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Culture, Theory and Critique
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Pictorial versus Iconic Turn: Two Letters
Gottfried Boehm & W. J. T. Mitchell Published online: 21 Dec 2009.
To cite this article: Gottfried Boehm & W. J. T. Mitchell (2009): Pictorial versus Iconic Turn: Two Letters, Culture, Theory and Critique, 50:2-3, 103-121 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14735780903240075
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Culture, Theory & Critique, 2009, 50(2–3), 103–121
Pictorial versus Iconic Turn: Two Letters
Gottfried Boehm and W. J. T. Mitchell
GottfriedBoehm Culture, 1473-5784 Original Taylor 2009 000000July-November 2-3 50 firstname.lastname@example.org & Theory Article Francis (print)/1473-5776 & Critique 2009 (online) 10.1080/14735780903240075 RCTC_A_424181.sgm and Francis
Antony Gormley, ORIGIN OF DRAWING IX, 2008, © the artist.
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Abstract In this exchange of letters, Gottfried Boehm and W. J. T. Mitchell explore the intellectual paths that brought them to simultaneously advocate an ‘iconic turn’ and a ‘pictorial turn’ respectively. They trace the emergence of the study of images through art history and philosophy and consider the diversity of images and the array of issues and ideas that come together under the topic of ‘iconology’ and ‘pictoriality’. On the way they discuss the use and treatment of images in the human and natural sciences, the history of aesthetic styles, the possibility of a physics of the image, the status of iconoclasm, and how the idea of a turn might equate to a paradigm shift in Western philosophical thinking.
Dear Tom, Has the ‘science of images’ begun to write its own history much too early, before it knows what it is or what it can be? One could misunderstand Hans Belting’s Viennese Colloquium, which sought to take stock of the field, as such an attempt. There, however, the matter was one of unwritten and future books, rather than an observation on what had already been achieved. Nevertheless, the ominous talk of the pictorial and/or iconic turn is nearly unavoidable when we discuss our own work. Indeed, although the terms refer back to the beginning of the 1990s, they designate more generally the attempt to gauge the legitimacy of our own work in actu. It therefore seemed appropriate to direct questions at the two of us as the coiners of these terms – questions received with mixed feelings, given that there is no lack of ‘turns’; they belong to the jargon of the science and to its marketing. Although quickly proclaimed, it is yet to be determined how much this new kind of scientific questioning – whether related to materials or also to methods – is actually worth. The ‘turn’ vacillates between what Thomas S.
Culture, Theory & Critique ISSN 1473-5784 Print/ISSN 1473-5776 online © 2009 Taylor & Francis http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/14735780903240075
I had been working on the anthology since the late 1980s and it was initially planned as a volume of the ‘Edition Suhrkamp’ series. This position. despite our differing intellectual presuppositions and scientific goals. This debate comprised positions by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. J. conceiving of the image as paradigm was not possible without outlining in one way or another its relation not only to language itself. but also to the dominant philosophical position. scarcely-known continent of pictorial phenomena and visuality. Hans-Georg Gadamer. Luckily. with the assessment that the image question touches on the foundations of culture and poses quite novel demands on the field that are not to be haphazardly satisfied. For the ‘image’ is not simply some new topic. other ‘pioneers’ have left behind their tracks. . that was finally published in 1994 by Fink Verlag in Munich. it might prove useful to follow through on the request for information and to respond in two letters. I attempted to break out of my isolation by compiling an anthology. in the late 1970s and early 1980s. incidentally.e. Bernhard Waldenfels. was 1 Contributions by Jacques Lacan. a cryptic image debate was taking place that I hoped to interpret in order to lend validity to my own intentions.1 However. before – as is apt to happen in this type of ‘Leatherstocking’ tale – going their own ways again. one that in the early years was sustained by mutual ignorance. i. Hans Jonas. Max Imdahl and others.104 Gottfried Boehm and W. it nurtures the talk of ‘theory’ or ‘science’ that can only prove itself through dialogic and interdisciplinary exchange. Given this situation. one that has shown itself capable of clarifying and availing itself of the long-neglected cognitive possibilities that lie in non-verbal representation. Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 I The attempt to make progress on the subject of the ‘image’ was at first. Meyer Schapiro and Kurt Bauch were also published from the older discussion. Was ist ein Bild? (What is an Image?). Once I finally read your works and got to know you personally. I will return to these beginnings with a few comments later on. but relates much more to a different mode of thinking. since at this point it is quite obvious that we agree. À propos chronology: this epistolary exchange will also serve to show that we have operated with a very large degree of independence from one another. I gained the impression that two wanderers in a forest had met. wanderers who had traversed the same. but also in works of modern art. very lonely work for me indeed. laying surveyor points here and there in order to open up the terrain for scientific discovery. I do not associate this undertaking in any way with quarrels over chronological priority. T. After having achieved sufficient security. where it had already been scheduled to appear in 1991. Mitchell Kuhn termed a ‘paradigm’ and the attitude of a rhetorical twist that recalls last fall’s fashions. Michael Polanyi. we are not alone on this journey. I wanted to show that in philosophy especially. but the days of ‘pioneer’ work have long since passed: the fascination with new horizons has set many heads thinking in the meantime. from Basel to Chicago and back.
The linguistic turn seemed to undermine all attempts to make further progress with the image. less because Jacques Derrida had proffered his interesting criticism of ‘logocentrism’. S. related to one another in the way that they locate the generation of meaning in acts of viewing (Husserl). g. which. to that of a naïve objectivism. as taken up by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason and which he had taken as the foundation of his own critical work. Was this source also rooted in language? Or could the origins be traced back to another – external – reference. one that allows for the fact that language is embedded in social. while not yet encompassing the image. cultural. unless one was attempting to show that images are themselves linguistic occurrences. under which an attempt like that of the linguistic turn to employ language as the ultimate verifier of knowledge could undoubtedly be subsumed. it should be possible to demonstrate the inherent pictoriality of language. or in vague familial similarities of the concepts. The place of the Kantian transcendence of consciousness had long ago been supplanted by that of language. already included numbers in addition to speech. the iconic turn is not based on a fundamental opposition to the linguistic turn. or that they participate in a universal system of signs. which Ernst Cassirer had earlier reflected upon in employing the concept of deixis (1964: 129). and was in general moving towards opening itself to meaning-generating processes. This route (one that had been presaged by C. or anthropological processes? If so. this vision of a non-verbal. which in light of the iconic turn had to expand in order to address the conditions for representation in a broader sense. but rather takes up the argumentative twist therein and pushes it further. but left me unconvinced in the end. e. I was more concerned with the fissures in that position’s argument. . In other words. but also by French semiotics) was fascinating. although it ascribed everything to language. which emerge in the practice of language play (Wittgenstein). In the philosophy of the 20th century one finds repeated attempts at a ‘criticism’ of language.2 I am referring here to the insight that reflection on the conditions for knowledge is an indispensable premise of any science that does not wish to subject itself to the reproach of a lack of intellectual rigour. Rather. iconic logos was in short my motivation for ascribing paradigmatic meaning to the 2 Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 For the genesis of the ‘Copernican world formula’. It turned out that the structural thought of linguistics or the continual reference to the communicative superiority of verbal language had led to a narrowing of what classical philosophy had termed ‘logos’. namely to that of Copernicus. as a meaning-generating process. it adheres to the insight. was not sufficiently able to establish the source from which language itself could derive the stability of a theoretical foundation. Peirce and Nelson Goodman. see Blumenberg (1965) and my attempt at transferring it to visual art (Boehm 1995). Understanding the image as ‘logos’. in processes of existence (Heidegger). The turn towards the image is a consequence of the turn towards language. This was a broad and complex concept that.Pictorial versus Iconic Turn: Two Letters 105 shared in different ways by analytical as well as continental philosophy and had been termed the ‘linguistic turn’ by Richard Rorty in his reader of 1967. possessed of a sophistication I did not want to forfeit and that references the ‘turn of all turns’.
Mitchell growing interest in the image (or. or history. 3 . and although the interaction with the observers is always considered in light of the conditions of each context. initially.3 II And thus I have outlined the theoretical aspects of the project. The desire to recognise is indeed a strong and satisfying human urge. it was not primarily a matter of intervening in academic philosophical debates. whose riches. How do images create meaning? This question serves as my guide. It was not abstract art in the first instance that brought forth meaning for which there is no model in reality – although it does so irrefutably – and which goes as far as to surpass the known Real. also – and especially – in cases involving e. mythology. and has remained so to this day. how does this exposition of meaning succeed? What are its objective foundations and what comprises its mechanisms? We know as yet much too little. however. I can imagine that you had something similar in mind when you spoke of ‘immanent representational practices’ (Mitchell 1994: 14/15). whose historical and cultural potential for change offer unrelenting resistance against premature generalisations. Independent of language. but the same can also be said for curiosity. Millions of people would not be visiting museums to look at pictures if they were only being fed what they already knew or had heard at some point. through to Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 For contributions in which the emphasis is on the side of perception see Boehm (1992). or from other mimetic instances. and the little we do know lacks the desired exactitude. On the other hand. those who have thoroughly examined and analysed great numbers of them and possess what one could call an image-sense. the visible emphasis was certainly placed on the side of the artefact. to be more precise: in pictures) and for speaking of the iconic turn as a project with a longer perspective.106 Gottfried Boehm and W. Those who are fascinated by images in the most fundamental way. traditional historical images that re-tell the time-worn content of the bible. know with certainty that there is such a thing as an iconic intelligence that the artist restores in order to free himself from the demands of language. from canonical texts. beginning with the opposition of connoisseur and antiques dealer. For the philosophically-educated art historian I understand myself to be. completely uncontested on a practical level. then of Wölfflin’s visual operations and Panofsky’s pre-textual methodologies. J. The best point of departure for further research seems to me to lie in the immanent order and reflexivity of images themselves.g. The recognition of such genuinely iconic meaning is. appreciation of this image-sense has been a tricky matter on a methodological level and for art history in general. which can only be satisfied when the boundary of what is already known has been transgressed. and to establish evidences of a unique type. but rather of formulating those questions to which I had been led by an intense exposure to art and by the practice of art history itself. T. Contradictions have emerged over the course of its history.
sex. in which the struggle between the visible and the speakable is fought out. The image is as far from innocent or immediate as is the eye. and usefulness. ideology. Now. instead. What is completely new is an emergence of image-generating processes that have led to cognitive Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 4 Panofsky’s is an iconology in which the ‘icon’ is thoroughly absorbed by the ‘logos’ (1994: 28). i. which contents of the world they should thematise. This urgency was heightened once again when. it lacked the ability to function as a medium of discourse on meaning. as you yourself have shown in your contribution on the ‘pictorial turn’. omnipresence. to function as a meta-entity.Pictorial versus Iconic Turn: Two Letters 107 positions held today. The first aspect concerns the fact that the work of modern artists from the middle of the nineteenth century onward incorporated the attempt to continually re-define and create the conditions of their own work in very different ways. Image criticism and image negation. . Essentially. These reflections on the image were driven forward by the artists in their acts of creation in the great laboratory of the modern. It has acquired ever greater importance in communication processes and thus also partially remedies the deficiency for which it had so often – justifiably – been taken to task: although capable of representing meaning. and the emphasis on a continually new beginning have ever since belonged to the work. ‘what do pictures want?’ This history has changed dramatically in two ways and set the processes in motion that made a ‘paradigm’ out of the image in the first place. culture. a criticism of the image rather than one of ideology. it is multifariously connected to the contexts of thought. what images should be and how they should look was to be explored anew by each author. and ‘to explore the way that pictures attempt to represent themselves …’ (24). ‘what and when is an image?’ and presumably also your question. its end. ‘My’ turn is. a system that formerly defined the co-ordinates to which images were to refer. but rather that a difference vis à vis language comes into play. towards the end of the century.e. Panofsky (whose authoritative reformulation of the term retains validity to this day) adopted the ancient concept of iconologia. perception-oriented and meaning-saturated determinedness. and in so doing caused this balance to shift to the side of textuality. It is therefore the history of images that motivates the question. The diversity of the pictorial in all its forms in the twentieth century lends the question ‘what is an image?’ irrefutable legitimation as well as a particular urgency. a new practice came about in the form of digital technology that equipped the image with a never before seen flexibility. into which the individual ateliers had integrated themselves.4 When the iconic is invoked. the name icono-logy would be the comprehensive methodological substitute for what art history is supposed to achieve: the understanding and interpretation of the logos of the image in its historical. Following the end of a binding system of genres accelerated by the invention of photography and motion pictures. it never implies a withdrawal from language. thus. and which cultural mission they were to fulfil. taking leave of the image. and speech – which of course does not mean that it could ever simply be deduced from these contexts.
such as the rediscovery of the history of science as a history also of images. this concern has triggered a certain amount of polemicising. In the same passage: ‘Ein Ikon ist ein reines Vorstellungsbild. or the chance. Here. one that is not necessarily visual]’. ‘Kurze Logik. then not particularly prevalent either. See e. C. to re-open a dialogue between the faculties thought long dead. this differentiation of the icon from index and symbol is itself deﬁned (2000: 429). How else could one determine a boundary or begin to differentiate? This is exactly what the major artists of the twentieth century have demonstrated for us. 99). and thus a name is given to the theoretical claim that associates itself with ‘turn’. Thus. Peirce (2000) has always returned to the designation ‘icon’. if not unknown. or of dissolving the eminence of aesthetic experience into the banality of an image-production centred on application. which the image had largely been thought to inhabit. which even a generation ago would have been utterly unthinkable. Other aspects have come to the fore. This is probably worth noting for an American reader acquainted with it. via the image. J. technical into artistic images. It is true that the German language does not differentiate between picture und image – the words ‘Bild’ (image) or ‘bildlich’ (pictorial) open up a very broad semantic field. in which older sources and preliminary works were involved that themselves The concept ‘Ikonik’ was introduced in ‘Zu einer Hermeneutik des Bildes’ (Boehm 1978). Ikonographie. the aesthetic realm. including its historical and cultural contexts. From my vantage point. whereby the differentiation between the icon on the one hand and ‘index’ and ‘symbol’ on the other was always of great signiﬁcance. and the fact that the image now plays a role in the day-to-day business of science.108 Gottfried Boehm and W. T. but I refute emphatically that it is incapable of doing so. S. Ikonologie. Kapitel I’.5 Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 III These matters were discussed in the anthology Was ist ein Bild? from 1994. 84. I gladly concede that the iconic turn has up until now hardly contributed to the analysis of aesthetic differences. This change in perspective is a most significant effect of the iconic turn. Imdahl’s programme is most clearly outlined in: Giotto. Ikonik (1980: esp. not least between the humanities and the hard sciences. it is not at all a matter of collapsing e. Arenafresken.g. However. Peirce’s concept is. Was this not a betrayal of art? Over the last few years. Mitchell processes at the heart of the hard sciences being driven by the iconic. In ‘Regeln des richtigen Räsonnierens’. was broadened to encompass the discursive and the cognitive. the concept of the iconic acquires the universality that it did not previously possess. in the German-speaking realm. The words ‘ikonisch’ (iconic) or ‘Ikonik’ (the Iconic) – Max Imdahl took up the latter and made it his theoretical trademark – therefore have no relation to the ‘icon’ introduced by Peirce as a pictorial sign.g. The neologism ‘ikonisch’ (iconic) emphasises this generalisation even further. Quite the contrary: whoever is seriously interested in criteria of differentiation cannot avoid exploring the aesthetic locus of experience from the inside as well as out. das nicht notwendig visuell ist … [An icon is a purely imaginative image. the image is simultaneously marked as an object as well as a process. 5 .
Consequently.Pictorial versus Iconic Turn: Two Letters 109 touched upon art history and philosophical questions. not least to the iconographically oriented branch of research that was accustomed to using external pretext as a key for accessing meaning and did not reckon with the immediate clarity and meaningfulness of the image itself. Leonardo da Vinci. I would initiate the ‘complex interplay between visuality. for rendering the specific context accessible. For Gadamer. This fact is generally taken for granted. Why? Because there is no single concept. The difference between this method and that of iconology. One spoke in the secondary literature of the ‘autonomous’ portrait and it thus seemed appropriate to also ascribe autonomy to its subject. However. who had mentored me in the craft of philosophy. In any case. lies in the analysis of making pictorial logic the point of departure. now by way of its intrinsic order. no verbal expression sufficient to define the autonomous individual – but it is possible to show. is language)’ (Gadamer 1986: 478). at that particular point in time. I was encouraged in this undertaking by Hans-Georg Gadamer. as well as that of cultural studies. das verstanden werden kann. institutions. but never as the representatives of a meaning external to themselves. bodies and figurality’ (1994: 16). What seemed significant here for the history of images was the fact that real people were being represented. Rendering it as a criticism of ideology or counter-reading Panofsky with Althusser. Giovanni Bellini. the observers. the peculiarities mentioned above posed great difficulty to art history. with the means available to the iconic. the first draft had already been completed in 1972 and was approved for my Habilitation in art history at the University of Heidelberg in 1974 (Boehm 1985). One could view the following case study as taking on this difficult (in that it is all too easily overlooked) problem: Published in 1985 under the title Bildnis und Individuum: Über den Ursprung der Portraitmalerei in der italienischen Renaissance (‘Image and the Individual: On the Origin of Portraiture during the Italian Renaissance’). This seems to contradict the often-cited passage from Wahrheit und Methode: ‘Sein. ‘what’ each individual is. Part of the significance of the individuals depicted by Antonello da Messina. as you describe the pictorial turn. but now with the instruments of a newly invented logic of representation that conspicuously avoided reference to external texts. but requires further clarification. The portrait thus becomes the true explication of a new historical concept of human beings. Raphael and others is that they presented themselves in certain roles and attitudes. The above-mentioned study fueled my ambition to further pursue the logic of images on a theoretical level as well. in as far as it can be understood. ist Sprache (Being. Giorgione. ‘language’ was an entity that encompassed manifestations Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 . What they had in common was the attempt to trace the way in which images create meaning and convince us. discourse. apparatus. and who – contrary to widespread belief – never intended to restrict hermeneutics to a linguistic basis. at the order of the visible so as to concentrate on the historical difference that the image opens up. The work takes as its main thesis the idea that a new type of portraiture emerged in Italy between 1470 and 1510 that depicted the subject as a sovereign entity. as I have found in your conception. seems to me personally to be too broad an approach. it appeared that the invention of a new type of the pictorial presence of individuals was in myriad ways embedded in the historical context of the time.
I would like to mention that I was concerned even then with investigating language with an eye to an implicit deictic power. 455. and how much concrete individuality it possesses. in the case of images.6 That text is a sort of snapshot of the beginning of those attempts. Mitchell of meaning like those achieved by music. a pictoriality. the challenge of protecting images from linguistic heteronomy. the image (Boehm 1978: 455). and suggestions for solving them are hinted at. My fundamental motive was. such that one Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 See note 5 (Boehm 1978: 444–71). even if he never ultimately reached that goal. he did not consider himself competent enough in other arts. Gadamer did make some progress towards an elaboration of these translingual aspects. which themselves do not illustrate the difference between the speakable and the visible. At the core of these considerations was the intent to understand images in view of an implicit processuality.e. which later fueled my resolve to shift the linguistic turn further towards the iconic (Boehm 1978: 451. for that matter. Just as a side note. the image. For this purpose. dance. which rules it follows. without falling victim to the alternative of either a ‘general’ science of the image (such as one of a semiotic character) or of a conceptually blind close reading. the symbol. did not provoke resistance on his part. their ‘facts’ or ‘contents’ can never be differentiated from the modalities of their appearance in the way that a sentence is able to differentiate the changing characteristics of a stable subject. which then later solidified around the iconic turn. with whose help meaning can articulate itself without borrowing from linguistic models (such as that of syntax) or from rhetorical devices (Boehm 1978: 461). originally in ‘Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane’ (Boehm 1992: 50). are touched upon there. perhaps too many. Images enter into the most intimate relationships with processes and potentialities. or. but that in return is able at any time to verify whether a word has ‘struck home’ by proofing it against the original. J. of course. has remained a leading aim ever since. but the question remains open as to how this order is to be understood. I was therefore sure that an attempt at a hermeneutics of the ‘image’. T. On the concept of ‘iconic difference’. What was always helpful at the time was the critical comparison of the model of the ‘image’ and the model of the ‘statement’. as it then appeared in a jointly-edited volume. to ‘state’ them (Boehm 1978: 450). One finding resulting from this comparison was that. 468). The intelligence of images lies in their respective visual order.7 Giving this visual and non-verbal logic a verifiable argumentative form. The point of departure was much more one of demonstrating that linguistic communication is indeed capable of deciphering images. Many problems. At the same time it was not at all a matter of completely demarcating images from language.110 Gottfried Boehm and W. i. 7 6 . Thus it has become clear that images themselves already possess their own ‘light’ and do not function merely as mirrors of the external meanings that they reflect. whether by way of iconological references or of ekphrases. His own passion was unquestionably channeled into the interpretation of poetry. I have employed the model of a mutual translation that not only aims at talking about images. of an ‘iconic difference’. but rather his critical interest.
form and content. ‘Zu einer Hermeneutik des Bildes’. one is inclined to ascribe an objective consequence or even a necessity to its development.-G. . it becomes clear that – up until Ferdinand de Saussure and beyond – it is the rule-bound relation of the elements to one another that brings about an inner realm. Gadamer and G. 2006 [Translated by Jennifer Jenkins. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. moonlike and inextricably melded with its material matrix. 1978. The best treatment for this type of blindness is dialogue. Here. Pacific Lutheran University] Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 References Boehm. How could we? Given that traditionally. unless language – or perception – places it there from without or bestows the image. of linguistic meanings. If one analyses the way in which the constitution of meaning was assigned to speech or to signs. understanding the intrinsic reliance of the linguistic turn on the iconic turn was thus already a dominant theme in this phase. in H. The nature of these tangents involved conceiving the iconic order following the pattern of Ferdinand de Saussure’s lateral phonemic organisation. which naturally does not imply that Europe would not otherwise have developed a rich culture of images encompassing various logics of production and reception. and consequently of a linguistic model. the sensory and the concept. against which even writing itself remains something superficial that basically does not participate in this meaning (Boehm 1978: 447). inner and outer. G. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2003: 111–75). and I await with bated breath the medicine that will reach me from Chicago. such as e.Pictorial versus Iconic Turn: Two Letters 111 gets the impression that the prevailing conceptual oppositions with which science and criticism have hounded images. with solar lucidity. A final remark on this essay concerns the latter-mentioned consideration of the image-blindness of older European science. the question regarding their order was superfluous. etc. the image retreats even further from the self-reflexivity of language into a completely external realm in which meaning is absent. I freely admit that in at least one place. 8 See Boehm (1978) sections V and VI. or in other words. always came too late. Boehm (eds). of course. I hope to have remedied these deficiencies with the theory of ‘iconic difference’. Looking back. You see. how one remains the prisoner of once-conceived fundamental ideas.8 In any case. Seminar: Die Hermeneutik und die Wissenschaften. then. Seeing through the Paragone being fought out between the twins of image and language. March. as it were. Western thought did not conceive of images as capable of their own power of illumination. signified and signifier. this essay took off on certain tangents that I could not yet avoid at the time. in which I had been encouraged by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ventures. as if the image had established itself in another logical world that we do not know according to its rules.g.
G. Semiotische Schriften. Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. In Sehsucht. 1964. H. Kloesel and Helmut Pape. M. Ikonographie. Gesammelte Werke. Last edition. T. Ikonik. But it is not too early to write a history in medias res. Of course there are intermediate cases. (ed). (ed). S. 1994. not at the beginning. Bermes (ed). Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 Dear Gottfried. Mitchell Boehm. which is reserved for the ‘exact’ or ‘hard’ or ‘experimental’ sciences. München: Prestel. I suspect that. ‘Eine kopernikanische Wende des Blickes’. Rorty.-G. Boehm. the nature of our respective intellectual formations. for you. Bildnis und Individuum. Volume 1. T. 1986. Mitchell. or at least to record our respective itineraries through this labyrinth. Boehm. ‘Das mittelbare Sprechen und die Stimmen der Schweigens’. 1965. Peirce. E. Merleau-Ponty. but somewhere in the middle of things. In Hermeneutik I. H. 1. and quantification are essential criteria. Göttingen: Ed. Thank you for the generous spirit of your letter. 1994. the relevant science is hermeneutics. in Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie. J. Über den Ursprung der Portraitmalerei in der italienischen Renaissance. In Neue Hefte für Philosophie und Sehen. I think you are absolutely correct that the relation of the ‘pictorial versus iconic turn’ is not one of priority. Edited by C. Cassirer. 2000. J. in the sense of reaching its end. where proof. Ikonologie. I want to respond to five themes that I see in your letter – the question of image-science. But there would be other . and the divergences in our approaches. 1992. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. In English. our convergences on the same concepts and theorists. which involve a strong emphasis on interpretation. Hamburg: Meiner. Kunst. The very word ‘science’ has such different connotations in English and German that we would need to head off possible confusions right at the outset. Tübingen: Band 1. G. Imdahl. Frankfurt/M. demonstration. 25–34. but of a parallel wandering in the forest. the historical and interpretive disciplines are rarely granted the honorific title of ‘science’. Gadamer. perhaps we will both have a chance to re-orient ourselves.112 Gottfried Boehm and W. M. Image science: I agree with you that it is too early for image science to write its history. Über die Veränderung der visuellen Wahrnehmung. Darmstadt: Band I. C. G. 1967. Wahrheit und Methode. the figure of the ‘turn’. the study of the way images make meaning in human history. We are clearly. 2nd edition. Hermeneutische Reflexionen. Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. Now that we have strayed into the same clearing and have a chance to compare our itineraries. Das Auge und der Geist: Philosophische Essays. The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method. ‘Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane’. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Giotto. ‘historical’ sciences such as paleontology. 2003. J. 1995. 1980. G. 1985. Picture Theory.und Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In C. uncertain at this point what sort of science a science of images would be. Was ist ein Bild? München: Fink Verlag. Arenafresken. Blumenberg. Die Kopernikanische Wende. München: Fink Verlag. Boehm. Jahrgang 1. R. W.
I would want to insist. I would like to hear more about this claim. it seems See my essay ‘Image Science’ in Huppauf and Weingart (2007). attentive to the materiality of images. phenomenology and cognitive science. but also what mathematics. I wonder if you would agree that images might not just ‘play a role’ of subservience or instrumentality within the exact sciences (as ‘illustrations’ or models). diagrams. photographs?) and which kinds of science (physics. perspectival representation. in practices such as the art of mosaic. and the study of conditions of perception and recognition of images. You remark on ‘the fact that the image now plays a role in the day-to-day business of science. and not only how images serve as instruments in the work of science. It strikes me that images have always been critical to mathematics. focusing on the circulation and power of images. the chemistry and even (according to James Elkins (2000)) the ‘alchemy’ of paint? (Could it be that some of the traditional hostility to images in science has to do with the powerful role of imagery in pseudo-scientific thinking. paleontology?). symmetry. I think images have always been crucial to science. geology. because my intuition would have been rather different. astronomy with charts and maps. and naturalness of the chemical-based photograph are irretrievably compromised by digitisation. truth. I think we need to ask. And then there are what in English we call the hard or exact sciences – mathematics. More fundamentally. physics. in other words.9 Is there not a mathematics of the image that links it to questions of form. not only what specific ‘image of science’ we are working from. chemistry. and repetition in ornament? Shouldn’t we also ask whether a science of images could also be a physical science.Pictorial versus Iconic Turn: Two Letters 113 sciences: semiotics and the formal conditions of meaning. and biology might contribute to the ‘science of images’. as well as the technical innovations in media that transform the very conditions under which images appear to us. congruence. on the antiquity of the digital image in graphic technologies that precede the invention of the computer. But even if this argument is incorrect. psychology. in my view) that the claims of realism. physics. and quantification of intensities? Doesn’t the emergence of new forms of the digital image produce a new relation of iconicity and numeracy in our time?10 And isn’t the mathematics of the image in fact as old as measurement. astronomy. at least since the invention of geometry (think of Socrates’ demonstration of the Pythagorean theorem to the slave boy in the Phaedo). and biology. Some observers believe (mistakenly. but themselves might be seen as targets or objects of these sciences. not to mention superstition and magic?) The whole domain of the photographic image is currently undergoing a technical and physical transition from a chemical basis to an electronic and computational support. rhetoric and media theory. with numerous implications for the ontology of the image. biology and medicine. The discovery of the structure of DNA would not have been possible without a combination of microphotography and sculptural modeling. at the same time. mathematics. which even a generation ago would have been unthinkable’. And surely chemistry has always worked with scale models of molecules. but then we would want to specify which kinds of images (models. perspectival pictures. 10 9 Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 . and notions of formal resemblance.
I take it. ‘Realism and the Digital Image’. is why iconoclasm is such a paradoxical and impossible project. of course. is the sort of reductionism that produces bad history and aesthetics. in Baetens and van Gelder (2006). I completely agree with your sense that. capable of reproduction. even if it is nothing more than embodied memory. mutation. the physical destruction of an image. so that they seem not only like imitations of a life that is somewhere else. I think the difference between a change of paradigm and a change of rhetorical design or ‘trope’ is not quite so sharp as you are assuming.114 Gottfried Boehm and W. in the long tradition of forensic connoisseurship and archaeology. a trope. in our time it certainly must mean a new relation with science and technology that will expand the field of hermeneutics. beginning with the spectacle of destruction itself. but themselves something like life-forms? Why do our metapictures or ‘images of images’ tend to treat them as if they were coevolutionary organisms like viruses. 2. as you know. or biology. books by television. the way images circulate across media. On the contrary. distribution.11 A physical science of images already exists. transcending any single material support while at the same time never appearing except in some material support. and evolution? Why do images seem to have ‘a life of their own’? Shouldn’t we be exploring the implications of a vitalist art history? Would it go back to the work of scholars like Henri Focillon and Bergson. where the phenomenon of cloning has made all the ancient myths about the creation of ‘living images’ now seem like real technical possibilities? So as you can see. J. seems to have the result of unleashing even more image-energy. as Foucault argued. can be accepted without question. or ‘figure of knowledge’ within a discipline. been involved in trying to think through the implications of a ‘life science’. like the splitting of an atom. and beyond itself into the lifesciences proper. and perhaps burst it open. in relation to new technologies of production. as well as forward to the work of a neo-vitalist such as Deleuze. My sense is that a paradigm is. In what sense are images like organisms? Why do figures of vitalism and animism continually haunt the discourse on icons. and 11 Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 See my article. But I wonder if you could clarify your intentions in putting the case as a preference for the turn as Kuhnian ‘paradigm shift’ as opposed to the ‘rhetorical design’. why the destruction of an image is almost never successful in making an image disappear. The notion of the pictorial turn as a straightforward replacement of language by pictures. of images. But there is no doubt that a pictorial turn has also occurred at the level of popular perception. I have also. . T. ‘like last fall’s fashions’. Turns: I share your mixed feelings about the fashionable repetition of the ‘turn’ as a received idea that. But a physics of the image (like the physics of matter and energy proper) would surely have to engage with the peculiarly immaterial character of the image. whatever the pictorial turn involves. That. Mitchell clear that something has changed as a result of the technical revolutions in image production and circulation.
and have invariably involved some interplay between the worlds of learning and the public sphere. The picture now has a status somewhere between what Thomas Kuhn called a ‘paradigm’ and an ‘anomaly’. then. as an object of historical investigation. is a legitimate concern of art history. but could be the product of a social movement based in the fear of a new image. who equates the onset of the ‘world as picture’ with the dominance of modern technoscientific rationality. as a student of mass culture and technical media.Pictorial versus Iconic Turn: Two Letters 115 consumption of images. but that pictures form a point of peculiar friction and discomfort across a broad range of intellectual inquiry. in style. and as what I call ‘a recurrent trope’ that occurs when a new image-repertoire. emerging as a central topic of discussion in the human sciences in the way that language did: that is. As I put it in Picture Theory. (1994: 13) My sense is that one fruitful area for continued discussion. from Plato’s suspicion of the arts. mass-culture version of the pictorial turn. is not that we have some powerful account of visual representation that is dictating the terms of cultural theory. to Wittgenstein’s anxiety over the ‘picture’ that ‘held us captive’? Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 .) Again. which traditionally has been given a more respectable status than the ephemerality of ‘mere’ fashion. or a new technology of image-production creates widespread anxiety. the pictorial turn involves both the ‘disciplines of the human sciences and … the sphere of public culture’ (1994: 11). both as a contemporary paradigm shift within learned disciplines (one that treats non-verbal representations with a new kind of respect – the movements in philosophy and language theory that you document). from Plato and Aristotle’s reflections on the arts of image and opsis. or do they also appear within philosophical discourse itself. Are the emotions of iconoclasm and iconophilia confined only to the popular. between a changing episteme and a change in fashion (or better. That is why. (I have also suggested that a pictorial turn may not necessarily depend upon a new technology. and which has played an absolutely central role in art history). a kind of ‘iconic panic’ usually accompanied by hand-wringing and iconoclastic gestures. along with fashion and style themselves. would be the relation between the ‘scientific’ and the ‘popular’ versions of the pictorial turn. as a kind of model or figure for other things (including figuration itself). to the invention of photography. What precisely is the difference between a paradigm and a rhetorical trope. and as an unsolved problem. more precisely: isn’t it the case that marketing. are often noticed first by iconoclasts who express alarm and horror over the onset of a threatening ‘world picture’. to the invention of oil painting and perspective. perhaps even the object of its own ‘science’. This is why I have argued that ‘pictorial turns’ have occurred before. Or. then. Pictorial turns. in my view. as is notably the case with Heidegger (2002). if I may quote from my original essay on ‘The Pictorial Turn’: What makes for the sense of a pictorial turn. as theorists from Adolf Loos to Roland Barthes have taught us? So I have consistently treated the pictorial turn. and of image science. and not just as the ephemeral jargon of marketing. I have wanted to treat the ‘fashion’ version of the pictorial turn with some measured respect.
and Fredric Jameson. and post-structuralism. Edward Said. Turner). W. Meyer Schapiro. Blake’s Composite Art (1978). The Laocoön group included such scholars as the prodigious medievalist Michael Camille. 1969). and through Anglo-American philosophy in the work of Nelson Goodman and Charles Sanders Peirce. Mitchell 3. I also worked with Beth Helsinger. it was by a very oblique route. and (later) Norman Bryson. Many other distinguished scholars passed through this Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 . The other crucial event in my formation was my arrival at the University of Chicago in 1977. who was the subject of my PhD dissertation and first book. and memory. We organised a research collective known as ‘The Laocoön Group’ in homage to Lessing’s pioneering text. and in photography. engraving. was resolutely interdisciplinary. illuminated manuscripts. through Derrida. Foucault. where the attitude toward art and image research was less welcoming. material aspect of both the verbal and visual arts. on the other. One of my mentors in graduate school at Johns Hopkins was Ronald Paulson. Wölfflin. the theorist and historian of photography Joel Snyder (we co-taught courses in ‘Style and Representation’ and ‘American Photography’. my sense of the stakes of literary and cultural research more generally were being formed by figures such as Northrop Frye (whose writing style remains a model for me). an expert in German art historiography. as well as pioneers of studies in media and visual culture such as Marshall McLuhan. provided a wonderful primer on the many twists and turns that govern the relations between verbal and visual expression. as well as by Roland Barthes. and the visual arts. but the history of printing. My apprentice work with Blake gave me a strong sense of the practical. and etching. and he still provides critiques of every word I write). whose classic text. emblem books. At the same time. Another mentor was Jean Hagstrum. a scholar of nineteenth century British literature and visual art (with whom I taught a seminar on the English painter J. with whom I organised a conference on ‘Landscape and Power’ that later became the focus of another whole field of research for me. My entry into philosophy was more belated. philosophy. T. and Rudolf Arnheim. and was preceded by a long apprenticeship in the philosophically-minded art historians. monuments. Perhaps your sense of isolation stems from your starting point in philosophy and hermeneutics. Focillon. the great Hogarth scholar who had made his own ‘pictorial turn’ from literature to the visual arts. William Ivins (Prints and Visual Communication. and then primarily by way of Wittgenstein (on the one hand) and the tradition of Marxist Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School. When I came to philosophy ‘proper’. J. It makes me realise just how sociable and widely supported my research has been from very early on. acquiring new forms and meanings. Panofsky. linking not only literature and art history. and Gombrich. the Byzantinist Robert Nelson (with whom I taught courses in ‘Image and Text’ and ‘Art Historiography’). and traditional iconography. along with an appreciation of the way images circulate across periods and media. The Sister Arts (1987). Formations: I am interested that you describe your early work in this field as lonely. M. where I found a welcoming group of scholars interested in working across the boundaries of literature. and Elizabeth O’Connor Chandler. The community of scholarship around the poet and painter William Blake. Margaret Olin. Only later did I begin to engage with German philosophy.116 Gottfried Boehm and W.
For you. replacing (as Rorty summarised it) ‘ideas’ and ‘things’. Tom Crow. When I edited The Language of Images in 1980. the turn from words (in philosophy) to the image was occasioned primarily by an engagement with modernist painting. popular belief. an encounter that for me came somewhat later. and published Iconology in 1986. when coupled with my editorship of Critical Inquiry. made it impossible for me to feel isolated in my work. It was inevitable that when language became the paradigmatic object of philosophy. This interdisciplinary atmosphere. Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 . first in my work on Blake’s poetry and painting. long since disbanded. continues to live in spirit at Chicago. mass culture. Above all. Intersections. I felt as if I had embarked on the intellectual equivalent of Ahab’s search for the White Whale in Melville’s Moby Dick. what do pictures want? This question. and later in a more generalised form that found a congenial home in IAWIS (the International Association for Word and Image Studies) and its journal. We are I think firmly on the same ground in thinking that it is the role of images as a ‘significant other’ to language that most often provides the master terms for a pictorial turn. Iconology opened. the sayable to the seeable. and Barbara Stafford. and I still remember early readers at October magazine (like Hal Foster) telling me that this was the wrong question to be asking (though Annette Michelson was much more reassuring). 4. The topic of imagery was very definitely out of fashion in the literary world when I turned to it. politics. it continually staged for me very concrete and theoretically sophisticated versions of ‘turns’ from words to pictures. Lately. as a review of Jonathan Crary’s Techniques of the Observer (1991) and Christopher Wood’s translation of Panofsky’s Perspective as Symbolic Form (1992) – I began to explore a totally new and unexpected question. This group. and I am inclined to agree with you that at least one version of the pictorial turn is a direct outgrowth of this development. even while I am convinced of its pertinence and necessity. for me. and back again. a few kind souls have been telling me that perhaps I was on to something after all. which still feels a bit bizarre to me. I think I know what you mean in saying that the topic of ‘images’ was ‘very lonely work’. Even as late as 1994. in addition. For you. and the works of the first generation Minimalist artist. Certainly Rorty’s ‘linguistic turn’ (1967. and by an oblique route through the writings of Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried. become for me a kind of professional identity. and ideology. especially in the kind of single-minded attention we have given to it. Nevertheless. namely. it is primarily a question of language (and images) as philosophical concepts. Perhaps this is the appropriate point to comment on some of the places where we have crossed paths in our intellectual wanderings. I gather. it is philosophy plus the visual arts and cinema. 1979) was a crucial common reference for us. Robert Morris. just two years after I had published ‘The Pictorial Turn’ in ArtForum – an essay which began.Pictorial versus Iconic Turn: Two Letters 117 group at various times. including Gayatri Spivak. The word-image relationship had. by the way. in fact. with a confession of failure: I had to admit that ‘a book which began with the intention of producing a valid theory of images became a book about the fear of images’ (1986: 3). Word & Image. definitely had an isolating effect. that images would soon be on the horizon as well. Joe Conners. enabling conversations between the social and natural sciences and the humanities.
and the semantic structure of exemplification (as a kind of inverse denotation). Gottfried. Peirce. the sign that signifies by virtue of its inherent sensuous qualities. and where I have taken up a kind of residence. My sense was (and still is) that Derrida is a philosopher of the graphic version Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 . nonarbitrary. The appearance of Martin Jay’s Downcast Eyes in 1994 confirmed my growing sense that philosophy as such had a deeply engrained suspicion of the image. Mitchell The fact that Rorty’s account of the linguistic turn was accompanied by his own version of iconoclasm and iconophobia. I was struck by Goodman’s denial that ‘language’ in the sense given it by Saussure or Chomsky was the master paradigm for his aesthetics. and I have recently been reading his 1992 essay on ‘Art Works in Word and Image’). in fact. You characterise him as participating in ‘the linguistic turn to employ language as the final instance of knowledge’. most notably the properties of density and repleteness of inscription. he was urging a theoretical reflection on signs and symbols that began with their non-verbal. In other words. on the openness of Gadamer to the visual arts are highly significant in this regard. I am struck by Saussure’s need to characterise the ‘signified’ in pictorial terms in the famous diagram of the sign. precisely the opposite. if I understand Goodman correctly. J. My introduction to Derrida was through Of Grammatology with the Laocoön Group and Gayatri Spivak in 1978. I was attracted to Goodman and Peirce because I thought they had gone well beyond the linguistic turn. was therefore what struck me most powerfully about Rorty’s position. and that is the work of Nelson Goodman and C. Gilles Deleuze’s casual remark in The Logic of Sense (1993) that ‘philosophy is always an iconology’ struck me as a highly ironic recognition of this fact. You characterise their work as attempts ‘to show that images are themselves linguistic occurrences or that they participate in a universal system of signs’. (I think your remarks. and even non-conventional qualities. that attracted me. Your own wish ‘to demonstrate the inherent pictoriality of language’ with the aid of Cassirer (whose concept of ‘symbolic forms’ was always inspiring for me as well) strikes me as an important common thread in our efforts to locate the pictorial turn – but perhaps as a kind of pictorial return – of the repressed. which surely would be denied by most philosophers. although Goodman’s major work on the theory of symbols is entitled Languages of Art (1988).118 Gottfried Boehm and W. I am struck by one common intellectual space that you have visited. I note that Derrida is another common reference for us. and it was a thoroughly anti-linguistic Derrida that we read. it was Peirce’s resistance to taking the symbolic (or the verbal) as the foundational moment of semiotics. T. his well-known argument against mimetic and pictorialist epistemology in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. When I return to Saussure in the light of Peirce. In short. Instead. and were providing the foundations for a positive science of the pictorial turn. was not sufficiently able to establish the source from which language itself could derive the stability of a theoretical foundation’. Similarly. and his insistence on the phenomenon of the ‘qualisign’. What fascinated me about Peirce was his placing of the icon in the position of ‘firstness’ in the world of signs (with indices as ‘secondnesses’ and symbols as ‘thirdnesses’). I have a somewhat different take on their work. a ‘position which. although it ascribed everything to language. but I suspect once again that we read him in very different ways. S.
that the ‘spacing’ of writing. 5. I am sure you are right. and the humblest forms of exemplification in things like carpet samples. that Max Imdahl’s concept of the iconic (to which you trace your use of the word) has ‘no relation to the “icon” introduced by Peirce as a pictorial sign’. by the way. from Spectres of Marx (1994) to Echographies of Television (2002). (One could note a similar turn in Goodman from language issues to questions of inscription. especially if you are right that Peirce’s concept was (or is) unknown in the German-speaking realm. and semiotics. which seems to lead directly to notions of pictorial realism.12 But I wonder if there is not a hidden conceptual resonance between Peirce and Imdahl on the icon as a ‘firstness’. Or at least no relation in the sense of historical influence. namely the index and the symbol. but I gather that his concept of the iconic is based in ‘the direct phenomenal experience of the plastic/formal structure of an artwork’. a phenomenological apprehension of immediate sensuous qualities as the foundational moment in aesthetics. It would also be crucial to reflect on Peirce’s insistence that iconicity of this latter sort is not exclusively visual or pictorial. who provided a short seminar on Peirce to our Bildwissenschaft Group at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin in January and February of 2005. and the graphic trace. the philosopher of mediality and spectrality. for you ‘too broad an approach’. epistemology. and of overturning that hierarchy in the most dramatic way. The deconstruction of logocentrism. was for me another way of exposing the hierarchy of language over images in philosophy. But it’s important to note.13 Perhaps you were put off by Peirce’s elaboration of the icon as a ‘sign by resemblance’. inscription. not to mention in Panofsky’s version of the first stage of iconological interpretation (the pre-iconographic moment of sensuous encounter). This strikes me as an accurate assessment of your own hesitation about treating the pictorial turn in the expanded field of social and political issues. marking. in other words. I have already gone on far too long. tracing. and the early history of writing from pictograms to hieroglyphics was his foundational archive. I don’t know Imdahl’s work very well. Later Derrida has been. then. Berkeley. and iconography. 13 E-mail correspondence. Algebraic equations. Divergences. but can occur across the media and sensuous modalities. and that my ‘counter-reading’ of ‘Panofsky with Althusser’ is. You have already signaled this by saying that your ‘“turn” is … a criticism of the image rather than one of ideology’. 30 May 2006 with Whitney Davis. that the icon can only work as a sign in this way when it has become associated with the other two sign-functions. for me. 12 Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 . for instance. mimesis. his colloquy with Bernard Stiegler. Derrida also led me back to Blake’s ‘wondrous art of writing’ as a scene of the graphic-iconic turn).Pictorial versus Iconic Turn: Two Letters 119 of the pictorial turn. a notion that is remarkably similar to Peirce’s iconic ‘firstness’. which link it to deixis and language. but it might be useful to conclude with a few remarks about the differences in our approach to the iconic/pictorial turn. But I think the difference is more complex than simply a ‘broad’ My impression is that the neglect of Peirce is now ending for some German scholars. I have been especially impressed with the work of John Krois of Humboldt University in Berlin. are icons in Peirce’s sense. chairman of the Art History department at the University of California.
Critical Realism in Contemporary Art. to Walter Benjamin’s elaboration of the camera and photography as the pictorial turns of modern ‘mechanical’ production of images and homogeneous commodities. Very best wishes. then. Little did I know when I wrote that sentence that I was already asking the question. J. Tom Mitchell June. and van Gelder. 14 This genealogy is sketched out in Mitchell (1986: 160–208). G. 1993. My aim was to explore ‘the common space’ occupied by Panofsky and Althusser. 2006. I hope this is not the end of our dialogue. a demonstration that the very notion of ideology was grounded in a specific image-repertoire. B. thank you again for the opportunity to ‘compare notes’ on our respective wanderings through the labyrinth of images and image science. Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century. H. Cambridge: MIT Press. Deleuze. what do pictures want? a question which is modeled on the intersubjective encounter. Perhaps this hermeneutic ground is the place where. The Logic of Sense. was definitely not to subject the study of the image to pre-fabricated ideological criticisms. the Work of Mourning and the New International. In any case. our twists and turns through the world of pictures come together. Echographies of Television. Spectres of Marx: State of the Debt. Derrida. Crary.14 When I staged an imaginary meeting between Panofsky and Althusser around the ‘recognition scene’ in my essay on ‘The Pictorial Turn’. J. to Marx’s figure of the camera obscura of ideology. . London: Routledge. J. Derrida. J. London: Routledge. but also an iconological critique of Althusser. by tracing the conceptual history of ideology from Destutt de Tracy’s ‘science of ideas’ in the French Revolutionary period. it was not with the idea of producing only an ideological critique of Panofsky. namely the ‘scene of recognition’ as ‘the link between ideology and iconology’ that ‘shifts both “sciences” from an epistemological “cognitive” ground (the knowledge of objects by subjects) to an ethical. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2002. on scenes of acknowledging as much as of knowing. Mitchell approach to the subject as opposed to a more restricted or focused approach. 1994. New York: Columbia University Press. 1991. political. J. Elkins. 2006 Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 References Baetens. T. but just the beginning. iconology and ideology. What Painting Is. 2000. J.120 Gottfried Boehm and W. My aim was rather to show the mutual constitution of iconology and ideology. finally. and hermeneutic ground (the knowledge of subjects by subjects)’ (1994: 33). Leuven: University of Leuven Press. My aim in bringing together Panofsky and Althusser. (eds). and Stiegler. and above all on the intuition that the problem of understanding the image is deeply linked with the understanding of the Other.
Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols. (ed). (eds). Iconology: Image. Ideology. B. T. The Sister Arts: Tradition of Literary Pictorialism and English Poetry from Dryden to Gray. Downloaded by [Western Kentucky University] at 12:23 04 May 2013 . J. and Weingart. 2002. W. Translated by C. Panofsky. 1994. Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought. Mitchell. Blake’s Composite Art: A Study of the Illuminated Poetry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. W. New York: Routledge. Berkeley: University of California Press. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. The Language of Images. Mitchell. Cambridge: MIT Press. N. M. The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method. P. MA: MIT Press. 1992. T. Perspective as Symbolic Form. 1986. E. Jay. 1967. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 57–85. (ed). 1994. 1978. 1969. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. H. R. Picture Theory.’ Ivins. London: Hackett. W. In Off the Beaten Track. Prints and Visual Communication.Pictorial versus Iconic Turn: Two Letters 121 Goodman. Cambridge. J. W. R. ‘The Age of the World Picture’. 1988. 1979. Heidegger. Text. 1987. W. Hagstrum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. J. Huppauf. Mitchell. 2007. T. J. T. J. Rorty. Mitchell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wood. 1980. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Science Images and Popular Images of Science. M. Rorty.
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