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(In Search of) A Fundamental Basis for Ethical Reection

Joseph A. Selling
Ethical questions rarely present themselves in an abstract manner. Situations we encounter in our daily personal and professional lives sometimes cause us to hesitate, to reect, even for a moment, about the ethical quality of possible modes of acting or withholding action (action and omission). These situations can be relatively trivial, encountered with such frequency that we do not give them much thought (e.g., parking in a no-parking zone). However, they can also be the origin of major questions that propose clear ethical issues, but that do not immediately include any indication of how we should deal with them (deceiving participants in a psychological experiment, being asked to determine the absolutely minimum standards for building materials). In some cases we can consult existing guidelines, either those which are specically enumerated, for example by an ethics committee or an existing statement of policy, or those guidelines which are commonly known, often referred to as common sense, rules of behavior, or simply, the way things are done. Where we get the tools to evaluate ethical issues is only infrequently discussed or raised to the conscious level. And yet it is the tools that we use, the manner of approaching an ethical question, that will most likely inuence the kind of response we will tend to give for an ethical dilemma. As already stated, most ethical questions arise in a context, in a situation. As a result, one can easily get the impression that the issue at hand is unique, that this ethical question is one that belongs to a particular area of life, and therefore that only an understanding that is rmly based in this specialized area is capable of responding adequately to the problem. Thus we see the growth of a number of specialized ethics medical ethics, business ethics, political ethics, the ethics of journalism, etc. frequently accompanied by a specic ethical code. To the extent that the analysis of any issue, question or ethical dilemma demands that one have control of the facts of the case presenting itself, it is true that specic questions need to be approached with an adequate amount of specic competence (expertise). However, the common ground of these types of issues is their ethical nature. The question might realistically be put whether there is one ethics which can guide us to an adequate response to most any question, or whether there are many ethics, each specic to the area in which it is being called forth.1 The professional, or competent person, in any given eld will tend to suggest that the ethical concerns s/he deals with can only be comprehended by someone who is thoroughly versed in that particular eld. As far as comprehension of the facts is concerned, there appears to be little ground for arguing the point.2 Nevertheless, one could still ask about the basis upon which even the professional (specialized) ethicist will make his/her judgments. Are the rules and structures of ethical codes still so specic that they apply only to one area of human behavior? Recent Developments One of the greatest achievements of ethical

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reection in this century has been the shift from a law or nature (natural law) oriented perspective to a person oriented perspective in dening the ultimate criterion for ethical judgment.3 This shift does not constitute a rupture in our ethical tradition, but rather a renement. In the past, natural law signied the concern of the ethical community that the ultimate criterion for judging what is right and wrong had to be objective, that is, it had to occupy a position that was beyond subjectivism, beyond mere human wish or aspiration, beyond our fallible decision-making capabilities. We might think, want, hope, even believe that something is right, but if we have no criterion outside of ourselves (objective), there is no way of really knowing, being sure, that we are not deceiving ourselves. An example of this might be the use of eugenics. Some would have it that in relatively simple form eugenics has been practiced for ages. Genetic engineering has been accomplished by cross breeding, articial pollination and insemination, selective breeding, etc. The scientic knowledge of human genetics is making this more and more of a common possibility. Utopian, idealistic thinkers and researchers may suggest that we could improve the human species by practicing either selective breeding or by direct genetic engineering. However, the often repeated critique of this suggestion is the question, who will decide what is better, who will decide what is more human, or desirable? Eugenics can easily degenerate into a form of genocide. Those who hold the power to engineer or to manipulate will be in a prime position to carry out their own wishes. A standard is needed which is independent of the exercise of such power. The question is, what is that standard, where can it be found, and how does it express moral authority? The difficulty with natural (moral) law

thinking is that whereas in the past natural law was understood as a source of objectivity (truth) not only for physical laws but primarily for social, aesthetic, and intellectual realities, in post-Newtonian culture it came to be identied with the laws of the universe. Worse still, in the other areas in which it continued to function such as in ethics natural law theory began to be seen as scientic, logical, deductive. One could know truth by discovering the structure of things. Calculation became a substitute for insight, aggressive analysis took the place of humble submission. Ethics built upon a scientic concept of natural law inevitably evolved into a practice of demarcation, calculation, and casuistry. The need to recapture the spirit as distinct from the letter of the natural law tradition led us to the search for another expression of ethical objectivity. The way things are is insufficient to provide insight into the way things should be. We learned these difficult lessons through the experiences of war, propaganda, pollution, manipulation and exploitation. Mans inhumanity to man could not be corrected by our scientic knowledge of the natural world. At the risk of making a long and complex story simplistically short, we will presume the proposition that natural law ethics eventually gave way to a person-oriented ethics.4 Typical of this transition has been the development of the theory of human rights. Four hundred years ago, ethicists attempted to explain the foundation for international justice on the basis of the law of nations in relation to natural law, an appeal to justice that transcended national priorities. Today, we appeal to things like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, the Helsinki Accords, etc. A much shorter time ago, we approached more local ethical issues by appealing to the laws of the church or of the state. Today, we approach many ethical issues by appealing to the rights

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of... the individual, workers, women, the public, the patient, the foetus,... etc. Consciously or not, most of us readily appeal to human rights, human dignity, respect for the person(s), etc., in order to substantiate our ethical reections and decisions. Nevertheless, the story is not yet complete. For although we may all be able to recognize something familiar in these observations, this does not escape the possibility that our concrete, operative notion of person (the human, the humanum, rights, dignity, etc.) remains relatively limited. Nor does it answer the methodological question of how to apply this ethical insight in our daily decisionmaking. Finally, although we recognize the shift from one expression of objectivity (natural law) to another (respect for the human person), we still have not approached the question of the validity and grounding of any ethical foundation (i.e., the fundamental question). Context as Limitation Ethical questions always present themselves in a specic context, in a situation. The person who becomes aware of these questions is necessarily part of the same context. Thus, we encounter the specialized ethics that which were mentioned above: business ethics, medical ethics, legal ethics, etc. Situated, and intimately bound up with a specic context, ethical questions are frequently interpreted in terms of the context in which they are encountered. Similarly, the resources upon which one will draw in order to respond ethically will also be interpreted in terms of that same context. The very fact that specic ethical questions demand specic ethical responses may result in a built-in prejudice on the part of those who are attempting to respond ethically. Even if ones basic criterion for judgment is (respect for the rights/dignity of) the human

person, this criterion becomes molded into the context in which it is encountered. In place of, or better as expression of, the human person, the focus of ethical reection may come to be understood as the client, the consumer, the patient, the defendant, the employee, the soldier, the civilian, the student, etc.5 Every single one of these categorizations constitutes a valid consideration in ethical reection. The rights-dignity-integrity-etc. of the clientconsumer-patient-etc. are genuine and important elements of responsible decision-making. However, do not the very same categorizations that are necessary for the articulation of ethical questions inherently limit our perspective of formulating an adequate response? In place of the humanum, we may have an operative notion of seeking to respect something less than the person. The object of ones attention may become physical health, psychological wellbeing, social integration, the availability of material resources, participation in legal protection, access to vital information, and so forth. All of these things are vital, but viewed separately they are not equivalent to human well-being. The respect for an objective criterion such as the human person is not equivalent to the realization, even the complete fulllment, of one of its parts. Thus, one can say that the full development of the humanum is not equivalent to the healthy body (medicine), security, self-fulllment, meaning (psychology), participation in power structures (economics, politics), a respected place in a well organized society (law), technical competence (education), the benets of industrial and technical progress (applied science), or even in knowledge and understanding (theoretical science). Understanding nature, even the universe, does not ipso facto make living in it any easier or more enjoyable. Even coming to terms with reality (philosophy) cannot bring about (function as the efficient cause of) human

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happiness. Furthermore, there is a kind of irony in the fact that precisely because of their dedication and commitment to their chosen vocation, most every ethical practitioner of any of these disciplines will defend some form of priority for the goals they are seeking to achieve. one cannot survive in a technological culture without technological knowledge information is the life blood of social living political know-how is a tool for protecting human rights social welfare is the only manner of insuring social participation self-fulllment is the ability to cope with reality and to direct ones own life the establishment and execution of a just legal system is the foundation of democracy as long as you have your health... Every one of these statements may be affirmed, but the very diversication of priorities is simultaneously a limitation of perspective. Most of us articulate a truly ethical perspective: We must take full account of the whole person. Then, as an expression of our own responsibility and commitment, we often follow this saying, and we should begin with... Objectivity and Proof The richness of human existence and the multidimensionality of human understanding are at once the source of our ultimately limitless potential and the cause of an almost inevitable tendency to shorten our perspective. The scope of our horizons as human beings produces not only hope but also vertigo. It is not only frightening to consider all our options, it is virtually impractical. Therefore, we work from within our own context, hoping to improve our own eld and make our own contribution. This is ethically responsible. However, any shortening of perspective will

limit the ethical project itself, which seeks to be comprehensive. The foundation of ethical judgment must be as broad as possible. With this observation we return to the question of foundation. It has been suggested that (some concept of) the human person has come to serve as a source of objectivity in ethical reection. One might justiably ask for some proof or demonstration of such a gratuitous proposition. Unfortunately, from the very beginning we should prepare ourselves for the possibility that no such proof exists. Certainly, if by proof or demonstration we imply a contemporary scientic meaning of these terms, we should give up hope of nding it. Nevertheless, even if a proof is inconclusive, a competent demonstration of available arguments should be sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the validity of a given proposition. The fact remains, however, that reasoning persons do not always exhibit ethical behavior. Obviously, there is a great difference between a reasoning person and a reasonable person. But that is another story. Scientic proof demands a measure, a criterion, something against which the phenomenon in question might be compared. If we are speaking about the most fundamental criterion for ethical objectivity, and proposing that such a criterion is the human person, by denition there is nothing more fundamental against which to measure the measure. Take, for instance, the affirmation that all human persons are fundamentally equal. Apart from the fact that the vast majority of people pay little more than lip-service to this proposition,6 there is precious little empirical evidence to demonstrate such a statement. On the contrary, a great deal of evidence appears to suggest the opposite. The proposition that the human person (or for that matter natural law) is the fundamental criterion for ethical reection, then, is neither an empirical statement nor the conclusion of

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some form of argumentation for which one can provide convincing proof. At the same time, it is a proposition that we can hope is acceptable to reasonable persons. One can accept such a statement, one can believe it, one can even have faith in its validity even though an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence appears to throw it into question. In other words, I suggest that we should entertain the idea that whatever we conclude to be the most fundamental criterion for ethical reection will describe the content of what we must ultimately call a faith statement. We cannot prove that all human persons are fundamentally equal. Ultimately, we make some kind of a decision to accept such a proposition we believe it. The same is true about the ethical foundation itself. We accept the criterion of the human person as the source of objectivity, something that is beyond subjectivism and wishful thinking. In order for this criterion to function, however, the concept of person that we invoke must lie outside the realm of individual and social manipulation. The concept of person to which one may appeal is not my concept, our concept, nor even some concept that has been formulated by others.7 Rather, it is a basis for appeal, invoked to substantiate an ethical claim that reasonable persons will be able to recognize as valid. This appeal does not prove any argument, it merely invites agreement. In order to function as an ethical foundation, a source of objectivity, a ground for ethical appeal, whatever we invoke, whatever we accept (on faith) or believe to be that ultimate criterion, in order to remain free of falling into mere subjectivism and wish-fulllment, there must be something more to this criterion than that which is evident, observable, explainable or provable. Even the idea of human person does not always escape the danger of reductionism. An example would be the notion of utopia. While in proposing the notion of a utopia one

might very well be formulating the most noble ideal of human aspirations, history has shown that utopian ideals are never realized. The reason is probably because utopias are always formulated on the basis of wishful thinking that does not take adequate account of the reality of the human person a reality that will continuously escape our efforts of descriptive formulation. The foundation of a utopia lies totally within itself, which means that its operative idea of person is limited, nished, complete presupposed to be so entirely adequate that there remains no room for critical appeal. Thus, the most basic, fundamental criterion for ethical reection cannot be proven, veried, or even self-fullling. It can only be believed, because although the nature of that criterion is available through our human experience, the reality which we seek or propose to fulll a critical role in our experience itself must lie outside the connes of any xed denition. If the working hypothesis that we are using becomes xed, static, thought to be entirely complete, we will probably be deceiving ourselves. This is precisely what happened to the concept of natural law it became static. Antigone could appeal to a law that was higher than human law because the natural law to which appeal was made had not yet become xed. It is difficult to conceive how one could make the same sort of appeal in our own world when natural law has become so closely associated with physical laws. Reality and Ritual Affirming that the reality to which we appeal in order to ground our most fundamental criterion for ethical reection, although available through human experience, lies outside of us is equivalent to the affirmation that this reality enjoys the status of objectivity. It is reachable, but it can never be fully possessed. It

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can always function in a critical manner. It renews and refreshes our ethical outlook, and it corrects our ethical perspective in the event that our thinking becomes stale, repetitious, or even goes astray. This renewal of our basic ethical outlook must take place in some context whereby we open ourselves to the reality which serves as the foundation of that ethical outlook. To be renewed, to be challenged to rethink our basic presuppositions, we must submit ourselves to (the source of) that reality which lies outside of ourselves. Personally and individually, most anyone can do this by practicing some form of critical reection. One can read books, listen to wise persons, engage in debate with others. All of these activities are forms of submission, opening ourselves to (at least another persons insight into) the reality which is always greater than our conception of that reality. However, to the extent that this practice remains private, there is no guarantee that it will be critical. We read only the books that we fundamentally agree with; we listen to persons who do not disturb us; we engage in debate over nuances about a basically shared concept of reality. Few persons debate with those with whom they fundamentally disagree. In order to genuinely submit ourselves to a reality greater than (outside of) ourselves, we might accomplish this task better through some symbolic, ritual activity. Through ritual, we submit ourselves to a process, an idea, a reality that we did not invent. We allow the reality to present itself to us and to challenge us. The use of symbols (or symbolic expressions) is necessary because the reality that we are confronting is not reducible to a single, descriptive denition. The engagement in symbolic, ritual activity, through which we submit ourselves to the reality which is expressed in symbols is not simply a passive experience. Ritual is something which we must engage in, submit ourselves to, open ourselves to. At the same

time, however, it is something in which we have an active part. Thus, it is performative. Engaging in ritual we must express and profess something that is not of our own making. Such an experience can challenge us. The extent to which it challenges is proportionate to the extent to which it demands that we submit to it. The reality that we are speaking of here is that which we have designated as the fundamental criterion of ethical reection. This, of course, is not the only reality to which we can submit ourselves through symbolic ritual. However, this is the reality that is the present topic of this essay, and whatever has been chosen as that fundamental criterion is the object of a faith statement. It is something that we believe, and we must renew and refresh that belief through periodic, even if occasional, confrontation with the symbolic representation of that object of faith. Let us take the example of one who accepts that human rights forms the foundation of an ultimate ethical criterion. In order to prevent falling into subjectivism, one must return to the source as it were and periodically allow oneself to be confronted by some symbolic expression of those human rights. One reads the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One seeks to understand the problems involved in elaborating human rights. One confronts the tension that exists between political rights (freedoms) and social rights (entitlements), etc. One must examine whether they are really, genuinely following the path of realizing all human rights and not simply using the slogan to promote their own welfare. There are even rituals available for carrying this through. One can become part of Amnesty International or a Civil Liberties Union. There are other organizations for monitoring the protection of human rights, either locally or internationally. One can petition, protest, make their voice heard. More importantly, one can examine whether their own behavior lives up to the

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ideals that they are professing. Losing touch with the source of the faith we have in an ethical foundation inevitably leads to forgetting that foundation with its total, challenging and critical impact. The profession becomes lip-service and ethical sensitivity becomes dull. Even free-thinkers have their symbols and their rituals. Dedicated humanists continuously debate the reality of the fully human. If they do not periodically reect upon the source of their faith, their humanism can degenerate into self-satisfaction which denies the challenging reality of the oneness of humanity. It is not surprising to hear the believers in a certain scientism speaking of the human enterprise or the destiny of the species to be one with the universe. Faith and Religion Faith statements are not limited to a religious context, that is, a context in which one speaks of God, or the transcendent, or some ultimate reality. However, a religious context is also a forum for making faith statements. If we understand a religion to be some form of belief in an ultimate reality, we can see how that belief can function as a challenge to those who share such faith. In order to get in touch with that reality, one must open oneself to it, submit to it. The symbolic (thematic) expression of an ultimate reality must also be professed in some sort of ritual activity, otherwise the belief in an ultimate reality remains simply private with the danger of being no ultimate reality at all. The only way in which we can prevent this belief from falling into a merely subjective projection of our own wishful thinking is to submit to something more than a private expression of the meaning of that ultimate reality. We need to engage in a ritual which represents more than the sum total of individual, private wishes and projections. If we

are not challenged by the ultimate reality, then that reality is not ultimate. Persons believe in many things, some more ultimate than others. The object(s) of our faith, however, may be more or less unied. The manner in which that faith is expressed may take on many forms. Some believe in a concept (human dignity, humanity, solidarity), others believe in spirits (animism), still others in an ultimate being (theism). Theism may be impersonal, or it may represent belief in a personal God, that is, a God who communicates with human beings. The propositions that we use for professing our belief, our faith, are sometimes called dogma, which is a systematized formulation of how that faith might best be expressed. The dogma(s), however, are expressions, they are symbols. In themselves they are nothing more than the formulations of an attempt to express the object(s) of our faith. As objects themselves, they serve no function if they are not expressed ritually. The profession of faith (expressing the formulations of what is believed and accepted to be something more than our own inventions) forms the core of ritual. In the case of religious ritual, we sometimes also refer to liturgy. Judeo-Christian Tradition Submitting ourselves to the reality which we consider to be the fundamental criterion of ethical reection is equivalent to opening ourselves to a source of correction and critique. Because the reality is something greater than ourselves (lies outside of us), we can only express it symbolically, through words, formulations, gestures, aesthetics. Because we must attempt to avoid subjectivism and selfserving control of the reality, we must encounter it ritually. We must profess the faith we have and listen to ourselves profess it, saying and doing things demanded by the ritual rather than selectively choosing what suits our

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own purposes. In this way, we open a path to escape reductionism, self-justication, ethical insensitivity, and stale lip-service. The Judeo-Christian heritage contains both symbols and rituals that provide fertile ground for articulating a critical, broad-based approach to formulating an (ultimate) foundation of ethical reection. The profession of this explicitly religious faith is not reducible to ethical concerns, although the latter enjoy an important place in the profession of this faith as a whole. Many ethical systems can t into the Judeo-Christian tradition and at the same time be enriched by it. Natural law has had a home in some of this tradition, and a person-oriented ethics is compatible with it as well. Those of us who allow our ethical reection to be submitted to the demands of this faith may nd a valuable source of correction and critique in its wider concerns. To mention just a couple of those concerns, Judeo-Christian religious faith teaches the need for forgiveness and reconciliation. We forgive because we have faith that we are forgiven, and we ritually profess the challenging notion that we wish to be forgiven as we forgive others. Then, the radical communitarian nature expressed in the faith of the Judeo-Christian tradition demands that every member of the community be given the opportunity to enjoy an equal respect with all the fellow members of ones community. To achieve this, it demands that priority be given to the needs of the poor, the weak, the widow and the orphan, etc. Thus, the ethical ideal of equal dignity is taken a step further. The concept of justice achieves a meaning beyond any primitive sense of give and take. Furthermore, the Judeo-Christian tradition is rich with performative ritual that provides an opportunity for its adherents to open themselves to being challenged by what they claim to believe. Submitting oneself to the scriptures or reciting a profession of faith reminds us that

neither we, nor our generation, nor our culture or language group, have projected our own wishful thinking into these symbolic expressions of an ultimate reality. The claim to believe what our faith professes simultaneously places a claim upon ourselves and issues a challenge to our particular lives. Thus, we can begin to understand how moral experience begins not in a moment of reection but rather in the practice of liturgy. While we should be careful not to reduce religion to ethics, we can suggest that the foundation of ethical reection is not only grounded but also expressed and renewed by performative ritual. If we have not allowed what we claim to believe to be mitigated and reduced to what we hold to be convenient or desirable,8 religious ritual or liturgy can provide a starting point for being ethical. Faith and Ethics The most fundamental criterion for ethical reection can only be fully and consistently engaged when we allow ourselves to be criticized and corrected by that same criterion we claim to believe. Opening ourselves to its critical function can only be achieved by submitting ourselves to its objective claims upon us. We may accomplish this submission by the ritual practice of symbolic, performative activity. In professing our faith, we are presented with the opportunity to know better the foundational reality we ourselves have accepted. Through the practice of humility we nd strength, coherence and objectivity. For, it is in losing ourselves that we nd ourselves. The relation between faith and ethics, therefore, is one that touches upon the very foundation of our ethical perspective. Faith does not provide rules and concrete ethical norms, although it may have a critical attitude toward the acceptability or the necessity of certain concrete rules and norms that are

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proposed as ethical standards. A faith that contains a fundamental proposition about the creative activity of a personal God will demand respect for the work of that creative activity and demand that this respect be embodied in concrete actions and norms. A faith that affirms the equal dignity of persons will reject discriminatory laws and customs. Nevertheless, the way in which these attitudes are worked out in the context of the limited, imperfect world in which we live is left to the responsibility of real, historical persons. Achieving the goals that our faith sets as ideals will demand foresight, prudence, choices, and a willingness to struggle with the concrete givens of our existence. Achieving these goals therefore demands hard work on the part of every ethical person. The faith they profess can and will Notes
1.The

correct their shortcomings and challenge their shortsightedness, if persons are willing to profess that faith integrally and openly, submitting themselves to the reality that goes beyond their own, situated existence.

corollary to this position is the possibility that a specific manner of acting in one context may be judged as ethically acceptable, even good, while the same action in another domain of human activity may be judged as unacceptable. 2.For instance, judging whether a given medical procedure is appropriate rests to a great extent upon comprehending what that procedure is, how it works, what are its risks, what are the consequences, whether there are alternatives, etc., all of which judgments can only be made with a thorough knowledge about the case under consideration - i.e., the patient, familial and social resources, etc. 3.Although natural law ethics, or what some might call natural morality, is most typical of Roman Catholic Tradition, a similar type of orientation can be identified in secular or civil tradition, especially in those constitutional social structures that claim certain rights for their individual members, such as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 4.One may wish to use the term personalism here, which would be appropriate. However, personalism is much more than an ethical theory. Its roots are philosophical and political, and only partially does personalism refer to the project of defining the nature of the human person. When this is indeed the case, ethical personalism attempts to achieve some understanding of person that may be referred to in order to arrive at some working definitions of other ethical terms, such as the good. 5.Note that the prejudice of a rights-oriented ethical perspective is that ethical questions deal primarily with the (violation of the) rights of persons who are subject to authority. When the recipients of the judgments of those who hold power become the primary focus, the demand for ethical responsibility comes to rest largely with the holders of power. Such a perspective both flows from and tends to perpetuate an attitude that might be called ethical paternalism. 6.Much of how a given society rates persons depends upon what is important to that society at the time. An agricultural society will consider the successful farmer to be better than the poor farmer. A technological society rewards persons with technological knowledge and skills. Most every society exhibits some form of classes, the hierarchy or even existence of which may not be immediately evident.

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7.This,

of course, does not exclude the fact that we must constantly be trying to arrive at a reasonable concept of person as a working hypothesis for ethical reflection. This concept, however, must remain continuously open to review just as most contemporary notions of person understand the phenomenon itself to be open, dynamic. For one attempt to describe the nature of the human person (adequately considered), see Louis JANSSENS, Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations, in Louvain Studies, 8 (1980) 3-29 [= Kunstmatige inseminatie. Ethische beschouwingen, in Verpleegkundigen en gemeenschapszorg, 35 (1979) 220-244]. 8.The somewhat oblique reference here is meant to encompass both an idea of God made in our own image, a comfortable religion, and personalized or sociologically functional forms of fundamentalism that thrive upon a selective reading of tradition.

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