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CORNELIA MATABUENA vs.

PETRONILA CERVANTES L-2877 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971 FACTS: In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common -law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable. ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. HELD: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half. Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Agapay vs. Palang 276 SCRA 341 Facts: Article 87; Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Out their union was born Herminia Palang, respondent. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambale swith his brother during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn, not with his wife or child. Miguel had also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good, he refused to live with his wife and child. When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted his second marriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. As evidenced by deed of sale, both jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Cornelia executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son and then two years later Miguel died. Thereafter, Carlina filed a complaint of concubinage on the previous party. Respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner contended that she had already given her half of the riceland property to their son and that the house and lot is her sole property having bought with her own money. RTC affirmed in favor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang.

R. Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos. in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the property. . authorizing the latter to maintain. Issue: Can an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered into by his Filipina wife over a land bought during their marriage? Ruling: Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. On the other hand. Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Francisco registered the lot in his name. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was enteredwit hout his (Benjamin’s) consent. Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out. Taylor (Benjamin). Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin. 2001 Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. a British subject. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated “vendee” in the Deed of Sale of said property. she acquired sole ownership thereto. De Batocael G. the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. 2009 Facts: On June 30. However. Respondents. no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed. June 22. Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code. no implied trust was created in his favor. to take care of his house and store. Joselyn bought from Diosa M. the donation inter vivos is considered null and void. nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco. Francisco asked hisniece Leticia.294 square-meter lot (Boracay property. No. being an alien. The deed stated that the donation was being made inconsideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years. On July 20. he instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. respondent Benjamin A. is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. 1988. married Joselyn C. 1992.Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was not by way of sale but was a donation and therefore void. Tabancura Vda. Thereafter. who are nieces. On June 8. who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Benjamin. Taylor (Joselyn). a 17-year old Filipina. Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her. lease. and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence tha ttwo persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. On June 9. ART 88 Matthews vs Taylor GR 164584. By entering into such contract kno wing that it was illegal. Martin a 1. 146683 November 22. Joselyn entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years. 1992. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda. Therefore. he executed an instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos ” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila. alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. 1989. sell. This is true even if Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition is sustained.  Arcaba vs. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. Havingno children to take care of him after his retirement. After the death of Zosima. recovery of possession and damages. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen.” Thereafter. respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba. and sublease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights. A few months before Francisco’s death.

the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable. which suggested that in addition to the existing water pump. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. a second Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and Aurora Guiang. In fulfillment of its contract. Furthermore. However. a corporation engaged in the hotel and resort business with office and establishment at Olongapo City. a submersible pump be installed to increase the pressure and improve the flow of water to the hotel. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with the order. On 2 May 1975. HELD: A&L Industries is a single proprietorship. then occupied by respondent spouses Federico and Aurora Guiang. it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. Petitioner Marmont secured the services of another contractor (the name of which was not disclosed). Marmont Resort Hotel Enterprise vs Guiang 168 scra 373 FACTS: The present Petition for Review seeks to set aside the decision in CA. for the property to be liable. with Federico Guiang signing as witness. The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights. Augusto failed to pay the same. After some time..000. Five (5) months later. May 28 1988 FACTS: Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation. there must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses. which dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner company against private respondent spouses. Lily Yulo.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries. Under the agreement. ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.00.00. the water supply of the Marmont Resort Hotel became inadequate to meet the hotel's water requirements. for a stipulated fee of P40. On 13 May 1980. petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court. petitioner Marmont filed a Complaint against the Guiang spouses for damages resulting from their refusal to allow representatives of petitioner and the second contractor firm entry into the water facility site. who managed the business and under whose name the said business was registered. he had already abandoned his family and left their conjugal home. Maris Trading drilled a well and installed a water pump on a portion of a parcel of land situated in Olongapo City.000. 2months prior the procurement of the loan. Inc. Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife. ART 94 CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY BA Finance Corp vs. a Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and petitioner Marmont Resort Hotel Enterprises. Hence. The said proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the same. Thus. purportedly authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note.003. titles and interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. the writ of attachment cannot be issued against the said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amounting to P660. . Soriano Corporation. whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. Maris Trading undertook to drill for water and to provide all equipment necessary to install and complete a water supply facility to service the Marmont Resort Hotel in Olongapo. CA GR 61464. Clearly. the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal properties with Lily.

Thereafter. the second Memorandum of Agreement. alleging that the subject matter thereof involved conjugal property alienated by Aurora Guiang without the marital consent of her husband. that contract cannot. being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982. AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC. February 12. Respondent Alfredo Ching. ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. was also signed by her husband Federico.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). “if the money or services are given to another person or entity. This circumstance indicates not only that Federico was present during the execution of the agreement but also that he had. The spouses there assailed the validity of the second Memorandum of Agreement. the Guiang spouses (defendants below) denied having had any previous knowledge of the first Memorandum of Agreement and asserted that the second Memorandum of Agreement was invalid for not having been executed in accordance with law. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. Ayala Investments vs CA GR No. executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. 118305. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. In this particular case. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. given his consent to the execution thereof by his wife Aurora. he should not have appended his signature to the document as witness. Respondent spouses cannot now disown the second Memorandum of Agreement as their effective consent thereto is sufficiently manifested in the document itself. as one of the witnesses thereto. Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court.300. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. Even if the debt or obligation were not for the benefit of the community. RTC: Denied the Motion to Dismiss CA: Affirmed decision of RTC and Dismissed the Appeal ISSUE: Whether or not the second Memorandum of Agreement was invalid in this case? We consider briefly respondent spouses' argument that the second Memorandum of Agreement was invalid for having been executed by Aurora Guiang without the marital consent of Federico. contrary to Articles 165 and 172 of the Civil Code. it is not embarking in a business. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. 1998 FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50. Magsajo. EVP of PBM. by itself. and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor. Pending the appeal of the judgment. Furthermore. RTC issued writ of execution. alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. the absolute community of property shall be liable if such debt or obligation were contracted during the marriage by both spouses or by anyone of them with the consent of the other. although ostensibly contracted solely by Aurora Guiang with Maris Trading. Hence. Otherwise. appointed deputy sheriff. Federico Guiang. in fact.In their Answer. the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM. however.000. Consent maybe express or implied. The contract of loan or servi ces is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Clearly. HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. as noted earlier. .

Lacson and Ricardo A. On September 25. cannot be presumed to be the benefit of the family as any advantage that may arise therefore is merely indirect. respondent corporation was not able to pay the balance as it suffered business reversals. Any loss resulting from the exercise of a profession or family business by any of the spouses shall be chargeable to the absolute community of property. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied.000. the principal contract. The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership. eventually ceasing operations in 1984. Miguel J. the PBMCI. if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract. however. i. This was renewed once for a period of one month. the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation. executed a promissory note to evidence the loan maturing on June 29.. was solely for the benefit of the latter. However. respondent corporation availed of its credit line and received the sum of P9. 1981.e. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. Hence. It failed to discharge that burden. through Alfredo Ching. ISSUE: May the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party? HELD: NO In this case. it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez. appreciation of shares of stocks. such as making himself or herself a surety or a guarantor in relation to an obligation to another person. It. . 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. Petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. November 29. Court of Appeals. petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against respondent corporation and individual respondents in the Regional Trial Court . this petition. we ruled that. Hence.00 payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself. the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. hence." In other words. 1981. In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Unable to collect the balance of the loan. Martinez. found that the obligation contracted by individual respondent Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his family. Alfredo Ching and Encarnacion Ching vs CA and Allied Banking Corp FACTS: Earlier in 1979. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction.952. the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession. where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business. 2006 FACTS: Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation.000.000 which it undertook to pay. The RTC rendered its decision on June 20. As in the previous loan. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount of P13. Any personal undertaking by a spouse. 1994. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. It held respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez jointly and severally liable to petitioner . there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Security Bank and Trust Co vs Mar Tierra Corp GR 143382.The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s employment (prolonged tenure.

The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans. For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone. Encarnacion T. on August 21. not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. the burden of the private respondent to prove that the source of the money utilized in the acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of the petitioner-husband alone.D.000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership In this case. the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100. Hence. the petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent. assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching. the private respondent claimed that the petitioner-husband acquired the shares of stocks from the Citycorp Investment Philippines in his own name as the owner thereof.[62] In this case. the trial court partially granted the aforementioned motion by suspending the proceedings only with respect to the PBMCI. likewise. Thus. . is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.88 exclusive of interests. Thereafter. Furthermore. hence. The petitionerwife had the right to file the motion for said relief. likewise. the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guar anty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. pursuing a legitimate business. It was. Ching. the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. As held by the trial court. The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account of PBMCI under Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code. It denied Ching’s motion to dismiss the complaint/or suspend the proceedings and pointed out that P. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI.000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. In this case. 1758 only concerns the activities of corporations. 1981. the petitioner-husband was in the exercise of his profession. the indebtedness covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. She.000 shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature. the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12. Certainly. she was a third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the properties. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety. No. on the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100. She alleged inter alia that the 100. to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent. The PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or motion to suspend the proceedings in invoking the PBMCI’s pending application for suspension of payments (which Ching co -signed) and over which the SEC had already assumed jurisdiction In the meantime. in an Order. it directed the individual defendants to file their answers. filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. The husband. the private respondent failed to adduce evidence to prove this assertion. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo Ching. The CA. Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI.612. partnerships and associations and was never intended to regulate and/or control activities of individuals. there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. thus. She attached therewith a copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo Ching. penalties and other bank charges. HELD: YES In this case. solely for the benefit of the latter. alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching. therefore.972.