14355; 31 Oct 1919]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed
for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to. Agusan del Sur. Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise ofeminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditionsimposed by the general authority. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred. Moday vs Court of Appeals Municipal Corporation – Eminent Domain – Disapproval by SP of SB Resolution Moday is a landowner in Bunawan.Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into. the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Moday’s . In 1989. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation toexercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority.

PLDT. Expropriation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.” This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought. the power of eminent domainmay be validly delegated to local governments. the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. 2011 26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain. digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 8. is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. Hence. Just Compensation) . the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. other public entities and public utilities. or order is “beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. ordinance. Eminent domain. the expropriation case is valid. For the taking of private property by thegovernment to be valid. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation It is government’s right to appropriate. Inherently possessed by the national legislature. private property for public use or purpose. HELD: Yes. the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case. or order invalid is when such resolution. ordinance. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose.

HELD: Yes. in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay. ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent domain affected title to real property. the Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require. hence. the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. San Roque. Cebu vs Heirs of Franco Pastor Municipal Corporation – Eminent Domain – Expropriation – BP 129 In 1997. MTCs do not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the power to try such cases. subject to the payment of just compensation. Brgy. Brgy. So Brgy. Concluding that the action should . so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT.FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT. through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129. Talisay. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems.

It ends with an order. . The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit. of course. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129. upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of thecomplaint. . would be a final one. for thereafter as the Rules expressly state. for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case. which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. .” The present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain. . and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation. . What are the two phases of expropriation cases? The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. HELD: Yes. in the proceedings before the Trial Court. if not of dismissal of the action. So. would an order of condemnation be a final one.” This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.” An order of dismissal. and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. if this be ordained. . and findings of. . . “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned. since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. too.have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20. . “no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.” The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.000. too. the commissioners would be final.

are not present. 2011 GR # L-20620 August 15. VDA. the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959. . HELD: No. In the main.It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period. 1974 (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain. the necessity of the expropriation. Hence. During the assessment of just compensation. the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse. DE CASTELLVI. Elements of Taking) FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease. a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain. REPUBLIC VS. digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 7. and the observance of due process. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain. the courts determine the authority of the government entity. and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. good order. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death.The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property. City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino Police Power – Not Validly Exercised Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health. QC justified the law by invoking police power. MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”. In the case at bar. to be determined by competent City Authorities. (2) for more than a momentary period. these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease. or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. morals. (3) and under warrant of legal authority. (4) devoting it to public use. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensationof a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit . or the general welfare of the people. safety.

at the discretion of the court.. 1958 No. JUAN F. during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired. 3) Four years later. A fee of not less than P2. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose. ET AL. SEC. obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. before constructing or repairing. this ordinance. 104 Phil 443 G. the city passes the burden to private cemeteries People vs Fajardo Case Digest THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. August 29. plaintiff-appellee. L-12172 FACTS: It appears that on August 15.paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. defendants-appellants. 2. PENALTY — Any violation of the provisions of the above. filed a written . appellant Babilonia. (Orig. EFFECTIVITY — This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. 1950.R. SEC.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1. vs. SEC. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao. shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both.00 for each repair permit issued. 4. Recs. 3. he and his son in-law. Camarines Sur. P. the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows: SECTION 1. FAJARDO. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property.. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should.

the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. 1954. as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare. but again the request was turned down by the mayor. in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property. 1954. . 1954. 3). it oversteps the bounds of police power. the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance. D). 7. Whereupon. for violation of the ordinance in question. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. and in its pursuit. series of 1950 is a valid exercise of police power? HELD: the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. E). for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. because they needed a place of residence very badly. and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. hence. and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs." From this decision. located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. On January 18. ISSUE: Whether or not ordinance no. appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao. defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. Camarines Sur.request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name. On February 26. which affirmed the conviction. On January 16. their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza. the request was denied. appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit. but the latter forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

in effect. ROSAURO TUAZON AND MARIA TERESA TUAZON (G. stands condemned under the ordinance in question.) SUBJECT: DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION. YUNITA TUAZON. be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited. beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference. it is plain. (BRIEF TITLE: NAPOCOR VS. BRION. being urban in character. As the case now stands. An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes. J. because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. regardless of its own beauty. 32 Phil. is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation.Rafferty. NO. To legally achieve that result. every structure that may be erected on appellants' land. in such case. between restriction and actual taking. 22 JUNE 2011. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. The appellants would. the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. TUAZON) ============================ SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST DIGEST: .R. while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. the State may not. permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. 193023. under the guise of police power. 580).

It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial . Section 3A-(b) of R. 6395 on just compensation due for properties traversed by transmission lines. THE FORMULA PROVIDED IN NAPOCOR’S CHARTER IS NOT BINDING ON THE COURT. heavily relying as it does on the supposed conclusiveness of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. RESPONDENTS DEMANDS THAT THEY BE PAID FULL VALUE OF THEIR LAND AS JUST COMPENSATION. 6395.A. NAPOCOR’s protest against the relevancy of Gutierrez. as amended. No. R. is not binding on the Court.NAPOCOR’S TRANSMISSION LINE TRAVERSED ON RESPONDENT’S PROPERTY.A.. We have held in numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the courts. 6395. has no merit. et al. IT IS ONLY A GUIDE. WHICH PRESCRIBES A FORMULA FOR EASEMENT FEE.[1][33] In National Power Corporation v. THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. IS NAPOCOR CORRECT? NO. Maria Bagui.[2][34] we categorically held: Moreover. NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT IT SHALL ONLY PAY EASEMENT FEE PURSUANT TO SECTION 3-A(B) ITS CHARTER.

de Capin. or such market value as determined by the assessor. whichever is lower. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property. To uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a judicial function but would also render as useless the . et al.A. Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation..[3][35] This judicial function has constitutional raison d’être. In National Power Corporation v. (Citations omitted. Santa Loro Vda.) The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts.function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.[4][36] we noted with approval the disquisition of the CA in this matter: The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R. and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.

SUBJECT: NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT RESPONDENTS MAY BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO SUCH VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BECAUSE THEY DID NOT OPPOSE THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSMISSION LINE ON THEIR PROPERTY. In the present petition. NAPOCOR insinuates that Mr. That the respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not oppose the installation of transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. OR FOR INJURIES DONE HIM. Tuazon’s failure to oppose cannot have the effect of thwarting the respondents’ right to just . HIS PRESUMED WAIVER IS A BAR TO HIS ACTION TO DISPOSSESS THE COMPANY.[5][38] This insinuation has no legal basis. Mr. Tuazon’s failure to oppose the instillation now estops the respondents from their present claim. Article III of our Constitution that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. IS NAPOCOR’S CONTENTION CORRECT? NO. HE IS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR THE VALUE OF THE guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9.

. or for injuries done him by the construction or operation of the road.) . or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence. will be considered a waiver. or enjoin its use by the railroad company. who stands by. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess the company.compensation. Julien v..” (Goodin v. Morgan etc. de Ynchausti v. et al. Cin. can not. Railroad Co. after the road is completed. he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the land.Ann. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co. without objection.[6][39] we ruled: “The owner of land. 35La. cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it..) “One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint.” (St.. reclaim the land..18 Ohio St. and sees a public railroad constructed over it. 924. if he ever intended to set up illegality.. 169. And Whitewater Canal Co. His acquiescence in the company’s taking possession and constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his resistance. In Rafael C. In such case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation..

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