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The Military and Democracy in the Philippines: Towards a Democratic Control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)*1

Rommel C. Banlaoi**2 Abstract Military intervention in politics continues to pose challenges to democratization in the Philippines. Military intervention serves as a threat to its fragile democracy restored in 1986. While the Philippine constitution mandates the civilian control over the military, the Armed Forces of the Philippines is still playing an important role in Philippine domestic politics not only as state manager but also as a power broker. Significant number of retired generals still get prominent positions in the civilian bureaucracy and government-owned corporations while the military establishment continues to shape the direction of Philippine defense policy and diplomacy. The Oakwood mutiny in August 2003 and the series of coup rumors thereafter indicate that the civilian government does not have a strong grip of its armed forces. This paper argues that a democratic control, and not only civilian control, of the military is an option for the Philippine government to contain its armed forces. A democratic control of the armed forces requires not only the strengthening of civilian supremacy but also the implementation of a nation-wide security sector reform that will make national security institutions, including the military, transparent and accountable to the people. INTRODUCTION

When the Philippine government successfully thwarted the mutiny of at least 300 junior officers and soldiers of the AFP on 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Premier Ayala Center in Makati City, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo described the moment as a great triumph for democracy.
Since 1986, the Philippine government has been bragging about the restoration of Philippine democracy perverted by a twenty-year authoritarian rule of former President Ferdinand Marcos. The Philippine government, however, has seen dozens of military rebellions and coup attempts. These indicate the fragility and infirmity of democratic institutions restored by a military-backed popular uprising in EDSA 1986.1 To prevent
*Lecture delivered at the seminar sponsored by the Hans Seidel Foundation and organized by the Foundation for Communication Initiatives held in Makati City on 27 October 2003. This paper reflects the personal views of the author and not the official position of the Department of National Defense and the National Defense College of the Philippines.
1 2

**Professor of P olitical Science, National Defense College of the Philippines.

the military to intervene and stage another coup, President Arroyo directed the Secretary of National Defense to institutionalize a course on coup d etat, conspiracies, operations and consequences in all military schools.2 But this paper argues that the threat of military intervention in Philippine politics may be attributed not to the quality of education and training of military officers, but to the failure of the Philippine government to exercise democratic control of its armed forces. While the Philippine Constitution of 1987 requires the military to be subordinated to the civilian control, this paper contends that a mere civilian control does not prevent military intervention in a democratizing state. This paper argues that a democratic control of the Philippine armed forces is an option for an effective containment of the military establishment. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

There are various explanations on why the military intervenes in politics. Samuel Huntington says that the major factor that draws the soldier into the political arena is not his own strength but rather the weakness of the political system."3 This runs counter to the idea of Morris Janowitz who argues that military intervenes in politics because of the superior quality of its organization and the shared values of the officer corps.4
Samuel .E. Finer, on the other hand, regards the socio-cultural environment as the key factor for military intervention. Finer contends that a low level of political culture is likely to result in military intervention.5 Finer also says that military intervention is the product of both the ability and the disposition of soldiers to intervene. According to Peter Calvert and Susan Calvert, there are push and pull factors of military intervention. Push factors include the ambitions of individual officers, factional disaffection, and institutional activity said or believed to be in the national interests.6 Pull factors, on the other hand, include the association of the armed forces with military victories, a general perception of a lack of cohesion, discipline or stability in society, and a specific perception by the armed forces of threats to the military institution or to the officer class, or to the dignity or security of the nation.7 Calvert and Calvert also describe the contagion theory of military intervention stating that coups in neighboring states contribute to the will of soldiers to intervene. They also talk about the habituation theory of military intervention stating that coups are encouraged by the tradition of past coups.8 This is related with a theory of internal contagion of B.C. Smith stating that once military intervention has occurred, there is

likely to be another. According Smith, A country with no experience of coup d etat is less likely to have one than a country where one has already taken place.9 Calvert and Calvert also regard intervention as a defense mechanism of the military establishment to maintain its institutional interests in the midst of contending civilian interests.10 Military leaders also justify intervention to provide substitute structure for weak and divided civilian government.11 Lucian Pye has, in fact, articulated this perspective when he points out that in the midst of political instability, the military represents the only effectively organized element capable of competing for political power and formulating public policy.12 The countrys level of economic development also encourages military intervention. In their examination of military intervention of Sub-Saharan Africa, McGowan and Johnson observe that the lower the economic growth and level of industrial employment, the higher the incidence of military intervention in politics.13 There is also a class dimension of military intervention. The idea of praetorianism occurs when the middle class is too weak to defend democratic civilian institutions.14 This view is consistent with the perspective of Huntington who argues that in societies that are too underdeveloped to have produced a middle class the military will be a radical force (trying to abolish feudalism, but when a middle class has developed, the military will side with it as a conservative force.15 External factors also encourage military intervention. The involvement by a foreign power has been identified as crucial in the decision of the military to stage a coup eetat.16 Smith observes that the influence of foreign support in the form of clandestine military, security and intelligence agencies (like the CIA) has been critical in a number of Third World coups.17 External dimension of military intervention is also related with the contagion theory of Calvert and Calvert, which has been described earlier. But the crucial issue at hand is how to prevent military intervention in politics. Huntington provides the classic prescription to prevent the military to intervene in politics. He recommends the promotion of military professionalism and maximization of objective civilian control of the armed forces. But according to Robin Luckham, the concept of civilian control has already been considered irrelevant by the widespread continuation of authoritarian politics by democratic means.18 According to this view, there is as strong possibility to have a civilian control which is not democratic. Thus, Luckham advances the idea of democratic control based on the recognition that civilian governments are not necessarily democratic and that the most effective way to contain the military is through the democratic process. Luckham underscores that preventing the military to intervene and reintervene does not rest solely upon military establishments. He contends that much of the answer about military intervention in politics lies beyond military establishments themselves. He enumerates the following as important variables in preventing military intervention:

democratic institutions that function effectively and remain legitimate, in an active civil society in which social and political forces remain strong enough to deter military intervention, in economies that grow and redistribute resources so as to minimize discontent and conflict, and in an international environment that supports democratic institutions.19 In other words, democratic control is a crucial element in preventing military intervention in politics. According to Andrew Cottey, et. al, the idea of democratic control of the armed forces involves three distinct but interrelated issues. 20 First is the extent to and ways in which civilian government regulates the influence of the armed forces in domestic politics. This is based on the assumption that the military establishment should be prevented from participating in domestic politics and should be trained to remain the apolitical servant of the democratic government.21 Second is the control of defense policy. This is based on the idea that the definition and development of defense policy should be under the control of democratic, civilian authorities and that the military should confine itself to implementing decisions made by those authorities.22 Third is the extent and ways in which the military influences a states foreign policy . This is based on the principle that the states foreign policy, especially on matters requiring the deployment and use of military force, must be under the control of the democratic civilian institutions. 23 Apparently, the democratic control of the armed forces is a highly normative and prescriptive concept. In fact, Luckham regards democratic control as a contested process, not as a fixed attribute of existing democracies.24 This is because democracy itself is a highly contested concept. But the democratic control of the armed forces views democracy as more than the military returning to their barracks. It also means civilians taking responsibility for governing through the formal institutions which make up the political system and through social institutions which allow individuals to express their concerns.25 One important mechanism in which individuals can democratically express their concerns is participation in elections. Luckham even regards election as the main criterion for the presence of democracy.26 He underscores that the past two or three decades have seen a dramatic decline in the political role of the military because elections have replaced coups as the mechanisms for regime succession and elite circulation. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY One historian traces the history of the Philippine military to the pre-colonial period when the inhabitants of what we now call the Philippines organized different armed forces for different barangays (villages) for purposes of protection.27 Another historian regards the Battle of Mactan of

There is no uniform history of the Philippine military.

1521 as the most celebrated episode in the military history of the Philippines in the precolonial period as it featured the military victory of Lapu-Lapu against the forces of Ferdinand Magellan.28 But the AFP traces its origin to Tejeros Convention of 1897. According to official history of the AFP: The origin of the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) could be traced to the Tejeros Convention in 1897-where the revolutionary government of General Emilio Aguinaldo created the Philippine Army under Captain General Artemio Ricarte. This Army was the offshoot of the Revolutionary Forces, which took arms against the Spanish Government from August 30, 1896 up to December 10, 1898 when the treaty of Paris was entered into by the United States of America and Spain. The same Army engaged the Americans during the hostilities between the Philippines and the United States which began on the night of February 4, 1899 and lasted up to September 25, 1903 - when the last of Filipino Generals, General Simeon Ola surrendered to the Americans. After the Filipino-American war, the country's armed forces organized through the promulgation of the National Defense Act in 1935 which created the Philippine Army, with the off-shore patrol a and Army Air Corps as its major components. The Philippine Constabulary, was then existing under the Department of Interior.29 Some scholars trace the origin of the Philippine military to the 1935 National Defense Act.30 Others trace it to granting of Philippine independence in 1945, when the United States tasked the Philippine government to organize its own armed forces. Official records show, however, that on 23 December 1950, the AFP was founded with four (4) major services namely: Philippine Army, Philippine Air Force, Philippine Navy and the Philippine Constabulary. The Philippine Constabulary, now called the Philippine National Police, was transferred to the Department of Interior and Local Government. At present, the AFP has three major services with five unified commands and twelve wide-support and separate units. The AFP describes itself as the Philippines guardian of democracy.31 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN PHILIPPINE DOMESTIC POLITICS

politics and to remain apolitical. A state with a functioning democratic control of its armed forces prevents the military to intervene in domestic politics. Since its creation, however, the Philippine military has been part and parcel of Philippine domestic politics. Richard Kessler, an avid observant of Philippine politics, has commented that the Philippine military has been employed in Philippine society not to ensure peace and justice but to protect the privileged position of the ruling elite.32 The military played a vital role in the electoral victory of President Manuel Roxas in 1946 and was active in the 1949 electoral success of President Elpidio Quirino.33 During the 1951 Philippine elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

In theory, a professional military is expected to disengage itself from domestic

deputized the AFP to guard the polls.34 The AFP assumed a very important political role when President Ramon Magsaysay, who served as the secretary of Philippine national defense, employed a great number of military officers to civilian posts. Within one year after his assumption into office, Magsaysay appointed more than 122 officers to civilian positions, which included several cabinet posts.35 Under Magsaysay Administration, the AFP was involved in many non-fighting missions, called civic actions, for purposes of political propaganda and counter-insurgency operations. These missions included infrastructure projects (road building, irrigation, artesian well digging, construction of schools and community centers, and the like), food production, medical services and even legal assistance to rural people in order to successfully win their hearts and minds.36 The role of the military in Philippine domestic politics became more influential during the administration of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, particularly during the entire martial law period. The military became the primary basis of Marcos political power. Marcos also organized the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) to support AFPs role not only in counter-insurgency operation but also in suppressing oppositions against Marcos constitutional authoritarian rule in the rural areas, particularly in Mindanao. Under Marcos Administration, the AFP tremendously grew in number and took many inherently civilian functions. Military officers took control of many civilian offices like the Bureau of Telecommunications, Bureau of Posts, Philippine Ports Authority, and National Computer Center.37 Military officers also seized for unpaid loans the privately owned Jacinto Iron & Steel Sheets Corporation and fourteen other Jacinto family businesses. 38 Men in uniform also got important positions in many government-owned-and-controlled corporations. Marcos justified the role of the military to perform inherently civilian functions in the name of development and modernization.39 Because of the expanded political role of the military under martial law, several generals proudly admitted that martial law had given the AFP new confidence in its own ability to run the government.40 Thus, the AFP has received an image of being the republic of the armed forces of the Philippines. Marcos authoritarian regime only met its final demise when the disgruntled factions of the Philippine military headed by Fidel Ramos, his own chief of the national police force, and Juan Ponce Enrile, his own minister of defense, supported a people power uprising in EDSA in 1986. According to Felipe Miranda of the University of the Philippines, The militarys already significant political role became more crucial as it played a pivotal role in the 1986 overthrow of Marcos.41 As a result of the military-backed popular uprising, Marcos left the country to have an exile in Hawaii until he died. The people power installed Corazon C. Aquino, wife of Benigno Aquino who was the arch political contender of Marcos, as the President

of the Philippines. It was during the administration of President Aquino when democracy was said to have been restored in the Philippines. Despite the so-called restoration of Philippine democracy, the military continued to play a significant role in Philippine domestic politics.42 Although President Aquino ordered the military to return to their barracks,43 forcibly retired over-staying generals of the AFP, and replaced military officers occupying civilian posts, the military remained influential in the realm Philippine politics. There is even a view that the EDSA uprising brought the Philippine military to the fore as a power broker.44 Despite the Aquino governments attempt to assert civilian control by reorienting the AFP towards the acceptance of the civilian supremacy over the military, some discontented factions of the AFP still staged eight different coup attempts against her government, one of which was headed by ex-Col. Gregorio Honasan, now a Philippine senator allegedly involved in the 2003 Oakwood mutiny.45 This indicated that some military leaders, particularly those from the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), found it difficult to submit themselves to civilian control.46 The series of coups against the Aquino government also undermined the consolidation of civilian control of the military.47 To protect the Aquino Administration from further military assaults, retired generals were given important civilian posts as a reward to their loyalty to the constituted civilian authorities. One excellent example is the appointment of retired General Rafael Ileto as the secretary of national defense. The former AFP Chief-of-Staff Ramos, who would later on succeed President Aquino during the 1992 presidential election, succeeded Ileto as the secretary of national defense. During the Ramos Administration, the military continued to perform important non-military responsibilities. Filipino soldiers were even trained to perform duties and operations other than war. Ramos offered a general amnesty to military officers involved in the past coups. Some of these officers, who opted to retire, got important civilian positions in the Ramos government as presidential advisers or consultants on national security concerns. Other officers found their fortune in the Philippine Congress either as senators or congressmen after retirement. Some got cabinet positions as heads of department. Unlike his immediate predecessor, Ramos government never experienced coup attempts. As a former chief of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP) during the Marcos Administration and former AFP Chief-of-Staff and secretary of national defense under the Arroyo Administration, Ramos was able to establish control of the military during his presidential term. But his ability to control the military was not based on the strength of the civilian institutions but on the ability of Ramos to demand obedience from its former subordinates in the military. Ramos even boosted the morale of the Philippine military by approving the AFP Modernization

Program to adjust to the situation unleashed by the withdrawal of American military troops in 1991.48 The trend of recruiting retired military officers to occupy civilian positions in the government continued during the administration of President Joseph Estrada. Although Estrada appointed former senator Orlando Mercado as the civilian head of the Department of National Defense (DND) during his term, retired generals still dominated undersecretary positions. Estrada also appointed several retired military officers to various civilian posts. The Philippine military intervened again in politics when it withdrew its support to the Estrada Administration in 2001. Mercado and General Angelo Reyes, Estradas own AFP Chief-of-Staff, rallied against him in EDSA at the height of what Filipino historians would call People Power II. Initially initiated by civil society movements protesting against Estrada for his alleged plunder of the Philippine economy, the People Power II (also known as EDSA II) led to the downfall of his. Estradas own vice president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, succeeded him after a weeklong popular protest. Like her predecessors, Arroyo relied on the political support of the military to protect her administration from opposition leaders coming from both the civilian and military sectors. Upon assumption into office, she appointed Eduardo Ermita as acting secretary of national defense. Ermita is a retired general, a former congressman and an influential leader of her coalition party. When Reyes retired from the military service as chief-of-staff of the AFP shortly after EDSA II, Arroyo immediately appointed him as the new secretary of national defense. It was during the Arroyo Administration when a rouge faction of the AFP staged a mutiny at Oakwood Premier Ayala Center. The mutineers clarified that they did not attempt to grab power. They just wanted to air their grievances against the alleged rampant graft and corruption in the AFP. Among their complaints included the alleged irregularities in the procurement system in the AFP, favoritism within the ranks, alleged involvement of some military officers in terror bombings in Mindanao, and alleged selling of firearms to insurgents by some AFP officers. Although the mutiny did not aim to capture state power, their actions demonstrated an apparent intervention in politics. The Oakwood mutiny revealed the weakness of the civilian authority to assert democratic control of its own armed forces. Because of alleged pressures from active and retired generals, Reyes was forced to resign in the aftermath of the Oakwood mutiny in August 2003. Reyes resignation also happened in the midst of several coup rumors surrounding the Arroyo Administration. After Reyess resignation, President Arroyo proclaimed herself concurrent secretary of national defense making her the first woman civilian head of the defense establishment.

During her stint as defense secretary, Arroyo ordered the restructuring of the defense establishment and emphasized civilian authority in the chain of command. She appointed as undersecretary for internal control her trusted assistant, Constancia de Guzman, to be her civilian eyes and ears in the DND. To date, de Guzman is the only civilian undersecretary in the DND. All other undersecretaries are retired generals of the AFP. Although some military officers doubt the credentials of de Guzman, the Office of the President defended her by saying that de Guzman has a master in national security administration at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP). De Guzman was on top of the restructuring of the DND organization. After the restructuring, Arroyo appointed Ermita as the new secretary of national defense in October 2003. Despite the restructuring of the DND organization under Arroyo, retired military officers continue to dominate the leadership in the defense establishment. In the study made by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), it is observed that since the restoration of Philippine democracy in 1986, four sectors in the civilian government have been identified as having hosted a significant number of military appointees. These are DND, Department of Transportation and Communications, the Bureau of Customs and government-owned corporations and special economic zones.49 According to Glenda Gloria of PCIJ: Of the 21 defense secretaries since 1941, more than half 11 had served in the Philippine military. Of the 11, six got their military training from United States, either at West Point, Fort Leavenworth, or as a member of the United States Armed Forces for the Far East (USAFFE). At least 26 military officers have been assigned to the DND since Marcos fell from power in 1986. In addition, at least 26 retired and active-duty military officers have been assigned to the DOTC since 1986. The department is one of the governments top revenue-generating sectors. Under the Arroyo and Ramos governments, military officers headed the Land Transportation Office, which is in charge of issuing drivers licenses and car registrations and is the governments fifth biggest revenue earner. There are many military appointees in government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) as well as in special economic zones (free ports) that were established following the liberalization of the economy after the 1986 People Power revolution. Board memberships in GOCCs are considered patronage posts, given the huge allowances that board members receive (a high of P100, 000 a month in the case of the Social Security System, for example). Under the Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo administrations, at least 37 military officers occupied posts in GOCCs and special economic zones.

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The Bureau of Customs, too, which is the governments biggest revenue generating agency, has had its shares of military appointees nine under the Aquino, Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo administrations.50 Under the Arroyo Administration, former chiefs-of-staff received civilian portfolios immediately after retirement. Former AFP Chief-of-Staff Roy Cimatu was appointed Ambassador-at-Large for Overseas Filipino Workers; former Chief-of-Staff Dionisio Santiago got the position of Director of the Bureau of Correction while former defense secretary Reyes got a job as Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-terrorism and later Chief of the National Anti-kidnapping Task Force. In short, military officers remain active in Philippine domestic politics after their retirement. Civilian political leaders continue to rely on the military for political support, indicating the weakness of the Philippine civilian institution. Military leaders continue to provide security blankets for Filipino politicians assuming leadership in a political system with fragile democracy. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN PHILIPINE DEFENSE POLICY The idea of democratic control of the military states that the definition and development of defense policy should be the prerogative of civilian leaders and that the military only implements decisions of civilian authorities. In the Philippines, the military defines and develops the countrys defense policy. 51 Although the AFP Strategic Planning Document states that policy guidance should ideally be provided by civilian authorities at the highest level, in reality, the military gives policy guidance to civilian authorities on defense matters.52 The only published defense policy paper of the Philippines was, in fact, conceptualized and authored not by civilian thinkers but by junior military officers assigned at the DND.53 In 2001, a civilian defense official organized a group of civilian thinkers in the DND to publish a defense white paper articulating a defense policy of the Philippines from a civilian perspective. But retired generals occupying vital positions in the DND rejected the draft 2001 defense white paper. Another draft was produced in 2002 involving civilian consultants of the DND. But it suffered the same fate because of a strong reservation of retired and active military officials. In 2003, the DND commissioned some civilian academics to produce a new draft of Philippine defense white paper. But the draft never received approval because defense and military officials in the DND could not put their minds together. The NDCP is supposed to play a role of civilian think-tank of the defense establishment to provide policy options to DND. The NDCP, however, remains to be led by retired military officials. Dr. Clarita R. Carlos, the first woman and first civilian president of NDCP, attempted to civilianize NDCP by appointing University of the

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Philippines (UP) professors to vital posts. She even organized a civilian-dominated Strategic Studies Group (SSG) to shape the policy direction of the DND. But her reforms were obstructed by the change of administration after EDSA II. The aftermath of EDSA II saw the return of retired military officers in NDCP. Military officers and assistants remain very influential in defense related matters. Policy pronouncements, speeches, and press releases of the president and the secretary of national d efense on national defense matters were products of completed-staffwork not of civilian employees but of military assistants. In the DND itself, military assistants are the ones handling most of the policy-related work of the department. Most civilian employees in the DND only perform routine and administrative functions. Based on the 1998 human resource management audit conducted by former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission Patricia Santo Tomas, now Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), 22% of the civilian personnel at the Office of the Secretary of National Defense (OSND) are doing administrative work while more than 80% of its total human resource complement are performing clerical and technical support functions.54 Military assistants numbering around 300 military officers and enlisted personnel are still performing many substantive and policy-oriented functions of the DND.55 Thus, many substantive functions of the DND will be derailed if military assistants will be required to go back to their mother units. In the graduate thesis made by Ma. Anthonette C. Velasco, a former Assistant Secretary for Personnel (ASPER) of the DND, an Angelito M. Villanueva, a civilian consultant of ASPER, they found that The pull-out of uniformed personnel from the DND proper led to the notable organizational dysfunctions such lack of quality staff work, ambiguities in the reporting system, overlapping lines of supervision and accountability, and the lack of career advancement opportunities for civilian employees. 56 The on-going National Defense Review (NDR), which is ironically conceived in 2001 not by a civilian leader but a retired general occupying a very vital civilian post in the DND, has already recognized this problem.57 The NDR Project Teams aim to really empower civilian leadership in the DND. Unfortunately, the NDR initiative is not taking off as expected because it challenges the status quo. The NDR, if pushed through, will be an important step in transforming Philippine defense towards a genuine democratic control of the armed forces. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN PHILIPINE FOREIGN POLICY

In the area of Philippine foreign policy, civilian authorities have asserted effective control. The defense and military establishments recognize the authority of civilian leaders in the pursuance of Philippine foreign policy. This may be attributed to the reality that most military leaders have been trained to perform functions pertaining to internal security than on external defense.

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Like many armed forces of the developing world, Philippine armed forces are paying more attention to internal security matters than on the issue of external defense. The Philippines has a National Internal Security Plan (NISP) but no external defense plan. The Philippines has, in fact, been relying on the external security umbrella of the United States. This eroded not only the external defense capability of the Philippines but also its wherewithal to think strategically on external defense matters. Its weak external defense capability is one of the major sources of gripes and demoralization in the Philippine armed forces. The Philippine military laments the reality that the AFP is one of the few armed forces in Asia with no external defense capability and with no modern weapons to defend is territory. One observer commented, Philippine defense capabilities have been a perennial joke within ASEAN. Lacking modern air and naval forces, the islands have been rife with smuggling, piracy, and fishery poa ching.58 According to Dr. Renato de Castro of De La Salle University in Manila, Not only was the AFP inferior to its ASEAN counterparts in equipment, but it also found itself ill-equipped to contain a number of domestic security threats.59 Capt. Rene Jarque of the Office of Special Studies of the AFP also observes: The reliance on the United States defense support coupled with successive insurgency problems eroded our external defense capability, not only in terms of equipment but also in the equally important aspects of personnel and resource management, doctrine and training. The general orientation of the armed forces, manifested in the mindset of many officers and soldiers, has become insular and shortsighted. In addition, we were not able to develop a strong tradition of strategic thought and planning that today, many officers exhibit an inability or unwillingness to think strategically. Likewise, the entire defense establishment is beginning to suffer the consequences of past decisions and actions that were driven by political whims and disjointed policies in response to short-term contingencies.60 Although the AFP attempted to implement its modernization program, intense bureaucratic politics between civilian and military leaders prevented t he program to 61 take off. This was aggravated by the onslaught of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which delayed the implementation of force modernization programs in many Southeast Asian countries. 62 The implementation of the AFP modernization program could have prepared the Philippine military to perform its external defense missions. Due to the rising problem of communist insurgency and Muslim secessionism, the AFP concentrated on internal security operations working in tandem with the Philippine National Police (PNP). While civilian leaders have effective control of Philippine foreign policy, it does not mean, however, that civilian leaders have established democratic control of the armed forces on external defense matters. This phenomenon is only reflective of the fact that external defense has been neglected in the Philippine military. But in the area of defense diplomacy, military officers continue to prevail upon civilian employees in the

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DND. Junior military officers, serving as military assistants in the DND, are the ones calling the shots in the area of defense diplomacy. Civilian employees only play a minor role in defense diplomacy and this role is purely administrative. Philippine defense diplomacy (particularly with the United States, Australia, Japan, China, Malaysia and Indonesia) is being shaped and managed not by civilian officers of the DND but by military officers at the Headquarters of the AFP. On matters of deployment of military troops for peacekeeping purposes, the military establishment continues to prevail upon the DND. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

While the Philippine Constitution requires civilian supremacy over the military,
the Philippine armed forces continue to play an important role in Philippine politics. The role the Philippine military plays in domestic politics provides them several opportunities to intervene, not to mention the capability of the military institution and the disposition of other military leaders to intervene. The military continues to play a dominant role in defense policy, which should have been controlled by civilian authorities. Although the Philippine military has no major role in the pursuance of Philippine foreign policy, which at present is under effective civilian control, the armed forces continue to prevail upon civilian employees on matters of defense diplomacy, especially in the deployment of military troops for peacekeeping purposes. Using our framework of analysis, the Philippine government has not established an effective democratic control of its armed forces. This lack of effective democratic control makes the Philippines vulnerable to military intervention. The economic and political conditions in the Philippines also encourage the military to intervene in Philippine politics. To prevent the military to intervene, there is a need to assert a democratic control of the armed forces. This requires not only the empowerment of civilian institutions but also the implementation of a nation-wide security sector reform. This kind of reform upholds the principle of accountable and transparent management of national security institutions, which include the military.

END NOTES
1Amando

Doronila, Insights from the Oakwood Muntiny, http://www.inq7.net/opi/2003/jul/30text/opi_amdoronila-1-p.htm, p. 1.


2President

at

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo Foundation Speech (Speech delivered at the National Defense College of the Philippines on the occasion of the 40th NDCP Foundation Day on 12 August 2003).
3Samuel

P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations (Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).

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4Morris

Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). Also see his The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization (Russell Sage Foundation, 1964). Also cited in Paul Cammack, David Pool and William Tordoff, The Military in their Third World Politics: A Comparative Introduction, 2nd edition (London: McMillan, 1993), p, 133.
5Samuel

E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Baltimore: Penguin Boks, 1976). Also cited in Cammack, Pool and Tordoff, Third World Politics, p, 133.
6Peter

Calvert and Susan Calvert, The Armed Forces and Politics in their Politics and Society in the Third World, 2nd edition (London and New York: Longman, 2001), p. 168.
7Ibid. 8Ibid.

B.C. Smith, Military Intervention in Politics in his Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development (London: MacMillan Palgrave, 2003), p. 184.
9 10Calvert 11

and Calvert, The Armed Forces and Politics., p. 170.

Ibid., p. 174. Pye, Aspect of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 283.

12Lucian 13P.

McGowan and T. Johnson, "African Military Coups d'etat and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis," The Journal of Modern African Studies , 22: (1984), pp. 633-666. Also cited in Smith, Military Intervention in Politics, p. 184.
14

Ibid. p. 181. p. 189.

15Ibid., 16Ibid.. 17 18

Ibid.

Robin Luckham, Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict, in Gawin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, eds., Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies (London and New York: Zed Books, 2003), p. 15.
19Robin

Luckham, Democracy and the Military: Democratization, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer 1996), p. 11.
20Andrew

An Epitaph for Frankensteins Monster,

Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: A Framework for Understanding Civil Military Relations, Economic and Social Research Council Working Paper, No. 1 (September 1999), p. 4.
21

Ibid. p. 5.

22Ibid., 23

Ibid.

15

24Luckham, 25Tricia

Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict, p. 15.

Jhun and Enrique Pumar, Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: Lessons Learned (Rapporteurs report of presentations at the May 4-6, 1995 conference), at http://www.american.edu/academics.depts/sis/democracyla/rapprt.htm, p. 4.
26Luckham, 27Cesar

Democratic Strategies for Security, p. 11.

Pobre, History of he Armed Forces of the Filipino People (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2000), pp. 1-4.
28Uldarico 29Armed 30See

S. Baclagon, Military History of the Philippines (Manila: St. Marys Publishing, 1975).

Forces of the Philippines, History, at http://www.armedforces.mil.ph/history.html.

for example Richard J. Kessler, Development and the Military: Role of the Philippine Military in Development in J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Cheong, eds., Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), p. 215.
31Armed

Forces of the Philippines, About Us, at http://www.afp.mil.ph/. Development and the Military: Role of the Philippine Military in Development , p.

32Kessler,

214. David G. Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 45.
33 34

Ibid. Kessler, Development and the Military: Role of the Philippine Military in Development , p.

35

218.
36Felipe

B. Miranda and Ruben F. Ciron, Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis, in J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Cheong, eds., Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), p. 173. Also cited in Ibid. David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1988), p. 143.
37 38Ibid. 39See

Miranda and Ciron, Development and the Military in the Philippines, pp. 165. Also see Armando Gatmaitan and Gregorio C. de Castro, Notes on the Role of the Military in SocioEconomic Development, Philippine Journal of Public Administration (July 1968). See Harold Maynard, A Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions in Indonesia and the Philippines (Unpublished dissertation, American University, 1976), p. 535. Also cited in Ibid., p. 144.
40 41Felipe

Miranda, Leadership and Political Stabilization in a Post-Aquino Philippines, Philippine Political Science Journal , Nos. 33-36 (June 1991 to December 1992), p. 158.

16

42For

a detailed account of the Philippine military after EDSA, see Criselda Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks: The Philippine Military After EDSA (Metro Manila: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1991).
43Edmundo

Garcia and Evelyn Lucero Gutierrez, eds., Back to the Barracks: Democratic Transition (Quezon City: National Institute for Policy Studies, 1992).
44Yabes, 45

The Military in

The Boys from the Barracks , p. vii.

Raymond Jose G. Quilop, Civil-Military Relations: An Overview of the Philippine Experience, at www.apan-info.net/partners/uploads/ AFP-OSS-CMR%20for%20Kasarinlan.pdf
46Ibid. 47

Ibid.

48Renato

Cruz de Castro, Adjusting to the Post-US Bases Era: The Ordeal of the Philippine Militarys Modernization Program, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Fall 1999), pp. 110137.
49Philippine

Center for Investigative Journalism, Out of the Barracks, Excerpt: The Investigative Reporting Magazine, Vol. IX, No. 2 (April-June 2003), p. 1. Also see Glenda Gloria, We Were Soldiers: Military Men in Politics and the Bureaucracy (Makati City: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002).
50

Ibid.

51See

Col. Cristolito P. Balaoing, Defense Planning: Challenges for the Philippines, Philippine Military Digest, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January-March 1999), pp. 22-54.
52Office

of the Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs (J5), AFP Strategic Planning: AFP Manual 5-1 (Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1984). This document is classified RESTRICTED.
53Department

of National Defense, In Defense of the Philippines: 1998 Defense Policy Paper (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 1998).
54Patricia

Santo Tomas, Managing Human Resource: The Case of the Department of National Defense (Unpublished report submitted to the Secretary of National Defense on 17 September 1998). Ma. Anthonette C. Velasco and Angelito M. Villanueva, Reinventing the Office of the Secretary of National Defense (MA Thesis: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2000), p. 9.
55 56Ibid.,

p. 10.

57Department

of National Defense, National Defense Review I Core Programs (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 2001). Sheldon W. Simon , Evolving Roles for the Military in the Asia-Pacific (Paper presented in the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii on March 28-30, 2000). Also see his The Many Faces of Asian Security: Beyond 2000 (Paper presented in the conference held at the Arizona State University on April 2000).
58 59De

Castro, Adjusting to the Post-US Bases Era, p. 120.

17

Capt. Jose Rene N. Jarque, A Conceptual Framework for the Defense of the Philippines: A Working Paper (Quezon City: Office of Strategic and Special Studies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1996), pp. 1-2.
60 61Renato

de Castro, The Military and Philippine Democratization: A Case Study of the Governments 1995 Decision to Modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in Felipe B. Miranda, ed., Democratization: Philippine Perspectives (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1997), pp. 241-280.
62Carlyle

A. Thayer, Force Modernization in Southeast Asia and its Implications for the Security of the Asia Pacific (Paper delivered at the National Defense College of the Philippines on 20 September 2000).

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