
into
the
vehicle’s
software.


 
 The
 primary
 advantage
 of
 a
 hybrid
 is
 that
 it
 delivers
 greater
 fuel
 efficiency.67
 
 The
 primary
 disadvantage
is
that
it
is
relatively
expensive
to
produce,
as
it
contains
both
an
electric
and
an
ICE
 drive
train.

Currently,
the
purchase
price
delta
makes
hybrids
less
economically
viable
than
pure
 ICE
vehicles,
requiring
buyers
to
pay
a
premium
for
ownership.

While
issues
of
environmental
 values,
 status
 symbol,
 and
 temporary
 government
 subsidies
 have
 contributed
 toward
 the
 popularity
 of
 hybrids
 such
 as
 the
 Toyota
 Prius
 in
 places
 like
 California,
 hybrids
 will
 not
 be
 a
 viable
alternative
in
Rwanda
due
to
the
high
price
point.
 
 22


3.4.4 PLUG­IN
HYBRID
ELECTRIC
VEHICLE
(“PHEV”)
 
 A
 PHEV
 is
 typically
 a
 vehicle
 that
 is
 propelled
 by
 an
 electric
 motor
 powered
 by
 a
 battery,
 but
 backed
up
by
a
small
ICE
generator
that
can
use
gasoline
to
recharge
the
battery.

PHEV
owners
 can
plug
their
vehicle
into
an
electrical
outlet
to
recharge
its
battery.68

After
driving
the
limit
of
 the
range
offered
by
the
battery
pack,
the
ICE
generator
automatically
burns
gasoline
to
recharge
 the
 battery
 and
 power
 the
 drive
 train.
 
 PHEVs
 are
 now
 being
 offered
 in
 the
 Chinese
 market
 by
 BYD,
and
GM
has
announced
plans
to
deploy
its
first
PHEV:
a
model
called
the
Chevrolet
Volt.


 
 The
advantages
of
PHEVs
are
that
they
can
be
driven
without
any
fossil
fuels.

The
Chevrolet
Volt
 and
BYD
F3DM
will
reportedly
give
a
range
of
65
–
98
km
per
charge
before
the
ICE
generator
 starts
utilizing
liquid
fuel.69

Thus,
PHEVs
could
meet
the
transportation
needs
of
many
vehicle‐ owning
commuters
without
utilizing
gasoline.

In
case
a
driver
needs
to
go
in
excess
of
65
–
98
 km,
they
have
the
assurance
that
the
ICE
generator
will
allow
them
to
seamlessly
continue
their
 journey,
taking
advantage
of
the
incumbent
and
ubiquitous
liquid
fuel‐refilling
infrastructure.


 
 The
 primary
 disadvantage
 of
 PHEVs
 are
 that
 they
 are
 expensive
 to
 produce,
 as
 they
 contain
 an
 ICE
generator,
electric
motor
and
embedded
lithium‐ion
battery
that
is
not
exchangeable.

Thus,
 the
consumer
has
to
pay
a
high
fixed
cost
to
receive
this
“complete
package”
under
the
hood.
 
 This
effectively
precludes
the
introduction
of
a
Battery
Operator
who
could
defray
the
cost
of
the
 expensive
lithium
ion
battery
by
amortizing
it
over
many
years.
 
 
 3.4.5 LIQUIFIED
NATURAL
GAS
(“LNG”)
 
 LNG
(or
compressed
natural
gas,
or
“CNG”)
offers
potential
for
C02
reductions
up
to
25%,70
but
 still
 requires
 exploitation
 of
 a
 carbon‐based
 fuel
 and
 pollutes
 relatively
 heavily
 compared
 to
 electrified
transport.

If
Rwanda
shifts
toward
a
transportation
infrastructure
dependent
on
LNG,
 it
raises
a
question
as
to
how
the
LNG
will
be
sourced.

Sourcing
from
foreign
suppliers
could
put
 Rwanda
in
an
even
worse
situation
than
it
is
in
today,
as
LNG
suffers
from
similar
price
volatility
 as
oil
but
is
far
more
expensive
to
transport
and
store,
as
it
must
be
kept
at
low
temperatures.
 
 If
 Rwanda
 can
 source
 LNG
 domestically
 from
 proven
 reserves
 in
 Lake
 Kivu,
 it
 is
 possible
 that
 shifting
 to
 an
 LNG‐dependent
 transportation
 infrastructure
 could
 cost
 less
 than
 an
 EV‐based
 transportation
 infrastructure.
 
 It
 is
 currently
 unknown
 how
 successful
 Rwanda
 will
 be
 at
 exploiting
its
methane
resources
in
Lake
Kivu,
but
the
possibility
of
utilizing
methane
to
power
a
 converted
 fleet
 of
 LNG‐powered
 vehicles
 should
 be
 kept
 in
 mind
 as
 Rwanda
 develops
 the
 next
 generation
of
its
transportation
system,
and
particularly
for
heavy‐duty
vehicles.
 
 Given
 that
 Rwanda
 possesses
 methane
 as
 a
 natural
 domestic
 resource,
 it
 is
 expected
 that
 the
 exploitation
of
it
to
meet
transportation
needs
would
be
politically
acceptable.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23


3.4.6 PURE
BATTERY­ELECTRIC
VEHICLE
(“EV”)
 
 An
EV
is
a
vehicle
propelled
by
an
electric
motor
powered
entirely
by
a
battery.

EVs
do
not
use
 any
liquid
fuels
whatsoever.


 
 A
sustainable
transportation
model
(geared
toward
OECD
countries)
developed
by
a
California‐ based
startup
company71
involves
the
procurement
of
large,
200‐kilogram
lithium
ion
batteries
 with
 a
 capacity
 of
 approximately
 20‐25
 kWh.
 
 These
 batteries
 are
 expected
 to
 propel
 a
 5‐ passenger
 sedan,
 manufactured
 by
 Nissan
 and
 Renault,
 approximately
 160
 km
 per
 full
 battery
 charge,72
or
7.5
km
per
kWh.

The
business
model
uses
a
consumer
value
proposition
designed
to
 meet
the
personal
transportation
needs
of
households
that
own
their
own
vehicles.

To
maximize
 convenience
 to
 these
 consumers,
 the
 company
 is
 building
 sophisticated
 “battery
 exchange
 stations”
 that
 use
 a
 robotic
 arm
 to
 replace
 the
 depleted
 battery
 with
 a
 fully
 charged
 one
 in
 a
 matter
of
minutes.
 
 3.4.7 SUMMARY
OF
ALTERNATIVES
ANALYSIS
AND
CONCLUSION
 
 Based
on
this
analysis,
AFVs
including
Biofuel,
PHEV
and
Hybrid
can
be
written
off
as
technically
 incorrect
options
for
Rwanda.

ICE
vehicles,
which
are
currently
entrenched
as
the
sole
method
of
 motorized
 transport
 in
 the
 country,
 enjoy
 a
 legacy
 that
 may
 be
 difficult
 to
 disrupt.
 
 However,
 failing
to
implement
a
more
sustainable
alternative
could
prove
punishing
to
Rwanda’s
economy
 as
it
experiences
increases
both
in
transportation
demand
and
oil
prices.
 
 Switching
 fleets
 to
 LNG
 has
 strong
 potential,
 especially
 if
 the
 Lake
 Kivu
 methane
 extraction
 project
is
scaled
successfully.

LNG
has
especially
strong
potential
in
meeting
the
fuel
demand
for
 large
buses
and
industrial
vehicles
that
are
too
heavy
to
be
powered
economically
by
electricity.

 Further,
 it
 would
 use
 a
 domestically
 extracted
 resource,
 which
 would
 contribute
 to
 Rwanda’s
 energy
 independence.
 
 On
 the
 other
 hand,
 LNG
 still
 requires
 the
 exploitation
 of
 a
 carbon‐based
 resource
and
releases
greenhouse
gas
(“GHG”),
which
contributes
to
climate
change
and
pollutes
 the
air.

Further,
utilizing
Lake
Kivu’s
methane
for
LNG
would
detract
from
the
use
of
methane
for
 electricity
generation.
 
 Switching
 fleets
 (or
 some
 percentage
 thereof)
 to
 EVs
 –
 especially
 of
 minibus
 taxi
 fleets
 –
 is
 the
 technically
correct
decision,
as
it
would
allow
vehicles
to
be
powered
by
off‐peak
electricity
that
 would
 otherwise
 not
 go
 to
 productive
 use.
 
 EVs
 would
 be
 less
 expensive
 to
 purchase
 than
 ICE
 vehicles,
less
expensive
to
operate,
would
create
an
additional
(and
significant)
source
of
revenue
 for
 the
 state‐owned
 utility
 (Electrogaz),
 and
 would
 detract
 from
 air
 pollution.
 
 The
 expert
 interviews
 and
 taxi
 driver
 interviews
 conducted
 in
 January
 2009
 demonstrated
 unanimous
 support
for
the
concept,
suggesting
strong
political
feasibility.


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24


FIGURE
3.4.7:
ANALYSIS
OF
ALTERNATIVES
SUMMARY
TABLE
 



 
 The
shift
from
Transport
1.0
to
Transport
2.0
in
Rwanda
provides
an
opportunity
to
create
a
“de‐ sophisticated”
 version
 of
 the
 model
 described
 in
 Section
 3.4.6.
 
 Given
 the
 statistics
 on
 weight,
 cost
 and
 range
 provided
 in
 Section
 3.1.5,
 it
 would
 likely
 be
 optimal
 to
 use
 a
 battery
 exchange
 mechanism.
 
 However,
 given
 that
 labor
 is
 relatively
 inexpensive
 and
 abundant
 compared
 to
 capital,
the
battery
exchange
mechanism
could
be
“de‐capitalized”
so
that
human
laborers
could
 perform
the
function
of
swapping
out
depleted
batteries
in
exchange
for
fully
charged
ones.

This
 would
require
the
utilization
of
several
modular
battery
packs
instead
of
one
large
battery
pack
 that
would
be
too
heavy
to
manage
manually.
 
 


3.5 


SWOT
ANALYSIS
FOR
THE
SHIFT
TO
TRANSPORT
2.0
IN
RWANDA


A
 SWOT
 Analysis
 is
 a
 strategic
 management
 tool
 used
 to
 identify
 the
 “Strengths,
 Weaknesses,
 Opportunities
and
Threats”
of
a
proposed
project
or
business
venture.73

The
analysis,
which
is
 conveyed
 visually
 in
 Appendix
 D,
 relates
 issues
 that
 are
 both
 helpful
 and
 harmful,
 originating
 both
from
within
Rwanda
and
from
the
external
environment.
 
 Strengths
 
 The
 “Strengths”
 cell
 underscores
 issues
 indigenous
 to
 Rwanda
 that
 make
 it
 an
 attractive
 environment
for
E‐Taxi
implementation.

High
taxes
on
import
of
petroleum
products
(see
Figure
 3.1.4A)
 opens
 the
 door
 to
 alternatives
 that
 could
 provide
 per
 kilometer
 transport
 cost
 savings
 (see
Section
3.1.5)
to
stakeholders
in
the
transport
industry.


 
 New
electricity
generation
coming
online
(see
Section
3.1.3)
could
meet
the
demand
for
off‐peak
 electricity
necessitated
by
E‐Taxis,
while
moving
from
oil‐based
electricity
generation
to
locally
 exploited
 methane
 and
 hydro
 electricity
 generation
 will
 reduce
 the
 cost
 of
 electricity.
 
 Further,
 the
combination
of
the
willingness
of
Electrogaz
to
offer
variable
pricing
and
the
growing
demand
 for
 ground
 transport
 services
 will
 benefit
 the
 business
 model
 of
 Battery
 Operators
 in
 the
 proposed
Transport
2.0
system.


 
 The
 existing
 phenomenon
 of
 taxis
 parking
 overnight
 at
 concentrated
 locations
 including
 petrol
 stations,
 company
 lots
 and
 rented
 lots
 reduces
 the
 need
 for
 chargespot
 ubiquity,
 thus
 reducing
 infrastructure
deployment
costs.
 
 25



 Finally,
 the
 active
 investment
 community
 in
 Rwanda
 will
 likely
 be
 willing
 to
 embrace
 this
 business
model
once
further
due
diligence
is
conducted.

 
 Weaknesses
 
 The
 analysis
 highlights
 several
 constraints
 in
 the
 “Weaknesses”
 cell.
 
 Of
 these,
 many
 of
 the
 constraints
could
be
overcome.

For
instance,
limited
electricity
generation
in
Rwanda
is
already
 planned
 to
 be
 addressed
 by
 the
 upcoming
 infrastructure
 projects
 mentioned
 in
 Section
 3.1.3.

 The
 possibility
 of
 a
 political
 argument
 against
 the
 allocation
 of
 electricity
 resources
 to
 vehicles
 when
few
Rwandans
have
access
to
the
grid
could
be
overcome
by
communicating
the
message
 that
all
electricity
will
be
harvested
during
off‐peak
hours
when
demand
for
electricity
is
eclipsed
 by
the
supply.


 
 The
unavoidable
fact
that
Rwanda
is
very
hilly
(and
would
thus
reduce
the
km/kWh
efficiency
of
 minibus
 taxis)
 would
 be
 predicted
 by
 the
 entrepreneurs
 implementing
 the
 system,
 and
 would
 thus
be
dealt
with
in
the
design
of
the
business
model.

The
same
argument
could
be
made
for
the
 fact
 that
 Rwandan
 minibus
 taxis
 are
 often
overloaded
with
heavy
passengers;
otherwise,
 RURA
 could
implement
a
policy
the
regulates
the
maximum
number
of
passengers
allowed
in
a
minibus
 taxi.


 
 Although
 there
 is
 no
 plan
 to
 implement
 a
 “smart
 grid”
 that
 could
 optimize
 the
 distribution
 of
 electricity,
the
entrepreneurs
could
follow
a
policy
of
only
charging
batteries
overnight,
thus
not
 adding
to
the
peak
daytime
load
of
the
grid.


 
 Taxes
for
the
necessary
inputs
are
very
high,
which
could
detract
entrepreneurs
from
importing
 E‐Taxis,
 batteries
 or
 infrastructure
 equipment.
 
 However,
 the
 government
 could
 overcome
 this
 challenge
 by
 establishing
 a
 national
 priority
 of
 switching
 out
 ICE
 taxis
 in
 favor
 of
 E‐Taxis,
 and
 complement
this
policy
with
tax
breaks
for
importers
of
the
requisite
goods.


 
 Finally,
 the
 dominant
 legacy
 of
 the
 Toyota
 Hiace
 will
 be
 difficult
 to
 disrupt,
 as
 this
 vehicle
 has
 proven
 to
 be
 reliable,
 fixable,
 and
 affordable
 for
 many
 years.
 
 This
 will
 require
 either
 the
 government
 or
 entrepreneurs
 to
 bear
 “discovery
 costs”
 to
 demonstrate
 the
 viability
 of
 the
 technology
to
the
population.

Specifically,
someone
must
take
the
risk
of
(1)
importing
EVs,
(2)
 importing
batteries,
(3)
setting
up
a
recharging
and
battery
exchange
network,
and
(4)
operating
 the
 business.
 
 If
 the
 venture
 fails,
 the
 entrepreneur
 must
 bear
 all
 of
 the
 costs.
 
 If
 the
 venture
 succeeds,
 then
 many
 other
 entrepreneurs
 may
 “free
 ride”
 on
 the
 discovery
 of
 the
 first
 entrepreneur,
 enter
 the
 market,
 and
 compete
 vigorously.
 
 This
 phenomenon
 could
 prevent
 the
 first
 entrepreneur
 from
 investing,
 thus
 precluding
 the
 shift
 to
 Transport
 2.0.
 
 Herein
 lies
 an
 opportunity
for
the
government
to
contribute
to
the
initiative
by
subsidizing
the
discovery
costs,
 particularly
by
procuring
funds
to
import
a
prototype
vehicle,
several
batteries,
and
build
a
small‐ scale
recharging
network.
 
 Opportunities

 
 The
 “Opportunities”
 cell
 highlights
 phenomena
 in
 the
 external
 environment
 that
 could
 prove
 beneficial
for
the
shift
to
Transport
2.0.

Irrespective
of
Rwanda’s
heavy
taxation
on
oil
imports,
it
 
 26


is
 very
 possible
 that
 the
 price
 of
 oil
 will
 increase
 over
 time
 due
 to
 the
 fundamentals
 of
 oil
 economics
 (i.e.,
 demand
 growth
 may
 outstrip
 supply
 growth,
 eventually
 resulting
 in
 excess
 demand).74

This
provides
an
opportunity
to
introduce
sustainable,
less
expensive
alternatives
to
 ICE
vehicle
transport.
 
 Not
 unlike
 Moore’s
 Law,
 which
 describes
 a
 trend
 in
 which
 integrated
 circuit
 capacity
 increases
 and
price
decreases
at
exponential
rates,75
lithium‐ion
batteries
are
following
a
similar
(though
 not
 as
 rapid)
 trend
 of
 energy
 density
 increases
 and
 price
 decreases
 over
 time.
 
 This
 will
 be
 beneficial
to
Battery
Operators,
who
could
provide
a
continuously
expanding
cost
delta
relative
to
 fossil
fuels
needed
for
ICE‐based
transport.
 
 Vehicle
manufacturing
benefits
from
economies
of
scale
production.

EVs
are
currently
relatively
 expensive
 relative
 to
 ICE
 vehicles
 because
 the
 latter
 is
 produced
 at
 scale.
 
 However,
 the
 cumulative
 set
 of
 inputs
 necessary
 to
 manufacture
 an
 EV
 are
 less
 than
 those
 required
 to
 manufacture
 an
 ICE
 vehicle.76
 
 As
 EVs
 are
 now
 starting
 to
 be
 produced
 at
 scale
 by
 major
 auto
 manufacturers,
 the
 purchase
 price
 of
 EVs
 should
 soon
 become
 competitive
 with
 ICE
 vehicles,
 which
will
benefit
stakeholders
in
the
Transport
2.0
system.
 
 The
 nature
 of
 the
 shift
 to
 Transport
 2.0
 is
 attractive
 to
 foreign
 investors,
 the
 international
 aid
 community
 and
 the
 international
 environmental
 community
 alike.
 
 Thus,
 it
 is
 likely
 that
 the
 government
of
Rwanda
could
approach
potential
sources
of
funding
to
help
defray
the
discovery
 costs
required
by
the
shift.


 
 Threats
 
 Although
 the
 constraints
 set
 forth
 in
 the
 “Threats”
 cell
 could
 be
 proactively
 overcome
 by
 independent
 agents
 in
 Rwanda,
 interviews
 suggested
 that
 they
 would
 be
 unlikely
 to
 adversely
 affect
 the
 shift
 to
 Transport
 2.0.
 
 Political
 issues
 with
 the
 Democratic
 Republic
 of
 Congo
 are
 unlikely
 to
 affect
 the
 development
 of
 the
 Lake
 Kivu
 methane
 plant,
 despite
 ongoing
 tensions.

 Nonetheless,
it
is
important
to
mention
that
there
might
be
some
inherent
risk
with
the
fact
that
 ownership
 of
 Lake
 Kivu
 is
 split
 between
 Rwanda
 and
 the
 Democratic
 Republic
 of
 Congo.

 Similarly,
 the
 current
 international
 financial
 crisis
 and
 general
 freezing
 of
 project
 capital
 is
 unlikely
 to
 affect
 the
 build‐out
 of
 the
 Lake
 Kivu
 methane
 plant,
 which
 is
 being
 managed
 by
 a
 reputable
American
firm.77
 
 Although
there
may
be
a
bottleneck
of
available
EVs
and
lithium‐ion
batteries
due
to
the
expected
 international
 demand
 increases,
 Rwanda
 would
 require
 a
 number
 of
 E‐Taxis
 (i.e.,
 less
 than
 10,000)
and
batteries,
which
is
orders
of
magnitude
less
than
the
quantity
that
may
be
demanded
 by
OECD
countries.

 



 3.6 


ADMINISTRATIVE
FEASIBILITY


As
the
proposed
E‐Taxi
system
would
be
operated
almost
entirely
in
the
private
sector,
it
would
 require
 limited
 resources
 from
 the
 government,
 suggesting
 that
 it
 would
 be
 administratively
 feasible
 to
 implement
 from
 a
 public
 policy
 perspective.
 
 Any
 administrative
 needs
 could
 be
 
 27


addressed
 by
 the
 National
 Transport
 Development
 Agency,
 which
 reportedly
 will
 soon
 be
 established
 by
 the
 Ministry
 of
 Infrastructure,
 with
 the
 task
 of
 “improving
 the
 quality
 of
 public
 transportation
services
in
the
country.”78
 
 As
 described
 in
 Section
 3.5
 this
 government
 agency
 will
 have
 an
 opportunity
 to
 subsidize
 the
 “discovery
 costs”
 necessitated
 by
 the
 paradigm
 shift
 to
 Transport
 2.0.
 
 Specifically,
 the
 agency
 could
contribute
by
procuring
funds
to
import
a
prototype
vehicle,
several
batteries,
and
building
 a
 small‐scale
 recharging
 network
 to
 demonstrate
 viability
 of
 the
 model
 both
 to
 prospective
 customers
and
the
population
at
large.
 
 The
other
administrative
needs
from
the
government
may
include:
 
 • Ministry
of
Finance:
Determining
the
optimal
tax
policy
for
E‐Taxi
related
imports
 • Electrogaz:
Determining
the
optimal
off‐peak
electricity
rate
for
E‐Taxis
 • RURA:
Regulating
the
maximum
number
of
passengers
in
E‐Taxis



 
 3.7

THE
BUSINESS
CASE
FOR
TRANSPORT
2.0
IN
RWANDA



 There
 exists
 an
 attractive
 opportunity
 for
 entrepreneurs
 to
 enter
 the
 Transport
 2.0
 market
 in
 Rwanda
either
as
Fleet
Owners,
Battery
Operators,
or
a
vertically
integrated
combination
of
the
 two.


 
 The
specific
business
of
a
Fleet
Owner
would
be
as
follows:
 
 • Buy
a
fleet
of
E‐Taxis79
 • Hire
drivers
to
be
paid
on
a
daily
wage
commensurate
with
the
existing
market
rate
 • Collect
transport
fees
as
determined
by
RURA
 
 There
 would
 be
 nothing
 innovative
 about
 the
 operation
 of
 an
 E‐Taxi
 fleet;
 rather,
 the
 only
 difference
between
running
a
regular
fleet
of
Toyota
Hiaces
or
a
fleet
of
E‐Taxis
would
be
that
the
 operating
cost
of
running
the
latter
would
be
lower.
 
 Alternatively,
the
drivers
interviewed
reported
that
they
would
be
willing
to
lease
an
E‐Taxi
for
 an
average
of
$580
per
month
(range
USD
$450
‐
$720),80
providing
opportunity
to
purchase
and
 lease
vehicles
to
drivers,
which
is
a
process
not
currently
practiced
in
the
Rwanda
taxi
industry.
 
 The
general
business
of
a
Battery
Operator
would
be
as
follows:
 
 • Buy
modular
lithium‐ion
batteries
at
wholesale
 • Build
network
infrastructure
to
charge
batteries,
including
 • Chargespots
that
E‐Taxis
can
plug
into
directly
 • Chargespots
inside
battery
kiosks
 • Engage
with
Electrogaz
to
enter
into
an
off‐peak
electricity
power
purchase
agreement
 • Determine
consumer
pricing
model
and
sign
up
E‐Taxi
drivers
as
subscribers
 
 
 28


Figure
 3.7
 explores
 several
 different
 financial
 model
 scenarios
 for
 a
 Battery
 Operator,
 ranging
 from
annual
losses
of
nearly
USD
$5
million
to
annual
profits
(EBITDA)
of
USD
$8.5
million.

The
 financial
 outcome
 of
 the
 Battery
 Operator’s
 venture
 is
 sensitive
 to
 several
 key
 factors:
 assumptions
about
energy
consumption
per
kilometer,
cost
of
batteries,
the
number
of
vehicles
 serviced,
and
cost
of
energy.
 
 The
first
two
of
these
variables
are
purely
exogenous;
energy
consumption
per
kilometer
will
be
 a
function
of
battery
technology,
vehicle
technology
and
local
conditions
in
Rwanda
(topography,
 average
weight
of
passengers,
etc.),
and
world
markets
will
determine
the
cost
of
batteries.

The
 number
 of
 vehicles
 serviced
 could
 be
 influenced
 by
 public
 policy
 through
 (1)
 tax
 relief
 to
 purchasers
of
E‐taxis,
(2)
reducing
energy
cost
to
Battery
Operators
who
could
pass
on
savings
to
 E‐taxi
 owners,
 and
 (3)
 providing
 loan
 guarantees
 for
 infrastructure
 build‐out
 so
 Battery
 Operators
could
similarly
pass
on
savings
to
E‐taxi
owners.
 
 In
the
different
scenarios,
the
fee
assigned
to
subscribers
for
the
right
to
use
batteries
is
targeted
 to
be
below
the
average
daily
cost
of
fuel
of
USD
$51
(see
Section
3.1.2),
with
a
savings
to
end‐ users
 of
 31%,
 21%
 and
 12%
 per
 the
 “pessimistic,”
 “moderate,”
 and
 “aggressive”
 assumptions,
 respectively.
 
Another
 role
 of
public
policy
to
incentivize
 end‐user
take‐up
 of
the
Transport
 2.0
 model
 is
 to
 have
 RURA
 fix
 the
 subscription
 price
 just
 as
 it
 fixes
 the
 price
 of
 gasoline.
 
 This
 approach
 would
 reduce
 risk
 both
 for
 end‐users
 and
 for
 Battery
 Operators,
 as
 it
 provides
 predictability
of
costs
(for
end‐users)
and
revenues
(for
Battery
Operators).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29


Figure
3.7:
FINANCIAL
MODEL
SCENARIOS
FOR
BATTERY
OPERATOR
 



 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30


4. RECOMMENDATIONS


 


4.1 


RATIONALE
FOR
FRAMEWORK
OF
RECOMMENDATIONS


The
 framework
 of
 recommendations
 is
 designed
 to
 help
 the
 government
 of
 Rwanda
 create
 favorable
 conditions
 that
 will
 facilitate
 the
 shift
 to
 Transport
 2.0
 while
 investing
 minimal
 time
 and
financial
resources
of
its
own.


 
 Some
OECD
countries
are
resorting
to
a
“carrot
and
stick”
approach
to
accelerate
the
transition
 away
from
ICE
vehicles
and
toward
EVs
by
implementing
“feebate”
mechanisms
that
heavily
tax
 purchasers
 of
 high
 emission
 vehicles
 and
 give
 rebates
 to
 purchasers
 of
 low
 emission
 vehicles.


 While
the
revenue‐neutral
aspect
of
this
type
of
policy
may
be
attractive
to
a
government,
it
may
 be
politically
infeasible
to
levy
additional
taxes
on
vehicles
that
are
already
subject
to
53%‐63%
 taxes.

For
this
reason,
the
recommendations
shy
away
from
any
“stick”
approach.




 
 4.2 


SPECIFIC
RECOMMENDATIONS


To
 enable
 the
 shift
 from
 Transport
 1.0
 to
 Transport
 2.0
 in
 Rwanda,
 I
 make
 the
 following
 recommendations
to
various
government
agencies:
 
 • Office
of
the
President:
Subsidize
discovery
costs
to
demonstrate
viability
of
EV
technology
 • NUR:
Launch
a
nationwide
competition
to
discover
appropriate
EV
adaptation
needs
 • RURA:
Standardize
the
size
of
battery
modules
to
overcome
coordination
failure
 • RURA:
Regulate
tariffs
for
battery
leases
that
reflects
the
needs
of
business
and
consumers
 • Electrogaz:
Offer
variable
electricity
pricing
to
reflect
peak
and
off‐peak
demand
 • RRA:
Relax
import
tax,
excise
tax
and/or
VAT
to
EVs
and
relevant
components

 • Ministry
of
Infrastructure:
Facilitate
loan
guarantees
from
IFC
for
infrastructure
build‐out
 • Ministry
of
Infrastructure:
Avail
land
for
infrastructure
build‐out
 • ONTARACOM:
Run
an
early
pilot
project
to
demonstrate
viability
in
the
transport
sector



 
 4.3


 Based
 on
 the
 analysis
 contained
 in
 this
 document,
 I
 conclude
 that
 it
 will
 be
 possible
 to
 adapt
 existing
EV
models
for
implementation
in
Rwanda,
particularly
within
the
minibus
taxi
industry.


 
 The
 general
 analysis
 of
 60
 interviews
 with
 minibus
 taxi
 drivers
 attempted
 to
 fill
 a
 gap
 in
 data
 made
available
by
NISR,
specifically
by
discovering
the
average
distances
driven,
average
amount
 of
money
spent
on
gasoline
and
maintenance,
various
minibus
taxi
ownership
models,
and
where
 minibus
taxis
are
parked
overnight.

Although
the
data
was
collected
as
randomly
as
possible
(in
 an
 effort
 to
 use
 a
 sample
 representative
 of
 the
 population),
 further
 research
 should
 attempt
 to
 corroborate
the
findings
through
more
robust
survey
collection
methodology.
 
 
 31


CONCLUSIONS
AND
DIRECTIONS
FOR
FURTHER
RESEARCH


The
 stakeholder
 analysis
 showed
 that
 there
 will
 be
 significant
 political
 support
 and
 minimal
 resistance
to
the
shift
from
Transport
1.0
to
Transport
2.0,
as
the
change
provides
an
opportunity
 for
Rwanda
to
conserve
its
precious
foreign
exchange
while
minibus
taxi
drivers
will
earn
more
 profits,
 and
 off‐peak
 electricity
 resources
 will
 be
 put
 toward
 productive
 use
 while
 earning
 additional
revenue
for
the
state‐owned
utility.

However,
the
domestic
oil
lobby
will
likely
oppose
 the
 shift,
 and
 future
 research
 should
 attempt
 to
 understand
 this
 lobby’s
 specific
 interests
 and
 positions
to
explore
space
for
compromise.


 
 The
AFV
analysis
concluded
that
vehicles
such
as
those
running
on
Biofuel,
PHEVs
and
Hybrids
 should
 be
 written
 off
 as
 technically
 incorrect
 options
 for
 Rwanda.
 
 While
 ICE
 vehicles
 enjoy
 a
 legacy
 that
 may
 be
 difficult
 to
 disrupt,
 every
 effort
 should
 be
 made
 to
 replace
 them
 with
 sustainable
 alternatives.
 
 This
 analysis
 concluded
 that
 LNG
 or
 EV
 vehicles
 would
 be
 attractive
 alternatives,
 but
 that
 EVs
 should
 be
 favored
 over
 LNG
 vehicles
 at
 least
 in
 the
 public
 transport
 sector.
 
 Future
 research
 should
 explore
 the
 specific
 relative
 advantages
 of
 EVs
 and
 LNGs
 in
 the
 context
of
Rwanda’s
environment
after
the
Lake
Kivu
methane
plant
is
adequately
scaled.
 
 The
SWOT
analysis
highlights
some
constraints
toward
implementation,
but
also
provides
advice
 on
how
to
overcome
each
constraint.

Barring
an
international
military
crisis
with
the
Democratic
 Republic
 of
 Congo
 that
 could
 disrupt
 electricity
 supplies
 or
 perpetuation
 of
 the
 international
 financial
 crisis
 that
 may
 prevent
 access
 to
 financing
 to
 import
 the
 requisite
 inputs
 to
 the
 Transport
 2.0
 model
 (including
 E‐Taxis,
 batteries
 and
 infrastructure
 components),
 the
 analysis
 concludes
that
the
shift
could
be
implemented.

Future
research
should
explore
the
specific
risks
 associated
with
the
Lake
Kivu
methane
plant,
both
from
a
technical
and
geopolitical
perspective.
 
 The
 financial
 analysis
 shows
 that
 there
 is
 a
 strong
 business
 case
 that
 should
 attract
 entrepreneurs
 to
 design
 and
 implement
 the
 Transport
 2.0
 system,
 thus
 reducing
 any
 administrative
contribution
that
the
government
would
have
to
make
toward
the
shift
away
from
 ICE‐powered
vehicles.
 
 Additional
 research
 should
 be
 carried
 out
 to
 discover
 potential
 sources
 of
 funding
 for
 the
 infrastructure
 build‐out,
 perhaps
 through
 the
 Clean
 Development
 Mechanism
 (“CDM”)
 or
 development
agencies.
 
 At
the
time
of
publishing,
no
lithium‐ion
battery
powered
E‐Taxis
had
been
robustly
field‐tested.

 Thus,
the
kilometer
per
kWh
“fuel
efficiency”
is
currently
unknown.

Further,
it
is
known
that
the
 long‐term
 health
 of
 a
 lithium‐ion
 battery
 is
 improved
 when
 the
 battery
 is
 only
 partially
 discharged
before
being
fully
recharged.

Thus,
it
is
possible
that
a
model
in
which
the
battery
is
 fully
 discharged
 and
 then
 recharged
 repeatedly
 could
 decrease
 the
 life
 of
 the
 battery
 and
 adversely
 affect
 the
 business
 model
 of
 a
 battery
 operator
 in
 a
 Transport
 2.0
 system.
 
 Research
 must
be
carried
out
to
explore
this
concept
further.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32


APPENDIX
A:
LIST
OF
EXPERT
INTERVIEWEES
FOR
PRIMARY
RESEARCH



 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33


APPENDIX
B:
RWANDA
TAXI
DRIVER
QUESTIONNAIRE


 Name:

 

Fixed
Costs
 
 1. Do
you
own
your
taxi?
 
 If
answered
no
 

 a) 















How
much
do
you
pay
to
lease/rent
it?
 
 If
answered
yes
 
 b) How
much
did
you
pay
for
it?
 c) 















How
did
you
pay
for
it?
(lump
sum
vs
financing)
 d) When
did
you
buy
it?
 e) 















Was
it
new
or
used
when
it
was
bought?
 
 If
answered
used
 

 1. How
old
was
it
when
you
bought
it?
 Operations
 
 2. How
many
km
per
day
do
you
drive
the
taxi?
 3. How
long
is
your
workday?
(in
hours)
 4. How
long
do
you
spend
waiting
(ie
not
driving)
on
an
average
day?
 5. Where
do
you
typically
wait
for
passengers?
(ie
in
designated
area,
or
driving
around)
 6. Where
does
your
taxi
go
during
the
night?
 7. In
your
opinion,
is
your
business
improving
over
time?

 
 Variable
Costs
 
 8. How
much
do
you
spend
per
day
on
petrol?
 9. What
is
the
fuel
efficiency
of
the
vehicle?
 10. How
much
do
you
spend
on
maintenance?
 11. Where
do
you
take
your
taxi
to
get
maintained?
 
 Earnings
 
 12. What
is
your
fee
structure?
 13. How
much
do
you
earn
per
day
(on
average)?
 14. What
percentage
of
your
income
do
you
save?
 
 Opinion
on
Electric
Taxis
(First
Explain
Idea
To
Driver)
 
 15. Would
you
be
willing
to
wait
for
passengers
in
designated
areas
sometimes
to
charge
your
battery?
 16. Would
you
be
willing
to
leave
your
taxi
at
a
designated
area
to
charge
overnight?
 17. Would
you
be
willing
to
buy
an
EV
taxi
if
the
government
helped
you
finance
it?
 18. How
much
could
you
afford
to
pay
per
month
(in
lease
payments)
for
the
EV
taxi?
 19. Is
taxi
driver
community
very
competitive?
Are
there
“taxi
gangs”
like
in
South
Africa?


 20. How
do
taxi
drivers
compete
for
turf?


City:


Date:



 
 
 
 
 
 34


APPENDIX
C:
DATASET
PRODUCED
BY
QUESTIONNAIRE



 
 
 35


APPENDIX
D:
SWOT
ANALYSIS


 



 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36


APPENDIX
E:
PHOTOS
AND
IMAGES


A
Japanese‐made
Toyota
Hiace
minibus
taxi
in
Rwanda


A
Chinese‐made
E‐Taxi
minibus
 


A
Japanese‐made
Toyota
Coaster
minibus
taxi
in
Rwanda
 
 37



 


A
Battery
Exchange
Station
(Source:
www.betterplace.com)


A
Battery
Chargespot
(Source:
www.betterplace.com)
 
 
 


38


Nyobugogo
Taxi
Park
(Kigali,
Rwanda)
 
 


39


Oil
truck
waiting
to
unload
its
cargo
into
a
storage
facility
outside
Kigali,
Rwanda
 
 


Oil
worker
unloading
cargo
from
a
truck
at
storage
facility
outside
Kigali,
Rwanda
 
 
 
 40



 Price
of
gasoline
is
fixed
at
756
Frw
per
liter
(~USD
$5/gallon)
throughout
Rwanda
 
 



 Rwanda
will
eventually
be
“out”
of
affordable
gasoline.

It
should
plan
accordingly.
 
 41


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 44


ENDNOTES

























































 1
Per
capita
income
of
USD
$900
 2
Ministry
of
Finance
and
Economic
Planning.
(2004)
 3
ibid.
 4
Gallagher,
Collantes,
Holdren.
(2007)
 5
Data
from
Rwanda
Revenue
Authority
 6
See
analysis
in
Figure
3.1.4C
 7
Estimate
based
on
annualizing
Q1
2008
value
of
exports
reported
by
NISR
(see
National
 Institute
of
Statistics
Rwanda.
Trade.)
(2008)

 8
National
Institute
of
Statistics
Rwanda.
Vehicles
By
Type.
(2008)

 9
See
www.betterplace.com
 10
Exact
data
for
the
breakdown
of
new
and
used
minibuses
purchased
are
not
retained
by
the
 RRA
or
NISR;
however,
it
is
common
knowledge
(corroborated
by
everyone
I
asked
while
in
the
 field)
that
purchasing
a
new
shared
minibus
is
almost
unheard
of
in
Rwanda.

 11
National
Institute
of
Statistics
Rwanda.
Vehicles
By
Type.
(2008)

 12
ibid.
 13
ibid.
 14
Rwanda
Utilities
Regulatory
Agency
(RURA).
(2009)
 15
World
Bank
Group.
(2008)
 16
150
Frw/ride
*
USD
$1/555
Frw
=
$.27/ride
*
2
rides/day
=
$.54/day
*
365
days/year
=
USD
 $197/year
 17
E.g.,
South
Africa
 18
Interview,
World
Bank
Country
Office.
Kigali
(1/5/09)
 19
National
Institute
of
Statistics
Rwanda.
Energy
and
Environment
Indicators.
(2008)
 20
National
Institute
of
Statistics
Rwanda.
Electricity
Production
in
kWh.
(2008)
 21
Interview,
World
Bank
Country
Office,
Kigali.
(1/5/09)
 22
ibid.
 23
Ministry
of
Finance
and
Economic
Planning.
(2004)
 24
The
New
Times.
(5/27/2008)
 25
Interview,
Electrogaz.
(1/9/09)
 26
Although
Rwandan
data
was
not
made
available
to
compare
average
peak
and
off‐peak
demand
 with
daytime
and
nighttime
generation
capacity,
it
is
generally
accepted
that
nighttime
demand
is
 lower
than
daytime
demand
while
generation
stays
relatively
constant
during
a
24
hour
period,
 creating
surpluses
of
electricity
overnight.
 27
For
example,
75
medium‐sized
2.5
MW
windmills
operating
at
a
capacity
factor
of
30%
would
 produce
about
55
MW
of
electricity.
 28
For
example,
a
cement
factory
in
Maine
draws
about
7
MW
of
electricity.
 29
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electricity_by_country.
Accessed
(2/28/09)
 30
The
population
of
St.
Kitts
and
Nevis
is
42,696,
while
the
population
of
Rwanda
is
10,100,000;
 St.
Kitts
and
Nevis
produce
about
130
million
kWh
per
year.
 31
ibid.
 32
Kwibuka,
Eugene.
(2/28/09)
 33
Rwanda
Development
Gateway.
(2009)
 34
Interview,
Electrogaz.
(1/9/09)


45


























































 35
An
important
distinction
should
be
made
here:
the
methane‐fired
power
plants
must
run
24
 hours
per
day,
and
hydro
plants
generally
run
24
hours
per
day,
although
they
have
a
mechanism
 to
allow
water
to
run
through
without
turning
the
turbines
that
generate
electricity.
 36
ibid.
 37
World
Bank
Group.
(2009)
 38
Rwanda
Development
Gateway.
(2009)
 39
Common
Market
for
Eastern
and
Southern
Africa
(COMESA).
(2007)


 40
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium‐ion_battery.
Accessed
(1/10/09)
 41
Green
Batteries.
(2009)
 42
Yoney,
Domenick.
(11/21/2008)
 43
It
is
not
currently
known
how
much
batteries
will
cost
when
they
are
produced
at
scale.
 However,
media
reports
indicate
that
these
three
prices
are
within
the
realm
of
reason.

See
this
 article
for
insight:
http://features.csmonitor.com/innovation/2009/01/22/worldwide‐race‐to‐ make‐better‐batteries/
 44
International
Energy
Agency.
(2009)
 45
Interview,
World
Bank
Rwanda
Country
Office.
(1/5/09)
 46
Mugabe,
Robert.
(1/6/2009)
 47
ibid.
 48
ibid.
 49
Mugabe,
Robert.
(1/3/2009)
 50
Mugabe,
Robert.
(1/6/2009)
 51
ibid.
 52
Ntayombya,
Sunny.
(1/8/09)
 53
Mugabe,
Robert.
(1/6/2009)
 54
Mugabe,
Robert.
(1/3/2009).

 55
Inflation
Data.
(2009)
 56
Energy
Information
Agency.
(2008)
 57
Transportation
and
other
operations
costs
are
ignored
because
this
analysis
seeks
to
estimate
 only
the
amount
of
money
that
permanently
leaves
Rwanda’s
domestic
economy;
as
transport
 and
other
operations
firms
may
be
domestically
owned,
inclusion
of
these
costs
in
the
analysis
 could
inflate
the
estimated
figure
of
interest.
 58
World
Bank
Group.
2008.
Rwanda
at
a
Glance
 59
National
Institute
of
Statistics
Rwanda.
Trade.
(2008)

 60
For
example,
many
“simple
drivers”
cannot
afford
to
buy
a
vehicle
outright,
but
could
afford
to
 lease
a
vehicle
secured
by
expected
revenues
through
operating
the
vehicle.
 61
Interviews
of
taxi
drivers,
Kigali,
January
2009
 62
Boston
Consulting
Group.
(2009)
 63
Alonso‐Pippo,
W.
et
al.
(2008)
 64
Tan,
K.T.,
Lee,
K.T.
and
Mohamed,
A.R.
(Forthcoming)

 65
ibid.
 66
Reuters.
(1/20/2009)
 67
Boston
Consulting
Group.
(2009)
 68
ibid.
 69
Blanco,
Sebastian.
(12/15/2008)
 70
Boston
Consulting
Group.
(2009)
 71
www.BetterPlace.com.
Accessed
(1/11/09)
 
 46


























































 72
LaMonica,
Martin.
(12/18/2008)
 73
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWOT_analysis.
Accessed
(1/11/09)
 74
International
Energy
Agency.
(2009)
 75
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s_law
 76
Deutsche
Bank.
(6/9/2008)
 77
Kwibuka,
Eugene.
(2/28/09)
 78
Kagame,
George.
(1/7/09)
 79
Cost
is
unknown,
as
it
would
depend
on
a
variety
of
circumstances,
including
scale
of
 production,
location
of
production,
tax
breaks
offered
by
the
Rwandan
government,
etc.

It
is
 recommended
that
the
government
implement
import
tax
policy
to
ensure
that
E‐taxis
are
less
 expensive
for
domestic
end‐users
than
the
current
best
alternative,
which
is
a
used
Toyota
Hiace
 that
costs
approximately
USD
$20,700,
as
reported
through
interviews
with
taxi
drivers
in
Kigali,
 January
2009
 80
Interviews
of
taxi
drivers,
Kigali.
(January
2009)
 
 
 
 
 


47