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Emergency Logistics Issues Impacting the Katrina Response What went wrong? How do we avoid a repeat?

Jos Holgun-Veras, Ph.D., P.E. Professor, Noel Prez, radua!e "esear#h $ssis!an! %iguel Jaller, radua!e "esear#h $ssis!an! &isa Des!ro, radua!e "esear#h $ssis!an! 'ri#ia (a#h!endorf, )niversi!* of Dela+are

Other contri utors!
"iguel #aller$ R%I &oel %'re($ R%I )oral *orres$ R%I +ethany +rown$ , Lisa -estro$ R%I

Research was supported y &./0s!

)""I12345267 8-R,! )ontending with "ateriel )onvergence! Optimal )ontrol$ )oordination$ and -elivery o9 )ritical .upplies to the .ite o9 E:treme Events; )".1.<ER 2==5>5> 8)haracteri(ation o9 the .upply )hains in the A9termath o9 an E:treme Event! *he <ul9 )oast E:perience;

)ommercial vs? Humanitarian logistics *he phenomenon o9 material convergence Katrina0s logistical de acle or How not to do it How do we avoid a repeat?
Operations -ecision support systems

*he need to re9ormulate humanitarian logistic modeling

"aterial convergence )onsidering social costs

)ommercial vs? Humanitarian logistics

Characteristic 01je#!ive pursued

Commercial logistics %ini2iza!ion of !o!al logis!i# #os!s

Humanitarian logistics %ini2iza!ion of hu2an suffering De!er2ined 1* 2a!erial #onvergen#e

3o22odi!* flo+s 4elf-#on!ained genera!ed De#ision 2a5ing s!ru#!ure 6no+ledge of de2and

4!ru#!ured in!era#!ions Non-s!ru#!ured under #on!rol of a de#ision in!era#!ions, un5no+n 2a5er 2ul!iple de#ision 2a5ers 6no+n +i!h so2e #er!ain!* )n5no+n and d*na2i# 0ne in a life!i2e even!s, s2aller volu2es 72pa#!ed and d*na2i# s*s!e2

Periodi#i!* and volu2e of logis!i# "epe!i!ive, large volu2es a#!ivi!ies 4!a!e of suppor!ing 4!a1le s*s!e2 s*s!e2s

+ackground on "aterial )onvergence and Humanitarian Logistics

Humanitarian Logistics @ "aterial )onvergence

/rit( and "athewson AB>=3C de9ined convergence as 8the movement or inclination towards a point; *hey created a comprehensive!
personnel convergence$ i?e?$ movements o9 individualsD in9ormational convergence$ i?e?$ 8movement or transmission o9 sym ols$ imageries$ and messagesE;D material convergence$ i?e?$ 8Ethe actual movement o9 supplies and eFuipmentE;

Humanitarian Logistics intertwined with "aterial )onvergence &ot much research in either 9ield

What is the pro lem?

*he e99iciency o9 the 9low o9 high1priority goods depend on the 9low o9 low priority cargoes EFuivalent to trying to move two di99erent liFuids through a pipe
High priori!*

&ogis!i# s*s!e2 &o+ priori!*

Is it really that ad?

Let0s take a look at previous e:periences
B>=7 B>>4 422B 422= Arkansas tornado Hurricane Andrew World *rade )enter <ul9 )oast

Indeed$ we could list as e:amples ALL maGor disasters

B>=7 Arkansas tornado


8E Athe day 9ollowing the tornadoC all this clothing and 9ood and all this vast store o9 supplies started moving into .earcy 9or distri ution to the tornado areasE?*here was no place to put it E &o uildings to put it in ??? *hat created a ig pro lem ??? .o much was worthless rags? *hey had some pretty good ones? .ome ody sent an old doggone ig carton o9 9alsies? We got a tu:edo$ a nice one E; 8EIt was coming y Railway E:press$ y truck$ y plane$ y 9reight carE Enormous amount o9 9loor space$ ut that was 9illed in two hoursH9illed ceiling high? One other ig uildingEpro a ly a hundred 9eet long and si:ty 9eet wide$ with B5 9eet ceilingE 9illed in B4 hours?; E si:ty percent o9 it was not goodD it shouldn0t have come to the area at allE; A&OR) report &o? =4$ pp? 46BC

B>>4 Hurricane Andrew


8E:cessive donated clothing created maGor pro lemsE some o9 the clothing was not appropriate 9or the tropical climate o9 -ade county Ae?g?$ winter coatsCE?O9ten$ truck drivers with loads o9 clothes drove straight to severely damaged areasE,pon arrival$ they o9ten did not know where to deliver the donated clothes$ so they unloaded them on the side o9 the road? *he heat and usual a9ternoon summer rains Fuickly turned the piles into heaps o9 stinking$ rotting cloth?; E 8 E:cessive 9ood donations created 9urther emergency management pro lems?; A&eal$ B>>5$ pp? 45C

422B World *rade )enter


8)hris Ward is snaking through a tunnel o9 card oard crates$ past o:es E past thousands o9 shampoo containers organi(ed y si(eE?*he pro lem is$ very little o9 it was neededE? little o9 the cargo reached the intended recipients$ as they simply had no use 9or itE*he propensity o9 Americans to ship stu99 to national disasters has ecome such an overpowering re9le: that rescue workers now have to divert considera le resources to ensure the largess does not get in the way? .ome even descri e the torrent o9 sundries as a 8second tier disaster?;; A&ewsweek$ 4224C 8I*hereJ were e:amples o9 much needed materials$ ut we also saw donations o9 unnecessary goods E the 9ive tractor1 trailer loads o9 pumpkins donated to <round Kero around Halloween that needed to e redirected to pu lic schools E? We heard o9 people driving machinery and eFuipment to the site$ leaving it 9or use$ and then ecoming upset when it was not returned even though the items were never documented$ processed$ or reFuested?; AWachtendor9 and Kendra$ 4225$ pp? =C?

422= <ul9 )oast


8L-onation management is the most di99icult part o9 every disaster$L he said o9 the unsorted mountains o9 clothes? LWe have a little it o9 everything?L;E? A)aller1*imes$ 422=C? 8.ometimes generosity can go awry?;E?? In KatrinaMs immediate a9termathE? collection sites along the "ississippi <ul9 )oast ecame 8nothing more than dump sites;E?; A*imes1%iscayune$ 422=C?


Katrina0s logistical de acle or How not to do it


*he 9indings discussed here are ased on do(ens o9 interviews with the individuals directly involved in the logistical response #HN and colleagues declared persona non grata y /E"A Aand very proud o9 itOC

B? "agnitude o9 the event and the reFuirements

*he largest natural disaster in ,?.? history!


-evastated B22 miles around the eye %roperty damages ascending to P>3 illion *otal economic impact may reach P422 illion One o9 the deadliest hurricanes to ever hit mainland ,?.?$ with B$=QQ con9irmed deaths and 443 people still missing as o9 "ay 4223 /looded 62R o9 &ew Orleans *he government 9ederal disaster declarations covered >2$222 sFuare miles$ an area almost the si(e o9 the ,nited Kingdom



*he American Red )ross AAR)C started preparing!

%repositioned =22$222 meals ready to eat A"REsC Identi9ied B= sites 9or large kitchens 9or mass 9eeding Opened several shelters in the region -eployed vehicles and sta99 to the disaster area Raised more than P4 illion$ 4@7 o9 charita le groups Led the e99orts o9 more than 442$222 sta99 and volunteers

When &ew Orleans 9looded$ AR) was overwhelmed! 8EI don0t think Red )ross ever had to work with so many outside agencies in coordinationE;

4? )ollapse o9 the communication in9rastructure


&early three million people without electricity@phone >BB emergency call centers were severely impacted Out o9 service! =2R radio stations$ 55R o9 *N stations =2$222 utility poles were toppled in "ississippi alone 8ItheJ entire in9rastructure was wiped out IandJ there were no communicationsEuntil 9ive days a9ter the storm IwhenJ we got satellite phones?; 8Ethe main communication came ack and 9orth y helicopter? .ort o9 like a &ew Age %ony E:press?; &o one knew 8Ei9 things had een delivered$ and i9 they had een delivered$ who accepted it?; *he Internet1 ased inventory system AE1*eamC used y the .tate o9 Louisiana to process emergency reFuests collapsed

7? Lack o9 integration etween computer systems


Local and state governments used a commercial so9tware AE1*eamC 9or procurement and tracking /E"A relied on a custom1made system called &E"I. A&ational Emergency "anagement In9ormation .ystemC E1*EA" and &E"I. did not communicate E1*eam reFuests had to e individually read and manually inputted into &E"I. /ederal sta99 could not check in9ormation on individual reFuests$ local@state sta99 could not check the status o9 their reFuestsE

5? Lack o9 planning 9or handling o9 donations


*he volunteers and sta99 availa le at staging areas were not enough to manage the large in9lu: o9 goods received 8Eanother thing we need in our plan is donated goods? *here needs to e a section within /E"A$ or the .tate$ or some ody$ esides NOA- in conGunction with NOA- that needs to e responsi le 9or donated goods?;


Nolunteers complained that communication with the government was ine99icient and that they did not know what the priorities and needs were -onations o9 low1priority goods hampered critical activities! clothing eing the most pro lematic Incoming trucks loaded with clothing sometimes dropped their cargo at parking lots

=? Limited asset visi ility


Asset visi ility was seriously o structed at oth ends o9 the supply chain Locals could not estimate the Fuantity and type o9 critical supplies needed /E"A had di99iculties determining supplies needed$ the resources it had availa le$ and the speci9ic location o9 a resource at a given point o9 time +ecause o9 lack o9 <%.$ no ody knew where trucks were? E:ample! the .uperdome trucks

3? ,ndersta99ing and lack o9 training

/E"A had around =22 vacancies A42R o9 the 4=22 agency positionsC with eight out o9 its ten regional directors working in an acting capacity /E"A turned to other 9ederal agencies to sta99 positions in "ississippi and Louisiana &ot all local sta99 were pro9icient users o9 E1*eam *he volunteer groups had pro lems! 8Eevery time a new group comes in$ you have to train IthemJ /ew individuals had logistic training


Q? Ine99iciencies in pre1positioning resources


&ot enough critical supplies were prepositioned *he locals did not event think a out prepositioning It was suggested that the state did not preposition the critical supplies called 9or y its own emergency plan ecause it was waiting 9or the /ederal emergency declaration to avoid using .tate 9unds *he 9ederal declaration o9 emergency was issued one day e9ore land9all /E"A started to preposition ut there was no time? *he activities were suspended ecause o9 Katrina?

6? %rocurement
%rocurement delays may e the single most important 9actor e:plaining the slow 9low o9 critical supplies a9ter the initial response 8Edelivery times were horri le? .mall Fuantities were OK Ihowever delivery o9J large Fuantities IwasJ very ad Atwo weeksC?; *his same respondent descri ed delivery o9 large Fuantities taking 413 weeks a9ter reFuisition$ while the delivery o9 medical supplies took B17 weeks as the sta99 were un9amiliar with the supplies and where to acFuire them



%opular wisdom in action E

/inding! Nolunteer organi(ations saved the day


Horrendous as it was$ the Katrina de acle would een much worse i9 not y the outstanding work o9 the volunteer organi(ations that!
pre1positioned supplies sent e:perienced and motivated leaders demonstrated great creativity$ ingenuity and 9le:i ility in the 9ace o9 disaster 62 million pounds S 4$222 semitrailers


How do we avoid a repeat? %art I! Operations

Key Recommendations


)reate a Emergency Logistics *raining %rogram *rain local population @ emergency response sta99 Learn to 9ollow the &ational Response %lan -e9ine proper roles 9or the key agents )reate a Ro ust Emergency Logistics &etwork Regional +lanket %urchasing Agreements$ R+%A Implement "easures to Increase Asset Nisi ility Regional %re1%ositioning@.haring o9 )ritical .upplies Implement %roactive -onation )oordination %lans -evelop -ecision .upport *ools


How do we avoid a repeat? %art II! -ecision .upport *ools

Research in progress at R%I

-iagnosis and characteri(ation!
)auses o9 logistical de acle post1Katrina How humanitarian logistics take place Tuanti9ication! Aimed at o taining empirical estimates %rovide support to analytical modeling Immediate resource reFuirements$ donation patterns


+asic research on analytical modeling

*o develop new modeling paradigms )onsidering social costs o9 logistic actions Incorporating social science concepts

Tuanti9ication! IRRs
Immediate resource reFuirements AIRRsC
+ased on processing the Action ReFuest /orms 9rom /E"A$ that captured the reFuests made y responders A total o9 B766 9orms o tained through a /reedom o9 In9ormation Act



Numbe r of re que s ts

-eveloped models to 9orecast immediate resource reFuirements

Water and ice (Aug ! " Se#t !$
B6 B3 B5 B4 B2 6 3 5 4 2 7 3 > B4 B= B6 4B 45 4Q 72

Time Series Plot of Number of Requests

8= /= .= -= ,= <= = < 8 <, <: ,. -= -8 ., .: /. 8=

Number of requests


%ood& 'R(s (Aug ! " Se#t

B6 B3 B5 B4 B2 6 3 5 4 2 7 3 > B4 B= B6

Number of requests





Tuanti9ication! "aterial convergence


We have assem led a data ase o9 donations ased on post1processing o9 newspaper articles Anow working on InternetC to e used 9or spatial econometric modeling to Fuanti9y convergence *he idea is!
,se this data to estimate spatial econometric models I9 success9ul$ this will ena le to get estimates o9 material convergence and to gain insight into key 9actors

*ypical model



*he need to re9ormulate humanitarian logistic modeling

*wo pressing issues

)onsidering the social costs o9 su99ering )onsidering material convergence
&asty pro lem +ehavioral 9oundations o9 convergence not clear


*he need to consider human su99ering

Humanitarian supply chains must 9ocus on minimi(ation o9 human su99ering
&o other o Gective 9unction captures etter the 9undamental goal o9 humanitarian logistics


&one o9 the current analytical 9ormulations e:plicitly consider victims0 well eing Asome consider penalty costs as a pro:y varia leC

How to Fuanti9y human su99ering?

,sing human su99ering as a decision criterion leads to philosophical and ethical dilemmas
Ideally no one should e purposely le9t in peril )ontroversial to assign economic value to su99ering and the loss o9 lives

A sensi le approach is to use economic valuation

An economic measure to evaluate alternatives A le to di99erentiate and prioriti(e alternative actions +ypasses the need to su Gectively decide levels o9 service Allows 9or un iased tradeo99 analysis etween social ene9its and operational costs

.ocial cost 9unction

4o#ial #os! ()


Depriva!ion !i2e

Key 9eatures!
Highly non1linear$ as a 9unction o9 deprivation time &on1additive demands! A person that have not eaten in 9ive days and get 9ood in the =th day$ will not eat 9ive days worth o9 9ood

E:ample o9 a social cost 9unction

,sing a small sample$ a social cost 9unction o9 not having access to water was estimated
Willingness to Pay for "Water"
Stated Preferences and fitted values by regression function


(t ) = e
350 300 250

(1.5031 0.11!"#t )

W$ P ())

200 150 100 50 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

$ i%e &it'out &ater( t (in 'ours)

)urrent approaches! %enalty ased 9ormulations


An amount is charged when a population reaches a deprivation time , +i!h the intent o9 capping su99ering at c() *his prompts the model to dispatch a delivery

%ro lems with penalty ased 9ormulations

*he value o9 does not matter$ as long as it is 8large; compared to delivery costs *he threshold deprivation time , is 9ar more important ecause it determines the permissi le su99ering c() However$ pre1setting is completely ar itrary
Low value social costs are important High value social costs are less important How do you know how to set ?



is the level o9 service achieva le given supply and demand! it cannot e pre1determined %arado:!
I9 the value o9 is set lower than what is achieva le$ no solutions will e 9ound I9 the value o9 is set higher than what is achieva le$ the population will su99er more than is actually needed

In conclusion!
%enalty ased 9ormulations$ setting eFuity constraints that mandate a delivery a9ter a set amount o9 time are very pro lematic

*he solution


Instead o9 9orcing the pro lem to 9it the commercial logistics paradigm$ Re9ormulate the pro lem as one o9 minimi(ation o9 social costs
Social cost Needs fullfiled

Needs not complet ely fullfiled




Deprivation time

Analytical 9ormulations
3onsidering so#ial #os!s
i ?t > =


? ilt >


'o!al so#ial #os! a! node i, !i2e ! $ se@uen#e of deliver* a#!ionsA node, deliver* a2oun!, and !i2e

X =

{ ( i< , d< , t< ) , ( i, , d , , t , ) ,...,( in , d n , t n ) }


T ?X > =
T ?X > =

(X) +

i l t

(X) +

[ ( ) ]


xilt +

[ ( ) ]
ilT i l


'o!al #os! A Deliver* B 4o#ial #os!s

Penal!* 1ased for2ula!ionA

T ?X > =
T ?X > =

(X) +

PT ( X )
i l t

'o!al #os! A Deliver* B Penal!* #os!s

(X) +

(< xilt )

7! is i2possi1le for !hese for2ula!ions !o rea#h !he sa2e solu!ions

( ilt ) = e ( <./=-<+ =.<<9, ilt )

&umerical e:amples
)ase I! One distri ution center$ One demand node Optimal policy! *o deliver as much as possi le
a$ Social cos ts ()$
'ru#5 #apa#i!* as C of de2and ,/C /=C 9/C <==C =.,/ -.:.// ,=..8= <:..:: <98.,, 3*#le 'i2e ?da*s> =./ =.9/ ,,<;;.;9 -./.89 ,8/.=; <:-.-< <-,;:,.// :-9.-; /.9..: ,.<.9, < <-<,/.=./< ,,<;..:. <,,8/./--8.,,


b$ A*e rage de #ri*ation time s (days $

'ru#5 #apa#i!* as C of de2and ,/C /=C 9/C <==C =.,/ =.;= =..: =.-, =.,/ 3*#le 'i2e ?da*s> =./ =.9/ <./: =.;= =.8, =./= ,.<. <.,; =.:; =.9/ < ,..= <.8= <.<<.==


)ase I! One distri ution center$ /ive demand nodes

< , / . 4#enario $A 'ravel !i2es D 8 hours D3 D3 < , . / 4#enario EA 'ravel !i2es D ,, /, 9, <<, <- hours

.olutions 9rom heuristics

/ormulations lead to stationary delivery patterns


Heuristic Social costs Traditional logistics Deliver neG! !o !he node +i!h 2aGi2u2A Deliver a! leas! on#e ever* / da*s ?%arginal 4o#ial Eenefi! H %arginal 'o!al %ini2izeA 'o!al #os! D !ravel #os!s B penal!* 3os!> #os!s <-<-,-<---.-/-,-<---.-/-,-<---. <8 F<<,/== - - F-,9,9<, <-,---<-,---<-,-.-/-<-,---<-,---<-,-. <; F<<,//= F,/=,=== F8,:=9,:9:

Strategy Heuris!i# solu!ion ?"e!urn !o depo! af!er visi!ing ea#h node> Nu21er of deliveries 'ravel #os! Penal!ies for un2e! 'o!al so#ial #os!s

*raditional Apenalty asedC 9ormulation


.ocial cost 9ormulation Anote di99erence in scaleC




Analytical approaches to humanitarian logistics must e re9ormulated *he popular penalty ased 9ormulations are very pro lematic Realism could e signi9icantly enhanced y e:plicitly considering material convergence and the cost o9 su99ering