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Emergency Logistics Issues Impacting the Katrina Response What went wrong? How do we avoid a repeat?

Jos Holgun-Veras, Ph.D., P.E. Professor, jhv@rpi.edu Noel Prez, radua!e "esear#h $ssis!an! %iguel Jaller, radua!e "esear#h $ssis!an! &isa Des!ro, radua!e "esear#h $ssis!an! 'ri#ia (a#h!endorf, )niversi!* of Dela+are

Acknowledgment
Other contri utors!
"iguel #aller$ R%I &oel %'re($ R%I )oral *orres$ R%I +ethany +rown$ , Lisa -estro$ R%I

Research was supported y &./0s!


)""I12345267 8-R,! )ontending with "ateriel )onvergence! Optimal )ontrol$ )oordination$ and -elivery o9 )ritical .upplies to the .ite o9 E:treme Events; )".1.<ER 2==5>5> 8)haracteri(ation o9 the .upply )hains in the A9termath o9 an E:treme Event! *he <ul9 )oast E:perience;

Outline
)ommercial vs? Humanitarian logistics *he phenomenon o9 material convergence Katrina0s logistical de acle or How not to do it How do we avoid a repeat?
Operations -ecision support systems

*he need to re9ormulate humanitarian logistic modeling


"aterial convergence )onsidering social costs

)ommercial vs? Humanitarian logistics

Characteristic 01je#!ive pursued

Commercial logistics %ini2iza!ion of !o!al logis!i# #os!s

Humanitarian logistics %ini2iza!ion of hu2an suffering De!er2ined 1* 2a!erial #onvergen#e

3o22odi!* flo+s 4elf-#on!ained genera!ed De#ision 2a5ing s!ru#!ure 6no+ledge of de2and

4!ru#!ured in!era#!ions Non-s!ru#!ured under #on!rol of a de#ision in!era#!ions, un5no+n 2a5er 2ul!iple de#ision 2a5ers 6no+n +i!h so2e #er!ain!* )n5no+n and d*na2i# 0ne in a life!i2e even!s, s2aller volu2es 72pa#!ed and d*na2i# s*s!e2

Periodi#i!* and volu2e of logis!i# "epe!i!ive, large volu2es a#!ivi!ies 4!a!e of suppor!ing 4!a1le s*s!e2 s*s!e2s

+ackground on "aterial )onvergence and Humanitarian Logistics

Humanitarian Logistics @ "aterial )onvergence


/rit( and "athewson AB>=3C de9ined convergence as 8the movement or inclination towards a point; *hey created a comprehensive!
personnel convergence$ i?e?$ movements o9 individualsD in9ormational convergence$ i?e?$ 8movement or transmission o9 sym ols$ imageries$ and messagesE;D material convergence$ i?e?$ 8Ethe actual movement o9 supplies and eFuipmentE;

Humanitarian Logistics intertwined with "aterial )onvergence &ot much research in either 9ield

What is the pro lem?


*he e99iciency o9 the 9low o9 high1priority goods depend on the 9low o9 low priority cargoes EFuivalent to trying to move two di99erent liFuids through a pipe
High priori!*

&ogis!i# s*s!e2 &o+ priori!*

Is it really that ad?


Let0s take a look at previous e:periences
B>=7 B>>4 422B 422= Arkansas tornado Hurricane Andrew World *rade )enter <ul9 )oast

Indeed$ we could list as e:amples ALL maGor disasters

B>=7 Arkansas tornado

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8E Athe day 9ollowing the tornadoC all this clothing and 9ood and all this vast store o9 supplies started moving into .earcy 9or distri ution to the tornado areasE?*here was no place to put it E &o uildings to put it in ??? *hat created a ig pro lem ??? .o much was worthless rags? *hey had some pretty good ones? .ome ody sent an old doggone ig carton o9 9alsies? We got a tu:edo$ a nice one E; 8EIt was coming y Railway E:press$ y truck$ y plane$ y 9reight carE Enormous amount o9 9loor space$ ut that was 9illed in two hoursH9illed ceiling high? One other ig uildingEpro a ly a hundred 9eet long and si:ty 9eet wide$ with B5 9eet ceilingE 9illed in B4 hours?; E si:ty percent o9 it was not goodD it shouldn0t have come to the area at allE; A&OR) report &o? =4$ pp? 46BC

B>>4 Hurricane Andrew

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8E:cessive donated clothing created maGor pro lemsE some o9 the clothing was not appropriate 9or the tropical climate o9 -ade county Ae?g?$ winter coatsCE?O9ten$ truck drivers with loads o9 clothes drove straight to severely damaged areasE,pon arrival$ they o9ten did not know where to deliver the donated clothes$ so they unloaded them on the side o9 the road? *he heat and usual a9ternoon summer rains Fuickly turned the piles into heaps o9 stinking$ rotting cloth?; E 8 E:cessive 9ood donations created 9urther emergency management pro lems?; A&eal$ B>>5$ pp? 45C

422B World *rade )enter

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8)hris Ward is snaking through a tunnel o9 card oard crates$ past o:es E past thousands o9 shampoo containers organi(ed y si(eE?*he pro lem is$ very little o9 it was neededE? little o9 the cargo reached the intended recipients$ as they simply had no use 9or itE*he propensity o9 Americans to ship stu99 to national disasters has ecome such an overpowering re9le: that rescue workers now have to divert considera le resources to ensure the largess does not get in the way? .ome even descri e the torrent o9 sundries as a 8second tier disaster?;; A&ewsweek$ 4224C 8I*hereJ were e:amples o9 much needed materials$ ut we also saw donations o9 unnecessary goods E the 9ive tractor1 trailer loads o9 pumpkins donated to <round Kero around Halloween that needed to e redirected to pu lic schools E? We heard o9 people driving machinery and eFuipment to the site$ leaving it 9or use$ and then ecoming upset when it was not returned even though the items were never documented$ processed$ or reFuested?; AWachtendor9 and Kendra$ 4225$ pp? =C?

422= <ul9 )oast

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8L-onation management is the most di99icult part o9 every disaster$L he said o9 the unsorted mountains o9 clothes? LWe have a little it o9 everything?L;E? A)aller1*imes$ 422=C? 8.ometimes generosity can go awry?;E?? In KatrinaMs immediate a9termathE? collection sites along the "ississippi <ul9 )oast ecame 8nothing more than dump sites;E?; A*imes1%iscayune$ 422=C?

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Katrina0s logistical de acle or How not to do it

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*he 9indings discussed here are ased on do(ens o9 interviews with the individuals directly involved in the logistical response #HN and colleagues declared persona non grata y /E"A Aand very proud o9 itOC

B? "agnitude o9 the event and the reFuirements


*he largest natural disaster in ,?.? history!

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-evastated B22 miles around the eye %roperty damages ascending to P>3 illion *otal economic impact may reach P422 illion One o9 the deadliest hurricanes to ever hit mainland ,?.?$ with B$=QQ con9irmed deaths and 443 people still missing as o9 "ay 4223 /looded 62R o9 &ew Orleans *he government 9ederal disaster declarations covered >2$222 sFuare miles$ an area almost the si(e o9 the ,nited Kingdom

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*he American Red )ross AAR)C started preparing!


%repositioned =22$222 meals ready to eat A"REsC Identi9ied B= sites 9or large kitchens 9or mass 9eeding Opened several shelters in the region -eployed vehicles and sta99 to the disaster area Raised more than P4 illion$ 4@7 o9 charita le groups Led the e99orts o9 more than 442$222 sta99 and volunteers

When &ew Orleans 9looded$ AR) was overwhelmed! 8EI don0t think Red )ross ever had to work with so many outside agencies in coordinationE;

4? )ollapse o9 the communication in9rastructure

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&early three million people without electricity@phone >BB emergency call centers were severely impacted Out o9 service! =2R radio stations$ 55R o9 *N stations =2$222 utility poles were toppled in "ississippi alone 8ItheJ entire in9rastructure was wiped out IandJ there were no communicationsEuntil 9ive days a9ter the storm IwhenJ we got satellite phones?; 8Ethe main communication came ack and 9orth y helicopter? .ort o9 like a &ew Age %ony E:press?; &o one knew 8Ei9 things had een delivered$ and i9 they had een delivered$ who accepted it?; *he Internet1 ased inventory system AE1*eamC used y the .tate o9 Louisiana to process emergency reFuests collapsed

7? Lack o9 integration etween computer systems

,=

Local and state governments used a commercial so9tware AE1*eamC 9or procurement and tracking /E"A relied on a custom1made system called &E"I. A&ational Emergency "anagement In9ormation .ystemC E1*EA" and &E"I. did not communicate E1*eam reFuests had to e individually read and manually inputted into &E"I. /ederal sta99 could not check in9ormation on individual reFuests$ local@state sta99 could not check the status o9 their reFuestsE

5? Lack o9 planning 9or handling o9 donations

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*he volunteers and sta99 availa le at staging areas were not enough to manage the large in9lu: o9 goods received 8Eanother thing we need in our plan is donated goods? *here needs to e a section within /E"A$ or the .tate$ or some ody$ esides NOA- in conGunction with NOA- that needs to e responsi le 9or donated goods?;

,,

Nolunteers complained that communication with the government was ine99icient and that they did not know what the priorities and needs were -onations o9 low1priority goods hampered critical activities! clothing eing the most pro lematic Incoming trucks loaded with clothing sometimes dropped their cargo at parking lots

=? Limited asset visi ility

,-

Asset visi ility was seriously o structed at oth ends o9 the supply chain Locals could not estimate the Fuantity and type o9 critical supplies needed /E"A had di99iculties determining supplies needed$ the resources it had availa le$ and the speci9ic location o9 a resource at a given point o9 time +ecause o9 lack o9 <%.$ no ody knew where trucks were? E:ample! the .uperdome trucks

3? ,ndersta99ing and lack o9 training


/E"A had around =22 vacancies A42R o9 the 4=22 agency positionsC with eight out o9 its ten regional directors working in an acting capacity /E"A turned to other 9ederal agencies to sta99 positions in "ississippi and Louisiana &ot all local sta99 were pro9icient users o9 E1*eam *he volunteer groups had pro lems! 8Eevery time a new group comes in$ you have to train IthemJ /ew individuals had logistic training

,.

Q? Ine99iciencies in pre1positioning resources

,/

&ot enough critical supplies were prepositioned *he locals did not event think a out prepositioning It was suggested that the state did not preposition the critical supplies called 9or y its own emergency plan ecause it was waiting 9or the /ederal emergency declaration to avoid using .tate 9unds *he 9ederal declaration o9 emergency was issued one day e9ore land9all /E"A started to preposition ut there was no time? *he activities were suspended ecause o9 Katrina?

6? %rocurement
%rocurement delays may e the single most important 9actor e:plaining the slow 9low o9 critical supplies a9ter the initial response 8Edelivery times were horri le? .mall Fuantities were OK Ihowever delivery o9J large Fuantities IwasJ very ad Atwo weeksC?; *his same respondent descri ed delivery o9 large Fuantities taking 413 weeks a9ter reFuisition$ while the delivery o9 medical supplies took B17 weeks as the sta99 were un9amiliar with the supplies and where to acFuire them

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%opular wisdom in action E

/inding! Nolunteer organi(ations saved the day

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Horrendous as it was$ the Katrina de acle would een much worse i9 not y the outstanding work o9 the volunteer organi(ations that!
pre1positioned supplies sent e:perienced and motivated leaders demonstrated great creativity$ ingenuity and 9le:i ility in the 9ace o9 disaster 62 million pounds S 4$222 semitrailers

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How do we avoid a repeat? %art I! Operations

Key Recommendations

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)reate a Emergency Logistics *raining %rogram *rain local population @ emergency response sta99 Learn to 9ollow the &ational Response %lan -e9ine proper roles 9or the key agents )reate a Ro ust Emergency Logistics &etwork Regional +lanket %urchasing Agreements$ R+%A Implement "easures to Increase Asset Nisi ility Regional %re1%ositioning@.haring o9 )ritical .upplies Implement %roactive -onation )oordination %lans -evelop -ecision .upport *ools

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How do we avoid a repeat? %art II! -ecision .upport *ools

Research in progress at R%I


-iagnosis and characteri(ation!
)auses o9 logistical de acle post1Katrina How humanitarian logistics take place Tuanti9ication! Aimed at o taining empirical estimates %rovide support to analytical modeling Immediate resource reFuirements$ donation patterns

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+asic research on analytical modeling


*o develop new modeling paradigms )onsidering social costs o9 logistic actions Incorporating social science concepts

Tuanti9ication! IRRs
Immediate resource reFuirements AIRRsC
+ased on processing the Action ReFuest /orms 9rom /E"A$ that captured the reFuests made y responders A total o9 B766 9orms o tained through a /reedom o9 In9ormation Act

--

-.

Numbe r of re que s ts

-eveloped models to 9orecast immediate resource reFuirements


Water and ice (Aug ! " Se#t !$
B6 B3 B5 B4 B2 6 3 5 4 2 7 3 > B4 B= B6 4B 45 4Q 72

Time Series Plot of Number of Requests


8= /= .= -= ,= <= = < 8 <, <: ,. -= -8 ., .: /. 8=

Number of requests

Days

%ood& 'R(s (Aug ! " Se#t


B6 B3 B5 B4 B2 6 3 5 4 2 7 3 > B4 B= B6

Number of requests

Days

4B

45

Days

Tuanti9ication! "aterial convergence

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We have assem led a data ase o9 donations ased on post1processing o9 newspaper articles Anow working on InternetC to e used 9or spatial econometric modeling to Fuanti9y convergence *he idea is!
,se this data to estimate spatial econometric models I9 success9ul$ this will ena le to get estimates o9 material convergence and to gain insight into key 9actors

*ypical model

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*he need to re9ormulate humanitarian logistic modeling

*wo pressing issues


)onsidering the social costs o9 su99ering )onsidering material convergence
&asty pro lem +ehavioral 9oundations o9 convergence not clear

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*he need to consider human su99ering


Humanitarian supply chains must 9ocus on minimi(ation o9 human su99ering
&o other o Gective 9unction captures etter the 9undamental goal o9 humanitarian logistics

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&one o9 the current analytical 9ormulations e:plicitly consider victims0 well eing Asome consider penalty costs as a pro:y varia leC

How to Fuanti9y human su99ering?


,sing human su99ering as a decision criterion leads to philosophical and ethical dilemmas
Ideally no one should e purposely le9t in peril )ontroversial to assign economic value to su99ering and the loss o9 lives

A sensi le approach is to use economic valuation


An economic measure to evaluate alternatives A le to di99erentiate and prioriti(e alternative actions +ypasses the need to su Gectively decide levels o9 service Allows 9or un iased tradeo99 analysis etween social ene9its and operational costs

.ocial cost 9unction


4o#ial #os! ()

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Depriva!ion !i2e

Key 9eatures!
Highly non1linear$ as a 9unction o9 deprivation time &on1additive demands! A person that have not eaten in 9ive days and get 9ood in the =th day$ will not eat 9ive days worth o9 9ood

E:ample o9 a social cost 9unction


,sing a small sample$ a social cost 9unction o9 not having access to water was estimated
Willingness to Pay for "Water"
Stated Preferences and fitted values by regression function

.,

(t ) = e
350 300 250

(1.5031 0.11!"#t )

W$ P ())

200 150 100 50 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

$ i%e &it'out &ater( t (in 'ours)

)urrent approaches! %enalty ased 9ormulations

.-

An amount is charged when a population reaches a deprivation time , +i!h the intent o9 capping su99ering at c() *his prompts the model to dispatch a delivery

%ro lems with penalty ased 9ormulations


*he value o9 does not matter$ as long as it is 8large; compared to delivery costs *he threshold deprivation time , is 9ar more important ecause it determines the permissi le su99ering c() However$ pre1setting is completely ar itrary
Low value social costs are important High value social costs are less important How do you know how to set ?

..

./

is the level o9 service achieva le given supply and demand! it cannot e pre1determined %arado:!
I9 the value o9 is set lower than what is achieva le$ no solutions will e 9ound I9 the value o9 is set higher than what is achieva le$ the population will su99er more than is actually needed

In conclusion!
%enalty ased 9ormulations$ setting eFuity constraints that mandate a delivery a9ter a set amount o9 time are very pro lematic

*he solution

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Instead o9 9orcing the pro lem to 9it the commercial logistics paradigm$ Re9ormulate the pro lem as one o9 minimi(ation o9 social costs
Social cost Needs fullfiled

Needs not complet ely fullfiled

t1

t2

t3

Deprivation time

Analytical 9ormulations
3onsidering so#ial #os!s
i ?t > =

.9

? ilt >

ilt

'o!al so#ial #os! a! node i, !i2e ! $ se@uen#e of deliver* a#!ionsA node, deliver* a2oun!, and !i2e

X =

{ ( i< , d< , t< ) , ( i, , d , , t , ) ,...,( in , d n , t n ) }


T

T ?X > =
T ?X > =

(X) +

T(X)
i l t

(X) +

[ ( ) ]
ilt

ilt

xilt +

[ ( ) ]
ilT i l

ilT

'o!al #os! A Deliver* B 4o#ial #os!s

Penal!* 1ased for2ula!ionA


T ?X > =
T ?X > =
T

(X) +

PT ( X )
i l t

'o!al #os! A Deliver* B Penal!* #os!s

(X) +

(< xilt )

7! is i2possi1le for !hese for2ula!ions !o rea#h !he sa2e solu!ions

( ilt ) = e ( <./=-<+ =.<<9, ilt )

&umerical e:amples
)ase I! One distri ution center$ One demand node Optimal policy! *o deliver as much as possi le
a$ Social cos ts ()$
'ru#5 #apa#i!* as C of de2and ,/C /=C 9/C <==C =.,/ -.:.// ,=..8= <:..:: <98.,, 3*#le 'i2e ?da*s> =./ =.9/ ,,<;;.;9 -./.89 ,8/.=; <:-.-< <-,;:,.// :-9.-; /.9..: ,.<.9, < <-<,/.=./< ,,<;..:. <,,8/./--8.,,

.:

b$ A*e rage de #ri*ation time s (days $


'ru#5 #apa#i!* as C of de2and ,/C /=C 9/C <==C =.,/ =.;= =..: =.-, =.,/ 3*#le 'i2e ?da*s> =./ =.9/ <./: =.;= =.8, =./= ,.<. <.,; =.:; =.9/ < ,..= <.8= <.<<.==

.;

)ase I! One distri ution center$ /ive demand nodes


< , / . 4#enario $A 'ravel !i2es D 8 hours D3 D3 < , . / 4#enario EA 'ravel !i2es D ,, /, 9, <<, <- hours

.olutions 9rom heuristics


/ormulations lead to stationary delivery patterns

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Heuristic Social costs Traditional logistics Deliver neG! !o !he node +i!h 2aGi2u2A Deliver a! leas! on#e ever* / da*s ?%arginal 4o#ial Eenefi! H %arginal 'o!al %ini2izeA 'o!al #os! D !ravel #os!s B penal!* 3os!> #os!s <-<-,-<---.-/-,-<---.-/-,-<---. <8 F<<,/== - - F-,9,9<, <-,---<-,---<-,-.-/-<-,---<-,---<-,-. <; F<<,//= F,/=,=== F8,:=9,:9:

Strategy Heuris!i# solu!ion ?"e!urn !o depo! af!er visi!ing ea#h node> Nu21er of deliveries 'ravel #os! Penal!ies for un2e! 'o!al so#ial #os!s

*raditional Apenalty asedC 9ormulation

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.ocial cost 9ormulation Anote di99erence in scaleC

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)onclusions

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Analytical approaches to humanitarian logistics must e re9ormulated *he popular penalty ased 9ormulations are very pro lematic Realism could e signi9icantly enhanced y e:plicitly considering material convergence and the cost o9 su99ering

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Tuestions?