102-826 (
NAI( (ty - -
DATE ...I.-h.,.. _ _,.
RELEA;S ........... .: · J .
7 December 1976
Allegations and Speculation Concerning
the Assassination of President Kennedy
There is a wide range of speculation and all.egations concerni.ng
the assassination of President Kennedy. These include questions as
to how many shots were fired, whether lee H''vey Oswald acted alone
or with other persons if, indeed, he is even guilty of the act.
There has been speculation that Oswald might have been a dispatched
agent of the Soviet Union, inasmuch as he had lived there for some
time. There has been speculation that anti-Castro elements may have
acted in retaliation for the failure of the Bay of Pigs. A most
active, recent line of speculation is that of the possibility that
Oswald was acting for the Castro Government. Some speculation has
left the inference that CIA was, in some   involved,
These issues are difficult to treat. They seldom have a credi-
ble in fact; it is very difficult to produce positive evidence
negating allegations that are not well founded. until
hard evidence is· available on a number of questions that have been
raised, almost any line of speculation may appear plausible.· This
memorandum attempts to deal in summary fashion with the issues re-
ceiving the most attention recently.
CIA Involvement
There is no evidence in documents or in the memories of various
Agency employees giving any indication of CIA involvement in the
assassination of President Kennedy. There was one attempt to asso-
ciate a former CIA employee . with photographs of a vagrant taken
into custody by the Dallas police following President Kennedyts as-
sassination. However, careful and scientific photograph comparisons
demonstrated that these photographs were not of the former Agency
employee. believe that the conclusion of the Rockefeller Commis-
sion was correct in stating that:
there is no credible evidence of
any CIA involvement ...
APPRGV(D fiEifliSt 1993
.. .. :_o <JFK
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C:.:.'l TED Sl :\ TES  
l. In with your re'lu.est, the: Subject l/CS
on 2·7 Hay 1964 relative to the inforr:e.tion
reporte:i \ - .- · · .. · .:=_ SeC'.:...-i ;..,:r Officer/
\. ____ - • is indicated as Tab A.
2. Upon interview, the Subject repc...ated subst ent:!.ally
the infor.r.ati on thc.t is repo:-ted inf -=-
Addi tione.l indicates th::!.t S•.1bj ect
C.efinitely id:ntified cP..lle;r_ fro_7l_!he
George Count-.1 t-:aryla.nd 1
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3. D'..l..rlng the telephone conversation Sl.!bject_ sta.ted
that she Cal!:e under the definite t eat r ---
resides in the Oxon Rill, P:...a.ryland area d'.le to tha f'ac-c - sae - -
some rred con.str-u.ction dune
.r-""'""--:-..;(''.-:=e in the Oxon Hill area r ecer..tl:r.
4. Subject stated she did not desire to place
preszu.re on\ ·- -- for further info.rz:..a.tion concerning
the end ·.m.:reabouts ot the "ex-CIA Cou...-ier" ; rho told 1 -
/ -fjea-c; President Ker:.necy would e.n1. the
's assassin ;rould also be essas sir.nted. Subject ad-
vised that I stated tbs.t the "ex- CIA lived in
TirE:;in:!.e. (city or tm·i!! not gi ;,-'u.ere there "'S.S a
c<::.f'eteria. l c.dvised the S1.Jbject thB;.t _tl:.e focr.l did
r.ot sgree ·.nth the Courier" a!ld she ( took
hi!J i!!tO to\r.l for n:eals. I fu..-tb.er i::J.d.icated u ... ,t the
"Couri.er" told her th.nt he "bE.d too m.1ch kno\:lo/_ga" indicating
tt.c.t tl:e latter ,;as the rC3.son he left the   I
stc.ted. teat the "ex-Cot.:..."r"j_er" told her a lot of thing::J relo.ti. ve
to peopl e :n b.gh places in the Go'trei · '· ""!lt w-!Uch -w-as quite
sr.ock:..ng and. tb.e infor.c.2.tion ln'Orried her t · ve r y much.
Document Number
FEB 19if
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for FOIA Review OIJ
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Commission No .
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Bureau File No.:
Choroc ,
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........ J"'"' '"'"""" '- '"' - - '\J-·-'-- ..I.. .;:) ..... 'J ..4..,:, ..1.. .J... ""'
told her ".;o o:? ?J.· c::::;ident KE:NNEDY that
he would oa 2.:J!S<:.G8i1·.::.teC [.:::::: ·:: .. :-::: :.is in turn, ·
be kill-ed o U_ ... : :·3:£ c::.. o/ 22/ G4, S!IERWOOD said
that on 11/23/c:::: :1 ___ ::_._ • .:::;i(.0:-.·.:: . :.:.:::z-::.DY h ad been assassinated,
__ ::::t   ::· .. .:. ·..; "'::.
.. .:..:.: ; ;·.' c::;"t Virain ia, told hor
  :.::tC. ::::.:::-,;:::. -:::1c ?:::-csiC.:·J:·ct be Groom
also CO:-.l.."l:c::.tod . .-::: ,P0::.·s0n '.-.·:,.:> }.:i2.:.o;: the President not
:!.::.ve to to t:· L:.l . connection with
c_. , 'but he ::.::.d bcc:i. o::l ::o:-.!e type of Arr.:ty Intelli-
ge:Alce   ::-.::::; g:: c v: :., I.'.l." 3 o SP.::s::r:'iCOD first considered
-:;:.·oo.-:1 to !:>8 :: " !:.:ri; ' II b·..:·: dc:::'-::1 o:: L3E HP..l1VEY os:'lAID, she
h irlo G:!:.oO;:J to:.d .. President KENNEDY
":i .::..S memb er c:f   to t:i!.-:o ove r the world, whi ch
bo8n in soveral hundred years . Groom
c··;::c:.· r:1z:::1b0:.·s oi t;'-e; :1::> BEllNA.::m BARUCH and
.. : : :E!f2-:-.. 3. o ·to identify groom who
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-:Jr!l:tS!lCc. n " ... z- .. ::osG ;;:. .... o ... , • , son of
1!rs.     o s:::::c:;::..::,), ::.dviscd r ecalls his mothe r mention-
:. . . :;; ..... <: :':-·:-. .::·.:c:.: :;:.:._;_u !:e did not recall its
,p<.:.:·_Jv.::;a or .._:.? :· ·.:; ::;:; :.:C.\lcd   :::o"i::l:er . in the past, has
f_-:;:.·.:-ot ·;;,;:::n C.-.=:-:::::..:.1.....; _::t:: .. o:· 7:hic h she did not !cnow
f::ct" I-!:c     :-.:.:.: ::..t ':7:..s :::e:::· oly :1 good story to listen
t o, bu-;: :1s f::= as ::.:::.y ...: :....::: ct.:.:l t:.·1.<.tl1 thc:: oi:u relating to the
it • .. ou2.d ::::: :... ";ni.L .. ::..on-·;;o- 0:16 shot ."
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BA 105-7740
6022 Trowbridge Road
Rosecroft, Oxon Hill, Maryland
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By memorandum dated June 8, 1964, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Washington, D. C. advised the Federal
Bureau of Investigation that one KATHRYN N. SHERWOOD had furnished
the following allegations to an employee of CIA by telephone on
May 14 , 19 6 4 •
Mrs. SHERWOOD had indicated that she resides in Prince
Georges County, Maryland and had registered several months
previously as a Republican in order to vote in the primary
elections. She indicated she was one of the Delegates on the
Republican ballot and was supporting Senator BARRY GOLDWATER.
She said that although she had registered Republican, she held
a deep respect for the late President _KENNEDY. With regard to
President KENNEDY's stand on Cuba, SHERWOOD said, "Too bad he
was selling us down the river."
Mrs. SHERWOOD had also commented that an acquaintance
in West Virginia, who said he was a former CIA courier, told her
prior to the assassination of the late President KENNEDY, that
President KENNEDY would be assassinated and that the assassin,
in turn, would also be killed. Mrs. SHERWOOD said that her
attempts to locate this person after the assassination were not
successful. This person had lived in West Virginia where there
was a cafeteria, but since the food did not agree with him, Mrs.
SHERWOOD took him into town for meals. Mrs. SHERWOOD had further
indicated that the "ex-CIA courier" told her he had too much
knowledge, indicating that this was the reason he had left CIA.
He also allegedly told her a lot of things relative to people in
high places in the United States Government, which were quite
shocking and the information worried Mrs. SHERtvOOD very much.
The CIA advised that due to the absence of any identifying data
concerning the alleged "ex-CIA courier" this individual could not
be identified.
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BA 105-7740
"The Sunday Star," a \lashington, D. C. newspaper,
in its !'lay 17, 1964, edition, contained an article entitled
"36 Candidates Vie for 11 Party Se2.ts." It described various
of candidates running in Prince Georges County, Maryland
for the position of Delegate to the Republican State Convention.
One slate is described as an independent, grass roots group
campaigning under the United Republican Organization; that
although a najo::city of its members favor Senator GOLDWATER,
it was an uncommitted slate. One of the candidates of the United
Republican Organization slate is:
Oxon H1ll, (Maryland)
As checked by IC RICHARD A. MARCUS on June 15, 1964,
the records of the Credit Bureau, Inc., Washington, D. C. containec
only an inquiry dated May 21, 1964, concerning a KATHRYN N,
N, SHERHOOD, husband, RUSSELL, 6 0 2 2 Trov1bridge Road, Rosecroft,
Maryland, No record was otherwise indicated.
On June 19, 1964, Mrs. KATHERINE N. SHERWOOD, 6022
Trowbridge Road, Rosecroft, Oxon Hill, Maryland, advised Special
Agents FRANCIS X. O'NEILL, JR. and ROBERT L. LANPHEAR that she is
a horse trainer and as such was at Waterford Park Race Trace,
vlest Virginia, on November 22, 1963.
Several days prior to November 22, 1963, she met
a groom who was tending horses next to her stable. She became
friendly with this person and provided him with transportation.
and dinners on several occasions.
On November 22, 1963, after President JOHN F. KENNEDY
had been assassinated, the groom told her he had known the
President would be assassinated. Further, he told her the person
who killed the President would not live to come to trial if, in
fact, he was ever caught.
SHERI-!OOD stated the ?room, v7hose name she could not
recall,   he had been a Gcmber of some type of Army Intelli-
gence un1t for a number of years and Has masquerading as a groom
to protect his life because he had information in his head of
such paramount importance that it would damage the reputation of
persons in high authority in America. She said he told her his
life would be nothing if he had not committed to paper and
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BA 105-7740
s ubsequently hid the paper, to be opened only in the event of
his death, the information he possessed. The groom never mentioned
that he had been connected with CIA.
SHERWOOD advised the man did a lot of talking and she,
at first, considered hirr. to be a "nut," however, after the death
of LEE HARVEY OSWALD she said she was convinced the man ha d been
SHERWOOD stated this man told her President JOHN F.
KENNEDY was a member of a three-man conspiracy "to take over the
world." She said this conspiracy had been in existence for
several hundred years and advised the other members of the group
were BERNARD BARUCH and JOHN EDGAR HOOVER. She said that Presiden-1
KENNEDY incurred the displeasure of the other two conspirators
and as a result a plot was formed to assassinate him, such plot
being carried out by OSWALD.
Mrs. SHERWOOD stated she had never discussed the
information she furn ished to Bureau Agents telephonically with
anyone. She said she recently ran as Republican representative
to the Republican State Convention on a "GOLDWATER Slate" but
denied using the aforementioned information during her campaign.
She advised Bureau   she herself was not "nuts" although
people might think sc.
SHERWOOD is described as a white female, date of
birth August 1, 1905, Chicago, Illinois, height S' 2", weight
114 pounds, brown eyes, gray hair, divorced for the past 32
years, resides with son, RUSSELL, at 6022 Trowbridge Road,
Rosecroft, Oxon Hill, Maryland. She presently is an unemployed
horse trainer.
On June 25, 1964, RUSSELL E. SHERWOOD, Jr.,
Electronics Engineer, Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D. C., home address of 6022 Trowbridge Road,
Rosecroft, Maryland, was inte rviewed by Special Agents JAMES F.
MORRISSEY and ROBERT L. OLSEN of the FBI at his place of employ-
After identifying KATHERINE N. SHERWOOD of the same
address as his mother, he was a pprise d of her June 19, 1964,
remarks to Specia l Agents of the FBI, and asked if he possessed
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BA 105-7740
any information bearing on the reliability of his mother's informa-
At the outset of the interview, he stated that he had
received a phone call from his mother at 1:00 p.m. that day in
which she advised him that she had been interviewed by FBI Agents
on June 19, 1964. He said she had not told him of her interview
previously but said to him she had told his wife who had
failed to mention the fact to him.
He said his mother was a horse trainer, but not a
good one, who also owned a horse which she had raced in the past.
In connection with trainer and owner activity she had been at
the Waterford Park track in Newell, \r/est Virginia, from June to
December, 1963. Just prior to Christmas, 1963, she returned to
live with him and his family at the Trowbridge Road address in
the same insolvent financial condition as she left to go there.
Since her arrival she had related to him on four or
five occasions a story of the prediction of a man whom she had
met at the track at Waterford Park. This prediction was that
LEE HARVEY OSWALD would never come to trial. As he recalled
his mother's story, this prediction was made subsequent to the
President's assassination, and prior to the death of OSWALD; that
it was based not upon any previously obtained independent
knowledge of this individual, but rather was merely a prediction
based on that personB analysis of the tenor of the times, that
is, that the violent reaction of people in Dallas to such a
terrible act as the assassination, suggested that OSWALD might
never live to come to trial. He felt that this prediction was
probably more like the opinion of many people at the time of the
assassination or was similar to those of the news columnist,
DREW PEARSON, on the theory that if one makes enough predictions,
one of them is bound to come true.
Concerning the individual, SHERWOOD stated that he
did not recall his mother's mentioning his past or present
employment. He recalled only that his mother mentioned this
individual was an American Indian and >vas a member of the
Cagala, which SHER\•JOOD described as a Jewish secret organization
similar to   Hasonry.
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BA 105-7740
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s tated that his r ecollection of his mothe r's
c omments in this respect was s ket chy and vague. He said
he recalled she mentioned something a bout a "T!laster plan," but
he did not recall its purpose or details of it. He stated
that his mother in the past has forgotten details of events
or added items which she did not know as fact, but felt she
was like most people in this respect. He said his mother is
susceptible to stories of this kind.
SHERWOOD said that he has no other information bearing
on the reliability of his mother's remarks. To him, it was merely
a good story to listen to, but as far as any factual truth
therein relating to the assassination, it would be a "million-to-
one shot." He said he could not imagine any normal person
claiming to have a connection, past or present, with Central
Intelligence Agency or an intelligence unit acting in the manner
described by his mother. He stated he considered it unfortunate
that investigative time had to be expended to check the credibilit•
of a story such as that r e l a t ed by his mother.
He suggested that h is wife be contacted; thaL perhaps
she mi ght be able to offer some information or perspective
relating to his mother's rema r ks .
On June 27, 1964, Mrs. BERNICE SHERWOOD, 6022 Trow-
bridge Road, Rosecorft, Oxon Hill, Maryland, mailing address
Washington 22, D. C., advised that she has known her mother-in-
law, Mrs . KATHERINE SHERWOOD, age 58, for approximately twenty
years, during which time KATHERINE has been "horse or track
happy." She further related that she has never had any reason
to doubt the of her mother-in-law's statements, but
realizes that she mixes with a crowd of race track followers
representing all types of personalities and characters. At
the present time, KATHERINE SHERWOOD a horse which is
being boarded somewhere in the vicinity of V.laterford Park Race
Track, located near Newell , West Virginia.
Mrs. SHERWOOD r ela t e d t h a t she and her mother-in-law
are not too clos e and tha.t she h a s never been a good listener
with respect to the l att er ' s conversations , and, in fact, most
of the conversations she ov e r hears are conversations between
Mrs. KATHERINE SHERWOOD a n d other indi viduals or group convers a-
tions. \
G •'-.§;_ '!13
Its f Lf CJ a,. C 7Y tt

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BA 105-7740
Mrs. KATHERINE SHERviOOD left !,Jaterford Park Race
Track in December, 1963, and came i:o live   ~ i t h her son, RUSSELL,
at the Oxon Hill, t1aryland, address. Sometime in January, or
February, 1964, while KATHERINE was running as a candidate for
the GOLDVJATER Delegation to the t1aryland Republican Convention,
people were gathered for a meeting, location not recalled,
Hhich could have been held at her residence. During the meeting,
the topic of communism arose, and t1rs. KATHERINE SHERWOOD related
the following incident to this group:
While at 1-laterford Park Race Track, she had made the
acquaintance of a groom whom she used to transport to and from
the race track and the nearby tovm of Newell, \-/estVirginia.
On the Friday that the President was assassinated, and on first
hearing this news, and before LEE OSHALD had been killed, this
groom made a statement in front of a group of horse trainers
and entry personnel that the assassin would never live to be
tried. This groom had also stated that the assassination was
a pre-planned conspiracy. On the Sunday following the President's
assassination when LEE OSWALD had been killed, most of the same
people who had heard the groom's statement were amazed that it
had been correct.
Mrs. BERNICE SHERI•JOOD stated that this was the first
time that she had ever heard her mother-in-law relate this
story and after the meeting, which in her opinion was attended
by some highly excitable people, she asked her mother-in-law
why she placed so much significance in the reliability of the
groom's statement, whereupon KATHERINE informed her that the
groom seemed to be well educated, was neat in appearance, and
he had told her that during World War II he had been with an
intelligence unit. He had also told her that she should nothave
been seen with him and that she should not continue to drive
him into town since he was being watched. According to KATHERINE
SHERWOOD, the groom apparently left the Waterford Park Race Trace
area soon after the assassination and prior to her leaving for
Oxon Hill, Maryland, in December, 1963.
Mrs. BERNICE SHER'riOOD st:a ted that she does not recall
her mother-in-law ever saying that the groom had remarked that
he knew so much about people in highly placed positions that
would damage their character, that such was a threat to his own
safety. Vlhen questioned, she related that she has never heard
KATHERINE make statements that JOHN F. KENNEDY and others were
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BA 105-7740
part of a conspiracy to take over the world.
On terminating the interview, Mrs. SHER\>JOOD stated
that she could not understand why so much emphasis and concern
was being attached to the reported statement made by the groom
since undoubtedly a number of people all over the country had made
s imilar statements at the time that word was received of the
as sassination of the President.
Mrs. BERNICE SHERWOOD furnished the foregoing informatic
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SUBJECX. •l:iJ!!i;,WOOD, Kathryn N.
OEC:If.'',SIF!Ul :lY '
o• ... fii'MvC sr. .. .,
1. For your information, a present employee of the c>- . L
Central Intelligence Agency has reported a telephone
conversation had with the above Subject during the evening (/" ,:._ '·
of 14 May 1961>. ·



., •.)


2. Our present employee indicated that she resides in
Prince Georges County, Maryland and several lllOnths previously
had registered as a Republican in order to vote in the
primary elections. During the evening of 14 May 1961. the
Subject telephoned our employee indicating that she was one
of the delegates on the Republican ballot and was supporting
Senator Barry Gold•>ater. During the conversation our em-
ployee indicated to Mrs. Sher1rood that she hadn't decided
which candidate to support and that although she had regis-
tered Republican she held a deep respect for the late
President Kennedy. Our employee stated to Mrs. Sherwood
that she liked the late President Kennedy's stand on Cuba
whereupon Sherwood said "too bad he was selling us down the
3. Also during the telephone conversation Sherwood ad-
vised our employee that an acquaintance in West Virginia
(city or town not given), who said he was a former CIA
Courier, had told her (Sherwood) prior to the assassination
of the late President Kennedy that President Kennedy would
I be assassinated and that the assassin in turn would also
be killed. Mrs. Sherwood further advised that her attempts
to locate this person in West Virginia after the assassi-
nation were not successful. According to Mrs. Sherwood's
l words this person "just disappeared from sight" following
the assassination of the late President Kennedy. Sherwood
:further advised our employee that the "ex-CIA Courier"
\ ..
lived in West V1.rgtma where there \laiJ a eateterta
ever the food did not agree With him and due to the latter
• · • she (Sherwood) took him into town for meals. Sherwood.
further indicated that the "ex-CIA Courier" told her that
he "had too much knowledge" indicating that the latter wae
the reason he l eft the Agency. Sherwood stated that the
"ex-CIA Courier" told her a lot of things relative to
people in high places in the U. S. Government which was
quite shocking and the information worried her (Sherwood)
very much.
4. Due to the absence of any identifying data con-
cerning the alleged "ex-CIA Courier" this Agency has been
unable to identif'y him.
and the
you, it
If you deem it appropriate to contact Mrs. Sherwood
identity of the "ex-CIA Courier" is made known to
is requested that his identity be to this _ l•
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con:unented on the fact t.h:li. Oswald had obt::t!ned ez::;Jloyment in this
country in a i.irm through a .2us2i:U"1 friend. ::ie thcught_ ...-- '
this might have a possible 0e:u-ing on any c.lam:.estine
systems he r:llght have received irom tile Soviets. . . " ·

. . . I .
· ..... _ · ·· 5. Members of 11r. R:m.kin' .s st:ai.f then commented en the tcsU-
. mony of l'r1rs. Oswald to eilect that. the latters f=om son regard-:
ing his desire to rerl.lr:::l to the Stclaa had tte oi being-· .
dictated since they ccnb.L'12ci none oi his usual g:r::l.In.l:latic:::U errors ar.d . .
used legz..l with '.7hlcn he would not have f::u:aili.ar .. . In
connection, the Ia.ct t!lat Lac Os-;nld \7rOta to the :Smb:::.ssy requesting ... ..... .
· .
help in his return to t!le U.S. seen alter receipt by the Emressy
of a telegram from tb.e reporti!lg on cor::.-espotlcience ..-.'it!l.
Oswald's to i:l·iicats to of ),lr. at:l.ff ·
tbat the So7iet.s migtt naa a.cce:::;a in snms I::'-£hion to the contents

of the telagrnm. T:!lay did r.ot believe it was   Cswald' s
letter to the Emb:lssy c:l.me immediately on tha heels cf the telegram
!rom the J:ep!lrt=lent. Thl3 lad to a clisc!lssion ci t.1a in the
press oi another talegram or !rom the Sr:1l:assy in ilio3cow to
the Ran.idn said he would undcrta!re to cl!trUy thia.
· .. ..
. -:
. . . . . : . "" . . .. -
:.:.'. 6. · 1:1r. Willems noted Oswald 1l.:ld i•1t.rcduced a state-. · · .
ment to t.he ei.fect t.C:a.t she suzpectsd !1er Gon to a CT....A ngen:; l:Ji r !.... . · ..
,"Y1llems asked in Oswald hw a CL\. $_/Art:
..., d •...,....,,.. no·'- \'PQll ... .. _ ... ".:3'-nd u· · P·l'lrc ,., ,., y--
"'"" ... \,;;;; lJ..r...l...\.4 S'JA 1- ..... J.J. . ,, -..1.......4-:l t. - · ..... ... _ . ... .:1._. ,,._ ... . ,
thls. -., first :red t.:"lnt in him and $ [d/:,:"
C · .. ba.:.i. i:be t'.'.lO Cl:lr.desti>J•J ofiiccr.B · wto
certainly would know -;?heth:r o:r not Cs,-,rald had ngent CL'J.
in the Eoviet Unio Re then sru,. "n::c ce ·;-Jc· .d 12}!C to
axe rus word Ior L1e i:tct th::.t Os-:vald had ;}Ot b-;:m ? .. Rr'nkin
ini:erioc the vi9w that oe Commission i:l:ld not ::\d'JT)tod tills nrccedure
other and v1on::!e:red ::vh.ether t::.ere not so!:le to
clarify this oore aiiectivol ;" £or tb-; C:1c
he m..1.de to have .. Dulle.a, who i.3 i,11:ill..!.:1--...· '.7iG.'l.   recm:ds ·
procedures , ra.,ie'.-v the v.:hicb. w0uld no.r· x='.l..1.y l:) b.cJ.d on.
and repor t to the   ::r W':IS follc·.-.t
l ead of .L-ireci:or of the P.tii 'rlho !o:-y;:: .. en to tlle Com-
. .....
7 A Con
... .. 1c-"b10 -.art C
t\·o. :_,......., , ,, ,, ...... .-.in·c ... ,..d
• lt!:) ,l. \,.4. .1. .. 1. . ,._ .. .L u- .., ,. ....,. \;;:(.. ..... .k .... _ ... .... ...__ • ., :..-'- - •• ,_ •
consisted of a by h.Lr . and hi.r. o:
    to C...".ta. Tbey th:::..t
in the £1Ie.:·dc::m nb.a.se. For
. . ...
• r ... • •.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. ....
. ....
·. ... · . .
. .
. . . ..
... . -.. ··
. . .
·- -- ... ·-.-.. ...
·· ·-·,. ------ --·--·--

18 April 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Support Di\' ision
SUBJECT Lee Harvey Oswald
1. On 17 April_!g_z4, _ the undersigned reviewed the
Security files I · pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald
to determine itthe Ut±ice of Security has ever conducted
any investigation regarding him or his murderer, Jack Ruby.
This_yesearch undertaken ?ased on
2. After reviewing the Oswald file, it was ascertained
that (tb..e Office of Secur had received information concerning
Oswald's defection to the oviet Union from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation_Jliior to 22 November 1963. It l'ias also ascer-
tained that the Office of Security had searched its indices
on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine
if we could furnish any information on persons whose names
came to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
during their investigations into the Kennedy and Oswald killL1gs ..
In addition, the Security file revealed that which
came to the attention of this Agency through various sources
such as the Domestic Collection Division and outside calls to
the Security Duty Office, regarding the deaths of the President
and his alleged assassin, was passed to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as possible leads in their investigative
there was absolutely no information in the Security
file to indicate tnat the of Securi y ever an
1nyest j gation inLo the death o-f President Kenne y
or lee Harver
3. With the approval of/ · - . ·· ·, the findings
of the aforementioned file review weie telephonically passed to
, . . . -
' It \vas
by the
f. : .... ,·-
emphasized that the information furnished
undersigned pertained only to records available to the
of Security. He was advised ! . ·
· -
is known to have a wealth
. '',-_: :;: : :/_:-- · __ :=·_- -
. -· - -.-:: --
-- -
. . .. . -· ..· .
.. . -. . -:   .. ·, ·.

• • -· 0 • • ... • •
J .
of concerning Lee Harvey It was
recommended that   J- · contact[
\ to deternine if \ has ever conducted any
investigation of their m...-n regarding OsHald or Ruby or
knmv of any other component in the Agency Nho have.
4. This data is furnished for your information.
__ \

from s ort of patting u. booby t r;.,1
_. • , , ••
blows up imme 9iately. So thera t.vc r e a
o pe ration s of sabotage , _s ome of them  
successful . But that' s the kind o f thing tha t the
United States had in mind at that time.
!10YERS: (V/0) Se ve n months after the Ba y of Pigs, Pre side nt Kennedy
MOYI:RS : ( V / 0)
travell e d to Seattle to deliver a major foreign policy
address at the Unive rsity of \-Jashington .
He talked about the rules of conduct that limit e d the
United States in its fight against communism.
"We cannot as a free na tion, compe t e with our
adve rsaries in tactics o f t e rror, ass assination,
false promises , conterfe i t mobs: and crises· ."
So President Kennedy spoke to the nation on November
16; 1961.
But he was also at tha t time approving Operation
.. . the code name for the next stage in the
CIA's s e cre t war on Cuba .
The name was romantic ... Operation Mongoose ... but
tactics were not. They included all of those things
the Pre side nt hctd just said Ame rica did not do.
Ther e had not been anything 1n the Ame rican e xpe rie nce
quite like the war on Cuba. To begin with, it's a gainst
the law for the CIA to run o pe rations in the U.S. But
to dire ct its secret army, the a ge ncy cre ated h e re in
Miu.mi the largest CIA in the world.
,.._.. _._ ·'
. -' : _ ~ ~ i
.- ..
. ~ ..
\ ·- ~ ·
- ~ · - _ · . : . _  
' .
~ FOfA Review Go1J
. '

- ... . '·

: ,.
- - ~
. .... ;.__... -
'1: - -,_
. '
--- ---·-- ·- -- ---- ---· ----·----------=:=c.-::,.-=;r::::: ..


MARSHALLS. CARTER, being duly sworn, deposes and says that
he is the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and that based on his
personal knowledge of the affairs of the Central Intelligence Agency and on
detailed inquiries of the officers within the Central Intelligence Agency who
would have knowledge about any relationship Lee Harvey Oswald may have
had with that Agency, he certifies that:
Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or
informant of the. Central Intelligence Agency;
the Agency never contacted him, interviewed him,
talked with him, or received or solicited any reports or
information from him, or communicated with him, directly
or indirectly, in anY: other manner;
the Agency never furnished him any funds or money,
or compensated him, directly or indirectly, in any fashion;\
Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected,.
directly or indirectly, in any way whatsoever with the Agency •
. .

=:::-----(L. S.
Subscribed and sworn to this day of...,....---::--:=-:-:,.--,---,--''
1964, before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, by the
said MARSHALLS. CARTER, who is personally known to me and he duly
acknowledged to me the execution of the foregoing instrument.
Notary Public
My commis_sion expires
-·--..,.-- .. -:.-·-----...,...--
i .
. • - • :.... - •. ?
- -- - ·-:-: :_,. ___:.r--- _ .. .:-..
... ,
·•.· ,'-
'· .,.-,
t ,.
·. , .
RAY S. CLINE, being duly sworn, deposes and says that _he is
the Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency,
and that based on his personal knowledge of the affairs of the Central
Intelligence Agency and on detailed inquiries of those officers and employees
within his supervision who would have knowledge about any relationship
Lee Harvey Oswald may have had with that Agency, he certifies that:
Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or
informant of the Central Intelligence Agency;
the Agency never contacted him, interviewed hi.m,
talked with him, or received or solicited any reports or
i.nforn1ati.on from him, or communicated with him, directly
or.indirectly, in any other manner;
the Agency never furnished hi.m any funds or money,
or compensated him,, directly or indirectly, in any fashion;
and ..
Lee Harvey Oswald was never as-sociated or connected,
directly or indirectly, in any way whatsoever with the Agency.
Subscribed and sworn to this day of-:---::-:=-.,.--,----,;--....,-:;,----'
1964, before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, by the
said RAYs.· CLINE, who is personally known to me and he duly I
acknowledged to me the execution of the foregoing instrument.
Notary Public
commission expires -----------------
. ' -
' '

· .. ·'  
. . -
.. _. : ..
: s s.
ROBERT L. BANNERMAN, being duly sworn, deposes and says
that he is the Director of Security of the Central Intelligence Agency, and
that based on his perso11<"1.l knowledge of the affairs of the Central
Intelligence Agency and on detailed inquiries of those officers and employees
within his supervision who would have knowledge about any relationship
Lee Harvey Oswald may have had with that Agency, he certifies that:
Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or
informant of the Central Intelligence Agency;
the Agency never contacted him, interviewed hi=,
talked with him, or received or solicited any reports or
information from him, or communicated with him, directly
or indirectly, in any other manner;
the Agency never furnished him any funds or money,
or compensated him,
directly or indirectly, in any fashion;
Lee Earvey Oswald was never associated or connected,
directly or in any way whatsoever with the Agency.
S. )
Subscribed and sworn to this day  
1964, before a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, by the
said ROBERT BANNERMAN, who is personally known to me and he
duly acknowledged to me the execution of the foregoing instrument.
Notary Public
:· ...
My commission expires ---------
'""· ..
. '-J.; '·. -
...... '- .
. _ .. .: __
. '::· .··.
·:,. ·,
. ·
( ,. ( '"-<'
\.. ..
s s.
RICHARD being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the
Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency,. and that
based on his personal knowledge of the affairs of the Central Intelligence
Agency and on detailed inquiries of those officers and employees vri.thin his
supervision who would have knowledge about any relationship Lee Harvey
Oswald may have had with that Agency, he certifies that: -
Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent,
infon:nant of the Central Intelligence Agency;
employee, or
the Agency never contacted him, intervie,;ved him,
talked with him, or. received or solicited any reports or
information from him, or communicated with him, directly
or indirectly, in any other manner; .
the Agency furnished him any funds or money,
or compensated him, directly or indirectly, i.n any fashion;
\ I
. Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected,
directly or indirectly, in any way whatsoever with the Agency •

Subscribed and sworn to this day of ,
19 64, before me, a Notary Public in and for the Sta-:t-e-o
f-:V=ir-g1..,-, n-1..,-. a-, -:b,-y__,th,.,-e---'
said RICHARD HELMS, who is personally known to me and he duly
acknowledged to me the execution of the foregoing instrument.
Notary Public
My commission expires
)c .\ -
i )'
. (
... --------. .--.·...------- --·--
-- -· ... --- --·- -- . --- -..
·- ·-- --------- -------
'.• ...
· ...... ·.·:
.. - :.
- .·


19 May 1964
Dear Mr. Rankin:
In response to your request, I am enclosing
· for the Commission's information my alfidavit t _o
effect that ·Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, em-
.. .. ·.'
.:., 0
. .. · ..
. ·. : -:z ·
-... ' .. -.:: .
o.: 0 ..;:.=-0
ployee, or informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. __  
.. : .. ... . ';
The Honorable J. Lee Rankin
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy
200 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002
·===:- _ ....
-: _ ... - · ...
• - 0 '
.. -7'-- 0
. '
•• Oo: --
____ _.Q..,oeument-Number.
103.8-405 0.
.: • •• o
. ·-  
br FOIA Review on
SEP 1976

I .
I . .
. I
. . ; .-..
-: 0 '.: • •: _ :
... ·;
0 ... · ·-··
"":'"' '" .. .· .. ·--...
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.. - ...
.... .. .. ..
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. '

: ..-
.... ---- ......... __ - -.. -.--

- ... __ J.Od .!,...e;;:;: .............
. ... '1
q :-.
JOHN A. McCONE, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he ·
the Director of Central Intelligence, and that based on his personal ·
knowledge of the affairs of the Central Intelligence Agency and on. detailed·.:
inquiries he caused to be made by the officers within the Central. · :..
Intelligence Agency who would have knowledge about any relationship
Harvey Oswald may have had with that Agency, he certifies that: -  
Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent,
info:;:mant of the Central Intelligence Agency;
. • •
employee, or
. • ..
the Agency never contacted him,. interviewed --_,_-: _ ..
talked with him, or received or solicited any reports or •.
- '-·-. ----: --- .·
information from him, or communicated with hi.m, directly ·- ·. :_.:_-, ;-:_
\ -·.--
or any funds or
or compensated him, directly or indirectly, in any fashion; ·:
and ' · · -, : _--- .,
-- ----- --
Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or coriilected, _ _.,:>;;;;::..,::·-
directly or indirectly, ·in any way whatsoever with the
. ·; :-:-: , __
-- ·. : - - :··.
McCONE . . ·::·-
Subscribed and sworn to th1. 7 '!{" day of ·- . .· ..
1964, before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, by the ..
said JOHN A. McCONE, who is personalty known to me and duly
acknowledged to me the execution of the foregoing instrument.
Document Number
for FOIA Review on
Notary Public
My commission expires

to39-4CS 8
I •
SEP 1976
'.- .
• #
.. _ ··_,
- .. " - ,-·
·:.·· ... _---:
:· ;- :. :.
. '.;j :
-. -· . -·,- ·:--:<: ·:·-:-- ._
- -- __ -...__-_____ ·:-:.'
- ..... ..
Central lntelhgcncc Agency
WJ511tngwn. 0 C. 20S05
Mr. Alan Weberman
Independent Research Associates
POB 2091
New York, New York 10013-2091
Reference: F93-0888
Dear Mr . Weberman:
2 5AUG 1993
This is to acknowledge receipt of that portion of y o ur
21 June 1993 letter (Item 11) wherein you provided the
biographic information requested regarding your 19 April 1993
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records
pertaining to James Forrestal .
Now that you have provided the required information and
you have agreed to pay applicable fees, we have accepted your
request which will be processed in acco rdance with the FOIA,
5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act,
50 U. S.C. § 431. Our search will be for documents in existence
as of and through the date of this acceptance letter .
The heavy volume of FOIA requests received by t he Agency
has created delays in processing. Since we cannot respond
within the 10 working days stipulated by the Act, you have the
right to consider this as a denial and may appeal to the CIA
Info rmation Review Committee. It would seem more reaso nable,
however, to have us continue processing your request and
respond as soon as we can . You can appeal any denial of
records at that time. Unless we hear from y ou ot herwise , we
will assume that you agree, and we will proceed o n this basis.
John H. Wrig
ion and Privac
Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Alan Weberman
Independent Research Associates
POB 2091
New York, New York 10013-2091
Reference: F93-0888
Dear Mr. Weberman:
2 3 $P 1994
This is a final response to your 19 April 1993 Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request for records pertaining to
James Forrestal. Your request was processed in accordance with
the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the CIA Information Act,
50 U.S.C. § 431. Our processing included a search for records
in existence as of and through the date of our acceptance
letter dated 25 August 1993.
We conducted a thorough and diligent search of our records
systems for material pertaining to the subject of your request
and were only able to locate one document consisting of 31
pages as previously released. The document, a copy of which is
enclosed, was originally located by another agency as a result
of its search for records on another subject and referred to
this agency for review and subsequent release.
The total costs incurred in the processing of your request
amounted to $57.40 consisting of 3 on-line computer searches at
$11.00 each, totaling $33.00; 1 hour of professional search
time at $18.00 per hour, totaling $18.00; 1/2 hour of clerical
search time at $10.00 per hour, totaling $5.00; and 1/4 hour of
archive search at $5.60 per hour totaling $1.40. As a
requester in the all other category, you are entitled to the
first two hours of search time or equivalent ($36.00) free of
charge. Since the number of pages reproduced from our system
of previously released material does not exceed the 100 page
free allotment, there are no reproduction charges. Therefore,
your total charges are $21.40. Please send your check or money
order in the amount of $21.40 to me made payable to the
Treasurer of the United States citing Reference No. F93-0888 to
ensure proper credit to your account.
Finally, the CIA was not created until 1947 and material
prior to 1947 would be contained in the records of the Office
of Strategic Services (OSS). The majority of the CIA
predecessor holdings have been turned over to the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) as we have been
systematically reviewing all of our OSS holdings of operational
files with a view to turning as much as possible over to NARA.
This review has been completed. Therefore, you may also wish
to submit your request to NARA at the following address:
Military Reference Branch
Textual Reference Division
National Archives and Records Administration
Room l3W, Archives Building
7th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20408
We appreciate your patience and understanding during the
period required to process this request.

Prepared bya
The Office ot General Counsel,
Central Intelliaence Aaency
DEX:LASSIFIID   ________ _

Tbi1 paper; a atudy or the bi1tory or the Central Intelltaenee Agency,
1ncludin& pertinent material• on World War II intelligence orsaDi&atioDI and
plaDI tor the po1tvar era, hal 'been prepared by the ott ice ot Oeaeral Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency, a• an aid to the better under•tandins or the
present 1tructure and tunctionr ot the Agency. While the ODited Statu bas
in intelligence activitiel Iince it• rounding, it va1 not until the
event• or the 1940's the need tor an efficient, taat-moving
i nt elligence 1ervice, that 1ucb ao organization on a goveramentvide baai&
conceiTed and deYdoped.   ruultl or thi1 effort culminated in the
!ormation ot the Ceutral Intelligence Agency.
Cocrdinator ot Information
The events vb1cb foretold advent of the second vorld var provided
the 1mpetua tor forming a number or organizations vbich later
aerved as the foundation tor the United State• intelligence actiTity during
the var. By an Executive Order elated 8 Septembe:: 1939, Presideat Franklin
Roosevelt proTided tor an tor emergency management "1D tbe eTent or a
national emergency" or t.he .threat or one. Such an office vas 1ubaequently
eetablished on 25 May 1940. By an administrative order or 7 January 1941,
the !Unction• or the office vere modified and further defined and included
advising and aasiating tbe President in time or emergency, coordinating
emergency or the Government and informing the President as to the
Yarioua agencies' progress in emergency matters.
Six month• later, the forerunner or a centralized intelligence 1ervice
vas established under the Coordinator or Information. William J. Donovan
vas to the He had authority trom President Roosevelt to:
"Collect and analy:e all information and data, vb1ch may bear upon
national • to correlate 1uch information and data, and to
make auch information and data available to the President and to
such • and agencies aa the President may determine,
and to carry out, vhen requested by the President, "uch supplemen-
tary activitiel as may facilitate the securing of information
important for national security oot nov available to the Govern-
The Coordinator ot Information vas to have access to information and data v1thin
the varioua departments and agencies but be vas not._ to interfere vith or i mpair
the dutiee and reaponsibilitiea or the Preaident's regular •ilitary and naval
adVisers. To assist him, the Coordinator could appoint committees of repr esent-
atives ot the varioua department• and agenciea. Colonel DonoTan vaa to receive
no compensation but vas entitled to transportation eubaiatence and other
- - - ----- ------ --
identical Under hia broad mandate, the Coordinator ot Information
began to build an oraan1zation capable of producing intelligence neceasary tor
the eucceaatul out of the var effort.
Office 6f Strategic SerTieea
In lea• than a Je&r, on 13 June 1942, by a ailitary order, the Prea1dent
abolithed the Office ot Coordinator of Information and eatabliahed the Office
ot SerTicea (OSS) vhicb operationally came under tbe Juriadiction
or the Joint Chief• ot Statt. OSS's mandate vaa to1
"a. Colbct and analyte tucb atrategic information a a may be
by the States Joint Chief• of Staff; and
"b. Plan and operate tucb 1pecial 1ervtce as may be directed
by the United State• Joint Chief• ot Start."
William J. Donovan vaa appointed by the Preeident as Director ot Strategic
Services "under tbe direction and ot tbe United State• Joint
Chief• of Statt.•
OSS vaa allowed certain privileges in conducting itt operations tuch aa
entering into contract• "vithout regard to provteion& of lav relating to
the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts." (Executive
Order 9241, 1 September 1942.) Alec it vaa imperative in performing certain
ot the wartime :tunctioo.e ot OSS that latitude be granted in the expenditure of
funds. It vas announced policy of OSS to employ ordinary TOucbered JDOneys
vbenever practicable. When, hovever, 1uch uae vould have gravely impeded the
effective prosecution of the program directed by the Joint Chief• of Statt,
OSS bad the authority to reeort to tucda expendable v1thout regard to lava
relating to the expenditure of Government funds. For example, it vould have
been most difficult to have performed many of the peculiar functiooa of OSS
under mandatory compliance vith lava or regulation• concerning employment
  annual and eick leave, dual compensation, tbe purchase of motor
vehicles, the employment of aliena, the retaining of investigators, or the
eecuring of laborer• or other personnel in various foreign countriet.
The General Accounting Office vae villing to accept voucbere thoving the
expenditure of tunda by OSS for 1uch purpoae1 providing that it vaa atated
auch expenditure• vere necessary in tbe performance of ite peculiar
functions in dieregard of ex11t1n& lav and regulation. 'l'be Rational War
Agency Act of 1945 (P.L. 372) 01 it pertained to OSS read as
•s.tariee and expeo.eee: For all expenaee oeceuary to enable
the Office of Strategic Service• to carry out 1te tunctiooa and
act1vtt1et, including 1alar1ee of a Director at $10,000 per annum,
one aeeietant director and one deputy director at $9,000 per annum
. /
each; procurement of neceaaary aervicea, aurPliea and equipment
Y1 thout regard to aection 3709, Rertaed Statutea; travel expenaes,
including expenaea outaide the Ub1ted Statu Yithout regard to the
Standardi&ed Government Travel Regulation• and the Subaiatence
Expenae AC't of 1926, aa amended (5 u.s.c. 821-833)A aad aJl1 aeneral
prortaion tor the filcal 7ear 1945 to the contraryJ preparation and
tranaportation of the remaina of officer• and nployeea vbo die
abroad or in tnnait, wb1le in tbe dilpatcb of .. official duties,
to tbe1r former bomea in this country or to a oot .ore diatant
for interment, aDd for the ordiD4%')' expenaea of   interment;
rental of nevareporting aervicea; puz;chaae of c•r aub scription to
commercial and trade reports; the rendering of gratuitous
eervicea and tbe diepoaition, tree or otherviee, or such
a1 the Director deem• advisable; purchaae or rental and operation
of photographic, reproduction, duplicating and printing machines,
equipment, and devices and radio-receiving and radio-lending equip-
lllent and devicea; aaintenance, operation, repair
and hire of motor-
propelled or boraedravo peuenger-ce.rrytng nhiclea at:.d Tellela of
all k1D4a; printing and binding; exchange ot tunda vitbout regard
to 1ection 3651, Revieed Statute• (31 u.s.c. 543); purcha"e and
tree diatribution of firearme, guard uniform., epecial clothing,
and other peraooal equipment; the coet of a coapartaent or euch
other accommodation• ae may be authorized br ·tbe Director for
aecuri ty vben authorized personnel are requUoed to
aecret doeumenta or band baggage containing bigblf technical and
nluable $57
000 of vbich amount auch au1D1 aa uy
be authorized by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget may be
trauaferred to other departments or agenciea of the Government,
either al advance payment or reimbureement of appropriation, for
the performance of any ot the tunctiona or actiT1t1ea tor vbich
thil appropriation i1 111ade: PROVIDED, That $37,000,000 of tbia
appropriation be expended vithout to the proviaiona of
lav God regula tiona relating to the expend! ture of Govt'rnment
fundi or the employment of pereotl4 in the Government aervice, and
$35,000,000 ot euch $37,000,000 may be expended for obJect• of a
confidential oature, 1uch expenditure• to be accounted for solely
on the certificate of the Director of the Office of Strategic
Services and eTery auch certificate 1hall be deemed a 1utficient
TOueher for the amount therein certified."
The Director of OSS enJoyed the confidence or the Congreea in managing the
41apoa1t1on of confidential tunds aa can be 1een by reading over the hearings
before the lubcomm1ttee on appropriation of the 78th Congreee, 2d Seaaion.
Plana for a Po•tvar National Intelligence Agency
Over a year before the var'a end, ·atud1ea vere UDdertaken v1th1n OSS
concerning the concept of a permanent, intelligence aervice for
the United Statea Government . Arter montba or atudy
a document
entitled Baa1a tor a Permanent United Statea Foreign Intelligence
. /
SeTTice,• wat drafted vbich Geueral Donovan pretented to Pretident Rootevelt
around 10 October 1944. !'be Pretident returned the paper on 31 October vith
tbe coliDent that au adT11er bad lnto:naed the Prtl1deut tbat a better and
cheaper 1atell18ence 171tn than General Donovan ha4 cteT11ed vu pouible.
!he Prelideut, boveTH', a eked that General Donovan continue hh work on a
po1t-var t.ntelliaenct orpnisaticu. Several day• 'before hit 4eath, Mr.
Roounlt requu.ted General Dononu to call a •eetina ot 1Dter11ted aaencies
tor their 1uagettiou. •to the propoaed centralized intelllaence aer?tce.•
.!he 10 October document contained much ot the 'baaic acbeme Vbicb
_. accepted tor the Central Intt-lliaence Aaency. General DonoT'a%1
wrote that aD oraan1ut1on vas needed "vbich vill trocure intelliaence 'both
'b7 onrt and conrt •ethods and vill at the aue tilDe provide iutelliaence
su1daoce, 4eteraine a.ational intelligence o'bJecthu aDd correlate the
lntelliaence 'by all Government agene1e1.•
Based on bil experience, General Donovan ad'fbed that the ettabliabA ' nt
ot a United State• 1ntelliaence agency be aoverned b7 ten principle•:
"l. !hat it 1hould be a central onrall Foreign Intelliaeuce
SerTice vbich (except tor tpecialized intelligence pertinent to
the operation• ot the Armed Services and certain other Government
aaenciee) could eerve obJecti-,ely and 1mpartiall1 the ot the
diplomatic, military, economic and propaganda aervice ot tbe Go•ern-
"2. 'l'bat tuch a SerTice 1hould not operate
vi thin tbe United States.
"3· !bat it ahould have no policy function and ahould not
be identified vith any lev-enforcing agency either at bome or
"4. ·That the operat1on.a ot such a Service ahould be primarily
the collection, analy111, and dissemination ot intelligence on the
polic7 or 1trategy level.
. .
. "5. 'l'bat 1uch a Service thould be under a hip:,bly qualified
appointed b7 the President and be adminiatered under
Presidential direction.
"6. That, aubJect to the approval ot the Preaident, tbe
poliCJ ot auch a Service 1hould be determined by the Director
vi th the adrtce and auiet&Dce ot a board on vbich the Department
ot State and tbe Armed Service• ahould be repreaented.
"7. !bAt aucb a Service chargei v1th collecting intelligence
national 1ntereata and detenae ehould have itt ovn aeatl.l
ot commuuieation and ahould be reapooa1ble tor all aecret acti'fitiea
llleh u:
(al S.er.t
(b   •
( c •
(d Claud .. t1ne 1ubnr11n
•a. !bat 1ueh a Serrtce be operated on both wueberect and

"9. '!'bat 1uch a a 1tatt ot 1peelal1ltl protea-
11ouall:r trained in aualyall ot S.atell1aence and poueuing a
htah degree ot liuguiatie, regional or tunet1onal competence to
evaluate 1nco.ina intelligence
to aake 1pecial reporta, and to
proTide cutdance tor tbe collecting branchel ot the Government.
•10. It 11 DOt neceua.ry to create a new aaenc7. 'lbe
nucleut ot auch an orsantzation already ex1ata tn the Ottice ot
Strates1c Serrtce1.•
On 18 •ovember 1944, General DoDOTan 1ubmttted a aemorand1.11 to the
Pruident vbicb empbatiled that •intelltaence control be ret\lr1le4 to the
1upervil1on ot the Prel1dent, • and that the "ettablhbment ot a central
authority reportioa to you /_the Pr .. idfiDf/ Yith reapon.lib1l1t:r to
trame intelligence obJective• aDd to collect and coordinate the intelltaence
aaterial required by the Executive Branch tn plann.ioa and carrying out
national polie:r and 1trates:7. •
A draft directive vaa alto torvarded to the Preaident Ybicb detailed the
principle• 1et out S.n the 10 October document and added eeveral nev propo•al•
a• tu:Dct1ooa and dut1e1 ot the propoaed aaenc:r 1nclndi'Q8S "Coordination ot
the tucct1oDI ot all agenciel ot the Government ••• ; collection,
either directly or tbrousb exiat1ng Government Departcenta and ageneiea, ot
pertinent information •• •J procurement, trainina and 1uperviaion ot 1t•
intelligence peraonnel; aubveraive operation• abroad, and determination ot
policiel tor and coordination ot tacilitiee euential to the collection ot
1ntol"'D&t1on." The DoDOvan plan alao recosntzed the eletDent ot aecrecy necea-
eary to the 1ucceaatul operation ot an intelligence in that the
Director to have authority "to employ nece11ary • and make pro-
Tieton tor necessary 1upplie1, tacilitiea, •nd aervice•" and be provide
tor the internal orsanilation and manasement • . •• in 1uch aanner .. be cay
'l'be Donovan propo1al va1 tent to various otticiall and the Joint Chief•
tor comment. Varioue counter vere made aDd on 24 -JauU&ry, the Joint
Strategic Surve;r Committee aubmitted a report to the Joint Cbieta ot Statt,
wbicb vaa buie&lly the DoDOvan Plan Yitb reT1110DI and refinement•. !bia
report vaa then uaed· aa the Joint Cbiete ot 8t&tt t•port vbich vu dated
19 September 19t.5, over a aontb a.tter the var had eu4ed.
The dl·att direeti'le
1\l>m1tted b7 the Joint Cb1ete, eal.led tor a •uonal
Intelligence compoae4 bt the Secretariea ot State, Var and !avy and

a repreaentati•e ot the Joint Cb1eta ot Starr vb1cb to be re•ponaible tor
o•erall intelligence plann1us and development, 1napeet1on and coordination ot
all teJeral intelligence actiTitie1 and vaa to .. aure the .oat ettect1ve accom-
pl1ahment or the intelligence •iuion related to ,..-tional. .. curity. A
Intelligence Agency vitb a director by tbe Prea1deot va1 to
be reapJnaible to the llA and a1111t it in ita   AD IDtelli&ence Advi-
aory Board made up or the beads or the principal •111tary aDd eiTil1an ase!lciea
h.lvius functions related to the national 1ecurity va• to adTiu the Director
ot Central Intelligence.
'l'b" Dl.>oovan Plan undoubtedly had a great deal ot influence on the Joint
Cbiefi even thouah they criticized it becauae tbe organization te propoled
would "o•ercentralize the national intelligence 1erT1ce• vitbout compeoaatiQ6
ad.antages and "place it at 1ucb a high level that it vould control the opera-
tion ot departmental intelligence agenciea, vithout relponaibility, either
indiYidually or colleeti.ely, to the bead• or department• concerned."
Various propo1al1 by the Joint Cbiefa indicate that the organization
they envinged vould oot be an undertaking vbicb vould re1ult in a "too
radical reorganization vitb the attendant di1turbance ot the present intel-
ligence 1et-up." While accepting coordination by a lational Intelligence
Authority, the Joint Cbieta recommended that the exilting intelligence
abould continue to function. 'Ibeir producta, bovever, were to be treely
available to the Central Intelligence Agency tor eyntbeoi•, and the
or the departmental intelligence agenciea were to be open to inspection by the
in aupport of 1t1 planning In tbie connection, the intereating
J-braee •protection or intelligence eourcea and method•" va• used. In the dratt
directive immediately tolloving the ltatement that operationa or the depart-
lltnt&l intelligence agencie1 were to be open to the Agency, the rolloving aen-
ten:e appeared: "In the interpretation of tbia paragraph, the llational Intel-
ligence Authority and the Central Intelligence will be re•pona1ble tor
tully protecting intelligence aources and metboda, which due to their nature,
have • direct aDd highly 1mport&nt beuing on a1lit&rJ operationa."
Secretary of the llavy, Jazces Forreatal, con•1dered the Joint Cbiere of
starr "•oundly conceived" and in a memorandum to the Secretary of War
on 13 October 1945 euggested that the proposal tor a federal intelligence agency
abould be puabed •v1goroualy at the White Bouse.• Shortly tberea.tter, A.uiatant
Lovett vaa placed in charge or a com1ttee in the War Department to
etudy the matter and proTide vbicb could be uaed aa a baeia for
diecu.ssiona vitb the Secretaries or State, War and llavy vho bad already 1utor-
liecuased a national intelligence
A1"ter CODJI1der1ng the TieVI aDd OpiDiODI or a creat aany people experi-
enced in wartime intelligence, the Lovett Co111111ittee eub11itted a report to the
Secretary or Var vbicb presented the cue tor a centralized national intel-
11gence Yery e1m1lar to that in the Joint Cbtere or starr report
euba1tted ai.x weeki previoualy. The Lovett Co111111ittee report eerTed .. a buil
tor the reco111111endatioa to the Pre•ident tor the eatabli1bment ot a national
organiration vb1cb vas tubmitted on 7 January 1946 by the
t&riu or . State, War aDd Bevy. A State Dep&rtment propo1al that the iatel-
, /
. .
lisenee 4rav ttl tunda tram the departaenta participating in the
lational Intelliaence Authority rather than trom au ' 1D4ependent budaet vas
the oul7 -Jor chaos• 1ucol'J'Orated 1u the Lovett ttee r•rt.
UDder aecttou 17 ot the State Dep&l'tMnt   t\m4.a tor the
ooD4uet ot 1utell1sence operations by the lattonal Intel11sence Authority,
aa 4iat1net troa thoae operattoDI conducted by tndiTidual asenctea, vould
be proTided b7 the 4ep.rtmenta aDd agenciea partictpatiQ& to auch operatioDI.
'l'be amounta aa4 proport1ona to be a&reed to by the partictpatios
woul4 be based on the reaponaibilitiea aDd capabil1tiea ot thoae asenciea.
!'he State Depe.rtmeut aabm1tte4 a reTised plau later to December iu which it
w.a atated that "the State Department atron&17 beltena • • • that u
independent bu.S&et tor the Central Agency ahould be aTOided tor aecar1t7
reaaon.e. Siuce pauaae ot the Independent Otticea Appropr1at1ona Act, 1945
(Public Lav 358, 78th Concre11), a nondepartmental aaeoer vithout au inde-
pendeut appeara to be apo11ible."
In their tiaal. reeo•enc!at1oDI to the Prelideut, the Secretariea ot
St:ate, Var aDd Ja-yy a&reeina vith the State propoaal
•Ua&eated that tund1 tor the Jational Authority be proTided by
the p&rt1ctpat1na departaenta in the amount aDd proportion• agreed apon by
•ember 1 ot the A•.athor1 ty. !be Director ot the Central Intelligence Ageuey,
Wlder the Authority
would 'tie to "employ uece11a17 peraonnel aDd u.ke
tor ueceaaary tacilitiea and aerTicea" vithin the limit•
ot the tunda made anilable.
The Central Intelligence
!be Jational Iutell1&enee Authority aDd the Central Intelligence Qroup
vere tormallJ authori&ed by a Preaident1al Directive dated 22 JanU&r,Y 1946.
Two ditterencea between the ot the Secretariea and the
Preaidential D1rect1n •.re ot ligniticance. Paragraph 9 limited CIG to
iuveetig'!ltion.a 4:>utlide the continental l1m1te ot the 'United Statea and 1te
posaeae1ons except as provided tor by lav and Presidential Directives. Para-
graph 10 the responsibility ot IIA aDd the Director ot Central
Intelltsence tovard protecting intelligence sourcea ud aethoda. u or1gina1ly
contemplated, tbe·reapoDiibilitJ in this tieU vas con.t1ned to protecting
1ource1 and methods vith vb1ch the Central Director became famil-
ia: iL iu.pection aaene1e• tho'e bearing on •111tary operatioDI.
Tbe Preaidential Directive touched upon the queation ot • only
tu the tirat ot Paragraph 2.
Text ot - 22 Januarz 1946
"l. It 11 II.Y desire, and I hereby direct, that all tede:n.l
foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordina-
ted ao aa to aaaure the • accompl1ahment ot the intel-
ligence m1esion related to the national aecur1ty. I hereby
- - - - ---------------
[Sec.retarie• ot State, V&r aDd lavi} toaetber Yitb another penon
to be named by •e a1 per1ooal   .. the lational Intel-
ligence Authority to accoaplilb tbia purpo1e.
"2. Vi tbh the U.11i t1 ot available   JO'-' I ball
ec.eb, troaa t1Jie to tilDe, auign • and tac1lit1el troll JOur
reapectlve department•, vbieb peraon1 1hall form a
Central Intelligence Oro up and a ball, "'nder the 41rec:t1on ot a
Director ot Central Intelligence, aaai1t the latiooal Intelligence
A'-'tbority. The Director ot Central Intelligence 1ball be deaigoated
by •e, 1ball be reaponaible to the Katiooal Intelligence Authority,
and 1ball lit a• a nonTOtin& •ember thereof.
"3. Subject to the ex11t104 lav
and to the direction and
control ot the •atioaal Intelli&ence Authority, the Director ot
Central Intelligence 1balla
"a. Accompliab the correlation and lftl'-'&tioo ot
intelligence rdatloa to the national ••curity, and the
appropriate diunioation Y1th1n the GonrJDent ot the
resulting atrategic and national polic7 intelligence. In
10 doing, tull nee aball be zade ot the at&tt and tacil-
1tiea ot the intelligence agencies ot JOur departments.
"b. Plan tor the ot 1'-'ch ot the
ot the intelligence agenciea ot your .. relate to
the national 1ecurity and recommend to the Rational Intelligence
Authority the e1tabliahment ot auch over-all policies and
objectives a1 vill assure the most accomplishment ot
the national intelligence million.
"c. Perform, tor the benefit or 1ald intelligence
agencies, 1uch 1ervicea ot common concern aa the lational
Intelligence Authority determines ean be acre efficiently
aecompllahed centrally.
"d. Pertol"'l 1uch other function• and dutiea related to
intelligence atteetlog the national aecurit7 &I the President
and the Rational Intelligence A'-'thority aay trom time to time
•4. lo police, lav enforcement or internal aecurity tunctiona
be under
"5• Such intelligence received by the intelligence agenciea ot your
departments a1 may be deaignated by the lational Intelligence Authority
•ball be treely aT&ilable to the Director ot Central Intellisence tor
correlation, evaluation or diaaemination. To the extent approved by the
Jational Intelligence Authority, the operation• ot 1aid intelligence
agenciea 1ball be open to 1napection by thr. Director ot Central Intel-
ligence in connection vitb planning tunctiona.
. /
•6. The exhtiQ& intelligence ot )"0\U' department.
aball continue to collect, eTaluate, correlate ao4 diaaemiuate
departmental 1ntelli&ence.
"7. !be Director ot Central Intelli&enee aball be adrtaed by
u Intelliaence A4rtaory :Board coo.aht1Dg ot the headJI (or
repreaentativea) ot the principal •1litary and cirtliaa intelligence
qenciea ot the Covermaent havitl8 t'unct1oo.a related to national
aeeurity, aa determined by the •ational Intelligence Authority.
•a. Within the acope ot exiatiug lav and Preaidential Directives,
other department• and aaenciea ot the ExecutiTe !ranch ot the 7ederal
Government aball turuiab aucb intelligence relating to
the national aecurity aa 1a in their poueuion, and u the Directcr
ot Central Intellt&ence may trom time to time requeat purauant to
regulatioua ot the Jational Intelli&ence Authority.
"9. Jlotbiug herein ah&ll be conatrued to authorize the makin&
ot investigations inaide the continental limita ot the United Statea
and ita poaeeaeione; except aa prortded by lav and Preaidential D1rec-
  In the conduct ot their activitiea the ••tional Intelligence
Authority and the Director ot Central Intelli&ence aball be reaponaible
tor tully protectitl8 intelligence aourcea and methods.•
On the initiative ot the Executive Department, the United States tor tbe
t1rat time in ita history, launchei a national intelligence organization. Ita
charter vas vr1tten in broad terms, vbich enabled the embryonic to teel
its evolutionary vay and handle obstacles only in such order as it deemed best.
Many ot the obataclea, bovever, vere iuberent in the charter under vbich the
national intelligence ayatem vu to operate. The criterion ot all •IA action
vas wether tbe action YaAJ neceua.ry to thf! planning, development and coordin-
ation ot Federal toreigD intelligence actiTitiea 10 aa to aaaure the moat
etrectiTe aceompliabmeut ot the intelligence a1ssion related to the national
ae-curit7. The term "national aecurity: it interpreted narrovly, vas conaid'!red
by aome to be an unfortunate limitation upon CIG becauae .any national intereats,
other than aecurity, can be aerved by a central intelligence aubmittiog
information to the policy aakera within the  
The operating agency under the lational Intelli&ence Authority, the
Central Intelligence Group
vaa 1odependent in name only becauee for all
practical purposes the activitiea ot CIG vere aubject to budget beads
ot the three department• - State, War and Jlfavy. Alao, the agency had no
employment rtgbta, obtaining ita peraonnel by asaignment •
. Arter the KIA and CIG ayatem vaa in exiatence tor about one year, aa a
purely executive creature, a great deal ot intereat bad developed in the
Congreaa vb1ch culminated in leg1alat1on creating a Jatiooal Security Council
and A Central Intelligence Agency. Studies made by the Senate Armed Services
Committee "and all teatimony rece1ve1 by it, ahova the need tor cloaer and
. /
, .
continuous coordination on a bigb leTel vitb1n tbe GoTerameut ot our domestic,
foreign and pol1e1ea, tor au appropriate 1utell1aenee to
eerTe both •111t&r7 and ciT111an ageueiea ot aeeurit7 ••• •
poltvar CoogrttuionaJ. 1UTea•;igatiou. into tbe Pearl l&rbor diluter
baTe been cited a1 one i>f tbe compelling reaaou. tor tbe eetabUah.meut of the
Central Intell1senee A&t.'DCJ. Aa a reau.lt ot 1te iunet1gat1on in December ot
the Boo1e Comm.ittee on Military Affair• 111ued "A Report On the System
Currently Ellployed in tbe Collection, Evaluation and of Intel-
ligence Affecting the War Potential of the United Statea," which recogni&ed
the need tor etroug intelligence a• the "nation'• tirat line ot defen•e."
The Committee aade nine recommendatiou.:
Reco111111endat1on 1: 'l'bat the Jational Intelligence J.utbori ty,
e•tabl1ebed on JanUAry 22
1946, by Pre•1dential 41rectiTe
authorized b7 act of Coogreu, (This 11 deligned to giTe the nev
autboritr a firmer baae.)
2: 'l'bat the Jational Intelligence Autboritr aball
eou.iat ot Seeretarie• of State, War, and the B&vy, or deputiel for
intell18ence. ('l'be Secretariea are obvil)ualy too buay to gin thil
bigbl7 important aubject the attention it deeerTea.)
Reco111111endat1on 3• the Central Intelligence Group recein
ita approprifttion• direct trom the Congre••· (At pre1ent tbe Group
receives ita appropriations ae graota trom the State Department, War
Department, and the Bavy Department, an unvieldl7 and
avkvard procedure.)
Reco1D!IIendat1on 4a 'l'bat the Central Intdligence Group have
complete control oYer ita ovn peraonoel. (At preaent the Grour
receivea "ratte tram the Departments of State, War, and lavy.)
Recommendation 5: '!'bat the of the Central Intelligence
Group be a 'iTilian appointed tor a term of 2 rear• and a
permanent term ot lO ye&re, at a aalary ot at least $12,000 a year.
(A elv111an wu.ld be leu aubject to the control or criticin
of any military eatablieament, leae likely to baTe ambitiou. in
another direction, vould be more in keeping vitb American tradition,
vould be more eymbolie of the ;olitico-military nature ot the
poled by intelligence in peacetime; furthermore, there ia
nothing to keep a qualified Army or Navy officer accepting the
poet in e1T1lian elotbee, and there ta every deaire, by aetting the
tenure of office at 10 ye&ra and making the aal&ry aubatantial, to
llake tbe poat attractive to one vbo baa le&Mled intelligence thoroughly
in the Army, Jlavy, or Foreign Service of the State Department. Con-
tinuity ot eervice ie   aa Tery important.)
6: That the Director ot the Central
Group 'be appointed by tbe President, by and lrl.tb the eoneent of the
, /
- - - - - -
Recommendation 7: !hat the Director ot Central Intelligence
ahall (l) aecompliah the correlation and evaluation ot intelligence
relat1Q8 to the national aecurity, and the appropriate 4iueminat1on
within the Conrment ot the reault1Q8 atrategic and national policy
intelligence, and in ao doins m!Uing tull u.e ot the .tart and
ta.cilitiea ot the iatelligence aaenciea already exiatiag 1n the
YI.'U"ioua OoTerameut depart.ml uta; ( 2) plan tor the coordination or
eueh ot the actiT1t1ee or the intelligence agencie• ot the Tarioua
GoTeroment department• aa relate to the national aecur1ty and recom-
aend to the Jational Intelligence Authority the eatabliabment or
aucb o..-er-all and objective& as v1ll auure the moat
ettectin or the national intelligence aiaaion;
(3)   tor the benefit ot aaid intelligence agenciea, auch
1erT1ce1 ot common conceru related directly to coordination, eor-
  evaluation, and diesemination ae the Rational Intelligence
Authority aball determine can be more efficiently accomplished
eontrally; (4) perform auch other aimilar tunctiona and dutiee
related to intelligence affecting tbe national ae the
Congreae and the !ational Intelligence Authority may tram time to
time direct. It i• epecltically underatood that the Director ot
Central Intelligence not undertake operationa tor the
ot intelligence.
(Tbia paragraph ie intended to enable the Central Intelligence
Group to concentrate on the analysis and evaluation ot high-level
intelligence tor the President and others vbo have to determine
national pol1c7. One ahould not remove any intelligence operation
trom the agenciee vbere day-to-day policiea and decisions have to
be made; the collection and basic analysis in each field ot intel-
ahould be aaeigned to the agency having primary responsi-
bility in that field.)
Recommendation 81 That Paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and
10 ot the Preaidential directive ot January 22, 1946, relating to
the establishment or a Rational Intelligence Authority be enacted
into lav, vitb euch revisions in vording aa may aeem necessary.
(The Prelident
1 d1rect1Te vas earet'Ul.ly prepared and had at
the time or ita publication, the lupport or the interested agencie&.)
Recommendation 91 That the be requeated aympathetically
to further the question or the eatabliabment or an Intel-
Corps tor the training, deTelopment, and aaa1gcment of
eapecially qualified orticere.
In July 1946, a draft or enabling legialation tor a proposed Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) vaa aent to the White Houae by the Central Intel-
It called tor a National Intelligence AutboritJ (RIA) con-
eiatiQ8 or the Secretariee or State, War, and Bavy, a pereonal representative
or the President and the "Director or the Central Intelligence Agency" as a
non-voting member. Tbe IIA vas to superv11e the act1v1t1ea ot CIA. It vas
, /
J.t·ovided that CIA vae to be e1tabl11hed "vith a Director vbo 1ball be the bead
tbereot." In December a more detailed and comprehene1Ye draft val lubm1tted
to the White Bouse vbich reflected tbe experience gained after 10 ot
operation under the 22 January 1946 Executive Order.
IL propo•ins thit legialation CIG attempted to overcome the auvorkable
ot ita charter, one ot the moet glarina ot vbich val the necesaity
tor c:w to obtain peraonnel troaa the State, War and Bavy Departmenta. It vas
until vel! iT&to the IUIIIIDer ot 1946 tbat arrangement. vere made tor CIG
to b1re directly. Budgetary problema &lao vere Yery difficult to
handle until agreement vaa reached vbich eatabliabed a vorking fund at the
disposal ot the CIG. Fortunately tor CIG all ot the departments and agencies
ot and particularly tbe Bureau ot the Budget, the General
Office and the State, War, Javy and Treaeury   vere
quick to rea!ite the lpecial adminiatrative problem• vbicb aroae in tbe
adminiatration and operations ot an intelligence agency. Tbey made pos1ible
the arrangements vbicb enablftd the agency to operate. Bovever, tbe manner
ot adm1niltrat1ve and logistical 1upport vas alvaya considered to be ot a
tempc,rary nature pending the pauage or aome torm ot military unification
One or the drarta ot enabling legislation had incoJ?-)rated the term
"vtth a Director ot Central Intelligence vbo 1ball be the bead thereof ."
Thil particular vording vas the same aa the terminology in the 2:2 January
d1recti ve. Ita apparent purpose vaa to create a poat to be tilled by an
official, re1pon1ible tor the centralized intelligence function• tor tbe
entire Federal Government, v1tb an intelligence agency to aaaiat bim.
In January 1947, at the time this propoaed legialation vas being
•tujiei at the White Bouse, Trum&n announced that the War and
Bavy bad agreed on a legislative program for unification or
the &rmed tervicea. Shortly thereafter, a aerioua effort vas made to
draft unification legislation tor aubmission to Coogre11. A team conaiat1ng
of Vice Admiral Forreat St.e:rtD&n, Major General Lauril Jloratad and Charles
Murphy, AdminiatratiYe Aasiatant to the President, vas 1elected to vrite
the White Bouse Yeraion or the Batiooal Defenae Act ot 1947.
The draft vbich resulted ll&de the CIA the coordinatins agency tor
  apparently adapting to the intelligence field the example
made in earlier military unification proposals, vbicb envilioned a single
defense to attached a number of coordinating
agencies, aome tor inter-military departmental coordination, and others
for m1litary-:ivil1an coordination.
The team did not include in their draft many of the more controver•ial
contained 1ri the December CIG probably becau1e ot
d1tf1 in getting them through Congre11. Instead, tbey aought 11mply
to lay dovu the broad ot a central intelligence 1ert1.ce upon vhich
the could later be developed.

7he   draft or nev legislation vas rece1ve1 by the
Group on 22 January. Section l02(a) or the draft
•hted that "There 1hsll be in the Council or National Detenae a Central
Inte;J.igence Agenc)' vith a Director vbo 1hall be tbe bead thereof • • "
1'be Director or CIJ, Lt. Gen. Vandenberg, tbe General Counael or CIG,
Kr. Jiou.ston, and one or his auistantis 11et vith the drafter• the Dext day
and tted tor incorporation in tbe next c1ratt, General
Vandenberg that the Director'• tunction or providing policy makers
vitb perUMnt ebould be spelled out more clearly. While General
vas strongly oppoeed to the participation or the Central Intel-
Agency or ita director in policy deci•ion& on any matter, be felt
that the Director or Central Intelligence 1hould be present at meeting& or
t.be N:ltio!lal Se.::urUy Council . To this General Noratad voiced 1erious
e.tceptions, ae be felt that the CoUDcil vas already too big. He thought
the Director 1bould not even be preaent as an obaerver, as this M..i
to be cumberaome and \liJVOrkable at meetings or the Joint Cbiera or
Starr. · As a compromise, Admiral Sherman 1uggeated that the Director aho..U.d
normally be present at aeetinge or the Council, in ita discretion. Genere.l
Vandenberg concurred in this, as did Genere.l loratad, and it vaa accepted
Vitb the addit-ional proviso that the Joint Cbier• or Sta.tr vould allo attend
meetings at the diacretion or the CoUDcil.
General indicated the difficulties vbicb be bad in
having to go to the Natio!lAl Intelligence Authority on many problems. Be
felt that the or his vould be multiplied, as be
have to ask policy guidance and direction from the Council, vbicb vas to con-
ai&t or many more me'Uibers than the N. I.A. He vas assured that the 1!li:ent or
the act vas t.bat the CIA vould operate iodependently and come under the
CounC'il only on suC'b specific measures aa the Council vould, trom time to
time desire to direct. It vould not be tor the Agency to aek
ap!Jro'V'!l.l 1'rom the The also pointed out the difti-
eultiee or operation Vbere clandestine methods vere in the
or detailed legislation empowering him to operate on tunds,
certain or and discharge any
of disloyalty.
It ves that the or Cectrsl Intelligence ahould report
1.:- the   on Derense. General Vandenberg iooicated 1t
vould be o.ecesaary to report. somewhere an:1 that toth the Preaident and be
did va!!t another agency "!'ree vbeeling" aro·1nd the Government. Bovever,
it tbough1. that the Agency should have sutricient pover to rerform its
OV"l tun"=:tion.a V1tbout its beiog to have srecif1c approval trom
tte Council on action.
The next draft received by Ciu reflected some of the&e A
major <'h&r-8e vas in the beginning or 't.he Intelligence section vbich reads:
"There is hereby established a Central Intelligence Agency ••• vith a
Director or Central Intelligence vbo shall be the besd thereof • • • II In
the third draft vben the regarding the poe1t1on or the Director
as the Advisor of the CounC'il vas eliminated, the Arvr:J-Ne.vy

conferee point.e1 out that the podtdon ot the Director u the Gover-..ent'a
intelligence dviaor vaa inherent in the podt1on itaeU. 'l'be wording "With
a Director ot Central Intelltgencew remained and appeared in the eventual
legialation; the poaition ot Dtrector ot Central Intelligence vaa recognized
1'rom the beginntns aa beins .ore than the head or the Central Intelligence
Agency but rather u tha Chiet Intelligence IArtaor in the OoYermaent.
It au.et be remembered that in 1947, Congre11 and the Preaident
a Ott1ce
vera atronsly influenced b7 the Pearl HArbor inveatigaUona 'IIllich ehoved the
Deed tor an effective intelligence ageocy. 'l'hU vaa atreued in Bou.ee and
Senate heartns• on the National Security Act btU, and Vitneu atter Vitneoa
teetitied aa to w.lue ot centralized intelligence. It vaa &lao pointed out
on numeroua occaotona that the proviaiona tor a Director ot Central Intel-
ligence and a Central Intel11gence Agency would be aimply a legialattve
recognition ot the PreUdent'a order ot 22 JanuaJ7 1946. The baUc role ot
the Director ot Central Iutelltgence trom 1946 vaa deacribed by  
Vandenberg in April 19471
"The Direetor ot Central Intelligence ia preaeutl7 charged vith
the tollovina baaie tunctionaz
1. The collection ot foreign intelligence information ot
cert.in tne• -- Without 1nterterins With or dupUeattns the normal
collection activittea ot the military and naval iotelli&ence aervicea ,
or the Foreign Serrtce ot the Staui Department.
2. The evaluation, corr!llation and interpretation ot the foreign
1D1'onoat1on collected, to order to produce the atrategic and national
policy intelligence requtred by the Preddent and other appropriate
officials ot the Goverment.
3. Tbe diaaemination or the ll&tioD&l intelligence produced.
4 0 The Of IUch aervicea Of COIImiOn c.:>ncero to the
intelligence agencies or the Government u can be 1110re
efficiently accompliohed centrally.
5. Plannins tor the coordination ot the intelligence activities
ot the Government ao aa to ae:ure the 1110re ettective accompliohme:lt
ot the national intelligence objectives."
General Vandenberg aloo upon the respona1b1lit1eo of the
Dtrector to the intelligence communityz
Win order to perform hi• prescribed functiona, the Director of
Central Intelligence must keep in close and intimate contact vith the
departmental intelligence agencies of the Government. To provide
tonoal machinery tor thie purpose, the President'• Directive eatab-
liahed an Intelligence Adviaory Board to advise the Director. Tbe
permanent membera ot thia Board are the Director• ot Intelligence of the
\lu and Navy Departments and the Air Force. Provieioc i 1 made,
aoreover, to invite tbe bead• of other intelligence agencie1 to a1t
aa memhra of the Adviaory Board on all vbich voul.d attect
their agencie1. In thia unner
the Board ter'f' .. to turuiab the
vitb the benefits of the knovledge
advice, experience,
and over-all requirements or tbe department• &D4 their
intelligence agencies."
In ita report to   BR 4214
the Rational Securit)' Act of 1947
the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department
the importance of the Intelligence Agency proTiaion of the Act in
relation to the coordination of Ubited State• policies in the foreign and
military The committee reported that, "In order that the
Securit)' Council in ita and advice to the Preaident 1llaY have
ava.ilable adequate there 11 provided a Central Intellige!lce
Agency.• ·
On 10 February 1947
Mr. Allen Dulles 1ubmttted 1everal co11111enta to
. em on itl enabling legt1lation. Be wrote that condderat1on abould be
given to haTing the Director of Intelligence "YOte in .U and "aleo to
permit matter1 to be referred to the President ••• in cue by aD$ ch&l:.C':e
there abould be a difference of opinion betveen the Director and the other
member a of the autbori ty." Mr. Dullea also 1tated that reference to the
conduct of foreign intelligence operationa •centrally" doe1 not have much
mean1Q8 and auggeated that it 1bould be atated that the operationa
are to be carried on by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Specific reference to the organizationsl place of CIA and ita poeition
relative to the Rational Security Council and other agencies did not occur
otten in the beariQ8B conducted on the Rational Securit7 Act bill. 'l'vo of
the more autbori the colloquies are included belov. On l April 1947, the
Senate Armed Services Committee held a bearing on the Rational Securit)' Act
1947 1egialation at vbicb Admiral Sherman and General Vandenberg testified.
The tolloving are excerpts trom the
'NDDroS 1 • • • vben JOU get dovn to the Central
Intelligence Agency
vbicb certainly il one of the .oat important
of all the tunction.a aet forth in the bill, I notice that it
reportl to the Prelident and does not aeem to have aey
line running to the Var Department, or the Jfavy Department, or to
the Secretary tor Air. And I vas vonder1DB it that rather excluded
position, you might aay
vas a vboleaome thing. It seems to me that
Central Intelligence Agenc)' ought have more direct contsct Yitb
the J.:rrrr:t and the Navy and the Air Force; a.nd u I 1ee it on the
chart here, it il pretty vell let aside aod goea only to the Pres-
ident. Vbat 11 the reason tor th&tt
.AIMIRAL SHERMAN 1 Ve ll, 1ir, this d 1..agram abov1 the primary
control or the Central Intelligence Agency through the Wational
Security Council vbicb, of course, il responsible to the President.
But, of couree, the Agency, by itl detailed
directive, take• information in tro. the a111t&ry aerTicea
&lao auppliea them Yith 1ntorut1on.
In other vorde, 1t ia a atatt aaency and controlled throuab
the Jatioaal Security Council, vhicb 11 aupported by the a1litary
aerrtcu, aDd in turu, aupporta them.
SDATaR 'n'DmGS: It ueu to me that ot eoarae the7 would
ditt\ue aucb information u a utter ot procedure to tbe
J.:nq, .. 't')' and Air Force, aa they collected the 1ntorut1on and
u the)' deemed it pertinent. But I vould teel a little aore
aecure about 1t it there were· a line running tram that aaeDC)'
to the War Depe.rtment, tbe lavy Department, and the Air Force,
rather tha!l have it so up through the Pr .. ident and back aeain.
Becauae the Preaident ia a rather buay man, and Vbile he hae
control over 1t, one ot ita tunctioDJ, it aeeu to ae, ougbt
to be to have a cloaer tie-in Vith the three aerrtcea than the
chart indicate•.
AIMIRAL SH.D\MAN: Well, air, that 11 the trouble Y1tb the
diagram. Actually, the Securit7 Council, placed directly under
it, has member• ot the three department•, the Secretary ot Jational
Detenee, the Central Intelligence Agency, vho collaborate• vary
eloaely Vitb Military and Kaval Intelligence, and there are a
good many other • •
SENATOR   I realize that, but even ao, I think intel-
ligence ia about ae important A part ot running a war aa there ia,
u I k:nov you V1ll agree. And it 11 rather aet ott by itael.t,
a!ld il only under the Preeident; Vbich ie all right tor general
direction purpoaea, but I do not reel eatietied in having it
the!"e vithout aome linea running to the War Department, the llavy
and the Air Force
nen thollgb that a18bt tollov and
they might do it anybov.
AIMDUL Well, in a turther development or tbil chart,
ve aight ahov a line or collaboration and 1ervice and 10 on, extend-
iDS from the Central Intelligence Agency to the three
and to those othera.
SENATe!\ TYDINGS: To the Joint Cbiet• ot starr, aeyvay.
AIJotlRAL 'l'bey aerve the Joint Cbiete ot Starr, aa a
llatter or tact. We have a Central Intelligence (man) in the Policy
Council or the Research aod Development Board at the preaent time.
SENATOR T1DOOS: U you ever do another chart, will you do me
the favor or connecting that up vith thole three department• and
Vith the Joint Cbie1"a or Starn Because it look.a like it 11 aet
up in that vay to advi1e the Prel1dent, IDOre than to adviae the
1ervice1 and the Cbie1"• or Staff; vhich, ot cour1e, 11 DOt
intention ot it at all, in my opinion.
. /
AlJURAL BlmUWI: Ve tried, lu thil particu.l.ar chart, to lhov
the prim&%'7 lioe ot control, Vith tbe exception ot the dotted
Une frOID the Prelident to the Jo1at Chiet1 ot St&tt, Which 11
there tor con1titutiooal reaaoua.
SIJQT(J\ Vell, I bope that rq COIDentl will cau.ae ua
to tiDd aome vay tbat we can aake 1ure that IOCDeone will otter an'
amendment trom tbe War Departaent or tbe 1&"7 Departaent tbat the
Intelliaence Agency 11 to have direct tie-in vith the Joint Chiet1
and the Army
Navy, aDd Air Force. Othenile, ve han another
Pearl Harbor controverey, vith the quution ari11DB
"Vbo cot the
tntormationT" And tbe repl,y, •n vu DOt  
'!'bat 11 one tbiq that 1hould not happen
And a1 tbil 11 1et up, 1t vould lend the laJUn tbe opiD.ion
tbat 1t va1 aore or le11 detached, rather than an 1ntep-&l. p&rt
ot tbe three
SENATOR TrDOOS: Admiral, that il an avtull7 lhort bit ot
explanation, under the caption "Central Agency,• the
vay it il 1et up here, leparately, to be appointed by the Presi-
dent, and euperaeding the 1ervice1 nov run by the Army and the
lfavy, I respectfully 1ubmit to you and to General lforatad that
1 t aigbt be r..ae to put an amendment in there, in order to make
certain that the tb1ng il underatood; that thia Central Intel-
ligence Agency aball aerv1ce the three department• and tbe
Joint Chief'• of' Statt'
and 10111e tie-in Yith the three
dep&rtment1, rather than to leave it hauging up there on a
limb all ott by itlel.t'. I do not think that YOuld change any-
thing materially, but it vould clarity it, aDd aake it plain
that ve are letting up 1omething tor the purpoaee tor vbich
ve conceive it to be aet up.
AIMIRAL SHERMAlf: Well, 11r, I would like to aake a com-
aent on the lansl.la8e as to the Central Intelligence Agency.
At one tilDe in the drafting ve couaidered completelr conring
the Central Intelligence Agency in the manner that it ahould
be conred by lav.
SENATOR 'l'rDOOS: Admiral, wy point 11 11Japl7 thia: that
under the vordins aa to the Cent.ral Intelligence Agency vhich
begina on page 20 and ends at the top of' page 22, it deala
aore or leaa vith consolidation and not vith the dutiel that
deTOln upon that ott'ice. It 1eem1 to me there 11 a TOid in
the bill that ought to be eliminated.
AIJtORAL SHERMAlf: Well, ve con.sidered the aatter ot tr'71D8
to conr the Central Intelligence Agency adequate17, aDd we
toun! that that matter, in itaelt, vae going to be a aatter ot
leg11lat1on ot conliderable acope and importance.
OD 25 April 1947 4uring a bearing ot the Bou1e Committee on Expend-
iture• in the Executive Department Vitb Secretary Forrettal tuti1')'1ng
the tolloV1ng remarks vere ude z
SECRETARY PORRESTAL: The only obJection 11 qain the
seneral one of the limitations that could conceiTabl7 1top
nry prompt action.
HR. BOOGS: The Director ot the Central Intelltaence
Agency vould vork under the National Security Council.
MR. BOGGS: Be 11 not a aember ot tbe Jfational Security
Council; be il an inderendent appointment ot the Prelident,
but be vorks under, on this chart •• be 11 not a member ot
the Council, the heavy line dravn here, but be il aore or
leis an executive 1ecretary on intelligence matters tor the
SECRL'I'ARY FORRES"rAL: Well, it il obviou., Mr. Boggs,
that the result& of hie vork vould be ot euential importance
to the Security Council.
MR. BOOGS: I think &o, and I agree Vitb you, but the
thought that I have in mind va& that be 1bould be a member
ot the Council himself. Arter all, be 11 dealing Vitb all
the information and the evaluation ot that information, tram
vberever ve can get it. It teems to me that be hal knowledge
and information ot matter• vbicb the National Security Council
voul4 consider more information at band and the eTa.luation ot
that io..tormation than any other 11ember ot that Council. Be
thould be put on an equal basis.
SECREI'ARY   I think that there it alvays lome
limit to the ettectiveneas ot any organitation in proportion
to the nUZDber ot people that are on it. The terrlces and the
intelligence 1ntormat1on ot the Director ot Intelligence
vould be available, and certainly no man vbo 11 either the
Secretary ot Rational Deten&e or the Chairman ot the Security
Council, vould vant to act or proceed vitbout eou.tant refer-
ence to the aourcea available to this Central Intelligence
Director. But again, I vould not try to 1pecity it by lav, 10
confident am I that the practical vork1ng• out ot tbi1 organ-
ization vould require hia preaeoce moat ot the tiae.
MR. BOGGS: I can tee -· I do not knov that I can 1ee --
I can-vi1ualite in my mind, even 1! this bill become• a lav,
as pre•ently 1et ur, a great deal ot room tor contution on
intelligence matters. Here ve have the Director ot the
Central Intelligence Agency, re&poneible to. the 5at1onal
, /
Security Council, and Jet the Director 11 DOt a .... ber ot
that Council, but be bas to set all ot bit information 4ow
through the chair ot the Secretary ot •atioD&l. DeteDJe, and
all the other aaenciea ot Ooven:aeut in addition to our
utiooal deteD.Ie aaencie., the Secretary ot Agriculture, the
S.cretary ot State, aDd 10 tortb. I Juat cazmot tulte •••
bov the aan 11 aoing to c&rry out hil tunctioDJ there withrJut
a great deal ot eonl"\uion, and really aore opportunity to put
the blame on aomebody el1e than there 11 nov.
SECRETARY FORR.ESrAI.s Well, it you ban ~ organization,
Mr. Bogga
in ltbich IDeD ban to rely upon placing the blame,
and tbi1 11 particularly true of Government, it JOU once get
that conception into their beads, you cannot I"Wl auy organ-
ir.ation, and it so•• to the root, real.l.)', of thit vbole
question. Tbil thing Yill o ~ vork, and I ban taid f'rom
the beginning it vould only vork, it the Coa!pOnenta in it
vant it to vork.
MR. BOGGS: Right, I certainly agree Yith that. IOv,
11r, in the ennt tbil bill becomes a lav
vill it require
very much additional legialation to 11Dplemeut it aDd aake
it ettective, in 70ur opinion!
SECRETARY FORR!STAL: Well, I vould think there 1bou.ld
be an examination ot all lavs that deal Yith the eatablitbment
ot tbe War Department and the Navy Department, and a du1ting
otf, 10 to speak, ot their functions in consonance v1tb thia
legislation, it it is paeeed.
General Vandenberg in bit te1ti1110uy betore tbe Senate Armed Services
C ~ i t t e e on the •ational Security Act ot 1947 explained the advilability
ot centralizing clandestine operationa abroad and empbssi&ed that the
Central Intelligence A8ency "mwst have the authority to collect in the
field ot national, al opposed to departmental, intelligence, vbere ve
have the 11eana to till the gaps /J.ett by overt eolleetio.!!l by clandestine
or 1emi-covert means it neceeeary. • He continued by laying that "At the same
time it IDUit be remembered that auy eentralif.ed clandettine 1ervice1
vould be available to each ot the department• tor ita 1peeialhed oeed1."
Tbe tact that the Central Intelligence Agency vould participate in covert
collection probably impressed tbe Congres1men. Beterence1 vere aade in
debates on the bill, e.g., Congre1sman Bolitield on 19 JUl7 1947 1tated:
•z want to brpreu upon tbe mind• ot tbe aembera that the vork ot tbil
Central Intelligence Agency, as tar as the collection ot evidence ie con-
cerned, 11 etr1ctly in the field ot eecret foreign intelligence, vbat is
knovn at clandestine intelligence."
Debate• in Congreee
There va• little opposition in the Congreu to the plan tor a central
intelligence eervice. Several Congresemen pointed out that the intelligence
agency prov111on.t in the va.riows untrication billa vere the 1101t i.aJportant
- - --______ __:__ _____ ___
part• of the unification les11lat1on. BoveTer
there vu a great deal of
ditcUieion particularly in committee on vbether or not the Director tbould
be choaen trom one of the Anod SerT1ce1 or vbether he ahoul.d be a chili&n.
!'be Senate Jill pro'Yided that the J)irector of Central IDtellisen.r.e wu to
be appointed troa the armed 1erT1ct1 or troa c1'Yil1an lite. A Boule emend-
aent provided that the Director of Central Intellisence be appointed trom
c1rtl1an lite. 'l'be reaton moet otten ginn tor the Bonae uaen4ment vu
that it vas a 1tep taken to pre Tent the Central Intellisence Agency trom
becoming a •Geetapo-tJPe orsanization.• !he conferee• adopted
the Senate Tereion but v1th teTeral conditiona liaiting the connectiona
v1th h11 ler'Yice of a Director cboeen tro111 the aUite.ry 1er'Yice1.
folloving excerpt• pertaining to the formation of a Central Intel-
lisence Agency are taken trom the debate on the unification lesielation. In
the BoUle on 19 Ju.ly 1947:
MR. WADSWOR'lli: ••• In addition, under the Council there would
be another element vbich il to ad'riae the Council, •ubJect to
regulationa aade b7 the Council, in the field of Iatelligenee,
in the foreign field; and there it e1tabli1hed a central intel-
liaenee aaenc1 tubJect to the Council beaded. b7 a director.
The tunction of that agency 11 to conatitute ittelt a1 a
ptbering point for information coming troaa all OTer t\le vorld
through all kind• of channell concerning the potential 1trength ot
other natioDJI and their poll tical intentioDB. There il nothing
te'!ret about that. ETery nation in the vorld 11 doing the tame
thing. But it must be remembered that the Central Intelligence
Agency is 1ubject to the Council and doee not act independently.
It il the lt.€eney for the collecting and diueminating ot informa-
tion vbich vill help the President and the Council to adopt wile
and ettect1Te pol1ciee.
So vith the information ot that 1ort concerning other nations
and information coming in vith respect to our ovn re.ourcu, both
ot vbich are anilable to the Council aDd Preaident, ve vill have
tor the tirlt time in our hietory a piece of uchinery that 1hou.ld
vork and it h high time that ve have it. We have never bad it
before. During this last var all aorta of devices vere resorted
to, obvioUBly in great haste
to accompli sh a thing like thil. You
may remember the huge number of epecial coamitteee, organ1Lat1ona
and 48encies eet up by !!xecutive Order in an to catch up
v1th the target. We have learned as a result of the var that ve
ebou.ld have aome permanent organir.ation, and that i1 the one
proposed in tbie bill.
MR.     ot Wilconein: It eeeme to ae troa vbat the
gentleman has aaid that the Central Intelligence Agency it one
ot the very important parte ot this entire eet-up. I Y11h to
aek the gentleman it there ie a coordination pro'Yided
tor betveen that Aaency and, lay the Department of statet For I
feel that certain information of the Aaency voul4 affect the
act1Titiu of the entire 1y1tem.
MR. 'l'be gentleman 11 correct. I poiDt out that
under the provilions or the bill the Intelligence Asency 1n
effect must cooperate vith all the agencie1 of the Gonrament,
includitl8 the State Department. It 11 the gatheriaa }lOint of infor-
mation that may come in trom any department of the Gonrment vith
re1pect to the foreign field, including the State Depe.rtaent, of
couru; 1ncludiD& the War Depe.rtment, through   including the
Bavy Department, through Oftl. 'l'hat information 1a pthered into
the central agency to be evaluated by Central Intelligence and
then di11em1nated to thole agencies of Government that may be inter-
uted in 1ome portion of it.
MR. SHEPPARD: ••• On the next level abo-re the Rational
Military Establishment there 11 provided the Bational Security
Council vith the Prelident a1 cbainD&n, vbicb vill effect1nly
coordinate our dome1tic and foreign policiel in the light of
1cund information furni1hed by the Central Intelligence Agency,
and vith the knowledge of our manpover and material capabilities
deriTed trom the National Security Resource• Board.
MR. PRICE: ••• AJ 1uch, it il adminiltrative unity, in
the interest of coordinating the total var effort of the !ation,
because in addition to putting an Araiy, a Bavy and an Air Porce
under the direction of a aingle admintatrative Secretary of
Defenae, it places a War Council, the Joint Chief• of Staff, the
MunitioDB Board, a Research and Development Board, the Central
Intelligence Asency, and other aucb department• in the Bation.al
Defense Establishment.
MR. JUDD: ••• llov, that aounds all right, but all of ua,
being human beings, 1urely knov that it a one-•tar general ia
Director of Intelligence, and a tvo-atar general or a three-atar
general talks to him, it ia llbolly unrealistic to ima8ine that
they vill not have an influence over him despite the lav.
'l'be man vbo had charge of our aecret intelligence in Germany
during the var vaa a cirtlian, Mr. Allen Dullea. Be cUd 1ueh an
extra.ordin.ary job that be vas in contact vith the top 11en tn
Bitler'• aecret aervice. Bitler had to execute hil top five men
because they vere double-crouing him and playing b&ll. vith oar
people. Mr. l)ullea told ua that the that tai..u thia "Job
ought to go into it a1 a man llbo goe• into a mon.ute1"7. Be
ought to take it a a J. Edgar Hoover baa taken the FBI Job - aake
it hil life'a vork. Be certainly ought to be cut completely loose
from any ties or responsibilities or connections v1th aay other
branch of the Government - civil or military - except the
President and the National Security Council.
. /
  MAlt\.SCO: ••• Mr. Cbai.Hian
this aection on central
intelligence vu ginn aore atudy b7 our aubcoramittee aD4 b7 the
full cOIIDi ttee than any other aection or the bill. It wu a
ao•t difficult aection to write. All or us bad the aame obJective
in viev, yet ve bad different ideas on ito I think peraooall.y
th&t the ve reached adequately protects the poaition.
Eventually I certainly tru.at that the bead ot tbia intelligence
agency vill be a civilian vbo 11 trained in the agency. It
takel years to train that type Of mao. Some vill tell 70U that
the preeeot director h not adequately trained; that 11 true.
\le do not ban any mao in the On1ted Statea vho b.u adequate
training today to do this kind or vork becau.e unfortunately
the United States has never gone in !or the r1gbt kind ot
intelligence. It ve had had a atroog central intelligence
in all probability we vould never had bad tbe
attack on Pearl Har'bor; there might not have been a World War II.
Many vitneuea appeared before our comittee. We vere avoro to
aecrecy, and I hesitate to even discuaa this aection becauae I
am afraid I might aay aomethiog, becauae the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD 11 a public record, and divulge aome information here
that ve received in that committee that vould give aid and
comfort to any potential enemy ve have. For that reuoo I· am
even reluctant to mention the testimony. I hope the committee
vill support the provieion in tbe bill, becauae the future
security of our country in a large measure depend• upon the
intelligence ve ·'Moat ot it · can be gathered YithoUt clan-
destine intelligence, but aome ot it must be of neceaaity
clandeatine intelligence. The thi oga ve aay here today
language ve c.baoge, might endanger the lives or IOCDe American
citi:ten.a in the future.
I think you can rely on the patriotiStD or men like the
gentleman t'rom liev York (Mr. WAr..SWORTB)
the gentleman tram
MasGacbusetts (Mr. McCORMAC<:)
tl-.e gentleman tram California
the gentleman M1 ch igan (Mr. BOFPMAli) •
We did our beet to vork out laQ.5\188e here that vould protect
that position and keep trom b'.llldiog up a ao-called military
hierarchy. A bill vill be introduced soon at'U!r thil legislation
becomes lav that vill be referred to the Committee on Armed
Services, vbere more atudy f!an be given to this moat illportant
aubject ••••
MR. BUSBEY I ••• Tbe main point in the amendment offered
by the gentleman trom Minnesota (Kr. JUDD) 1a permanency and
t he etrort to vork tovard a civilian bead vbo 11 not 1n1'luenced
by any department or our Military Establ1ebmenta.
MR. Mr. Chairman, I ahould like to cU.rec:t
myself nov to section 105 concerniog the Central Intelligence
to vbich section DIY propoeed amendment relates. ,;'he
ameDdmeot, 1o effect, provides that a c!rtlian 1ball head
tbil intelligence agency rather than alloving a choice or a
civilian or a militAry mao. It al1o prorldel that tbe povera
granted tbe Central Intelligence group under the Preaident•a
Executive Order 1hall pan oo to tbe Bat1onal Security Cooncil
aa vas designated in the bill vbich paned other body on
July 9·
The amendment further provides that the authority and
fUnctions ot the Central Intelligence Agency ahall be tboae
vbicb vere deaigoated under the Preaident•a Executive Order.
As this aection ia nov constituted, the Director or tbe
!ntelligence agency to be chosen by the President, Yitb tbe
consent or tbe Senate, may be either a civilian or an ott1crr
or tbe armed 1ervicea. I reel that it il extremely uodeair·
able to have aa bead or this agency, in a poai tion vbich
makes it incumbent upon bim to coordinate intelligence report&
from the Yarious aervices, a member or one or the aervices.
A c1rtl1an in thil position vould not be aubJect to a cry or
discrimination or favoritism and vould, therefore, be in much
better position to be completely objective in di1cuasion. The ·
portion ot this amendment vbich related to the granting or
povera under the Preaident'a Executive Order to the Wational
Security Council retains at least a aemblance or pover vithin
this agency to effectively correlate, evaluate, and diaaeminate
information vbich ia gathered by other intelligence 1erT1cea.
By confining its paver a to this authority, ve, there tore,
effectively deny to tbe Central Intelligence Agency the paver
to interfere Y1 th the vork personally being done by e1tabl11hed
aervicea in field.
I refer you, Mr. Chairman, to the   Report llo. 2734 or
the Seventy-ninth Congress, vbich a report on the intelligence
of our national var effort and vbich include• recom-
mendations made by tbe Houae Committee on Military Affaire at
that time. While tbe mietakea of World War II are 1till fresh
in our minds, the committee undertook a aurvey to
vbat our policy on national intelligence 1bould be. 'l'beir recom-
aen.datiotl.l are not vbolly carried out in the aeuure bere contem-
plated; but the ga1na made Iince their report vould be consolidated
by adoption of thil amendment.
I feel, Mr. Chairman, and I cannot 1treae it too atrongl.y,
that vb.at 11 needed 11 ao independent intelligence aaency, working
vtthout direction by our armed 1ervicea, v1th full authority in
operational procedure•.
Hovever, it to incorporate 1uch broad
authority into the bill nov before ua - ao cooaequentl7 I aupport
the amendment vbit'b ha.l nov been offered. To do leu than thil
. /

would be to vreclt vbat little ba1 been done to •treagtben our
intelligence 1y1tem, I feel that il il Y1r7   for the
1ecurity of our •uon, at a tim• vben our .ecurity il 110re aDd
aore thr .. tened, to grant adequate authority to tbl Central Intel-
ligence A(J.e=f.
In conclu.lion, Mr. Chairman, I do vant to c0111111eDd the sentle-
man frOID Michigan (Mr. BOFPMIJII) aDd the other aemben of bU com-
a1ttee for their ardent 'IIOrlt aDd fairneu in reporting thi1
MR. JUDD: ••• The Director of Central Intelligence i1
1uppoeed to deal vith all pouible threat• to the countr)' from
abroad, through intelligence aet1T1ti11 abroad, But 'ritbout
tb11 aendment be vill have DOt onl)' the ruult1 of the J'BI'I
intelligence aetiTit1e• here at home, but al1o the power to
1napeet itl I do DOt believe that if n bad
realised the full illport of thil language 'llben ve vere 1tlldying
it in ve would ban allowed it to 1taDd u it 11.
Surely ve want to protect the Atomic Energ)' C0111:11i11ion aDd the
.P'BI from the D1rector of Central Intelligence coming in and
firxling out vbo their agentl are, vbat aDd vbere their neta
are, bov they operate, arxl thu.a troy their effeet1 nneu.
MR. HOLIFIELD: I do DOt think it il nece1aary for h1m to
inapeet the operationa in order to 1et up bia ovn intelligence
unit in the VI)' that be vanta to, and I point out that the
lfational Seeurit7 CoWle11 11 compo1ed of the Seeretariea of State,
of lfatio'Oil Defenae, ot the Arm)', the :lavy
and the Air Foree,
arxl the lfational Security R"aoureea Board, and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, 10 it aeema to me that the protection of the
lfational Securit,. CoWle11 18 a cheek aDd the Preaident il a cheek.
I b&rdl)' think that the liW1 could exceed bh authority.
MR. BUSBEY: In reference to the gentleman from California
(Mr. HOLIFIELD), vben be 1tate1 that ve can uaume that tbU
lational Security Agency vill do tbil aDd do that, I Juat 'risb
to remind the membership that the trouble in the past vitb
legillation has been that ve have not taken the time to 1pell
out these little detaila. It il these a11umption1 ve have ba4
that have sotten ua into trouble. I think it i1 nry important
that the gentleman'• amendment be adopted,
In the Senate on 9 Jal7 1947:
MR. BALDWI!fr •• , Under the Council there 11 eetabl1ehed
a Central Intelligence Agency to provide coordinated, adequate
intelligence tor all Government agencie1 concerned vith nation&!
eecur1 ty. 'When one read a the record of the paat var in resard
to that field, it h tourxl that there val much to be deaired in
the vay intelligence vu. co7ered aod there va. creat coutlict
about it. I lay nothing bere ill 4eprec1at1ou ot the MD vho
were engaged 1u the intelligence eerrlce, becauae lotH rnark-
able and courageoua thing• were clone. lnertbeleu,
ve tr011 our experience the DMd ot a Central Iutel-
l1geoee Agency; and tbil bill eueh an ageuq. leither
a Jfatioual Secur1t7 Council oor an iotelli&ence ageoq aov uute.
MR. BILL: ••• It vould prortde adequate eecurity meuurea
at ali timee, rather than only wben boet111t1u tbrtaten. It
create• the Jfatiooal Security Council, the Jfational Securit7
Reaource1 Boeard, the Central Intelligence Aaeucy, the Munit1oua
Board, aDd the Re1eareh and Development Board, in order that ve
may make certain that oar tore1go and ailitary policiea are
coordinated and autua.l..l.y eupport1ng; that a Oentral Intelligence
ABeD<:)" 'I1JA1 collect and analy"z.e the mall ot information vbich 11
10 eueot1al tor the Government to 1161utaio peace and vithout
vbich the cannot wa&e var auceeaetul..ly ••••
MR. Gt.lRNEYa • • · • 'l'be bill alao prortdee tor a lfational
Security Council, a Central Intelligence Ageoey, aod a Katioua1
Securit;r Reaourcee Board, all ot vbieb report to the
Preddeot, but vbicb &leo vork. cloaely vitb the ageociel UDder
the Secretar,y ot Jfatiooal Security.
MR. GURNEY: • • • u an important adJunct to the Jfatioual
Security Council there 11 provilioo tor a Central Intell1g!oce
Agency, vbich till• a long recognized demand tor accurate iutor-
mattou upOn vbicb impOrtant   •ud
llilitary policy can be baaed.
In the uniticat1on bearings, Admiral Sherman aaid that the Centra.l
Intelligence Agency vu uot adequately covered in the aerger bill., and in
the "debate on the Bou.ae bill ICr. McCol'llick. pointed out that:
•we telt, eiuce enabling legialatioo vaa going to come in
later troaa another etanding co111111ittee ot the Bou.ae ••• the
queation that vould ariae io connection vitb thi1 Central
Intelligence Agency, abould. be lett to the ataDding committee,
and that our committee ahould try to meet the immediate problem."
The "immediate problem" vaa aolved by the paeaase ot the Jfat1Qnal Security
Act ot 1947, vb1cb vu aigDed by Pree1dent Tr\D&D ou 26 July 1947. Onr a
year previoua to tb1a, iu 1946, enabling legialatioo detiuing the autbor1t1ea
ot a Central Intelligence Agency and eatabliahing certain procedure• tor ita
admioiatratiou bad been prepared aooo after the CIG vaa tol'lled, but vi tb tbe
empbaeia 1u 1947 on the paaeage ot the armed toreea merger legialatioo vith
ita central intelligence proviaiooa, the ettort devoted to enabling legia-
lat1oo tor CIA alack.eoed. Bovever, the need tor eucb legUlatioo became

aore aDd aore acuttt. In April ot 1947, before the pauaae or the Bationa.l
Security Act, a dratt ot enabling legillat1on val pr .. ented to the. Bou.e
Committee on Expenditure•, but it vat oot until the next 7ear that a
1eriou. ettorl vat ll&de to enact CIA leghlation.
On 24 Pebruary 1948, the Director, Re&r Mmiral Billenkoetter appeared
before the Bouae Committee on Armed Serrtce1 and ansvered att1rmatively the
Committee'• que1tion ot vbether 1egitlation in addition to the Rational
Security Act ot 1947 vae neceuary. On 13 March, atter approTal by the
White Bouse, drat't1 ot a propoted bill to provide tor the admini1trat1on or
the Agency vere tubmi tted by CIA to the Cbainaan ot the Senate Anted Porcu
Coadttee aDd the Speaker ot the Bou.e. Senator Ouruey introduced on the
1ame day S.23o6, a bill •to provide tor the adminittration or the Central
Intelligence e1tabli1hed purtuant to 1ection 102, latioD&l
Security Act ot 1947, and tor other purpo1u.• A bUl vith the eame title,
B.R. 5871, vaa introd1.1ced on 16 March in the Bou.e and referred to the
Committee on Armed Serrtcea. On 8 April the Bou.e eub-cOIIIIDittee in
executin 1e111on unan1mou.ly approTed the proviliou. ot the bill atter
41acuuing 1uch pointl a1 vbether debate on the Bou.e fioor voal.d DOt
bring out clau1t1ed in.tormation, and the authority ot the Director to
!laue rtua. The tul.l. COIIIIDittee approved the b1ll on .. May.
On 13 May the Senate COIIIDi ttee on Armed Serrtcee aet in executive
1e11ion vith tour 1enator1 present vbo vere authorized to 1pe&k tor the
tull eoi!IID1ttee. Certain changes were vorked out aDd a •clean bill,•
5.2688 vaa introduced on 17 May.
The nev Senate Bill dittered from the Bou.e nrlion (B.R. 5871) in
the tolloving pa.rticular•: (l) Section 6(a) ot the Senate Bill rea.d:
•Trau.ter to aDd receiTe trom other Gonrnment a&•nciu euch IUIDI a1 may
have been approTed by the Bureau or the Budget aDd appropriated ••• "
(2) Section 7(a)(l) ot the Senate Bill included the phra .. •penonal
1errlce1 vi thout regard to lUii tat1on1 on type I ot per1ona to be employed"
inatead or the phrue •employment ot aliena• becau.e the Committee thought,
tor reaaona ot 1ecurity, that the vord •aliena• 1hould DOt appear in the
lav although it VAl the intent of the Commit tee that CIA employ aliena
vbere neceuary. ( 3) Section 7(b) vbich formerly read •or 1um1 Dade
available to the Agency 1uch amount• a1 may be appropriated by the Bureau
ot the Budget may be expended • • • • vaa amended to reads "the 1uma !lAde
available to the Agency u.y be expended • • • ·· ."
Senate Report 1302 accompanying the bill 1tatea on page 3: ". • • aDd
that euch fundi aay be expended vithout regard to the prov111on• of lav
applicable to Government fundi. • 'l'b11 vae a change t'rom the original dre.tt
of the report vbich read a • ••• aod that a portion ot eucb tund•. • • • ".
!'be Chief Clerk or the Collllllittee St&tf in.tormed CIA that the phraae "a
portion• val deliberately •truck out becaUie it va. the intent of tbe
Committee that CIA •hou.ld baTe complete control onr the of
i tl fundi
TOuchered and wrrouchered.
. ./
---------------·------------- -
The bill vas puled over three tlJDu io the Senate, finally coming
up tor debate oo 21 JUDe. Ao ueodmeat va• offered by Senator McMaboo
etriki!ll out .. etioo 7(b) ot 8.2688 vbich san the A&eoer authority to
upend coutideotial t\md1. !be Congru1 adJour"Ded, bovenr, nth oo
fUrther action on the CIA 1es1•lat1on.
On 15 December 1948, the Aaeucy prueuted a 4ratt ot lesillattoo to
the Judget Bureau Ybieh, atter 1uageatiug ebanau, adrtled CIA on 9 February
1949 that it would have no objection to the A&eucy aeDdiDS the reviled dr..tt
to the Bllt Congreu. Oo U February the dr&tt1 nre .. ut to Coogreu nth
au explanation that it val 1ub1taot1ally the 1ue u 8.2688 aod B.R.5871
introduced in the 8oth Coocre••·
The Bou.e A.nlled S.rrtcu aub-co!IIDI1ttee Jo. 3 Mt on 18 February 1949
to eouaider the leg11lation, B.R.2663. Tbe committee di1eu.1ed it 1ect1ou
by aectiou and certain •1oor ameodmeota were aade 1ucla4iQgZ
FIRST The tena "the United States" va• aod1tied to include "ita
tenttOr'i'e• and poueuioa.a" ao that native• ot BavaU, Alaeka, Puerto
Rico, aDd other poueuioua vbo wen ordered h011e on leave could be
ordered to the United State•, it• terr1tor1el aDd po11e11ioua 1t 1uch
vere their home.
SBCOKD 'l'he word "tull-tille" vu to Clualify the pbra1e
•o!"tieer• aod earployeea ot the Agency" in order that the ••Ucal tacU1-
tiel involved in tbe 1es11latiou could be exteuded oul.y to regul..ar tull-
tiae employee• ot the Aaeocy. It va• agreed that tac111 tie• 1hould
be extended to citiua.a of the Uoited Statu aDd employed 'by the
Aaeuey alike, but the tae1lit1el 1hould not be exteo4ed to p&rt-ti.JDe
e1.1.1todial pertouoel aDd occalional earployeu ot the .&aeucy. Bovever
phylieu   1uoculation.l and nccioatioa.a 1hould be sino to
all employee• both tull-tille aDd part-time.
!BIRD The que1tiou aro1e u to the bo1pit&l aDd •edical facilities
vbi-:h-nre to be extended to covert nathe pereounel acting u agent• oo
a 1"6--t-time ba111. Becau1e ot the clau1!'1ed nature ot th11 work, oo
•entiou ot thil could be aade 1u a report. Bovever, it va1 the 1oteot
of the committee that a!ly agent vbo vu oot a tull-tille .-.ployee vho vas
injured 1u the cour1e ot duty tor the Agency 1hould be couaidered to be
a full-time employee ot the Agency oo that date aDd be 1\abJect to the
full prortliooa ot the act.
P'<XJRTB In connection Y1 tb the carryill8 ot tire-anu, the pb.rue
•and guarde" val inserted a.tter the vord "courier. • The explaoattC\n
generally ottered val that there IMY bo timet vben CIA vould Yilb to anD
a guard vitb the courier rather than the courier hi.mlelt.
FilTH The intent or the committee val that the lava to be
vitb the admill1b111ty ot aliena UDder the act vere
those tor permanent reeideoee without regard to the immigration lava aod
regulation•. There val oo intent to valve any lav1 regardill8 the conduct
ot these aliena once they vere io the United State1. Tho committee

- --         
tboU&bt that the alien• admitted abould be aubject to all lav• once they
had been admitted, inc:ludiD& thole concerning deportation tor cau.e. The
COIIIIIi ttee 1uage1ted the Ule Of the pbrale •calend&r rear• 1n the 1ect1on
inatead ot •tilcal rear• 10 that CIA vould have the benet1t ot an ertra
100 aliena in ti1cal 1949.
1"be 1ub-coaDittee approftd and reeOUIDeDded the bill to the full com-
aittee vbicb unau1Jaoudy approved it. In a beariQS before the Com-
aittee, Mr. Saucer de•cribed the bill, aDd in anrJer to a queation, be
atated that the pover1 ot the Aaency were DOt broadened beyoDd thole
enumerated in the lat1oDal. Becurit:y Act ot 1947. .. entatin Walter
DOted that the proviliona on admitting aliena 1ufrinaed •on the Jar11-
diction ot the Judiciary Committee" and al•o that thil provilion vaa
loo•elr dravu, 10 be reque1ted that an open rule be cranted •1o that the
attention ot the Congre11 may be directed to 1ection 8 ot the bill." Th1•
Yal sranted. .
Debate vith a 1uapenaion ot rules on the bill took place on 7 March
1949. Mr. Marcantonio provided the major oppo•ition to the bill in
debate, bali us bil argument on iuue• a• the 1Japo1ed vbicb
deprived Congreumen ot a tull expl&nation ot the bill, the danger to
civil liberties, the inappropriateneu ot confidential t\md1 and the
undes1rab1lit:y ot the aliena provilion. Mr. Coller allo objected to
the aliens mainly on Juriedictional ground1. The bill
348 tor and 4 agaiDJt.
The Jurildictional iuue ot the aliena provili..ou·wu ot 10111e concern
1n the Senate. Senator McCarren on ll March interpoud an objection to
con•ideration ot the bill, probably the Judiciarj Committee
ot vbicb be val chairman bad DOt been given the bill tor condderation.
Alter a meeting vitb the Director, at vhich the Director explained the
aliena provilion and agreed to turni•h the Senator vitb a regular con-
fidential report on the number or alieni brought in tmder it, Senator
McCarran vithdrev bil objectiona and vrote to Senator Luca• that be
would 1upport the bill.
The Senate Committee on Aned Service• reported out B.R. 2663 on
10 March 1949. In the debate on 27 May 1949, Senator Langer provided moet
or the oppoli tion to the bill baled mainly on the aecrecy 1urrounding the
bill a!ld the alieDB provilion in it. Be offered tvo amendment• vbich vere
accepted, one to provide that CIA employee•, vhile in the continental
United State• on leave, 1ball not be available tor employment except b:y
CIA, and another requiring a determination by the Comiuioner ot the
Immigration Service aa vell a• b:y the Director ot Central Intelligence and
the Attorney General ltetore tbe ad.miuion ot certain aliena to the Un1 ted
States tor permanent re1ideuee vithout regard to tbe immigration lave vas
granted. Senator Johtaon u1o voiced lome obJection to the 'bill but
announced he vould vote tor it. Be va• concerned that CIA would ban
"1veeping povera vbich are being Telted in the •ilitary throuab thil piece
ot leg11lation." 'l'be Senate paned B .R. 2663 u amende-d b1 a voice Tote.
On 6 June the CoD1'erence CoiiiD1ttee reported agreement on the amendment•
and on the aue 481 the Senate adopted tbe Conference Report and on tbe
tol.lov1Q8 dq atter a abort debate in Vbicb Mr. Marcanton.to aaain oppoeed
the aeuure aDd Mr. Walter aaain apoke on the alien proneion the Bou.e
»&Ued I.R. 2663, •• uaeoded. Prel14ent Truman the Central Intel-
11sence Act on 20 June 1949.
The Central Intelligence Agency ia within the Executive
Branch ot the Ooverment, and it tl reapon.aible to the ft'atioD&l. Security
Council, the fUnction ot vhicb 11 to adviee the Preaident vitb reepect
to tbe integration ot domeatic, foreign, and ailitar.y policiee relatios
to the national tecurity 10 •• to enable tbe military aerncea and the
other department• and agenciea ot Government to cooperate aore effectively
in aattera involving national aecurity. The Prelident, aa the •aole organ
ot the Government in tbe field ot international baa
at b1a command the ueeut1ve pover ot the Government. Under thtl paver,
theoretically be t1 beyond the reach ot any btber branch ot the Government
except 1n the mode preecribed by the Conetitution - through tbe impeaching
pover - and be admilliater1 bit branch ao that be can 1101t ettect1nly dil-
charse btl dutiea. The JratioD&l. Intelligence Authority vaa founded and
the Central Intelligence Group va1 formed by Prelidential Directin in
1946 to Ulure the moat effective accompliabmeat ot the intelligence
million related to national 1ecurity vbich tl a aatter conddered vithin
the &xeeuti ve purview.
It va• recognized at an earl7 date in our hiltory, hovner, that
otticer1 in tbe Executin Branch vere not under tbe excluaive direction ot
the Preaident. Dutiea and retponeibilitiea grov out ot and are 1ubject to
the control ot the lav, and not only to the direction ot the Preaident,
vbo auat 1ee to it, bovever, that the lava are !aithtul.ly uec:uted.
Congreaa baa teen to it tbat the Preaident conaiderable help
available tor btl adminiatrative burden.a. In the development and
imple=entation ot major policiea be baa tbe aaaiatance ot variou1 otticea
created by acta ot Congreu. The Rational Security Act ot 1947 vaa one
ot theee &I va1 the Central Intelligence Ageney Act ot 1949.
!be prov1e1one ot tbe ft'ational Security Act are a recognition by tbe
Congreu ot the aena1t1ve nature or Govercment intelligence act1v1-
tiea. The "availability ot intelligence o! the bigbeat order to the
Prelident aDd to the lational Security Council 11 an euential element in
the tol"''lulation ot tbe tore1sn policy ot the United Statea, and 1n the
cooduct ot tore1go relation• by the Preaident in c&rr)'iog out that policy. •
Via-a-via ita appropriation and inve•tigative !unction, Congreaa ia
oo=enwd with the operatiou ot -aenciu Yithiu the Eaecut1n lranch. CIA
t1 aware ot itl pol1t1ou ot bein& depeDdent on Coucreu tor tt1 leg1elatiou
u4 ttl uiltence but With ttl obvio\ll aecurity probl ... Mr. Wen Dul.lee,
tile J)S.rector, bal 1t&teda •ID tutelligence 70D ban to tab ce.rt&.1n •
OD taith. You ban to look to the uu vbo 1a cU.rect1oa the orpn1r.atiou aDd
tile r411ult1 be achiena. • The Armed Serrtce1 and Appropz 1&t1ou Colllll1 ttee
ot both Boueee ban uerc1aed Jur1ad1ct1on onr CIA. .A.I a neQlt
the A.nDed
Serrtcu COIIIDitteea ot the Seuate an4 tbe Bou11 ban ulnt&ined'
•aupervilion over the operat1on1 ot [Cl!iJ to au entirely aclequate degree."
Preaaure for a CIA Watchclo& Co.mittee ot Coosr••• ar11e1 per1ocl1call1 but
hal uver been TOtecl.
latioual Security Council
.A.I au execut1n -aency, CIA il UDder the coutrol of the Preaident, but
Cougreu 1n tbe Bat1oual Security Act ot 1947 preacr1bed that CIA "i•
eatabliehed under the lat1oual Security Council.• rurtheraore, according
to the Act, for tbe purpo11 of coor41uat1Qi intelllaence act1Tittee, the
Central Intelligence Agency il given certain dutiel to perform UDder the
cUrection ot the WSC. SectioD 102(d)(5) ot the •at1oD&l Security Act of
1947 1a a catch-all prov111on vitb rather broad 1Jiplicat1ou   that
CIA ahall "perfona auc:h other tunct1oua aDd dutiea related to intelligence
atfectina the ut1oual. aecurity u the htioual Security Council uy from
time to time direct.• Taken out ot context aud vithout bavledge ot ita
bi1tory, thil aect1on could bear almost unlimited iuterpretation, proTided
the aerrtce performed could be 1huvu to be ot beuefit to an intelligence
qeucy or related to utioual iutell1,aeuce. A renew ot the CongreuioD&l.
hovever, indicate• that vben CIA val tirat propoee4, Congreu vas
1utereeted 1n aD ageucy for coor41uat1na 1utell1&e=e aDd
    4i4 not propo1e aQ1 OTereea• collectiou actintiea for CIA.
Vbile Coucre•• recogDized that CIA would participate iu clandeetine col-
lectiou overaeaa, t.tte 110n to provide tor auch collec-
tion oTerleal vu defeated, aDd, u a coapromi11
aect1ou 102(4)(4) aud
(5) of the •atioual Security Act vere enacted, vbicb penitted the Rational
Security Council to deterra1ue the extent ot the collection vork to be per-
foi'Hd b7 CIA.
The Wational Securit7 Council in the Central Intelligence
Ageuc7 doe• 10 through ••tiooal Security Council Intelligence Directives
Which, ot couree
are biDding upon CIA. When the WSC forma a bal1c policy
&Del aeaigne 1mplemeatat1on to CIA, the Agency then ba1 authority to go
a.beacl. loveTer
it at1ll aay be neceuary to so to Congreu tor authority
aDd tuDda.
· •'

'I //'I//:)
....... _ __. .......... uJueu uJll""age zo, LOJtunn J
als ---·---·--m ':JJ(!/;f. q71l I - • s
:arriVIartha Mitchel1,
57 ,"'Die-s
e-/ . . . .
;;/ Cancer i
a [ ·'By JOIL'l T. McQUIS_TON __
e I i\1artiJ<LJv1itchell, the out-
d I spoke!' estrang2d · wife qf for.
fmer· Attorney General-JiJclm ,.'-•·· --•·
  died_ early yesterday
I at the Memor1al
t, ing Cancer Center. She was 57
years· old.
Her physician. Dr. Klaus
attributed her death :o
multiple myeloma-a rare. type
of malignancy that attacks. bone.
l! marrow-complicated by hem-.
:> orrhage and tenninal bronchial
·- pnMmonia: ..
- -- Mr!Clt:riffhelr had ·surrerM .. ,,_
r- from the '.malignancy
r· _.,.,_, ,   ....
pitalization Sunday fo!lciwinga
: , cardiac arrest, according to Dr. cc
'' i Mayer, who is director of the; · · er
e·•blocid bank and hematology lab- ;views were wideiy reported'by
y, oratory of the cancer center. r the press haaa:-_knacldor sttr.·
l· None pf Mrs. ;';!l.tchell's fam- !ring controversy. · -. ·
lt•ily ))resent at h_er As   __ _ _
·d I Her son, C. Ray Jennmgs. who 'she enjoyed criticizing liberals,
;rlh<>d been in close touch· v;itll;urge-d pdisciplibe"-:-fur'Vietnam r<
, I her. was out of town and could :war protesters and "Suggested n
.rlnot be .reached yesterday, Dr. !that
n Mayer said: Mro--Mi1chelr lia"<i ·b.  
]. been .apprised of her conditior: 'reveal
. , but did not come to the l-os· I When the WntC:tzate scandal
)-1 .. I :.

is 1 pltal because she was noccn ·!broke, she did -'not hesitate to_
;scious arA because he mtght 'turn her barbs on the Nixon P
been in the _wa}• ih trre;AdminLstraUon,'urging
· mtenstve . care .i.lntt. satd Dr.. fiei:lls·
_ ;\layer, who added that Mr.·reall); ---, "'-:....---1-ll'
" Mitchell had "very con· I'··· It-. was .not- -unusual for Mrs.
e d.. •
;cerne . - '). i --::·---
! Mrs. :>1itche!l, ;,y)'wse candiai Continued on Page 70,Column 5
.. ....
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A Report Links C.I.A. to Murder .in·   S ~
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St:BJECT: Maeting wiD. the Warren Com.mi.s3ion on 12   1964 .. ·· .: "
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-· mafwHh lb.i'.:-in; Cliei Coar..se.!. IOr t.l!e l-f.:::. '
c:n,d ot1:ler oi 1.ir. s stail. The purno..se oi · . -·
· t hls :me eting t o discu.::;s current status of the .:onb:ib'.ttion
to the \"ior.:.t of th-a :1larren Con:.=r'..is.sic:l. ..
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::1 . .• · .: on Lee Hm-vey 0S'ii'a!.d'3 s t::ly in tbe U.:Ji!:ln <!S r ecorted cy .the .::'BI,
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_ :-: ·;· clisCtl.ssion is- rcperted in a separate ., ._ ..
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. . . 3. Aiter the queslion oi ·· .. ,·
: .. - C.swrud; ! .. i r. R:>nkh's !; t:ii 3bowed t!S J.       G_1.d
·_ · prep:u-ed hazed en ai   to c:1em, incluilinz . ··
.: · our own cont.!ibu.t.ion..conccrmng in the i m:t-
·- terial, wiili s ome matex·i::l.l
·. . we nro·, ided, '.'lill fcrw2.rG.cd to· us oy 1.ir. ?..an:-'h1':.; rt \::ts then
.· .. · fiuggest.ed tX:.t u. CJ.?. .. o.::i:icar most f:::!..":li.ib.r '.v'ith ti1.;
· · cy CT..A on U2.S.R. o: i:hB visit t;1c;; in.
order to on t.."1e   tesHmo&ly tile :C.y
11arin2. C3wald. U!p:ced t o send i:h.e b .
t!lis tbct we wail unLi1 oi m..a.-
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a beck b whi.c11   C'..l!:. Cl.Jt giYir..g -.
t he i:::npres.:1ion t.:J:.'C this m5.g!:!.t bava or for a .:ip,wr- ·
::;yst!?\!1, They ::wk8d H :?Cill-J   :iJ\ e:L. .. to send
' tO r-:si io- "' e••i<""/ ·-·.-:. " '":"•1·"0 n, .•. '. ·,,Tc;:,-. ",..."il"Q- J :.
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done ti::;o 'r;"i.   irJl' tior. o! I.e:::
cl-. mcut! or. I .nj crcd c , \roc <her u: c >.:: oi : :oe ,:'!::=: :\::. nt2if .... _
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coo;.mented oo the iact t.h:l.t Oswald had ec:ployment in this
country in a phctogr:1.piric iirm through a friend. ::ie thought _ _.....- ·
this might ha-;e a possible 0earing on any cla.-1C.estine -·
systems he z::tight have. i.rom the Soviet3. . . - . __l .
"'- . - I \ :-· -.
· · - · .. 5. Members o! 1ir. R:mkin's sW! then commented on the tcsti-
. mony of l'r1rs. Oswald to eiiect that t.'le latters i=om ?ler- son regard-:
ing his desi!"e to retur:1 t o the Unit2d Sttiaa had the oi being----
dictated since ccnt:Un2ci none oi his usual g:r::l.r!ll:latic::ll errors ar.d .
used l<mgua.:;e wi th •;;hicn he would not have f:u:aHiar ... . In this·-"
connection, the fact t!lat Lac \ll"ota to the .Emb::.zsy requesting
. -· ...
. ..... ...
• • '"'!' ....... .
:-i.. -. · help in ar.:-:1.nging his retur::I to t!le U.S. seen alter receipt by the Emressy
.::> ·:· ·. of a telegr::ull fro::n tbe I>::p::u:tmect report!!:lg on correspondence ..-.rit!l.
.:; .
. . .
. . .
. .
. .

Oswald's to i.:l-iicate to oi )Ar-. a.1nk:in' s sb.ff
tb.at the Soviets mlght hac access in s.;ms I:tZnion to the contents
of the telagrru:n. 'I'!lay did r.ot b-ali eve it was coL"'lcident!li that Cs•.vald' s
letter to the c:une L--nme<lialely on tba heals cf th;- telegram
!rom the       Thi3 lad to a clisc..Ission c! in the
press of another talegram or !rom the Sm!:ass)• in to
. ·:
... .. .
the -nepartment:··-·;.\·1r. Rankin said he would undcrt:l..!re- to thia.
: .
.. · .. .... , - . ,
.; . . . . ... . , .. .. ... .
.. 6. · :WJI. \Vill3ms noted   Oswcld ll!ld !...-,b.-educed a state- - · .
ment .to tne eilect tl::a.t she !1er non to b-3 a CT...A   · ..
askzd in b.ct O;;wald hw a CL1.  
replied na iud ·.-;;1llems them ii t!1Crc . . ·
this. -... first t:ut in him und
c -.. Com.u1issiori !fu.::i"tbe t·.vo Cl:tr.destin;)
. ce1·tainl7 ,,7ocld know Ol" not Cs\7ald had :.:..t1 ug;ent for CIA
in the Soviet Unio .::te then Sal" we- .
e1s wcrd lor i::tct th:lt Os-:vald had ,,_ :3
ini:erjcc ed the vi9w that t.:le Commission c"J.d not     t:ills prccedure·
other a;encies a.nd VlODCered whet!wr t;:..ere   not SO:!:le v:r..y to
clarify this point r:::::10re eiiectively £or C:1e
he m..1.da ":f.lB to have Lulle3, \7ho i.3 wit;.'l. recm:ds -
procedures, re"liew t:1e v:h!ch ,,,;<;u.ld D') on. a,3Gnts
and repol--t to tile fullc .... , •
of -the I:irector of the :231 ':'lho     to the Com-
mission reg:l .. rdL""lg the oi }'BI rel::l:! •}.1.S \':ith C.:;·:.rt="J.d. ·
7. A c! the f.:--::;::-1 D.!:-; rx·int  
consisted of a re•.Tie·.v by h:..r. P...=t.-.'dn a..1d of. :-:::'Ips hi
investi6::-,.Eon to c!..;.te. They r.oted th:::.±  
in the nhase. For e:r.J.rnnl<), i:nd   cZ
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